Winter 2005- (Published in TURKISH POLICY QUARTERLY, VOLUME 4, NO. 4) To the extent that the U.S. pursues a more active policy aimed at transforming societies and compelling changes in behavior in regions adjacent to Turkey, Ankara will be presented with continuing and difficult choices. Changes in the foreign policy debate on both sides, against the backdrop of turmoil in Iraq, make clear that the bilateral relationship can no longer be left on autopilot. Failure to explore a new approach could spell further deterioration in the outlook for cooperation.
A CWIHP Document Reader compiled for the international conference "The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War: 1977-1987" Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
Aug./Sept. 2001 - As the 21st century opens, Greece and Turkey may face the best opportunity in years to settle their outstanding differences. That was not so during most of the 1990s. Experts feared that the end of the Soviet threat, which had overshadowed bilateral differences, would expose their rivalry to more nationalistic tension.
December 2004 - The Eurasian sub-region of the Black Sea and Caspian basins has become more prominent in international business and geopolitics than at anytime since 1991, when a long ongoing process of restructuring the European political and security architecture began.
April 2001 - During the EU summit in Nice last December, America's allies seemingly resolved the longstanding issue regarding the relationship between the new European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and NATO. In exchange for the reaction force's use of NATO assets for peacekeeping, NATO would be guaranteed the de facto first right of refusal before the deployment of the European force could be considered. In addition, the reaction force would not duplicate NATO planning, thus precluding the development of two competing and parallel defense structures.
June 2003: On March 1 of this year, the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership came to an end when the Turkish parliament denied the 4th Infantry Division access to Turkey. In time, a new U.S.-Turkish relationship will evolve, but it will not be what it was, nor will it happen automatically.
November 2007 - (Xenophon Paper No. 4, written for the International Centre for Black Sea Studies and posted with the permission of the author.) The wider Black Sea area is rapidly becoming a focal point of interest for a number of extra-regional actors that can also be considered, in view of their active involvement, to be stakeholders. As Ian Lesser, the author of this new Xenophon Paper suggests, the Black Sea is strategically significant because it is an important part of the European security environment, it is a political and logisticalhub for power projection to crisis-prone areas beyond the Black Sea basin and it is important in its own right because of its impressive development potential but also because it harbors many flashpoints for regional conflict.
September 2000- The following was excerpted from remarks made by the minister at a Policy Forum in Washington organized by the Western Policy Center.
October 2002- When Turkish voters go to the polls on November 3, they will do so to register a deep sense of despair over the country's economic mismanagement and their growing anger toward mainstream parties. The majority of the voters will be casting a "protest vote," in every sense of the word, and the likely outcome will be a victory for the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP).