2. See, for example, "Report First, Check Later," James A. Baker III, interviewed by Marvin Kalb. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 3.
3. "The Pentagon and the Press," Defence Secretary William J. Perry interviewed by Marvin Kalb. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1996, p. 121.
4. Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions? by Nik Gowing. Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1994.
5. "Talking to the World About American Foreign Policy" by Nicholas Burns. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, Fall 1996, p. 12.
6. The 1996 Report of Reporters Sans Frontières concluded that "more advanced media do not necessarily go hand in hand with better quality information." Luton: University of Luton, 1996, p. 3.
7. See, for example, "The Dead and the Deadline" by Paul Meller. The Guardian, 25 March 1996.
8. "UN Peacekeeping -- Past Lessons and Future Prospects." Speech by the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind to the University of Edinburgh, 10 March 1995.
9. "Where is Kigali?" by Lindsey Hilsum. Granta, Autumn 1995, pp. 147 -- 8.
10. Kalb, "The Pentagon and the Press" (see note 3).
11. See, for example, a detailed description of the distorting impact of media coverage on governments and NGOs during the Rwanda crisis in "Reporting Rwanda: The Media and Aid Agencies" by Lindsey Hilsum. Paper submitted to the multidonor evaluation exercise on Rwanda coordinated by the Danish Foreign Ministry, March 1996.
12. See, for example, Yugoslavie: la politique de la bande velpeau by Alain Destexhe. Paris: Armand Colin, 1993.
13. See, for example, a critical assessment of the superficial, palliative nature of the U.S. response to the Goma cholera catastrophe during the Rwanda crisis in "Behind the CNN factor" by this author in the Washington Post, 31 July 1994. The U.S. dispatch of water trucks from California and logisticians from Frankfurt made good television pictures and suggested U.S. engagement. The reality was a minimalist U.S. policy born out of embarrassment, and maybe shame, at having failed to engage diplomatically in Rwanda four months earlier. The U.S. had rejected earlier UN requests for heavy airlift capacity to transport the 5,500 peacekeepers that had been pledged.
14. Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4).
15. Abstract from The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience by the Steering Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Published by the Danish Foreign Ministry, 1996.
16. Ibid., Vol. E, p. 66.
17. From the proceedings of a closed workshop at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 31 October 1995.
18. Quoted with permission from a presentation by Cameron R. Hume, political adviser at the U.S. Mission to the UN, to a Fulbright colloquium at the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London, on 10 July 1996. Hume quoted "Global Humanitarian Emergencies 1996," a paper released by the U.S. mission to the UN in February 1996. It details 23 "essentially internal conflicts" in progress at that time.
19. Britain's Minister for Overseas Development, Lady Chalker, has complained that 90 percent of the media coverage is for 12 percent of their work -- in war zones. In a speech on 20 March 1996 she asked why there was no coverage for the 88 percent of her ministry's work "that can prevent tragedy."
20. Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4).
21. "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered," by Steve Livingston and Todd Eachus, Political Communication, Vol. 12 (1995): pp. 413 -- 429. See also "The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-Hour News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy," by Warren P. Strobel, American Journalism Review, May 1996, pp. 32 -- 37. Strobel confirms Gowing's finding (see note 4) and details what he calls the "five myths" of the CNN effect and its claimed impact on the making of foreign policy.
22. Hilsum, "Where is Kigali?" p. 148 (see note 9).
23. See conclusions from deliberations of the Council on Foreign Relations conference, "US National Interests after the Cold War," at Wye Plantation, Maryland, 14 -- 16 December 1995. These have subsequently been codified into a checklist of "Blue, Red, White and Translucent Chips" published in America's National Interests, Cambridge, MA: Commission on America's National Interests at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, July 1996.
24. Hume's presentation to Fulbright Colloquium (see note 18).
25. PDD 25 on "Multilateral Peace Operations," 5 May 1994.
26. See, for example, "Clinton Makes Foreign Policy and Electoral Positive" by Tara Sonenshine of Newsweek and former special assistant to President Clinton and deputy director of communications for national security policy. International Herald Tribune, 15 May 1996.
27. "Principles Governing US Use of Force." Speech by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake at George Washington University, 8 March 1996.
28. For fuller analysis of "policy panic," see Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4).
29. An example is set out in "The Clash of Civilizations" by Samuel Huntington. Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22 -- 49.
30. Speech by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 14 September 1994.
31. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, interview on The Charlie Rose Show (PBS), 28 September 1994.
32. Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4).
33. The author experienced an important example of this. On 29 June 1993, at the height of the campaign of ethnic cleansing, he held a five-hour interview with the Bosnian Serb military commander General Ratko Mladic in Zvornik. Mladic made clear his own assessment that although the major western powers were publicly trying to give every impression of a political determination to act tough against his forces, fundamentally they had no political will to make the kind of military commitments that would create serious problems for him. "I understand the West better than the West understands itself," Mladic boasted at one point, adding "I play chess better than the West plays chess." His military successes in the following two years up to the summer of 1995 and the new, proactive U.S. policy, proved the correctness of Mladic's analysis of Western inertia and lack of will to use overwhelming political pressure backed by decisive military force.
34. See, for example, "Nightmare in Liberia," editorial in the Washington Post published in the International Herald Tribune, 11 April 1996. The warring factions in Liberia are described as "at bottom, unrestrained, self-enriching bullies, who have turned their country into a graveyard."
35. "Behind the CNN factor: Lights! Cameras! Atrocities! But policy makers swear they are not swayed by the images," by Nik Gowing. Washington Post, 31 July 1994.
36. See, for example, the editorial by Marvin Kalb and Pippa Norris in Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1996, p.1.
37. "Conflict of Interest," an edited version of Martin Bell's speech to the Chichester Festival. Reprinted in The Guardian, 11 July 1996. "Journalism of attachment" was first proposed by Martin Bell at the NewsWorld 96 conference in Berlin, 22 November 1996. See "BBC Man Attacks Neutral War Reports," The Guardian, 23 November 1996.
38. For the British government's working definition of U.K. national interests, see paragraph 267 of the Ministry of Defence's Defence Estimates 1995. London: CMD 2800.
39. Proceedings of IISS closed workshop (see note 17).
40. "Why Foreign Policy Cannot Be Dictated by Blind Emotion" by Douglas Hurd, The Standard, 16 July 1996.
41. In Harm's Way by Martin Bell. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995, p. 273.
42. Ibid., p. 133.
43. "The More Engagement in China the Better" by Thomas L. Friedman. Reprinted in the International Herald Tribune, 18 April 1996.
44. "Citizens Knowledge of Foreign Affairs" by Stephen. E. Bennett, Richard S. Flickinger, John R. Baker, Staci L. Rhine and Linda L.M. Bennett. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1996.
45. As a random sample, take "100 killed daily in Burundi's tribal war" by Sam Kiley, The Times, 5 July 1996. Also, "Slaughter at tea factory was work of Hutu rebels" by Chris McGreal, The Guardian, 6 July 1996.
46. Proceedings of IISS closed workshop (see note 17).
47. "Toll at 304 in Burundi attack," Agence France Press, International Herald Tribune, 22 July 1996.
48. "Burundi Slides Towards Civil War" by Michela Wrong, The Financial Times, 27 July 1996.
49. Interview by the author with Lady Chalker, British Foreign Office Minister for Overseas Development, on BBC World TV, 31 July 1996.
50. Appearance by Sylvana Foa on BBC News, 25 July 1996.
51. Response by Nicholas Burns, 25 July 1996.
52. Kofi Annan, then head of UN Peacekeeping, said: "We have to move very quickly before everything blows up in our faces. History will judge us rather rely for Rwanda, and I don't think we can repeat that experience in Burundi," interview on BBC World TV News, 24 July 1996.
53. See, for example, "Act now to stop the killing in Burundi." Published appeal by International Crisis Group, 30 July 1996.
54. "East Africans `will invade to halt Burundi's war'" by Chris McGreal in The Guardian, 10 July 1996. As mediator between the Hutu and Tutsi factions in Burundi, the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere was quoted as saying: "We can't allow another Rwanda. We will have to go in whether Burundi wants it or not."
55. United Nations Association Bulletin. London, 3 September 1996.
56. Ibid.
57. "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia" by James Burk, Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University. Paper presented to Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, 20 -- 22 October 1995.
58. "RAND Research Brief -- 2502," a summary of Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Military Operations by Eric V. Larson. Washington, DC: RAND, 1996.
59. See, for example, "Disasters debate: Whose disaster is it anyway? Rights, responsibilities and standards in crisis" by Peter Walker, Director of Disaster and Refugee Policy for the IFRC. Paper delivered to the World Disasters Report 1996 review conference, 23 May 1996.
60. "Should soldiers get off the humanitarian front line? Disasters, armies and the new world disorder" by Peter Walker. Paper delivered to the World Disasters Report 1996 review conference, 23 May 1996.
61. See, for example, "Why does the media always get it wrong in disasters: Stereotypes, standards and free helicopter rides" by Nick Cater. Paper delivered to the review conference on 23 May 1996 launching World Disasters Report 1996 by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). London: Oxford University Press, 1996.
62. Steering Committee, Vol. E, p. 66 (see note 15).
63. "Africa's Grisly Harvest of Death" by Chris McGreal. The Observer, 27 October 1996.
64. See, for example, "Liberia, who cares?" Letter from the field by Trevor Lines in a bulletin of UK Medecins sans Frontières, May 1996.
65. See, for example, the speech to the SHAPE-EX NATO conference in Brussels by then U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, 30 April 1996. "Overall, the evidence of the past five years is that UN peacekeepers can accomplish much where the local parties have grown weary of war, but they will have great difficulty where one or more parties remains more interested in conquest than co-existence." It has to be asked how even vivid media coverage can make a fundamental difference to Albright's frank assessment, with all the limits to conflict prevention it implies?
66. "OAU focuses on ethnic slaughter in Burundi" by Chris McGreal. The Guardian, 8 July 1996.
67. For a detailed description of the new practical realities of real-time, satellite reporting from conflicts, see, for example, Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4) or Bell, In Harm's Way (see note 41).
68. See, for example, "Burundi army kills Hutu villagers in wake of coup" by Chris McGreal, The Guardian, 30 July 1996. "Hutu rage grows against Burundi's new Tutsi ruler" by David Orr, The Independent, 30 July 1996. "Killings by Tutsi-led-army fuel violence in Burundi: coup has provoked a vicious cycle of revenge" by Louise Tunbridge, The Daily Telegraph, 30 July 1996.
69. For full details, see Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage, p. 80 (see note 4).
70. Bell, In Harm's Way, p. 143 (see note 41).
71. For a detailed argument, see Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage, p. 20 (see note 4).
72. For a detailed description of both, see Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4).
73. For fuller details, see "Dictating the Global Agenda" by Nik Gowing in Spectrum, Summer 1991. Reproduced by the Royal Institute for International Affairs in The World Today, June 1991, p. 111.
74. Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage, pp. 46 -- 55 (see note 4).
75. Steering Committee (see note 15).
76. Gowing, Real-Time Television Coverage (see note 4).
77. Steering Committee, Vol. E, p. 66 (see note 15).
78. Hilsum, "Reporting Rwanda" (see note 11).
79. "Media of Hate" by R.M. Connaughton. Camberley, UK: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996.
80. Steering Committee (see note 15).
81. See "UN suppressed warning of Rwanda genocide plan" by Lindsey Hilsum, The Observer, 26 November 1995. Hilsum reports how a telegram dated 11 January 1994 (three months before the mass murders began) from the UN Force Commander in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, revealed to senior UN officials that Hutu extremists were planning to massacre and exterminate the minority Tutsis in Rwanda.
82. Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mark Thompson, London: Article 19 (International Centre Against Censorship), 1994.
83. Incitement and the Media: Responsibility of and for the Media in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia by Francoise Hampson. Colchester, Essex: Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1993.
84. From the proceedings of a closed IISS workshop on 31 October 1995.
85. From conversations with many mediators and diplomats involved in the Bosnian negotiations who describe how leaders of the warring factions often played to the cameras with statements and polemics that knowingly misrepresented what was happening behind closed doors. Such statements thereby inflamed rather than assisted the process of negotiation.
86. See, for example, the appeals of International Alert, London.
87. "West's Intervention in Africa: Not Solving the Problems" by Howard W. French of the New York Times. International Herald Tribune, 28 May 1996.
88. "US Aide Sounds Alarm Over Burundi" by Joseph Fitchett. International Herald Tribune, 2 May 1996.
89. See "Suffering in Silence: Media Coverage of War and Famine in the Sudan" by Steven Livingston in From Massacres to Genocide, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996.
90. See, for example, Humanitarian Crises: Meeting the Challenges. Report of the Cantigny Conference Series supported by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation -- Conference at George Washington University, Washington, DC, 4 -- 5 May 1995, p. 11 ff.
91. Speech by U.S. AID Administrator Brian Attwood on the role of foreign aid and economic development as strategic weapons in preventive diplomacy; delivered 21 September 1995, Brussels.
92. In his address marking the 33rd anniversary of the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, the OAU's secretary-general explicitly warned of the "close linkage between the prevailing economic predicament of our continent and the yet unresolved, as well as potential conflict situations in Africa," 28 May 1996.
93. Burns, "Talking to the World," p. 14 (see note 5).
94. "Bringing Humanitarian News Into Prime Time" by Emma Bonino, International Herald Tribune, 28 June 1996.
95. See the introduction to Somalia, Rwanda and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crises, edited by Edward R. Girardet. Geneva: Crosslines Global Report, 1995.
96. Burns, "Talking to the World" (see note 5).
97. Remarks by Jon Snow, presenter, ITN Channel Four News, to the 1996 One World Broadcasting Trust awards ceremony, London, 20 March 1996.
98. Ibid.
99. Bonino, "Bringing Humanitarian News into Prime Time" (see note 94).
100. See, for example, Correspondent and Assignment on BBC 2 or ZDF's Auslands Journal and ARD's Weltspiegel in Germany.
101. For confirmation of this author's analysis see, for example, Bonino, "Bringing Humanitarian News into Prime Time" (note 94). See also "The Shrinking of Foreign News," by Garrick Utley, Foreign Affairs 76(2), March/April 1997, pp. 2 -- 10.
102. "The Truth is Out" by John Pilger. Broadcast, 10 May 1996, p. 20.
103. See "ITV is Missing Out on Serious Opportunity," a letter by independent TV producer Mike Dodds in Broadcast, 17 May 1996. It was followed by a robust response from John Blake, Deputy Controller, Network Factual Programmes, in a letter, "The Facts About Documentary Output on ITV," in Broadcast, 24 May 1996.
104. See, for example, the 3-year review of ITN (Independent Television News) by Britain's Independent Television Commission, which concluded that ITN "provided a high quality news service with strong coverage over three years of foreign and domestic stories," December 1995.
105. See, for example, the personal reflection of Nicholas Burns, "Talking to the World," p. 14 (see note 5).
106. Snow, "One World Broadcasting Trust" (see note 97).
107. For one representative reminiscence, see "In the Death of a War Reporter and Father, a Lesson about Journalism" by John Darnton of the New York Times. Reprinted in the International Herald Tribune, 9 April 1996.
108. In October 1996, BBC TV news and the TV agencies transmitted news videos of the Afghan civil war by satellite phone at a speed equal to one-thirtieth of real time. Each 2-minute news story took 1 hour to feed. The resulting video quality was adequate, but not perfect. The use of telephone instead of TV satellite dish (with its transport and transmission costs) contributed to a significant cost saving.
109. See, for example, "Lap-Top Bombardiers and the Media: Threat or Asset?" by Nik Gowing. Presentation to the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, 20 November 1995.
110. Note, for example, the amateur Hi -- 8 video of the Israeli drone seen flying over the Qana refugee camp in South Lebanon around the time of the Israeli shelling in April 1996 that killed more than 100 people. The video was released by "The Independent" to major news organisations on 6 May 1996, about two weeks after the incident.
111. There is occasional and fragmentary contrary evidence such as "Look, Americans Do Care about Foreign Policy," by Thomas L. Friedman of the New York Times. International Herald Tribune, 2 May 1996.
112. Cantigny Conference Series, Humanitarian Crises, p. 14 (see note 90).
113. See, for example, remarks by Marcus Plantin of the ITV Network Centre to the Royal Television Society, 15 September 1995. See also information technology discussions at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 1 -- 6 February 1996. Note, in particular, the remarks by Professor Joel de Rosnay, Director for Development and International Relations, Cité des Sciences et de l'Industrie, France, in his presentation on 3 February.
114. Steering Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Vol. E, p. 66 (see note 15).
115. Bell, In Harm's Way (see note 41).
116. Hilsum, "Reporting Rwanda" (see note 11).
117. "The Third Genocide" by Alain Destexhe. Foreign Policy, No. 97, Winter 1994 -- 5, pp. 12 -- 13.
118. Steering Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Vol. E, p. 66 (see note 15).
119. "Blaming the Victim" by Tom Gjelten, The New Republic, 20 December 1993.
120. Mark Urban wrote these remarks in a book review of The Quick and the Dead by Janine de Giovanni. London Sunday Times.
121. "Making Peace With the Guilty" by Gen. Charles G. Boyd, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, 1992 -- 5. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5, September/October 1995.
122. See, for example, "Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware." Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KA, 1995.
123. Boyd, "Making Peace," pp. 23, 28 (see note 121).
124. See, for example, "A Conflict of Views: The Press and the Soldier in Bosnia" by Rod Thornton, formerly an officer serving with British UN forces in Sarajevo. Reprinted without the author's permission in The South Slav Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3 -- 4, pp. 57 -- 58, but contents confirmed as genuine to Nik Gowing. Thornton wrote: "Journalists in Bosnia have subordinated the need for fair and objective reporting to their own perceived need to create a sloganeering, crusading, `something must be done' approach that sits well with the need to fire the imagination of both casual reader and politician alike. And very often the truth does not fire imaginations. If truth is the first casualty of war, then objectivity is on the first stretcher behind it." Thornton then details examples.
125. "Glamour Without Responsibility," by `Kenneth Roberts,' The Spectator, 5 March 1994, p. 12.
126. "Testament of an Interventionist" by Martin Bell. British Journalism Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1993, p. 9.
127. CNN World Report conference, May 1995.
128. "TV Giants Vie To Lure `Brit Packer'" by Ed Vulliamy. The Observer, 19 May 1996, p. 23.
129. Ibid.
130. Boyd, "Making Peace," p. 29 (see note 121).
131. "The Million Dollar Action Woman" by Dina Rabinovitch. The Guardian, 6 July 1996.
132. "Exposing Genocide . . .," an interview with Roy Gutman by Sherry Ricchiardi. American Journalism Review, June 1993, pp. 32 -- 36.
133. Seasons in Hell by Ed Vulliamy. London: Simon and Schuster, 1994.
134. "This War Has Changed My Life," by Ed Vulliamy, British Journalism Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1993, p. 5.
135. Balkan Odyssey by David Owen. London: Victor Gollancz, 1995, p. 84.
136. Boyd, "Making Peace" (see note 121).
17. `Roberts,' "Glamour Without Responsibility" (see note 125).
138. In his valedictory telegram to the UN dated 9 January 1994, the outgoing UN Force Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lt-General Francis Briquemont, wrote: "In Sarajevo the BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina] army provokes the BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] on a daily basis. This is very easy for us to notice as the BiH mortars are generally located near UNPROFOR units and headquarters. Since the middle of December, the BiH army jumped another step by launching heavy infantry attacks from Sarajevo to the Serb held suburbs of the city. This is an important drift of the concept of Safe Areas. The BiH army attacks the Serbs from a Safe Area, the Serbs retaliate, mainly on the confrontation line, and the Bosnian presidency accuses UNPROFOR for not protecting them against the Serb aggression and appeals for air strikes against the Serb gun positions." Also, in "Making Peace," Boyd wrote: "The press and some governments, including that of the United States, usually attribute all such fire to the Serbs, but no seasoned observer in Sarajevo doubts for a moment that Muslim forces have found it in their interest to shell friendly targets." (pp. 28 -- 29, see note 121).
139. A notable exception was the BBC TV Panorama programme in January 1995 marking the departure of UNPROFOR commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, in which John Simpson challenged Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic about the alleged high casualty figure in Bihac (later shown by the UN to be a wild exaggeration).
140. "Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press," by Peter Brock, Foreign Policy, No. 93, Winter 1993 -- 4.
141. See the letters published in Foreign Policy, No. 94, Spring 1994, pp. 158 -- 165.
142. "War Stories," by Charles Lane, The New Republic, 3 January 1994.
143. Boyd, "Making Peace" (see note 121).
144. See Foreign Affairs, November/December 1995.
145. David Binder of the New York Times, quoted in Gowing, "Real-Time Television Coverage," p. 63 (see note 4).
146. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 113 (see note 135).
147. See, for example, "While America Watched: The Bosnia Tragedy," reported by Peter Jennings, ABC News, 17 March 1994.
148. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 260.
149. "Anatomy of a Massacre," by David Binder, Foreign Policy, No. 97, Winter 1994 -- 5, p. 77.
150. Ibid., pp. 70 -- 78.
151. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. London: Oxford University Press, 1993.
152. Speech by William Perry to John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 13 May 1996.
153. "Preventive Diplomacy: The Therapeutics of Mediation," presentation to a symposium at UN Headquarters, New York City, 23 -- 24 April 1996. Later published as "A Clinician's Caution: Rhetoric and Reality" in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, ed., Kevin M. Cahill. New York: Basic Books, 1996, pp. 305 -- 317.
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