Reflections Upon the Political Crisis in Lithuania: Its International Implications

During a noon discussion held at the Wilson Center in January, 2004, Richard Krickus, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, Mary Washington College, had described four possible outcomes of the presidential crisis in Lithuania. First, President Rolandas Paksas could simply resign. Second, Paksas could be impeached. Third, Paksas could be found innocent by the Seimas (Parliament) panel and/or the Constitutional Court. Finally, the Seimas panel and/or the Constitutional Court could find him guilty, but the Seimas would not garner enough votes to impeach Paksas. On May 3, 2004, Krickus returned to the Wilson Center to describe how these scenarios played out, as well as to assess the current and potential influence on Lithuania from the Kremlin.

After lengthy debates in the Seimas and the Constitutional Court, President Paksas was impeached by the parliament in March, thereby evading the fourth and least favorable scenario, according to Krickus. However, the story does not end there, since presidential elections are scheduled for June 13 and the government has not yet found a way to legally prevent Paksas (who has about 30 percent support in the polls) from running. This brings to light another scenario that is rather similar to the fourth: that is that Paksas is impeached, but regains the presidency by rallying support of the electorate.

Putting aside the myriad of possible outcomes to the elections in Lithuania, Krickus turned his attention to the issue of Russian influence on Lithuanian politics, which was the basis for Paksas's impeachment. Although Krickus admitted that there is no "smoking gun" offering clear evidence that the Kremlin is attempting to gain control over the country, suspicion mounts when presented with the range of connections between Russia and Lithuania as well as the long list of motives and interests Russia has in the country.

One theory presents Russia exploiting certain institutional weaknesses of Lithuania's democracy. Namely, that the Constitution does not adequately divide the powers of the executive and the legislature; that Parliament is the least trusted institution by the electorate; that economic inequality in Lithuania is rising and is radicalizing the electorate; and that Rolandas Paksas is an unstable person, and therefore a suitable target of manipulation. Lithuania's active involvement in crucial Russian foreign policy areas, such as Kaliningrad, Belarus and the Vilnius 10, offers an explanation for why Russia has singled out Lithuania, rather than Estonia or Latvia.

The story of Paksas's relationship with Russian businessman Yuri Borisov gives this theory some credence. As the owner of a business that sells and maintains helicopters (which implies a close connection with the Russian government), Borisov was Paksas's top campaign contributor. With this money, Paksas was able to dominate the air waves during the campaign, sending out a populist message to groups that are normally ignored by the political elite in Vilnius. Thus, with a relatively small investment, it is argued, Russia can play an important role in Lithuanian politics. Also linked to the impeachment proceedings was a company called Alimax, a consulting company that had been asked create an electoral strategy for Paksas, and included references to ways the Russian government could manipulate politics in the country.

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense was circulating reports that Russian mafia figures had been cooperating with Lithuanian political leaders to gain access and control over key industries, including energy and communications, thereby posing an economic threat from Russia. Some analysts have traced last year's international investment spike to Russian real estate purchases in the country.

But what are the Kremlin's objectives? Krickus offered four: to improve Russia's economic situation by penetrating the EU market through Lithuania; to punish Lithuania for siding with the EU and NATO and following through with accession objectives; to discredit and destabilize Lithuanian democracy; and to achieve the Finlandization of Lithuania, that is gaining ‘veto' power over Lithuania's foreign policy. Even if these goals are plausible, however, there is little that NATO, the EU or the US can do to address these concerns, since this influence is being carried out through economic means, rather than posing a conventional military threat. As a result, among the US, NATO and the EU, none has taken steps to come to Lithuania's aid, most probably because the US is hesitant to put its good relations with Putin's Russia on the line for a small country.