1. William Schneider, "Waiting for a New Clinton Doctrine," National Journal, March 25, 1995, p. 778.
2. Ibid.
3. Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
4. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Democracy and Development," paper presented to the Nobel Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Uppsala University, Sweden, August 27-30, 1994, pp. 9, 10, and 18 (Table 5). For their entire sample of regimes across several decades, the average population growth rate in democracies was 1.48 percent; in dictatorships, the rate was 2.51 percent. This is not a mere artifact of the association between democracy and higher levels of development. Dictatorships had higher (often substantially higher) average rates of population growth at every one of ten levels of per capita GNP.
5. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990). (See also the other essays in the Montville volume. Also Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993); Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
6. For a conceptualization of the third wave, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
7. Adrian Karatnycky, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1994: Democracies on the Rise, Democracies at Risk," Freedom Review 26(1), 1995, p. 5.
8. Although there are 191 independent countries in the world today (24 more than in 1984), the increase in democracies is due mainly to a dramatic rise in the percentage of countries with the formal institutional arrangements of democracy: from 38 percent in 1984 to 60 percent in 1994, according to Freedom House.
9. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994-1995 (New York, 1995), p. 3.
10. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-9; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy," in Diamond et al., Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 6-8.
11. The limitation of this discussion to U.S. agencies is not intended to disparage the growing and creative engagement of other official development agencies, such as the Swedish International Development Authority, which developed in 1993 an extensive and sophisticated strategy for wide-ranging assistance, to both governmental and nongovernmental recipients, in support of democracy and human rights.
12. Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10," Foreign Policy no. 95 (Summer 1994), p. 124. Something around $400 million appears to be the most reasonable estimate. Under the Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act of 1994 (PPDA), AID political assistance for democracy is budgeted principally through two titles. Title I establishes "Support for Democratic Participation" as one of the four objectives of "Sustainable Development" assistance to "less developed" countries. Title II, "Building Democracy," authorizes a wide range of support (including economic and humanitarian) to countries that are not eligible for sustainable development support, either because they are too advanced economically or because the government's overall performance record rules them out of a conventional development assistance relationship with the United States. (A third title authorizes political institution building in countries emerging from civil war or humanitarian crisis.) Title II includes the entire country programs for the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and selected other "Countries in Transition" (including those emerging from civil strife and those where democracy is threatened, such as Colombia and Venezuela). In its FY96 International Affairs ("Function 150") budget request, the Clinton Administration requested $179 million (the same as FY95) for its "Support for Democratic Participation Programs," including $11 million for multilateral programs of the Organization of American States (OAS) and $1.527 billion for the Building Democracy programs. Some of these Building Democracy funds are for political assistance for democracy (free and fair elections, judicial systems, legislatures, local government, civil society, political culture, accountability, and so on): $148 million of the $788 million requested for the NIS, $73 million of the $480 million requested for Central and Eastern Europe, about $60 million for various Latin American, Caribbean, East Asian, and African countries, and some of the $140 million in special assistance for Haiti, Cambodia, and Angola. Thus, something over $300 million of the Building Democracy budget is for political assistance programs for democracy; adding the $179 million in Support for Democratic Participation yields a budget request for FY96 of around $500 million in AID spending for democracy promotion, more narrowly construed. This is slightly less than 10 percent of the total requested for bilateral, nonmilitary foreign aid.
Clearly, however, other development assistance spending has potential democratic impacts. The PPDA not only lists four objectives of sustainable development--broad-based growth, environmental protection, democracy promotion, and population stabilization--but emphasizes their interrelated character and points to other goals that cut across these, such as enhancing popular participation in development and improving the participation and status of women. Assistance to civil society organizations, for example, may simultaneously advance the role of women in the economy or improve environmental protection, at the same time that it strengthens the ability of citizens' organizations to lobby the government and hold it accountable. Some portion of development assistance for economic growth, population stabilization, and environmental protection (totaling over $2.3 billion in FY95) might be considered as assisting indirectly the civil society and social structural foundations of democracy. If one were to estimate that even 10 percent of this other development funding builds democratic civil societies; then count the entire Building Democracy account, and add in the $179 million in support for democratic participation, the total democracy promotion budget would be roughly $1.7 billion in FY95 and close to $2 billion in FY96. So how one estimates democracy expenditures by such an aid organization depends on how narrowly one construes the function. What is striking is how small in comparison are the sums appropriated annually to the nongovernmental democracy assistance organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (see note 26).
13. For a detailed critical assessment of these AID democracy assistance programs in Latin America during the 1980s, see Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 206-226. The earliest AID involvement in explicitly political assistance began in the early 1960s, when AID and the Ford Foundation supported the development of law faculties in a number of Latin American, Asian, and African countries. Premised in modernization theory, the "Law and Development" program naively expected that cadres of lawyers schooled in Western law "would spearhead the process of political and economic modernization." This program gave way in the mid-1970s to a focus on making legal services available to the poor, as part of AID's new emphasis on poverty alleviation and basic needs. Women's rights and human rights assumed a larger role in the late 1970s, but it was not until the Reagan Administration that a third-generation "Administration of Justice" program began, focused initially on Central America. The current "Rule of Law" program, much broader geographically and conceptually, represents a fourth generation of AID programs in this area. However, the comprehensive democracy promotion endeavor of which it is a part is without precedent in the agency.
14. See Joel Barkan, "Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad? Lessons from Africa," in Axel Hadenius, ed., Democracy's Victory and Crisis: Nobel Symposium 1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press); and the U.S. Agency for International Development, "Building Democracy: USAID's Strategy," in Strategies for Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: USAID, March 1994).
15. Personal communication from USAID Africa Bureau Information Center, August 8, 1994.
16. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992), p. 35.
17. Africa Bureau of USIA, "Summary of AF Democracy Programming in FY95 AF Country Plans" (no date).
18. "Forging Democracy through Understanding and Trust: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies," Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, July 29, 1994.
19. Barkan (note 14, above).
20. For example, according to Michael Pinto-Duschinsky ("Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and their U.S. Counterparts," International Affairs 67(1), 1991, pp. 33-63) in 1988 about half of their total of $170 million in income from the German government was spent on these democracy-promoting activities ($85 million), exceeding by a factor of more than five the NED budget and nearly equaling the estimated total U.S. democracy-promotion spending in 1989 of $100 million. My estimate of $85 million is derived from applying the percentages on the first four types of foreign activities Pinto-Duschinsky lists in Table 4 to the total funding amounts he lists in Table 1. The U.S. figure is drawn from his essay but is consistent with what U.S. administration figures estimated to me in 1989. Pinto-Duschinsky judged at the time "that overall U.S. government spending on political aid (excluding CIA activities) is about half West German spending on the party foundation's foreign operations" (p. 47).
21. These totals were obtained by adding the figures for Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and do not include a number of projects the Ebert Foundation was then initiating in Russia and several East European countries (information from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, February 1992).
22. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation, for example, works with more than 500 partner organizations in more than 80 countries on programs to train journalists and political leaders, promote civic education, strengthen civil society organizations, and foster the regular exchange of information and ideas about democracy.
23. On the origins of NED, see Carothers (note 13, above), In the Name of Democracy, pp. 202-205.
24. In addition to the annual reports of NED and its core grantees, see Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25-46, and Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10" (note 11, above). In recent years, the parent organization has spent about 20 percent of the total funding on its own discretionary programs, while roughly 31.5 percent has been allocated to FTUI, 14 percent to CIPE, and 12.25 percent each to the two party institutes (with 10 percent going to administrative expenses).
25. The other regional labor institutes, which have been functioning for several decades and which were important instruments of political and ideological competition with Communist forces during the Cold War, are the African-American Labor Center, the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, and (for Latin America) the American Institute for Free Labor Development. FTUI, established in 1977, is both a regional institute (for Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and an administrative center through which NED funding for the other three AFL-CIO institutes flows.
26. Annual congressional funding ranged from $15 million to $18 million from 1984 to 1990, and from $25 million to $30 million from 1991 to 1993. The Clinton administration's request to raise its funding for FY1994 to $50 million sparked intense congressional debate that almost killed the endowment altogether. Total funding of the endowment family of organizations is larger because of grants from AID, which now exceed for the two party institutes what they receive from the NED appropriation, and because of occasional grants of up to $10 million earmarked by Congress for programs in particular countries (e.g., Poland, Nicaragua, and Haiti). See Carothers (note 12, above), "The NED at 10," p. 126.
27. See HonorČ Koffi Guie, "Organizing Africa's Democrats," Journal of Democracy 4(2) (April 1993): 119-129.
28. See the 1993 and 1994 Annual Reports of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington DC, covering the relevant fiscal years (October 1-September 30). On the Mexican Civic Alliance, see Sergio Aguayo, "A Mexican Milestone," Journal of Democracy 6(2) (April 1995), pp. 157-167.
29. John D. Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," Journal of Democracy 5(4) (October 1994): 146-160. For a summary of CIPE programs, see Center for International Private Enterprise, 1983 to 1993: A Decade in Review (Washington, DC: CIPE, 1993).
30. Paul Somogyi, "Assisting Independent Trade Unions in Post-Communist Countries," Problems of Post-Communism, March-April 1995.
31. National Democratic Institute, "1993: A Year in Review," Washington, DC, January 1994, pp. 4-5. IRI has similar (though less extensive) programs, but is more inclined to focus party assistance on one or more conservative parties. Carothers, "The NED at 10," p. 127.
32. International Republican Institute, "IRI: A Decade of Democracy, 1984-1994," Washington, DC, June 1994.
33. About 40 percent of this budget ($16 million in FY94) derives from its annual congressional appropriation through the State Department, but its total government funding is much larger because, like the two party institutes, it receives substantial annual, project-specific grants from AID ($23.1 million in FY94). The two party institutes and FTUI also operate field offices abroad, but many of these serve regions rather than individual countries.
34. Summary of Grants Awarded during May 1994, communication from the Eurasia Foundation, June 1994.
35. Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, Newsletter, no. 7 (Winter 1995): 34.
36. International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Brochure (1994) and Annual Report, 1993-94. The 13 countries in which the Centre now works are El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand.
37. By contrast, the Canadian centre has three representatives from developing countries on its thirteen-member international board of directors, including former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias.
38. Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Annual Report 1993-94 (London: Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 1994). WFD's Corporate Plan 1995-1998 projects somewhat increased funding for the former Soviet Union (especially Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) and, in its other two target regions, priority on these six countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia.
39. Rozann M. Stayden, "Democratization: Legal Transformation--The Necessity of Strong Legal Systems and Institutions in Emerging African Democracies," Discussion Papers from a Seminar on Democratization in Africa, the Carter Center of Emory University, May 13-14, 1994, pp. 201-209.
40. With membership of some 2000 leading editors, publishers, broadcasting executives, and journalists in more than 80 countries, IPI holds conferences and seminars on a wide range of topics relating to press freedom and the journalistic profession. It also runs regular training programs in developing and post-Communist countries and publishes a monthly magazine and an annual report that monitor country developments with respect to press freedom. See Adam Feinstein, "Fighting for Press Freedom," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 159-168. The annual survey of the CPJ, Attacks on the Press, is a particularly detailed account of violations of press freedom, and the organization also publishes a monthly Update.
41. IDEE, Newsletter no. 7 (Winter 1995):30, 37; TransAtlantic Perspectives (published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States), no. 30 (Autumn 1994): 36-37.
42. IDEE, Newsletter no. 7 (Winter 1995): 2-3, 5, 22, 30-36.
43. Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1992 Annual Report.
44. John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 1992 Annual Report, Chicago.
45. TransAtlantic Perspectives, no. 30 (Autumn 1994), special issue on Political Development in Central and Eastern Europe.
46. New York Times, 15 October 1990.
47. George Soros, The Soros Foundations Network, The Soros Foundations, New York, February 1994.
48. When the U.S. House of Representatives voted in mid-1993 to eliminate funding for NED (a vote that was soon reversed), more than 100 U.S. NGOs and study centers joined in a statement of support for the endowment.
49. Carothers concludes that AID "does not like to do political development work and is not good at it," in part because its officers lack expertise (In the Name of Democracy, p. 221). This longstanding and widely shared criticism was more or less true in the 1980s but appears increasingly invalid, however, as AID experience with democracy assistance projects cumulates over time and as commitment to the goal becomes entrenched at the top, as it has during the Bush and Clinton administrations. Moreover, AID has utilized a growing array of consultants and specialists (many on leave from academia) with real expertise in democracy, and it is now developing a multiyear program to train specialized career officers in democracy promotion.
50. Carothers in particular points to its cumbersome and risk-averse nature. See In the Name of Democracy, pp. 221-222.
51. NDI, which has a network of some 500 pro bono consultants, estimates that from February 1993 to January 1994 it saved more than $2 million in consulting fees for more about 7600 days of expert assistance rendered pro bono. See NDI, "Submission to the Congressionally Authorized Study on U.S. Government-Funded Democracy Programs," July 1994, p. 12.
52. In FY94, the Asia Foundation received about 55 percent ($23 million), of its entire budget in project-specific funding from AID; NDI received four-fifths ($14 million), and IRI also received most ($11 million) of its budget from AID. The Eurasia Foundation obtains virtually all its funding from AID.
53. Leading NGOs like NED, NDI, and the Asia Foundation have all raised these concerns in recent years. See also Carothers (note 12, above), "The NED at 10," p. 134.
54. NDI, "Submission to the Congressionally Authorized Study on U.S. Government-Funded Democracy Programs," July 1994, p. 11.
55. NDI, "Submission to the Congressionally Authorized Study on U.S. Government-Funded Democracy Programs," July 1994, pp. 11-12.
56. Problems of auditing and accountability are among the most frequently cited objections by critics of NED and its core institutes. In response to these criticisms and to a critical evaluation by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), NED implemented in FY94 a new audit strategy with more formal, comprehensive procedures, more frequent audits (twice as many during fiscal years 1993 and 1994 as during the previous two years), and more on-site visits to evaluate and improve grantee accounting systems (NED, 1994 Annual Report, p. 8). It must be remembered, however, that as audit procedures become more rigorous and comprehensive, cost-effectiveness may in fact diminish, partly because auditing involves certain minimum fixed costs that are difficult to justify for small grants. Congressionally funded donor organizations like NED are publicly accountable in that they are subject to congressional oversight and are periodically audited by the GAO, AID, and the USIA Inspector General.
57. Carl Gershman, "The United Nations and the New World Order," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 9-11.
58. Inge Tvedten, "The Angolan Debacle," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 2 (April 1993), p. 118.
59. Julio Jeldres, "The UN and the Cambodian Transition," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (October 1993), pp. 104-116.
60. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 21-23; see also Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 87-89.
61. John Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe," in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds., Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) pp. 124-125.
62. Neil J. Kritz, "The CSCE in the New Era," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 25. Membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), established in 1990, has similar democracy and market conditionality.
63. The Group of 24 industrialized countries came together in mid-1989 to coordinate aid to Poland and Hungary and then later agreed to extend aid to other Eastern European countries that pursued democracy and free markets.
64. Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy," pp. 128-129, 133 (note 61, above). PHARE stands for "Poland/Hungary Aid for Restructuring of Economies," which was launched for those two countries in July 1989 but soon expanded to other Central and Eastern European countries.
65. "What is Phare?" European Commission, Phare Information Office, Brussels, Belgium, 1995, p. 3.
66. Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme--Projects Summary, 2 February 1995. See also The European Union's Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme: Projects in Operation in 1995 (Brussels: European Commission, Directorate General for External Economic Relations, April 1995).
67. IDEE Newsletter no. 7 (Winter 1995): 39-40.
68. Quoted in Kritz, "The CSCE in the New Era," p. 19 (note 62, above).
69. Pinder, "The European Community and Democracy," p. 132 (note 61, above).
70. Heraldo MuŅoz, "The OAS and Democratic Governance," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 29-38; Peter Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 40. A reform of the OAS Charter adopted in December 1992 (the Washington protocol) provides for the suspension of a member state whose democratic government has been overthrown by force.
71. Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice," pp. 40-42.
72. Ibid., p. 44. See also Tom J. Farer, "A Multilateral Arrangement to Secure Democracy," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), pp. 115-166.
73. Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice," pp. 43-45.
74. Clement Nwankwo, "The OAU and Human Rights," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 50-54.
75. Larry Garber, "The OAU and Elections," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 55-59.
76. Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," The American Journal of International Law 86, no. 46 (1992), p. 50.
77. Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Toward a Global `Guarantee Clause,'" Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 60-69; and Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracy," Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, pp. 105-122.
78. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
79. Jonathan Hartlyn and Arturo Valenzuela, "Democracy in Latin America since 1930," in Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. VI: Latin America Since 1930: Economy, Society, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); see also Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, in press).
80. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 57-59; see also Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 56-61.
81. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (February 1994), p. 14.
82. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Middle Income Countries," in Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 270-313, and "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy," pp. 342-345; and Michael Coppedge, "Institutions and Democratic Governance in Latin America," revised version (August 1993) of paper prepared for the conference "Rethinking Development Theories in Latin America," Institute of Latin American Studies, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, March 11-13, 1993, p. 16.
83. These insights derive from Harry Blair and Gary Hansen, "Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs." Washington, DC: USAID, Feb. 1994.
84. Robert Klitgaard, "Political Corruption: Strategies for Reform," and Larry Diamond, "Political Corruption: Nigeria's Perennial Struggle," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 86-101 and 73-85.
85. Election observing is the term used to describe the work of international visitors who watch and assess the electoral process, typically for periods of no more than a few weeks in country (though this may be spread out over a few periodic visits during preparation for the election and then the campaign). Election monitoring denotes the work of a much larger number of indigenous observers, organized and deployed by nonpartisan NGOs as well as the various political parties. A comprehensive monitoring effort will place at least one nonpartisan observer (usually from a broad umbrella organization in civil society) at every polling site in the country.
86. Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan, "The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 2 (April 1993), pp. 95-107.
87. The South African case was unique in the scale of international involvement, which included over 1,000 UN-organized international observers (augmenting thousands of domestic monitors) and millions of dollars in assistance in public and private assistance for voter education and electoral administration.
88. Jennifer L. McCoy, Larry Garber, and Robert A. Pastor, "Making Peace by Observing and Mediating Elections," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 102-114. See also Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1991), pp. 208-210; Larry Garber and Eric Bjornlund, "Election Monitoring in Africa," in Festus Eribo, Oyeleye Oyediran, Mulatu Wubneh, and Leo Zonn, eds., Window on Africa: Democratization and Media Exposure (Greenville, NC: East Carolina University Center for International Programs, March 1993), pp. 28-50; Eric Bjornlund, Michael Bratton, and Clark Gibson, "Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa: Lessons from Zambia," African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 405-431.
89. NDI's unmatched experience in election observing, and its early warning of serious flaws in preparations for the December 1992 voting, made it too great a risk to the Kenyan government. See National Democratic Institute of International Affairs, "1992: A Year in Review," Washington, DC, 1993, p. 8.
90. Joel D. Barkan, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 85-99.
91. Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 4-17.
92. Richard Rose, "Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 2 (July 1994): 29.
93. Peter Szanton, "DIALOG," TransAtlantic Perspectives, no. 30 (Autumn 1994): 6.
94. Robert D. Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
95. Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," pp. 7-11.
96. Harry Blair, "Civil Society, Democratic Development, and International Donors: A Case Study from Bangladesh," paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New York, September 1-4, 1994, p. 24.
97. Karen L. Remmer, "Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience," World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 315-335; and "The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s," American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 (September 1991): 777-800; and Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 4 (October 1994 special issue on Economic Reform and Democracy): 104-118.
98. Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation" (note 79, above).
99. See Larry Diamond, "Democracy and Economic Reform: Tensions, Compatibilities, and Strategies of Reconciliation," in Edward Lazear, ed., Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), pp. 107-158.
100. An eleven-country study shows that many of the most prominent success stories of economic reform in the developing and post-Communist worlds (Korea in the 1960s, Indonesia from the late 1960s, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, and Poland) received very generous financial aid and debt rescheduling, whereas the successful cases of reform without substantial aid were the already rich countries of Australia and New Zealand, as well as Spain and Portugal with the implicit aid of imminent entry into the European Union. John Williamson and Stephan Haggard, "The Political Conditions for Economic Reform," in John Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 566-567.
101. Thomas R. Callaghy, "Vision and Politics in the Transformation of the Global Economy," in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., Global Transformation and the Third World (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 173-174.
102. Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, "How Hemmed In? Lessons and Prospects of Africa's Responses to Decline," in Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 526.
103. Larry Diamond, "Democracy: The New Wind," Africa Report 39, no. 5 (September- October 1994), pp. 50-54.
104. Paul Collier, "Africa's External Economic Relations, 1960-1990," in Douglas Rimmer, ed., Africa Years On: The Record and Outlook after Thirty Years of Independence (London: James Curry Ltd, 1991), p. 161.
105. Carol Graham, Safety Nets, Politics and the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
106. As of early 1994, Sachs estimates, the West had transferred only about 1/7 of the resources pledged. Jeffrey Sachs, "Betrayal," The New Republic, January 31, 1994, p. 14.
107. Jeffrey Sachs, "Life in the Economic Emergency Room," in Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform (note 100, above), p. 521. This paper was delivered at a January 1993 conference. For a similar and more recent perspective, emphasizing the funding of social safety net programs based in major regional cities throughout Russia (with parallel transfers of Russian subsidies for state enterprises into the safety net programs), see Michael McFaul, "Causes and Consequences of the `End of Market Romanticism' in Russia," paper presented to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, March 31, 1994, p. 34-35.
108. McFaul, op. cit., p. 33.
109. Ibid., p. 31.
110. Michael McFaul, "Why Russia's Politics Matter," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January- February 1995): 98-99.
111. Ibid., p. 98.
112. See Williamson and Haggard, "The Political Conditions for Economic Reform," p. 566.
113. Joan M. Nelson with Stephanie J. Eglington, Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid? (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992), pp. 48-49. As they note, when reform elements are too weak, external pressure fails; when reformers predominate, pressure is not needed. Yet, some states, particularly in Africa, are so weak that even a militantly authoritarian regime may have little choice but to capitulate to coherent external pressure, or face collapse. Still, Nelson and Eglington provide a thoughtful and balanced treatment of the issues that has heavily influenced the discussion that follows.
114. Ibid., p. 38.
115. Ibid., p. 53.
116. Ibid., p. 4.
117. Although Turkey remains a constitutional democracy in form, the deterioration of its empirical democratic standards is reflected in its declining freedom rating from Freedom House and in the harsh assessments of international human rights groups. See, for example, Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 1993-1994, pp. 551-554, and Human Rights Watch Annual Report 1994 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1993), pp. 243-246.
118. Kathryn Sikkink, "The Effectiveness of U.S. Human Rights Policy: Argentina, Guatemala, and Uruguay," paper presented to the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 21-25, 1991. Uruguay's first post-transition democratic president, Julio Sanguinetti, declared shortly after taking office in 1984, "The vigorous policies of the Carter Administration were the most important outside influence on Uruguay's democratization process." Quoted in Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 96.
119. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 96-97.
120. Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton University Press, 1994).
121. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 608-642.
122. Robert A. Pastor, "Nicaragua's Choice: The Making of a Free Election," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 15.
123. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 95. On the U.S. efforts to induce and support democratic transition in Chile, see Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, pp. 150-163. As far back as 1983, and repeatedly thereafter, President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz had emphasized to Chun Doo Hwan the importance of his commitment to transfer power to an elected successor at the end of his presidential term in 1988. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 976-980.
124. J. Samuel Fitch, "Democracy, Human Rights and the Armed Forces in Latin America," in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1993) p. 203 (emphasis in the original).
125. Reagan struggled throughout his presidency between his passionate commitment to freedom and democracy and his strong emotional attachment to Cold War authoritarian allies like Marcos, Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, and the Angolan insurgent Jonas Savimbi. Moreover, the first year and a half of Reagan's presidency, with Alexander Haig as secretary of state, charted a very different course, seeking to reverse Carter's human rights emphasis and refurbish relations with anti-Communist authoritarian regimes in the Third World. See Smith, America's Mission, pp. 286-290, and Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, pp. 118-127. Carothers provides a largely critical perspective on what the Reagan administration ultimately accomplished for democracy in Latin America; Smith, taking a global view, offers a more sympathetic assessment (pp. 297-307).
126. Francisco Villagr·n de LeŪn, "Thwarting the Guatemalan Coup," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (October 1993), p. 124.
127. However, Sikkink concludes that U.S. human rights pressure over the years has not been particularly effective in Guatemala and cautions that even superpower pressure for democratization may be ineffective unless it is applied in a comprehensive and forceful manner, clearly conveyed through multiple channels and utilizing a wide range of policy instruments; and unless there is a moderate faction within the authoritarian regime prepared to be receptive to such pressure. Sikkink, "U.S. Human Rights Policy," pp. 32-38 (note 118, above).
128. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 98.
129. Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 41, no. 4 (July 1989), p. 484.
130. On this effect in Chile late in Pinochet's rule, see Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 972 and 974.
131. All quotes are from Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Future: A Turbulent Transition," Journal of Democracy 1, no. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 8-9.
132. Nelson and Eglington, Encouraging Democracy, pp. 16-17, 32 (note 113, above).
133. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Africa," in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics, 2nd. ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).
134. Barkan, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election," p. 91 (note 90, above).
135. Quoted by Barkan, from the World Bank's press release of the meeting of the Consultative Group for Kenya (Paris, 26 November 1991).
136. Githu Muigai, "Kenya's Opposition and the Crisis of Governance," Issue ("A Journal of Opinion" of the U.S. African Studies Association), 21, no 1/2 (1993), p. 29.
137. Larry Diamond, "Power-Dependence Relationships in the World System," in Louis Kriesberg, ed., Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1979). These principles are also emphasized by Nelson and Eglington, in Encouraging Democracy, who also stress the importance of a reform element within the regime (pp. 48-49). However, if aid dependence is extreme enough, as it is in much of Africa, and the donor community is sufficiently united (as in Kenya initially and Malawi), even a regime in which hardliners predominate may have little choice but to give in to the pressure (or face financial collapse).
138. John R. Heilbrunn, "The Social Origins of National Conferences: A Comparison of Benin and Togo," Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 2 (June 1993).
139. Africa Report, March/April 1993, p. 62. Worse still, reports the defeated opposition candidate Fru Ndi, "The French government's ministry to Cameroon openly accused the U.S. government" of supporting his party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), in charges that were repeated by the government-controlled press.
140. West Africa , 5-11July 1993, p. 1146.
141. The Economist, May 29, 1993, p. 46.
142. Divergent bureaucratic goals and agendas have also been evident in other countries, such as France and Germany (though probably not to the same degree). Nelson and Eglington, Encouraging Democracy , p. 23.
143. Abraham Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History," in Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America: Themes and Issues, p. 263.
144. Fitch ("Democracy, Human Rights, and the Armed Forces," p. 205; note 124, above) proposes that military aid be conditional not only on decent human rights performance (as evaluated by independent organizations like Amnesty International and the OAS) but also on "certified progress toward greater democratic control" over the military.
145. Carothers, a cautious supporter of democracy promotion, nevertheless takes this view. In the Name of Democracy, particularly pp. 224, 257.
146. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy," in Lipset, Political Man, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992).
147. Barkan, "Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad?" pp. 21-22 (note 14, above).
148. "Free and Fair Elections and Beyond. Summary and Conclusions from the Conference on the International Electoral Institute Commission," Stockholm, Sweden, May 18-19, 1994.
149. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance," Paris, 1993. The first meeting of the Working Group was held in May 1994. A subsequent meeting, in November 1994, was preceded by a seminar on the role of the Consultative Group process in addressing these issues at the level of individual countries. A seminar on aid to civil society is planned for 1995.
150. David Arase, "Japanese Policy toward Democracy and Human Rights in Asia," Asian Survey 33, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 935-952.
151. These procedural directions appeared to enjoy general consensus at the November 1994 meeting, but the DAC PDGG Working Group is not a policy-making body, and it remains to be seen if the DAC itself will formally adopt them.
152. International IDEA, Newsletter 1, March 8, 1995; Declaration of the Founding Conference for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 27-28 February 1995; Conclusions and Suggestions for the Mandate and Tasks of the Proposed Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, October 1994); Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Government on the Working Group for an International Electoral Institute (IEI), Stockholm, October 1993. The fourteen sponsoring countries are Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, India, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden.
153. Nelson and Eglington, Encouraging Democracy, p. 42 (note 113, above).
154. "African Democracies Worry Aid Will Dry Up," New York Times, March 19, 1995, pp. A1 and A8.
155. Carothers, "The NED at 10," p. 135 (note 12, above).
156. Moreover, an argument can be made for some organizations taking a global approach, rather than ruling out certain countries, so that (with modest investments in a small country like Sierra Leone) democratic aspirations and ideals can at least be kept alive everywhere, even against great odds.
157. By this principle, the United States should also rethink its current broad requirement to cut off all aid to gross human violators or military regimes. It is fine to punish those regimes, but why not leave open the possibility of assisting nongovernmental organizations (with both economic development and political aid) where possible?