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**Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of
China:
A Multi-Archival Mystery**

**Brian Murray
Columbia University**

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CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, Series Editor

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The end of the Cold War and the opening of Soviet archives has provided an opportunity to reexamine new information from Chinese Communist memoirs on the Soviet role in the Chinese revolution as well as to re-evaluate the standard “loss of China” historiography of this issue.¹ Unfortunately, the Russians continue to view this history with a great deal of sensitivity and, as a result, the declassification of Soviet documents on China has been neither as comprehensive nor as detailed as the release of documents on the history of the Cold War in Europe or even in Korea.² This is especially true of Soviet relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For example, the Russians have declassified detailed records of the July and August 1945 treaty negotiations with the Kuomintang (KMT), including preparatory memoranda and the actual minutes of the negotiations, while records of the similar treaty negotiations between the Soviets and the CCP in February 1950 remained largely unavailable to foreign researchers when I conducted research in Moscow in early 1993.³ The newly opened Soviet archives contain, nevertheless, substantial new information which, in combination with new memoir materials being published in mainland China and the opening of new archival collections in Taiwan, shed new light on the history of Moscow’s role in the Chinese Civil War. This Working Paper will briefly review findings from research in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow as well as the archive and records office of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei.⁴ These findings generally confirm recently

¹ The standard “loss of China” historiography is best represented by Tang Tsou, *America’s Failure in China, 1941-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), and Ramon Myers, “The Soviet Union and Nationalist China’s Attempt to Recover the Northeast,” *Symposium on the History of the Republic of China*, vol. 5, Taipei, 1981. Steven Levine, *Anvil of Victory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) and Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), both challenge this view. Steven Goldstein and He Di, in “New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 1 (Spring 1992), 4-6, detail some of the new Chinese sources on this issue.

² Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 18-39, details the general state of archival research in Moscow. Kathryn Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” in the same issue, and in her CWIHP Working Paper, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives,” reports on the findings from her research in both Soviet Communist Party and Foreign Ministry archives. Weathersby’s access to documents on Korea, and that of other scholars researching European issues, appears to have been much greater than that which was available on Soviet-CCP ties.

³ Both the Foreign Ministry Archive (“Arkhiv vneshnei politiki SSSR,” hereafter AVP-SSSR, despite the official title change to AVP-RF) and the Central Party Archive of the CPSU (Tsentralnyi partiinyi arkhiv, hereafter TsPA, despite the official name change to a cumbersome RTsKhIDNI) in Moscow contained both quantitatively and qualitatively more declassified files on Soviet-KMT relations than on Soviet-CCP ties. Preparatory, internal Soviet memoranda on the July-August 1945 Soviet-KMT negotiations can be found, for example, in AVP-SSSR, fond 6, opis 7, dela 142 and 410 while the minutes of the negotiations can be found in delo 500. The only available files, as of February 1993, on the Soviet-CCP negotiations in February 1950 were protocol files and preliminary Chinese and Soviet drafts of the treaty under negotiation; see, e.g., AVP-SSSR, fond 7, opis 23-d, delo 142-Kitai and opis 22-a, delo 030/200-Kitai.

⁴ The Archive and Records Office of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China (Waijiaobu dang’anxizunchu), hereafter ROC-MFA, is not officially open although the Foreign Ministry does entertain requests for special access on approved topics. Such a request would ideally be forwarded by, or at least include, a letter of support from an

published CCP accounts on the lack of Soviet support, even opposition, to the Communist revolution in China rather than the standard historiography of a CCP rise to power aided by Moscow. In particular, documentary evidence from KMT archives confirms CCP allegations that the Soviets counseled against launching the Chinese revolution in 1945 and even advocated a division of China at the Yangzi River in early 1949 when the CCP was marching toward complete victory. This new evidence challenges both the American “loss of China” thesis as well as Russian sources which generally discount Stalin’s early advice and challenge the idea that the Soviets wanted to divide China at the Yangzi.⁵

Stalin’s Anti-Revolutionary Advice

The first evidence that the Soviets were not interested in seeing the CCP start, let alone emerge victorious in, the Chinese Civil War was the quotation from the memoirs of the Yugoslav Communist, Vladimir Dedijer. According to Dedijer, Stalin admitted in 1948 that he had advised the CCP to make peace with Chiang Kai-shek in 1945 and not pursue the revolution in China.⁶ Recent CCP publications have added substantial detail to this account of Stalin’s advice to the CCP to abandon the military struggle against the KMT. According to CCP sources, the Soviet Military Command in Manchuria tried to restrict Chinese Communist military penetration of the Northeast. The Soviets tried to prevent the CCP from taking over the principal Manchurian city of Shenyang (Mukden) and only after intense negotiations did they dispatch a military mission to Mao’s headquarters in Yanan to spell out Soviet conditions for the CCP’s entry into Manchuria. The Soviet Red Army delegation, accompanied by the CCP military commander Zeng Kelin, that visited Yanan in September 1945 insisted that CCP units could enter Manchuria only if they agreed to three Soviet conditions: not to enter the cities, not to operate openly in Soviet-

academic institution in Taiwan. References to this collection in this working paper will provide first the current file number (danghao) followed by a slash mark and then the original classification (yuanbian danghao) as the files are indexed by the new numbers but the original numbers figure prominently on the files themselves.

⁵ S. N. Goncharov’s interview with I. V. Kovalev, “Dialog Stalina s Mao Zedong’om,” *Problemy daln’ego vostoka* 6 (1991), 1-3 (1992), also in *Far Eastern Affairs* 1-2 (1992), provides the Russian version of events while the Chinese account can be found in Liu Xiao, “Sheng shi Sulian” [Ambassador to the Soviet Union], *Shijie zhishi* 3 (1987), 14-15. See also E. P. Bazhanov, “Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye otnosheniye” [Sino-Soviet Relations], *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 2-3 (1989): Shi Zhe, “Reminiscences of a Chinese Interpreter,” *Chinese Historians* 5:1 (Spring 1992), 35-46; Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou, “Guanyu Sidalin zeng fou quanzhi wo guo Changjiang de shenlun” [An Exploration of Whether Stalin Advised Our Party Not to Cross the Yangzi], *Dangde wenxian* 1 (1989), 56-58; Xiang Qing, “Guanyu Sidalin quanzhi jiefang dazhun guo Jiang zhi wo jian” [My Opinion on Stalin’s Advice to the Liberation Army on Whether to Cross the Yangzi], *Dangde wenxian* 6 (1989), 64-66; and Liao Gailong, “KangRi zhanzheng houqi he jiefang zhanzheng shiqi Sulian yu Zhongguo geming guanxi” [Soviet Relations with the Chinese Revolution at the End of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance and During the War of Liberation], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, special issue, 25 December 1990, pp. 1-8.

⁶ Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1953), 331, quoted in Tang Tsou, *America’s Failure in China*, 325-26.

occupied areas, and not to operate under the Communist name of “8th Route Army.”⁷ Consequently, the CCP Central Committee in Yanan issued directives to its units in Manchuria to evacuate the cities, railways, and airports due to “diplomatic complications.”⁸ Other CCP sources report that the Soviets did not oppose using violence to ensure Chinese Communist compliance with these restrictions. Wu Xiuquan’s memoirs, for example, describe an exchange between a Soviet Military commander and Peng Zhen, the head of the CCP’s Manchuria bureau, in which the Soviet ordered the CCP to evacuate the city of Shenyang and added “if you do not leave, we will use tanks to drive you out.” Peng Zhen purportedly responded, “the army of one Communist Party using tanks to drive out the army of another Communist Party! Something like this has never happened before. Can this kind of action be acceptable?”⁹

The restricted access to Russian archives makes it difficult to document conclusively these CCP accounts. However, several declassified reports in the Soviet Communist Party archives confirm the Red Army’s hostility toward the CCP’s presence in Manchuria. The first declassified record of contact between the Soviet Red Army and the CCP in Manchuria appears in a letter from Hu Fujia, identified as a Secretary of the Northeast Committee of the CCP, to the CPSU’s Skvortsov on 6 September 1945. Secretary Hu wrote that the CCP units had met up with the Red Army on August 15 when they entered Manchuria but were unable to establish contact, as they could not speak Russian, until early September when Soviet consular officials arrived. The CCP complained that Red Army soldiers were engaging in activities inconsistent with the practices of a proletarian army, in particular raping women and depriving peasants of their livelihood. Secretary Hu specifically asked Skvortsov to order the Soviet Red Army Command in Harbin to establish a military disciplinary committee and immediately publish orders specifying strict punishment of all violations of military discipline. Hu also asked the Soviets to start a mass propaganda campaign to win back the Chinese people who, according to the CCP, now genuinely feared the Soviet soldiers. Secretary Hu also asked for assistance from the CPSU. In particular, protesting that the Soviets had immediately started to disarm the CCP forces upon their arrival in Manchuria, Hu asked that the Soviets instead provide them with arms. Hu argued that the CCP needed to

⁷ Liu Dexi, “1945 nian 8 yue zhi 1949 nian 10 yue Sulian dui Hua zhengce” [The Soviet Union’s China Policy From August 1945 to October 1949], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, 25 December 1990, special issue, pp. 27-38. James Reardon-Anderson, *Yanan and the Great Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 119; Andrei Ledovskii, *Kitaiskaia politika SShA* (Moscow: Nauk, 1985), 125-26; and Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star* (Beijing: New World Press, 1984), 522-23, all reported on the September 1945 Soviet Military mission to Yanan albeit without the details on the contents of Soviet advice to the CCP. Westad, *Cold War and Revolution*, 83-84, provides the details of the first official Red Army mission to Yanan based largely on the memoirs of Zeng Kelin.

⁸ Yang Kuisong, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, special issue, 25 December 1990, p. 65, and CCP Center to Northeast Bureau, 29 August 1945, 20 and 26 November 1945, in *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, v. 13, p. 138 and p. 207.

⁹ Wu Xiuquan, *Wangshi cangshang*, 162 quoted in Westad, *Cold War and Revolution*, 125-26.

establish a self-defense unit due to attacks by the KMT and deserters from the Japanese Kwantung Army. Finally, Hu requested that the Soviets provide money, printing presses, and paper to facilitate the CCP's propaganda and political work in Manchuria.¹⁰

Another letter to Skvortsov, from the Manchurian Committee of the Third Unit of the Shandong Bureau of the CCP, similarly asked the Soviets for typographic presses and paper for propaganda purposes, and to maintain military discipline over their own troops and not disarm CCP units in the area. The CCP unit also asked the Soviets to provide communication links to Yanan, noting that they had been cut off by the Japanese in 1944, and were needed to re-establish contact with the CCP Central Committee. Hu Techao [sic] of the same Manchurian CCP Committee subsequently apologized to a CPSU official for breaking party discipline by making a direct approach to the "elder brother" and asked for instructions from the Soviet Communists, also noting that their communication links to Yanan had been severed.¹¹

The appeals by these Chinese Communists in Manchuria to their "fraternal" Party elders in Moscow evidently did not elicit a positive reply (no record of an official reply from the CPSU to the CCP on any of these aid requests was located). However, in an exchange between a Soviet Colonel, A. Petrovskii, and a CCP official in Manchuria, Li Chinmo [sic], the Soviets officially rejected a similar request for printing presses and paper. Col. Petrovskii also refused to grant the Chinese Communists permission to operate in Soviet-occupied areas, noting that this was a question to be decided by the central government of China, i.e., the government of Chiang Kai-shek.¹²

Soviet relations with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government provide the most direct evidence of the Soviet abandonment of the Chinese Communists. In November 1945, the KMT agreed to conduct negotiations with the Soviets for the joint economic development of Manchuria after the Soviets promised to aid the airlift of KMT troops into Shenyang and Changchun airports.¹³ According to Chinese Communist sources, the Soviets not only forced the CCP to evacuate these Manchurian cities but severed all contacts with the CCP in Manchuria in November 1945.¹⁴ In the meantime, the Soviets continued the negotiations on economic cooperation with the KMT in Changchun, and Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his son, Chiang Ching-

¹⁰ Hu Fujia to Skvortsov, 6 September 1945, in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 46, list 12-18.

¹¹ Committee On Party Work in Manchuria from the Shandong Bureau of the CCP Central Committee to Skvortsov, 2 September 1945 and Hu Techao (sic), Secretary of the Manchurian Committee of the Third Unit of the Shandong Bureau to Marmorshgein, 13 September 1945 in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 46, list 19-21.

¹² Col. A. Petrovskii and Li Chinmo (sic), minutes, 6 September 1945; Li to Petrovskii, 7 September 1945; and Petrovskii to Li, 8 September 1945; all in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 46, list 22-23.

¹³ Petrov to Wang, 17 November 1948 and 24 November 1948, in AVP-SSSR, fond 100, opis 32, delo 013, list 10-11; Wang to Petrov, 19 November 1948 and 26 November 1948, idem, delo 014, list 73, 74, and 79; Chiang Kai-shek and Petrov minutes of meeting, 13 November 1948, Petrov to Wang, 17, 24, and 30 November 1948, in ROC-MFA 119.13/320.22 (Suzheng 192).

¹⁴ Liu Dexi, op. cit., p. 30.

kuo, to Moscow for a personal summit with Stalin in late December 1945.¹⁵

As in Manchuria as a whole, the Soviets preferred to deal with the KMT rather than the CCP on the Liaodong peninsula where the Soviets operated a naval base at Lushun and a commercial port at Dalian under the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. In December 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov issued orders to the commander of the Soviet naval base (Port Arthur) instructing him that no Chinese troops, either KMT or CCP, were to be allowed in the Soviet base. Molotov particularly stressed that, “we must resolutely oppose all attempts by the Communists to restructure the political and economic life of the naval base as they have done in their own base areas.”¹⁶ While refusing to deal with the Communists in Manchuria as a whole or within the naval base at Lushun, the Soviets invited the KMT to dispatch a negotiating team to Lushun at several points in 1946 and 1947. The Soviets also held negotiations with the KMT on the northern “border” of the naval base at least once, in April 1947, and entertained an official KMT delegation dispatched from Nanjing in June 1947.¹⁷

Mikoyan, Roshchin, and the Division of China

Soviet relations with the KMT government also provide the only currently available evidence to support the charges in recently published CCP accounts that the Soviets advised the Communists not to cross the Yangzi River in early 1949 to finish off the war against the KMT just as they had advised the CCP not to start the war in mid-1945. While the available documentary evidence is not conclusive, the record of Soviet diplomatic interaction with the KMT suggests that the Chinese account of CPSU Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to the CCP’s Central Committee headquarters in the town of Xibaipo in Hebei province in January 1949 and the Soviet preference to see China divided at the Yangzi is more accurate than the published Russian version of the Mikoyan visit.¹⁸

According to Chinese sources, Stalin sent Mikoyan to meet with the CCP leadership in

¹⁵ *Last Chance in China: the Diary of Chang Kia-ngau*, trans. by Dolores Zen (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), provides a detailed record of the Soviet-KMT negotiation in Changchun. Chang was the head of the KMT negotiating team. The only record on Chiang Ching-kuo’s summit with Stalin presently available in Soviet archives was the protocol file. AVP-SSSR, fond 7, opis 10, delo 142. Chiang Kai-shek’s instructions to his son, however, indicate that the summit proceeded along the same lines of the August 1945 treaty negotiations, i.e., on the basis that the KMT government was the only government in China. Chairman Chiang Kai-shek to Chiang Ching-kuo, 24 December 1945 in ROC-MFA, 112.1/158.4.

¹⁶ Molotov to Marshal Meretskov, n.d. but early December 1945, AVP-SSSR, fond 6, opis 7, por. 524, list 16-17.

¹⁷ Petrov to Gan Naiguang, 7 March 1947, Petrov and Wang, minutes, 7 March 1947 and 31 March 1947, Wang to Petrov, aide-memoire, 16 April 1947, Petrov to Wang, aide-memoire, 4 May 1947, and Wang to Petrov, aide-memoire, 12 May 1947 in ROC-MFA, 119.13/320.25 (Suzheng 199): (etc. etc. from Suzheng 202 and 199):(etc. etc. from Suzheng 202 and 198).

¹⁸ See references in footnote 5.

January 1949 after deciding that Mao Zedong should not come to Moscow given the ongoing war in China.¹⁹ According to CCP sources, Mikoyan advised the CCP not to cross the Yangzi River and argued in favor of a division of China along the lines of the North-South Dynasties (420-581 AD).²⁰ The CCP, of course, ignored the Soviet advice (as it had in 1945), crossed the Yangzi in May 1949, and effectively wiped out the remaining KMT resistance on the mainland by October 1949.

It is well known that the Soviets maintained official, diplomatic relations with the KMT government up until the very last minute, breaking relations with the KMT only on 2 October 1949, the day after Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It is also well documented that the Soviet Ambassador to China, Nikolai Roshchin, was the only member of the diplomatic corps to follow the KMT government in its retreat from Nanjing south to Guangzhou (Canton) in early 1949. Roshchin stayed in China until early May 1949 negotiating with the KMT and returning to the USSR only after the CCP had crossed the Yangzi.²¹ While Ambassador Roshchin's reports from China remained classified, unlike those of his immediate predecessor, it appears obvious from KMT Foreign Ministry records of his diplomatic activity in China that Roshchin's mission was similar to that attributed to Mikoyan by the Chinese Communists.²² While Mikoyan was trying to keep the CCP north of the Yangzi, Roshchin was

¹⁹ The attached, undated telegram, circa mid-1948, refers to a Soviet request on the date of Mao's intended departure for Moscow. According to both Chinese and Soviet accounts, Stalin decided, in the end, that it would be better for Mao to stay in China while the war was continuing and that, instead, Mikoyan should visit the CCP leadership at Xibaipo. S. N. Goncharov, op. cit., and Shi Zhe, op. cit.

²⁰ The common reference in CCP sources is "hua Jiang er zhi, gao NanBei Chao (divide and rule at the Yangzi and adopt a North-South Dynasties formula)," Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou, op. cit., p. 56. In his review of Liu Xiao's book, John Garver, "New Light on Sino-Soviet Relations: the Memoir of China's Ambassador to Moscow, 1955-62," *China Quarterly* 22 (June 1990), 303-307, incorrectly translates the historical reference to the North-South Dynasties ("NanBei Chao") as a reference to contemporary Korea. During this period of Chinese history, North China was dominated by barbarians from north of the Great Wall while South China was divided among several competing Chinese regimes. Under Mikoyan's plan, North China under the Soviet-backed CCP would have similarly been cut off from the KMT warlord regimes in the South.

²¹ Stuart to Marshall, 4 February 1949, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), 1949, vol. 8, p. 104; Andrei Ledovskii, "Vspominayut veteranyi (Recollections of Veterans), *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* 5 (1989), 23-33;" Yaxici baogao (Soviet Affairs report), undated, circa November 1949, in "Wo kang Su qinlue an (Our Case Against Soviet Aggression)," ROC-MFA 114.3/324.98.

²² Roshchin was trained in military intelligence and it is possible that his reports were not declassified in Soviet Foreign Ministry archives because he was the CPSU operative in China doubling, after his appointment in 1948, as the Ambassador. In that case, Roshchin's reports might be available in the CPSU archives. Reports from China filed by an agent with the pseudonym "D. Godunov" during this period remain classified although the titles of the files indicate that "D. Godunov" was stationed in KMT China rather than Manchuria. According to KMT sources, Roshchin met with KMT leaders, in particular, Chiang Ching-kuo, throughout the Civil War--even before the start of his mediation effort and appointment as Ambassador. The KMT had not expected Roshchin to be appointed as Ambassador. Roshchin's biography was reported to the ROC Foreign Ministry by Ambassador Fu Bingchang, Moscow, to Wang Shijie, Nanjing, 14 February 1948, in ROC-MFA 101.1/310.61. On Roshchin's earlier dealings with the KMT leadership, see *Jiang cong tong da shi chang bian (President Chiang Kai-shek's Special Compilation of Historical Events)*, Party History Commission of the KMT Central Committee, Taipei, vol. 5, pp. 90-91 and Chinese Embassy, London, to Nanjing, 18 January 1946, ROC-MFA 413.2/85.24

trying to maintain a Soviet position with the KMT in South China.²³

American diplomats in China reported that Roshchin was actively engaged in an effort to independently mediate the KMT-CCP civil war starting in September 1947 while he was still the Soviet Embassy's defense attache. According to American diplomatic sources, Roshchin met with several leading KMT officials in the fall of 1947 offering to mediate an end to the civil war and claiming some influence over the CCP. Roshchin was recalled to Moscow in early January 1948 and then appointed Soviet Ambassador to China on 22 February 1948. Upon his return to China, Roshchin continued his mediation efforts with high-ranking KMT officials throughout 1948 and into 1949, i.e., until the military successes of the Chinese Communists rendered the effort moot. The Americans reported that Roshchin's efforts met with some success among KMT officials.²⁴ More importantly, Roshchin told the KMT that the Soviets were interested in mediating the Chinese Civil War due to their fear that Mao Zedong could become an "Asian Tito." The Americans largely discounted these second-hand reports of Roshchin's mediation effort, believing that the KMT was simply flirting with the Soviet Union in an effort to gain further U.S. economic and military aid for the war against the Communists, despite the fact that Roshchin had directly approached the American Embassy seeking for support for his mediation effort.²⁵

Records from the ROC Foreign Ministry archives detail the extent to which the Soviets were seriously attempting to stop the Chinese Civil War before the CCP reached the Yangzi. In October 1947, as Roshchin was starting his mediation effort in Nanjing, the Soviet ambassador to Iran, I.V. Sadchikov, approached his Chinese (KMT) counterpart in Teheran, Zheng Yitong, with a similar proposal to end the Chinese Civil War. The Soviet ambassador tried to persuade the Chinese that a downturn in Soviet-American relations at the time need not lead to a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Ambassador Sadchikov argued that the Soviet Union understood the KMT's ideology, based on the thought of Sun Yat-sen, and pointed out that both the Soviet Union and China had a common enemy in Japanese and American imperialism. The Soviet side argued that U.S. policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty was contrary to the interests of both the Soviet Union and China. Sadchikov concluded his demarche by proposing Sino-Soviet talks on

²³ Roshchin's subsequent appointment as the first Soviet Ambassador to PRC in 1949 is seen by CCP historians as "impolite" (bu limao), Shen Xiaohui, "1940 niandai wei ZhongMei tiaozheng guanxi pingxin" (A Comment on Sino-American Relations in the Late 1940's), *Jindaishi yanjiu* 5 (1989), p. 241.

²⁴ Confirmation of this can be found in "Guanyu diaozheng Wo guo waijiao zhengce zhi jingjian" (An Opinion Regarding Adjustments in Our Foreign Policy), 26 September 1948, ROC-MFA 112.1/314.14.

²⁵ Leighton Stuart to Department of State, 20 September 1947, FRUS, 1947, v. 7, pp. 289-92; 24 and 26 February 1948, FRUS, 1948, v. 7, p. 112 and pp. 117-19; 15 and 30 July 1948, FRUS, 1948, v. 7, pp. 360-61 and pp. 387-88; and 1, 14, and 16 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, v. 7, pp. 625-56. Stuart reported that Roshchin wanted to involve Washington in the mediation effort. Leighton Stuart to Department of State, 9 June 1948, FRUS, 1948, v. 7, pp. 281-82.

Xinjiang, Manchuria, and the KMT-CCP conflict.²⁶ Roshchin's diplomacy, therefore, was not an isolated event but rather part of a coordinated Soviet effort to effect an end to the Chinese Civil War at a time when the CCP was marching toward victory.

Following up on his own diplomatic overtures in Nanjing, Roshchin approached officials in the KMT's Ministry of Defense proposing talks aimed at averting a Sino-Soviet "Cold War." He proposed working together to find a common Sino-Soviet position on the Japanese peace treaty, and promised to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs, to extend Soviet commercial credits to the KMT, and to open joint economic development projects on the Sino-Soviet border that would be profitable to both sides. Roshchin argued that the Soviets were willing to invest heavily in China to offset the influence of Anglo-American imperialism, thus allowing China to industrialize along the lines of Meiji Japan. Roshchin said that the outstanding problems in Sino-Soviet relations could be easily resolved if the Chinese would simply entertain his proposal. Brandishing both the carrot and the stick, Roshchin added that the Soviet Union might be forced to establish a "buffer zone" (*huan chong di chu*) along its border with China to protect Soviet national security interests if the Chinese did not agree to pursue the proposal.²⁷

The KMT military officials reporting on Roshchin's offer concluded that the Soviets had two specific reasons for offering this latest proposal. First, they saw Roshchin as trying to capitalize on the increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in China so as to turn the KMT against the United States and Britain. Second, Roshchin was seen as moving to defend the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty in response to attacks in the Legislative Yuan on both the treaty and on Foreign Minister Wang Shijie, who was seen by Moscow as generally pro-Soviet.²⁸ On a more general level, the KMT military officials saw the commercial credits and economic assistance in Roshchin's proposal as a Soviet effort to undermine China's territorial integrity. More importantly, they believed that Roshchin's offer to mediate the KMT-CCP conflict stemmed from a Soviet desire to disabuse the CCP of the notion that it could cross the Yangzi within the next year (as the CCP eventually did notwithstanding Soviet diplomatic efforts). Thus, the KMT's Defense Ministry itself believed Roshchin's approach was designed to slow the Communist march to the Yangzi.²⁹

Roshchin met personally with Wang Shijie in August 1948 and repeated the Soviet desire

²⁶ Zheng Yitong, Teheran to Foreign Ministry, Nanjing, 19 October 1947, ROC-MFA 112.1/61.11.

²⁷ "Su ni xiang Hua jin xing tanpan" (Soviet Plan to Enter into Negotiations in China), report prepared by Second Section of the Ministry of Defense (Guofangbu di'erting) for the Foreign Ministry, 4 June 1948, ROC-MFA 112.1/319.13.

²⁸ A Soviet Foreign Ministry biography of Wang Shijie, 31 July 1945, AVP-SSSR, fond 6, opis 7, delo Ki-110/3, list. 3-6, identified the Chinese Foreign Minister as fairly pro-Soviet, noting his support for the USSR even before the Soviet declaration of war against Japan. Similarly, Soviet Ambassador, A. A. Petrov in a report to Molotov, 19 January 1947 cited Wang Shijie and Chiang Ching-kuo as the leading pro-Soviet figures in the KMT leadership and noted that Chiang Kai-shek, according to his own son, shared a similar outlook. AVP-SSSR, fond 7, opis 12, delo 020-Kitai.

²⁹ "Soviet Plan to Enter into Negotiations in China," op. cit., ROC-MFA 112.1/319.13.

to mediate the KMT-CCP conflict and provide the KMT with material aid. He did not, however, repeat his earlier threat of a Soviet need to establish a “buffer zone” along the Sino-Soviet border if the KMT failed to agree to the talks.³⁰ In his discussions with Wang Shijie, Roshchin emphasized only the “carrot” of Soviet aid and friendship for the ROC government.

However, earlier in the same month, the Chinese Embassy in Brussels had secured copies of what were purported to be internal Soviet documents, from a Soviet courier, which effectively brandished the “stick” in Roshchin’s mediation effort. The Chinese Embassy in Brussels forwarded the four documents to Wang Shijie just before his meeting with Roshchin.³¹

The four purported internal Soviet documents obtained in Brussels, attached hereto as an appendix, included a transcript of a 14 March 1948 speech by Josef Stalin to the Soviet Politburo, two Soviet military orders dated 22 May and 6 June 1948, and an undated telegram. The documents, in particular the two military orders, all portended a serious increase in the previously limited, virtually non-existent, Soviet aid to the Chinese Communist military in Manchuria. The speech by Stalin promised that the Soviets would increase by “tenfold” their aid to China’s liberation movement. The first military order, from Moscow to a Soviet military commander in Harbin, appeared to be the first concrete Soviet move to implement Stalin’s threat. The order noted that the Soviet government has recently decided to increase by “many times” its assistance to the Chinese liberation movement and details the nature of the increased Soviet assistance to the Chinese democratic forces in Manchuria. The order also notes that a Political Instruction Unit will soon be dispatched to Manchuria to aid in implementing the new Soviet policy in China. The second order added detail as well as military advice that Moscow believed should be passed along to the Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Zhu De. Finally, the undated telegram documented that the Soviets, per the earlier orders, had succeeded in establishing contact with Zhu De, and refers to the timing of a possible visit to Moscow by Mao Zedong.³²

³⁰ “Wang buzhang yu Su zhu Hua dashi Luoshan tanhua jilu (Record of Conversation Between Foreign Minister Wang Shijie and Soviet Ambassador Roshchin),” 25 August 1948 in ROC-MFA, 112.3/314.57. In the course of this meeting, Roshchin confirmed the account from Li Zongren’s memoirs that Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to travel to Moscow in September 1946. Roshchin acknowledged that he was the intermediary, along with Chiang Ching-kuo, who arranged the trip, which was canceled at the last minute. The Soviets had already dispatched an airplane to fly Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow before he changed his mind. See Li Tsung-jen (Li Zongren) and Tong Te-kong, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 500-501 and Stuart to Marshall, 4 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, pp. 8-10.

³¹ Qu Chang, Brussels to Wang Shijie, Nanjing, 5 August 1948, in “Wo zhu Yi(lan) dashi yu E shi tan ZhongE bangjiao (Our Ambassador in Iran’s Discussions with the Russian Ambassador on Sino-Russian Relations),” ROC-MFA 112.1/61.11. After paraphrasing the contents of the four documents, Qu noted that they had been secured from a Soviet courier in Western Europe, “Su lai xi Ou xinchai.” The courier requested some form of “compensatory action” (chou shi) in exchange for the documents which could mean some sort of political “tit for tat” but, just as likely, some form of financial remuneration.

³² The four documents were in a file entitled “Shitailin zai zhengzhiju mimi huiyi biaoyan” (Secret Speech of Stalin at the Politburo), ROC-MFA 105.11/61.15. The file contained both handwritten and typed Russian originals

While the telegrams from Brussels demonstrate that the documents were unquestionably Soviet in origin, it is quite possible that they were not genuine military orders but merely part of a Soviet disinformation campaign designed to scare the KMT into agreeing to the Soviet mediation proposal. As such, they would be perfectly consistent with Roshchin's threat to establish a "buffer zone" along the Sino-Soviet border, starting in Manchuria. In fact, Wang Shijie believed that the KMT's initial rejection of Roshchin's mediation effort back in February 1948 had led Moscow to grant approval for the Communist attack on Shenyang as the Soviet Embassy officially asked the ROC Foreign Ministry to protect Soviet citizens living in the KMT-occupied cities of Manchuria immediately after Wang had rejected Roshchin's initial overtures.³³

Roshchin's subsequent approach to the Ministry of Defense directly threatened the KMT with the formal detachment of Manchuria and possibly other border areas if the KMT refused to agree to enter into the negotiations with the Soviets. The disclosure of these documents by the Soviets, regardless of their authenticity, to the KMT would add weight to Roshchin's threat as Generalissimo Stalin himself is seen herein ordering an increase in Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists in an effort to offset the "tremendous aid" rendered to the KMT by the United States. In fact, the record of Stalin's speech, if authentic, can be seen as a Soviet declaration of the Cold War. The Soviet diplomacy behind the mediation effort, in Teheran, Brussels, and Nanjing, emphasized that the KMT need not enter a "Cold War" alongside the United States in opposition to the Soviet Union. Roshchin was offering the KMT a way out of a confrontation with the Soviet Union and threatening that the price for refusing the offer might well be a dramatic increase in Soviet aid to the CCP and the incorporation of Manchuria and other Chinese border areas into a Soviet "buffer zone."

Whether the documents were Soviet disinformation or genuine Soviet military orders, the fact that they were given to the KMT during the course of Roshchin's mediation suggests that, as CCP sources have alleged, the Soviets were, in fact, interested in a division of China along the lines of the "North-South Dynasties." The Soviets were dealing with both the CCP and the KMT at this point in the Civil War and pressuring both parties to abandon the military struggle and pursue a political solution per Mikoyan's visit to the CCP Central Committee at Xibaipo and Roshchin's own diplomatic efforts with the KMT leadership in Nanjing. The implication of this from the perspective of both Chinese parties was a division of China either at the Great Wall, the Yellow River, or the Yangzi. And of course, both Chinese parties resolutely rejected this formula.³⁴

with typed English and handwritten Chinese translations attached; there were no identifying memoranda or cover sheets within the file itself or elsewhere in Foreign Ministry records.

³³ Stuart to Department of State, 7 February 1948 in FRUS, 1948, v. 7, pp. 85-86.

³⁴ Liu Xiao, *op. cit.*, notes that the CCP rejected, in word and deed, the proposal to divide China. The KMT's rejection of the North-South Dynasties was put forward by Li Zongren in his memoirs, published before his return

The Validity of the Documents

The validity of the attached documents, however, cannot be ascertained without fuller access to the archives in Moscow. When I conducted research there, restrictions at both the CPSU and Foreign Ministry archives made it difficult to establish the validity of Soviet documents discovered in Taiwanese archive. For example, as noted earlier, continued classification precluded analysis of the majority of the reports by the principal CPSU agent in KMT China at the time, known by the pseudonym "D. Godunov." Moreover, the frequent use of pseudonyms in CPSU documents presents obstacles even to confirming the names of the officers and agents mentioned in the orders.³⁵ There is, however, some circumstantial evidence to support the view that the documents may in fact be genuine.

First, the Stalin speech is recorded in a manner consistent with the Soviet leader's colloquial, rambling style.³⁶ Moreover, current records of the Communist Party archive in Moscow indicate that it is possible that the Politburo met on the date in question, 18 March 1948.³⁷ As the Stalin speech was delivered at the same time and via the same courier as the other documents, the authenticity of the speech would lend credence to the remaining documents.

Second, the first military order mentions the formation of a Political Instruction Group that was being formed and would include Chinese Communists living in the USSR. There are several letters, starting in mid-1948, in the CPSU archives from Chinese residents in the Soviet Union petitioning to be allowed to return to "liberated" or new China--perhaps as members of this Political Instruction Group. The letters are significant not only because the dates correspond to the alleged formation of the Political Instruction Group, per the 22 May 1948 order, but also because several of the Chinese, or their Russian spouses, were refused permission to leave the USSR for China due to their past anti-Soviet "crimes" or the fact that they had relatives living in the United States. Thus, leaving Russia for "liberated" China meant, in the Soviet view of the

to mainland China: "Had the Americans supported me with their full might, so that Mao Zedong and I had divided China along the Yangzi River, China could have fallen into the same miserable situation that Korea, Germany, Laos, and Vietnam are in today. The southern government would have had to depend on the United States for its survival, while the northern government would have looked to the Soviet Union. Neither could have achieved real independence but would have killed themselves beneath different banners." *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, 504.

³⁵ Stalin, for example, was sometimes referred to simply as "Stalin" or by his CPSU pseudonym, "Filippov." For example, Mao Zedong, addressed a 8 January 1946 letter to "Comrade Filippov," TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 992, list. 5.

³⁶ I am grateful to Odd Arne Westad for making this point.

³⁷ According to archival records, the Politburo took a decision on the appointment of cadres on 18 March 1948 but there is no way to confirm that the Politburo actually met on that date, the decision could have been taken by signature without a formal meeting. The records also indicate that no decisions on international or inter-party issues were reached on that date. Personal communication, TsPA, 21 February 1994.

time, that these individuals would effectively be leaving the Soviet camp, implying that the Soviets did not expect the CCP to completely unite China within the socialist bloc. Most of the letters in the file concern Chinese men, or their Russian spouses, whose requests to leave for China were rejected. The files contains the letters from the petitioner as well as the rejection letter from the CPSU hierarchy. For example, Gao Gang and Lin Biao wrote to Malenkov on 25 November 1948 on behalf of a Chinese Communist, identified in Chinese as Zhang Sichou (sic) and in Russian as I. I. Guiskovo, who had left the USSR for Manchuria earlier in 1948, requesting that his Russian wife and family be allowed to join him in Harbin. The Soviets denied the request as the Russian wife, Lubov D. Poduneeva, had distant relatives living in Los Angeles and, therefore, she was not permitted to leave the USSR for CCP-controlled Manchuria. In fact, the only recorded incident of a Russian wife being allowed to join her Chinese Communist husband in Manchuria was the wife of Li Lisan, E. P. Kishkina, whose request appears to have been approved in May 1948.³⁸

Third, the attached documents, including the Stalin speech, note that the Soviets would be increasing their support for the Chinese “democratic forces” starting in the spring of 1948. There is very limited documentation to support the existence of any Soviet aid to the CCP before this point in the Civil War. However, there is evidence of the Soviets, including Stalin and other Politburo members, receiving the type of detailed intelligence reports from Soviet agents in the Communist areas of Manchuria that would have provided the detailed information referred to in all of the attached documents. For example, L. S. Baronov forwarded an intelligence report, from an unnamed Soviet agent in Manchuria, to Stalin and Suslov in early June 1947 which quoted CCP sources, in particular Gao Gang, on the state of the military conflict in Manchuria. According to the report, Gao Gang was insistent that the CCP’s ability to deflect a KMT flank attack to clear the Shenyang-Changchun rail corridor was dependent on the speed with which military supplies could reach the Communist forces. The report did not contain a request for Soviet support but did provide the top Soviet leadership with detailed information on the CCP’s military position vis a vis the KMT in June 1947.³⁹

A subsequent report filed by a Soviet agent on 12 June 1947 detailed the CCP’s

³⁸ The first letter in this group, dated early January 1948, is from a Chinese Communist named Liao Huanxing which was rejected by E. Kovalev in a letter dated 4 February 1948 citing his arrest by the Soviet NKVD in 1938 as the reason. There were three such letter in May 1948, including the one regarding Li Lisan’s wife, and several others later in 1948. Li Lisan himself had returned to China in 1946. TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 613, list. 6-22 and delo 614, list. 79-83.

³⁹ L. S. Baronov to Stalin and Suslov, “Informatsionna’ia zaniska ot MGB SSSR (Informational Note From the USSR Ministry of State Security),” 4 June 1947 in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1117, list. 194-96. The same report noted the number of US Military Advisors stationed in Beijing as well as the number of troops loyal to Marshal Li Jisan, an anti-KMT warlord living in Hong Kong but with allies in South China who controlled, according to this report, 350,000 troops.

preparations to attack the Manchurian city of Siping and did contain a very specific CCP request for Soviet aid which was also forwarded to the top leadership of the CPSU. The Soviet agent “P. Fedotov” was presumably the author of the earlier report.⁴⁰ Fedotov reported that the Communists were planning to attack Siping with 50,000 men holding 70,000 in reserve in case the KMT counter-attacked with a flank attack, employing re-enforcements from Changchun. Fedotov reported that Gao Gang said it was impossible (“nelz’ia”) to stop the CCP’s planned offensive at this point as this would allow the KMT sufficient time to re-group for such a counter-offensive against the Communists in northern Manchuria. (This suggests that the Soviets had counseled against the wisdom of launching the offensive in the first place.) Gao Gang asked Fedotov for military supplies, in particular 75 mm Japanese artillery shells, specifying the caliber and quantity, and said that his forces would go to any point along the Soviet border to collect the supplies. Gao emphasized that the CCP was in desperate need of the artillery shells if the planned offensive against Siping was to succeed.⁴¹ The Soviets did not send the supplies at this point and the Communist assault on Siping ended in a CCP retreat back into northern Manchuria.⁴²

In January 1948, Soviet General Major Surin of the Politico-Military Administration of the Primorskii Region (Soviet Far East) forwarded a detailed report to his superiors in Moscow on the military situation in Manchuria following the Communist retreat from Siping. Like the earlier intelligence reports from Manchuria, Surin’s map and explanations of the Manchurian military campaign were most likely forwarded to the CPSU leadership and the Soviet General Staff.⁴³ Thus, there is some basis for the Soviets giving military advice to the CCP on the danger of counter-offensive flanking attacks, as in the attached military orders. Also, Gao’s request for Japanese artillery shells, in Fedotov’s report, is consistent with the state of the CCP’s armaments at the time and the lack of any physical evidence that the PLA had any Soviet weaponry or munitions at any point before the Korean War.⁴⁴ Finally, Gao’s offer to collect the requested military supplies anywhere along the Sino-Soviet border is consistent with the attached document’s instructions for the dispersal of military supplies intended for the CCP along the trans-Siberian railway up to the Sino-Soviet border.

Based on the information currently available in Soviet archives, Moscow started to

⁴⁰ The attached documents refer to a Lieutenant General “Fedenko” stationed in Manchuria. A General Major Fedorov is listed on the table of contents of another file in the TsPA as reporting to Baronov on the situation in China. Unfortunately, his files are listed on the table of contents but not with the file itself. Fedorov to Baronov, cover sheet, 18 August 1947, TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 182.

⁴¹ Gao noted that the CCP had only 1,000 shells which he argued would be insufficient for the planned offensive. P. Fedotov, 12 June 1947 report to L. Baronov, forwarded to Zhdanov, 13 June 1947 in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1117, list. 197-98.

⁴² The failed attack on Siping was later cited by Mao Zedong as evidence of Lin Biao’s military incompetence in the aftermath of the Lin Biao Affair in the early 1970s.

⁴³ General Major Surin to L. Baronov, 17 January 1948 in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 613, list. 1-4.

⁴⁴ Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star*, 655.

entertain CCP requests for aid only in the fall of 1948, i.e., as the attached Stalin speech and military orders suggest.⁴⁵ In addition to Gao Gang's June 1948 request for artillery shells, Lin Biao wrote directly to Stalin in September 1948 to request the dispatch of 100 Soviet technical advisors and engineers. Andrei Gromyko recommended to Molotov, two months later, that the request be delayed pending further study. Gao Gang also appealed directly to Stalin in October 1948 requesting railway equipment and 20,000 tons of cotton. By December 1948, Gao was communicating his aid requests, for railway cars, equipment, and electricity, directly to Soviet officials in Manchuria rather than to the CPSU hierarchy in Moscow. This also suggests a fundamental change in the nature of Soviet-CCP ties in mid to late-1948 along the lines of the attached speech by Stalin and the two military orders.⁴⁶

There is one more piece of circumstantial evidence from Soviet archives to support the validity of the attached documents. In September 1948, Lin Biao wrote to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov requesting his assistance in the educational and ideological care of a group of 21 Chinese students, 19 of whom were CCP members, being sent to the Soviet Union for medical and technical training. This is the first recorded instance of the CCP sending students to the USSR during the civil war. Consistent with the tradition of Chinese students from May 4, 1919 to June 4, 1989, the first thing that they did upon arrival in the USSR was protest the fact that they were not being allowed to study in Moscow. The Soviets were keeping the CCP students out of sight of foreign diplomats (including the KMT with whom Soviet Ambassador Roshchin was still actively engaged in negotiations back in China), in Ivanovo, an isolated town about 400 kilometers northeast of Moscow. The students claimed that they had been promised the opportunity to study in the Soviet capital and insisted on being allowed to leave Ivanovo for Moscow. One of the student leaders protested that they had walked over 3000 kilometers in China to secure the opportunity to study in Moscow and if they were not allowed to do so, they

⁴⁵ Malik to Molotov, 21 January 1947, AVP-SSSR, fond 6, opis, 9, delo 310, notes that the Soviet Director of the Changchun Railways, Zhuravlev, reported that the People's Democratic Army (PDA) had taken control of the railways in northern Manchuria and that the Soviet railway workers should now be paid by the PDA. This suggests that the Soviets were not aiding the CCP at this point insofar as the CCP was being held responsible for paying the costs of the operation of the railway as per the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty.

⁴⁶ Gromyko to Molotov, 17 December 1948, referring to a letter from Lin Biao to Stalin, 10 September 1948; Gao Gang to Stalin, 11 and 16 October 1948; and Gromyko to Molotov, 16 December 1948, in AVP-SSSR, fond 7, opis 12, delo 20-Kitai, list. 2-8. There are three Soviet officials identified as being in Manchuria in these communications in November 1948, the Soviet Consul, Malinin, and the Director of the Railway, Zhuravlev, in Harbin, and a "Comrade Lyiskov" in Shenyang. Malinin and Zhuravlev both endorsed Gao Gang's requests for 3200 railway cars and 100 engines but noted that the Soviets could only afford to lend limited numbers (1650 and 130, respectively) of their stock from Dalian and suggested that the railway equipment seized as "war booty" from the Japanese (1000 cars and 86 engines) be turned over to the CCP in fulfillment of Gao's aid request. This confirms not only the nature of Soviet aid to the CCP but also the date, i.e., the Soviets only started to aid the CCP in late 1948. Moreover, it suggests that the Soviets did not provide the CCP with any sort of Japanese arms in 1945-46 but, as with the railway cars and engines, removed all the portable Japanese "war booty" to Siberia and Soviet-occupied Dalian.

would walk the entire 6000 kilometers back to China. The protest, however, was over within two weeks and ended without a long march back to China. The students agreed to remain in Ivanovo after individual and party meetings with their Soviet hosts.⁴⁷ The invitation to host the students obviously came after the Stalin Politburo speech attached hereto. Moreover, the decision to keep the students out of sight in Ivanovo is consistent with the Soviet effort to maintain correct diplomatic relations with the KMT while opening up to the Chinese Communists in mid-1948 per Roshchin's ongoing mediation effort in Nanjing.

Conclusion

If the attached documents are genuine, it raises the question of why the KMT did not hand them over to the United States in support of their increasingly desperate pleas for American aid to fight the Communists. One can think of several possible reasons. Quite aside from the questionable and even sensitive provenance of the materials, passing the documents to the Americans would have revealed the KMT's ongoing diplomatic dealings with the Soviets at a time when the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was heating up. It might, therefore, harm KMT interests to disclose the serious nature of their relations with Moscow to the Americans. Moreover, the documents make it clear that Soviet aid to the CCP was only beginning in mid-1948, which would have contradicted KMT assertions to the United States that the Soviets had been aiding the Communists ever since 1945.

If the documents are genuine, they do not undermine the CCP's version of the Mikoyan mission. On the contrary, if the Soviets were simultaneously starting to aid the CCP in Manchuria in mid-1948 while continuing negotiations with the KMT in Nanjing, then the CCP charge of Stalin's advocacy of a Northern and Southern Dynasties division of China is even more believable. The attached documents do not indicate that the Soviets are committing themselves to all-out support of the CCP's effort to unite China. On the contrary, point number 5 of the 22 May 1948 military order cautions, "advance henceforth only when and where a liberated territory has been consolidated by us." And the purported Stalin speech similarly contains a warning that the Communists should not get intoxicated by their success. In his concluding comments on Asia, Stalin cautions:

There are those who are too proud of the success. There is a danger that someone

⁴⁷ Report by S. Shudenko, Ministry of Higher Education, 27 October 1948 and Lin Biao to Molotov, 1 September 1948, in TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 614, list. 52-55 and list. 64. Lin Biao's first recorded communication to Soviet officials was a handwritten letter to a Comrade "Nikolaev" regarding the health of a CCP official under Soviet medical care in Harbin, 3 February 1948, TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 614, list. 2. This also suggests some sort of Soviet military presence in Manchuria, starting in early 1948.

from our comrades dazzled by the success forgets entirely about himself and boasts in such songs as “the world is now at our knees” and “we can do whatever we like.” No, comrades, with success already gained, we would work even more energetically and better, for in general, perfection in the world does not exist.

This type of sobering advice is exactly what CCP sources have attributed to Mikoyan during his January 1949 visit to Xibaipo. Nie Rongzhen, for example, compared the overly cautious Soviets to the ancient man of Qi who, like Chicken Little, was constantly concerned with the sky falling down.⁴⁸ Roshchin, reflecting the same sort of concern, told American consular officials in Guangzhou, before the Yangzi crossing, that he thought the CCP would be “riding a tiger” if it attempted to take over all of China.⁴⁹

Thus, if the documents are genuine, the Soviets were starting to aid the CCP in mid-1948 and cautioning them not to push their offensive to a complete unification of China. At the same time, the Soviets were using their newfound friendship for the CCP and the military gains of their “little brother” in Manchuria as a tool in support of Roshchin’s effort to extract concessions from the KMT in South China. Taken together, the documents, Mikoyan’s visit to Xibaipo, and Roshchin’s diplomacy all support the idea of a Soviet desire to see China divided at the Yangzi rather than risk a potential confrontation with the United States over the “loss” of its sphere in South China.

In the attached speech, Stalin refers to a potentially dangerous situation in Europe. The speech was delivered just before the start of the Berlin blockade. If Stalin was expecting or planning a confrontation with the United States in Europe, he had all the more reason to try to avoid a confrontation with the Americans in China. A Communist crossing of the Yangzi, from the Soviet perspective, certainly raised the specter of such a conflict with the United States. The Soviet fear that Mao Zedong would become an “Asian Tito” obviously reinforced the Soviet desire to end the Chinese Civil War before the CCP reached the Yangzi.

If the documents were Soviet disinformation, they are still significant insofar as they demonstrate the extent to which Moscow was actively engaged, on both sides, in trying to end the Civil War. According to Soviet archival sources, Moscow started to aid the CCP in mid-1948 at which time, according to Chinese archives, the Soviets were still aggressively pursuing negotiations with the KMT. Thus, the mere presence of such Soviet documents in KMT archives, whether disinformation or genuine articles, adds credence to the idea that Moscow wanted to see a division of China at the Yangzi rather than risk a confrontation with the United States. There is

⁴⁸ According to Nie Rongzhen’s account of the Mikoyan visit to Xibaipo, “Stalin was somewhat like the ancient man of Qi who was worried that the sky might fall anytime. The Soviet comrades had the impression that the revolutionary army led by the CCP had been greatly diminished over years of war and only dwindling number (sic) of troops were left. This showed how they always underestimated the strength of the Chinese Revolution.” Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star*, 585-86.

⁴⁹ Clark, Guangzhou to Marshall, Washington, 1 April 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, pp. 217-18.

also strong evidence to suggest that the Soviets felt that China was reverting to warlordism. Thus, risking a confrontation with the United States on the chance that the CCP might succeed and at the same time stay within the Soviet bloc, was, from the Soviet perspective, a dangerous proposition as the Cold War in Europe was heating up.⁵⁰

The true motivations of the Soviets and the validity of the attached documents, however, will not be fully understood until the remaining archives in Moscow are opened and the restrictions on research in the Party and Foreign Ministry archives are lifted. Chinese archives, of course, could also provide validation of these documents as well as a more complete and reliable account of the entire history of the Chinese Civil War than is currently available based on memoir and other secondary CCP accounts. The archives in Taiwan also hold valuable information that remains clouded in Cold War secrecy, in particular records on the Taiwan Straits crises in the 1950s. While the Foreign Ministry archive office in Taipei is open, researchers must apply for special permission and photocopying is not permitted, which makes research especially difficult for foreign researchers as the documents are generally transcribed in handwritten Chinese script. More importantly, access to documents and catalogues remains in the hands of the archivists rather than the researchers. In the case of the research outlined in this paper, access was granted only to the files of the North American (United States) and West Asian (Soviet Union) Departments of the ROC Foreign Ministry and not the higher-level files of the Foreign Minister's office. The Russian Foreign Ministry archives permit access to both the country "referentura" files and those of the Foreign Minister's office although, as noted above, declassification remains problematic for the more sensitive issues in Sino-Soviet, especially Soviet-CCP, relations, and for deciphered telegrams in general. A complete account of this murky chapter in the diplomatic history of the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War in Asia as a whole, therefore, will have to wait until Moscow, Taipei, and Beijing decide to lift remaining restrictions on open access to these key sources on the international history of the Cold War.

⁵⁰ Evidence for the Soviet belief that China was returning to warlordism can be seen in Roshchin's comments to Ambassador Stuart and Consul Clark, per footnotes 25 and 49. Also, Stalin's first question to T. V. Soong at the start of 1945 treaty negotiations concerned the loyalty of the Guangxi warlord Zhang Fakui to Chiang Kai-shek. In the same negotiations, Stalin made favorable references to the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin. Stalin and T. V. Soong, 30 June and 2 July 1945, ROC-MFA, 119.6/316.8 (Suzheng 227). Soviet intelligence reports also detailed the troop strength of various southern Chinese warlords, in particular, Marshal Li Jisen; see L. S. Baronov to Stalin and Suslov, 4 June 1947, op. cit., TsPA, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1117, list. 194-96. Marshal Li also figured prominently, moreso than Mao Zedong or any CCP leaders, in the Soviet media in the middle of the Chinese Civil War, e.g., *Pravda*, 11 and 21 April 1947, and 6 December 1947 and *Izvestiia*, 30 May 1947.

APPENDICES:

DOCUMENT I:

Stenographic Record of a Speech by Comrade J. V. Stalin at a Special Session of the Politburo, March 14, 1948.

In the February session of the Politburo, Comrade Molotov gave us a detailed report on the present international situation. In general, I agree with the conclusions he drew but I still have some objections concerning the estimated causes of the present world crisis. I already stated sometime ago that the world is divided into two camps: in the one camp are peoples possessing financial capital and exploiting the majority of the population on earth and in the other are peoples in the colonies and dependent countries being oppressed and exploited. Quite naturally, a developed capitalist country like America becomes the champion of the former camp while the Soviet Union arising from the principal theories of Marx and Lenin, becomes the leader of the latter. Since the purpose of the two camps is quite opposite, sooner or later, there will be conflict between them.

Now, exactly, this moment has come and, therefore, it is in vain to look for a way of reconciliation between the two hostile camps for the simple reason that their respective points of view are absolutely irreconcilable. If one of the camps does not capitulate to the other, armed conflict between them, sooner or later, will be absolutely inevitable. The innumerable conferences taking place in recent years indicated clearly to us that we cannot come to an agreement with the camp opposing us just as water and fire are unable to come to terms.

The present situation of a hostile yet peaceful world may still last for a long time but there will come a time when conflict, I repeat, will be inevitable. What then should we do, Comrades. The answer to this question is absolutely clear. We should, without respite, increase the power of our country militarily as well as economically and to be ready for any surprises. At the same time, we should energetically support the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples of the dependent and colonial countries against the imperialism of America, England, and France. Now quite obviously, such a struggle is the only way for their liberation from oppression and exploitation, there being no other way out for them. Many colonial and dependent countries have already entered the path of national liberation movement which will bring about a world crisis of capitalism. But the victory of the working class in developed countries and the liberation of oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the instruction and consolidation of a common revolutionary front. There is already such a front although we are not satisfied with the results attained thus far and should exert all our efforts for its further

development. In particular, we should give our special attention to Spain and South American countries.

With no exception, all the Governments of Central and South America only hold on by the bayonets of the several tens of thousands of their faithful soldiers and everyone of the Governments is like a real house of cards. They only need a strong wind to blow at them and they will be swept away and will vanish without a trace. In all these countries, we should have such power that when the time requires we could, with the assistance of the exploited masses, overthrow all those operatic dictators, help them to take power into their hands, and deprive the United States of necessary raw materials. This is quite a possible task for us, there is nothing utopian in it if we notice that in Central and South American countries, 70% of the population (in some cases even more) are downtrodden and exploited poor people with bitter hatred towards their oppressors. They only wait, we repeat, for the possibility we should give them if occasion demands. At present, it is necessary to intensify our propaganda there, and to completely organize all our forces.

The United States of America counts on the latter countries as her reliable strongholds and this is somewhat correct so far as the Governments of the South American Republics are concerned. As regards the working masses, we know reliably that they are only waiting for the possibility to start the relentless opposition against their oppressors. In Bogota, capital of Colombia, a conference of Pan-American countries will take place next month, and I absolutely believe that it cannot come to any positive result.⁵¹ There is already so much contradiction among them, so much dissimilarity of interests and purposes, that the only similarity among them is their appetite. Under pleasing, flattering phrases will be hidden deep mutual distrust and the desire to take as much as possible and to give as little as possible. All will be concluded in magnificent phrases of mutual solidarity and common interests, while in a really dangerous moment, there will be such discord among them that they will become a liability and not an asset for the United States.

We should pay special attention to Brazil which possesses such an inexhaustible reserve of raw materials that the United States has good reason to count on her natural reservoir. The Communist party there is subject to strong persecution but this is only of service to it. In a struggle with the enemy, it receives a baptism of fire and can free itself from the opportunists, the weak-minded, and those who are simply dissatisfied with any regime. We want people who are able to sacrifice absolutely everything for the communist idea and when Brazilian communists will consist of only several hundred such persons, she can face the future cheerfully.

⁵¹ The Ninth International Conference of American States met in Bogota from 30 March through 2 May 1948. The Charter of the Organization of the American States was signed during the Bogota conference on 30 April 1948. *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 9, pp. 1-69.

After Brazil, we should pay special attention to Venezuela. In that country, huge oil reserves are completely exploited by North American capitalists and, in case of war, the first thing we should do is prevent American industry from using Venezuelan oil. Since we already elaborated a detailed plan for this, I consider it unnecessary to repeat it to you now.

Regarding the Panama Canal, I suppose it should be quite indifferent to us since, in a future war, surface water fleets will lose all their significance and we have no reason to have any special interest in it. In case of its destruction, it will require a long time to restore it and this will only delay the economic development of the world after the war.

In Europe, we should be particularly interested in Spain. According to all the information we have, Franco's regime there will soon come to an end. Naturally, we could accelerate its fall, but I considered, and still consider that for the present time, this is premature. Comrade Zhdanov also discussed the reasons why it is disadvantageous for us now to undertake in that country any transformation and I agree with him entirely. We should limit ourselves now to fortifying our position and propaganda.

In Italy and France our position is so strong that we need not fear any election or any change of government.⁵² In time of necessity, the majority of the population of the country will be with us, notwithstanding all the contriving in selling themselves to the American capitalist bourgeoisie.

We are not afraid of England or the small European countries. They follow America out of necessity, and yield to her through fear cast to them by adroit propaganda. We have already spoken enough of that. We have already worked out our active plans and it now rests for us to follow them.

The most important of our trump cards is, and should always be, Asia. Millions of masses enslaved in the current century are already awakened and regardless of how scheming the colonial imperialists may be, they cannot deny them the desire to become free and to live an independent life. All colonial empires have already come to an end, their complete collapse is only a question of the near future. We have already exerted great efforts to accelerate the emancipation of Asiatic peoples, although I think henceforth we should increase tenfold our work in this direction. The example of China's liberation movement is enlightening to us and becomes for us a model of future work. In spite of the tremendous aid rendered by America to Kuomintang China, the whole of China is trembling under the powerful blow of the victorious communist army. Chinese reactionaries have suffered defeat after defeat. Awakened by the prospect of a new life, the

⁵² The United States government feared that the Italian Communist Party would win national elections scheduled for 18 April 1948 but the Communist-Socialist bloc received only 30% of the vote. Stalin's comments here seem to confirm the Italian government's belief at the time that the Soviets had decided not to interfere in the elections. See Italian Ambassador Tarchiani meeting with Secretary of State Marshall, 6 May 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 3, p. 797.

Chinese people without any charity are dealing a blow to the oppressors who sell themselves to foreign capital. The People's Army successively liberates new towns and new regions. Through suffering and struggle, they are creating a new, anti-imperialistic, democratic China. Our part is to use every possible means to help our Chinese comrades until they can definitely save themselves from all their enemies, be friendly with the Soviet Union, and begin a new, happy life.

The next stage for us should be India. Now, she gained freedom from England, but such freedom appears to be only a myth. Here is millions of working masses who cannot and do not wish to live in the old way. They understand that the real meaning of the running intrigues of the imperialists is to stir up with new sauce in order to extend their domination in Asia. The anti-imperialist struggle is taking in a wider range of people. We will help them to win and to enjoy equal rights in the family of free peoples.

In general, in the whole of Asia, we firmly and unbendingly conduct our plan worked out last year and I can boldly say that it has had very great success. But, the successes sometimes have their shady sides. They give birth sometimes to dangers which if given certain developments may cause the whole thing to unravel. There are those who are too proud of the success. There is a danger that someone from our comrades dazzled by the success forgets entirely about himself and boasts in such songs as "the world is now at our knees" and "we can do whatever we like." No, Comrades, with success already gained we should work even more energetically and harder, for in general, perfection in this world does not exist.

Together with our work in the world we should not forget the work inside the Soviet Union. The restoration of the people's economy is going forward without stopping although there still are some defects in some places. Our duty is to remove them in the shortest period, nor to stop in front of any obstacles or any personalities with their past merits. We should, from the root, tear out those with obsolete spirit and those who hinder our going ahead.

The development of our heavy and light industries is progressing with continuous success. We have reason to believe that our last Five-Year Plan will virtually be finished in four years.

As always, we should pay special attention to the development of the Soviet Army and Navy. Their present condition in comparison with the American and English Armies, about which we have absolutely correct information, I can definitely say that only in one respect are we inferior, that of surface water fleet, whilst in all other respects, we are far superior. In spite of all the intrigues of America and in spite of the colossal budget she has undertaken for the Army and Navy, they cannot catch up with us. On the contrary, as time goes on, the greater increase will be in our favor in relation to the Anglo-American armed forces. We do not wish for war, but we are not afraid of it.

From now on, we will do all that is possible so as to prevent mankind from a new catastrophe, but if the imperialists want that, it cannot be helped and it will be the worst for them.

I cannot be silent about the indeed pitiful role played by the "United Nations" organization. Even the dead Geneva "League of Nations" acted with greater dignity and independence. The present "United Nations" is none other than a gathering of marionettes, who obey, by raising up hands, the command of their master--American imperialism. Often they act against their own national or economic interests, just to please the almighty egg [*ugodit vsesilnoi yaitso*], and, therefore, we have nothing to do with such company.

Take, for example, the Marshall Plan. From the economic viewpoint, it is no more than an even worse version of the war-time plan of "export or unemployment" already put forward in the United States. It is an attempt to transfer to other countries the catastrophe which threatens the American economy. Wall Street monopolists hope to attain this aim by selling to countries in the European continent what is not needed in their economic restoration. They export there not machine equipment and important industrial raw materials but finished goods. These imported finished products threaten to suffocate the important branches of the industries of Western countries and to doom the working class to chronic unemployment. Thus, no wonder that many European countries from the very beginning refused to take part in the Marshall Plan. Governments of these countries realized the serious danger to the independence and sovereignty of their nation with the so-called "American aid." In spite of the efforts the imperialists made to deceive the people and to break their resistance, the opposition against the insidious, scheming Wall Street grows irrepressibly. The working class cannot reconcile themselves with selling their fatherland to American imperialism. They rejected the Marshall Plan to enslave their country. We should defeat this plan and do so in the interest of the workers of the world.

There is a great difference between the Soviet Union in comparison with a group of countries who hold out greedy hands to American. We do not need anyone's help, as we only hope for our own strength. We attain eminent success because we have a correct leading line of the party and we are able to organize the masses in carrying out this line. Look at other countries. How many can be found with the ruling party having a correct line and carrying it out? Actually, there are no such parties now in the world, for all of them live without prospect, confused by chaotic crises and being unable to find out the means to get out from the quagmire. Only our party knows how to manage the situation and push ahead toward success. It has been a hundred years since Marxism has come on the stage. In this period, tens and hundreds of bourgeois governments attempted to destroy Marxism. And what of it? Bourgeois governments passed away while Marxism remains. And, comrades, we are obliged to work and struggle under the banners of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for our success. From this follows the conclusion: Be faithful, to the end, to the great banners of Marx, Lenin, and Engels. Be faithful, to the end, to the cause of the brotherly, united proletarians in all countries.

(Stormy applause and Greetings to Comrade Stalin.)

Document II:

MVC No. 4784, May 22, 1948, Moscow.

To: Commander East-Asian Operational Section, General Lieut. Managarov, Harbin.

In accordance with the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, this is to inform you that in view of the progressive success of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, we are setting forth a new task and new objective. It is clear that without the extensive material assistance of America, the resistance against those who fight for the real liberation of China would have already been compelled to cease long ago. As you know, [KMT] Minister Chen Chi Tian, early last year, said that without American aid, "the situation [in China] might become favorable to the communists." To us, the success of the Chinese reactionaries would greatly enhance the position of American imperialists in East Asia. We cannot permit this under any circumstances and that is why the Soviet government, not many days ago, resolved to increase many times our assistance to the Chinese People's Liberation Movement.

In accordance with what has been mentioned above, you should immediately come into contact with the Headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the PLA and to ascertain, in the quickest possible way, their special needs at the present time. From June 1st till the end of September, we will concentrate, along the railroad from Irkutsk to the border line of Manchouli, considerable army stocks, clothes, and petrols, for the PLA. Light and heavy tanks, motorized artilleries of various calibre, and aviation equipments for the Chinese crew who were sent to us for training will also be dispatched.

Major General Pokrovin has been appointed to administer these supplies and he is to be subordinate to you. Once you have received a written list of the special needs of the Chinese PLA from the Headquarters of the Chief of Staffs, you may immediately satisfy their needs. Furthermore, in Irkutsk at the present time, an Auxiliary Staff is being formed consisting of high ranking officers from our army who gained great military experience at the time of the war for the Fatherland. Having been formed, the Auxiliary Staff will be sent immediately to the Headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the Chinese PLA. All the Soviet officers belonging to said staff will be under the disposal of Lieut. General Fedenko who has been appointed head of the Soviet Auxiliary Staff.

The Chief of Staffs of the Soviet Army has elaborated a detailed plan for military operations against Chinese reactionaries who have sold themselves to American capitalists. The above-mentioned Auxiliary Staff will have the task of carrying out the Soviet plan with the commanding chief of the Chinese democratic forces. Over this coming summer, several decisive blows should be dealt to the opposition so as to compel [them] if not to capitulate, to be so

weakened that they can no longer continue any severe resistance in spite of American aid.

The report of yours during your trip in the regions of Shaanxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, and your conversations with Lin Po Chou, Yung Hsiu Feng, Lin Feng, and Li Yu were discussed in the Politburo on Saturday last, May 17th.

The Politburo passed the following resolutions:

1. It is necessary to develop more widely political propaganda in regions already liberated. However, propaganda is not enough, it is necessary to prove to the people that the arriving of the Liberation army will bring them real freedom on the basis of democratic principles. It is necessary to immediately give to the Chinese people the feeling that after thousands of years of unscrupulous exploitation and slavery, a new era has come to them and their destiny is now at last in their own hands.
2. It is necessary, in the first place, to liquidate all kulak elements, who actively support the opposition or who cling to the old ways and oppose changes of the Chinese life.
3. After the liberation of each place, immediately reorganize all administrative organizations and conduct elections to self-government organs. Watch carefully and secretly that only progressive elements are to be filled in there and not the opportunists or those in disguise who are actually in opposition to the communist idea.
4. Strictly and ruthlessly forbid local authorities from treating the people with the least injustice. Those guilty of such offenses should be put to trial by a court elected from the people.
5. Improve the on-going campaign for the abolition of illiteracy.
6. Adopt the necessary energetic measures for improving the people's sanitary conditions. Pay special attention to the immediate liquidation of the spreading epidemics, typhus, cholera, plague, etc.
7. Accelerate economic life in liberated regions.
8. Accelerate land reform.

At the end of June, the Politburo will send to the liberated areas a Political Instruction Group. I do not know yet the exact number of persons in it, but according to the information I have already, it will consist of approximately 50 persons (among whom 32 Chinese who are citizens of the Soviet Union). The Group will be under the direction of the civil authority of the liberated region and will be engaged energetically in carrying out the above-mentioned measures. In due course, you will receive the exact list of the members of the Group and on their arrival in Harbin, you should establish close contact with them.

The General Staff, in turn, proposes a number of wishes, the essence of which is summarized in the following:

1. Carry out a reorganization of the Army as soon as possible. There will soon leave from here Chinese officers (24 persons) who completed the entire course of the War Academy and received

corresponding political preparation in our country.

2. Raise the discipline and political consciousness among Chinese fighters and clean out [purge] all unwelcome elements.
3. Improve military operation techniques based on the experience and principle of the Soviet Army.
4. Liquidate the besieged resistance in Mukden (Shenyang).
5. Advance henceforth only when and where a liberated territory is consolidated by us.
6. Pay particular attention to the possible development of partisan activity in the enemy's rear.

In your relations with Chinese democratic authorities, either military or civil, you as well as your own subordinates should not forget that our assistance to them is unselfish and brotherly and that we absolutely do not intend to interfere with the internal affairs of the Chinese people. If we consider it necessary now to help them with words and deeds, it is solely with the object of helping the young rulers and commanders with our rich experience. When the young republic is strengthened, we will no longer give them advice and will be satisfied with their sincere friendship towards us.

Your propaganda organ should constantly emphasize the huge difference in action between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We are without self-interest, and do not, at any time, seek gain from the Chinese people, while American imperialism, in unison with American capitalism, assist the Kuomintang with the sole object of deriving from the assistance as much gain as possible. The American intention is to enslave the country economically, to suck out all its raw materials and to make a market for the manufactured goods, "Made in America." To us, China is an old neighbor, with whom we wish to maintain friendly relations, but to the Americans, it is a base for advancing opposition to the Soviet Union. Also inform the Chinese people, as much as possible, about American measures in Japan and about their intention to revive Japanese military and industrial power.

You will receive further instructions from our next courier. Major General Pokrovin will bring with him detailed instructions concerning armaments for the need of the Chinese PLA. On receiving the list of armaments they need, present a copy to the Ministry. Weapons and munitions should be distributed immediately on receiving the list.

Speed up the transmittal of the regular reports and bills of account. Send Colonel Proskuren to Irkutsk under the direction of the staff. He will be very useful there while you do not need him

With communistic greetings,

Foreign Operations Section. Section Chief, General (Signature Illegible.)

Document III:

MVC No. 5462, Moscow, General Lieut., Chief of Foreign Operations Section, July 6, 1948

TO: Chief of East-Asian Operational Section, General Lieut. Managarov.

Section Chief left on duty for a trip abroad last week and will return to Moscow in August. After his return you should come here to report personally on the work entrusted to your service during the past six weeks. As to the time of your coming to Moscow, you will be informed by telegram.

All the supplementary equipment you requested for the need of the Chinese PLA will be sent quickly to Major General Pokrovin in the next week. Heavy tanks will be sent first while mortars will be dispatched after munitions.

You should immediately direct the attention of the Chief of Staff of the PLA [to the fact] that their right flank protrudes too much in front and that is why they cannot have victory very easily. The Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, therefore, has urgently communicated this message to Lieut. General Fedenko and we hope that the Chief of Staffs will adopt decisions to arrest the right flank so as to smooth out the left. Tempting plans to surround the opponent from the right flank, so as to turn it sharply to the left, [are] too dangerous as an opponent threatened in the flank movement may make use of the troop dislocation to counter-attack during the movement.

In general, the Chief of Staffs should act methodically and not be enthusiastic about overly aggressive operations. Now that victory is already near, it would be a crime to give the opponent the least possibility of having any success or to gain initiatives in any front.

Our Chief of Staffs is dissatisfied with the lack of coordination in operation between the commanding chiefs and the army. In this regard, Lieut. General Fedenko has already received a series of instructions and I think he will adopt necessary measures to remove the above-mentioned defects.

Now, after the arrival of Lieut. General Fedenko at the HQ of the Chief of Staffs of the Liberation Army, you will be responsible for the problem of supply and leave the purely operational part to him. Your staff is now too far away from the front. In your post, you are irreplaceable and the Ministry, therefore, does not want to burden you with too much work.

Be particularly energetic to have contact with the organs of the PLA on questions of provisions and try to avoid repeating the mistakes of last year. Adopt every resolute measure so that in the coming winter the army will not suffer shortages. We can provide bread, canned meat and fish, sugar and butter. Petrol is already on the way and will arrive at the appointed place in a few days. Henceforth, all your actions should have only one objective: to assist in liquidating the

enemy at whatever price. This liquidation is absolutely necessary to us for establishing our position in the Far East. A grave political situation in Europe threatens us with a war against the United States of America and her allies and therefore we should be prepared everywhere. Dazzled by their hatred of the Communists, the Kuomintang cannot see the precipice into which they are falling and since the matter concerns the safety of our Siberian border, we have no choice. We want a China friendly to the Soviet Union, not one which politically and economically is enslaved by international capitalists and is hostile to us.

Your bills of account will be sent tomorrow to the Controller Section of the Ministry and the next courier will bring you the conclusion of their study.

With comradely greetings,

Operations Chief, Section Chief Lieut. General. (Signature--Filyashev/Filyashkii)

Document IV:

Telegram, no date, no authority

We received from the Headquarters of the PLA General Zhu De's operation plan for October with great interest. It serves at the present time the subject of detailed discussion at our General Staff. But we still need some details and the Minister has therefore ordered you to leave immediately for General Zhu De and to bring back from him information about the quantity of troops which he intends for operation marked as Number 22.

The plan is acceptable, although we calculate that he would require no less than ten selected divisions with heavy artillery. It is necessary to keep the plan in strict secrecy. Telegraph the exact date of the commencing of the operation. Find out from Mao Zedong when he will be able to come to Moscow.

(The original with proper signature).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Murray recently completed his doctorate in Political Science at Columbia University. This working paper is based on research for his dissertation, “Western versus Chinese Realism: Soviet-American Diplomacy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1950.” He would like to thank Steven Levine and, especially, Odd Arne Westad for insightful comments on the validity of the documents and encouraging suggestions on an initial draft of this working paper.

APPENDICES:

DOCUMENT I:

Short-hand Record of a Speech by Comrade J. V. Stalin at a Special Session of the Politburo, March 14, 1948.

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Now, exactly, this moment has come and, therefore, it is in vain to look for a way of reconciliation between the two hostile camps for the simple reason that their respective points of view are absolutely irreconcilable. If one of the camps does not capitulate to the other, armed conflict between them, sooner or later, will be absolutely inevitable. The innumerable conferences taking place in recent years indicated clearly to us that we cannot come to an agreement with the camp opposing us just as water and fire are unable to come to terms.

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development. In particular, we should give our special attention to Spain and South American countries.

With no exception, all the Governments of Central and South America only hold on by the bayonets of the several tens of thousands of their faithful soldiers and everyone of the Governments is like a real house of cards. They only need a strong wind to blow at them and they will be swept away and will vanish without a trace. In all these countries, we should have such power that when the time requires we could, with the assistance of the exploited masses, overthrow all those operatic dictators, help them to take power into their hands, and deprive the United States of necessary raw materials. This is quite a possible task for us, there is nothing utopian in it if we notice that in Central and South American countries, 70% of the population (in some cases even more) are downtrodden and exploited poor people with bitter hatred towards their oppressors. They only wait, we repeat, for the possibility we should give them if occasion demands. At present, it is necessary to intensify our propaganda there, and to completely organize all our forces.

The United States of America counts on the latter countries as her reliable strongholds and this is somewhat correct so far as the Governments of the South American Republics are concerned. As regards the working masses, we know reliably that they are only waiting for the possibility to start the relentless opposition against their oppressors. In Bogota, capital of Colombia, a conference of Pan-American countries will take place next month, and I absolutely believe that it cannot come to any positive result. There is already so much contradiction among them, so much dissimilarity of interests and purposes, that the only similarity among them is their appetite. Under pleasing, flattering phrases will be hidden deep mutual distrust and the desire to take as much as possible and to give as little as possible. All will be concluded in magnificent phrases of mutual solidarity and common interests, while in a really dangerous moment, there will be such discord among them that they will become a liability and not an asset for the United States.

We should pay special attention to Brazil which possesses such an inexhaustible reserve of raw materials that the United States has good reason to count on her natural reservoir. The Communist party there is subject to strong persecution but this is only of service to it. In a struggle with the enemy, it receives a baptism of fire and can free itself from the opportunists, the weak-minded, and those who are simply dissatisfied with any regime. We want people who are able to sacrifice absolutely everything for the communist idea and when Brazilian communists will consist of only several hundred such persons, she can face the future cheerfully.

After Brazil, we should pay special attention to Venezuela. In that country, huge oil reserves are completely exploited by North American capitalists and, in case of war, the first thing we should do is prevent American industry from using Venezuelan oil. Since we already

elaborated a detailed plan for this, I consider it unnecessary to repeat it to you now.

Regarding the Panama Canal, I suppose it should be quite indifferent to us since, in a future war, surface water fleets will lose all their significance and we have no reason to have any special interest in it. In case of its destruction, it will require a long time to restore it and this will only delay the economic development of the world after the war.

In Europe, we should be particularly interested in Spain. According to all the information we have, Franco's regime there will soon come to an end. Naturally, we could accelerate its fall, but I considered, and still consider that for the present time, this is premature. Comrade Zhdanov also discussed the reasons why it is disadvantageous for us now to undertake in that country any transformation and I agree with him entirely. We should limit ourselves now to fortifying our position and propaganda.

In Italy and France our position is so strong that we need not fear any election or any change of government. In time of necessity, the majority of the population of the country will be with us, notwithstanding all the contriving in selling themselves to the American capitalist bourgeoisie.

We are not afraid of England or the small European countries. They follow America out of necessity, and yield to her through fear cast to them by adroit propaganda. We have already spoken enough of that. We have already worked our active plans and it now rests for us to follow them.

The most important of our trump cards is, and should always be, Asia. Millions of masses enslaved in the current century are already awakened and regardless of how scheming the colonial imperialists may be, they cannot deny them the desire to become free and to live an independent life. All colonial empires have already come to an end, their complete collapse is only a question of the near future. We have already exerted great efforts to accelerate the emancipation of Asiatic peoples, although I think henceforth we should increase tenfold our work in this direction. The example of China's liberation movement is enlightening to us and becomes for us a model of future work. In spite of the tremendous aid rendered by America to Kuomintang China, the whole of China is trembling under the powerful blow of the victorious communist army. Chinese reactionaries have suffered defeat after defeat. Awakened by the prospect of a new life, the Chinese people without any charity are dealing a blow to the oppressors who sell themselves to foreign capital. The People's Army successively liberates new towns and new regions. Through suffering and struggle, they are creating a new, anti-imperialistic, democratic China. Our part is to use every possible means to help our Chinese comrades until they can definitely save themselves from all their enemies, be friendly with the Soviet Union, and begin a new, happy life.

The next stage for us should be India. Now, she gained freedom from England, but such freedom appears to be only a myth. Here is millions of working masses who cannot and do not

wish to live in the old way. They understand that the real meaning of the running intrigues of the imperialists is to stir up with new sauce in order to extend their domination in Asia. The anti-imperialist struggle is taking in a wider range of people. We will help them to win and to enjoy equal rights in the family of free peoples.

In general, in the whole of Asia, we firmly and unbendingly conduct our plan worked out last year and I can boldly say that it has had very great success. But, the successes sometimes have their shady sides. They give birth sometimes to dangers which if given certain developments may cause the whole thing to unravel. There are those who are too proud of the success. There is a danger that someone from our comrades dazzled by the success forgets entirely about himself and boasts in such songs as "the world is now at our knees" and "we can do whatever we like." No, Comrades, with success already gained we should work even more energetically and harder, for in general, perfection in this world does not exist.

Together with our work in the world we should not forget the work inside the Soviet Union. The restoration of the people's economy is going forward without stopping although there still are some defects in some places. Our duty is to remove them in the shortest period, nor to stop in front of any obstacles or any personalities with their past merits. We should, from the root, tear out those with obsolete spirit and those who hinder our going ahead.

The development of our heavy and light industries is progressing with continuous success. We have reason to believe that our last Five-Year Plan will virtually be finished in four years.

As always, we should pay special attention to the development of the Soviet Army and Navy. Their present condition in comparison with the American and English Armies, about which we have absolutely correct information, I can definitely say that only in one respect are we inferior, that of surface water fleet, whilst in all other respects, we are far superior. In spite of all the intrigues of America and in spite of the colossal budget she has undertaken for the Army and Navy, they cannot catch up with us. On the contrary, as time goes on, the greater increase will be in our favor in relation to the Anglo-American armed forces. We do not wish for war, but we are not afraid of it.

From now on, we will do all that is possible so as to prevent mankind from a new catastrophe, but if the imperialists want that, it cannot be helped and it will be the worst for them.

I cannot be silent about the indeed pitiful role played by the "United Nations" organization. Even the dead Geneva "League of Nations" acted with greater dignity and independence. The present "United Nations" is none other than a gathering of marionettes, who obey, by raising up hands, the command of their master--American imperialism. Often they act against their own national or economic interests, just to please the almighty egg (ugodit vsesilnoi yaitso??) and, therefore, we have nothing to do with such company.

Take, for example, the Marshall Plan. From the economic side, it is no more than an even

worse version of the war-time plan of "export or unemployment" already put forward in the United States. It is an attempt to transfer to other countries the catastrophe which threatens the American economy. Wall Street monopolists hope to attain this aim by selling to countries in the European continent what is not needed in their economic restoration. They export there not machine equipment and important industrial raw materials but finished goods. These imported finished products threaten to suffocate the important branches of the industries of Western countries and to doom the working class to chronic unemployment. Thus, no wonder that many European countries from the very beginning refused to take part in the Marshall Plan. Governments of these countries realized the serious danger to the independence and sovereignty of their nation with the so-called "American aid." In spite of the efforts the imperialists made to deceive the people and to break their resistance, the opposition against the insidious, scheming Wall Street grows irrepressibly. The working class cannot reconcile themselves with selling their fatherland to American imperialism. They rejected the Marshall Plan to enslave their country. We should defeat this plan and do so in the interest of the workers of the world.

There is a great difference between the Soviet Union in comparison with a group of countries who hold out greedy hands to American. We do not need anyone's help, as we only hope for our own strength. We attain eminent success because we have a correct leading line of the party and we are able to organize the masses in carrying out this line. Look at other countries. How many can be found with the ruling party having a correct line and carrying it out? Actually, there are no such parties now in the world, for all of them live without prospect, confused by chaotic crises and being unable to find out the means to get out from the quagmire. Only our party knows how to manage the situation and push ahead toward success. It has been a hundred years since Marxism has come on the stage. In this period, tens and hundreds of bourgeois governments attempted to destroy Marxism. And what of it? Bourgeois governments passed away while Marxism remains. And, comrades, we are obliged to work and struggle under the banners of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for our success. From this follows the conclusion: Be faithful, to the end, to the great banners of Marx, Lenin, and Engels. Be faithful, to the end, to the cause of the brotherly, united proletarians in all countries.
(Stormy applause and Greetings to Comrade Stalin.)

Document II:

MVC No. 4784, May 22, 1948, Moscow.

To: Commander East-Asian Operational Section, General Lieut. Managarov, Harbin.

In accordance with the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, this is to inform you that in view of the progressive success of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, we are setting forth a new task and new objective. It is clear that without the extensive material assistance of America, the resistance against those who fight for the real liberation of China would have already been compelled to cease long ago. As you know, (KMT) Minister Chen Chi Tian, early last year, said that without American aid, "the situation (in China) might become favorable to the communists." To us, the success of the Chinese reactionaries would greatly enhance the position of American imperialists in East Asia. We cannot permit this under any circumstances and that is why the Soviet government, not many days ago, resolved to increase many times our assistance to the Chinese People's Liberation Movement.

In accordance with what has been mentioned above, you should immediately come into contact with the Headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the PLA and to ascertain, in the quickest possible way, their special needs at the present time. From June 1st till the end of September, we will concentrate, along the railroad from Irkutsk to the border line of Manchouli, considerable army stocks, clothes, and petrols, for the PLA. Light and heavy tanks, motorized artilleries of various calibre, and aviation equipments for the Chinese crew who were sent to us for training will also be dispatched.

Major General Pokrovin has been appointed to administer these supplies and he is to be subordinate to you. Once you have received a written list of the special needs of the Chinese PLA from the Headquarters of the Chief of Staffs, you may immediately satisfy their needs. Furthermore, in Irkutsk at the present time, an Auxiliary Staff is being formed consisting of high ranking officers from our army who gained great military experience at the time of the war for the Fatherland. Having been formed, the Auxiliary Staff will be sent immediately to the Headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the Chinese PLA. All the Soviet officers belonging to said staff will be under the disposal of Lieut. General Fedenko who has been appointed head of the Soviet Auxiliary Staff.

The Chief of Staffs of the Soviet Army has elaborated a detailed plan for military operations against Chinese reactionaries who have sold themselves to American capitalists. The above-mentioned Auxiliary Staff will have the task of carrying out the Soviet plan with the commanding chief of the Chinese democratic forces. Over this coming summer, several decisive blows should be dealt to the opposition so as to compel [them] if not to capitulate, to be so

weakened that they can no longer continue any severe resistance in spite of American aid.

The report of yours during your trip in the regions of Shaanxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, and your conversations with Lin Po Chou, Yung Hsiu Feng, Lin Feng, and Li Yu were discussed in the Politburo on Saturday last, May 17th.

The Politburo passed the following resolutions:

1. It is necessary to develop more widely political propaganda in regions already liberated. However, propaganda is not enough, it is necessary to prove to the people that the arriving of the Liberation army will bring them real freedom on the basis of democratic principles. It is necessary to immediately give to the Chinese people the feeling that after thousands of years of unscrupulous exploitation and slavery, a new era has come to them and their destiny is now at last in their own hands.
2. It is necessary, in the first place, to liquidate all kulak elements, who actively support the opposition or who cling to the old ways and oppose changes of the Chinese life.
3. After the liberation of each place, immediately reorganize all administrative organizations and conduct elections to self-government organs. Watch carefully and secretly that only progressive elements are to be filled in there and not the opportunists or those in disguise who are actually in opposition to the communist idea.
4. Strictly and ruthlessly forbid local authorities from treating the people with the least injustice. Those guilty of such offenses should be put to trial by a court elected from the people.
5. Improve the on-going campaign for the abolition of illiteracy.
6. Adopt the necessary energetic measures for improving the people's sanitary conditions. Pay special attention to the immediate liquidation of the spreading epidemics, typhus, cholera, plague, etc.
7. Accelerate economic life in liberated regions.
8. Accelerate land reform.

At the end of June, the Politburo will send to the liberated areas a Political Instruction Group. I do not know yet the exact number of persons in it, but according to the information I have already, it will consist of approximately 50 persons (among whom 32 Chinese who are citizens of the Soviet Union). The Group will be under the direction of the civil authority of the liberated region and will be engaged energetically in carrying out the above-mentioned measures. In due course, you will receive the exact list of the members of the Group and on their arrival in Harbin, you should establish close contact with them.

The General Staff, in turn, proposes a number of wishes, the essence of which is summarized in the following:

1. Carry out a reorganization of the Army as soon as possible. There will soon leave from here Chinese officers (24 persons) who completed the entire course of the War Academy and received

corresponding political preparation in our country.

2. Raise the discipline and political consciousness among Chinese fighters and clean out [purge] all unwelcome elements.
3. Improve military operation techniques based on the experience and principle of the Soviet Army.
4. Liquidate the besieged resistance in Mukden (Shenyang).
5. Advance henceforth only when and where a liberated territory is consolidated by us.
6. Pay particular attention to the possible development of partisan activity in the enemy's rear.

In your relations with Chinese democratic authorities, either military or civil, you as well as your own subordinates should not forget that our assistance to them is unselfish and brotherly and that we absolutely do not intend to interfere with the internal affairs of the Chinese people. If we consider it necessary now to help them with words and deeds, it is solely with the object of helping the young rulers and commanders with our rich experience. When the young republic is strengthened, we will no longer give them advice and will be satisfied with their sincere friendship towards us.

Your propaganda organ should constantly emphasize the huge difference in action between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We are without self-interest, and do not, at any time, seek gain from the Chinese people, while American imperialism, in unison with American capitalism, assist the Kuomintang with the sole object of deriving from the assistance as much gain as possible. The American intention is to enslave the country economically, to suck out all its raw materials and to make a market for the manufactured goods, "Made in America." To us, China is an old neighbor, with whom we wish to maintain friendly relations, but to the Americans, it is a base for advancing opposition to the Soviet Union. Also inform the Chinese people, as much as possible, about American measures in Japan and about their intention to revive Japanese military and industrial power.

You will receive further instructions from our next courier. Major General Pokrovin will bring with him detailed instructions concerning armaments for the need of the Chinese PLA. On receiving the list of armaments they need, present a copy to the Ministry. Weapons and munitions should be distributed immediately on receiving the list.

Speed up the transmittal of the regular reports and bills of account. Send Colonel Proskuren to Irkutsk under the direction of the staff. He will be very useful there while you do not need him

With communistic greetings,

Foreign Operations Section. Section Chief, General (Signature Illegible.)

Document III:

MVC No. 5462, Moscow, General Lieut., Chief of Foreign Operations Section, July 6, 1948

TO: Chief of East-Asian Operational Section, General Lieut. Managarov.

Section Chief left on duty for a trip abroad last week and will return to Moscow in August. After his return you should come here to report personally on the work entrusted to your service during the past six weeks. As to the time of your coming to Moscow, you will be informed by telegram.

All the supplementary equipment you requested for the need of the Chinese PLA will be sent quickly to Major General Pokrovin in the next week. Heavy tanks will be sent first while mortars will be dispatched after munitions.

You should immediately direct the attention of the Chief of Staff of the PLA [to the fact] that their right flank protrudes too much in front and that is why they cannot have victory very easily. The Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, therefore, has urgently communicated this message to Lieut. General Fedenko and we hope that the Chief of Staffs will adopt decisions to arrest the right flank so as to smooth out the left. Tempting plans to surround the opponent from the right flank, so as to turn it sharply to the left, [are] too dangerous as an opponent threatened in the flank movement may make use of the troop dislocation to counter-attack during the movement.

In general, the Chief of Staffs should act methodically and not be enthusiastic about overly aggressive operations. Now that victory is already near, it would be a crime to give the opponent the least possibility of having any success or to gain initiatives in any front.

Our Chief of Staffs is dissatisfied with the lack of coordination in operation between the commanding chiefs and the army. In this regard, Lieut. General Fedenko has already received a series of instructions and I think he will adopt necessary measures to remove the above-mentioned defects.

Now, after the arrival of Lieut. General Fedenko at the HQ of the Chief of Staffs of the Liberation Army, you will be responsible for the problem of supply and leave the purely operational part to him. Your staff is now too far away from the front. In your post, you are irreplaceable and the Ministry, therefore, does not want to burden you with too much work.

Be particularly energetic to have contact with the organs of the PLA on questions of provisions and try to avoid repeating the mistakes of last year. Adopt every resolute measure so that in the coming winter the army will not suffer shortages. We can provide bread, canned meat and fish, sugar and butter. Petrol is already on the way and will arrive at the appointed place in a few days. Henceforth, all your actions should have only one objective: to assist in liquidating the

enemy at whatever price. This liquidation is absolutely necessary to us for establishing our position in the Far East. A grave political situation in Europe threatens us with a war against the United States of America and her allies and therefore we should be prepared everywhere. Dazzled by their hatred of the Communists, the Kuomintang cannot see the precipice into which they are falling and since the matter concerns the safety of our Siberian border, we have no choice. We want a China friendly to the Soviet Union, not one which politically and economically is enslaved by international capitalists and is hostile to us.

Your bills of account will be sent tomorrow to the Controller Section of the Ministry and the next courier will bring you the conclusion of their study.

With comradely greetings,

Operations Chief, Section Chief Lieut. General. (Signature--Filyashev/Filyashkii)

Document IV:

Telegram, no date, no authority

We received from the Headquarters of the PLA General Zhu De's operation plan for October with great interest. It serves at the present time the subject of detailed discussion at our General Staff. But we still need some details and the Minister has therefore ordered you to leave immediately for General Zhu De and to bring back from him information about the quantity of troops which he intends for operation marked as Number 22.

The plan is acceptable, although we calculate that he would require no less than ten selected divisions with heavy artillery. It is necessary to keep the plan in strict secrecy. Telegraph the exact date of the commencing of the operation. Find out from Mao Zedong when he will be able to come to Moscow.

(The original with proper signature).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Murray recently completed his doctorate in Political Science at Columbia University. This working paper is based on research for his dissertation, “Western versus Chinese Realism: Soviet-American Diplomacy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1950.” He would like to thank Steven Levine and, especially, Odd Arne Westad for insightful comments on the validity of the documents and encouraging suggestions on an initial draft of this working paper.