Yemen, Germany, and Korea were three divided nations whose externally-imposed
division brought war to the post-World War II world. The Korean War (1950-53)
was the only direct superpower confrontation of the Cold War. The Yemeni wars
(1962-64, 1971-72, 1979, 1993-94) repeatedly involved regional allies with great
power backing. That the German division did not break out into war only underscores
its enormous potential for igniting a World War III. Yemen and Germany achieved
unification in 1990; Korea is still waiting. Preventive diplomacy was practiced
on three types of occasions in these cases of national division: in preventing
war from breaking out between the two states, in preventing the wars that did
erupt from spreading, and in reuniting the two halves. This chapter will cover
all three but concentrate on the latter type, illustrated by Yemen and Germany
and by the efforts made in South-North Korean relations in the 1990s. It will
explain the issues which have hindered further progress in the South-North Korean
dialogue and will discuss the stakes, attitudes, and tactics in the negotiation
of the unification disputes of Yemen, Germany, and Korea.
I. DIVISION OF YEMEN, GERMANY, AND KOREA
Yemen, Germany, and Korea were divided by Cold War politics, although the formal division of Yemen took place in the colonial period. Although the three divisions were artificial, foreign-imposed separations within a single historic nation, they were replicated in domestic politics, and so for domestic as well as international reasons carried the seeds of war.
Yemen
The division of Yemen was brought about by the foreign powers which had dominated
Yemen since the nineteenth century: Britain in the south from 1939 until 1967
and the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the north until 1918. The division of the
world after 1945 into two opposing international bocs led by th le US and the
USSR prolonged the division. (1)
In north Yemen, the Imam was the ruler until 1962, when he was ousted by republican forces and Yemen Arab Republic was established. Civil War between royalists and republicans followed with Nasser's Egyptian forces intervening to help the republicans and Saudi Arabia backing the royalists. The republicans eventually won. (2)
Yemen became independent in November 1967, combining Aden and the former protectorate of South Arabia. Before the British withdrawal, two rival factions fought for control: the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). The socialist National Liberation Front won and renamed the country the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1970. Representatives of North Yemen made contact with South Yemenis with an eye to unification, but they failed because of the ideological conflicts between moderate and radical socialists in South Yemen. The socialist radicalization in the south impelled many South Yemenis to move to the north. In North Yemen, traditional Islamic tendencies increased under Saudi Arabian influence. Thus, the two Yemens developed into different societies.
Germany
The division of Germany was created by the Allied Powers after World War II. Toward the end of the war, the Allies agreed that upon the surrender of the Reich they would assume authority over all of Germany, which would be divided into four zones of occupation, with joint control exercised from Allied headquarters in Berlin. But by 1947 the control ceased to function.(3)
The Soviet Union and the three Western Powers - the United States, Britain, and France - then proceeded to establish German governments in their respective zones. The Western Powers merged their three zones and established the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on September 21, 1949; the military occupation was then converted into a contractual defense relationship.
In the process, divided Germany came closest to war in 1948-49, as the three Western zones moved toward an autonomous government and on 24 June introduced a new common currency, the West German mark. Two days later, the USSR closed all land routes to the Western sectors of Berlin. Faced with the options of shooting their way through on land and letting West Berlin starve into surrender, the US and its allies decided to fly in supplies. For 462 days, until 30 September 1949, preventive diplomacy was practiced by avoiding the war-or-surrender choice and inventing a third option. The Soviet blockade ended on 12 May and negotiations were opened to restore ground communications and establish air corridors for civilian flights.
The Soviet zone declared itself the German Democratic Republic (GDR) a week after the airlift ended, on October 7, 1949 and was granted sovereignty by the USSR on March 27, 1954. The Paris Agreement of 1954 gave sovereignty to the Federal Republic from May 1955. However, the four former occupying powers reserved their rights with regard to questions regarding Germany as a whole and its division. As for Berlin, the three Western sectors of the city were merged in 1949 into one unit with close ties with West Germany but not merged with it completely. It remained under the jurisdiction of the three Western Powers until East and West Germany were reunified in October 1990.
Korea
As with Germany, the division of Korea was caused by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The Yi Dynasty was the last kingdom in Korea before Korea was occupied by Japanese forces in 1905 and annexed by Japan in 1910. The surrender of the Japanese troops in August 1945 was received separately by the United States and the Soviet Union, and Korea became divided at the 38th parallel into two military occupation zones, with the Soviet forces in the north and the American forces in the South. At the Moscow conference in December 1945, the US and the USSR agreed to a four-power trusteeship to last five years. However, the Soviet Union refused to take concrete measures to carry out the agreement.
The US presented the question of Korean independence before the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a favorable resolution on November 14, 1947, establishing a nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). The UNTCOK arrived in Seoul but was refused admission to North Korea by the Soviet Commander. Elections were held in South Korea in May 1948 and the Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15.
In the North, a Provisional People's Committee, led by Kim II Sung of the Korea
Communist Party, was established in February 1946. In July, the North Korean
Worker's Party was formed from the merger of Kim's Communist Party and the New
People's Party led by Koreans returning from Yenan. In 1947, a Supreme People's
Assembly was established and Kim II Sung became premier. A new assembly was
elected in August, 1948 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
was proclaimed on September 9, 1948. Soviet forces withdrew from North Korea
in December 1948. The Workers' Parties of North and South Korea were merged
into one party, the Korean Workers' Party in June 1949 with headquarters in
Pyongyang.(4)
On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops invaded the Republic of Korea. In the
absence of the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council called for
a cessation of hostilities and for military assistance from all members to South
Korea. After 25 months of war and negotiation, an armistice was signed on June
27, 1953, along a demilitarized zone which passes around the 38th parallel.(5)
This armistice continues today.
II. RECONCILIATION BETWEEN DIVIDED UNITS OF YEMEN, GERMAN, AND KOREA
Contacts were made between the divided parts of Germany, Yemen, and Korea during the 1970s as an exercise in preventive diplomacy by both the divided state leaders and their external allies. While they prepared the base for later efforts, they failed because external conditions continued to support the division and, even if they had wanted to, the divided states' leaders were not strong enough to overcome external constraints on the stakes and attitudes involved.
Yemen
From November 1967, when South Yemen became independent, to the final phase of unity negotiations between South and North Yemen, there were repeated unity initiatives and two border wars between South and North Yemen. The military clashes between South and North Yemen which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s were terminated through the mediation of the Arab League, which also tried to promote Yemeni unification.
Intermittent fighting, beginning in early 1971, erupted into open warfare between
the two Yemens in October 1972. North Yemen received aid from Saudi Arabia,
while South Yemen was supported by the Soviet Union. Agreement on a ceasefire
was eventually reached through Arab League mediation. At a meeting in Cairo
on October 24, both sides agreed to the union of two Yemens within 18 months.
The leaders of South and North Yemen signed a second agreement the following
month in Tripoli, defining the character of the new state and appointing members
of various technical committees. However, the progress toward unity made in
Cairo and Tripoli in 1972 did not continue.(6)
A second border war broke out in February 1979. Again the war ended through the Arab League mediation and an agreement was signed in March 1979 in Kuwait. The agreement called for the mutual troop withdrawal, non-interference, and rededication to the principles established in Cairo and Tripoli in 1972. The summit in Kuwait established a committee that produced a draft unity constitution and led to a series of agreements on cooperation in many fields. At the end of 1981, the constitution committee presented a draft plan for the establishment of a parliamentary democracy for a United Yemen. In the following years, South and North Yemen cooperated with each other and made extensive personal contacts through numerous unity-related meetings. However, such preparatory steps for unification had to remain without practical results until 1989.
Germany
During the Cold War, West Germany demanded to be recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the whole Germany, while East Germany recognized the existence of two German governments. East Germany was isolated from the West because its government was not recognized as being democratically elected, and West Germany, according to the Hallstein Doctrine, did not maintain diplomatic relations with states recognizing East Germany.
When Willy Brandt became chancellor of the Federal Republic in 1969, he made more conciliatory approaches to Eastern European countries, especially East Germany, in a demarche known as East Policy (Ostpolitik).(7)
Formal discussions were held the following year between representatives of East and West Germany for the first time, and diplomatic contacts were made between West Germany and East European countries, including treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. West Germany, however, would not ratify the treaties until a satisfactory solution of the Berlin question was reached by the Four Powers.
The Four Powers finally signed an agreement on the status of Berlin in September
1971, in which the parties acknowledged that West Berlin was not a constituent
part of West Germany but recognized that the ties between West Germany and West
Berlin could be maintained. It was agreed that transit traffic by road, rail
and waterways through East Germany of civilian persons and goods between West
Berlin and West Germany would be facilitated and unimpeded.(8)
In December 1972, West and East Germany signed the Basic Treaty. In it, they pledged to conduct normal and good neighborly relations, sovereign equality and self-determination, discontinuance of the West German claim to speak for the whole Germany, economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, and an exchange of permanent missions. Though West Germany recognized East Germany as a government and pledged to deal with it on the basis of equality, it was not willing to treat East Germany as a foreign state. West Germany stated that there was only one German nation and that relations between East and West Germany could not be the same as those between foreign states. Both countries became members of the United Nations in September 1973. In 1974, West and East Germany agreed to establish permanent representative missions in Bonn and East Berlin.
Following the Basic Treaty, a number of agreements were signed between East
and West Germany, leading to diverse interactions between East and West Germans.
From 1975 to 1989 there were about 6.3 million visits by West Germans (half
of them inhabitants of West Berlin) to East Germany, including East Berlin.
About 1.3 million East Germans over retirement age, plus 40,000 younger people,
were officially permitted to visit West Germany. The volume of East-West German
trade increased from 4.5 billion clearing units in 1970 to 14.4 billion in 1987.(9)
Korea
Official peaceful contacts between South and North Korea began in the early 1970's. The Nixon Doctrine of 1970 signaled the lessening of the Cold War and the advent of détente in the international system and the Korean Peninsula. On August 12, 1971, the president of the South Korean National Red Cross proposed direct South-North negotiations to arrange for the reunion of family members separated by the division of the country. His proposal was accepted by the president of the Red Cross of North Korea. North Korea sought peaceful coexistence with the West and proposed a North-South Korean dialogue. On July 4, 1972, a joint communiqué was published simultaneously by Seoul and Pyongyang agreeing that unification should be peaceful and through independent Korean efforts not subject to external imposition or interference and that it should transcend differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems; a South-North coordinating committee was established.
South Korea has been a permanent observer at the United Nations since 1951, and North Korea obtained observer status in 1973. South Korea President Park Chung Hee announced on June 23, 1973 that South Korea would not object to entering the United Nation together with North Korea, provided that this would not hinder national unification. President Park made it clear that this policy was to be considered as an interim measure before national unification and did not signify recognition of North Korea as a state. The South Korean government preferred a gradual approach to a unified state.
North Korea put forward a five-point "Peaceful Unification Program" in response to the June 23 statement, proposing joint entrance into the United Nations under the single name of "Confederal Republic of Koryo" along with the creation of a great national assembly. North Korea argued that the concurrent admission to the United Nations would lead to the permanent division of the country and preferred a rapid step to unification. Unification talks were suspended in 1973 and a series of clashes between North and South Korean vessels occurred in disputed waters in 1974. In October 1978 the United Nations Command accused North Korea of threatening the 1953 armistice after discovering an underground tunnel beneath the demilitarized zone.
In the 1980s, some international changes promoted cooperation between South and North Korea. The emergence of Gorbachev in the USSR weakened the Cold War system; North Korea needed to improve its relations with the United States. It therefore suggested tripartite talks on unification in June 1984, involving North and South Korea and the United States. The offer meant a significant change in the North Korean position as it included South Korea for the first time. The North Korean proposal was rejected by South Korea, which favored direct bilateral talks between South and North Korea.
After the explosion of a South Korean airplane over Southeast Asia in
November 1987 with the loss of many lives, South Korea accused North Korea of
sabotage; North Korea denied the accusation but indicated that unless North
and South Korea resolved their differences, a military confrontation was likely
and so proposed a joint conference. In August 1988 a series of talks were held
at Panmunjom between North and South Korean legislators. The negotiations produced
no constructive results.
III. NEGOTIATING NATIONAL UNIFICATION DISPUTES IN YEMEN AND GERMANY
Tactics
South and North Yemen became united from the top down by the two established leaderships, through step-by-step agreements and then military action, with leadership change following unification. North Yemen President Ali Abdallah Saleh and South Yemen General Secretary Ali Salim Al-Baid discussed the unification of their two countries in April and May 1988, and agreed to revive the unification process and to reduce tensions in the frontier area. As a result, they withdrew troops from their common border and created a demilitarized zone for a joint investment project; their citizens were permitted to cross the border using only identification cards.
The following year, North Yemen proposed the merger of the foreign and defense ministries of the two countries as a first step toward unification. President Saleh and Secretary General al-Baid signed an agreement to unify the two states, to take place in one year on the basis of the 1981 constitutional draft; an organizational committee was set up to work out procedural arrangements. The existing political organizations in the two states, the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) in the south and the General People's Congress (GPC) in the north, were to be retained.
The allocation of senior posts in the new government proved difficult. The principle of a 50-50 split and the assignment of deputies from one part of the country to department heads from the other was maintained. Saleh and al-Baid were named president and vice president for the five-man Presidential Council, and South Yemen's head of state, al-Attas, became prime minister. The two legislatures were amalgamated to form the House of Representatives.
Commissions were entrusted in January 1990 with preparation for the integration of the armed forces and the internal security apparatus. Negotiations were held on finance, economic, and other portfolios. The central banks, postal and customs services, and news agencies, among others, were amalgamated in early 1990. Both currencies were to be valid at a fixed exchange rate. Unification entailed many structural changes in South Yemen, e.g., lifting of the ban on political parties, liberalization of the economy, and the freedom of the press.
Unification ran into renewed difficulties in August 1993, however, when the YSP leader Al-Baid withdrew from government activities in protest against the growing marginalization of the south, especially with regard to the distribution of oil revenues. The political deadlock continued in spite of the efforts of French, Omani, Jordanian, Palestinian, and U.S. diplomats to mediate. Al-Baid declared the independence of the new Democratic Republic of Yemen with Aden as its capital in May 1994 and the northern army attacked in response, while the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution (No. 924) calling for a cease-fire.
Fierce fighting followed, and the oil refinery in Aden was damaged by two bombing
raids from the South. The foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council
declared that the unity of Yemen should not be imposed militarily. However,
northern forces maintained their pressure on Aden, which came under their control
in July. Many of the southern leaders fled to neighboring countries as the civil
war ended. Since then, Yemeni elections have been hailed as the most democratic
in the Arab World.(10)
East and West Germany were united under democratic pressure, which brought about leadership changes in the East during the unification process within the context of the transformation of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. Tactics concerned above all the establishment of agreement on the negotiability of unification among the proper parties. Federal (West) German Chancellor Helmut Kohl organized the process, first using the East German people to undermine their government, then gathering support from the US, and finally turning to negotiate terms of an agreement with the USSR. Starting in July 1989, many thousands of East German citizens fled to West Germany through other East European countries. Spontaneous demonstrations and church meetings took place in East Germany in the fall and winter of 1989, with citizens powerfully demanding human rights, self-determination, and political, social, and economic reforms. The New Forum (Neues Forum) was established in September 1989 with support from opposition groups and a goal of dialogue with Communist rulers of East Germany. Honecker resigned the following month as prime minister and general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party and was replaced by Egon Krenz. Krenz offered concessions to the opposition, initiating a dialogue with the New Forum and church leaders. When one million East Germans demonstrated in East Berlin in November 1989 demanding free elections and democratic reforms, the government and Politburo members resigned. The Berlin Wall was brought down by enthusiastic crowds from both sides on 9 November. Hans Modrow was confirmed as the new prime minister by the East German Parliament on November 13 with a pledge to introduce political and economic reforms and to hold free elections in 1990.
The process of finding an interlocuteur valable on the East German side continued into 1990, as the East German Parliament removed constitutional provisions that protected the single ruling party status of the Communist Party (SED), renamed the Democratic Socialist Party (PDS) in February. As the political situation became unstable, the party Politburo and Central Committee and chairman Krenz of the Council of State all resigned. Continuing pressure from the citizens and opposition parties forced the passage of laws required for changing the constitution and the election law on February 20. The first free elections in East Germany took place on March 18, 1990. The winners were an alliance of three conservative parties allied with the West and led by the East German Christian Democratic Union (CDU); although the alliance failed to obtain an absolute majority, a coalition government was formed in April 1990 with Lothar de Maiziere as prime minister, and negotiations could begin.
The first question to be resolved was, negotiations between whom? Because of
the international status of East and West Germany and their membership of opposing
military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the process of German unification
had to include negotiations with the Four Powers. At the Malta Summit of December
1989, US President George Bush convinced Soviet Party Secretary Mikhael Gorbatchev
to enter into negotiations, but Gorbatchev preferred to keep the matter between
the four occupying powers. It was not until the end of January 1990 that the
Soviet Union agreed to include the two Germanys in the negotiations along with
the Big Four, by a procedural formula know as "2 + 4." In February representatives
of 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries endorsed the 'two-plus-four' talks in which
East and West Germany would handle the internal aspects and the Four Powers
(France, USSR, Great Britain and U.S.) the external aspects of German unification.(11)
Stakes
The unification of Yemen, originally scheduled for November 1990, was achieved on May 22, six months ahead of schedule. Unification was made possible by changes in stakes produced by internal and external developments in the late 1980s. First, changes in Eastern Europe and the rapid disintegration of the socialist community of states, within which South Yemen was integrated ideologically, economically, and militarily, removed external support for the South Yemeni government. The Soviet Union dropped its reservations against Yemeni unification in March 1990
Internally, the economy of Yemen was dysfunctional. Land reforms and resulted
in a reduction in agricultural production. Industrial production declined and
the petroleum sector became almost bankrupt. Soviet military and economic aid,
which was vital to South Yemen, was drastically reduced. Pressures for unification
from South Yemen citizens continued in spring 1990. As a result, the South Yemen
government had very limited options. The regime was divided into factions opposed
to one another along regional and ideological lines. In this state of confusion,
the leadership thought that rapprochement with North Yemen was the best way
to stay in power.(12)
Changes also occurred in North Yemen. The tribes in North Yemen had opposed unification in the late 1960s and this caused the failure of the Cairo and Tripoli agreements. Tribal opposition also stalled North Yemen's initiative following the 1979 border war. The tribes were hostile to the socialism of South Yemen, convinced that the socialist system indicated a decline in moral standards, and they were joined by Islamic forces and conservative business circles in their opposition. They were also strengthened by financial backing from Saudia Arabia. In the 1980s the situation began to change; the government began to control the northern and eastern tribes and the collapse of socialism reduced their fears. Furthermore, the Saudi government not longer opposed the unification efforts. Thus, the unification was made possible through negotiations between North and South Yemen and cooperation from Saudi Arabia. However, the case of Yemen also shows that unification can be threatened if some of the parties are dissatisfied with its results.
In East Germany, the Communist Party had ousted its old leadership, apologized to the people and promised reforms, in order to regain the confidence of the people. In spite of these efforts, German people continued to rebel until the government gave up the absolute status of the Communist Party and consented to free elections. They were then voted out of power in the elections of March 1990 by the parties demanding immediate unification. The East German people thus redefined the stakes, first changing their system from dictatorship to democracy through their own efforts, in order to change the relations from division to unification.
Despite the "2+4"formula, the real negotiations over unification took place between one of the 2 - West Germany - and one of the 4 - the Soviet Union. Here the question was, what was at stake for the Soviet Union? What was the price of unification, i.e. of losing East Germany? That price was termed "security" but it needed to be operationalized. First the USSR equated security with German withdrawal from NATO or neutralization, then changed it to membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Then it meant membership in a NATO with changes, but then in June the Soviet Union backtracked to its previous position of German membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact for five years, a position rejected by West Germany and, in the June 1990 two-plus-four meeting, by the Four. Finally Kohl and Gorbatchev reached an agreement on 15 July that a united Germany would be free to join whatever military alliance it wished, thus permitting it to become a full member of NATO. The USSR pledged to withdraw its armed forces from East German territory within four years and NATO troops would not be in East Germany during this period; it was also agreed that a united Germany would reduce the strength of its armed forces to 370,000 men and would not have nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, all components of the security that the USSR bargained for in exchange for inevitable unification.
But the process of redefining the stakes continued, with a new focus. A formula of "unification in exchange for security" was not enough. Less than a week before the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, scheduled for 12 September 1990, Gorbachev told Kohl of the difficulties he was facing inside the USSR; Kohl understood and raised his offer from DM 5 million to DM 8 million to house the returning Soviet troops, against the DM 16-18 million asked by Gorbachev. The Soviet leader intimated an impasse over the aid matter and three days later Kohl raised his figure to DM 11-12 million, while Gorbachev talked of DM 15-16 million. Gorbachev noted specifically that it was unification that was at an impasse. Kohl then added to the DM 12 million another DM 3 million as credits without interest. The sum of DM 15 million was thus reached as the price for reunification, and the new formula became "unification in exchange for payment." The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was signed on schedule.
Article VII, Paragraph 2 of the treaty stipulates the united Germany has full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs. The treaty entered into force on March 15, 1991, when the Soviet Union, as the last party, ratified the treaty. The 'two-plus-four' treaty provided an international legal framework for German unification. It has helped Germany to unite without war, suffering, and conflict.
The unification of Germany was then made possible because the Soviet Union was brought into the argument through two successive formulas. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev abandoned the Soviet Union's former policy of hegemonic imperialism and control in Eastern Europe, allowing the East European countries to decide on their future.(13)
But the prospect of the German unification created worries in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wanted Germany to remain neutral after unification. However, recognizing that only Germany would be able to grant economic assistance to the Soviet Union for restructuring its economy, Gorbachev gave in and allowed Germany to choose its own alliances. A change in Soviet Union's position also came about as the Gorbachev administration became convinced that a united Germany controlled within an alliance --even a Western one - was less of a threat that than one on its own, loose in the heart of Europe.
Attitudes
In the 1980s the North Yemen government began to change the attitudes of northern tribes. The government constructed schools and hospitals in the tribal areas and provided services and jobs for tribal members. The new relationship between government and tribes permitted the government to freely pursue unification. In the South, public opinion grew to support the unification process in the late 1980s, while the leadership began to see unification in its interest in the current domestic and international context.
Even though negotiation brought about the unification of Yemen, it did not produce peaceful results when unification was later threatened by the dissatisfied part of the new state. When the southern part of Yemen tried to secede from the central government after unification, the mediation of the United Nations Security Council and the outside powers was not able to produce a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The northern forces finally reimposed the unity of Yemen militarily.
In East Germany the government tried to pursue a preemptive policy of giving in to popular demands, but public pressure used each concession as a stepping stone and was always one step ahead of the government. In order to reduce pressure from the East German people, East Germany opened the borders in November 1989, hoping that the most dissatisfied people would go to West Germany while the remaining ones could be brought under its control. However, this expectation of the East German government did not work out, as the people demanded a change of system.
Seizing on the rapidly evolving situation in the East in 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stepped up a persistent campaign for reunification. He publicly proposed the end - reunification - and the means - negotiation - before the West German parliament on 16 November and received a Soviet go-ahead the next day. He then presented a ten-point plan for the future of Germany on November 28, suggesting a confederal structure with the ultimate aim of federation. Kohl and Modrow proposed a contractual community between the two Germanys in Dresden on December 19.
German unification was achieved through direct negotiation between the two German democratic governments. This had been possible because the East German people, thorough their own efforts, could compel the Communist government to hold free elections, by which the Communist dictatorship was transformed into a democratic system in a peaceful manner. West Germany's long-term strategy of informing the East Germans about the situation of West Germany and the outside world by radio and T.V. changed their attitudes and contributed to the unification of Germany.
In May 1990, the Parliaments of East and West Germany approved the Treaty
between East and West Germany establishing a Monetary, Economic, and Social
Union, which came into effect on July 1, 1990. The Treaty between East and West
Germany on the Establishment of German Unity was signed two months thereafter,
stipulating that East Germany would accede to West Germany on October 3, 1990
in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law of 1949
IV. NEGOTIATING THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION DISPUTES OF KOREA
Attitudes
As in other divided states, the new international environment of post-cold war era changed some of the attitudes involved in the Korean division. South and North Korea agreed to build a new relationship through their prime ministers' meetings in the early 1990s. In September 1990, North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Muk visited Seoul for discussions with South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young-Hoon. The meeting represented the highest-level contact between North and South Korea since the end of the Korean War. Subsequent talks between the two premiers were held in October and December 1990 and, after a hostile delay, a year later in October, 1991.
An agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea was signed at the conclusion of the fifth round of prime ministerial talks in Seoul in December. Under the agreement, South and North Korea pledged to discontinue mutual slander, to promote economic cooperation and reunion of family members and to work toward a full peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement. The agreement became effective in February 1992 during the sixth round of negotiations, held in Pyongyang, when the two parties accepted each other for the first time as legitimate partners in negotiation.(14)
South and North Korea realized that peace and unification are inter-related and that peaceful coexistence between the two parties must precede the national unification. The Basic Agreement provided a framework for cooperation and exchanges between South and North Korea to build a foundation for the unification.
North Korea applied for UN membership in May 1991, in a change from its earlier insistence that the two Koreas should occupy a single UN seat. Both Koreas became members of the UN separately in September 1991.
Stakes
Despite the 1991 Basic Agreement, North and South Korea face important political issues, which complicate the stakes involved in unification. These issues are the nuclear issue of North Korea and the transformation of the Korean Armistice Regime.
North Korea officially joined the IAEA in September 1974. It joined the NPT in December 1985 and signed the nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992. The North Korean Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement in April 1992. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration declared it would withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991. The prime ministers of South and North Korea signed a Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on January 20, 1992, designed to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to create an environment and conditions for peaceful unification of Korea. According to the declaration, South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, and shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.
In order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the parties agreed to conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides in accordance with the procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. After the ratification of the nuclear safeguards agreement of North Korea, the first international inspection team arrived at its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The inspection team found evidence of North Korea's non-compliance with its NPT obligations. Eventually, the confrontation between North Korea and the IAEA came to a deadlock, leading to North Korean decision to pull out of the NPT altogether in March 1993. At this point, the US felt compelled to open a direct dialogue with North Korea on nuclear matters.(15)
The first result was a statement in June 1993 in Geneva which suspended the
North Korean withdrawal from the NPT. In return, the US pledged not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.(16)
After subsequent negotiations which benefitted from a roadblock-breaking intervcention
by former President Jimmy Carter, the US and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework
on the Nuclear Issue in Geneva on October 21, 1994.(17)
With this agreement, North Korea promised to dismantle its potential military
application of the nuclear program. In accordance with this nuclear agreement,
North Korea froze its nuclear program on November 1, 1994, and pledged to dismantle
its graphite-moderated reactors by 1998.(18)
A North Korean submarine landed on the eastern coast of South Korea in September 1996 and 26 armed infiltrators came ashore. Later, North Korea apologized to South Korea for the incident and promised to make efforts to ensure that such an incident will not recur. The apology opened the way to a resumed dialogue between North and South Korea and contributed to the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The next day, North Korea agreed to talk with South Korea and the United States about negotiating a formal end to the Korean War. North Korea also agreed at the same time, December 30, 1996, to store spent nuclear fuel rods safely rather than reprocessing them for plutonium in keeping with a 1994 agreement. North Korea and a US-led consortium called the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) signed the protocols on January 8, 1997 for the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors. KEDO was formed in 1995 after the 1994 US-North Korean agreement to freeze its suspected nuclear weapons program in exchange for the two light-water reactors.
In return for the nuclear agreement, North Korea gained economic, political, and military benefits. Economically, North Korea exchanged the nuclear freeze for US $ 4.5 billion worth of economic assistance, the Western pledge to transfer some advanced technologies to North Korea, a ten-year supply of oil, and an easing of economic sanctions. As in the case of Germany but several steps away from unification, stakes were redefined and the formula for agreement became "removal of obstacle in exchange for payment." Politically, the nuclear deal with the US allowed North Korea to break out of international isolation, including the improvement of its relations with major Western Countries and the application for membership in international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, APEC, WTO, etc. Militarily, North Korea obtained the US guarantee that the US would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, as long as North Korea remained in the NPT.
Despite the l994 accord, however, North Korea was suspected of developing nuclear weapons at the Kumchangri underground site near Yangbyon. The US had been pressing since August l998 for acces to the site. The Clinton Administration was obliged by the US Congress to clear up all suspicions by the end of the following May; if not, Congress was set to suspend the use of federal funds to supply North Korea with heavy oil as an alternative energy source, thus damaging the l994 Agreed Framework.
In a major breakthrough, North Korea agreed on l6 March l999 to provide the US satisfactory access to the Kumchangri site by allowing an initial visit by a US delegation in May l999 and additional visits later on to remove any concern about the site's future use. The US in turn agree to take steps to improve political and economic relations, and also offered 600,000 tons of grain to North Korea through the World Food Program(19) .
In relation to the nuclear issue, North Korea missile devel;opment has raised tensionms in the peninsula and more broadly in the region. Since l985, North Korea has been conducting missile tests, including the Scud B in l985, Scud C in l990, and Rodong I in l993. The US held negotiations with North Korea since l996 in order to freeze the North Koreran ballistic missile program and halt the export of its missiles to countries in the Middle East and South Asia. In August l998, North Korea test fired a newly developed Taepodong I ballistic missile into the open seas off the coast of Japan; it also developed Taepodong II, capable of reaching the west coast of the US. The Taepodong I missile test was intended as a show of force by North Korea in its dealings with the US.
During his visit to North Korea in May l999, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, appointed by President Clinton to prepare a report on US policy toward North Korea, offered economic and political incentives in return for an end to missile development. In August, North Korea expressed its willingness to negotiate over its missile development. There is a possibility that North Korea has undertaken its missile program as a bargaining chip, in order to trade it off against economic and political benefits being considered by the US, although the foreign missile sales are economically rewarding. If the benefits offered are sufficient, North Korea in difficult economic straits may have no alternative but to accept the deal offered by the US.(20)
The transformation of the Korean armistice regime into a peace treaty is seen as the way to change the stakes from security between hostile neighbors to joint security and prosperity through unification. The 1953 armistice has come under serious threat as North Korea has raised its demand for United States-North Korean peace treaty. Since 1974, North Korea has been proposing negotiations with the US to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.
Until recently, South Korea held the position that issues related to replacing
the current armistice regime with a new peace structure were to be discussed
through a dialogue between South and North Korea. South Korea wants to be actively
involved in the resolution of the armistice issue. At a summit meeting between
President Clinton and South Korean President Kim Yong-Sam in April, 1996, the
two leaders proposed the convening of a four-party meeting of the representatives
of South and North Korea, the United States and China "as soon as possible and
without preconditions" to "initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent
peace agreement." They agreed that this process should also address a wide range
of tension-reduction measures.(21)
The Chinese initial response to the proposal was positive, saying that it was willing to play a constructive role as a signatory to the Armistice Agreement. However, as time went on, China made it clear that the four-party talk can only be realized when the parties directly concerned, i.e., South and North Korea, settle their differences. China would not press North Korea to accept the proposal. The South Korea-US Joint Announcement also made it clear that the two Koreas should take the lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace agreement and that ""separate negotiations between the US and North Korea on peace-related issues on the Korean Peninsula cannot be considered".
The two rounds of preliminary talks in New York failed to produce agreement
on the agenda for negotiations at the four-party talks. In the first round in
August 1997, the United States and South Korea insisted that North Korea should
join the talks unconditionally. North Korea demanded massive food aid, a lifting
of economic sanctions and formal relations with the US as preconditions for
the talks. The second round in September also failed to produce any results
as North Korea continued to demand food aid as a prerequisite for entering four-party
talks and insisted that the issue of US troop withdrawal from South Korea should
be included on the agenda.(22)
The first round of 4-party talks was held in Geneva in December 1997. The meeting
discussed the future direction of 4-party talks, but could not produce any agreement,
even on the composition of committees. Even without any results, the first round
was significant in that the four-party talks actually came into operation. The
four parties agreed to hold the second meeting in March 1998.(23)
While the first two rounds of talks focussed mainly on how to proceede, the third round in October l998 produced an agreement to set up two subcommittees on the establishment of a peace regime in the Korean peninsula and on tension reduction there. The subsequent meetings of the subcommittees began to handle substantive, concrete issues, but the sixth round in August l999 ground to an impasse on the same old issues. North Korea insisted that the agenda include its demand for US troop withdrawal from South Korea and a peace trteaty between North Korea and the US.
Tactics
South Korean policy favors a gradual approach to unification: first, confidence-building and peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, and later, nation unification. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung suggested a sunshine policy toward Nmorth Korea, asking North Korea to open its door to South Korea and the outside world and indicating that South Korea would not seek to absorb the North. The response was very defensive. North Korea said that it would pursue its own policy of opening the door in its own way to the outside world and criticized South Korea's attempt to liberalize the North through its sunshine policy. North Korea's main concern at this stage is to maintain its own political system amidst the changes occurring in the rest of the former Communist area, especially Eastern Europe. North Korea used nuclear and missle threats to obtain aid from the United States and other countries in order to overcome its tremendous economic difficulties. Experiencing it own economic difficulties at the end of the l990s, South Korea has also worried about maintaining its system. Both South and North Korea seek to maintain the status quo. However, both Koreas need a more stable international environment to maintain their systems. Thus both may need to establish a peace regime in the peninsula.
The four-party meeting can be utilized as an opportunity to enhance the peace and stability and facilitate unification of the Korean Peninsula. But on the question of transforming the current Korean armistice regime into a peace regime,(24)
South and North Korea differ as to the tactical issues such as the parties to the negotiation and the role of the current armistice regime. South Korea has maintained that the transformation of the armistice regime should be discussed between the two parties concerned, as stated in the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea.
North Korea insists that a peace treaty should be negotiated between North Korea and the US, excluding South Korea. The Armistice Agreement was signed by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and the UN Commander, on the other; since the Chinese People's Volunteers have withdrawn from Korea and the UN forces in South Korea are in fact US troops, the real parties to the Armistice Agreement are the DPRK and the US and these would be the parties to conclude a peace treaty, according to North Korea. Since South Korea did not sign the armistice agreement, it cannot become a signatory to the peace treaty. Thus, South and North Korea differ as to who should negotiate on the transformation of the armistice agreement regime into a peace regime.
North Korea has tried to nullify the Armistice Agreement since 1994. It has taken a series of unilateral means to undermine the current armistice regime. It has paralyzed the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) by withdrawing its own delegation and pressing China to recall its delegation from the Commission, and has closed down the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) by expelling its Polish members from North Korea. Also, the North Korean infiltration of armed agents aboard a submarine in 1996 flagrantly violated the Korean armistice agreement.
The four-party meeting was motivated to harmonize the US-North Korean talks and the inter-Korean dialogue. The US was in a dilemma to meet North Korea's demand for direct talks and simultaneously to allay South Korean concerns. The four-party meeting proposal was presented as a practical solution to the dilemma. As North Korea continues its pro-US / anti-South Korean policy approach, the meeting is a supplementary device to encourage North Korea to restart the South-North Korean dialogue on the establishment of a peace arrangement.
V. CONCLUSION
Preventive diplomacy seeks to prevent escalation of conflict and violence, or war. In two of the three divided states - Yemen and Korea - war was not prevented on several occasions - between the Koreas in 1950-53, between the Yemens in 1971-72, 1979, and 1993-94, as well as within North Yemen in 1962-65 and South Yemen in 1965-70.
Between the two Germanies, however, war was prevented on an ongoing basis and most notably in 1948-49, as both sets of external supervisors took measures to avoid direct confrontation with each other.(25) In general, war and other forms of violent confrontation were prevented by repeated and renewed efforts to create a unification process. When violent incidents and tension threatening to escalate into violence disrupted these efforts, conscious energies were deployed to put them back on track.
Ultimately, escalation and violence were prevented by conflict resolution and transformation, by simply eliminating the conflict through negotiated unification. A number of conditions made this possible and a number of policies built on the condition. Stakes changed as the economy collapsed on one side of the divide, and new, better fortunes became available to that side's elites by joining the other side. Attitudes changed when the external sponsors no longer supported division and the weaker side's sponsor dropped its sponsorship, and public pressure rose in favor of unification. Leaders on both sides - incumbents or new replacements - then began to negotiate the steps to unification, making sure that its benefits were shared, that its procedural uncertainties were eliminated, and an outcome was laid out that was clearly more advantageous than continued division. The parties then negotiated two sets of procedures - a transitional regime to accomplish unification, and a permanent constitutional regime for relations within the newly unified state.
Many of the same conditions existed in the Korean peninsula, but they did not produce the same results (as yet). In fact, they led the weaker side to dig in and even to increase tensions and threats of war. As a result, the stronger side grew increasingly wary of unification. Some progress was made in South-North Korean relations through a series of prime ministers' talks between South and North Korea in the early 1990s. The Basic Agreement between South and North Korea in 1991 suggests that peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea will eventually lead to unification.
The nuclear problem of North Korea recently raised tensions in the Korean Peninsula, but the problem was managed through the negotiations between North Korea and the US in 1994 and l999. The issue of transforming the armistice regime into the peace regime has not been resolved between South and North Korea. The main obstacles in South-North Korean dialogue are North Korea's demands for the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula and for a US-North Korean peace treaty. South Korea thinks that peace can be established only when attitudes are changed and confidence is built between South and North Korea. The unification of Korea has not yet been achieved as the leaders of South and North Korea have not been able to negotiate sincerely over the unification problem.
Each side sticks to its uncompromising position. South Korea seeks to achieve peaceful coexistence and carry out exchanges with North Korea, believing that this will eventually lead to unification talks between the two parts of the peninsula, somehwat as occurred in Yemen. North Korea, on the other hand, is hesitant to open its society to South Korea and the outside world, as this may lead to systemic changes in the North. North Norea therefore seeks to maintain its own system as its first priority. It will take time for it to gain confidence in this course. When it is no longer threatened by economic difficulty, it can negotiate with South Korea on an equal basis, quite the reverse of the courses followed on the path to unfication in Yemen and Germany. Meanwhile, both Koreas may need to build a peaceful environment on the peninsula in order to overcome their economic difficulties and maintain their domestic systems. The four-party talks may restart a negotiation between South and North Korea with great power cooperation. If the South and North Korean leaders and people decide to unify themselves in the future, the great powers should agree to unification as they have done so in the cases of Yemen and Germany.
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ENDNOTES
1. Ursula Braun, "Yemen: Another Case of Unification," Aussenpolitik, XXXXIII 2 (l992).
2. Robert D Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic. Boulder: Westview 1987.
3. Karl Birnbaum, East and West Germany: A Modus Vivendi. Farnborough: Saxon House, l973; J K Sowden, The German Question l945-l973 (New York: St Martin's Press, l975)..
4. Chong Sik Lee, The Korean Workers' Party (Stanford" Stanford University Press, l978).
5. See Xibo Fan, "Negotiations between China and the United States on the Korean Armistice," in I William Zartman and Jeffrey Z Rubin, eds., Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor: University oif Michigan Press); Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: Norton, l969); C Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (Stanford: Hoover, l964); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, l985); Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, l990); C Chai & Y Zhao, Panmunjom Negotiations (Beijing: PLA Press l989).
6. Charles Dunbar, "The Unification of Yemen: Proceess, Politics and Prospects," Middle East Journal XXXXVI 3:456-76
7. Wolfram Hanrieder & Grame Anton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Britain (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, l980).
8. Peter Merkl, "The German Janus: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik," Political Science Quarterly (Winter l974-75); Karl Birnbaum, East and West Germany: A Modus Vivendi (Farnborough: Saxon House l973); Honoré Catudal jr, The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (Berlin: Berliner Verlag, l978); Dieter Mahnke, Berlin in geteilten Deutschland (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, l973); David Keithly, Breakthrough in the Ostpolitik: the l97l Quadripartite Agreement (Boulder: Westview, l985).
9. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "The Peaceful Reunification of Germany," Issues and Studies XXVII 3 (March l99l)
10. Thomas Omalia, et al, Promoting Participation in Yemen's Election (Washington: National Democratic Institute, 1993); The April 27, 1997 Parliamentary Elections in Yemen (Washington, 1997). See also Franck Mermier, ed., Yemen: l'État face à la démocratie, Maghreb-Machrek l55 (January l997)
11. Steven Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (Washington: American Institute for German Studies, l992); Helmut Kohl, Uniting Germany (Pekka Kalevi: Pekka Kalevi Hamalainen, l997); Gregory Treverton, America, Germany and the Future of Europe (Prince: Princeton University Press, l992).
12. Dunbar l992, 464-67
13. Kinderman l99l
14. Young Whan Kihl, "New Environment and Context for German Reunification," Korea and World Affairs, XVI 4 (winter l992).
15. Alexander Y Mansourov, "The Origins, Evolution and Future of the North Korean Nuclkear Program," Korea and World Affairs XIX l (spring l995); Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St Martins, l995); Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, l995); Leon Sigal, Disarmingh Strangers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l998); Leon Sigal, Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea," in Rudolf Avernhaus, Victor Kremenyuk and Gunnar Sjöstedt, eds, Nuclear Negotiations (Laxenburg: International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, 2000).
16. Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l998); Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St Martin's Press, l995).
17. Jimmy Carter, Report of Our Trip to Korea, June l994 (Atlanta: Carter Center l994); Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Boston: Addison Wesley, l997); I William Zartman and Narushige Michishita, "Two Koreas' Negotiating Strategies Revisited: Focusing on the Nuclear Issue," in Byong-Moo Hwang & Young-Kwan Yoon, eds., Middle Powers in the Age of Globlization (Seoul: Korean Association of International Studies, l996).
18. Jin-Hyun Paik, "Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula," Korea and World Affairs XIX 3:408-12 (l995)
19. Korea Times, l7 March l999
20. Korea Times, l September l998; Korea Herald, 27 August l999.
21. Korea Herald 17 April, Int. Herald Tribuen, 17 April
22. Korean Times, 24 September 1997
23. Chosen Alko, 11 December 1997
24. Paik l995.
25. Gerlinde Sinn & Hans-Werner Sinn, "What can Korea Learn from German Unification?" in Byong-Moo Hwang & Young-Kwan Yoon, eds.,Middle Power s in the Age of Globalization (Seoul: Korean Association fo International Studies, l996).
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