The Lukashenko 'Victory' in Belarus and Sources of Instability in Europe's Last Dictatorship

At a recent Kennan Institute seminar, Ethan Burger, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service and Research Scholar, Transnational Crime & Corruption Center, American University, discussed how events from the past decade in Belarus have produced the present political and social situation in the country. He began his presentation by reading aloud excerpts from two U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports for 2005 without identifying the countries to which they referred. Comparing recent events in Uzbekistan and India to those in Belarus, he commented that that Realpolitik, rather than human rights concerns, drives the U.S. to be particularly critical of Belarus, though he agrees that the Belarusian government's policies are unacceptable.

Burger noted that in 1994 Aleksandr Lukashenka was legitimately elected president of Belarus. In 1996, he continued, Lukashenka organized a referendum that extended his term from 1999 to 2001, eliminated the independence of the judiciary, and transferred significant powers away from the legislature to the president. The Belarusian Supreme Court, the Council of Europe, the United States, and most human rights organizations regarded the referendum as a violation of the Belarusian constitution, and therefore invalid. After 1996, according to Burger, the Lukashenka government began its assault on the independent media and non-governmental organizations in Belarus with ties to the political opposition. In 1999, the opposition held a symbolic "rump" election to demonstrate that Lukashenka's legal term as Belarusian was coming to an end and that he had to give up power or hold a new election. Also in 1999, Victor Gonchar and Yuri Zakharenko (perhaps the two most viable opposition candidates) were "disappeared"—which many observers believe were arranged by persons within Lukashenka's inner circle, Burger said.

Under constant harassment by the government, the political opposition became atomized, according to Burger. In addition, it lacked the resources and access to the media needed to conduct an effective campaign. On September 9, 2001, Lukashenka was overwhelmingly re-elected president, and opposition candidate Vladimir Goncharik—a Soviet-era trade union official—allegedly finished second with less than 20% of the vote in an election that the OSCE and most international observers determined did not meet international standards. Burger argued that the opposition's decision to unite behind Goncharik was probably based not only on his reputation as a reasonable person who was unlikely to institute drastic changes in Belarusian society, but also on the hope that he would be deemed "acceptable" by Russian President Putin. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Belarus lost what little priority it may have had to policymakers and the media. Burger said that Lukashenka was arguably one of the principal beneficiaries of the terrorist attacks because they drew attention away from his own human rights abuses.

In 2004, two years before his second term was set to expire, President Lukashenka announced suddenly that there would be a new referendum to amend the Belarusian Constitution in order to permit him to run for an unlimited number of terms. This referendum was held on the same day as national legislative elections, which had been scheduled months in advance. Not surprisingly, Burger said, no opposition candidates were elected to the National Assembly, and the Central Election Commission declared that this referendum had been adopted with an affirmative vote of 86.2 percent of the ballots cast and with a sufficient share of the electorate to be valid. A polling group organized by Gallup reported that only 48.4 percent of those who voted supported the referendum, a figure insufficient to amend the Constitution. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Congress unanimously passed the Belarus Democracy Act, and President Bush signed it into law within four days. However, Burger argued, the Act was primarily a political statement meant to tell the people of Belarus that the world had not forgotten them. The Act did not explicitly provide money to fund programs to promote democracy in Belarus.

The 2006 presidential election in Belarus was originally scheduled for July, but Lukashenka moved up the date to March 19. By doing so, Burger argued, he made it much more difficult for the opposition to organize an effective campaign, although Lukashenka's policies had already made it impossible for the opposition to win. Lukashenka had witnessed "color revolutions" in neighboring Ukraine and Georgia and did not want to take any chances. His clampdown on the political opposition and what remained of the independent media intensified, Burger said. He explained that the democratic opposition narrowly approved former Deputy Mayor of Grodno and former Docent of the University of Grodno Aleksandr Milinkevich as its presidential candidate. In addition, Aleksandr Kazulin, a former rector of Belarus State University (whose popularity increased following his arrest and assault by Belarusian law enforcement authorities) also organized an active and outspoken campaign.

Despite Lukashenka's dictatorial tendencies, many Belarusians still support him, Burger acknowledged. They do not see any viable alternative to his rule. They believe that he has combated corruption, maintained national independence, and paid their pensions and wages on time. Most importantly, he has provided a sense of stability, in contrast to Russia and Ukraine. Burger predicted that this sentiment might change in the future, but that political change was most likely to follow demographic change. He contended that a new generation might want to be part of a larger Europe, even if this meant less political stability. If Russia follows through on its recent threat to raise previously subsidized energy costs to Belarus, and those new high costs are passed on to the citizens, President Lukashenka's popularity may decline.

Burger noted that officials in the United States and Europe have made strong declarations against the authoritarian tactics undertaken by President Lukashenka during the May 2006 presidential elections, but have done little to back those declarations up with concrete actions. Burger said that both the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and the United States openly provided support to the Belarusian opposition, refused to recognize the election results, and have instituted visa bans which prohibit certain Belarusian officials from crossing their borders. He suggested that the United States and EU go a step further and implement more serious measures such as refusing to recognize the passports of any Belarusian travelers (with the exception of students seeking to study abroad), not permitting Belarusian nationals to open bank accounts abroad, and restricting exports to Belarus to food and medicine. He added that it is important for the U.S. to show to the world that its policies are consistent with its statements, but noted that its ability to influence events in Belarus were limited. The U.S.'s true strength, according to Burger, may lie in its ability to influence European policy, which in the long run will have a greater impact on Belarus. Since the level of EU member-states trade and investment in Belarus has been increasing, it remains to be seen whether economic opportunities will outweigh symbolic declaratory policies, concluded Burger.