The end of the Cold War presents opportunities for more effective international cooperation in dealing with conflicts, but it also poses new challenges. The first major test of post-Cold War collective security was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the ensuing Gulf War raised expectations that international cooperation could deal more effectively with aggression than in the past. Some 40 countries, including such unlikely allies as Syria and the United States, sent more than 800,000 troops to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The response was facilitated by a series of strong UN Security Council resolutions that reflected nearly unprecedented agreement among the permanent members.
If the Gulf War raised expectations for a more effective collective security system, Bosnia dashed them. The United States initially deferred to the European powers for leadership in dealing with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. The responses, largely limited to diplomacy and humanitarian relief operations, proved largely inadequate. For several years, the major powers could not reach a consensus on what, if any, military action was appropriate. In the case of the United States, this indecisiveness reflected splits within the administration and within Congress on how to deal with Bosnia. As a result, the UN, NATO, and the EU/WEU (European Union/Western European Union)--as well as the individual states--were for a long time largely ineffective in the face of aggression and ethnic cleansing.
Bosnia may represent a more typical problem than the Gulf War; if it does, the international community must improve its methods of dealing with conflict. The main problem appears to be the lack of political will and the absence of strong leadership, not a dearth of resources or military expertise. Furthermore, improving international institutions will matter little unless such improvements are coupled with a willingness among leaders to use available mechanisms and put new political and military strategies to work. 1
The core issue is collective decision making about where, when, and how to use military force when traditional means of conflict resolution--negotiation, persuasion, diplomacy--are insufficient. Conventional wisdom holds that military force should be used only as a last resort. Too often, however, reserving force as a last resort allows genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other brutalities of war to devastate the lives of thousands of people in a region and further reduce the chances of resolving a conflict.
This report, which is based on an analysis of conflicts that have occurred since the establishment of the United Nations, seeks to contribute to collective planning and decision making; it derives some conclusions that may help political and military leaders in making difficult decisions. It assumes that the United Nations will not be empowered with a standing army or similar rapid reaction capability despite the perceived need for such a capability. If this continues to be true, then the development of alternative approaches is even more imperative. Indeed, even if the UN develops a modest force of brigade size along the lines of recent proposals, additional forces will no doubt be needed to complement the UN force in dealing with deadly conflicts. 2
Despite growing global interdependence, war remains a common feature of the international landscape, occurring among different national, ethnic, and religious communities unwilling to live together and settle their disputes peacefully. Although today's conflicts are often cloaked in the rhetoric of ethnic, religious and cultural dissent, for the most part, wars erupt over political power. The international community today faces some 40 unresolved conflicts (Table 1), about average for the post-Cold War era. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of conflict between the major powers, it also removed some of the restraints that inhibited conflict. Although the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer fueling proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, new wars are breaking out because the fear of superpower intervention has diminished.
Table 1. Unresolved Deadly Conflicts (January 1995) 3| Africa | Asia | Middle East |
|---|---|---|
Algeria |
Afghanistan |
Iran |
| Europe | Former Soviet Union | Americas |
Bosnia |
Azerbaijan |
Colombia |
Sources: Michael Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996; SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1995; Carter Center, State of the World Conflict Report 1994-95, Atlanta, 1995.
The conflicts are widely distributed, and the level of hostilities varies considerably. Most are smoldering conflicts, but at any one time intense fighting typically characterizes 5-10 cases. Although the vast majority of these conflicts primarily involve groups fighting within states, the distinction between internal and external conflict is becoming blurred: the loss of life and impact on neighboring states requires that the international community consider intervention in both cases. Multinational forces that are under the control of the UN, a regional security organization, or both, are involved in containing conflict in about 20 of these cases at any one time. For the most part, this involvement is limited to a peacekeeping role, after a cease-fire has been negotiated.
Outside military forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most of these conflicts--the recent recrudescence of mass violence in Liberia is clear evidence of this. The purpose of multinational forces is to stop the fighting and assist in bringing about a fair and lasting resolution of conflict, not to achieve a military victory. Therefore, multilateral military efforts should be a subordinate part of an overall campaign that includes diplomacy and humanitarian activities. The multinational forces must be prepared for combat, but their use must be designed to create conditions for a lasting peace. In most cases, they will need to support political and humanitarian efforts effectively. For these reasons, the subordination of multinational military operations to international political guidance is essential.
Given the wide scope and persistent nature of deadly conflict, extraordinary efforts are needed to reduce loss of life and ensure justice. Yet international cooperation is more difficult to achieve with struggling economies and without the kind of Cold War threats that imposed greater cohesion. This combination of developments presents a difficult challenge for national leaders who must establish and coordinate the kinds of multinational efforts needed in the new security environment.