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Pakistan Picaresque
by
Samia Altaf
Untitled Document
For our meeting with the director of the Pakistan Nursing Council, we
arrived punctually at a small two-room office tucked away in a
corner of the National Institute of Health’s campus in Islamabad. In
the center of one room was a table covered with a flowered plastic
tablecloth, as if awaiting a picnic. Resting on it were a pencil holder,
some writing materials, and a telephone. On one side of the table was a
rather ornate chair, and on the wall behind it was a framed photograph of
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the man credited with creating Pakistan, in his
signature oval cap and a severe black sherwani, a formal knee-length coat. Four rickety chairs,
a bit dusty, lined the other side of the table. In the adjoining room were
more rickety chairs and another table, on which an elaborate tea service
was arranged. A small man wearing stained clothes sat on a stool by the
door, and mumbled something as he rubbed sleep deposits from his eyes.
“She’s what?” I heard my companion
ask in a panic-stricken tone. “Dead! Oh, my God, do you
hear that?” she said to me. “The director of the nursing
council is dead.” She stood still for a minute, as if paying her
respects. “How did she die?” she said, again turning to the
fellow.
The man looked offended at our misapprehension.
“Late. Mrs. S.,” he said. Ah, Mrs. S. wasn’t dead. She
would be late.
My companion, a Canadian, was new to this part of the
world and understandably confused by the way Urdu, the national language,
is translated into English, the “official” language, especially
by people who have minimal schooling. Mrs. S. had gone from merely being
late to being “the late Mrs. S.” In a way, this slip of the
tongue—or of the ear?—was quite symbolic. For in its
efforts to make any effective contribution to the changing needs of the
health care system, the Pakistan Nursing Council—the
federal institution that oversees nursing and all related
professions—might as well have been dead.
We told the man that we would wait.
For the past several weeks, my Canadian colleague and
I had been traveling through Pakistan as we prepared recommendations for a
technical assistance program funded by the Canadian government. She was the
external consultant on this project, and I was the local consultant. A pale
woman in her early forties, she was dressed that day in loose trousers and
a neutral-color top. Privately, I had taken to calling her
“Lucymemsahib,” after a character in Paul Scott’s novel
of postcolonial India, Staying On (1977), who exemplifies the imperialist attitude of British
hangers-on. True to this model, Lucy had been undergoing a
memsahib-like change by barely perceptible degrees each day. Both
of us were at times in each other’s way, at times at cross-purposes.
We were unsure of who was actually in charge—she, by virtue
of her status as “lead” consultant, or I, more experienced,
though a “local” and hence inferior.
Mrs. S. arrived an hour later quite flustered. She was
a shy-seeming, slightly built woman in her fifties wearing a
flowery shalwar-kameez. On her head was a starched dupatta—a long scarf—from which raven
black hair peeked out. Dyed, no doubt. She looked a bit startled to see me
in a sari, wrinkling her nose delicately in what I interpreted as
disapproval as she adjusted the dupatta with an elaborate gesture.
“You are not a Pakistani?” she asked,
affecting nonchalance.
I told her that I was, and could see that she did not
believe me. Why, then, was I wearing a sari? The traditional
sari—a single piece of cloth wrapped around the
body—is worn by subcontinental women of many religious and
ethnic backgrounds. Pakistani women wore saris until the 1970s, when in a
period of Islamo-nationalist fervor, and with the tacit
encouragement of the government, they adopted the shalwar-kameez–dupatta ensemble—loose,
baggy pants and a long tunic with two yards of loose cloth that drape the
shoulders. The rejected sari acquired an “Indian” tinge, and
came to be seen as vaguely “Hindu” as well as
anti-Islamic, a sentiment that hasn’t entirely
disappeared.
Mrs. S. apologized for the delay, telling us that she
had been called away unexpectedly. “Must have been something
important,” I said conversationally, for she was quite out of sorts.
I worried that my sari-clad personage was a contributing factor.
This turned out not to be the case. A World Bank delegation was visiting,
and she had been called to meet them “right away.”
Couldn’t she say that she had an earlier meeting
and have them wait? Lucymemsahib wanted to know.
“How can you do that?” Mrs. S. asked.
“They are the World Bank.”
And now, she asked, what could she do for us?
The year was 1992, and
Lucymemsahib and I were helping the government of Pakistan prepare a grant
proposal for the country’s Social Action Program (SAP)—a
comprehensive effort to renovate Pakistan’s health, education, and
water sanitation systems that the World Bank and a consortium of other
multinational development organizations had pledged to support.
Specifically, we were looking into ways to attract more women to provide
midlevel health services in rural areas. As head of the Pakistan
Nursing Council, Mrs. S. presided over the governmental organization
responsible for the recruitment, training, and certification of nurses at
Pakistan’s 60 civilian nursing schools and a handful of specialized
military institutions.
The SAP we helped prepare, which ran from 1993 through
1998, turned out to be a dismal failure, as was the one that followed in
1999–2003. Subsequent programs, especially since 9/11, show every
indication of being as unsuccessful. The critical indicators of maternal
and child health tell it all. Estimates of Pakistan’s maternal
mortality ratio since 1990 range from 300 to 800 maternal deaths per
100,000 live births; even the low end of this range is unacceptable. By
contrast, Sri Lanka, another South Asian country, with an income per capita
that was roughly comparable to Pakistan’s at the beginning of the
1990s, saw its maternal mortality ratio fall from 92 per 100,000 in 1990 to
below 50 today. The infant mortality rate in Pakistan in 2003 was 76 per
1,000 live births, as compared with 11 in Sri Lanka. In the developed
countries, the
infant mortality rate is only about five per 1,000 live births.
Beyond the health care sector, the story is much the
same. A report published in 2007 by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, D.C., concluded that the $1 billion in
development and humanitarian assistance the United States has poured into
Pakistan since 9/11 has saved lives in areas affected by a massive 2005
earthquake and has improved the lot of a small number of people, but
“has done little to address the underlying fault lines in the
Pakistani state or society.” Assistance from other institutions such
as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank has been equally
ineffective.
These stories of failure are nothing new. They have
been repeated over the years in numerous programs all over the developing
world. The interesting question is why.
Some of the reasons are familiar. Developing
countries—often beset by political instability, outmoded
institutions, meager resources, and a host of other
woes—are desperate for money. (When, in a conversation with
a Pakistani official, I predicted the failure of the SAP, he replied that
at least it would bring in “foreign exchange for the national
kitty.”) At the same time, international lending organizations such
as the World Bank are under pressure to make loans; otherwise they are out
of business. Some baseline “tangible” results are expected when
the project ends, but these mainly take the form of documented capital
outlays (schools built, computers purchased, etc.) and published reports.
There is little interest in assessing whether the projects have actually
had an impact on people’s lives.
The development history of Pakistan, long before the
first SAP, was full of hastily assembled programs that lacked adequate
support institutions or other infrastructure. The legacies of this
haphazard approach are everywhere. Health centers cobbled together sit
locked and empty—sometimes because they lack staff and
supplies, sometimes for reasons that aren’t readily apparent. The
situation in education is at least as dire. “Ghost” schools,
which show enrollment figures higher than the number of malnourished,
bedraggled students living in the whole village they supposedly serve, are
documented as major achievements.
The specialists who design the programs work for and
are answerable to distant development agencies. Most are narrowly trained
technicians from Europe or the United States who have very little
understanding of the
social conditions and institutions in the country they are dealing with. At
a personal level, they bring with them something more destructive than
ignorance: a certain kind of palpable arrogance. They have been designated
“experts”: foreigners who represent high-profile
donors and who command exorbitant salaries. Most are white, which, given
Pakistan’s colonial experience, imbues them with a tincture of
superiority in the minds of the general public. White Europeans were, after
all, the colonial “masters.” Being human, these experts very
quickly gain an exaggerated sense of their own authority and a disinclination to entertain ideas
divergent from their own. Consequently, they
end up using their sometimes considerable financial
decision-making power not to benefit the country they’re
supposedly there to serve, but in the interest of their own institutions or
to protect their jobs.
Present in the country for a short period of time,
they are focused on the product—an impressive report,
expenditures made—they signed up to deliver. They favor
technocratic “solutions.” Sickness is to be combated with
clinically skilled people, for example; to deal with illiteracy, it is
assumed, you need teachers and reading materials. The relationship between
problems and their social context is left unexamined. Grandiose, fuzzy, and
unrealistic plans that rely on capital outlays and numbers of people to be
trained are quickly drawn up with the representatives of the host
government, which participates happily—for this will bring
in money—or unhappily, because there is no other option.
Most funding agencies work on a short budget cycle, so even if some
die-hard planner wants to, there is no time to consider larger
issues and long-term solutions.
Yet those who give aid and the governments that
receive it have the feeling they are “doing something” to
respond to the nation’s ills. Most
specialists do their jobs to the best of their abilities. People with
experience know full well that most of the time they are just muddling
through, trying to meet deadlines. In the end, government officials,
technical consultants, and aid agencies all hope that “some”
good comes out of the muddle. Alas, when muddle goes in, muddle comes out,
as we have seen in the years since that afternoon in Mrs. S.’s tidy little office, where we witnessed that muddle with
our own eyes.
Mrs. S. started by telling us about the background of Pakistan’s nursing
system, which was inherited from British colonialists.
“We use the same curriculum that was used to
train British nurses during World War II,” she said with obvious
pride.
“Surely it has been updated since then,”
said Lucymemsahib jokingly.
“No.”
“You really mean it has never been updated since
then? Why not?” asked Lucymemsahib, quite aghast.
“There was no need to,” replied Mrs. S.
“Only recently, after all this Alma-Ata business, there is pressure
to change it,” she added, sounding as if this were completely
unnecessary.
That “business” was an international
conference held in the city of Alma-Ata, in what is present-day
Kazakhstan, in 1978. Considered a watershed event for the design of
health delivery systems in developing countries, the conference decreed
that services based on the Western model were inappropriate for these
countries. Since most health problems in developing countries were believed
to be the result of environmental problems such as poor sanitation and
malnutrition, it was decided that they should be tackled by making
improvements in the environment. Any remaining medical needs could be
addressed by minimally trained local health workers.
The wisdom or folly of this policy and the tale of its
selective implementation are matters for another time. Most of the
developing countries, including Pakistan, signed on to the resulting
Alma-Ata Declaration, promising to reorient their programs according to a
primary health care (PHC) model introduced at the conference. Since there
was little discussion of how this was to be done, however, each institution
in Pakistan translated the model as it saw fit.
“To meet the needs of the PHC model, we are
going to stress more community medicine and family planning in the nursing
curriculum. Nurses will be doing all this along with their regular
work,” said Mrs. S.
“Why?” asked Lucymemsahib. “Nursing
is, as its name says, nursing. And equally important. What hospital can
function without good nurses?”
“That is true. But it is in the declaration. We
have to do community medicine.”
“But what about nursing?” insisted
Lucymemsahib, clearly not happy about nurses’ involvement in this
community medicine business.
“What particular aspects of community
medicine?” I asked, knowing full well the many colors and
constructions of this much-maligned term.
“Oh, just some things to do with the
community,” offered the director nonchalantly.
After completing a 24-month curriculum, including a
practicum rotation in a hospital, nurses take the examination administered
by the Pakistan Nursing Council. Once they pass, they are certified and
registered by the council. Sounds good. This means there are standards that
can be monitored.
“But it does not matter,” our good Mrs. S.
said, “whether they are certified or not. A lot of organizations hire
nurses without any certification and registration. Especially the private
hospitals and clinics. And since these institutions pay a lot more money
than does government service, the nurses prefer to work for them rather
than for the government. Many do not even wait to complete the training
program.”
“Do these organizations then train these people
themselves?” asked Lucymemsahib.
“Oh no, there is no need to train them. They can
work.” At least Mrs. S. was honest.
“What do you mean, there is no need?”
“Well, they do know the work.”
“What work do they do?” Lucymemsahib was
genuinely confused.
“Nursing work,” responded our hostess
calmly, adjusting some papers on her desk.
“But nursing is a skilled profession. A nurse,
to be effective, has to perform certain tasks which are technical, and many
times critical.” Lucymemsahib looked at me, her face flushed and eyes
shining with indignation. She was a registered nurse herself. In Canada,
nursing is a highly skilled, well-organized, and respected profession.
“Ah, but you see, there is no rule which says
that you are not allowed to work as a nurse without certification,”
Mrs. S. explained patiently. “And practically speaking, even if there
were, there is no way we can reprimand them. There is no way to enforce
this rule.”
“Can you not change the rules and put in
regulations?” Lucymemsahib turned again to Mrs. S.
“What rules?” asked the lady mildly.
“The rules regarding the employment of people
who are not properly qualified to do the job.”
“No, no, rules should not be changed, for this
would lead to a lowering of standards, and it is very important to maintain
high standards.” Mrs. S.’s voice rose with emotion. For all her
life, she told us, she had fought to adhere to standards “against all
odds.”
“What standards are you talking about?”
Lucymemsahib’s voice was also high.
“The standards of nursing, the noblest
profession in the world. It must have the highest standards in the
world.” Mrs. S.’s voice cracked on the high note.
And, just as suddenly, both ladies stopped talking.
Their faces were red and they were out of breath.
Lucymemsahib’s worry was justified. Even today,
one need only visit any facility in the large cities to see what is going
on. “Nurses,” whose only claim to the title is their little
starched uniform, are blundering through people’s lives. I saw a
nine-year-old boy die after a routine appendectomy because a
nurse did not know that she needed to give him a test dose before
administering penicillin, to check for allergic reaction. A hypertensive
man had a stroke because the nurse who was monitoring his blood pressure
did not think she had to alert the doctor when it became dangerously high.
There are nurses who do not know how to read a thermometer.
At the same time, nurses have thriving private
practices in towns where they are called “doctor.” They
dispense medicines, suture wounds, treat ingrown toenails, perform
abortions. One enterprising young lady was doing outpatient cataract
removals in a small town just 50 miles from where we sat. Her name came up
again and again whenever the subject of private medical care or palatial
houses—the two go hand in hand in Pakistan, as in other
countries—was under discussion. She had done well enough to
build a mansion within two years of opening her “practice,”
complete with marble foyer and imported toilets, which, though completely
unusable because of the inadequate water supply, were nevertheless the
cause of much envy.
“Why do employers hire unregistered nurses, when
they know that these women might not be adequately trained?” My
friend was persistent.
“Because there is an acute shortage of nurses in
the country, and no clinician can work without nurses,” replied Mrs.
S. This, too, was a fact, consistently documented. “To date, 19,000
nurses are registered with the council, and given the population, this is
an extremely poor nurse-to-population ratio. This means we
have one nurse for 6,000 people. On top of that we think that easily half
of these 19,000 are out of the country, and the other half are trying their
best to get out too. As you can see, there are just not enough nurses to
meet the demand. That is why even untrained girls are hired. That is why we
need to train more nurses.” (According to the World Health
Organization, Pakistan had 48,446 registered nurses in 2004—though
there is no way to know how many of these nurses were actually in the
country—and the fact that health indicators have barely
budged shows this is mostly an improvement on paper.)
“This situation exists only in urban areas, does
it not?” I asked, for Pakistan is certainly more than its three large
cities; almost 70 percent of the population is rural, and
rural-urban disparities are a major hurdle in developing standard
programs or uniform employment salaries, benefits, etc.
“Of course. What need is there for nurses in
rural areas where there are no hospitals? As it is, we do not have enough
nurses for urban areas,” said Mrs. S.
“Why do you then not increase the output? Surely
in a country where there is a shortage of jobs, this should be a very
attractive option for women.” Lucymemsahib was being logical,
applying the law of supply and demand. But this was Pakistan, and there
were yet another 10 layers to the problem.
“This is easier said than done,” Mrs. S.
replied, with a pursing of her lips. “It is not easy to attract girls
and women to go into the nursing profession, especially if they come from
good families.”
“What on earth do you mean!” Lucymemsahib
was horrified. “Is it because of poor salaries? Is the pay that
low?”
“Oh, no, pay has nothing to do with it,”
replied Mrs. S. “Girls prefer to go into teaching, although that has
still lower pay. It’s just that nursing is not considered a . . . a
decent profession.”
Lucymemsahib looked from me to Mrs. S. and back again,
her mouth opening and closing like a fish’s.
“But you are a nurse, aren’t you?” she said, once
she got her breath back.
“Oh, no, no I am not.” Mrs. S. was quick
to correct her. She was from the federal bureaucracy, a civil servant. Down
to the present day, no nurse has served as the director of the Pakistan
Nursing Council.
The institution of nursing in Pakistan is a strange
hybrid. It is built on the foundations of the health and medical system
created by the British in the 19th century to serve the colonial and local
elite. Initially, nurses came from Britain. Later, especially during World
War II, nursing programs were set up in local hospitals, and, as in
Britain, women were recruited. This was a challenge. Educated women from
middle-class households, who had some schooling, were reluctant
to go into professions. Those that required close contact with people,
especially males who were not part of a woman’s immediate family,
were even less attractive. At the same time, Christian religious missions
were well established on the subcontinent, and they had their own schools
and hospitals. The missions also took in abandoned infants and children,
most of whom were the offspring of English men (often soldiers) and local
women. These Anglo-Indians, like the mestizos of Latin America,
were mostly the products of nonmarital unions and were shunned by
society. They were therefore prime candidates for conversion to
Christianity, and for less desirable jobs. Almost all
Anglo-Indians on the subcontinent are Christians. At first, most
of those who went into nursing were Anglo-Indian Christian girls
who lacked other options. From the beginning, nursing in Pakistan thus
suffered a double handicap, and it is still seen as an
“inferior” profession.
“You have mentioned that nurses leave the
country at the first opportunity. Is that a major problem?” I
restarted the conversation on a topic that seemed safe.
“Oh, yes! It is a terrible loss,” Mrs. S.
said, with genuine feeling. “Our own country desperately needs the
manpower. But what can we do?”
“All governments can stop the qualified
personnel from leaving the country,” said Lucymemsahib. “The
government can mandate this.” Poor Lucymemsahib! For the life of her,
she could not understand why it was so difficult for a government to stem
the exodus of its trained womanpower, especially since the training was
financed by taxpayers or other government-funded programs, as in
the case of nurses and physicians.
“All government servants who wish to leave the
country need only obtain a No Objection Certificate from the government,
and they can go wherever they like,” Mrs. S. told us. “Most of
the time people are granted this certificate. But it can be withheld in
case of essential personnel.”
“Aha!” Lucymemsahib pounced on this
opening. “Then the government can refuse to give this document to
people that it thinks are needed in the country. And it is clear that
nurses, being in short supply, are essential personnel.”
“But why do it?” Mrs. S. asked patiently
and sincerely. “As it is, there are not enough jobs in the country to
absorb all the qualified nurses. They go, for they too have families to
take care of.” She looked to me for understanding. “They work
for some years on short-term contracts, and after they have made
enough money to build a house, or educate a brother, or collect a dowry for
themselves or for a daughter, they come back again.” She added, after
a brief pause, “In fact, it is better to let them go. Otherwise, they
create trouble for us.”
The fact that international assistance pays for the
training of new personnel but not for salaries to employ them is a major
and unresolved problem in all rural health programs in Pakistan. Aid
organizations assume that trained workers are an asset to the government,
and expect local health service delivery systems to absorb them. In
reality, local governments do not have the institutional capacity to
deploy, pay, and utilize the trained work force. Hence, senior officials
hope that trained personnel, who can be demanding and vocal, will just go
away. Their exodus, though contrary to the objective of these programs,
relieves the government of blame for not using these workers.
But because policymakers and development experts agree
that skilled manpower is essential for improved services, they continue to
design and fund training programs. Pakistan has been a recipient of aid for
such programs many times. International experts don’t try to figure
out how the workers turned out by these programs might be used. That is
left to the host governments. In unstable regimes,
administrators—who are often political appointees with
little accountability and slim hope for long tenures in their
jobs—have neither an interest in doing this nor an inkling
of how it could be accomplished. Or their hands are tied because programs
that have been developed outside the country rigidly bind funding to
specific activities, even if they are of little use.
Unfortunately, most program evaluations, usually
conducted in-house by the donor organizations, rate the training
programs as successes, since their products are tangible and can be
measured. The host country is happy because the programs bring in lots of
money. The local managers are happy because they receive personal
rewards—special remuneration, a vehicle, trips to donor
countries, and so on. Lending agencies, such as the World Bank, and
grant-giving agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International
Development, are happy because they are able to disburse funds in time for
the next budget request.
“Oh, good,” said my companion, seeing some
advantage even in this bizarre situation. “Once these nurses come
back, they are more experienced and thus more valuable, so they can be
hired at that time. At least the government will have the trained manpower
it can use.”
“Oh, no, no.” Mrs. S. almost recoiled at
this suggestion. “Now they cannot be hired at all. The government has
placed a ban on re-employment of returning nurses. Any nurse who
has worked outside the country in her private capacity cannot work for the
government again.”
“But why not? They are more experienced. . .”
“Because,” and here Mrs. S. did a
wonderful imitation of being hurt, “they have rejected us in the
first place. Now why should we accept them?”
Actually, the ban is not based on sentimentality
alone. Government rules forbid the hiring of anybody 35 or older in regular
federal jobs. This, so the explanation goes, is because a government
employee can retire with full benefits after 20 years of service. Older
people will be more likely to depart as soon as they are eligible, taking
their experience with them and drawing full benefits. Most nurses who
return after spending some years out of the country are nearing or past age
35, and thus are automatically ineligible for federal employment.
Not enough nurses. Not
enough jobs. Nurses working as “doctors.” Trained nurses being encouraged to
leave the country. Untrained and uncertified “nurses” being
recruited in sheer desperation by private hospitals. What a strange and
paradoxical situation! Yet there is no discussion of these crucial issues.
And new training programs are being developed, because there is pressure
from international organizations to include more women, supposedly to meet
the human resource shortage.
My companion sat shaking her head. Mrs. S. was
starting to look restless. She signaled to the attendant for tea. In a
government office, a tea break can become a project unto itself.
“The problem with women,” Mrs. S.
volunteered conversationally, again adjusting the dupatta delicately on her hair as
the tea service was laid out, “is that they all want to get
married.” Quite a problem, and one the world over. “So
eventually they must leave the profession to take care of their husbands
and children.”
We let this pass, and raised another possible solution
to the “problem” with women: training more male nurses. As the
primary wage earners, they would not be compelled to leave once they
married, and they could tend to the male patients, making it easier to
attract women to the profession.
“Not a good idea,” according to Mrs. S.
And why not?
“Because men are very unreliable. As students,
they will agitate the girls,” she continued in the same
conversational mode, oblivious to the effect of her remark on her audience.
“If they are in classes together, they will induce them to strike on
petty matters.”
“But the girls are under no obligation to do
their bidding,” Lucymemsahib said.
“Yes, but the poor girls have no choice but to
follow the boys. It is natural for them to do so. By themselves, girls
never cause any problems. They quietly do what they are told or get married
and go away.” Mrs. S. warmed to her subject. “Look what is
happening in Liaquat National Hospital, Karachi.” Liaquat hospital is
a major training institution for nurses, one of the few in the country that
prepare male nurses. About a third of each entering class was male (as is still the case
today). During the weeks before our visit to Mrs. S., the nursing students
at Liaquat had gone on strike, demanding better living conditions,
apparently at the instigation of male students.
“All because of these boys!” Mrs. S.
continued. “So many headaches these boys are causing us.” She
struck her forehead with the palm of her right hand in the traditional
gesture of frustration, causing the dupatta to flop off her hair. She hastily retrieved it.
“And the girls are not listening to us either. They are naturally
listening to the boys. Stupid things!” She shook her head in
indignation.
Lucymemsahib looked at Mrs. S. as if she had come from
another planet. Thankfully, the tea arrived at this point, and we fell to
it with gusto, under Mr. Jinnah’s enigmatic smile from his perch on
the wall. Mrs. S. very generously ordered her attendant to run out for some
mint chutney to go with the samosas, which were really out of this
world.

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Samia
Altaf, a public-health physician who has worked in the United States and Pakistan, is the 2007–08 Pakistan Scholar at the Wilson Center. She is currently at work on a book about aid effectiveness in the health sector in Pakistan.
Reprinted from Winter
2008 Wilson Quarterly
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