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The U.S. Role in South Asia's Nuclear Deterrence

Much of the literature about nuclear deterrence was created during the Cold War. Wilson Center Fellow Bhumitra Chakma says it's time for a new framework when discussing the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan.

Over the past few decades, the United States has lent a helping hand to defuse Indo-Pakistani crises, particularly the 1990 Kashmir crisis, the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai terrorism crisis.

"All of these incidents had nuclear implications, and the United States was a powerful factor in diffusing the tension," said Wilson Center Fellow Bhumitra Chakma. "It's difficult to know what might have happened if the United States was not a [stabilizing] force." Each incident had the potential to escalate and yield dangerous consequences.

Chakma, a lecturer and director of the South Asia project at the University of Hull in England, said much of the literature about nuclear deterrence was created during the Cold War in the context of U.S.-Soviet bilateral nuclear relations. Chakma said this analytical model is outdated and should not be used when explaining the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, he added, analysts have used the Cold War framework to interpret South Asia's nuclear deterrence.

"It is wrong to use the Cold War deterrence framework," he said. "A broad multi-layered nuclear landscape has emerged after the Cold War. We are now in a second nuclear age."

Today, he said, nuclear deterrence must be analyzed in light of a new and complex nuclear environment. There are great powers with overwhelming nuclear capabilities; there are middle-range nuclear powers, regional nuclear weapons states, aspirant nuclear weapons states, and non-state actors who seek nuclear weapons, all of which constitute different categories of nuclear deterrence.

"The nuclear landscape has changed and we need to reassess what is nuclear deterrence," Chakma said. "The old definition no longer applies. We need to rethink our understanding of it and reformulate our strategies." He noted the new global nuclear order, particularly paying attention to the more recent nuclear weapons powers.

One major difference between developed countries with nuclear capability and such countries as India and Pakistan is that these South Asian countries are not wealthy nor are they technologically advanced, said Chakma. They lack the resources to develop a robust command and control system, which puts the entire security of their nuclear assets into question.

Recognizing this danger, the United States is providing technological expertise and advice to help Pakistan develop its command and control systems. There is little chance of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands from sources in India, said Chakma. "But assistance to Pakistan is in the U.S. national interest," he said. "In Pakistan, there is the possibility of these weapons falling into the wrong hands either because of state fragility or by rogue nuclear scientists or rogue military commanders. If terrorists obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan, their first target would be the United States."

Chakma contends that the Untied States, given its friendship with India and Pakistan, has acted like a neutral referee in South Asian crises, preventing tensions from escalating. The United States, he said, has come to provide a third dimension, acting as a powerful factor in South Asia's nuclear deterrence. The U.S. role in the South Asian nuclear landscape is likely to remain similar to that of the past for the foreseeable future.

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