THE END OF THE COLD WAR offers the world an opportunity for more effective cooperation to prevent or halt deadly conflicts, but it also poses new challenges. One such challenge is overcoming the reluctance of political leaders to take military action in this era of transition. Few leaders are willing to invest their political capital in risky, controversial international interventions with uncertain outcomes. And the effects of this unwillingness and consequent inaction are painfully clear: armed conflicts devastate communities and the lives of individuals, create refugees, disrupt international commerce, and undermine international norms. Unless the major security interests of the leading nations are directly threatened, however, substantial military involvement by the international community will be rare beyond peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.
One legacy of the Cold War is thinking of the use of military force in terms of either doing nothing, or employing overwhelming forces in a decisive manner. Such thinking is no longer appropriate. A middle ground involving a more modest use of international force--in a limited but persistent manner--demands more attention. Such use of force, if required, would substantially raise the costs to an aggressor or a group that grossly violates human rights.
Leaders might be more willing to commit their states to international efforts to prevent or suppress conflict if they had more confidence in the ability of the international community to manage such an intervention successfully with limited losses. Such confidence, coupled with a clear understanding of costs, risks, expected duration of a contemplated intervention, and the prospects of success, would better equip leaders to make a compelling case and take the risks associated with military intervention.
There are three choices for managing multinational forces: the United Nations, a regional organization, or an ad hoc coalition. In all cases a clear mandate that defines the purpose, scope, and--to the extent possible--the time frame of the military operations is necessary, along with an effective interface between the military commanders and the political leaders. This interface should translate broad political objectives into explicit military missions that, in turn, should determine the composition of the forces. Unified operational control of the multinational forces and systematic supervision with regular feedback to the political leadership are also vital elements of a management system.
Each arrangement for managing multinational forces presents diverse and difficult challenges. The United Nations is clearly not a war-fighting organization, so UN management will likely be limited to peacekeeping, and even in this restricted role, there is considerable room for improvement. Management by regional organizations is potentially promising, but to date both the political willingness and military capabilities are lacking, except in NATO. The North Atlantic alliance possesses a highly capable command and planning structure, and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a promising concept, but turning the concept into a reality has been a slow process. Ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" are thus the most likely arrangements for managing multinational military interventions that go beyond peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, or noncoercive military support. The option of single-nation intervention, of course, remains open, but such actions are beyond the scope of this report.
Within the United Nations structure, the Security Council and the Secretariat each play a distinct role. The main role of the Security Council is to provide the ultimate source of legitimacy for multilateral military operations by making authoritative decisions on when, where, and for what purpose multinational forces are used. The UN's other role involves managing peacekeeping operations under the secretary-general in conjunction with his diplomatic role in conflict resolution. UN officials have gained considerable experience over the past 50 years, but the member states have not provided them with necessary resources to conduct these operations with full effectiveness, nor are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
More basically, the very concept of peacekeeping has serious limitations. Under existing doctrine, peacekeeping operations are undertaken only with the consent of the belligerents, and UN forces cannot use force except for self-defense. It should be noted that the focus of these efforts is on the latter stages of conflict, usually after a cease-fire agreement has been reached. In some cases, UN "peacekeeping" efforts did not in fact keep the peace, and confidence in the United Nations was undermined. More usefully, the international community should not limit its military efforts to peacekeeping; rather, it should be able to consider the use of military forces at any stage during the life cycle of a conflict.
Rigid adherence to the concept of impartiality can circumscribe active intervention by the international community in deadly conflicts. In several cases, preserving the principle of impartiality has limited the UN's options and frustrated many of the military and political figures who tried to settle disputes. Military interventions must be fair and just in order to maintain legitimacy, but genocide, ethnic cleansing, and rape as a weapon of war all call for prompt and severe action. International intervention in such matters should be backed up by the credible prospect of the use of force, which may cause the belligerents to cease such acts or face consequences from the international community. Clear rules of engagement can go a long way in deterring abuse by the belligerents.
Regional organizations, in the view of many observers, including the UN secretary-general, should shoulder more of the load for military operations. For states bordering areas of conflict, the threat is more immediate, and they usually have a better understanding than more distant nations of the problem and its cultural context. Despite these advantages, most regional organizations have decided not to intervene militarily in conflicts, and they are therefore neither appropriately structured to manage military operations nor do they have the necessary resources.
In certain cases, ad hoc coalitions are a more promising alternative to UN and regional command arrangements. Nations that form ad hoc coalitions are self-selected states with a genuine interest in preventing or halting deadly conflict. They must either borrow from an existing command structure, such as NATO's, or rely mainly on the assets of the leading partners. Like-minded nations will often possess interoperable equipment, easing logistical problems, and many will have already conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Since these coalitions usually involve one or more of the major powers, material and financial support is assured, and the depth and quality of military resources often exceed those available in the membership of regional organizations.
The main operational price paid by ad hoc coalition members is the lack of binding ties between coalition members. Sustained operations and mounting casualties can strain the bonds of coalition members in war situations, even when they share overall strategic interests. Coalitions are in constant danger of disintegrating during the course of difficult military operations, where over time national interests may take precedence over common interests. This was a major consideration during the Gulf War.
Whichever management arrangement is selected, multinational forces must be suited to the task, with their number and composition based on the mission and the situation they are likely to encounter. But even with sufficient numbers and equipment, they are likely to be effective only if they are adequately staffed and supported in three key areas: command and control, intelligence, and logistics.
In conclusion, the more effective use of multinational military forces to deal with deadly conflict will depend on how well we learn the lessons from previous efforts. A brief comparison of earlier conflicts and current hostilities suggests that decisions to use force will continue to be extraordinarily difficult for national leaders both individually and collectively. This burden can be lightened somewhat by increasing their confidence in the ability of the international community to manage the use of force effectively. This, in turn, will require fresh thinking on the use of force and the adoption of specific mechanisms to address the many shortcomings identified in the growing literature on previous military interventions.
Our contribution to this fresh thinking is to suggest some changes for all three types of management arrangement.