Cold War International History Project
Virtual Archive 2.0

1956 Hungarian Revolution

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 9 and 12 July 1956
July 09 1956 - In their meeting on July 9 and 12, 1956, the CPSU Presidium calls for an article to be prepared on the subversive activities of “imperialists” in Poznan and Hungary. Italian communist, Palmiro Togliatti, is to assist in writing an article in the Italian press. The working notes also refer to the situation developing over the rehabilitation of Hungarian communist, Laszlo Rajk, with a reference to HWP leader Rakosi.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 20 October 1956
October 20 1956 - Notes from the meeting of the CPSU Presidium on the issues of Poland and Hungary. Soviet officials discuss preventing the ouster of Polish Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski and forming a committee to possibly replace Gomulka. The Presidium considers events in Hungary with recommendations to dispatch Mikoyan, recall troops to their units, and draft an informational report.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 23 October 1956
October 23 1956 - The Presidium is updated on events unfolding in Budapest. Khrushchev favors deploying troops to quell the uprising. Mikoyan, alone in his dissent, advocates political measures followed by troops if necessary. Nagy’s capacity to control the situation is discussed, Presidium members assert the incongruities with Poland, and Khrushchev dispatches Mikoyan and Suslov to Budapest.
 
Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary
October 24 1956 - The CPSU CC Politburo meets to discuss the burgoning crises in Poland and Hungary. Also participating was Hungarian leader Novotny. Khrushchev described for the Soviet leadership his discussions with Gomulka on the Polish situation. Khrushchev urges patience in dealing with Poland. On the situation in Hungary, Khrushchev tells the Soviet leaders that actions were taken at the request of the Hungarian leadership.
 
Report from Soviet Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Perevertkin
October 24 1956 - Report from Soviet Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Perevertkin on the movement of Soviet troops into Hungary
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 26 October 1956
October 26 1956 - Liu Shaoqi of the CPC CC tells the CPSU Presidium that the Rokossowski issue is central in Poland. The Presidium considers incoming information sent by Mikoyan and Suslov from Budapest. It is recommended that Hungarians studying in Moscow be instructed and sent back to Budapest to end the “vacillations” within the CC. Presidium members are critical of Mikoyan and call for a firm line with Hungary. Khrushchev commits to sending three more Presidium members to Hungary, contacting ousted Prime Minister Andras Hegedus, and reinforcing the troops.
 
Protocol 55 of the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the RWP, on the Situation in Hungary and Measures to be Taken in Romania.
October 26 1956 - The Romanian Workers' Party Politburo meets to discuss the events in Hungary and decides the actions to be taken in Romania to prevent a spill-over of the Hungarian uprising into the country.
 
Telegram from Soviet Politburo members Mikoyan and Suslov reporting on the situation in Hungary
October 27 1956 - Mikoyan-Suslov Report on the situation in Hungary, appointments to the Hungarian government, and discussions with the Hungarian leaders.
 
Andropov Report, 28 October 1956
October 28 1956 - Yuri Andropov forwards this letter from Hungarian Prime Minister Andras Hegedus to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The letter requests Soviet troops to quell the riots in Budapest.
 
Telegram from the Budapest KGB Station concerning the latest developments in the city following the popular uprising
October 28 1956 - The KGB station in Budapest reports on the ongoing crisis in Hungary. While some popular forces are considering stopping the fighting, others continue to disarm the state organs. The fighting dies down in Budapest and the Imre Nagy government is gaining legitimacy. American embassy officials were seen evacuating from the embassy.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 28 October 1956
October 28 1956 - The notes from this session of the CPSU Presidium reveal a desire to support and strengthen the Kadar-Nagy government and the draft declaration prepared by the Hungarians for radio broadcast on October 28. Khrushchev, desiring to avoid the complications that Britain and France face in Egypt, asserts the need for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal.
 
Andropov Report, 28 October 1956
October 28 1956 - Yuri Andropov forwards this letter from Hungarian Prime Minister Andras Hegedus to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The letter requests Soviet troops to quell the riots in Budapest.
 
KGB Chief Serov, Report
October 29 1956 - KGB Chief Serov details the violence and resistance in Hungary. He writes that armed groups are executing communists and are actively planning to seek out and kill employees of the state security organs. Serov expresses concern over the dismissal of state employees and the decision by other state employees to leave work.
 
Mikoyan-Suslov Report
October 30 1956 - Mikoyan and Suslov report from Hungary that the situation is getting worse. “Hooligans” are reportedly seizing institutions and killing communists. Military relations between officers and generals in the Hungarian and Soviet armies are described as deteriorating and concern is expressed that Hungarian units may defect to the side of the insurgents. Nagy asked Andropov to confirm reports that Soviet troops are continuing to cross into Hungary. Mikoyan and Suslov conclude by stating that they will call for a cessation of troops into Hungary and a request to send Konev to Hungary.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956
October 30 1956 - The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.
 
Mikoyan-Suslov Report
October 30 1956 - Mikoyan and Suslov report from Hungary that the situation is getting worse. “Hooligans” are reportedly seizing institutions and killing communists. Military relations between officers and generals in the Hungarian and Soviet armies are described as deteriorating and concern is expressed that Hungarian units may defect to the side of the insurgents. Nagy asked Andropov to confirm reports that Soviet troops are continuing to cross into Hungary. Mikoyan and Suslov conclude by stating that they will call for a cessation of troops into Hungary and a request to send Konev to Hungary.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956
October 30 1956 - The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.
 
Protocol No. 58 of the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the RWP Which Adopted Some Measures to Ensure Order in Romania Given the Events Taking Place in Hungary
October 30 1956 - Summary of the decisions taken at the meeting of the RWP Politburo concerning actions to be taken in conjunction with the developments in Hungary.
 
Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti on the question of the situation in Hungary
October 31 1956 - This CC CPSU draft telegram to Palmiro Togliatti agrees with the Italian leader’s assessment that the Hungarian government is becoming more reactionary. The telegram states that Nagy’s growing alignment with reactionary forces will not be accepted. The CC CPSU telegram concludes with reassurances that the unity of collective leadership of the party remains in tact.
 
“Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee About the Situation in Hungary” (Protocol 49)
October 31 1956 - This resolution instructs the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade to transmit a letter to Tito requesting a secret meeting on November 1 or 2 with Khrushchev and Malenkov. It also empowers certain members to conduct negotiations with the United Workers Party of Poland.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October 1956
October 31 1956 - Khrushchev states that Soviet troops should act to restore order in Hungary. He further claims that Soviet withdrawal will compel the Americans, English and French to go on the offensive. The Presidium also discusses the creation of a provisional revolutionary government headed by Kadar with Nagy serving as Deputy Premier on the condition that Nagy agrees to enter into negotiations over Soviet departure from Hungary. Scheduling meetings with Tito and Gomulka is mentioned.
 
Notes of a Telephone Message
October 31 1956 - This is an undated and unattributed telephone message taken between 31 October and 1 November 1956.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October 1956
October 31 1956 - Khrushchev states that Soviet troops should act to restore order in Hungary. He further claims that Soviet withdrawal will compel the Americans, English and French to go on the offensive. The Presidium also discusses the creation of a provisional revolutionary government headed by Kadar with Nagy serving as Deputy Premier on the condition that Nagy agrees to enter into negotiations over Soviet departure from Hungary. Scheduling meetings with Tito and Gomulka is mentioned.
 
Notes of a Telephone Message
October 31 1956 - This is an undated and unattributed telephone message taken between 31 October and 1 November 1956.
 
“Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee About the Situation in Hungary” (Protocol 49)
October 31 1956 - This resolution instructs the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade to transmit a letter to Tito requesting a secret meeting on November 1 or 2 with Khrushchev and Malenkov. It also empowers certain members to conduct negotiations with the United Workers Party of Poland.
 
Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti on the question of the situation in Hungary
October 31 1956 - This CC CPSU draft telegram to Palmiro Togliatti agrees with the Italian leader’s assessment that the Hungarian government is becoming more reactionary. The telegram states that Nagy’s growing alignment with reactionary forces will not be accepted. The CC CPSU telegram concludes with reassurances that the unity of collective leadership of the party remains in tact.
 
Andropov Report
November 01 1956 - Andropov reports that Imre Nagy has threatened a scandal and the resignation of the government if the Soviet Union continues to send troops into Hungary. In his meeting with Nagy, Andropov is told that Hungary is withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and will further request a UN guarantee of Hungarian neutrality if Soviet troop movements into Hungary do not stop. The report notes that after the meeting the Hungarian government informed the Embassy of its decision to leave the Warsaw Pact.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956
November 01 1956 - At this session of the Presidium, Mikoyan argues that in the face of a universal demand for troop withdrawal the best option is to support the Hungarian government. Mikoyan promotes negotiations over force. The other members support the application of force to put down the uprising. Supporters of force refer to the necessity of keeping Hungary within the Soviet sphere and preventing the uprising from spreading to other Eastern European nations.
 
Andropov Report
November 01 1956 - Andropov reports that Imre Nagy has threatened a scandal and the resignation of the government if the Soviet Union continues to send troops into Hungary. In his meeting with Nagy, Andropov is told that Hungary is withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and will further request a UN guarantee of Hungarian neutrality if Soviet troop movements into Hungary do not stop. The report notes that after the meeting the Hungarian government informed the Embassy of its decision to leave the Warsaw Pact.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956
November 02 1956 - A plan outlining military measures against Hungary was presented at this session of the Presidium. The notes reflect that fear of fascist influence in Hungary motivated adoption.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956
November 02 1956 - The CPSU CC Presidium is confronted with reports from Hungary of mass demonstrations, armed counterrevolutionary groups, and the support for Nagy by the opposition. The CC is told about the Hungarian decision to declare neutrality and the likely confrontation between Soviet and Hungarian troops should the former continue to advance toward Budapest. Also discussed is the split within the HWP and possible Soviet responses.
 
Notes of a Secure Phone Call from the USSR Ambassador in Romania, A. A. Epishev
November 03 1956 - Imre Nagy requests that the Romanian ambassador relate to Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej rumors of an impending Soviet invasion of Hungary. The notes describe that Nagy’s request was transmitted to Dej and in response a Romanian representative was dispatched to Budapest.
 
Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’s Speech at the 3 November Session
November 03 1956 - In this speech, Khrushchev admits that the lack of Hungarian leaders is his own fault. He criticizes Rakosi and Gero for poor leadership and for excluding Imre Nagy from the party. Regret is expressed for not removing Rakosi earlier. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union can not be on the sidelines, and remarks that unless forced into retirement Nagy will work with the enemy.
 
Notes of a Secure Phone Call from the USSR Ambassador in Romania, A. A. Epishev
November 03 1956 - Imre Nagy requests that the Romanian ambassador relate to Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej rumors of an impending Soviet invasion of Hungary. The notes describe that Nagy’s request was transmitted to Dej and in response a Romanian representative was dispatched to Budapest.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Horvath
November 03 1956 - Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.
 
Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’s Speech at the 3 November Session
November 03 1956 - In this speech, Khrushchev admits that the lack of Hungarian leaders is his own fault. He criticizes Rakosi and Gero for poor leadership and for excluding Imre Nagy from the party. Regret is expressed for not removing Rakosi earlier. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union can not be on the sidelines, and remarks that unless forced into retirement Nagy will work with the enemy.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Horvath
November 03 1956 - Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.
 
Zhukov report on the situation in Hungary as of 12 noon
November 04 1956 - Zhukov reports on the progress made by Soviet troops entering Hungary. He writes that troops have recaptured key institutions and buildings in Budapest and the provinces. Zhukov notes that the government of Imre Nagy has gone into hiding and that to prevent the escape of insurgents and leaders the Soviet army has occupied the airports and closed off roads along the border with Austria. The report describes remaining areas of resistance such as the Corwin Theater in Budapest.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956
November 04 1956 - At this session of the CPSU CC, Molotov raises concerns over the new Hungarian government’s decision to condemn the “Rakosi-Gero clique” and call for the condemnation of Stalinism. Molotov argues that the CC must exert influence on Kadar to prevent Hungary from going the way of Yugoslavia. The session also discusses recommendations for purging higher educational institutions and Kadar’s withdrawal of appeals to the UN for assistance.
 
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
November 04 1956 - Mikoyan and Suslov describe their trip to Hungary. They note that much of the violence has subsided, and remaining opposition is being liquidated by Hungarian patrols and Soviet troops. Included is a description of their meeting with members of the CC of the Hungarian Worker’s Party. The authors write that the presence of Soviet troops in Budapest has had a negative effect on city residents. After writing about Nagy’s recent activities, Mikoyan and Suslov state that the unity of the CC and Politburo of the HWP remains in tact, but opposition to Gero’s candidacy for first secretary of the CC is growing.
 
Cable, N. Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry
November 04 1956 - In this coded telegram, the Soviet Ministry is informed of Imre Nagy’s location at the Yugolsav embassy in Budapest. Firiubin reports that the Yugoslavs are attempting to obtain a statement from Nagy in support of Kadar’s new government. Tito is noted as requesting that the Soviet government not repress communists who ‘did not immediately take the correct line’ during the uprising and that the Soviet government protect the Yugoslav embassy from potential attack.
 
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
November 04 1956 - Mikoyan and Suslov describe their trip to Hungary. They note that much of the violence has subsided, and remaining opposition is being liquidated by Hungarian patrols and Soviet troops. Included is a description of their meeting with members of the CC of the Hungarian Worker’s Party. The authors write that the presence of Soviet troops in Budapest has had a negative effect on city residents. After writing about Nagy’s recent activities, Mikoyan and Suslov state that the unity of the CC and Politburo of the HWP remains in tact, but opposition to Gero’s candidacy for first secretary of the CC is growing.
 
Stenographic record of a 4 November 1956 meeting of Party activists
November 04 1956 - Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 5 November 1956
November 05 1956 - Members of the CPSU CC Presidium consider changing the name of the Hungarian Worker’s Party (HWP).
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 6 November 1956
November 06 1956 - Debate occurs at this CC session between Molotov, who opposes approving the appeal written by the Provisional CC of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, and the other members of the CC who desire approving the document. Molotov is concerned about the unknown composition of the CC of the HSWP, the condemnations of former Hungarian Worker’s Party (HWP) politicians, the issue of renaming the HWP, and the risk that Hungary will become the next Yugoslavia. Khrushchev states that Molotov is “clung to the cult of Stalin” and that Molotov is considering bringing back Rakosi and Hegedus.
 
From the diary of D.T. SHEPILOV
November 07 1956 - In his diary, Shepilov pledges to investigate the circumstances surrounding tank fire near the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. Promises are made to investigate the story and report back to Yugoslavian officials. Shepilov notes that Yugoslavian Ambassador Micunovic agrees with judgments made about Nagy. Shepilov expresses consternation at how Yugoslavia can provide refuge for Nagy and condemn him. References to a meeting in Brioni between Khrushchev, Malenkov and Tito detail the opinions of Yugoslav and Soviet officials concerning Nagy.
 
Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the UCY on the events in Hungary
November 08 1956 - In this letter, the CC UCY responds to the CC CPSU over questions concerning Yugoslavia’s decision to provide shelter to Nagy and his group at their embassy. The letter begins by expressing agreement on the weakness of Nagy’s government, the need to form a new government under Kadar, and the existence of “honest communists” in Nagy’s government that could assist Kadar. The letter relates that Yugoslavia cannot hand Nagy and his group over to authorities because of the domestic consequences of such an action. The correspondence ends with both the suggestion of amnesty for Nagy and Yugoslavia’s disavowal of any connection to Nagy or the uprising.
 
Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 60)
November 27 1956 - These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.
 
Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis
December 28 1956 - Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.
 
Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the State of Soviet Foreign Policy
June 24 1957 - The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.
 
Minutes of the Meeting of the HSWP CC Political Committee
January 31 1989 - Minutes of the meeting of the HSWP CC Political Committee on the Historical Subcommittee of the Central Committee’s description of the events of 1956 as a people’s uprising rather than a counterrevolution. Editor's note: On 23 June 1988, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Central Committee established a committee to analyze Hungary’s political, economic and social development during the preceding thirty years. The panel, headed by Imre Pozsgay, 5 a politburo member and minister of state, included party officials and social scientists. After several months of examining pertinent archival documents, the Historical Subcommittee (one of four working groups) completed and discussed its final report at its meeting on 27 January 1989. Most sensationally, the report described what occurred in 1956 in Hungary as not a “counterrevolution” (as Moscow and the regime it installed in Budapest headed by János Kádár had long insisted) but a people’s uprising. This very point was announced by Imre Pozsgay in an interview on both the morning news program and the next day, on the most popular political journal of Hungarian Radio, “168 hours,” without any prior consultation with the political leadership. The issue triggered a serious crisis in the Party and eventually served as a very important catalyst in the transition process. The following excerpt reflects the first reaction of the Politburo members. (EXCERPT)
 
KGB Chief Kryuchkov’s Report, 16 June 1989
June 16 1989 - KGB Chief Kryuchkov reports that research into Soviet repression in the 1930’s through 1950’s reveals that Imre Nagy willingly worked for the NKVD as an informant. Using the pseudonym “Volodya,” Nagy information is said to have led to sentences for Hungarian émigrés. Kryuchkov states that the documents should be shown to the Secretary General of the HSWP and possibly used in response to calls for Nagy’s rehabilitation.
 

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