With the end of the Cold War and of global confrontation, the threat of a world nuclear war has diminished substantially, although it cannot totally be ruled out. Today the greatest and most immediate danger for the United States, Russia, and the world community is posed by local wars and conflicts, which under certain situations can erupt into massive warfare. The main task for the United Nations, for individual states, and for the world community is to prevent wars and conflicts by neutralizing their sources; that is, to apply political, economic, and diplomatic means to prevent local wars and conflicts. When political and diplomatic measures have been exhausted, military force must be considered.
The essence of wars and local armed conflicts is the same. War has always been a continuation of politics by other, forceful means. Just as in a war, the sides to a local conflict use violent instruments in pursuit of certain policies. I define local conflict as a form of hostilities involving the use of regular or irregular armed forces which stops short of developing into war. The American military defines local conflict as a military conflict of medium intensity that is limited to a comparatively small region and engages only a small part of the adversary's armed forces.
Since Clausewitz's time, it has become standard to consider war a continuation of policy by other, violent means. The emergence of nuclear weapons, and later the "new thinking" introduced by Gorbachev, suggested that war could no longer be a continuation of policy. Two questions are involved. The first concerns the acceptability of warfare in the modern world. The second asks whether the emergence of a new type of weapon can change the sociopolitical calculus of war.
The answer to the first issue is unequivocal: all wars should be ended, and especially nuclear wars, which have catastrophic consequences both for participants and for other countries. However, despite the justifiability of this argument, despite our good intentions, and despite the existence of nuclear weapons, not all conflicts in today's world can be solved through diplomatic means, and thus the use of armed force continues. Hence, in response to the second issue, we have to conclude that war and politics are inseparable. It would be more accurate to say that nowadays, both nuclear and conventional war should not be a continuation of policy by other means. But if a war has begun despite our wishes, it is always connected to politics.
The qualitative changes in both politics and the instruments of combat are complicating the connection between war and policy. On one hand, the responsibility of politicians is increasing. On the other hand, weapons of mass destruction and changes in the international system influence politicians and fundamentally alter the character of war. Political scientists emphasize justly that new weaponry is increasingly intertwined with politics, to the extent of becoming a policy itself. To avoid war, all states have to change their policies in accordance with the above realities. Otherwise, the scenario Clausewitz warned of 160 years ago may come true: sooner or later war will slip out of thehands of politicians and become an instrument of collective suicide. Unfounded declarations that war and politics are no longer related can only mislead the attempts of people struggling to prevent wars and local conflicts.
A survey of history finds no shortage of wars. More than 14,000 wars have been recorded in history, and the pattern continues to this day. In 1994 there were 31 large-scale military conflicts in 21 countries, including eight members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The number increased in 1995. The highest death toll was in Rwanda (one million casualties), but high casualties also occurred in Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Greece, Iran, and Turkey. With the end of the Cold War, the world has become more rather than less dangerous.
What was the principal cause of all these wars? If we leave aside their immediate causes, all wars involve the desire to seize foreign territories, material resources, wealth, or human labor (slavery); conquest of new territories as colonies; attempts to establish spheres of influence; or striving for world domination. Nations and states which fall victim to these aggressive actions are forced to fight for their sovereignty, independence, and existence. To this day, this is how wars and local conflicts begin.
It would seem that with the end of the Cold War we have for the first time in history the chance to prevent the outbreak of wars. Post-Cold War thinking proclaimed the superiority of the interests of mankind over national interests, and claimed that all controversies between states should be solved diplomatically. A substantial strengthening of the United Nation's role in international affairs was also envisaged. The security of every state would be guaranteed by the establishment of a global security system, rather than confined within the limits of national security. With an eye toward fulfilling this vision, the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, and with the collapse of the USSR a regional security system of states also disappeared. Nevertheless, most other states, while taking certain measures to reduce arms buildup and to maintain a partnership with former socialist states, still regard their national interests as a foreign policy priority and focus on strengthening their military security. Hence, the Soviet successor states are also forced to look out for their national interests. It appears that the world community is nowhere near ready to implement this "new thinking."
Does this mean that war will be casting its shadow over human history forever, or is it possible to put new and effective barriers in its way? On one hand, the aforementioned traditional causes of war are now supplemented by the emergence of new sociopolitical, economic, territorial, and ethnic disputes between and within states. On the other hand, there are new factors that can reduce the likelihood of war being waged or at least limit the scale of hostilities. The struggle for natural resources will be the source of the sharpest sociopolitical and economic controversies in the foreseeable future. This struggle will escalate to the limits of political confrontation, and military responses cannot be excluded.
The character of future military threats will also dependon the future political world order-on the kind of international system that will replace the bipolar world, which was based on superpower confrontation. Some observers think the international system will inevitably be a monopolar one under U.S. leadership, but this perspective seems unrealistic now. A different group of scholars and politicians predict a return to a bipolar world, with a number of Southeast Asian, Eurasian, and Central Asian states allying with China to confront the United States' political and economic expansion. This outcome is possible but unlikely. The most likely development-and the one in the best interests of the international community-is the strengthening of a multipolar system with various regional centers of power, such as the United States, Western Europe, Russia and other CIS states, China, Japan, India, and others.
The increasing variety of national interests in a multipolar world will make it a more complex system than a hegemonic or bipolar one. A multipolar system can only be stable by balancing states' interests. This stability can only be attained by dramatically restructuring the entire system of international relations, which is unrealistic in the near future.
The rise in national consciousness, which should not be equated with the narrow concept of nationalism, may become an important factor among those determining the direction of international affairs and the eruption of conflicts. Movements for national self-determination are appearing everywhere-in Europe (not only in the former Yugoslavia and Russia, but also in islands of political stability like Belgium or Spain), in the Middle East and Asia (Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Kurdish regions)-and may become sources of interethnic conflict. Sharpening controversies between developed and developing countries can transform the former East-West axis into a North-South one.
Attempts to revise post-World War II borders can be most dangerous to international stability. These include Japan's claims to the Kuril Islands and Chancellor Helmut Kohl's comments that he had reunited East and West Germany but that it would be the task of future chancellors to regain the other German lands. Such claims can launch a chain reaction of territorial demands, increasing both political and military tensions.
The United States, which has close economic links to most countries and is highly dependent on imported oil and other raw materials, has an interest in maintaining stability in important regions of the world. Increasing tensions or military conflicts in these regions would threaten U.S. interests, and considering the large number of American troops and military bases abroad, could result in U.S. involvement in military conflicts or local wars. It is not too difficult to send American troops to Bosnia, for instance, but they may encounter resistance and have to be reinforced, with more and more forces being dragged into conflict, and the conflict zone expanding, as happened in Vietnam. Moreover, if the number and scale of conflicts increase, the United States would be unable to control them alone and would have to cooperate with other centers of power, including Russia.
Besides these global challenges, Russia faces a number of military threats closer to home. Armed conflicts are blazing in theCaucasus and Central Asia (especially on the Tajik-Afghan frontier), close to Russia's borders. Along these borders, territorial claims are being made on Russia and its national interests threatened by the attempts of third countries to increase their sphere of influence in the Baltics, the Balkans, and the south. Nationalist groups in some countries of the near abroad proclaim Russia their enemy. NATO expansion poses a direct threat to Russia, especially if NATO forces and nuclear weapons were deployed in Eastern Europe and in the Baltics.
In the past, Third World countries sought the support of one of the superpowers or its allies to help defend their national interests. Now, with the possibility of such support gone, many are arming feverishly and creating threats to one another in the process. There are many complex disputes between the former Soviet republics and in some war rages (Armenia-Azerbaijan, for example). Fighting continues in Chechnya and the situation in Tajikistan is very tense. It is extremely important, and for the West as well, to preserve the integrity of Russia so that it can continue to be a great power. Otherwise, the world will not be able to handle all the conflicts that may erupt in Eurasia, a land strewn with nuclear weapons.
In sum, in addition to traditional sources of conflict, new challenges exist which cannot always be solved by peaceful diplomatic means. The increase in potential sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world means that, in certain situations, the use of armed forces cannot be excluded.
The first step in preventing armed conflicts entails neutralizing their origins by political and economic means. This demands the coordinated efforts of many states. The most promising way to do this is for Russia and other CIS states to establish a cooperative relationship with NATO under the auspices of the OSCE. But to substantially reduce the likelihood of war, every state, including the United States and other NATO countries, must substantially change its policies, rather than only talk about such changes. All efforts should be directed to the creation of a general global security system which would not infringe on any country's interests and security. If, on the other hand, the Cold War bipolar system will be replaced by a single superpower or a group of leading powers who attempt to further weaken former Cold War participants (the general attitude toward the vanquished is well known), then new conflicts will replace old ones and the chance for preventing armed conflicts will be lost.
The time is ripe not only for a reconsideration of the activities of national governments, but of international organizations as well, especially the United Nations. An important contradiction in the UN's action has become more evident in recent years: while the UN charter prohibits the use of force or threats of force in international affairs, the UN is itself employing force more frequently to enforce its resolutions. Sometimes the UN uses force before all political means have been exhausted. The absence of a prior political solution puts the deployed peacekeeping forcesinto a difficult position because, as Talleyrand said, you can do a lot of things with bayonets, but you cannot sit on them. Appropriate amendments to the UN charter are necessary.
My principal conclusion is the following: no matter how many speeches one makes declaring that conflicts are immoral and intolerable, they will be mere words with little effect. It is high time that the United Nations and individual states address the basic sources of conflict and war. The cases of Tatarstan and Chechnya show that a conflict can be either artificially aggravated or defused. One should never forget that politics is the art of the possible. One should move toward an objective step by step, amassing one's achievements gradually. Maximalist aims and adventurist policies can lead to disaster.
It is also necessary to enhance the authority of the Security Council, and of individual states and especially their foreign ministries to enable them to settle conflicts diplomatically. There is usually a lot of high rhetoric about the importance of solving conflicts peacefully, but often little diplomacy is attempted and ultimately military force is used. When the army fails to accomplish a particular objective, however, officers are severely reprimanded. Yet one rarely hears of the Ministry of the Interior or the State Department being questioned for its failure to settle a conflict by diplomatic means. Conventional thinking is that if diplomacy works, fine, but if it does not, then the armed forces can always be employed.
The effectiveness of the UN is also undermined by its failure to ensure that international agreements are upheld. For instance, the 1988 Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan were completely implemented by the governments of Afghanistan, the USSR, and Russia. But the United States, Pakistan, and other states failed to cooperate and there was no UN reaction to this. Especially dangerous is when international organizations and peace-keeping forces, instead of separating and reconciling the conflicting parties, favor one side to the conflict while trying to suppress the other with force. This was Russia's mistake in Afghanistan, when it turned its back on the Najibullah government and practically sided with the Mujahideen. Rather than mitigating the Afghan problem, this resulted in a further expansion of the civil war. Now, some hotheads suggest abandoning the Tajik government and siding with the opposition. That would require doing the same in Uzbekistan. It is not difficult to fathom the threat to Russia from the south. Who would pay the tremendous costs of such a foreign policy? In similar ways, the UN and some individual states are fanning the flames of conflict while declaring their allegiance to peace and stability. Such an approach cannot be tolerated further.
UN military forces also need to be reformed, especially since they have come to be employed more frequently in recent years. Experience shows that command of peacekeeping forces should not be given to NATO or other regional organizations. Peacekeeping forces should be under UN command. The role of the UN military staff committee, which until now has had nothing to do with peacekeeping affairs, should be enhanced, staffed more fully, and given the necessary facilities.
Numerous exercises are conducted for peacekeeping troopsin which, for instance, they undergo detailed training in how to treat refugees. From the logistical point of view, these exercises are far from perfect and resemble dress rehearsals. Still, contact between soldiers of different armies is useful. NATO is particularly concerned with making peoples of other countries accustomed to the presence of NATO soldiers on their territories.
Soldiers need training, but a more useful training exercise would be a UN-sponsored exercise involving both politicians and soldiers in the prevention or resolution of some of the aforementioned problems which are the frequent sources of deadly conflict. Not only soldiers can learn from such a simulation, but also those who make the decisions to initiate armed conflict. The main task for the UN should be analysis of the fundamental sources of conflict and the development of practical suggestions about how to maintain peace. It is also important to strengthen the UN's monitoring and implementation functions so that it can ensure its decisions are executed.
Equally necessary is the genuine aspiration of all countries and peoples to balance their interests, to cooperate with one another without double standards, and to stop dividing people into "us" and "them." These are the most important factors for the success of the UN. The main responsibility of the military is to ensure that all its actions are within the parameters of political decisions in order not to aggravate or prolong conflicts.
The military, and especially the general staff, should play an increased role in a number of stages of a potential conflict: in assessing the military-political situation, in the decision-making process on crisis prevention or resolution, and in the planning and implementation of political, economic, or diplomatic decisions. The idea that politicians should be concerned with policies and the military with military affairs is a widespread misconception. Historical experience shows that "pure" policy does not exist. Policy is only practical when it takes into consideration the whole complex of sociopolitical, economic, ideological, and military-strategic factors. For example, in 1941 Stalin's highest priority was to avoid war with Nazi Germany. He delayed mobilization and refused to put the armed forces on alert. His preoccupation with political and diplomatic concerns to the exclusion of military considerations led to disaster.
This bitter experience demonstrated that the military should not be excluded from political decision making but should rather take active part when military aspects of policy are involved. Military-political decisions should be made in close collaboration with politicians, economists, diplomats, and the military.
The military must make a sober assessment of the tasks assigned to it, and present political leaders with realistic information about the feasibility of these tasks. A responsible political decision cannot be made if Russia's defense minister reports, for instance, that an enemy capital can be captured by a regiment in two hours, when in fact it would take years and heavycasualties to accomplish this objective. Such inaccurate information can lead policy to a dead end.
The modern approach to military engagement is changing in two ways: first, it is becoming evident that no massive use of nuclear weapons is possible and the theory of global nuclear war must be abandoned. Nuclear weapons will mainly play a deterrent role. Second, the relationship between direct and indirect strategic action is changing.
As the conditions for starting and waging wars change, it is imperative to develop more flexible military-political planning and to develop a greater variety of both direct and indirect actions. Indirect military action will play an increasingly prominent role because nuclear weapons will be reserved for deterrence purposes because the great powers are increasingly reluctant to support only one side in a conflict, and because they are more reluctant to engage their professional armies. During the Cold War, the adversaries in military conflicts (for example, in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Afghanistan) were usually each supported by the superpowers, and hence the conflicts lasted for many years. In the post-Cold War world the great powers are more likely to act in concert, and measures to localize conflicts will be more effective.
Indirect action may be used to create political conditions that may prevent wars. Prevention should be a primary goal because the most likely scenario for a large-scale war is one in which states gradually become absorbed into conflicts which then grow and involve other states. If political measures fail to prevent conflicts, the military can also be used in a preventive role by enforcing sanctions; blocking communication from the sea, air, or ground; demonstrating its force capabilities; or dispatching peacekeeping forces to separate adversaries. The demonstration of force in Haiti in 1994, for example, facilitated the diplomatic activity that resulted in the resignation of the junta. If these preventive measures are not successful and hostilities are unavoidable, a surprise attack may minimize the scale of fighting. Active combat operations by ground forces can precede massive air and naval strikes to break the adversary's will to resist. During or after these strikes, an ultimatum can be presented to the adversary, demanding surrender or proposing a compromise. Ground forces, which usually suffer the heaviest casualties, should only be thrown into a bloody Clausewitz-style battle after destroying the adversary's firepower and principal military installations. Since it is nearly impossible to destroy all of an enemy's means of defense, those enemy weapons in the path of the friendly forces' offensive should be targeted.
Even the most skillful application of indirect strategies cannot always guarantee the adversary's defeat. In such instances, either political and strategic objectives must be amended or direct action must be taken. Such direct actions in the future will, one hopes, be based on well thought-out exercises and will employ a wide array of tools of warfare. Untraditional methods will play a greater role in the planning of indirect actions-ranging from psychological warfare to subversive actions to special forces operations. In the United States and elsewhere a series of manualsand instructions on the conduct of special operations already has been prepared; for example, U.S. Army Combat Manual M 31-22, "Management, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations" (1981), U.S. Army Field Manual M 31-21, "Methods of Special Operations" (1983), and others.
As early as 1954 George Kennan came to the conclusion that the Soviet problem could not be resolved exclusively by military means and advocated a search for a more flexible strategy to meet the United States' international objectives.1 In the end, these alternative forms of pressure on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries proved to be the most effective. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stressed the need to develop cunning new methods to deter both old and new enemies. Some specialists even argue that the world is facing a new generation of wars in which the aim is not the physical destruction of the enemy through direct confrontation, but subversion of the enemy's military power from within through political and economic pressure. American expert E.E. Keel articulates this strategy in more subtle terms: "We must elaborate an effective strategy not to contain our adversaries, but to influence them and form their foreign and domestic policies in accordance with our interests."2
Since local conflicts are the most common present-day threat, the role of mobile forces will accordingly increase. However, we must not copy the American system in this respect. The U.S. army's main challenges and tasks occur far from its territory. In Russia, local conflicts occur either inside the country or very near its borders. Hence, mobile forces are insufficient for Russia. Mobile forces (paratroopers, for example) can operate independently only for a short time and need subsequent reinforcement. Moreover, deployment of mobile forces in Russia is delayed by the country's vast size, weak communications, and shortage of air, sea, and surface transport. Yet many cities, important economic and military installations, and railroads are situated close to these troubled borders and need defense. These vulnerable sites need permanently stationed forces: ground, air, and other defense units.
Experience shows that even local conflicts require the commitment of large numbers of forces, as in the Persian Gulf War. Attempts to resolve conflicts with small numbers of forces, as in the Soviet-Finnish War or the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, led to heavy casualties and protracted hostilities. Leaving political considerations aside, a purely military conclusion from the experience of Afghanistan and other regional wars is that peacekeeping forces operating under the aegis of the UN or independently must act resolutely, concentrating sufficient forces to fulfill their given task in as short a time as possible.
Local conflicts are complicated by the fact that there is no distinct front line. Rival armed units are mixed in with the civilian population and may strike from various, often unexpected directions. Supply and logistics are often hindered by broken communication lines. Management and coordination between stationed and arriving mobile units, and between army, navy, air force, and antiaircraft defense units should be organized thoroughly.
Failure to abide by these principles led to the Soviet Army's ineffectiveness in Afghanistan. Despite lessons provided bythe Vietnam War, standard motorized rifle regiments and divisions with their cumbersome structure and heavy material were dispatched to Afghanistan. These soldiers were unfit for guerrilla warfare in the mountains against the Mujahadeen. Moreover, Soviet units sent to Afghanistan were not regular forces but peacetime divisions supplemented by reservists. The lack of training and coordination resulted in unnecessary losses and bad performance. As losses accumulated, strategies were revised. Troop commanders developed new tactics suitable for the concrete operational task at hand. Line divisions were reinforced by a large number of paratrooper assault battalions, special force detachments, and helicopter units. Gradually and improvisationally, learning from bitter experience, we came to the conclusion that mobile forces must be created and trained for wide varieties of specific actions in local conflicts.
Paradoxically, despite the ten years of experience garnered from Afghanistan and other local conflicts, Russian military doctrine until recently has been exclusively oriented toward global war. Local wars were considered an accidental and passing phenomenon, uncharacteristic of modern warfare and unworthy of serious attention. This view must be reassessed and lost time made up for. We must study the experiences of other countries that have reformed their militaries to respond to the specific circumstances of local conflicts and wars. Adjustment of military doctrine to the realities of local conflicts requires the following three steps:
First, potential conflicts must be identified. In Russia, there are many research centers, but their work is largely uncoordinated. Moreover, rather than attempting to predict future events, they are more frequently engaged in analyzing the past, and limit their activities to publishing articles or appearing on radio or television programs. Serious analysis of potential conflict zones is needed which can produce concrete proposals for how to prevent those conflicts from erupting.
The media and politicians also have a role to play. Currently, certain political figures and the press fan the flames of conflict instead to trying to tame it. Certain federal legislative acts are sharpening rather than resolving conflict, as in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya. Interference in the internal affairs of other republics is counterproductive, especially when military support is given to one of the conflicting sides. It is high time to understand that no one gains from fighting and bloodshed. Balance and consensus are imperative.
Prevention planning in Russia would also be facilitated by the creation of an analytic research center under the auspices of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. This center could coordinate research on the political situation in certain explosive regions and could prepare practical proposals with concrete suggestions. The center should coordinate its work with the Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff and the analytical structures of the Foreign Ministry, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of the Interior, the Intelligence Service, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Military Sciences.
The primary goal should be avoiding conflicts like that between Ossetians and Ingush or that in Chechnya. These regions became increasingly tense over a number of years and little was done to resolve the tensions peacefully. Such carelessness and irresponsibility can allow local conflicts to turn into civil wars.
Second, commanders of the armed forces must study past local wars in order to draw conclusions from those experiences. Documents on the wars in Korea, Afghanistan, and elsewhere must be declassified for this purpose. A deeper and more objective study is required of the combat operations in the Gulf War. There is still a great deal that is unknown about the conduct of the Gulf War, and descriptions of it sound more like publicity than analysis.
Third, changes in the nature of military threats demand a broadening of strategic options available to the armed forces. The following actions deserve more careful consideration:
Army manuals need to be written for each of the different kinds of conflicts. These documents should elaborate approaches to the conduct of different types of combat operations more thoroughly than they have in the past. Separate manuals should be developed for mobile forces. Combat training should more closely apply the principles developed in these manuals.
The foreign press reports that NATO forces are reorienting their plans for combat training away from traditional programs focusing on large-scale operations to the new challenges of crisis management. The Russian armed forces must also adjust their training programs in similar ways. Exercises for the conduct of operations in local conflicts should be developed. Commanders, staff, and troops should be trained for operating under states of emergency. Some units should also be trained in the particularities of peacekeeping.
This does not mean, however, that preparation for a "classic" war against large-scale aggression should be abandoned. It does mean that more attention needs to be devoted to the theoretical elaboration and practical planning of how to prevent or limit local conflicts.
A troubling trend in the conduct of warfare has been the steadily rising share of civilian casualties. In World War I, civilian casualties constituted 5 percent of all casualties. In World War II they were 48 percent, in the Korean War, 84 percent, in Vietnam, 98 percent, and in Afghanistan, 85 percent. This increase is a product of the increasingly destructive power of modern weapons, of violations of international rules by the armed forces, and of guerrilla tactics in which rebel forces mix with thelocal population and use it as a shield. How can one, for instance, destroy a rebel missile launcher yet spare the lives of civilians when the launcher is situated in the courtyard of a residential house?
But is total brutality then unavoidable in war? One should strive to abide by international rules even in the most cruel war. It is impossible, for instance, to justify the massive bombings of Dresden by Allied air forces and the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945 when the war was coming to an end, or the American bombing of Vietnamese and Iraqi residential areas, or Soviet bombing of Afghani residential areas. A more rational approach can avoid heavy casualties. In 1944, for instance, Soviet troops prevented the Nazi command from detonating explosions it had planned for Krakow, thus preventing high civilian casualties. That same year, skillful diplomatic and military actions taken by the Soviet leadership combined with the sensitivity of local leaders made it possible to avert combat in Romania and Bulgaria. By refraining from the complete encirclement of the Nazis in Silesia, the Soviet Army saved this industrial area and its population from destruction. Civilian losses were also minimal during the Soviet offensive in Manchuria in 1945. Despite its political imprudence, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was very thoroughly planned from the military point of view, and heavy civilian casualties were avoided.
Under any circumstances the military command must do its best to spare civilian lives. Still, one should understand this problem in all its complexity. First, both sides to the conflict should be held responsible for violation of international human rights laws. The media, however, often adopts a one-sided view toward this issue. Second, humaneness should not be turned into cruelty against one's own troops. The decision to stop air and artillery strikes against Grozny for humanitarian reasons also meant prolonging the conflict, with new victims with each passing day. While civilians in Grozny should be spared from bombings, we must understand that Dudaev's gunmen also are being spared, and Russian soldiers will have to pay for this decision with their lives. Where can the line be drawn to balance these considerations? Everyone has a measure of his own, but the Russian soldier pays for these decisions.
The capabilities of precision weapons should not be overestimated either. In 1991 the world witnessed the "pinpoint" strikes of coalition forces hitting Iraqi hospitals, mosques, and residential quarters, killing thousands of civilians.
The problem of high civilian casualties is endemic to local conflicts. There is no panacea. Experience shows, however, that when troops are supported by their society, they are less embittered. The higher the level of civil consciousness and professionalism of the military command, the better the chances that military objectives will be reached with minimal casualties among civilians.
In conclusion, the role of the military in preventing and resolving armed conflicts is a very complex and important one. There are many new challenges which need to be thoroughly studied and then incorporated into planning and training procedures. This is especially true for peacekeeping operations, in which Russia and NATO have already cooperated fruitfully. Experience from these operations should be developed and skillfully used for common interests.
1. George Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), 81.
2. Earl E. Keel, Jr., "Toward a New National Defense Strategy," in Essays on Strategy 10, ed. Mary A. Sommerville (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 45*-73.