"UNEP seeks to ensure that countries rebuilding from conflict identify the sustainable use of natural resources as a fundamental prerequisite and guiding principle of their reconstruction and recovery," says David Jensen, of the UN Environment Programme.
June 2006 - It is an article of faith that an independent, diverse and reasonably professional media is an essential fixture of democracy. As irritating as it can sometimes be, fact-based journalism practiced by public-spirited people really does help make the machinery of democracy work. Over the past 15 years, the U.S. and European governments along with private donors, including George Soros, have backed this premise with substantial funds. Since 1990, international donors have spent at least $600 million and probably much more on media training and development in emerging democracies, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and more recently in Afghanistan and the Middle East. While in the overall context of international aid $600 million is not a great sum, it is a very substantial resource to be focused on the care and feeding of one particular professional endeavor, in this case journalism, especially one whose normal relationship with government is adversarial.
November 2000- The undeclared war between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, initiated by NATO on March 24, 1999, was formally ended on June 9, 1999, with the signing of a military technical agreement under which the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) obtained a legal foundation.
October 1999 - The century's main principles responsible for the redefinition of empires and nation-states in Europe and the launching of an era of democracy - self-determination and liberalism - have one overarching flaw, Aleksa Djilas states: there are no formal guidelines for application or instruction. Had there been a more clear definition of applicability of these two pillars of democracy, and had the West chosen a more uniform pattern of across-the-board action, perhaps the Yugoslav disaster might have been prevented. As an example, Djilas pointed out that the political option of pressure for multi-ethnic integration and cooperation was unfortunately not even explored prior to 1991 at the outset of the Yugoslav crisis. Another example: had the West exerted pressure on the Albanians to vote and participate in the political process in Serbia as early as 1992, Slobodan Milosevic would have lost the presidency of Serbia to Milan Panic and the war in Kosovo could have been averted.
This paper analyzes the prospects for peace and stability in Kosovo, including recent developments as well as possible future steps. The author asserts that to ensure an independent Kosovo will not be a source of instability, Albanians, who constitute over ninety percent of Kosovo’s population, must demonstrate their determination to govern democratically with full respect for the rights of other peoples in Kosovo, and in friendly relationships with all neighboring states. An independent Kosovo must also be embedded in a regional network of economic, political, and security cooperation intended to make the borders in the region transparent and to allow the people of the region to cooperate peacefully as they move together toward a closer relationship with Europe.
January 2004 - Over the past decade, international organizations and development NGOs have broadened their efforts to nurture democratic governance from the centers of power in capital cities to local government. Local government is the first tier of public authority that people confront in their everyday lives. Good local governance provides services to diverse populations, facilitates the development of political institutions and cross cutting social networks and fosters economic development. At the same time, effective local government has the capacity to resolve conflicts at an early stage, preventing them from escalating into violence. In this light, the circumstances enhancing the sustainability of post-conflict local democracy command great interest.
April 2000 - As a young boy, I was unusually aware of Russia as our home in Kensington creaked under the weight of many tomes written in Cyrillic while prints of Tsarist and Bolshevik Russia stared at us from walls with their unmistakable 'dare to survive the cauldron of history' quality.
Once again, NATO has been drawn into the search for the least bad solution in the Balkans. This time the crisis has surfaced in Kosovo, the province that, ten years ago, seemed to be the most dangerous ethnic flashpoint in what was then Yugoslavia. For the Serbs, Kosovo is politically and religiously attached to Serbia. For the Albanians, Kosova is demographically dominated by Kosovar Albanians and geographically contiguous with northern Albania. Today, both sides are armed, dangerous, and likely to keep fighting without an international agreement. Even with an accord, they are more menacing to the proposed NATO peacekeeping force than were the war-weary local forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.
July 1999 - In March 1999, shortly before the start of NATO’s war in Kosovo, EES initiated a series of seminars and discussions on different aspects and implications of the crisis designed to apply the same scholarly and policy-oriented focus to the war in Kosovo that typifies the Wilson Center’s approach to all public policy issues. This volume brings together the highlights of several of these talks, which hopefully will provide useful insights on and analyses of the crisis to those who were unable to attend the sessions. In it you will find a wide variety of views, some supportive of the Administration and NATO’s approach, others critical. The intent of the report is to provide a balanced view of events in the region as well as U.S. and NATO policy, presented by a distinguished group of academics and policy experts.
October 2006- From all accounts, the talks that have been held in Vienna over the last year, which brought together delegations from Serbia and Kosovo to negotiate Kosovo's status, have not enjoyed the substantial progress that some might have expected. Despite this deadlock, the undertones of official public statements regarding Kosovo's status clearly point to the fact that Kosovo's status will eventually be as an independent state, although the details of how and when are not clear. What seems to be neglected almost completely in this discussion is what will happen "the day after" the status decision is announced. The focus on the Talks has meant that all energies in Serbia have been spent on crafting arguments for why Kosovo must not become independent, while nothing is being done to prepare the Serbian electorate or the Serbs living in Kosovo for the separation that seems imminent. Likewise in Pristina, calls for independence ring hollow, given the poor record of self-governance there. To address these neglected issues, EES organized a short conference of experts to discuss the many consequences of the Kosovo status decision and the international community's continuing efforts to create a functioning democracy in Kosovo and maintain peace throughout the Balkan region.