THE CHANGES IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IN THE 1990s

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INTRODUCTION

This paper represents the fruit of the work done by Ana Julia Faya, a member of the first "class" of Latin American Junior Scholars participating in the Junior Scholars Training Program, a competitive scholarship offered by the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center Scholars, with the generous support of The Ford Foundation. The Junior Scholars Program is designed to enhance the research and analytic skills of junior or mid-level scholars or practitioners from Latin America involved in public policy issues through study at a public policy research or academic center in the United States. The Program's aim is to contribute to the design and practice of public policy in Latin America. Individuals at private research institutions, universities, or public institutions are invited to apply in future grant cycles.

Each Junior Scholar grantee spends a semester at a US university or research institute under the guidance of a mentor in his or her field of study. Resources of the host institution are made available, as well as opportunities for the Junior Scholars to access the various research institutions and government bodies in Washington.

Ana Julia, a resident of Cuba, works for the Centro Félix Varela. Her research focuses on the nature and mechanisms of her countries' relations with the US and with the hemisphere as a whole. She spent considerable time in Washington, D.C. in addition to her period of university study. While in Washington she met with officials from each branch of the US government involved in the formulation of policy toward Latin America, as well as with policy experts and regional specialists from a variety of institutes in the area. The insight she gained during those interviews and through her research at the Library of Congress, her host institution and other research facilities in the US is reflected in the depth and thoughtfulness of this paper.
As this publication goes to press, the second group of grantees have begun their semesters in residence working on a very different set of issues: popular mobilization, education, and gender and economic restructuring, and we are receiving applications for 1998. Through the Junior Scholars Training Program, the Latin American Program looks forward to continuing to support the energy and labors of this promising generation of Latin American scholars.

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Ana Julia Faya

Introduction

To speak about the changes that are globally taking place has become a common occurrence in papers published in recent years. Some theoreticians have approached these phenomena from a conservative and immobilist point of view, as if they were witnessing "the end of history";¹ others, from an opposite outlook, have described the process that is taking place as the beginning of "the postmodern age," from which a new global civilization that would leave aside the cultures of modernity and demand new ones would emerge;² some have attempted an explanation proposing a "turbulence" model with which interpretations of present day political and social expressions would be provided³; while still others suggest the creation of universal models of international relations as the "cosmopolitan democratic community,"⁴ trying to encompass these changes that take place in the global level under new interrelation patterns. But these are only a few explanations for this period in world history we are now witnessing.

No matter what the explanations for these transformations may be or what point of view they may take, the truth of the matter is that we are living in a stage of transition and change at the global level. From the industrial age we have entered into the telecommunication era. "The shift towards a rapidly changing society has deeply changed the former expectations and perceptions. It has placed traditional roles and institutions under a serious and

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incomprehensible stress. It has undone rituals and points of reference that had stabilized and sanctified life for generations. It has rendered useless the experiences of the elders for the tribulations of the youngsters. The acceleration of change forces us to see life as movement, not as order; the universe as something unfinished. Science and technology revolutionize our lives, but memory, tradition and myth condition our response.\(^5\)

In this context, a resistance to what is new is evident even in the actors or subjects of these changes: the nation-states, the international organizations formed by them, the structures within societies—whether economic, political, organizational and among the individuals. The trauma caused by change is not always welcomed. Even those who attempt an explanation for these changes are very seldom able to forgo former interpretation schemes and are dominated, at least partially, by old concepts. The old order refuses to disappear and continues to regulate attitudes and forms of thought. The social being dominates social conscientiousness, said the old 19th century scholar, and our circumstances, our social being, are in a transitional stage—"continuity and change", the presence of what is old and of what is new, at times simultaneously, a period of "turbulence" in the global order.

The great technological revolution of recent decades has served as a guiding principle for the economic and intellectual development of the countries, both at the macroeconomic level as well as in the training of the work force, of the men and women of the world. In a short period of time, entire sectors of society were margi nated from the economic life of their countries and almost complete continents were removed from the global economic activity, while transnational oligarchies reaped unsuspected wealth. Microcomputer systems were now what steam engines used to be when they were invented, and they contributed greatly to the speeding up of productive processes. There is now a new ontology and a new form of

interrelation among countries, social and economic groups and individuals. Armies do not escape these dynamics and need to re-elaborate their strategies, under a new concept of security. "Military security is accompanied by economic, ecological, financial and cultural security. The nation-state and the concept of `national sovereignty' that accompanied its emergence during the industrial revolution are today threatened not only by the geopolitical designs of a unipolar world, but also by the new economic reality that fosters the globalization and compactation of historical development."

At the same time, some phenomena have interconnected human groups and nations among the most diverse societies and contributed to challenging the old structures of the nation-state system. This interlinking occurred in an autonomous manner, not by the design of any of the existing international agencies nor of the world summits, which have thus far failed to address these developments until they were at an advanced stage. These phenomena include the onset of air pollution; the crisis of renewable natural resources; the alarming increase of poverty; the growing internationalization of capital flows beyond the authority of the states; the need for sustainable development; the transformation of civil society in the so-called Third World; and the global establishment of a significant number of non-governmental organizations.

However, the new economic policy of the post-cold war era prevents ecological and social problems from threatening mankind as a whole from being effectively included in governmental political agendas; at the most, this has taken place only partially. There is no genuine North-North, South-South cooperation, much less North-South, because the nature of

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8 Blanco, Juan Antonio, op. cit., p. 12.
the universally existing system prevents it. National or transnational oligarchic interests prevail over the interests of the communities. Old bilateral conflicts between nations reemerge—and new ones appear. The most powerful nations continue imposing their agendas at international organizations, including the United Nations system, and rivalries among powers, now for the preeminence of economic more than military blocks, govern international relations. Old hegemonic concepts still persist, if not as a product of the "spheres of influence," as a result of the frailty of the economic and political systems of peripheral countries, that have not been able to change their circumstances overnight, even when the end of the cold war was announced.

The new transnational oligarchies imposed their systems of relations and the model of liberal representative democracy became universal in a totalitarian, globalizing manner, leaving little space for other possible alternatives that could encompass situations that have not been resolved under the current models or the recently exhausted ones.

Hostages of this reality are to be found in the institutions of the inter-American system in the midst of the changes that have taken place in the last five years. Old schemes prevail in the attempt to advance new projects. Government elites tend to maintain traditional models in interstate relations, even when the solution to some of the problems affecting societies crosses over national boundaries and when an awareness has emerged of the limitations of traditional states in the transformations that are taking place.

Because this is a transitional period in global relations of all types—economic, political, and social—to assert the existence of only one political or economic model at the exclusion of viewpoints that were adequate in previous periods of modern societies is tantamount to denying the present changing reality, this period of crisis, of transformation of what used to be. It would be like clinging to the system of relations that prevailed up to now, at moments when the weight
of unresolved problems is weakening its foundations. Most importantly, it is equivalent to restricting the possibilities of striving for a better life for all.

Even if they wanted to, the determination to democratize the hemisphere would not be achieved without the genuine participation and better representation of the various components of society. Considering the new circumstances, this is fundamental. The free market formula cannot guarantee the satisfaction of the needs of the large majorities in the various countries. This will only be achieved through a profound transformation of the political and economic relations that have existed up to now in these societies, under political models that are yet to be tried. "Undoubtedly, this is a transitional period that develops in the midst of warlike confrontations and exacerbations of xenophobic and fundamentalist ideologies of various types. It seems that many years will pass before the waters return to a relatively defined course. This should suggest a certain degree of cautiousness in the propositions."⁹

One of the successes displayed by the Organization of American States in the 90s is the adherence of all its member states to the system of liberal representative democracy. Several authors consider this an example of the advances that multilateral organizations should strive for under the new world circumstances. However, it is only the political expression of a new concept of global security that doesn't deny the philosophy under which the United Stated agreed to the creation of the system. It is not indicative of the transformations demanded by the new global and regional circumstances. Besides, the implementation of the model of representative democracy was not a sufficient solution to the demands of Latin American and Caribbean societies of other times, when it was tried, and much less so now given the complexity of present circumstances. There is a governance crisis, a crisis in the activity of traditional political parties, a crisis of representation in the various sectors comprising today's society, in this way it is possible to speak of a crisis in the democratic system as a whole.

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⁹ Vila, Carlos M., Política y poder en el nuevo orden mundial. Una perspectiva desde América Latina (mimeographed), February 1993, pp. 3-4.
From this point of view I will attempt to analyze the transformations that have taken place in the inter-American system after the cold war: what progress has been made and how much change is necessary?; what have been the parameters for this change?; and up to what extent does the philosophy that gives rise to the system still prevail in spite of the substantive changes in the conditions of hemispheric security and in the midst of urgent demands of the societies in the Americas and the world? We are free to decide — "terribly free to decide." We can choose to resign ourselves to seeing individuals, groups, social sectors and entire continents kept apart from civilization processes, suffer under ever greater famines, while the on-going stubborn economic policies deplete even more our natural resources and endanger our ecosystem. Or we can choose a new and genuine human solidarity, among all, while we try to develop effective social and ecological policies. "From a perspective point of view, an armed victory against oppression in any jungle in the world will be of little value if mankind is unable to conduct simultaneously a global fight to decelerate and revert the race towards a social and ecological catastrophe." Only three years ago, at an international meeting sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the then Secretary General of the OAS, perhaps speaking more from a personal standpoint than as a representative of that organization, expressed dramatically: "...for the task of improving social conditions in the Americas there is no grace period. The evidence is compelling and urgent: unless there is immediate, concerted action, the torrent of unmet demand, once released, will sweep before it all possibility of solving our problems."

I have divided this paper into three parts. In the first, the system and the objectives that gave rise to it are characterized and the background of the present situation is presented. There

10 Blanco, Juan A., op. cit., p. 131.
is an attempt to describe the ineffectiveness of the regional organization to offer a solution to the economic problems of the area, the relative implementation of the model of liberal democracy in Inter-American relations from the ’50s to the ’80s, and the sharpening in this stage of the differing perceptions between the two poles in the hemispheric relationship. In the second part I consider the scope and limits of the changes that have taken place; the new idea of security under the model of liberal representative democracy for the entire continent; and the characteristics of the new projects of the OAS General Secretariat. In the third, some conclusions are attempted with the purpose of evaluating the situation of the system, from the point of view of regional considerations, taking into account the world environment of today and the experiences of the inter-american system that have been described.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist block and, with it, the end of the East-West conflict, make more acute and urgent the problems caused by resource imbalances, the ever increasing gap in development, and the exclusion of important social sectors from policies affecting them. In Latin America and the Caribbean their solution will take more time than the dismantling of the global political polarization.

Section I: The Post-War Inter-American System

Characterization of the System

Some authors consider that the interamerican system is the oldest of the existing international organizations, dating back to the creation of the Pan-American Union towards the end of the 19th century. Although this may be an idea worthy of taking into account, in my paper I have preferred to consider the Pan-American Union and the meetings following its foundation as forerunners of the present system. It was not until the creation of the OAS and the adoption of its Charter, the establishment of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and the
adoption of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) that relations between the government of the United States and those of Latin America and the Caribbean at the end of the World War acquired a systematic and legal nature in these institutions. Through the adoption of these agreements and treaties, some of a political nature and others with a military and security contents, the structures of these institutions became interrelated and there was an attempt at regulating the relations between the Latin American and Caribbean countries and the United States. All this with a gamut of interests that was much broader than customs, communication, transportation, patent or trade agreements which in general characterized the hemispheric gatherings during the first half of this century.

This regional system had a unique characteristic: the confluence of several countries with different levels of development including the unquestionably mightiest power in the world at the end of the Second World War. This circumstance was of the utmost importance for the development of these institutions. The asymmetric nature of their members, between the two poles conforming these mechanisms or institutions, determined the prevailing agenda and thus the differences in underlying purposes and the difference in perceptions which characterized the rapprochements and encounters between the member states. The periods of concurrence to achieve some given purpose within the system have been more frequent that the crises. But even during the latter, the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean countries have shown an adequate capacity to manage conflicts so as to prevent breaches in a system characterized by an enormous asymmetry, but also by the need of a mutual relationship.

For the United States, the creation of the system offered the possibility of establishing hemispheric security agreements in a moment when the rivalry with the Soviet Union required closing the hemisphere to its potential interference or even its influence. U.S. objectives in the regional forum had to do with its national security, which extended throughout a territory from Alaska to the Patagonia. Its perception of regional problems was based on a world power
standpoint, which was distant from that of Latin American and Caribbean countries on this matter; in its relationship with them, what U.S. Senator William Fulbright called "the arrogance of power" would always prevail and it would establish political, economic, military and cultural gaps. "A first step in understanding U.S. policy toward the region is to recognize the parallel nature of perceptions and behavioral patterns. The U.S. not only fails to reciprocate the region's strong feelings, both positive and negative, it has difficulty understanding the basis of those feelings."12

It was the Latin American and Caribbean countries who strived for the creation of the Organization of American States at a moment when the United States was favoring strategic alliances with European powers and the foundation of the United Nations.13 In exchange, they agreed to sign the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance before the OAS was established in 1948. They believed that two main objectives would be fulfilled with the creation of the regional organization: first, they hoped to obtain a Marshall Plan for the region which would help overcome the economic stagnation caused by the sale of raw materials to the United States during the war14 and, second, they would limit, through agreements, U.S. possibilities of intervening militarily in the area.15

Even when all Latin American governments had these two objectives in common, their level of commitment with them varied according to the specific circumstances in each country. Thus, for the countries in the Caribbean Basin, the principle of non-intervention was of major significance because of the presence of U.S. troops in their territories in earlier decades (such was the case in Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic) or because of the proximity of the United States territory to their borders, while this danger was seen with less intensity by the countries in the Southern Cone. Also, even when economic cooperation was of common interest, for the banana republics it was a matter of survival, while for Argentina, Chile, or Brazil it represented the possibility of increasing the relative industrial development they had achieved. The various levels of economic dependence on the United States would establish differences in the political projections of the countries in the area in the hemispheric organizations.

Although some authors equate inter-American relations with the Inter-American system, the former covers a much wider range of issues. These include the complexity of interstate bilateral relations between the United States and each of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as the interaction among various national and international factors—in which civil society and, within it, non-governmental organizations have an important role to play—and the effects of these political, economic and even cultural interactions, on which global circumstances also act. The performance of the inter-American organizations of the system was an adequate reflection of the situation of interstate relations. Since the United States did not only have an hegemonic, but a dominant role to play in them, this was reflected within the system in the control that this country exerted on the agenda items and on the philosophy of

17 As other authors, I do not consider hegemony and domination to be equivalent terms. The former can be understood as a considerable political, economic or cultural influence of the more developed countries on the less developed ones. The latter implies a control with certain pressures on these areas on which, at times, coercion is also exercised.
their treatment. When Latin American and Caribbean issues were considered, this was due to a relative loss of U.S. dominance or to a negotiation, at times implicit, between these two parties in the relationship.

Rapprochements and Encounters

Towards the end of the 40s and during the 50s, the attention of the United States was addressed at strategic security objectives. It made use of all its military, economic, political and ideological resources to support its world hegemony, vis-a-vis an antagonist who was forming alliances with a large part of Europe, under an economic, political and social system that was not only different, but opposite to its own, and that had the potential to influence the countries undergoing the decolonization process. The echoes of the conferences that preceded that of Bandung in 1955, opposing the military blocks that emerged after World War II, ran against the typical relations between the United States and the Latin American countries. However, in the face of an enemy like the Soviet Union, political and military strategies could leave no space for a preferential treatment to other areas in the world but to the solution of punctual conflicts within the philosophy of the East-West confrontation. That was the treatment awarded to the Latin American region during this stage.

At the same time, according to Western ideology, this area was considered a "safe backyard", where it was unthinkable to question the preeminence of the United States. Thus, all political expressions that were seen, or explained, as harmful to U.S. political ideology were rejected, and contested, with the consensus of the governments in the region, even when they may have been an answer to the outstanding nationalist objectives of a given Latin American social sector, as happened in Guatemala in 1954. Since the government elites in the inter-American system shared the same interests, they allowed the intervention of U.S. troops to oust the Jacobo Arbenz government, while dictatorships such as those of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, or Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, extremely different from
the model of liberal representative democracy enshrined in the stipulations of the OAS Charter and sources of conflict among the states in the area, remained in power.\textsuperscript{18}

But even during this period when interests and actions coincided, a difference in the perception of various issues emerged. Aside from being a main element of its system, the defense of liberal representative democracy was only of pragmatic value for the United States; it would be subordinated to strategic interests and it would be disregarded if through an alliance with the military, the non-interference of communism in its sphere of influence or the preservation of its interests as a power were secured. However, for the Latin American and Caribbean oligarchies it meant the avoidance of domestic disorders caused by the military, since these were the countries that suffered in their territories the repression and torture of their citizens, at times with no social sector limitations, and with crystal clear definitions of political opposition as any group or individual not totally loyal to the policies that stemmed from the barracks; but above all, the seizing of power by a military dictatorship in any nation meant a rupture in the political electoral game and blocked the access of economic and political sectors of the very oligarchies to power, since the civil order in society was violated. That was why, among other reasons, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution over the Batista dictatorship was warmly welcomed by the Latin American governments in 1959,\textsuperscript{19} while, within the United States administration, it was seen since the beginning as a potential danger for national security.\textsuperscript{20}

But moreover, the political and cultural tradition, a product of a Latin American and Caribbean history that was very different from that of the United States, admitted authoritarian

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\textsuperscript{19} Faya, Ana Julia and Rodríguez, Pedro Pablo, El Despliegue de un Conflicto Inconcluso, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 1996.

governments that had come to power through military or civil-military coup d'état or people's uprisings and revolts, or conspiracies of the bureaucratic elites, which not only in many cases represented the interest of the people, but were considered legitimate since they were able to solve the authority crises caused by the desire to achieve development, or do away with economic upheavals, corruption and so on. And, in many cases, even the succession of governments in the region was not a simple change of administration, as it was in the United States, but the opportunity to ratify or not, at times in the form of a plebiscite, the permanence of a given political group in power—sometimes in coalitions with dissimilar positions—more than the need of choosing other political alternatives. The history of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean has not been that of the United States.21

Until 1960, the main interest of U.S. policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean focused on the institutionalization of a network of military agreements and treaties of a hemispheric scope, designed to safeguard its continental security. "With the signing of the Rio de Janeiro Defense and Reciprocal Assistance Treaty in 1947, began the creation of a hemispheric system devised to confront the emerging Soviet block and its real or alleged expansionist designs in American soil. Latin American armed forces underwent a large and systematic technical, logistic and doctrinary reorganization process and a clear-cut international division of work was established. Thanks to their superior skills and participation in similar military networks in other parts of the world, the U.S. Armed Forces took charge of the defense of the Hemisphere, while Latin American forces specialized in confronting domestic enemies and in a vicarious involvement in larger conflicts."22

22 Vila, Carlos M., op. cit., p. 27.
On the other hand, the Latin American governments that had agreed to this American policy expected in vain a substantive entry of capital that would invigorate their economies, in the process of industrial development which had begun towards the end of the '30s, particularly in countries of a relatively large political importance, such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. During this stage, several political parties were reorganized to admit new social groups or strata and formed populist alliances, where entrepreneurs and workers' representatives marched together and leaders with authoritarian traits enjoyed wide popular support.\textsuperscript{23} The Cuban Revolution and its national development model appeared at a moment when Latin America felt frustrated because of the insufficient economic assistance it received from abroad and the failure of policies aimed at strengthening regional economies. These elements also contributed to the initial support Latin America extended to it.

Under these circumstances, the proposal submitted by Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek at the OAS for discussing the regional economic situation was activated. In the U.S. administration itself there had been debates on the policies that should be followed towards Latin America—remember Milton Eisenhower's report and the ideas discussed in Congress by the then Senator John F. Kennedy. The United States feared that the revolutionary ideas, the guerrilla, or simply the nationalist ideas inspired by the Cuban Revolution would spread and, thus, sped up the design of a development model for the area, known as the Alliance for Progress, in agreement with the newly adopted policy. This proposal was discussed and adopted at the meeting of the OAS Inter-American Economic and Social Commission, convened at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1961.\textsuperscript{24} The inclusion of the Cuban Revolution in the East-West conflict, as its ties with the Soviet Union became closer, was the factor that triggered the implementation of this project.


The ideological confrontation led to the underscoring of the values of liberal representative democracy in regional institutions, at a moment when the United States was implementing counterinsurgency programs in close alliance with Latin American and Caribbean armies.

During the '70s, these alliances created a climate that favored military dictatorships, the so-called "security regimes." When the Alliance for Progress began to languish, the special attention awarded to the region also declined. "One of the most notable characteristics of this period is the relative absence of regional conflicts. The countries of the Caribbean Basin, and in particular the Central American isthmus, enjoyed levels of economic growth of more than five percent annually during this decade. This growth was accompanied by increasing political 'stability' achieved through the predominance of military regimes, not democratic ones." These figures, however, refer to macroeconomic indicators; the levels of poverty and the inequalities in the distribution of income were becoming significant during those years; that is why other researchers believe that "the effects of this (national security) doctrine were devastating" in terms of economic, political and social development. During this period, the OAS convened a Special Assembly to discuss the social situation and increasing famine in the continent, because of their destabilizing impact on the governments.

During the '70s, the United States experienced a relative loss of its global hegemony, which was expressed by a drop in its main economic indicators, the effects of its defeat in the Vietnam war, and the readjustment of its policies towards the Soviet Union, which gave rise to the Helsinki Agreements. In our region, together with the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone and in Central America, nationalist governments with various degrees of radicality

26 Nef, Jorge and Nuñez, Ximena E., op. cit., p.46.
emerged in Jamaica, Venezuela and, towards the end of the decade, Grenada and Nicaragua. Some of them had military features, such as Alvarado's in Peru and Torrijos' in Panama. Associations for regional integration were attempted, for example, SELA, ALADI, NAMUCAR, and CARICOM in the Caribbean. All these events allowed for the inclusion of topics in the OAS discussions such as the lifting of diplomatic sanctions against Cuba and the admissibility, through resolutions, of political pluralism—in contrast with the defense of representative democracy of the former decade—and, thus U.S. intervention in Nicaragua at the fall of Anastasio Somoza's regime was avoided.27

The general crisis of the inter-American system began in the first half of the ‘80s with the position adopted by the United States on the Falkland Islands war, when it favored its alliance with Great Britain in detriment to the TIAR signatories. For the first time since the signing of the Treaty in August 1947, an extracontinental power had attacked a member state—Argentina in this case—and the United States, the craftsman of this alliance for hemispheric security, turned its back on its stipulations to favor its global interests as a world power. In full exercise of an extremely ideological policy, where the East-West confrontation was used to calibrate every conflict in the region, the United States paid for its extracontinental alliance with a crisis in its hemispheric system.28 Even though nothing resulted of it, it was during this stage that the advantages of creating an Organization of Latin American States was discussed. The final results were the impracticality of its mechanisms and institutional inertia.

Even the OAS Secretary General, Alejandro Orfila, during the last General Assembly under his mandate in 1983, referred to the Organization in the following terms:

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The OAS has not always been present in the dramatic problems born by the peoples of Central America and the Caribbean, whose solution should be of the highest priority for the continent. Yet, other institutions have been resorted to, or solutions, instruments and occasional actions have been taken, with the obvious deterioration of its public image.29

The '80s also witnessed the transition of military regimes to the so-called "controlled" or "viable" democracies. The combination of volatile domestic economic and political problems with the denunciation of violent tortures, disappearances and murders in Latin American societies contributed to international pressures, particularly from the United States, which was readjusting its foreign policy on the area, with the objective of forcing the military back into their barracks. The security regimes became less secure given the possibility for social revolts or uprisings that could spread to the region. But this transition would have very distinctive characteristics. In most cases, it was an extended transition, controlled by the military to the very end, which resulted in authoritarian processes called "democraships" by some. Through irreversible pacts with the civilians, the military controlled the individuals and parties that would take part in the elections. There were situations, such as Brazil, where "the authority of the executive power was not established through direct nor indirect elections in an electoral college specifically appointed to this effect." In the cases of Argentina and Bolivia, the transition to democracy came with the collapse of the military regimes, one as the result of the Falkland adventure and the other because of the corruption or "gangsterization" of its armed forces. In each case, these processes were very different from the overthrow of dictatorships in the '50s and '60s.30

29 Speech delivered by the Secretary General at the Opening Session of the Thirteenth Session of the OAS General Assembly, OAS Files, November 14, 1983.
Two critical situations affecting inter-American relations as a whole while these transitions to democracy were taking place are worthy of attention, due to the impact that their solutions would have on the actions of the OAS: the Central American conflict, that threatened to become a hemispheric issue, and the regional foreign debt that caused the economies in Mexico and Brazil to collapse, temporarily, but nevertheless with seismic characteristics.

The United States tried to elucidate the Central American conflict within the OAS in a commission formed mainly by Central American governments, since strong alliances still existed, due to the special relations with the military, in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. But after the Falkland Islands incident, the Latin American answer to mediation through the Contadora Group could only take place outside the OAS. The main purpose of this group was to avoid direct U.S. armed intervention in the area.

With the creation of the Contadora Group, several precedents in the relations of Latin America and the Caribbean with the United States were set:

a) For the first time after the establishment of the inter-American system, an armed conflict in the region was not settled at the hemispheric organization.

b) This settlement originated a revised Act, after negotiations between the parties, demanding, *inter alia*, the banning of U.S. military maneuvers, the removal of U.S. military bases, the withdrawal of military advisors and the reduction of armaments in the area.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) These two last items affected Cuba and the United States, the latter because of the help if offered to the armed forces in El Salvador and the Nicaraguan “contra”, the former because of its advising and logistic support to the Sandinistas and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN).
Even when the first Contadora Act demanded mutual compromises, it intervened directly in the decisions of the Sandinista government and tried to limit the possible victory of the FMLN in El Salvador. Its opposition to the ongoing U.S. policies and its disregard for the OAS were obvious. "None of the Contadora countries felt much sympathy for the establishment of revolutionary governments in their backyard, but they were much more reluctant to admit a direct intervention of the United States in the region and be trapped in the East-West confrontation."32

Later, the activity of the Group did not follow its initial positions. In 1986, the second Act made concessions to U.S. pressures in the statement of its four points; the group extended to what was known as the Contadora Support Group, when four governments—recently emerging from their transition from military regimes to democracies—joined it, thus rendering more difficult the harmonization of positions. After the 1986 Act, it relinquished its negotiation ground to a Central American entity, while Contadora remained as an observer of the adopted agreements. "The Central American conflict showed once again that it is impossible to reach a settlement in a regional conflict which affects U.S. interests without Washington's support."33

The Contadora Support Group changed its name and attention to other regional problems. With the creation of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action—or Rio Group, as it is commonly known—more than ten Latin American countries would first consider any regional issue that was to be discussed in the various multilateral fora: UN, NAM, Geneva's IACHR, or the OAS. The Group has been instrumental to the holding of Ibero-American Summits, even while remaining apart from this forum; these

policy coordination entities began to function without the presence of the United States and in parallel with the OAS.

The situation of the regional foreign debt, on the other hand, also contributed to the emergence of Latin American entities that would focus on it, such as the Cartagena consensus. Later, the Rio Group, the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and other subregional integration mechanisms considered this situation and had an influence on the regional consensus on this issue. The consideration of the foreign debt issue in the area, however, did not achieve a mediation level such as that of Contadora, nor was it examined by the hemispheric organization; it was mostly discussed bilaterally on a case-by-case basis.

During the second half of the decade, the OAS started to break its inertia with the initiatives of its Secretary General and that of the UN on the Central American negotiations: the Baena Soares missions to El Salvador in 1984, the monitoring of the Nicaraguan elections and other actions. This was the moment when the implementation of neoliberal policies began to make positions between Latin America and the Caribbean vis-a-vis the United States become more similar and to bridge the gap that had been created in the regional organization during the first half of the '80s.

"Deterioration of U.S.-Latin American relations—and especially of U.S.-South American relations—reached its worst moment in the '80s, when the region faced severe international economic difficulties. In the end, however, external economic vulnerability deepened ties between South American states and the U.S. Instead of the U.S. rethinking its interests in Latin America, a great many Latin American countries rethought their interests with regard the U.S. The relative importance of trade with the U.S. increased substantially for Latin America in the 80s, and the U.S. financial institutions played a crucial role in assuring investment flows attracted by privatization programs throughout the region. As the U.S. and
Latin American states rapidly remodeled their foreign policy priorities, the idea of a new era of convergence was conceived in which the language of hegemony was replaced in favor of partnership and cooperation."34 Towards the end of the decade, the governments in the area assumed, or were about to assume, the defense of liberal representative democracy, either through internal processes or through external pressures or both—as in the case of Chile—or through military interventions, as in the case of Panama. The welcome many Latin American societies offered to the democratic game was also an expression of their exhaustion after long years of military dictatorship and of the possibility various sectors saw in participating in the political life of their countries.

Together with this, economic adjustments imposed by international financial organizations were taking place in all the countries, with contraction of the budgets for social welfare, education and public health, privatization processes—not exempt from conflicts and demands from a number of domestic social sectors—and a withdrawal of the state from the economic guidance of the nations. The liberal representative democracy-market economy symbiosis spread throughout the continent and became the only permissible path for development. The new interrelation that the global technological revolution allowed would impact the accelerated pace with which these processes took place—approximately five years—and their imposition as an absolute truth from the centers of power to the periphery.

The transition from military regimes to liberal democracies was convenient for the political adjustment the transnationalization of capitals demanded. Democracy was now understood as a structural support of a process that externally tended towards political globalization and the domination of transnational elites on national interests. At the domestic

level, it favored private sectors in civil societies in order to, first, prevent state centralization and, second, control transformations within societies themselves.  

**The End of the Cold War: The Transformations in the System**

To the changes that occurred during the ‘80s in most Latin American and Caribbean countries, in terms of the neoliberal model of their economies and the transition towards liberal representative democracies, we must add the crucial transformation in global international relations, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, first, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the ‘90s, these international circumstances defined the consolidation of liberal representative democracy as the only political and ideological paradigm in the continent, from decisions adopted by the OAS.

The new circumstances created with the end of the cold war forced transformations in the inter-American system, since the need of guaranteeing hemispheric security that had been the basis upon which it had been built, had disappeared. The promotion of democracy would now be one of the pillars of the new conception, as restraining communism through military alliances had once been. During the Twenty-first Session of the General Assembly held in Santiago, Chile in 1991, new security reasons made the inter-American system undertake transformations geared at adapting its institutions and instruments to the new realities. The adoption of economic policies common to the United States and the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean favored discussions in the OAS. Undoubtedly, it was one of those periods when the two poles in inter-American relations met.

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It would be risky to assert that the disappearance of the Soviet Union and, with it, of the East-West conflict brought about the transformations that have taken place in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Readjustments in the economies and political systems of Latin American nations, which began in the early '80s, have responded to several causes, discussed previously in this paper, within a process of world globalization. However, in the traditional institutions of the inter-American system—the OAS, TIAR and the IADB—the elimination of bipolarity was the determining cause of the changes that took place in them, since they were created and functioned according to the U.S. hemispheric security interests.

At the Santiago General Assembly, the so-called Inter-American System Think Tank submitted a report on the deliberations at three sessions held since 1990, whose conclusions indicated the paths to follow. The report began with an analysis on the transformations that had taken place in the world and their bearing on hemispheric and international relations as a whole; it explained how the changes in Europe had given rise to a world political unipolarity and an economic multipolarity, implying a need to reinforce democracy as a universal ideological foundation, especially in the American continent. There was a recommendation to strengthen the ongoing neoliberal policies by restricting state intervention in domestic economic policies, granting facilities to private capitals in economic arrangements and opening markets in a unifying process that would also contribute to economic integration in a free trade area, whose first expression would be the Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United States, Canada and Mexico. 36

As to the OAS, the need to revitalize its work was expressed, although it was specified that: ".. in the course of time, some of the remaining instruments, institutions and activities, such as the TIAR, had lost their relevance. The constraints of the traditional security concept

have rendered it obsolete." Further on the report stressed: "...the situations related to peace and security have become less important than the economic and social problems in the hemisphere. Thus, the OAS should be reinforced and reorganized in order to fulfill its responsibilities in these areas with more effectiveness, while at the same time improving its operations regarding other objectives in its Charter, particularly in the promotion and strengthening of democracy and the defense of human rights." 37

This would be the ideological foundations of the new security mechanisms that would be established. Military pacts and TIAR would be relegated to a secondary position, while other aspects in inter-American relations, erstwhile concealed, would serve as a reference for the deliberations at the assemblies and special sessions held to that effect, like the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System and, particularly, Resolution 1080.

For the renewal of the OAS, three blocks of main issues had to be addressed:
1) Democracy and human rights
2) Reinforcement of economic transformations
3) Security issues

Afterwards, the agreements of the Miami Summit held in December, 1994, and The New Vision of the OAS, submitted by the General Secretariat in 1995, would reaffirm and expand these purposes.

37 Ibid.
Democracy and Human Rights

As a political model, democracy alone, without qualifications, has never existed. Since the emergence of state-nations in the modern era, there have been two main models of democracy in the world, and each has questioned the democratic credentials of the other.

One, "socialist democracy," linked to the state socialism system or "real" socialism, was implemented in the Soviet Union and in the countries in Eastern Europe. It was based on a one-party system, where a bureaucratic apparatus established a "mechanism of citizen consensus in which the government contributes the economic security of the population in exchange for the political stability that it should receive from it." 38 In this model, the state intervened actively in almost all the processes in civil society, it declared that it represented the interests of the majority and emphasized social order as a way to satisfy individual needs. 39 This political model contributed to the downfall of the economic system associated with it. 40 Even when many critics do not consider it to be really democratic, its architects believed that it was the most perfect expression of the people's power, or of the majority, through the State. The most grave mistake of those who implemented the model was the gradual replacement of this State by a governing oligarchy that became increasingly detached from the majority they allegedly represented. 41

38 Blanco, Juan Antonio, op. cit., p. 76.
40 When the collapse of the socialist system took place, or even before, several countries undertook economic reforms in their systems, which are still in a transitional stage. These are the cases of Cuba, China and Viet Nam, all of which, coincidentally, had arrived to power through genuine popular revolutions.
41 It is interesting to note that, aside from the warnings by Rose Luxembourg, Lenin himself had cautioned about this possibility already in 1918. Cfr. Lenin, Vladimir I., "La enfermedad infantil del 'izquierdismo' en el comunismo", Obras Escogidas, Volume III, Editorial Progreso, Moscow, p. 373.
The second model is usually referred to as "democracy", or representative democracy, liberal representative democracy, liberal democracy, and is inherent of capitalist regimes. It has, in turn, several organizational patterns. It can be headed by a president, a prime minister or a parliament. It can be a two-party system or a multiparty system; it can be monarchical, constitutional or representative. The only common characteristic of all these variants is that each will be adjusted to the needs of each capitalist society under each concrete circumstance.

The term liberal democracy generates a contradiction. "Any important political theoretician in the 19th century would have been bewildered at the expression 'liberal democracy.' During World War I, it was still generally accepted that a political tradition existed: liberalism, with a unique set of ideas, an appeal to a specific social class and appropriate historic traditions; on the other hand, another tradition prevailed: democracy, with its own ideas, class and history. You had to decide which to join, since it was very difficult, or impossible, to embrace both." 43

As Blanco explained, "the liberal state emerged to protect the civil rights of thought, expression, religion and consciousness that were necessary for the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the absolutism of the Ancien Régime." 44 And he quotes Parenti, 45 when he reminds us that in 1690 John Locke stated that "the government was created to protect property" and in 1776, Adam Smith, in his work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, supported this idea more clearly when he expressed that civil authority "has been actually established to defend rich men against poor men, or those who have some property from those who have none." It can be asserted, continued Blanco, that "a liberal policy is a policy oriented towards capital accumulation and free market... as a driving force for general welfare.

42 In order to describe this model, I will follow Juan Antonio Blanco's rationale in the chapter "El mito de la democracia liberal", op. cit., since I consider it to be the most complete approach of all the bibliography consulted on the subject, and agrees with my point of view.
44 Blanco, Juan Antonio, op. cit., p. 57.
45 Parenti, Michael, Inventing Reality, St. Martin Press, USA, p. 2.
Democracy, on the other hand, was originally an anticapitalist political ideology since it upheld two principles: participation and equal opportunities." 46 Wolfe adds: "The dilemma of liberal democracy is that liberalism denies the logic of democracy and democracy denies the logic of liberalism: without a working class there is no democracy. Democracy is no longer considered a subversive term that makes the dominant classes shiver, mainly because the dominant classes coopted it. In the West, democracy has acquired the meaning of bourgeois democracy; it is no longer defined according to the criteria of participation and equality, but by the existence of some formal political traits: elections, a constitution and rules agreed upon for political discourse." 47 Participation and equality are immersed in this scheme, under the false perception that the model has the potential to solve them.

Due to the international conditions of the post-Cold War era and the intercommunication created by new technologies, this model has been able to expand itself globally. And, as a safeguard of the interests it represents, it also presupposes the inadmissibility of other models that are not variants for its readjustment when faced with obstacles to its performance. The failure of state socialism as a convincing politic alternative has allowed liberal democracy to be considered as the only government alternative at the end of the century.

In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, with the adoption of this model, the circumstances pertaining to their special relationship with the United States and their mutual coexistence in the hemispheric entity will concur under the characteristics previously described in this paper, and consequently the conceptual constructs of this institution will be the ones promoted by the superpower and accepted by the Latin American and Caribbean elites.

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46 Blanco, Juan Antonio, op. cit., p. 57.
The multilateral institutions of the inter-American system will play a major role in the universalization of the democratic electoral model. The OAS, for instance, will provide the legal grounds for the defense of democracy, based on the possibility of a multilateral intervention in the states where this democratic balance may have been broken. The organization will also offer its services for the technical supervision of the legal structures associated with it as well as that of the whole electoral process based on a single standard. The role of the IDB will be to finance state transformations, legal institutions and programs geared at civil societies. This entails several evils:

1. The promotion by multilateral institutions of the imposition of a single electoral model which only corresponds to a stage of development of market economies, without taking into consideration that the development of this economic system may question and alter the components of the model as a whole — the state, the political parties, the legal institutions, the civil society.

2. The imposition of a universal model without taking into consideration regional or national characteristics in a world in transition, where the cultural, political, and historical particularities of the various territories still play a major role in the behavior of societies and where the pace of the changes and their level of radicalism is also diverse.

3. The implementation of a universal model without having first resolved the global authority crisis "across the world's authority structures at each level of organization," as the result of the present transition of civilization, and especially, in the case of the Americas and its traditional political parties.

4. The development of the model without the effective and novel incorporation of the new social actors and organizational expressions, which emerged during recent decades, to

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the dynamics of the electoral game, where the participation of all social sectors without exception has not been resolved.

This situation applied by multilateral institutions, in this case the OAS, has expanded to the area of human rights. The conception of a democratic model is linked to a specific and exclusive way of viewing human rights, in absolute harmony with the economic system that sustains them. In their confrontation with other models, human rights became equivalent to civil and political rights. In other words, the right to organize, vote, and political expression. 

"[..] There is a growing tendency in the region to equate civilian rule with full respect for human rights. This tendency has also affected the human rights entities of the OAS."49 Any inhabitant of a country will not only have the right to vote, but by casting his ballot he will be truly free and move on the category of citizen.50 Thus, an illiterate Bolivian "cholo" will enjoy the same human rights as the manager of a transnational as long as both can be members of a political party and cast their ballot on election day; one will use a Mount Blanc while the other will stamp his fingerprint. More encompassing expressions of individual welfare such as the right to housings, heath care, public education or to economic development are not conceived nor are the political mechanisms which involve the dissemination of real power in order to make feasible the participation of the people in the social life.

To quote Richard Bloomfield:

It does makes sense to combine democracy and human rights in the regime because the two are so intimately linked: it is hard to conceive a truly representative democracy without respect for human rights and viceversa. On the

49 Vivanco, Jose Miguel, "International Human Rights Litigation in Latin America. The OAS Human Rights System" p. 73.
other hand, with the best of will, eliminating extreme poverty will happen only over a long time. No doubt it will improve the climate for democracy and human rights but it is not a condition necessary for democracy. The defense of democracy and human rights should be distinguished in OAS deliberations from measures to promote economic development and eliminate extreme poverty. To conflate the latter with the norms and procedures of a defense-of-democracy regime is to diffuse the focus that a strong regime requires.\footnote{Bloomfield, Richard J.,“Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the Americas”, in Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the Americas. A Conference Report, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, May 1994, p.20.}

In general, there is a true symbiosis in the concept of democracy-human rights. For some authors, respect of political and civil rights automatically leads certain states to the exercise of democracy. However, in practice, what allows international institutions to recognize certain governments as "observers of human rights" is the simple fact of having reached power under a polyarchy. For other authors, to ascribe to international regulations of human rights and especially their observance is a main step for the recognition of an authentic democratic form of government. "The existence of a democratic form of government — evidenced by fair and free periodic elections, three branches of government, an independent judiciary, freedom of political expression, equality before the law and due process — is a \textit{sine qua non} to the environment of human rights. Consequently, the elements of democracy are found in the international human right norms. For example, by becoming a party to an international human rights instrument, a state agrees to organize itself along democratic lines by establishing independent tribunals, allowing freedom of expression, and conducting free elections."\footnote{Cerna, Christina M., "Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, in Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 27, no. 2, winter 1995, p. 295.} These concepts turn out to be rigid. The mere compliance of certain civil and political rights parameters in a society does not necessarily lead to a true democracy. Furthermore, human rights are not always observed
because power was obtained through a given electoral pattern. However, there is no doubt that in the first case there is a greater possibility of perfecting the exercise of government towards a true democracy, at least under a rule of law. The real problem arises when certain elements not contemplated by this concept of democracy-human rights begin to hinder the performance of the economic model and consequently the political model will have to be altered for its solution or removal. In the case of the Americas, especially of Latin America and the Caribbean, the rise of extreme poverty has reached detrimental levels for the current democracies. We may be witnessing a readjustment of the economic policies — one of the many adaptations of the system — in order to avoid a catastrophe.

Let us first analyze the changes which have occurred at the OAS, in terms of democracy and human rights, and which are its proposals.

The Assembly at Santiago, Chile, set the basis for future modifications of the OAS; the cornerstone for the changes would be based on the resolutions and agreements adopted on democracy. The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System stipulated that "representative democracy is the form of government of the region" and also stated that "its effective exercise, consolidation and perfection" were priorities shared by the members states. Consequently, the establishment of working groups that would contribute to the creation of procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of democracy were adopted. In other words, it was not only a question of its generalized acceptance throughout the continent but of creating mechanisms for its universal expansion and sustenance, including the counsel and supervision of the electoral processes which brought them into being.

Resolution 1080 was adopted for the defense of democracy. It stipulated:
To instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the case of any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process, or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states, in order, within the framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene an *ad hoc* meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period.53

This adopted paragraph, conferring to the different instances of OAS the authority to rule and act in the event of changes which might occur within the government of any member state, forced them to uphold the Charter in the event of such actions, to determine if it affected the principle of non-intervention established by the Charter since 1947 and to consider the scope of said actions. During the Special Session of the General Assembly held in Washington in 1992, a motion to amend the Charter was adopted with the inclusion of an article which approved the suspension of a member state where the events contemplated in Resolution 1080 had occurred. This motivated the increase of discussions regarding the consequences of the recently adopted Protocol.

On this occasion, and regardless to the legal objectives mentioned, the Organization was faced with the constraints inherent to any international body: a process of decentralized decisions, the lack of strong sanctions and above all, difficulties in the exercise of collective actions for the obtainment of complex targets such as the restoration of democracy in a country.54 It was a matter of reverting the trend of defending the principle of non-intervention,

the Latin American bastion of the system and, also, the limits which trespassed on the very concept of state sovereignty. A change was observed in the definition of intervention, which was outlawed when carried out unilaterally, but accepted as a collective multilateral mechanism; this ambiguity has caused much difficulty in achieving a consensus on this issue, due to historical differences of the perception of hemispheric relations between the two poles and also due to a feeling of self-defense developed by the Latin American and Caribbean countries \textit{vis-a-vis} the United States.

Underlying the new possibilities for intervention were the differences in perceptions, the asymmetry between the OAS member states, the advances obtained by Latin America in international regulations since the inception of the OAS, and the traditional behavior of the United States in these affairs. "U.S. thinking about the OAS has shifted since the end of the cold war from the traditional notion of a security alliance to one that sees collective problem solving as its central purpose. The pragmatism of the U.S. national character is partly at the root of this conception, but it is also a "great power" mind set. As political theorists have noted, big powers do not worry too much about outside intervention (from which their power protects them), but are more motivated by the Thucydidean notion that a big power simply does what it thinks it needs to do to advance its interests. Latin American countries, on the other hand, are passionately concerned with the safeguards of international legal principles and doctrines. These are, after all, their major defenses against the great powers" especially the U.S..\textsuperscript{55}

However, stress was placed on this trend, based on the fact that once discussions at the institution concluded, the adopted agreements would have a greater force. "Another related question is the criticism that the OAS is not truly efficient in the promotion and defense of democracy because decisions must be arrived at by consensus of its thirty-four active members.

This is a valid criticism. The lack of a Security Council mechanism in the Organization is viewed by some as a serious weakness. Such a view, however, ignored the flexibility of action that the Secretary General has, if used effectively, and if supported by key countries. Moreover, decisions taken by consensus of all member states, although perhaps less bold than some would prefer, tend to be implemented more resolutely.⁵⁶

For some, the issue depended on the real possibility of reverting a situation where a democratic government had ceased to exist. Once this occurred, the applicable sanctions were no longer political and assumed military or economic forms. In this event, new problems emerged: the linkage of these issues to those pertaining to the security and the relevance of one institution or another to implement the sanctions adopted, whether it would be the OAS, the IADB, or the IDA.

Regarding the promotion of democracy, the Assembly at Belem created a Special Unit for this purposes, which would work during the 1994-95 biennium and set the guidelines for two categories of programs: one to conduct studies on the activity of the different democratic fora in Latin American societies, to disseminate research, documents and literature on the theme and to create a documentation center. The other would provide counsel to institutions linked to the legislative and electoral processes, as well as educational programs to promote democratic values.

These ideas were further elaborated in a document by the General Secretariat, A New Vision of the OAS, which would synthesize the lines of the Organization already announced by Cesar Gaviria during his inauguration in 1993 and the most relevant agreements adopted at the Assemblies held in Mexico, Santiago, Managua and Belem do Para, in a program for the

coming years — although the absence of topics dealing with poverty is significant. This extensive and detailed document consists of several chapters: the defense and protection of human rights, hemispheric security, drug trafficking control, combat against corruption and modernization of the state, economic integration of the hemisphere, defense and protection of the environment and promotion of a sustainable development, telecommunications, promotion of cultural values, modernization of technical cooperation and internal organization of the OAS, fellowships and training programs, national offices and administrative issues. But foremost is "the strengthening of democracy throughout the hemisphere" as without this the possibility to develop the aforementioned aspects cannot be conceived.«57

In this document, the Centre for the Promotion of Democracy (CPD), adopted at Belem, was strengthened and expanded even more than at the Miami Summit agreements, where this Group was to provide counsel, assistance and to design, promote and execute programs aimed at advancing political reforms such as constitutional and institutional changes in compliance with what the Summit considered as "the consolidation of democratic states in the Americas".58 The interrelation generated by the Summit, between OAS and the Bank, together with the contribution of a more dynamic exchange with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Commission of Women within the OAS, and the World Bank, UNCTAD and USAID, among others, would bring about this reform and expansion of CPD, trying to emphasize these aspects of participation in the democratic model.

In this respect, special attention was paid to the strengthening of the representative instances of civil society, trying to privilege the capacity of its leaders and to develop the

proposing capacity of these groups, with a marked interest in women and native organizations. This is a Bank's coordination area, where it favors development programs of the so called microenterprises, in accordance with state instances, in order to diminish the gap privatization processes generated among the different Latin America strata. This is also a form of cooperation for these sectors, which are the most excluded from the current political and economic processes.

Up to the moment, CPD activities in the areas envisaged by the new vision depend on governmental claims and therefore only play a partial role in the modernization of national parliaments, such as the improvement of civil registers; the strengthening of the governmental capacity for the investigation and struggle against corruption; the introduction of ethical codes and standards in case of conflicts in the public sector; the strengthening of national institutions for the protection of human rights, women's rights, and so on, the strengthening of institutions and/or national legislation on the protection of traditionally marginated groups such as the natives; the strengthening of the legal systems effectiveness in the constitutional and criminal branch; the strengthening of the technical-administrative capacity to improve its effectiveness; the streamlining of the governmental regulatory processes and the creation of mechanisms for public access to information on governmental activities.59

Regarding legislative or parliamentary activity, the main object of CPD has been its formal modernization.60 However, although the CPD intends to move on to a different "qualitative" stage, where parliamentary activities will reflect the interaction of the political elements that come into play, the voluntariness of the states in these processes becomes an obstacle, whereas lofty objectives such as the "respect for the fundamental rights and full participation of the citizens" become dead letter in the OAS red tape unless the governments

59 Ibid.
60 Spehar, Elizabeth and Forti, Alfredo, "Los parlamentos y la consolidación democrática: De lo formal a lo sustantivo", in Cuadernos del CLAEH, No. 73-74, 2nd series, Year 20, 1995, pp. 113-9.
undertake, by themselves, the necessary transformations for the effective incorporation of the various social sectors. The same may occur in the remaining areas described. The new vision marks a policy, however, it has not been incorporated to the activity of all the member states and ratification by the General Assembly is still pending.

The OAS Secretary General intends to transform the institution from a political instance into one for the elaboration of hemispheric policies, where the multilateral institution will continue to coordinate or facilitate these policies, adopted by all the member states and implemented in their societies. Thus, among other reasons, the budgetary situation of the institution would be saved, as its total sum will not suffice for the undertaking of ambitious programs with individual budgets. There are, however, several obstacles: the persistence of the asymmetry between members; the fundamental bearing of the United States on policy decisions within the institution and the secondary role of Latin America and the Caribbean in its foreign policy; the resistance of all members to adopt new methods in their relations; the presence of an inefficient and inactive bureaucracy, typical of the post-war period, in the midst of the transformations at the end of the century.

Economic and Social Issues

Changes in favor of neoliberal models were consolidated in the Latin American and Caribbean region at the beginning of this decade. The significant improvements of the macroeconomic indicators will be perceived as the salvation of the stagnated economies of the '80s. The globalizing processes will contribute to their final development. This combination of market economies and liberal democratic regimes will characterize the regional institutions and the system.

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McLean, Phillipe, Special Adviser to the OAS Secretary General, a testimony to the author, May 1996.
In the United States, the transnational elites found their counterpart in the elites of the capital cities of the Southern Hemisphere, consequently broad sectors of entrepreneurs and most of the civil society remained as hostages of the social and economic restructuring process that they brought about under the aforementioned neoliberal model. This process of change has implied the global liberalization of capital which demands the structural transformation of the country in order to facilitate its flow: privatization processes, contraction of the role of the state and especially the reduction of the public budget.

The implementation of this system required the cooperation of multilateral institutions; however, this area was the one that reflected with the most accuracy the contradictions between inter-American relations even though there was a coincidence in the interest of the ruling elites to advance the economic models, based on the asymmetry of the two poles which comprise the institutions of the system.

Undoubtedly, the foreign policy designed by the United States for Latin America and the Caribbean during the Bush Administration and continued by Clinton represented an attempt to define relations by favoring the economic model described and also by renewed economic relations. This was the result of a transitional policy at the world and hemispheric level, where the U.S. Administration not only tried to find a solution to the challenges posed by a global competition, but also to adjust its policy towards the region in accordance to the new changes. In this respect, the Initiative for the Americas, a new project, was received with interest and also filled in the gap left by the Reagan Administration during the former "lost Decade".

Long sessions were devoted to the analysis of this project at the regional organizations, where the proposal for a free trade area for the hemisphere proved to be the most appealing issue although the path for the Latin American and Caribbean nations was not
The report submitted by the inter-American system think tank at the OAS 21st General Assembly, held in 1991, stressed the priority for regional economic development based on the expansion of its market economies, the increase of financial flows and investment with a greater technical cooperation, and the support to regional and subregional integration.

Consequently, a demand for the active participation of OAS in the development of IPA was stated as well as the follow-up of the Uruguay Round, which was closely linked to this development. These topics were reanalyzed at the assemblies held in Nassau, Managua and Belem de Para, together with the results of the working groups created for these purposes which considered the legal hurdles to hemispheric commercial integration. At the Belem Assembly, the agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico was followed-up and it was recommended that work on the IPA should be transferred to a Special Commission on Trade, with an emphasis on the so-called free area.

Paradoxically, the issue of the creation of a hemispheric free zone "was not given priority by the Clinton Administration in the preliminary versions of the preparatory documents for the Miami Summit. Actually, the Clinton Administration tried to move the emphasis on the economic topics of the meeting, away from "free trade" and into investment."

The push for the creation of the free trade bloc reflected the goals of the U.S. Administration to favor investment, as it facilitated the implementation of economic, political and social changes in the countries to which they are addressed. It also was also the result of the political wear and tear experienced by the Democratic Party during the signing of NAFTA with Mexico. This topic, when it was taken up by the Executive, had ceased to be a Republican

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62 Remember the Special Session of the Latin American Economic System for the debate of the IPA and further publications on this issue.

issue at the time when the Summit was held. The Clinton Administration was caught between two fires: on the one hand, the need to make an effective announcement to the Hemisphere that would also contribute to recover a favorable domestic image and on the other, the growing difficulties in Congress to obtain approval for the expansion of free trade throughout the continent. Thus the announcement of a Free Trade Area by the year 2005 at the Summit meeting was no more than "a public relations exercise, vis-a-vis the insistence of Latin American and Caribbean countries, but it lacked a serious negotiation agenda."  

In order to give continuity to these agreements, a Tripartite Committee was established, comprised by OAS, IDB and CEPAL. The OAS would be the main coordinator of the agreements adopted by the Summit, while the role of the IDB as an institution of the system was renewed as a result of the decisions adopted in Miami, and acquired a new significance through its links with the financing of many of the issues of the Summit Action Plan: those related to democracy, civil societies, the environment, poverty and the free trade and integration zone. However, it is important to state that the issue of poverty, which was emphatically debated at the Special Session held in Mexico, did not form part of the Summit agenda. Although it was a main issue for inter-American relations; this issue was readdressed by the Bank in its programs for the support to economic adjustments in the region.

Following the First Ministerial Meeting on Trade held in Denver, 1995, the policy for the creation of the technical bases and necessary advisory services for the different countries, geared at the creation of a Free Trade Area (ALCA) by 2005 was strengthened. The agreements adopted included: maximization of the opening of the markets with high levels of discipline; consistency with the stipulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO); balance of the opening process so that all areas contemplated in the agreements of the Summit of the Americas would be covered; non-imposition of barriers against other nations; and

64 Ibid, pp. 40-1.
comprehensiveness in terms of mutual rights and obligations. All these issues will be reviewed at the Third Meeting on Trade to be held in 1997.

However, this controversial and highly longed for target of a Free Trade Area (FTAA) by 2005, has very little possibilities for success due to, among other reasons, the differences of opinion which prevail in the United States regarding the policy that should be implemented. The prevalent economic situation and the technical imbalances between geographic areas, especially between the small and large countries in the region would require a still greater preeminence of the work of the multilateral institutions in this respect, as well as the coordinations of the subregional integration mechanisms which exhibit imbalances in their commercial growth: "... the greatest relative growth occurred within the Andean Group (33 percent), followed by MERCOSUR (27 percent), Central America (22 percent), and NAFTA (13 percent). The partial figures available for the Caribbean indicate only a modest growth" If the aforementioned technical and developmental difficulties can be overcome, the obstacles posed by the domestic policy of the U.S. against this integration would still remain, whereas the much longed for regional target, in the best case scenario, would only favor some selected countries.

In spite of the emphasis on integration voiced at the OAS, and particularly at the IDB since the Summit of the Americas, there have been no modifications of the structures of these entities with the exception of the establishment of working groups such as those already mentioned, in cooperation with CEPAL. However, the topic of poverty has led to reforms of the

\[65\] Joint Declaration, Second Regional Ministerial Meeting on Trade, Cartagena, March 21, 1996.
\[67\] Rey de Marulanda, Nohra, Manager of the Regional Integration and Program Department at the Inter-American Development Bank, testimony to the author, April 18, 1996.
The Twentieth Special Session of the General Assembly on Inter-American Cooperation was held in Mexico in 1993, at the proposal of this country at the General Assembly held in Nassau. This was an old debt with the agreement adopted during the '70s and the result of the discussions at meetings for amending the Charter in 1992. On this occasion, it was considered that "Solidary Cooperation for Development" was a fundamental goal of the OAS, an ideal instrument in support of national efforts and especially "to contribute to overcoming extreme poverty in the Hemisphere". At the same time, the amendments to the Charter made in 1992 contemplated an addition to Article 3: "The elimination of critical poverty forms an essential part of the promotion and consolidation of representative democracy and is the common and shared responsibility of the American states." The final wording of one of the sections of Article 116 was the following: "... The General Secretariat will promote economic, social, legal, educational, scientific and cultural relations among all the Member States of the Organization, with a special emphasis on cooperation for the eradication of critical poverty."

However, all these declarations and resolutions are currently at a standstill and their implementation is still pending. The IDB is one of the institutions to broach the topic in its programs. Up to the moment, the OAS has not elaborated any such policy nor have the Summit...
of the Americas or the New Vision of the OAS included among their policies the issue of the eradication of poverty.

Figures on the poverty situation in the region fall below the so-called permissible poverty: nine out of every twenty citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to former OAS Secretary General, Joao Baena Soares; more than one third of the total population, according to the U.S. State Department; more than fifty percent of the population of Ecuador, according to the Chicago Tribune; fifty percent of the total population on the region do not have access to electricity; eighty percent of the children in Brazil do not conclude their elementary education, just to quote a few indicators. 71

After the reforms adopted during the '80s through neoliberal policies, the macroeconomic indicators experienced a growth in most of the countries of the region, which allowed many to consider the possibility of a beginning of an economic recovery. However, the number of poor has increase compared with the figures for the beginning of the '80s. "More persons have an income below the poverty line and the percentage of those who are not able to satisfy their basic needs has increased."72

On the other hand, the unequal distribution of income, the Latin American and Caribbean region ranks first in the world in this matter, continued to increase, with a concentration of income by the wealthiest sectors and considerable destabilization of the remaining social classes in the continent: "This is what makes the current crisis in Latin

America and the Caribbean so different and makes the situation of the large masses of silent poor, with little experience in the struggle for solutions, so bleak. What's new are the unmistakable signs of an explosive situation based on the demands of a middle class without any hope of improvement in the foreseeable future. The members of this class have reacted with vigor and energy and have deployed an enormous capacity to flood public opinion with its claims. There is an on-going discussion regarding the new classes of poor in Latin America and the Caribbean: those who have little hope, the poor middle class which has already lost all its expectations, and the enormous mass of persons who have always been poor and lack the ability to speak for themselves." 73 They have never been represented by any of the various forms of government in Latin America, with the exception of the aborted attempts at popular governments. These new circumstances of the expansion of poverty to social classes which traditionally had not been affected by it, caused by the polarization of income distribution, forced the officials in the regional entities to consider the possibility of an imminent social explosion.

The analysis by the Bank at its Forum on Social Reform and Poverty, in coordination with the United Nations Program for Development, in 1993, was based on the aforementioned elements. It also warned that the viability of the economic reforms and of the proposed model were in clear jeopardy. The market alone could not resolve the problem but rather tended to worsen it. Consequently, the roles allotted to the state in the privatization and adjustment processes and to the Latin American and Caribbean civil societies in what they called "a comprehensive strategy for development" were revised. This was to be achieved through the integration of social reform, and economic reform in an attempt to avoid limiting social policies to sectorial or relief programs, and to integrate them to the economic model.

73 Iglesias, Enrique V, op. cit. p. 83.
The Bank proposed these reforms on ethical, economic and political grounds. From the ethical point of view, it argued, the maintenance of dual societies could not be justified. From the economic point of view, it was inefficient to maintain almost half of the population away from the consumption and productive processes, without any conditions for participation in more productive activities. From the political point of view, the exclusion of significant sectors of the population was considered to be incompatible with the consolidation of democratic systems.74

This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the current situation. The exclusion of social sectors from the economic activity as a result of the very dynamics of the system has had an impact on the state, its institutions, social groups and on the political model, although the latter is not admitted. "The deficiencies of the institutional and normative atmospheres limit the effectiveness of state institutions, restrain participation of the people and exert a negative impact on the credibility of the democratic institutions", insisted the Bank in a report submitted in March, 1996.75 The proposed actions would have a threefold effect: First, the reassessment of the role of the state, its institutions, the management of the governance crisis and the reorientation of obsolete legal mechanisms. Second, the strengthening of civil society as a counterpart to the strengthening of the state based on a more intimate relation with the political and social economies which promote the incorporation of the most excluded sectors such as women and indigenous groups. Third, the implementation of social reforms integrated to the aforementioned objectives. All of these actions were adopted at the Eight Bank Capital Replacement and they are still to be implemented.76

74 Inter-American Development Bank, Reforma Social, pp. 5-13.
75 Inter-American Development Bank, Marco de Referencia March 11, 1996.
76 Jarquin, Edmundo, Department for Strategic Planning and Operational Policies at the Inter-American Development Bank. Interview granted to the author on May 8, 1996.
The lack of mechanisms for a true participation of sectors of the population in the government is an intrinsic deficiency of the current political model, consubstantial to its exclusion from the income distribution under the current political economy. However, the ideologization of liberal democracy, as an exclusive and universal model, does not admit this criticism, in the same manner that the state socialism or the "real" socialism tried in the extinct socialist block did not admit that it did not represent the interests of the broad masses. The strengthening of the state, based on the incorporation of those who "lack the ability to speak for themselves", as Iglesias, the President of the IDB expressed, would imply a radical transformation of the political model in force, towards new forms yet to be implemented, which surpassed the models that the modern era experimented. For the moment, the Inter-American Bank has warned against the governance crisis that the present economic model has brought to the Latin American and Caribbean societies, and, as a consequence, the ineffectiveness which this entails for the objects of this institution. In spite of the coordinations undertaken by the OAS, based on the General Policy Framework and Priorities of Solidary Cooperation and the Eradication of Extreme Poverty, adopted at the Twentieth Special Session of the General Assembly, there have been no concrete measures within the political entity to advance the actual transformations that the described situation demands. The Bank has been the one to step-up the necessary readjustments that will guarantee the stability of the power elites.

Hemispheric Security

The end of the Cold War imposed a reassessment of the concept of security for the Inter-American system as the raison d'être of its institutions had been affected. The absence of an extracontinental enemy, with the capacity to alter the prevailing peace and political ideology, led to the analysis of the constituent bases of the system and to a reconsideration of the topics that would be included in the inter-American agenda. The concept of collective defense, which had prevailed until then and to which the TIAR responded, was replaced with that of collective
security, which encompassed political, economic and social issues and not only the defense against aggression or the threat of aggression or conflicts between states.\textsuperscript{77}

The concept of collective defense implies an action to be carried out by each of the states, or by a group of them, when summoned. However, collective security implies a common multilateral action with a legal or institutional apparatus created beforehand and geared at imposing measures which have been defined and agreed upon in a centralized manner. Thus the foresight expressed in the letter of the TIAR responds to collective defense actions, while the implementation of the other concept would require a different military mechanism. Thus, the relevance and objectives of the IADB were considered.

On the other hand, the common perception of international changes, due to the disappearance of the communist "threat," and the establishment of liberal democratic regimes based on market economies by all the active members of the inter-American system have allowed for the dissemination of the concept of the so-called cooperative security, conceived as a new strategic philosophy, which besides incorporating values such as the defense of democracy and human rights, is geared at establishing the conditions for security based on mutual trust among the states, "the regulation of the military capacity and predictability of the actions of its participants"\textsuperscript{78} Cooperative security would include the concept of expanded collective security, where the use or threat to resort to the use of force gave way to understanding and to the peaceful solution of disputes.

\textsuperscript{77} We use the concepts stated by Hector Manuel Ezata in his article, "La inevitable (pero difícil) transición de la OEA", Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, no. 35, Mexico, Summer 1992.

\textsuperscript{78} Statement by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Cesar Gaviria, at the inception of the Regional Conference on Measures to Foster Confidence and Security, Santiago, Chile, November 8, 1995, OAS Files.
Perception of the need for changes is shared by all the member states, however, the philosophy, forms and mechanisms which will be implemented is not, nor is the vision of the challenges which should be given priority. One can conclude that the continent should confront the challenges of demographic growth, "of poverty, of the protection of the environment and of non-renewable resources, of proliferation (particularly the challenges posed to peace and security) in order to overcome in the next century the realities of this one, during which Man has annihilated more than 200 million of his fellow beings.  

Or stress can also be placed on an area of security where the struggle against terrorism, drugs, illegal international activities, the deterioration of civil peace, refugees, illegal immigration and arms trafficking will replace the struggle against communism in inter-American relations, as was expressed in the report of the Special Commission on Hemispheric Security at the OAS Permanent Council in 1992.

There is a general consensus in terms of the diagnosis of the problems and on the need to transform the legal and institutional mechanisms which sustained the former notion during the Cold War. However, there is no real and effective articulation between the problems that were diagnosed and the measures or resolutions to be implemented by the relevant OAS Commissions.

The subordination of the military to civil power is an area that reflects a lack of consensus both in its national expression and in the relations between the international bodies of the system, namely, between the IADB and the OAS.

For several years, the OAS General Assemblies have examined the links between the IDB and this institution, with the view of transforming the Board into a consultative body subordinated to political decisions and with restraining functions on issues such as those.

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\(^{79}\) Intervention by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. José Manuel Insulza in Ibid, Santiago, Chile, November 8-10, 1995.
expressed at the Special Commission on Security, which would deal with secondary issues if those for which the Board was created for are to be considered primary.

Although created during World War II under the concept of collective defense generated by the policy of the U.S., once the war was over, the Bogota Conference in 1948 refused the motion to include the Board among the organs of the OAS Council, based on the peaceful nature of this organization and on the inappropriateness of incorporating a military entity into its structure. Its functions were restricted to the preparation and maintenance of military planning for common defense and to directly submit these plans to the consideration of the governments, as stipulated by the Fourth Consultative Meeting in 1951.

In 1961, a note by the Board to the Directive Council of the OAS informed that its budget should be added without adjustments to that of what was then the Pan-American Union, currently the General Secretariat. The note was based on the Board's reliance on the governments and on the fact that this relationship would be established through delegations to the Board. Furthermore, a paper prepared by the Special Commission for the Amendment to the Charter in 1966 expressed: "The IADB is a standing military planning entity for the defense of the continent."

It has no organic relationship with the OAS and its components, but is directly linked to the governments in the Americas."80

If one bears in mind that the current concepts of security imply the use of multilateral intervention mechanisms, instead of unilateral intervention, and that they should be used in situations inherent to civil life, the discussion on the subordination of the Board to the political

80 “Seguridad Hemisferica, Junta Interamericana de Defensa”, report by the rapporteur Didier Opperi to the Twentysecond Session of the OAS General Assembly on May 18,1992, OAS Files.
institution will gather strength; also the differences in perceptions among the member states of the system will increase. Still, no conclusions have been drawn on these issues which involve, on the one hand, the civil-military relations at the national level and the tasks that the military will undertake and, on the other, the new activities of the Board and its traditional direct links with U.S. aggressive or subversive policies. "Then there is a special panoply of problems associated with the U.S.. This disproportion of power between the U.S. and its neighbors, which feared for the historic use of that power to intervene militarily, has blocked a clear subordination of the regional military instrument (the IADB) to the political body (the OAS). One extreme formulation of this fear is that, with democracy and human rights as excuses, the U.S. seeks to turn the OAS and the IADB into instruments to put Latin American armed forces under U.S. command as enforcers of U.S. intervention."81

There are two aspects, among others, which define the *raison d'être* of the military which this new condition has challenged. First, the expansion of their functions to activities traditionally undertaken by other bodies, such as the police or other entities created to this effect, like the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which would affect the armies of all the continent, including their structures, in order to carry out the new missions.82 Second, the different concerns of the Latin American and the U.S. armies. Under the current international situation there is no longer an extra continental threat and not even the uprisings or social revolts in the continent are considered significant, or at least they are not perceived as threats to continental security. However for several Latin American armies, the danger still exists, because not all armed incidents in their territories have come to an end.


The military alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War was seen by all them as a tactical measure in the event of a possible extracontinental threat. The true strategy for the Latin American armies was to ward off the threat posed by the U.S. itself, given its philosophy of domination and intervention which have always characterized it, aside from the dangers posed by the obvious imbalance in terms of the development, size and technology of its armed forces.83

In the eyes of the military, these different perceptions increased with the new international trends which barely outlined the contour of national sovereignty. To restrict the field of action of the nation-states and the concept of sovereignty inherent to them would be tantamount to damaging the very nature of the armies. In spite of acknowledging the new realities, they tend to defend their old conceptions. "The nation-state remains the principal actor in international relations. The armed forces are a logical consequence of the primacy of the nation-state, ensuring, guaranteeing the state's vital interests. As we contemplate the new scenarios to be generated by the changing international order, the armed forces fulfil both their traditional role of defending the nation-state and the new role in which the military is an instrument used by the state, operating through international organizations, to design and attain its political objectives."84

In 1995, the tasks of the OAS Special Commission on Security gave way to the Hemispheric Security Commission; however, its activities have left aside, at least for the time being, the discussion of the preeminence of the political body over the military, based on the perceived disagreement. On the other hand, as the Secretary General of the OAS himself

84 Zabala, Carlos Maria, general intervention in Political-Military Relations within International Organizations, symposium at the Inter-American Defense College (Margaret Daly Hayes, Rapporteur) September 28, 1995, p.7.
explained at the Regional Conference on Security held in Santiago, Chile "... the Hemisphere is still lacking a sufficiently refined security agenda capable of replacing, in practice and in an explicit manner, the orientations which were imposed during the Cold War. Although we have advanced in the identification of the values and bases of a new strategic vision, it would be an exaggeration to assert that we have achieved a consensus accepted or acceptable by all." The Inter-American institutions are a reflection of the states that conform them and in the international arena, these issues have still to be resolved. The performance of the military in traditionally civil activities has been sporadic and plagued with opportunism.

The work of the OAS Security Commission has been addressed at the implementation of the so-called measures for fostering trust, based on the transparency of operations and recently, in cooperation with the United Nations, in the deactivation of anti-personal mines, based on agreements adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1995 and faced with the reality that there are practically one million of such mines in the Hemisphere which have not been deactivated.

Among the measures adopted at the Regional Conference at Santiago for the promotion of trust were: the prior notice of military exercises, the exchange of information and participation in the Conventional Arms Register, consultations for advancing the limitation of conventional weapons, the invitations of observers to military exercises as well as the exchange of military and civil personnel for training, and the cooperation in case of natural disasters and specific studies on the security issues of small states.

The latter was advanced mainly by the Caribbean states, at the beginning of the decade, based on the fact that the fragility of their economies could not resist the challenges that for other nations represented a normal part of their daily problems, such as drug trafficking, natural disasters or damages to the environment.
International circumstances forced real transformations on the institutions of the system, since they disturbed the U.S. conception of security and would therefore have an impact on those institutions created as a result of its need for hemispheric security. This is why TIAR disappeared and the existence of the Board was questioned. However, the weight of the difference in perception, in the asymmetry and reasons for belonging to the system, among Latin American and Caribbean countries with respect to the U.S., hindered the true transformations which the old bureaucracies required in this respect.

Conclusions

"... Today's society, even more than its predecessor sixty years ago, confronts the task of reconciling technological and economic integration with traditional political structures, national awareness, social needs, institutional arrangements and habitual ways of doing things."85

This statement by a U.S. historian is the result of the analysis of the complexity of this global transitional stage of societies, where problems related to the ecological and social crisis and the overpopulation of the world, together with the depletion of natural resources associated to them, are some of the most pressing and urgent examples. As was previously pointed out, in 1993, 9 out every 20 inhabitants in Latin America and the Caribbean lived below the poverty line and in a public appeal published in The New York Times, a group of Latin American intellectuals, headed by the Noble Prize laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez, alerted that by the year 2000 — within 4 years — three fourths of the tropical rain forests will have been cut down

and 50% of the species will have been lost forever. " What took Nature millions of years to create will have been destroyed by man in little less than 40 years."86

One of the most difficult problems to resolve is precisely to rise the individual and social awareness on the need to change the current economic and political models, "to reconcile technological changes and economic integration with the traditional political structures", in order to be able to confront the challenges that mankind has before it. This post-Cold War period is not contributing to this aim, especially in the inter-American relations and among the institutions of the inter-American system.

The transition from industrial to cybernetic or telecommunication civilization, the change in the interconnection of human groups or nations, has had less impact on the OAS, IDB, IADB, or TIAR than the end of the Cold War. Transformations in these organizations have been advanced by the changes in the traditional perception of security instead of by the need for the historical consolidation we are experiencing. This process has followed similar parameters to the ones that took place after World War II, when the old concept of collective defense was adopted; the alliance of the Latin American and Caribbean power elites with the United States, who, with its hegemonic power, sets the paradigms. In this case the support of liberal democracy as a political model and to market economies, without any margin for alternatives, served as the basis for the new security of the continent.

This option leaves aside the typical practices of regional political and historical traditions, where caciquism, political leaders, nationalist governments, socialist governments, parliaments dominated by majority leftist coalitions, political parties emerged from revolutions or communist parties with a significant influence on the workers' movements and the

governments, have enrichen the Latin American and Caribbean political culture, not always with ominous results, in a way that the very different political history of the U.S. has not been enrichened. This is not only a case of the manichean binomial, liberal democracy vs. dictatorship, where we are of course aware of the side we choose. This is the case of a larger set of political possibilities and alternatives typical of the region, given the degree of external influences to which it has been exposed, for which there is no place under the current Inter-American consensus, nor under the present degree of intervention by the multilateral institutions. And this will be detrimental to the possibilities for resolving the current problems.

Liberal democracy is a new creed in which even the system is trapped. However, it is also resorting to "traditional policies" whose implementation did not resolve the problems of the region, but rather contributed to their accumulation. The implementation of neo-liberal economic models face obstacles which will not be overcome unless neoliberalism and the political models that go with it are shattered to pieces. The history of the Latin American nations unfolds together with the history of modern era, after the devastating annihilation of indigenous cultures by the colonization process. The Latin American republics emerged when nation-states existed in Europe and in America, and they all were striving for preeminence in this part of the world. We all know about the sequence of world powers in various areas or countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which lasted until the strength acquired by the U.S. left no alternative whatsoever. Representative democracy in American capitalist societies was the political model of the inter-American institutions and the negative consequences which stemmed from its implementation, which are currently undergoing a crisis, are not circumstantial but accumulative and historical. The developmental efforts of the Latin American republics were framed on the industrial civilization, however, not all reaped the same benefits, and for some development is still a goal to reach. The profound differences, not only

between the North and the South, but within Latin America and the Caribbean, become more dramatic, particularly when some of the nations still need sugar mills, that today should be computer controlled according to world demand and should not pollute the environment.

The liberal democratic model was adopted by the member states of the inter-American system basically as an option to state socialism, which represented a totally opposite economic, social and political system where state-owned property prevails *vis-a-vis* private property. Under the present circumstances, liberal democracy strives to resolve contradictions inherent to its very nature, such as the "defense of the wealthy against the poor, or of those who have against those who have not", *vis-a-vis* the issue posed by the absence of mechanisms for the participation of increasingly growing sectors of the population in the political, economic and civilization processes. According to the IDB report mentioned in the second part of this paper the rise of these marginalized groups represents an ethical, political and economic challenge for the very survival of the present model, and at the same time is a consequence of it.

The new hemispheric security is conceived mainly on the bases of liberal democracy. A number of problems are associated to the stability of these democracies. The characteristics of this stage are marked by the coexistence of the old problems of national and hemispheric security with the new problems which the state must face. Its specific manifestations are the lack of definition of the priorities of the regional political bodies under the umbrella of security, in other words, drug trafficking, the authority crisis of the states, the governance crisis, corruption, migrations, terrorism or poverty are seen as detrimental to security and receive the same level of treatment as the non-proliferation of conventional weapons, the need for a peaceful solution to disputes or the elimination of anti-personal mines from specific areas. At times, some of these issues have received less attention then the latter.
The inter-American system still requires radical transformations, although changes may have been made to the charter of the political institution in response to the demands of the new security conditions. The decision to defend liberal democracy, as well as the relevant resolutions and amendments to the charter, represent a positive change in the performance of regional entities when compared to the situation under the military dictatorships of the '50s and the '80s. The establishment of the rule of law, the possibility of putting an end to disappearances, assassinations, torture and repression of individual freedoms represent a step forward. However, to supervise these issues in order to avoid their occurrence under the new democracies is the responsibility of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. As some experts have pointed out, the mere change of a regime does not necessarily imply the end to the violation of human rights. "Guatemala goes on being Guatemala." 88

This emphasis on the surveillance of the respect for human rights has implied a greater activity for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, although this does not necessarily represent a change of its objectives nor of its philosophy. A genuine transformation will occur when the concept of human rights is expanded to the right to education, food, access to health facilities, housing, which are all aspects of the basic needs of man that the narrow concepts of today have not included within the scope of the Inter-American Commission.

Eradication of poverty is the target of the organization and this has been reflected in the amendments to the Charter in the Washington Protocol of 1992. The policies which must be implemented in order to reach this target represent a serious problem for the system. Firstly, they will depend on the individual policies implemented by the states as well as on the support that the multilateral institutions of the system will offer to this effect, all in perfect harmony. The odds against this objective are posed by the extent of the problem which has accumulated

for more than a century and the specific characteristics of the models promoted by the multilateral institutions. However, the crisis which has emerged as a result of this phenomenon may lead, at least at this stage of global transition, to a readjustment of the models and to new changes within the system. Consequently the groups that have been totally set aside could reap benefits. To imagine the possibility of transforming the system towards a more "liberating" one within this newly installed civilization, would be a lofty exercise of optimism and "faith in the improvement of man", however it is very unlikely under the present conditions.

Without doubt, a prerequisite for the radical structural transformations of the inter-American system is a revolution in the perceptions, assumptions and cosmovision of its power elites.

There is a prevalence in the system of different perceptions, an asymmetry, the self-defense of Latin American and Caribbean countries vis-a-vis the U.S. and the lack of understanding by the United States of the attitudes of its neighbors south of the border. In this respect, the tacit, non-explicit agreement of non-unilateral intervention during this stage is an achievement which time will have to confirm. Up to the moment, cases which repel this assertion, Haiti for example, have been preceded by a process of great OAS activity in coordination with the United Nations, in situations which have occurred in active member countries, which have been analyzed by all using similar parameters. Time will reaffirm this inter-American cooperation in cases which go beyond this scenario, under the domestic political pressure in the United States, as in the case of Cuba, the coming into power of a political party with a nationalistic program in any country of the region, or volatile situations of social crises, as has always been the case throughout the long history of our peoples in the Americas.
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