Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Kennan Institute Occasional Paper Series #122, 1981. PDF 26 pages.
Senior Scholar Marina Ottaway writes that ten years after the U.S. invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains a deeply troubled country, rent by internal dissensions and caught in the maelstrom of the increasingly sectarian politics of the region.
Given that Iraqis have experienced relatively democratic elections, Sassoon analyzes the economic lessons of an Arab country emerging from an authoritarian regime and assesses the pitfalls that other Arab countries might encounter with their nascent democracies.
The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003
A CWIHP-NSA Document Reader compiled for the international conference "The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988," Washington, D.C. 19 July 2004
September 2007 - Over the past few months, the Biden-Gelb plan has been widely discussed as a solution for the faltering policy in Iraq. A major component of the plan is to decentralize power in Iraq—Bosnian style—to the three main ethnic and religious groups in an effort to end the civil war. While the applicability of the Bosnian model has been challenged in the press based on the differences in the circumstances under which the Dayton Agreement was signed in Bosnia and the current environment in Iraq, the desirability of the Bosnian model has largely gone unchallenged. This meeting aimed at bringing up some of the rather uncomfortable realities that the Dayton model created in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The debate on what to do in Iraq should not ignore the fact that-although the fighting in Bosnia has ended-inter-ethnic cooperation and dialogue have languished. Twelve years after Dayton, Bosnia is still far from the effective, sovereign and democratic state that the agreement had envisioned. In the end the Bosnian model may serve up more questions than answers for Iraq.
The antagonistic division between ‘old' and ‘new' Europe, as coined by Donald Rumsfeld, underscores the uncertainty of the transatlantic relationship as well as the ambiguous roles of NATO, its new members and Partnership for Peace (PFP) partners. This antagonism became exacerbated by the war in Iraq and, even as the ‘major hostilities' ended in Iraq and the guerrilla counter-insurgency against US-led coalition forces accelerated, significant security rifts persist between ‘old' Europe and the US, with ‘new' Europe caught in the middle and forced to take sides.