ARTURO VALENZUELA
DECEMBER 1999
CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY
CONFLICT
CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK
Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, the Commission seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.
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The Ditchley Conference summary and Note by the Director are copyright 1999
by The Ditchley Foundation and reprinted with permission.
01 00 99 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
On April 22, 1996, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy of Paraguay asked army commander General Lino César Oviedo to resign.1 The general's refusal to comply with the presidential order precipitated a constitutional crisis that threatened to interrupt Paraguay's fragile democratic transition. It also threatened to bring to an end a remarkable recent democratic consolidation in the Western Hemisphere, one characterized by an assertive collective defense of democracy by the nations of the region through the Organization of American States (OAS).
With the exception of Cuba, the entire Western Hemisphere is governed by leaders who came to power through more-or-less fair and transparent elections. Never before have so many countries in the Americas been so close to living up to the republican and democratic ideals enshrined in constitutional documents promulgated in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Nor has the region experienced such a long period without severe and prolonged breakdowns. The only successful coup d'état in the hemisphere since the beginning of the current wave of democratic governance in the 1980s was a 1991 coup in Haiti that was followed by the restoration of constitutional president Jean-Bertrand Aristide by a U.S.-led multinational force.
This does not mean that democracy has been fully consolidated in the Americas, or that democratic governance has not experienced serious challenges. Although some countries in the region have long traditions of democratic rule, others are experimenting with it for the first time. In many countries, the basic institutions of democracy, including the holding of fair elections, are fragile. In others, the lack of effective judicial systems and conformity to the rule of law leaves citizens vulnerable to corruption and the abuse of power. Many nations are becoming disillusioned with petty party politics as weak and ineffective parties tarnish the image of legislatures and executives. In addition to the coup in Haiti, democratic rule has been blemished by unconstitutional disruptions in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru, and military insubordination has been threatened in Venezuela.
But most people in the region see democracy as a far better alternative to the corrupt and ineffective regimes of the past. For the first time in history, the problems of society are being addressed within democratic frameworks. In Latin America, two heads of state--Brazil's Fernando Collor de Mello and Venezuela's Carlos Andrés Pérez--have been impeached for corruption and replaced by constitutionally designated successors. In the past, comparable allegations would have encouraged military coups.
Nor is the promotion and defense of democracy strictly an internal matter. In this new era of democratic governance, the nations of the hemisphere have affirmed their collective commitment to preserving democracy. Although democratic values have been enshrined in Latin American constitutions dating back to the early twentieth century, the defense of democracy in the region has in the past taken a back seat to other considerations. A turning point came in June 1991, when the member nations of the OAS met in Santiago to adopt a "Commitment to Democracy the Renewal of the Inter-American System," which declared their "firm political commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and representative democracy, as indispensable conditions for the stability, peace, and development of the region."
The Santiago Commitment was followed by the adoption of Resolution 1080 on representative democracy, which instructs the OAS secretary general to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council when anything disrupts the democratic process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of any of the Organization's member states. The Council members are to examine the situation and decide whether to convene a meeting of foreign ministers or a special session of the OAS General Assembly to adopt procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of democracy. The adoption of Resolution 1080 was followed a year later by the signing of the Washington Protocol, providing for the suspension of a member state if its democracy was overthrown by force. The protocol officially went into effect on September 25, 1997, after twenty nations signed it.
Prior to the crisis in Paraguay, Resolution 1080 had been invoked three times. Responding to events in Haiti in October 1991, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted Resolution 567, vigorously condemning the military coup that overthrew Aristide. The resolution was followed by concrete sanctions, including the imposition of a commercial blockade, a process that eventually led to United Nations-sponsored measures to restore democracy. In the case of Peru, the OAS, through the adoption of Resolution 579, deplored the dissolution of the Peruvian Congress and urged immediate action to restore democratic institutions. Pressure from the OAS contributed to the successful restoration of constitutional government in Peru over a period of months. Finally, with the adoption of Resolution 605, the OAS condemned the attempted "self-coup" in Guatemala in May of 1993, leading to the restoration of constitutional government in that country. In all of these cases, the constitutional order had clearly been interrupted by a military coup or executive action shutting down the national legislature. In Paraguay, democratic institutions had not been dismantled, but the insubordination of the country's most powerful military officer was an ominous development that threatened the country's fragile democracy.
Paraguay, a landlocked nation of close to 5 million inhabitants bordering on Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, had long been characterized by frequent coups d'état and civil conflicts. It had been involved in two international wars and had a practically unbroken tradition of authoritarianism. Civilian elected governments such as those of Emilio Aceval (1892-1902) and Eusebio Ayala (1932-36) were exceptions that proved the rule. Sharp rivalries between the traditional Liberal and Conservative (Colorado) parties defined the struggle for power. Control of the omnipresent state, with its vast patronage networks, regulatory authority over land and commerce, and monopoly over the armed forces and police, afforded the winners with enormous rewards while putting the losers at a sharp disadvantage.
General Alfredo Stroessner seized power in 1954 after a deadly civil conflict between Liberals and Colorados in 1947. He retained it for 35 years, ruling as one of a long line of Paraguayan "caudillos." His staunchly anti-communist and repressive regime relied on twin pillars he deftly manipulated: the armed forces and the Colorado Party. The military was bound to Stroessner through his control of appointments and promotions and its heavy involvement in state-sponsored contraband and corruption. The party was a vast patronage machine that mobilized support for the dictator in eight successive "elections." Opposition forces were either coopted or repressed.
Stroessner's grip began to loosen in the 1980s, as Paraguay was buffeted by a deep, hemisphere-wide economic crisis. Economic scarcity contributed to the growth of opposition forces, which in 1979 put aside their differences to launch a united campaign against the regime. Stroessner was overthrown in February 1989 by army officers previously loyal to him. This reflected not only an erosion of support among the population at large, but growing generational conflicts within the armed forces and the Colorado party. Stroessner's blatant efforts to impose his son, Gustavo, an air force colonel, as his successor, exacerbated the situation.
The leader of the coup, long-time Stroessner aide General Andrés Rodríguez, moved against his mentor for fear that the insurrection might pass him by. In a fierce battle in downtown Asunción, his army troops defeated Stroessner's Presidential Escort Battalion. Rodríguez called for elections within three months, making it impossible for an opposition to organize a credible challenge. The elections to finish Stroessner's term, in which Rodríguez himself was a candidate, were marred by allegations of fraud and by the overwhelming dominance of the Colorado machine. Nevertheless, the elections proved to be a first step in the gradual liberalization of the Colorado regime, including significant reforms in the electoral process and a growing tolerance for press freedom and freedom of association. In a dramatic manifestation of the growing strength of the opposition, independent candidate Carlos Filizzola defeated the Colorado party in the 1991 mayoralty election in Asunción, although the ruling party won a majority for the constituent assembly that produced the constitutional reform of 1992.
Paraguayans went to the polls in 1993, and for the first time ever, the highest office in the land was garnered by a civilian chosen in relatively free, direct, and competitive elections. The electoral process was closely monitored by the Organization of American States and international observers. Although some observers questioned the legitimacy of the primary elections that led to the choice of the Colorado party candidate, most agreed that the general elections were fair overall, even if state resources were used to support the official Colorado party candidate, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, who emerged victorious. While the Colorado party obtained the largest number of seats in the legislature, it fell short of an absolute majority. The Colorado party obtained 40 percent of the vote, followed by 32 percent for the Liberals (the Authentic Revolutionary Liberal party-PLRA), and 23 percent for the newly created Encuentro Nacional (EN).
The consolidation of democracy in a country with enormous economic and social disparities and no tradition of democratic governance is a daunting task, and Paraguay's new democracy has encountered many difficulties. Paraguay is one of the region's poorest countries, and the government has not been able to respond to the growing demands for improvements in the standard of living. Greater tolerance of dissent has resulted in a wave of peasant and labor protests, including general strikes, that have undermined the credibility of the regime and tarnished democratic government.
The president's ability to govern has also been circumscribed by Colorado party factionalism and his lack of congressional majorities. Wasmosy turned to the uncertain support of the opposition Liberal party and Encuentro Nacional in advancing his governmental agenda.
A businessman with little political experience, Wasmosy was also not able to put to rest the widespread perception that the state continued to be a vast patronage machine dispensing jobs to Colorado party faithful and special interests. Government officials benefited from corruption, including widespread smuggling and narcotics trafficking. Wasmosy's credibility was undermined by the fact that his own fortune stemmed from the largess of Stroessner and powerful party leaders who enabled his companies to benefit from huge public works projects, including the Itaipú dam. The president blocked attempts by opposition forces in Congress to strengthen the judicial system and reform the armed forces.
The new civilian president's most immediate problem, however, was the continued involvement of the military in politics and more directly in Colorado party politics, which undermined the authority of politicians and elected leaders. Ironically, Wasmosy owed his own election to the indispensable, and probably fraudulent, support that General César Oviedo gave him to prevent the election of José María Argaña, a rival Colorado leader.
Oviedo, a key supporter of the military coup of 1989 and a close aid to General Rodríguez, had been promoted from colonel to division general in only four years. He considered himself the most powerful man in Paraguay, preserving the perquisites of an officer corps accustomed to special favors and privileged access. He made no secret of his ambitions to run for president in 1998.
General Oviedo repeatedly pressed the president to do his bidding, demanding that Wasmosy follow his dictates regarding not only military appointments but also appointments to government posts and the Supreme Court. He made use of his influence within the Colorado party and Congress to thwart major government initiatives such as the floating of international bonds and the construction of a second bridge across the Paraná River. Finally, he brazenly interfered in the internal affairs of the Colorado party, including its internal election process.
Oviedo's interference in governmental decisions and party politics constituted a direct challenge to the president's authority and a serious threat to Paraguay's fragile democracy. As the struggle for power between the two men accelerated, Wasmosy asked for the general's resignation on several occasions, but in each case was forced to rescind his request. By the first quarter of 1996, the president's position had become untenable. The general's actions had reduced him to president in name only. Wasmosy understood that his survival as president depended on his ability to remove the commander of the army. And yet he was unsure of himself, fearing that any move would backfire and lead to a confrontation he wished to avoid.
The president realized that in any move against Oviedo he could count on the support of Air Force Commander General César Rafael Cramer, Navy Commander Vice Admiral Carlos Guillermo López Moreira, and Presidential Guard Commander Colonel Domingo de Guzmán Gaona, all bitter rivals of Oviedo and the Army. He could also count on the support of Armed-Forces Commander General Silvio Rafael Noguera, nominally Oviedo's superior but with no direct command over troops. A member of the army infantry, Noguera and his colleagues resented the fact that they had lost ground to Oviedo and his commanders in the more powerful cavalry since the 1989 coup. Noguera was concerned that Oviedo's unabashed political ambitions were damaging to the armed forces and their efforts to professionalize the institutions. Finally, the president could also depend on the national police, although police leaders were not informed beforehand of his intentions.
Despite this array of support, Wasmosy knew that Oviedo, as commander of the army, had an overwhelming military advantage over the other services and could count on the loyalty of his division commanders. Oviedo was also a belligerent and threatening man who enjoyed throwing his weight around, in sharp contrast to the reserved president.
Air Force General César Cramer and his officers had especially strong incentives for discouraging Oviedo from seizing power. After the 1989 coup, Oviedo and his cavalry officers were contemptuous of their air force counterparts and repeatedly sought to undermine their institution. In 1996 Oviedo went a step further, signaling his intention to create an air wing for the army. He expected that a donation of F-5 Tigers and helicopters from Taiwan would be steered his way, along with a sizable increase in the army's share of the defense budget. The general's ambitions led to a direct and bitter confrontation with General Cramer and strong opposition from other service commanders, who also saw their budgets threatened by Oviedo.
General Noguera, General Cramer, and Commander of the Presidential Guard Novoa assured the president that the combined action of the Air Force and the Guard's anti-tank commandos could neutralize Oviedo's tanks and troops, rendering any coup attempt extremely costly. Resistance to Oviedo, however, would depend on the Air Force's success in protecting its planes from a surprise attack by Army troops, a problematic condition because the Air Force command and field is located next to the principal cavalry regiment in Asunción.
Under the guise of maneuvers for antinarcotics purposes, General Cramer decided to move his planes out of Asunción. He stationed some in the city of Ayala and the rest in an even more secure place, Wasmosy's own private ranch in the northern department of Amambay, a distance of 29 minutes flying time. "Santa Teresa" ranch, whose airfield was improved to handle the additional traffic, soon evolved into the Air Force's principal base of operations. Indeed, quiet military preparations to stop Oviedo had begun as early as August 1995, and the Air Force began moving planes out of Asunción as early as March 1996.
THE CIVIL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION
In Washington, U.S. officials following Paraguayan politics became increasingly concerned over the standoff between the president and his army commander. They were also approached by individuals knowledgeable about Paraguay, such as Philippine businessman Juan Jiménez, who warned that a military coup was not out of the question in Paraguay. On a trip to Asunción during the third week of March 1996, Jorge Prieto, Paraguayan ambassador to the United States, sensed that the conflict was coming to a head. For weeks rumors had circulated that Wasmosy might try a "Fujimorazo"--dismissing parliament with military support in order to consolidate his own rule. (The maneuver is named for Alberto Fujimori, the Peruvian president who pulled one off successfully in 1992.) Prieto, in a conversation with U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay Robert Service, discounted that possibility but noted that the president was sheltering five fighter aircraft on his ranch to protect them from the army, implying that he was preparing for a possible confrontation.
Three weeks later, on April 14, Wasmosy called Ambassador Service to his residence and, in the presence of Ambassador Prieto, spoke of his deep frustrations with Oviedo, whom he blamed for the weaknesses and failures of his government. He feared that Oviedo had embarked on a campaign to promote unrest in order to force him from office. He was also concerned about the upcoming Colorado party internal elections that Oviedo was attempting to manipulate. Wasmosy noted that he had no choice but to seek the general's resignation, perhaps within the next couple of months, and wondered whether the United States would support Paraguay in the event of a coup attempt.
Three days later, on April 17, the president sent his wife to Miami to visit one of their sons. The next day he informed loyal military commanders that he would ask Oviedo to resign. He gave them little advance warning, but they nevertheless had envisioned a confrontation for some time and had made some contingency plans.
In Washington, reports from the U.S. embassy in Asunción heightened concern about the situation in Paraguay. State Department officials instructed embassies in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to contact host governments and ascertain what they knew about developments in Paraguay. Officials in those countries echoed U.S. apprehensions but provided little concrete information on internal developments in Paraguay. The State Department took steps to send a special envoy to Paraguay to provide a strong message of support for democratic institutions and a warning against unconstitutional behavior.
That trip was canceled, however, when Ambassador Prieto informed the State Department on Friday, April 19, that Wasmosy would ask Oviedo for his resignation in the next few days. Brazilian Ambassador to Paraguay Márcio d'Oliveira Dias, who had been informed two days earlier of the president's intentions, was placed in an awkward dilemma. On April 19 Oviedo was to receive a high-level commendation from the Brazilian military for his meritorious service. The ambassador hoped that his refusal to address remarks to the gathering at his residence would not make Oviedo suspicious. On Saturday April 20, presidential aid Ruben Melgarejo Lanzoni officially informed U.S. Ambassador Service and Argentine Ambassador Néstor Ahuad of the president's decision. Although foreign ambassadors were notified, the president and his closest aids kept the information from everyone else in the Paraguayan government, fearing leaks that would allow Oviedo to mobilize support, as he had on earlier occasions. Ironically, the foreign minister of Paraguay had less information about developments in his own country than did a select group of foreign ambassadors and their governments.
Wasmosy did not convey his decision directly to Ambassador Service. He had already left town to spend the weekend at the ranch, the staging ground for Air Force jets and troops from the Presidential Guard and the Airmobile Brigade. Then the president took an extraordinary step. At 3:00 p.m., piloting his own plane and accompanied only by his personal pilot, Wasmosy took off from his ranch in the direction of the capital of Brazil. Alerted by Brazilian Ambassador Dias, Acting Foreign Minister Rego Barros met Wasmosy at the airport and personally drove him to the residence of Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
In a private meeting kept secret from the press and foreign governments, Wasmosy shared his plans with his Brazilian counterpart. The Brazilian president pledged his country's support for Wasmosy, noting that Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners, Uruguay and Argentina, would not tolerate a disruption of the constitutional order in a member state. Although he did not pledge military support for Paraguay, he assured Wasmosy that the Brazilian high command, traditionally close to their Paraguayan counterparts, would not support Oviedo's rebellious stance. Wasmosy then flew back to his ranch in northern Paraguay.
Oviedo Refuses to Resign
On the morning of Monday, April 22, Wasmosy called Oviedo to the presidential palace and informed him that he was relieving him at once of his duties as commander of the Army. Oviedo immediately refused to submit his resignation, arguing that the president should first consult with former president Rodríguez, who was then out of the country. Later that morning Wasmosy convened a second meeting with the other service commanders and reiterated his call that Oviedo step down, handing the General a written order to that effect and leaving the room. Oviedo, in the presence of his service colleagues, adamantly refused the president's order, pointedly warning his colleagues that if the 1989 coup had seen bloodshed, the current impasse could lead to "rivers of blood."
As rumors of Oviedo's insubordination began to circulate in Asunción, the president continued to keep key ambassadors informed of the situation, including Ambassadors Service, Dias, and Ahuad and Papal Nuncio Lorenzo Balidisieri, who quietly informed the rest of the diplomatic community of the crisis. The president called Ambassador Service to warn him that Oviedo was refusing to step down, but said he had not given up on negotiating his departure. He added that the government would make a public announcement after an emergency afternoon cabinet meeting.
The meeting, which began about 4:30 p.m., turned into a marathon session of close to four hours as the president listened to the advice of his cabinet and key government and opposition leaders. The absence of an official statement from the government added to the mounting tension in a city where rumors were now rampant. Everyone knew something serious was transpiring, but few knew what.
The first official pronouncement that something was amiss came at 6:35 p.m., when the U.S. embassy in Asunción issued a communiqué. The strongly worded statement "recognized President Wasmosy's constitutional right to dismiss Army Commander General Lino Oviedo," and added that "General Oviedo's refusal to accept the President's decision constitutes a direct challenge to the constitutional order in Paraguay and runs counter to the democratic norms accepted by the countries of this hemisphere." The statement concluded that any course of action other than the resignation of the General "is totally unacceptable and will be met with the appropriate response of the international community. We will continue to monitor the situation in Paraguay and, in consultation with our OAS partners, will review the full range of necessary actions." At 7:00 p.m., the Brazilian ambassador, speaking for his country and the MERCOSUR nations (Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay), also rejected any and all attempts to subvert the democratic order in Paraguay.
Later that evening, the Brazilian government issued a communiqué noting that it was following with "profound concern the events taking place in the Republic of Paraguay, which constitute a serious menace to democratic institutions and the constitutional order established in that sister nation." The statement expressed the Brazilian government's "total support" for President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, warning that any rupture in the constitutional and democratic order would "gravely compromise the cooperation between Brazil and Paraguay in all of its aspects."
The announcement by the U.S. embassy, followed by those issued by other diplomatic missions, was a critical development in the unfolding drama. They officially confirmed that Oviedo was refusing to accept the order to relinquish his command and that the international community stood firmly behind the president and the constitutional order. The press releases immediately helped galvanize support for the president among political leaders who had been uncertain about what was going on. More importantly, it helped unleash a wave of support for the president from a nervous population equally in the dark. As night wore on, the streets filled with citizens chanting support for the president and condemning a military coup. The threat of unspecified actions by the international community also laid down a marker that raised the stakes for Oviedo in his confrontation with Wasmosy, placing many in Paraguay who wanted to play it safe on notice that they had best support the president. Emerging from his cabinet meeting at 8:00 p.m., the president issued a strong and pointed statement officially confirming the General's insubordination and his determination to stay the course.
Despite the president's categorical statement, increased pressure from the international community, and growing manifestations of popular support for Wasmosy, Oviedo remained undaunted. He had no intention of accepting the president's order and believed, as a specialist in psychological warfare, that he would eventually outmaneuver the president with a combination of threats and inducements to wavering politicians. Oviedo was undeterred even when General Rodríguez, his former mentor and superior, made an emergency trip to Asunción from Buenos Aires to impress on Oviedo his opposition to a military clash.
In an attempt to "solve" the crisis, Oviedo floated the idea that he would resign if the president and vice-president, Angel R. Seifart, whom he personally disliked, also resigned from office. In this case, the presidency would devolve on Senate President Milciades Rafael Casabianca, who would name a ministry of Oviedo's choosing and call for new elections. Pro-Oviedo senators contacted Casabianca to urge him to consider the General's proposal. The Senate president, while willing to discuss the matter with Oviedo in order to find a solution to the crisis, made it clear that he and his party would not go along with any scheme that did not involve the formal and legal resignation of the president and vice-president, duly ratified by the Congress.
International Pressure Increases
Meanwhile, in an effort to escalate the pressure on Oviedo, the ambassadors of the United States, Brazil, and Argentina drove to Oviedo's headquarters, where they hoped personally to urge him to abide by the president's decision and impress on him the seriousness of the international community's commitment to maintaining the constitutional order. Although they were allowed into Cavalry headquarters, past a throng of waiting reporters, Oviedo refused to speak to them. On being rebuffed, Ambassadors Service, Dias, and Ahuad decided to hold a press conference on the street outside the Cavalry gates. They spoke openly and on the record, conveying the same message they had intended to deliver privately. They warned that any interruption of the democratic process would be greeted by an overwhelmingly negative reaction on the part of the hemisphere, including the Organization of American States and the MERCOSUR countries, who would isolate Paraguay if necessary. The ambassadors noted that they were speaking not on behalf of President Wasmosy but on behalf of their own governments.
While the ambassadors held their impromptu press conference, Wasmosy returned to his residence. He was joined by many of his closest collaborators, including several cabinet officials, members of the diplomatic community, and other visitors. Encuentro Nacional leader Carlos Filizzola called on him around 9:00 p.m. to convey the unconditional support of his party for the president and the institutional order. Senate President Casabianca also arrived to inform the president of Oviedo's "terms" for resolving the crisis, "terms" Wasmosy categorically rejected. The president called Liberal Party President Domingo Laíno to inquire whether it was true that he favored a negotiated solution to the crisis. Laíno gave the president assurances that his party also supported him and the constitutional order, expecting Oviedo to step down.
At the president's request, Laíno and Casabianca agreed to go see Oviedo to urge him to desist from any military action, only to be told by the general that he was already behind schedule in implementing his own plans, a veiled threat that he intended to use force shortly. Indeed, before their arrival at his headquarters, Oviedo had issued an ultimatum to the president, saying that he was prepared to attack the residence at 12:30 a.m. Oviedo's threats, combined with rumors that communications links with troops loyal to Wasmosy had been severed, heightened the sense of impending confrontation. Adding to the president's own anxiety were the repeated calls form his wife in Miami urging her husband to protect his family and resign his office.
In this tense atmosphere of uncertainty and escalating crisis, the president began to lose his nerve. He feared that an attack was imminent and that he would be responsible for widespread death and destruction. As many of his guests left the residence and as he began to talk of resigning his post, Ambassador Service urged the president to give himself more time and consider moving over to the U.S. embassy compound across the street for protection.
After considerable hesitation, the president finally agreed to take the ambassador's offer, provided his three sons could join him. At 12:40 a.m., April 23, the president and his sons drove in a Ford pick-up truck and Ambassador Service's car to the residence of the U.S. ambassador in the U.S. embassy compound. At the same time, the president's helicopter took off from the presidential residence and proceeded to navy headquarters as a decoy.
Brazilian Ambassador Dias had left the presidential residence earlier to take a call from Brazilian army commander General Zenildo de Lucena, a friend of Oviedo's. The general informed the ambassador that he had just spoken to Oviedo and urged him to desist from any violent action and abide by the constitution. Oviedo told his Brazilian counterpart that he need not worry. There would be no armed confrontation in Paraguay. The outcome would be settled peacefully with the president's resignation and the transfer of power to the president of the Senate. Startled by this revelation, Ambassador Dias placed an urgent call to Wasmosy to inform him of the conversation, only to be informed that the president had left his residence. After several unsuccessful calls, he called Ambassador Service and asked him: "Bob, do you have a guest?" When Service replied in the affirmative, Ambassador Dias rushed over to the U.S. chancery, puzzled as to why the president might seek refuge in the U.S. ambassador's residence and worried that the president might pay a political price for his decision.
When Ambassador Dias arrived at the U.S. compound, he noticed the president holding up a handwritten note to the light of a nearby lamp. Wasmosy was reading over the letter of resignation he had just written and was checking to see whether the U.S. stationery had U.S. government watermarks. He did not want his resignation to appear on a bond parchment with the seal of the United States on it. Ambassador Service and the president's sons had been unable to persuade Wasmosy not to write the letter of resignation. The president remembered vividly the dismembered corpses he saw during the 1989 coup that overthrew Stroessner and feared that a clash between bitterly opposed segments of the armed forces would lead to even greater loss of life.
Ambassador Dias took very strong exception to the president's intended course of action, discreetly taking the note from his hands and suggesting an intermediate solution, a temporary leave of absence rather than a full-fledged resignation. To illustrate what he meant, he began to dictate an alternative note as the president wrote. The new letter read: "With the goal of avoiding spilling innocent blood, and to allow for a period of reflection for all persons involved in this crisis, I solicit a temporary leave of absence from my position as Constitutional President of the Republic of Paraguay, leaving my office in the hands of the National Congress." Ambassador Dias quietly tore up the original note and offered to deliver the president's missive to the rebellious general. At 1:30 a.m. on April 23, the ambassador and the president's close friend, Hugo Aranda, set out to deliver the president's offer to abandon the presidency temporarily.
Oviedo, who believed that the emissaries were bringing the president's resignation, immediately contacted Vice-Admiral López Moreira and Police Commander Mario Agustín Sapriza in an effort to determine Vice-President Seifart's whereabouts. He was determined to prevent Seifart from succeeding Wasmosy and hoped that his call would quell any military resistance to the impending deal. Both commanders, however, fearing that Oviedo was bluffing, refused to confirm the vice-president's whereabouts and insisted on seeing a fax of Wasmosy's resignation before they spoke further to Oviedo.
Oviedo once again refused to see the Brazilian ambassador, insisting that only Aranda bring him the president's "message." When he saw Wasmosy's proposal, he grew furious, arguing that a temporary leave of absence was simply unacceptable. He would settle only for a resignation if a deal was to be struck to prevent violence. Senate President Casabianca, who was with Oviedo, noted that a temporary resignation would not be constitutional. Oviedo, visibly upset, summoned an aid to find a copy of the resignation letter that General Stroessner had signed on the morning of February 3, 1989. With Stroessner's letter as a model, Oviedo penned an alternative "resignation" letter, telling Aranda to convey to the president that he would accept nothing less. Although unhappy, the general was confident that he still had the upper hand, that the president had already caved to his threats, and that it was only a matter of time before the president would come around to accepting his ultimatum. The general was encouraged by Senate President Casabianca's willingness to help "resolve" the crisis.
Back at the ambassador's residence, President Wasmosy received many calls from abroad in the early hours of the morning, urging him to stay the course. U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Davidow spoke twice to the president, urging him not to step aside and appealing to his patriotic duty. Paraguayan Ambassador Prieto, who spent the night at the State Department in order to communicate easily with the president, repeatedly urged Wasmosy to stand firm, arguing that, if necessary, he could leave the country without relinquishing presidential authority. He also impressed upon him that, in the event of an Oviedo takeover, he would refuse to turn over the Paraguayan embassy in the United States to a de facto government. Ambassador Prieto had in mind the recent case of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide who, although exiled, continued to be recognized internationally as the legitimate president of Haiti.
In Washington, State Department officials worked throughout the night contacting their counterparts in Latin America and Europe, urging them to support the president and his loyal commanders, while conveying words of warning to Oviedo. At 3:00 a.m., OAS Secretary-General César Gaviria was finally able to speak personally to Wasmosy from his hotel in Bolivia. Gaviria argued in no uncertain terms that the president should stay in office, while announcing that he would arrive in Paraguay early the next day to convey the support of the hemisphere.
While Wasmosy continued to ponder his course of action and wait for the reply from Oviedo, Air Force General Cramer's aircraft stood ready to move on Asunción. Equipped with napalm, air-to-ground missiles, and 250-pound bombs, Paraguay's small air force could have inflicted significant damage on army targets. Cramer had flown to the ranch around 10:00 p.m., leaving only a small number of ground personnel at air-force headquarters. All planes were safe from attack. Earlier in the evening Cramer had spoken to U.S. State Department officials in Washington, who had called to inquire about the situation on the ground. He was also called by U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Record, who underscored U.S. support for the Paraguayan constitutional process.
Once at the ranch, Cramer and his pilots received little news from Asunción. Cramer was unaware of the president's state of mind and the "negotiations" that were taking place with Oviedo. Cramer, however, was in constant contact with a spotter plane that he kept flying throughout the night over Asunción to inform the Air Force commander of any troop movements that would warrant dispatching the fighter planes into battle. He was also in contact with several police stations in Asunción manned by loyal policemen. Finally, Cramer was in touch with the Presidential Guard that had made a point of training men in the use of mortars and had distributed these men, as well as select groups of sharpshooters, to strategic points around the city.
Of particular concern to loyalists was the Military Academy commanded by Colonel José Bóveda, an Oviedo loyalist, who, they feared, would attack several targets in the city. Apparently, officers loyal to the government within the academy played a role in delaying any military movement. At 4:10 a.m., the Air Force issued a communiqué that read: "In view of the seriousness of the events unleashed by the ostensible resistance of the Commander of the Army to obey the order for him to turn over his command; and in light of rumors that he counts on the support of the Armed Forces, the Commander of the Paraguayan Air Force makes public his unconditional adherence to the constitutional mandate to defend the legitimately constituted authorities."
In his headquarters, Admiral López was equally uninformed about the negotiations taking place across town. He was in touch with the Navy's riverboats, helicopter carrier, and marines tasked with protecting the presidential palace. Among his guests was Commander of the Armed Forces General Noguera. During the evening he took a call from Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, who was trying to reach Wasmosy and believed that he had taken refuge in the Naval Headquarters. At 6:30 in the morning, he issued a statement saying that the Navy "considered it its duty to make public its institutional vocation and urges its comrades in the armed forces to reaffirm their irrevocable commitment to democracy and the process that leads to its full implementation." A similar statement was issued by the National Police command.
Vice-President Seifart, who had learned only a few days earlier that the president was thinking of asking Oviedo for his resignation, discovered that Wasmosy had asked Oviedo to step down when he heard the statement issued by the U.S. embassy in the early evening. He had not been invited to the president's cabinet meeting. On hearing the news, he immediately went over to the presidential residence to receive a briefing on the events of the day. He then returned to his office, staying there until past midnight, when he heard rumors that the U.S. Southern Command was sending planes to Santa Cruz, Bolivia, to stand by for possible action in Paraguay. At 1:00 a.m., he returned to the presidential residence, only to find that its principal occupant had left. Fearing for his own life, Seifart decided to take refuge in Naval Headquarters, although, to his chagrin, he was followed there by a car driven by army personnel, which his driver was able to elude.
Curiously, despite the conviction of loyalist commanders that a confrontation could take place, there is little indication that Oviedo had devised a plan to mobilize the cavalry and troops loyal to him to remove the president by force if necessary. Accustomed to getting his way as Paraguay's "most powerful man," and in control of its most powerful military force, Oviedo had been taken completely by surprise by the president's move to relieve him of his command and did not have a military contingency ready. He nevertheless remained confident that he would gain the upper hand with threats and intimidation, as he had in the past.
By the time Wasmosy's emissaries returned to the U.S. chancery with the message that Oviedo would settle for nothing less than a full resignation, Wasmosy had changed his mind and decided to stay in office. His determination was strengthened by the torrent of support he was receiving from abroad. Later in the day, Wasmosy would hear from MERCOSUR, the European Union, and Presidents Carlos Menem, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Bill Clinton. César Gaviria soon arrived in Asunción, and the foreign ministers of Argentina and Uruguay and the deputy foreign minister of Brazil announced that they would arrive the following day. Representatives of the Rio Group of countries and the Ibero-American Summit of Presidents also announced trips to Asunción.
More significant was the outpouring of support from the people of Paraguay, particularly the young. A new generation of Paraguayans yearned to move away from the praetorian politics of the past. The increased activism of civil society, the strengthening of opposition parties, and the emergence of new political groups like Encuentro Nacional had created a new climate of support for democratic institutions. By dawn, the streets were full of ordinary citizens, students, workers, and peasants, all calling on the president to hold his ground. Unions, student groups, opposition party leaders, and Colorado leaders all rallied to the president's side. Congress, which had mustered a quorum at 4:50 a.m., also added its voice, calling for citizen demonstrations rejecting military insubordination. Senate President Casabianca, whose behavior had been more ambiguous earlier, supported the congressional action.
By 7:00 a.m., Wasmosy was joined at Ambassador Service's residence by his labor and justice ministers and his private secretary. They added their voice to those insisting that the president return to his office and issue a strong statement in defense of the constitutional order. At 9:30, Wasmosy delivered a fairly low-key address before a crowd gathered in front of the presidential palace, a speech that was received rather cooly by an audience concerned that the president was not defending democracy forcefully enough.
In Washington, Panamanian Ambassador to the OAS Lawrence Chewning, president of the Permanent Council of the OAS, called for an emergency meeting of the council on Tuesday morning, April 23, to consider the Paraguay crisis. On the agenda was the possible invocation of Santiago Resolution 1080. The meeting was confused because of the delegates' lack of information about events in Paraguay. As a result, some delegations questioned whether Resolution 1080 should be invoked since there had been no apparent interruption of the constitutional order.
After Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott pointed out that the president of Paraguay had spent the night as a visitor in the U.S. ambassador's residence, Ambassador Carlos Victor Montanaro, the permanent representative of Paraguay, called for an invocation of Resolution 1080. He did so even though he himself was not fully conversant with events in Paraguay and had received no instructions from his foreign ministry.
Talbott supported his motion, urging the council to issue a strong declaration of support for democracy in Paraguay and swiftly to convoke the foreign ministers of the hemisphere to consider specific action. He noted that the United States had cut all military aid to Paraguay and was prepared to move promptly to impose economic sanctions, adding that "we face a situation that calls upon our governments and peoples to speak up forthrightly and to take action in support of the proposition that democracy is the right of all peoples in the Americas and that the day of the dictator is over."
Complicating the work of the Permanent Council were press reports from Asunción claiming that the crisis had been resolved, with Oviedo agreeing to step down as commander of the Army to become minister of defense. Despite the dearth of information, the OAS Permanent Council adopted a strong resolution expressing its "full and resolute" support for Wasmosy and condemned the threat to constitutional order posed by Oviedo. The Permanent Council also called for respect for Paraguay's constitution "and the government legitimately established through free and popular expression." The president of the council, Ambassador Chewning, noted that "once more the enemies of democracy have provoked an institutional crisis that threatens to infringe mercilessly on the people's will." The Permanent Council, in accord with Resolution 1080, called for a meeting of the hemisphere's foreign ministers to evaluate the Paraguay situation, with the time and place to be determined depending on developments in that country.
The reports of Wasmosy's attempt to settle the crisis by offering the Ministry of Defense to Oviedo were soon confirmed in Asunción. Wasmosy had arrived at that decision after talking to several foreign ambassadors and leading political leaders. Indeed, the option of making Oviedo defense minister was an appealing "middle ground" that might resolve the problem without conflict. Much to Wasmosy's chagrin, however, this suggestion to effect a peaceful solution of the crisis was met with universal disapproval in Paraguay. In a matter of hours, Wasmosy was transformed from a defender of democracy to a villain prepared to reward military insubordination. Students who had earlier marched in the streets in support of the president now excoriated him for capitulating to Oviedo. Nor was the reaction confined to the streets. Several cabinet officers threatened to resign and military leaders who had stood with Wasmosy expressed dismay. What had been viewed in some circles in Paraguay and abroad as a logical step, depriving Oviedo of effective control over troops while letting him save face, was widely regarded as a fundamental betrayal of the democratic process.
Wasmosy soon realized he could not abide by his decision. When Brazilian Ambassador Dias failed in his attempt to persuade Oviedo to decline the Ministry of Defense in light of the overwhelming public condemnation, Wasmosy was forced to renege on his offer. In an extraordinary speech delivered on April 24, the president noted that over and above his personal commitments was the will of the people, which he had to respect. Oviedo, who thought that he had managed to win the standoff with a politician for whom he had considerable contempt, found his fortunes suddenly reversed. That very morning, in an elaborate ceremony attended by the president, he had resigned as Army commander and turned over his post to General Oscar Rodrigo Díaz, since he was certain of his imminent elevation to the defense ministry. From that position, he believed, he could continue his political career while making life difficult for the president and his adversaries in the military. Instead, he found himself without a job, subject to widespread derision, and facing judicial prosecution. This inflamed the passions of his supporters, who believed that it was the general, not the president, who had been ultimately betrayed.
A review of the Paraguayan crisis of 1996 suggests that growing economic ties with other countries and fear of being isolated economically played a negligible role in averting a coup. Commercial interests and private-sector groups were not particularly vocal during the standoff between Wasmosy and Oviedo. Many appeared inclined to wait out the controversy to see which side would prevail, assuming that Wasmosy might not emerge the winner. The resolve of the MERCOSUR countries to add a "democracy clause" to membership in the region's largest market may increase the cost of unconstitutional actions in the future. Greater economic integration or the prospects of free trade, however, were not primary motivating factors in the resolution of the crisis. Politics, and particularly the internal struggle for power and interests within the Colorado Party, fueled the crisis. The internal correlation of forces in Paraguay, coupled with the strong diplomatic response from abroad, helped avert a potential constitutional breakdown.
The key internal factor in determining the outcome of the standoff was the decisive position taken by loyalist sectors of the armed forces willing to stand up to Oviedo despite difficult odds. These sectors not only chafed at the sway Oviedo had over the powerful army, but many also feared for the future of the armed forces if they continued to operate as a militarized faction of the Colorado party. Indeed, they worried that if Oviedo prevailed, the end result would be the destruction of the armed forces at the hands of a society increasingly impatient with Paraguayan-style "politics as usual." In their view, the armed forces could be preserved only by disengaging the military from partisan politics. The strong support for democratic continuity in broad sectors of civil society and opposition parties was also an important ingredient in dissuading Oviedo from confronting the government militarily and providing the authorities with the resolve to stay the course. It is difficult to determine the relative weight of internal and external factors. The internal ones were critical. International pressure was crucial in helping to avert a more direct confrontation and in providing key support for Wasmosy and his own resolve.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1996 CRISIS: CUBAS'S ELECTIONSubsequent events in Paraguay suggest that the country has a long way to go in consolidating democratic institutions. In the aftermath of his ouster, Oviedo faced congressional and judicial inquiries into his insubordination. He also was confronted with criminal charges of sedition as opponents within his own Colorado party attempted to weaken his still-formidable political support and cripple his ability to pursue the presidency. The courts failed, however, to convict Oviedo, because he was still powerful and because of the difficulties of charging him when he had actually agreed to resign from office and to accept a cabinet post by the very government seeking his imprisonment.
In the months after his ouster, Oviedo not only avoided conviction but worked diligently to obtain the presidential nomination of the Colorado party. The odds against him were significant. The party machinery was controlled by his long-time Colorado rival Luis María Argaña, and the general remained deeply unpopular in many sectors of Paraguayan society. However, the charismatic Oviedo continued to enjoy strong appeal, particularly among rural Paraguayans nostalgic for the strong personalist leadership of the past.
On September 7, 1997, less than 18 months after he was forced to leave his command as head of the Paraguayan army, Oviedo won a close if disputed race for the presidential nomination of the Colorado party. He received 36 percent of the vote to Argaña's 34 percent and 24 percent for Wasmosy's former minister of finance. Oviedo's exultant supporters immediately took their hero's victory as a sign that traditional politics was very much alive, resorting to bullying and intimidating party opponents.
Fear of an Oviedo presidential victory on the part of both Wasmosy and Argaña and the general's enemies within the armed forces led to renewed attempts to place him behind bars. On January 8, 1998, a military tribunal condemned him to 10 years in prison for sedition, a conviction upheld by the Supreme Court in April.
With Oviedo's conviction, his vice-presidential running mate, Cubas, a businessman and engineer, took over the top place on the party ticket. Oviedo's perennial rival Argaña became the vice-presidential candidate, uniting the Colorado party. On May 10, their campaign was victorious, defeating the combined opposition slate headed by Liberal Party President Domingo Laíno.
Many observers believed that Cubas, although beholden to Oviedo for his election, would move cautiously in determining his fate, seeking to consolidate his own authority as president before attempting to free his mentor from prison. However, in his first act on assuming office in August, Cubas ordered the release of Oviedo, commuting his sentence to the three months he had served. In doing so, he argued that he was simply fulfilling a campaign promise by exercising executive authority.
Cubas's action, however, led to a firestorm of protest from Oviedo's opponents, who feared the general would now take revenge on them. His foes in the military were particularly concerned that Cubas, prodded by Oviedo, would seek to reinstate his own supporters in the armed forces and attempt to force his enemies out. Opposition party leaders, joined by argañista Colorados, vowed to begin impeachment proceedings and challenge the president's decision in the courts. Cubas's own brothers opposed his action; one quit a cabinet post in protest.
On December 2, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the president had exceeded his authority in releasing Oviedo from prison, a ruling that Cubas promptly announced he would not respect. This set in motion an increasingly acrimonious conflict between the executive and the congressional opposition intent on impeaching the president, though the opposition fell short of the necessary two-thirds vote.
By March 1999, after the break for summer holidays, it was clear that Cubas had badly miscalculated the degree of opposition to his decision to release Oviedo and that a serious constitutional crisis was in the offing. That crisis turned ominously violent when Vice-President Argaña was assassinated on March 23, 1999, fueling street demonstrations, rioting, and further calls for impeachment. On March 25, with a few oviedista members absent, the lower chamber voted to impeach the president amid rumors that Argaña's assassination had been ordered by Oviedo to ensure that he would not succeed to the presidency.
The lower house's action set off a wave of street demonstrations in favor of removing Cubas from office. Oviedo supporters countered these demonstrations on March 26 when they opened fire on pro-democracy demonstrators, killing eight and wounding over 150. Although Cubas hoped to receive backing from sectors in the armed forces to dissolve Congress, such help never materialized. As in 1996, the Brazilian and U.S. ambassadors, along with the Papal nuncio, played key roles in resolving the crisis, urging Cubas to resign as the Senate prepared to take up the articles of impeachment in a trial.
Once again, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso played a decisive role in the final outcome. He succeeded in persuading Cubas to leave office for the sake of internal peace. On March 29, shortly after Cubas left office, Congress President Luis González Macchi, first in the line of succession, was sworn in as president. He soon set about building the first genuinely multiparty government in Paraguayan history. Cubas sought exile in Brazil; Oviedo, in Argentina. The succession of González Macchi and the willingness of all three major parties to join in a government of national unity bodes well for the continued evolution of democracy in Paraguay.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACYThe ouster of Oviedo in 1996 did not immediately set Paraguay on a course of constitutional stability. But the precedent set by Wasmosy's bold actions, taken with the continued engagement and support of the international community, helped keep the country's democratic institutions on track.
The rapid, decisive, and overwhelming support for the constitutional order in Paraguay was critical in providing Wasmosy with the resolve to stand firm in the face of military insubordination and dissuaded Oviedo from hasty action. The roles of the United States and Brazil were particularly important. The U.S. ambassador not only encouraged Wasmosy's resolve, but provided him with a safe haven that made it difficult for Oviedo to contemplate a direct move against him. The overwhelming response of countries close to Paraguay, particularly Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina (Paraguay's MERCOSUR partners), the direct appeal of the secretary general of the OAS, and solidarity from European nations provided Wasmosy with needed encouragement. Just as significantly, it signaled to the Paraguayan public the strong commitment of the international community to a new order of constitutional democracy. This commitment encouraged the population to come to the defense of democratic institutions. This same commitment helped resolve the crisis provoked by Cubas's pardoning of Oviedo, and encouraged key Paraguayan politicians to set aside long-standing enmity to forge a consensus for democratic cooperation.
Nor can one underestimate the importance of the hemisphere's collective action in making Oviedo and his fellow commanders hesitate to use force both in 1996 and 1999. Oviedo gambled that he could get his way by bluffing, not by resorting to force. Wasmosy's mixed signals in his dealings with the general--whether or not they were, as some believe, part of a deliberate scheme--might have favored the president. They led Oviedo to believe that Wasmosy was prepared to make a deal, in which case a direct move against him would have been unnecessary. But the president's military supporters believed Oviedo would be unwilling to buck the trend toward democracy in the region. Indeed, Oviedo himself had once told colleagues that with the adoption of Resolution 1080, the era of military coups in Latin America had come to an end.
The Paraguayan case, however, underscores the limits of current OAS mechanisms for dealing with regime crises. Resolution 1080 is clearly valuable for bringing members of the OAS together to consider possible responses to the interruption of the democratic process in any country of the hemisphere. It can also serve to deter those who may be tempted to launch a coup. But by the time the OAS Permanent Council had convened to consider invoking Resolution 1080, the critical moments of the Paraguayan standoff had passed.
The resolution does not, however, provide an efficient mechanism for rapid mobilization to protect the legitimacy of constituted authority. The successful resolution of the Paraguayan crisis was heavily dependent on the strong leadership of key diplomats in Asunción and the willingness of officials in several countries to improvise direct contacts and visits to support the constitutional order. These measures included the visit of OAS Secretary General Gaviria.
The Paraguayan crisis was long in coming. Most foreign ministries were aware of Wasmosy's dilemma well before the situation came to a head. Yet no systematic attempt was made to ascertain the likelihood of a civil-military confrontation. Nor were any concerted efforts made to formulate an international response prior to the onset of the crisis. Member states of the OAS are understandably reluctant to do anything that might be deemed interference in the internal affairs of other states. And beleaguered leaders are not particularly anxious to admit their vulnerabilities to their counterparts in the hemisphere. Indeed, OAS members rejected suggestions to create mechanisms for more active monitoring, consultations, and "anti-coup" planning when they were proposed in the planning stages of the Summit of the Americas.
As Paraguay has dramatically shown, however, if the OAS and regional organizations are to be truly effective in defending democracy in the region, they must move beyond a reactive stance. In consultation with elected leaders, they must actively monitor situations in which democracy is vulnerable.
They should help devise mechanisms and procedures for early consultations--before the onset of a regime-threatening crisis--and provide resources for a coordinated response should a crisis develop. Such a step would probably involve strengthening the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, which focuses on electoral observation and supporting democratic institutions into a body that can monitor and follow crisis situations before they reach a critical turning point. Monitoring must then be followed by efforts to engage the parties without appearing to interfere unduly in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. In Paraguay, engagement might very well have been welcomed by all parties before the dramatic confrontations leading to impeachment and the death of Argaña.
The work of the OAS should complement rather than replace the independent action that states, or groups of states, might take in any given case. Indeed, a special effort should be developed to create a "group of friends," countries that would follow internal events closely, offer their good offices, and report back to the OAS on the course of events. With improved monitoring and coordinating mechanisms in place, the OAS and its permanent representatives will at least have a far better understanding of a particular crisis, should the Permanent Council consider action pursuant to Resolution 1080.
Among the recent threats to democracy in the hemisphere that prompted the invocation of Resolution 1080, the case of Paraguay stands out as the only situation in which the democratic order was not interrupted. The lessons from Paraguay should be taken to heart in the search for ways to prevent the development of a similar crisis elsewhere in the Americas.
Notes and References1. This report is a revised and extensively updated version of the author's article "Paraguay: The Coup That Didn't Happen," Journal of Democracy 8, Number 1 (January 1997).
2. For a discussion of democracy as a fundamental value of the inter-American system, see Domingo E. Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, "The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy," in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 132-49. See also Heraldo Muñoz, "The OAS and Democratic Governance," Journal of Democracy 4, No. 3 (July 1993), 29-38.
3. For a discussion of Resolution 1080 and a review of its application see Peter Hakim, "The OAS: Putting Principles into Practice" Journal of Democracy 4, No. 3 (July 1993), 39-49.
4. For general accounts of Paraguay stressing the role of the armed forces see Paul Sondrol, "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil Military Relations," in Armed Forces and Society (Fall 1992), pp. 105-22, and Riordan Roett, "Paraguay After Stroessner," Foreign Affairs, 124-142.
5. The official OAS report on the election can be found in Organización de los Estados Americanos, "Informe de la Misión de Observación Electoral en el Paraguay Sobre las Elecciones Generales Realizadas el 9 de Mayo de 1993" OEA/SER.G CP/INF. 3493/3, August 5, 1993.
6. The following description of events in Paraguay is drawn from the U.S. and Paraguayan press and conversations the author had with many of the principals described in this article. The author was sent to Paraguay as a special U.S. government emissary in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt to provide U.S. support for the democratic process. He returned to Paraguay in July of 1997 to conduct interviews for this article ten months after he left the government. A valuable, if occasionally misleading, chronology of events based on extensive interviews is José María Costa and Oscar Ayala Bogarín, Operación Gedeón: Los secretos de un golpe frustrado (Asunción: Editorial Don Bosco, 1996). Lino Oviedo's own El Golpe que no existió: Raíses y Razones (Asunción: Talleres de Industria Gráfica Comuneros, 1997), is an odd collection of newspaper clippings and occasional musings by the former commander that provides little clarification of his motives or his perception of events. He interprets international efforts in support of democracy in Paraguay as a broad conspiracy orchestrated by the Inter-American Dialogue or the result of particular economic design on Paraguay's resources.
7. As such I take issue with my colleague Richard Feinberg's interpretation. See his "The Coup That Wasn't," Op-ed, Washington Post, April 30, 1996.
8. For a discussion of the events surrounding the Cubas resignation see the informative article of Diego Abente-Brun, "`People Power' in Paraguay," Journal of Democracy 10 (July 1999):93-100.
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__ John Stremlau with Helen Zille, A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa, July 1997. (Web only)
__ Nik Gowing, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention, September 1997.
__ Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys, September 1997.
__ Preventing Deadly Conflict: Executive Summary of the Final Report, December 1997.
__ Gail W. Lapidus with Svetlana Tsalik, eds., Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions, Proceedings of a Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation, April 1998.
__ Douglas E. Lute, Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience, April 1998.
__ Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda, April 1998.
__ John Stremlau, People in Peril: Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, and Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 1998.
__ John Stremlau and Francisco R. Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role? July 1998.
__ Tom Gjelten, Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View. Report to the Commission, July 1998. (Web only)
__ Edward J. Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action, August 1998.
__ Donald Kennedy, Environmental Quality and Regional Conflict, December 1998.
__ George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond, December 1998.
__ Essays on Leadership (by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, George Bush, Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Desmond Tutu), December 1998.
__ M. James Wilkinson, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation: Tackling Greek-Turkish Hostility, June 1999.
__ Graham Allison and Hisashi Owada, The Responsibilities of Democracies in Preventing Deadly Conflict: Reflections and Recommendations. July 1999.
__ Preventive Diplomacy, Preventive Defense, and Conflict Resolution: A Report of Two Conferences at Stanford University and The Ditchley Foundation. September 1999.
Name_____________________________________________________________
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To order Timothy Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (copublished with the United States Institute of Peace), contact USIP at 1-800-868-8064 or 1-703-601-1590 for ordering information.
To order Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East; The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention; Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict; Turkey's Kurdish Question; The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena; Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence; Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World; and The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation; books in the Commission series published by Rowman & Littlefield, please contact the publisher at 1-800-462-6420 or 1-301-459-3366.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
David A. Hamburg, Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence. Founding Essay of the Commission. April 1994.
David A. Hamburg, Education for Conflict Resolution. April 1995.
Comprehensive Disclosure of Fissionable Materials: A Suggested Initiative. Discussion Paper. June 1995.
Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. Report to the Commission. December 1995.
Andrew J. Goodpaster, When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions. Report to the Commission. July 1996. (Web only)
Timothy Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (order from copublisher, United States Institute of Peace), 1996.
John Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations. Report to the Commission. November 1996.
Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy. Report to the Commission. May 1997.
John Stremlau with Helen Zille, A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa. Report to the Commission. July 1997. (Web only)
Nik Gowing, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention. Report to the Commission. September 1997.
Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys. Report of the Commission. September 1997.
Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. (Full Report and Executive Summary.) Report of the Commission. December 1997.
Gail W. Lapidus with Svetlana Tsalik, eds., Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions. Proceedings of a Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation. Report to the Commission. April 1998.
Douglas E. Lute, Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience. Report to the Commission. April 1998.
Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda. Report to the Commission. April 1998.
John Stremlau, People in Peril: Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, and Preventing Deadly Conflict. Report to the Commission. May 1998.
John Stremlau and Francisco Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role? Report to the Commission. July 1998.
Tom Gjelten, Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View. Report to the Commission. July 1998. (Web only)
Edward J. Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action. Report to the Commission. August 1998.
Donald Kennedy, Environmental Quality and Regional Conflict. Report to the Commission. December 1998.
George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond. Report to the Commission. December 1998.
Essays on Leadership (by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, George Bush, Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Desmond Tutu). Perspectives on Prevention. December 1998.
M. James Wilkinson, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation: Tackling Greek-Turkish Hostility. Report to the Commission. June 1999.
Graham Allison and Hisashi Owada, The Responsibilities of Democracies in Preventing Deadly Conflict: Reflections and Recommendations. Discussion Paper. July 1999.
Preventive Diplomacy, Preventive Defense, and Conflict Resolution: A Report of Two Conferences at Stanford University and The Ditchley Foundation. Perspectives on Prevention. October 1999.
Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East; The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention; Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict; Turkey's Kurdish Question; The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena; Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence; Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World; and The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation are books in the Commission series published by Rowman & Littlefield. Please contact the publisher at 1-800-462-6420 or 1-301-459-3366.
Carnegie Commission on
PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT
Carnegie Corporation of New York
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 715
Washington, DC 20036-2103
Phone: (202) 332-7900 Fax: (202) 332-1919
e-mail: pdc@carnegie.org
On the Web: www.ccpdc.org