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In Praise of the Values Voter
by
Jon A. Shields
Untitled Document
Theodore Lowi, one of the most famous political scientists of his generation, wrote darkly in his
1969 classic, The End of Liberalism, of a politics devoid of conflict over moral
principles.
He saw midcentury America as a demoralized
democracy in which legislators drafted vague laws and left it to
bureaucratic agencies to work out much of the substance offstage with
contending interest groups. A bewildered public, in Lowi’s grim final
sentence, had been left paralyzed by a “nightmare of administrative
boredom.”
Lowi spoke for the many Democratic Party activists and
intellectuals in the consensus-oriented period after World War II
who longed for a more ideological politics. Above all, these reformers
wished for a more issues-based Democratic Party, one less bent on
merely retaining power and acquiring patronage jobs at the expense of
larger principles. They vehemently rejected the “end of
ideology” celebrated by postwar thinkers, who favorably contrasted
the pragmatism of American politics with the ideological politics of Europe
and the horrors of totalitarianism. In cities such as New York, Chicago,
and Los Angeles, middle-class reformers struggled to wrest
control of the local Democratic Party machinery from
working-class ethnics, most of whom were Catholics. On the
national stage, the reformers sought to weaken the power of party bosses
over presidential nominations. Political scientist James Q. Wilson
described the “essence of this reform ethic” in The Amateur Democrat (1962)
as “a desire to moralize public life.”
Beyond the political trenches, academics and
intellectuals nurtured similar ambitions for a sharpening of partisan
differences. A special committee on party reform convened by the American
Political Science Association concluded in 1950 that the
“ailment” of American parties was their absence of ideological
cohesion, a condition that had dangerously slowed “the heartbeat of
American democracy.” When the New Left emerged in the early 1960s,
Tom Hayden and other leaders expressed their hope, in an open vivified by
controversy” over fundamental moral questions. Only moral warfare
could combat the looming specter of civic apathy.
These liberal efforts culminated in a dramatic
remaking of American political institutions. After the 1968 presidential
election, Democratic Party reformers succeeded in creating a commission,
first chaired by Senator George McGovern (D-S.D.), that
effectively transferred control over the selection of presidential
candidates from pragmatic party bosses to party activists by radically
increasing the number of state primaries, from 16 in 1968 to 28 in 1972.
The commission also imposed racial and gender quotas for convention
delegates, a development that dramatically increased the influence of
feminist organizations in the party. More generally, the open selection
process strengthened the hand of upper-middle-class,
issues-oriented reformers at the expense of
working-class voters, who tended to participate in primaries at
lower rates. The Republican Party, meanwhile, become more plebiscitary as
well, since state laws governing primaries tended to apply to both parties.
Years later, evangelical activists used the primary process to push the
Republican Party to the right.
Changes outside the Democratic Party were just as
important. With reformers such as Ralph Nader leading the charge, new
advocacy groups, including Greenpeace and the National Organization for
Women, challenged the traditional power of labor unions and organized business. As political scientist
Jeffrey Berry has found, approximately half of all the advocacy groups in
existence today were created between the mid-1960s and the early
’70s. These public-interest groups also enjoyed more power thanks in
part to new laws, such as those allowing citizens a role in the federal
regulatory process. Cumulatively, these changes in the parties and
government were so dramatic that some political scientists began to speak
of a “new American political system.”
One might suppose that present-day
conservatives would have declared war on this new system. However, it is
liberals who are leading the charge, mounting a counterattack against their
own revolution. They decry the moral conflict their predecessors longed
for. They see single-issue advocates as a kind of democratic
cancer. Above all, they are committed to pushing moral issues and passions
to the margins of American political life.
Some liberal observers
profess to be puzzled by people who vote their convictions rather than
their pocketbooks. They want to put economic self-interest back
at the center of national politics. “Unassuageable cultural
grievances are elevated inexplicably over solid material ones, and basic
economic self-interest is eclipsed by juicy myths of national
authenticity and righteousness wronged,” complains journalist Thomas
Frank in his inquiry into the political soul of his home state, What’s the Matter With Kansas? (2004).
Others hope to remove controversial moral issues such
as embryonic stem-cell research from politics by placing them in the hands
of scientific “experts.” In his best-selling book The Republican War on Science (2005),
for example, journalist Chris Mooney criticizes what he regards as the
politicization of science by liberals and, especially, conservatives.
Echoing the early 20th-century Progressives who hoped for government
by supposedly apolitical elites, Mooney contends that “scientific
expertise and consensus” should direct our political choices rather
than our moral or ideological commitments.
Most critics, however, hope to enlist centrist voters
against divisive moralists. In a strange political turn, they have embraced
what President Richard M. Nixon called “the silent majority” as
the source of their salvation from 1960s liberalism. They have become the
new conservatives. Washington Post columnist and Brookings Institution fellow E. J. Dionne
argues that “ideological battles” have left a “restive
majority” with the sense that politics does not address their real
concerns, such as child care, school reform, and health care. Ideological
battles, he says, have destroyed a once consensual and deliberative
republic in which “people resolved disputes, found remedies, and
moved forward.” Political scientists Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and
Henry Brady likewise embrace centrist citizens when they lament, in
their study of political participation, Voice
and Equality (1995), that American religious
institutions have tended to “distort citizen activity” by
mobilizing followers around social issues—particularly
abortion—rather than “an economic agenda focused on
the less advantaged.” More recently, political scientists Jacob
Hacker and Paul Pierson have argued that American politics has moved
“off center” as “most voters sit on the sidelines
watching a political blood sport that plays out with little concern for
what the moderate center of opinion thinks.” And Stanford political
scientist Morris Fiorina and his coauthors dedicated their widely
read and scathing criticism of activists in Culture
War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2004)
to “tens of millions of mainstream Americans.”
Yet there is remarkably little evidence that average
citizens have become disaffected from politics as a result of ideological
warfare. It is true, as critics charge, that political elites are more
polarized than ordinary Americans. But they always have been. As political
scientist Gary Jacobson of the University of California, San Diego,
demonstrates in Polarized Politics (2000), since the 1970s ordinary Americans have
grown more ideological at the same pace as their party leaders.
At the same time, the divide between the parties has
indeed widened: For many years, pollsters have regularly asked American
voters to locate themselves on a seven-point
liberal-conservative scale, and since the 1970s those who
identify with one of the two major political parties have moved about 1.2
points farther apart. But the parties are not out of step with public
sentiment. When the same people are asked to locate the parties on the
ideological scale, the vast majority indicate that their party’s
position and their own are about the same. About 30 percent of the voters
place themselves somewhere between the two parties ideologically, but that
number has not changed since the 1970s.
Another argument marshaled by critics of ideological
politics is that it has alienated American voters and reduced political
participation. Yet reports of declining voter turnout since the 1970s are
exaggerated. True, when turnout is reckoned as a percentage of the
voting-age population, there appears to be a decline. But the
political scientists who report these figures fail to account for the
growing number of people who are ineligible to vote, notably felons and
illegal immigrants. When turnout is calculated as a share of the eligible population, the
story is quite different. An average of just over 56 percent of eligible
voters cast ballots in presidential elections between 1972 and 2004.
Contrary to what critics would predict, the contentious presidential
elections of 1992 and 2004 produced higher turnouts—more than 60
percent. That is unusually high by 20th-century standards,
and unmatched in any election since Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and
George Wallace squared off in 1968, an election year not known for its
political consensus and moderation.
Political polarization has
improved civic life in two other respects, just as political scientists of the 1960s hoped. Lowi and his
contemporaries saw the widespread willingness of individual voters to split
their tickets—to cast ballots for presidential and
congressional candidates from different parties in the same
election—as a major symptom of the sickliness of
America’s political system. Voters, Lowi complained, were not being
offered a real choice. “The similarities between the Republican and
Democratic administrations greatly outnumbered and outweighed the
differences.” Today’s voters are significantly less likely to
split their tickets than they were in 1972, a fact that further suggests
citizens are not growing disenchanted with partisan politics.
In the miasma of mid-20th-century politics, moreover,
opinion surveys revealed that many American voters did not identify with
the party that best represented their values, instead choosing on the basis
of the past performance of candidates or their own economic self-interest.
That, too, is changing. According to Jacobson, the increasing coherence of
the parties’ ideologies has made “it easier for voters to
recognize their appropriate ideological home.” It has provided
citizens with “a much clearer idea of how their collective choices
will translate into congressional action.”
Overall, American voters are more involved and more
attuned to how well leaders reflect their political beliefs than they were
just a few decades ago. Yet many political analysts are just as unhappy as
Lowi and his contemporaries were. If civic disaffection cannot explain
their repudiation of ideological politics, what does?
The chief answer is that they lost their enthusiasm
for “values voters” because those voters turned out to have the
wrong values. One of the great political ironies of the past few decades is
that the Christian Right has been much more successful than its political
rivals at fulfilling liberal thinkers’ hopes for American democracy.
Liberals built an array of well-funded public-interest groups
such as Common Cause, Environmental Defense, NARAL Pro-Choice
America, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund. But most of these organizations asked little more of their supporters
than checkbook activism, and some were entirely supported by
foundations. The Right, on the other hand, built genuinely grassroots
organizations, including Operation Rescue, the Christian Coalition, and
Concerned Women for America, whose members mobilized millions of
disaffected evangelical citizens through church-based networks.
In his famously despairing account of Americans’ civic involvement, Bowling Alone (2000),
Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam conceded the point, without
appearing to find much solace in it: “It is, in short, among
Evangelical Christians, rather than among the ideological heirs of the
sixties, that we find the strongest evidence for an upwelling of civic
engagement.”
This was not the way things were supposed to turn out.
The New Left had imagined that an America roused to greater ideological
awareness would be dominated by debates between liberals and socialists.
Political scientists, as Hacker and Pierson note, also based their
enthusiasm for more ideologically coherent parties on the assumption that
“liberal Democrats would benefit from the hardening of party
differences.”
These were not unreasonable expectations. The
ideological activists of the 1960s were overwhelmingly liberal. Even the
pro-life movement’s early campaigns of civil disobedience
in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade (1973) were led by leftist Catholics who had cut their
teeth on the antiwar movement. Conservatism was thought to exist more as a
kind of pathological disorder of the nation’s passive mainstream
masses, an affliction of Nixon’s silent majority. Now, however, many liberal thinkers
see silent, ordinary Americans as a bulwark against an ideological politics
that tilts to the political right.
Yet if the critics of ideological politics have mixed
motives, there still might be a good case for trying to push moral issues
and passions to the edges of American politics. But that is not easily
done. Even those who vehemently call for the marginalization of moral
issues hold hard positions on those issues that they either conceal or fail
to recognize. Nowhere is this clearer than in the debate over
abortion.
Recall Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry
Brady’s claim that religious groups “distort” American
politics by focusing on abortion rather than “the least
advantaged.” While this may strike some as a perfectly reasonable
argument, it assumes that the human embryo has no moral status. If this
assumption is wrong, if the fetus does have a claim to protection, it is
precisely “the least advantaged” that the
right-to-life movement is defending.
Although critics fault pro-life advocates
for focusing too much national attention on abortion, they do not criticize
the Supreme Court for creating a national abortion policy that is badly
“off center.” Some of the new champions of middle-of-the-road Americans try to answer this
criticism by insisting that Roe v. Wade represents mainstream opinion. In Culture War? Fiorina and his coauthors
commend the Court for instituting a “broadly acceptable
compromise” on abortion. A majority of Americans are
“pro-choice buts” (i.e., in favor of abortion rights
but with qualifications), they say, and therefore “oppose the
overturning of Roe v. Wade.”
But that majority is not nearly as solid as Fiorina
suggests. It rests on Americans’ great ignorance of what Roe does and does not allow. As
sociologist James Davison Hunter of the University of Virginia has shown,
the vast majority of Americans imagine that Roe is far more restrictive than it actually is. For example,
some 80 percent of Americans do not believe that abortion is available
through all nine months of pregnancy. Such “mass legal
illiteracy,” according to Hunter, explains why “Americans want
to keep Roe intact,
but . . . also favor proposals that would restrict (some severely) what it
currently allows, if not undermine it altogether.” They wrongly
assume that the United States is simply in step with European practice,
even though most European democracies, including Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden, limit abortion access to the first trimester.
Ironically, abortion only became a volatile political
issue when the Supreme Court attempted to take it out of politics with the Roe decision. Before the Court
intervened, the states were steadily revisiting their abortion laws through
the normal political process, and the door to subsequent argument and
revision remained open. After Roe, pro-life activists were left with few political outlets.
Their campaign of civil disobedience began when their political options
were suddenly reduced to amending the Constitution or radically changing
the makeup of the Court. If liberal thinkers are alarmed by activist
radicalism and truly believe in the centrist majority, the obvious course
would be to support a reversal of Roe, allowing ordinary political conflict to sort the issue
out through the democratic process in state legislatures. But that
proposition has not found many takers.
The fact that we cannot
escape moral conflicts in politics does not doom American democracy to
endless political warfare. Even the most passionate religiously
inspired social movements learn to moderate their appeals in order to
win over middle-of-the-road citizens. As historian Eric
Foner concluded in his study of 19th-century politics, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (1970),
abolitionists enjoyed more success once they began to emphasize
constitutional arguments and the pragmatic concerns of ordinary citizens,
such as their fear of a racial bloodbath in the aftermath of slavery.
As Foner put it, such arguments were “far more effective politically
than mere moralizing about slavery.” The Women’s Christian
Temperance Union and its successor organizations ultimately succeeded in
their campaign for prohibition by taking a similarly moderate course. The
WCTU’s remarkable president, Frances Willard, directed her activists
to “be of a teachable spirit and tolerant of those opinions which
differ from ours, while we still strive to show the reasonableness of
ours.”
In the early 20th century,
the Catholic Church’s crusade against eugenic sterilization rested
squarely on public reason. As the historian Sharon Leon found, Catholic
activists labored to appeal to non-Catholics by
“emphasizing scientific objections to the procedure, legal arguments
about appeal and due process, and, finally, social justice issues raised by
the racial and economic status of the targeted population.” More
recently, the civil rights campaign in the South was a model of a
disciplined social movement. And despite the media’s attentive vigil
over the culture war’s most outrageous and marginal characters, most
conservative Christian activists today quietly labor to engage those who
disagree with them in a civil and reasonable way. Stand to Reason, an
organization that trains some 40,000 Christian activists annually, teaches
citizens to avoid religious language and engage others in reasoned debate
on substantive issues, such as the moral status of the fetus versus the
newborn.
It is precisely this moderation within social
movements that breeds uncompromising and even violent militants at the
fringes. There were violent abolitionists, ax-wielding temperance
crusaders, disciples of Black Power in the civil rights movement,
Weathermen in the New Left, eco-terrorists in the environmental
movement, and abortion clinic bombers in the Christian Right. But
radicals also tend to inspire further moderation within social movements.
This has been especially true in the Christian Right, where leaders are
trying to escape the long shadow of fundamentalists such as Jerry Falwell
and Randall Terry (of Operation Rescue fame). Most advocates who want to
win over mainstream Americans are not interested in losing strategies.
Yet leaders in all social movements know that they
must also fire up their followers and potential recruits even as they
instruct them to engage the public with reason and civility. They must
simultaneously excite and educate democratic passions, a tradeoff that
brings us directly to the fundamental tension between the competing
democratic values of participation and deliberation.
The Founders appreciated this tension far better than
most of today’s observers. In their view, deliberation was only
possible in institutions that were insulated from public passions. For that
reason, for example, the Constitution provided that members of the Senate
would be chosen indirectly, by state legislatures. In addition, the
Founders drew congressional districts sufficiently large that the bonds
connecting the districts’ citizens would be weak. Their strategy was
to sacrifice participation for the promise of deliberation and freedom from
majority tyranny. As the late Wilson Carey McWilliams summarized their
philosophy, “Liberty requires that we be kept weak.”
Yet experience has shown that the tradeoff between
participation and deliberation is not nearly as stark as the Founders
imagined. The genius of American social movements is that they have both
engaged citizens and educated their moral passions. But they do still more. Social
movements draw us out of our own self-interest by attaching us to other
citizens and causes greater than ourselves. They demand our sacrifice,
solidarity, and attention to politics. In this way, social movements help
solve one of the central problems of democracy, which is the tendency of
citizens to tirelessly pursue their own happiness without regard to the
public weal. Such movements are a bulwark against the emergence of a
consumer republic in which citizens, in Alexis de Tocqueville’s
ominous words, simply indulge “their petty and banal
pleasures.” America’s culture wars, in other words, are one of
the best antidotes to the individualistic consumer culture liberals tend to
loathe.

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Jon A. Shields is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. His book on the democratic virtues of the Christian Right will be published by Princeton University Press next year.
Reprinted from Autumn
2007 Wilson Quarterly
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