Yaacov Ro’i and his collaborators provide the first scholarly survey of one of the most successful Soviet dissident movements, one which ultimately affected and reflected the demise of a superpower’s stature.
The US intelligence community predicted India’s nuclear bomb in 1964 but mistakenly concluded Israel had “not yet decided” to go nuclear, according to newly declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.
CWIHP is pleased to announce the addition of a new document to its online Digital Archive. CWIHP e-Dossier No. 31 contains a secret 1973 conversation between Mordechai Gazit, General Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, and Soviet journalist Victor Louis.
CWIHP e-Dossier No. 8
CWIHP Working Paper No. 46
Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before.
Drawing on unpublished materials and interviews with important sources, including Rabin himself, Efraim Inbar’s work offers a systematic study of Rabin’s strategic thinking and his policies.