The prima facie evidence from the UNPROFOR and IFOR experience in Bosnia -- especially the high number of casualties sustained by French forces -- suggests that public opinion in Europe, at least, is far more robust on the issue of casualties than many politicians instinctively fear it to be. Commanders from several nations, including those at the highest levels in U.S. forces, have expressed privately to this author their irritation with political paranoia about the possibility of casualties. They say it restrains unnecessarily their military effectiveness. After all, they argue, any military operation must plan for casualties. Political preparation of the electorate in advance, along with vigorous ministerial handling of any casualties, should be enough to prevent a major public backlash that can undermine a military deployment. The casualty issue only becomes a problem when there are weak, diffident political efforts at belated damage limitation.
After searching for other evidence of significant fluctuations in public support for U.S. peace-support operations in Lebanon and Somalia, Burk has also questioned the conventional wisdom that the public is intolerant of casualties.57 He concludes that public opinion backed both operations and was "neither volatile, overly sensitive to casualties, nor obviously irresponsible," even after incidents like the deadly firefight in Mogadishu. Fear of casualties did not influence policy as many assumed it would -- especially politicians and many in the media.
In separate research, Larson58 has further shown that public support for U.S. military operations and public tolerance for casualties is related directly to clear, unequivocal bipartisan political approval for "compelling" missions. Failure to secure such agreement will inevitably lead to questioning a mission's merits. Such a situation has been highlighted uncomfortably by controversial U.S. involvement in the new generation of substate conflicts. As Larson concludes: "When political and other opinion leaders fail to agree with the President that much (or any) good is likely to come of an intervention, the public also becomes divided."
The consequences of such disagreements can be near catastrophic. According to Larson, "They can lead to enduring divisions in the public, and to support that is brittle and easily exploited by adversaries, thereby leading both to failed interventions and incorrect lessons for the future." Inevitably, the media will highlight such splits and thereby weaken the image of the policy. This author suggests that, as a result, the need for unity -- whether interstate or intrastate, and especially in the European Union (EU) -- has been seen consistently as the overriding prerequisite for policy. The best way to achieve unity is by way of a minimalist, low-risk response that has virtually no chance of preventing or halting conflict.
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