Part Three
The Role of the Military

6. The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Today, the widespread occurrence of violence, persistent threats that more conflicts will break out, and the capacity of established states to help prevent such violence lead to three important conclusions regarding the use of force or threats of force in the post-Cold War period.¹ The first conclusion is that the post-Cold War environment has proven that peace will not keep itself.² Responsible members of the international community must understand the implications of this conclusion for their role in international affairs. Preventing deadly conflicts will require sustained and, at times, extensive involvement by multilateral and regional organizations as well as by individual nations. Second, force and threats of force cannot be regarded exclusively as a last resort. They must be part of an integrated strategy of conflict prevention and used in conjunction with political and economic instruments. The use of force and threats of force are not only viable options, they are intricately linked to the success ofefforts to prevent deadly conflict. The third major conclusion is that states-particularly the United States-must accept the military implications of their leadership roles. Rather than becoming less relevant to international relations, the use of force retains its central importance as states adjust to the dynamics of the post-Cold War era. These three conclusions have important implications for informing national and international leaders' considerations of how to deal with the problem of preventing deadly conflicts.

PEACE WILL NOT KEEP ITSELF

The Sources of Conflict

The end of the Cold War has had important consequences for the incidence and nature of deadly conflict. To be sure, the Cold War period was not the era of peace and tranquillity that some observers now seem to remember. Interstate and intrastate conflicts were a common feature of the supposedly "stable" bipolar world. There were, by some estimates, 125 wars leading to 40 million deaths in the years following World War II and before Operation Desert Storm. Most of these wars were in the developing world. They were not the result of ideological differences between East and West. They were the result of the age-old causes of war-boundary disputes, economic conflicts, and ethnic tensions. Any listing of the ethnic conflicts that took place during the Cold War will quickly belie the notion that such conflicts erupted only in the post-Cold War era.

While deadly conflicts certainly were a prominent feature of the Cold War world, the end of the superpower competition and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have had a significant impact on the possibilities for both interstate and intrastate wars. Despite the reality of conflict and the potential for nuclear confrontation, the Cold War was not without its stabilizing aspects. For example, it is unlikely that during the Cold War Iraq would have been left free by the Soviet Union, its patron and principal source of arms, to invade Kuwait, an oil-producing country in a region known to be a vital interest of the United States and the West. The diffusion of political authority increases rather than decreases the potential for international challenge and conflict.³

In regional competition, the superpowers did not want to see any of their client states collapse, since such collapse could lead to regional political losses. Thus, regimes in states such as Somalia, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, which otherwise would have had difficulty maintaining social order and legitimacy, were propped up by financial aid, arms transfers, and diplomatic support. The cessation of much of this support has left some states incapable of maintaining a functioning domestic order. Their inability to ensure the safety of the citizenry and to provide economic subsistence can produce anarchy, lawlessness, and warlordism, factors that often result in massive violations of human rights, armed conflict between rival factions, and large flows of refugees into neighboring countries.

The end of the Cold War also has facilitated the breakupof multinational political units such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has raised the potential for the emergence of violent centrifugal forces in places such as India, Iraq, Pakistan, and Ukraine. Two of the immediate consequences of the centrifugal forces in multinational states are the increasing incidence of mass communal violence (such as in Bosnia) and conflict over minority ethnic conclaves left behind in the territory of another ethnic group (such as in Nagorno-Karabakh). The erosion of empires and multinational states has moved ethnic concerns to the forefront of political discourse. "Nationalist" movements are defined more by ethnicity or religion, rather than by political ideology or territory. Afghanistan, it appears, is not inhabited by Afghans, but by Pathans, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baluchis, and Turkomans, none of whom wishes to be ruled by the other.⁴

Indeed, the process of "political fission" may well be the most striking tendency in world politics in the years ahead. The principle that no people should be ruled by another can, if taken to extremes, create antagonisms that will make ethnic or religious violence an all-too-common feature of international life. There are, according to more conservative estimates, at least 3,500 distinct and identifiable groups around the world that could be called "nationalities." The Republic of Kazakstan alone is inhabited by 102 nationalities. Can it become 102 countries? Who shall determine which group is deserving of its own territory and which is not? The central question in the politics of the twenty-first century everywhere in the world likely will be the tension between holding together and pulling apart: between the centripetal pull of a modern global economy that requires regional and worldwide organization, and the centrifugal push of atavistic tribalisms.⁵

Exacerbating the problem of sustaining multinational political associations are two major demographic trends: population increases and urbanization. Dramatic population increases are taking place in the developing world. From 1985 to 1990, the world added 88 million people per year to its population; the overwhelming majority of this increase occurred in the developing world. For example, from 1985 to 1990, Europe's population grew at the rate of 0.2 percent per year while Africa's grew at 3.0 percent per year.⁶

Population forecasts reinforce the notion that population growth will continue to be concentrated in the developing world. Egypt's population grows by one million every nine months, and is forecast to reach about 94 million people by 2025. Roughly one-third of the population lives in poverty, up from 20*-25 percent in 1990.⁷ Indonesia adds three million people to its population every year, and the country is projected to have 260 million inhabitants by 2025. Brazil's already large population of 155 million today will approach 245 million by the middle of the next century.⁸ Pakistan, with 123 million people in 1990, will have 276 million by 2025, and India's population, 853 million in 1990, is projected to grow to 1.45 billion by 2025.⁹ These burgeoning populations will, of course, put enormous pressure on political, economic, and ecological systems.

The populations of most states in the developing worldare relatively young. In Kenya, for example, about half the population is under 15, while less than 3 percent is over 65.¹⁰ In Pakistan, 46 percent of the population is under 15; in India, the figure is 35 percent.¹¹ Therefore, tens of millions of young people enter the job market every year. Inadequate economic opportunities for them will further strain the fabric of societies already under siege from a host of forces that contribute to political fragmentation.

A related concern is the rapid trend toward urbanization, particularly in the developing world. At the turn of the century, roughly 5 percent of the world's people lived in cities with populations over 100,000. Today, an estimated 45 percent live in urban centers. In recent years the most explosive growth has been in the developing world. Between 1950 and 1995 the number of cities in the developed world with populations greater than one million more than doubled, from 49 to 112. In the same period, million-plus cities in the developing world increased sixfold, from 34 to 213.¹² In 1985, 32 percent of the people in the developing world lived in cities; by 2000 this number will have risen to 40 percent, and by 2025 estimates are that nearly 60 percent of the people in the developing world will reside in urban areas.¹³

Of course, dense concentrations of predominantly young, relatively unskilled workers put enormous pressures on social and political structures. Poverty, unemployment, disease, crime, and pollution have plagued urban centers for centuries. The explosive growth of urban populations in the developing world increases the likelihood of social upheavals that could threaten governments, cause widespread disorder, and ultimately result in more failed states with which the international community will have to contend.

Finally, some argue that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons, as well as the ballistic missiles with which to deliver them-also increases the likelihood of deadly conflicts. Nations or groups that possess such weapons may be tempted to use them. Those who do not have them may well perceive a need to acquire them, particularly if they feel vulnerable to attack by those who do possess them. Alternatively, nations without weapons of mass destruction may be tempted to launch preventive or preemptive attacks against a potential adversary's unconventional weapons capabilities before they can be fully deployed or employed. Certainly the widespread availability of such weapons threatens to raise the cost of any conflict that does erupt. On the other hand, it is important to remember that modern weaponry is not necessary for the wholesale slaughter of huge numbers of people. More than half a million people perished in Rwanda in the 1994 tribal war, where the most common instrument of death was nothing more sophisticated than a machete.

The Incidence of Conflict

Today, violent conflict afflicts more than one-quarter of the world's states and touches every region of the globe. The specter in 1996 of more than 40 conflicts of every type simultaneously under way connotes a problem of global proportions. The post-Cold War period is replete with examples of conflicts caused byaggression, ethnic and religious violence, the collapse or absence of functioning governments, territorial disputes, and mass migrations. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 demonstrated that aggression can still produce a "traditional" interstate war. However, the extensive list of armed conflicts that have taken place since the end of the Gulf War reflects the pervasiveness of intrastate conflict. By one count, there are 32 significant ethnic conflicts ongoing today.¹⁴ While many argue correctly that these conflicts have deep historical roots, it is important to recognize that modern events have molded them into something other than solely "primordial hatreds."

Today's intrastate violence is a product of complex historical processes shaped by contemporary events. Violence touches every continent. The former Soviet states, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central and South America all are home to intrastate conflicts. In Africa and elsewhere, boundaries imposed by colonial rulers cut across tribal and ethnic lines. Corrupt leaders manipulate ethnic tensions and the volatile dissatisfactions that result from slow or uneven economic development. In some cases, such as Liberia and Somalia, warlords vie for power and wealth, with little or no attention devoted to the development of a functioning and recognizable civil society. In 1992 more than 20 million refugees were fleeing communal violence worldwide. Included in that figure was 3 percent of the entire population of sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁵ By 1995, at least 71 countries were creating or hosting large numbers of displaced persons. In Liberia alone, the civil war that began in 1989 has left 150,000 Liberians dead and 1.2 million displaced-out of a total population of only 2.5 million.¹⁶

A simple review of the events of the past five years leads to one inescapable conclusion: In the aftermath of the great power competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, deadly conflicts of every description are an all-too-common feature of international life. Death tolls are staggering: 500,000-1,000,000 in Rwanda, 100,000 in Burundi, 250,000 in Bosnia; 50,000-150,000 in Iraq, 100,000-300,000 in Angola, just to mention a few.¹⁷

The Case for Involvement

Why should states outside the region of conflict or multinational organizations become involved in preventing the outbreak or escalation of these violent, predominantly internal, conflicts? After all, persistent or massively violent conflicts often trace their origins to deeply rooted antagonisms that are obscure to outsiders. Although every conflict is unique, several alarming characteristics warrant our concern. The Rwandas, Burundis, Somalias, and Bosnias all are characterized by massive loss of life and brutal violence. The number of people killed, left homeless, or forced to migrate threatens local as well as regional stability. Surely conflicts with such enormous consequences invite action, perhaps even forceful action, to preclude them if possible or contain them if not.

It is important to recognize that prevention is notsynonymous with simply maintaining or restoring the status quo. There may well be occasions where the use of force or threats of force are required to facilitate necessary or desirable changes in highly unstable situations. For example, force might be appropriate where mass violence is a distinct possibility and where new power-sharing arrangements could reduce the tensions that contribute to such a possibility.

Intervention will not take place in a vacuum. Many of the countries where violence is occurring or might occur have experienced repression at the hands of outside powers and may well resent any form of imposed settlement. Discounting or ignoring the history, values, and culture of the local population will be a recipe for disaster. The internal will to create or maintain peace is essential. It is for the people in conflict to commit ultimately to peaceful solutions to their disagreements.

Why should states outside the region of conflict become engaged in these internal, potentially violent, situations? As President Clinton indicated in his speech to the American public explaining the commitment of U.S. troops to the enforcement of the Bosnian peace accords, there are three distinct reasons for a nation such as the United States to become involved in efforts to prevent the outbreak or resumption of deadly conflict. These are threats to an important national interest; the moral or humanitarian imperative; and the responsibilities of leadership.

Traditional conceptions of the national interest would seem to preclude involvement in conflicts in strategically remote parts of the planet. Violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, pose little or no threat to important American or European economic or political interests. Certainly the safety, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the developed countries are not threatened by such conflicts.

This narrow view of the concept of national interest seems not only anachronistic, but strategically myopic. The changing nature of the threats posed by these conflicts makes it impossible to ignore occurrences in countries once considered peripheral. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, the sale of fissionable material, the spread of modern and increasingly destructive military weapons, genocide, terrorism, and exportable activities such as ideological or religious extremism can endanger regions as well as individual countries. The proliferation of modern, relatively inexpensive military weapons means that potential adversaries do not need a substantial industrial base in order to acquire or support forces capable of inflicting much more destruction than the level of domestic economic development would suggest.

The varied and complex causes of conflict also may make them more likely to spread. Neatly drawn depictions of regions or countries of national interest can be overwhelmed by the spread of conflict from the "periphery." If the United States had no important national interests in Bosnia per se, it certainly had an abiding interest in stability in Europe. The goal of keeping thewar from spreading to surrounding areas was a primary concern for U.S. policymakers, and even led to the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Macedonia to demonstrate U.S. resolve to contain the conflict, at least geographically. The Bosnian conflict is but one example of the threat a war can pose for surrounding countries. Violence in Rwanda inevitably hauled Zaire into the conflict. Likewise, Liberia's civil war has become a real challenge for Sierra Leone.

Taken together, the destructive military potential of even minor powers and the likelihood that many forms of conflict will overwhelm established or disputed political boundaries make the traditional conception of the national interest unusable as a means of substantively assessing the dangers posed by conflicts in seemingly remote corners of the earth. Of course, acceptance of a broader view of what constitutes the national interest does not lead automatically to military involvement in every conflict. Other instruments of statecraft are available to support efforts to prevent the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict. Diplomatic and economic leverage can convey intent and influence the course of events. Embargoes and boycotts can have a significant effect on the economic and political health of the target nation or group. Regional and multinational organizations can contribute to efforts to preclude conflict.

The key, however, is not simply to declare the issue, however unfortunate from a humanitarian perspective, one of little or no national interest because the security of the republic is not endangered. Intense regional, ethnic, or civil wars now have an immense potential for destruction. The United States and the other peaceful great powers must adopt an approach to the definition of national interests that acknowledges these conditions and accepts their role in the world as it is, not as they might wish it to be.

A broadened sense of the national interest should be framed in terms of widely held notions of justice. How would one give operational effect to such a conception of the national interest? Early efforts to preclude deadly conflict could involve exposing gross injustices or substantial violations of human rights. National intelligence resources could be helpful in shedding light on atrocities in some cases. Specific international mechanisms could be designated to deal with such exposed injustices. The War Crimes Tribunal for actions in the former Yugoslavia provides such an example.

The lethal potential of modern conflict and the instantaneous and global access to information have heightened the impact of the moral dimension of international affairs. Moving images of human suffering lead invariably to calls for action to end the cause of the destruction. The end of the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union has enabled analysts, scholars, and policymakers to focus more on issues of human rights, to the extent that the entire concept of sovereignty as previously understood has come under increasing scrutiny. Of particular concern is the treatment of minorities or ethnic groups within a state. "Inalienable rights" adhere to every human being simply byvirtue of that person's existence; these rights are not dependent on locale or system of government. Thus, when traditional notions of sovereignty cloak oppression and massive violations of human rights, increasingly the legitimacy of outside involvement outweighs the principle of internal primacy.

Advocates for human rights call for a new humanitarian order in which governments are held-by force, if necessary-to higher standards of respect for human life. Many contend that the protection of ethnic, religious, and other minorities endangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile government is now increasingly a recognized obligation of the international community. In the words of former UN Secretary-General Javier Peréz de Cuéllar, "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."¹⁸ Thus, along with the broadening definition of national interest, the concept of sovereignty also requires reassessment. Sovereignty would no longer reside with states, but with the people within them.

The difficulty here, of course, is consistency. Taken to its logical limits, the guiding principle of morality and the primacy of human rights-that is, the international community's obligation to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its people-will be impossible to enforce consistently. To do so would dictate intervention in every civil war. Obviously, potential cases for intervention far outstrip available resources. Intervention will have to be selective, and a moral principle applied unevenly will leave even well-intended international actors open to charges of hypocrisy, cowardice, neglect, or racism. Indeed, those who want to increase substantially the UN peacekeeping effort in Liberia already have compared the level of effort there with that in Bosnia and concluded that the peacekeeping operation is unlikely to be enhanced "because we are Africans, not Europeans. People say `They are Africans. Let them kill each other.'"¹⁹

Despite the pitfalls attending the application of moral principles to international situations, humanitarian concerns are likely to become an ever stronger rationale for action by individual states as well as regional and multinational organizations. The crux of the issue is whether this rationale will be accepted and acted upon by governments and publics. While every instance of significant violations of human rights will not result in the deployment of military forces from outside the country or region in conflict, the accumulation of cases in which force is applied may well give future violators pause. At the very least, the moral imperative makes shielding such violations from international view and censure essentially impossible.

International legal norms provide a framework of support for this moral imperative. There are treaties and conventions that codify legal norms related to human rights and violations thereof-it is not just a moral imperative, it is the law. Morality aside, the international community has some strong prudential reasons to strengthen and enforce the rule of law in the international system. Domestically, states prefer predictable,effective legal regimes because they promote political stability and economic growth and prosperity. Similarly, at the international level enforcement of the rule of law fosters an environment in which political stability and economic growth can flourish. Stability and the rule of law promote the general welfare.

If the root causes of conflict are to be addressed in substantive and extended fashion, it will be essential to create and maintain an environment that protects, or at least strongly encourages respect for, fundamental human rights and provides the circumstances whereby people can pursue their livelihood in a society that provides opportunities for development and growth. Therefore, as increasingly violent conflicts threaten both regional stability and the effective functioning of the global economic system, international actors, particularly the major powers, cannot retreat from the responsibilities of leadership.

To be sure, national political leaders and, indeed, UN and regional organizations as well, will be reluctant to become engaged in risky, seemingly open-ended interventions unless some important national interest is at stake. Effective prevention regimes undoubtedly will have to be based on multinational action legitimated by declarations of support from the United Nations, a relevant regional organization, or an ad hoc coalition of involved and willing partners. Unilateral action remains a possibility, but will be limited, in all likelihood, to instances in which a nation's important interests are threatened or when a special relationship exists between the source of conflict and the intervening power. Over time, the accumulation of instances of successful prevention or intervention may well increase the confidence of national leaders in the ability of multinational forces to conduct such operations at acceptable levels of cost and risk. If practice does not exactly make perfect, experience certainly should facilitate the planning and execution of preventive interventions, particularly by regional organizations and the United Nations.

Participation by an increasing number of nations also will help spread the costs and risks of prevention. "Burden-sharing" all too often means that developed countries provide transportation and logistical capabilities, while others provide the soldiers that are in harm's way on a sustained basis. One of the responsibilities of leadership is sharing the personal risks, not just the financial costs of prevention.

The Road Ahead

The conclusion that peace will not keep itself is buttressed by all too much horrific evidence. The implications of this conclusion are much more contentious. A "business-as-usual" response to the forces at work in the post-Cold War world will produce heartfelt expressions of concern and remorse at the human and societal costs exacted by conflicts of extraordinary ferocity and seemingly unending duration, but little in the way of concerted action untilafter the fact or unless the interests of a major power are threatened. A more engaged response suggests the need for nations, particularly the major powers, to broaden their concept of the national interest, to reconsider the traditional notion of sovereignty, and to endeavor to prevent the outbreak or escalation of instances of mass violence.

Critics of this more engaged approach argue that preventive intervention produces at best only short-term palliatives, while failing to alleviate the deeper causes of the conflict. To be sure, such may well be the case in some instances, and the desire to avoid open-ended commitments to "nation-building" likely will remain a fundamental imperative for national leaders contemplating the potential costs and benefits of intervention. On the other hand, a short-term intervention may well provide the basis for the development and initial implementation of long-term structural solutions. To paraphrase Lenin (who once observed that quantity has a quality all its own), preventing the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict has a quality all its own.

The boundaries between peace, crisis, and war may be blurred, particularly in an ethnic conflict. Such a conflict may experience numerous periods of escalation, de-escalation, and apparent dormancy.²⁰ Inaction resulting from the view that short-term solutions do not redress the historical, cultural, religious, or territorial sources of conflict will be an alluring temptation, but cannot be the accepted norm if the incidence of deadly conflict is to be reduced. Certainly it is all too easy to accept the view that deadly conflict, particularly ethnic or religious conflict in the developing world, is a problem too difficult for the mechanisms of international adjudication to redress.

Dealing directly and effectively with the problem will take effort and leadership. What is quite clear is that military force and, even more so, threats of force that are credible and potent enough to support effectively a diplomatic-political strategy, have a distinctive role to play in the prevention of deadly conflict, whether it be through unilateral action or under the auspices of a multinational coalition or regional organization. What is also clear is that while diplomacy remains the preferred solution in conflict resolution, the use of force must not be considered only as a last resort.

FORCE CANNOT BE EXCLUSIVELY A LAST RESORT

The Lessons of History:
"All-or-Nothing" versus "Limited Objectives"

The premature declarations announcing the dawn of a more peaceful era following the fall of the Berlin Wall have not been borne out by experience. Rather than the end of history, the world is witnessing a return of history in the diversity of the sources of conflict. Since peace will not keep itself in this unpredictable and turbulent period, the use of military force or the threat of force, far from being rendered irrelevant or obsolete, has become a potentially more important instrument of statecraft in the prevention of deadly conflict. Indeed, the second major conclusionthat emerges from this substantive consideration of the role of military force in the prevention of deadly conflict is that force is not, should not, and cannot be considered exclusively as a last resort.

As the preceding discussion argues in detail, the causes and incidence of conflict in the post-Cold War world dictate that states reassess their conception of the national interest, for it is this conception that provides the basis for state action (or inaction). Humanitarian issues or conflicts in regions deemed peripheral, once subordinated to the bipolar competition of the Cold War, can constitute legitimate security risks. Certainly a national security strategy based on the principle of expanding the community of market-based democracies requires recognition of the importance of preventing massive violations of human rights, wherever they occur.

Prevention does not require the indiscriminate broadening of a state's view of its important interests or a commitment to use force in every circumstance. What effective prevention does require is recognition of both the changed nature of national interests and the extent to which military force can be used in a variety of ways to support efforts to prevent deadly conflict. In traditional terms, what is needed now is a more potent linkage between interests, more broadly defined, and the use of military force to protect those interests.

The threat and actual use of force long have been accepted as necessary instruments of influence. However, the perceived lessons learned from actual force employments in the last three decades produce a contemporary view that recognizes both the necessity as well as the risks of resorting to force. Consequently, decision makers are left to determine under what conditions military force can be used effectively to attain different types of national objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk.

In the United States, the loss of the Vietnam War and the 1983 bombing of the military compound in Beirut led to the discrediting of the doctrine of flexible response and the resurgence of what will be styled here the "all-or-nothing" approach to the use of military force. In 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed perhaps the most well-known articulation of this view. Weinberger listed what he called six major tests that should be made in judging whether to employ U.S. military forces. Briefly stated, Weinberger's criteria are (1) commit forces only in the defense of vital national interests; (2) commit forces only with the clear intention of winning; (3) commit forces only if there are clearly de fined political and military objectives; (4) continually reassess the relationship between objectives and forces, and adjust as necessary; (5) commit forces only with the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress; and (6) commit forces only as a last resort (emphasis added).²¹

Other influential policymakers supported Weinberger's lead. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell listed his own six questions that he argued had to be addressed before any decision to intervene was made: Is the political objective important, clearly defined, and understood?Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? (emphasis added) Will military force achieve the objective? What will the cost be? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? Once military force alters the situation, how will it develop further and what will the consequences be?²² General Powell felt strongly that if military force was to be used, it had to be used in overwhelming strength in order to accomplish the mission.

In May 1994 the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 25, its own policy statement on the use of U.S. military forces in multilateral peace operations.²³ In PDD-25, the number of criteria that had to be met or considered had grown to eight in the case of United Nations operations for which the United States would be asked to vote, 14 if the United States was expected to participate in peacekeeping operations, and 17 if the United States was to be asked to participate in combat operations.

In March 1996 Anthony Lake, President Clinton's assistant for national security affairs, described a somewhat different approach to considerations of the use of force. He cited seven justifications for the use of force: To defend against direct attacks on the United States; to counter aggression; to defend key economic interests; to preserve democracy; to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, or drug trafficking; to maintain U.S. reliability as an international partner; and for humanitarian purposes. While the list reflects the more varied missions that military forces could be called upon to accomplish in the post-Cold War environment, Lake's formulation concluded with the observation that force would only be used "once all peaceful means have been tried and failed. . . ."²⁴

While the specifics of each set of criteria vary, the strategic approach they all share is that force should be used only as a last resort, after all the diplomatic and economic instruments of influence have failed. Of course, not everyone shared this view. Secretary of State George Shultz argued that diplomacy and force could not be separated completely. Responding to Secretary Weinberger in 1984, Shultz insisted that power and diplomacy always went together. In Shultz's view, the hard reality was that diplomacy not backed by strength (and the willingness to use it) was ineffectual.²⁵ Furthermore, Shultz felt strongly that force could not be used only as a last resort. As he noted in a speech to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, "If force is the last resort, it is the only resort."²⁶

Others as well argued against the "force as a last resort" and "all-or-nothing" views. In one of his last major speeches as president, George Bush noted that military force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or even a temporary alternative. He also decried the search for a definitive set of rules for decision makers to apply when they are considering the use of force. In Bush's words, "there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment. Each and every case is unique." He also challenged the view that force should only be considered in the event of threats to vital national interests. Indeed, he made the critical point that the relative importance of an interest is not a guide for the appropriateness of the use of force: military force may not be the best way to safeguard a vital interest, while the use of force might be the best way to protect an important, but not vital, interest.²⁷

Events seemingly conspired to give the impression that the all-or-nothing approach indeed was the most appropriate response to the conflicts of the post-Cold War world. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact removed the direct threat to the survival of the United States and its allies. All other threats, almost by definition, did not imperil vital national interests. The overwhelming battlefield success of the coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm seemed to validate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. The small but politically significant number of American military casualties in Somalia led to the rapid withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces, with attendant criticisms of "mission creep" all but abolishing acknowledgment of the successes of the humanitarian operation that had, by all accounts, saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

The conventional wisdom has been to overlearn the lessons of Somalia at the expense of strategic wisdom and real world experience. Military force has been effective throughout the world in the prevention of deadly conflict. The deployment of UN forces to Macedonia may well have played a critical role in preventing the conflict in Bosnia from spreading, thereby avoiding the attendant instabilities the widening of that conflict would have inflicted on neighboring countries. The imminent arrival of U.S. paratroopers focused the minds of the junta leaders in Haiti, leading to the reinstallment of the popularly elected president and subsequently to the first peaceful transfer of power between elected leaders there in 200 years. Military forces in the Sinai and in Cyprus have been deployed for so long that stability in these potentially volatile regions has become the rule rather than the exception. While no one can know for sure, the early application of force by NATO in the initial stages of the Bosnian conflict might have prevented or reduced the carnage of that war. Certainly it would be hard to argue that the results could have been any worse for the citizens of Bosnia.

The point here is not that the evaluative criteria described by Secretary Weinberger, General Powell, President Clinton, and others are inappropriate or inapplicable. Indeed, as the incidence of conflict in recent years has made abundantly clear, states and international organizations must have some reasonable procedures for deciding which of these seemingly endless conflicts warrant the commitment of military forces. Ideally, clearly defined political objectives provide the context for the development of clear military objectives. These circumstances enhance significantly the probability of the successful use of force, either to prevent deadly conflict or to bring it to a rapid conclusion. What is to be avoided is the rote application of a list of prerequisites in those instances where the perceived threat to national interests seems less acute or urgent.

To be sure, military force cannot succeed in preventing every conflict. No nation or international organization has the resources or the will to pursue such a standard. Furthermore, justas the use of force should not be regarded as the last resort in conflict prevention, neither should it become the first resort, a sort of international default setting that obscures the need for sustained diplomatic and economic efforts to deal with the structural causes of conflict. What must be avoided is a general state of paralysis, a condition where major powers and multinational organizations decry the incidence and level of violence while simultaneously assuaging their consciences with declarations about strategic interests and limited resources.

The consequences of inaction have become all too clear in the post-Cold War world: horrific levels of casualties, devastated communities, vast numbers of refugees, disrupted commerce and truncated economic development, discredited international norms of behavior, and national and regional instability.²⁸ Modern weapons give even minor powers enormous destructive capability. Intrastate, ethnic, and religious conflicts portend sustained levels of violence against those once considered "noncombatants." Women and children become symbols of heritage and culture, thereby making them "legitimate" targets for death and destruction. Lengthy conflicts reconfirm old hatreds or justify new ones, making the construction of any sort of civil society all the more difficult, if not impossible. Leaders exploit and inflame ethnic or other differences to serve their own interests and ambitions.

Military force cannot eliminate these conditions, but the prudent use of the military in preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflict can help to avoid or reduce the costs and consequences of deadly conflict. The pursuit of such "limited objectives" should be regarded not as naive idealism on the part of the United States and other major powers, but as an integral aspect of a strategy of enlightened self-interest.

Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy

The use of, or threat to use, military force to prevent the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict necessarily involves the ability to deter or coerce; that is, to persuade an adversary not to follow an unacceptable course of action. (Deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that has not been initiated; coercive diplomacy, or compellence, attempts to reverse actions that already have been undertaken by an adversary.) The requirements for the successful employment of a strategy of deterrence or coercive diplomacy are well known. Three are particularly applicable, since in their absence even a major power can fail to intimidate a weak opponent and find itself engaged in a protracted, costly conflict. First, the deterring or coercing power must create in the opponent's mind a sense of urgency for compliance with its demand. Second, the target nation or group must believe that the coercing power is more determined to achieve its stated demand than the target is to oppose it. Finally, there must be a threat of a military response that is credible enough and potent enough to persuade the adversary not to challenge the deterrer, or to accept the demands made by the side employing coercive diplomacy.²⁹

Elements of Successful Prevention

Credibility, capability, and communication become the sine qua non for successful prevention. A major challenge for deterring powers will be to determine what will dissuade an aggressive state or faction from initiating deadly violence. In order for deterrence or compellence to work, one must understand the aggressor's cost-benefit calculation. If an aggressor perceives that the benefits of a course of action will outweigh the costs, deterrence or coercion will fail. Therefore, the intervening powers will have to identify pivotal assets or interests that will influence the target's cost-benefit calculation and raise the perceived price of aggression to unacceptable levels.

Such calculations are extremely idiosyncratic; they should not be presumed to reflect simple "rational actor" assessments. Threats that effectively influence one target may be entirely irrelevant to the cost-bene fit analysis of another. Therefore, deterrent and compellent strategies must be tailored in specific ways to fit the peculiar circumstances and actors in each situation. Preventive actions must take into account the cultural, political, historical, and even psychological variables that will affect the likelihood of success.³⁰ For example, a leader's perception of an impending humiliating retreat could engender a psychological reaction that makes such an action all but impossible to accept. Coercive actions by former colonial masters may engender strong resistance, while the same action by another, historically unattached, power could prove successful.

The degree to which these variables operate will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain with any degree of precision. However, intervening powers must be aware of their importance and try to account for them during the development of a preventive strategy. At the very least, leaders must understand that there are few "standard operating procedures" that are likely to be valid regardless of the specifics of the individual case.

Credibility is perhaps the most critical aspect of a successful strategy of prevention. No one doubts that the major powers have the military ability to inflict significant levels of damage on the target state or group. Much less certain are views about the willingness of the major powers to use those abilities in a protracted way if deterrence or compellence fails. In order to establish and maintain credibility, intervening powers must be willing to carry out threats or promises, since force and the willingness to use it are the bases of deterrence and compellence. Perceptions of lack of will can dominate an aggressor's risk calculus, even in the face of overwhelming military force. In the case of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi ruler might have been deterred from invading his neighbor or compelled to withdraw from its territory had he been convinced that the United States was not only concerned about the effects of his invasion, but concerned enough to engage in a war in which it might sustain heavy casualties.³¹

It is the target's perception of the intervening power's impotence or lack of resolve that emboldens warlords, dictators, and aggressors. In this regard, the domestic constraints on U.S.leaders seem particularly salient. Despite being acknowledged as the world's foremost military power, the fragmented decision-making apparatus of the U.S. government and the lack of consensus about the role of the United States in the post-Cold War era combine to cast significant doubts about the credibility of U.S. threats to use force in a sustained and potentially costly way. The failure of American will in Vietnam gives substance to such doubts. The vote in the Senate to support Operation Desert Storm prior to the Gulf War was hardly overwhelming, and the extreme ambivalence about the deployment of U.S. troops to Haiti and Bosnia indicates that public support for such endeavors is fragile and uncertain at best. The lessons of the October 3, 1993, fight in Mogadishu in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed have not been lost on those who would test U.S. resolve in the future.

Effective communication of intent and resolve is not so easy as one might surmise in this era of instantaneous global communications. Two problems complicate the matter. First, in almost any preventive situation, there will be multiple audiences involved. The (perhaps idealized) view of two unitary, rational actors involved in a bargaining process is no longer valid, if it ever was. The compelling power must deal with the target nation or group, factions that may exist within the target nation or group, as well as interested allies or adversaries of both sides, regional organizations that may be involved, and the United Nations or other international organizations.

As the number of actors involved has grown, the ability to communicate with them separately has essentially disappeared. Messages tailored for one particular participant cannot be kept privileged for long. Diplomatic positioning is much more difficult when the process is largely transparent. Interested parties can exert influence on the internal decision-making processes of both sides. The composition of different actors and the relationships among all of them make it much more difficult to influence the actions of the "opponent."

Messages intended to communicate resolve to an opponent can affect the willingness of other actors to compromise. In Bosnia, for example, actions that were designed to signal NATO resolve to the Serbs seemed to have encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to adopt a harder line, anticipating that they could hold out for a better deal in any subsequent agreement that might be reached. The inherent characteristics of intrastate conflicts ensure that the difficulties engendered by multiple audiences and simultaneous communications will affect the development of a credible deterrent or compellent strategy.

The magnitude of the demands made on the target nation or group obviously will influence the probability of success of a deterrent or compellent action. The more one asks of an adversary, the less likely a favorable outcome. Opposition engenders even more potent threats, as leaders harden their positions in the face of external demands. For the intervening power, credibility becomes an end in itself. Leaders of the target nation or group perceive the legitimacy of their rule to be at stake.

Intrastate conflicts are particularly susceptible to this action-reaction cycle. In ethnic or civil wars, the stronglypreferred outcome for both sides is the elimination of the opposition. Coercive or deterrent action to prevent deadly conflict will be difficult to develop and implement. However, responsible leaders should not throw up their hands in despair, unwilling or unable to make threats of force that are sufficiently credible and potent. While preventive action may not be able to preclude conflict entirely, military force can be used to establish clear limits on intolerable behavior.

The Bosnian example again seems relevant here. No deterrent or compellent action short of occupation may have been sufficient to prevent civil war in the former Yugoslavia. However, during the course of the conflict, when the United Nations or NATO made specific, limited demands on the Serbs and demonstrated their willingness to enforce those demands with military action, the Serbs generally adhered to the limits that were drawn. Examples of these limited objectives include the opening of the Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the establishment of no-fly zones.³² Similar restrictions have been imposed elsewhere, such as the no-fly zones in Iraq.

The major point here is not that the international community should be satisfied with the establishment of limits that prevent the most egregious of excesses. Rather, it is to describe the dynamics at work in any situation involving threats to use force and to demonstrate the strong connection between the nature of demands and the probability of success of preventive action. The experiences of the post-Cold War era demonstrate vividly the need for the international community to improve its ability to engage in timely preventive action. Toward that fundamental end, the use of force cannot be exclusively a last resort.

Successful prevention will require the implementation of what some call the "glass of water" strategy.³³ The analogy is that of using a glass of water to extinguish a spark before it becomes a raging inferno requiring much more substantial effort to put out. The timely use of force or threat to use force may preclude the need for much costlier efforts later.

However conceptually appealing this approach may be, in reality nations will continue to be reluctant to intervene if the commitment seems ill-defined or open-ended, which most incipient conflicts are likely to be. An implication of the all-or-nothing approach to the use of force is the requirement for clearly defined military objectives. Certainly such clarity of purpose shapes the size and nature of the employment. Yet there are few situations involving deadly conflict in which one can with confidence clearly delineate what will happen during the course of events. Things change; the introduction of military force into a situation changes the very nature of that situation. How can decision makers square this circle of the need for timely and credible action while at the same time having some specific idea of what the action is intended to accomplish?

The notion of a "rolling assessment" provides one such solution. A decision to intervene will be made based on an assessment of thesituation at the time. A level of force appropriate to the task at the outset may become less credible as conditions change. Therefore, leaders need to make continual assessments of the operation and of its political environment and make strategic and operational adjustments as required. If the situation on the ground changes, then both political and military leaders must reexamine their objectives and the prospective costs of the operation. The course of a conflict can be erratic and unpredictable; the situation may reach a point where intervention is no longer warranted or where it requires a level of commitment in order to be credible that the intervening power(s) neither wants nor can fulfill.

This rolling assessment performs two critical functions. First, it projects to the public the fact that leaders have clear political objectives and that the intervention has a focused purpose and role. If the path to the achievement of those objectives becomes too costly or ambiguous, leaders will recognize the need to extricate the nation from the commitment. Second, the rolling assessment enables leaders to use the most effective combination of military, diplomatic, and economic tools for the particular situation. A change in the nature of the conflict, therefore, may warrant a modification in the nature and extent of the response.

To be sure, leaders certainly monitor the progress of any intervention involving their forces. One advantage of codifying the notion of rolling assessment is that it facilitates the use of military force early in a crisis, thereby enhancing the probability of preventing a deadly conflict, while at the same time assuaging public concerns about the costs and risks of intervening. A second advantage is that a rolling assessment commits political and military leaders to continuous evaluations of the situation, accepts a priori the possibility that changes or unforeseen consequences could result in significant changes in policy, and, it is hoped, reduces the trauma of terminating an intervention in the face of unacceptable costs.

What would be the effect on domestic and international credibility if such a rolling assessment were to lead to withdrawal from a particular conflict? Surely there would be domestic political costs: casualties incurred, resources expended, expectations dashed, political capital consumed. Would credibility suffer, making future interventions more difficult? An environment in which force is accepted as a useful instrument in preventing deadly conflict but in which unacceptable costs are not borne in the name of credibility would seem to foster, over time, the view that prevention is an important goal of the international community and that timely intervention is the key to successful prevention. Not every attempt at prevention will succeed, but rolling assessment will enhance both public support and credibility by helping to avoid the catastrophic intervention that makes subsequent attempts politically impossible.

Building the political will to broaden the concept of the nationalinterest and to consider the use of force as something other than the last resort is a mammoth political challenge, but one that is necessary for the successful prevention of deadly conflict. Both civilian and military leaders must be cognizant of the costs associated with the use of force and with the potential constraints on its employment. Military officials must accept the fact that crisis management remains the responsibility of political leaders. Political leadership provides legitimacy and credibility to ongoing missions while setting the stage for potential future actions.

The requirement for an ever-closer relationship between force and diplomacy engenders a parallel requirement for ever-closer communications between political and military leaders, with mutual appreciation for the pressures on both groups that inevitably arise. Without close communication and such mutual appreciation between political and military leaders, the potential for misunderstanding will be great, with subsequently deleterious effects on the efficacy of the intervention.

However straightforward this conclusion may seem, in practice it contradicts the conventional wisdom about leaving the conduct of military operations to the military professionals. Military leaders will have to accommodate the involvement of political leaders in what have been presumed in the past to be operational issues. Political leaders will have to avoid the temptation to micromanage ongoing operations. More important, national leaders will have to avoid overreacting to tactical setbacks, thereby possibly conferring strategic consequences to essentially tactical events. The U.S. response to the battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which 18 American soldiers were killed illustrates the effect that individual events can have on national policy.

The argument here is that prevention is not simply deterrence or compellence incognito. To be sure, both are subsumed in the concept of prevention, but prevention must entail the construction of a broader system, one which develops both the short- and long-term policies needed to prevent violence and to assist states in the development of more effective instruments of governance. Blandishments as well as inducements will need to be part of a successful system of prevention. Links between responsible nonviolent behavior and the promise of reward through fuller integration into the international economic and political systems provide the "carrot." The timely use of military force to prevent the outbreak or escalation of violence and punish those whose behavior violates accepted norms of behavior supplies the "stick."

The use of force and threats of force, then, must be an integral aspect of the system of prevention. More specifically, their use should not be held in abeyance until all other options have been exhausted. Force and threats of force should be considered with, not after, diplomatic and economic measures. Equally important, sanctions and other instruments of influence should not be considered in a vacuum; force or the threat of force should be considered as a viable supplement to other instruments. The belief that force exists only as the last rung on a ladder of potential responses deprives nations and multilateral organizationsof flexibility and influence. Reinforcing diplomatic and economic instruments with "teeth" will lend credibility to deterrent proclamations and weight to the implementation of coercive measures.

The Menu of Military Options

The term "use of military force" conjures up images of legions of tanks, fighting vehicles, helicopters, and high-performance aircraft engaged in massive struggles that produce significant damage and numbers of casualties. In fact, military forces can be used in numerous ways and combinations to help prevent, contain, or resolve a conflict. Indeed, many of the imaginative ways in which military forces can be used require only relatively few forces engaging in essentially nonviolent activities. The following discussion is only suggestive, not definitive, in its description of the roles that military forces can play in a system of prevention. The following are some examples of how military forces can be used:

• Military assets can be used to provide independent and reliable intelligence and other information about an incipient or ongoing crisis through technical surveillance means of various kinds, military observers, or military advisors assigned to one or both sides. Such means could be used to acquire data on levels and sophistication of armaments, state of training of military units, unusual or massive movements of troops and equipment, etc.

• Military-to-military contacts have become a major post-Cold War mission for the armies of developed countries. Such contacts are intended not only to assess and improve the state of training of the host-country forces, but to demonstrate the proper role of a military establishment in a democracy and the appropriate relationship between political and military leaders. The professional education of military elites and future leaders may reduce the propensity of military establishments in developing countries to seize and maintain control of the government.

• The preventive deployment of small "tripwire forces" can contain a conflict or prevent its escalation or spread. Such deployments can be at borders around a conflict area, internally between conflicting groups, at critical communications or economic centers, etc. The United Nations deployment to Macedonia is a good example of a preventive deployment. Such demonstrations of commitment must be accompanied by strong political signals. Preventive deployments must be accompanied by political and diplomatic efforts to solve the potential threat to peace that inspired the deployment. A combination of strong political signals, the demonstration of resolve through deployments on the ground, and continuous efforts to resolve the underlying problems are key to the success of preventive deployments.

• The commitment of deployed forces to demonstrate resolve was a common feature of the Cold War era. The Berlin Garrison demonstrated both allied resolve and the grave consequences that aggression would entail. NATO armies defended the inner-German border for four decades. The UN forces in Korea continue to separate hostile armies 43 years after the armistice. There is no reason to believe that in the post-Cold War era substantial numbers of forces could not be deployed for considerable periods of time to prevent the outbreak of war between hostile neighbors, particularly if those neighbors were armed with weapons of mass destruction.

• Military forces have been used extensively in traditional peacekeeping roles as "intervening" forces to ensure the effective implementation of a cease-fire agreement or peace treaty. U.S. forces have been stationed in the Sinai since the Camp David Accords of 1979. Peacekeeping forces in Cyprus have been on duty even longer. The dramatic increase in the number of UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in the last five years indicates both the need for and the legitimacy of the use of military forces for such missions in the post-Cold War era. Developing nations can make significant contributions to peacekeeping operations.

• Humanitarian interventions can prevent or arrest mass starvation, relieve the suffering following natural disasters, or aid refugees fleeing from deadly conflict. The ultimate fate of the UN mission to Somalia notwithstanding, the humanitarian aspect of the operation must be judged a legitimate and effective use of military force. Relief efforts in Rwanda did not prevent the tragedy there, but they did bring some level of relief to the survivors.

• Military force can be used to impose, control, and enforce economic embargoes. The sanctions imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait are still largely in place, enforced by military forces, five years after the end of the war. Sanctions imposed on Serbia during the fighting in Bosnia were enforced by both ground and naval units.

• Military forces can be employed to stop-or at least reduce-atrocities during a conflict. Techniques can range from observation and reliable reporting-thereby identifying the culprit-to the use of military forces to stop such acts through the demonstration and use of force. Punitive air strikes or extensive blockades can raise significantly the cost of aggression or the massive violation of human rights.

• Military forces can be deployed to protect key installations such as communications sites, population or refugee centers, dams and hydroelectric stations, etc. Military forces also can assist in keeping communications and logistics supply lines open in order to provide food and other supplies to the civilian population living in the conflict area. Such missions could include using military forces to protect convoys, restore or rebuild bridges, telecommunications centers, energy and water supplysystems, and other critical infrastructure assets.

• At the higher end of the scale, military forces can be used for what are styled peace enforcement operations. In the absence of a peace agreement between the warring parties, intervening forces can be used to enforce a cease-fire or separate the belligerents. Military forces also can be used to remove illegitimate governments that have seized power from duly constituted authority, as the United States did in Haiti.

• Finally, military forces can be used to stop or overturn the results of aggression. Timely intervention may prevent the outbreak of full-scale war or deter aggression. The rapid return of U.S. forces to Kuwait in December 1994 demonstrated both resolve and capability. Of course, the coalition of forces that defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf War is a textbook example of the use of force to reverse the results of aggression.

This menu of the potential uses of military force should not obscure the fact that although military force is often a necessary component of an effective system of prevention, it is seldom a sufficient one. The role of military force is to provide political leaders with as many options as possible in their efforts to prevent deadly conflict. Effective prevention will always be a complex and challenging task, one requiring strong and resourceful leaders who can build the necessary political support at home and, if need be, also create the requisite international agreement and support for the use of military force.

The Capabilities-Interest Gap

If one accepts the proposition that force and threats of force are not a last resort, then the challenge becomes one of recognizing when and how to use them. All conflicts are not "created equal." Each should be examined individually to determine its significance, its level of threat to national or international interests, and the likelihood of success if force were used. Since the paths that these conflicts can follow are in many cases impossible to predict with precision as to specific detail or with confidence as to final outcome, they can develop into overwhelming, seemingly intractable problems. Therefore, the sooner the response to the violence, the greater the likelihood that its emergence or escalation can be curbed. In Rwanda, intervention may well have prevented enormous loss of life, just as the intervention in Somalia, for all its ultimate problems, saved thousands of innocent people from starvation.

In cases such as Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia, UN forces prevented the escalation of violence by monitoring elections, troop withdrawals, and cease-fire lines. The fact that "force" was on the ground during periods of significant tension and transition indicates that it is a critical element in the successful prevention of violence. The conclusion here is as simple as it is compelling: Force and threats of force work. Not always completely, and not without cost. But the available evidencesuggests strongly that the early use of force or threats of force by individual nations or multilateral organizations can prevent the emergence or escalation of deadly conflict.

Whatever the potential benefits of the early application of force, the fact remains that for the foreseeable future nations will be reluctant to commit their forces in preventive situations unless important national interests are threatened. In some cases, such as the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that traditional approach is satisfactory. In others, such as the tribal violence in Rwanda, it clearly is not. The capabilities for successful prevention exist, but the absence of a compelling interest reduces the likelihood of timely engagement.

One solution proposed for the resolution of this "capabilities-interest gap" is the creation of a standing military force under the auspices of the United Nations. (My purpose here is not to evaluate the operational advantages and difficulties associated with the various proposals, but only to describe the alternative approaches.) In light of the reluctance of nations to commit their forces to intrastate conflicts in regions of less than vital interest, assembling an effective military response to a crisis usually requires a significant amount of time, if it can be done at all. A standing UN rapid-reaction force could alleviate this problem and be employed in concert with, not in place of, other instruments of influence. The glass-of-water strategy is relevant here: a trained force arriving at the scene of potential violence as soon as the enabling resolution has been passed by the Security Council likely will be more effective than a larger national or multinational force arriving later. An immediate response force would be unimpeded by national political considerations, would enhance the credibility of the United Nations, and would, hopefully, lower the ultimate cost of the intervention. Since the Security Council would have to authorize the deployment of the rapid-reaction force, member states would retain a say in its use. The rapid-reaction force would not replace traditional peacekeepers; it would be trained to carry out normal military functions and operations as well as to handle unanticipated events.³⁴

An alternative to the creation of a standing UN force is the development of a standing force composed of national elements that remain in their respective countries but are "dedicated" to UN-sanctioned rapid-reaction missions. The division of labor would be worked out in advance. For example, nations such as the United States could commit strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, while others contributed troops, supplies, communications equipment, engineers, and so on. Just such an arrangement has been implemented for potential action in Burundi. For such an arrangement to be effective over time, nations would "dedicate" their contributions for specific periods of time, rather than waiting for an incipient crisis before responding.

A variation of the "dedicated forces" concept entails the creation of a standing operational-level headquarters in the United Nations that would be responsible for the planning and advance preparations that are critical for a rapid-reaction force to work. The headquarters could establish, maintain, and operate anearly-warning system designed to identify areas of likely or imminent conflict. The headquarters also would conduct contingency planning as well as maintain liaison with regional organizations and agencies. It would develop the training objectives for the component forces dedicated to the United Nations, and deploy with those forces when they are authorized to do so by the Security Council.

Whatever one's view on the desirability of a UN standing rapid-reaction force or one composed of dedicated national elements, it is increasingly clear that the international community needs to reappraise the Cold War mindset regarding when to use force. For preventive action to succeed, potential aggressors must believe that the international community has the capabilities and the will to punish aggression. Force is relevant in prevention to deter or coerce aggressors, to lend credibility to threats, and to complement other diplomatic and economic instruments. This closer connection between force and diplomacy warrants a more intimate relationship between political and military leaders to lessen the potential for misperception, miscommunication, and misunderstanding. Military force is available in a variety of forms to accomplish a variety of tasks. The early use of the military may prevent the outbreak of violence and establish the conditions for the development of long-term political and economic solutions. To be sure, not every conflict can be prevented. But many, particularly intrastate conflicts, can be prevented or limited in duration and scope. Peace will not keep itself in the post-Cold War world, but the timely use of military force can reduce the incidence and destructiveness of deadly conflict.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF LEADERSHIP

The experiences of the post-Cold War period provide the basis for some useful judgments on the use of the military for prevention and some unavoidable implications for both nations and international organizations. The incidence and cost of deadly conflict in the very few years since the end of the Cold War have contributed to the increasingly firm conviction that the international community is better served by using force or threats of force early to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflict. The economic imperatives of the glass-of-water strategy have become more and more appreciated: Clearly it is the developed nations of the West that have paid or will pay to restore areas devastated by deadly conflict. Prevention is clearly less expensive than restoration. As a direct consequence of this conviction on the early use of force, the role of the United Nations in conflict prevention has increased significantly.

The data on the expanded number and scope of UN operations are well known. From 1948 to 1988 the United Nations conducted 13 peacekeeping operations, which typically consisted of deploying observers or peacekeeping troops to enforce an already agreed-upon cease-fire. Since 1988, the United Nations has conducted 22 peace operations that have pursued a wide range of new and challenging missions, including preventive diplomacy, the establishment of safe havens, protection of refugees,re-establishment of governments, and supervision of elections. The United Nations has deployed more than 70,000 military personnel to locations throughout the world, with 16 operations ongoing presently. What the UN involvement in nearly every military operation in the last six years reflects is the extent to which the United Nations provides legitimacy, as well as institutional oversight in some cases, for the use of military force in the post-Cold War world.

The post-Cold War era has seen an evolution in the political framework within which force is employed. This new perspective is reflected particularly in changing views toward UN authorization for use-of-force operations under both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN charter. The number and diversity of UN operations, as well as the complexity of the tasks they have been employed to accomplish, have focused renewed attention on the legal and practical bases, distinctions, and limitations of these endeavors. During the past six years, the international community has conducted or sanctioned three rather different types of missions: Traditional peacekeeping operations conducted under the provisions of Chapter VI; peace enforcement operations in accordance with Chapter VII; and missions that fall outside the definitions of either Chapter VI or VII, dubbed Chapter VI 1/2.

Conceptually, Chapter VI missions are relatively straightforward. They require consent by the warring parties to the presence of peacekeeping forces to maintain a cease-fire or other agreement. The presence of peacekeeping forces allows political negotiations to proceed in a more stable atmosphere. Peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and are neither required nor prepared to impose solutions on the combatants. During the Cold War, the majority of peacekeeping missions were postconflict operations intended to separate the belligerents and prevent the reignition of conflict. Donor state reluctance to introduce forces to hostile circumstances, and recognition by states in crisis of the need for outside help, suggest that classical Chapter VI peacekeeping might be more effective as a preconflict measure-while there is still peace to keep-rather than a postconflict response.

Nonetheless, the evidence of the past eight years clearly indicates that the United Nations is competent to execute Chapter VI missions where there is consent by the warring parties for UN involvement. The presence of UN troops or observers before a crisis escalates can help prevent tensions from escalating into conflict or from spilling over from neighboring states. Traditional peacekeeping operations should remain multilateral efforts that are impartial and provide a suitable atmosphere for substantive political negotiations or for the implementation of the provisions of a peace treaty or cease-fire agreement. Although it is not a UN operation, the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai is an example of a mission that helped to maintain the peace in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. UN forces in Macedonia undoubtedly helped keep the conflict in Bosnia from spreading.

Of course, the conceptual and legal clarity of Chapter VI operations do not guarantee their success. The difficulties and dangers encountered by peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Bosnia resulted in more than 200 deaths among the peacekeepers. The "consent" of the belligerents dissipated in both instances, putting the peacekeepers in untenable positions. Repeated instances of such occurrences may well lead countries that have traditionally supplied troops for peacekeeping missions to reassess their policies and adopt a more guarded approach to contributing their forces, particularly where the peace is perceived to be fragile.

For all of the operational effectiveness of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions, the dramatic increase in their number has engendered enormous financial costs that the United Nations is ill-equipped to bear. In the early 1980s, the budget for peace operations was just over $400 million. By the late 1980s, costs had doubled to about $820 million. By 1994 the costs had grown to $3.6 billion. Concern about overstaffing and inefficient use of resources in nonmilitary aspects of UN operations has led some nations, notably the United States, to question their annual assessment from the United Nations and, in some instances, to refuse to pay the entire³⁵ assessment. U.S. arrears to the UN total about $700 million. Some accommodation between major donor nations and the United Nations will have to be made if the UN is to be able to fund the level of peace operations that has become "normal" in the post-Cold War period.

Chapter VII missions are also conceptually and operationally straightforward, although they are more difficult to execute than traditional peacekeeping missions. Resolutions authorizing the use of force under the provisions of Chapter VII are, in essence, declarations of war. Chapter VII operations are undertaken to reverse the results of aggression, to enforce peace between warring parties without their approval, or to respond when an important national security interest has been threatened.

During the Cold War, states justified their use of force on the basis of perceived threats to national security. The imprimatur of the United Nations was not, with some notable exceptions, used to legitimize the use of force. In the post-Cold War world, a UN resolution "authorizing" the use of force clearly has become more important. Furthermore, the UN provides the multilateral framework within which regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions can pursue their interests, by force if necessary. The Persian Gulf War is the most dramatic example of this approach. More recently, the United Nations authorized the United States to organize a multinational task force to intervene in Haiti.

The end of the East-West rivalry and the increased incidence of intrastate conflicts that produce very high levels of violence have led to a reevaluation of the traditional concept of state sovereignty. As noted above, the international community increasingly has come to accept the notion that international law does indeed permit intervention in a state to save citizens from their own rulers. In his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggested that the United Nations might be compelled to intervene in the domestic affairs of nations in certain circumstances, such as a breakdown of civil authority,gross violations of human rights, or when internal events threaten international peace or stability.³⁶

As a result of the intensification of intrastate conflicts and the reassessment of what falls within a state's "domestic jurisdiction," the United Nations has become involved in more complex operations that do not fall neatly into the categories of Chapter VI or Chapter VII missions. These "gray zone" or Chapter VI 1/2 operations refer to those where consent by all warring parties is ambiguous or absent and where more robust peace enforcement may be required. For example, Saddam Hussein's repression of the Kurd and Shiite citizens of Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War led to the establishment and enforcement of secure zones in northern and southern Iraq where Iraqi troops and aircraft are forbidden to enter.

In light of the nationalist and ethnic tensions most likely to lead to the eruption of deadly conflict in the years ahead, the need for these conceptually messy and operationally difficult Chapter VI 1/2 operations almost certainly will be more prevalent in the future. There are differing views on the nature and extent of the challenges posed by Chapter VI 1 /2 operations. To be sure, difficulties will arise when consent is not forthcoming from all parties involved. Intervening troops could be forced into a position of "peacekeeping with no peace to keep." Correctly assessing the nature of the challenge will be crucial if any mission is to have a reasonable chance of success. Since the size, armament, rules of engagement, and behavior of peacekeeping forces are very different from those intended to enforce peace, those operations that fall between the two clearly delineated functions will be the most vexing. Nonetheless, they will be an important aspect of any preventive system, and there may well be less ambiguity than is popularly believed when crafting these political-military strategies.

Three distinct approaches have been proposed for how to narrow the "gray zone" associated with these operations. One approach espouses the view that the United Nations can simply muddle through the "undefined" aspects of Chapter VI 1/2 operations. The "stick with it" approach is predicated on the assumption that the presence of peacekeeping forces is more helpful than harmful in conflict prevention situations. Peacekeepers can constantly reassess the situation on the ground and make adjustments as necessary, adjustments that may include a change in the UN mandate or a significant shift in operational outlook. The "rolling assessment" technique described earlier is particularly applicable to these types of situations. In the view of this approach to dealing with ambiguous or complex operations, the United Nations is actively learning from each new experience how to deal with these missions and has been reducing the level of uncertainty associated with Chapter VI 1/2 operations.

A second perspective holds that there really is no "gray zone" between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations, but that there is actually a "zone of paralysis" that makes progress all but unobtainable. Since under the UN mandate peacekeepers must remain neutral, they will be unable to perform their duties and could well be held hostage or even assaulted by one or more of the warringparties. Proponents of this view argue that the situation that confronted the peacekeepers in Bosnia prior to the Dayton agreement is a case in point. The credibility and effectiveness of the peacekeeping force continued to plummet as peacekeepers' actions were constrained by their mandate and by the increasingly aggressive action on the part of the belligerents. In the end, the peacekeepers were hostages, literally taken captive in some cases, or were subjected to hostile fire.

In this view, "peacekeepers with no peace to keep" cannot alternate between being neutral keepers of an agreed-upon set of conditions and enforcers that by definition will engage in coercive behavior, possibly even combat. In such circumstances, it is impossible then to revert to the previous status of neutral observers. Therefore, peacekeeping forces should not be deployed in the absence of a peace to keep. If the conditions under which peacekeeping forces were deployed change, they should be withdrawn and, if properly sanctioned, replaced by a more appropriately equipped and instructed peace enforcement mission.

The third approach to dealing with the ambiguities of such operations seeks to remedy the possibility of paralysis by adjusting the traditional concept that UN peacekeeping forces must remain neutral. Maintaining neutrality is challenging when there is a clear transgressor and cooperation under the terms of the deployment is not forthcoming. Consequently, there may be circumstances when the maintenance of neutrality is not only difficult, but actually detrimental to the likelihood of a successful mission. Knowledge that the UN force is equipped and authorized to respond to violations of treaty terms or to acts of violence directed against it or its protected population could well have a deterrent effect on potential aggressors. The "meanest dog on the block" approach adopted by NATO forces deployed to Bosnia to enforce the Dayton accords seems to have reduced the temptation, at least initially, to test the resolve of the newly arriving forces.

This approach would, of course, entail changes to traditional notions of how peacekeeping forces are organized, equipped, and instructed. The deterrent effect on potential aggressors might also spill over onto those who were contemplating contributing troops to the mission. On the other hand, the chance to prevent a deadly conflict that could easily produce hundreds of thousands of casualties, such as was the case in Rwanda, makes the "suspension of neutrality" approach perhaps a necessary aspect of an effective prevention regime.

Managing Military Forces

An issue closely related to the types of missions military forces will be called upon to accomplish is the concept for managing multinational operations. An in-depth discussion of the practical issues associated with the management of military operations is beyond the scope of this analysis. The purpose here is simply to identify the different management schemes available in the post-Cold War era and to make some preliminary observations about their utility in light of the experiences of the past six years.

Three organizing schemes are available for the managementof multinational military operations. (Unilateral action is always possible, but does not involve managing international forces.) These three options are (1) the United Nations; (2) regional organizations; and (3) ad hoc coalitions.³⁷ What lessons, if any, can we draw from recent experience about the efficacy of each approach?

Today, the United Nations does not have the capability to manage deployed multinational forces. It lacks the command, control, and communications capabilities needed to provide real-time supervision of operational forces. UN communications and monitoring capabilities have improved significantly in recent years, but remain inadequate to serve as an operational headquarters. The United Nations can supervise peacekeeping forces on essentially stable missions where both sides accept their presence and the probability of substantial conflict is low.

Of course, the development of a UN rapid-reaction force would put the organization directly in the command and control business. Consequently, the creation of such a force would have to be accompanied by the acquisition of the sophisticated infrastructure and trained personnel required to operate and maintain such capabilities. If the "dedicated forces" concept were put into practice, it likewise would entail the requirement for modern command and control facilities if the efforts of the contributing nations were to be coordinated effectively. The need for rapid deployment often necessary for effective preventive action only exacerbates the requirement for worldwide command and control capabilities.

Regional organizations would, at first glance, seem likely candidates to provide management oversight for military forces deployed in their regions. However, these organizations generally suffer from the same lack of resources and infrastructure as does the United Nations. The clear exception, of course, is NATO. But NATO took a long time to develop, and its capabilities reflect decades of political discourse, the development of alliance-wide operating procedures, and the sustained commitment of substantial financial resources. No other regional organization can match its political, organizational, and financial capabilities.

Despite these shortcomings, there are opportunities for regional organizations to contribute to prevention activities. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have potential that could be developed. Indeed, the multinational (but largely Nigerian) peacekeeping force in Liberia was deployed under the auspices of ECOWAS. Other regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity, have established histories of diplomatic involvement in regional crises. However, if regional organizations other than NATO are to become effective mechanisms for the management of crises and the command and control of deployed military forces, they will need to devote considerable political effort and financial resources to the task. Preventive action would seem an appropriate place to start for the development of integrated planning and coordinating capabilities.

In the absence of robust UN or regional capabilities forthe management of military forces, ad hoc coalitions become, almost by default, the most promising mechanism for instituting preventive action or peace operations. A "coalition of the willing" could be employed for deterrence of potential aggression, humanitarian aid operations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, or conventional war against a common foe. The obvious advantage of this arrangement is that the participants are all volunteers. The difficulties are those associated with any military operation, but exacerbated by the multinational aspect of the endeavor: command and control, logistics, strategic and tactical lift, effective sharing of intelligence information, and differing employment doctrines and levels of operational sophistication.

The coalition that conducted the Persian Gulf War is the most obvious example of this arrangement. But even this successful endeavor revealed the pressures to which any coalition is subject, particularly differing views of acceptable goals. Therefore, any ad hoc coalition will have to be based on some fundamental level of agreement about the desirability of the mission, its likely duration and cost, and the goals it is intended to accomplish.

On the other hand, ad hoc coalitions can be formed quickly, and they are not subject to the (potentially lengthy) deliberative procedures common in more established organizations. Consequently, coalitions may be the most responsive mechanisms for prevention, enabling interested parties to act in concert quickly. A preventive system that can identify likely hotspots will enhance the probability of successful preventive action by ad hoc coalitions, presumably with the approval of the United Nations or relevant regional organizations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

This assessment of the post-Cold War world has produced three significant conclusions: Peace will not keep itself; force should not be used exclusively as a last resort in the prevention of deadly conflict; and there are important lessons about the use and management of military force that have been learned from recent experience. What do these conclusions imply for national and international leaders?

First, it is clear that prevention matters. Preventing deadly conflicts not only saves lives, it will also facilitate the establishment of structural mechanisms for the management of the still-emerging post-Cold War system. Whatever the ultimate shape of that system, preventing the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflicts is an essential aspect of regional and even global stability. Early forceful action can preclude conflict and prevent the need for more complex and more costly operations in its wake.

Traditional peacekeeping operations will continue to be a routine aspect of international life. But they will be used only when both sides of a conflict agree to arbitration and to the interposition of peacekeeping forces. The majority of peace operations in the future likely will fall into the more nebulous and dangerous category of peacemaking. Therefore, force that is credible enough to deter or coerce, deployed prior to the outbreak of conflict, will preclude the subsequent requirement forconducting difficult and potentially costly Chapter VI 1/2 operations.

Although Chapter VII operations can be successful when a forceful leader guides international action, most states will continue to be hesitant to participate in such operations unless clear and important interests are at stake. Undeniably, preventive action must become an increasingly familiar aspect of the international system if we are to reduce the incidence of violence that has become more prevalent, more destructive, and more difficult to contain.

Prevention can work. In 1992, the United Nations authorized the deployment of troops to Macedonia to prevent conflict from erupting within its borders or from spreading into Macedonia from the other Balkan states, where conflict is ongoing. What can we learn from this successful instance of prevention? What were the conditions that attended the deployment of UN troops for this preventive action? Are there other countries or regions where the deployment of force can be used to prevent the spread of conflict from neighboring areas?

What we do know is that no serious intervention will occur without strong international leadership to provide a base of support for the action. Political will is directly related to public perceptions of the desirability and feasibility of the endeavor. Leaders must convince their publics that the benefits associated with preventing deadly conflicts outweigh the costs.

Since the decision to act multilaterally is derived unilaterally, countries need to be given the incentive to act in concert with others. Structuring such incentives is no easy task. The accumulation of successful "preventions" may well reduce the reluctance to participate, but acquiring such a record will require the commitment of the military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities of the major powers for the foreseeable future. In the end, leadership and acceptance of the responsibilities attendant to membership in the international community will provide the basis for multilateral action.

No system of conflict prevention will be perfect. The use of force remains an integral aspect of international relations. The traditional causes of conflict have, if anything, reemerged with suddenness and ferocity in the post-Cold War world. The end of the superpower competition and the enormous attendant changes in the dynamics of the international system affirm the need for significant adjustments in traditional conceptions of the national interest and the use of force. Those who contemplate the use of violence to achieve their aims must confront an international community that will, when necessary, respond forcefully to prevent the outbreak or escalation of deadly conflict. Those who immediately discount any attempt to use the military to prevent deadly conflict as too costly or not in the nation's important interests do not respond to the needs of the contemporary world.

What is inescapable is the need for states to accept the military implications of their leadership, and this fact applies particularly to the United States. The United States has both obligations and interests in promoting a stable international environment favorable to democratizing and market-reforming states.Articulating objectives and mobilizing itself and others to support this agenda demands American leadership, a role the United States must accept if it is to retain its influence in global affairs. As President Clinton acknowledged in his most recent national security strategy document, "freedom, democracy, security and prosperity are now threatened by regional aggressors and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; ethnic, religious and national rivalries. . . . Today, addressing these threats demands American leadership."³⁸

In the end, in some instances, there will be no substitute for the use of force-American force. When power and responsibility come together in this way, as they inevitably do for a Great Power, the willingness to use force is the unavoidable burden of leadership. In the post-Cold War world, the use of the military to help prevent deadly conflict reflects the imperatives of both power and principle.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Many of the issues discussed in this paper were examined by the participants in the U.S. Military Academy Senior Conference held at West Point, N.Y. on June 8*-10, 1995. The conference was co-sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

2. This conclusion is a restatement of Donald Kagan's formulation that "peace does not preserve itself" in his On the Origins of War (New York: Doubleday, 1995).

3. Richard N. Haass, Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 3.

4. David Fromkin, "The Coming Millennium," World Policy Journal (Spring 1993), 3.

5. Ibid., 3*-4.

6. James A. Winnefeld et al., Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 16.

7. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hall, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs 75 (January/February 1996): 41.

8. Ibid., 42*-43.

9. Ibid., 48.

10. Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1993), 25.

11. Chase, Hall, and Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," 48.

12. Eugene Linden, "The Exploding Cities of the Developing World," Foreign Affairs 75 (January/February 1996): 53.

13. Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century, 26.

14. Trent N. Thomas, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 34.

15. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), 92.

16. Thomas L. Friedman, "Heart of Darkness," New York Times, 21 January 1996, sec. 4, p. 15.

17. Armed Conflicts Report, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (Spring 1995), 6*-10.

18. Quoted in Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72 (1992/1993): 3.

19. Friedman, "Heart of Darkness."

20. Thomas, "Global Assessment," 40.

21. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., November 28, 1994.

22. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs 71 (Winter 1992*-1993): 38.

23. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 1994.

24. Anthony Lake, address at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1996.

25. George P. Shultz, "The Ethics of Power," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 2095 (February 1985): 1-3.

26. George P. Shultz, address to the U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, September 9, 1992.

27. George Bush, address to the U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, January 5, 1993. Reprinted in Haass, Intervention, 199*-204.

28. Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Alternatives to a U.N. Standing Army," Atlantic Council of the United States, May 1995.

29. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1995), 197.

30. Ibid., 208.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 271.

33. Richard M. Connoughton, "Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance, Rwanda, April-December 1994," Occasional Paper No. 18 (Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 14.

34. For a thorough discussion of the practical issues associated with the creation of a UN rapid-reaction force, see "Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations," Report of the Government of Canada, September 1995.

35. National Defense University, Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ffice, 1995), 164.

36. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York, United Nations, 1992).

37. For a complete discussion of the organizational and operational issues associated with each approach, see Goodpaster, "Alternatives to a U.N. Standing Army."

38. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996), 2.