Understanding and Addressing Youth in “Gangs” in Mexico

NATHAN P. JONES

INTRODUCTION

Academic and policy analysts have identified Mexican street gangs as a potential looming security threat as Mexico continues its struggle against large drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). However, interviews for this chapter indicated that a security-centric lens on “gangs” only exacerbates youth involvement in gangs, while “social integration” and/or human rights approaches are more effective and less costly.

There is a surprising dearth of scholarly literature on youth gangs in Mexico, particularly in the English language. The Mexican government has released few reports on the issue and has little in the way of descriptive statistics on the gang phenomenon in Mexico because it fails to gather systematic information. Like the early iterations of the Merida Initiative, the Mexican government’s response to gangs has been security-centric. However, research in Mexico for this report indicated that the gang phenomenon in Mexico is incredibly diverse, not easily categorized and would be more cost-effectively addressed through a “social policy”


2 Gerardo Sauri, of the Mexico City Commission on Human Rights, interview with author, October 16, 2012; Héctor Castillo Berthier, general director of the Circo Volador Program, interview with author, October 17, 2012; Manuel Balcázar, interview with author on maras in Chiapas, October 17, 2012.

3 Some Mexican scholars have addressed the issue. José Manuel Valenzuela Arce, Alfredo Nateras Domínguez, and Rossana Reguillo Cruz, eds., Las maras. Identidades juveniles al límite (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Colección Estudios, 2007).

4 A notable exception to this dearth of information on gangs in Mexico was published during the writing phase of this report. See Manuel Balcázar Villarreal et al., Pandillas en el Siglo XXI: El reto de su inclusión en el desarrollo nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública Federal, 2012).
approach. Indeed, even the word gang or *pandilla* brings with it connotations that lead to false understandings and counterproductive policies. This lack of information about this diverse youth gang phenomenon makes further analysis on this issue all the more necessary.

This report seeks to (1) understand and define the gang issue in Mexico, (2) establish the regional histories and sociologies of what is known about these gangs, (3) understand the causes of youth gang involvement, (4) briefly describe U.S.-Mexico bilateral efforts on youth gang prevention via the Merida Initiative, (5) identify a sampling of existing civil society groups and programs geared specifically toward addressing youth gangs in Mexico and Central America, and (6) provide policy recommendations for the U.S. and Mexican governments on how to best support civil society and strengthen relevant state institutions.

There are numerous programs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Mexico that are addressing youth gang involvement. This chapter profiles three government-supported NGOs operating in Mexico with strong indications of success, Youth: Work Mexico (International Youth Foundation), Circo Volador, and Cauce Ciudadano. To manage youth gang involvement, the Mexican government’s primary goal should be to “scale up” these types of programs and address areas of weak governance that allow gangs to flourish.

**METHODS**

For this project the author conducted in-depth interviews with scholars such as Héctor Castillo Berthier, government officials such as Gerardo Sauri of the Commission on Human Rights in Mexico City, civil society representatives who work with at-risk youth in Mexico such as the head of the Circo Volador program, and graduate students such as Manuel Balcázar who conducted fieldwork on *manas* in Chiapas. Their insights provided an invaluable context for archival research that included Mexican government and NGO reports, presentations from the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, news reports, and scholarly books and articles. The chapter drew upon the author’s previous academic research and fieldwork on Mexican drug trafficking networks in Mexico City, Tijuana, Guadalajara, and elsewhere.

**YOUTHS IN STREET GANGS IN MEXICO**

There is significant regional variation in street gangs in Mexico. Categorizing them is difficult, but given the context of sophisticated organized crime violence in Mexico, it is important to make distinctions between organized crime and
largely youth-based street gangs and understand the history of gangs in the region, including the United States and Central America. Before we can delve into the histories and sociologies of youth gangs in Mexico, we must establish a working definition of this highly “fluid” concept.7

**Gang Definitions**

In a recent report, the Organization of American States “eclectically” defines youth gangs as:

> …a spontaneous effort by children and young people to create, where it does not exist, an urban space in society that is adapted to their needs, where they can exercise the rights that their families, government, and communities do not offer them. Arising out of extreme poverty, exclusion, and a lack of opportunities, gangs try to gain their rights and meet their needs by organizing themselves without supervision and developing their own rules, and by securing for themselves a territory and a set of symbols that gives meaning to their membership in the group. This endeavor to exercise their citizenship is, in many cases, a violation of their own and others’ rights, and frequently generates violence and crime in a vicious circle that perpetuates their original exclusion. This is why they cannot reverse the situation that they were born into. Since it is primarily a male phenomenon, female gang members suffer more intensively from gender discrimination and the inequalities inherent in the dominant culture.8

This definition is useful for its subtlety and its view of youth in street gangs through a human rights lens instead of a purely security-centric lens. Security-centric views of gangs can increase social stigmatization and thereby serve to exacerbate social marginalization. The academic literature on gangs identifies social and cultural marginalization as a primary cause of gang inception and individual gang involvement.9

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice programs provides another useful definition of youth gangs, which helps to exclude other criminal actors.

---

A group must be involved in a pattern of criminal acts to be considered a youth gang. These groups are typically composed only of juveniles, but may include young adults in their membership. Prison gangs, ideological gangs, hate groups, and motorcycle gangs are not included. Likewise, gangs whose membership is restricted to adults and that do not have the characteristics of youth gangs are excluded.\(^{10}\)

Spanish media often refers to gangs as *pandillas* or *maras* interchangeably. Those that distinguish between the two terms usually point to the transnational and more recent character of Central American *maras* versus the local character of *pandillas*.\(^{11}\) This term, along with *pandillero*, or gang member, has stigmatizing negative social connotations. Thus, human rights advocates tend to prefer the term “youth groups” or *grupos juveniles*.\(^{12}\)

Within youth gangs are smaller cliques or *clicas*, which are loosely affiliated with larger gangs and help to account for their “horizontal” and “leaderless” character.\(^{13}\) A 2007 Organization of American States (OAS) report on gangs provides a useful distinction between youth gangs and youth groups: “gangs differ from other juvenile relational models in that they have clearly defined fixed and drastic internal rules whose breach can entail punishments that may even result in death.”\(^{14}\) The report goes on to describe how gangs are “basically [an] urban” phenomenon, and thrive on conflict with state institutions, civil society, and other gangs. This increased rivalry and sense of being different from the rest of society helps to consolidate gang identity; distinguishing them from other youth groups.\(^{15}\)

The OAS report provides a useful typology of gangs that includes five gang categories: (1) “scavenger (short-lived) gangs,” (2) “transgressor” or “youth gangs,” (3) “violent gangs,” (4) “criminal gangs” and (5) “female gangs,” which it identifies as severely understudied.\(^{16}\) An example of scavenger gangs are school gangs, which are “small to medium sized (15–40 members)” and engage in minor criminal acts “within and around their neighborhood and school.” “Transgressor or youth gangs” tend to be larger with “40–80 members” and are engaged in constant protection of their neighborhood from rival gangs. They tend to be more hierarchical and have “ranking standards” and “initiation rites.” “Violent gangs” tend to be large, having “100–500 members,” and are considered the second stage of gang evolution. They control broader territory dominating neighborhoods through cliques. Criminal

\(^{10}\) Howell, “Youth Gangs.”


\(^{12}\) Valenzuela Arce, Nateras and Reguillo, *Las Maras*; Manuel Balcázar; Héctor Castillo Berthier.

\(^{13}\) Seelke, “Gangs in Central America.”


\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) OAS, “Definition and Classification of Gangs.”
gangs, which have between 50 and 200 members, are considered a third stage of gang evolution because they engage in more complex criminal activities. Transnational maras with a presence in southern Mexico are an example of this gang type.17

**Gangs, not “Cartels”**

Given the context of drug-related organized crime violence in Mexico, it is important to distinguish between youth gangs and “cartels,” which are more appropriately referred to as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) or organized crime groups (OCGs), given their inability to control prices.18 Youth gangs sometimes referred to as street gangs typically control local turf for extortion and drug distribution. They engage in less profitable criminal activities than larger, more sophisticated organized crime groups that focus on drug and arms trafficking and are more geographically dispersed.19 The youth gang literature also identifies lower levels of hierarchy in youth gangs than in drug trafficking organizations as a distinguishing factor.20

Much has been made about the potential alliance between cartels and street gangs. While gangs and organized crime often share common members, most Mexican gangs do not have extensive transnational connections or connections to large Mexican DTOs. One 2009 report on gangs in Monterrey estimated that there were more than 1,600 youth gangs in the metropolitan area and only 20 of those were involved in retail drug sales.21 In Monterrey, for example, it was argued that the Zetas controlled local street gangs, but the degree and extent of that control is unknown.22 Also, the presence of the Zetas appears to be weakening in the city according to a report from Southern Pulse that suggests that the Gulf Cartel now controls three-quarters of Monterrey.23 This may help to delink the gangs and organized crime in the city because the Gulf Cartel is known more for trafficking rather than extortion and kidnapping emphasis of the Zetas, though their business model may be changing following competition with Los Zetas.24

---

17 Ibid.
Loose “Alliances?”

It should be noted that some youth gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) have been reported to form alliances with DTOs such as Los Zetas. Central American maras also have established relations with prison gangs, e.g., Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) has a historic affiliation with the Mexican Mafia or La Eme prison gang. The nature and extent of these alliances is hotly debated. Most analysts believe that the relations are ad-hoc and operate on an as-needed basis motivated by profit. Recent reports also indicate that Mara Salvatrucha and other gangs prey upon Central American migrants on their way to the U.S. through Mexico through kidnapping, extortion or by providing information on the migrants to larger criminal organizations. There are also reports that Los Zetas are heavily involved in human trafficking along these routes, providing circumstantial evidence of ad hoc cooperation on these shared profit schemes.

REGIONAL GANG VARIATION

Gang structures and sociologies generally vary by region in Mexico. Southern Mexican states such as Chiapas and Oaxaca have a significant Central American mara presence, while northern Mexican gangs are heavily influenced and in some cases cross-fertilized by U.S. gangs. Central Mexican gangs tend to be characterized as “youth groups,” often with minimal criminal activity. It should be noted that these are generalizations based on region and the various gang types may be found beyond these generalized descriptions, e.g., Mexican government reports mention the presence of MS–13, a Central American mara, “in 20 of 32 Mexican states.”

Southern Mexico and the Maras

Some scholars such as Max Manwaring and policy makers now argue that transnational street-gangs known as maras threaten the sovereignty of Central

26 Dudley, Transnational Crime.
27 Dudley, Transnational Crime.
29 Max G. Manwaring, “A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Trafficking Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil,” Strategic Studies Institute, December 2007: 59.
American nations. Many Central Americans migrated to the United States during the civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s. In some cases they went as children without family structures. When these new immigrants arrived in the United States, existing Mexican street gangs rejected them. Some of these immigrants banded together to form street gangs for protection, such as the infamous MS-13 gang. Many of the members of these gangs were eventually deported back to Central America. Once in their home countries the deportees reformed gangs, which would become the first “super-gangs,” or transnational street gangs. These gangs are now highly dispersed and victimize society through crimes like kidnapping, extortion and gang-related homicides.

According to a Mexican Attorney General’s Office (PGR) presentation to the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 2010, Central American maras such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 are present “in 20 of 32 (Mexican) states,” but primarily along the southern border with Guatemala. The degree of the presence varies by locale. Interviews indicated that mara presence is heaviest in the southern state of Chiapas, where Central American mara members are likely to flee to avoid the mano dura or “strong hand” policies of Central American governments. Maras in southern Mexico are a largely urban phenomenon with a “symbolic presence” in rural areas having to do with the fact that they are pushed out of urban centers. This makes targeting urban centers for youth programs all the more advantageous.

Central American governments beginning in 2003 implemented mano dura or “iron fist” policy responses. The strategies involved “zero-tolerance” practices of arresting tattooed or suspected mara members without due process of law and holding them for up to 12 years at a time on the suspicion of gang membership. The strategy was “incarceration heavy” and may also have included extrajudicial killings. While they initially appeared to improve security, the strategies resulted in overflowing prisons, leading to riots and the release of many gang members for lack of evidence. The policies also led to retaliatory violence from maras and increased

31 Howell and Moore, “History of Street Gangs.”
32 Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America.”
33 Procuraduría General de la República, “Medidas de Acción.”
34 Mano Dura or “Iron Fist” policies were established in El Salvador (2003) and other Central American countries. These policies were characterized by “zero tolerance” of gangs and gang members. Gang members could be arrested for tattoos or “flashing signs” and specialized anti-gang police units were established. The policies typically stigmatized the gang members and the specialized units were accused of human rights violations. Manuel Balcázar; Mo Hume, “Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs,” Development in Practice 17, no. 6 (2007): 1.
35 Manuel Balcázar.
social marginalization, which prevented their “reform and ultimately meaningful reintegation into society.”  

It became clear to Central American governments that arrest and imprisonment alone could not solve the problem and alternative social programs were necessary to divert youth from maras. Due to these criticisms, Central American governments shifted to mano extendida (extended hand) and mano amiga (friendly hand) policies, which tend to focus on alternatives and incentives instead of purely punitive measures. Evidence of the effectiveness of these programs is difficult to find, as is evidence of their ineffectiveness. This stems from the piecemeal nature of their implementation and rising regional violence as a confounding variable. Indeed, the northern triangle countries of Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala) now have some of the highest homicide rates in the world.

U.S. and Central American gangs tend to draw a large portion of attention in Mexican media and government reports. This may have to do with their established structures, reputations for violence, ease of identification, and the tendency of media and government to focus on potential national and transnational security threats. Indeed, some are establishing relationships with large sophisticated Mexican “cartels,” further blurring distinctions between youth gangs and sophisticated transnational DTOs. In contrast, there are thousands of small youth gangs and youth groups in Mexico that are not so easily characterized and have no connection to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Treating these groups with the same security-centric focus could be counterproductive, serving to disenfranchise young people through police repression.

**Gangs in Northern Mexico**

Northern Mexican gangs are heavily influenced and structurally modeled on U.S. street gangs. These include gangs that formed in the United States border region and are present in Mexico such as Barrio Azteca, which formed in El Paso and has a strong presence in Ciudad Juárez. Also included are prison gangs like the Mexican Mafia, also known as La Eme. The Mexican Mafia is a highly sophisticated U.S.-based prison gang, which taxes and exerts authority over the majority of Southern

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
43 Washington Valdez, “Zetas Cartel—Mara Salvatruchas.”
44 Gerardo Sauri; Manuel Balcázar.
California Latino street gangs. The Mexican Attorney General’s Office (PGR) has identified it as having a presence in Mexico. Given its business-oriented nature and connections to highly profitable drug trafficking organizations, this “presence” likely consists of intermediaries between prison gangs and Mexican DTOs designed to facilitate the flow of drugs into the highly profitable U.S. consumer market. In reality La Eme is not a youth gang, but a sophisticated organized crime group.

Numerous U.S. street gangs have a significant presence in Mexico, particularly in the northern border region. Examples include collaboration between the Barrio Logan gang (San Diego) and the Arellano Félix Organization (Tijuana Cartel), and the alliance of the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO) and the El Paso-based Barrio Azteca.

When the Arellano Félix brothers (Tijuana Cartel) found themselves in conflict with Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán of the Sinaloa Cartel they relied on David Barron Corona, one of their bodyguards, to recruit from his San Diego-based Barrio Logan street gang and La Eme prison gang to build their enforcer squads. Over time the enforcers for the Tijuana Cartel, who were also members of La Eme and Barrio Logan, grew in number; thus institutionalizing the relationship.

Barrio Azteca began as a street gang in El Paso, Texas and expanded into its sister city, Ciudad Juárez. It also became an important prison gang. During the conflict between the Juárez Cartel (CFO) and the Sinaloa Cartel beginning in 2008, Barrio Azteca played an important role fighting with the Juárez Cartel. Likewise, the Sinaloa Cartel utilized the Artistas Asesinos and the Mexicles to counter the Juárez Cartel and Barrio Azteca. Gangs such as Barrio Azteca are...


47 Skarbek, “Governance and Prison Gangs.”


50 Jones, “The State Reaction.”

51 Washington Valdez, “Zetas Cartel-Mara Salvatruchas.”
known for their sophistication in terms of the type of weapons they sometimes utilize and their use of the Náhuatl language to encrypt communications to avoid law enforcement detection.  

Not every gang in northern Mexico has a strong connection to U.S. gangs nor are they as dangerous. Indeed, a 2010 report by Mexico’s Public Safety Ministry argued that most gangs in Baja California were not as dangerous as their U.S. counterparts and were principally dedicated to graffiti.

Gangs in Central Mexico

Mexico has low-level youth gangs with minimal criminal activities. Indeed, these low criminality groups may be the largest part of the so-called “gang” problem, a term that may do more harm than good. Central Mexican gang sociology differs greatly from that of U.S. gangs. Due to the drug consumption market in the United States, gang membership is often an occupation that entails working in drug sales and protecting “turf” for the purposes of drug sales. In Mexico, drug consumption has not been high—though this appears to be changing—and thus Mexican youth gang members often have had to seek legitimate employment or engage in other petty crimes to sustain themselves and their families. Expert interviews in Mexico indicated that the number of gang members presently involved in retail drug sales and enforcement was a very small proportion of the overall membership (3–4%), even in colonias or neighborhoods where both gangs and drug sales are present.

“Youth groups” with common identifiers, but very loose connections, are particularly relevant in Central Mexico. For example, reggaetoneros in Mexico City are sometimes referred to as “gangs.” In reality their only connections are their love of reggaeton music, associated dance, fashion, occasional vandalism, and confrontations with police they view as repressive to their ostensibly legal activities. This category is not limited to reggaetoneros, but includes los darketos or “goths,” los emos, los punketos, etc. These groups are included here because they are

---


54 José Manuel Valenzuela Arce, interview with author on the sociology of gangs in Tijuana versus those in the United States, February 2011.


56 Héctor Castillo Berthier.


58 Héctor Castillo Berthier.
the social groupings that may be most prone to gang involvement or conflated with gangs. These groups are also the most easily prevented from joining gangs through cost-effective preventive action by the state and civil society. Further, the same development programs that are likely to reduce mara and northern Mexican street gang involvement are likely to benefit these groups as well.

The term banda was used to describe these youth groups in Mexico City in the 1980s. Many members of so-called bandas were excluded from work and school—essentially giving them what is now described as ninis status (the so-called ninis are those who neither work nor attend school: ni trabajan, ni estudian)—and were subject to extortion from local police. Often the term pandilla or gang, with its concomitant negative connotations, is used to describe them. Today the term tribu urbano or urban tribe is also used to describe these youth groups. Human rights workers and academics interviewed for this project prefer the term grupos juveniles or youth groups, because it is not a stigmatized term.59

Gangs in central Mexico tend to be low on the criminality scale. For example, a 2009 study of Guadalajara found 144 gangs comprising 3,710 members across 65 neighborhoods. Of those, 86 gangs were dedicated to public disorder and graffiti, 12 to car and auto-parts theft, 10 to consumption of drugs and alcohol, 10 to selling/consuming drugs/alcohol and auto theft and 6 to robbing passersby and businesses.60 Similarly, a study produced in Mexico City found 351 youth bandas and gangs in 2007. The delegation of Iztapalapa had about 30 criminal gangs with an average age of 25 that were more frequently linked to organized crime than other regions of the city.61

CAUSES OF YOUTH GANG INVOLVEMENT IN MEXICO

The existing literature on youth gang involvement in Mexico identifies many important socioeconomic and psychological factors that contribute to youth gang involvement, including unemployment, a poor educational system, lack of parental involvement, lack of after-school activities, poverty, etc.62

59 Héctor Castillo Berthier.
61 Ibid., 17.
Profile of a gang member

There is an extensive literature profiling gang members and their social characteristics. Among those characteristics identified by the literature and interviews are: aged 12–24, unemployment, lack of education, a family member who is a gang member, “aggressive or violent … experience multiple caretaker transitions … associate with other gang-involved youth,” come from single parent homes, suffer abuse in homes, drug consumption, traumas, and living in poor urban environs with a lack of public services and utilities especially when a large proportion of the population is in poverty. For example, in some cases, Mexican citizens in rural areas do not have birth certificates due to the cost of traveling to attain one or other barriers created by weak state capacity and poverty, making it impossible for some to enter the formal economy.

Economic contributors to youth gang activity

Mexico’s economy has shown impressive macroeconomic stability. Following the “unholy trinity” of the 2008 financial crisis, the so-called swine flu epidemic and tourist fears due to drug violence, Mexico’s economy contracted by 6 percent. However, Mexico has since had modest but consistent growth and has become a $1.8 trillion economy. In 2011, GDP growth was over 4 percent, outpacing Brazil’s 2.7 percent. Mexico continued to outpace Brazil’s economic growth in 2012 climbing at 3.5 percent compared with Brazil’s 0.9 percent, but slowed in 2013 with 1.2 percent economic growth compared with Brazil’s 2.5 percent.

---


64 Howell, “Youth Gangs,” 2.

65 Howell, “Gang Prevention.”

66 USAID, “Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment.”

67 Manuel Balcázar.


according to the OECD. Mexico’s economic ministers have suggested that drug violence costs the Mexican economy 1.2 percent of total GDP, which makes Mexico’s economic resilience all the more impressive. More recently Mexican Health Minister Mercedes Juan López has suggested that the material costs of the “drug war” alone cost the state 1.3 percent of GDP and if other factors, such as health costs, insurance, private security, and lost productivity are taken into account, the costs may be as high as 8 percent to 15 percent of GDP. While Mexico has made impressive economic strides, poverty remains a problem; “comparing incomes alongside access to health care, education, social security, housing, and food, finds that just over 45 percent of Mexicans are considered poor.” Because poverty contributes to many of the underlying social conditions that lead to gang involvement, Mexico has a long road and a great deal of social investment needed to mitigate the gang issue.

Despite positive economic growth, unemployment in Mexico, especially youth unemployment, remains a serious problem contributing to gang involvement. In 2012 the Mexican overall unemployment rate was 5 percent, while youth unemployment for young males aged 15-24 was nearly double at 9.7 percent. The overall youth unemployment rate for 2012 was 9.4 percent. It should also be noted that the underemployment rate is likely close to 25 percent.

Los Ninis

The so-called ninis have been identified as a potential contributing factor to insecurity and a drag on the Mexican economy. Unemployed and uneducated youth are also an obvious potential contributor to gang membership, as youth seek alternative sources of “belonging” during idle time and engage in petty crimes to


sustain themselves and their families. However, the reality of ninis is complex and being a nini is not a permanent state.\textsuperscript{78}

Luis Miguel González of El Economista identifies a youth unemployment rate of 12.3 percent in Mexico in 2011, indicating that 1.6 million young people between the ages of 16–29 neither work nor study. González also notes that unemployed youth are more likely to be pulled into criminal activity, suffer from mental health issues and be vulnerable to illness.\textsuperscript{79} Suicide is also a major problem for young people in this age group. According to INEGI, suicides among 15–24 year olds account for 23.2 percent of all violent deaths.\textsuperscript{80}

**U.S.-MEXICO BILATERAL EFFORTS ON YOUTH GANG PREVENTION: THE MERIDA INITIATIVE**

The Merida Initiative is a U.S.-Mexico partnership that has been an important framework for bilateral cooperation since 2007. It was initiated as partnership to counter organized crime partnership and was security-centric, focusing on military equipment. The United States initially provided $1.4 billion over three years to Mexico and lesser amounts to Central America.\textsuperscript{81} The initiative has four pillars: (1) “disrupt capacity of organized crime to operate,” (2) “institutionalize capacity to sustain rule of law,” (3) “create a 21st century border structure,” and (4) “build strong and resilient communities.”\textsuperscript{82} Pillar IV, “building resilient communities,” was added in the Merida 2.0 phase and is particularly important in addressing youth gang involvement.

The initial military equipment was slow to be delivered and U.S. and Mexican government officials have since acknowledged that local and national capacity-building and development efforts characterized by pillars II and IV are where...
resources now need to be allocated in order to address Mexico’s long term security issues.\textsuperscript{83} This has led to a re-evaluation of the Merida Initiative, which is sometimes referred to as “Beyond Merida” or “Merida 2.0.”\textsuperscript{84}

The government of Mexico acknowledges it must fund its own social and development programs to expand state capacity in a sustainable fashion. Pillar IV of the Merida Initiative is primarily funded by the Mexican government and through programs such as the Todos Somos Juárez (We are all Juárez) program. It has devoted 3.38 billion pesos in Ciudad Juárez, making the city a testing ground for Merida Initiative funded concepts and programs.\textsuperscript{85}

Most Merida funds for development on the U.S. side are administered through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and help to fund important initial projects. The Mexican government has been particularly interested in “proof of concept” from USAID-funded programs.\textsuperscript{86} Proof of concept is understood to mean that the Mexican government is interested in seeing effective program concepts tested and measured for success so that these programs can be scaled up and expanded throughout the country. Measuring success of small-scale development programs is particularly difficult, leading some to question the effectiveness of development programs to combat or prevent youth gang activity; however, as Jütersonke et al. point out, “absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence.”\textsuperscript{87}

The work of USAID, NGOs, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have been valuable insofar as they have demonstrated the efficacy of various programs and provide the technical know-how in establishing pilot programs. Beyond the government of Mexico, the private sector in Mexico, particularly in Monterrey, has demonstrated a willingness to fund and operate programs that would benefit youth prone to gang activity. Awareness that these are pilot programs, which will have funding and support from domestic actors, bodes well for their long-term sustainability and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{88}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[84] Seelke and Finklea, “U.S.–Mexican Security Cooperation.”
\item[88] Interview with USAID official.
\end{footnotes}
EXISTING YOUTH GANG PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN MEXICO

Given the nature of youth gang involvement, programs and groups which may not be specifically geared toward preventing youth gang participation, have important salubrious effects. Effective schools and sports programs often divert students away from gang involvement. Job training programs, drug rehabilitation, counseling and family counseling are all examples of programs and services that can address the root causes of gang involvement. Programs and groups run by former gang members like Homeboys United and Cauce Ciudadano may provide gang members with a psychological means by which to exit gang life.89

Programs that address gang involvement can be divided into three general types: prevention, intervention, and suppression. Prevention is generally far cheaper and safer than intervention and suppression because the latter two can result in retaliation from gang members.90 Intervention on the other hand focuses on attempting to remove gang members from gang life and reintegrate them into society. Groups such as Homeboy Industries provide valuable job training and social services to gang members attempting to exit gang life.91 The group serves as an example of a successful intervention program that can be more broadly applied. Suppression focuses on law enforcement activities designed to capture and punish gang members. suppression is the least cost-effective type, but often gets the lion’s share of funding given the tendency to view these problems through the security lens. It should be noted that a comprehensive gang strategy should include varying degrees of all three types with “hard-core” gang members being targeted for suppression and intervention and potential youth initiates being targeted for prevention.

Drug rehabilitation programs

Drug rehabilitation centers help would-be and former gang members end drug use. From 2002–2008, drug abuse in Mexico rose, especially in the northern region among males 18–24, but has since stabilized.92 Drug rehabilitation centers have proliferated in the last decade in Mexico. Drug rehabilitation center financing from the Merida Initiative was funded through the State Department’s Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and supported the training of 600 new

90 Interview with USAID official.
counselors trained in a “standardized curriculum developed with support from the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and Merida assistance.” According to INL, plans to train 5,000 new counselors are under way. “Mexico’s 2012 budget for addiction-related activities (including alcohol and tobacco) is approximately $84 million.”

Drug rehabilitation centers in Mexico have been criticized for various shortcomings including: 1) A lack of professionally trained staff, 2) being at risk of high-profile narco and gang attacks as a result of being perceived as recruitment centers for rival gangs, 3) overcrowding, and 4) having an insufficient number of locations to meet the rising needs of Mexican society. It is clear, based on INL and Mexican government statements, that the lack of drug rehabilitation centers with trained personnel has been identified and plans to address it are under way. The success of those plans will depend upon the effectiveness of implementation.

## Violence in Ciudad Juárez

No city has been harder hit by drug violence in Mexico than Ciudad Juárez. In 2007 the Sinaloa Cartel was fighting the combined forces of the Gulf Cartel and its armed wing Los Zetas for control of the lucrative point of entry in Nuevo Laredo. Seeing no end in sight, the Sinaloa Cartel shifted its aggression from Nuevo Laredo to Ciudad Juárez and began a bloody struggle with the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (Juárez Cartel) to control the city. The struggle exploded with increased homicide rates in 2008. Homicide rates in Juárez remained high until early 2012, when, according to the Chihuahua state prosecutor’s office, there was a 59.8% drop in murders over the same six-month period in 2011. The cartels involved in the struggle for the city utilized local gangs like the Artistas Asesinos and the Barrio Azteca. The use of violent low-level enforcers exacerbated rates of crime and violence. Juárez became the “murder capital” of Latin America, a distinction it lost in

---

95 Department Of State, “Country Reports - Honduras through Mexico.”
2012 to San Pedro Sula of Honduras. There was a silver lining in Juárez’s high levels of violence. It attracted government and NGO resources and made Juárez the center for finding solutions for Mexico’s drug related violence.

**Todos Somos Juárez**

In response to rising violence in Juárez, many NGOs entered the city. The federal government of Mexico initiated a program known as Todos Somos Juárez or “We are all Juárez.” Todos Somos Juárez was announced after a Jan. 30, 2010, birthday party massacre of 15 people, mostly youths, in Villas de Salvárcar, Juárez. Drug traffickers claimed to believe rivals were in attendance at the party. The Juárez program was in many ways intentionally modeled upon the city of Medellín, Colombia’s response to organized crime-related violence in the 2000s that emphasized large infrastructure projects to increase the number of safe spaces for youth in the city.

Todos Somos Juárez is an example of an overarching government and civil society partnership in Mexico that can bring together societal support for youth gang prevention programs. While it was a federal program, it included state and local government representatives and invited the public to participate in 15 open workshops on a range of topics. It also institutionalized “tables” where local citizens could participate, provide feedback, and identify issues of contention. Human rights activists have criticized these tables because the government generally controls them, steering funding toward high-profile infrastructure projects, thus limiting the real impact citizen participation could have. Despite this, institutionalizing citizen participation in governance appears to have had a real impact in galvanizing the city’s response to violence. Todos Somos Juárez was beneficial to overall gang prevention and employment programs because it provided an overarching framework for government and civil society cooperation.

Juárez has seen a significant reduction in violence. There has been an extensive debate on whether this can be attributed to Todos Somos Juárez or other factors.


such as the dominance of the Sinaloa Cartel in its conflict with the Juárez Cartel.\textsuperscript{104} Some have also credited the “get-tough” policies of Julián Leyzaola, the Juárez public safety chief who previously presided over a similar reduction of violence in Tijuana, but who in both cities was accused of human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{105} Most analysts believe the reduction of violence in Juárez can be explained by all factors to greater or lesser degrees coalescing, although many point to the potential negative long-term consequences of zero-tolerance policies.\textsuperscript{106}

**Youth: Work Mexico and Entra21**

One of the specific programs implemented in the backdrop of Todos Somos Juárez was *Entra21*, which was developed in Latin America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to train young people with relevant skills for the job market.\textsuperscript{107} *Entra21*’s Juárez iteration began with an assessment of local employers and the work skills they needed from young people. Relationships with local employers were developed and employers committed to offering program participants internships. If these internship reviews were positive, the understanding was that participants would be offered jobs with the employer.\textsuperscript{108}

Youth: Work Mexico also identified significant dropout rates as students moved from primary to secondary school (the equivalent of moving from elementary to middle school). More than 3,000 students dropped out at this critical juncture.\textsuperscript{109} By meeting with parents and conducting focus groups, Youth: Work Mexico identified numerous reasons for this dropout rate.\textsuperscript{110} For example, each *colonia* has a primary school but not necessarily a secondary school. This meant that parents had to send their children out of their local neighborhoods on public transportation in an insecure city. Many parents and students were afraid to do this. Further, public schools require a tuition payment, which while small and symbolic, posed a barrier for some parents.\textsuperscript{111}

Youth: Work Mexico implemented by the International Youth Foundation through a USAID grant, began immediately instituting summer camp programs in Ciudad Juárez in 2010, designed to target these students who were not registered

\textsuperscript{104} Ramsey, “Honduras”; Martinez-Cabrera, “Juárez Slayings Decreased.”


\textsuperscript{106} Manuel Balcázar.

\textsuperscript{107} International Youth Foundation, *Youth: Work Mexico*.

\textsuperscript{108} Carlo Arze, head of Youth: Work Mexico in Ciudad Juárez, telephone interview with author, October 9, 2012.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
for school. The goal was to convince parents to register their children and overcome the barriers that prevented them from doing so. They negotiated with local schools to extend registration deadlines and were successful in registering a significant proportion of these students, preventing them from becoming ninis. Of the summer program participants in 2010, 2011, and 2012 that had just completed primary school and not enrolled in secondary schools, 87% were able to register late and were placed in secondary school the next year. 112

Youth: Work Mexico, as “a youth to youth initiative,” serves as an example of best practices for youth gang prevention in Mexico and beyond. First, it allied with and incorporated existing youth groups in Juárez. Second, it incorporated existing youth gangs and turned them into positive social forces, which promoted their program and engaged in outreach work. Third, it was culturally sensitive. When recruiting in potentially violent neighborhoods it was careful to ask permission from local gang leaders to avoid unnecessary violence. 113

Circo Volador

Another program that helps to prevent gang involvement by addressing root social causes is the Circo Volador program. This program began in the 1980s as an outgrowth of the youth research of Héctor Castillo Berthier, professor of sociology at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico (UNAM). Due to his previous research on youth in Mexico City, the Mexican government tapped Castillo to understand, and work to eliminate, violence among gangs in Mexico City. In his initial research, he identified music as a common denominator among youth in the city. In an attempt to establish youth outreach, Castillo established a radio show for young people to express themselves in Mexico City. The show was canceled due to a young person cursing the Mexican president, but the networks of youth contacts created by the radio show participation allowed further research. 114

Later Castillo found an abandoned space and asked his network of contacts what it should be used for. The youth contacts suggested a physical space for theater and art, which they renovated themselves. The program goal became to take an illicit skillset and turn it into a productive, employable skill. For example, youth engaging in graffiti could be converted to artists and graphic designers. Radio shows produced histories of neighborhoods. The production of the shows required interviews by young people of neighborhood residents. According to Circo Volador program leaders, this had the salubrious effect of connecting the

112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
neighborhood youth to older residents and the resulting dialogue brought the two groups closer together.\textsuperscript{115}

Today the Circo Volador program has expanded beyond Mexico City to 10 cities. The Social Development Ministry (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, or Sedesol) of the Mexican government provides funding for organizer salaries. The program begins with a diagnostic stage that takes two to three months and includes an initial intervention. The communities selected have generally high levels of violence, high poverty, and are located in highly marginalized areas without basic services like water and electricity.\textsuperscript{116}

The initial intervention by Circo Volador uses cultural activities to build trust in the community such as: movies, Internet radio shows from local youths, and art and music exhibitions. Organizers ask questions like: What skills do local youths have that can be professionalized? How do youths view violence? As victims or as aggressors? How does the community view youths? Often the answers indicate that there is segregation between youths and adults that allows young people to become a scapegoat for the social ills of the larger community.\textsuperscript{117}

A one-year intervention process follows the diagnostic and initial intervention. This includes workshops to professionalize existing skills. The skillsets are used to discuss themes of violence and to unite the community. Radio shows create histories of the neighborhood, uniting neighborhood generations and changing “perceptions on both sides of the age spectrum.”\textsuperscript{118} Participants have also created comic books that explore issues of violence in relationships. These types of projects generate self-reflection for youths that in turn changes their self-image and relationship with the community.\textsuperscript{119}

Cities and neighborhoods are identified using Sedesol’s Levels of Social Violence Index and are typically high in homicides, assaults, and arms in addition to lacking infrastructure like pavement, water, electricity, etc. Circo Volador has a total of 70 employees nationwide. A four-person permanent team is based in each of the following cities: Tijuana, Juárez, Tapachula, Playa del Carmen, Federal District, and San Luis Potosí. Circo Volador aspires to self-sufficiency in funding by soliciting donations from local businesses and institutions using the logic that the program reduces crime and creates a safer neighborhood. However, the program is still heavily dependent upon Sedesol funding.\textsuperscript{120}

The program emphasizes safety when working in violent locales. First, all employees are trained to avoid “being a hero” and to remove themselves from

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{115} Héctor Castillo Berthier.
\bibitem{116} Ibid.
\bibitem{117} Ibid.
\bibitem{118} Ibid.
\bibitem{119} Ibid.
\bibitem{120} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
danger. Second, because local drug dealers observe the program by planting spies in workshops, program organizers make it clear that they are not interested in eliminating drug dealing; rather they only want to address youth issues. Program organizers consistently find that in a neighborhood with over 100 youth, typically only three to four are involved in local dealing; corroborating the notion that less than 3–4% of the population stigmatizes the vast majority of youth uninvolved in the drug trade.\textsuperscript{121}

Cauce Ciudadano

Cauce Ciudadano is another example of a Mexican NGO successfully working with at-risk youth in Mexico City. Led by ex-gang member-turned-activist Carlos Cruz, its mission is to “prevent, reduce and eliminate violence generated by young people, as well as play the same role in various development circles including family, school, and neighborhood.”\textsuperscript{122} The organization provides life-skills training to young people “to strengthen protective factors, reduce risk factors, and promote healthy lifestyles for them to lead full lives free of violence,” as well as boost “individual and community resilience.”\textsuperscript{123} These life skills include: “health promotion,” “resilience,” “the prevention of psychological and health problems,” and the promotion of “social responsibility by linking personal responsibility” to broader responsibilities to “family, school and society.”\textsuperscript{124}

Cauce Ciudadano provides important training to “civil society organizations” and “members of government agencies working with young people.” One example of Cauce Ciudadano’s collaboration with another NGO and private sector entity is its work with the Ashoka NGO, which collaborated with Danone to provide life skills training to the door-to-door and street sales staff of Danone products in Mexico City.\textsuperscript{125} This project focused on women working in the informal sector, aiming to incorporate them in the formal sector with jobs that provided “full social benefits.” Employment and life skills training of women resulted in improved family structures and likely reduced the probability of gang involvement within these families. Cauce Ciudadano also conducts career training, provides conflict

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Cauce Ciudadano, ¿Quiénes Somos?
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
mediation directly with local gangs and youth groups to convert gangs and youth groups into positive social forces within their communities.¹²⁶

**Gang Prevention and Intervention Programs in Central America**

The Washington Office of Latin American Affairs (WOLA) has profiled youth gang prevention programs in Central America that can serve as examples for Mexico. In Guatemala, “Ceiba Group” is an NGO that provides mentors and after-school programs for at-risk youth. The group also provided training to local youth to become mentors in addition to opening centers, which provide safe public spaces for library and Internet services.

Paz y Justicia in Honduras is run by the Mennonite Church and works with homeless youth to “cultivate” leadership in an effort to prevent gang initiation. The NGO also provides tattoo removal funding in conjunction with the Catholic Church.¹²⁷ The NGO has served roughly 320 youth and has limited police involvement in intervention programs to raise youth trust levels.¹²⁸ These programs, like the Mexican programs profiled in this report, emphasize human rights, life skills, and youth to youth strategies in their gang prevention efforts.

Measuring success of these programs in the context of reduced violence is impossible given the small scale of the implementation of these programs and the weak state capacity of Central American governments. Policy makers rather should seek to achieve a “tipping point” or “critical mass” of these type of development programs, while strengthening critical institutions such as the judicial, law enforcement, penal, and educational systems.¹²⁹

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The framework of the Merida Initiative should be continued and built upon with an increased emphasis on development capacity building in Mexico and

---


¹²⁷ A fundamental weakness of this report is a lack of information on the significant role of the Catholic Church in gang prevention in the region. This lack is attributable to the time and resource constraints of the report and the fact that many Catholic Relief Service programs, while very effective in gang prevention activities, have a very limited media profile, are highly localized and are difficult to contact. This should not be construed as a failure to recognize the critical role these groups play in gang prevention throughout the hemisphere; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Atreviéndose a querer: Respuestas comunitarias a la violencia pandillera juvenil en América Central y comunidades de inmigrantes centroamericanos en Estados Unidos,” August 27, 2009, 39, http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Citizen%20Security/past/Atreviendose_a_querer.pdf.


Central America. In many ways, this is occurring and should be deepened. It must also be recognized that Merida funding is a small fraction of what the Mexican government is spending on these types of programs and reforms.

Through Merida Initiative funding, USAID has supported NGOs and local civil society groups that have on a small scale successfully engaged in youth employment training programs. These programs like Youth: Work Mexico, Circo Volador and Cauce Ciudadano should be “scaled up,” and expanded to more cities throughout Mexico. Initial statements and plans from the new Peña Nieto administration indicate it plans to do just this by expanding the Todos Somos Juárez model to 251 cities with over $9 billion in funding from the Mexican federal government.\^\textsuperscript{130}

Circo Volador and Youth: Work Mexico currently function in Ciudad Juárez and are expanding to other cities such as Tijuana, where they recently graduated 112 youth.\^\textsuperscript{131} Though Youth Work: Mexico is still in the implementation phase and is yet to be formally evaluated, it has successfully applied best practices in the Mexican context as evidenced by similar procedures used by Circo Volador and Cauce Ciudadano. These programs should be applied in large cities throughout Mexico, especially those hardest hit by drug violence like Monterrey, where private sector funding is available and likely to be supportive.\^\textsuperscript{132} Where private sector funding may be lacking, federal government funding for projects is critical.

Below is a list of recommended policies for the Peña Nieto administration to address youth in street gangs in Mexico.

1. **Emphasize development funding.** Current funding to address drug related violence in Mexico is heavily weighted toward the security apparatus including the military, the police, the penal system, and the judiciary. While these are critically important governance sectors, development funding to prevent Mexican youth from entering the judicial and penal system is also a cost effective use of resources. Localized programs such as Todos Somos Juárez can serve as models for the wider emphasis on development funding and as previously mentioned, initial indications from the Peña Nieto administration indicate that an expansion of this program is forthcoming.\^\textsuperscript{133}

2. **Employment training programs with life skills components.** Youth: Work Mexico, Circo Volador, and Cauce Ciudadano all incorporate methods that train youth in valuable skills, but also address underlying psychological and social issues, like traumas and self-esteem, that make young people


\^\textsuperscript{133} Associated Press, “Mexico Unveils New Strategy.”
susceptible to gang involvement. Likewise addressing these issues makes young people valuable to employers, further reducing their propensity to become involved in gangs. Increased program funding for these and similar programs can be administered via grant programs through Sedesol or other government agencies. To expand these types of programs they must be “scaled up” and adopted by government agencies. This will first require long-term funding of institutions and programs. Second, leaders of these NGOs must be utilized to “train the trainers.” Third, the Mexican government must have a willingness to accept localized failures and to adjust these programs and the metrics by which they are assessed to local and institutional conditions.

3. **Institutionalized police-youth dialogue forums.** Interviews with officials of the Mexico City Commission for Human Rights indicated that there were moments in Mexico City where dialogue between youth and police was encouraged and resulted in salubrious policy proposals. One such time followed the News Divine nightclub tragedy where police arrived to arrest underage drinkers at an overcrowded club and the ensuing stampede resulted in the death of nine youths and three police officers.\(^{134}\) Unfortunately these moments of dialogue required tragedies and were not institutionalized into regular local forums to increase dialogue between police and youth in the city. Regularized forums for dialogue would improve the relationship between youth and local police by eliminating the mutually held negative perceptions and providing a forum for youth civic participation that will yield valuable policy prescriptions. Mexico City's public safety chief recently announced the creation of a new unit to address youth crime and gangs. This unit could provide an institution to lead and organize youth, civil society, and police dialogue and serve as a model for Mexico.\(^{135}\)

4. **Education.** The Education Ministry (Secretaría de Educación Pública, or SEP) should establish an anti-gang curriculum to provide children with the necessary tools to make appropriate decisions about gang membership, particularly in Mexico’s south where *mara* presence is strongest. Further, extending the hours of the school day and number of days of school could help occupy more youth time.\(^{136}\)

5. **National surveys on youth gang involvement in Mexico.** According to an OAS report on youth gangs:

   In Colombia and Mexico, there is very little legislation on gangs and, therefore, a paucity of specialized institutions for

---


tackling the problem. In addition care delivery mechanisms are insufficient, isolated, and poorly coordinated. This situation requires enactment of new legislation consistent with a rights-based approach.\textsuperscript{137}

Thus, the country’s national statistics agency, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI), should be funded to begin gathering systematic nationwide data on gangs and youth group involvement. Because this data is likely to be tightly correlated with statistics on development, INEGI should work closely with Sedesol to develop the type of data to be gathered and implement these surveys.

6. **Increased funding for the study of youth gangs in Mexico.** Through grants to academic institutions the Mexican government should offer graduate and postgraduate funding for academics studying the youth gang and youth group phenomena in Mexico. Anthropological, sociological, and political science fieldwork-based research will be particularly valuable to supplement quantitative data produced by INEGI.

7. **Safe public spaces.** Invest in the construction of safe social spaces for young people including after-school programs, recreational centers, and spaces for music concerts and art. Merida Initiative funding has been utilized in Juárez to build “prep schools” that also serve as after-school and sports recreational centers in poor colonias. These infrastructural development projects expand state educational capacity and provide adolescents with after-school options, giving them alternatives to criminal activities and or victimization.

8. **Drug rehabilitation programs.** Increasing funding for drug rehabilitation programs to address gang intervention is necessary. These programs and centers must professionalize treatment providers and institute accountability and transparency mechanisms, while protecting the privacy of patients.

9. **Create a Mexican National Gang Alliance.** Mexican government funding could support conferences and information sharing between civil society, relevant law enforcement institutions, and government officials. In the United States, the National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations (NAGIA) brings together “22 state and regional gang investigator associations.”\textsuperscript{138} Gang expert interviews in Mexico indicated that Mexico currently suffers from an “atomization” of agencies with knowledge of the

\textsuperscript{137} OAS, “Definition and Classification of Gangs,” 12.

gang phenomenon. Unlike the law enforcement focus of the U.S. NAGIA, the Mexican version should emphasize civil society participation.

10. Gang Truces and Peace Zones. The recent and apparently successful gang truces in Central America suggest these strategies might be effective in addressing Mexico’s mara and gang problems. El Salvador has created peace zones in which local gangs agree to cease all gang and criminal activity in designated municipalities. This is the second phase of the gang truce in El Salvador between the largest maras, MS-13 and Barrio 18, that appears to have successfully reduced homicides. Due to the apparent success, other Central American nations such as Honduras are attempting to replicate them. While tentative and experimental at best, the peace zone concept might be applicable to Mexico, especially in southern states such as Oaxaca and Chiapas that have the strongest mara presence. Civil society groups, in particular the Catholic Church and other religious groups, have played a critical role in the negotiations of these truces in Honduras and El Salvador and could play an important role in the establishment of truces with maras in Mexico. There has been significant internal debate in both the Salvadoran government and the Catholic Church on whether or not the gang truce is a good idea. Some fear legitimizing the gangs as political actors, while others fear the government is admitting that it is powerless to stop the gangs.

Because of the role of higher-level organized crime groups such as cartels in Mexico being responsible for a higher percentage of homicides, a gang truce might not have the same impact on homicides in Mexico as it did in El Salvador. This does not mean that it might not be an effective strategy for reducing localized violence and diverting gang members into job training programs and the legitimate economy. There are localized examples of non-aggression pacts between street gangs throughout Mexico, e.g., eight gangs signed a non-aggression pact before local authorities in León, Guanajuato. A program called León is with the Young, which included sports, recreational activities, and self-employment workshops designed to steer the young away from vandalism and drugs, complemented the pact. While this may seem small in the context of León’s 991 gangs, this is an example of programs

139 Manuel Balcázar.
143 Ibid.
that can and should be scaled up to include more gangs and services over time.\textsuperscript{144} Similar gang peace pacts have been made in Guadalajara and Monterrey.\textsuperscript{145}

**CONCLUSIONS**

While Mexico’s gang problem appears significant, there are examples of government, private sector, and civil society efforts to address it that appear, at least qualitatively, effective. There are examples of successful gang programs and best practices at the local level in Mexico, but they are slow to be expanded nationally. Interviews indicated Mexico suffers from an “atomization” of efforts addressing the gang phenomenon.\textsuperscript{146} The dizzying complexity of gangs in Mexico also makes formulating policy difficult. While media may portray youth as violent *pandilleros*, *mareros* and *narcos*, many so-called gang members are in reality youth group members of “urban tribes” linked only by music and fashion. Addressing these youths through security-centric and “zero-tolerance” policies only serves to disenfranchise them and exacerbate the problem of social marginalization. The complexity of this issue means that addressing youth gang involvement will be tied to other issues such as education reform, after-school, and employment programs.

Todos Somos Juárez has succeeded in providing a successful framework for civil society, private sector, and government cooperation on efforts relating to the gang phenomenon. As it stands now, it is simply too small and localized to have an impact on the broader issues of drug related violence and gang involvement in Mexico. Todos Somos Juárez and the successful programs like Youth: Work Mexico, Cauce Ciudadano, and Circo Volador should be funded for more rapid expansion throughout Mexico. One city is insufficient; Todos Somos Juárez should be expanded to more cities in Mexico with appropriate accountability and transparency mechanisms. Under the framework of programs like Todos Somos Juárez the policy recommendations suggested here can be implemented. Indeed, the new administration in Mexico appears intent upon ongoing implementation of this strategy.\textsuperscript{147} Continued support for the deepening and sufficient funding of these policies must continue to ensure their successful implementation.


\textsuperscript{146} Manuel Balcázar.

AUTHOR ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank the following groups of people: the Mexico and Central America gang subject matter experts who made time to share their knowledge and expertise, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute team for invaluable support and feedback, and the Baker Institute for Public Policy Drug Policy program interns who assisted in the editing and researching of this paper in its various draft phases.

REFERENCES


USAID. “Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment,” 2006.


