But, at the same time, there are signs that NGOs and humanitarian organisations are belatedly coming to terms with the inherent limits and distorting influence of TV coverage on conflict management. An urgent reassessment of priorities and likely responses is taking place. "Rapid and radical shifts in the nature of international disaster response have left agencies reeling," concludes one new assessment.59 In the view of one leading NGO figure, the kind of military response prompted up to now by TV coverage in particular is not the most cost-effective. Indeed, while such operations carry the kind of high profile demanded by politicians to satisfy the need to "do something," they are no longer effective or appropriate.60 Impulsive intervention prompted by a conscience-driven political response to TV pictures is considered counter-productive,61 despite the valuable boost it gives to fund-raising.
The massive, belated international response to the cholera catastrophe in Goma after the Rwanda genocide in 1994 seemed a worthy, correct action at the time. But the resulting Gaza-style refugee camps soon took on the air of permanent structures. They created a new crisis of fiefdoms, criminality, and social inadequacy. The intense media coverage produced Pyrrhic consequences. Governments and agencies made "ad hoc decisions that were not always in line with sound operating principles and resulted in skewed emphasis on some relief activities at the expense of others."62 Two years later, in October 1996, the subsequent mass exodus of Hutu refugees during ethnic fighting in eastern Zaire became the predictable and preventable crisis foreseen by aid agencies. For two years, however, there had been no international will to act until matters took on crisis proportions with over 300,000 refugees on the move.63
For the time being, however, most NGOs continue to fight hard -- both subtly and blatantly -- to persuade TV news organisations to cover conflicts or looming catastrophes like Afghanistan, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. They believe, or at least assume, that high-profile media coverage of a simmering crisis will prevent much worse.
Often the outcome is despair at the media's indifference or inaction.64 So great is the increasing desperation of some NGOs to get worldwide attention and funding for forgotten conflicts that they tempt journalists into the conflict zones with offers of transport and logistics support. But to what effect? Do the big nations really care about Afghanistan or Liberia? Do international mediators have the kind of political or military leverage that will persuade determined warlords or substate leaders to consider peace rather than the kind of military campaign for hegemony they have long planned?
The evidence is not encouraging. The answer to both questions is likely to be "No."65 Again, Burundi 1996 is a prime example. In the buildup to July, Tutsi prime minister Antoine Nduwayo expressed what many governments quietly fear: "The real problem is the ideology of genocide that has been developed for years here, as well as in Rwanda."66
It is an ideology of murder that neither leading world powers nor the media have the power to overcome. In addition, the novelty value of media coverage of conflicts that few know about or want to know about has long worn off.
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