Cold War International History Project
Virtual Archive 2.0

The Mitrokhin Archive

The Mitrokin Archive -- A Note on Sources
January 01 1990 - A note on sources contextualizing the Mitrokhin Archive. Please read this first in order to understand the nature of the material.
 
Letter to the [CWIHP] Editor -- A Note on Sources
June 01 2000 - Letter to CWIHP from Vasiliy Mitrokhin on the submission of the KGB in Afghanistan Manuscript. This letter places the KGB in Afghanistan entry into further context. Please read this before using the materials.
 
CWIHP Note on the Mitrokhin Archive -- A Note On Sources
June 01 2000 - CWIHP note on the Mitrokhin sources, first published in the introduction of the KGB in Afghanistan Volume.
 
Biography of Vasiliy Mitrokhin
December 22 2000 - Short biography of Vasiliy Mitrokhin, which provides context for the materials in the Mitrokhin Archive collection.
 
The KGB in Afghanistan - Geographical Volume 1
February 01 2002 - This text is an edited version of a manuscript outlining the KGB's operational activities in Afghanistan between 1978 and 1983, authored by Vasiliy Mitrokhin, a former KGB archivist who defected to Britain in 1992. Mitrokhin tells us that the KGB was deeply involved with Soviet Afghan policies from the very beginning. The piece deals with events in and around Afghanistan and the activities of the Bolshevik nomenklatura in the region between 1962 and 1983. It is based exclusively on information from the KGB archives to which Vasily Mitrokhin had access to. Please read the note on sources under the collection listing to understand the limitations of this material.
 
KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82
April 01 2004 - Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin to the CWIHP, following the publication of the Mitrokhin WP40 "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.
 
STASI German/Russian Lexicon of Intelligence Terms Introduction - English Text
June 01 2006 - This compact German-Russian dictionary came to light in 1967. The dictionary is anonymous: it has no indication of title, authorship, publisher, place and date of publication - there are no indications at all. On reading through it, it is clear that it contains Cheka terminology, and was compiled after 1954. When translated into Russian, these terms were to assist operational officers working in the USSR KGB Establishment attached to the GDR MfS [Ministerium für Staatssicherheit] - helping them to read secret German-language materials supplied in great quantities by the GDR MfS [2], sent on to the Centre with a cover note, and to carry on conversations on Chekist themes with their German colleagues.
 
On Human Rights. Folder 51. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Outlines the KGB’s response to the USSR’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The accords obligated signatories to respect their citizens’ human rights. This gave Soviet dissidents and westerners leverage in demanding that the USSR end persecution on the basis of religious or political beliefs. Some of the KGB’s active measures included the establishment of a charitable fund dedicated to helping victims of imperialism and capitalism, and the fabrication of a letter from a Ukrainian group to FRG President Walter Scheel describing human rights violations in West Germany. The document also mentions that the Soviet Ministry of Defense obtained an outline of the various European powers’ positions on human rights issues as presented at the March 1977 meeting of the European Economic Community in London from the Italian Foreign Ministry. The KGB also initiated Operation “Raskol” [“Schism”], which ran between 1977 and 1980. This operation included active measures to discredit Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, measures designed to drive a wedge between the US and its democratic allies, and measures intended to convince the US government that continued support for the dissident movement did nothing to harm the position of the USSR.
 
Actions to Promote Discord. Folder 90. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Contains information on active measures undertaken by the KGB residency in Ankara, Turkey during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. The residency carried out active measures to destabilize Turkey’s military regime, undermine US military personnel’s sense of security through the publication of threatening leaflets, inflame the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, and foster anti-American sentiments. Mitrokhin provides detailed descriptions of several operations involving altered or fabricated personal correspondence, as well as newspaper articles written by, or ‘inspired’ by KGB agents or confidential contacts. The KGB residency claimed that these operations resulted in, among other things, the removal of Foreign Minister Nuri Birgi from office, and the expulsion of several American diplomats for allegedly interfering with Turkish elections.
 
An Illegal Trainer (KGB history of agent "Halef"). Folder 60. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.
 
The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.
 
By the Church Gates. Folder 1. The Checkist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This folder includes information on the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon, 1919 and 1922, and Felix Dzerzhinsky’s minutes of 2 December 1920 meeting asserting exclusive role of the VChK in undermining the Church. The note includes extracts of a 23 February 1922 decree on confiscation of Church treasures, and describes the subsequent liquidation of Bishop Phillipe and Professor Uspenski, the emergence and persecution of the True Orthodox Church and True Orthodox Christians operating underground, and KGB Penetration of the True Orthodox Church’s top leadership during the 1960’s. Efforts to strengthen Orthodox control over Belorussian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian national churches, the February 1975 conference of heads of Warsaw Pact security services and their decision to engage in joint action against the Vatican, the World Council of Churches and other religious institutions in the West, and the KGB’s campaign against underground religious manuscript publishers (samizdat) during 1970’s are discussed. The file contains KGB statistics on religious participation throughout the USSR, and a description of Archbishop Sinod’s, anti-Soviet activities in 1920’s and his support for Hitler during the Great Patriotic War. The notes section includes Mitrokhin’s thoughts on religion in Kievan Russ in 988 and extracts from FCD operations files on Church personalities involved in operations abroad. Includes operational codenames of KGB agents who had infiltrated the True Orthodox Church.
 
About an Embassy. Folder 78. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Folder 78 concerns KGB operations against the Syrian embassy in Moscow in the early 1970’s. It begins with brief biographical descriptions of the KGB agents and confidential contacts involved in penetrating the embassy. The Syrian Ambassador, Vhaya Jamil, was targeted by female KGB agents and confidential contacts who were told to express a romantic interest in him, while an official from the embassy’s military procurement bureau was targeted by a KGB agent who enticed the official into engaging in foreign currency speculation. As a result of his actions, the official was expelled from the Soviet Union. The KGB also used specially organized hunting trips on which agents and confidential contacts developed relations with Ambassador Vhaya. During one such hunting trip the Ambassador revealed the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai V. Podgorny would visit Egypt in January 1971 to sign a friendship agreement with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. On a similar occasion on 12 September, 1973, Ambassador Vhaya explained that the short term goal of Middle Eastern leaders was to debunk the myth of Israeli invincibility, while the long term goal of destroying Israel, would have to wait for 5-15 years. Finally, Ambassador Vhaya became one of the KGB’s confidential contacts on a KGB organized hunting trip codenamed OPERATION T, which was personally approved by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. During the trip, a KGB agent was assigned to invite Vhaya to what was purported to be his aunt’s dacha. Subsequently the Ambassador was considered to be a KGB confidential contact.
 
The Baptists. Folder 2. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - This folder includes information on Cheka operations against the Evangelical Christin Baptist Church, (EHB) between 1917 and 1984. It is divided into six sections. The first section, entitled “The Baptists” provides background information and statistics on Cheka operations against the Baptists, anecdotes about religious radio broadcasts into Russia by émigrés, a description of the penetration of the Polish Baptist community by the KGB in the 1960’s, and a description of an operation against a conference of Kyrgyz Baptist leaders in 1968. Tactics for penetrating religious organizations and the role of KGB spies once they are inside targeted organizations are also discussed. The section concludes with an analysis of how widespread religious persecution backfired by strengthening religious opposition, KGB disinformation techniques, and the role that Americans, and American religious organizations, played in providing material support to publishers of religious manuscripts and brochures. Sections two and four are case histories of dissidents named Baturin and Redin respectively. Both men were Baptist leaders, and in both cases KGB officers attempted to dissuade them from continuing their underground activities by registering their organizations officially with the Soviet government. In both cases they failed. Baturin ultimately went on a hunger strike and was sentenced to four years in prison, while a KGB report on Redin which asserted that one of his goals was to amend the USSR’s law on religious believers was somehow leaked to Radio Liberty and broadcast. The leak resulted in Redin’s being placed under intensive surveillance by the KGB. He was arrested at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport along with his wife, son, and other followers while on his way to Murmansk. Section three is a case history of an agent code named “Umnov” who was active in the mid 1970’s. Umnov’s father was a Baptist leader, but Umnov and his brother were KGB agents who penetrated their father’s organization and uncovered the location of its printing press. Section five, entitled “Suyeverii” (Superstitious Folk) is an account of a KGB operation against anti-Soviet religious groups in Krasnodar. It involved inserting first one agent, code named “Karpov”, followed by three others, into a Baptist group in Krasnodar Krai. Each agent had a skill which made them useful to publishers of religious materials, which facilitated their infiltration. The operation concluded when the press, located on an isolated farm 75km from Krasnodar was raided by the KGB and shut down. The final page of this folder is an order handed down by Yuri Andropov at a 16 August, 1978 meeting of the Collegium of the KGB. Andropov stated that it was necessary to decrease the role of ideology in the fight against religious groups, while increasing the level of training for KGB agents involved in combating them.
 
A Directive from the Centre. Folder 79. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.” “Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies. In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.
 
Tracking down writers of anonymous letters and leaflets, 1957-74. Folder 14. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Vasiliy Mitrokhin describes investigative methods used during anti-Soviet incidents in Sverdlovsk and Serov. On November 7, 1969 anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed in the city of Sverdlovsk. The KGB collected 60 copies. It was determined that the leaflets were made on a portable typewriter of a foreign make using a standard-format paper. It was also estimated based on the content of the leaflets that the author was approximately 17-20 years old. On April 26, 1970 the anonymous leaflets appeared in the city for the second time. They were printed on the same typewriter, but differed in content. The KGB operatives collected 14 copies. Similarly to the first group of leaflets, they feature a signature of the “Executive body of the party ‘Free Russia’.” On May 1, 1970 identical leaflets were disseminated in the city of Serov. The KGB operatives narrowed down the circle of suspects to 176 students. From local testimonies, they discovered that Uzlov, a student at the Ural Institute of Engineers, had been a member of a youth organization called “Revolutionary Workers’ Party,” which was later renamed to “Free Russia.” Nikolay Shaburov (born 1945) and Victor Pestov (born 1946) were leaders of the “Free Russia.” They designed the text of the leaflets and recruited followers to help distribute the copies. Members of the “Free Russia” were arrested and convicted.
 
The KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast. Folder 17. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin observes that having surveyed Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, codenamed “Pauk” (Spider), for a long time, the KGB had sufficient evidence to prosecute him. However, their intention was to debunk his teachings. The KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast invited agent “Marina”—Natalia Reshetovskaya— to participate in their actions against Solzhenitsyn. Mitrokhin indicates that Marina went through an intensive course of operative and psychological preparation. The KGB familiarized her with the nature of ideological subversion practiced by security services dealing with Solzhenitsyn. Marina also gained necessary expertise by performing practical tasks, learning the surroundings of Solzhenitsyn, and taking a look at his literary works. Beyond Solzhenitsyn, the KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast also oversaw various clubs and organizations attended by intelligentsia that might have had harmful political inclinations. There were several instances of such developments recorded in Ryazan Oblast. In 1967, Belik, teacher at a music school in Ryazan, founded the Olymp Society, whose policy was to combat government censorship. Bigalko, teacher of Russian language at the Pedagogical Institute, started a discussion club called “Disk” that encouraged students to think critically and challenge authority. The KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast compiled reports on teachers and representatives of intelligentsia who held anti-Soviet views. Professor Vilensky was one of them. He urged the introduction of another political party, listened to foreign radio programs, and drew comparisons between the Soviet and bourgeois ways of life. Such behavior contributed to an atmosphere of impunity among citizenry, which further encouraged unwanted generalizations.
 
The KGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Annual review by V.V. Fedorchuk of counter-intelligence operations in 1970. Folder 16. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Annual review presented by V.V. Fedorchuk, chairman of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR, summarizes the main successes, failures, and future priorities of the KGB in 1971. According to Mitrokhin, Fedorchuk reported that in 1970 a number of Jewish nationalist groupings were uncovered in Kiev, Khariv, and Odessa. In addition, 33 Soviet citizens were seen in contact with foreign nationals. Counterintelligence efforts concerning foreign-bound vessels had been inappropriate. On a passenger vessel “Bashkira,” for example, crew members, including KGB agents, engaged in contraband. The KGB conducted operations across 800 objects in industry, ministries and agencies, railroad, air and naval vessels. In 1970, preventative measures were undertaken against 153 ideological groups and 13 nationalist groups. Criminal charges were pressed against 313 people as a result. 317 anonymous letter writers were identified. Over 20,000 ideologically harmful documents had been confiscated. Operative Technical Unit conducted over 8,500 operations, including wiretappings in hotels, apartments, etc. The rate of conviction, however, remained low, constituting only 34% of the total number of arrested. Most operatives in the Ukrainian KGB have, on average, 7 to 9 agents. In Kharkiv, operatives of the Fifth Directorate are servicing 14 residencies. They have been assigned over 80 agents. In 1970, the Ukrainian KGB recruited 4 foreign nationals. More than 60,000 foreign nationals visit Crimea annually. This creates broad opportunities for the enemy to recruit Soviet citizens. 133 specialists have left Zaporozhye for India to participate in the construction of a metallurgic plant. It was reported that they constantly communicate with specialists from England and the GDR. In 1969, agent-related work in Vinnitsia Oblast accounted for 36% of an operative’s time, while in 1970 it rose to 50%. Meetings with agents take place at least twice a month. An operative has 10 to 20 agents on average. Operatives in Dnipropetrovsk have, on average, 19 agents. Colonel Liodianoy reported that out of 177 kilometers of Chernivtsi Oblast’s border with Romania, 30 kilometers spread through mountainous regions, where a technological base is limited. Only 12 soldiers guard 21 kilometers of the borderline. Transit trains from Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia lack control. In 1970, 1752 individuals have not left the USSR out of 1,354,000 citizens from socialist countries, which entered through the customs in the western Ukraine.
 
Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations. Folder 80. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.
 
About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo. Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit. To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.
 
Counter-Intelligence Protection, 1971. Folder 97. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.
 
The Cairo Residency, 1972-76. Folder 82. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Information on the results of an analysis of the activities of the KGB residency in Cairo, Egypt from 1972-1976, conducted by KGB Service R. Starting in January 1973, the KGB leadership prohibited the residency from using Egyptian citizens as agents; however the resident in Cairo initiated restrictions on penetration operations earlier, in 1967 and 1968. As a result, by 1977, the residency had no agents in the majority of its intelligence objectives. In May 1971, after the defeat of the anti-Sadat opposition group “left Nasserists,” the KGB’s leadership role in the organization came to light. In response, President Sadat took steps to curtail the activities of Soviet intelligence in Egypt. The KGB resident in Cairo was forced to strengthen his efforts to obtain information on the intentions of the Egyptian leadership, while improving security for clandestine operations. In 1967, the Centre decided not to task the Cairo residency with collecting information on the United States or China, because its limited resources permitted it to focus only on Egypt’s internal politics, and its relations with the USSR, the United States, Israel, and other Arab states. The prohibition against using Egyptian citizens as agents meant that the residency often had to rely on operational-technical means of collection; however by June 1977, the KGB’s leaders instructed the Cairo resident to select and recruit a well-known Soviet-Arab for use in gathering political information, and active measures.
 
National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. FOlder 53. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry Vasiliy Mitrokhin expresses the KGB concerns regarding the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists’ (NTS) anti-socialist activities held in the Soviet Union and in the West. Mitrokhin states that the KGB had the task of taking control of NTS’ activities as well as destroing their reputation and connections with other anti-Soviet organizations. In order to paralyze the NTS, the KGB’s fundamental goal was to establish strong connections with the organization by sending undercover agents. Toward the end of 1963, the NTS became familiar with the presence of KGB agents among their members. KGB’s main goal was to create an illusion that the NTS was ruled by the KGB, which would help to make America and the West to distrust the organization. According to Mitrokhin, taking over the NTS’s publication “The Posev” was important as well. Mitrokhin provides a KGB plan to overturn the publication and he also attaches the list of all KGB agents who were involved in this undertaking, including their short biographies and codenames.
 
The Cheka Emergence. Folder 96. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin provides a history of the Cheka’s creation and its missions in Europe between 1918 and 1925. Mitrokhin divides the creation of the Cheka into three periods of time. According to Mitrokhin, the Council of the People’s Commissars ordered the establishment of the Extraordinary Commission (the Cheka) on June 18, 1918. Red Army officials were not satisfied with the existing secret police -- Military Control -- because too many officers from the Tsarist Army were involved. In December of the same year, the politburo ordered the unification of Military Control and the Cheka into the Special Department under the All-Russian Extraordinary Committee; Mikhail Kedrov became commander. Immediately, the Special Department was ordered to start foreign espionage, however because of their lack of experience in the field, agents were limited to working in border zones. Mitrokhin states that the second period of the Cheka’s emergence began in 1919 at the First All-Russian Congress of Commanders of the Special Departments. The commanders emphasized the importance of advancing the Special Department’s capabilities and ordered the establishment of a Foreign Department to strengthen espionage effectiveness in capitalist countries. According to Mitrokhin, in 1920 the Foreign Department organized the first residencies in the countries with which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had diplomatic relations. Mitrokhin provides an example of a common organization structure for a residency. The third period of the Cheka’s emergence began at the end of 1920 when the Foreign Intelligence Service was established as an independent organization under the Foreign Department of the All-Russian Extraordinary Committee. On December 20, 1920 the commander of the Foreign Department, Felix Dzerzhinsky, formed an official staff. Mitrokhin provides names and numbers of positions. In 1925 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party ordered an end to active espionage in capitalist countries in order to concentrate on neighboring countries that presented a potential military danger. During peaceful times agents of the Foreign Intelligence Service had to study military bases, people’s mentality, and to prepare for the case of war.
 
The Richard Zorge Case. Folder #59. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin recounts how during the 1960s the leadership of the KGB had shown its Dzerzhinsky Central Club agents a 2-part French movie entitled “Who Are You, Doctor Zorge?” A Soviet spy, Zorge aroused much interest within the ranks of the KGB. Drawing upon KGB files, Mitrokhin states how Zakharov, the Deputy Director of the KGB, consequently issued an order to prepare a report on Zorge. Based on Mitrokhin’s account, the report consists of the following statements: Richard Zorge had been working as an agent in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Zorge was born in Baku, Azerbaijan to a Russian mother. His grandfather, Fredrick Albert Zorge, an associate of Marx and Engels, was one of the founding members of the U.S Socialist Worker’s Party and the International Worker’s Soviet. Mitrokhin mentions that the KGB file relates that while in Germany, Richard Zorge had become a member of the Social Democratic Party. He subsequently changed his affiliation to the Communist Party of Germany in 1919. In 1925 Zorge received an invitation to work in Moscow for the Comintern until May 1927. From 1930 to 1932, Zorge acquired residency status, first in Shanghai, and then in Tokyo. As part of his cover, Zorge assumed the position of a correspondent for German newspapers. In 1939, Zorge became the official press-attaché for the German Embassy in Tokyo, where he gained the favor of the ambassador and other diplomatic heads. According to the KGB account, in May 1939 Zorge informed the Main Intelligence Directorate that Germany was preparing to invade Poland on September 1, 1939. In May 1941, Zorge presented the Directorate with a forecast of Germany’s war plans against the USSR. Zorge warned about the presence of 150 German army divisions near the Soviet border, gave a general outline of German troop movements, and accurately predicted that the German offensive against the USSR would commence on June 22, 1941. The KGB entry further describes that during the fall of 1941, Zorge assured Soviet authorities that Japan would not participate in the war against the USSR. Zorge’s guarantee allowed the high command of the Red Army to redirect a part of its force from the Far East to the regions surrounding Moscow. Zorge contributed precious information to the process of deciphering German and Japanese war plans, but Stalin initially did not pay much attention to his work. One can judge Stalin’s misgivings about Zorge from one of his statements: “Do not send me any more of this German disinformation.” KGB evidence points to the fact that under Stalin’s influence, Zorge’s motives and advice came to be viewed with much disdain amongst party apparatchiks. Many of Zorge’s coworkers often employed deceptive tactics in order to portray Zorge as a German and Japanese spy. Quoting from the KGB files, Mitrokhin expresses that in 1937 there was an attempt to recall Zorge back to the USSR with the purpose of liquidating him. Zorge’s understanding of the situation, however, led him to avoid the trap. Mitrokhin concludes by remarking that the circumstances surrounding Zorge’s demise remain unknown. According to Japanese accounts, Zorge was executed in Tokyo on November 7, 1944. Max Klausen, Zorge’s aid, posits that Richard Zorge committed suicide. At the end of the document, Mitrokhin includes an appendix in which he lists a timeline of pertinent events and proceedings.
 
The Yuri Case. Folder #91. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB sources to describe Yuri Velichkov Bagomil Stanimerov (b.1941), a Bulgarian citizen who graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1968. Stanimerov was recruited by the Bulgarian branch of the KGB in 1970, and became a resident of Sweden in 1972. Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that in April 1974, CIA officer Huey Walter “Hearst” made Stanimerov an offer in the name of the National Security Council. While Stanimerov refused the offer, he told Hearst that he would continue collaborating with him. Stanimerov subsequently traveled to many foreign countries, but the Americans no longer expressed interest in him. In 1975, Stanimerov was sent to work in the Bulgarian embassy in the United States. The Americans began to train Stanimerov as a spy and tried to ideologically convert him. The Mitrokhin account posits that the KGB gave Stanimerov instructions in case the latter succeeded in infiltrating the CIA. In 1978, the KGB received information regarding the fact that Stanimerov was being investigated by the FBI for his ties with the Bulgarian intelligence services
 
The Vernii (Devoted) Case. Folder #92. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB files to describe Ivan Illarionovich Ortinskii-“Vernii” (b. 1922), a native of the Lvov region, Ukraine. A priest in a Greco-Catholic church, Vernii pursued his religious studies at the Vatican and lectured at a seminary in Rome in 1964. Beginning in 1973, Vernii lived in Ingolstadt, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). According to the entry, the KGB established contact with Vernii when the latter visited his parents and kin in Lvov in 1968. In 1971, Vernii was recruited as an agent by the KGB branch of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Between 1971 and 1974, collaboration between Vernii and the KGB took place within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. As an agent, Vernii provided the KGB with information regarding his church, and the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that Vernii transmitted information to the KGB through his sister, Ukrainian SSR agent “Chestnaya” (born Ortinskaya). Mitrokhin concludes the entry by stating that in 1978, Vernii informed the KGB from Vienna that he would no longer work as an agent, since he had aroused much suspicion within the Greco-Catholic Church.
 
The Kardinal and Mavr Case. Folder #94. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB files to describe “Kardinal” (formerly “Lord”)-Lothar Schwartz (b. 1928), a member of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany, and a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Kardinal’s work as a KGB operative began in 1970 when the latter was recruited by KGB agent “Mavr” Moorfon Shamie. Throughout his tenure with the KGB, Kardinal maintained ties with agents Emke, Vishnevskii, Fooks, and Mishnikov. Kardinal provided the KGB with intelligence regarding West German Chancellor Willie Brandt’s visit to the Soviet Union, and Brandt’s intention of pressing General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev on issues concerning West Germany and the internal problems within the USSR. Amongst other things, Kardinal also notified the KGB of the details of a meeting between Brandt, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, and Chilean President Salvador Allende, and Brandt’s suggestion regarding the turning of events in Portugal. According to the entry, in 1974 the KGB presented Kardinal with a gift of 877 rubles. In 1975, Kardinal was given $5,000, which was transferred to him by KGB operative M.S Skorik (“Vlas”). By 1976, Kardinal was given another $5,000, in addition to a gift of 11,635 deutschmarks he received in 1977. Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that “Mavr” Moorfan Shamie had been the head of “Aleinsfilm,” a West German film studio. An investigation into Mavr’s work had revealed that regardless of his ten-year collaboration with the KGB, Mavr did not help the KGB branch in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) infiltrate enemy intelligence agencies. An analysis of the information received by the KGB from Kardinal led the KGB leadership to come to the conclusion that the evidence provided by Kardinal did not reveal more than what had been presented to the public by the West German press. Moreover, Kardinal’s findings had been too general, and often bordered on disinformation. Kardinal’s behavior indicated that he acted in agreement with Mavr. Mitrokhin concludes the entry by stating that the KGB consequently relieved Mavr from his agency duties, and severed all ties with Kardinal.
 
The Ref Case. Folder #68. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Drawing upon KGB files, Mitrokhin presents a profile of Marcel Laufer “Ref,” a Uruguayan citizen of Jewish ancestry and a special agent of the KGB. Ref was recruited to work in the KGB by Arismendi, the Secretary of the Uruguayan Branch of the KGB. The document asserts that Ref underwent special training in the USSR, and was sent to France in August of 1970. The Mitrokhin account states that Ref was given 4,000 rubles to work in France and pose as the owner of a trading firm along with Andre Michel. Mitrokhin states that the KGB had established a monthly stipend of $400 which covered Ref’s living costs and job-related expenses. According to Mitrokhin’s notes on the KGB entries, Ref was blamed by the KGB for not contributing enough to the agency. To increase his productivity, the KGB conducted a disciplinary program in which Ref was taught the importance of fulfilling agency responsibilities. The document mentions that according to Arismendi, Ref was filled with a resolute sense of duty after undergoing the teachings of the program. Ref asserted that he was ready to commit himself to his KGB assignments, and would continue to adhere to communist ideologies. Ref was subsequently sent back to the USSR on multiple occasions to be trained by the KGB. Mitrokhin’s account of the KGB document mentions that Ref’s trading firm dealt in leather goods. Ref’s partner, Andre Michel, was of Georgian descent and had been a dealer in leather apparel. In 1978, Ref was granted a ten-year visa to live in France as a “privileged” citizen. However, the file asserts that the KGB believed that Ref continued to treat his official duties with indifference. None of Ref’s operations yielded notable results due to the fact that Ref often created a false aura of danger around his work in order to continue to arouse the curiosity of the KGB. As a result, Mitrokhin relates that the KGB believed that Ref’s position within the agency did not warrant the 7,000 French francs the KGB paid him on a monthly basis to cover automobile costs and personal expenditures. Accordingly, ties between Ref and the KGB were duly terminated. Arismendi was notified about Ref’s departure from the KGB in 1980.
 
The Skeptic Case. Folder #54. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB sources to describe Boris Yakovlevich Krilov (“Maximilian”), an agent from the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, who was responsible for the surveillance of Soviet citizens. Maximilian’s duties led him to investigate a certain Nikitin about whom the latter compiled the following entry: KGB’s account of Maximilian’s entry indicates that as a native of Moscow, Yuri Vasilevich Nikitin (b. 1949) worked as a radio technician at a Soviet factory, but lived in Kuntsev. Beginning in 1975 Nikitin constantly visited the Historical Library where he studied philosophical absurdity and read the works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Freud. Nikitin also sought to learn an ancient Indian language and rejected Marxism and Leninism. Maximilian came to the conclusion that Nikitin believed that truth in life simply did not exist, and that life was meaningless. The KGB file further revealed that Maximilian learned that Nikitin had served in the army, and had subsequently graduated from the Ordzhonikidze Engineering and Economics Institute. Nikitin had nonetheless worked as an ordinary laborer in order to devote more time to finding truth and meaning in life. As related by the KGB entry, Maximilian had ascertained that in 1973 Nikitin had written a treatise called “In Search of Truth.” Nikitin had adopted the pseudonym of Skeptic L.E, and had written the treatise in the form of 1,131 aphorisms. Quoting from the KGB file, Mitrokhin reveals that Maximilian had further discovered that Nikitin had written a book whose context described the mysticism behind good and evil. The book, entitled Cosmic Tale, envisions an undiscovered planet in which life is heavenly and just. Cosmic Tale also describes the fictional arrival of the “Good Human” to Earth. The entry mentions that Maximilian portrays Nikitin as a nihilist—a pessimist with an anti-Soviet attitude which he expresses by discussing issues such as tyranny, freedom, power, Soviet propaganda, and Marxist-Leninist ideology. As related by Mitrokhin, Maximilian asserted that before 1972 Nikitin was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and believed in the ideals of communism. Moreover, Nikitin had worked as an engineer and had largely fulfilled his civic duties. The KGB file stated, however, that Maximilian had discovered that Nikitin had been a lecturer in the All-Union Society “Znanie.” In 1969, Nikitin met a fellow Ordzhonikidze Institute student who attracted Nikitin with his intellect. Mitrokhin mentions that Maximilian related how Nikitin had often met with the student, who frequently recited poetry. It was later revealed that the student had been a member of an illicit organization. As recorded by Mitrokhin, Maximilian related that Nikitin was consequently removed from the CPSU and from his position as an engineer. In essence, Nikitin no longer aroused much interest in anyone. Ever since, Nikitin “could not bear to hear any more about the Soviet Communist Party which aroused much annoyance with its presence.” Mitrokhin mentions that Maximilian had discovered that Nikitin had been friends with Sergey Borisovich Korolev (b. 1946), a Ukrainian who worked as a senior scientist at a physiological laboratory. Korolev had been a graduate of the Moscow State University’s Mechanics/Mathematics Department. The KGB entry also reveals that Korolev had possessed “Nikolai and Alexandra,” a U.S.-published book with an anti-Soviet context.
 
The Case of Dissident Velikanova. Folder #38. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin describes how on November 1, 1979 KGB operatives arrested dissident Tatiana Mikhailova Velikanova. Mitrokhin relates that since Velikanova’s name was widely known outside Soviet borders, the KGB warned its resident agents abroad to adopt certain procedures in case of an emergency. Tatiana Mikhailova Velikanova (b.1932) was a highly-educated Russian and a mother of three. Beginning in the late 1960s, Velikanova actively participated in public anti-state demonstrations—particularly at the Pushkin Square in Moscow. Drawing upon KGB files, Mitrokhin mentions that in 1969, Velikanova became a member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights, a club which according to the KGB, boasted Tatar autonomists, extreme nationalists, religious fanatics, and secessionists amongst its ranks. For more than ten years, Velikanova and her associates were producing anti-Soviet and politically harmful material, distributed to foreign publishing houses and radio stations. Under Velikanova’s initiative, The Chronicles of Current Events, a samizdat publication was issued in Moscow in 1974. The Chronicles described topics such as arrests, judiciary procedures, the pursuit of dissidents, and other aspects of political life in the Soviet Union. The periodical shed negative light on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). By Mitrokhin’s account, although Velikanova had been officially sanctioned by the state with regards to continuing her work, she paid no heed to the warnings. In essence, Velikanova remained largely unmoved by the searches and interrogations subsequently conducted by the State Prosecutor’s Office. The KGB file stated that the West had helped Velikanova by supplying her with financial resources. Velikanova further received assistance from the Fund for Aiding Political Nonconformists. Velikanova’s file stated that she was being investigated by the KGB in accordance with the wishes of the Prosecutor’s Office.
 
The Nationalism Case. Folder #57. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin expresses the KGB’s views on the threat of organized oppositionist nationalism within the Soviet bloc. According to the KGB, nationalist groups usually unite their members by embracing common goals and ideologies. Mitrokhin cites the KGB’s belief that nationalist forces abide by strict codes of organization, discipline, purpose, and conspiratorial obligation. Nationalist groups often attract young undergraduate and graduate college students—particularly those intellectuals inclined toward artistic self-expression. Mitrokhin then gives an overview of certain prominent nationalist groups active in Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Armenia. The entry initially describes the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN), whose anti-USSR activities in the Lvov oblast were discovered by the KGB in 1961. Members of the OUN attempted to steer Ukraine toward autonomy from the USSR and to form an independent Ukrainian Republic. Drawing upon the KGB files, Mitrokhin states that none of the OUN members apprehended and interrogated by the KGB in labor camps confessed to having actively participated in the struggle to achieve Ukrainian independence. The document subsequently notes that in 1962 alone, 23.8% of all Soviet undergraduate and graduate students maintained some kind of membership in nationalist groups. KGB sources indicate that given their broad intellectual horizons, highly educated individuals are often unable to communicate their ideas within the strict bounds of Leninism and consequently seek other channels, such as nationalism, to express their dissatisfaction. The document continues to discuss nationalism in the USSR by introducing the “Ellipse,” a group of young writers and scientists in Tartu, Estonia. The Ellipse was dedicated to “finding a balance between Marxism and Western ideology,” as well as linking Estonia’s culture to the West. Along with the Ellipse, Estonia also boasted the Free Estonian Youth, an organization which aimed to recruit new members (particularly 18-23 year olds), buy arms, spread anti-Soviet literature, drive out the ethnic Russian population, and create an independent Estonian Republic. In Moldova, as in Estonia, anti-Russian sentiment also spurred multiple nationalist organizations whose attitudes were often channeled through local institutions of higher learning, radio and television personalities, and cultural icons. The hub of nationalist movements in the USSR, according to KGB tenets, seemed to be Ukraine. From 1965-66 the KGB infiltrated a group calling itself DOR “88.” The primary purpose of the DOR was to fight for the official recognition of Ukraine’s language and culture, as well as to achieve autonomy from the Soviet sphere. In Kyiv, the KGB sanctioned the editors of the academic journal “Vitchizna” (issue No.12, 1966), whose publication of a novel titled “Gordina” by Yaroslav Stupaka, exhibited signs of harmful nationalist ideology through certain passages, poetic verses, and religious references. With regards to the Caucasus, the entry describe the forces of organized nationalism in Yerevan, Armenia where by 1966 an illicit faction called the Armenian Youth Soviet, founded by five undergraduate history students at the Armenian State University, boasted upwards of forty members. Moreover, the Dashnaks—probably the most potent nationalist party in Armenia—repeatedly called for Armenia’s independence in spite of official state sanctions. In Azerbaijan, an organization called the Struggle for Azerbaijani Independence sought to achieve autonomy and national recognition for the Azeri people by following the Yugoslav example. The Baltic republics, also contained their share of organized nationalism. From 1967-1968, the KGB uncovered twenty-five Lithuanian nationalist groups which consisted of dozens of anti-Russian ideologues who sought to drive Lithuania toward the path of independence. The entry mentions that between 1964 and 1968, the number of nationalist groups in Ukraine, Armenia, Latvia, and Lithuania doubled. In 1968, the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN) hosted its Fourth Great Meeting at which members established a consistent plan aimed at implementing nationalist tenets. One of the nationalists, Gorbovoii, asserted that “the era of fighting for Ukraine’s autonomy via the use of force and arms is over; the time has come to shrewdly infiltrate major Soviet positions in government, manufacturing, transportation, and education—thus eliminating USSR’s influence in Ukraine by destabilizing the system from within.” Mitrokhin concludes his entry by listing a number of prominent nationalist dissidents in Armenia, Ukraine, and Lithuania.
 
The Homyakov Case. Folder #87. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB files to describe Martin Ole Heinstadt-“Homyakov” (b.1947), a citizen of Norway, and a secretary/archivist at the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow. According to the entry, the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) of the KGB sent one of its operatives, Valerii Evgenevich Zverev, to a function at the Norwegian embassy in Moscow in May 1971. Zverev had been sent to the embassy in order to strengthen ties with SCD KGB operative “Pavlov.” As a cover, Zverev had adopted the identity of a foreign correspondent. The entry states that during the May 1971 gathering, Zverev met Homyakov with whom he was subsequently able to meet regularly. Homyakov began to give Zverev information about official embassy business, including details regarding Soviet citizens and embassy visitors Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that in order to continue receiving information, the SCD KGB ensured that Homyakov and Zverev met in a secluded region, away from the eyes of foreign visitors. The SCD KGB sent operative Andrei Mikhailovich Agekyan, who acted as a mediator between Homyakov and Zverev. Agekyan presented himself as an attorney who was capable of resolving disagreements. The entry mentions that Agekyan was able to “rescue his friends from impending problems.” KGB sources, as described by Mitrokhin, state that there was an agreement with Homyakov regarding the means of establishing contact with the SCD while he was in Norway. From May 4 to September 3, 1972 Homyakov was again in Moscow, where he worked as a guard at the Norwegian embassy. In relocating Homyakov to Moscow, the SCD KGB was able to continue to maintain its operations in the Norwegian embassy, and receive key documents from the Norwegian military attaché. Homyakov was later arrested by Norwegian authorities for espionage.
 
The Ezhov Case. Folder #85. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin gives an account of KGB operative Peter Yots (codename “Ingo” or “Ezhov”), and his assignments within the FRG. The KGB file presents a brief biographical sketch of Yots who was born in 1937 in Berlin, and was trained as an electrical technician who specialized in deciphering coded radio transmissions and telegrams. Drawing upon KGB files, Mitrokhin asserts that Yots worked as an agent in the First Chief Directorate which sent him to West Germany in 1961 to fulfill the aims of operation “Glavnoiie.” The operation, according to the file, required Yots to monitor the movement of FRG forces and military equipment at the “Aizedlerhoff” railroad station. Yots was, nonetheless, soon relocated to Nuremberg where he took up a job as a lighting technician at a local theater. Between 1962 and 1964, Yots contributed to operation “Delta” from the island of Nidervert off the coast of Nuremberg. The KGB account relates that Yots was authorized by the First Chief Directorate to use necessary means to intercept telegraph messages and other communications, so as to inflict “maximum damage” upon the enemy. In 1967, Yots was relocated to Munich, where he became employed as a lighting technician at a local television station. One of Yots’ Munich missions, codenamed “Zarevo,” involved carrying out the surveillance of the “Alley Café”—a bar owned by Adolf and Mariette Laimer which was frequented by Americans. The KGB entry mentions that Yots also monitored the U.S Consulate and all surrounding public venues which attracted American diplomats and personnel. Yots was relocated by the First Chief Directorate to Czechoslovakia on August 2, 1968 but returned to Munich in 1969.
 
The Lucy Case. Folder #74. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB files to describe Erlich Vranni “Lucy” (b. 1948), a native of Bern, Switzerland and the secretary of the Swiss Ambassador to Indonesia from 1969-1970. Beginning in January 1970, Lucy collaborated with Sergei Nikolayevich Argunov, an agent within the KGB’s branch in Jakarta, Indonesia. Argunov worked undercover in Indonesia as a correspondent for a Moscow radio station. According to the entry, Lucy showed support for the KGB’s branch in Jakarta and displayed much affection for Russian people, history, literature and culture. Mitrokhin has recorded that Lucy had become an avid reader of works by Dostoevsky, Chekov, and Turgenev. While working for the KGB, Lucy transmitted copies of three letters, prepared by the Swiss Embassy and intended for Renault Hauser at the Austrian Embassy, Susan Kelly at the Canadian Embassy, and May Menzis, personal secretary of the British Ambassador. Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that Lucy was captivated by the secretive nature of the KGB which made life “more interesting.” Lucy was rewarded 200 dollars for fulfilling her duties. According to the account, Lucy often mentioned to her colleagues that “she did her work not for the sake of earning money, but rather for the sake of being well-treated by the agency.” The account also affirms that Lucy did not embrace a given political belief system, and was indifferent to religion. KGB sources, as described by Mitrokhin, state that in September/October 1970, Lucy temporarily worked at a consulate in Saigon. She subsequently returned to Switzerland where she awaited a new assignment. The account mentions that Lucy refused to meet with other KGB agents during her stay in Switzerland, and that Sergei Argunov was sent to Bern in January/February 1971 to reestablish his ties with Lucy. Argunov was able to persuade Lucy to continue collaborating with other KBG agents in London/Canada. During their rendezvous, Argunov gave Lucy 500 Swiss francs. Nonetheless, according to Mitrokhin’s account, Lucy’s mission to Canada did not come to fruition and all ties between Lucy and the KGB were lost in 1971. There was unconfirmed evidence that Lucy went to the United States where she reestablished her contact with the KGB.
 
Solzhenitsyn, Codenamed Pauk [Spider]. Folder 40. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This folder contains information about KGB active measures directed at author Alexander Solzhenitsyn following his exile from the Soviet Union in 1974. The operational directives prepared by the KGB’s leadership for 1974 and 1975 are reproduced verbatim. They included plans to limit Solzhenitsyn’s influence in the West, discredit him and the pro-democracy literary journal “Continent” with which he was closely associated, and make his family fear for their personal safety. Many of the specific measures undertaken by the KGB are described in the document. These included televised interviews with men featured in “The Gulag Archipelago” in which they claimed that Solzhenitsyn fabricated or misrepresented their statements to him, the publication of personal letters between Solzhenitsyn and his close male friends which were intended to reveal the “intimacy of their relations,” and the publication of an article claiming that Solzhenitsyn failed to pay his taxes while he resided in Switzerland. The 1978 operation codenamed “Vampire 1” involved planting a news story which suggested that Solzhenitsyn was a KGB spy, and having it reprinted in prominent newspapers and journals throughout Europe and the US. The document concludes with an index of acronyms, people, and codenames mentioned in the folder.
 
Once More about Radio Liberty. Folder 66. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Contains information on KGB active measures to undermine the activities and credibility of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America during the mid 1970’s and early 1980’s. In one operation, personally authorized by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, the Spanish journal “Arriba” and 42 other Spanish journals published articles stating that Radio Liberty broadcasts into the USSR violated the Helsinki Accords because they impinged upon Soviet sovereignty, and were contrary to Spanish national interests. Following this activity, the Spanish leadership decided not to extend its agreement with the US which allowed Radio Liberty to broadcast from Spain. During a 1976 operation, an East German agent who worked as an international lawyer spread disinformation about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty’s ‘illegal’ activities in 35 foreign embassies in Vienna. In October 1977, the KGB sent letters to a variety of Western news outlets, including the Washington Post, claiming to be from a group of Radio Free Europe employees. These letters were directed specifically at US Senators Edward Kennedy, Charles Percy, and Frank Church, and Representatives Edward Derwinsky, Clement Zablocky, Herman Badillo, and Berkley Bedell. In 1981, with the help of the journal “Pravda,” the KGB exposed the role of Radio Liberty in the ‘events’ in Poland.
 
A novel entitled “Where is the truth?” Folder 18. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin describes how the Novosibirsk KGB Directorate dissuaded a former Gulag inmate from completing a novel based on his prison experiences during 1949-54. Pereverzev had been sent away to a forced labor camp twice. Having completed his prison terms, he returned to Novosibirsk and decided to write his own account of the Soviet reality. According the KGB Directorate, such writings would be readily accepted by bourgeois publishers. They became intent on putting an end to Pereverzev’s literary pursuits The KGB Directorate in Novosibirsk discovered that Pereverzev corresponded with citizens from capitalistic countries, visited the GDR on two occasions, and attended the American exhibition in Novosibirsk entitled “Public education in the USA.” Pereverzev was taken under closer surveillance. Agents “Gorin” and “Sorokin” obtained 1,100 typewritten pages of Pereverzev’s novel that depicted his imprisonment. Agent Sorokin, being a professional writer himself, judged the novel as a composition of high quality. Sorokin, however, was instructed to convince Pereverzev that the style and content of his writing were good-for-nothing. Sorokin pointed out flaws in the composition and advised Pereverzev to consult a publisher and ask for an official review from a respected local journal. The KGB Directorate arranged for both sources to give Pereverzev negative evaluation. Having received criticism from authoritative institutions, he began to despair of his abilities and gave up on finishing the novel.
 
Gulag Camps, 1959-73. Folder 19. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin provides an overview of several corrective labor camps in different parts of the Soviet Union. He selectively describes the state of these facilities, the kinds of prisoners, disciplinary measures, difficulties, etc. Up until 1956, Mitrokhin indicates, a large number of labor camps had been scattered across the Komi ASSR. The republic had 10,000 former convicts, particularly nationalists and members of the People’s Workers’ Union, the NTS. Due to these conditions, anti-Soviet organizations sprang up in the region. One of such anti-Soviet developments took place in February 1968, when Lithuanian nationalists in the city of Vorkuta commemorated Lithuania’s 50th anniversary of independence by getting together and calling on people to tune in to the Voice of America’s broadcast of celebrations. Later, an incident with reported casualties occurred at one of the coal mines in Vorkuta, provoking negative sentiments against communism. At a corrective labor camp in Dubravno, former foreign intelligence agents, cartel representatives, bourgeois nationalists, leaders of anti-Soviet and sectarian groupings, approximately 300 foreign citizens and persons without citizenship, and Chinese émigrés are detained. The camp is run by the Ministry for Defense of Public Law and Order. Since 1963, all particularly dangerous state criminals, regardless of where they committed offence, are detained at the Dubravno camp. Among particularly dangerous criminals are Gingsburg, Galasnikov, Dobrovolsky, Dikman, and Fediunin. Prisoners Daniel and Siniavsky are having a bad influence on the rest of inmates. Prisoners Moroz, Goronia, Masiutko and others are trying to stir up nationalistic attitudes. They have established connections with peers in Ukraine, including Svetlichny, Dziuba, and Chornovil. One of the critical requirements at corrective facilities is to maintain a differentiated placement of inmates. Mitrokhin writes that this is to ensure that recidivists and unrepentant “enemies of the people” are kept separate from those, who are likely to straighten out.
 
Heat Haze. Folder 20. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin notes that beginning in December 1970 and during the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the KGB had the following objective: to enhance intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the Cheka. To achieve this purpose, the KGB established a strategic unit consisting of heads of directorates, deputy secretaries, and other leading committee members chaired by Lieutenant General S.K. Tsvigun. Particular attention was given to signs of terrorist intentions. The unit counteracted eight anti-Soviet groups and organizations, including the Revolutionary Party of Intellectuals (Sverdlovsk), Russian Workers’ Party (Rostov-na-Donu), Struggle for Personal Freedom Union (Temirtau), Struggle for Liberation of Armenia Union (Yerevan), a group of Zionists, and others. Security level was elevated for entry into Moscow, monitoring of important targets, and conducting street patrols. On Red Square, 67 people harboring anti-Soviet views were detained, and four attempted suicides by burning were prevented.
 
Disintegration, 1976-77. Folder 22. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In 1976, Leningrad KGB Directorate initiated active measures against “Plushkin,” laboratory director, and “Monarkhist,” employee of a suburban forestry, both of whom were intending to establish an anti-Soviet organization. They formed a group of 22 members—representatives of intelligentsia in science and technology, workers, and students. The members described themselves as “truly Russian patriots” and pursued the policy of “bringing about an evolutionary change of an existing regime.” Back in 1967, Plushkin used to be a member of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of People. Active measures against Plushkin and Monarkhist were aimed primarily at neutralizing their influence on politically undecided people. Seven agents were asked to work on Plushkin and Monarkhist. Two additional agents in a position to conduct counterintelligence operations were recruited. These recruits—codenamed “Vladimir” and “Chebyshev”—were well-read in matters of philosophy and literature, and were able to penetrate entourage of Plushkin and Monarkhist. Agent “Kovrov” was instructed to gain leadership of the group and bring its members into conflict. The most difficult assignment was entrusted to agent “Tumenets.” His objective was to gradually dissuade Plushkin from his anti-social activity. The effort to disintegrate the group was divided into several stages. First, the agents narrowed down the circle of the dissidents’ associates. By 1977, the group lost 12 members. Then, criminal charges were pressed against Monarkhist. The ensuing police investigation caused distress and confusion, leading to a confrontation between Plushkin and Monarkhist. The third step in disintegrating the group was for Tumenets to convince Plushkin to contact the KGB. Plushkin consented, fearing that because of his past involvement in the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of People his identity had been exposed, and hoping that cooperation with the KGB might improve his case. He pleaded+ guilty and confessed to organizing illegal meetings and harboring anti-Soviet views. In April 1987, Plushkin summoned the remaining members to his apartment and they agreed to cease their underground activity.
 
Signs of Anti-Sovietism, 1972. Folder 21. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - On December 25, 1972 Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council granted the KGB authority to issue official warnings. The goal of the warnings was to prevent activities that threatened national security. Mitrokhin’s notes demonstrate that they were not intended as a punishment or penalty. The order of the Presidium provided for the use of the official warnings as a preventative measure. Preventative discussions with suspects involved interpretation of Soviet laws and explanation of potential consequences that could follow if anti-social activities were not immediately discontinued. Once issued, the official warnings of the KGB acquired the force of law. They were subsequently added to the KGB records and could be used as evidence in court. Operative data, statements, and agent communiqués could provide rationale for issuance of an official warning from the KGB. Article 2 of the Instructions for the Application of an Official Warning laid down the following basis for its use: a) production, possession, or distribution of politically harmful materials; b) oral dissemination of politically harmful pronouncements; c) participation in group activities violating social order, operation of a transport system, or state enterprises; d) contact with foreign citizens in cases when such contact is deemed to serve hostile purposes; e) entry, considered unlawful according to existing regulations, into embassies and other establishments representing capitalistic states, or residential buildings and vehicles belonging to their personnel; f) disclosure of secret and classified documentation. In this folder, Mitrokhin states that the right to use official warnings was reserved only to senior officials of the KGB Directorates 3, 5, 7, 9, and a limited number of other departments. Deputies of the abovementioned officials were also authorized to decide on matters relating to the use of the official warnings. Such warnings could also be applied to persons without citizenship and foreign citizens without the privilege of extraterritoriality. Mitrokhin lists criteria used to define hostile and anti-Soviet activity for which the official warnings could be issued. The KGB had a unified accounting system that described reasons for and circumstances of committed crimes, and outlined preventative measures that had been used. According to Mitrokhin’s summary of the 1977 statistical report accompanying the USSR criminal code, relating to section “Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda,” 89.9% of crimes were influenced by bourgeois radio misinformation, reading of politically harmful literature, and actions of hostile individuals. Included in the 1977 report is also an analysis of social status of many suspects and convicts, which contains such category as “kulak origins.” The report provides additional indicators regarding reasons for anti-Soviet behavior beyond these examples.
 
KGB Practices. Folder 70. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This entry contains brief descriptions of a variety of KGB operations carried out between the early 1960’s and late 1970’s, and provides a sampling of the kinds of operations that were common in that era. Operation “Grom” [“Thunder”] involved fabricating a US State Department memo on Soviet citizens’ inclination towards treason. The memo discussed ways in which the US could exploit this tendency to its advantage. It was published on the front page of the British newspaper “Daily Express.” A pamphlet created by the KGB and attributed to the terrorist organization ‘BAS’ (South Tyrolean Liberation Committee) was introduced as evidence in the trial of BAS leader Norbert Burger in Austria. In July 1976 the KGB residency in Singapore spied on Chess Grandmaster Boris Spassky during his visit to Singapore, and noted in its report that he spent much of his free time on the tennis court. The KGB created and disseminated a letter, ostensibly from nationalist Ukrainian emigrants, protesting the French government’s cooperation with Zionists, and threatening reprisals against French Zionists. The KGB residency in Austria organized operation “Bonga” [“Bigwig”] in which forged letters from Chairman Mao were produced. These letters indicated that Mao himself had essentially organized the opposition to Hua Guofeng’s reforms, and that Hua might lead China to a revisionist course. In March 1977, the newspaper of the Austrian Communist Party printed a translation of a secret Chilean document in which the Chilean secret police asked Gen. Augusto Pinochet for additional funds to carry out undercover operations abroad. Pinochet’s reply contained a harsh rebuke for the request, and a strong admonishment against engaging in clandestine operations abroad. Mitrokhin did not mention where the document came from, nor did he state whether it was authentic or a forgery.
 
The Bukovsky Case 1959-1976. Folder 26. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Vasily Mitrokhin describes the KGB handling of Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky, native of Bembei, Bashkir ASSR. Bukovsky has been under investigation by the KGB since 1959, when he was still in the 10th grade in the Moscow Secondary School No. 59. As a high school student, he authored a journal “Martyr” that contained negative comments about the CPSU. In 1960, he established a youth organization that produced illegal leaflets. Since then, Bukovsky engaged in a number of dissident events and was time and time again warned by the KGB against participating in such activities. Bukovsky continued and in 1963 Miss Stevens, an American citizen, passed to him a copy of a book by Milovan Djilas entitled “The New Class.” Bukovsky proceeded to disseminate it. On 1 June, 1963 criminal charges were pressed against Bukovsky following his arrest. It was decided to enroll him at the psychiatric clinic, the custody was first granted to his parents. Bukovsky continued his anti-Soviet activity and on 5 December 1965 joined protests in defense of Siniavsky and Daniel. He was interned in a psychiatric clinic that month. In the fall of 1966, Bukovsky, Daniel and Gubanov established a youth organization called “Avangard.” In 1967, Bukovsky was arrested once again. At trial, he spoke against Article 70 and 190 of the Constitution, stating they were ambivalent, vague and exploited to persecute political opponents of the CPSU. In 1972, Bukovsky was sentenced and sent to a labor camp. In 1976, he was exchanged for Corvalan, the leader of the Communist Party of Chile.
 
The Case of Zinovyeva and Others, 1972. Folder 23. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin describes KGB reports on slanderous and politically harmful material disseminated in Kaluga Oblast. In particular, such instances were reported in the city of Obninsk, where a well-known Institute of Physics and Energy and other scientific organizations are based. As a result of a systematic flight of young scholars abroad, the ongoing correspondence between many employees and foreign correspondents, and visits by foreign specialists, a substantial part of the scientific and technological intelligentsia has been influenced by harmful ideology. Zinovyeva, a 25-year-old senior laboratory assistant at the Institute of Physics and Energy, had been keeping contact with Vayl and Pimenov, both of whom had been formerly convicted for anti-Soviet activity. Zinovyeva periodically visited them in Kursk and Leningrad, received their manuscripts, and carefully disseminated their works among her colleagues at the Institute. Zinovyeva passed the material on to Ivanovsky, Dobrokvashyn, Vygodin, Sokolovsky and others. She went beyond just introducing her colleagues to the “spicy” writings, organizing regular readings. Agent “Smirnov” was among her closest acquaintances. Two additional agents penetrated here entourage. But agent “Kazakov” conducted the most active investigation. Zinovyeva introduced Kazakov to Pimenov’s memoirs and other ideologically harmful material that she had received from Vayl and Pimenov. Politically harmful material in Zinovyeva’s possession was photographed in the course of the investigation. With the help of agents Kazakov, Smirnov and K., the KGB tried to persuade Zinovyeva to stop disseminating ideologically harmful material and acknowledge the futility of such efforts. Nevertheless, Zinovyeva continued. Taking into account that Zinovyeva worked at the institution of strategic significance and enjoyed access to the top-secret projects, the KGB decided to implement legal measures against her. Thus, an emergency maintenance of the dormitory where Zinovyeva had been residing was arranged. During the repair, maintenance personnel came across Zinovyeva’s documents that contained slander on the Soviet state. All the material was seized from Zinovyeva and handed over to the special prosecutor’s office in Obninsk, resulting in criminal charges against her. The successful prosecution of the case drew suspicion away from the agents and involvement of the KGB. The judicial collegium of the Kaluga Oblast found Zinovyeva, Pimenov, and Vayl guilty. Zinovyeva was placed on a year-long probation. Pimenov and Vayl were sentenced to 5 years in a corrective camp.
 
Hot Pursuit, 1975. Folder 25. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Vasiliy Mitrokhin reports that on 7 May 1975 the border patrol officers detained a suspiciously-looking young man, between 20-22 years of age, for trespassing on the border zone in the village of Lunka, Glybovsky District, Chernivsty Oblast, who identified himself as Muntianov Boris Borisovich, resident of Odessa. His likeness did not match the passport photo and the officers asked that he follow them to the local security checkpoint. Muntianov resisted and attacked one of the officers, hitting him in the face. He headed for the deep forest and was able to escape. Searching the area, officers retrieved the trespasser’s rucksack that contained the Russian-English dictionary, a chocolate bar, flashlight, batteries, large-scale map of Chernivtsi Oblast, electric razor, binocular, four passports with different surnames, birth certificate, work-book, and a registration card issued to Petraukas Zigmas Yuzovich, native of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Lithuanian KGB informed that Petraukas is a wanted criminal. Local residents of Novoselitskoe and Glybovsky districts actively assisted in the search of Petraukas. On May 8, fifteen search teams with trained dogs scanned the forest. Petraukas was intercepted near the village of Marshynitsy, approximately five kilometers away from the border. Petraukas confessed during questioning that he was dissatisfied with the life in the USSR and was planning to escape via Romania to a capitalist country. The testimony was confirmed through the interior investigation in his cell.
 
The Cherepanov Case, 1968-1980 Folder 24. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this folder Vasiliy Mitrokhin reports that in 1968, a part-time student of the Vilnius Polytechnic University, Cherepanov, was sentenced to two years in a correctional facility for disseminating inflammatory leaflets in downtown Vilnius calling for the overthrow of the Soviet government. In 1970, he returned to Vilnius upon release and was unable to find employment. The KGB recruited Cherepanov, but in 1974 he was fired from the agency network for attempting to exploit his connection with the KGB for personal use, for behaving provocatively and making derogatory statements about the leadership of the KGB, and for intending to leave the Soviet Union. In 1978, Cherepanov met Yolanda Vachatis, citizen of Canada. They tried to get married, but the KGB intervened. In January 1980, Cherepanov attempted to leave for Israel. He applied for permission from the Office of Visas and Registration at the Ministry of the Interior, but was denied. In March 1980, Cherepanov met with Heikki A. Surye, citizen of Finland. Heikki agreed to assist Cherpanov and handed him a map marked with locations safe for escape. Cherepanov persuaded Surovets to come along. The two began collecting information critical of the Soviet regime in order to publish it in the Western press. On June 30, Cherepanov and Surovets left Vilnius for Riga. Once in Riga, Cherepanov mailed a letter to Vachatis, who resided in France at that time, saying that he was planning to meet her there sometime in July. On July 7, Cherepanov and Surovets reached the border zone. The warning system was set off, but, due to a rainy weather, footsteps could not be traced, enabling Cherepanov and Surovets to cross the border. Heads of the 11th and 2nd customs checkpoints and others were reprimanded for negligence and mismanagement of the situation. Cherepanov and Surovets were taken back to the USSR on July 24.
 
The Troyitsky Couple, 1964-65. Folder 27. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin reports on KGB investigation of the Troyistsky couple. Troyitskaya Lidiya Petrovna was a legal consultant at the Central Bureau of Technical Assistance, Glavzapaduralstroy. Her husband Troyitsky Zinovy Anatoliyevich was a member of the CPSU, senior instructor of law at the Perm State University. In order to distract the Troyitsky couple and wiretap their apartment, A. G. Korolkov, a member of the CPSU, reserve colonel, and the deputy director of the Central Bureau of Technical Assistance at Glavzapaduralstroy, was encouraged to establish friendly relations with them. From the audio record of the couple’s conversation, it was clear they were intending to go on vacation on September 2, 1964 and travel on a cruise ship to Astrakhan, stopping over in the town of Volsk, Saratov Oblast, on the way back to see Troyitskaya’s sister—L. P. Kazakova. The KGB launched the operation “Artists.” listening equipment was installed in their cabin on the ship. The couple slandered the USSR and expressed concerned for their safety in their conversations. At Kazakova’s apartment, the Troyitsky couple listened to the Voice of America, BBC and other radio stations. On September 17, the KGB conducted a covert search of the premises and photographed a notebook with addresses of their Soviet and foreign contacts On March 23, 1965 the KGB searched Troyitskys’ apartment, discovering a copy of the NTS (Narodno-trudovoy Soyuz) brochure in a Christmas ornament, and other items. In the aftermath of the search, the Troyitsky couple was arrested. Zinovy Troyitsky was sentenced to six years in various strict-regime facilities and was stripped of his license to teach. Lidiya Troyitska was sentenced to three years in a strict-regime colony.
 
The Campaign against Soviet Economic Policy. Folder 31. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin states that in 1978 the West attempted to gain influence over Soviet fiscal policy because the U.S.S.R. was in opposition to the Helsinki Accords. Soviet officials ensured the Soviet public that any attempts by the West to change the socialist system in the country would not affect domestic politics in any way. However, it would negatively affect the development of relations between the West and the East and would damage international economic and trade cooperation. According to Mitrokhin, the Soviet administration was especially concerned with Carter’s efforts to end any kind of collaboration with the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin provides a detailed plan prepared by Soviet officials to stop the anti-socialist campaign in the West that was led by the Carter administration.
 
The Solzhenitsyn Case. Folder 40. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin states that in 1974 the KGB prepared a plan to repress Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s anti-soviet activities in the West. The plan emphasized the importance of separating Solzhenitsyn from his supporters as well as using their testimony from interrogations against Solzhenitsyn. KGB chief Yuri Andropov approved this plan on September 19, 1974. Mitrokhin provides two pages of the signed plan in this entry, where Solzhenitsyn’s code-name was “Spider.” In 1975 the KGB prepared a more detailed and specific plan to take Solzhenitsyn’s activities under control. It was also crucially important to control the context of “The Continent” magazine. The plan called for KGB agents in the West to publish provocative materials about Solzhenitsyn that would give the impression that he was an undercover agent for the KGB. The plan was prepared by the First, the Second, and the Fifth Chief Directorates of the KGB. The plan is provided by Mitrokhin in the entry. In 1978, when Solzhenitsyn delivered his speech at Harvard University, the KGB was very pleased with its turnout and used it against him in his further anti-socialist activities. Representatives of the KGB in the Soviet Union and the Ministry for State Security of East Germany prepared operation “Vampire – 1.” This operation was focused on publishing many materials about “Spider” that would put him in a compromising position in the West. In 1978 “Neue Politik,” a western German magazine, published an article “Confessions of an agent “Vetrov,” also known as Solzhenitsyn” stating that Solzhenitsyn had been an active KGB undercover agent. This article was published in major magazines and newspapers in many Western countries. Mitrokhin states that this provocative publication almost ended Solzhenitsyn’s career.
 
The Tanov Case. Folder 43. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin describes the essential role that the KGB agent Tanov played in repressing the dissident movement in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. Mitrokhin states that Tanov had important connections and was a trusted person among Soviet dissidents which helped him to receive important information about their activities. Tanov’s primary target was Orlova who was friends with many dissidents in the U.S.S.R. and in the West. She introduced Tanov to many of her acquaintances, which helped him to broaden his connections. Mitrokhin partially focuses on describing how Tanov gained trust among anti-soviet activists. Mitrokhin also states that because of Tanov’s critical role, the KGB was able to establish a detailed list of dissidents, their activities, connections, places where they met as well as personal portraits
 
Practicing Psychiatry for Political Purposes. Folder # 28. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - According to Mitrokhin, psychiatry was used against people who promoted anti-socialist ideology. Mitrokhin provides the cases of Eugene Nikolaev and Vladimir Borisov who were forced to stay in psychiatric hospitals for their “incorrect political beliefs.” Nikolaev later wrote a book "The Betrayal of Hippocrates" where he described all of the methods used by doctors to change his views opposing the Soviet system. Mitrokhin reports that in 1975 the KGB became aware of the negative stands of the West on dissidents’ psychiatric treatment in the Soviet Union. They stated that Soviet policies neglected human rights. In December of the same year, the KGB prepared a plan, a copy of which is provided by Mitrokhin in the note, to eliminate the anti-soviet campaign that discredited the practice of psychiatry for political purposes. The KGB’s goal was to create the illusion that psychiatry was only used for legitimate medical reasons. The KGB officials started intensively expanding relations between foreign and Soviet doctors, organized numerous conferences and symposiums, and created an exchange program for neurologists in order to reach their goal. “Professor,” a trusted agent of the KGB, was ordered to collect materials about the abuse of psychiatry in capitalistic countries.
 
The KGB vs. Vatican City. Folder 29. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin describes the history of chilly diplomatic relations between the KGB and Vatican City from the 1960s through the mid 1980s. Vatican City officials were interested in establishing strong positions in the Soviet government for religious institutions. Mitrokhin states that during this period of time the KGB administration thought of Vatican City as one of the most crucial strategic locations in the world to monitor because officials there were actively promoting the importance of religion in the Soviet Union. According to Mitrokhin, organized religion in the Soviet republics was facing a leadership crisis due to the success of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In the 1960s the Catholic Church actively started promoting anti-Soviet philosophies and nationalism in the Soviet republics by distributing literature about capitalist ideology. As Mitrokhin states, Catholic followers were using different techniques to recruit more Soviet citizens; however, their primary focus was the young generation from becoming largely atheist. Vatican officials in the Soviet Union wanted to prevent another generation. Some Soviet religious radicals were assisting them in their attempts. Mitrokhin provides names, occupations, some biographical facts, as well as the KGB cases of the people who were involved in this undertaking. Mitrokhin provides a detailed description of spiritual-political life in Lithuania in the 1960s and early 1970s. Mitrokhin states that Catholic clergy played an active role in Lithuanian politics because their goal was to separate church from the government and to create strong religious opposition movement to the Soviet regime. Vatican officials sponsored many anti-socialist activities held in Lithuania yet they considered the Lithuanian opposition and nationalist movements to be the weakest among the Soviet republics. According to Mitrokhin, many Lithuanians were deeply offended by this attitude. In 1973, in the city of Kaunas, a young student named Kalantas committed suicide in public for this reason. Mitrokhin describes the details of that incident. The KGB was very concerned with all of the occurrences that took place in Lithuania. Mitrokhin provides a detailed plan that KGB officials prepared in order to stop religious and opposition movements. The folder also includes names, code-names, and undercover occupations of all KGB agents who were a part of this project. Vatican officials also provided financial aid for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. According to Mitrokhin, they had been supporting Western Ukrainian nationalists with their desire to religion. Mitrokhin provides evidence to support his statement: in spring of 1979 the KGB confiscated 12,000 undeclared rubles from Italian citizen Bernardo Vinchenso. He confessed that this money was given to him by Ivan Ortunskiy, a Ukrainian priest of the Greek Catholic Church in Italy. Pope John Paul II informed Ortunskiy that he was interested in receiving information about the political environment for the Creek Catholic Church, the exact number of Creek Catholic supporters, and their activities in Ukraine. Pope John Paul II had plans to help establish Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. According to Mitrokhin, in 1969 KGB chairman Yuri Andropov ordered the KGB to overcome all Vatican officials’ plans towards the Soviet Republics. Mitrokhin provides a specific plan that Andropov prepared to stop religious campaign in the U.S.S.R., the fundamental platform of which was to recruit as many Greek Catholic followers as possible. Mitrokhin provides three detailed examples of what the recruiting process looked like and what methods were used by KGB officers. Part 2/2 According to Mitrokhin, in 1967 Vatican City activities presented a greater threat to the world’s communist movement than ever before. That year the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) ordered the establishment of a special KGB subunit whose mission would be preventing ideological sabotage. The KGB administration states that the agents had difficulties working in the Vatican due to its small population. Residents of Vatican City were very careful in terms of Soviet espionage and neither trusted nor communicated with the Soviets. Mitrokhin provides a list of all KGB recruited agents who took a part in the mission including their names, code-names, background, and occupations. In 1970, in Budapest, Cheka officials of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary had discussions regarding the progress being made by their agents in Vatican City. Representatives of both countries were disappointed that their protégés had not yet gained access to the Secretariat of State documentation. The residency in Rome was absolutely focused on issues within the Vatican; Hungary remained responsible for all operations conducted by the intelligence services. In 1980 the KGB became aware of Poland’s close connections with Vatican officials. The KGB administration ordered residents in Poland to tighten relations with the socialist country. It was critical for the KGB to have agents who had Pope John Paul II’s trust and who could ask for his attention at any moment. The KGB and Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs started to form mutually beneficial relations. Mitrokhin provides a detailed agenda of goals that were meant to be reached with the help of the Polish intelligence service.
 
"The Kontinent" magazine. Folder 45. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this folder Mitrokhin provides the KGB plan to limit the influence of “The Kontinent” magazine on the dissidents’ movement in the West and in the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin states that there were a few of dissidents’ groups in Paris, but the editorial staff of “The Kontinent” had the most power and respect. The CIA funded publishing of the magazine through the committee of Radio Liberty. According to Mitrokhin, the magazine was first published in October of 1974 in West Germany. Most staff people were former citizens of the Soviet Union; however, two American CIA officers, Bailey and Betell, were a part of the editorial staff. Mitrokhin states that the fundamental goal of the magazine was to collect as many anti-soviet materials from different countries of the world, to unite all authors who promoted the dissidents’ movement in their publications, as well as to help Soviet writers to publish their anti-socialist compositions. Mitrokhin states that the KGB’s primary task was to cultivate strong connections within the editorial staff in order to prevent provocative works from being published as well as to limit the influence of the magazine by tarnishing its reputation. It was also planned to unite all dissidents, which would help to limit a number of their activities. Mitrokhin provides in this entry the KGB’s detailed plan for achieving these goals. However, according to Mitrokhin, The KGB was presented an unexpected challenge in its attempts to unite all dissidents. Dissidents constantly had disagreements and arguments within their community in regards of dissidents’ stands on different policies and issues. Due to such occurrences, the dissident movement expanded because many activists wanted a leadership position. They had been actively publishing more anti-soviet materials as well as taking part in many anti-soviet radio shows. Mitrokhin provides names of major activists. The First and the Fifth Chief Directorate of the KGB immediately started preparing a plan to limit these activities. According to Mitrokhin, their major task was to expose and exaggerate dissidents’ connections with the Central Intelligence Agency which would diminish their respect and influence
 
The Sakharov-Bonner Case. Folder 44. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this folder Mitrokhin provides a detailed history of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner’s anti-socialist activities in the Soviet Union as well as their achievements and failures. Mitrokhin states that in 1966 Sakharov stopped his scientific studies and became very involved in the dissident movement. At the end of 1970 he, along with other activists, organized the Committee of Human Rights in the Soviet Union. Sakharov gained much influence in the Soviet Union and used it to influence dissidents’ trials. Toward the end of 1974 the KGB discovered that Sakharov had been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The KGB residency in Oslo began to take steps to prevent Sakharov from receiving the prize. Mitrokhin states that the residency did not have strong connections with Nobel Prize officials, which led to Sakharov receiving the prize in 1975. Soviet Union officials did not let him travel to receive the prize, so his wife Yelena Bonner accepted it on his behalf. According to Mitrokhin, in 1977 Sakharov limited his activities in the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. Some people said that he was mentally tired of having conflicts with the authorities, but others stated that he did not have leadership skills as a person. Mitrokhin also states that he no longer pretended to be “a father of Russian democracy.” Mitrokhin includes two controversial articles about Sakharov that were published in the socialist countries which analyzed his personality. These articles stated that Sakharov was a weak individual and coincidence was the only reason that he became a leader of the dissident movement in the U.S.S.R. According to Mitrokhin, at the beginning of the 1980 he was exiled to Gorkiy-town without trial. The West felt very sympathetic for Sakharov, yet Soviet officials could no longer tolerate his anti-soviet activities. Mitrokhin points out the fact that Sakharov’s role in the Soviet nuclear program played a big role in his case. KGB officials interpreted it as Sakharov’s attempt to destroy his Motherland. According to Mitrokhin, the West was concerned about Sakharov’s fate and in 1986 Oslo officials were preparing an anti-soviet film about Sakharov’s role in promoting human rights in the U.S.S.R. Maximov, who prepared the plot of the documentary, also planned to include scenes from the Nobel Prize award ceremony. Mitrokhin based this entry on the copies of KGB documents that he provides in the end of this folder. Sakharov’s code-name was “Akset,” and his wife, Yelena Bonner, was named “Lisa.”
 
The Logician (The Zinoviev’s Case). Folder 46. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this short entry, Mitrokhin claims that the Fifth Chief Directorate of the KGB handled the case of Alexander Zinoviev. Zinoviev was an author of anti-soviet books, including "Yawning Heights" and "Bright Future." Mitrokhin states that Zinoviev was stripped of his Doctorate of Philosophy and also expelled from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for his anti-socialist publications. His KGB code-name was “Logician.” In November, 1978 the KGB residency in Bonn was ordered to monitor Zinoviev’s activities after he immigrated there.
 
The Komsomol meeting. Folder 47. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this note Mitrokhin describes events which took place at Moscow State University (MGU) in November 1956. Three students from the faculty of geography, Varuschenko, Nedobezhkin and Nosov, openly criticized actions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol). According to Mitrokhin, they claimed that the committee did not represent the youth’s interests, that the leaders of Komsomol were corrupted by the Communist Party, and that there was an absence of activities. The students stated that the Central Committee required fundamental reform in order to keep students united and active in political life. According to Mitrokhin, most students from all MGU faculties agreed with the statements made by the activists from the faculty of geography. They demanded to elect Varuschenko to the executive board of the Central Committee and also proposed to organize an independent organization to discuss issues that concerned most youths. That month Varuschenko was elected to the Central Committee and the Independent Club of Geographers was founded. Mitrokhin states that the KGB was extremely concerned about these circumstances. The administration feared that they had lost control over the youth. The KGB stated that the reason for this opposition was foreign propaganda brought to the Soviet Union by foreign students. As a result, the KGB quickly disbanded the new club and the new executive board of the Central Committee. Varuschenko was expelled from the university.
 
The Ginzburg's Case. Floder 48. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this folder Mitrokhin specifically focuses on Alexander Ginsburg’s anti-Soviet activities in the 1970s. The note recounts that Ginsburg was a repeat offender for promoting opposition to the Soviet regime and the head of the Russian Social Fund and Solzhenitsyn Fund. His position allowed him to receive financial and material aid from different foreign institutions–something that was prohibited by Soviet law. Ginsburg had been supplying these funds to many organizations promoting anti-socialist propaganda (including Ukrainian nationalist clubs, Jewish extremists, and Orthodox activists). According to Mitrokhin, Ginsburg received 270,000 rubles of foreign aid in the 1970s. Mitrokhin reports that the KGB believed that in 1976 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ordered Ginsburg to unite all anti-Soviet adherents to actively and publicly support the Helsinki Accords. He also had been passing on important information about major anti-Soviet activities held in the Soviet Union to American correspondents Thomas Kent, Alfred Short, and others. As Mitrokhin reports, in 1979 the CIA exchanged Ginsburg for two Soviet spies. After the exchange, Alexander Ginzburg was tried, but was not convicted because all witnesses refused to give evidence.
 
Stiffening control over citizens. Folder 56. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - This report provides evidence of a secret Moldovan KGB and Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) conference which took place in July 2, 1976. In this folder Mitrokhin provides a detailed plan for cooperation between these two institutions in order to provide state and public security. According to Mitrokhin, state security had been threatened by foreign spies, anti-socialist leadership, foreign tourists from capitalist countries, Jewish and German extremists, and sectarians. In order to counter these perceived threats, the officials of both institutions agreed to provide each other with the needed information, to organize events to promote socialism and patriotism, and to cooperate under any circumstances. This folder provides evidence that the officials were most concerned about foreign visitors and their activities in Moldova. A number of actions were taken to prohibit any kind of a threat, including special control over temporary residents, prohibiting immigration of people of Jewish and German descent, confiscating weapons from civilian foreigners, and detaining them in case they violate law and order. Mitrokhin points out that the officials agreed that strengthening the State Automobile Inspectorate (GAI) and border patrol would be necessary to avoid the chance of the smallest opposition movement.
 
Neutralizing of Dissidents’ Activities in the 1970s. Folder 49. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin describes dissidents’ activities in the Soviet Union and KGB attempts to stop them. According to Mitrokhin, in the 1970s the KGB was very concerned with the democratic movement in the Soviet republics. Dissidents, Soviet immigrants in the West, and religious activists were in strong opposition to socialism and were taking leadership positions among the citizens. KGB officials decided to immediately abolish the movement. Mitrokhin states that organized groups and clubs presented the greatest danger. In 1973, in Moscow, intellectuals founded a club called “Samopal,” where members discussed and criticized political issues, events in foreign countries, etc. Also, the youth began a hippie movement and were promoting anti-socialist ideas. Hippie movement had more than 200 members and was gaining great popularity among Soviet students. Mitrokhin describes a black market in Leningrad where illegal literature was sold. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was the most popular author among those whose publications were prohibited. In this report Mitrokhin especially focuses on KGB activities to stop the anti-socialist movement led by former Soviet citizens in the West. Mitrokhin provides an actual copy of the original KGB plan of action that was prepared for this mission. The first task was to interrupt any kind of communication between the immigrants and Soviet people and to block all possible means of foreign correspondence. It was also highly important to know about all conflicts and disagreements between dissidents in order to surreptitiously deepen them, so as to destroy any kind of a unity. New York and Paris were two major cities in the interest of KGB. In the second part of the note, Mitrokhin discusses an issue with foreign media, their interest in Soviet immigrants, and attitude towards the KGB. Western media, especially radio stations, Mitrokhin states, kept in close touch with immigrant dissidents. They often participated in talk-shows promoting anti-socialist ideology. In 1977 the American journalist [Arthur] Sulzberger published an article in “The New York Times” where he attacked KGB actions towards dissidents. A month after this incident, the KGB published a list of foreigners who were not allowed to cross the Soviet border. Mitrokhin also provides a list of undercover KGB agents who travelled abroad as interns, relatives of citizens of the Western countries or professors of colleges in order to build close relations with dissidents.
 
The Telegram "Dogma." Folder 50. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - According to Mitrokhin, in 1979 KGB headquarters sent a telegram to its residencies abroad stating that Soviet intelligentsia, the American embassy in Moscow, and foreign correspondents who were accredited to work in the Soviet Union, had been holding anti-soviet activities. The telegram text, which is provided by Mitrokhin in his entry, states that Kopalev, Chukovskaya, Kornilov, Vladimov, and Vojnovich were expelled from the U.S.S.R. Union of Writers for their anti-socialist publications. However, after this incident they started to gain influence among Soviet writers and many anti-soviet materials were published, which led to publication of the almanac “Metropol.” The American embassy assisted the publication by organizing events with influential intelligentsia of the West who inspired Soviet writers in favor of capitalism. Mitrokhin states that KGB officials ordered all residencies to immediately stop these activities. It was planned to publish provocative materials about all Western supporters of the almanac. KGB residencies in the West were in charge of collecting these materials.
 
Association of the United Postwar Immigrants. Folder 52. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin provides an example of methods the KGB used to make foreign intelligence services distrust Soviet anti-socialist organizations. Mitrokhin cites the case of the Association of the United Soviet Postwar Immigrants. According to Mitrokhin, the head of the organization was a former citizen of the Soviet Union, but after WWII he stayed in Western Germany and had been actively promoting anti-socialist ideology among immigrants. Mitrokhin does not provide his real name, but uses his KGB codename “Konstantinov.” According to Mitrokhin, in February of 1963 the KGB sent counterfeit documents to West German counter-intelligence stating that “Konstantinov” had been an active KGB spy since WWII. The KGB also sent letters in the name of Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants to National Alliance of Russian Solidarists stating that the officials of the latter organization are “politically bankrupt” and that they were no longer able to promote anti-socialist ideology. The KGB residency in Belgium prepared a flyer with false information stating that the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was a corrupt institution whose president used its funds for personal use. According to Mitrokhin, the reputation of the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was destroyed and no longer remained influential.
 
Kompromats. Folder 34. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin explains the importance of having kompromats (a form of grey propaganda used in information warfare against opponents in business and politics) for Soviet anti-socialist activists. Mitrokhin provides two examples of KGB kompromats that played significant roles in repressing oppositionists. In late 1960s the Ukrainian nationalist movement had been growing in popularity. Ivanchenko was one of the radicals who allowed himself to publicly criticize Soviet policies and claimed that Ukraine faced Russification. He organized a club that promoted anti-socialist philosophy. All these facts of his biography were documented by the KGB. Mitrokhin states that Ivanchenko knew many influential Ukrainian nationalists very well. His connections were critical to the KGB. According to Mitrokhin, in 1970 he was blackmailed by the KGB. They used a kompromat: either Ivanchenko became their undercover agent and helped them to fight the anti-socialist movement or he would be excluded from the university and charged for his ideological crimes. Ivanchenko was recruited and his new codename was “Nikolai.” In another example of kompromat Mitrokhin states that in the second half of 1972 Jewish population in Odessa started an opposition movement against the Soviet immigration policies. One of their leaders, Emmanuel Pekar, was once arrested at the Odessa market for selling watches of foreign origin; however he was not charged. Mitrokhin states that Pekar was offered a choice—to become a KGB undercover agent in the Jewish community or go to trial for speculation. Pekar was recruited and his new codename was “Milan.”
 
The Conrad Case. Folder 72. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this folder Mitrokhin describes the work experience of German KGB agent Conrad (codename “Gregor”), his experience as a spy, involvement with communist parties in different countries, and activities as the head of military sabotage groups in Western Europe. Mitrokhin states that Conrad’s career path begins in February 1936 when he moved to Norway, Oslo and met with KGB officer Ernst (codename “Anton”), who at that time was the NVKD resident in the Scandinavian countries. Ernst recruited Conrad to organize sabotage missions in Europe. These missions failed, since Conrad was unprepared to accomplish them (including an attempt to destroy the steamboat “Stephen Bathory” in 1938). He was forced to leave to France to avoid being imprisoned. Conrad and Ernst lost contact at the beginning of WWII in Europe. Conrad stayed German occupied Paris. Mitrokhin’s note recounts that from 1941 to 1944 Conrad was a member of the French Resistance. In April 1945 the Socialist Unity Party of Germany decided to return Conrad to Germany, where he started organizing committees of the German Communist Party. Mitrokhin provides evidence that in 1949 Conrad delivered Curt Muller, the Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Germany (the KPD, West Germany), to East Berlin. But because Muller’s wife escaped and informed the West German intelligence agency, Conrad had to leave West Berlin to avoid the risk of being captured. According to Mitrokhin, in 1952 [Semyon] Ignatyev, the minister of State Security, issued a decree to look for responsible people to organize military sabotage in the West. That year KBG agents in Berlin learned about Conrad and his involvement with Ernst in the past, and he was made an agent of Ministry for State Security of the USSR in East Germany after he was trained to use different types of mines, to look for weapon caches, and to read secret writing. Mitrokhin states that beginning with 1953 Conrad absolutely relied on KGB funding and was the head of all resistance movement groups in West Germany. In 1977 Conrad was awarded the order of the Red Star for his long-term work for the Soviet Union’s interests.
 
The Pathfinders (the Sinyavsky-Daniel show trial. Folder 41. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this case Mitrokhin provides a history of the Sinyavsky-Daniel show trial. Between 1959 and 1962 two unknown Russian authors (pseudonyms Tertz and Arzhak) published two anti-soviet books, “This is Moscow Speaking” and “The Trial Begins,” in Western countries. The KGB was not familiar with the authors and did not know where they lived. According to Mitrokhin, KGB agent “Efimov” discovered that a litterateur from Moscow, Yuliy Daniel, had some anti-soviet materials. In the beginning of 1964 the analysis of all available information proved that Daniel was the author of “This is Moscow Speaking” and that his pseudonym was Arzhak. It was soon discovered that Tertz, whose real name was Sinyavsky, was Arzhak’s close friend. The KGB began a new operation “The Imitators,” which helped to learn about their connections abroad, new works in progress, places where authors kept their original writings as well as the means they used to send their literature to the West. Mitrokhin states that KGB agents had difficulties working because Sinyavsky once was an agent for the KGB, so he was familiar with all of the techniques. In September 1965, after the KGB collected all of the necessary information, a criminal case was opened. Sinyavsky and Daniel were arrested. Mitrokhin provides details of the investigation process. In February 1966 the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union sentenced “the imitators.” Sinyavsky was sentenced to seven years in jail and Daniel was sentenced to five. After Sinyavsky served his time, he moved to France with his wife where he became well respected among immigrants. According to Mitrokhin, however, later on he lost that respect because he published a provocative book A Walk with Pushkin. Mitrokhin states that the KGB kept monitoring Sinyavsky’s activities throughout his career in France.
 
Around the Nomination (The Case of Orlov). Folder 42. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this folder Mitrokhin expresses the KGB’s concerns regarding the potential for Yuri Orlov’s nomination for a Nobel Prize. Orlov was well known in the Soviet Union for his dissident activities and for organizing the Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor Soviet adherence to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. According to Mitrokhin, he openly supported all anti-soviet groups and organized public protests for the Soviet human rights movement. As the KGB was concerned, they made many efforts to take the movement under control, but these did not lead to success. Mitrokhin provides examples of the KGB’s attempts to stop Orlov’s activism. Mitrokhin states that the West, however, was in extreme support of Orlov’s ideology. In order to help his movement to gain more influence, Western officials nominated Orlov for the Nobel Prize in 1978. The KGB immediately developed a complex plan to assure Nobel officials that Orlov did not deserve the prize and that it would have been unfavorable for the prestige of the Nobel Prize if Orlov was awarded it. Mitrokhin states that KGB chief Yuri Andropov took control over the operation because Orlov winning the prize would have been crucially harmful for the Soviet political system. Mitrokhin provides the detailed plan in this entry. A KGB resident in Oslo sent an urgent telegram to Moscow on October 27, 1978 stating that Anwar El Sadat and Menachem Begin became laureates of the Nobel Peace prize. Mitrokhin provides full telegram text in this entry and also states that the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs expressed his satisfaction with the fact that Orlov did not win the prize because it would have negatively affected relations between the two countries.
 
The U.S.S.R.-France Society. Folder 71. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - This note describes the relations between the U.S.S.R. – France Society and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD). According to Mitrokhin, SSOD was founded in 1958 as a public organization for intellectuals interested in Soviet studies. However, the U.S.S.R. – France Society served as a cover institution for KGB agents. Although the multi-national organization was a threat to leaks of confidential information, under cover agents used the relations between the two organizations to establish connections with diplomats, the heads of influential clubs, journalists, and scientists. It was convenient for KGB agents to organize events to promote political goals. Because of the relations developed as a result of these activities, the KGB residency prevented a number of anti-socialist decisions.
 
Operational Techniques. Folder 76. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this folder Mitrokhin reports on some spy techniques used by the KGB in major western European cities (including Helsinki, Geneva, Bucharest) in 1975. According to Mitrokhin, the main tasks for KGB residents trained in the use of operational techniques were to check post offices for foreign correspondence, to secretly receive information about meetings of officials of a certain country, and to videotape any acts of anti-socialist movements. This note provides detailed statistics on the photographs taken of foreign mail, telephone recordings, and radio-intercepts. Mitrokhin specifically focuses on operations which took place in Vienna. As his note states, KGB agents photographed thousands of pages of secret materials using the “Zagadka,” a mini-camera built into a regular pen. The KGB residency had their own “TS” correspondence service with 98 N-line—undercover agents operated by legal residents—around Europe. Residents used microdot script and steganography —the art of writing hidden messages—for agents of N-line. As Mitrokhin states, X-line—residency subunit of scientific-technical investigation—agents’ tasks were to provide materials for secret operations. They built in a recording device in an ashtray, used the inside of an automobile seats to keep secret materials, and batteries for cameras. Mitrokhin also provides the exact number and names of all KGB residency agencies in Vienna in 1975, and describes security techniques used for their technology and agents.
 
The Case of Hmelyova: "The Witch." Folder #37. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - In this entry, Mitrokhin relates the KGB details surrounding “The Witch”—Aida Moiseeva Hmelyova (b. 1936), a native of the Kokchetavskii region in Russia. Mitrokhin describes how Hmelyova was investigated by Moscow’s Fifth Directorate of the KGB which shadowed her throughout 1969. According to KGB files, Hmelyova maintained close ties with Ginsburg and Galanskii, and had positioned herself against the Soviet government by participating in anti-state demonstrations, particularly within the Democratic Movement. Drawing upon KGB sources, Mitrokhin mentions that Hmelyova had passed on harmful material to foreign officials, and had spread anti-Soviet documents within her social circle. In February 1971, Hmelyova accompanied Galanskii to the Dubrov Camp in order to collect information about the condition of inmates and to take photographs in restricted areas of the camp. The KGB file asserts that when an agent named Gabriel Kolko (the identity of Kolko within the entry is questionable) was arrested, he declared that the materials he had received to send abroad came from Hmelyova. The entry goes on to state that Hmelyova even had a negative impact on her children, in whom she aroused anti-Soviet sentiments. Hmelyova’s apartment had often served as a gathering place for foreign visitors. Beginning in 1975, Hmelyova and Sichev (whom she married in 1977), became the spokespersons for the so-called Free Artists. According to KGB sources Hmelyova and Sichev often hosted exhibitions at their apartment which presented the works of the artists, and were attended by anti-Soviets, foreign correspondents, and diplomats. The KGB entry concludes by describing how in May 1978, the KGB conducted a preventative talk with Hmelyova. During the conversation Hmelyova was warned that in the long run, her role in anti-Soviet movements would result in administrative sanctions. Nonetheless, Hmelyova continued to assume an adversarial stance. In January 1979, Hmelyova participated in the founding of an organization called “Election-79.” In October 1979, Hmelyova and her husband Sichev emigrated abroad.
 
The “MRAKOBES” [Obscurantist] Case, 1960-61. Folder 15. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This report from Vasiliy Mitrokhin presents evidence of an anonymous writer—“Mrakobes”— who between 1960 and 1961 delivered anti-Soviet letters and caricatures of government and party leaders to foreign embassies and Soviet institutions in Moscow. The letters were written by hand and contained Church Slavic fonts and constructions. They were put in a letter box at different times of the day, in different parts of Moscow. Each set of letters was put in a different letter box. Examination of text, envelopes, and paper demonstrated that the anonymous author was familiar with rare literature, had a good command of musical and church lexicon, and made good use of figures of speech. The author was also estimated to be a middle-age male with education in humanities. From some letters intercepted by the KGB, operatives obtained his fingerprints. They also observed that one letter box was frequented by the anonymous writer more than others. The KGB laid an ambush. The hideout for the operatives was camouflaged as a storage room and a light signal was set up. Several weeks later, on February 5, 1961 “Mrakobes” delivered four letters. A surveillance team identified him as S.F. Petrakov (born 1924). To verify it was the right person, the team wanted to check his fingerprints against the earlier obtained fingerprint. Petrakov was invited to a medical inspection, during which an operative posing as a doctor fingerprinted him with a magnifying glass. Petrakov’s identity was confirmed. He confessed to having produced around 100 anti-Soviet documents that had been mailed by post at various times.
 
Non-conformism. Evolution of the “democratic movement” as a politically harmful process since the mid-1950s. Folder 9. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In this transcript, Mitrokhin points out that according to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) bourgeois ideology affected cohesion of the Soviet society in three major ways: 1) by creating opposition and manipulating people’s personal weaknesses in order to pull apart the Soviet organism; 2) by inflaming disputes between younger and older generations, members of intelligentsia and working class; 3) by building up everyday propagandist pressure. The democratic movement originated in 1950s. It largely consisted of artists and literary figures of the time who advocated the conception of a democratic society. Mitrokhin indicates that the Soviet government also regarded all revisionists, nationalists, Zionists, members of church and religious sects to be a part of the Democratic movement. The Russian offices of the Amnesty International and Helsinki Accords Watch were also branded as members of the opposition. Among the well-known and active followers of the Democratic movement were author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the 1958 Nobel Laureate in Literature Boris Pasternak, and the founders of the Chronicle of Current Events, the anti-Soviet bulletin launched in 1968, Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin. By 1970s, Yakir and Krasin had overseen the publication of about 27 issues of the bulletin. Soon, the emergence of a series of samizdat journals and dissident groups led to the initiation of a firm “parallel political life.” However, following the arrest of Yakir in 1972, the Democratic movement began to decline. A number of involved individuals were subjected to a compulsory medical treatment. The official policy of the KGB was to deny any claims, whatsoever, of the existence of the Democratic movement. The dissident movement in the Soviet Union, Mitrokhin maintains, was a combination of legal and illegal forms of protest against socialism. Nevertheless, the KGB asserted that dissidents were not a product of the socialist system of government, but rather a “foster child” of the Western ideology and the secret services of the United States and Western Europe. The Democratic movement included members both from inside and outside the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin suggests that according to the KGB’s point of view, the ultimate goal of the insiders was to overthrow the Soviet regime. The outside dissidents sought to spread out the dissident ideology to other socialist countries, thereby garnering international support. To the KGB, the outside component was particularly dangerous part of the Democratic movement. In 1980, the KGB attempted to discredit dissident activity by publishing The White Book. For a brief period, the publication introduced a new term “uluchshysty,” meaning “improvers.” The so-called improvers posed as a counterweight to the dissidents. In instances where dissidents sought to weaken the government, the improvers searched for means to strengthen it. Among dissidents, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was at the forefront of the Democratic movement. He based his vision on the notion of nonviolent revolution and passive resistance. Solzhenitsyn called for the rejection of the Communist Party’s (CPSU) controlling position. Since 1980, dissidents concentrated primarily in Paris, New-York and London. Their main function was to disseminate written materials challenging the legal basis of the Soviet rule. The dissidents protested against the dictatorship of the CPSU, which, they believed, was firmly secured in the 1977 Constitution. As a result of such built-in constitutional bent toward the supremacy of the Communist Party, citizens of the USSR whose views ran contrary to that of the Party automatically acted in violation of the law.
 
Aleksandr Antonov, 1917-1921 case. Folder 7. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Contains a detailed account of the Tambov Province peasant revolt. The article narrowly focuses on the causes of the revolt, Aleksandr Antonov’s biography, and the NKVD efforts to suppress the revolt. In 1919-1921, a forced systematic collection of peasant food and supplies coupled with high taxes contributed to an atmosphere of unrest in Tambov Province. Together with several followers, Aleksandr Antonov launched a resistance movement directed against Bolshevism. In 1919, Antonov trained 150 men in the art of war and the number of followers grew rapidly since then. Having penetrated Antonov’s inner circle and arrested some of the key figures of the organized resistance movement in Tambov, the NKVD eventually put down the revolt.
 
Operation "LES" (The Forest). The 1940-50 MGB Operation Against Moldavian "Freedom Party." Folder 8. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - In the post-WWII period there were approximately 30 active anti-Soviet organizations in Moldova. Operation “LES” aimed at the elimination of the “Freedom Party” that existed from 1949 until 1950. “Freedom Party” was established in May 1949 by brothers Istratiy and Viktor Andreev. It was divided into separate cells of five members. Each member created their own cell, and each cell had its own leader. The organization networked with nationalist groups throughout Moldova and western Ukraine, where it often purchased ammunition and enlisted nationalist-minded partisans. According to its charter, the core function of the “Freedom Party” was to restore people’s freedom and guarantee the return of monarchy. By 1950, the operation “LES” involved more than 20 KGB agents. Agents “Moriak,” (Sailor) “Busuioc,” (Basil) and “Vernyj” (Trustworthy) were among the KGB’s main informants. At the time of their arrest on 5 June 1950, the anti-Soviet formation “Freedom Party” had 33 members.
 
Agent Reports. Procedural guidance on the form of agent reports in criminal cases. Folder 10. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - This document outlines the limits and requirements of an agent’s engagement in the implementation of given objectives. The limits of an agent’s participation in a criminal investigation are set by an operative responsible for a particular case. Taking into account concrete circumstances of each assignment, the operative determines proper format of an agent report in order to fully detail all relevant information. The primary requirement of agent reports is to capture the circumstances, connections, and function of persons and events under investigation. Agent reports must be comprehensive, complete and objective. In criminal cases, every agent must conduct a deep examination of one’s lifestyle, behavior, habits, psychological condition, peer pressure, facial expressions and intonation. Agent reports are attached to an agent’s Working and Personal files. When an agent is relocated to a different KGB center, the reports included in the Working file remain in the original center for 10 years, while his or her Personal file is sent to a new location, where a new Working file is created.
 
By way of introduction. Folder 5. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Contains Vasiliy Rozanov’s brief personal observations of the first years of Lenin’s regime. Rozanov, Russian writer and philosopher, describes the creation of the early police agencies that emerged between 1917 and 1918. Among the first military and police institutions set up across Russian cities by Lenin’s Bolshevik government were the Military-Revolutionary Committee (Vojenno-revolutsyonnyj komitet, VRK) and the Union of People’s Commissioners (Sovet Narodnyh Komisarov, SNK). These agencies aimed to bring anti-Soviet newspapers and publications under government control. All bourgeois and Menshevik publications were to be shut down. On 20 December 1918, the SNK established a special commission entitled the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Vserossiyskaya chrezvychajnaya komissiya). The commission’s core function was to combat counterrevolution and sabotage. Mitrokhin quotes Rozanov as having written that every new recruit of the Extraordinary Commission had to “disavow one’s own will and be subordinate to duty alone.” Lenin’s policy was to achieve unconditional and unquestioning obedience so that no decision could be taken without directives from the Party. According to Mitrokhin, Rozanov also indicates that in 1921 Lenin viewed freedom of speech as a political tool of bourgeois. In 1922, during the drafting of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Lenin advised Kurskiy, RSFSR Justice Commissioner (Narkom justisyj), to impose the highest degree of punishment for involvement in propaganda and agitation. Lenin sought to avoid the mistakes of the Paris Commune, which, he believed, had closed down bourgeois newspapers too late. Written by Rozanov in 1919, this personal account begins with a literary introduction that depicts the first years of Lenin’s regime as an “iron curtain descending upon Russian History.”
 
Pseudonym. Folder 11. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Mitrokhin states that discipline was the main reason for assigning a pseudonym to a KGB agent. Some agents refused to choose a pseudonym, considering it to be humiliating. But as Mitrokhin points out, a refusal to use a pseudonym could diminish the psychological and operational effect of the recruitment process. The KGB Order No. 00430 stipulated that all recruits had to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding their collaboration with the agency. The KGB Order No. 00235 specified that the most valuable agents had to be indexed solely by their respective pseudonyms. As a recruitment tactic, Mitrokhin notes, the use of a pseudonym enhanced agent’s awareness of the secretive nature of one’s work and accentuated the conspiratorial function of the KGB.
 
Directorate K Memorandum No. 153/838, 21 January 1976. Folder 13. The Chekist Anthology
June 01 2007 - The Memorandum No. 153/838 considered problems associated with the dissident movement of the Peoples Workers’ Union (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz, NTS). Vasiliy Mitrokhin writes that among the primary concerns mentioned in the Memorandum was the execution of complex active measures to aggravate contradictions between the leadership of various NTS groups. The Memorandum instructed operatives to observe relations of the NTS with the publishers of the journal “Continent.” In order to fuel up tensions between the NTS groups, operatives needed to, among other things, find out whether members of the “Continent” received higher payments than members of the NTS. In general, Mitrokhin suggests that the foremost purpose of the Memorandum was to gather disreputable information and undermine activities of the NTS.
 
Disarming “Osot” ideologically, 1963-73. Folder 12. The Chekist Anthology.
June 01 2007 - Vasiliy Mitrokhin provides a detailed account of the KGB active measures in the case of Vladimir Dremluga, codenamed “Osot.” In 1963, at the age of 23, Dremluga was put on probation for his repeated attempts to leave the country. In 1964, Dremluga enrolled in the Leningrad University where he met Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, the leading members of the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current Affairs. A year later, Dremluga was dismissed from the University for indecent behavior. In 1968, he was sentenced to three years in jail for acting inimically to the country. While in prison, Dremluga did not disavow his anti-Soviet beliefs. Upon his release in 1971 he was sentenced again. During his second imprisonment in Yakutia, the KGB decided to proceed with active measures against Dremluga. Dremluga’s second prison term had no impact on his overt anti-Soviet statements. However, he became reclusive, exercising more caution and deliberation in making new acquaintances. The next step for the KGB was to introduce him to agent “Mayskiy” (May). Agent Mayskiy reported that Dremluga’s lengthy imprisonment had restricted his communication with friends in Moscow who shared his beliefs. He actively sought ways to reconnect with them. The KGB’s plan was to initiate a “postal chain” for Dremluga to supposedly reestablish his channels of communication. Agent Mayskiy offered Dremluga to correspond with his peers in Moscow through Svetlana, Mayskiy’s friend in Yakutsk who had an acquaintance in Moscow. Svetlana was to be reached through “Maslova,” allegedly a teacher at the prisoner’s night school. In fact, all correspondence went directly to the KGB. By means of such “postal chain,” the KGB was able to work out Yakir and Krasin and, consequently, press criminal charges against them. In his written conversations, Dremluga continued to express anti-Soviet opinions. But his convictions were soon undermined by the Yakir and Krasin’s trial and letters he received from the operatives in Moscow, depicting a tragic defeat of the democratic movement. Dremluga became uncertain and wavering. Having isolated Dremluga from his like-minded friends, the KGB then insisted that he repent and publicly condemn his own anti-Soviet actions. For fear of reprisal, Dremluga eventually renounced his views and condemned his activity.
 

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