Nuclear Weapons Publications
China was exporting nuclear materials to Third World countries without safeguards beginning in the early 1980s, and may have given Pakistan weapons design information in the early years of its clandestine program, according to recently declassified CIA records.
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Kennan Institute Occasional Paper Series #19, 1977. PDF 39 pages.
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Kennan Institute Occasional Paper Series #18, 1977. PDF 13 pages.
Issue Brief #2 - How to Become a Customer: Lessons from the Nuclear Negotiations between the U.S., Canada and Romania in the 1960sMar 15, 2013
Despite their recent popularity and apparent utility, civil nuclear cooperation agreement negotiations are fraught with the possibility of deception as evidence from Romania in the 1960s and 1970s suggests.
Senior Australian officials worked from 1944 to around 1973, when Australia ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to equip their country with a nuclear weapons capability. When Australia did choose to permanently forego the nuclear option, it wasn’t because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but rather because of significant geo-political changes taking place throughout Asia in the mid-1970s.
In the last months of 1995, U.S intelligence agencies detected signs of nuclear test preparations at India’s test site in Pokhran, but the satellite photos that analysts studied were “as clear as mud,” according to declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.
The role that nuclear weapons play in international politics and security is evolving. For wealthy, militarily powerful countries, nuclear weapons are playing a diminishing role in security planning. Conversely, some countries that lack advanced military capabilities may be coming to see nuclear weapons as increasingly important for their security. The differences between these two groups are reinforced by the fact that, over the past decade, two dictators who ended their nuclear programs have lost their regimes and their lives. As a result, authoritarian leaders may now have an increasingly personal interest in holding on to their nuclear ambitions. U.S. interests can be advanced by minimizing the association that has developed over the past decade between ending nuclear weapons programs, ending regimes, and ending authoritarian leaders’ lives.
Although Iran’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle presents an inherent option for creating a bomb, the Tehran regime has no urgent incentive to build nuclear weapons. Current U.S. policy, which emphasizes coercive sanctions and diplomatic isolation to compel Iran to comply with its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would fall squarely under the rubric of containment, even as the term has been eschewed and delegitimized in the U.S. policy debate. As long as Iran does not overtly cross the U.S. “red line” of weaponization, U.S. policy will likely remain containment in form, if not in name.
New documents released by Fundacao Getulio Vargas trace the evolution of the Brazilian nuclear program, from its early beginnings in 1947, to the establishment of its top secret civilian-military program in 1978, and up to the modern day.
The US intelligence community predicted India’s nuclear bomb in 1964 but mistakenly concluded Israel had “not yet decided” to go nuclear, according to newly declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.