November 29, 2012 // 3:30pm — 5:00pm
We are at a critical juncture in world politics. Nuclear strategy and policy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda, and issues ranging from a nuclear Iran to the global zero movement are generating sharp debate. The historical origins of our contemporary nuclear world are deeply consequential for contemporary policy, but it is crucial that decisions are made on the basis of fact rather than myth and misapprehension. In Nuclear Statecraft, Francis J. Gavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear revolution.
November 27, 2012 // 10:30am — 4:30pm
Supported by the Korean Ministry of Unification, "Regional Dynamics and Inter-Korean Relations, Past and Present" seeks to bring a broader historical perspective to current issues affecting inter-Korean relations by conveying the importance of deep historical continuities on the Korean Peninsula.
November 13, 2012 // 9:00am — 10:15am
How did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only survive but also regain the support of many Chinese citizens after the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989? Why has popular domestic sentiment turned toward anti-Western nationalism despite the anti-dictatorship democratic movements of the 1980s? Why is there a higher possibility that the new Beijing leadership will adopt a more nationalistic foreign policy in response to domestic nationalism in spite of China benefiting most from globalization?
The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973
November 08, 2012 // 3:30pm — 5:00pm
In "The Limits of Detente," Craig Daigle draws on newly released documents to shed new light on how the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the result of not only tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of detente appeared in sharp relief.
November 06, 2012 // 3:30pm — 5:00pm
Reflecting Vladimir Tismaneanu's personal experiences within communist totalitarianism, "The Devil in History" is about political passions, radicalism, utopian ideals, and their catastrophic consequences in the twentieth century’s experiments in social engineering.
November 02, 2012 // 2:30pm — 4:00pm
Shen Zhihua, former Wilson Center public policy scholar and director of the Center for Cold War International History Studies at East China Normal University will discuss his latest book entitled, “Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s” which examines relations between China and the Soviet Union during the 1950s, and gives a unique insight into Chinese thinking about the Korean War.
November 01, 2012 // 3:30pm — 5:00pm
Why did Sweden choose, in the late 1960s, to abandon its long-standing nuclear weapons plans? Today, the end of the Cold War and the declassification of large parts of the relevant documentary record, especially concerning the technical preparations for nuclear weapons production, have created the prerequisites for a more penetrating analysis of this important historical issue. The purpose of this presentation is to summarize the research on Sweden’s plans to acquire nuclear weapons based on primary sources. This overarching analysis is then tested against International Relations theories which have sought to explain factors of proliferation and non-proliferation.
October 24, 2012 // 3:30pm — 5:00pm
Robert S. Norris, senior fellow for nuclear policy at the Federation of American Scientists will lead a Wilson Center panel discussion on "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Nuclear Order of Battle." Joining him will be defense analyst and nuclear historian David A. Rosenberg. The event will take place during the 50th anniversary of the 13 day crisis.
October 23, 2012 // 4:00pm — 5:30pm
The Cold War International History Project in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian presents a panel discussion, Foreign Relations of the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
October 17, 2012 // 3:30pm — 5:00pm
Based on secret transcripts of top-level diplomacy undertaken by the number-two Soviet leader, Anastas Mikoyan, to settle the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, this book rewrites conventional history. The "missiles of October" and "13 days" were only half the story: the nuclear crisis actually stretched well into November 1962 as the Soviets secretly planned to leave behind in Cuba over 100 tactical nuclear weapons, then reversed themselves because of obstreperous behavior by Fidel Castro. The highly-charged negotiations with the Cuban leadership, who bitterly felt sold out by Soviet concessions to the United States, were led by Mikoyan.