

PATHWAYS TO PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: WHAT ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES?

HORN OF AFRICA STEERING COMMITTEE



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About the Leadership Project

The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2005 and seeks to promote holistic and sustainable approaches to international conflict resolution, prevention, and post-conflict recovery. The Leadership Project's founding methodology is based on the importance of inclusivity, interest-based negotiation training, and demonstration of interdependence to help rebuild fractured government systems and create greater collaborative capacity in post-conflict countries. Key Leadership Project programming consists of in-country training interventions for leaders in societies emerging from violent conflict, as well as Washington-based public events and country-consultations on specific conflict-prone or affected states that brings together experts, practitioners, and policymakers to discuss some of the most persistent policy challenges. The Leadership Project also launched a major research effort titled, "Southern Voices in the Northern Policy Debate: Including the Global South," funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York, that will engage Africa-based research and policy institutions in providing a southern perspective for the American policymakers on the mutual challenges faced by North and South. The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity works in close collaboration with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Africa Program.

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SUMMARY

It is time for the U.S. government to make conflict resolution and building peace its number one priority in the Horn of Africa. More than any other factor, armed conflict undermines progress on a variety of fronts. Successful peacebuilding could provide the key to unlock other seemingly intractable regional situations, not only bringing war to an end, stabilizing post-war scenarios, and preventing future conflict, but also ensuring good governance, stable partners against terrorism, and addressing development, poverty reduction, and economic recovery. Although there are significant barriers, peacebuilding works: mediation efforts have a good historical track record, negotiated settlements are proving increasingly effective at bringing even messy civil wars to an end, and new research demonstrates that even long-standing enemies can understand their interdependence and need to cooperate through a basic sequence of rapprochement. The U.S. should therefore adopt a multi-dimensional peacebuilding strategy in the region which:

1. Listens to a variety of local, non-state voices;
2. improves its own understanding of localized and regionalized conflict dynamics in the Horn;
3. facilitates the establishment of regional forums for dialogue about peace and security challenges at both Track 1 and Track 2 levels; and
4. provides political and financial support for peacebuilding initiatives, from mediation and negotiation training for local stakeholders to trust building and the creation of collaborative capacities among key leaders within the Horn.



INTRODUCTION

When President Obama's administration arrived in office his Africa team identified the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of armed conflicts as one of their priority objectives.¹ As Obama's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, put it, "conflict prevention and conflict mitigation will be among my highest priorities. Conflicts in Africa do more to undermine progress than almost anything else. They destabilize states, halt economic growth, cause enormous loss of life and frequently result in major refugee flows. They also tarnish Africa's image."² In similar fashion, the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review released in 2010 emphasized the need for the U.S. State Department to increase its capacity to engage regionally on cross-cutting issues such as violence prevention and conflict resolution.³

This paper is informed by two consultative conferences. The first engaged policymakers in the U.S. government, European Union, the non-governmental peacebuilding community, and private sector representatives. The second involved the organizers and members of various diaspora groups from the Horn. It is intended to stimulate renewed debate about how these aspirations might be integrated into a new U.S. approach to the Horn of Africa, one that reinforces the administration's stated objective by making conflict resolution and peacebuilding the top regional priority.⁴ To do so, it addresses four principal questions:

1. What interests have shaped recent U.S. engagement with the states and peoples of the Horn of Africa?
2. Why should the U.S. government make conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives the central plank of its strategy towards the region?
3. What might an approach focused on conflict resolution and peacebuilding entail?
4. What are some of the principal barriers to implementing such an approach and how might they be overcome?

We conclude that the U.S. government should adopt a five pronged approach based on the need to listen to a wide variety of local, non-state voices, improve its own understanding of localized and regionalized conflict dynamics, facilitate the establishment of regional forums for dialogue about peace and security challenges at both Track 1 and Track 2 levels, and provide political and financial

support to incorporate peacebuilding practices into its approach, from mediation and negotiation training for local stakeholders to trust building and the creation of collaborative capacities among key leaders within the Horn.

United States engagement with the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has never been a top geostrategic priority for U.S. policymakers. Nevertheless, the region has appeared sporadically on Washington's foreign policy radar, usually for negative reasons such as warfare and instability, genocidal violence, famine, drought, population displacement, piracy, and terrorism. These varied challenges have seen successive U.S. administrations deploy almost the full spectrum of policy instruments from humanitarian relief, development aid, and support for HIV/AIDS prevention, to economic sanctions, military intervention, drone strikes and the deployment of U.S. Special Forces.

During the Cold War, the U.S. was often focused more on the adjacent Red Sea and Arabian peninsulas but it supported anti-communist regimes in the Horn with little regard to their democratic mandates or development agenda. After the Cold War ended, however, there was no equivalent overarching framework for U.S. policy towards the region. In its place emerged a messy patchwork of shifting bilateral relationships, with awkward Cold War commitments replaced by attempts to induce democratic transitions. These were influenced by shifting geopolitical calculations in the Horn during three key years: 1991, 1998 and 2001. In 1991, the Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia and Siad Barre's government in Somalia were toppled. In Ethiopia, this paved the way for Eritrea's independence and ushered in what became two decades of creeping authoritarianism under Meles Zenawi's Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. In Somalia, the country was left without a central government for nearly fifteen years. In 1998, the outbreak of war between the formerly allied regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which led to U.S. missile strikes on Sudan's al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum later that year, significantly altered the region's geopolitics.

Regional dynamics shifted once again in the aftermath of the "9/11" terror attacks on the United States. Since then, countering terrorism has become the most prominent unifying theme in U.S. policy across the Horn and led to the establishment of the only U.S. military base in Africa, at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti in 2002. State terrorism was also a major theme of U.S. policy towards

the region when in September 2004 the George W. Bush administration concluded that the government of Sudan was committing genocide in its Darfur region. This episode had a significant impact on how the U.S. engages with the region but it did not displace the dominant counter-terrorism discourse. Not surprisingly, Washington's "War on Terror" encouraged governments in the Horn to label their domestic opponents as "terrorists," thereby effectively criminalizing dissent. By early 2007, for example, two former Clinton administration officials still concluded that "stemming the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies has become such an overwhelming strategic objective for Washington that it has overshadowed U.S. efforts to resolve conflicts and promote good governance; in everything but rhetoric, counterterrorism now consumes U.S. policy in the Greater Horn as totally as anticommunism did a generation ago."⁵ Four years on, there have been some signs of improvement and a more nuanced U.S. approach, but counter-terror activities in the region continue to absorb considerable U.S. funds and human resources, although it is far from clear that they have delivered cost-effective results.⁶ The United States clearly has legitimate interests in implementing an effective counter-terrorism policy in the Horn. But in the long-term this should be understood as primarily a conflict resolution, political, and economic development challenge; not an issue with a military solution.

Today, U.S. relations with the region's governments are mixed. Washington enjoys good if often complicated relations with the authorities in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. This does not mean there are not points of disagreement and sensitive issues but there are important points of common interest. In contrast, relations with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sudan, and Eritrea remain difficult, largely because of the often wide gulf in policy and perceptions of interests between Washington and the regimes in these countries. In Somalia, the U.S. government has grown increasingly frustrated with the TFG and consequently increased its engagement with alternative authorities outside Mogadishu, particularly those in Somaliland and Puntland. The U.S. has clearly staked out its relationship towards the TFG's principal opponent, *al-Shabaab*, by making it the only actor in the Horn of Africa to be included on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.⁷ U.S. relations with Sudan, now separated from its southern half, are complex and multidimensional but border on the hostile despite efforts to facilitate the transition set out in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and collaboration on intelligence/counter-terrorism activities. Although the U.S. has already nominated an Ambassador to the Republic of South Sudan, since

its independence on July 9, its relations with the north remain strained. The last U.S. ambassador to Sudan departed over fifteen years ago, well before the U.S. missile strikes on Sudan in August 1998. U.S. relations with Eritrea are also distinctly sour. The relationship has shifted from a potential U.S. ally in the “War on Terror” to Asmara being perceived as the region’s public enemy number one. The last U.S. ambassador in Eritrea departed in July 2010 and there is no Eritrean ambassador in Washington.

These varied relationships both explain and are reflected in the hugely uneven U.S. diplomatic presence in the region. While some states house large U.S. embassies, others have none at all (Somalia) or lack an ambassador (Eritrea, Sudan). In this volatile region it will be extremely difficult, at least in the short-term, for the U.S. to have good relations with all of the region’s governments at the same time. Indeed, over the short-term, advancing U.S. interests will probably harm relations with several of the region’s incumbent regimes.

Perceptions of the United States across the region also vary considerably. Some see the U.S. as an international bully willing to break international law when it suits its interests and willing to turn a blind eye to the human rights abuses of brutal regimes as long as they support its counter-terrorism agenda. Others see the U.S. as a useful source of resources, whether in the form of development aid, humanitarian assistance or military training and support. Some see the U.S. government as a paper tiger which talks a great deal about the importance of good governance and human rights but lacks the leverage to dictate outcomes on the ground. For others, the U.S. is a role model but one which should be on “their” side of regional disputes. As a consequence, these groups may become unhappy if they receive anything less than Washington’s unconditional support. In contrast, there are those in the region who feel victimized by the U.S. government and believe that it will never be on their side regardless of what path they follow. Finally, the perceptions of many are a combination or mixture of multiple points of view.

Why the U.S. should prioritize peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives

It is time for the U.S. government to make conflict resolution and building peace its number one priority in the Horn of Africa. As Assistant Secretary Carson observed, it is armed conflict which more than any other factor undermines progress on a variety of fronts. Successful peacebuilding could provide the key to unlock other seemingly intractable regional situations, not only

bringing war to an end, preventing future conflict, and stabilizing post-war scenarios, but fostering good governance, stable partners against terrorism, as well as development, poverty reduction, and economic recovery. Framed in more negative terms, it is time to “give peace(building) a chance” because the business-as-usual policies pursued for the last two decades have quite simply failed to deliver peace, security or development in the region. Specifically, peacebuilding should supplant the previous focus on counter-terrorism as it would help build stronger, more accountable states in the region. It is such states, rather than the presence of U.S. troops and operatives that will fundamentally limit the opportunities for non-state terrorists in the Horn.

To date, U.S. engagement in peacemaking in the region has been highly selective and met with mixed results. Moreover, evidence from the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea/Ethiopia demonstrate that successful conflict resolution is much more than signing a peace agreement; it is about signing the right type of agreement which addresses core causes of a conflict, embodies local concerns about justice, and provides for ways of sustaining those agreements, often in the face of concerted pressure to dismantle them. A full peacebuilding framework is necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

Although military victory is sought by both sides to a conflict and can sometimes produce stable outcomes, victory itself never settles the reason the conflict began in the first place. Most of today’s armed conflicts in the Horn will only be genuinely resolved through engagement with all parties and painstaking negotiation, although there is considerable disagreement over which actors the United States government should directly engage. Any regional push for peace must therefore include a willingness to encourage sustained and frank dialogue between the key players. Of course, the short-term prospects for resolving peacefully the differences between, for example, Meles and Isaias, Khartoum and Juba, or the TFG and *al-Shabaab* are not good. But there are several reasons why negotiations or mediation initiatives should be (re)started. First, these pairings listed above are not the only important players in their respective conflict zones. Dialogue on peace and security issues must therefore be extended to include other voices, particularly those of unarmed constituencies. Second, left to fester without sustained attempts to facilitate constructive dialogue these conflicts are likely to get worse, not better. Third, the U.S. and other international actors are not well served by leaving critical peace deals unimplemented, such as the Algiers Agreement (2000) or the Djibouti Agreement (2008), or unfinished, such as the CPA process between Sudan and South Sudan or the Doha agreement (2011) on Darfur. Fourth, these protracted conflicts reinforce tenden-

cies toward authoritarianism and stifle progress on democratization or greater respect for human rights.

Nor should the United States be fatalistic about the prospects for success. There is good evidence that attempts to negotiate an end to armed conflicts often work. First, mediation has a good historical track record, even in messy civil wars. On the basis of analyzing approximately 460 mediation events in civil wars between 1946 and 2004, the architects of the Civil War Mediation dataset concluded that mediation was associated with positive outcomes – involving some sort of agreement – in approximately 76% of cases.⁸ Second, as mediators continue to learn what works best in negotiated settlements, they have become an increasingly effective means of bringing a durable end to civil wars and hence preventing war recurrence – in 78% of cases between 1940 and 2007, according to one Harvard professor.⁹ Third, in relation to inter-state feuds, even long-standing enemies can learn to cooperate. As a major new study by Charles Kupchan concluded, although cases of interstate rapprochement are unique, they all follow the same basic sequence: unilateral accommodation sets the stage for reciprocal restraint, which then provides a foundation for societal integration and, ultimately, the generation of new narratives that transform oppositional identities into a shared identity. Rapprochement thus “emerges as a product of engagement, not coercion: peace breaks out when adversaries settle their differences, not when one side forces the other into submission.” In sum, it is diplomacy, not economic interdependence that represents “the currency of peace.” Importantly, for the Horn of Africa, “especially during the initial phases of rapprochement between antagonistic states, regime type is not a determinant of outcomes; democracies and autocracies alike can make for reliable partners in peace.”¹⁰ Finally, Track 2 efforts can also bear fruit, especially if they promote local peacebuilding capabilities. Within the Horn, the exemplary work done principally in northeastern Kenya by the late Dekha Ibrahim and her colleagues in the Wajir Peace and Development Committee demonstrates the potential of local peacemaking efforts. U.S.-based projects can also be constructive as demonstrated by an initiative in Burundi conducted by Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald of the Woodrow Wilson Center. They worked with principal stakeholders to rebuild trust, communications and negotiations skills, collaborative capacity and an understanding of their interdependence, and contributed to a successful transition to elections and the demobilization, disarmament and integration of the armed forces.¹¹

Building peace in the Horn of Africa: A five pronged approach

Looking at the Horn through a conflict resolution lens should focus policy-makers' attention on peacebuilding – the need to promote good governance, increase human security (not just state or regime security), strengthen regional cooperation, and boost economic development and regional economic integration. Furthermore, the strategy should adopt a multi-track approach incorporating informal as well as formal dialogue and active civil society participation.

This document's companion conflict mapping paper, *Horn of Africa: Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace*, concluded that a comprehensive policy of constructive engagement towards the region would need to address a variety of cross-cutting issues which operate at different levels from local disputes to interstate conflicts all the way up to globalizing processes and networks. Specifically, trends in political violence across the Horn highlight the centrality of governance issues; ongoing patterns of mutual destabilization; the importance of local (sub-state) dynamics; the salience of the region's borderlands and frontier zones; the impact of resources, especially land, oil, and water; and the roles of diaspora communities.¹² This is because many of the region's conflicts interconnect in significant ways. As Ken Menkhaus recently argues with respect to Somalia,

“Crisis is very much a part of a regional conflict complex. U.S. policies which help resolve the ongoing Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, and which encourage rapprochement between the Ethiopian government and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, would go a long way to creating a more conducive regional environment in which to successfully address the Somali crisis.”¹³

Addressing these issues will take time. There are no quick fixes to peace and security challenges in a region as conflicted as the Horn of Africa. Even in the best case scenarios, the latest World Development Report concluded that the world's fastest-moving countries take a generation or more to transform their problematic institutions. Specifically, it took the world's 20 fastest-moving countries an average of 17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 years to achieve functioning bureaucratic quality, and 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control.¹⁴ Consequently, in both the U.S. government and the region, policies, institutions and mechanisms should be developed with an eye to longevity and sustained engagement with these issues. An appropriate metaphor to guide such activities is one of constant gardening.

In this context, we suggest that the U.S. government pursue a five-pronged approach to conflict resolution in the Horn:

Listen to a Variety of Local and Non-State Voices

The U.S. government should begin the formulation of a new approach by conducting a listening exercise designed to solicit opinion from a wide variety of actors within the region, including the antagonists to any specific conflict, non-state voices, as well as those external actors interested in conflict resolution. Some relevant opinion poll and public survey data is already available for certain parts of the region through such institutions as the National Democratic Institute, Afrobarometer, and the African Union's High-Level Panel on Darfur. There are also a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in conflict resolution activities in the Horn and fully engaged with local actors at different levels, such as Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, the Nairobi Peace Initiative, Interpeace, and ACCORD from South Africa. However, the U.S. government would need to supplement these existing efforts and then use the results as the basis for working with interested external partners to formulate the substantive contours of a coordinated peacebuilding strategy for the Horn. Listening to local opinions may also entail more systematic engagement with diasporas from the region who often retain links to their countries of origin. The need to hear local/non-state voices from across the Horn also underlines the importance of pressing for press freedom and access to the internet.

Improve Knowledge of Local and Regional Dynamics

As documented in the companion conflict mapping paper, the origins of many of the Horn's armed conflicts lie in both disputes at a localized, sub-state level and regionalized patterns of rivalry. And yet traditional diplomatic and information-gathering mechanisms are not well-suited to understanding these complex local dynamics let alone helping to resolve them. The U.S. government should therefore develop new systems of information gathering and support conflict mapping exercises of current local-level conflicts and regional dimensions across the Horn. It should also conduct a comprehensive study of traditional conflict resolution practices and mechanisms used across the region.¹⁵

Promote a (Track 1) Regional Peace and Security Forum

The principal actors across the Horn of Africa clearly lack consensus on how to conceptualize let alone address the region's principal peace and security challenges. The United States should therefore explore how it might encourage an intra-Horn dialogue on peace and security issues. Potential models for such regional dialogue include the "basket" (e.g. border issues, international law,

security sector reform etc.) approach adopted by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe which met regularly from the early 1970s, or the less structured approach of the annual Berlin Security Conference with its emphasis on supporting a common approach to European security and defense issues. The Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa provides models developed by African leaders. The obvious place to begin establishing such a forum for dialogue would be the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, as occurs in other parts of the world, such as the security dialogue conducted by the ASEAN Regional Forum, participation in the Horn's forum need not be limited to IGAD members when pressing security issues such as management of the Nile waters involve states outside the organization.

Promote a (Track 2) Regional Peace and Security Forum

While state-centric dialogues and approaches are important, on their own they are not enough to bring stable and sustainable peace to the Horn. They not only should be supplemented and informed by the region's non-state actors, but sometimes non-state actors offer a neutral platform that is more readily trusted and utilized by conflict parties. The U.S. government should therefore also explore ways of supporting a similar regional forum initiative for Track 2 actors. Potential models include the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), or the aforementioned efforts by the Wajir Peace and Development Committee and the Woodrow Wilson Center, all of which contribute to efforts towards regional confidence-building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation, capacity building, training on negotiation and communication skills, and cooperation. Unfortunately, some relevant institutions in Ethiopia – for example, the Inter-Africa Group and the Center for Policy Research and Dialogue – were forced to close or suspend their activities in the wake of the Charities and Societies Proclamation Law (2009), which forbade institutions classified as foreign NGOs from undertaking activities in a variety of areas including conflict resolution, human rights, and law enforcement. Ideally, this Track 2 forum would operate in tandem with the region's Track 1 dialogue, much as the Sant'Egidio Catholic lay order did in the Burundi and Mozambique peace processes in the 1990s or the Wilson Center did in working with the United Nations and the African Union in Burundi during the mid-2000s.

Support Training Initiatives and Reconciliation Work

The U.S. government should investigate ways to generate new training efforts for the key armed conflicts in the region that could impart skills to allow locals to navigate difficult transitions, such as mediation, negotiation, problem solving, communications, and leadership. Working to build trust, cohesion, a sense of interdependence and the ability to work together in addressing core conflict issues is essential to creating reconciliation among antagonists and setting the stage for post-conflict recovery. Arguably the three most pressing and potentially destructive conflicts in the region as a whole are the conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, and the Somali TFG and *al-Shabaab*. While the U.S. is not best placed to play a leading role in every mediation or reconciliation process, it should support initiatives by governments or non-state actors doing so and broaden the pool of African actors trained in mediation skills. Without trained mediators the odds are stacked against conflict resolution initiatives.¹⁶ For example, South Sudan has expressed an interest in mediating in the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is well placed to play a mediatory role between Sudan and the new Republic of South Sudan. Nor should the U.S. government feel compelled to do local conflict resolution itself. Ultimately, it is only local actors who can resolve local disputes. Training them, or working through non-governmental entities which have their trust, are the most effective approaches. U.S. government personnel and structures are not well equipped for the task and there are too many local suspicions about the motives behind U.S. government initiatives. Instead, the U.S. government should identify local actors and NGOs, international and national, capable of conducting effective peacemaking, and then support them logistically, financially, and politically.¹⁷

Barriers to building peace in the Horn of Africa

Building peace in the Horn will not be easy or succeed quickly and will require its advocates to find ways of removing a number of predictable barriers. The first barrier is mental; the idea that peacebuilding represents a soft, ineffective and unrealistic approach, a “feel good” exercise that does not address power relationships and cannot impact pressing counter-terrorism concerns. In fact, it is traditional counter-terrorism approaches that have proved unrealistic and ineffective. It is naïve to continue the same tired and limited policies associated with the “War on Terror” mentality and expect fundamentally different results. U.S. interests in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa are best addressed

by policies that support political and economic development and the protection of human rights.

A second barrier is the U.S. government's current financial situation. The default reaction in such times of austerity is to defend what currently exists and suggest there is no room for new programs. Instead, the U.S. government should acknowledge that business-as-usual cannot continue and use the current period of introspection as an opportunity to spend its resources in a smarter fashion. The good news about conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives is that most of them are not expensive, especially when compared to military alternatives, notably the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Nor are they particularly controversial politically, unlike establishing a drone base in Ethiopia or supporting military incursions, as the U.S. has done with respect to Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia. They also require relatively few personnel. Indeed, making greater use of small diplomatic posts or micro embassies in strategically important areas for U.S. engagement should form an important part of the peacebuilding agenda (see below).

The current shape of U.S. government bureaucracy throws up a third set of barriers. One difficult issue is how to integrate regional priorities with more established bilateral relationships and current frameworks, such as AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA. Depending on the conclusions generated by the kind of analysis we proposed above, the U.S. government will need to downgrade some bilateral relationships in favor of giving greater voice and influence to more regional perspectives. A second problem is that the U.S. interagency system has done a poor job of generating a sophisticated knowledge-base of conflict dynamics among its key personnel. Knowledge of localized dynamics is particularly poor. This has been retarded by both a lack of relevant language skills among U.S. personnel (in Arabic, Somali, Swahili, Amharic etc.) as well as what might be called the "fortress embassy mentality." U.S. diplomats tasked with peacebuilding must spend a higher proportion of their time outside their embassies and the capital city of their host country. A smarter use of U.S. resources will therefore involve utilizing more small-posts and micro-embassies in strategically significant areas.¹⁸ The newly created Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations within the U.S. State Department provides an opportunity to address some of these concerns.

Finally, it will be difficult to get traction for conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives so long as authoritarian regimes in the Horn regard such efforts as threatening their power. This raises several big issues, not least the

crucial link between good governance and peacebuilding and questions about how to support the latter in the absence of the former. Ultimately, the U.S. government must recognize that its long-term interests are best promoted not by building relationships with particular regimes and/or political parties but by supporting the legitimate rights and aspirations of the peoples of the Horn. This means the United States should support policies that attract transnational support throughout the region and beyond, such as promoting good governance, the rule of law, and security sector reform, and not become tied to supporting particular regimes come what may.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See, for example, Johnnie Carson, “A New Beginning: U.S. Policy in Africa,” speech to Center for American Progress, September 15, 2009, at <http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/09/inf/Africaeventtranscript.pdf>
- 2 Opening Statement by Assistant Secretary–Designate Johnnie Carson, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations confirmation hearing, April 29, 2009, at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/April/20090429170028eaifas0.2521784.html>
- 3 *Leading Through Civilian Power* (Washington DC: Department of State, First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 2010), p.viii.
- 4 Although the Horn can be defined in numerous ways, in this paper it refers to the member states of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), namely, Djibouti, Eritrea (currently suspended), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. (The new Republic of South Sudan applied for IGAD membership in July 2011, which is expected to be granted in the near future.)
- 5 John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Blowing the Horn,” *Foreign Affairs*, 86:2 (2007), p.60.
- 6 See, for example, *DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force* (Washington DC: GAO Report GAO-10-504, April 2010), at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10504.pdf>
- 7 The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is not included on this list but its leader, Joseph Kony, is “a Specially Designated Global Terrorist” under Executive Order 13224 (August 28, 2008) and the organization is included on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
- 8 Karl DeRouen Jr, Jacob Bercovitch, Paulina Pospieszna, “Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 48:5 (2011), pp.663–72.
- 9 In this study, civil wars experiencing no violence for at least 5 years were considered ended. Monica Duffy Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory,” *International Security*, 34:4 (2010), pp.7–36.
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- 13 Ken Menkhaus, "Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and U.S. policy," House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2010, at <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/men061710.pdf>
- 14 *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011), p.108.
- 15 See, for example, Linda James Myers and David H. Shinn, "Appreciating Traditional Forms of Healing Conflict in Africa and the World," *Black Diaspora Review*, 2:1 (Fall 2010), at <http://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/bdr/article/view/1157/1220>
- 16 The U.S. government could thus do far worse than invest the resources necessary to develop the type of mediation teams and support structures that could carry out this painstaking work. Initially, this might involve adopting a rigorous system of appointing and evaluating mediators; providing adequate support to mediators in the field; developing a learning culture based on review, assessment, research and adaptation; and adopting a confidence-building model of mediation in armed conflicts. See Laurie Nathan, *Towards a New Era in International Mediation* (London: LSE/DFID Crisis States Research Centre, May 2010), <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/Policy%20Directions/Towards%20a%20new%20era%20in%20international%20mediation.pdf>
- 17 Current legislation in Ethiopia explicitly prohibits international support for local NGOs engaged in issues of conflict resolution.
- 18 For a discussion of how such posts have been increasingly utilized by the British government in Africa see Tom Cargill, *More with Less: Trends in UK Diplomatic Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: Chatham House Africa Programme Paper 2011/03, May 2011), <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/174359>