1. Berto Jongman, "War and Political Violence," in Jaarboek Vrede en Veilegheid 1996 (Yearbook Peace and Security) (Nijmegen: Dutch Peace Research Center, 1996), p. 148. See also European Conference on Conflict Prevention, From Early Warning to Early Action, A Report on the European Conference on Conflict Prevention (Amsterdam: European Conference on Conflict Prevention, 1996), pp. 11, 15; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International Peace Academy, Healing the Wounds: Refugees, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation, Report of the Second Conference Sponsored Jointly by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Peace Academy, June 30-July 1, 1996, p. 1. See also, Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. v.
2. See U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1997 (Washington, DC: Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1997), p. 84.
3. Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, Africa Watch, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples, Centre International des Droits de la Personne et du Developpement Democratique, Rapport de la Commission Internationale d'Enquete sur les Violations des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda Depuis le 1er October 1990 (New York: Africa Watch, 1993), pp. 62-66; Charles Trueheart, "U.N. Alerted to Plans for Rwanda Bloodbath," Washington Post, September 25, 1997, p. A1.
4. See, for example: Humanitarian Aid and Effects, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 3 (Copenhagen: Steering Committee on the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), p. 52; Barbara Crossette, "Agencies Say U.N. Ignored Pleas on Hutu," New York Times, May 28, 1997, p. A3; "Open Wounds in Rwanda," New York Times, April 25, 1995, p. A22; John Pomfret, "Aid Dilemma: Keeping It from Oppressor," Washington Post, September 23, 1997, p. A1.
5. Eleanor Bedford, "Site Visit to Eastern Congo/Zaire: Analysis of Humanitarian and Political Issues," USCR Site Visit Notes (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997), pp. 4-7.
6. The question of whether a rapidly deployed UN force could have dramatically reduced the level of violence in Rwanda was the focus of a conference, "Rwanda Retrospective," cosponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, and the U.S. Army, January 23, 1997. For a brief review of the conference, see Scott R. Feil, "Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered," ISD Reports III, No. 2, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, April 1997. See also the full conference report, Scott R. Feil, Rwanda Retrospective, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, DC, forthcoming. Former UNAMIR commander Major General Romeo Dallaire asserted, "I came to the United Nations from commanding a mechanized brigade group of 5,000 soldiers. If I had had that brigade group in Rwanda, there would be hundreds of thousands of lives spared today." See "Rwanda: U.N. Commander Says More Troops May Have Saved Lives," Inter Press Service, September 7, 1994. Others have also made this point. See Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force," New York Review of Books, June 10, 1993.
7. The costs of relief and reconstruction are drawn from, Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 4 (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 32. Costs of prevention are estimated in Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
8. The Commission's view is spelled out in chapter 6. Commission member Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan dissents from the Commission's view on Security Council reform. In his opinion, the addition of permanent members would multiply, not diminish, the anomalies inherent in the structure of the Security Council. While the concept of regional rotation for additional permanent seats offers prospects of a compromise, it would be essential to have agreed global and regional criteria for rotation. In the absence of an international consensus on expansion in the permanent category, the expansion should be confined to nonpermanent members only.
9. The rotating members of the Security Council would retain their contribution for at least one year after their period on the Council so as to cover political commitments entered into while a member.
10. Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), pp. 427-429, 474. The dispute over Bahrain's future--then a British protectorate--became increasingly virulent in the late 1960s, threatening the delicate peace in the region. In 1969, British and Iranian officials asked United Nations Secretary-General U Thant for UN mediation to determine a mechanism to resolve the issue of Bahrain's sovereignty in accordance with Bahraini views. Representing the UN's good offices, Ralph Bunche engaged the parties in discreet and unpublicized negotiations that enabled the sensitive talks to progress. In 1970, their agreement on Bahrain's independence was approved by the UN Security Council. For further information on the Bahraini negotiations or Ralph Bunche, see Brian Urquhart, "The Higher Education of Ralph Bunche," in Journal of Black Higher Education (Summer 1994), pp. 78-85. See also Husain al-Baharna, "The Fact-Finding Mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Settlement of the Bahrain-Iran Dispute, May 1970," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 22 (1973), pp. 541-553.
Chapter 1
1. United Nations Children's Fund, The State of the World's Children 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13; Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996), pp. 18-19.
2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 17-30.
3. Christer Ahlström, Casualties of Conflict (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1991), pp. 8, 19; United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 65.
4. United States Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1997 (Washington, DC: Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1997), p. 84.
5. Sena Eken et al., Economic Dislocation and Recovery in Lebanon, Occasional Paper 120, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, February 1995, p. 4.
6. The Carter Center, State of World Conflict Report 1994-1995 (Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, 1995), p. 2. For a broader discussion of the links between conflict, government policies, and food supply, see Joseph Collins, "World Hunger: A Scarcity of Food or a Scarcity of Democracy," in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, eds. Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 360; Amartya Sen, "Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of Political Rights," The New Republic, January 10 -17, 1994, pp. 31-33.
7. United States Mission to the United Nations, Global Humanitarian Emergencies 1996 (New York: United States Mission to the United Nations, 1996), p. 6; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT Database, Agriculture Data - Population: Crops Primary, http://www.fao.org (updated April 24, 1997).
8. United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, World Population Prospects: The 1996 Revision (New York: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Population Division, 1997). Estimate based on medium-variant projections.
9. Kevin Watkins, The Oxfam Poverty Report (Oxford: Oxfam UK & Ireland, 1995), p. 3. See also United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 9.
10. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13.
11. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. iii.
12. William F. Martin, Ryukichi Imai, and Helga Steeg, Maintaining Energy Security in a Global Context, The Triangle Papers 48 (New York: The Trilateral Commission, September 1996), p. 50; Energy and Atmosphere Program, Sustainable Energy and Environment Division, Bureau for Policy and Program Support, United Nations Development Program, UNDP Initiative for Sustainable Energy 1996, United Nations Development Program, New York, 1996, p. 1.
13. Nikos Alexandratos, ed., World Agriculture: Towards 2010, An FAO Study (Chichester, England: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and John Wiley and Sons, 1996), p. 86.
14. World Resources Institute, United Nations Environment Program, United Nations Development Program, and the World Bank, World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 14, 35-37.
15. For example, see Gary Gardner, "Preserving Global Crop Land," in State of the World 1997, ed. Linda Starke (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1997), pp. 42-59; Congressional Budget Office, Enhancing U.S. Security Through Foreign Aid (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1994), p. 11.
16. John D. Steinbruner, "Reluctant Strategic Realignment: The Need for a New View of National Security," The Brookings Review (Winter 1995), p. 6.
17. Lee Frederikson, "The Internet or Infomercial: Which Will Turn Your Audience On?" Marketing News, January 20, 1997, p. 15.
18. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 8; John Stremlau, "Dateline Bangalore: Third World Technopolis," Foreign Policy, No. 102 (Spring 1996), p. 161.
19. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
20. In spite of an increased level of international cooperation on environmental issues, environmental destruction continues at a rapid pace. For a discussion of environmental degradation and its consequences, see Lester R. Brown, "The Acceleration of History," in State of the World 1996, ed. Linda Starke (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), p. 4; World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 2-3; World Resources Institute, United Nations Environment Program, United Nations Development Program, and the World Bank, World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. xi-xiv; Commission on Developing Countries and Global Change, For Earth's Sake (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1992), pp. 16-18. For a discussion of environmental degradation and its potential to generate conflict, see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Thomas Homer-Dixon and Valerie Percival, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Briefing Book (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996); Donald Kennedy, Environmental Quality and Regional Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming).
21. Peter Stalker, ed., States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization (London: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995), p. 113.
22. United Nations, General Assembly, 49th Session, Assistance in Mine Clearance: Report of the Secretary-General, Document A/49/357, United Nations, New York, September 6, 1994, p. 7.
23. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), p. 215.
24. This sect was also found to have considerable biological weapons capability. "Nerve Gas Attack on Tokyo Subway Kills 10; Police Raid Religious Sect's Offices, Seize Chemicals," Facts on File: World News Digest with Index 55, No. 2834 (March 23, 1995), p. 205.
25. Ron Purver, "The Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism," The Monitor: Non-Proliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control 3, No. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 5. See also Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1984).
26. Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in Managing Global Chaos, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 607-622. Also see Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
27. Francois Jean, ed., Populations in Danger 1995 (London: Médecins Sans Frontières, 1995); Graça Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996).
28. Gregory Quinn, "The Iraq Conflict," in The True Cost of Conflict, ed. Michael Cranna (New York: The New Press, 1994), pp. 25-54.
29. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 255; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Economic and Social Council, E/1996/52, United Nations, New York, May 13, 1996.
30. James H. Michel, Development Cooperation, Development Assistance Committee 1995 Report, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1996, pp. A8, 98.
31. International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Annual Report 1996 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 323.
32. Médecins Sans Frontières, Médecins Sans Frontières Activity Report, July 95-July 96 (Brussels: Médecins Sans Frontières, 1996), p. 86; CARE, CARE International 1995 and 1996 (Brussels: CARE, 1996).
33. "The Philanthropy 400," The Chronicle of Philanthropy 4, No. 2 (October 31, 1996), pp. 41-47.
CHAPTER 2
1. See, for example, Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton, eds., International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986); Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1989); John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane B. Bendahmane, eds., Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987); Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990); Jack Nusan Porter, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Historical Bibliography (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982); Leif Ohlsson, ed., Case Studies of Regional Conflicts and Conflict Resolution (Gothenburg, Sweden: Padrigu Papers, 1989); Ramesh Thakur, ed., International Conflict Resolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).
2. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954); Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979); Mohammed Ayoob, "The New-Old Disorder in the Third World," in The United Nations and Civil Wars, ed., Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 13-30.
3. Mark Katz, "Collapsed Empires," in Managing Global Chaos, eds., Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 25-35.
4. These countries moved toward democratic rule through transitional elections. See Roger Kaplan, Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, 1996), pp. 105-107.
5. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder are among those who argue that states in transition to democracy are prone to conflict. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. For criticisms of their argument, see "Correspondence," International Security 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 176-207. The scholarly debate over the democratic peace proposition is captured in a selection of essays presenting both sides of the issue; see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). See also the discussion of this subject in chapter 4.
6. Richard E. Bissell, "The Resource Dimension of International Conflict," in Managing Global Chaos, eds., Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 141-153; Naomi Chazan and Donald Rothchild, "The Political Repercussions of Economic Malaise," in Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline, eds., Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 180-214; Gareth Porter, "Environmental Security as a National Security Issue," Current History 94, No. 592 (May 1995), pp. 218-222; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict," Policy Paper #20, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, CA, January 1996.
7. Articles from regional newspapers illustrate the concern of states with internal strife that outside actors are attempting to influence the outcome of events. Turkish president Suleyman Demirel has accused Syria of supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK): "Syria's support for the PKK is clearly evident...it not only supports the PKK, but actively supports all the other organizations that want to change the regime in Turkey." (Makram Muhammad Ahmad, "Turkey: Demirel on Ties With Syria, Terrorism," Al-Musawwar, July 26, 1996, pp. 18-21, 82-83.) Typical of many states of the former Soviet Union, Georgian denunciation of Russian aid and support for the Abkhaz rebels reflects anger over Moscow's perceived double standard policy for its "near abroad." ("Anti-Russian ‘Hysteria' Over Abkhazia in Georgia," Pravda, July 13, 1995, p. 1.)
8. The development of conflict indicators for crises within states is a new field with much experimentation. For example, Pauline Baker and John Ausink identify the following indicators of potential internal strife: demographic pressures, massive refugee movements, uneven economic development along ethnic lines, a legacy of vengeance-seeking behavior, criminalization, and suspension of the rule of law. Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," Parameters 26, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-31. A study by Michael Brown identifies both underlying and proximate causes of internal conflict (see Table N.1). Additionally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is developing a Conflict Management Division and an extensive list of early warning indicators.
9. Personal communication, Irene Khan, Chief of Mission, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees--New Delhi, April 17, 1995.
10. Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," in Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict, ed. Barbara Farnham (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 119-145.
11. "Susceptibility" here does not mean being unwitting, but rather "open" or disposed (for many reasons) to follow leadership in this direction. In fact, whole societies or groups do not have to go along, only some critical part--armies or some groups of those willing to fight. Conversely, various factors can inhibit the willingness of a group to be led to initiate conflict, such as physical dispersion, widespread prosperity or even pervasive poverty, war weariness, or indifference to the issues said to be at stake. This analysis builds on the work of Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: Random House, 1986).
12. Other examples include Benin, Eritrea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the breakup of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
13. As disclosures now bring to light, even the highest levels of Afrikaner leadership may have been actively engaged in the violent, clandestine counterinsurgency efforts aimed at breaking resistance to the apartheid regime. "‘Prime Evil' de Kock Names Ex-President Botha, Cabinet Ministers, Police Generals in ‘Dirty War,'" Southern Africa Report 14, No. 38 (September 20, 1996). For an in-depth treatment of the earliest meetings between National Party officials and opposition leaders, see Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
14. Jack Reed, "De Klerk Lifts ANC Ban, Says Mandela Will be Freed Soon," United Press International, February 2, 1990; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 83-84.
15. In 1986, a privately funded study commission on U.S. policy toward South Africa, chaired by Franklin A. Thomas, facilitated initial contacts between ANC leaders and prominent Afrikaners with close ties to the apartheid government. These contacts helped open the way for the crucial political dialogue which followed. Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 72-73.
16. For detailed discussions of South Africa's transition, see David Ottaway, Chained Together (New York: Times Books, 1993); Marina Ottaway, South Africa (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997). See also John Stremlau with Helen Zille, A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1997).
17. Some analysts argue that although the term "perestroika" was used in 1985, real reform did not begin until 1986. Others, however, assert that Gorbachev's 1985 personnel changes, which moved reformers into positions of power, constitute the beginnings of reform. Gorbachev sets the beginning of reform as early as 1985; in Perestroika, he states that reform had been under way for two and one-half years. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 60; Seweryn Bialer, "The Changing Soviet Political System: The Nineteenth Party Conference and After" in Politics, Society and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia, ed., Seweryn Bialer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 193-241. See also Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 52-67.
18. The West's negotiation strategy in concluding the November 1990 Two + Four Agreement, which laid the framework for German reunification, was instrumental in assuaging Russian security fears. For further reading, see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), pp. 184-190; Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), especially pp. 527-535; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 149-197, 328-352.
Table N.1
The Underlying and Proximate causes of Internal Conflict
Structural Factors
Weak states
Intrastate security concerns
Ethnic geography
Political Factors
Discriminatory political institutions
Exclusionary national ideologies
Intergroup politics
Elite politics
Economic/Social Factors
Economic problems
Discriminatory economic systems
Economic development and modernization
Cultural/Perceptual Factors
Patterns of cultural discrimination
Problematic group histories
Proximate Causes
Structural Factors
Collapsing states
Changing intrastate military balances
Changing demographic patterns
Political Factors
Political transitions
Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies
Growing intergroup competitions
Intensifying leadership struggles
Economic/Social Factors
Mounting economic problems
Growing economic inequities
Fast-paced development and modernization
Cultural/Perceptual Factors
Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination
Ethnic bashing and propagandizing
CHAPTER 3
1. For an assessment of missed opportunities in Rwanda, see Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, "Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act, or Failure of Actions Taken?," in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce Jentleson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming). Major General Romeo Dallaire stated that with a force of 5,000 trained troops and an appropriate mandate he could have prevented thousands of deaths. "Rwanda: UN Commander Says More Troops May Have Saved Lives," Inter Press Service, September 7, 1994, p. 2.
2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 795 (1992), adopted on December 11, 1992.
3. Almost immediately following Serrano's suspension of the constitution, judiciary, and legislature, a broad-based civilian movement began to mobilize. Three major democratic institutions--the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Court of Constitutionality, and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman--refused to accept the self-coup (autogolpe) and actively defied Serrano. Most of the military would not support Serrano's actions, and the media was vocal in its denunciations. Members of civil society united under the Instancia Nacional de Consenso--a representative forum which was instrumental in reversing the coup after only two weeks. Internationally, the Organization of American States offered its support to the opposition, and dispatched fact-finding missions to investigate the situation. Secretary-General João Baena Soares met with representatives of civil society--including business, religious, and human rights leaders--and warned of severe international repercussions. For more information, see Francisco Villagrán de León, "Thwarting the Guatemalan Coup," Journal of Democracy 4, No. 4, October 1993, pp. 117-124; Rachel M. McCleary, "Guatemala's Postwar Prospects," Journal of Democracy 8, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 129-143; "OAS Starts Probe of Guatemala Leader's Use of Emergency Rule," Chicago Tribune, May 31, 1993, p.7; Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 77-78.
4. Following Congo's first-ever democratic elections in 1992, tensions simmered between supporters of President Pascal Lissouba and opposition groups. Local conflict resolution initiatives failed to secure a peaceful settlement. After legislative elections in early 1993, violent acts increased and threatened to escalate into open conflict. At this critical juncture, Congolese defense minister General Raymond Damase N'Gollo, acting as mediator on behalf of the Congolese government, issued an appeal for international assistance. With the leadership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the government of France, an international committee was appointed to oversee new elections, and an international arbitration jury was formed to examine possible election fraud. Completion of these measures restored stability to the situation and allowed the Republic of Congo's democratic transition to move forward. See I. William Zartman and Katharina R. Vogeli, "Preventing Coup and Collapse: Delivering Competition out of Monopoly in Congo," in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce Jentleson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
5. A slightly different version of this four-part framework was originally developed by Douglas E. Lute in "Improving National Capacities for Response to Complex Emergencies," a paper prepared for the conference, "Humanitarian Response and Preventing Deadly Conflict," cosponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Switzerland, February 16-17, 1997. Recent evaluations of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) have highlighted these factors in accounting for the relative success of the operation to date. See, for example, United States Army War College, Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Mission in Haiti: The Military Perspective (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996); Margaret Daly Hays and Gary F. Weatley, eds., Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti--A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, February 1996).
6. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) has been marked by a high level of cooperation between the United States, which provided the bulk of the initial troops for the operation, and UN officials. Additionally, a great deal of attention has been paid to working with the Haitian legislature and security forces to promote democratic practices. See Margaret Daly Hays and Gary F. Weatley, eds., Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti--A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, February 1996).
7. For one diplomat's reflections on the process of assembling the coalition and holding it together, see James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), especially pp. 275-299, 308-320, 370-378, 396-406.
8. John M. Sanderson, "The Humanitarian Response in Cambodia: The Imperative for a Strategic Alliance," in After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance, eds. Jim Whitman and David Pocock, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 179-193; Jimmy Carter, "Get Tough on Rights," New York Times, September 21, 1993, p. A21; Anthony Lewis, "At Home Abroad; Fragments of Hope," New York Times, July 30, 1993, p. A27; Paul Lewis, "United Nations Is Finding its Plate Increasingly Full but its Cupboard Is Bare," New York Times, September 27, 1993, p. A8; Elizabeth Becker, "A U.N. Success Story," New York Times, April 28, 1995, p. A33.
9. John Eriksson et al., Synthesis Report, in The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, ed. David Millwood (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 30.
10. For example, Serbian troops blocked humanitarian convoys delivering food, clothing, medical supplies, and winter materials to refugees in Bosnia's war-torn cities. Even after pledges to allow aid convoys through, the Serbs bombed roads traveled by the relief convoys and highjacked UN trucks to prevent the delivery of such relief supplies. Barbara Crossette, "After Weeks of Seeming Inaction, U.S. Decides To Punish Belgrade," New York Times, May 23, 1992, p.1; "Serbs Again Block Supplies in Bosnia," New York Times, December 8, 1993, p. A6; Stephen Kinzer, "Yugoslavs Celebrate Sports Victory with a Political Echo," New York Times, July 4, 1995, p. 5.
11. See John Stremlau, People in Peril: Human Rights, Humanitarian Relief, and Preventing Deadly Conflict (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming).
12. Sadako Ogata, "World Order, Internal Conflict and Refugees," address at Harvard University, October 28, 1996.
13. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization for Migration, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report of the Regional Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement and Returnees in the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relevant Neighboring States, Geneva, May 30-31, 1996, CIS/CONF/1996/6, July 4, 1996.
14. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees 1995: In Search of Solutions (New York: Oxford University, 1995), pp. 48, 172-184. This shift has generated some concern that UNHCR has made this move at the expense of fulfilling its protection mission. This issue is elaborated on in chapter 6.
15. CARE, 1996 CARE International Report (Brussels: CARE International, 1996).
16. "Donor fatigue" is frequently mentioned by those who fear that badly needed foreign assistance will not be available as an instrument of preventive action. In fact, official development assistance from OECD countries has remained fairly constant, fluctuating between $55 and $60 billion during the 1990s. Meanwhile, resource flows from the private sector have grown substantially, almost tripling between 1986 and 1994, from $37 to $105 billion. Of growing concern, however, is the need to divert scarce foreign assistance resources from long-term development work to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of complex emergencies. For example, two years of emergency work in Rwanda cost the United States $750 million, a sum that is equal to the entire USAID African Development Fund for all of sub-Saharan Africa. See Healing the Wounds: Refugees, Reconstruction and Reconciliation, Report of the Second Conference Sponsored by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Peace Academy, June 30-July 1, 1996, p. 49. For a more general discussion, see Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1995); United States Mission to the United Nations, Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996 (United States Mission to the United Nations, ECOSOC Division, 1996), pp. 22-24; James H. Michel, Development Co-operation, Development Assistance Committee 1995 Report, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996, pp. 8-9.
17. In the United States this reluctance found its way into official policy guidelines with the release of the Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 in 1994. Drawing from the U.S. experience in Somalia, the directive outlined the stringent conditions under which U.S. troops would be engaged overseas, chief among them being the need for a clear end-state and "exit strategy." The White House, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Presidential Decision Directive 25 (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994).
18. This section draws on a paper prepared for the Commission by Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities In Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 27, 1997).
19. The Bush administration's decision to commit U.S. troops was considered the logical extension of previous policy. As the leading contributor to Operation Provide Hope, the U.S. was concerned that its efforts would be wasted unless provisions were made for the secure distribution of humanitarian assistance. As conditions deteriorated, both the UN and the Bush administration concluded that "only a U.S.-led coalition could move quickly and efficiently enough to make a rapid impact on the humanitarian catastrophe." See Herman J. Cohen, "Intervention in Somalia," The Diplomatic Record 1992-1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 59-67; George Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992-1993, Book I - January 1 to July 31, 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
20. The risk of retribution may be particularly high for indigenous NGOs, although international NGOs, to the extent that their in-country presence relies upon permission from host governments or ruling factions, also put their operations at risk. See Robert I. Rotberg, "Conclusions: NGOs, Early Warning, Early Action, and Preventive Diplomacy," in Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation, 1996), pp. 263-268.
21. Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1997), para. 207-216.
22. This discussion draws on lessons learned from three cases of successful post-Cold War preventive diplomacy: the Baltic States, Congo, and Macedonia. These cases were examined during the conference, "Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World," cosponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, April 23, 1996.
23. See Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, September 1997).
24. Annan, op. cit., Renewing the United Nations, para. 60, 111.
25. In addition, world leaders now have many different forums in which to discuss emerging crises and the means at their disposal to manage these crises. The schedule of high-level international meetings also introduces the important element of continuity to crisis management. The following organizations, for instance, will hold cabinet- or head-of-state-level meetings in 1997-98 (meetings held annually unless otherwise noted):
Arab League
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)
Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
The Commonwealth
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Community for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
European Council (twice annually)
La Francophonie
Group of Eight (G-8) (Members meet as G-7 for
certain macroeconomic regulatory issues)
Group of 77
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Nordic Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Organization of American States (OAS)
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE)
South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC)
Southern African Development Community
(SADC)
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
United Nations General Assembly
United States-European Union (EU)
(twice annually)
Western European Union (WEU)
World Trade Organization (WTO) (ministerial-
level meeting every two years)
26. Ruth Wedgwood, "Macedonia: A Victory for Quiet Diplomacy," The Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1995, p. 19. For another example of quiet diplomacy, see Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 429.
27. Two major schools of power sharing have developed: the "consociational" approach, of which Arend Lijphart is the leading proponent, and the "integrative" approach advanced by Donald Horowitz. The consociational approach focuses on accommodation through achievement of elite agreements. Integrative power-sharing arrangements attempt to defuse tensions by providing incentives for moderate behavior among ethnic group leaders and by enhancing minority influence in the decision-making process. For an overview of these two schools and a discussion of the applicability of power sharing to the resolution of ethnic conflicts, see Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). See also Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," Journal of Democracy 1, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 73-79; Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph Montville. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 451-475; Donald Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," Journal of Democracy 4, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 18-38; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 16-20, 55-60, 142-146; Arend Lijphart, "Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Systems," in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlichka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 275-287.
28. Diana Chigas, with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp, "Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation," in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 25-97; Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vade Mecum: An Introduction to the OSCE (Berne: OSCE, May 1996).
29. For definitions and examples of Track Two diplomacy and multitrack diplomacy, as well as a discussion of relationships in a multitrack system, see James Notter and John McDonald, "Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies For Peace," American Perspectives on Conflict Resolution, Electronic Journals of the U.S. Information Agency, Volume 1, No. 19, December 1996, http://www.usia.gov/journals/journals.htm, updated December 1996; James Notter and Louise Diamond, Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1996), pp. 1-17; Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 37-51; Kumar Rupesinghe, "Multi-Track Diplomacy and the Sustainable Route to Conflict Resolution," Cultural Survival Quarterly (Fall 1995), pp. 13-18.
30. The National Research Council's Committee on International Conflict Resolution is conducting substantial research aimed at identifying and examining the major techniques and concepts involved in conflict resolution. Track Two research currently under way focuses primarily on interactive/problem-solving techniques. Numerous papers are being prepared for the committee, which plans to make these papers available during 1998.
31. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, sanctions had very little effect until they were significantly strengthened in April 1993 and successfully forced President Slobodan Milosevic, for the first time, to accept the Vance/Owen peace plan. See David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), pp. 134-135.
32. A study by the Commission has suggested that to improve the UN's ability to maintain sanctions, the UN Collective Measures Committee should be revived and its mandate expanded to include possible inducements. A reconstituted Collective Measures Committee might initially address a five-point agenda: 1) improvements within the UN Secretariat to facilitate the imposition, implementation, and suspension of a sanctions regime; 2) recommendations for national capacity building to impose, monitor, and enforce sanctions; 3) ways to improve cooperation with nonstate parties; 4) combining sanctions with other preventive measures; and 5) the value of financial sanctions. See John Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, November 1996), pp. 57-67.
33. Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions, p. 29.
34. Swift, decisive imposition of sanctions was one of five conditions identified by Hufbauer and Elliott as contributing to their effectiveness. Other conditions identified are: a relatively modest goal; a target state much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and also economically weak and unstable; friendly relations between the sanctioned state and the sanctioning state prior to the imposition of sanctions; and low costs for the sanctioning state. See Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Hufbauer, "‘New' Approaches to Economic Sanctions," in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, eds. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), pp. 132-157.
35. Stremlau, op. cit., Sharpening International Sanctions, p. 61.
36. For example, USA*Engage, a coalition representing over 600 American businesses, agricultural groups, and trade associations, seeks to advance public and private sector involvement in world affairs by attempting to educate policymakers on the impact of unilateral sanctions in terms of: 1) costs to the U.S. economy, 2) the damage to security, commercial, and human rights objectives, 3) the adverse impact on U.S. ties with its closest allies, and 4) the damage to U.S. global competitiveness and investment policy. Interested readers can get more information on USA*Engage from their website: http://usaengage.org. See also Richard Lawrence, "U.S. Sanctions Spur Outcry; Corporate America Presses Case against Increasing Curbs on Other Nations," Journal of Commerce, May 21, 1997, p. 41D.
37. For a discussion of the impact of sanctions on civilian populations, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, "The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions," in Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 274-315. Also see Bryan Hehir, The Uses of Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 1996). Hehir, in considering the moral dilemma posed by sanctions that will harm innocent civilians, suggests implementation of a "principle of consent," i.e., the support of people who will be directly affected. Hehir highlights South Africa as just such a case. Damrosch, while supporting a similar concept of internal expressions of support for sanctions, also illuminates two further complications: 1) cases where an indigenous nongovernmental leadership cannot be identified or, if it exists, is unable to voice its opinion because of government oppression; and 2) cases where the leadership targeted for punishment enjoys broad popular support.
38. The feasibility and effectiveness of targeted financial sanctions is discussed in Stremlau, op. cit., Sharpening International Sanctions; Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Hufbauer, op. cit., "‘New' Approaches to Economic Sanctions," pp. 133-157; Elizabeth S. Rogers, Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict, Discussion Paper, 90-02 (Harvard University: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996).
39. This section draws heavily on a Commission-sponsored study headed by David Cortright. See David Cortright, ed., The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
40. Until very recently, the lone exception was the much quoted 1971 article by David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24, No. 1 (October 1971). Although this remains an under-researched topic, three recent studies are William J. Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Eileen M. Crumm, "The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics," Journal of Peace Research 32, No. 3 (1995), pp. 313- 330; Cortright, op. cit., The Price of Peace.
41. Cortright, op. cit., The Price of Peace.
42. William Gamson and André Modigliani, Untangling the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1971); Martin Patchen, Resolving Disputes Between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 262.
43. On November 26, 1991, the World Bank announced in Paris that a Consultative Group of Donors for Kenya would withhold new loans for at least six months. On May 14, 1992, the World Bank announced on behalf of the Paris Consultative Group of Aid Donors for Malawi that it would not approve $74 million in new loans. The World Bank press statement on behalf of the Consultative Group on Malawi expressed "deep disappointment at the [Malawian] Government's lack of responsiveness to [governance] concerns and what they perceive as its continued poor record in ensuring basic respect for human rights, release or trial of detainees, better conditions in the prisons, respect for the rule of law, and independent judiciary, public sector accountability and transparency, freedom of speech, and open public participation and debate on policy options and freedoms of association." A similar statement was released on Kenya. See David Gillies, "Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank's Policy Frontiers," in The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale, eds. J.M. Griesgraber and B.G. Gunter (London: Pluto Press, 1996), pp. 101-141, especially pp.123-126; John Stremlau and Francisco Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming).
44. "Charter of the World Trade Organization. Annex 2: Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing The Settlement Of Disputes," January 1, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1143-1153, 1224-1247.
45. See, for example, Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 9-10.
46. Three recent examples of this type of action include: 1) the establishment by the United Nations Security Council of no-fly zones over Bosnia in October 1992 to protect civilians from strafing by Serbian aircraft; 2) the dispatching of over 20,000 troops, an aircraft carrier, and maritime prepositioning ships to the Persian Gulf in October 1994 by President Clinton to discourage Iraqi troops from re-invading Kuwait; and 3) the placement of the USS Independence battle group and the USS Nimitz off the shores of Taiwan in March 1996 to dissuade the Chinese military from further intimidation of Taiwan. See Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Backs a Ban on Combat Flights in Bosnia Airspace," New York Times, October 2, 1992, p. A2; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. May Seek the Use of Force to Stop Serbs' Flights Over Bosnia," New York Times, December 4, 1992, p. A1; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Sends Force as Iraqi Soldiers Threaten Kuwait," New York Times, October 8, 1994, p. 1; Patrick E. Tyler, "China Warns U.S. To Keep Away From Taiwan Strait," New York Times, March 18, 1996, p. A3; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Off Taiwan, U.S. Sailors Are Unworried," New York Times, March 19, 1996, p. A3.
47. The conflict in the Gulf in 1990-1991 offers a clear example of how such an approach can work. See Department of Public Information, United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996).
To support its examination of the role of force in preventing deadly conflict, the Commission sponsored two studies on the subject: Andrew J. Goodpaster, When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, DC, July 1996; Daniel J. Kaufman, The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict, unpublished report, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, DC, 1996. The Kaufman paper is an outgrowth of Senior Conference XXXII, "The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict," cosponsored by the Commission and the United States Military Academy at West Point, June 8-10, 1995.
48. United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 224-227, 476-478.
49. Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Policing the New World Disorder," Strategic Forum, No. 84 (October 1996), p. 4.
50. One development which may reduce the reluctance to use ground forces is the potential use of nonlethal technologies and weapons. Nonlethal weapons are means to control or coerce people, disable equipment or otherwise impede aggressive action while minimizing death and unnecessary destruction. These technologies may be antipersonnel, antimateriel, or involve electronic and information warfare. The deployment of nonlethal or less-than-lethal techniques and technologies would allow peacekeepers additional options between using deadly force in self-defense or in defense of the mission or remaining exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. The use of nonlethal technologies is not without its problems, however. Principal concerns surround their actual safety and effectiveness. See Anthony Fainberg and Alan Shaw, Nonlethal Technologies and the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming).
51. See Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993), pp. 81-85.
52. The notion of "fire brigade" or rapid reaction capabilities within the UN has come under careful consideration in recent years. Among the earliest supporters of the concept was Brian Urquhart, who has written extensively on the subject. See, for example, Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Police the World?," New York Review of Books, May 12, 1994, pp. 29-33; Brian Urquhart, "If the United Nations Is for Real, Give It a Police Force," International Herald Tribune, May 23, 1994, p. 4; Brian Urquhart, "Peace-Keeping Saves Lives," Washington Post, February 16, 1995; Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force," New York Review of Books, June 10, 1993, p. 3; and Brian Urquhart, "Whose Fight Is It?" New York Times, May 22, 1994. For reactions to Urquhart's proposal, see Lee Hamilton, Gareth Evans, Lord Carver, and Stanley Hoffman, "A UN Volunteer Military Force--Four Views," New York Review of Books, June 24, 1993, p. 58; Robert Oakley, McGeorge Bundy, Sadruddin Aga Khan, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Marion Dönhoff, "A UN Volunteer Force: The Prospects," New York Review of Books, July 15, 1993, pp. 52-56. The governments of Canada and Denmark also conducted studies on the topic; see Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Report of the Government of Canada, September 1995; and Dick A. Leurdijk, "The Netherlands Non-paper. A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study. Revised version, April 1995," in A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 1995), pp. 73-92. See also Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996).
53. Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Report of the Government of Canada, September 1995; Leurdijk, op. cit., A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response, p. 77.
CHAPTER 4
1. The role of international regimes in conflict prevention is further developed in Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 39-51.
2. International organizations and regimes have a long history of peaceful dispute settlement. The United Nations has functioned as a forum for international dispute resolution since its establishment; for example, see the discussion of the case of Bahrain in the prologue. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and European Union (EU) have well-established dispute resolution mechanisms. The WTO's Dispute Resolution Body (DRB) rules continually on a number of trade conflicts between member states, including, for example, a complaint against the United States by Venezuela and Brazil over U.S. gasoline regulations, settled in 1996, and a complaint against Japan by the United States, EU, and Canada over alcoholic beverages, also settled in 1996. The EU has been a force for peaceful resolution of conflict in political as well as economic disputes. The Conference on Stability in Europe, established in May 1994, brought more than 40 European states together to resolve disputes over borders and the treatment of minorities. Only two months later, Hungary renounced territorial claims against Romania and Slovakia. (Nicholas Denton, "Hungary Acts on Borders," Financial Times, July 15, 1994, p. 2; Patrick Worsnip, "Talks on Stability Fan Old Enmities," The Independent, May 28, 1994, p. 7.) A number of states with sea-going interests, including those at critical maritime locations with heated disputes such as Yemen, Eritrea, Qatar, and Bahrain, have agreed to have their differences settled according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For instance, in 1995, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal settled their dispute over territorial waters through the International Court of Justice and the Convention on the Law of the Sea. (More information on the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO and the Law of
the Sea may be found at their websites: http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/dispute.htm, and http://www.un.org/depts/los)
3. Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August, 1996), p. 7.
4. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), pp. 1-10.
5. At the urging of the United Nations General Assembly, the International Court of Justice offered an advisory opinion, issued in 1996, on the question "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?" The Court observed that a threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 is unlawful. Further, the Court found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons must be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons. Yet the Court could not reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a state in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake. The Court suggested that international law and the stability of the international order, which it is intended to govern, will suffer from the continuing difference of views with regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly as nuclear weapons. As a result, it unanimously agreed that an obligation exists to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control. "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons," Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, General List No. 95, July 8, 1996.
6. There are five major documents which address chemical and biological weapons identified in international law: 1) "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," February 8, 1928, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (T.I.A.S.) no. 9433; 2) "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacterial (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction," March 26, 1975, T.I.A.S. no. 9433; 3) "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997, 32 International Legal Materials (I.L.M.) 932 (1993); 4) "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons," 29 I.L.M. 932 (1990); 5) "Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons," 28 I.L.M. 1020 (1989).
7. For discussions of some of the issues which have slowed progress on chemical and biological arms control, see Committee on International Arms Control and Security Affairs of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Achieving Effective Arms Control: Recommendations, Background and Analysis, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1985, pp. 115-118; Frederick J. Vogel, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Strategic Implications for the United States, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997, pp. 8-11. For general and up-to-date information on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), implementation and enforcement of the CWC and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), see Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The OPCW Home Page, http://www.opcw.nl/, updated June 10, 1997.
8. For example, Finland, Germany, Norway, the states of the former Soviet Union, and the United States all conduct various training and inspection programs on CWC verification. In the case of the United States and the former Soviet Union, these programs focus on and advance already-existing bilateral chemical and biological weapons agreements. The German, Norwegian, and Finnish programs are made available to outside parties, especially specialists from developing countries. See Janne E. Nolan et al., "The Imperatives for Cooperation," in Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, ed. Janne E. Nolan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 51-52. Other positive examples of confidence-building mechanisms are seen in regional organizations such as the Rio Group, and in bilateral agreements such as the India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons. See Roland M. Timerbaev and Meggen M. Watt, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes -- 1995 Edition (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1995). Significant to most of these efforts is the conscious decision by states and regional organizations to promote and improve transparency. While transparency is at the heart of many nonproliferation regimes, there are great disparities in their respective verification systems, which is a significant issue. "When applied in tandem, however, the Non-Proliferation and Chemical Weapons Convention systems will create a high degree of transparency, and synergies between them may increase the underlying effectiveness of each." Leonard S. Spector and Jonathan Dean, "Cooperative Security: Assessing the Tools of the Trade," in Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, ed. Janne E. Nolan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 154-155.
9. The United States accounts for 45-55 percent, with China, France, Germany, Russia and the UK accounting for another 35-40 percent. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: Oxford University Press, October 1996), p. 273. Also see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 268.
10.Michael Renner, Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1997).
11. For critiques of the accuracy, consistency, and applicability of the register, see Arms Control Association, "ACA Register of U.S. Arms Transfers," The Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, August 1996; British American Security Information Council, Chronicling an Absence of Restraint: The 1995 UN Arms Register, Basic Papers, No. 13, November 3, 1995 (Washington, DC: British American Security Information Council, 1995); Edward Laurance, "The UN Register of Conventional Arms: Rationales and Prospects for Compliance and Effectiveness," The Washington Quarterly 16, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 163-172; Frederic Pearson, "The UN and Regional Organizations in the Control of Conventional Arms Transfers," paper presented at the Center for Defense Information conference, "Conventional Arms Transfer Restraint in the 1990's," Washington, DC, November 16, 1994, pp. 68-82.
12. "Wassenaar Members Review Data Exchange," Arms Control Today, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May 1997), p. 32.
13. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," Article XXI; and "Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength," Vienna, May 15-31, 1996. For additional information on the treaty and force levels, see Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty (Washington, DC: On-Site Inspection Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, 1996), pp. 2-3, 15-30. For one ambitious proposal to promote more extensive control of conventional forces, see Task Force on Peace and Security, United Nations Association of the USA, National Capital Area, "A Global Treaty for Reducing Conventional Arms and Armed Conflict," Washington, DC, February 28, 1997.
14. Edward J. Laurance, "Surplus Weapons and the Micro-Disarmament Process," paper presented at the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs Workshop on Micro-Disarmament, "A New Agenda for Disarmament and Arms Control," Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 8, 1995; Juanita Darling, "Gun-Swap Project Overwhelmed by Response in War-Weary Land," Los Angeles Times, October 5, 1996, p. A6; Juanita Darling, "Salvadoran Gun Swap Nets Quite an Arsenal," San Jose Mercury News, October 6, 1996, p. A20.
15. Suzanne Daley, "In Mozambique, Guns for Plowshares and Bicycles," New York Times, March 2, 1997, p. A3.
16. Defense spending in East Asia has increased in absolute terms, but has decreased as a percentage of GDP. The opposite is true for most other regions where both absolute defense spending and defense expenditure as a portion of GDP have declined. For evidence of the rise in East Asian defense spending over the past decade in contrast to other regions, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996/97 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 308, 311.
17. Ibid.
18. These 27 participating states are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Contacts among the world's militaries are more extensive than many realize. In particular, with the end of the Cold War, the volume of military-to-military contacts between East and West has grown significantly. In addition to multilateral contacts such as NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), the militaries of the world engage in a wide range of bilateral activities that include staff visits, exercises, personnel and unit exchanges, training cadres, and student exchanges. Military-to-military programs offer an important avenue for preventing deadly conflict by enhancing transparency, promoting confidence-building measures, improving communications, and increasing the professionalism among military institutions around the world. They offer significant potential to support arms control initiatives, improve multilateral peacekeeping operations by enhancing interoperability, and promote civil-military relations that support democratic institutions.
19. For information on the founding of the ASEAN Regional Forum, see Chairman's Statement: The First ASEAN Regional Forum, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Bangkok, July 25, 1994.
20. While these two nations will still pursue peaceful nuclear technologies, the ABACC will serve to implement the SCCC's ban on testing, storage, and possession of nuclear weapons. Tariq Rauf et al., Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 1996-1997 Edition (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1997), pp. 61-62.
21. For a theoretical discussion of the requirements for law within states, see Edward W. Lehman, The Viable Polity (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 23-60, 139-162; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, trans. Anders Wedberg, 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 15- 47, 181-267; Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Policing the New World Disorder," Strategic Forum No. 84 (October 1996), pp. 1-4.
22. For discussions of the successful characteristics of conflict management, negotiations, and settlement, see Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994); Donald Rothchild, "Conclusion: Management of Conflict in West Africa," in Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997), pp. 197-277; I. William Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); I. William Zartman, "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution," in Conflict Resolution in Africa, eds. Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 299-319.
23.For a discussion of the relationship between conflict and economic growth, opportunity, and performance, see Milton J. Esman, "Economic Performance and Ethnic Conflict," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 477-490, especially 484 and 489. For examples of how inequitable access to economic opportunity has prompted conflict, and how economic reforms have helped to resolve those conflicts, see Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996), especially pp. 122-131; and Alicia Levine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," in The International Dimensions of International Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996).
24. United Nations Department of Public Information, "Platform for Action," The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 46-56.
25. Advances in the global and economic and social agendas have resulted from several other world conferences as well, such as the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development, the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, and the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women.
26. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 6-10.
27. Sudhir Anand and Amartya K. Sen, Sustainable Human Development: Concepts and Priorities, United Nations Development Program, Office of Development Studies Discussion Paper Series (New York, 1996), pp. 4, 27-31.
28. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), p. 92.
29. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, DPI/876, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995).
30. See Frank Newman and David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co, 1996), pp. xxvi, 8, 14.
31. See United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, DPI/876, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1988); Helsinki Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
32. See Helsinki Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975); Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, November 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 193 (1991).
33. The United States' annual country reports on human rights practices have stirred controversy since their inception in 1971, but only in recent years have they taken on greater prominence in shaping policy. See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996--Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997).
34. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees 1995: In Search of Solutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 57.
35. Frank Newman and David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 19-21.
36. For a theoretical examination of international arbitration and the role of the arbiter, see Gregory A. Raymond, Conflict Resolution and the Structure of the State System: An Analysis of Arbitrative Settlements (Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers, Inc., 1980) pp. 1-25; John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 188-201.
37. Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
38. For a general discussion of mediation, its use, success, failure, and advantages over arbitration, see John Burton, op. cit., pp. 180-193, 220-223; Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 64-85; I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 445-461.
39. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 244-245; John Pinder, "Community Against Conflict: The European Community's Contribution to Ethno-National Peace in Europe," in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1996), pp. 170-171; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd ed., eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 55; Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, Ethnic Conflict as a Pathology of the State: A New Conceptual Approach (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and the Fund for Peace, Washington, DC, 1996).
40. In an examination of the preventive value of various power-sharing techniques, Timothy D. Sisk discusses three ways in which such opportunities can be preserved: federalism, to establish clear institutional links between center and regional/local power centers; vote pooling, an outgrowth of electoral systems that "force" majority groups to form coalitions; and presidential systems, to permit the election of a broadly supported leader with the potential to serve a unifying, nation-building role. See Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 27-46. Sisk's comments draw heavily upon the work of Donald L. Horowitz. See Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 601-652.
41. See, for example, Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Stuart Bremer "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions 18, No. 3 (1993), pp. 231-249; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205-235; James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27-72; R. J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence within and between Nations: A Test against Published Results," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, No. 3 (September 1985), pp. 419-455; R. J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War, 5 vols. (Los Angeles: Sage, 1975-81); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also note 5 in chapter 2.
42. I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), pp. 267-273.
43. For a discussion of the transitions from military to civilian rule in Chile, see Javier Martínez and Alvaro Díaz, Chile: The Great Transformation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; and Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1996), pp. 8-40. For a similar discussion of the transformation in Argentina, see Felipe A. M. de la Blaze, Remaking the Argentine Economy (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), pp. 65-122.
44. I. William Zartman "Governance as Conflict Management in West Africa," in Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997), pp. 9-48, especially pp. 36-43.
45. For a comprehensive examination of truth commissions and other forms of "transitional justice," see Neil J. Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). See also Henry J. Steiner, ed., Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment, World Press Foundation Report #16 (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 1997).
46. Theodore Meron, "Preventing Genocide: The Contribution of War Crimes Tribunals to Peace, Reconciliation and Deterrence," lecture given in the Henkels Series on Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical and Policy Implications. University of Notre Dame, Report, The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, No. 12 (Spring 1997), pp. 23-24.
47. Kofi Annan, "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform," Report of the Secretary-General, A/51/168, July 14, 1997, para. 90.
48. For a general discussion of the democratization process, see Mohammed Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure" in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 37-51; Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996); Anthony Lake, After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990); I. William Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
49. Colin Nickerson, "In Quebec, Tribes Talk of Leaving; Indians, Inuit Claim Land Rights," Boston Globe, October 13, 1995, p. 1. See also David Kleesh, Gislain Becard, Paul Deer, Mathew Coon-Comb, and Ken Deer, interviewed by Scott Simon, Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, October 28, 1995.
50. Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Muller, eds., Political Handbook of the World: 1997 (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1997), pp. 76-77.
51. Central Office of Information, Britain 1997: An Official Handbook (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), p. 25.
52. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 133.
53. See James Carroll, "The Silence," The New Yorker, April 7, 1997, p. 68.
Chapter 5
1. Ian Smillie and Ian Filewod, "Norway," in Non-Governmental Organisations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, eds. Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (Paris: OECD, 1993), pp. 215-232.
2. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Preventing Violent Conflict: A Study (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997), pp. 44-45. See also a recent article by Sweden's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for reflections on enhancing the UN's conflict prevention efforts: Jan Eliasson, "Establishing Trust in the Healer: Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the United Nations," in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Basic Books and The Center for International Health Cooperation, 1996), pp. 318-343.
3. See Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Report of the Government of Canada, September 1995; Dick A. Leurdijk, ed., A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 1995).
4. The preventive defense strategy developed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry centers on preventing conflict through U.S. engagement with allies and former enemies. Preventive defense seeks to halt the outbreak of conflict by turning adversaries into partners. Taking the Marshall Plan as its model, preventive defense is based on enhancing alliances and bilateral relationships, regional confidence building, constructive engagement, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Initiatives such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program, the US-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (Gore-Chernomyrdin), Partnership for Peace (PFP), the NATO-Russian Charter (the Founding Act), and International Military Education and Training programs with centers in Germany and Hawaii are central to promoting stability and monitoring developments in a number of regions on the brink of conflict. For example, Partnership for Peace's military exercises and civilian meetings have created an expanding network of security relationships in Europe, building confidence, increasing transparency, and reducing tensions. Likewise, maintaining strong ties with partners in Asia and engaging with China, India, Pakistan, and others to increase understanding and avert crises are vital elements of preventive defense. Similar efforts are under way in Africa and the Americas.
Continuing the focus on prevention, Secretary of Defense William Cohen emphasizes the importance of U.S. global engagement to shape the international security environment. This strategy is based on the view that maintaining order and stability requires strong U.S. leadership to promote peace, prosperity, and democracy, and for this purpose military-to-military cooperation and nonproliferation programs remain a high priority for the Department of Defense. See William S. Cohen, The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1997); William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1996); William J. Perry, speech at the Aspen Institute Congressional Program conference, "US Relations with Russia," Dresden, Germany, August 20, 1997.
5. Craig Turner, "Canada's Diplomacy Coup Amazes U.S.; Ottawa's Land Mines Fight Mixed Skill and Determination," Toronto Star, August 31, 1997, p. A1; Ved Nanda, "U.S. Wise to Join Land-Mine Ban Talks," Denver Post, August 29, 1997, p. B7.
6. Labor organizations have often provided a channel for broad-based constructive political expression. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was instrumental in building a politically engaged nonwhite middle class in South Africa. COSATU called for peaceful marches, held strikes, and was party to negotiations with government and employers. On a global scale, an organization that has promoted social justice and internationally recognized human and labor rights is the International Labor Organization (ILO), a UN specialized agency. The ILO along with the governments of member states and their employees have created a system of international standards in all work-related areas, such as the abolition of forced labor, freedom of association, and equality of treatment and opportunity. Alan Cowell, "The Struggle: Power and Politics in South Africa's Black Trade Unions," New York Times, June 15, 1986, p. 14; Juliette Saunders, "South African Workers to Stage Nationwide Protests," Reuters European Business Report, June 18, 1995. For more information on the International Labor Organization, see their Internet site at http://www.ilo.org./.
7. One observer identifies four "crises" and two "revolutions" which account for the dramatic increase in NGO activities. The crisis of the modern welfare state, the development crisis brought on by the rise in oil prices and global recession in the 1970s, global environmental damage, and a crisis of socialism have all limited or delegitimized the role of governments in meeting the needs of their citizens. Increasingly, people are turning to the private sector to fill the void left by the state. The ability for collective private action has been greatly enhanced by the revolutionary growth in communications technology, which has made possible global organization and mobilization. The second revolution was brought about by the growth of the global economy in the 1960s and early 1970s. This in turn spurred the development of a middle class in many parts of the developing world. This social class has been particularly active in developing and supporting the work of NGOs in its communities. Lester M. Salamon, "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector," Foreign Affairs 73, No. 4 (July/August 1994), pp. 109-122; Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 50-66.
As mentioned earlier, NGOs can also provide early warning of deteriorating circumstances and suggestions regarding the best approach to conflict resolution. The London-based International Alert is a prominent example of an NGO involved in early warning and monitoring of conflict situations. Formed in 1985, the organization provides training for conflict negotiators, serves as a neutral mediator, and shares information on indicators of conflict and emergency situations. For more information, see International Alert Annual Report 1994 (London: International Alert, 1995). A more recent example is the Brussels-based International Crisis Group that was formed in 1995 and focuses primarily on trying to mobilize governments and international organizations to take preventive action.
8. See Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
9. See Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 13-56; Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, "Operational Dilemmas and Challenges," in Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention, eds. Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 130-131.
10. Cyrus R. Vance and Herbert S. Okun, "Creating Healthy Alliances: Leadership and Coordination among NGOs, Governments and the United Nations in Times of Emergency and Conflict," in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 194-195.
11. A number of international NGOs, including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam, International Save the Children Alliance, and Lutheran World Relief, have subscribed to a common code of conduct to guide their mutual activities. This code is a voluntary agreement acknowledging the right to humanitarian assistance as a fundamental principle for all citizens of all countries. In addition, InterAction, an umbrella organization of 160 U.S. NGOs, established InterAction Private Voluntary Organization Standards to create a common set of values for each member agency to follow and to enhance the public's trust in the ideals and operations of its members. See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, http://www.ifrc.org/; and InterAction, PVO Standards (Washington, DC: InterAction, 1995, amended May 1, 1996).
12. Joe Hinds, A Guide to Peace, Reconciliation and Community Relations Projects in Ireland (Belfast, Northern Ireland: Community Relations Council, 1994), pp. 36-37; Mustafa Ceric, Vinko Puljic, Nikolaj Mrdja, and Jakob Finci, "Press Release," Inter-Religious Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, June 9, 1997.
13. For a detailed analysis of the role of the Community of Sant'Egidio, see Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp. 3-4, 15-19, 33, 145.
The first direct contact between the leadership of the insurgents (RENAMO) and the FRELIMO government took place at Sant'Egidio in Rome on July 8, 1990. Not long thereafter, two members of Sant'Egidio were enlisted as primary mediators and served in that capacity for the ten rounds of peace talks held at Sant'Egidio headquarters in Rome before the General Peace Accord was signed on October 4, 1992. (Joining Bishop Jaime Goncalves on the mediation team were Sant'Egidio's founder and leader, Andrea Riccardi, and Don Mateo Zuppi, a parish priest in Rome. A fourth team member, Mario Raffaelli, represented the Italian government.) In concert with the Italian government and other governments, Sant'Egidio maintained a momentum for peace among the two parties until the accord was signed.
This diplomatic solution to the conflict, however, was only the beginning. The challenge after 1992 was to maintain the peace so that postwar reconstruction efforts could begin to rebuild the nation's economic infrastructure. The primary problem was a social one: reconciling old enemies and ministering to a brutalized generation were essential to successful implementation. Nearly all of "the best-informed observers" predicted the breakdown of the accords due to ill will, inefficient bureaucracy, and immobilizable resources. What they failed to predict, however, was the capacity of local people and institutions to create the framework for locally brokered cease-fire and conflict resolution procedures. As the representatives of Sant'Egidio knew, the grassroots churches were well placed to fulfill this role, both to bring RENAMO and FRELIMO together, and to mobilize people around reconciliation and rebuilding communities. After the war, local churches served as mediating institutions, facilitating the reintegration of RENAMO soldiers into Mozambican society. The churches' relief agencies then expanded their operations into areas previously occupied by RENAMO. Representatives of Sant'Egidio helped sponsor the training of "social integrators" to bring the reconciliation process into local communities. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).
14. All Africa Council of Churches, "Recommendations of the Conference of Christian Churches of the Democratic Republic of Congo," Kinshasa, July 26, 1997; All Africa Conference of Churches, "Contribution of Christian Women at the Conference of Christian Churches of Congo," Kinshasa, July 25, 1997.
15. In Chicago, in 1993, for only the second time in history, a Parliament of the World's Religions was convened. This gathering passed a "Declaration Toward a Global Ethic." People from very different religious backgrounds for the first time agreed on core guidelines for behavior which they affirm in their own traditions. This statement attempted to clarify what religions all over the world hold in common and formulated a minimal ethic which is essential for human survival. See Hans Küng, "The Parliament of the World's Religions: Declaration of a Global Ethic," in Yes to a Global Ethic, ed. Hans Küng (New York: Continuum, 1996), pp. 2-96.
16. The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs were founded by physicist Joseph Rotblat to eliminate the role played by nuclear weapons in international politics. The conferences are rooted in the common humanity of all peoples, rather than in national loyalties. Participants are invited in a personal capacity, not as representatives of governments or institutions. Pugwash urges scientists to consider the social, moral, and ethical implications of their work. There have been more than 200 Pugwash conferences, attracting over 10,000 scientists, academics, politicians, and military figures. Among their many contributions, they have laid the groundwork for the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Recently, the conferences have also begun to discuss poverty and environmental issues. Student Pugwash groups, which discuss these same issues in high schools and universities, have been formed in 24 nations; 50 chapters exist in the United States alone. "Pugwash Conferences Wins 1995 Peace Prize," Associated Press, October 13, 1995; "Rotblat: First Nuclear Protester," Reuters Information Service, October 13, 1995.
17. Other experiments demonstrate the power of shared, highly valued, superordinate goals that can only be achieved by cooperative effort. Such goals can override the differences that people bring to the situation, and often have a powerful, unifying effect. Classic experiments readily made strangers at a boys' camp into enemies by isolating them from one another and heightening competition. But when powerful superordinate goals were introduced, enemies were transformed into friends.
These experiments have been replicated in work with business executives and other kinds of groups with similar results. So the effect is certainly not limited to children and youth. Indeed, the findings have pointed to the beneficial effects of working cooperatively under conditions that lead people to formulate a new, inclusive group, going beyond the subgroups with which they entered the situation. Such effects are particularly strong when there are tangibly successful outcomes of cooperation--for example, clear rewards from cooperative learning in school or at work. They have important implications for childrearing and education. Ameliorating the problem of intergroup relations rests upon finding better ways to foster child and adolescent development, as well as utilizing crucial opportunities to educate young people in conflict resolution and in mutual accommodation.
18. See W.D. Hawley and A.W. Jackson, eds., Toward a Common Destiny: Improving Race and Ethnic Relations in America (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995).
19. See E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 274-283.
20. For one treatment of this linkage, see Nik Gowing, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).
21. For example, Internews Network, a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting international understanding through the innovative use of broadcast media, sponsors conflict prevention training programs on free media in the former Soviet Union. It contributes to developing independent media programming to aid public understanding of sustainable market reform and democracy and develops guidelines and codes of ethics to help former Soviet reporters cover conflict objectively without aggravating tensions. Internews has worked closely with local nongovernmental media to provide training, equipment, technical and organizational know-how, and news exchanges to help develop objective journalism at the national, regional, and local levels. Seminars have been initiated to strengthen television journalists' sense of responsibility, impartiality, and accuracy in reporting conflicts, and to heighten their awareness of the devastating effects of irresponsible reporting. The program consists of ten week-long seminars on the coverage of ethnic conflict, balanced news reporting, station management, and technical aspects of production.
Table N-2
Activities of UN Agencies
Field: Agency
Atomic Energy: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Children: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Civil Aviation: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Disaster Relief: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA)
Education/Science/Culture: United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Environment: United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP)
Food/Agriculture: Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Food Council (WFC), World Food Programme (WFP) HealthWorld Health Organization (WHO)
Human Settlements: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS)
Industrial Development: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
Intellectual Property: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Labor: International Labor Organization (ILO)
Maritime: International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Meteorology: World Meteorology Organization (WMO)
Monetary Policy: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Narcotic Drugs: ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Population: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
Postal Regulations: Universal Postal Union (UPU)
Refugees: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Research/Training: United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), United Nations University (UNU) TelecommunicationsInternational Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Trade/Development: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Trade/Tariffs: World Trade Organization (WTO)
Women: United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women
Source: Chadwick F. Alger, "Thinking About the Future of the UN System," Global Governance 2, No. 3 (Sept.-Dec. 1996), pp. 335-360.
Also working in the former Soviet Union is the Commission on Radio and Television Policy, cochaired by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Eduard Sagalaev, president of the Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation. The commission is made up of 50 respected figures from the mass media, academia, and public survey institutions in the former Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States. Commissioners gather annually to debate media issues and adopt recommendations based on analyses of working groups. Prior working groups have dealt with issues such as television coverage of minorities and changing economic relations arising from democratization, privatization, and new technologies. The commission has also published two policy guidebooks which have been translated into more than a dozen languages, and are used by governmental and nongovernmental groups in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East, and Ethiopia. See Television and Elections (1992) and Television/Radio News and Minorities (1994).
22. See Voice of America, Conflict Resolution Project Annual Report (Washington, DC: Voice of America, 1997).
23. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report No. 9 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); James A. Schear, "Riding the Tiger: The UN and Cambodia," in UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 135-191; John M. Sanderson, "Preparation for Deployment and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations: A Cambodia Snapshot," in Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, eds. Kevin Clements and Christine Wilson (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994). According to James Schear, who served as an assistant to the head of UNTAC, Yasushi Akashi, Radio UNTAC "gained a reputation as the most popular and credible radio station in the country, and was widely listened to in Khmer Rouge areas."
24. The growing importance and influence of an increasingly effective women's rights movement was reflected in the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, attended by more than 30,000 women representing 189 countries. The significance of this event lies not only in its opportunity for women from around the world to meet and discuss issues of transnational concern, but also to learn ways to facilitate deeper contact. In particular, the conference emphasized electronic networking as a means by which women might gain access to information and share ideas on a worldwide basis, a resource not available a few years ago. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1996), p. 351; further information can be found at the UN website, Women, the Information Revolution and the Beijing Conference, http://www.un.org/dpcsd/daw/.
Chapter 6
1. Jesse Helms, "Saving the U.N.," Foreign Affairs 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 2-7; James Holtje, Divided It Stands: Can the United Nations Work? (Atlanta, GA: Turner Publishing, Inc., 1995); Peter Wilenski, "The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold War Period," in United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles In International Relations, eds. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 437-467.
2. For an insightful examination of many of the United Nations' early efforts and innovations in peace and security operations, as examined through the life of United Nations diplomat Ralph Bunche, see Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1993). See also William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).
3. The United Nations undertakes a number of tasks in addition to its more publicized work in areas such as peace and security, development, and human rights. Table N.2 identifies many of these fields and corresponding United Nations agencies. A Council on Foreign Relations study highlighted many of these roles as they relate to the U.S. national interest in an effective United Nations. See American National Interest and the United Nations: Statement and Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996).
4. United Nations Childrens Fund, State of the World's Children 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
5. United States Mission to the United Nations, "Global Humanitarian Emergencies 1996" (New York: February 1996), pp. 3-4; U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1997 (Washington, DC: Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1997), pp. 5-6; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 255; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR by Numbers 1996" (Geneva: UNHCR Public Information Section, July 1996), p. 12.
6. For varying perspectives on the role of the United Nations secretary-general, see Thomas E. Boudreau, Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary-General and the Prevention of International Conflict (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the United Nations and Its Secretary-General," in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 16-32; Thomas M. Franck and Georg Nolte, "The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General," in The UN and International Security after the Cold War: The UN's Roles in International Relations, eds. A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 143-182; James Holtje, Divided It Stands: Can the United Nations Work? (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, Inc., 1995), pp. 97-124; Giandomenico Picco, "The UN and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary-General Out of It," Foreign Affairs 73, No. 5 (September/October 1994), pp. 14-18; Brian Urquhart, "The Role of the Secretary-General," in U.S. Foreign Policy and the United Nations System, eds. Charles William Maynes and Richard S. Williamson (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 212-228.
7. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), see especially pp. 354-355; Peter James Spielmann, "U.N. Chief Considers Reconvening Peace Talks on Bosnia," Associated Press, May 28, 1993.
8. See Olara Otunnu, "The Peace-and-Security Agenda of the United Nations: From a Crossroads into the Next Century," in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century, report of the 25th Vienna Seminar cosponsored by the Government of Austria and the International Peace Academy, March 2-4, 1995 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1995), pp. 66-82.
9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 44.
10. Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 71.
11. Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (New York: United Nations, 1997), para. 110.
12. Ibid., see especially para. 67, 76-79, 111-116, 180-184, 198. Prevention is an element of several other areas of interest in the secretary-general's report, including: drug control, crime prevention, and counterterrorism, para. 143-145; improving UN coordination with civil society, para. 207-216; and general managerial reform to streamline UN operations to eliminate duplication and enhance cooperation and information sharing, Annex.
13. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1995).
14. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Development (New York: United Nations, 1995).
15. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: United Nations, 1996).
16. See John Stremlau and Francisco Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming). The only international financial institution that has a mandate to support the internal political development of borrowing states is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See Melanie H. Stein, "Conflict Prevention in Transition Economies: A Role for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development?" in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 339-378.
17. In his report to the General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recommended that a commission be established to study the need for fundamental change in the system at large. The Commission supports this call for the reasons outlined herein. Kofi Annan, op. cit., para. 89.
18. This section draws on a study prepared for the Commission by Connie Peck of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). For further discussions on the relative strengths and weaknesses of regional organizations, see Charles Van der Donckt, Looking Forward by Looking Back: A Pragmatic Look at Conflict and the Regional Option, Policy Staff Paper No. 95/01, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, September 1995; Ruth Wedgwood, "Regional and Subregional Organizations in International Conflict Management," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 275-285.
19. The charters and treaties of many regional organizations explicitly acknowledge the importance of the United Nations and the primacy of the principles embodied in the UN Charter. The Organization of African Unity Charter (1963) states that one of the group's purposes is "to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) highlights the necessity of "adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter" in the Bangkok Declaration (1967) and the Singapore Declaration of 1992 affirms ASEAN's "commitment to the centrality of the UN role in the maintenance of international peace and security as well as promoting cooperation for socioeconomic development." The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) reaffirms the "commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn[s] all violations of these principles. We recognize with satisfaction the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness...." The European Union's Maastricht Treaty seeks "to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." The oldest of the regional organizations, the Organization of American States, resolves "to persevere in the noble undertaking that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles and purposes they solemnly reaffirm." Even the Treaty of Washington that led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) takes full cognizance of the UN Charter and its principles as well as the rights and responsibilities of the Security Council and member states of the UN.
20. Ruth Wedgwood, "Regional and Subregional Organizations in International Conflict Management," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 276-278.
21. Richard Feinberg, "The Coup That Wasn't," Washington Post, April 30, 1996, p. A13.
Chapter 7
1. This section draws upon research into human conflict and education over the past several decades. See, for example, David Hamburg, "An Evolutionary Perspective on Human Aggression," in The Development and Integration of Behavior: Essays in Honor of Robert Hinds, ed. P. Bateson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); B. Smuts, D. Cheney, et al., Primate Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); M. Brewer and R. Kramer, "The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior," Annual Review of Psychology 36 (1985), pp. 219-243; A. Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973); D. T. Campbell, " Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives," in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. D. T. Campbell (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965); G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Doubleday, 1958); J. Groebel and R. Hinde, Aggression and War: Their Biological and Social Bases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); W. D. Hawley and A. W. Jackson, eds., Toward a Common Destiny: Improving Race and Ethnic Relations in America (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995); E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); M. Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973).
2. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, "A Culture of Peace and Nonviolence within Educational Institutions: Elements for the Launching of an Interregional Project," draft paper prepared November 23, 1995. UNESCO publishes newsletters and other information on the Culture of Peace programs on its website: http://www.unesco.org/cpp/
3. Mikhail Gorbachev, "On Nonviolent Leadership," in Leadership (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming).
4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Leadership and Conflict," in Leadership (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming).
5. For a sampling of the literature regarding bureaucratic decision making, primarily in the U.S., see Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security (New York: The Free Press, 1988); Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Jacquelyn K. Davis, National Security Decisions: The Participants Speak (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990); D.A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," International Security 17 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation," International Security 18 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107; E. Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?" World Politics 47 (October 1994), pp. 1-41; Irmtraud N. Gallhofer and Willem E. Saris, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 28-33.
6. Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 1-12.
7. Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn't," Foreign Policy 101 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 102-115.
8. Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, An Emerging Consensus: A Study of American Public Attitudes on America's Role in the World: Summary of Findings (College Park, MD: Program on International Policy Attitudes, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1996), p. 1.
9. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Security in the New Order: Presidents, Polls, and the Use of Force," in Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy, eds. Daniel Yankelovich and I.M. Destler (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), pp. 238-239.
10. Ibid.
11. Daniel Yankelovich and John Immerwahr, "The Rules of Public Engagement," in Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy, eds. Daniel Yankelovich and I.M. Destler (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), pp. 43-77.
Appendix 2
1. Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
2.Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 31.
3.Peter de Costa, "Combining Against Conflict," Africa Report 37, No. 5 (September-October 1992), pp. 21-26.
4."African Charter on Human and People's Rights," O.A.U. Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5.
5.Diana Chigas, with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp, "Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation," in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 25-97.
6.Reinhardt Rummel, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict Prevention (London: International Alert and Saferworld, 1996), p. 16.
7.Reinhardt Rummel, Common Foreign and Security Policy, p. 42; European Information Service, "Human Rights: EU Needs To Put Teeth into Policy," European Report, December 7, 1996; and European Information Service, "Human Rights: European Parliament Seeks Reform of EU Policy," European Report, December 14, 1996.