Introduction

Many present-day Russians still consider Ukraine to be part of Russia, historically, culturally, and even spiritually. So pervasive has been the myth of Russo-Ukrainian unity that any attempt at asserting a Ukrainian identity has been viewed by many Russians as betrayal or as foreign intrigue. Despite the persecution of Ukrainian culture in both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, Ukrainians have developed the idea of a distinct Ukrainian nationhood. Many of the current misunderstandings between Russia and Ukraine have as their base a fundamental clash over the historical role of Ukraine. Are Ukrainians and Russians the same people? Are Ukrainians somewhat distinct only because their “Russianness” has been corrupted by Polish practices? Are Ukrainians really a distinct nation both in the past and in the present?¹

In this clash, both sides are looking at the same historical experience but reaching diametrically opposed conclusions. To a large extent, each side selects examples that corroborate its own interpretation and ignores or explains away evidence to the contrary. But the problem is deeper than this, for there is an ambiguity to the Russo-Ukrainian encounter from its very inception in the seventeenth century. Much of the ambiguity comes from posturing; from what Kliuchevsky has said about the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, in which both sides “did not say what they thought and did what they did not wish to do.”² In these encounters both sides found it convenient to overlook differences and concentrate on areas of real or imagined unity. But how did Ukrainian elites view the relationship with Russia? In which areas did they seek links with Russia and in which ones did they hold on to what they considered essential differences? In order to get to the root of these questions, it is necessary to at least touch upon the Ukrainian outlook prior to the encounter with Russia.

The Polish-Lithuanian Experience

When in 1654 Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi placed Ukraine under the protection of the Muscovite tsar, the country had experienced more than half a century of political, religious, cultural, and social turmoil. Up to the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, and even after it, Ukrainian (Ruthenian) elites were trying to find a place within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Only after the failure to reach an accommodation within Poland-Lithuania did Ukrainian elites begin looking toward Muscovy and involving it in Ukrainian affairs. In their encounter with Russia in the seventeenth century, Ukrainian elites were primarily focusing on and reacting to political, social, religious, and cultural issues within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

By the sixteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was, in theory, a “Republic of the Nobles” of two territories, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The nobles, encompassing the political nation, could be of diverse ethnic origins—Polish, Lithuanian, Ruthenian, or German—and diverse faiths—Roman Catholic, Protestant, or Eastern Orthodox—but had individual liberties and equal rights. Reality differed greatly from theory, particularly in the territories of the Commonwealth inhabited by Ruthenians (Ukrainians and
Belarusians). There was no equality among the nobles: political leadership was exercised by the princely houses of the Rurikids and the Gedyminids, while the nobles, descended from the boyars, acted as subordinates and retainers. Although the Union of Lublin, which transferred Volhynia and the Kyiv land from the Grand Duchy to Poland, did not create a third Rus’ entity, it did guarantee the rights of the Ruthenian language and recognized the laws of Rus’ as the official code in the annexed territories. The Rus’ faith—Eastern Orthodoxy—provided another link to the ancient Kiev. Thus, despite Lithuanian and, after 1569, Polish rule, Ukrainian society preserved the social structure, religious faith, language, and law code of Kievan Rus’.3

Ukrainians conceived of unity within the Commonwealth primarily as a political matter. They were part of the Polish political nation because they belonged to the szlachta. There were ethnic, religious, and cultural differences between the Ruthenian szlachta and the Polish, Lithuanian, and German nobilities, but these were not significant for the unity of the state. Thus a Ukrainian nobleman could be designated as gente ruthenus, natione polonus. Since religious and cultural differences were encompassed within the political nation, these differences were tolerated in other orders of society.4 Because some members of the szlachta were Orthodox, townsfolk or even peasants could also be Orthodox. While this is a highly idealized and theoretical picture, it does reflect to some degree the tolerance and cultural heterogeneity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth up to the mid-sixteenth century.

In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Ruthenian Orthodox society was challenged intellectually by both the Catholic Counter-Reformation and the Protestant reforms. In the programmatic vision of the Jesuit ideologue, Peter Skarga, confessional unity was essential for political unity, and Eastern Orthodoxy was considered not only erroneous, but also subversive of the state.5 Owing to increasing political pressure, accompanied by a flowering of Polish culture, Ruthenian nobles began converting to Roman Catholicism and adopting the Polish language and culture. As the Ruthenian political nation declined because of these defections, the remaining Ruthenian elites—both nobles and clergy—began looking for ways of defining a Ruthenian identity that would find acceptance in the political, social, and cultural structure of the Commonwealth. One attempt was the Church Union at Brest (1596), whereby the Ruthenian Orthodox Church recognized the pope but retained its eastern Christian traditions. Another response was a vigorous Orthodox Slavic reform that attempted to counter the Catholic attacks on theological, intellectual, and even cultural grounds. In the end, these efforts failed. By the seventeenth century, the Commonwealth was increasingly becoming an association of Roman Catholic, culturally Polish noblemen. Others were considered politically unreliable, heretical, or simply uncivilized and unsuited to be part of the political nation. Thus the areas that Ukrainians had defined as distinct—religion and culture—were no longer legitimate. Unity in the Commonwealth had to pertain to all spheres. The political szlachta nation had to be Roman Catholic in religion and Polish in language and culture.6

In attempting to find a place for a reformed Eastern Orthodoxy and Ruthenian culture in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ruthenian clerical and cultural elites entered a larger struggle between...
Eastern and Western Churches, between Greek-Slavonic and Latin-Polish culture—in essence, a struggle between West and East. It was hardly an even struggle, for the Western side simply viewed the East as heretical, ignorant, and backward, while the Eastern side, using Western learning, attempted to prove its doctrinal correctness and create a revitalized humanistic Ruthenian Orthodox Slavic learning. While the Ruthenian side could never bridge the gap of perceived inferiority within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was certain that it had created the most enlightened Orthodox Church—one that could and should play a leading role in the renovation of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

The new learning and polemics over the church union sparked a keen interest in history, particularly that of Kievan Rus’. In the early seventeenth century, not only were the old Kievan chronicles recopied, but new historical writing brought them up to more contemporary times. The polemical literature debating the Union of Brest made use of the Rus’ past. Moreover, spurred by Polish historical writings, the Ukrainian authors introduced new terminology and concepts into history writing, such as a Rus’ “fatherland” and a Ruthenian or Rus’ people. These writings went beyond the Polish-Lithuanian concept of a szlachta nation and implied the existence of a Rus’ nation that included the Orthodox Ruthenian population from various estates.

The religious and social picture in Ukraine was further complicated by the emergence of a new social group—the Cossacks. Recruited primarily from non-noble elements of the population, the Cossacks organized themselves into a military host that defended the southern frontier against the Tatars and Turks. The Cossacks saw themselves as frontier knights, a military order that possessed certain “rights and liberties.” Although, at times, the Commonwealth recognized these rights for some of the Cossacks, the idea of a non-noble brotherhood of Cossack warriors with liberties clashed fundamentally with the concept of a Commonwealth of free nobles. The lack of recognition of Cossack estate rights led to a series of Cossack revolts, including the fateful one of 1648.

Up to the end of the sixteenth century, the leadership of Rus’ was still exercised by the princely households and executed through a system of subordinate noble retainers. For example, the princes of Ostrih led the Orthodox revival by printing the Orthodox Bible and founding the Ostrih academy, which generated the cadres for the revival in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. However, owing to the extinction of some princely households and the conversion to Roman Catholicism and Polish culture of others, princely leadership began to wane and the subordinate Ukrainian nobility became disoriented. By the time of the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising, the lesser Ukrainian nobles had either become Polish or joined the Cossacks, but had ceased to act on behalf of a Ruthenian noble estate. A new leadership role was assumed, rather hesitantly, by the Cossacks. In 1620, the entire hierarchy of the then outlawed Orthodox church was consecrated in Kiev under Cossack protection. From that time on, the Cossacks fought not only for their estate rights, but also for the Rus’ faith.

Despite the increasing intolerance, the Ruthenian elites, including the remaining szlachta, the Orthodox clergy, and the Cossack officers, expressed loyalty to and identity with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
The revival of the Rus’ faith, the renewed interest in Rus’ history and culture, and the recognition of a distinct Ruthenian or Rus’ people called for some political recognition and acceptance for Rus’ within the Commonwealth. But finding a place for Ukraine or Rus’ within Poland-Lithuania would require a fundamental restructuring of the Commonwealth. Such an attempt was made in 1658, after Ukraine’s break with the Commonwealth and the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement with Muscovy. The Treaty of Hadiach (1658) transformed the dual Commonwealth into a confederation of three states: the Polish Crown, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Grand Duchy of Rus’. Rus’ had its own administration, treasury, army, and judiciary, while the rights of the Orthodox Church were to be guaranteed throughout the Commonwealth. But the arrangement could not succeed, because it required that Ukraine, in the form of the Grand Duchy of Rus’, return to szlachta rule, while Ukraine was governed de facto by the Cossacks. The attempted ennoblement of Cossack officers was accepted neither by the Polish or Lithuanian szlachta nor by the Cossack rank and file. Thus, the most fundamental definition of the Commonwealth, as a composite of the szlachta nation, could not be maintained. Muscovy, moreover, now deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs, would not permit the existence of a Rus’ state as part of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the idea of Rus’ as part of the Commonwealth continued to linger. In the early eighteenth century, a popular poem viewed Poland as the mother of three children: Liakh, Rus’, and Lytva. Liakh and Lytva killed their brother Rus’ against the will of Poland, the mother. The poem tries to make the point that Poland or the Commonwealth is the true mother of Rus’, who grieves over the injustice done to Rus’ by his brothers.

The fundamental outlook of the Ukrainian elites had been shaped by the Polish-Lithuanian experience. The Orthodox clerical elite strongly identified itself with an enlightened Orthodoxy in competition with Catholicism and the West. Both secular and clerical elites had a concept of a Commonwealth or state composed of several political entities—Poland, Lithuania, and possibly Rus’. Historical writings had spread the idea of a Rus’ people and of ancient Rus’ as a direct historical predecessor. And parts of Ukrainian society believed in the political “rights and liberties” of estates and lands, particularly of the Cossack estate. These beliefs and perceptions would color the behavior of Ukrainians as they encountered Muscovy and the Russians.

The Search for Links with Muscovy/Russia

The Ukrainian elites, striving to be included in the szlachta nation of the Commonwealth, generally avoided maintaining any overt links with Muscovy. If in Polish eyes Rus’ was backward and schismatic, then Muscovy was nothing less than barbaric. Moreover, Muscovy was frequently an enemy of the Commonwealth, and links with it could be viewed as treasonous. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian elites were aware that Muscovy was the only independent and powerful Orthodox polity. Some elements of the Ukrainian clergy began looking to Muscovy for religious, political, and financial support.

As the Ukrainians began coming to Muscovy, seeking alms for monasteries or subsidies for publications, they were treated with considerable hostility. The Muscovites suspected the Ukrainians’ Orthodoxy and viewed
the “Lithuanians” or “Cherkasy,” as they called them, as foreign and dangerous. The Ukrainians persisted and developed the terminology and concepts that would bring Rus’ and Muscovy closer together.

Given their renewed interest in the Rus’ past, the Ukrainian clergies of the 1620s and 1640s turned not only to their own historical tradition, but also to Polish and Muscovite sources. From the Polish historians, particularly Stryjkowski, they learned about Slavic unity and that ancient Rus’ was common to both Muscovites and Ruthenians. More importantly, in trying to define and differentiate Rus’ from Lithuania and Poland within the Commonwealth, these writers began looking more closely at Muscovite chronicling. From such sources, the Ukrainian writers created an image of the Rus’ past that transcended current political boundaries. In fact, the seventeenth-century Ukrainian writers incorporated, somewhat mechanically, a number of contradictory views of Rus’—Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian—into their writings. By assembling these varied traditions, some of these writers were able to link Ukraine and Muscovy through faith, dynasty, land, and even people.15

The work that went farthest in establishing such links was the Sinopsis, frequently described as the first history of the Eastern Slavs. Attributed to Innokentij Gizel’, the archimandrite of the Kiev Caves Monastery, the Sinopsis first appeared in Kiev between 1670 and 1674.16 While attempting to enlist the help of the tsar, the author fiercely maintained the autonomy of the Caves Monastery vis-à-vis the Kiev metropolitanate and the Moscow patriarch. For Gizel’, it was vital that the monastery retain its stauropigial status, subordinated directly to the Patriarch of Constantinople.

The main thesis of the work is encapsulated in its title, The Sinopsis, or short compilation from various chronicles, about the beginning of the Slavic-Rus’ nation and the first princes of the God-saved city of Kiev and the life of the holy, devout prince of Kiev and all “Rossiia,” the first autocrat Volodimer and about the pious sovereign, tsar, and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great, Little and White Rossiia. The author intertwines concepts of a people, dynasty, and state. He begins in pre-Kievan times with the “slavenerossiiskii narod,” which is subsequently ruled by the “Varangian princes,” beginning with Ihor Rurykovych. For subsequent periods of history, the author uses the terms “rossy,” “rusy,” and “rossiiane” in order to describe a people inhabiting a historical territory north of the Black Sea, between the Volga-Don and Danube-Dniester-Dnieper river systems. Although no northern boundary is given, Novgorod Velikii is included.17 The author of the Sinopsis states that the Rurikide princely family established the Russian state. This gosudarstvo Rossiiskoie emerges fully with Volodimer’s conversion to Christianity and encompasses Muscovy as well as the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.18 The story of the Russian state is, in fact, the story of the Rurikide family, which allows the author to include in the chronicle various fragments of Russian and Ukrainian history (including an extensive episode on Dmitrii Donskoii) and link various territories, time frames, and centers of power. For example, when the princely seat of Rus’ is moved from Kiev to Vladimir on the Kliaz’ma, and from there to Moscow, this occurs because it suits princely desires.19 The creation of two metropolitanates (Kiev and Moscow) is due to the fact that one part of Rus’
(Kiev) comes under the rule of a foreign prince, the Lithuanian Vytautas. And, most importantly, when Kiev comes under Muscovite rule, this is lauded because “the first-born of all the cities of Rossiia, the tsarstvennyi city of Kiev,” has come under the rule of the pravoslavnyi samoderzhets. Orthodoxy is also identified with the tsar, land, and people. Thus the wars that the Zaporozhian Cossacks fight against the Turks are waged in the interests of the pravoslavnyi rossiiskii narod. Rus’ is called pravoslavnyi krai and the tsar is referred to as the pravoslavnyi samoderzhets.

Despite considerable confusion in its account of history and ethnography, the Sinopsis brought together a number of ideas that had been reverberating in Ukraine during the second half of the seventeenth century: (1) Rus’, or, as it was beginning to be referred to in the 1670s–80s, “Little Russia,” on account of its historical ties to the house of Rurik and its Orthodox faith, belonged within a larger, all-Russian context; (2) although there was ethnic multiplicity, there was also a larger pravoslavnyi rossiiskii narod that inhabited the territory of the house of Rurik; (3) Rossiia, which included Muscovy and Little Russia, and the entire rossiiskii narod were to be ruled by the Orthodox autocrat, whose ancestry derived from the house of Rurik; (4) the Muscovite tsar represented the continuation of the house of Rurik (the fact that the tsars were no longer Rurikides was never mentioned).

The Sinopsis’ somewhat extreme Russocentrism was one view among several held by members of the Ukrainian clerical elite. In the 1670s, Feodosii Sofonovych, the archimandrite of the Monastery of St. Michael of the Golden Domes, wrote another major historical work, Kronika. Sofonovych traces the history of Rus’ during the Kievan period, then describes how Lithuania absorbed Rus’, and finally focuses on Poland’s entry into Rus’ history. He shows little concern for the Russian territories of Rus’. Like Gizel’ in the Sinopsis, Sofonovych concentrates on rulers, but the Russian Rurikides are of no interest to him. Instead, he lavishes his attention on Prince Danylo of Galicia-Volhynia. He sees the Muscovites and Ruthenians as separate peoples. In describing hetman Khmel’nyts’ky’s placement of Ukraine under the suzerainty of Muscovite tsar, Sofonovych simply reports the event without expressing any opinion about it.

It must be remembered that the search for Rus’, whether within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or under the Muscovite tsar, occurred against the background of continuous crises and turmoil in Ukraine: the renewal of the Orthodox hierarchy (1620), the Khmel’nyts’kyi revolt (1648), the Pereiaslav agreement with Muscovy (1654), and a period of continuous warfare over Ukraine known as the Ruin (1660s–80s). After three decades of conflict, the Ukrainian elite was slaughtered, and Right-Bank Ukraine (west of the Dnieper river) devastated and depopulated. For some members of the elite, gaining the protection of the Muscovite tsar and the powerful Muscovite state seemed the only means of attaining a measure of stability.

In turning to the Muscovite tsar, the author of the Sinopsis and numerous other Ukrainian petitioners were seeking the help of Muscovy in promoting and protecting Slavia Orthodoxa. This Slavic Orthodox world, based on the Orthodox faith, the Slavonic language, Byzantine and post-Byzantine culture, the literary and artistic styles of Rus’, and the South Slavic influence included Ukraine,
Belarus, Muscovy, Bulgaria, and non-Slavic Moldova. It was this culture of Slavia Orthodoxa that was threatened by the Catholic Counterreformation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In countering the Polish, Catholic, and Western challenge, the Ukrainian prelates, to some extent, transformed the culture of Slavia Orthodoxa. They combined post-Byzantine and Western cultural models, introducing the “Greek-Latin-Slavonic” school (the Ostrih academy and the Kiev Mohyla collegium). They attempted to provide Orthodox answers to theological questions never before posed in the Orthodox world. Perhaps the most lasting Ukrainian contribution to the revitalized Slavia Orthodoxa was the recodification of Church Slavonic so that it would equal Latin as a sacred language. The “Meletian” (named after Meletii Smotryts’kyi, compiler of the grammar) norm of Church Slavonic became the standard not only in Ukraine, but throughout Slavia Orthodoxa.

In fact, a spiritual and cultural revitalization of Slavia Orthodoxa through Ukrainian learning was the vision of such Ukrainian clerics as Smotryts’kyi. As he contemplated the Orthodox world, he saw it in chains, except in Muscovy, where it was free but ignorant, and in Ukraine, where Orthodoxy was both free and learned. It was this learning that the Ukrainian clerics wanted to bring to Muscovy. In going to Muscovy they were not only obtaining protection, alms, or a good office, but also attempting to create a united revitalized Orthodoxy capable of meeting the Roman Catholic and Protestant challenges.

The Insistence on Distinctiveness from Muscovy/Russia

At the same time that some Ukrainians were attempting to find affinity with Muscovy/Russia in religion, dynasty, high culture, and even ethnos, they insisted on their own distinctiveness within the existing political, ecclesiastical, and social structures. For the most part, the proponents of Ukrainian political and social distinctiveness were the secular political elite. However, the clergy were also adamant defenders of Ukrainian privileges, particularly their own.

The secular political elite was represented by the Cossack officers and the Cossack administration that de facto ruled Ukraine. This elite performed two political roles, acting as representatives of their own estates and, in some fashion, as representatives of Ukraine. This dual role of the Cossack elite was in effect a continuation of the role it had assumed after the 1648 Khmel’nyts’kyi revolt. Two important documents defined the political status that the Cossacks were accorded in seventeenth-century Ukraine, the Zboriv Treaty and the Pereiaslav Agreement. The Zboriv Treaty, concluded with Poland in 1649, affirmed that the relationship of the King of Poland with the Cossack elite was that of a contractual bond between the sovereign and the Zaporozhian army. That army, in turn, had virtual control over a good part of Ukraine. The Pereiaslav Agreement concluded with Muscovy in 1654 was modeled on the Zboriv Treaty. From the Cossack point of view, the Pereiaslav Agreement maintained the same contractual relationship between the sovereign and the Zaporozhian army and the monarch: in this case, the Muscovite tsar was substituted for the Polish king. The idea of a contractual relationship between tsar and subject was, however, incompatible with the Muscovites’ sense of authority. The Muscovite interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement was that of unilateral submission of the Cossacks and Ukraine to the tsar.
Whatever the legal interpretation, the tsar did confirm certain “Little Russian rights and liberties” at Pereiaslav and reconfirmed them—sometimes in radically altered form—each time a new leader of Ukraine, or hetman, assumed office (1657, 1659, 1663, 1665, 1669, 1672, 1674, 1687). Thus there was a formal recognition by the tsar and Muscovy that Ukraine was a distinct political entity and that Ukrainians were privileged subjects. Moreover, there was hardly any question about Ukraine’s political distinctiveness, since it acted as a semi-independent Cossack polity. Despite the Pereiaslav Agreement with the Muscovite tsar, the Ukrainian Cossack elite pursued alliances with various states that were in fact Moscow’s enemies: Poland-Lithuania (i.e., the politics of the Hadiach Union and the Right-Bank Ukrainian hetmans), the Ottoman Empire (i.e., Hetman Doroshenko), and Sweden (i.e., Hetman Ivan Mazepa).

It was only after the Battle of Poltava (1709) that Russian control over the Ukrainian Cossack polity, referred to as the Hetmanate, was sealed. In the post-Poltava period the secular political elite, the Cossack officers, gradually transformed themselves into a szlachta or gentry. They developed a more consistent political outlook that attempted to blend the presumed unity of the emerging Orthodox Slaveno-Russian empire with the political and social distinctiveness of Ukraine.

The Little Russian concept emerged gradually throughout the eighteenth century. Its basic elements were the acceptance of the term “Little Russia” for Ukraine or part of Ukraine, the emergence of a specific Ukrainian historical consciousness, the conceptualization of a distinct “Little Russia” that was nevertheless part of a larger Russian imperial scheme, and the further refinement of the idea of “Little Russian rights and liberties.”

The term “Little Russia” won acceptance because of its historical precedence in ecclesiastical usage, official status in Russia, and terminological linkage with Russia. This term first appears in fourteenth-century ecclesiastical usage: the Constantino-poli ban Patriarchate used the term mikra Rosia to identify Ukraine, while the term makra Rosia identified the territory of Muscovy. Prior to the Pereiaslav Agreement, the Muscovite tsar titled himself tsar vseia Rusi (tsar of all Rus’); after the Agreement, Aleksei Mikhailovich adopted the title tsar vseia Velikiia i Malyia Rossii (tsar of all of Great and Little Russia). Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi identified Ukraine as “Little Russia” in his dealings with the Muscovites. Nevertheless, a number of terms—“Ukraine,” “Little Russia,” “Rus’”—continued to be utilized in designating Ukraine.

The gradual acceptance of the term “Little Russia,” the emergence of a historical consciousness, and the idea of loyalty to a Ukrainian political entity and its relationship to Russia was elaborated in a new historical/literary genre, the Cossack chronicle. In fact, this genre was partially sparked by the indignation felt by the Ukrainian Cossack elite over the clergy’s inattention to the Cossack polity. In 1718, Stefan Savyts’kyi, a clerk in the Lubny regiment, lamented that none of his countrymen had written a history, “particularly from the spiritual rank, who since the time of emancipation from Poland lacked neither people capable of the task nor the necessary typographical means.” In response, the Cossack elite produced its own history. Two of the most influential Cossack chronicles were those of Hryhorii Hrabianka (1710) and Samuil Velychko (1720).
The two works are not really chronicles but histories that attempt to document and explain how the new Ukrainian Cossack polity came into existence. For both works, the central event was the great uprising under the leadership of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, who is presented as the hero and founder of the Cossack state. At the same time, both chronicles connect the Cossack polity with an ancient lineage. In Hrabianka’s case, the Ukrainian Cossacks are linked to the Khazars and to Rus’. Velychko asserts that the Sarmatian Cossack Rus’ provinces had been “the Ukrainian Little Russian fatherland” since the time of Volodimer, who baptized Rus’. Both chronicles attempt to show by this lineage the historical continuity and legitimacy of the current political and social order.

Both chronicles exhibit a great deal of terminological fluidity in referring to Ukraine. In Hrabianka, “Rus’,” “Ros’,” “Rossiia,” “Mala Rossiia,” “Malaia Rossiia,” “Malorussiia,” “Ruthenia,” “Malorossiiskaia Ukraina,” and “Ukraina” are all used to indicate Ukraine or Ukrainian territory. Velychko uses the terms “Rus’,” “Little Rus’,” “Cossack-Rus,” “Ukraina,” and “Little Russia” when referring to Cossack Ukraine. Both chronicles distinguish Ukraine from Muscovy and Ukrainians from Russians. Hrabianka presents the Pereiaslav Agreement as a pact necessitated by political and military circumstances. Because of the common Orthodox faith, Khmel’nys’ts’kyi was able to obtain the tsar’s protection over Ukraine and a guarantee of Cossack rights. Velychko develops further than Hrabianka the idea of a contractual relationship between Little Russia and its people on the one hand and the tsar on the other hand. In Velychko’s version, the tsarist envoys at Pereiaslav swore in the name of the tsar that all Ukrainian rights would be respected in perpetuity.

Unlike the Sinopsis, the Cossack chronicles developed no general scheme of East European history, nor did they present justifications for tsarist protection based on dynastic claims, or even link Ukraine with Russia on the basis of religion or ethnicity. They strove to present the story of Ukraine from the Ukrainian Cossack point of view. For them, the Kievian Rus’ period is the murky past: their primary interest is in Cossack Ukraine under Poland, the great liberator hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, and Cossack and szlachta rights and liberties. At the same time, these post-Poltava authors wanted to show their loyalty to the tsar.

The Cossack chronicles demonstrate and infer a number of crucial components of the emerging Little Russian concept: (1) that Little Russia and Great Russia were separate lands and peoples; (2) that the two lands were linked by a common tsar; (3) that the Zaporozhian army, the Little Russian people, and Little Russia itself entered into voluntary agreements first with the Polish king and later with the Muscovite tsar; and (4) that Little Russia and its people always retained their “rights and liberties.”

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Little Russian concept appears as a fully developed viewpoint in two important sources, the Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei and the works of Hryhorii Poletyka. However, there are two significant changes from the views of the Cossack chronicles. Although the chronicles had shown little precision as to the territorial extent of Little Russia, they presumed that at the very least Little Russia encompassed Ukraine on both
sides of the Dnieper. Later authors still use the term in this larger sense when speaking of historical Little Russia, but to late eighteenth-century contemporaries, “Little Russia” meant only the Hetmanate, the truncated Left-Bank polity ruled by the tsar on the basis of the Pereiaslav Agreement. For them this Little Russia, and not the much larger seventeenth-century entity, was their “Fatherland.”

The second major transformation was the emergence of a Ukrainian gentry or szlachta as Little Russia’s leading social class. The differentiation between the Cossack rank and file and the officers was clearly evident in the chronicles. However, the early eighteenth-century chronicles still emphasized the Zaporozhian Army and the Cossacks as the major contracting partners with the tsar. Without excluding the Zaporozhian Army or the Cossacks, the late eighteenth-century authors presented the gentry or szlachta as the corporate representative of Little Russia and the main contracting partner with the tsar.

The Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei reflects the thinking of this newly developed Ukrainian gentry. Dedicated to the “honor, glory and defense of all Little Russia,” it included a panegyric to Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. The poem ascribes the paramount role in liberating Little Russia from the Polish yoke to the Ukrainian gentry and laments the fact that the Ukrainian noble and military ranks have not been recognized by the imperial authorities. Most important, the poem flatly rejects the concept of Little Russia as part of a uniform Russian Empire. The personified Little Russia bluntly tells Great Russia that it swore allegiance to the tsar, not to Russia. It goes on to state that, in fact, Little Russia and Great Russia are separate lands bound only by a common monarch, and that Little Russia has its own rights guaranteed by all the tsars.

In his writings, Hryhorii Poletyka insisted that Little Russia had always possessed certain rights guaranteed by the Muscovite tsar. He wrote a treatise entitled “Historical Information on What Basis Little Russia Was under the Polish Republic and by What Treaties It Came under Russian Rulers and a Patriotic Opinion as to How It Could Be Ordered so that It Would be Useful to the Russian State without Violations of Its Rights and Freedoms.” Poletyka identified the rights of Little Russian gentry with the Polish nobility’s “golden liberties” and wanted to resurrect the administrative, judicial and social systems of Ukraine under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the Khmel’nycy uprising. At that time, according to Poletyka, regular diets of the szlachta acted as legislative bodies, consulting with other estates on important matters, while courts of the nobility and town magistrates adjudicated civilian cases. According to Poletyka, Ukraine’s misfortunes were the consequence of the Cossacks’ usurpation of these powers from the nobility following the Khmel’nycy uprising.

While Poletyka’s gentry democracy may have been somewhat extreme, the views expressed on Ukrainian autonomy and Ukraine’s relationship with Russia did reflect the thinking of the Ukrainian gentry. Similar views were presented at a 1763 Officers’ Council attended by 100 delegates from all parts of Little Russia. Moreover, the petitions to the 1767 Legislative Commission, with more than 950 gentry signing the various petitions, do indicate a widespread acceptance of the Little Russian concept on the part of the Ukrainian gentry.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Little Russian concept
encompassed historical consciousness and political loyalty to Little Russia and its peculiar constitutional and administrative prerogatives. At the same time, the Ukrainian gentry viewed Little Russia as linked to Russia through the tsar and, therefore, to an even larger Russian state or empire. Such a formulation of the differences between Ukraine and Russia permitted the Ukrainian gentry to maintain their political and social system in Little Russia, affirm loyalty to the tsar and even the Empire, and partake in the political and social life of that Empire, if they so desired.

Ukraine and the Evolution of Imperial Russia

When Ukrainians first encountered Muscovy, in the seventeenth century, it was an increasingly powerful yet remote country on the fringe of Europe. By the late eighteenth century, Russia was a huge multi-national empire and a major European power. The change from Muscovy to Imperial Russia involved not only territorial expansion, but also a fundamental administrative, military, and cultural transformation. Ukrainians played an important role in this transformation and, at the same time, were profoundly affected by it.

Ukrainian clerics began coming to Muscovy seeking alms and support for publication well before the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement. These contacts proved very difficult because of the insularity of Muscovite Orthodoxy. In essence, the Muscovite Church did not accept the Orthodox population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as Orthodox. It placed the Ukrainian Orthodox in the same category as Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Uniates, requiring that Ukrainian Orthodox be rebaptized before being accepted into the Muscovite Orthodox Church. This attitude intensified after Kiev Metropolitan Petro Mohyla’s liturgical reforms in the 1630s distanced the Ukrainian Church further from Muscovite practices.

Official Muscovite attitudes changed at the time of the Pereiaslav Agreement. Since the main justification for bringing Ukraine under the suzerainty of the tsar was the protection of Orthodoxy (as expressed by the 1653 Zemskii sobor), one could hardly maintain that Ukrainians were not truly Orthodox. Muscovite expansion into Ukraine had also whetted the appetite of Patriarch Nikon for establishing a universal Eastern Orthodox Church subordinated to him. Moreover, the Muscovite Church could not avoid the Western challenge. The Polish Roman Catholic king had been a serious contender for the Muscovite throne, and coalition politics made Muscovy an ally of Protestant states. If the Muscovite Church were to provide a leadership role for Eastern Orthodoxy, then it also needed to assume, at least partially, the mission of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy, i.e., to create an Orthodoxy that could withstand the Catholic and Protestant challenge. For Patriarch Nikon, a reformation of the Muscovite Church was necessary not in order to bring it closer to the West, but rather to consolidate Orthodox forces against the West. This could be done only by unifying the Greek, Kievan, and Muscovite traditions, and the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were particularly well placed to accomplish such a task.42

Patriarch Nikon’s political ambitions notwithstanding, the Muscovite Church was hardly ready for a blending of various Orthodox traditions. Muscovite Orthodoxy was grounded in the belief that it possessed the one true faith, in its fullness, in the only Orthodox—i.e., truly Christian—realm.
It emphasized simplicity as the main avenue of pleasing God and was fundamentally opposed to the Ukrainians, Latin, and the “study of philosophy.” Thus, Muscovy had a functioning well-developed autarkic cultural tradition which could only view the Ukrainian presence as alien.

The Ukrainian clerics were able to penetrate and have an impact on Russian religious and cultural life because they received the support of tsar and court. As Muscovy began its western expansion, the Ukrainian clerics provided an important vehicle for Muscovy’s acquisition of Western ideas and intellectual techniques. Although the Kiev Mohyla Academy and its Russian copy, the Greco-Slavonic-Latin Academy, were hardly at the cutting edge of Western learning, they were, nevertheless, firmly planted within the Western intellectual tradition. The rhetoric, logic, neoscholasticism, and the Latin and Greek languages taught by the Kievan clerics established the intellectual foundations for natural philosophy and political theories drawn from other sources. Most importantly, the Ukrainian elites provided a large number of educated cadres without whom the early drive toward empire could hardly have been sustained.

Thus, from the mid-seventeenth century, several waves of Ukrainian clerics moved or were summoned to Muscovy and, in effect, assumed prominent roles in Muscovite religious, educational, cultural, and intellectual life. Among the Ukrainians who dominated Muscovite high culture during this period were Arsenii Satanovs’kyi, Epifanii Slavynets’kyi, Dymytrii Tuptalo, Stefan Iavors’kyi, Lazar Baranovych, Teofan Prokopovych and the Belarusian Symeon Polacki. Considering the different world views of the Muscovite and Ukrainian clergy, it is hardly surprising that they clashed over the doctrines of the transubstantiation and the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. Kievan theology, in theory, yielded to the authority of Muscovite tradition on these questions, but in practice, Western and Kievan iconography, literature, music, and intellectual currents poured into Muscovy via the Ukrainians.

This attempted Ukrainization of Muscovite Orthodoxy helped trigger the Old Believer schism in Russia. Patriarch Nikon’s attempt to reform Muscovite Orthodoxy according to Ukrainian and Greek models, which, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had also been Westernized by Greek scholars educated at Italian universities, resulted in the raskol that divides the Russian church to this day.

Despite the raskol (against which the Muscovite Church engaged the efforts of Ukrainian scholars and preachers), the Ukrainian presence in Muscovy brought Ukrainian and some Russian clerics (the younger generation of whom were being educated by émigré Ukrainians) closer together intellectually. The Ukrainian clerics were attempting to bring the two traditions together, to create a fairly unified Slavia Orthodoxa. Their vision linked “enlightened” Orthodoxy with the tsar, ancient Rus’, and the Slavonic language and culture. In essence, they were the proponents of a unified “Slaveno-Rossian” (Slaveno-rossiiska) high culture based partly on the post-Mohyla, Jesuit school version of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian version of Church Slavonic.

The impact of the Ukrainian clerics on Russian intellectual and cultural life has been the subject of considerable debate. Traditional historiography has represented the Ukrainian influence as a major trans-
formation of Muscovite culture. Some scholars, George Florovsky, saw this transformation as a tragedy, a corruption of orthodoxy and Russian culture by Latin, Catholic, and Protestant elements. Others, Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi and Dmitrii Likhachev, welcomed the Ukrainian influx as beneficial “Ukrainization” of Muscovite culture which greatly enriched Russia. Most scholars credit Ukrainian humanism in preparing the Petrine “revolution” and in aiding in the transformation of Muscovy into modern Russia.

Recently, Max Okenfuss advanced a revisionist view that the large influx of Ukrainians had a minimal impact on Russian culture. By carefully studying both book and manuscript libraries in Russia, Okenfuss concluded that Orthodoxy combined with humanism was limited to Ukrainians and other foreigners. Okenfuss argues for a fundamental cultural autarky of both the Muscovite nobility and most of the clergy. He claims that the “Ukrainian-Lithuanian-Belorussian community was small, isolated, and alien” and that “the growth of humane secular learning was not an organic development within Muscovite society, but the struggle of Kievans—the struggle of Ukrainian humanists to make themselves head above the din raised by an avalanche of psalters and liturgical books.” At most, Ukrainian humanism created “Russian Levites,” a caste with education alien to those of the nobles, most of the middle estates, and the peasantry.

Irrespective of the resistance to humanistic Slaveno-Rossian culture in Muscovy, this culture produced by the Ukrainian clerics was subsequently viewed as a point of unity between Russia and Ukraine and as an important step in the evolution of modern Russian culture. Moreover, these Ukrainian clerics did help to “jump-start” Muscovy’s transformation into Imperial Russia. Soon other ideas and developments made that process more European and, paradoxically, also more Russian. Cameralism and the concept of the well-ordered police state, imported from the Germanies, formed the intellectual underpinnings of the new state activism. The cameralists had the political goal of maximizing society’s productive potential through the agency of the state, which assumed the role of policing and developing society. From the time of Peter I, the Russian Empire pursued the goals of increasing the power and wealth of the state not only through annexation and conquest, but also by attempting to rationalize government, extract greater state revenues, and increase productivity.

In its activism, Westernization, and pursuit of reforms, Imperial Russia began developing a more secular, cosmopolitan, and, at the same time, more Russian imperial culture. Primary in this process was the development of a modern literary Russian language and secular Russian literature. The Russian Imperial state introduced the civil alphabet, which sharpened distinctions between ecclesiastical and civil linguistic forms; published grammars and dictionaries; and produced works dealing with all aspects of the secular world, from practical manuals to translations of foreign literature. The linguistic medium that began to emerge was a middle style that incorporated elements of the “high” style of Slaveno-Rossian and the “low” style of colloquial Russian. By the nineteenth century, the new literary Russian had become the linguistic medium of the empire. At the same time, the imperial
elites had an increasing knowledge of German and, by the end of the eighteenth century, French. Although elements of Slaveno-Rossian culture survived well into the nineteenth century, it was gradually being relegated to Orthodox Church services and spiritual literature.

For the Ukrainian elites, the evolving Russian Empire presented both opportunities and dangers. A strong Orthodox state, based largely on Slaveno-Rossian culture, and challenging both Poland-Lithuania and the Tatar-Ottoman world, certainly fulfilled the aspirations of at least a part of the Ukrainian clerical elite. The evolution of the Little Russian concept allowed the clerical and non-clerical elites to express political loyalty to the tsar and a greater Russia while, at the same time, insisting on specific “Little Russian rights and liberties.” The cameralist police-state concepts were not hostile to such regional autonomy and corporate traditions. In fact, the cameralist practice was to subordinate the corporate bodies to the new state purpose rather than to curtail or abolish them. Nor was the evolving Russian imperial culture considered a threat by the Ukrainian elite, since it continued to share high culture, whether Slaveno-Rossian or a mixture of imperial Russian and Slaveno-Rossian. The Ukrainian elite of the late eighteenth century readily accepted the fact that it shared a monarch, some aspects of history, and high culture with Russia. At the same time, this elite continued to insist on the special juridical and social arrangements and distinct historical development of Ukraine (i.e., the Hetmanate of the Left Bank).

While the Little Russian concept provided sufficient intellectual space for the Ukrainian elite to participate in Imperial Russia and, at the same time, to remain distinct within it, it had a number of basic flaws. First, it could not accommodate the prevailing concept of tsarist authority and power. From the time at Pereiaslav when tsarist envoys refused to take an oath on behalf of the tsar because such an act was an unthinkable encroachment on autocratic rule, Ukrainian “rights and liberties” were at the mercy of tsarist wishes and even whims. It is true that in the seventeenth century the tsar had issued charters upon each election of a Ukrainian hetman, thereby de facto confirming traditional “rights and liberties.” Moreover, every break with Muscovy/Russia by Hetmans Vykov’skyi, Doroshenko, and Mazepa was justified by the Ukrainians with the argument that the tsar had violated his solemn obligations toward Ukraine. But obligations to subjects were antithetical both to traditional autocracy and to the more modern absolutism of the eighteenth century. In the final analysis, the Ukrainian elite had no legal or moral recourse when its “rights” were violated; it could only appeal to tradition and the tsar’s sense of justice.

The Little Russian concept also clashed with Enlightenment ideas that became dominant in mid-eighteenth-century Russia. While cameralism recognized regional, historic, and cultural differences, the Enlightenment insisted that there was a basic uniformity in nature and society. What was important to “enlightened thought” was the discovery of these basic rules or laws, and not concentration on superficial differences. For good government, it was crucial to discover the laws of governance and apply them. It was very difficult for the Ukrainian elite to defend the historical and legal traditions of their “homeland” against the argument that the introduction of the “best of all possible laws” would bring greater development and progress.
Catherine II’s introduction of what she conceived to be the “best of all orders” resulted in administrative uniformity for the Empire, including Ukraine. The Hetmanate was divided into three provinces; the Ukrainian administrative, military, and fiscal institutions were dismantled; and a new Russian imperial provincial and district administration was installed. Similarly, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was reorganized along imperial lines. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, little remained of the legal institutions, historical legacy, and corporate “rights and liberties” which, in Ukrainian eyes, distinguished them from Russians.

The Remnants of Distinctiveness: The Little Russian Concept in the Early Nineteenth Century

The abolition of the Hetmanate’s institutions and the introduction of an imperial administration effected the gradual fusion of the Ukrainian and Russian social structures. Yet alongside this absorption of the Ukrainian elite into the Russian Imperial system, the Little Russian identity continued to exist. It existed as a subset either of an all-Russian identity or of one centered on the notion of Empire. The Little Russian identity continued to exist because of a number of factors: (1) the Ukrainian gentry’s dominant role in the Imperial administration of Little Russia; (2) the survival of Ukrainian customary law; (3) the occasional restitution of certain legal and military formations traditional to Little Russia; and (4) an interest in the history and folklore of Ukraine that helped nurture the idea of a Little Russian fatherland.

The first factor, the gentry’s role in the administration of this territory, was due to the Little Russian gentry’s acceptance into the Imperial ruling class. In 1785, Catherine II permitted the Little Russian gentry to be recognized as part of the Imperial dvorianstvo. Previously, the Little Russian gentry had attempted to claim the same rights as those enjoyed by the szlachta under Polish-Lithuanian rule. This, of course, was unacceptable to Catherine, as the Polish szlachta enjoyed much greater privileges than did the Russian dvoriane. The abolition of all Ukrainian institutions and the introduction of the 1775 provincial regulations, however, finally forced the Imperial Russian authorities to recognize the Little Russian gentry. Since nobles were to play an essential role in the new provincial administration, the former claim that there were “no nobles in Little Russia” had to be dropped, and a Little Russian dvorianstvo had to be created out of the old Ukrainian gentry. The Ukrainian elite’s integration into the Russian nobility, along with the complete enserfment of the Ukrainian peasantry in 1783, provided the Ukrainian gentry with unprecedented opportunities to pursue imperial careers and to acquire immense wealth. As a result, as a noble class they absolutely dominated the local administration of Little Russia.

The second factor that ensured the continuation of the Little Russian concept was the survival of Ukrainian common law. In 1801, Ukrainian courts on the territory of Little Russia were abolished and replaced with Imperial Russian courts. Ukrainian common law, however, was appended to the Russian law code in these courts, thus ensuring that the legal system in Little Russia would continue to operate somewhat differently from that of the rest of the Russian Empire. These legal peculiarities survived until the 1917 Revolution as the only remaining vestige of the Hetmanate’s former autonomous status.
The third factor that sustained a sense of Little Russian identity was the occasional restitution of certain legal and military institutions that had previously been abolished. For example, Ukrainian traditionalists were able to convince the imperial authorities to partially restore one of the most important elements of Cossack Ukraine—the Cossack army. During the Napoleonic invasion, fifteen Cossack regiments were reestablished and then disbanded after the Russian victory.\(^60\) During the 1830 Polish uprising, Tsar Nicholas authorized the reactivation of eight Cossack regiments consisting of 1,200 men each.\(^61\) Again, once the uprising was crushed, the Cossack units were no longer needed and were subsequently disbanded. Any attempt to revitalize the Cossacks as free warriors of old Ukraine, however, was forestalled by Imperial opposition and by the Cossacks’ own economic decline. By 1837 the Cossacks were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of State Properties (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennykh imushchestv), an agency intended primarily for state peasants.\(^62\) However, the Cossacks retained certain privileges that had been granted to them concerning land ownership, taxes, and military service.

The fourth development that encouraged the survival of the Little Russian concept was literary—the unprecedented writing concerning the history of and nostalgia for the Little Russian fatherland. The most influential work of this type was the anonymous \textit{Istoriia Rusov}.\(^63\) This early nineteenth-century work presents a long, elaborate, and to a great extent fictitious history extending from Kievan times to the 1760 Turkish war. Perhaps its most interesting claim is that the Kievan Rus’ period properly belonged to the Ukrainians and had been inappropriately included in Russian history. The \textit{Istoriia Rusov} was enormously popular among the nobility of the former Hetmanate and circulated widely in manuscript form. While recognizing Ukrainian history as a special branch of a greater “all-Russian” entity, the work at the same time stresses Ukrainian separateness and is an eloquent apology for the Hetmanate and Cossack rights and privileges. Its tone, at times, is quite anti-Russian, and it insists that Ukraine has certain inalienable and guaranteed rights that must be upheld. However, the \textit{Istoriia Rusov} never questions the tsar’s claim to sovereignty over Little Russia—indeed, it looks to the tsar in the hope that he will maintain the last remnants of Ukrainian autonomy, and even restore the traditional rights of the Ukrainian elite.

But no restoration was possible. On the contrary, the imperial authorities continued to pursue a policy of administrative uniformity. The loss of any semblance of political distinctiveness convinced some of the more reflective members of the Ukrainian gentry that they were epigones of a country and a nation that had ceased to exist. Oleksa Martos captured this mood in a diary entry written at the grave of Hetman Mazepa in 1812:

”Mazepa died far away from his country, whose independence he defended. He was a friend of liberty and therefore deserves to be honored by posterity. After his expulsion from Little Russia, its inhabitants lost their sacred rights, which Mazepa had defended for so long with great enthusiasm and patriotic ardor. He is no more, and the name of Little Russia and its brave Cossacks have disappeared from the list of nations who, although small in numbers, are yet famous for their way of life and their constitution. Now rich Little
Russia is reduced to two or three provinces. That this is the common
destiny of states and republics, we
can see from the history of other
nations.\textsuperscript{64}

After a century and a half, the
balancing by the Ukrainian elite
between assertions of Russo-Ukrainian
unity and insistence on Ukrainian
political distinctiveness seemed over.
Russians and Ukrainians shared the
idea of an all-Russian tsar, an all-
Russian Orthodox faith and church, an
empire, and an imperial Russian high
culture. Russians and Ukrainians were
administered in a similar manner and
were part of a similar imperial social
structure. The only differentiation on the
part of the Ukrainian elite lay in
Ukraine’s distinct past. The Ukrainian
elite was certainly aware that Ukrainians
spoke a different “vulgar” language than
Russians and had different songs and
folk customs, but in the pre-Romantic
era such differences among the common
people were of little significance. To
them, Little Russia was long dead. What
lingered for some was a nostalgia for the
distinctiveness of the past.

\textbf{Concepts of Russo-Ukrainian Unity
and Ukrainian Distinctiveness:}
\textbf{Epilogue and Conclusions}

For most of the early modern
period, Ukrainians were part of two
large states: Poland-Lithuania and
Muscovy/Russia. In both instances,
Ukrainians accepted some form of
unity while at the same time insisting
on maintaining essential differences. In
the case of Poland-Lithuania, Ukraini-
ans subscribed to political unity as part
of the \textit{szlachta} nation, yet insisted on
religious and cultural differences. As
these and other attempted arrange-
ments within Poland-Lithuania proved
unworkable, some Ukrainians began
looking for succor to Muscovy. In their
pro-Muscovite orientation, Ukrainians
claimed affinity with Muscovy in
religion, dynasty, high culture, and
even ethnos. However, they insisted on
maintaining their distinctiveness in
political, social, and, on occasion,
ecclesiastical structures. The claim to
distinctiveness proved so strong that it
even survived the abolition of separate
Ukrainian political and juridical
institutions.

That Ukrainians could claim unity
with Russia and at the same time insist
on their own distinctiveness was not
surprising. Before the advent of nation-
alism, multiple identities and loyalties
were the norm, particularly in large
multinational states. Therefore, it was
possible to be a political Pole, a devout
Orthodox Christian, and an advocate
of Rus’ culture. It was normal to be
loyal to the tsar, Orthodoxy, Imperial
Russia, and, at the same time, to be a
fervent defender of Little Russia. In
fact, the whole Little Russian concept
was nothing more than an intellectual
justification for such multiple loyalties
and identities.

From the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, Ukrainians began
discovering other areas of distinctiv-
ness from Russians. Under the influ-
ence of Herder and Romanticism, a
new generation discovered the Ukrai-
nian folk and their vernacular lan-
guage. Until its banning in the 1860s
and 1870s, literature written in ver-
nacular Ukrainian evolved slowly
under the cover of a mere local variant
of a larger all-Russian literature. In this
respect, Ukrainians were still employ-
ing the old Little Russian concept, but
applying it to the areas of vernacular
language and literature. In the late
nineteenth century, Ukrainian intellec-
tuals emancipated themselves from the
Russian connection, positing that
Ukraine was different from Russia in
all respects: language, literature,
culture, history, and politics. This
marked the birth of modern Ukrainian nationalism, which no longer permitted multiple identities. By identifying themselves as Ukrainian, the nationalists excluded the possibility of being Russian.

Concomitantly, Russians began identifying the Imperial Russian state primarily with the Great Russian people and culture. This was a rejection of a meta-Russian nationality which would contain separate and legitimate Little Russian and Great Russian components. The imperial and even the Slaveno-Russian culture began to be treated as narrowly Russian. Thus what had been shared in the past by Ukrainians, Belorussians, Moldovans, and Russians was appropriated to a Russian or Great Russian nationality. The identification by some of the entire Slavia Orthodoxa with Russia and Russians made the Moldovan-Ukrainian prelate Petro Mohyla, who had never been to Russia and remained a patriot of the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth until his death, a defender of “Russian” religion, culture, and values. Such a view also sanctioned the banning of the Ukrainian language on the grounds that there “never was, is, or could be a Ukrainian language.”

By the late nineteenth century, Ukrainians and Russians were interpreting their history on the basis of two completely opposed paradigms. In discussing the early modern period, Ukrainians emphasized those areas that were distinct from Russia and saw in them evidence of Ukraine’s autochthonous development. Russians emphasized those aspects that Ukrainians held in common with Russia and saw in them proof that Ukraine had been and always would be Russian. These two fundamentally opposed views still cast their shadow on current debates concerning the question of Russo-Ukrainian unity and Ukrainian distinctiveness in the early modern period.
Notes

1. For a discussion of the current Russo-Ukrainian disputes on history and relevant literature, see my article, “History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine,” in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, 1994), 123–46.


3. The literature on the history of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is voluminous. The works most relevant for our analysis include M.K. Liubavskii, Ocherk istorii Litovsko-russkogo gosudarstva do Liublinskoi unii vkluchitel'no (Moscow, 1910) and F.M. Shabul'do, Zemli lugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo (Kiev, 1987). For a discussion of the nobility in the Ukrainian lands after 1569, with extensive bibliographic notes, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648,” in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., Rethinking Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987), 29–102. The most recent, and extremely valuable, addition to the literature of the subject is N.M. Iakovenko, Ukrains'ka shliakh ta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st.: (Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraina) (Kiev, 1993).

4. Natalia Iakovenko has noted the significant presence of a nobility of Tatar background in the Ukrainian lands of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and an influx of nobles from Muscovy in the sixteenth. See N.M. Iakovenko, Ukrains'ka shliakh ta, 170–74, 242.


7. For definitive works on the Ukrainian church elite of the time, see G. Golubev, Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodevzhniki, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1883–98); V. Eingorn, O snosheniakh malorosiiskogo dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha (Moscow, 1894); The Kiev Mohyla Academy, special issue of Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 8, no. 1–2 (June 1984); Frank Sysyn, “The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Geoffrey A. Hoskins, ed., Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine (Edmonton, 1990), 1–22.


9. The history of the Cossacks from the fifteenth to seventeenth century is well summarized in V.A. Golobutskii, Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo (Kiev, 1957) and Gunter Stökl, Die Entstehung des Kosakentums (Munich, 1953). The topic is treated in much greater detail in volumes 6–10 of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi’s Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusyi, 10 vols. (Lviv and Kiev, 1898–1937).
10. This notion is developed in Iakovenko, *Ukrains’ka shliakhta*, 268–69.


17. Hans Rothe, ed., *Synopsis, Kiev 1681*, 149–51. The author continues to use terms “russkie” and “Rossiia” to describe both Vladimir-Moscow and Ukrainian lands from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century (pp. 328, 335, 349, 351, 354), and his “pravoslavnorossiiskii narod” designates both Ukrainians and Muscovites under Aleksei Mikhailovich (pp. 278, 364–5).
18. For the first use of the term “gosudarstvo Ruskoe,” see ibid., 167. Vladimir is called “Veliki Samoderzhets Rossiiskii” (p. 216).

19. Ibid., 208.

20. Ibid., 353.

21. Ibid., 360.

22. Ibid., 364.


27. The ever-expanding contractual relationship between the Cossacks and the king of Poland is very well traced in volumes 7 and 8 of Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi’s Istorya Ukrainy-Rusy; the Treaty of Zboriv is discussed in vol. 8, pt. 3, 193–288.

28. For information on the Pereiaslav Agreement, see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy v 3-kh tomakh, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1954); Akty otnosiaschiesia k istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, 15 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1861–1892), vol. 10; and John Basarab’s Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton, 1982). The articles of the agreement are analyzed in A. Iakovliv, Ukrains’ko-moskovs’ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh, Pratsi Ukrains’koho naukovo instytutu, vol. 19 (Warsaw, 1934).

29. The conflicting Ukrainian and Muscovite interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement are dealt with in B.E. Nol’de, Ocherki russkogo gosudarstvennogo prava (St. Petersburg, 1911). The section dealing with Ukraine has been translated into English: “Essays in Russian State Law,” Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, 1988, no. 3 (Winter–Spring): 873–903.


34. See, for example, “A tsia zemlia—predkovichna vitchyzna nasha, iaka siiaie pravdezhn im i neskhynytm blahochestiam vid sviatoho i ravnopostol’noho kniazia Volodymyra Kyiv’s’kooho, scho prosivyv Rus’ khreshcchniam.” (Velychko, vol. 1, p. 79. The quotation is from the text of Bohdan Khmelnyts’kyi’s universal as reproduced in Velychko. According to M. Kostomarov and V. Ikonnikov, Velychko edited the text of the actual document. According to I. Franko, M. Hrushevs’kyi, O. Levyts’kyi, and M. Petrovs’kyi, the entire text is a creation of Velychko. See Valerii Shevchuk’s translation of Velychko’s footnotes on the same page.) For references to the fatherland as “kozats’ko-rus’ka malorosiis’ka Ukraina” see vol. 2, 200–202 and elsewhere.

35. For a discussion of names used in the Cossack histories, see Serhii Shelukhin, Ukraina—nazva nashoi zemli z naidavniishykh chasiv (Prague, 1936), 145–50.


37. Velychko, Litopys, 1: 137. Velychko’s treatment of the Pereiaslav Agreement stands in contradiction to the actual events, for the Russian envoys refused to swear an oath on behalf of the tsar.


43. The influence of these Ukrainian clerics on Muscovite church life is the subject of K. Kharlampovich’s Malorossiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn’ (Kazan’, 1914).

44. On the conflict between the Kievan and Muscovite clerics concerning transubstantiation, see Grigorii Mirkovich, O vremeni presushchestvleniia sv. darov, spor, byoslet v Moskove, vo vtoroi polovini XVII-go veka (Vilnius, 1886), 31–82, appendix I–XXVI.


49. Ibid., 109.

51. V.V. Vinogradov, Ocherki po istorii russkogo literaturnogo iazyka XVII–XIX vv. (Leiden, 1949), 72–84.

52. A. Iakovliv, Ukrain'sko-moskov's'ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh (Warsaw, 1934).

53. This expression was used by Catherine in 1765 in her instructions to the newly appointed Governor-General and President of the Little Russian College, Count Petr Rumiantsev. The instructions were published in Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obschestva, vol. 7 (1871), 376–91.


55. The Ukrainian gentry’s claims are outlined in a 1784 preliminary draft of the charter. For a good summary of these, see D. Miller, “Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossi. Pervrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo,” Kievskaiia starina, no. 2 (1897), 94–96. A detailed listing is to be found in the 1786 law code: N. Vasiленко, ed., Ekstrakt iz ukazov instruktsii i uchrezhdenii s razdeleniem po materialam na deviatnadtsat’ chastei [Materialy dla istorii ekonomicheskogo, iuridicheskogo i obschestvennogo byta Staroi Malorossii, vol. 2] (Chernihiv, 1902), 216–31.

56. For the 1775 Basic Statute for the Administration of the Provinces of the Russian Empire, see PSZ, no. 14,392 (7 November 1775), 20: 229–304.

57. For Catherine’s decree forbidding the movement of Ukrainian peasants and extending the poll tax to Ukraine, see PSZ, no. 15,724 (3 May 1783), 21: 908.


60. The organization, activities and disbandment of the 1812–16 Cossack formations have been studied in numerous works. The most important are: I. Pavlovskii, “Malorossiiskoe kozach’e opolchenie v 1812 godu,” Kievskaiia starina, 1906, no. 9: 1–20 and no. 10: 137–54; N. Storozhenko, “K istorii Malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka,” Kievskaiia starina, 1897, no. 6: 460–83; P. Klepats’kyi, “Dvorian’ske zems’ke opolchennia (kozaky),” Zapysky Naukovo ho tovarystva 31 (1930): 6–21; V. I. Strel’skii, Uchastie ukrajinskogo naroda v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev, 1953); B. S. Abolikhin, “Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g.,” Istoricheskie zapiski, 72 (Moscow, 1962).


