Although the elements that will contribute to NATO's new mission have begun to emerge at the 50th anniversary of its founding, the shape of the concept itself still requires definition. This paper is intended to advance that process of definition. If the needs of NATO are to be met, then the Alliance will have to adopt a strategic mission that upholds international order, yet sets limits on that mission. Such a mission must meet the needs of Alliance members and partners for stability ; whether in the face of local conflict in some regions, or the international threat of "rogue states" and the terrorist campaigns of both state sponsored and non-state actors.
November 2000- On March 24, 1999, NATO attacked Serbia and bombed it for two and half months. Around two thousand civilians were killed - a figure most often quoted locally and probably realistic. Milosevic's regime quoted a figure of five thousand, NATO of five hundred. There is more agreement about the number of Serbian soldiers (both in the military service and the reservists) and policemen killed - seven hundred and two hundred respectively. The material damages are between thirty and fifty billion dollars. As a result, Serbia, which had been poor, became even poorer, unemployment increased and wages decreased.
68. NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern EuropeJul 07, 2011
This research project is motivated by a double empirical puzzle underlying the implications of NATO enlargement for the process of security community formation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). First, the development of institutional relationships between NATO and most of the former communist countries has led to ambiguous results in terms of reducing sources of political tension and military conflict (i.e., positive, in the case of Romania and Hungary or Hungary and Slovakia; inconclusive for Armenia and Azerbaijan; and negative for Belarus). Second, despite their relatively similar, constant and strong support for NATO membership, the countries of the region have demonstrated curious policy discrepancies, especially in contrast with the vast majority of long-term NATO members, when faced with the option of assisting certain NATO operations (i.e., the1999 military intervention in Kosovo). Accordingly, while the first empirical anomaly calls attention to possible NATO institutional effects, the second one hints to its potential normative influences.
"Implications of Enlarging the Euro-Atlantic Space: Problems and Prospects for Northeastern and Southeastern Europe"Jul 07, 2011
November 2002 Policy Bulletin- The anticipated expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in November and December 2002, respectively, will have a profound impact on the security environment in Eastern Europe—a region that, a decade after the fall of communism, still faces a number of critical security uncertainties and daunting reform challenges. NATO enlargement will likely take a “big bang” approach with invitations issued to seven countries at the Prague Summit in November — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, uncertainties and challenges remain and include questions about the future US commitment to, and interest in, Europe; the credibility of European leadership in the region; territorial and ethnic disputes; incomplete democratic and economic reform processes; and the proliferation of organized crime and corruption. To address these challenges and encourage much needed debate on these issues, the Euro – Atlantic Initiatives program of the Stanley Foundation, in conjunction with the East European Studies program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, organized a two - phase project entitled Enlarging the Euro - Atlantic Space: Problems and Prospects for Northeastern and Southeastern Europe.
289. America's New Friends in the East: Does EU and NATO Expansion Promise to Re-energize the Transatlantic Alliance?Jul 07, 2011
December 2003 - When France and Germany announce their nominations for "Man of the Year 2003" it is a safe bet that Donald Rumsfeld will not make the shortlist. The US Defense Secretary's pointed reference to the Franco-German axis against the war in Iraq as being merely representative of "old Europe" compared with a new, more pro-American Europe emerging with the accession of eight formerly communist countries to the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004, cranked up the tension in Transatlantic relations to levels not seen for decades. Americans were already well aware of Rumsfeld's talent for stirring controversy. Now it was Europe's turn. And France and Germany rose dutifully to take his bait. But why, we need to ask, were they so easily angered? Was Rumsfeld right after all?
1999 - The international strategy on Kosovo, developed in early 1999, ran off course when the Kosovar Albanians did not initially accept proposals for an agreement because it did not offer their ultimate goal: separation. The international strategy assumed that the Kosovar Albanians would agree and that a threat to use air power against Serbian forces to coerce agreement might be required. It also assumed that eventually Belgrade would back down.
When NATO adopted Partnership for Peace (PFP) at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, few had any notion of how important and essential the PFP program would actually become. Just as PFP had matured into a fundamental program not originally envisioned by its architects, the MAP process contains the same potential. Consequently, it is time to assess the first year defense planning experiences of the new NATO members and of the nine MAP partners in order to suggest improvements to ensure the program's success.
July 2000 Conference Report - The Wilson Center's East European Studies and West European Studies programs organized this day-long conference on April 19, 2000. The conference conducted a comprehensive examination of the NATO-Europe partnership and its future prospects, as well as an analysis of the implications of the Bosnian and Kosovo wars for NATO and for the new and aspiring members of the NATO alliance and the European Union (EU). The goal of the conference was to provide a comprehensive view of the West's key integrative institutions, NATO and the EU, as well as a clear summary of the evolving security picture in Europe and of America's future role in an ever-evolving NATO.
January 2002- Jeffrey Simon and Chris Donnelly addressed specific challenges facing NATO now and in the immediate future, and the impact of those problems on the enlargement process. Donnelly stressed that over the past ten years NATO has evolved from a purely defense organization into a security organization, taking on wider and larger tasks and challenges. But NATO's primary problem, and one that cannot be ignored, is that it's structure and organization have not evolved to effectively accommodate these changes.
October 1997 - The expansion of NATO is nothing new. NATO has enlarged itself several times in the past, most recently absorbing the G.D.R. (through the back door of the G.D.R.'s incorporation into one Germany). But the currently envisioned expansion is different from previous ones: this enlargement is primarily politically motivated and it is about the future shape of Europe. The foremost political challenge on the continent after the Cold War is the integration into European organizations of the countries previously included in the Soviet bloc, and NATO has stepped up to this challenge as part of its transformation. If the NATO-Russia Council is successful and NATO's relations with Russia develop along a constructive path, then the alliance's eastward enlargement has the potential to accelerate the integration of Central European countries into a Euro-Atlantic community in a manner that erases the animosities that caused armed conflict in the past.