Obama Gets Osama: Nothing Succeeds Like Success
The tracking down and killing of Osama bin Laden will carry significant consequences for America's Middle East and counter-terrorism strategy, but none as important as the actual success of the operation. Public Policy Scholar Aaron David Miller explores what it means for U.S. reception in the Arab world.
The tracking down and killing of Osama bin Laden will carry significant consequences for America's Middle East and counter-terrorism strategy, but none as important as the actual success of the operation.
The most compelling ideology in life isn't nationalism, capitalism, or even democracy; it's success. Why? Because success breeds power and constituents; failure generates the opposite. And at a moment when the United States looks feckless and weak in Libya, against Iran, and with uncertain outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq, the sheer tenacity, skill and flawless execution in the storming of bin Laden's Pakistani compound has for a brief moment restored America's street credibility in a region which values and respects power and success more than words and deeds. The gap between this administration's rhetoric and capacity to follow through has often threatened America's credibility, and this helped to close that gap, just a little. We won't be loved—the Muslims and Arabs still hate our Middle East policies—but we have demonstrated an effective use of American power under tough circumstances, and that counts for something.
The success against bin Laden also raises deeply disturbing questions about Pakistan. In the seamy, dark world of intelligence and black ops, it was taken for granted that Pakistani intelligence has been supporting, harboring anti-American insurgents including the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban to hedge Pakistan's own bets against India, maintain its influence with Islamic extremists, and keep its options open in Afghanistan. That Pakistan may also have been harboring bin Laden and other 9/11 planners elevates that behavior to a new level of perfidy. I hope that it turns out that the Pakistanis were the ones who gave bin Laden up, but even then, they would have a great deal of explaining to do.
Regarding our counter-terrorism strategy, the killing of bin Laden doesn't close a file so much as it opens up and highlights the contradictions in American policy. 9/11 didn't occur because a bunch of guys were running around Tora Bora with AK-47s; it took place because 19 guys got into the United States illegally, trained at U.S. flight schools illegally, and violated our aviation security system with impunity. It could have been planned anywhere; indeed, the most recent attacks against the United States came out of Pakistan and Yemen, not Afghanistan.
Now bin Laden is found in Pakistan, and after hundreds of billions of dollars and more than 1,500 Americans dead, we need to wonder what the odds are of creating an Afghan government with the capacity to prevent al Qaeda's return when we find that Pakistan—the key king-maker in Afghanistan—may have been harboring bin Laden and other 9/11 planners all along. Meanwhile, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, operating chiefly in Yemen, may be a greater threat anyway. How do we effectively fight terror in a state that is not only failing but whose president—a relatively reliable partner in the anti-al Qaeda struggle—may be on his way out?
Finally, it should be fascinating to track the hearts and minds dynamic as the Muslim and Arab worlds react to the United States' killing of bin Laden. Since polls continue to show that the majority of Muslims never believed bin Laden was responsible for 9/11 to begin with, it should be striking to see how the operation is perceived, particularly against the backdrop of the Arab spring, where public opinion is shaping politics with an ever-increasing influence.
Given the recent Pew polls from Egypt, which reflect how low America's stock has fallen, there's no doubt we won't get much mileage out of the bin Laden operation. To do that we'd have to reverse hearts and minds to minds and hearts, not just change the wrapping on the box of U.S. policies but appeal to the region by changing its contents. We'd have to actually alter our policies on Iran, Hamas, Gaza, and Israel, and that's not going to happen—nor on certain issues should it happen. We're in for some rough times ahead in this region, and Americans haven't had much to feel good about lately. But for now we should celebrate the end of bin Laden, the tenacity of the American intelligence community, the skill of our special forces, and the fact that maybe, just maybe, there are moments in life where there really is some sort of justice in a largely unaccountable and out-of-control world.
