1. Draft of a speech for Jefferson Day. See James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 597.
2. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), Chapter 2, "Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions," p. 35.
3. Margaret Doxey, personal communication, December 7, 1995. Articles 39 and 41 can be decoupled, as happened in the case of the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Britain did not seek sanctions as a follow-up to the determination that a breach of the peace had occurred.
4. G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, and K.A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: IIE, 1990 ). Chapter 5, "Conclusions and Recommendations." This study does not include sanctions after 1990, although an updated version of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered is in preparation. In addition, the Council on Foreign Relations will sponsor a study group on post-Cold War sanctions that will be directed by Richard Haass.
5. R.N. Cooper, untitled address to International Institute of Strategic Studies, September 1994, on economic sanctions and incentives includes a critique of Hufbauer et al.
6. Hufbauer, et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Introduction.
7. H.J. Aaron, R.R. Bryant, S.M. Collins, and R.Z. Lawrence, "Preface to the Studies on Integrating National Economies," in A. Krueger, ed., Trade Policies and Developing Nations (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995).
8. World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995), p. 1.
9. The ten "Big Emerging Markets" identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce are: China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong), India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, South Africa, Poland, and Argentina. J. Stremlau, "Clinton's Dollar Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, No. 97, Winter 1994-95.
10. See: M.P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), Chapter 9, "The Case of South Africa."
11. Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, p. 47.
12. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 17.
13. George Lopez, personal communication, December 17, 1995.
14. For a detailed account of this diplomatic campaign see: James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995), Chapter 16, "Building the Coalition."
15. Jose E. Alvarez, "The Once and Future Security Council," in Order and Disorder After the Cold War, A Washington Quarterly Reader, Brad Roberts, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 413-428.
16. Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, p. 48.
17. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, and 666.
18. B.W. Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: Norton, 1994).
19. See: D.E. Reuther, "UN Sanctions Against Iraq," in D. Cortright and G.A. Lopez, (eds.) Economic Sanctions (Boulder: Westview, 1995), and Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, "Iraq," pp. 39-40.
20. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687.
21. T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), "Summary and Implications," p. 315.
22. See: J. Dreze and H. Gazder, "Hunger and Poverty in Iraq," World Development 20, No. 7 (1992).
23. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudi with Key Role in War Calls for End to Iraqi Sanctions," New York Times, December 14, 1995, section A, p. 3, late edition. Quotes Prince Khalid bin Sultan, a nephew of King Fahd and son of Saudi Arabia's Defense Minister.
24. See: Eric Rouleau, "The View from France: America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1995.
25. For a brief report of the CSCE Berlin ministerial meeting and the immediate reactions of the six leaders of the Yugoslav republics, see: Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 478-84.
26. Ibid., p. 638.
27. United Nations Security Council Resolution 713.
28. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 647.
29. United Nations Security Council Resolution 757.
30. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 752, 757, 787, and 820.
31. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 649.
32. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Wellington House, 1995), p. 363.
33. Ibid.
34. Lord Owen details this arduous diplomatic campaign from the autumn of 1992 until he stepped down in the spring of 1995. His memoirs are supplemented with television footage, sound, pictures, and detailed documentation on CD-ROM.
35. Ibid., p. 125.
36. Sonja Licht, "The Use of Sanctions in Former Yugoslavia," in D. Cortright and G.A. Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions, pp. 153-160.
37. In a lengthy memorandum to the EC foreign ministers dated July 22, 1994, Lord Owen noted that two-way traffic across the Serbian-Macedonian border exceeded 2,000 trucks and 450 railway wagons per week, which prompted him to call for a tightening of sanctions, and adequate compensation for the financially strapped government of Macedonia. If this failed to persuade the FRY to act against the Bosnian Serbs, he urged withdrawal of UNPROFOR from both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the use of force-lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina and air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, pp. 288-89.
38. Bill Clinton, interview by Wolf Blitzer, CNN, December 14, 1995.
39. United Nations Security Council Resolution 748.
40. United Nations Security Council Resolution 883.
41. "UN Sanctions Prompt Gadaffi To Send Home 1M Africans," Financial Times, October 19, 1995.
42. United Nations Security Council Resolution 788.
43. United Nations Security Council Resolution 733.
44. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 812 and 846.
45. United Nations Security Council Resolution 864.
46. "Nigeria Foaming," The Economist, November 18, 1995.
47. CommuniquÈ, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Auckland, New Zealand, November 10-13, 1995.
48. Nicholas Phythian, "Francophone Summit Urges Democracy in Nigeria," Reuters, December 4, 1995.
49. "UN Body Condemns Nigerian Executions," Reuters World Service, December 15, 1995.
50. "OAU Backs Nigeria's Military Rulers," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 7, 1995.
51. Paul Lewis, "U.S. Seeking Tougher Sanctions to Press Nigeria for Democracy," New York Times, March 12, 1996, section A, p. 1.
52. Concluding Statement, First Meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration, Marlborough House, London, December 18-20, 1995.
53. For example, in a rare display of cross-party agreement, Canada's Parliamentary Standing Foreign Affairs Committee on December 14, 1995, called on the government to "take a strong leadership role in coordination of an enforceable oil embargo against Nigeria with the United States of America, the European Union and other partners to stop the military terror in Nigeria. . . ." Legislation to tighten more limited sanctions-not including an oil embargo-has also been proposed or passed in the U.S. and several European countries, and there is a growing movement among human rights and other public interest groups to press their governments for full sanctions against Nigeria.
54. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission of the Secretary-General to Nigeria, April 23, 1996, United Nations, established pursuant to UN Resolution 50/199 adopted by the General Assembly on December 22, 1995. The mission comprised: Justice Atsu-Koffi Amega of Togo, Justice V.S. Malimath of India, and John P. Pace from the office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights.
55. Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group: Concluding Statement, Marlborough House, London, April 23, 1996.
56. David Ljunggren, "Nigeria Spared Commonwealth Sanctions for Now," Reuters, June 25, 1996.
57. "Nigeria's Diplomatic Coup in Commonwealth Group," text of report by NTA TV, Lagos, June 28, 1996.
58. Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996, February 1996, pp. 17-18. Copies may be obtained by telephoning the ECOSOC section of the United States Mission to the United Nations at (212) 415-4275.
59. See: Gian Luca Burci, "The Indirect Effects of United Nations Sanctions on Third States: The Role of Article 50 of the UN Charter," African Yearbook of International Law, 1995, pp. 157-171.
60. Andrew Yarrow, "United Nations Sanctions Committees," Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, unpublished working paper, May 1995.
61. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1, January 3, 1995, p. 27.
62. United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 47-120B.
63. Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, Implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations related to assistance to third states affected by the application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, Report of the Secretary-General. A/50/361, August 22, 1995.
64. A/Res/50/51, 29 January 1996.
65. Howard W. French, "Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000 Children a Month," New York Times, Nov. 9, 1993, section A, p. 1.
66. See for example, "Health Effects of Sanctions on Iraq," editorial, The Lancet, 346 (8988), December 2, 1995, p. 1439.
67. Typically, the committees receive notification of shipments of medical supplies and foodstuffs. In the case of Haiti, the committee deals with issues of humanitarian relief by international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The Libya committee dealt with issues of medical evacuations in addition to humanitarian imports of medicines and foods. Yarrow, "United Nations Sanctions Committees" (see note 60).
68. International Report, "The Conlon Report: The Trouble with Sanctions," Vol 1/No. 62, June 27, 1995.
69. George Lopez, personal communication, December 17, 1995.
70. A U.S. public opinion poll taken December 1-3, 1995, for the United Nations Association of the United States of America revealed UN performance ratings at an historical high, with 54 percent saying the UN is doing "a good job." UNA-USA Press Release, December 7, 1995. For a fuller assessment of the U.S. public's view of the UN see: Steven Kull "What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn't" Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter 1995-96). For a description of how U.S. politicians continue to successfully exploit the UN's shortcomings for partisan advantage see: Jeremy D. Rosner, "The Know-Nothings Know Something," Foreign Policy, No. 101 (Winter 1995-96).
71. John Stremlau, "Stifling The UN Shortchanges U.S.," Christian Science Monitor, April 23, 1996, and "`Beggar Thy Neighbor': The Politics of UN Insolvency," August 1995, unpublished report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
72. International Report, "The Conlan Report," (see note 68).
73. Richard Vork, "The EU/OSCE-Sanctioned Assistance Missions and SAMCOM: Implementation of the United Nations Sanctions Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Those Areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina Held by Bosnia Serb Forces," 1995.
74. Paul Conlon, "Sanctions Infrastructure and Activities of the United Nations: A Critical Assessment," unpublished draft report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, August 31, 1995.
75. Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, para. 75.
76. Conlon, "Sanctions Infrastructure," p. 21.
77. The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century, A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, (New York: Ford Foundation, 1995), pp. 23-24. Our Global Neighbourhood, The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 106-108.
78. UN Sanctions as a Tool of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Non-Paper by Australia and the Netherlands, prepared for the UN-Congress on Public International Law, New York, 13-17 March 1995, unpublished.
79. Conlon, "Sanctions Infrastructure," p. 17.
80. Andrew Yarrow, "Office of Foreign Assets Controls (U.S. Treasury)" and "The State Department's Role and Concerns about Sanctions," unpublished draft reports to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 1995.
81. Conlon, "Sanctions Infrastructure," p. 23.
82. Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993), Chapter 9.
83. Report of the Collective Measures Committee, General Assembly Officials Records Succession, A/1891, New York, 1951 and A/2215, 1952.
84. For an excellent survey of the relative strengths and weaknesses of regional security arrangements see: Charles Van de Donckt, Looking Forward by Looking Back: A Pragmatic Look at Conflict and the Regional Option, Policy Staff Paper No. 95/01 (Ottawa, Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, September 1995).
85. "Africans Vote for Sanctions Against Coup in Burundi," New York Times, August 1, 1996.
86. See, for example: Daniel J. Kaufman, The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict, Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming.
87. See, for example, Melanie H. Stein, "Conflict Prevention in Transition Economies: A Role for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development?" in Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1996).
88. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Towards a Framework for Multilateral Sanctions, paper prepared for the Carter Center Conflict Resolution Program, March 25-26, 1996.
89. Our Global Neighbourhood, The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Chapter 5, "Reforming the United Nations," pp. 225-302.
90. The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century, a report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations (see note 77).
91. John F. Kennedy, speech to the UN General Assembly, September 20, 1963.