A Toolkit for Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence

Many of the world’s cities are extremely dangerous. Violence-prone, corrupted by criminals, growing with shantytowns at the margins, these cities are increasing the fragility of states and consigning their populations to chronic insecurity. The ways ordinary people along with their neighbors and officials cope with chronic urban violence is what we call resilience: those acts intended to restore or create effectively functioning community-level activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetrators of violence are marginalized and perhaps even eliminated.

In this toolkit, we identify promising practices promoting urban resilience, as well as the obstacles. We develop ideas to enhance community capacity to act independently of armed actors. We specify the types of horizontal (e.g., intra-community, or neighborhood-to-neighborhood) and vertical (e.g., state-community) relationships that have been used to sustain this relative autonomy. Violence and responses to it are situated in physical space, so the spatial correlates of resilience are crucial—how physical conditions in a neighborhood will affect the nature, degrees, and likelihood of resilience.

Resilience is robust and positive when ongoing, integrated strategies among the different actors yield tangible and sustainable gains for a particular community: improvement in the physical infrastructure, growing commercial activity, and community-oriented policing, to name three common attributes.

When citizens, the private sector, and governing authorities work together in a sustainable way at the level of the community, a dynamic capacity is created to subvert the perpetrators of violence and establish everyday normalcy. The security activities produced through citizen-state networks are most accountable, legitimate, and durable when they are directed and monitored by communities themselves, in a relationship of cooperative autonomy.

This toolkit is derived from the report, Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence by Diane E. Davis. It was published in May 2012 by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The full report, this publication, the case studies, and other resources are available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/urban_resilience.html

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Chronic violence can have many sources and causes. Transnational criminal syndicates, local gangs, drug cartels, insurgent groups and their progeny—these among others are common perpetrators. Because illegal trafficking is often the core of the criminal activity, the monetary gains serve to corrupt officials, the police in particular, in order to protect the supply chain. The police and other security forces then become agents of violence as well.

The failure to quell chronic urban violence increases the fragility of the state. Even if the police are not working with the criminals, the tactics used to combat civilian armed actors—ranging from the deployment of the military to more routine forms of police-deployed violence—alienates affected communities and fuels broad political dissatisfaction.

Chronic insecurity, police misconduct, and unevenly distributed public investment result in distrust of government and the rise of privatized security—vigilantism, private security guards, walled-off neighborhoods, and social isolation. These responses tend to fragment communities and dissolve bonds between the state and communities, which creates a climate where violence entrepreneurs can thrive.

At-risk communities are often “informal” settlements in which residents have no property rights, few if any public services, dilapidated or nonexistent infrastructure, and scarce political legitimacy. Governments that confront this problem directly are far more likely to nurture resilience.

Breaking or preventing this cycle of violence by inducing, supporting, and expanding positive resilience in at-risk communities is the most promising use of public resources, whether local or international. Forging new and effective public policy—e.g., urban redevelopment—based on this experience is also promising.
To stem or prevent violence, several strategies are advisable. Ameliorating or eliminating the structural causes of rising crime and violence is a common strategy. Changing the economic or institutional conditions in the city as a whole is another pathway. Reforming the administration of justice and strengthening the rule of law is a third.

We suggest turning attention to the ways individuals and institutions at the level of the community carve out spaces for action even in the most dire of circumstances. With a focus on individual and community resilience, it is possible to generate knowledge about what is working and what is not to reduce violence and return to normalcy. This grounded knowledge can be the basis for policy action.

To this end, then, we conceptualize resilience as *individual or communities’ capacities to resist against the perpetrators of violence through strategies that help them establish relatively autonomous control over the activities, spaces, and social or economic forces and conditions that comprise their daily lives.*

Urban resilience can be positive or negative. **Positive resilience** is a condition of relative stability and even tranquility in areas intermittently beset by violence. Strong, cooperative relationships between the state and community, and between different actors—businesses, civil society, the police, etc.—tend to characterize positive resilience. **Negative resilience** occurs when violence entrepreneurs have gained effective control of the means of coercion, and impose their own forms of justice, security, and livelihoods. In such situations—most frequently in informal neighborhoods where property rights are vague or contested—the community is fragmented and seized by a sense of powerlessness, and the state is absent or corrupted.

**Defining Resilience**

We define resilience as the ways that actors and institutions at the level of the community actually cope with or adapt to chronic urban violence.

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Elements of Positive Resilience

In our case studies of eight cities—Johannesburg, Karachi, Kigali, Managua, Medellín, Mexico City, Nairobi, and São Paolo—and other research (Table 1, page 8), we found several key attributes of positive resilience. They can serve as a guide for action.

Empower social relations
Those cities with the best examples of positive resilience—Medellín, Managua, the Historic Centre in Mexico City, and Orangi Township in Karachi—counted on strong community organizations capable of pushback against violence. These organizations forge horizontal linkages among a number of constituencies in those places.

These horizontal and “bridging” social connections in an area—i.e., a neighborhood—make it easier for wider swaths of citizens to be united against other local-level perpetrators of violence, such as drug lords in the case of São Paolo, whose scale of operation usually transcend a single street or neighborhood site.

When widely extended bridging connections also build on bonding connections by counting on the involvement of citizen or community groups with a deep history in a given location, there is strengthened social and spatial scope for citizens to push back against violent actors.

Utilize common purpose
Bridging and bonding at the community level often results from other activities undertaken by community groups, sometimes in cooperation with municipal authorities. Projects of urban renovation, participatory budgeting, community-led reconstruction, collectively administered water and sanitation projects, etc., bring communities together in purposeful activity, and connect them positively to the state.

One potential hazard of having many civil society actors and outside interveners (such as development agencies) is that it can create fragmentation in the community and weaken the bridging and bonding that is optimal.

Foster cooperative autonomy
Cooperative autonomy implies the capacity of a community—individuals, NGOs, and other social and cultural organizations—to act in concert with private business and government over a period of time to reclaim peace and normalcy.

Spatial allegiance is a key to creating a sense of community. If residents do not identify with a neighborhood and view it as a temporary home, it makes it difficult to create meaningful social networks (e.g., Diepsloot in Johannesburg).

Another crucial ingredient is the way private businesses become part of the solution. Generally, mixed land use enhances resilience.

Reimagine state-community relations
More extensive relations between the state and a community can result in a vertical relationship at the expense of horizontal relationships. Still, positive resilience is characterized by productive relations between state and community.

In Medellín and Mexico City, for example, participatory budgeting programs played a role in bringing citizens into dialogue about investments and priorities that could be constructively tailored toward creating greater security. Urban redevelopment and similar efforts can be initiated from “below” or “above.” What is crucial is for authorities to provide adequately open, sustainable, and empowering mechanisms to involve the communities.

Make police a part of positive resilience
The most commonplace and perhaps important state-community relation-
ship is through the police and other security forces. This is frequently, perhaps predominantly, a fraught relationship. Moving the police-community dynamic to one of mutually recognized legitimacy, respect, and basic functionality is crucial.

We propose that principles of legitimate security (described later) go far to restructure this relationship to make it mutually beneficial and reinforcing.

Transform spaces of violence
One effective way to generate resilience is to focus less on the perpetrators of violence and more on the spaces in which violence thrives, turning attention to transforming spaces as the starting point for nurturing resilience. To the extent that territorial control—be it armed, political, social, or economic—has been shown to be central to violence, re-ordering space can be a first step in countering the power of violent actors.

Promote private investment
Investing in mixed commercial and residential land use, particularly in areas of the city at risk for crime, and prioritizing strategic urban investments reinforce both horizontal and vertical relationships and results in renewed vitality throughout the city. Commercial areas may hold greater potential than residential areas for generating sufficiently strong engagement to sustain community autonomy versus armed/violent actors.

Resilience materializes at the interface of citizen and state action, and is strengthened through relations of cooperation within and between communities and governing authorities. When citizens, the private sector, and governing authorities establish institutional networks of accountability that tie them to each other at the level of the community, they possess much greater capacity for push back against the perpetrators of violence, and thus greater likelihood of establishing normalcy in everyday life.
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<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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| Crime Prevention Education  
Scale: Individuals and Communities | To address the climate of fear from increasing rates of violence and the resultant reduction in the quality of public life, neighborliness, and community cooperation, crime prevention awareness is being conducted at the scale of the individual, the family, and the community. Agencies work at the community level to identify and remove the drivers of violence production. |
| Leveraging Social Capital  
Scale: Communities and Neighborhoods | Violence and social networks have a reverse causal relationship, but Varshney asks if violence changes social behavior, can social behavior change violence? Using ethnic violence in India as a case study, he determines that civic structures that bridge groups also foster peace. Brass holds a more pessimistic view of violence, claiming that it is orchestrated by “political riot machines” operated by the state. At this level of violence, social networks and social capital are useless, while neighbor kills neighbor. |
| Social Welfare and Livelihood Analysis  
Scale: Communities, Neighborhoods, Formal and Informal Economic Spheres | This approach targets the deep-rooted developmental factors of violence, examining the economic conditions that drive people to commit crimes and asking how socioeconomic development policies alter incentives for crime production. It also raises questions about the impact of structural unemployment on unemployed youth and correlations to illicit activities. Preferred policies include education, job-creation, or social (including sports) activities for youth. |
| Urban Design Interventions and Infrastructure Provision  
Scale: Communities, Urban Transportation and Servicing Networks | The relationship between violence and the built environment continues to be explored. State-related infrastructure projects in poor areas are tangible, visible evidence of the social contract between the state and the citizens. The process of democratic urban redevelopment paves the way for community participation in a state-led development project and acts as another method of social crime prevention. An example of this is the urban parks in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. |
| Targeting Good Governance  
Scale: State and City Government | Good governance goes hand-in-hand with strengthening the police and the judiciary. This strategy centers on the concept of trust—between the state and the people, between the police officers and the people, and between different levels and arms of the government. With the increasing prevalence of crowdsourcing technology, we are starting to see more members of the public taking an active role in crime reduction by anonymously calling police with tips. |
| Security Sector Reform  
Scale: City Government, Judiciary, Police, Army and Nation | This approach focuses on the state capacity, usually at the national level, and emphasizes the creation of an efficient crime-fighting apparatus. Felbab-Brown writes that the physical presence of the state (perhaps through police or urban development projects) can go a long way in calming a restive area. Equally popular are calls for changes to accelerate the arrest capacities or crime-fighting activities of federal agents and local police—pursuit of the so-called “mano dura” or “iron fist” approach. The crafting and advocacy of community level programs that build local capacities to hold police and governments responsible (e.g., in community policing), that educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities, and that offer new forms of citizen monitoring of criminal behavior have gained widespread policy attention and support. Finally, ensuring a fair and just judicial system that remains depoliticized and accessible to the people is another strategy of violence reduction. |

References are available in the report: http://web.mit.edu/cis/urban_resilience.html
Challenges to Positive Resilience

To keep violence and armed actors at bay, or to protect themselves from total capture or colonization by such forces, residents may need to create either horizontal relationships among themselves (i.e., new fortified relations among social, political, spatial, and economic stakeholders in a given spatially defined community) or vertical relationships with forces residing outside the physical confines of the community, including other armed actors, or the state. International actors and institutions can also come into play.

Aligning with non-state violent actors is what we call negative resilience. Gangs and other illicit armed actors can gain effective control over territory, guaranteeing a certain form of order, justice, and livelihoods. (Notably, gauges like crime statistics can show “improvement” in such situations.) Two salient features of negative resilience are informality and a troubled relationship with the state.

Informality
The complex status of informal neighborhoods, even entire towns, is a consistent source of difficulty in any metropolis. Rapid urbanization leads to the quick construction of “shantytowns” with no public services, little social capital, and scant political leverage. City governments pour resources into well-heeled districts in part to lure investment, tourism, and the like, while informal and legal—but-peripheral areas are neglected. These are the breeding grounds of crime and negative resilience.

Imposition of property rights, without view to larger social or economic consequences of home ownership or its large impact on solidarity within the community, led to social divisions within the community between those with and without title. It also pushed those without title to become more dependent on local power brokers, even as those with title became more linked to formal governing institutions.

The city’s leaders often fail to formally recognize the social and economic value of peripheral areas and are unwilling to embrace the growth of informal neighborhoods as a justifiable response to hardship. This prevalent attitude has often led to repression, if not flat-out destruction of entire neighborhoods by police and other arms of the state.

Even without actual bulldozing, the constant threat of displacement fuels community instability and new forms of clientelism in which citizens politically depend more on informal community leaders to mediate between them and the state.

Such a situation undermines horizontal networks among community residents, builds dependence on local strongmen, and reinforces vertical networks of authority, whether formal or informal, built around the power of those who could protect and or accommodate residents in marginal areas. All this reinforced the power of informal and illicit “leaders” who grounded their legitimacy and rein-
forced their authority by controlling informal territories and activities within them for their own gain.

The state and negative resilience
Political authorities have too often contributed to the incidences of criminal control of parts of their city. This is sometimes the result of pure corruption, as with drug cartels in Latin America. At other times, the lack of dealing with vast tracts of informal settlements, as in Nairobi, provides the grounds for negative resilience. And the role of the police, which is problematic in so many places, is frequently counterproductive in situations of chronic violence.

Police involvement in many low-income or informal neighborhoods may derive from the state’s interests in controlling populations and space. Once inside these informal spaces, police tend to accommodate and reinforce the informal order. Police often ended up in competition with informal leaders over who would control local protection rackets. This led to long-standing networks between police and local leaders, including those involved in illicit activities, with these relationships growing stronger and more nefarious as the ranks of the informal economy expanded and the commodities traded became more illicit. This was especially so when markets for extortion and protection involved goods traded across metropolitan, national, and transnational supply chains, primarily because movement in space was more costly and difficult to protect.

In those environments where police protected criminals more than residents, and where the scale of illicit trade expanded beyond the community’s boundaries, violence was much more likely. Police complicity in illegal activities meant that the rule of law was all but nonexistent and such an environment produced acute mistrust of police.

Those cities where the formal/informal divide is most clearly manifested in physical space and where police or state toleration of such conditions continues are the cities that have been hard pressed to break out of the cycle of violence, a state of affairs most evidenced by the cases of Nairobi, São Paolo, and Karachi. Those cities where there are conscious efforts to break down the formal/informal divide through urban and social policies, where low-income neighborhoods generate resources through formal and licit more than informal and illicit activities, and where police abuse of power is less tolerated have been able to pursue strategies of resilience. Here we see the cases of Mexico City and Medellín, as well as Managua.

Urban Location and Resilience: Center vs. Periphery

Common Characteristics of Central City Spaces
- Mixed land-uses
- Multiple economic functions and opportunities
- Pedestrian activity and mobility
- Strong state presence
- Police-community cooperation or negotiation
- Positive or proactive resilience

Common Characteristics of the Urban Periphery
- Newly settled
- Precarious land tenure
- Limited employment options
- Relative state absence
- Police-community estrangement
- Negative, reactive, or equilibrium resilience
Legitimate Security

Whether or not the police become connected to communities behind a common project of creating order goes a long way in explaining whether strong horizontal or vertical relations will develop across a variety of actors and institutions sufficiently to generate a certain degree of positive resilience.

Urban policymakers must be able to develop new security programs that mandate police and community cooperation, with the nature and direction of efforts set by the community itself.

The principles of legitimate security (LS) provide guidance for thinking about the “coproduction of security”—allowing for and supporting citizen and community autonomy from violent coercion and the co-optation of interests by both state and non-state actors. This guidance can be the subject of dialogue within communities and with officials, NGOs, the private sector, and other stakeholders.

- **LS is underpinned by legitimate justice systems that ensure accountability.** This is enabled by the rule of law and properly functioning courts.

- **LS should be embedded as a right.** Security as a right connects citizens to the state and to the system of law; as a commonly held right, it creates bridges to other groups.

- **LS is specific to marginalized and underrepresented populations, including ethnic/racial minorities, women, the poor, and indigenous.** The legitimacy of security provisions depends on its fair and broad application.

- **LS does not provide security for some at the expense of others; it is a public good to be equally distributed.** When security provision is linked to
a market logic, available for purchase or representing a means to profit, its public availability becomes restricted and its quality becomes diminished.

- **LS is not administered in a top-down or bottom-up fashion. It should be realized through institutional arrangements between sectors that serve as routes for mediation, collaboration, and checks-and-balances.**

- **LS does not perpetuate spatial segregation or reinforce the formal-informal divide. By its nature, it is inclusive.**

- **LS respects and accommodates diverse cultural norms of security and justice.**

- **LS can be strengthened by third-party “trust brokers” and social networks that serve as mediators when other justice and security mechanisms are not functioning.**

Both cooperative autonomy and legitimate security serve as the glue that links actors together at the local level and that allows a scaling of state-civil society connections to the city level.

A human rights discourse may be absolutely central, and it may have more power than discourses of order to generate relationships of cooperative autonomy. When citizens turned to an alternative discourse that united them both with their neighbors and the police, they were able to embrace a strategic approach toward security that did not challenge the state’s power or presence in the community through the police occupation. Instead, they made it clear that through an appreciation of human rights, the community and the police force were educated about the limits and possibilities of action against perpetrators of violence.

Independent of how deeply such lessons or principles were absorbed, the mere effort to open dialogue about rights created new space for participation between the community and the police. Through the discourse of rights, citizens were able to argue how and why they do want a police presence in their community, but one that conducts its work with respect for residents. Ultimately, a rights discourse has been an effective way to legitimate citizen action in the eyes of multiple stakeholders.
Urban Redevelopment

Resilience is typically forged at the community level through strong neighborhood identities, in spaces where organizing efforts, often led by key individual actors but successful at bringing diversity, have resulted in a sense of community solidarity and strength. In many cases, however, resilience at the community level is catalyzed by the state, originating both from a lack of state support or in response to state encouragement to engage the community in solving issues of violence.

In addition to the provision of legitimate security, an indispensable contribution of the state is good practices of urban planning and redevelopment. Urban planning is an unconventional means of changing social and spatial relations in ways that increase security in cities in conflict.

Examples of the ways that urban planning measures can enhance resilience go way beyond investments in more streetlights or more police on the streets to include more ambitious initiatives that bring people back into the downtown at night or introduce new infrastructure capable of integrating informal settlements with the rest of the city. Such measures are inspired by a desire to build connections among people, as much as designing space.

Urban Planning

Principles & Practice

- Good practice is expansionist, creating more public space, housing, economic opportunities, etc., and is achieved through a mix of construction and investment. Conversely, reductionist urban renovation destroys what are perceived to be harmful or blighted spaces, but in the process can disrupt or destroy valuable horizontal and vertical relationships.

- Good practice involves rethinking the formal-informal divide, with an eye to connecting new and old neighborhoods of various income levels through a more integrative and equitable distribution of services, investments, and opportunities for interaction in urban spaces.

- Good practice accepts a wide range of community urban projects and priorities generated from networks of those who live in the areas of violence; communities are given the autonomy to set the agenda for next steps.

- Good practice recognizes that territorial integration of planning across larger areas will respond to the concerns of given localities and at the same time pays more attention to the creation of networks of activities and allegiances that transcend the individual neighborhoods of the city.

- Good practice will take advantage of experiences showing that circumscribed sites or small “islands of resilience” that produce demonstrable effects that can generate optimism and hope in other parts of the city. They are limited unless there is a spatial strategy to extend or strategically reproduce these experiments so that islands of resilience become “zones of resilience” and ultimately “cities of resilience.”

Urban planning practices have too often undermined positive resilience by undertaking massive projects intended to fundamentally transform urban space. These are risky because they displace or threaten longstanding residents and undermine local commerce. At times, they disrupt or even destroy viable or recoverable neighborhoods.
### Table 2. Key Findings from Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Type/Trajectory of Violence</th>
<th>Scope and Nature of Informal Settlements</th>
<th>Police/Community Relations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Johannesburg</strong></td>
<td>Political, criminal/ steady state with peaks (e.g., xenophobic attacks) and valleys (e.g., World Cup 2010)</td>
<td>Informality persists in the city-center and peripheral areas; many townships (incl. Diepsloot) semi-formalized.</td>
<td>Mixed. Low trust and police corruption, but efforts to improve relations with community institutions. Lack of trust resulted in vigilantism (e.g., kangaroo courts).</td>
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<td><strong>Karachi</strong></td>
<td>Political violence, gangs, ethnic and sectarian violence, some acts of terrorism. Escalating political and gang violence.</td>
<td>Informal settlements are pervasive in the city due to low housing stock in a growing megacity. Informal settlements are not served by state-owned urban service providers.</td>
<td>Police are arms of warring political parties, distrusted by community. Military often restores order in times of crisis. Vigilante justice, target killings, and custodial killings are rampant.</td>
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<td><strong>Kigali</strong></td>
<td>Criminal/ Low and flat or dropping</td>
<td>83% of residents live in informal areas. The dearth of formalized housing is largely rooted in the city’s topography.</td>
<td>Collaboration between community institutions for crime prevention. The relationship is too strong sometimes, blurring lines between public and private spheres.</td>
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<td><strong>Managua</strong></td>
<td>Criminal/low but rising quickly (and the potential to fall victim to general rise in violence throughout region).</td>
<td>Informality grew with agricultural decline.</td>
<td>Concern about growing drug corruption. Residual goodwill from revolution keeps relations good.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Medellín</strong></td>
<td>Drug cartel/ uptick recently after long period of decline.</td>
<td>Prevalent but city extends services to informal settlements.</td>
<td>Efforts to bring together informal residents and police include performances at invisible borders and human rights table discussion to address police abuses.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mexico City</strong></td>
<td>Drug &amp; other crime/ staying the same</td>
<td>Efforts by stakeholders to break down informal-formal divide.</td>
<td>History of police corruption addressed; strong police presence in the historical center. The police presence in the poorer and more peripheral parts of the city is still inconsistent.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nairobi</strong></td>
<td>Political and criminal/rising</td>
<td>60% of residents on 5% of land; few city services and no legal status in prospect. Because they are ungoverned spaces where the state refuses to exist or intervene, lawlessness is the norm.</td>
<td>Police viewed as corrupt, repressive; rising vigilantism, as well as private security by landlords. In informal areas police are not present, so communities devise their own justice, security.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>São Paolo</strong></td>
<td>Criminal/declining</td>
<td>Informal neighborhoods on outskirts – history of community-initiated but state-supported upgrading; nighttime drug culture downtown–drug addicts exploit abandoned spaces in the city center when the businesses close for the night.</td>
<td>Police corrupt and despised; residents seek security from non-state actors. Slums are targets of police violence. Police presence downtown fades away at night.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Citizen Activity</td>
<td>Private Sector Involvement</td>
<td>Type of Resilience</td>
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<td>Generally inadequate; state provision ignores peripheral areas. Policies for service provision exist (Free Basic Services) but are not implemented.</td>
<td>Many community-led projects for violence reduction. A survivalist mentality in some to do what they need to do – on their own or with their community – to get by.</td>
<td>Limited in townships, largely due to the lack of formal economic activity. City as a whole seen as an economic hub and draws much investment to its economic center.</td>
<td>Equilibrium. Positive forms of resilience (e.g. community policing and movements) and negative forms of resilience (e.g. mob justice) are of equal strength.</td>
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<td>Decaying in old parts of city and poorly maintained. Newer parts are often not accessible by major roads. Informal water connections are prevalent. Infrastructure mafias prevail.</td>
<td>Citizen pushback exists. Citizen-built infrastructure transformed Orangi. Most activities are organized along political and ethnic lines, which makes scaling up at the city level difficult.</td>
<td>Violence and terrorism have hampered private investment and FDI flows. A mafia controls land. Investment in walled communities to create pockets of security for the middle and upper class.</td>
<td>Negative. A divided city, spatially and socially partitioned into ethnic and political enclaves. Weak state and even weaker agencies muscled out by gangs and infrastructure mafias.</td>
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<td>Lack of sufficient infrastructure, especially housing. A significant portion of the lack of infrastructure is due to the terrain of the area.</td>
<td>State-led efforts pre-dominant, though local actors do much implementation. Community solidarity is rooted in the common experience of genocide.</td>
<td>Foreign investment creating some jobs and affordable housing for the poor. Strong state-led push to attract investment has stifled the informal sector.</td>
<td>Positive resilience due to the widespread community involvement and accessibility of leadership (i.e. horizontal and vertical connections).</td>
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<td>Distributed through community organizations; general resources lacking.</td>
<td>Neighborhood solidarity is strong and empowering despite few resources.</td>
<td>Contentious relations with Ortega government, but many signs of cooperation.</td>
<td>Positive. Neighborhood solidarity has maintained horizontal ties within communities and sustained vertical ties to the state.</td>
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<td>Success in integrating informal areas due in part to public transit; Public water and power company adept in serving informal settlements, regardless of tenure status.</td>
<td>Many initiatives, e.g. to reduce violence in informal settlements. City-led but with broad community cooperation to gain resources and autonomy.</td>
<td>Many businesses have been involved at all levels of revitalization.</td>
<td>Positive. There is ample evidence of cooperation between citizen-led initiatives and state infrastructure projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of infrastructure in tough neighborhoods an impediment to business.</td>
<td>Several citizen-initiated projects to get more policing, especially in the historical center. This is more difficult to sustain in more peripheral, poorer parts of the city.</td>
<td>Successful collaborations in revitalizing historic downtown district.</td>
<td>Positive. The historical center reclaimed from decline. Peripheral areas could also be positive as citizens take action to revitalize and secure their neighborhoods.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sorely lacking in informal or peripheral areas. Successful infrastructure provision in informal areas achieved through corrupt government officials and illegal cooption of other areas' services.</td>
<td>Typically devolves into rent seeking; state-sponsored programs poorly conceived. Generally disconnected from the state and each other.</td>
<td>New investment in informal areas low. Investment limited to but significant in formal areas of the city.</td>
<td>Negative. Absence of (corrupt) state stirred some positive resilience via community actions. More pervasive negative resilience from violent non-state actors as service and security providers.</td>
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<td>Large-scale redevelopment downtown did not prevent crack addicts from taking over at night. Provision of public services was one means of connecting the state to informal communities but the one service that the state never provided was security.</td>
<td>Peripheral areas submit to armed gangs in lieu of state-led opportunities; downtown redevelopment was very top-down, with resistance from the crack addicts but also the smaller business owners whose shops will be removed from the area.</td>
<td>Investment downtown limited to daytime businesses.</td>
<td>Negative. In periphery, non-state armed actors control means of violence. More equilibrium downtown—the area has become safer with urban redevelopment and more visible police, but only during the day; little inclusion of the community in the process of revitalization.</td>
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Guidelines For Policy Making

1. Reducing chronic violence through positive resilience requires an integrated urban policy approach built on a closer understanding of the potential social and spatial synergies produced by bringing together citizens, the private sector, and authorities in delimited urban spaces. Urban policies that strengthen horizontal and vertical relations among multiple actors in a given locality, whether formulated for addressing security or other local service or development concerns, will lay a strong foundation for resilience.

As a principle, integrated urban policy programs should prioritize projects that create strong and self-sustaining bonds of connection within and between citizens and the state at a given locality, assessing a policy’s successes in terms of its capacities to tie multiple interests together in the promotion or protection of the given locality’s social and economic vibrancy.

2. In situations of chronic violence, community residents know best the local conditions and are better able to determine which adaptations can be accommodated or promoted without engendering conflict or opposition from neighbors, authorities, or agents of violence. Without their involvement, strategic missteps and coercive over-reach are likely. As such, urban policies intended to foster resilience should keep a strong and united community at the center of all policy decisions, better enabling citizen outreach to the state and other partners whose cooperation will further strengthen the resolve, commitment, and cohesiveness of resilient communities.

Strengthening the cooperative autonomy of communities facing chronic violence is the first step in generating resilience, and it can be accomplished by funding or incentivizing community-level activities that strengthen citizen capacities to communicate knowledge of local conditions to relevant policymakers and officials, thus placing communities at the center of problem-solving action.

3. Cooperative autonomy should be the goal of all citizen-government-private sector interactions regardless of sectoral domain, but it is particularly critical in the area of local security policy. Given the historical role that police have played in many cities with chronic violence, they are often seen as interlopers and exploiters of citizen vulnerabilities. The lack of trust between citizens and police will limit the gains associated with even the most positive of security measures, thus reducing or capping the benefits of other complementary activities targeted towards enabling resilience.

Policing practices or security measures that are designed by and solicited from communities, rather than imposed upon them, will have the most legitimacy; thus security policy must also be subject to the principle of cooperative autonomy. Doing so will also help strengthen horizontal connections between citizens and the police, allowing a freer exchange of critical information about crime or violence and moving a locality one step further towards a state of positive resilience.

4. Certain locations in a city will lay a stronger foundation for cooperative autonomy, for the establishment of legitimate security practices, and thus for resilience. In particular, urban locations with mixed land-use patterns that bring together small- and large-scale businesses with residents, and whose co-existence fuels vibrant consumer markets and dense foot traffic, are fertile sites for focusing policy and investing in demonstration projects.

Policymakers must disaggregate and tailor their action approaches to take into account the divergent social and spatial practices in different locations of a city. Such assessments should be used to identify the “resilient ready” neighborhoods that might be prioritized for initial investment, with policymakers then...
expanding their efforts to create a network of hospitable sites. These small but targeted successes should then be scaled out by spatially leveraging resilience effects to ever-larger zones in the city.

5. Although neighborhoods with mixed land use may have social and infrastructural advantages that favor resilience, such attributes are much less likely in peripheral and newly settled areas of a city. Limited infrastructure, ambiguous property rights, high degrees of informality, and a history of hosting migrants, refugees, or other seasonal populations with limited ties to other citizens and authorities can put such settlements at risk. Coping mechanisms in these areas are more likely to empower the agents of violence, even as structural limits to collective efficacy can make resilience less robust. When resilience does flourish, it may be more likely to take an individual rather than collective form.

“At-risk” areas are of high priority, but will require a different set of investment strategies and resources than the sites that are by their very social and spatial nature much more favorable to resilience. Policymakers must be strategic about when and how to invest in those areas where a more comprehensive and costly approach will be necessary, and how to balance investments in these more problematic areas of the city with the “low-hanging fruit” areas where payoff will be immediate and visible. Depending on the levels of violence and political will, the targeting of at-risk areas that are not yet hospitable to resilience may come at a later stage, after the scaling out of successful sites eliminates the territorial options for displaced violent actors from such high-risk areas.

Strategic Investments in Infrastructure

6. Building resilience depends on good city planning, with infrastructural investments central to laying the foundation for well-functioning cities in which mobility, housing, and services are distributed in an integrated and equitable fashion. Most cities in the developing world suffer from an array of single-function land uses distributed in a territorial hierarchy that reinforces the social and spatial exclusion of the most disadvantaged populations. Commercial and financial activities tend to be concentrated in centralized locations or in areas easily accessible to high-income populations, while residential areas tend to be isolated from each other and lacking commercial or industrial activities that might promote continuous activity and non-stop vibrancy of street life. Owing to the high costs of land associated with this territorial division of labor, low-income populations tend to be relegated to the periphery or stuck in under-serviced and inaccessible areas where informality in land tenure sets further barriers to public and private investment. It is these latter areas that are most likely to suffer from chronic violence and least likely to contain the social capital and economic resources necessary for positive resilience.

Policymakers must begin to question this territorial logic, and work actively to target or create new incentives for investments that strengthen or generate more integrated land uses, with the aim of using such investments to help local officials minimize or eliminate the social and spatial exclusion that characterizes cities with chronic violence. Such an approach also means shifting from a sectoral to a spatial strategy of policymaking, where strengthening synergies between commercial, residential, and employment activities in every locality of the city should take priority over targeted sectoral investments like provision of housing or commercial renovation alone.

7. An integrated and comprehensive approach to building urban spaces is well served by multi-faceted urban renovation projects in which strengthening synergies between the production and consumption functions of urban space are principal goals. It is important, however, to distinguish between traditional urban redevelopment projects and those with the aim of strengthening urban locali-
ties in ways that have spillover effects for all local residents, and not merely the developers or even the users of the new investments. Urban redevelopment is often undertaken as part of a large scale initiative that involves displacement or resettlement, and that assumes a complete recasting of an area’s profile to attract higher-end consumers and new populations. The larger the project, the more the pressure for a return on profits, the greater the tendency for developers to come from outside the targeted investment area, and the less the involvement of local communities in project design. All three tendencies will limit the community’s willingness to embrace urban renovation projects, thus eliminating the positive horizontal and vertical connections necessary for building cooperative autonomy and resilience capacities, independent of the positive security outcomes such projects promise to generate.

When promoting integrated urban renovation projects, policymakers should prioritize smaller-scale and low-cost projects, focusing on value-added but readily implementable initiatives like improving street lighting, expanding pedestrian mobility, supporting public space, and attracting vibrant commercial presence. Such programs can involve community residents and will put their embrace of such projects at the center of community life, thus strengthening horizontal and vertical social relations while also improving urban livability. Small-scale or value-added projects are also less likely to produce displacement and gentrification pressures that might generate citizen opposition. Likewise, the reliance on local contractors for procurement and local citizens for project development will generate more community buy-in, thus spreading “ownership” and responsibility for protecting these investments across the multiple constituencies that reside in the locality.

8. In high-risk areas on the urban periphery and in low-income neighborhoods with single-function land-use patterns, comprehensive urban renovation may be a longer-term objective, requiring massive investments in integrated urban projects. Fostering the conditions for positive resilience in such sites will involve much greater investments in infrastructure and urban redevelopment. It will also require sufficient community buy-in to keep residents actively engaged as urban transformation occurs around them. In such areas, the ambiguity of property rights can further complicate commitments – from public or private sector developers – to undertaking large-scale urban renewal. One way to advance integrated urban aims is to prioritize infrastructure investments that break down previous barriers of social and spatial exclusion from the rest of the city. To achieve this objective, collective infrastructure provision is more urgent than individual property rights and housing tenure. Such investments must come with visible state presence and considerable state legitimacy, in part because the state’s absence in infrastructure and service provision created an environment where violence flourished.

To lay the groundwork for integrated urban development in high-risk areas, particularly those where mafias and other violent actors strengthened their authority through service provision, policymakers should both prioritize infrastructural investments and involve community residents in decisions about transportation, electricity, water, and other critical infrastructural services that link neighbors to each other and to other parts of the city. Community involvement in infrastructure policymaking can help generate the conditions for positive resilience by strengthening both collective efficacy and commitment to the locality as a physical space, thus bringing neighbors together to determine how such collective needs should be adjudicated in ways that might produce a different urban future and that may lay the foundation for larger, more ambitious and integrated urban projects further down the road once an area’s infrastructure becomes upgraded.
9. Beyond their physical consequences, urban infrastructural upgrading as determined through community deliberation is a way to improve dialogue between the state and citizens, thus linking them to each other in ways that allow increased community autonomy from the agents of violence. When community dialogue with authorities is ongoing rather than unfolding through a single instance of participation over a given project, the connections within and between citizens and the state are strengthened. Thus, although there may be a multiplicity of ways to generate the horizontal and vertical reciprocities that comprise what we have termed cooperative autonomy and that lay the foundation for positive resilience, engagement around certain issues and in certain formats may be preferable. In particular, “one-off” rounds of invited community participation on a single urban project may not generate the same kinds of loyalties within and between citizens and the state as do urban programs that require constant management, oversight, communication, and maintenance. Likewise, participation exercises that unfold coincident with extant political jurisdictions are subject to distortion through patron-client networks or party domination.

In order to strengthen the bonds of cooperative autonomy, communities should be delegated greater responsibility for management, assessment, and decision making about daily urban conditions in their immediate localities. Programs focused on the care and management of public spaces or other shared community infrastructures can go a long way in keeping sustained connections within and between citizens and governing authorities in ways that generate positive resilience. Such bonds can also serve as the basis for accountability between citizens and the state, thus making the project of good governance a two-way avenue of reciprocities in which citizens are as responsible as authorities for conditions in their neighborhoods. Such bonds should be fostered at scales smaller than those provided by formal governance arrangements, so as to enable the greatest degree of community autonomy.

10. Coordinating citizen involvement in the care and management of urban spaces is easier said than done. This is particularly the case when a given locality is divided socially, economically, politically, or ethnically. The smaller the territorial scale of community oversight, the less likely such divisions will occur. But defining a community on too large a scale can lead to fragmentation and problems of coordination. When multiple aid and assistance organizations operate in a given locality, the proliferation of organizations with divergent objectives can get in the way of community cohesion. As such, part of the challenge is identifying the boundaries around a given community, an appropriate scale for programmatic action, and a common agenda for a single locale.

Mitigating undue fragmentation and fostering greater community interaction requires a spatial rather than a sectoral approach to community bonding. This means that special attention must be paid to the existence of NGOs and government programs in localities, and the extent to which they divide a community either sectorally or spatially. If resilience via community autonomy is the aim, both citizens and authorities should make concerted efforts to foster linkages among existing advocacy and aid programs at the level of the locality. Policymakers and funders should themselves prioritize the needs of a spatially defined community over their own organization’s sectoral or advocacy interests.

11. Among policies that reinforce cooperative autonomy, those related to security are among the most critical but also the most problematic to develop. Authorities will understandably be reluctant to leave security matters entirely in the hands of citizens, and will prefer community policy programs and other initiatives that solicit citizen input in security matters while keeping larger security operations and goals in state hands. The objectives of national and regional security make state coordination of security policies at these large scales reason-
able. Yet conditions at the level of the community are entirely different, in part because of the limited trust in police and the military. In many communities, citizens are reluctant to let states set the security agenda because the state’s criterion for successful battle against agents of violence may not match that of a given locality. Likewise, the inordinate power granted state security forces, particularly when the target includes political enemies and organized crime, can easily run against the quotidian and pragmatic strategies of resilience deployed in areas where informal and illicit activities form part of daily life. It may be a matter of trading off the principle of state coordination of security operations for greater security at the level of the locality, although one must recognize allowing communities to take security into their own hands is a slippery slope that must be closely monitored.

Policymakers and authorities must work to develop and fund community-led security strategies. Such actions will provide more legitimacy for the state at the level of the community, thus generating the social capital and trust in governance institutions that will be needed to sustain resilience and fight against violence in other domains of community life. Security policies that enable decentralized and shared policing practices dictated by communities with a sense of their own needs will be more legitimate in the eyes of residents, thus feeding back on the cooperative autonomy necessary for resilience. In the service of these aims, new ways to involve the police in activities other than security must be identified so as to improve relationships with residents that have long distrusted the police. Encouraging the community’s role in resisting against the actors of violence will require a commitment to the co-production of security, as an objective to be shared between citizens and the state.

Training Workshop Proposals

12. If positive resilience can lay the foundation for greater security and successful community push-back against violence, and if building better cities enhances the aims of positive resilience, then development agencies and governments must do a better job of educating security and governance professionals about cities and how to build them in ways that enhance urban resilience capacities. Such an objective not only involves a re-thinking of the sector-specific approach to both development and violence mitigation, it also entails an appreciation of a more integrated approach to the study of cities, communities, and development. To do so requires a better understanding of urban spatial dynamics, urban design principles, and urban planning processes.

We recommend a series of training workshops that bring together security experts, development officials, and urban planners who can engage with each other and with selected city mayors in the discussion of how to strengthen resilience in cities facing chronic violence. More targeted workshops could then follow that bring together local stakeholders with the police and other law-enforcement officials. Discrete trainings for security personnel drawing on security-sector reform practice as well as community policing experience are also advisable. In addition to discussing the recommendations above, such workshops would provide a format for bringing in security and development officials who work at other scales than the city, thus providing the basis for new conversations about scaling up urban resilience strategies from cities to nations to regions.

13. Given our findings about the importance of starting at a small, more manageable spatial scale to identify strategies, sites, and agents of resilience, and given the limitations of many current quantitative measures for assessing violence reduction, it is important to develop new metrics and methodologies that can be used to assess and evaluate both the potential for resilience in a given city, and the impacts of any policy investments or programs developed in
order to strengthen resilience and/or reduce violence. Such metrics and methodologies would not only involve ethnography, they also would build network theories, spatial dynamics, and other qualitative measures and indicators. We recommend a series of methodology workshops that expose community residents, local officials, and security or development policymakers to new techniques and methodologies for the study of resilience. Such workshops would discuss how to identify, measure, and assess resilience as well as how to link metrics of resilience to the larger aims of eliminating or violence and establishing security.
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