Cold War International History Project
Virtual Archive 2.0

Korea, unification of

Ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
March 21 1950 - Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin reporting his meeting March 20 with Kim Il Sung and Kim's request for a meeting with Stalin in April.
 
Ciphered telegram, Soviet representative Aleksei Ignatieff in Pyongyang Ignatiev to Vyshinsky
April 10 1950 - Telegram from telegram, Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Aleksei Ignatieff Ignatiev to Vyshinsky concerning a report from the North Korean deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. The deputy chairman reported about diplomatic overtures from Mao to the DPRK and North Korean partisan activities in the South.
 
Telegram Ignatiev to Vyshinski
April 10 1950 - Telegram from telegram, Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Aleksei Ignatieff Ignatiev to Vyshinsky concerning a report from the North Korean deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. The deputy chairman reported about diplomatic overtures from Mao to the DPRK and North Korean partisan activities in the South.
 
Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinski regarding meeting with Kim Il Sung
May 12 1950 - Shtykov reports of a meeting with Kim Il Sung, in which Kim Il Sung tells Shtykov the questions he means to ask Mao Zedong in a following meeting in Beijing the next day.
 
Top secret report on military situation by Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov
June 26 1950 - Report from Shtykov to Zakharov detailing North Korean advances on the first day of the Korean War. Included is a list of conclusions drawn up by Shtykov regarding the conduct of Northern and Southern forces thus far.
 
Ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov)
July 01 1950 - Reply from Stalin to Shtykov's telegram of July 1, 1950. Requests additional information on KPA plans and reaction to American internvention. Informs of intent to meet requests by Kim Il Sung for additional war materiel.
 
Ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on North Korea
July 01 1950 - Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin (copied to the Soviet leadership) describing the successes of KPA forces in the South. He also relays the concern of some of the DPRK cadre regarding American intervention.
 
Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the People’s Republic of China [PRC] N.V. Roshchin)
July 05 1950 - A telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai with regards to India's mediation in the PRC's entry into the UN, Chinese troop movements in preparation for a possible Southern/Allied counterattack, and Soviet planes flying over Manchuria.
 
Ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)
August 28 1950 - Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il Sung, congratulating him for his victories thus far and offering the help of the Soviet air force.
 
Telegram from Fyn Si (Stalin) to Matveyev (Army Gen. M.V. Zakharov) and Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK T.F. Shtykov, approved 27 September 1950 Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo
September 27 1950 - Telegram from Stalin to Soviet representatives in the DPRK containing extracts from a meeting of the VKP CC(b). The message expresses Stalin's displeasure with the KPA forces' conduct of battle and issues a series of directives for continuing the campaign.
 
Ciphered Telegram, DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist leader Pak Hon- Yong to Stalin (via Shtykov)
September 29 1950 - Telegram from Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong telling Stalin of the losses they have incurred following American air and ground attacks in South Korea and of their general lack of supplies and trained personnel. They explain that should the Americans cross the 38th parallel, North Korea and Communist South Korea would require immediate and direct military assistance from the Soviet Union (or at least the benefits of Stalin’s influence over Chinese volunteer forces) in order to avoid complete American capture.
 
Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia (Stalin)
September 30 1950 - Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin reporting the dire circumstances into which the North Koreans had fallen in the wake of the Inchon landings. Mentioned is a correspondence between the North Koreans and Mao which hinted at possible Chinese aid.
 
Draft Telegram, Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov)
September 30 1950 - A message from Stalin to Matveyev approving Kim Il Sung's plans to reconsolidate KPA forces and pull out of South Korea.
 
Ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government
December 07 1950 - A telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Moscow, informing the Soviet leadershipof the terms under which the Chinese will consider an armistice on the Korean Peninsula.
 
VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York
December 07 1950 - Message to Vyshinsky that U.S. proposals for a ceasefire should not be accepted as they are negotiating from a position of weakness after several defeats.
 
Ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai
December 07 1950 - Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.
 
“Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,” Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) and Approved in Principle at a Meeting of the CCP Central Secretariat, [Excerpt]
March 02 1954 - Zhou discusses the need to make agreements at the Geneva conference in order to open a path for discussion and negotiation with the west. Zhou notes that because the US, France and Britain are not united in their opinions, the CCP must hold fast to their positions on the peaceful unification of Korea, and of peace in Indochina. Finally, Zhou suggests that the CCP prepare to discuss issues of trade, relaxing international tensions, and breaking the US embargo, although these issues are not on the agenda.
 
Telegram, PRC Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian to the PRC Foreign Ministry, Zhou Enlai and the CCP Central Committee, “Reporting the Preliminary Opinions of Our Side on the Geneva Conference to the Soviet Side,”
March 06 1954 - Zhang Wentian discusses his visit with Molotov. During this meeting, Molotov says delegations from China, Korea, and Vietnam are welcome to Moscow before the Geneva conference to discuss its proceedings. Molotov also mentions several issues that still need to be discussed, such as relaxing tensions in Asia, Korean unification, ministers in attendance at the conference, and India's participation in the Indochina discussion.
 
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Speeches at the Conference and the Situation at the First Plenary Session
April 26 1954 - Zhou Enlai reports on some last minute agreements regarding the conference procedures. It is decided that the Korean delegation will speak first, and that Thailand, Britain, and the Soviet Union will take turns chairing the conference.
 
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding a Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Eden
May 01 1954 - Zhou Enlai, Molotov, and Eden discuss the Korea issue, the Indochina issue, Sino-British relations, British-American relations, and the issue of five powers.
 
Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden
May 14 1954 - Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden discuss Geneva Conference proceedings related to the Korea and Indochina issues. Zhou expresses concerns for the French proposal on Indochina and states that China supports the North Vietnamese proposal. Zhou and Eden agree that a military armistice should be decided on, although they disagree on specific issues surrounding an armistice.
 
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Plenary Session
May 14 1954 - Zhou Enlai reports on Eden's proposals at the tenth session on Korea. Eden focuses on elections based on the population distributions in North and South Korea, international supervision, and foreign troop withdrawal.
 
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Thirteenth Plenary Session
June 06 1954 - Zhou reports on the plenary session on the Korea issue. Mainly, Zhou writes of how the US is impeding negotiations because of their adamant stance in favor of UN supervisory body for Korean unification.
 
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fourteenth Plenary Session
June 13 1954 - Tensions rise as the six western countries decide the Korean issue should be returned to the UN if decisions cannot be reached in this episode of the Geneva conference.
 
Minutes, Meeting between Wang Bingnan and French Delegation Member [Jean] Paul-Boncour (Summary)
June 14 1954 - Paul-Boncour and Bingnan discuss the Korean issue. Paul-Boncour states that the US is joining 15 other countries to "sabotage" the conference on the issue of international supervision of Korean unification.
 
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fifteenth Plenary Session
June 17 1954 - Zhou reports on the fifteenth plenary session on Korea. After several of their proposals of the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations are turned down, the other 16 nations issue a joint declaration to end the conference. After this, Zhou proposes that the 19 nations issue a joint statement reflecting their common desire to achieve the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. This proposal is also rejected, and the meeting ends with no agreements made.
 
Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey (Summary)
June 18 1954 - Zhou and Casey discuss issues of Korean unification, PRCs recognition in the UN, and Indochina. Zhou insists that if a nation establishes military bases in another country's territory, it is for aggressive reasons.
 
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
September 10 1959 - Excerpt from a report from Ambassador Károly Práth to Budapest summarizing a conversation which took place at a cocktail party he hosted on 20 August 1959. The ambassador reports on a question asked by North Korean Deputy Premier Yi Chu-yon to Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Pelishenko regarding the time-scale for the unification of Korea.
 
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
November 30 1960 - Report from Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth on the conciliatory measures being adopted by the DPRK towards the Chang Myon administration in the South.
 
Record of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Song Ch’ol
April 09 1966 - Informational meeting regarding the situation in North Korea. Pak Song Ch'ol claims that the American forces in South Korea is becoming a hinderance; Japanese relations with South Korea and Soviet Union and their impacts on North Korea were also discussed
 
Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
November 25 1967 - Sino-Korean relations continue to deterioate, along with the condition of the KPA's capabilities. The Soviet Union recognizes that the DPRK is the source of most tensions caused along the DMZ.
 
Information on talks with the Soviet Military Attaché in the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]
February 04 1972 - This document is a report on a conversation within the Albanian embassy in Pyongyang between Zachary Yanakiev, Third Secretary of the Bulgarian Embassy in the DPRK, and the Soviet military attache, Major Bulanov. The discussion focused on six main points- 1. relations between Albania and the DPRK 2. Sino-Albanian relations and the standpoint of Albania on the issue of Nixon’s visit to China 3. the perspectives for the normalization of relations between Albania and the USSR 4. the issue of Sino-Korean relations 5. events in China (surrounding the plane crash in Mongolia and liquidation of certain elements of the leadership) 6. Kim Il Sung’s proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea
 
Meeting: An Preliminary Meeting between Delegates of the North and South Focusing on Official Visits
March 07 1972 - This meeting lays out the specific procedure of how official visits are to be carried out.
 
Meeting: A Preliminary Exchange Between Delegates of the North and South During Which the Details of Official Visits Laid Out by the South are Accepted
March 10 1972 - This exchange is the North's response to their previous meeting during which the South laid out the specific details it had in mind for official visits. The North accepts thyese details and awaits the next meeting where the South will give a specific time for its official visit to the North.
 
Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972 in the GDR Embassy
March 13 1972 - During the conversation there was an exchange of opinions on the following questions: 1. The DPRK Position on the Nixon Visit to Beijing and its Influence on the Situation in Korea 2. Conversation of Comrade Brezhnev with Foreign Minister Ho Dam in Moscow 3. Some Aspects of KWP Activity in the Communist World Movement 4. 60th Birthday of Kim Il Sung on 15 April
 
Meeting: A Preliminary Discussion Between North and South within the Freedom House in Panmunjeom on Official Visits
March 14 1972 - During this meeting the details of official visits are discussed with the South stating that Chang Ki Yeong (ex-Vice Premier and current President of Hankook Ilbo) and his assistant Jung Tae Yeon (Hankook Ilbo correspondent to Japan) would visit the North at 12:00, April 25th. Further, the delegate from North Korea suggests that their should be a meeting between such high-ranking officials as Lee Hurak (Director of the KCIA) and Kim Yeongju (the Director of Organization and Guidance) with the North in agreement to this proposal
 
Meeting: A Preliminary Meeting between Delegates of the North and South discussing Official Visits and Laying the Groundwork for a Meeting between High-Ranking Officials
March 16 1972 - The North presses for Chang Ki Yong to visit earlier, between April 1st-April 11th. Further, the North's delegate passes along word that Kim Yeongju agrees with the suggestion of himself meeting with Lee Hurak, although he believes it should occur within Korea itself. The South though maintains it should occur within a third country. Another topic considered are meetings between the two delegates themselves (Kim Deokhyun of the North and Jung Hongjin of the South) with Kim Yeongju and Lee Hurak to ease the process of planning a meeting between high-ranking officials.
 
Meeting: A Preliminary Discussion during which the South Suggests Expediting the Visits of Delegates Kim Deokhyun and Jung Hongjin
March 17 1972 - The South during this discussion suggests that both sides scrap the visit of Chang Ki Yeong and instead suggests that the delgates of both sides (Kim Deokhyun and Jung Hongjin) visit each respective capitol in order to further push a meeting between Lee Hurak and Kim Yeongju
 
Conversation with Kim Yeongju (1)
March 28 1972 - Jung Hongjin meets with Kim Yeongju and delivers a message to him from Lee Hurak, who expresses that he must meet with Kim as soon as possible in order to bring about peaceful unification and the exchange of material and human resources that will facilitate this. In response, Kim Yeongju delivers his own message focusing specifically on mutual distrust, political differences, and the need to pool economic resources.
 
Conversation with Kim Yeongju (2)
March 31 1972 - Kim Yeongju Delivers a Final Message to Lee Hurak in which he requests him to visit on April 12th, prior to a public proposal he is to make. Also, he discusses a like visit of Kim Deokhyun to the South, though he leaves the date of his visit to be discussed later
 
Meeting with Director of KCIA Lee Hurak (1)
April 19 1972 - Within this document, Lee Hurak and Kim Deokhyun discuss the importance of holding meetings between Lee and Kim Yeongju. These meetings should occur as soon as possible in order to begin the process of building a rapport which will lead to working level meetings that will lay the groundwork for reunification.
 
Meeting with Director of KCIA Lee Hurak (2)
April 20 1972 - During this meeting Lee Hurak states that he cannot visit the North during April as it is already April 20th, and further he has personal business. Also, he proposes that when a high level meeting does take place a joint announcement by both sides should be made surrounding the details of said meeting and what was decided therein. He states this is to prevent one side from looking dominant, while the other looks passive.
 
ON THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION: Conversations with the South Korean Delegates to the High-Level Political Talks between North and South Korea -May 3, 1972
May 03 1972 - This document was ascertained from a collection of Kim Il Sung's works printed in North Korea. It has its origins within Kim Il Sung's conversation with Lee Hurak, but a number of changes have been made to stress the three points to a greater extent
 
Conversation with Kim Il Sung
May 04 1972 - This document is a conversation between Kim Il Sung and Lee Hurak. Within it Kim Il Sung presents his three principles of national reunification: solidarity, peace, and self-determination. Also, there is some debate over whether Vice Premier Pak Seongcheol's visit to Seoul should be prefaced first by a visit from Director Kim Yeongju.
 
Note: On Information from DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Li Man Seok, on 8 June 1972 for the Ambassadors of the European Socialist Countries (except Albania) (content already reported in telegram of 9 June 1972
June 09 1972 - In this document the information from North Korea to its Communist allies on the progress of the Red Cross talks is laid out by the GDR Ambassador. In it they insist that they are the driving force behind the talks, while the South is simply resisting their proposals for full and free exchange. It should be noted that the GDR Ambassador looks at this information incredulously however.
 
Note on Information provided by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Kim Ryeongtaek, on 3 July 1972 for the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Romania, Hungary, and the GDR at 20:40 hours in the DPRK Foreign Ministry
July 04 1972 - Comrade provided information on the 4th Plenary Session of the KWP Central Committee and on the situation in Korea after the publishing of the "Joint Statement." He starts by discussing the remarks made by Kim Il Sung during the 4th Plenary. There KIm outlines the need to isolate South Korea from Japan and states how the South's acceptance of the three principles within the "Joint Statement" represents a major milestone in the achievement of reunification. Then Lee discusses the need for the support of the North's socialist allies to provide further international pressure on Park Chung Hee and the South Korean government.
 
Information regarding: New developments concerning the unification of Korea and relations between the DPRK and South Korea, August 16 1972
August 16 1972 - This document provides a basic summary of North-South relations. The first portion of the document begins with basic background information, but it quickly begins discussing developments surrounding the opening of talks in '71 and '72. First it analyzes the tactical considerations of both sides. Second, it begins to discuss the details of the Red Cross talks. Third, it goes over the July 4th "Joint Statement," with a specific emphasis on the three principles enumerated therein. It then goes into an analysis of reactions towards the Joint Statement both domestically, and among various elements within the international community. The document concludes by stating that the propagandistic nature of the three principles are opposed in many ways to the domestic and international realities. Thus progress towards peaceful reunification would be slow at best.
 
Letter: From Kim Il Sung to Nicolae Ceausescu
September 01 1972 - In this document Kim Il Sung briefly mentions the success achieved towards national reunification through the July 4th Joint Statement.l He also informs Ceausescu that he will be unable to visit Romania due to matters concerning internal affairs.
 
N o t e on Information Provided by Head of 1st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Kim Jaesook, about 1st Main Negotiation of Red Cross Committees from DPRK and South Korea on 12 September 1972
September 15 1972 - This document first outlines and then analyzes the information provided by DPRK foreign minsiter Kim Jaesook. In terms of analysis the document focuses on three main points: DPRK positions in Red Cross negotiations, especially the 1st Main Negotiation; successes achieved through the 1st Main Negotiation; and further prospects for Red Cross negotiations.
 
Note: On Information Provided by Head of 1st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Kim Jaesook, [about 2nd Main Negotiation of Red Cross Committees From DPRK and South Korea] on 3 October 1972 during 12:00 and 13:30 Hours
October 12 1972 - This document is a summary of information on the 2nd Main Negotiation provided by DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Jaesook. He discusses the objectives of the DPRKJ in this round of negotiation, struggles over the meeting location, the victory in getting delegates outside of Park's Republican Party in the Negotiation, an agreement on placing future meetings in the respective capitals. Overall, Kim Jaesook stated that the 2nd Main Negotiation achieved major victories in carrying the message of the DPRK to the South Korean people.
 
Information concerning: 1. The first conference of the co-chairs of the Committee on regulation of the issues between North and South Korea, which was held on October 12th in the Panmunjeom area, and 2. The announcement of “martial law” in South Korea on the 17th this month.
October 19 1972 - The document concerns information provided by Kim Jaebeon on two points: 1. The first conference of the co-chairs (N:Pak Seongcheol, S: Lee Hurak) of the Committee on regulation of the issues between North and South Korea and 2. The announcement of "martial law in South Korea. In discussing the conference Kim states that the delegate of the DPRK at the conference successfully took the South to task on the "three principles of reunification" agreed upon within the Joint Statement. In particular he states they successfully challenged Lee on the issue of heavy anti-communist rhetoric in the press of the South, and President Park's address mentioning reunification "on the basis of free democracy." Kim then goes on by saying that the delegates decided to leave the number of members within the committee and the actual agenda to be discussed would be decided at a laterconference. The South closed the conference by asking what Kim Il Sung meant by his confederation and whether the committee could form the basis of this confederation. He then moves on to discuss the announcement of martial law. Interesting enough he discusses how the North was informed to this development before Park formally announced it. He then goes into a discussion of Park's motivation for this move and the options of the DPRK in responding to it.
 
Note on Information given by the 1st Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Jaebong on 19 October 1972 in the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the Embassies of Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and the GDR during 17:00 and 19:00 hours
October 23 1972 - This document discusses the same issues as the previous one and is based on the same information provided by Kim Jaebong.
 
Note: On a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 18 October 1972 in the GDR Embassy
October 24 1972 - In this document Embassy Counselor Merten summarizes a conversation he had with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy. The conversation begins with a discussion of the DPRK's reaction to the West German visit to China. The conversation then turns to a discussion of North-South relations with a particular emphasis on Park Chung Hee's motivations in consolidating power to bolster his position in negotiating with the North.
 
Conversation with Kim Il Sung
November 03 1972 - In this document Kim Il Sung stresses the improtance of reunification through the formation of the coordinating committee. He especially stresses economic cooperation as a good place to begin before political or cultural coordination. In particular he discusses how reunification will be helpful in developing mineral and fishing resources, bolstering athletics with a unified team, and the cutting down on serious military expenditures. Kim goes on to express a willingness to reunify immediately despite who may assume the chairmanship of the unified nation, and speaks out against anti-communist rhetoric in the South as it is delaying reunification.
 
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
November 22 1973 - Diplomats of the Soviet Bloc discuss relations between the two Koreas, and what would be necessary for reunification. Sino-Korean relations, and Chinese military aid to the DPRK are also discussed.
 
Letter From GDR Ambassador Wenning to Bulgarian Member of the Politburo and Secretary of SED Central Committee Comrade Hermann Axen
June 18 1975 - This letter encloses a translated copy of an "Information for the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung during the Visit of the DPRK Party and Government Delegation to Bulgaria from 2 to 5 June 1975." In it is discussed both Kim Il Sung's remarks on Korean Unification both officially and privately with Comrade Todor Zhivkov. Essentially in both cases Kim makes the argument that the path of military reunification is largely closed off due to the superior military presence of both South Korean and American forces, and instead discusses the details of achieving peaceful reunification by swelling up internal divisions within South Korea, forcing the withdrawal of American forces, and isolating the Park Chung Hee regime internationally.
 
Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry
February 16 1976 - Korean Officials meet with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. The North Koreans believe Korea can not be reunited peacefully, and that the DPRK is prepared for a nuclear war.
 
Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry
February 16 1977 - The DPRK reaches out to other socialist nations to gain support for its 4-point proposals. They include references to the DPRK developing nuclear power and the possibility of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.
 

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