January 1998 - One of the key issues in the debate over NATO enlargement is the question of the relationship between NATO and the Baltic states and how an expansion of the alliance would affect Russia's relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. While it is clear that the Baltic states will not be entering NATO anytime soon, it is worth noting that the arguments of those who opposed NATO's enlargement because of its impact on Russia have already been proven wrong.
Since the Paris and Madrid conferences, which created a NATO-Russia Joint Council and ratified NATO's enlargement, Russia has modified its Baltic policies. Because those policies are widely regarded as a litmus test of Russia's European policy, this modification bears close scrutiny. Although Russian opposition to NATO's enlargement has not declined, the most recent terms Moscow has offered the Baltics, though insufficient to stabilize the region, seem to represent a small but measurable step away from the negative, bullying tone that has characterized much of Russia's Baltic and European policies-and which is still heard, if less strident than before these conferences. This paper attempts to both explain and assess Russia's new Baltic Policy.
November 2000- NATO was conceived and functioned during the Cold War as a collective defense organization. The centerpiece of the allied mission was to deter an attack and to prepare for the emergencies of Article 5 - defending the territory of the members-states against an attack by the Warsaw Pact. Although the ultimate test never came, it is fair to say that the alliance acquitted itself well in this area.
This paper focuses on the nature of these political criteria, what may be termed the politics of the “end game” of EU and NATO expansion. Now that the technical criteria have been, for the most part satisfied, what comes next? Who decides who gets admitted, when, and on what basis? Four major actors or sets of actors are discussed: the Eastern/Central European applicant countries, the EU and the European allies, Russia, and the United States. In each case the interests and the politics involved are examined and an attempt is made to reach some tentative conclusions as to how the process of enlargement will now proceed. A final substantive section, building on the earlier analysis, weighs both the technical and, increasingly, the political considerations operative as the enlargement process nears its decisive moment.
July 2001 Conference Report - Given the obvious importance of minority and ethnic issues for the stability of the continent, the continuing threat of further disintegration of the region on the basis of minority conflicts, and the still elusive solution to this contentious issue, the East European Studies program (EES), the Kennan Institute, and the Conflict Prevention Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center cosponsored an all day conference on April 24, 2001, to address "Minorities and Tolerance in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS." Intended to analyze the role of national and shared minorities and their impact on security and stability in the region, the conference highlighted the important roles played by the EU and NATO enlargement processes in promoting tolerance and encouraging strategies to deflect ethnic tensions. The event concluded with a session seeking to propose strategies to avert ethnic hatred by focusing on lessons learned from Chechnya and a broad-brush look at what has worked for international efforts in conflict prevention.
The antagonistic division between ‘old' and ‘new' Europe, as coined by Donald Rumsfeld, underscores the uncertainty of the transatlantic relationship as well as the ambiguous roles of NATO, its new members and Partnership for Peace (PFP) partners. This antagonism became exacerbated by the war in Iraq and, even as the ‘major hostilities' ended in Iraq and the guerrilla counter-insurgency against US-led coalition forces accelerated, significant security rifts persist between ‘old' Europe and the US, with ‘new' Europe caught in the middle and forced to take sides.
December 1998 - Many scholars suggest that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact developed out of the failure of the US and the USSR to come to agreement on the reconstitution of postwar Germany. Beyond this argument, however, one can also suggest that the central mechanism of the Cold War arms race in Europe was the political competition between West Germany's Bundeswehr and the National People's Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for legitimacy in the eyes of the German people.
Although the elements that will contribute to NATO's new mission have begun to emerge at the 50th anniversary of its founding, the shape of the concept itself still requires definition. This paper is intended to advance that process of definition. If the needs of NATO are to be met, then the Alliance will have to adopt a strategic mission that upholds international order, yet sets limits on that mission. Such a mission must meet the needs of Alliance members and partners for stability ; whether in the face of local conflict in some regions, or the international threat of "rogue states" and the terrorist campaigns of both state sponsored and non-state actors.
November 2000- On March 24, 1999, NATO attacked Serbia and bombed it for two and half months. Around two thousand civilians were killed - a figure most often quoted locally and probably realistic. Milosevic's regime quoted a figure of five thousand, NATO of five hundred. There is more agreement about the number of Serbian soldiers (both in the military service and the reservists) and policemen killed - seven hundred and two hundred respectively. The material damages are between thirty and fifty billion dollars. As a result, Serbia, which had been poor, became even poorer, unemployment increased and wages decreased.
68. NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern EuropeJul 07, 2011
This research project is motivated by a double empirical puzzle underlying the implications of NATO enlargement for the process of security community formation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). First, the development of institutional relationships between NATO and most of the former communist countries has led to ambiguous results in terms of reducing sources of political tension and military conflict (i.e., positive, in the case of Romania and Hungary or Hungary and Slovakia; inconclusive for Armenia and Azerbaijan; and negative for Belarus). Second, despite their relatively similar, constant and strong support for NATO membership, the countries of the region have demonstrated curious policy discrepancies, especially in contrast with the vast majority of long-term NATO members, when faced with the option of assisting certain NATO operations (i.e., the1999 military intervention in Kosovo). Accordingly, while the first empirical anomaly calls attention to possible NATO institutional effects, the second one hints to its potential normative influences.