Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

Additional copies of this report may be obtained free of charge from the Commission's headquarters:
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
2400 N Street, N.W.
Sixth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20037-1153
Tel.: (202) 429-7979 Fax: (202) 429-9291
E-mail: pdc@carnegie.org

Foreword

THE MONUMENTAL CHANGES in the international security order over the past decade demand a reexamination of the circumstances and procedures regarding the application of military force.

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, absent the brake of the Cold War competition and faced with a rising tide of instability, the United States has committed its armed forces to a wide range of military operations over thirty times. Currently, 50,000 American troops are deployed in various regions around the world, participating in thirteen ongoing missions. In each case, the introduction of military forces was made after a careful examination of the benefits of each particular operation and the inherent risks involved. In nearly every case, the United States used its forces in conjunction with the United Nations, regional security organizations, or both.

The United States and its partners initiated each one of these operations to secure specific objectives, such as to facilitate the humanitarian efforts of nongovernmental organizations, to enforce cease-fire agreements, or to secure diplomatic initiatives. While these operations have been undertaken as a reaction to an international crisis, they have most certainly served to mitigate the threat of mass violence and have allowed the belligerent parties the latitude to further the process of peace.

Each operation must be judged on its own merit. However, our experiences of the past few years provide us with the added benefit of increasing our knowledge base and experience in developing a more systematic approach to dealing with international crises. Issues that at one time seemed almost intractable, such as forming ad hoc coalitions and establishing fully capable command and control structures for peace operations, are now becoming more workable in light of the lessons that we have learned.

This report, by one of America's premier strategic thinkers, is another step in that education process, and it advances the discussion on the proper use of force to alleviate the horrendous effects of regional conflicts. It is a thorough and thought-provoking study on the proper application of military power to forestall the escalation of confrontation and violence.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
18 April 1996

Preface

THIS STUDY is part of a larger effort by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict to devise ways of reducing mass violence in the international system. Included in the Commission's framework are attempts to define the problem of post-Cold War conflict, reveal the nature and cause of mass violence, devise a doctrine for triggering international responses to aggression, and finally to conceive a broad system of interrelated--although not necessarily interdependent--processes that operate at every phase of a real or potential conflict, from early warning and preventive diplomacy to military intervention and conflict resolution.

Although the Commission is primarily concerned with preventing the outbreak of violence and is therefore emphasizing means of early warning and conflict avoidance, its consideration of the constructive use of force in dealing with violence is twofold. First, the international community may not always be able to predict and prevent the outbreak of violence, and it must therefore develop the capability to mitigate violence, even if that requires using force. Second, the Commission hopes to contribute to the development of a system of intervention that is so predictable, rapid, and effective that its mere existence would act as a deterrent against mass violence.

The purpose of this study is to increase the Commission's understanding of how to facilitate timely and effective military intervention where such actions will help forestall mass violence. Obviously, military or even diplomatic intervention may not be appropriate in every case. The evidence shows that in many instances, international initiatives, of varying scope and duration, can have salutary effects. The record also shows, however, that there is much room for improvement. The study advances an agenda of international action to meet the challenges of deadly conflict. At a minimum, it seeks to stimulate and broaden the debate on the use of force.

The study was conducted under the leadership of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), Co-Chair of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a member of the Commission's Advisory Council. General Goodpaster was assisted by C. Richard Nelson of the Atlantic Council, Rachel Epstein of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and James Kiras of the Lester Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The study also benefited from the comments and suggestions of a wide range of political and military professionals from many nations with extensive experience in dealing with deadly conflict. The report was edited by Jeannette Aspden, the Commission's managing editor.