Yet the legacy of this violent period has a strong impact on Latin American citizens, policymakers, and military officers: few believe that this past has been clearly exiled to the dustbin of history, never to threaten the peace and prosperity of the region again. For example, guerrilla movements persist in Colombia and Peru, a border war erupted between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 and has only recently been resolved, and vigilante groups threaten to undermine many of the compromises that ended the Central American civil wars. Hence, a lively and fundamentally important discussion flourishes in the region concerning the causes, prevention, and resolution of deadly conflict.

The Problem of Deadly Conflict

Motives. Latin American analysts disagree about a number of issues concerning deadly conflict, but there is a major consensus concerning the roots of such violence. Social and economic marginalization produces poverty and a sense of powerlessness^1. Some critics believe that this marginalization is reproduced and reaffirmed through political structures which defend the status quo and thereby lead to political alienation from the political system^2. There is also a great deal of concern that the emphasis on allowing the market to work furthers this alienation by rapidly destroying communal and societal safety nets^3. This situation may continue to simmer, explode suddenly and/or develop into sustained violent conflict, depending upon precipitant events or the success of political entrepreneurs.

Such poverty and marginalization occasionally produce sporadic and spontaneous but extremely violent uprisings. These uprisings are provoked by a sudden event, such as raising prices on previously subsidized goods and services, or national governments taking over resources that had been controlled locally. The phenomenon of an "urban revolt" is a short, spontaneous uprising with a minimum of organization and coordination, distinguished from "civil disobedience" by violence^4. For example, between 300 and 2,000 people were killed and another 1,000 were wounded during the "Caracazo" of 1989, two days of rioting throughout the principal cities of Venezuela.⁵

But it is more dangerous when poverty and alienation provide fertile ground for political entrepreneurs to organize sustained violence against the political system. While we are all familiar with such movements against authoritarian political systems, we are less aware that they also occur against democratic systems that fail to provide opportunities for social, economic, and political participation. This was the battle cry of many left-wing activists in the 1960s and 1970s against "bourgeois democracy," but many committed democrats in the 1990s continue to worry about it.⁶

The issue of political entrepreneurs raises the question of the motives of these leaders of violence. Ideological beliefs have historically been the main impetus for organizing violent movements. However, ideologically based violence has waned as the right has been discredited by massive violations of human rights; the end of the Cold War has discredited anti-democratic alternatives even among the left⁷; and Sendero Luminoso in Peru has met defeat.⁸

According to Latin American analysts, the second most prevalent motive of these political entrepreneurs is the struggle for political and economic power. (The U.S. government, partly because of a historical skepticism regarding the importance of ideology, tended to emphasize power over reform-oriented ideologies in its analyses of these movements.) These political leaders seek to empower the marginalized sectors of society so that the disenfranchised may gain control over their everyday lives, be secure, and climb out of poverty. In the past, the closed nature of the social, economic, and political structures of Latin American countries convinced these leaders that revolution was the only path to improvement^9. With re-democratization, there is a new opportunity for the peaceful empowerment of these groups. Latin Americans worry nonetheless that the new political and economic structures may not deliver sufficient opportunities to the large number of citizens mired in poverty and thereby contribute to a new round of violent challenges to the system.

Personal and illicit economic gain is an increasingly important motive among individuals seeking to organize the socially marginalized into potentially large-scale and deadly confrontations. Though contraband has long been a way of life for many groups in Latin America because of governmentally sponsored private monopolies, it has not previously resulted in large-scale violence. Today, the drug barons of the region have organized poverty-stricken peasant producers and the desperate urban poor into bands of traffickers. Their hold over these individuals comes not only from the distribution of economic benefits but also from terror. Drug lords have organized enforcement gangs and generated large-scale violence in efforts to terrorize those who would interfere with their ability to continue to get rich^10. A particularly violent combination of guerrilla movements with drug production and trafficking developed in Peru.¹¹

Politicization of indigenous communities may be leading them to become increasingly assertive in demanding not only economic benefits but the right to participate in the national political life without assimilating into mainstream society. War and mass violence from the Conquest to the first half of the 20th century demobilized, silenced, and isolated many of the surviving indigenous peoples of Latin America. But the Central American wars and the increased penetration of the market in the 1980s in many ways destroyed their isolation and led many indigenous people and sympathetic activists to defend their cultural heritage actively once again. When traditional political systems did not respond appropriately, some of these groups turned to violence.¹²

There is also increasing concern in parts of Latin America over the organized violence perpetrated by gangs of young urban marginals and the official security forces ostensibly given the charge of upholding the law. In Central America, such gangs are reproducing their experiences in urban gangs in the United States, where they were refugees from the civil wars. Gangs in the rural areas often include ex-combatants who have demobilized but cannot find gainful employment, because of the economic crisis currently afflicting the region^13. Given the lesser opportunities for legally gainful activities in the shantytowns of Latin America and the low professional state of the police and judiciary, gang violence produces a much greater perception of insecurity in Mexico City, Guatemala City, San Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro than in the United States. The result is a proliferation of private police forces, poorly trained but armed, and a militarization of urban police forces. The combination of these factors produces a dramatic increase in the level of deadly urban violence.¹⁴

The migration of economic refugees has in the past produced extremely violent conflict in Latin America. In 1937, for example, Dominican troops massacred up to 12,000 Haitians looking for work in the Dominican Republic. The 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras was precipitated by Honduran decisions to expel thousands of Salvadorans working illegally in Honduras. Many Venezuelans and Costa Ricans now believe that crime and unemployment are the result of the thousands of Colombians and Nicaraguans, respectively, illegally crossing the border^15. Vigilantism has not yet produced large-scale deadly conflict, but the potential remains, as, for example, on the Honduran-Salvadoran border. The 1992 World Court resolution of the border demarcation resulted in official and extra-official armed groups harassing hundreds of people caught on the "wrong" side of the border. Salvadoran Defense Minister Gen. Jaime Guzmán Morales expected that "these kinds of conflicts will continue until a definitive solution is reached regarding citizenship and property rights in the border communities."¹⁶

A populist demagogue or military junta’s drive for power may also lead to violent conflict as such leaders seek to divert attention from their inability to deliver on promises. Most Latin American analysts interpret the Argentine decision to seize the Malvinas/Falkland Islands as a tactic on the part of the military junta to divert popular attention from protests against the junta’s economic mismanagement and control of the government. The re-democratization of the region, however, should make it less likely that political leaders can or need to manufacture diversionary and violent conflicts in order to retain power.¹⁷

Territorially focused nationalism has been a source of constant tension in the region because most borders contain disputed sections. Bolivia refuses to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Chile because it cannot resolve the question of sovereign access to the Pacific (lost to Chile in the 19^th-century War of the Pacific); Ecuador and Peru have only recently (1998) resolved the question of their border. Nicaragua and Colombia, and even Venezuela and Colombia (both long-standing democracies), have experienced threatening moments on their borders^18. Progress has been slow over the last century. Among the most promising recent experiences are the resolution of the last points of contention between Argentina and Chile; Guatemala’s recognition of the legal existence of Belize; and the acceptance by Honduras and El Salvador of the arbitration resolving their border demarcation. Yet even in some of these cases the potential for deadly conflict remains. Guatemala is only now, six years after recognizing Belize, beginning to discuss where the precise borders lie, and El Salvador and Honduras are encountering increased tensions along the border as they seek to resolve citizenship and property questions.¹⁹

Patterns. Deadly conflict in Latin America has taken different forms, depending upon whether the issues involved were "traditional" or what are now seen as "new" post-Cold War security issues. The patterns of conflict that matter are not only the ones that directly produce deaths, but also those designed to wreak havoc on the economy and sow a climate of insecurity among the population and subsequently produce deadly conflict. The goal of both these types of conflict is to weaken and de-legitimize the ability of the state to provide for the common good; it thus feeds directly into the governability problems perceived by many Latin American analysts to be the major issue of the contemporary period (see footnote 3).

The traditional pattern of hostilities consists of armed skirmishes between organized tactical units directed from the capitals^20. These traditional patterns of conflict develop in Latin America over borders, natural resources, and power projection. In only one of these confrontations has a "new" issue on the international agenda been a major factor in the violence: the drug trade in the U.S. invasion of Panama. That intervention and subsequent U.S. pressure on Colombia led some observers of Latin America to fear a new wave of U.S. military invasions in the Caribbean Basin^21. The Latin American security literature on confidence-building measures, arms control, and the military balance of power focuses on this pattern of violent conflict.²²

Even before the end of the Cold War and the focus on "new" sources of conflict, the traditional pattern of interstate violence did not fundamentally concern Latin American analysts. In 20^th-century Latin America, internal conflict has been significantly more deadly than interstate conflict, especially during the last thirty years (compare tables 1-4). Four patterns of violent conflict can be discerned: civil war between armed groups operating under central commands; locally autonomous and officially tolerated "death squads"; non-official violence perpetrated by anti-system forces, either political insurgents or criminals; and terrorist attacks designed to undermine the state’s ability to provide peace and prosperity.

Death squads can take many forms, consisting of soldiers, police, and even private entrepreneurs seeking to make money. They tend to be locally autonomous and officially tolerated, if not directly encouraged, and essentially given carte blanche to act as they see fit in "saving" the country^23. Government officials are rarely held accountable for their actions, yet, at the very least, their inaction is fundamental to continued death-squad activities. These violent activists are defenders of the status quo, whether against political insurgents or criminals, including gangs of street children in Rio de Janeiro. One of the problematic issues in newly democratic societies of Latin America is attempting to discover who was responsible for directing these actions, and determining whether to punish them or move toward reconciliation based on discovering the truth. (See discussion in the section on measures to preclude violence.)

Terrorist violence is distinguished by its desire to provoke a reaction that produces more violence. By increasing the level of violence in a society, terrorists seek to destroy the system. Three types of terrorism have been distinguished: subversive terrorism, state terrorism, and transnational terrorism. One of the interesting aspects of subversive terrorism in Latin America, which differentiates it from that in the Middle East or Northern Ireland, is that it is not linked to demands for national sovereignty of a particular group. Instead, it is stimulated by perceived domestic injustices. Government forces and their allies use state terrorism to destroy the links between guerrillas and society. Transnational terrorism is committed in neutral or third-party states but is targeted at the home country of the terrorists. Costa Rica and Honduras suffered from many of these acts in the 1980s.²⁴

A final pattern of deadly conflict is indirect but still contributes to a climate of conflict that produces significant numbers of deaths. These are terrorist attacks designed to undermine the ability of the state to provide an acceptable level of individual security and prosperity. These attacks focus on economic targets such as power stations or policemen and judges as symbols of the state’s ability to provide individual security. Many Latin American analysts see this challenge as directly linked to the question of governability.²⁵

Regional dimensions. Latin America’s interstate wars in the 20th century, unlike those of the 19th, have been bilateral affairs. There has also been surprisingly little spillover of internal conflict across borders, although outsiders often become involved in their neighbors internal problems. In the 1980s, we had active military involvement by the U.S., Argentina, and Cuba in Nicaragua and El Salvador, as well as by Nicaragua’s Sandinista government in El Salvador, and Cuban support for the guerrilla movement against the military dictatorship in Chile. Because Latin American countries all faced many of the structural problems that could lead to violent conflict, there was great concern that violent conflict in one country, if not contained, could envelop the region. Speaking of the Central American conflicts during the 1980s, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that "if a war developed in this region, its effects would spread to the entire Latin American continent (sic). From Mexico to Tierra del Fuego, our societies would be in turmoil, polarized, and radicalized."²⁶ Both the defenders of the status quo and those seeking to overthrow it shared this expectation.²⁷

Regionalization of conflict occurs not only via interstate war, but also by international linkages created by subversive and criminal elements. The fear that neighboring forces in conflict will develop contacts with Colombia’s guerrillas propelled Colombia’s presidents to mediate conflict in Central America and Panama. The international links of revolutionary forces not only increased their ability to do violence, but also stimulated the Colombian government and its international allies to use military force to defend the country against external aggression, thereby increasing the level of deadly conflict. Many Peruvian analysts worried that Sendero’s successes were creating contingency plans among Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the U.S. to invade the country.²⁹

All political sectors in the region saw that Latin America was being pulled apart by the Cold War. In response to the internationalization of Latin American conflicts, the right sought more intervention by the allied superpower, the United States.³⁰ As Minister Caputo noted, "... polarized and radicalized societies are particularly apt for superpower conflict and competition ... we would see ourselves once again involved in a foreign conflict, raising banners which are not ours and shedding our blood for symbols that do not represent in any case either a national or regional interest."³¹

The center, as well as some sectors of the left, perceived that easing both superpowers out of Latin American conflicts would facilitate their management. Efforts were undertaken to create a Zone of Peace in the region as a whole, or in subsections that could be more easily isolated from U.S. strategic concerns, such as southern South America. Augusto Varas of FLACSO-Chile was an early exponent of this idea, and the Comisión Sudamericana de Paz was established in Buenos Aires in 1987 with the explicit task of stimulating the conversion of South America into a Zone of Peace. Before this third path or isolationist security scenario could play itself out, however, the Cold War ended, helping to produce a dramatically altered security environment for Latin America, along with re-democratization and economic liberalization.

In the post-Cold War era Latin America has once again emphasized the regional dimensions of security by stressing the collective nature of security and thus the responsibility and interest of the inter-American community to aid in disciplining those who threaten the region’s peace. By this definition, all movements against democratic systems as well as interstate violence should become internationalized because the community will become involved in protecting peace and security. The expectation is that such intervention will be limited to diplomatic and economic boycotts. But Argentina was quite supportive of the U.S. decision to utilize military force in Haiti.³²

What Can Be Done?

Early reaction to signs of trouble. Latin Americans have been searching for early warning signs in order to head off many of the violent conflicts. They perceive that success in this area is a twofold process, requiring a willingness to undertake concerted action as well as the ability to discern the likelihood of conflict. Both have been problematic, but perhaps the commitment to act has been most difficult to develop. This is because historically most Latin American countries saw the defense of national sovereignty as their best protection against the willingness of European great powers and the U.S. to intervene, even with force, in their domestic affairs.

This view began to change in the late 1980s, largely as a result of the ongoing experience with violent conflict. The Contadora peace process, sponsored by Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico,³³ attempted to resolve the Central American crisis with a minimum of attention to domestic issues and more emphasis on traditional concerns about foreign interventions against internationally recognized governments and local military balances. The Contadora effort stagnated since the United States emphasized the internal political aspects and the Sandinistas were reluctant to diminish their military capacity (they saw the United States, not Honduras or Costa Rica, as their chief adversary).³⁴ The 1986 and 1987 Esquipulas meetings triggered a major conceptual shift which produced the Arias Plan. President Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica perceived that the roots of Central American interstate mistrust lay in domestic politics. He thus pushed for national reconciliation, questioned the the Sandinista government not because it was illegitimate but because it was not democratic, and argued that a lasting peace required the democratization of the political systems. In addition, a timetable for the implementation of the distinct phases of the peace plan was developed. And an International Commission of Verification and Vigilance (CIVS), consisting of the foreign ministers of the G7, the five Central American countries, and the General Secretaries of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN was created.³⁵ Because Latin Americans, not North Americans, took this initiative, the domestic sources of interstate conflict now became legitimate targets for action by Latin Americans.

The most convenient shorthand for Latin American concerns with potentially violent situations is the survival of democratic systems. Latin Americans like to criticize the American definition of democracy, which focuses on the formal institutions and elections, and emphasize instead the need to incorporate the "democratization of social and economic conditions."³⁶ The truth is that their governments use the formal definition of democracy when it is convenient for their political or policy goals. Latin American governments agree that all of the hemisphere is governed by democratic political systems, with the exception of Cuba. The overthrow of a democratic system thus was first informally recognized, and subsequently codified in the OAS, as a threat to the peace and security of the region.

There are other efforts to discover early warning signs of deadly conflict. Among the major projects are FLACSO-Chile’s efforts to construct an index of developments in the area of the strategic balance. This effort builds on the Peace and Security in the Americas working group, who produced a definition of the strategic balance as encompassing four elements:³⁷

1. A perception of total power distribution, determined by the actual and potential capacities of two or more potential adversaries.

2. The concept of a strategic balance encompasses more than the military balance.

3. The strategic balance needs to be conceived of and analyzed in a specific context, peculiar to the geographic, historical, military, and cultural attributes of the actors.

4. Capacities are related to the specific strategies that actors choose to use in achieving their goals.

Comprehensive balanced approach to alleviating pressures. Although Latin American analysts, policymakers, and activists may disagree about what needs to be done, virtually everyone agrees that stable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive and balanced efforts. The Central American Treaty for Democratic Peace of 1995 identifies four guiding principles: the rule of law (estado de derecho), the strengthening and perfecting of democratic institutions, the subordination of the armed forces to constitutionally mandated civilian authorities, and the maintenance of an active, flexible, and mutually collaborative dialogue.³⁹ One analyst argues that democracies -- best response to terrorism combines civil means -- economic, political, legal, and diplomatic -- with military force.⁴⁰ Another scholar and ambassador argues that cooperative security in South America requires development of a common understanding of security compatible with democratic forms of government in the region, equal deterrence capabilities among states in the region, and coordination of foreign policies.⁴¹

The team in Nicaragua, under the auspices of the International Commission of Support and Verification and the OAS, has made a number of recommendations for the construction of peace in societies previously at war. These four recommendations illustrate the idea that constructing peace requires a comprehensive approach.⁴²

1. Nationalization and Sustainability of the Peace Process

The conditions that led to the establishment of the international peace mission should not be permanent. Responsibilities for support services must be gradually transferred to national entities, both governmental and non-governmental. State institutions include the judiciary, police, the human rights prosecutor, and electoral organs. In civil society, local organizations will need to be strengthened.

This process of nationalization requires strengthening these entities and their capacities to support the peace process, principally the national efforts of mediation, conflict resolution, human rights protection, and violence-deterrence. If this process is not successfully carried out, an institutional vacuum will develop after the international mission leaves and the peace will not survive.

2. Popular Participation in the Peace Process

The population participates in the peace process via the peace commissions. This eliminates the paternalistic practices into which international organizations are often prone to fall and which atrophy national capacities and generate passive attitudes. The most effective dissuasion from the use of violence is one that comes from an organized population with a positive and active attitude toward its future. The peace process is not constructed exclusively by the state and international organizations but also by organized popular constituencies. The three actors need to coordinate so as to make their actions complementary. In short, it is a participatory conflict resolution process.

3. Local Decentralization of the Peace Process

The goal is decentralized conflict resolution. Involving local authorities will allow the pacification process to respond to the specific needs of the people in the most efficient, practical, and realistic manner. By this means, the local peasant communities become participants in the peace process, not just objects. For this to be effective, local capacities must also be strengthened.

4. Development of Peasant Civil Society

These post-war communities have historically been repressed. The construction of peace ought to stimulate their organization and the development of forms of self-representation which will allow them to become effective actors in society.

Who Does the Work?

There has been a fundamental change in Latin Americans’ understanding of their margin for action. Many analysts have historically argued that Latin America’s problems were not locally caused and that therefore solutions to national problems require changes in the behavior of external factors. Some of these perceptions have changed. For example, Tokatlian and Pardo argue that Colombia’s consistent and long-standing tradition of violence is the root cause and thus external factors build on it, but the solutions to it have to be found in Colombia.⁴³ Latin America has also historically been a state-oriented society; that is, the government was perceived as the key actor, for good or bad, in structuring the political, economic, and social environment in which people interacted. The terror of the national security states largely destroyed this view, although it does still persist in some countries that escaped the horrors of state terrorism.⁴⁴

Civil Society. The strengthening of civil society is virtually a battle cry in contemporary Latin America. Analysts recognize that society has the power to make a difference, but that it has been too unconcerned and demobilized to act. There is a new effort to inculcate democratic values rather than simply using democracy as a tool to be discarded if it doesn’t work out.⁴⁵

Freedom of the press has long been understood to be necessary for a free society in Latin America, but now, with the dismantling of many government monopolies over paper distribution and television channels (and the penetration of satellite TV), there is a proliferation of alternative sources of information. This is a mixed blessing, since hate groups can also peddle their wares. But since schoolchildren are now being taught about human rights, perhaps the new free societies in Latin America can tolerate such excesses.

Civil society is also being strengthened by the proliferation of "think tanks," organized by locals and supported in part by international foundations. Some build on existing structures such as the FLACSO groups in Chile and Argentina, while others are stimulated by diplomats and politicians (e.g., the Arias Foundation and the Comisión Sudamericana para la Paz, la Seguridad Regional y la Democracia), by retired military officers (e.g., the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Civiles-Militares, with head offices in Lima, and an office in Chevy Chase, Maryland). Still others are private efforts by intellectuals and others.

The rise of non-governmental organizations in Latin America has been a fundamental factor in the strengthening of civil society. The churches were early activists, particularly in the area of human rights and development (remember Liberation Theology). But they have also been active in instances when border tensions threatened to erupt into deadly conflict.⁴⁶ Today there are NGOs developing throughout Latin America focusing on virtually any issue of interest. One of the important arguments concerning the ability of local NGOs to perform effectively is that they need to establish themselves as legitimate national actors whose functioning is simply facilitated by international NGOs.⁴⁷

State. Despite the new emphasis given to society, the state is still perceived to play an important role, more so than in the United States. Before addressing the question of what the state should do (see below), we need to address the question of who in the state is seen as responsible for helping to prevent deadly conflict.

Latin America is a region of strong presidentialism. The president is often a kind of democratically sanctioned authoritarian for the period in office, a period usually constitutionally limited to one term.⁴⁸ Thus, in the past, to speak of "state action" meant to focus on presidential interests. Things have changed in the past five years, however, as presidential excesses threatened to bring down democratic systems in Venezuela, Brazil, Guatemala, and Ecuador, as they did, temporarily, in Peru. Attempts to transform the system into a parliamentary one⁴⁹ seem to be developing into a trade-off –– increased legislative power in return for the possibility of immediate re-election for the president. The result should be governmental policies that are more in tune with the desires of the electorate. This should facilitate some of the changes analysts argue are necessary to ensure peace and prosperity.

Besides the president, the other major state actor in Latin America has been the military. An important debate exists concerning the role of the military in providing socioeconomic infrastructure or the policing necessary for the personal security which, in turn, provides citizens the opportunity for development. The history of military violation of human rights and its role in violently suppressing what were initially peaceful efforts to change an unequal and discriminatory status quo makes some people nervous about involving the military in the new "civic actions" of the 1990s.⁵⁰ Yet in the context of states and societies with limited resources, some analysts feel that it would be a waste of talent and capability to exclude the military from performing these tasks.⁵¹ The experience of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is often cited. The prerequisite, however, is civilian control of the military. In the absence of civil control, it is argued, we may have a repeat of the 1960s experiences of Brazil and Peru, in which militaries "learned" from their experiences with social infrastructure development programs that politicians and democracies could not alleviate the root causes of conflict.⁵² In addition, some analysts argue that military influence in foreign affairs makes a nation’s foreign policy less attuned to human needs and more focused on military factors.⁵³

The new missions of the Nicaraguan military are constitutionally very extensive. These include helping to patrol the border; providing security in rural areas; respecting and promoting human rights; combating drug-related activities and the illegal traffic of people and goods across the border; defending the environment; and searching for a new order in international relations and civil defense.⁵⁴ The Colombian constitution of 1991 increases civilian control over the military by increasing legislative oversight of its operations and creating a civilian-dominated National Security Council. In addition, President César Gaviria named the first civilian defense minister in forty years. The new constitution still allows constitutional authorities to utilize the military for maintaining internal order, however.⁵⁵

Reform of the judiciary and the police is an enormous task, even in established political systems like the Colombian and Mexican ones, not to mention the evolving ones of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The problem is not just the impunity with which certain social groups act against the marginalized populations. It is also that the police are themselves often at the service of the exploiters⁵⁶ or so overzealous in their efforts to maintain "order" that they dramatically abuse the very citizens whom they are supposed to protect.⁵⁷

Finally, a growing number of peace analysts and activists are becoming more interested in the economic agencies of the state. These advocates want more effort paid to the social safety net, which they feel has inadequate resources compared to those dedicated to the structural adjustment of the economy and downsizing of the state. This is not an argument for keeping the state large and omnipotent. Rather, it requires a smaller and more responsive state with strengthened state regulatory and development agencies to perform necessary tasks to facilitate peace and prosperity for those whom the market would exploit in the short- to medium term.⁵⁸

International Organizations. Latin American states and citizens are proud to be members of the world community, so they have become involved in international organizations that have an impact on the post-Cold War world order. They believe that the United Nations in particular has an important role to play in conflict prevention and resolution.⁵⁹ Latin American states participating in UN peacekeeping missions have enjoyed popular support. The presence of a more broadly based international organization in Central America was particularly important to those who saw the OAS as too closely allied with the U.S. In addition, many want international organizations to be vigilant of human rights in their own countries, because governments fighting internal pacification programs cannot be expected to watch these things carefully.⁶⁰

The Role of Advanced Industrialized Countries. During the Cold War, many Latin American governments and citizens feared the "North" would exploit them. Today, they fear Latin America may be ignored at a time when it needs the expertise, resources, and even goodwill of the North if it is to succeed in building peace and prosperity. Analysts are not just referring to economic relations, important as they are in the context of globalization. For the issue of deadly conflict, they see a need for Northern participation in conflict resolution processes like those in Central America. In conflict prevention efforts the participation of the North is perhaps even more important, since many of the weapons come from the North and the sanctions threatened by Northern markets could have a large impact in deterring violent action, especially against democratic institutions.⁶¹

The challenge of coordination among the tasks and actors, and the importance of leadership. The recognition that coordination and leadership is necessary stimulates Latin American nations to seek greater cooperation amongst themselves. It is commonplace to encounter rejection of any mention that the U.S. should lead, especially when security is equated with an inter-American military focus, as was the case under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR).⁶² An interesting suggestion was made by one analyst that the U.S. should avoid four errors in the current context: it should not 1) quickly throw together a "Grand Design" for the hemisphere, ideologically based and underfunded; 2) promote a hemispheric scheme more oriented towards events outside the region than within it; 3) unilaterally intervene, particularly with Rapid Deployment Forces; and 4) push innovations (such as demands for compulsory arbitration on border disagreements) that threaten to upset the progress already made by parties in negotiations.⁶³

The Latin American leaders who have demonstrated an ability to focus regional attention have been ex-President of Costa Rica and Nobel Prize winner Arias and whoever happens to be President of the big three, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Among organizations, the Comisión Sudamericana para la Paz played an important role at one time, and now the Peace and Security in the Americas group is stimulating much work, although it is hard to know how much influence it has on policymakers at this time.

Tools for Preventive Action: Recommendations

In this section, I will discuss seven of the recommendations included in the Commission’s Second Report and add three more which various Latin American analysts have suggested. I am less familiar with the local-level development literature. I will therefore not discuss recommendations to promote accountable governance––including effective and judicious policing, an independent judiciary, and other attributes of a just democracy––as a means of maintaining order in unstable circumstances, improving health standards and practices⁶⁴, minimizing illiteracy, or managing resources and technology to derive the greatest benefit for the greatest number, including, in particular, husbanding land and water resources to help ensure adequate food production.

1. Control, reduce, and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These efforts have a long history in Latin America, beginning with the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967.⁶⁵ While it is true that the key countries (the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba) did not sign on at the time, Cuba is no longer a concern and Argentina and Brazil have now agreed not to proliferate. In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed accords to proscribe chemical and biological weapons. The countries also did not let problems with constructing chemical and biological proscription regimes at the international level derail agreements reached at the subregional level.⁶⁶ They subsequently signed the Cartagena Agreement, forswearing all weapons of mass destruction.⁶⁷

2. Control trade in conventional weapons. The discussion of various arms control measures is a major enterprise in Latin America today.⁶⁸ The Argentine Ambassador to the OAS, Hernán Patino Mayer, was a major advocate for the creation of an obligatory arms registration agreement in the region, attached to UN efforts. Costa Rica had difficulty negotiating the Treaty for Democratic Security in Central America because efforts to limit military budgets were derailed in discussions concerning establishment of adequate levels; this development suggests ongoing difficulties with military spending levels.⁶⁹ More generally, the 1995 Ecuador-Peru war set back arguments that the old threat to territorial sovereignty had passed in Latin America; instead, there were new pressures for increased expenditures.⁷⁰ However, the 1998 peace between Peru and Ecuador has brought sharp decreases in military spending in both countries. Even Argentina, with perhaps the weakest military in terms of domestic influence, is asking to be designated a "major non-NATO ally" so as to be eligible for surplus U.S. military equipment and rebuild its armed forces on the cheap.⁷¹

Once again President Arias has staked out a bold position. In conjunction with eleven other Nobel Peace laureates, he has proposed a Code of Conduct concerning the arms trade.⁷² It requires increased control and vigilance of arms trade, including registries of arms produced and sold, plus international collaboration to exchange the intelligence which increases transparency in the trade. A successful code will require international cooperation––not just Latin American––to prevent the creation of loopholes in those countries not participating in the code.

3. Promote the establishment of stable, democratic governments. For Latin Americans today, discussion of how to promote stable and democratic governments means focusing above all else on the questions of governability and civilian control over the military. Governability is a broad term which essentially conveys the idea that a political system has sufficient legitimacy with all the competing sectors of society so that each is willing to compromise in order that the system survive. This understanding allows the government to contain social tensions and process unsatisfied demands via creative policies. To a Latin American, the concept has great meaning, coming after a time in which civil society was willing to trash the old democratic systems rather than compromise.⁷³ As such, it is a powerful symbol: Chilean leaders agreed to a Pact of Governability when the clash between defenders and reformers of the constitution (written by the military government in 1980 and revised just before that government returned to the people in 1989) threatened to escalate.

For most Latin Americans, strengthening democratic governments also means consolidating civilian control over the military. Civil control in a democratic context should produce fewer domestic and international conflicts.⁷⁴ But Monica Hirst has raised the interesting question of whether different degrees of civilian control have important implications for peace, even in consolidated democracies.⁷⁵ She is leaning toward an affirmative answer, but it is still too early for the evidence to be convincing either way.

Another way to strengthen democracy is to increase its reputation and standing in the region by committing the inter-American community to its defense. The OAS recently adopted the view that a threat to democracy in any Western Hemisphere nation automatically constituted a threat to the security of all American nations. The Miami Summit of American Nations seconded this view and the first hemispheric meeting of ministers of defense followed suit. As a result, diplomatic and economic sanctions were imposed on coup leaders in Haiti in 1991, Peru in 1992, and Guatemala in 1993, and the threat of sanctions recently helped avoid a coup in Paraguay.

The Group of Eight suspended Panama’s membership after its fraudulent elections in 1988. Subsequently, when democratic processes were upset in Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, Latin American states imposed or threatened economic and diplomatic sanctions. Mexico and Cuba, however, demonstrate the limits to Latin American (as well as American, in the case of Mexico) willingness to act: Mexico was not sanctioned in 1988 despite widely documented fraudulent elections, and Latin Americans do not see the continuation of Fidel Castro’s government in power as a threat to hemispheric security.

Latin America’s willingness to use international sanctions to promote and defend democracy does not extend to use of military force. Latin America largely opposed utilizing violence to combat violence in Haiti. Among the major Latin American states, only Argentina supported the idea of using military force to remove Haitian usurpers.⁷⁶ The proposals for a hemispheric cooperative security regime pushed by the Paz y Seguridad group is very conservative on this point. After warning against the UN Agenda for Peace emphasis on the diminution of sovereignty in the contemporary world, the group goes on to warn that once the principle of multilateral interventions is accepted, it can easily be applied to a variety of issues.⁷⁷

4. Champion the rule of law as the basis for regulating social interaction at all levels. The buzzword in Latin America for this issue is estado de derecho. Both the right and the left use it against each other because the laws themselves privilege some outcomes over others (i.e., by what is defined as legal and illegal). But the basic point upon which all sides agree is that the rule of law provides credibility among competing actors. It is therefore fundamentally important when bringing together social groups who have just been involved in deadly conflict. The most interesting conceptualization of the estado de derecho is that of the Executive Secretary of the Comisión Sudamericana para la Paz: it derives from popular sovereignty and the reign of justice.⁷⁸

5. Promote creation of a robust civil society to help diverse groups thrive in proximity. In Latin America, one of the key social divides is ethnicity. The region had avoided widespread ethnic conflict for the past half-century, mainly by continued demobilization and isolation of indigenous communities. Now that these communities are newly empowered and seeking to defend their rights, tensions could escalate if not handled well. It is particularly surprising to see how unaware mestizo society was of the large-scale and efficient organization among indigenous peoples until the large-scale uprisings in Ecuador in 1990 and Mexico in 1994.⁷⁹

For many mestizo analysts, achieving a stable multiethnic society would be greatly facilitated by promoting local NGOs. Because they are not tied into the reigning distribution of social and economic power, they can serve as honest brokers among the groups.⁸⁰ But the indigenous communities have made extensive efforts on their own to avoid needless antagonisms. Thus, in Ecuador, leaflets explain the demands of indigenous peoples and specifically state that they are not seeking independence nor do they see their demands as anti-mestizo.⁸¹

6. Promote economic development in ways that can be indigenously absorbed and sustained. We should understand that the need for sustainable economic development extends to poor mestizo peasants as well as to indigenous communities. It is particularly important for development aid to promote education and alternative crops for peasants growing illegal ones.⁸² The "Alliance for the Sustained Development of Central America" agreement reached at the presidential summit of 1994 calls for the respect of cultural and ethnic diversity in the development process. This requires not just promoting economic development, but also socio-economic reforms that distribute resources more broadly.⁸³ In Ecuador, the newly mobilized Amazonian peoples argue that delimiting the physical frontiers among ethnic groups will lead to a more rational and optimal use of the nation’s resources.⁸⁴

7. Refine institutions and processes for nonviolent dispute resolution and promote conflict resolution strategies based on mutual accommodation. Getting the military out of the business of ensuring domestic order is a fundamental first step for many analysts in refining institutions and conflict resolution processes.⁸⁵ But in the Latin American context, it also raises the controversial question of justice for violators of human rights in a country’s authoritarian past. Arias stands at one end of the spectrum when he declares that "it is still necessary for the Latin American family to attain reconciliation, but not at the expense of pardoning all of the crimes of those who committed them."⁸⁶ At the other extreme stands the Uruguayan president, Julio María Sanguinetti: "we pardoned terrorists, who had some responsibility for the violations of human rights, so it is natural to have amnestied the military as well."⁸⁷ The 1989 plebiscite in Uruguay supported Sanguinetti’s position with 55.4% of the vote. Even Argentina finally passed a law limiting prosecution to those who gave orders, rather than those lower down who actually tortured and "disappeared" people. President Menem wound up pardoning leadership and instituting a controversial amnesty law covering past human rights abuses.

The framing of an issue plays an important role in negotiations between adversaries. We have already seen how important Arias’ definition of the situation in Central America was in overcoming the pitfalls that derailed the Contadora process. Tokatlian and Pardo note that an important aspect of Colombia’s ability to negotiate with the guerrillas was the switch in how the government defined the situation: President Belisario Betancur(1982-86) changed the country’s strategy from a focus on "internal violence as a product of international violence" (links to Cuba and Nicaragua), to "national peace is linked to international peace." The new definition opened up new opportunities; symbols and signs in the negotiations indicated that the military option was being discarded or downplayed.⁸⁸

None of the recommendations by Latin Americans for preventing or resolving deadly conflict has been particularly unique to Latin America. But there are three areas in which Latin American analysts address issues which relate more specifically to their own reality.

1. More efforts to control/reduce demand for drugs in Advanced Industrialized Countries (AIC). Drug trafficking has wreaked havoc on many local communities and even entire countries in Latin America. There are few calls for legalizing the production and export of drugs in Latin America, although the violence of the last 15 years is beginning to push some analysts to discuss it not as a solution, but as an aid in the effort to combat consumption.⁸⁹ There is, however, a sense that Latin America is paying the bulk of the costs of the war on drugs, even as the consumption driving the market occurs largely in the advanced industrialized nations, with the U.S. as the dominant consumer. Analysts are interested in developing a means to transfer more costs of fighting the problem to consuming countries. This strategy requires cooperation among producing countries so as to negotiate a better deal with consumers, including the U.S.⁹⁰

2. Small arms registration and control. While most analysts in the U.S. think of controlling conventional weapons in the military sphere, the issue looks very different from Latin America. The export of small arms from the U.S. to Latin America dramatically aggravates the problem of deadly conflict. There is, thus, an increasingly vocal demand in Latin America that the U.S. cooperate on regulating the flow of small arms to the region.⁹¹ In an interesting twist to what we commonly hear in the U.S., on this matter Latin America wants the U.S. to control its borders!

3. Maintain stable local balances. Another difference between how the U.S. looks at Latin America and how it looks at itself lies in the area of deterrence. Many Latin American civilian and military analysts perceive the need to deter aggression or adventures by neighbors militarily. The United States doesn’t see why Latin American nations would fight each other, and hence chalk this talk up to militarists. But some very respected Latin American advocates of democracy and civilian control over the military see an uncertain world and believe that prudence in the defense of a nation’s interest requires that it have a minimal deterrent force. For these analysts, the success of confidence-building measures depends upon partners’ perceiving that risks of betrayal are low because the military balance is stable. This perspective informs their suggestions for international cooperation in order to modernize, rebuild, and professionalize the armies of the region.⁹²

Endnotes

1. Compare, for example, Heraldo Muñoz, La Agenda de Seguridad en las políticas exteriores sudamericanas, Santiago: Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, Documento de Estudio No. 5, n.d., pp. 21-23; Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Centroamérica: Nueva Agenda de Seguridad," Paz y Seguridad en las Américas, 9 December 1996, p.4, who also adds the inequality of wealth distribution; General Julio Balconi Turcios, Guatemalan Minister of Defense, "La Seguridad Hemisferica," Paz y Seguridad en las Américas, 9 December 1996, p. 15; and Col. Jose Luis Nuñez Bennett, Honduran Minister of Defense, "La Posguerra Fria en el Hemisferio," Paz y Seguridad en las Américas, 9 December 1996, p. 18.

2. Dante Giadone, "Prologue" in Monica Hirst, et al., Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina, Buenos Aires: Fundación Arturo Illia, 1990; the right in Guatemala initially perceived that holding elections without reforming any political institutions would be sufficient to end the war. Gabriel Aguilera, Los Temas Sustantivos en las Propuestas Para la Paz, Guatemala: FLACSO/Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1993.

3. Muñoz, op. cit.; Luciano Tomassini, "Los alcances del concepto de gobernabilidad" in Manuel Carballo Quintana and Gunther Maihold, eds. ¿Qué Será de Centroamérica?: Gobernabilidad, legitimidad electoral y sociedad civil, San José, Costa Rica: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1994, pp. 15-40; Jose Sánchez Parga, "Menos Estado y más Gobierno," Ecuador Debate, 30 December 1993, pp. 44-53.

4. Nelson Prato Barbosa, "Revuelta urbana y desobediencia social," Cuadernos del CENDES (Caracas), 10 January-April 1989, p. 10.

5. Tulio Hernández, "El tercer saqueo" and Ocarina Castillo D’Imperio, "¿Acaso fué necesario?" ("Perhaps it was necessary?") in Cuadernos del CENDES (Caracas), 10 January-April 1989, pp. 114-117.

6. See footnote 3.

7. Bejar, Rafael Guido "Entre las aspiraciones democraticas y la proclividad autoritaria: una gobernabilidad incierta en El Salvador" in Quintana and Maihold, eds., op. cit., pp. 271-72; Jorge Castaneda, Utopia Unarmed, New York: Random House, 1993; Socialists who break with their revolutionary past and accept the legitimacy of diverse ideological currents within the political left, are referred to as "Renovated." Chile Information Press (CHIPnews), "Socialist Party Congress Analyzed," Santiago, May 13, 1996.

8. Sendero was on the extreme of the left, akin to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Cultural Revolution in China. Alberto Bolivar Ocampo, "Intelligence and Subversion in Peru," Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 3:3, Winter 1994.

9. Mario Rolando Cabrera, "Apuntes Sobre los Origenes del Enfrentamiento Armado en Guatemala," paper presented at the First Central American Workshop, The Clingendael Project, "Causes of Conflict in the Third World," San José, Costa Rica, December 8-11, 1996, p. 22.

10. Alejandro Reyes Posada, "Paramilitares en Colombia: Contexto, Aliados y Consecuencias" paper presented at the Research Conference "Violence and Democracy in Colombia and Peru," 30 November-1 December 1990, Columbia University.

11. Ocampo, op. cit., p. 424.

12. Among the agreements in the Guatemalan Peace Plan is one entitled "Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples." In addition, the "Alliance for the Sustained Development of Central America" that came out of the presidential summit of 1994 calls for the respect of cultural and ethnic diversity. Rojas Aravena, op. cit., p. 5. And in 1990 Ecuador,

13. Gabriel Aguilera "Las políticas de Defensa en Guatemala" in Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera and Francisco Rojas Aravena, eds., De la Guerra a la Integración: La Transición y la Seguridad en Centroamérica, San José, Costa Rica: Fundación Arias Para la Paz y el Progreso Humano, 1994, pp. 108-110; Equizabal, Cristina, "El problema de la seguridad en Centroamérica: El caso de El Salvador" in Solís Rivera and Rojas Aravena, eds., op. cit., p. 93.

14. During 1995, 50 percent and 70 percent of respondents in opinion polls reported that their level of insecurity had increased in Costa Rica and El Salvador, respectively. Gallup Polls, Costa Rica April 1995 and El Salvador June 1995, as cited in Laura Chinchilla M., "Seguridad ciudadana y reforma policial en centroamerica" in Chinchilla, ed., Documentos p. 99; see also, Gabriel Aguilera, ed., Buscando la Seguridad: seguridad ciudadana y consolidacion democratica en Guatemala. Guatemala City: FLACSO-Guatemala, 1996.

15. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Fernando Ochoa Antich called on Colombia to repatriate 3,000 prisoners in Venezuelan jails: "Border incidents add to tension in Venezuelan-Colombian relations," Andean Group Report February 3, 1994, RA-94-01, p.1; also "Uslar Pietri: la situación amenaza con convertirse en un gran conflicto," El Nacional (Caracas), March 17, 1995, p.A8; the chief public defender in Nicaragua complains of Costa Rican xenophobia and abuses, including beatings and rape, by immigration authorities. "Nicaraguans Continue Massive Migration to Costa Rica," EcoCentral 2:8, February 27, 1997.

16. "Honduras and El Salvador Report Progress in Territorial Talks, But Border Conflicts Continue" EcoCentral 2:8, February 27, 1997.

17. Manuel Antonio Garreton M. "Panorama del Miedo en los Regimenes Militares. Un Esquema General," Documento de Trabajo 365, Santiago: FLACSO, December, 1987.

18. Earle Herrera, Por Que se Ha Reducido el Territorio Venezolano? Caracas: Alfadil, 1990; Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, Colombia y Venezuela: Una historia atormentada Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1987; Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem noted in a televised speech in 1993 that Argentina would be "setting foot in the Malvinas" before the year 2000, although he said it would be without a conflict. Latin American Regional Reports-Southern Cone RS-93-01 February 4, 1993.

19. "Guatemala and Belize plan to renew territorial negotiations" and "Honduras and El Salvador Report Progress in Territorial Talks, But Border Conflicts Continue," EcoCentral 2:8, February 27, 1997.

20. Jane E. Holl, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: Second Progress Report, New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996, p. 2.

21. Enrique Obando Arbulu, "Los condicionamientos políticos de la decada de los noventa: subversión y narcotráfico" in Fernando Pardo Segovia, ed., Aproximaciones Hacia Nuevos Temas de Seguridad, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1993, p. 18-21; Paz y Seguridad en las Américas, "Políticas de Seguridad Hemisferica Cooperativa," March, 1995, No. 1, p. 8.

22. Many analysts of violent conflict in Latin America have wide ranging interests and thus focus on different aspects of the problem, depending upon their audience. For example, the FLACSO-Chile international and military relations group publishes three publications whose emphasis on traditional military issues varies greatly: the annual volume in the series Estudio Estratégico de América Latina put out by the Centro Latinoamericano de Defensa y Desarme (CLADDE) and FLACSO-Chile); the journal Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad; and Paz y Seguridad en las Américas, a joint project of FLACSO-Chile and the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

23. For example, in Colombia drug lords took over the leadership, arming and financing of paramilitary bands previously organized by the Army and large landowners. These groups then attacked "subversives"––anyone who advocated change in the existing distribution of social and economic power. Francisco Leal Buitrago, "Political Crisis and Drug Trafficking in Colombia" p. 6, 14; Alberto Bolivar Ocampo, "Intelligence and Subversion in Peru," Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 3:3, Winter, 1994.

24. Francisco Rojas Aravena "Violencia Política, y Orden Internacional: El terrorismo en Centroamérica," Estudios Internacionales XXIII:90, April-June, 1990, pp. 178-182.

25. Bolivar Ocampo, op. cit.

26. Dante Caputo, "Treinta meses de política exterior en democracia" speech at the Centro Cultural San Martin, Buenos Aires, June 4, 1986, as cited in Frohmann, p. 392-93 (translation by Mares).

27. Rojas Aravena, "Centroamérica: Nueva Agenda de Seguridad," p. 6.

28. Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel and Rodrigo Pardo, "Violencia Politica, Paz Interna, y Política Internacional," Estudios Internacionales XXIII:90, April-June, 1990, pp. 196-97.

29. Bolivar Ocampo, op. cit., p. 424; Obando Arbulu, Enrique "Los condicionamientos políticos de la decada de los noventa: subversión y narcotráfico" in Pardo Segovia, ed., op. cit., p. 22.

30. Right appeals to U.S. for support v. international communism.

31. Dante Caputo, "Treinta meses de política exterior en democracia" speech at the Centro Cultural San Martin, Buenos Aires, June 4, 1986, as cited in Frohmann, p. 392-93 (translation by Mares).

32. Monica Hirst, "Strategic Coercion, Democracy and Free Markets in Latin America" Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigación, Buenos Aires: FLACSO-Programa Buenos Aires, September, 1995 pp. 6-17.

33. The Contadora Group was created in 1983, a Support Group consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay was incorporated in 1985, and in 1986 they became the Group of Eight, subsequently simply called the Rio Group.

34. Alicia Frohmann, "De Contadora al Grupo de los Ocho: el reaprendizaje de la concertación política regional," Estudios Internacionales (Chile) XXII:87, July-September, 1989, pp. 365-427; reprint of FLACSO-Chile Documento de Trabajo #410, 1989.

35. Rojas Aravena, Francisco "El proceso de Esquipulas: el desarrollo conceptual y los mecanismos operativos," Estudios Internacionales (Chile) XXII:86, April-June, 1989, pp. 224-47.

36. Rosario Green, "Nuevas formas de concertación regional en América Latina: El Grupo de los Ocho" Informe Anual RIAL 1988, Santiago: RIAL, 1988, as cited in Frohmann, p. 400.

37. Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Medidas de confianza mutua y balance estratégico: un vínculo hacia la distensión y la estabilidad" and David R. Mares, "Equilibrios estratégicos y medidas de confianza mutua en América Latina: la historia de una relación ambigua y compleja" in Rojas Aravena, ed., Balance Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua, Santiago: FLACSO-Chile, 1996 pp. 31-54 and 55-86, respectively. P. 32 lists the characteristics in more detail.

38. Papers were presented at the First Central American Workshop in San José, Costa Rica, December 8-11, 1996, and are currently being revised.

39. Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Centroamérica: Nueva Agenda de Seguridad," p. 7.

40. Augusto Varas, "Terrorismo y Anti-Terrorismo en las Relaciones Sociales e Internacionales Contemporáneas," Estudios Internacionales XXIII:90, April-June, 1990, p. 165.

41. Carlos Portales C., "Seguridad compartida en América Latina: desafio del siglo XXI," Estudios Internacionales XXII:85, January-March, 1989, pp. 20.

42. My paraphrased summary from the Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación CIAV/OEA, "Proceso de Paz en Nicaragua: Verificación de Derechos Humanos, Resolución Pacifica de Conflictos y Construcción de la Paz," Mimeo, August, 1996, pp. 25-26.

43. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and Rodrigo Pardo, "Violencia Política, Paz Interna, y Política Internacional" Estudios Internacionales XXIII:90, April-June, 1990, pp. 187-220; for a similar point on Central America, see Luis Pasara, "Guerra/paz: un juego demasiado costoso," Centroamérica/usa, 3 July-August 1988 (San José, Costa Rica) pp. 14-15.

44. Cf., Anibal Romero, Decadencia y Crisis de la Democracia: ¿A dónde va la Democracia Venezolana? Caracas: Editorial Panapo, 1994.

45. prodemocratic values efforts in schools, among political leaders, and among political activists.

46. Alonso Zambrano, "Iglesia de Colombia y Venezuela piden bajar tensión en la frontera," El Nacional (Caracas) March 17, 1995, p. D8.

47. See the discussion of how Mexican and Central American NGOs evolved and in particular their relationship with international NGOs and the links they created among themselves: Sergio Aguayo Quezada, "Del Anonimato al Protagonismo." Aguayo, an academic, is also the head of the Mexican Commission on Human Rights.

48. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. 2. The Case of Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

49. Oscar Godoy Arcaya, "El regimen parlamentario: una opción política para Chile" in Godoy Arcaya, ed., Hacia Una Democracia Moderna: La Opción Parlamentaria, Santiago: Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1990, pp. 9-40.

50. Worry about military civic action; Carreras, "Costa Rica en el Contexto de la Seguridad Internacional," p. 10, worries that instead of "civilizing" the military we will "militarize" society and also doubts that teaching soldiers about human rights will change their behavior when called upon to deal with internal disorders; Guatemalan Minister of Defense notes that constitution allows President to call upon military to perform internal functions, including controlling delincuency, Balconi Turcios, "La Seguridad Hemisferica," p. 16.

51. Cf. The eloquent discussion in Gral. Paco Moncayo, "Fuerzas Armadas y Desarrollo Nacional" as well as Fernando Bustamante, "Fuerzas Armadas, Democracia y Ciudadania: Una Reflexion Preliminar," both in Fuerzas Armadas. Desarrollo y Democracia, Quito: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1996, pp. 71-85 and 97-119, respectively.

52. Felipe Aguero, "The Latin American Military: Development, Reform, and ‘Nation-Building’?" In Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith and Augusto Varas, eds., Security, Democracy and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations, Miami: University of Miami North-South Center, 1994, pp. 243-64; Carlos Romero argues that the Venezuelan officers serving in the peacekeeping missions in Central America were fearful that their own country might fall into civil war if Venezuelan politicians continued to be corrupt and fight among each other. Upon their return to Caracas, they became involved in the abortive coup of March, 1992. In Jorge I. Dominguez, ed., Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming.

53. Brigagao, Clovis "Brasil e América Central: Relações Politicas e Militares" Politica e Estratégia, April-June 1985, III:2, pp. 246-53.

54. General Joaquin Cuadra, "La Seguridad Hemisferica y Regional Desde la Perspectiva Nicaraguense," Paz y Seguridad en las Americas, 9 December 1996, p. 22.

55. Juan Carlos Palou, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Transición Constitucional en Colombia," Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad VIII:4 October-December, 1993, pp. 4-9; Jose Sánchez Parga, "Fuerzas Armadas, opinión pública y sociedad civil," Fuerzas Armadas. Desarrollo y Democracia, Quito: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1996, pp. 121-39; includes discussion of missions society wants military to play Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru.

56. See footnote #23

57. Chile has this problem with Carabineros. Chile Information Press (CHIPnews) "Report Gives Chile Low Marks in Human Rights" Santiago, December 9, 1996; Gabriel Aguilera and Rosalinda Bran, "La gestion de seguridad en Guatemala" in Aguilera, ed., Buscando la seguridad pp. 287-356.

58. José Sánchez Parga, "Menos Estado y más Gobierno" Ecuador Debate, 30 December 1993, pp. 44-53.

59. Orrego Vicuna, Francisco, "Nuevas modalidades para el restablecimiento de la paz y seguridad en el derecho internacional: el Grupo de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas" Estudios Internacionales, Jan-March, 1991, XXIII: 93, pp. 3-18.

60. Tokatlian and Pardo, "Violencia política, la paz interna..." p. 220. The Mapuches in Chile took the government to the Inter-American Human Rights Court in 1996, the first such instance by an indigenous people’s group. "Mapuches Turn to International Court," Chile Information Press News, April 4, 1996; Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade, "Democracia y derechos humanos: el regimen emergente de la promoción internacional de la democracia e del Estado de Derecho" in Fernando Pardo Segovia, ed., Aproximaciones Hacia Nuevos Temas de Seguridad, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1993, pp. 53-76, includes a review of what has happened in the OAS in last 10 years on human rights. The UN also plays an important role on traditional security issues, having set up a regional center in Lima, the Centro Regional de las Naciones Unidas para la Paz, el Desarme y el Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe, which puts out a monthly Boletin.

61. Oscar Arias Sanchez, "El Mundo Despues de la Guerra Fria: Los Principales Retos" Paz y Seguridad en las Americas 9 December 1996; Marcus Stern, "Mexico’s crop of illicit guns has U.S. roots" San Diego Union-Tribune March 30, 1997 pp A-1, A-13.

62. on the failure of the Rio Treaty from a Latin American perspective, see Carlos Portales C., "Seguridad compartida en América Latina: desafio del siglo XXI," Estudios Internacionales XXII:85, January-March, 1989, pp. 10-13; Roberto Russell, "Conflictos y Armamentismo en América Latina" in Hirst, et. al., ed., Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina, pp. 61-67.

63. Alejandro Deustua Caravedo, "La seguridad colectiva en el sistema interamericano" in Fernando Pardo Segovia, ed., Aproximaciones Hacia Nuevos Temas de Seguridad, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1993, p. 42.

64. But do see Nila Velázquez, "Gobernabilidad y educación," Ecuador Debate, December, 1993, pp. 90-100. She includes the nutritional needs of babies as an important element for a broad based education that would develop democratic citizens.

65. Pilar Armanet Armanet, "La zona desnuclearizada latinoamericana en la perpectiva de la cooperación regional" in Augusto Varas, ed., Paz, Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina, Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1987, pp. 151-167.

66. Alcides Costa Vaz, "Condicionantes de las Posiciones Brasileras Frente al Desarme, Control de Armas y Seguridad Regional" in Cambios Globales y América Latina. Algunos Temas de la Transición Estratégica Volume 1991/92 of Estudio Estratégico de América Latina, Santiago: CLADDE-FLACSO, 1993, p. 92; Rut Diamint, "Argentina y los procesos de verificación de las medidas de fomento de la confianza," pp. 201-15.

67. Paz y Seguridad en las Américas "Políticas de Seguridad Hemisferica Cooperativa" March, 1995, No. 1 p. 3.

68. Cf., Hugo Palma, América Latina: Limitación de armamentos y desarme en la región, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1986; Insulza, Jose Miguel, "Efectos regionales de las iniciativas de desarme global" in Augusto Varas, ed., Paz, Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina, Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1987, pp. 279-288; Rojas Aravena, ed., Balance Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua,Santiago: FLACSO-Chile, 1996; Isaac Caro, "Medidas de Confianza Mutua en América Latina" presented to the project Transformaciones Globales y Paz, Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. November, 1992 is a bibliographic listing of treaties and meetings on confidence-building measures, including arms control, among Latin American states.

69. See the critique by Costa Rican Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodrigo Carreras, "Costa Rica en el Contexto de la Seguridad Internacional," Paz y Seguridad en las Américas, 9 December 1996, p. 10.

70. Oscar Arias Sánchez, "El Mundo Después de la Guerra Fria: Los Principales Retos," Paz y Seguridad en las Americas, 9 December 1996, pp. 8, 26.

71. Philip Finnegan, "Argentinians Request Closer U.S. Ties, Arms," Defense News 12:4, January 27-February 2, 1997, p. 4.

72. Oscar Arias Sánchez, "El Mundo Después de la Guerra Fria: Los Principales Retos" Paz y Seguridad en las Américas 9 December 1996 p. 9; other discussions regarding regulating the conventional arms trade can be found in Munoz, Heraldo, La Agenda de Seguridad en las políticas exteriores sudamericanas, Santiago: Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, Documento de Estudio No. 5, n.d.

73. Cf. definition of governability by the President of the Arturo Illia Foundation for Democracy and Peace, Dante Giadone, "Prologue" in Monica Hirst, et. al., Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina, Buenos Aires: Fundación Arturo Illia, 1990 p. 8; Manuel Carballo Quintana and Gunther Maihold, eds., ¿Qué Será de Centroamérica?: Gobernabilidad, legitimidad electoral y sociedad civil, San José, Costa Rica: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1994.

74. Augusto Varas, "Democratization, Peace, and Security in Latin America," Alternatives X:4, 1995, pp. 607-623; Brigagao, Clovis, "Brasil e América Central: Relações Politicas e Militares," Politica e Estratégia April-June, 1985, III:2, pp. 246-53; Pilar Armanet, Seguridad Regional en América del Sur: Responsabilidad Civico-Militar, Santiago: Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, n.d.

75. Monica Hirst, "Security Policies, Democratization and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone," Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigación, Buenos Aires: FLACSO-Programa Buenos Aires, August, 1995.

76. Monica Hirst, "Strategic Coercion, Democracy and Free Markets in Latin America," Serie de Documentos e Informes de Investigación, Buenos Aires: FLACSO-Programa Buenos Aires, September, 1995.

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84. Declaration in leaflet "Marcha por la Legalización de los Territorios y la Defensa de la Vida de los Pueblos Quichua, Achuar y Shiwiar" distributed for the march across Ecuador in Spring, 1992.

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