International Security Studies
A recently released report, National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, outlines a strategy that the US secretaries of Defense and Energy believe will allow the US to maintain a small but effective nuclear force. Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar William Eldridge comments on the strategy.
In a wide-ranging interview on C-SPAN's Washington Journal, Harman discussed transparency in counter-terrorism, the China diplomatic controversy, the private sector's role in enhancing the nation's cyber-security, and the anniversary of the death of Osama Bin Laden.
Although Iran’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle presents an inherent option for creating a bomb, the Tehran regime has no urgent incentive to build nuclear weapons. Current U.S. policy, which emphasizes coercive sanctions and diplomatic isolation to compel Iran to comply with its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would fall squarely under the rubric of containment, even as the term has been eschewed and delegitimized in the U.S. policy debate. As long as Iran does not overtly cross the U.S. “red line” of weaponization, U.S. policy will likely remain containment in form, if not in name.
The global jihadist movement will ultimately self-destruct, argued Public Policy Scholar Stephanie Kaplan at the latest event in International Security Studies' ongoing Terrorism and Homeland Security Forum. To catalyze this implosion, the U.S. must constrain the movement's operations and narrative.
Is Iran destined to become a nuclear power? Aaron David Miller and Michael Adler weigh the options, including whether military action might succeed where sanctions and diplomacy so far failed.
The role that nuclear weapons play in international politics and security is evolving. For wealthy, militarily powerful countries, nuclear weapons are playing a diminishing role in security planning. Conversely, some countries that lack advanced military capabilities may be coming to see nuclear weapons as increasingly important for their security. The differences between these two groups are reinforced by the fact that, over the past decade, two dictators who ended their nuclear programs have lost their regimes and their lives. As a result, authoritarian leaders may now have an increasingly personal interest in holding on to their nuclear ambitions. U.S. interests can be advanced by minimizing the association that has developed over the past decade between ending nuclear weapons programs, ending regimes, and ending authoritarian leaders’ lives.