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**ULBRICHT AND THE CONCRETE
'ROSE': NEW ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE
ON THE DYNAMICS OF SOVIET-
EAST GERMAN RELATIONS AND
THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958-61**

HOPE M. HARRISON

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COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

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Introduction

Until very recently the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961 was the subject of surprisingly little study by political scientists and historians, particularly in comparison to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet the Berlin Crisis lasted far longer than the Cuban Missile Crisis, witnessed the greatest post-World War II risk of direct U.S.-Soviet hostilities, and had significant long-term effects on U.S.-Soviet relations and on relations within the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Further, such observers as President Kennedy believed it may have been a key factor in the Soviet initiation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. One important reason for the rather scarce study of the Berlin Crisis has been the paucity of documents available to researchers on the Crisis, from archives in both the West and the East. At last, archives in Russia and the former East Germany (due to the breakdown of the communist system) and in the United States and Britain (due to the thirty-year-rule) are becoming open on this period, and the large number of newly declassified documents on the Berlin Crisis allows us to put together a much more comprehensive account than ever before. This Working Paper focuses in particular on what led up to the Soviet ultimatum to the West of 27 November 1958, which started the Berlin Crisis, and to the building of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961, which in an important sense ended the crisis.¹ Documents from the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party (SED)² and the East German secret police (Stasi) in east Berlin, and the post-1952 CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Central Committee Archives (Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation, TsKhSD) and Foreign Ministry Archives (Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, abbreviated as AVP, RF) in Moscow, as well as interviews with former diplomats in Moscow and Berlin and published sources, provide the evidentiary base.³

¹ I would like to acknowledge the support of several organizations, research centers, and individuals. During the year of my research in Berlin and Moscow, I had a grant from the Social Science Research Council for dissertation work in the Free University of Berlin Program on German and European Studies. Part of my Moscow research was funded by a Pepsico Grant from the Harriman Institute at Columbia University. Fellowships from the Nuclear History Program of the University of Maryland and the Center for Science and International Affairs of the Kennedy School at Harvard University have also helped me carry out my research, as does my current affiliation with the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Without being a part of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), I could not have had access to the rewarding materials of the Moscow Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD). Finally, I would like to acknowledge the following people for their help: Jim Hershberg, Bonnie Terrell, Gerhard Wettig, Zoya Vodopyanova of the TsKhSD, Alla Ivanovna Shirokova and Anatoly A. Bykov at the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, Volker Lange, Horst Bergman, and Ute Räuber at the SED archives, Yuli Kvitsinky, Karl and Giesela Schirdewan, Horst Brie, Fred Oldenburg, Mikhail Bezrukov, Beate Ihme-Tuchel, Gary Garrettsen, and James Richter.

² On the author's experiences working in the SED archives, see Hope M. Harrison, "Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher's Diary," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 2* (Fall 1992), 20, 28-32.

³ Unfortunately, documents regarding decision making at the highest levels in Moscow, in the so-called Presidential Archives, are still not open to researchers. These include details of Presidium (Politburo) sessions and the personal papers of Khrushchev and others within the top leadership. The KGB and Defense Ministry archives are also not open. Thus, this Working Paper cannot offer the final word on the Berlin Crisis, and particularly on

This Working Paper demonstrates that East German influence on Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis was much more important than previously believed. The evidence from the newly opened archives also shows that the Soviet leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was more interested in reaching a German settlement with the West and preoccupied with preventing East German leader Walter Ulbricht from sabotaging this process than has been recognized. In addition, the documents confirm the view of several scholars that Soviet fear of West German acquisition of nuclear weapons was an important influence on Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* (policy on Germany) connected with the crisis. Finally, the role of the faltering East German economy looms much larger in the documents than previously known.

The Berlin Crisis began with Khrushchev's ultimatum to the Western powers of 27 November 1958. Khrushchev declared that if the West did not enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on preparing a German peace treaty and on transforming West Berlin into a demilitarized "free city" within six months, the Soviets would turn over their rights and responsibilities regarding Berlin, and particularly their control over the Western access routes between West Germany and West Berlin (located within East Germany about 100 miles from the West German border and accessible by three highway transit routes, three air corridors, railways and waterways) to the East German government.⁴ The Soviets and Western powers had been putting forward various incompatible proposals on resolving the German and Berlin issues (whether to be united or divided and in what form) for several years, but the tone of this Soviet note was more aggressive than previous statements, particularly because of the six-month deadline. The note stated that "(i)f this proposal is not acceptable to the U.S. government, there is no topic left for talks on the Berlin question by the former occupying powers."⁵ Furthermore, if the West did not recognize the Soviet right to transfer its rights and responsibilities in Berlin to the GDR and tried to hinder this from happening, perhaps by force, this would "result immediately in appropriate retaliation" by Warsaw Pact members.⁶ The fact that Khrushchev sent the note at a time when he had been boasting about Soviet military strength due to developing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities hovered conspicuously in the background.⁷

debates within the top leadership on Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik*. Nonetheless, it can present much more primary evidence on the Soviet and East German dimensions of the Berlin Crisis than has previously been possible.

⁴ For the text of this and other related notes, see George Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question, September 1958-June 1961* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁷ For analyses on the connection between Khrushchev's policies during the Berlin Crisis and the development of Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities, see Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 1966), and Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

Although Khrushchev rescinded and renewed his ultimatum to the West twice more during the crisis, and met with both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, he was never able to resolve the German and Berlin issues to his satisfaction with the American leadership. Realizing this and in light of the perilously weak East German economy and the increasing numbers of East German refugees streaming out of East Berlin and East Germany into West Germany and especially West Berlin, Khrushchev gave the go ahead for the construction of the Berlin Wall.

Prior to the opening of the archives in the former Soviet bloc, scholars had to rely largely on published Soviet and East German statements and on speculation for their understanding of Soviet aims and of the influences on Soviet policy. Scholars have identified a variety of potential Soviet offensive and defensive and maximal and minimal aims involving influences by Western policy, Soviet domestic politics,⁸ East Germany,⁹ China,¹⁰ Soviet technological successes,¹¹ Soviet ideology,¹² and Khrushchev's personality.¹³ The following are aims that have been ascribed to the Soviet leadership in the Berlin Crisis: to prevent West Germany from having access to nuclear weapons,¹⁴ to get Western recognition of the East German regime and thus

⁸ On the role of domestic politics, see James Richter, "Inside Politics, Outside Influences: The Interaction of Domestic and International Politics and the Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy under Khrushchev" (book manuscript, 8 July 1992, forthcoming from Johns Hopkins University Press); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966); and Robert Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

⁹ For works which recognize significant East German influence on Soviet policy, see Paul Willging, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the German Question, 1950-1955," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971; Diethelm Manfred-Hartmut Prowe, "City Between Crises: The International Relations of West Berlin from the End of the Berlin Blockade in 1949 to the Khrushchev Ultimatum of 1958," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1967; and Jonathan Steele, *Socialism with a German Face: The State that Came in From the Cold* (Thirty Bedford Square, London: Jonathan Cape, 1977). For a very good summary of the argument for East German influence on Soviet policy, see Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 271-74. Adomeit's book is by far the most comprehensive treatment of both the 1958-61 and 1948-49 Berlin Crises.

¹⁰ Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (2nd ed.) (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), 621, 655.

¹¹ See Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*; and McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), 358-59, 363-66, 378-85.

¹² Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior*, 320.

¹³ See William Taubman's forthcoming work on the role of Khrushchev's personality on his policy making.

¹⁴ Marc Trachtenberg, "The Berlin Crisis," in *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 169-234; and Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). See also Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 610, 619-620, 639; and Scott Parrish, "Soviet Reactions to the Security Dilemma: The Sources of Soviet Postwar Self-Encirclement" (Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science Department, 1992), Chapter 5, "Khrushchev's 'Missile Diplomacy,' 1958-1962," which finds the interaction between the security dilemma, brought on by West German nuclear weapons, and the cognitive biases of the Soviet leaders as being the key influence on Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis.

stabilize that regime,¹⁵ to show Khrushchev's domestic opponents how strong and successful he was, to show Khrushchev's Chinese critics that he was not "soft on the imperialists," to divide the Western alliance,¹⁶ to force the West to accept the Soviet Union as its political and military equal, to test the rules of the new nuclear game to see if nuclear weapons could be used for coercive purposes,¹⁷ and to force the West to a summit conference to discuss German and disarmament issues.¹⁸

Newly accessible documents from the former Communist bloc indicate that East German influence, specifically Walter Ulbricht's influence, on Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* grew significantly in the time between Stalin's death in 1953 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and in fact was absolutely crucial in leading up to the building of the Wall. During the Berlin Crisis, the East Germans acted increasingly independently from the Soviets; they initiated important policies regarding *Deutschland-* and *Berlinpolitik* which the Soviets did not know about in advance and did not support when they were told of them. The tail wagged the dog far more than the West realized.¹⁹

East Germany was able to wield this significant influence, because although it was overwhelmingly dependent upon the Soviet Union militarily and economically, the Soviet Union was dependent upon East Germany ideologically, in terms of its reputation (Khrushchev believed that if communism failed in East Germany, this would be seen as an implicit indictment of the Soviet system also), and strategically (the Soviets did not want to lose control of East Germany's forward position vis-a-vis NATO).²⁰ GDR Deputy Foreign Minister P. Florin told a gathering of

¹⁵ Virtually all scholars point to this as a key Soviet aim.

¹⁶ This view of Soviet objectives was the most common among officials of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

¹⁷ On Khrushchev's attempts at coercion and compellance in the crisis, see in particular Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, and Bundy, *Danger and Survival*.

¹⁸ Most analysts see this as a key Soviet objective.

¹⁹ The papers presented at the "Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History" held in Moscow January 12-15, 1993, sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Moscow Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD, the post-1952 Central Committee archives), indicate that several of Moscow's "satellites" in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s had more room for maneuver than has been previously recognized. For summaries of the conference in the press, see Daniel Sneider, "Archives Revise Cold-War History," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 January 1993; and John-Thor Dahlburg, "Sifting for Soviet Clues to the Cold War," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 January 1993. Of the following five journalistic accounts of the Berlin Crisis and the role of Ulbricht in it, the first holds up by far the best in light of the new archival evidence: Norman Gelb, *The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of Europe* (NY: Dorset Press, 1986); Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963* (NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991); Honore M. Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1980); Curtis Cate, *The Ides of August: The Berlin Crisis, 1961*, (NY: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1978); and Peter Wyden, *Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

²⁰ Glenn Snyder's analysis of the alliance security dilemma, derived from Kenneth Waltz's work, can be applied very productively to the Soviet-East German relationship during the Berlin Crisis. The strength or weakness of the alliance security dilemma depends on the tension between the risks of abandonment and entrapment--the fear that

GDR ambassadors in 1956 that Khrushchev had said: "This conflict between socialism and capitalism proceeds in the GDR as a country with open borders.... As a result particular attention by all forces in the peace camp must be directed towards GDR victory in the competition."²¹

Florin also reported that the Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung believed that "victory in this question is a victory of the entire peace camp, and a failure would be a failure of the entire peace camp."²² Thus, the East Germans knew that their country and its stability was very important to both the Soviets and the Chinese, and this proved to be a source of East German leverage on Soviet and Chinese policy. In addition to this general leverage that East Germany could use with the Soviets, East Germany also had much more concrete means of leverage at its disposal--its border guards and their capacity, illegal though it was, to manipulate the regime on the sectoral border in Berlin.

The Berlin Crisis was the culmination of a long-standing debate within East Germany, within the Soviet Union, between the East Germans and Soviets, and within the Warsaw Pact about whether the West Berlin "problem"--its position as a capitalist enclave surrounded by East Germany illustrating obvious differences in standards of living between socialism and capitalism--could be resolved separately from and before a German peace treaty. This debate was addressed at a 12 May 1958 meeting between Florin, then head of the International Department of the SED Central Committee, and O. Selyaninov, a counselor at the Soviet embassy in the East Berlin:

Regarding the Berlin problem as a whole, Florin said that there are still big differences of opinion among the German comrades on how to approach its resolution. "We still do not have an agreed upon concept on this question, just as there is not a united, agreed upon position between us, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp. In particular, some German comrades believe, for example, that the Berlin question cannot be resolved as long as Germany is not united. Others, on the other hand, believe that the Berlin question can be gradually resolved by starting now to carry out a determined line of political and economic conquest of West Berlin so as to

your ally will abandon you when it comes time to supporting you in conflicts with the adversary and the fear that your ally will drag you against your will into conflicts with the adversary. Thus, Khrushchev's fear of East Germany's voluntary or involuntary abandonment of the alliance led him to be entrapped by Ulbricht into adopting policies regarding Berlin that he probably would not have adopted otherwise. See Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* (July 1984), 461-95.

²¹ "Stenographic Protocol of the Ambassadors' Conference in the Large Conference Room of the 'House of Unity' on 1-2 February 1956," Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Zentrales Parteiarchiv (Institute of the History of the Workers' Movement, Central Party Archive, hereafter referred to as IfGA, ZPA), J IV 2/201-429, volume 2, 187. Page numbers of documents from German and Soviet archives cited in this Working Paper refer to the page numbering of the actual document, not the leaf number of the folder or microfilm. Throughout the text and footnotes of this Working Paper, all proper names of Soviet and Chinese officials are spelled as they are commonly seen in English. Thus, for example, "Perwuchin" is "Pervukhin," and "Liu Schau-tji" is "Liu Shao-chi."

²² *Ibid.*, 188.

create the preconditions for the unification of Berlin in the future." Florin noted that he is a proponent of the second point of view.²³

Ulbricht was also a proponent of this second point of view, as was the Soviet ambassador to East Germany, Mikhail Pervukhin, and Selyaninov, who reported to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in February 1958 that

West Berlin continues to be a center of hostile activity against the GDR and other socialist countries, which is aggravated by the absence of closed sectoral borders.... We must proceed from the fact that the Berlin question can be resolved independently from resolving the entire German problem, by the gradual economic and political conquest of West Berlin. Particular attention should be paid to strengthening political work in West Berlin and carrying out certain economic and cultural measures. Regarding various types of administrative measures, we should turn to these only in the extreme circumstance of avoiding an undesired aggravation of the situation in the city.²⁴

Much of Ulbricht's behavior during the Berlin Crisis can be seen as an effort to persuade Khrushchev to adopt this view, that is, to persuade Khrushchev to resolve the West Berlin problem immediately and independently of a broader German peace settlement, when it appeared that such a peace settlement was not achievable. Indeed, as A. James McAdams points out, Ulbricht was trying to do this even before the Berlin Crisis:

Because of the attention Khrushchev's ultimatum received in late 1958, one may easily fail to notice that over an extended period between 1955 and 1957 Soviet officials barely mentioned the issue in their contacts with the West. Yet, over the same years, in contrast, the East German leader was actually pressing his allies on a routine basis to turn over the city to the GDR, including its western sectors, on the grounds that it was perfectly natural that Berlin in its entirety be steered down the path to socialism.²⁵

Khrushchev, on the other hand, wanted to wait as long as possible to see if he could come to some sort of agreement, at least a provisional one, with the three Western powers on West

²³ "Record of Meeting with the Chairman of the International Department of the SED CC, P. Florin," 12 May 1958, from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov, adviser to the USSR Embassy in the GDR, 16 May 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik (microfilm reel) 8873, Fond (fund) 5, Opis (list) 49, Delo (file) 76, p. 1. For the ease of scholars working in the Russian archives, I use the original Russian citation terms.

²⁴ "On the Situation in West Berlin," 24 February 1958, report written up by two diplomats in the Soviet embassy in the GDR, O. Selyaninov, adviser, and A. Kazennov, second secretary, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 22-23. "Administrative measures" refer to the possibility of instituting a regime on the sectoral border by which people could only cross if they had a visa and showed identification such as a passport.

²⁵ A. James McAdams, *Germany Divided, From the Wall to Reunification* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 29, 41. McAdams' work is based on extensive archival research and interviews in east Germany and comes to similar conclusions about the role of Walter Ulbricht as put forth in this Working Paper.

Berlin and Germany as a whole. Thus, Khrushchev was very anxious that Ulbricht not act unilaterally vis-a-vis West Berlin. This explains Selyaninov's response at the May 1958 meeting with Florin that although he agreed with Florin's view on starting to resolve the West Berlin issue independently of a broader German settlement, this "demanded the preparation of a whole series of political and economic measures by the GDR *and other socialist countries*."²⁶ [emphasis added] In other words, the GDR should not act alone, but should work out its approach with other socialist countries, including most importantly, of course, the Soviet Union. Three months before this meeting with Florin, Selyaninov and his colleague at the embassy, A. Kazennov, had written a report to the Soviet Foreign Ministry urging the formulation of a "united" approach on West Berlin, especially since, "our friends," the East Germans, were "somewhat unclear on the issue of tactics regarding West Berlin."²⁷ As will be shown below, the closest the Soviets and East Germans came to working out a united plan on the Berlin question was at a meeting in Moscow on 30 November 1960, but neither Khrushchev nor Ulbricht ended up holding to the agreed plan.

Some observers in the West have speculated that the divergent policies pursued by Khrushchev and Ulbricht during the Berlin Crisis were the result of a planned division of labor between them, but the declassified documents reveal that these differences were real, not planned or staged, and that Khrushchev and Ulbricht never completely resolved these differences during the Crisis or even in the aftermath of the Wall. These differences can be boiled down to the following: Khrushchev always saw and used West Berlin more as a lever to compel the West to recognize the post-war status quo and the existence of East Germany, and Ulbricht always saw West Berlin more as a prize, although he was certainly willing to exploit it as a lever until he got it as a prize. Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate treaty with the GDR, which was never carried out during the Berlin Crisis, was really Khrushchev's way of using West Berlin as a lever, since the key implication of his separate treaty threat was that the GDR would then have control over the access routes to West Berlin. So, if the West did not want to fall victim to the whims of the GDR, risk its access to and perhaps lose West Berlin, it was supposed to come to terms with the Soviets on a German peace settlement.

As will be illustrated below, had Khrushchev not felt forced by Ulbricht into finally acting in 1961, he probably would not have built the Wall when he did. Ulbricht played on Khrushchev's belief that if he did not start to carry out some of his threats about Berlin and/or Germany in 1961, his prestige and that of the whole socialist camp would be undermined. Ulbricht also convinced

²⁶ "Record of Meeting with the Chairman of the International Department of the SED CC, P. Florin," 12 May 1958, from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov on 12 May 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76, p. 2.

²⁷ "On the Situation in West Berlin," 24 February 1958, report written up by two diplomats in the Soviet embassy in the GDR, O. Selyaninov, adviser, and A. Kazennov, second secretary, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 22-23.

Khrushchev that East Germany and its economy would collapse if the Soviets and other members of the Warsaw Pact did not take drastic measures to support East Germany. Finally, at a time of widening schism between the Soviets and Chinese, lack of action would also be a severe blow to the reputation of the Soviet Union and of Khrushchev personally if it led to the "loss" of East Germany. In 1961 Ulbricht really wanted the Berlin sectoral border closed and a separate peace treaty with the GDR, but was forced to settle for just the border closing.

Prelude to the Ultimatum

As mentioned above, the general context for the ultimatum was the series of notes sent back and forth between the Soviets and the West about a German peace treaty and reunification. The key disagreement between the two sides consisted of the West's insistence that free all-German elections monitored by the four powers, the UN, or some credible body, must occur before reunification since the East German leaders had not been democratically elected; and the Soviets' insistence that the present East and West German governments together formulate a plan for reunification. Although Khrushchev always claimed to be acting on principle by insisting that the Germans themselves must find their own path to reunification, instead of having it dictated by the four powers, he revealed his true motivation in a letter to Chancellor Adenauer:

Trying to achieve German reunification on a capitalist basis at the expense of the GDR, you propose to leave this question to be decided by a group of states where capitalist states have three voices, and the socialists have only one. But what would you say if it was proposed to submit the question of German reunification for decision by a group of states of a different composition, for example, composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, China, and the Soviet Union. You, of course, would not be enthralled with this proposal, since you would know for sure that these states would support the socialist development of all of Germany. But it is not hard to see that both proposals are unrealistic.²⁸

Thus, when the West German Bundestag on 2 July 1958, and the Bundesrat on 18 July 1958, resolved to propose (which they did formally on 9 September 1958) to the four powers that they create a "four-power group (at least at the level of an ambassadors' conference) with a mandate to

²⁸ AVP, RF, Fond--Referentyra po FRG (fond--files on the FRG), Opis (list) 4, Portfel' (portfolio, abbreviated as por.) 9, Papka (file) 22, 18 August 1959 letter from Khrushchev to Adenauer, pp. 7-8. The archivists in the Foreign Ministry identified files by "Referentyra po FRG" and "Referentyra po GDR" when they did not want to give researchers the actual Fond numbers. For the most part, the FRG Fond was 0757, and the GDR Fond was 0742.

prepare joint proposals for the solution of the German problem,"²⁹ the Soviets decided to give the GDR the task of making a preemptive counter proposal. This GDR proposal of 5 September 1958,³⁰ urged the creation of a joint German commission, in addition to the Four-Power commission, thus ensuring that the socialists could have a forum where they would be on more equal terms with the capitalists instead of being outnumbered three to one. In the words of the East German note:

The government of the German Democratic Republic expects the government of the Federal Republic of Germany ... to ... abandon further attempts to take the solution of the German problem out of the hands of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany and to turn it over to other powers.

The Bundestag resolution authorizing the government of the Federal Republic to propose to the four powers the establishment of a body of representatives of the four powers to work out proposals on the unification of the two German states testifies to a stubborn desire to uphold the viewpoint that the unification of the two German states is a matter for foreign powers and not a matter for the German people.

Under such a procedure the German people would be barred from solving the cardinal national problem which they have a right to solve, and a decision concerning their state and social system would be imposed on them from without.³¹

Clearly, the fear expressed particularly in the last paragraph was that the *East* German people would have a "state and social system . . . imposed on them from without" if it were left up to the four powers. Thus, the Soviets and East Germans were doing everything they could to prevent this.

It has been speculated that the GDR note of September 5 was really a Soviet initiative, but until the archives in Moscow and east Berlin were accessible, there was no hard evidence. The paper trail in the archives leading up to the September 5 GDR note and the September 18 Soviet note reveals that the GDR note was formulated by the Soviets. On 13 August 1958, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N. Patolichev sent a letter to the CPSU Central Committee proposing that the East Germans take the initiative in preempting the West German proposal on the German

²⁹ See the "Aide-Memoire From the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States Proposing Establishment of a Four-Power Ambassadorial Group To Make Preliminary Recommendations on German Reunification, September 8, 1958" in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (United States Department of State Publication 9446), 536-37.

³⁰ For the text of the version of the East German note to the Four Powers which was sent to the Soviets, see Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 3-5.

³¹ "German Democratic Republic's Note to the Soviet Union Outlining Proposals for a Peace Treaty (September 5, 1958)" in *ibid.*, 4.

question.³² The Central Committee Presidium agreed to this in its meeting of August 15,³³ and the Soviets then sent a note to the East Germans (expressing everything that Patolichev had advocated), which was then translated into German and sent by Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer to SED Politburo member Hermann Axen on August 23:

In connection with the expected request by the German Federal Republic [FRG] government to the governments of the USSR, the USA, England and France on forming a permanent working group of the Four Great Powers to prepare proposals on the German question, it is necessary to consult on possible Soviet and GDR steps.

. . . Considering that Adenauer's above mentioned request to the Four Great Powers will be received sympathetically by a part of the German population and can bring a certain propagandistic victory to the Bonn government, it would be useful to make some simultaneous counter proposals.

People in Moscow feel that Adenauer's above mentioned proposal could be countered by the USSR and the GDR with the idea of the formation of a commission of representatives of the Four Great Powers--not, however, to discuss the German question in entirety, but to hold the necessary consultations and to prepare suitable measures for the conclusion of a German peace treaty. It would also be useful to propose that, in addition to this organ of the Four Great Powers, a commission be created of representatives of the governments of the two German states for the discussion of questions which are connected with German reunification.

If the GDR leadership is in agreement with this, *it would be desirable if the GDR government would take the initiative*, in which it would make a critique of the West German plan for the formation of a working group and would make the above mentioned proposal. *Such a statement could possibly have the form of a request to the Four Great Powers. The Soviet Government could in this case support the proposals of the GDR government in its answer to the Bonn government.*

We assume that the USSR and GDR statements and the above proposals will complicate the Adenauer government's maneuvers of trying to gamble with the issue of German unity and will make our standpoint on the German question more understandable and clear to the German population. The Soviet and GDR Ministries of Foreign Affairs can be tasked with preparing the detailed agreement on the contents of the proposed statements of both sides as well as the general tactical line.³⁴[emphasis added]

³² 13 August 1958 letter to the CPSU CC from N. Patolichev, AVP, RF, Referentyra po FRG, Opis 3, Por. 14, Papka 18.

³³ Report to the CPSU CC from V. Kuznetsov, 12 September 1958. AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 3, Por. 33, Papka 21.

³⁴ Letter from Otto Winzer to Hermann Axen on August 23, 1958, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/125.

This letter clearly lays the groundwork for the East German and Soviet notes to the Western Powers of 5 and 18 September 1958.³⁵ On August 27, C. Astavin, a charge d'affaires at the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, sent Gromyko the requested GDR proposals, drafted by the East German Foreign Ministry.³⁶ Two days later the Third European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent Deputy Foreign Minister V.A. Zorin a note agreeing to the GDR draft proposals with a few changes.³⁷ Meanwhile, Ulbricht was apparently in the Soviet Union at this time, since in a letter to the Central Committee on August 28, Yuri Andropov, head of the Central Committee department on relations with communist and workers' parties of socialist countries, spoke of the need to "use the opportunity of Ulbricht's stay in the Soviet Union" to talk to him about the increasing numbers of East German intelligentsia fleeing the country.³⁸ No doubt, Ulbricht was there to coordinate the East German September 5 note. The note adhered to the Soviet instructions almost word for word and was followed, as proposed, with a Soviet note supporting it to the Western powers on September 18.³⁹ As expressed in the Soviet instructions to the East Germans of August 23, the impulse for action came from the desire to preempt an expected West German proposal and counter any anticipated West German "propagandistic victory." Although the Soviets were responsible for this initiative, even before the August 23 Soviet instructions, it was clear that the East Germans wanted the situation in Berlin and Germany changed, and they were already starting to make statements and policies geared towards stabilizing the situation in East Germany.⁴⁰ As part of this, the East Germans were making plans to transform (East) Berlin into the capital of the GDR, so as to boost their international recognition and prestige.

The notes of September 5 and 18 both expressed a sense of urgency, calling for the commissions to be set up "at once" or "as soon as possible" so as to "greatly speed up" the process of concluding a peace treaty, and requesting responses from the Western Powers "in a

³⁵ See "Note From the Soviet Union to the United States Supporting an East German Proposal To Establish a Four-Power Commission and a West German-East German Commission to Prepare a Peace Treaty with Germany, September 18, 1958," which also includes a detailed description of the East German note of September 4, in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 537-539.

³⁶ AVP, RF, Fond--Referentyra po GDR, Opis 3, Por. 28, Papka 21.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Letter from Yu. Andropov on 28 August 1958, to the CPSU Central Committee, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 2-3.

³⁹ On September 12, V. Kyznetsov of the Third European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed to the CPSU CC that it support the GDR note of September 5 with a note to U.S., Great Britain, France, the FRG, and the GDR. AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 3, Por. 33, Papka 21. Considering that the original Soviet instructions to East Germany drafted on August 13 (and agreed to on August 15 by the CPSU CC) by N. Patolichev of the Soviet Foreign Ministry specifically stated that the Soviets would follow up the East German note in such a way, the need for this CPSU CC resolution is a bit comical.

⁴⁰ See for example "Record of Meeting with the Chairman of the SED Central Committee International Department, P. Florin," on 12 May 1958 from the diary of counselor at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, O.P. Selyaninov on 16 May 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76.

short time." The Western Powers responded "in a short time" on September 30, but not to the satisfaction of the Soviets and East Germans. An "essential prerequisite" for negotiations for a German peace treaty, they reiterated, was

the creation of a Government which truly reflects the will of the German people. . . . German representatives at any discussions about a peace treaty which were held in advance of the reunification of Germany would . . . have no power to commit a future all-German Government to any of the conclusions reached. For these reasons, the United States Government considers that the first task in any discussion of the German problem must be the reunification of Germany and the formation of an all-German Government by means of free elections.⁴¹

When the West did not respond to the September 5 and 18 notes the way the Soviets and East Germans wanted, there then followed a series of high-level Soviet-East German meetings (mostly among Ulbricht, Pervukhin and A.A. Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador to West Germany) and correspondence in September, October and November, indicating that they were consulting in great detail on further tactics. The meetings were held on September 26, October 2, 5, 10, 12, 15, and 20, and November 17. The notes from these meetings, combined with correspondence between the Soviets and East Germans and with the Soviet ultimatum of November 27, provide much evidence regarding Soviet motivations for sending the note. The evidence overwhelmingly indicates defensive motivations of three kinds: fear of the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr; fear of impending Western aggression against East Germany; and a desire to preserve and support East Germany, visibly suffering due to its weak economy and the exodus of refugees.

Soviet concern with West German acquisition of nuclear weapons had an important place in the November 27 ultimatum. The note stated that the Western powers "have included Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which was set up behind the Soviet Union's back, and, as is clear to everyone, against the Soviet Union, and are now arming Western Germany with atomic and rocket weapons."⁴² Referring to "unheeded" past Soviet protests⁴³ against the atomic arming

⁴¹ "Note From the United States to the Soviet Union Insisting on Creation of an All-German Government Through Free Elections Prior to Negotiation of a German Peace Treaty, September 30, 1958," in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 540.

⁴² Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 27.

⁴³ One particularly important example of Soviet protests against West German acquisition of nuclear weapons is the trip of Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Soviet Presidium and close ally of Khrushchev, to Bonn, where he met with Adenauer twice on 26 April 1958, both times emphasizing at length Soviet opposition to West German nuclear weapons and the potential dangers and risks of West German acquisition of them. "Record of Meeting of A.I. Mikoyan with Adenauer in his Residence on April 26, 1958" and "Record of A.I. Mikoyan's meeting with FRG Federal Chancellor K. Adenauer at a Reception in Bonn on April 26, 1958," in the AVP, RF, Fond: Referentyra po FRG, Opis 3, Por. 3, Papka 17.

of West Germany, Khrushchev implies that the note is an attempt to make the West take the Soviet protests more seriously.⁴⁴

This public record of Khrushchev's concern with West German access to nuclear weapons is also reflected in the classified conversations between Soviet and East German officials in the months leading up to the ultimatum. On September 26 and on October 2 and 5, Ulbricht and Pervukhin discussed with worry the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) 8th Congress in Kiel from September 18-21, at which there was much focus on the need to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons and to step up the struggle against East Germany.⁴⁵ On October 5, Smirnov told Ulbricht, Pervukhin, and Astavin that

since April of this year, the situation in West Germany has become more much complicated for us. . . .In West Germany they are continuing the arming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, which are now legal. . . .The Bundeswehr does not yet have the strength which would allow it to fulfill its aims unilaterally, however, in the next few years the arming of the Bundeswehr will be completed, and then West Germany will have a modern trained and equipped army of 350-550,000 men.

In this connection, our general goal is to continue to exert a breaking influence on the arming of the Bundeswehr. If all countries of the socialist camp unite their forces in this direction, then the arming of the Bundeswehr could be delayed for 2-3 years, which would be a serious victory for our general cause.⁴⁶

Then, in a meeting on October 20, Ulbricht vented his frustration with Smirnov to Pervukhin, saying that Smirnov had not protested the atomic arming of the Bundeswehr and aggressive NATO policy vehemently enough in his recent letter to Adenauer. Pervukhin calmed Ulbricht, saying that this concern "would be reflected in the answer we are preparing on the German

⁴⁴ Khrushchev's press conference on the German Question on 27 November 1958, in Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 47.

⁴⁵ "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on September 26, 1958," from the diary of Pervukhin on 30 September 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76; "Record of Meeting with Comrades W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl on October 2, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 12 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; and "Record of Meeting with Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

⁴⁶ "Record of Meeting with Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 7-8. It is interesting that Smirnov mentions delaying the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr by two years here, because during Mikoyan's April 1958 meetings with Adenauer in Bonn, Adenauer and others kept responding to Mikoyan's protests regarding West German nuclear weapons by saying that "the decision of the Bundestag is of preliminary character and is not a law which absolutely must come into being. . . . for the realization of the Bundestag's decision we need at least two years and if there is an agreement on disarmament in that period, then the atomic arming of the FRG will not be carried out." See the Foreign Ministry report written up on 13 May 1958, "On the Results of A.I. Mikoyan's trip to the FRG (April 25-28, 1958)," AVP, RF, Delo 118/FRG, Referentyra po FRG, Opis 3, Por. 16, Papka 18, p. 4.

question"⁴⁷--i.e., the Soviet note of November 27. The East German army carried out their first maneuvers under simulated conditions of a nuclear strike from 20-25 October 1958.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the Soviets and East Germans were watching closely the increasing West German domestic opposition to the government's policy of the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr and sought to strengthen this opposition.⁴⁹ Following the ultimatum, they felt that they had been successful in doing this, as Smirnov told Ulbricht on December 5.⁵⁰ There were also times, however, in the period leading up to the ultimatum, that the Soviets and East Germans watched with anxiety as the policies of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) moved closer to those of the ruling coalition in Bonn.⁵¹

Another reason for the note was a fear of some sort of Western political and economic and perhaps even military offensive against East Germany that needed to be preempted. The November 27 note stated that West Germany was trying to "pursue a 'policy of strength,' . . . a policy of dictating to the other German state,"⁵² and "nurtures plans for the abolition of the German Democratic Republic and for strengthening its own militarist state at the expense of the G.D.R."⁵³ In the weeks leading up to the ultimatum, the Soviets and East Germans did not just fear the materialization of these West German plans at some distant time in the future, but they seemed to have information indicating that the West Germans might act soon. On September 26, Pervukhin told Ulbricht that "according to the data we have, the West is preparing to carry out a series of significant economic and political measures against the GDR," to which Ulbricht responded that "the Bonn government is already carrying out a series of concrete measures against us now. Recently, for example, West Germany has been limiting the deliveries of steel to the GDR."⁵⁴ At the October 2 meeting between Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, the Minister President

⁴⁷ "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on October 20, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 23 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 1.

⁴⁸ "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on October 15, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 18 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹ See for example the "Record of Meeting with the Chairman of the Third Main Department on German Questions of the GDR Foreign Ministry, Wilhelm Meissner" on 13 May 1958 from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov, counselor at the USSR embassy in the GDR, on 5 June 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 9202, Fond 5, Opis 50, Delo 68; and the report by N. Tverdokhlebov, adviser at the Soviet embassy in the FRG, "On the Tasks of Soviet Propaganda and Counter-propaganda in the FRG," 13 August 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 9203, Fond 5, Opis 50, Delo 68, especially pp. 7 and 17.

⁵⁰ "Record of Meeting of M.G. Pervukhin and A.A. Smirnov with W. Ulbricht on December 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 5 December 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 1.

⁵¹ "Record of Meeting with Comrades W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl on October 2, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 12 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 1-2.

⁵² Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 27.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵⁴ "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on September 26, 1958," from the diary of the USSR Ambassador to the GDR M.G. Pervukhin on 30 September 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76, p. 1.

of the GDR, and Pervukhin on further tactics on *Deutschlandpolitik*, Ulbricht "said that the West German ruling circles were preparing a broad plan of subversive activity against the GDR and the countries of the socialist camp" and that it was part of a NATO plan.⁵⁵ On October 5, Ulbricht told Pervukhin, Smirnov, and Astavin that he "had documents which lay out NATO's aggressive plans."⁵⁶ Smirnov agreed, saying:

The West was very alarmed by the decisions of the 5th SED Congress, directed towards the conclusion of the construction of socialism in the GDR. In the West they understand that if they do not hinder and ruin the plans for the socialist construction of the GDR, changes could occur which would exert an invincible influence on West Germany and on all of the so-called "free world."⁵⁷ Therefore, the Western Powers are talking openly about activating the struggle against the GDR and about how they cannot passively watch over events occurring in the GDR. It is possible that the West will not stop at limited local provocations on GDR territory. It might be enough for the West to organize a provocation in one or several villages, so that then the whole world would shout about it.⁵⁸

Smirnov also urged the East Germans to be ready for a West German political offensive. At the October 5 meeting, he told Ulbricht that "according to data received from informed sources, the German monopolies had ordered Adenauer to activate his *Deutschlandpolitik* . . ." Since Adenauer's proposals may find some listeners in the GDR, "the GDR should put national questions in the first place, not giving Adenauer the chance to speculate with national questions."⁵⁹ Ulbricht then met with Pervukhin three days later on October 15 to report on how the East German foreign ministry was planning to activate its *Deutschlandpolitik* as Smirnov had asked: it was preparing a memorandum on West Germany to be sent to the four powers.⁶⁰

In addition to their fears of imminent West German action, the Soviets and East Germans were afraid of a more general Western offensive regarding Germany once the attention of the West was shifted away from the Far East, where Chinese shelling of Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu had precipitated a crisis over the summer. On October 2, Ulbricht and Grotewohl told Pervukhin that they "had to keep in mind that as soon as the issue of the

⁵⁵ "Record of Meeting with Comrades W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl on October 2, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 12 October 1958, p. 1.

⁵⁶ "Record of Meeting with Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 1.

⁵⁷ This comment is typical of Smirnov, who was almost always wearing ideological blinders. He really seemed convinced that the Soviets and East Germans could swing West Germany onto the socialist path.

⁵⁸ "Record of Meeting with Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁶⁰ "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on October 15, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 18 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

Chinese islands was shifted to the second burner, Germany would be next."⁶¹ At the October 5 meeting, Smirnov said that West German activity on the German question had increased lately, because they realized that

[f]or the past two years, the forces of the Western powers were involved in the Near, Middle and Far East, leaving the German question in the shadows. Moreover, Adenauer had to make some concessions, in particular by taking new steps towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. As a result of this, the West lost two years, which the GDR used well.⁶²

Smirnov believed that now the West would shift its attention to Germany, and the Soviets and East Germans had to be ready for this.

In addition to being motivated by fear regarding West German aggressive plans, in sending the ultimatum the Soviets were also motivated by the positive feeling of wanting to support East Germany, increase its prestige internationally, help it to be seen as a sovereign state. Ambassador Pervukhin's annual "Report by the USSR Embassy in the GDR on the Internal and Foreign Policy of the GDR and the Activities of the Embassy in 1958" stated that "the strengthening of the position of our friends [the East Germans] on all-German questions was also enabled by the Soviet proposal on normalizing the situation in Berlin, which was directed towards strengthening the sovereignty of the GDR."⁶³ Pervukhin also wrote that the activity of the embassy in 1958 had been aimed at "helping prepare Soviet foreign policy steps directed towards the resolution of the Berlin problem, the consolidation of the situation in the GDR, and the advancement of its international prestige."⁶⁴ In the November 27 note, Khrushchev kept reminding the West of the existence of the GDR, saying that the Soviet Union wanted to "proceed from the principles of respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic,"⁶⁵ that "Berlin . . . lies at the cent(er) of the German Democratic Republic but the western part . . . is severed from the German Democratic Republic as a consequence of foreign occupation,"⁶⁶ and that the "Soviet Union expresses its complete solidarity with the German Democratic Republic, which is firmly defending its legal rights."⁶⁷ At the December 5 meeting with Pervukhin and Smirnov, Ulbricht told them

⁶¹ "Record of Meeting with Comrades W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl on October 2, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 12 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 4.

⁶² "Record of Meeting with Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 9.

⁶³ "Report by the USSR Embassy in the GDR on the Internal and Foreign Policy of the GDR and the Activities of the Embassy in 1958," 28 February 1959, AVP, RF, Ambassador Pervukhin's annual "Report by the USSR Embassy in the GDR on the Internal and Foreign Policy of the GDR and the Activities of the Embassy in 1958" AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 4, Por. 26, Papka 30, p. 86b.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶⁵ Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 34.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

that he believed the November 27 note had been successful in raising the international prestige of the GDR. He said that "the current moment is a turning point in the issue of the recognition of the GDR. . . .The fact of the existence of the GDR, the durability of its position, is being recognized by more and more people."⁶⁸

Of course the main reason the Soviets felt the need to support East Germany by the end of 1958 was the weak East German economy and the related refugee problem. In the period leading up to the ultimatum, and throughout the Berlin Crisis, there were many Soviet-East German discussions on the poor state of the East Germany economy and the need to remedy this.⁶⁹ The Fifth SED Congress of 10-16 July 1958 (before which Ulbricht was in Moscow consulting on proposals to be made at the Congress⁷⁰) had declared that East German per capita consumption would surpass that of West Germany by 1961.⁷¹ Khrushchev had similar plans for the Soviet economy to outstrip that of the U.S. and increasingly felt that the main priority of socialism in showing its predominance over capitalism was in the economic sphere.

The GDR's bad economic situation was a principle impetus for most refugees, although the intelligentsia left for largely political reasons, especially after the 5th Congress made it clear that East Germany would remain socialist. In the year prior to the ultimatum, there had been at least monthly Soviet-East German meetings on the refugee problem, which continued throughout the Crisis, as well as all sorts of Soviet and East German analyses of the trends and causes of the refugee outflow, with attention focusing increasingly on the intelligentsia.⁷² Andropov wrote an

⁶⁸ "Record of Meeting of M.G. Pervukhin and A.A. Smirnov with W. Ulbricht on December 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 5 December 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 2.

⁶⁹ See, for example, the conversation on 12 May 1958, between Florin and Selyaninov, "Record of Meeting with the Chairman of the SED CC International Department, P. Florin on May 12, 1958," from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov, adviser to the USSR embassy in the GDR, May 16, 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76, p. 5. In discussing how to increase East German influence on West Berlin, Florin suggests political methods, but Selyaninov tells him that the important thing is to strengthen the economy of East Berlin and the standard of living there.

⁷⁰ See "Record of Meeting with W. Ulbricht" on 23 June 1958, from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin, written up on 27 June 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76.

⁷¹ See the "political letter" written up by V. Kochemasov, temporary charge d'affaires at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, "On the Process of Carrying out the Main Economic Tasks of the GDR Which were Set at the 5th SED Congress," 27 May 1959, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 4, Por. 3, Papka 27.

⁷² See for example "Record of Meeting with the Chairman of the Department on Internal Affairs of the GDR Ministry for Internal Affairs, P.G. Bergman" on June 18 from the diary of the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in the GDR, P.G. Bushman on 21 June 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; "Record of Meeting with the Director of the Department of Internal Affairs of the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs, P.G. Bergman" on 8 August 1958 from the diary of the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in the GDR, P.G. Bergman on 14 August 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; report on the East German intelligentsia fleeing, by Yuri Andropov, Director of the CPSU Central Committee Department on Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, "To the CPSU Central Committee" on 28 August 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; "Record of Meeting with the GDR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, H. Grünstein" on 2 September 1958, from the diary of first secretary of the Soviet embassy in the GDR, P.G. Bushman on 8 September 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; and "Record of Meeting with P.G. Bergman, Head of the

urgent letter to the Central Committee on 28 August 1958 about the significant increase in the numbers of East German intelligentsia among the refugees (an increase of 50% from 1957). He reported that the GDR leadership said the intelligentsia was leaving for the higher standard of living in West Germany, but that in fact reports from the refugees indicated that their motives were more political than material. Andropov said that the SED officials did not know how to relate to the intelligentsia and needed help. "In view of the fact that the issue of the flight of the intelligentsia from the GDR has reached a particularly critical phase," Andropov wrote, "it would be expedient to discuss this with Comrade Ulbricht, using his stay in the USSR to explain to him our apprehensions on this issue."⁷³ While the East German leadership had hoped that the resolutions of the Fifth Congress for strengthening the economy and socialism in the GDR would decrease the refugee outflow, it actually had the opposite effect, as deputy Interior Minister H. *ULQWUQ told P. G. Bushman, first secretary in the Soviet embassy, in a meeting on September 2.⁷⁴ At the October 2 and 5 meetings with Pervukhin, Ulbricht dwelt on the continued difficult situation regarding the intelligentsia.⁷⁵

Although the East German passport law of 11 December 1957 reduced the overall number of refugees leaving East Germany, it drastically increased the proportion of refugees leaving through West Berlin, from 60% in 1957 to well over 90% by the end of 1958.⁷⁶ Thus, there was increasing pressure to do something about West Berlin. There were also rather frequent references, which continued throughout the Crisis, by East German and Soviet officials to the difficulties for East Germany due to the "open borders" or "lack of a closed border" in Berlin.⁷⁷ Mentioning this in such a way implied that the borders could be closed. In the ultimatum,

Interior Affairs Department of the GDR Interior Ministry, on December 13, 1958," from the diary of Bushman, first secretary of the Soviet embassy in the GDR, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

⁷³ Letter from Yu. Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee on 28 August 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, pp. 1-3.

⁷⁴ "Record of Meeting with GDR Deputy Interior Minister, H. Grünstein on September 2, 1958," from the diary of first secretary in the Soviet embassy in the GDR, Bushman, 8 September 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

⁷⁵ "Record of Meeting with Comrades W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl on October 2, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin, 12 October 1958, and "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin, 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

⁷⁶ "Record of Meeting with Maron, GDR Interior Minister, on January 27, 1958," from the diary of N.R. Shelekh, adviser at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, 6 February 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; "Record of Meeting with Bergman, Chairman of the Department of Internal Affairs of the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs on February 27, 1958," from the diary of P.G. Bushman, first secretary of the USSR embassy in the GDR, 11 March 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; and "Record of Meeting with Bergman, Chairman of the Department of Internal Affairs of the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs on April 26, 1958," from the diary of P.G. Bushman, first secretary of the USSR embassy in the GDR, 28 April 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

⁷⁷ See, for example, "Record of Meeting with GDR Interior Minister [Karl] Maron" on 27 January 1958, from the diary of Shelekh, an adviser to the Soviet embassy in the GDR, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82, p. 1; and a report "On the Situation in West Berlin" on 24 February 1958, by Selyaninov and Kazennov of the Soviet embassy in the GDR, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 9, Delo 82, p. 1.

Khrushchev stated that, on the basis of Western militaristic policies and Western use of West Berlin as a center for "subversive activities" against East Germany and other countries of the Soviet bloc, "the very essence of the allied agreement on Berlin has vanished"⁷⁸ and that West Berlin should become a demilitarized free-city. If the West would not agree to this, then the Soviets would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR with the implication that the East Germans would then have control over the access routes to West Berlin and could then make sure that no East German refugees were brought out, especially by plane, from West Berlin to West Germany, thus stemming the refugee exodus.

Not only do the new archival documents shed light on the Soviet (and East German) motivations for sending the ultimatum, they also reveal some of the actual process which led up to the note being sent on November 27. At the October 2 meeting, with regard to preparing a response to the Western note on Germany of September 30,⁷⁹ Pervukhin said that the Soviets

should answer the Western powers *with a special note*. In our note, . . . we would again emphasize the position of the Soviet government on the German question and support the GDR proposal on the preparation of a peace treaty. In the note, we could formulate the basic parts of a peace treaty.⁸⁰ [emphasis added]

Ulbricht and Grotewohl agreed with this proposition and asked "that the Soviet note be publicized about a week or two before the GDR elections," so that they could make great use of the Soviet note in their propaganda work on the eve of the elections. Ulbricht further said that "we must speak to West Germany with a different language. We can't always be telling Adenauer that we propose negotiations, and he refuses them."⁸¹ Obviously, Ulbricht wanted the Soviet note to represent a toughening of Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik*. The GDR elections that Ulbricht and Grotewohl referred were to take place in the second half of November, so they wanted the note to be sent in the first half of November. This obviously did not happen, although Khrushchev did make his speech hinting at the note on November 10.

At Ulbricht's request, Pervukhin and Smirnov met with him again on October 5. He told them that "it would be good if the Soviet government would answer the latest letter from Adenauer such that West Germany could not sustain any illusions regarding the possibility of

⁷⁸ Embree, *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 33.

⁷⁹ The Soviets asked the East Germans more than once urgently for speedy input into the Soviet drafting of a response to the West. See "Extract from a Record of a Meeting of Colleague [F.] Thun with Comrades Shelyakov and [V.S.] Bykov in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 10, 1958," IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/125; and the letter from Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer to Ulbricht on 5 November 1958 in *ibid*.

⁸⁰ "Record of Meeting with Comrades W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl on October 2, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 12 October 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875 Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82.

⁸¹ *Ibid*.

German reunification on Western terms."⁸² As in the October 2 meeting, Ulbricht was clearly pushing for a more hard-line Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik*. Ulbricht followed this up with a public speech to the West Berlin voters on October 27, and, as McAdams points out,

became the first to signal the coming crisis over Berlin, when he announced publicly that his government was no longer disposed to tolerate the existing state of affairs. All of Berlin, he stressed, lay "on the territory of the GDR" and was within its "sovereign domain." The only logical solution to the conflict lay in the immediate termination of the Western military presence in the city which, in his mind, no longer enjoyed any legitimate justification anyway.⁸³

Regarding this speech and others that followed, Hannes Adomeit points out that "Ulbricht was more direct than Khrushchev in attacking positions of the Western allies in Berlin and ... displayed a greater attitude of unconcern about likely international consequences of these direct challenges."⁸⁴

On November 5, East German Deputy Foreign Minister : ~~IQH~~sent Ulbricht the Soviet draft response (which was written in the Soviet Foreign Ministry on October 10) to the latest American notes on Germany (of September 20 and 30, saying that West Berlin could be a part of international agreements signed by West Germany and insisting on all-German elections prior to the creation of an all-German government to negotiate a peace treaty), along with some proposals for changes from the SED legal department, and told Ulbricht that the Soviets wanted his response to their draft *on the same day*.⁸⁵ It seems, however, that Ulbricht did not send a response to Pervukhin until November 13, with a note saying "I assume that this proposal is unnecessary due to ... Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's [November 10] speech. If we should submit a new proposal, please let us know."⁸⁶ Thus, it seems that while the Soviets were clearly consulting with the East Germans on how to respond to the last U.S. notes, perhaps the East Germans did not in the end receive advance notice of Khrushchev's November 10 speech. Grotewohl's behavior at his press conference of November 12 at which he was at a loss to give reporters any information on the possible timing or even likelihood of the transfer of Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to the East Germans also supports this possibility.⁸⁷

⁸² "Record of Meeting with Ulbricht on October 5, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 11 October 1958, TsKhSD, *ibid*.

⁸³ McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 29. See also Ulbricht's speech in *Neues Deutschland*, 28 October 1958.

⁸⁴ Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior*, 271-72.

⁸⁵ Letter from Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer to Ulbricht and enclosures on 5 November 1958, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/125.

⁸⁶ Letter and attached proposal from Ulbricht to Pervukhin, 13 November 1958, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/125.

⁸⁷ Press Office Stenographic Report of the Press Conference by the Minister President of the GDR on 12 November 1958, IfGA, ZPA, NL 90/240, pp. 32, 35.

In Pervukhin's meeting with Ulbricht on November 17, he "informed [Ulbricht] about the proposed measures of the Soviet government regarding the four-power status of Berlin."⁸⁸ This seems to indicate that the Soviets had at least a draft of the November 27 note on November 17. Ulbricht said he supported the Soviet plan and Khrushchev's recent November 10 speech. He added that

it would be helpful to publish the Soviet notes to the three Western powers, and also to the FRG and GDR governments, no later than November 26, since this would provide the opportunity for us to use the principled position of these documents in the process of preparations for the elections in the West Berlin senate, which will take place on December 7. Regarding concrete steps towards implementing the Soviet government's proposals for transferring to GDR organs control functions which have been carried out by Soviet organs in Berlin, Ulbricht remarked that perhaps we should not hurry with this, since this would give us the opportunity to keep the adversary under pressure for a certain period of time.⁸⁹

Unlike Ulbricht and Grotewohl's October 2 request on the timing of the Soviet note, this request was almost carried out, although the Soviets may have already planned to send the note on November 27 before Ulbricht asked that it be sent by November 26. Ulbricht's comment about not hurrying to transfer the Soviet control functions to East Germany is interesting, since he usually urged the Soviets to act faster. Perhaps he was worried about this process and wanted more time to prepare for it.

In sum, the process leading up to the ultimatum of November 27 was guided by the Soviets, although they consulted regularly with the East Germans, who were pushing for a very strong note to the West. At this point, there is no significant evidence of the Soviets being pushed into anything against their will by the East Germans. Their interests seemed to be very similar, so there was no need for major disagreements over strategy. This changed as the Crisis progressed and took on dynamics of its own. East German influence on Soviet policy actually increased as the stability of the East German regime weakened throughout the Crisis.⁹⁰

The Crisis Develops

The East Germans took the Soviet ultimatum very seriously. The East German Ambassador to Moscow, Johannes König, told Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N.P. Foryubin on

⁸⁸ "Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on November 17, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 24 November 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873 Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 77.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ On the concept of strength through weakness, see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 22-23.

December 12 that the GDR would "use the six-month period, which is discussed in the Soviet note of November 27 to the GDR and the Western powers, to . . . persuade the West Berliners that the liquidation of the occupation status of Berlin is in their interest."⁹¹ The East Germans believed that Khrushchev would carry out his threats and turn over Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to the East Germans. They quickly began to draw up draft proposals for this, such as the one sent from Ulbricht to Gromyko on 4 February 1959, on "Problems in Connection with the Transfer of the Rights of the Soviet Representatives Concerning West Berlin to the GDR Government."⁹² They also formulated detailed drafts of agreements that East Germany would sign with the new "free city" of West Berlin and all sorts of proposals to the Soviets about how they should proceed with their *Deutschlandpolitik*.⁹³

While the East Germans made a point publicly of taking Khrushchev at his word, they were privately concerned that he might not carry out his threats to the Western powers, especially after Khrushchev relaxed his six-month deadline in March of 1959 and urged a four-power conference of foreign ministers (CFM) to be held in Vienna or Geneva to begin negotiations on Germany and Berlin. In East Berlin in March, Khrushchev told Ulbricht: "Do not hurry. The wind does not blow in your face. . . .The conditions are not ripe as yet for a new scheme of things."⁹⁴ Then in April, before the CFM began, the Soviets informed the East Germans that they would not submit their proposal on a statute for the free-city of West Berlin at the CFM, thus implying that they were not going to push for the six-month deadline of the 27 November 1958, ultimatum, which would have been 27 May 1959, to be upheld.⁹⁵

The Geneva CFM, however, did represent significant progress for the Soviets and East Germans. The Soviets succeeded in getting the West to negotiate about Germany and Berlin, and the East Germans (and the West Germans) were allowed to send representatives to this four-power meeting for the first time. The CFM held sessions from May 11 to August 5.⁹⁶ In these sessions, the Soviets, led by Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, were able to convince the West, represented by U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, and French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, to discuss the Berlin issue outside of a general German settlement, to consider an interim agreement on West Berlin, and to agree to the creation of an East-West German committee before national elections. As Jack Schick points out,

⁹¹ "Reception of the GDR Ambassador to the USSR, J. König on December 12, 1958," from the diary of N.P. Foryubin, 18 December 1958, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 3, Por. 8, Papka 5.

⁹² IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/127.

⁹³ See IfGA, ZPA files J IV 2/202/127, J IV 2/202/128, J IV 2/202/129, and J IV 2/202/130.

⁹⁴ Cited in McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 45.

⁹⁵ See the meeting between GDR First Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer and Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin on 23 April 1959, IfGA, ZPA, NL 90/459.

⁹⁶ For a good summary of the course of the Geneva CFM, see Schick, *The Berlin Crisis*, 77-96. For internal GDR views on the Geneva CFM, see IfGA, ZPA, NL 90/464.

the Western concessions expressed in the Herter Plan and subsequent modifications to it at the Geneva CFM led the Soviets to the mistaken conclusion that they were getting somewhere in pushing the West out of West Berlin.⁹⁷ The Soviets, for the most part, held a firm line throughout the conference, and even renewed the six-month deadline threat on June 10.

In the period between the failure of the Geneva CFM and the Paris Summit of May 1960, more summits occurred than at any other time since World War II,⁹⁸ including Khrushchev's meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David in September 1959. At Camp David, Khrushchev got Eisenhower to admit that the situation in Berlin was "abnormal" and that negotiations over Berlin "should not be prolonged indefinitely." They agreed to a summit in Europe to try to negotiate a German settlement and to a subsequent visit by Eisenhower to the Soviet Union; a tenuous "spirit of Camp David" prevailed.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, while Khrushchev was following the path of negotiations with the West, Ulbricht was carrying out part of his own plan on the German question--the further development of socialism in the GDR. Ulbricht's forced collectivization campaign in 1959 and 1960 indicated that whatever Khrushchev was negotiating with the West, Ulbricht was making sure that the GDR continued quickly down the path of socialism. In the process, more and more farmers and others fled the GDR.¹⁰⁰

In the spring of 1960, it became clear that the East and West held different views of what had been accomplished in negotiations over the previous year and what could be accomplished at the Paris Summit. On May 5, Khrushchev announced that the Soviets had shot down a U.S. U-2 spy plane on May 1, but he still went to Paris on May 14. At the first and last session of the summit on May 16, Khrushchev called off the gathering due to what he called an American provocation and said he would wait to negotiate with the next U.S. administration.¹⁰¹ Even after this blow-up, when ~~KUWERLY~~ returned to Moscow through East Berlin, he announced to Ulbricht's chagrin and probably shock:

We are realists and we will never pursue a gambling policy. Under present conditions, it is worthwhile to wait a little longer and try to find a solution for the long-since ripe question of a peace treaty with the two German states. This will not escape our hands. We had better wait, and the matter will get more mature.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Schick, *The Berlin Crisis*, 91.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 99-104.

¹⁰⁰ McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 48-49.

¹⁰¹ On the U-2 incident and the Paris Summit, see Schick, *The Berlin Crisis*, 111-128; and Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: The U-2 Affair: The Untold Story of the Greatest US-USSR Spy Scandal* (NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986). The ill-fated U-2 flight actually occurred without Eisenhower's specific knowledge and authorization.

¹⁰² Schick, *The Berlin Crisis*, 121-22.

In the face of continued Soviet unwillingness to carry out their threats, the East Germans increasingly tried to carry out these threats themselves and act unilaterally, while trying to entrap the Soviets into supporting them. Two meetings between the GDR Ambassador to Moscow, König, and Selyaninov, on 23 and 26 September 1960, are very revealing in this regard. In both meetings, Selyaninov expressed great concern that the East Germans were unilaterally changing their policy on to the treatment of Western officials entering East Berlin. The following is König's account to Ulbricht of the first meeting on September 23:

Selyaninov wanted to talk about reports in the West Berlin press about the trip of the U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, [Walter] Dowling, into the Democratic Sector and ask some questions. Selyaninov wanted to know whether there was an order for [passport] control of Western accredited diplomats in Bonn by our ministry or by other GDR organs. From his statements, I saw that he was astounded that such a [passport] control was carried out vis-a-vis Western diplomats. He especially wanted to know whether it resulted in the conflicts with Dowling that were reported in the West Berlin press. Selyaninov commented that the Ambassador and the diplomats of the Soviet embassy, as well as other ambassadors and diplomats of people's democracies in Berlin, who travel more often to West Berlin [than Western ambassadors travel to East Berlin], were not asked for identification at the West Berlin checkpoints, especially when they drive with the flag, as was the case with the American Ambassador. . . .But the Soviet diplomats so far have had absolutely no problems with this, including when they have shown identification given out by the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Selyaninov asked whether new measures in this regard were being carried out by our side.

I had the impression that Selyaninov was very concerned that eventual measures by GDR officials against the ambassadors or diplomats of Western embassies could also be directed against the Soviet embassy personnel in their visits to West Berlin. It was clear that the Soviet embassy wanted to be informed in the future about measures of this kind.¹⁰³

Selyaninov, however, was not satisfied with König's answers and returned three days later to talk with him again, which König reported to Ulbricht on September 27:

[Selyaninov] again brought up the question of eventual GDR measures concerning trips into democratic Berlin by diplomats of Western embassies. He said that the USSR embassy had recently received a new directive from its government which foresaw stronger activity in relation to West Berlin, regarding trade, culture, etc. This would also result in more activity in West

¹⁰³ IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/128, 1-2. Both the East Germans and Soviets use the word "control" to refer to the checking of documents at the borders with East Berlin and East Germany.

Berlin by the employees of the Soviet embassy. Selyaninov said that Ulbricht and Grotewohl are being told about this new directive. He then requested that if new measures for the [passport] control of Western diplomats entering democratic Berlin were going to be taken, these measures must take into account the tasks connected with the new directives for the Soviet embassy. In his view, the new measures from our side and the tasks which arise for the Soviet embassy from the new directives must not conflict with each other.

I told him that I would report his opinion to the necessary people.

To Selyaninov's question about what kind of measures we were planning, I said that I did not know.¹⁰⁴

Ulbricht then continued this discussion in a letter to Khrushchev on 18 October 1960:

Comrades of the Soviet embassy in the GDR have asked how we behave when Ambassadors of the Western powers accredited in Bonn meet with the Soviet Ambassador in the GDR in a capacity which arises from the Potsdam Agreements. We have told them that the same regulations must apply as they apply to the Supreme Commanders. When the Supreme Commander of the English troops comes to the GDR, the Supreme Commander of the Soviet troops tells the corresponding organs of the GDR, and the person concerned is let through without [passport] control. The same regulation must be carried out with diplomats. When the person concerned is not registered, we are obligated to ask for their ID.

After our organs had checked the documents of Mr. Dowling, the American Ambassador in Bonn, at the Brandenburg Gate, the representative of the Soviet embassy, Comrade Selyaninov, visited the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked whether the foreign ambassadors and diplomats of all countries were obligated to show their ID. He made it clear that diplomats of the Soviet embassy and of the people's democracies go more often to West Berlin and are not checked at West Berlin checkpoints. It is enough to have the CD-license plate [*corps diplomatique*] on the car. This comparison of the treatment of the U.S. Ambassador with the diplomats of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies is not correct. We have friendship treaties with the Soviet Union and with the people's democracies, and it is easy to resolve all issues. The Soviet Union has diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic and also with West Berlin officials. But the USA demands uncontrolled entrance into the capital of the GDR in order to demonstrate that it does not recognize the GDR. Comrade Selyaninov did not notice these fundamental differences. The CD-license plates are no ID for us, since they can be bought in stores in West Berlin. A long time ago we asked the state organs of the GDR to carry out [passport] controls of CD-cars, since many more CD-cars travel from West Germany to West Berlin than there are embassy employees there. . . .

We do not believe that the work of the Soviet organs in West Berlin will be complicated by our [passport] controls. We cannot have a situation in

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 1-2.

which a four-power status is in principle not recognized, but in reality the representatives of the states which do not want to recognize the GDR government can come into the capital of the GDR without identifying themselves.¹⁰⁵

Ulbricht was obviously quite frustrated with the lack of much forward action in 1959 in carrying out the Soviet ultimatum and thus by 1960 was acting more independently.¹⁰⁶ These interactions also fall into a broader context of Soviet-East German disagreements on the expediency of establishing direct political, economic, cultural and other contacts with West Berlin. The Soviets, as well as the Poles and Czechs, were in favor of developing and expanding such contacts in the hopes of using these to wean West Berlin away from West Germany. The East Germans, on the other hand, were against such contacts, afraid that instead of increasing socialist influence in West Berlin these contacts would actually increase capitalist influence in the GDR. If there had to be such contacts, the East Germans wanted total control over these by a commission of representatives of socialist countries so that the process did not get out of control and harm GDR interests.¹⁰⁷ In general, however, there were increased efforts from 1958-1961 by both the Soviet and East Germans to increase their influence in West Berlin.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, in 1959 and 1960, there continued to be Soviet and East German references to the "open border," or "lack of a closed border" in Berlin. For example, in a report "On Several Issues regarding the Economic and Political Situation in Democratic Berlin" dated 10 December 1959, Pervukhin (who clearly believed the border should be closed) wrote:

The presence in Berlin of an open and, to speak to the point, uncontrolled border between the socialist and capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts the population to make a comparison between both parts of the city,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁰⁶ The East Germans, however, did succeed in getting the Soviets to agree to stop giving visas to West Berliners on West German passports to visit the Soviet Union, and only to give them visas on the basis of their West Berlin identity card. See the Soviet note to East Germany of 17 August 1960 (in response to the East German note of 30 January 1960), IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/128, Bd. (volume) 4.

¹⁰⁷ "Record of Meeting with P. Florin, Head of the International Department of the SED CC, on May 12, 1958," from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov, adviser to the Soviet embassy in the GDR, 16 May 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76, pp. 2-5; "Record of Meeting with Comrade Walter Ulbricht on June 11, 1958," from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin, 12 June 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 81, pp. 1-3; Note from Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin to Pervukhin on April 6, 1959, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 5, Por. 26, Papka 30; "Record of Meeting with GDR Deputy Foreign Minister König on December 1, 1959," from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov, adviser at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, 4 December 1959, TsKhSD, Rolik 8911, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 189; and letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade A.A. Gromyko, 19 May 1961, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, "Record of Meeting with Egon Bahr, Head of the Department of Press and Information of the West Berlin Senate, on December 21, 1960," from the diary of Yu.V. Bebyrov, first secretary of the embassy, and A.D. Zakharov, second secretary of the embassy, TsKhSD, Rolik 9247, Opis 5, Fond 50, Delo 226; and Pervukhin's "Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in the GDR for 1960," from 15 December 1960, TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 287.

which, unfortunately, does not always turn out in favor of Democratic Berlin.¹⁰⁹

...The existence of an open border between East and West Berlin and the possibility of free crossing of the border by citizens of both parts of the city creates many different difficulties.¹¹⁰

...Through the open and, more to the point, uncontrolled sectoral border, more than 300,000 people, including more than 200,000 citizens of Democratic Berlin, pass every day.¹¹¹

Through these open borders, more refugees kept fleeing, and particularly the intelligentsia.¹¹² And of course, the percentage escaping through the open border in Berlin kept rising to over ninety percent.¹¹³ The worsening economic situation, including in agriculture due to Ulbricht's stepped-up collectivization measures, continued to be a significant influence.¹¹⁴

East German independent actions grew more frequent and serious, from the Soviet point of view, throughout 1960, and Selyaninov was often the person to deal with these. On 28 January 1960, Selyaninov met with GDR Deputy Foreign Minister König and P. Florin, head of the SED International Department, at a reception at the Soviet embassy. That morning König had given the embassy a copy of a note the GDR planned to send to the U.S., Great Britain, and France through the GDR embassy in Prague, protesting West German behavior in West Berlin. As Selyaninov wrote in his diary, "prior to this, the East Germans had not informed the Soviet embassy in any way about their plan to send such a note, nor had they discussed this with the

¹⁰⁹ AVP, RF, Delo 022/GDR, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 4, Por. 3, Papka 27, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 18.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 31. See also Pervukhin's 15 January 1960 letter to the Central Committee "On Several Facts of Hostile Activity in the GDR," pointing out that this hostile activity by the West was aided by the open border, TsKhSD, Rolik 8946, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 281, pp. 1, 24.

¹¹² Ibid., 81-82. See also Andropov's report to the Central Committee, "Information on the Situation Among the GDR Intelligentsia" on 3 November 1959, TsKhSD, Rolik 8908, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 182. There continued to be monthly meetings on the refugees between Bergman, head of the Department of the Interior of the East German Interior Ministry, and Bushman, first secretary at the Soviet embassy, TsKhSD, Rolik 8909, Opis 49, Delo 185. See also the analysis of the refugees from January through September 1960 by Tzschorn, personal adviser to the GDR Minister President Grotewohl, to Deputy Premier [Willi] Stoph on December 1, 1960, IfGA, ZPA, NL 90/448 and the GDR Politburo report "On the Situation in the Intelligentsia," which was part of the preparatory materials sent on 5 December 1960, by Otto Schön to the Central Committee members and candidate members for the 11th SED plenum on 15-17 December 1960, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/1/259.

¹¹³ Report "On the Exodus of the GDR Population to West Germany" written up at the Soviet embassy in the GDR in May 1959, TsKhSD, Rolik 8909, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 185, p. 3.

¹¹⁴ See the KGB report of 1 June 1960 (which was based on a GDR Ministry of State Security report from March), to the Central Committee on "The Situation in Agriculture" in the GDR, TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 4, Opis 49, Delo 286; Pervukhin's 15 December 1960, "Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in the GDR for 1960," TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 287; and "Record of Meeting between W. Ulbricht and A. Smirnov, USSR Ambassador to the FRG, on July 15, 1960," written in the embassy on 25 July 1960, TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 288.

Soviet Foreign Ministry through their embassy in Moscow."¹¹⁵ Selyaninov was clearly completely shocked by this obvious departure from normal practice by the East Germans and conveyed this to the East Germans. "König answered, quite embarrassed, that, unfortunately, in the rush, the East German foreign ministry did not get the time to consult with the Soviets, which of course, was not right and was a great omission."¹¹⁶ This incident tells as much about the rule in Soviet-East German relations as about this and other exceptions.

More serious concerns with East German independent behavior came toward the end of 1960, in connection with the run-ins Selyaninov had with the East Germans in September. On 17 October 1960, A.P. Kazennov, second secretary at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, wrote a report which was sent to the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry on the basis of a meeting with G. Danelius, secretary of the Berlin district committee of the SED. Kazennov wrote that

our friends [the East Germans] are studying the possibility of taking measures directed towards forbidding and making it more difficult for GDR citizens to work in West Berlin, and also towards stopping the exodus of the population of the GDR through West Berlin. One of such measures by our friends could be the cessation of free movement through the sectoral border and the introduction of such a process for visiting West Berlin by GDR citizens as exists for visiting the FRG. In so far as measures in this direction would have definite consequences for the work of the embassy in West Berlin and for the development of direct Soviet contacts with West Berlin, it would be expedient to discuss with our friends at the appropriate level the question of the regime on the sectoral border in Berlin.¹¹⁷

This important meeting --a Soviet-East German summit conference-- did take place soon afterward, on November 30.

Moving Toward a Decision on Berlin

The record of the 30 November 1960 meeting between Ulbricht and Khrushchev and other top-level officials, including East German economics chief Bruno Leuschner, Minister of Foreign Trade Heinrich Rau, Soviet Gosplan chief Alexei Kosygin, Gromyko, and Pervukhin, in Moscow on tactics regarding *Deutschlandpolitik* in 1961, is perhaps the most important and

¹¹⁵ "Record of Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister of the GDR Foreign Ministry, J. König, and Head of the SED CC International Department, P. Florin on January 28, 1960," from the diary of O.P. Selyaninov, adviser to the USSR embassy in the GDR, 5 February 1960, TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 288.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹¹⁷ "Record of Meeting with G. Danelius, Secretary of the Berlin District Committee of the SED on October 17, 1960," from the diary of A.P. Kazennov, second secretary of the USSR embassy in the GDR, 24 October 1960, TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 288, p. 5.

illuminating document this author has seen in the new archival materials.¹¹⁸ This meeting took place at the end of the conference of eighty-one communist and workers' parties in Moscow at which the conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese escalated dramatically. The meeting also took place three weeks after John F. Kennedy was elected to become president of the United States. As we saw above, Khrushchev had announced at the aborted Paris Summit of May 1960 that he would wait to continue negotiations on Germany and Berlin with the next administration. Now that there was going to be a new U.S. administration, it was time to plan strategy.

Both Khrushchev and Ulbricht left the meeting believing that in the end they had gotten what they wanted: Ulbricht believed that if no agreement could be reached with the Western powers, the Soviets would sign a separate treaty with East Germany in 1961; and Khrushchev believed that Ulbricht would take no unilateral steps with regard to the control regime on the Berlin sectoral border while he was trying to negotiate with the West.¹¹⁹ Both were let down afterwards.

At the meeting, they decided to plan their tactics for three possible scenarios, in declining order of preference: Western agreement to a four-power peace treaty with the two Germanys and agreement to make West Berlin a free-city; Western agreement on a provisional agreement on West Berlin for one-and-a-half to two years, while the two Germanys discussed the principles of a peace treaty; and no Western agreement on a peace treaty or on West Berlin, with the result that the Soviets and other socialist countries would sign a separate treaty with East Germany by the end of 1961, giving East Germany control over the access routes to West Berlin. Signing a separate treaty with East Germany would have to be done in such a way that it would not result in a serious conflict with the West.¹²⁰

Much of the meeting focused on helping the East German economy. By the end of the meeting, Khrushchev had decided to take over almost completely the East German economy, with some help from other socialist countries, in order to save it. Ulbricht was so panicked about the state of the economy that when Khrushchev said that if the Western powers did not agree to either of the first two options listed above, a peace treaty with East Germany absolutely had to be signed in 1961 or the Soviets would lose a terrible amount of prestige, Ulbricht said one word-- "nyet!"¹²¹ Ulbricht said that this was impossible economically in 1961, because the East German

¹¹⁸ "Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht on November 30, 1960," AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 4, Papka 43. See also Pervukhin's summary of the meeting in his annual "Survey of the Work of the USSR Embassy in the GDR for 1960," TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 287, pp. 88-90.

¹¹⁹ For the Soviet summary of the outcome of this meeting, see Pervukhin's "Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in the GDR in 1960," which was sent to Andropov on 15 December 1960, TsKhSD, Rolik 8948, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 287, pp. 88-90.

¹²⁰ See the record of the meeting and Pervukhin's summary of it.

¹²¹ See page 10 of the meeting transcript, AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 4, Papka 43.

economy was already in grave danger, and a separate peace treaty would probably just make this worse, since the West Germans (and perhaps all of NATO) would institute an economic boycott against East Germany (and perhaps against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well). It became clear later in the meeting that Ulbricht's concern (which turned out to be valid) was also that perhaps Khrushchev again would not really carry out his promise to sign a separate peace treaty. Once Khrushchev assured Ulbricht that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would give East Germany whatever it needed to survive, that "East German needs are also our needs,"¹²² Ulbricht gave his full support for signing a separate peace treaty if they could not come to an agreement with the West, but said that "if we do not conclude a peace treaty, and instead return to propaganda for a peace treaty, then we will have discredited our policy and will be able to recover our prestige only after one-two years. We cannot act the same way that we did in 1960"¹²³--i.e., you have to follow through on your promise this time. Ulbricht said that if they had to sign a separate treaty, they had to do it before the West German elections of 17 September 1961.¹²⁴ Khrushchev seemed to agree.

Hearing Khrushchev's promises of great economic aid to East Germany, Kosygin warned: "Several of their [the East Germans'] requests also create difficulties for us, since they ask for about \$500 million in hard currency, and also for goods which we ourselves must buy on the world market."¹²⁵ Khrushchev agreed that the Soviets could not possibly give the East Germans the sixty-eight tons of gold that they were asking for.¹²⁶ Both Khrushchev and Kosygin observed, no doubt partly out of wishful thinking, that the West Germans probably would continue their economic agreements with East Germany, and the situation would not be as bad as Ulbricht feared. Nonetheless, they agreed that they had to begin preparing to make East Germany economically independent from West Germany. Probably sensing the frustration Ulbricht felt with him, Khrushchev commented:

We have not lost the two years which have passed since making our proposals, but we have impaired our position. However both our and your fault lies in the fact that we did not sufficiently think through and work out economic measures. We should have thought more precisely about liberating the GDR

¹²² Ibid., 13-14.

¹²³ Ibid., 15. See also p. 8.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 8.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 18. In this author's interview with Karl Schirdewan, who was Ulbricht's closest deputy in the mid-1950s and who almost replaced Ulbricht at the end of 1957, he spoke of Ulbricht's frequent and often unrealistic requests for large amounts of economic aid from the Soviets so as to make East Germany and East Berlin into the show windows of socialism. Interview on 22 April 1992, Potsdam.

¹²⁶ "Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht on November 30, 1960," AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 4, Papka 43, p. 19.

economy from the FRG. . . . We did not know that the GDR was so vulnerable to West Germany. It is not good; we must correct this.¹²⁷

...You are also not without guilt on this, since you did not exert resistance [to the West Germans], you did not disentangle yourselves, you got used to thinking that Germany was one.¹²⁸

The meeting made it clear that a separate treaty with East Germany was an option of last resort. Both the Soviets and East Germans hoped that they could come to an agreement with the West, at least a provisional one for a year-and-a-half or two, to buy some time. They also clearly felt that an agreement with the West, and even negotiations to that end, would benefit the GDR more than a separate treaty would, in terms of increasing the GDR's international prestige and with this, they hoped, its internal stability. On the other hand, the Soviets and East Germans knew that they were unlikely to achieve an agreement with the West and that they would therefore probably be obliged to sign a separate treaty.

Ulbricht wanted to start taking more action to protect East Germany, although he knew that this would lead to more conflicts in Berlin.¹²⁹ Khrushchev told Ulbricht not to do this, since Khrushchev had given his word to the Western powers that he would not change the existing conditions in Berlin before a summit meeting, "so we cannot now unilaterally correct the situation. Let us put this off until the time before which we gave our word that we would not change the situation. There is not much longer to wait now."¹³⁰ Instead, Khrushchev emphasized to Ulbricht the usefulness of the "levers in the hands of the GDR" in helping them to get what they wanted. He told Ulbricht:

We are proposing now that West Germany extend economic ties with you. I already told [West German Ambassador to Moscow Hans] Kroll that you have strong levers in your hands. You know that they understand that by exacerbating this issue, they subject Berlin to risk. We have to say this to them directly. I will say this to Kroll tomorrow at the reception. We must also think through how the GDR will say this, but so that it will not look like a threat.¹³¹

He also told Ulbricht: "We will work out with you a plan for the gradual ouster of the Western powers from West Berlin, but without war. For this we will use the levers in the hands of the GDR."¹³² At this point, Khrushchev seemed to be considering West Berlin as both a lever and a prize.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 9.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 12.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 9-10.

¹³¹ Ibid., 12.

¹³² Ibid., 15-16.

Ulbricht, however, did not trust Khrushchev's intentions¹³³ and wrote him a fifteen page letter on 18 January 1961,¹³⁴ presenting his proposals on *Deutschlandpolitik* and on the East German economy and declaring:

Since the statement of Comrade Khrushchev on the West Berlin question in November 1958, two years have flowed by. . . .The possibilities to eliminate at least a part of the remnants of the war in West Berlin and Germany in 1961 are favorable, since the Adenauer government is not interested in a worsening of the situation in the period of the Bundestag election campaign, and President Kennedy in the first year of his presidency also does not want any aggravation of the situation.¹³⁵

Ulbricht went on to propose East German-Soviet consultations in April 1961 "to raise the authority of the GDR in future negotiations" and said that they should result in a joint statement that "must contribute to making the Western powers understand that a compromise absolutely must be achieved in the summer of 1961."¹³⁶ He proposed the convening of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) after the East German-Soviet consultations, since "until now, most of [these countries] have considered the peaceful resolution of the German question and the West Berlin question as an affair which only involves the Soviet Union and the GDR."¹³⁷ Ulbricht then mentioned a possible "compromise which should be carried out before the West German Bundestag elections" in September:

We believe it is possible to reach a compromise in 1961, i.e., to eliminate only some remnants of the war and to handle the other issues in negotiations on the preparation of a peace treaty.

The core of the compromise is to give the 2 German states 1 1/2 to 2 years for the preparation of a peace treaty, for disarmament and for the carrying out of peaceful coexistence as the preparation for later reunification. . . .We assume that on the occasion of the consultation of the party and government delegations of our two states, the Soviet government will state

¹³³ With regard to 1961, the former Soviet diplomat Yuli Kvitsinsky writes in his recently published memoirs: "Walter Ulbricht was not certain that we were really ready to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR. Thus, he had no other option than to keep carrying on his propaganda campaign and to promise his citizens that the peace treaty was immediately impending and that all of Berlin would be the capital of the GDR." Julij A. Kwitzinskij, *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten [Before the Storm: Memoirs of a Diplomat]* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1993), 178.

¹³⁴ For preparatory materials for this letter, see the top secret materials sent by First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer to Ulbricht on 10 January 1961, "Possibilities of Tactical Action on the Issues of a Peace Treaty and West Berlin" and "Plan of Measures Regarding Organizational Questions in Connection with the Preparation of the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty with the GDR and the Convening of a Peace Conference," IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129.

¹³⁵ IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129, pp. 1-2.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

that the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet and GDR governments with the participation of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition which are prepared for this, will be unavoidable if the Western powers do not arrive at a compromise in the course of the next months.¹³⁸

This final comment hinted at a renewed ultimatum, which Khrushchev later delivered to Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in June 1961. In his letter, Ulbricht went on to point out that, since in the Four-Power negotiations, "the enemy will exploit the situation of flight from the Republic," "the economic stabilization of the GDR is the key task in 1961 to decrease flight from the Republic" and again asked for significant economic aid from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.¹³⁹ In pointing out the need for economic aid, Ulbricht not so subtly explained to Khrushchev that if East Germany had gotten the kind of aid that West Germany had gotten from the United States in the first post-war decade, it would not have such serious economic problems.¹⁴⁰

On the same day that Ulbricht sent this letter to Khrushchev, an East German delegation led by Politburo member Hermann Matern showed up unexpectedly in Moscow on its way to Peking for a month. Planning this trip, without giving the Soviets any advance notice, to the Soviets' rival in the socialist camp in the midst of East German negotiations with the Soviets on policy regarding a peace treaty, West Berlin, and economic aid to the GDR may well have been intended to step up the pressure on the Soviets, although Matern assured the Soviets that they were only going to discuss economic issues with the Chinese, not political issues.¹⁴¹ It was a very brazen move and was seen by the Soviets as such.

In Khrushchev's 30 January 1961 letter to Ulbricht, he agreed with most of what Ulbricht had said in his January 18 letter, but stated:

¹³⁸ Ibid., 7-8.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 7-15. The East Germans used the term "republikflucht," "flight from the Republic" in reference to the process of people fleeing from East Germany.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 13-14.

¹⁴¹ "Unofficial translation," IfGA, ZPA. TsKhSD, Rolik 8978, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 277. The one-page report was sent by Yuri Andropov, Chairman of the CPSU CC Department on Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, to the Central Committee on 18 January 1961, and written by I. Kabin, Chairman of the German section in the CPSU CC's Department on Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. Six sentences from the January 25 draft are missing in the January 30 unofficial German translation of Khrushchev's letter, the most important of which is the following at the end of the second paragraph after "acceptable resolutions" in the quote above: "Open unilateral action from our side could be used in such a situation by certain circles in the USA to exacerbate the situation so as to push Kennedy into a position not differing essentially from Eisenhower's position on the German question, which would be advantageous to the FRG and reactionary circles in the West." Although it is possible that the person doing the unofficial German translation of the letter left out this and the other five sentences by mistake, the more likely and interesting possibility is that the Soviets decided not to include this and the other sentences and thus be more subtle in urging Ulbricht not to act unilaterally.

We know that you are also of the view that, due to the present situation with a new American president in office, it is necessary and important to try to resolve the issue of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on the basis of an understanding with the USA as well as with the other Western powers. Currently, we are beginning to initiate a detailed discussion of these questions with Kennedy. The probe which we carried out shows that we need a little time until Kennedy stakes out his position on the German question more clearly and until it is clear whether the USA government wants to achieve mutually acceptable resolutions. . . .If we do not succeed in coming to an understanding with Kennedy, we will, as agreed, choose with you the time for the implementation (of your proposed measures [i.e., the separate treaty]).¹⁴²

In fact, from the time of Kennedy's election as President in November 1960, Khrushchev went out of his way to smoke out Kennedy's position on the Berlin and German questions and to see if some sort of agreement could be reached with him. In mid-December 1960, the Soviet Ambassador in the U.S., Mikhail Menshikov, told Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times*: "'Time is of the essence.' The two leaders must meet before those who would not like to see agreement have had a chance to act and prevent it."¹⁴³ The allusion to people against an agreement could have been to Khrushchev's domestic rivals,¹⁴⁴ the Chinese, Adenauer and/or Ulbricht. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was using Georgi Bolshakov, an undercover Soviet intelligence agent in Washington, as his direct link to President Kennedy through his brother Robert.¹⁴⁵ Khrushchev reportedly did not like his foreign minister, Gromyko, and did not trust his foreign ministry, since it had been run for many years by Khrushchev's rival, Vyacheslav Molotov, who had been ousted from power in 1957.¹⁴⁶ Thus, Khrushchev chose his own channel to the U.S. leadership and kept pushing for a meeting with Kennedy as soon as possible. In March the Kennedy Administration announced that its position on Germany and Berlin would not include the Eisenhower Administration concessions at the 1959 Geneva CFM but would start from scratch. At the same time, Kennedy indicated that he would be interested in a summit conference. The latter stance was no doubt influenced in part by Thompson's cable of 16 March 1961, saying that "in the absence of negotiations Khrushchev will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and precipitate a Berlin crisis this year," and then "we must at least expect the East Germans to

¹⁴² IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129, pp. 1-2. See also the Soviet draft letter, 25 January 1961, in AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46.

¹⁴³ Salisbury memo, 15 December 1960, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter referred to as JFKL), cited in Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 42.

¹⁴⁴ Llewellyn Thompson, the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, learned in mid-January 1961, that "Khrushchev had just spent a week fighting new battles with internal rivals." Thompson to Rusk 21 and 24 January 1961 memos, JFKL, cited in Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 54.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 152-57.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 157, 324.

seal off the Sector boundary in order to stop what they must consider (to be an) intolerable continuation of (the) refugee flow through Berlin."¹⁴⁷ Evidence of the Soviet urge for a resolution in 1961 is also found in a February 17 Soviet aide-memoire to the FRG saying that the Soviets were not prepared to wait for a German settlement until after the FRG elections of September.¹⁴⁸ But it was not until early May that the Soviets declared their interest in a summit, formalized with a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on May 16. Why the two month delay if Khrushchev was so eager for a summit with Kennedy?

The delay was probably due in part to the fallout from the November 1960, Moscow conference of communist and workers' parties at which the Sino-Soviet schism burst into the open.¹⁴⁹ The Chinese did not place much stock in negotiations with the West. In addition, Khrushchev was distracted by the late March Warsaw Pact meeting on the German question and the fallout from the bungled CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba on April 18 and was weighing his options. The U.S. failure at the Bay of Pigs may have made Khrushchev feel that Kennedy was sufficiently weak to be forced into concessions on Germany and Berlin at Vienna.

The meeting of the WTO PCC that Ulbricht had proposed to Khrushchev in his 18 January 1961 letter to get the other members of the Warsaw Pact much more involved in the "peaceful resolution of the German question and the West Berlin question" occurred in Moscow on March 28-29. Unfortunately, this author has seen no documents directly touching upon this meeting in any archives in Moscow or Berlin. The available evidence on the proceedings of this meeting contained in the account by Honore M. Catudal, and in the accounts which follow this by Norman Gelb, Peter Wyden, and Michael Beschloss, comes largely from the testimony provided to Western intelligence services by Jan Sejna, former Czech deputy defense minister and a participant at the conference.¹⁵⁰ Catudal's account makes sense in light of the documents in the archives dating from around the same period.

At the Warsaw Pact meeting, Ulbricht declared that the refugee problem was becoming so great that the border controls had to be strengthened and supplemented by a barbed wire barrier

¹⁴⁷ Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Moscow) to State Department, 16 March 1961, cited in Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 62 fn 15, 240-41.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

¹⁴⁹ For more information on this, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 343-69. See also the documents in the SED archives on the conference and the difficult preparation of the joint declaration made at the end of the conference, IfGA, ZPA, 2/20/72, "Comments of the Delegation of the Communist Party of China on 'The Proposal for the Declaration on the Consultation of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties,'" 16 November 1960; and the top secret "Assessment of the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Resolution Adopted" written up by the First Non-European Department of the East German Foreign Ministry, 8 March 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123.

¹⁵⁰ See Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 48-51; Gelb, *The Berlin Wall*, 71-72; and Hermann Zolling and Uwe Bahnsen, *Kalter Winter im August [A Cold Winter in August]* (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1967), 102-104.

on the sectoral border in Berlin. Commenting on Ulbricht's reference to the refugee problem, an intelligence official told Catudal that he had information at the time that "the SED was actually encouraging people to flee in order to build up a case for action--not that they sought action because the people were fleeing."¹⁵¹ Whatever the case, the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact allies did not agree to close the border at the March meeting, since they thought this action would be too provocative and would cast the communist system in a very unfavorable light. Instead, Khrushchev would continue to strive for negotiations with Kennedy, and to watch the refugee situation would be watched closely. In the meantime, Ulbricht was told that he could "prepare everything for a future contingency" under conditions of great secrecy.¹⁵² As Khrushchev stated in his opening speech to the August 3 WTO PCC meeting in Moscow, the participants at the March meeting decided unanimously that if as a result of the meeting with Kennedy and other contacts, the Western powers did not show readiness to find a real path for the resolution of the question of a peace treaty with the two German governments, then the WTO countries would start preparing to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR.¹⁵³

According to Catudal, Ulbricht's plan for a wall had apparently "been drawn up in the 1950s by the SED Planning Commission and was known to American and West German intelligence agents as 'Operation Chinese Wall.' The plan had been lying on ice for some time before the West obtained a copy in July 1958...."¹⁵⁴ The plan "provided for the eventual replacement of the fence of barbed wire with a concrete wall and palisades."¹⁵⁵ Curtis Cate maintains that the original plans for a wall, called the *Geheime Verschlussache* ("secret seal-off matter") were developed in 1952 by the then Stasi chief, Wilhelm Zaisser, to retaliate against the expected formation of the European Defense Community (EDC).¹⁵⁶ The closure of the Berlin sectoral border, with the exception of a few checkpoints, for several weeks following the 17 June 1953 East German uprising was no doubt an important precursor for the plan which was implemented on 13 August 1961.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵¹ Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 48. In his analysis of Ulbricht's famous press conference of June 15, to be discussed below, Gelb also implies that Ulbricht consciously stimulated the refugee exodus to prod Moscow into action, *The Berlin Wall*, 100. See also McAdams' discussion of Ulbricht's collectivization policy in 1959 and 1960 and its relation to the increasing numbers of refugees fleeing from the countryside, *Germany Divided*, 49.

¹⁵² Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 50.

¹⁵³ Khrushchev's opening speech to the August 3 WTO PCC meeting in Moscow, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, p. 1.

¹⁵⁴ Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 210.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁵⁶ Cate, *The Ides of August*, 143-44, 517.

¹⁵⁷ See the following documents from the Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, AVP, RF: "Telephonogram by VCh" (telegram dictated over a secure high-frequency telephone) from [A.A.] Grechko and [V.S.] Semyonov in Berlin to Molotov and Bulganin, June 17, 1953, 23:00, Fond--Molotov's Secretariat, Opis 12a, Por. 200, Papka 51; "Telephonogram by VCh" from [V.D.] Sokovosky and Semyonov in Berlin to Molotov and Bulganin, *ibid.*;

Following the March WTO PCC meeting, Pervukhin sent the CPSU CC a report on April 7 on the East German refugees written up by V. Sul'din, a second secretary at the Soviet embassy in the GDR. Sul'din reported that

the efforts of our friends to impede the exodus of the populace to the West by introducing a passport law establishing a stricter process of granting permission for temporary departure to the FRG and introducing control over the railroads and highways leading to Berlin have not yielded the expected results.¹⁵⁸

One week later, Yuri Gagarin returned to the Soviet Union as the first human being to have travelled in space, and two weeks later, the U.S.-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles failed at the Bay of Pigs. Both of these no doubt made Khrushchev feel that his position vis-a-vis the United States was strengthened, and the worsening of the East German refugee situation increased the need for talks with Kennedy to try to reach a German settlement to stabilize the situation. Thus, on May 16, Ambassador Menshikov gave President Kennedy Khrushchev's letter of agreement for a summit in Vienna on June 3-4.

With the summit planned, it was all the more important to Khrushchev that Ulbricht not take any independent provocative action on Berlin beforehand. On May 19, however, Ambassador Pervukhin wrote to Foreign Minister Gromyko that the East Germans wanted to close the border immediately and were not following Soviet policy on Berlin:

Our friends would like to establish now such control on the sectoral border between democratic and West Berlin which would allow them to, as they say, close "the door to the West" and reduce the exodus of the population from the Republic and weaken the influence of economic conspiracy against the GDR, which is carried out directly from West Berlin.

Trying to liquidate the remnants of the occupation period as soon as possible, our German friends sometimes exercise impatience and a somewhat

"Telephonogram" from [V.] Miroshnichenko and [N.M.] Lun'kov in Berlin to Semyonov, received in the Third European Department of the Foreign Ministry on July 4, *ibid.*; top secret memorandum to [A.Y.] Vyshinsky from [G.M.] Pushkin on 6 July 1953, Fond--Referentyra po Germanii, Opis 41, Por. 93, Papka 280; and the top secret "Information on the proposals of Comrades Sokolovsky, Semyonov and [P.F.] Yudin in connection with the situation which has arisen in the GDR," 9 July 1953, *ibid.* In point 16, page 5, of the last document, the three diplomats "do not believe it is advisable to open the Berlin sectoral border after the elimination of the state of emergency in East Berlin, since the Western commandants in West Berlin will not take the necessary measures to guarantee the cessation of the sending of agents and provocateurs into East Berlin and the GDR from West Berlin aimed at carrying out subversive activity against the GDR." This proposal from the Soviets based in Berlin was withdrawn when a decision was reached in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow to remove the restrictions on the sectoral border in Berlin. Nevertheless, in the period that the East Germans did totally control the Berlin sectoral border, they and the Soviets learned how much easier it was to control the situation in East Berlin with the border closed.

¹⁵⁸ "Concerning the question of the exodus of the GDR populace to West Germany," report sent from Pervukhin to the CPSU on 7 April 1961, TsKhSD, Rolik 8979, Opis 49, Delo 381, p. 3.

one-sided approach to this problem, not always studying the interests of the entire socialist camp or the international situation at the given moment. Evidence of this, for example, is their efforts to stop free movement between the GDR and West Berlin as soon as possible with any means, which in the present conditions would complicate carrying out the struggle for a peace treaty. Recognizing the correctness of our position that the liquidation of the remnants of the occupation period is possible only on the basis of a peace treaty, our friends therefore urge a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR.¹⁵⁹

Pervukhin then urged the Soviet government to fight for a provisional solution on West Berlin at the upcoming summit with Kennedy in Vienna to buy time to strengthen the GDR economically and politically.¹⁶⁰ If no provisional agreement could be reached with Kennedy, then a separate treaty should be signed with the GDR.¹⁶¹

Just before leaving Moscow for the Vienna Summit, Khrushchev told U.S. Ambassador Thompson that if he did not reach an agreement with Kennedy on Berlin, he would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR after the West German elections in September and the Soviet Twenty-Second Party Congress in October.¹⁶² Khrushchev, however, had already at least tacitly agreed with Ulbricht at their 30 November 1960 meeting that the peace treaty would be signed *before* the West German elections. Thus, either he was misleading Thompson, or he had decided not to support Ulbricht's position on the timing of the separate peace treaty. What was supposedly not in doubt, however, was that Khrushchev would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR if he did not reach an agreement with the U.S.

Khrushchev and Kennedy did not come to a meeting of minds on Berlin and Germany at Vienna, and when Khrushchev felt that Kennedy was not prepared for a compromise, he handed him a Soviet aide-memoire, another six-month ultimatum indicating that the Soviets would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR by December if no agreement on Germany was reached in the interim. The former and long-time senior Soviet diplomat Georgi Kornienko, who at the time was a counselor at the Soviet embassy in Washington, maintains that Ambassador Menshikov misled Khrushchev about what to expect of Kennedy at Vienna. According to Kornienko, Menshikov said what he thought Khrushchev wanted to hear and told Khrushchev that President Kennedy

¹⁵⁹ Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade A.A. Gromyko, 19 May 1961, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46, p. 2-3.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁶² Thompson to Rusk, 24 and 30 May 1961, JFKL, and *The New York Times*, 25 May 1961, cited in Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 180.

and his brother Robert were pretending to be strong, but when pushed would cower and retreat.¹⁶³

Kennedy, on the other hand, had been briefed by the State Department that Khrushchev would mainly strive "to obtain some commitment to resume negotiations" and that there would "probably be considerable flexibility" in his position.¹⁶⁴ When Khrushchev took a much stronger stance than this at Vienna, Kennedy responded just as strongly, as French leader Charles De Gaulle had urged him to do when they met in Paris before the summit. De Gaulle had pointed out that Khrushchev "had been threatening to take action on [Berlin] and laying down six-month deadlines for two and a half years. No doubt, if he intended to go to war over what he called that 'bone in his throat' he would have done so already."¹⁶⁵ De Gaulle also reminded Kennedy that since the West would not be able to stop the Soviets by conventional means if the Soviets made a move for West Berlin, the only way to deter such a move would be to make it clear to Khrushchev that the West would back up its commitment to West Berlin with nuclear weapons if necessary.¹⁶⁶ Thus, both Kennedy and Khrushchev came to Vienna expecting the other to be much more inclined toward compromise than turned out to be the case. As Khrushchev and Ulbricht had agreed,¹⁶⁷ Khrushchev urged Kennedy several times at Vienna to agree to an interim arrangement on Berlin, as Khrushchev and Eisenhower had discussed at Camp David in 1959, but Kennedy refused, since "he felt that to show any flexibility on Berlin during this meeting would suggest to Khrushchev that he would not fulfill the American commitment to the city."¹⁶⁸ Kennedy's refusal dispelled Khrushchev's last hope for a provisional agreement on Berlin. Thus, Khrushchev had Pervukhin ask Ulbricht to set up a meeting of the WTO PCC in Moscow as soon as possible.¹⁶⁹

A few days after the failed Vienna summit meeting, Yuli Kvitsinsky, an attache in the Soviet embassy in the GDR, learned in a meeting on June 10 with E. Hüttner of the East German foreign ministry's department on the Soviet Union that many in the East German leadership felt that it was

¹⁶³ G. M. Kornienko, "Upushchyennaya Vozmozhnost': Vstrecha N.S. Khrushcheva i Dj. Kennedy v Vene v 1961g." ["A Lost Opportunity: The Summit of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy in Vienna in 1961"], *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya [Modern and Contemporary History]* 2 (1992), 102.

¹⁶⁴ "Background Paper: Soviet Aims and Expectations," President's meeting with Khrushchev, Vienna, 3-4 June 1961, p. 6, JFKL, cited in Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 115.

¹⁶⁵ Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 87.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ For documents attesting to the Soviet and East German efforts to come to an interim agreement with the West on Berlin, see "Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht, November 30, 1960," AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 4, Papka 43, pp. 10-11, 15; the letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev on 18 January 1961, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129, pp. 2, 4, 7-8; and especially the letter from Pervukhin to Gromyko on 19 May 1961, AVP, RF, top secret, Fond--Referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46, pp. 6-11.

¹⁶⁸ Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 220.

¹⁶⁹ Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, June 1961 (no exact date), IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129, p. 2.

high time, at last, to sign a peace treaty and on that basis resolve the West Berlin issue. This measure is connected with a certain risk, but there is even more risk in the further delay of the resolution of the issue, since any delay assists the growth of militarism in West Germany which increases the danger of a world war. Thus, the danger of conflict in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR is balanced by the other danger. In this connection . . . Comrade P. Florin, chairman of the SED CC International Relations Department, said that further dragging out the signing of a peace treaty is a crime.¹⁷⁰

It was also assumed that at some point "the sectoral border in Berlin would be closed."¹⁷¹ At the end of his notes from the meeting, Kvitsinsky made the footnote that it seemed "that some functionaries in the Central Committee apparat have an incorrect position regarding the preparations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR and the resolution on that basis of the West Berlin question."¹⁷² When the present author asked Kvitsinsky about this in an interview, he said:

There was not then on our part a real readiness to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. We were not impatient. But the GDR was impatient and was in a weaker situation and Ulbricht used strong propaganda for a peace treaty. But we understood that the conclusion of a peace treaty must be the final step, because it was connected with a very serious straining of relations with the three Western powers. Therefore, there was only limited agreement between the GDR and the Soviet Union on this. . . . We in the embassy and in the Third European Department [of the Foreign Ministry] felt then and repeated again and again to the Germans since the spring of 1961 that we had to show more restraint, that if we took measures to limit movement across the border, this would make our position on the creation of a free city in West Berlin less persuasive, that it would injure our initiatives regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty.¹⁷³

Ulbricht's press conference of June 15--to which, contrary to normal practice, East Berlin officials went out of their way to invite correspondents in West Berlin-- may very well have been designed to influence Khrushchev's attitude in favor of closing the border.¹⁷⁴ At the press conference, Ulbricht made it clear that a Soviet separate peace treaty with the GDR would give

¹⁷⁰ "Record of Meeting with Senior Adviser of the GDR Foreign Ministry's Department on the Soviet Union, E. Hüttner, on June 10, 1961," from the diary of Yu.A. Kvitsinsky, attache at the USSR embassy in the GDR, 14 June 1961, TsKhSD, Rolik 8980, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 384, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Author's interview with Yuli Kvitsinsky, Moscow, 26 October 1992.

¹⁷⁴ Gelb, *The Berlin Wall*, 97.

GDR authorities control over the access routes to Berlin, which would presumably allow them to stop the West from flying East German refugees out of West Berlin to West Germany.

Annamarie Doherr of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* asked Ulbricht: "Does the formation of a Free City in your opinion mean that the state boundary will be erected at the Brandenburg Gate?"

Ulbricht answered:

I understand by your question that there are men in West Germany who wish that we (would) mobilize the construction workers of the GDR in order to build a wall. I don't know of any such intention. The construction workers of our country are principally occupied with home building and their strength is completely consumed by this task. Nobody has the intention of building a wall.¹⁷⁵

In light of the fact that a wall was built two months later, there are a variety of ways to read Ulbricht's statement at the press conference. First, Ulbricht could have been telling the truth at the time. It may be that at least as far as Ulbricht then knew, there were no plans to build a wall, just plans to sign a separate peace treaty and turn over control of the access routes to the GDR, coupled with tighter controls on the Berlin sectoral border. A second possibility is that Ulbricht was nervous and just slipped. In light of later evidence on the extreme secrecy surrounding the building of the Berlin Wall, it is unlikely that Ulbricht would have deliberately mentioned anything about it in public if he knew about it.¹⁷⁶ So this possibility seems unlikely. A third possibility, argued very persuasively by Norman Gelb, is that Ulbricht made the comments about the wall knowing that this would cause panic in the GDR and increased numbers of refugees, which would then compel Khrushchev to finally acquiesce in closing the border and signing a separate peace treaty. In light of the new archival evidence, Gelb's argument is convincing:

At that stage, despite his ultimatum to Kennedy [at Vienna], Nikita Khrushchev wasn't sure he wanted to risk a showdown by handing control of the western access routes to Berlin over to Ulbricht, with the implied backing of Soviet forces in East Germany. Nor had he yet decided, as an alternative, to let the East Germans take action to stop the refugees. Worried that the Americans might respond forcefully or that they might encourage and support a massive anti-Communist uprising among the disgruntled East German populace, Khrushchev was in no hurry to give Ulbricht, whom he neither liked nor trusted, what he wanted.

Now, to the great annoyance of the Soviets, Ulbricht--fearing for the future of his regime, his personal position, and the country's economy--was trying to force the pace and thus preclude another Khrushchevian climb-down. He trusted Khrushchev no more than Khrushchev trusted him. He recalled how

¹⁷⁵ Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 125. See also, Wyden, *Wall*, 47.

¹⁷⁶ This first argument has been favored by Gerhard Wettig in conversations with the author.

the Soviet leader had dodged a Berlin showdown the previous year, after he had walked out of the Paris summit conference with the words, "We are realists. We shall never follow a reckless course."

Ulbricht could not act against the wishes of the Kremlin. But he could influence events and attitudes. His presence at the press conference and his comments implying that West Berlin would soon be his to do with as he pleased were calculated to raise the level of tension already building in the city, and they did. After his press conference performance was screened on East German television that night and splattered over the front pages of the East German press the following morning, the number of refugees checking in at the Marienfelde [West Berlin] reception center rose sharply, as the East German leader must have known it would.¹⁷⁷

This argument is certainly in line with Ulbricht's personality and his previous behavior. Of course, Ulbricht's comments risked giving away the element of surprise to the West, but it may be that Ulbricht felt so desperate that he decided the risk was worth taking if it forced Khrushchev to act. A final possible explanation is put forth by Kvitsinsky. He recounts that he regularly sent Ulbricht translations of long records of Khrushchev's conversations with leading Western representatives. In one instance in 1961 Kvitsinsky sent Ulbricht a record of a conversation in which Khrushchev had commented: "we [the Soviets] don't conceive in our dreams of erecting a wall through Berlin." Thus, Ulbricht also commented that he had no intention of erecting a wall through Berlin. Kvitsinsky points out that there has been so much speculation about why Ulbricht said this at the press conference, but the answer is quite simple: "In reality [Ulbricht] had just used Khrushchev's argumentation one more time so as to demonstrate 'the complete unanimity' of the positions of the GDR and the USSR on the German question."¹⁷⁸ This explanation could also be combined with the first and third explanations. Unfortunately, this author has found no new archival evidence that would show decisively which of these explanations is correct. The third seems the most probable.

Two weeks after the press conference, Ulbricht had a chance to continue pressing his case privately with the Soviets. Florin returned to Berlin on June 28 from meetings in Moscow and reported that the Soviet Presidium would meet the next day to discuss Ulbricht's proposal for a WTO PCC meeting.¹⁷⁹ Florin noted that the Presidium would also discuss whether China and Albania should be invited and said that there were unofficial reports indicating that the Chinese felt that the Soviets were moving too quickly on the peace treaty issue and that compromises should be explored more thoroughly. Contrary to the standard argument that the Chinese were

¹⁷⁷ Gelb, *The Berlin Wall*, 99-100. See also the account of the press conference in Cate, *The Ides of August*, 58-65.

¹⁷⁸ Kwizinskij, *Vor dem Sturm*, 216.

¹⁷⁹ Hand-written note from Florin to Ulbricht, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129.

pushing Khrushchev to be hard-line in the crisis, this and other similar indications¹⁸⁰ reveal that the Chinese may have been a significant factor in the Soviet decision merely to close the border and not go all the way and sign a peace treaty, since the latter was seen as too provocative.

According to diplomatic reports reaching East Berlin, the Chinese were not happy with Khrushchev's renewed deadline threats to Kennedy at Vienna:

The Chinese were very worried when the Soviet Union made the proposal to resolve the issue of a peace treaty with Germany absolutely in this year, since it was clear to them that due to the complicated situation in Europe and the expected resistance of the Western powers, especially the USA, military conflicts could occur which could lead to a great war. Due to their concern about this, the Chinese comrades were very restrained for a period on this issue. They then consulted with the Soviet comrades and were convinced that the Soviet comrades would proceed very carefully on this issue and would do everything to avoid military conflict. Once convinced, the Chinese comrades then fully and completely supported the Soviet and GDR proposal for the conclusion of a peace treaty....¹⁸¹

The Chinese actually did not really come around to supporting a peace treaty with the GDR in 1961 or 1962 and told GDR representatives in the fall of 1961 that they could not legally sign a German peace treaty, since they did not see themselves as the legal successor to the Kuomintang

¹⁸⁰ See the secret report prepared by the First Non-European Department of the East German Foreign Ministry, 13 July 1961, "Comments on Assessing the Speech of Comrade Liu Shao-chi [Chinese Politburo member] at the Celebrations on the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China, on June 30, 1961," IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123; "Second Information on the Reportage in the Chinese Press on the Questions of Concluding a Peace Treaty and the Resolution of the West Berlin Problem in the Period from July 6-18, 1961," compiled by Hähnel, section leader (of the First Non-European Department of the East German Foreign Ministry), Berlin, 24 July 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/115; top secret report by [Helmut] Liebermann, the senior counselor of the First Non-European Department, China Section, of the East German Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1961, "The Position of the PRC on the Questions of the Concluding a German Peace Treaty, the Resolution of the West Berlin Problem, as Well as the Defensive Measures Taken by the GDR Government," *ibid.*; top secret report by Liebermann, 3 November 1961, "Supplement to the Assessment of the Position of the PRC on the Questions of Concluding a German Peace Treaty, the Resolution of the West Berlin Problem, as Well as the Defensive Measures Taken by the GDR Government," *ibid.*; "Record of Conversation with Comrade Flato, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy [in China], in the Polish Embassy on December 1, 1961," written up by the East German Ambassador to Peking, [Josef] Hegen, and [Warner] Wenning, counselor at the embassy on 6 December 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123; and the secret report by [Fritz] Stude, section leader of the First Non-European Department of the East German Foreign Ministry, 1 March 1962, "On the Position of the PRC on the Questions of the German Peace Treaty and the West Berlin Problem." For another view of the role of the Chinese in the Berlin Crisis, see the Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)," Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 6 (May 1993).

¹⁸¹ "Record of Conversation with Comrade Flato, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy [in China], in the Polish Embassy on December 1, 1961," written up by the East German Ambassador to Peking, Hegen, and Wenning, counselor at the embassy on 6 December 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123, pp. 1-2. Flato was reporting on his conversation "with a leading PRC comrade in the Central Committee," whom he did not name.

regime of World War II.¹⁸² Perhaps this was the Chinese excuse to avoid the conflict with the West that they feared in the wake of the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the GDR. It also could be that since Beijing's attitude towards the GDR was increasingly governed by the worsening of Chinese relations with the Soviet Union,¹⁸³ the Chinese for this reason refrained from supporting the Soviet public campaign for a separate peace treaty with the GDR in 1961 and 1962.

The Final Weeks Before the Wall

In his speech to the 13th SED plenum on 3 July 1961, citing Khrushchev's ultimatum to Kennedy at Vienna, Ulbricht seemed convinced that a German peace treaty of some sort would be signed in the next few months, through which the West Berlin issue would be resolved. Ulbricht said that Khrushchev had made it clear to Kennedy that they would not wait to sign a peace treaty and resolve the West Berlin situation until West Germany finished its atomic armament.¹⁸⁴ He also spoke of measures which would be taken against the *grenzgänger*s, Berliners who regularly crossed the border because they lived and worked on opposite sides. Ulbricht's "Peace Plan of the German People," which he presented at the Thirteenth SED Plenum on July 3-4 and at the Volkskammer session on July 6 and sent out to all East German local officials, spoke of the need for all East German officials and citizens to be firm in carrying out their duties in the preparation of a peace treaty over the next few months. Ulbricht also emphasized that with a peace treaty, the GDR would control all transit routes on GDR territory to West Berlin by land, sea and air.¹⁸⁵ At the same plenum, the speech by Erich Honecker, Politburo member and SED security chief, reflected sheer panic about the economy, but made no direct reference to its impact on the refugee problem. Meanwhile in the same month, Khrushchev told the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi: "On the West Berlin question we are in agreement with your thesis that imperialism is a paper tiger."¹⁸⁶ This implied that Khrushchev had decided to act on Berlin under the assumption that the West would not respond forcefully.

¹⁸² See the top secret *Transcript* sent from Stude in the First Non-European Department of the East German Foreign Ministry to East German Ambassador Hegen in Peking on 13 September 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123; and the top secret letter from section leader Hähnel at the East German Foreign Ministry to [Norbert] Jeschke in Rangoon on 14 September 1961, *ibid.*

¹⁸³ "Record of Conversation with Comrade Flato, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy [in China], in the Polish Embassy on December 1, 1961," written up by the East German Ambassador to Peking, Hegen, and Wenning, counselor at the embassy on 6 December 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123, p. 5.

¹⁸⁴ Stenographic Protocol of the first day of the Thirteenth Plenum, 3 July 1961, p. 4 of Ulbricht's speech, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/1/257.

¹⁸⁵ See *ibid.*, and the Russian translation in the TsKhSD, Rolik 8978, Opis 49, Delo 377.

¹⁸⁶ "Record of Meeting with the Ambassador with Comrade Chen Yi, Member of the Politburo and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China," 31 August 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123, which cites comments at a the July meeting.

On July 4, Pervukhin sent a detailed sixteen-page report to Gromyko analyzing "practical measures which will arise from the imminent conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, which could be used in the preparation of materials for the negotiations with our German friends."¹⁸⁷ There seemed to be no question in his mind that a peace treaty with the GDR would be signed soon. Pervukhin stated that the "most difficult issues which will arise after signing a peace treaty are the practical exercise by GDR organs of effective control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG and the establishment of a regime over the movement of the population between West and Democratic Berlin." Achieving one or both of these objectives, Pervukhin pointed out, would give the GDR the means to stop the refugee exodus.¹⁸⁸ He outlined various options for closing the border, increasing border control, or leaving the border regime unchanged in the wake of the peace treaty, and concluded that it would be better at first not to close the border, since this would be difficult technically and politically, although it might nonetheless ultimately prove necessary.¹⁸⁹ Pervukhin advocated first "establishing effective control over the movement of the German populace between West Berlin and the FRG not only by land transport, but also by air," and leaving "the regime on the sectoral border in Berlin without fundamental changes." However, plans should also be made for "introducing a state border regime on the sectoral border" if necessary.¹⁹⁰ In the subsequent weeks until early August, the East Germans tried to implement some of Pervukhin's suggestions (which may very well originally have been East German ideas which were fed to Pervukhin) to gain control over the transit routes between West Berlin and the FRG,¹⁹¹ but they were not successful: the West protested and did not recognize the GDR's right to take these actions. Pervukhin also followed up on the November 1960 discussions between Khrushchev and Ulbricht and their advisors, maintaining that West Germany would probably institute an economic embargo against the GDR in the event of a separate peace treaty and that therefore the Soviet Union must be ready to extend any necessary economic help to the GDR.¹⁹²

Meanwhile, on July 5, Kornienko, hoping to offset Ambassador Menshikov's provocative public comment that the West would not fight for Berlin, met with Kennedy advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., to assure him that "the present position [of the West] in West Berlin would be preserved as it is now ... in the event of the signing of a peace treaty."¹⁹³ The Kennedy

¹⁸⁷ Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade A.A. Gromyko, 4 July 1961, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46, p. 1.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁹¹ See Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 164-208.

¹⁹² Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade A.A. Gromyko, AVP, RF, Referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46, pp. 14-15.

¹⁹³ G.M. Kornienko, *Upushchennaya Vozmozhnost'*, 102.

Administration assumed that Khrushchev sent Kornienko to do this so as to lessen the chance of conflict over the signing of a peace treaty,¹⁹⁴ but Kornienko maintains that he acted on his own.

The escalating refugee crisis over the summer increased the pressure on Ulbricht and Khrushchev. More than 100,000 refugees fled the GDR in the first half of 1961, including 20,000 in June. In July a thousand exited every day, with a total of 30,000 for the month. The Western airplanes from West Berlin to the FRG were filled.¹⁹⁵

On July 7, Stasi Chief Erich Mielke told a meeting of high-ranking Stasi officials: "The securing of peace demands that we must force the Bonn leaders to the negotiating table before [FRG Defense Minister] Strauss is done with his atomic arming."¹⁹⁶ He also ordered immediate preparations "so that operative measures can be carried out at a certain time according to a united plan" and ordered a "strengthening of security of the western state border and the ring around Berlin."¹⁹⁷ Mielke warned that "in spite of the correlation of forces, the danger of open conflict exists. The ruling circles of the West are not correctly informed of the real situation."¹⁹⁸ Ulbricht made a similar comment at the Thirteenth Plenum: "It is extremely important that as many GDR citizens as possible understand the state of the correlation of forces in Europe and in the world, without underestimating our strengths and our own weight, but also without illusions."¹⁹⁹ These two comments by Mielke and Ulbricht indicate that it is possible that they did not grasp the real correlation of strategic nuclear forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union--which greatly favored the former--and that they believed Khrushchev's boasts of superiority.²⁰⁰ Khrushchev's July 8 speech at a military academy at which he announced a halt to the demobilization of the armed forces and a one-third increase in the military budget, supposedly in response to impending U.S. military increases, probably bolstered Ulbricht's and Mielke's views on the correlation of forces. Khrushchev also called again for a summit on Germany and Berlin and threatened a separate peace treaty with the GDR otherwise.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 103, and Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 157.

¹⁹⁵ Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 164, 184.

¹⁹⁶ "Protocol on the Working Meeting of 7.7.1961," Central Analysis and Information Group of the Ministry for State Security (ZAIG) 4899 of the Federal Representative for the Files of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic (the Stasi archives, hereafter referred to as MfS archives), p. 2.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 9.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹⁹⁹ Stenographic Protocol of the first day of the Thirteenth Plenum, 3 July 1961, p. 48 of Ulbricht's speech, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/1/257.

²⁰⁰ In this connection, see also Ulbricht's comments to Smirnov on 11 January 1960, that if the West Germans used tactical nuclear weapons against the GDR, the GDR would respond by bombing Bonn. Smirnov responded that "such a 'skirmish' between you would be dangerous for others." Ulbricht agreed, but said it was important to force Bonn to stop advocating such a policy. "Record of Meeting with the First Secretary of the SED CC, Comrade W. Ulbricht," from the diary of the USSR Ambassador to the GDR, M.G. Pervukhin, 18 January 1960, TsKhSD, Rolik 9247, Fond 5, Opis 50, Delo 226, pp. 114-15.

An unsigned memorandum dated 13 July 1961 in Ulbricht's files, entitled "Proposals for the Continuation of the Consultations," indicates very close coordination between Ulbricht and Khrushchev at this point. The first three points were: "Discussion of Comrade Khrushchev with Comrade Ulbricht on tactics regarding West Berlin and the preparation of a peace treaty," "internal consultation of the first secretaries," and "consultation in plenum." Successive points dealt with economic preparations for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to help the GDR if West Germany adopted an embargo against the GDR following the signing of a peace treaty and also deal with security preparations in connection with the signing of a peace treaty.²⁰¹ No doubt as preparatory material for Ulbricht's consultations with Khrushchev, the next day First Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer sent him "A Plan for the Most Important Diplomatic Steps and Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Conclusion of the German Peace Treaty."²⁰² Ulbricht then sent this "Plan" to Khrushchev on July 26, along with an outline of the key issues he would address at the upcoming meeting of the WTO PCC in Moscow at the beginning of August.²⁰³

On July 15, Ulbricht received a report from Leipzig, unfortunately unsigned, but clearly from a high-ranking East German official, regarding the upcoming meeting of the WTO PCC in Moscow:

In Moscow I then spoke with Comrades Paul Verner [SED First Secretary of the Berlin District and Central Committee candidate member] and Erich Honecker [Politburo member and SED security chief].

Comrade Verner told me that in a conversation with Comrade [I.] Kabin [Chairman of the German Section in the CPSU CC's Department on Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries] he had learned that there are certain conversations among the Soviet comrades about a peace treaty and especially the West Berlin issue.

Comrade Kabin intimated that everything must be thought through carefully again from every angle. With this he also commented that they still do not know how all these issues should be solved practically, because they still do not have clear pictures of particular problems.

Comrade Verner also said that Comrade Kabin, who is responsible for issues concerning Germany in the [CPSU] Central Committee, expressed his thoughts about whether proposals are not being passed on to Khrushchev which currently are not in agreement with our measures.

Comrade Kabin further let it be known that high-ranking delegations of the invited foreign fraternal parties will come to Moscow and that a) political-economic issues [and], b) military issues--in connection with the peace treaty

²⁰¹ IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46.

and West Berlin [--] will be discussed and that we should be well prepared for this.

In this connection, Comrade [M.A.] Suslov [Presidium member and leading CPSU ideologue] also implied that we should especially expect to deal with questions about West Berlin.²⁰⁴

This report suggests that the Soviets had not decided at this point, less than a month before the Wall was built, what should be done regarding the German and Berlin problems and that they were not necessarily moving in a direction on these issues which would be favored by the East Germans.

Kennedy's television address of July 25 probably helped prod Khrushchev toward acquiescing to the East German requests to close the border. Kennedy made it clear that the U.S. was committed to maintaining and defending Western rights in West Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin, but he did not mention East Berlin and freedom of movement between East and West Berlin.²⁰⁵ Kennedy also raised the U.S. defense budget and announced a partial troop mobilization and various other measures to meet the Soviet challenge. The Soviet military intelligence officer, Oleg Penkovsky, who was giving secret information to the U.S. and Great Britain, told his Western interlocutors that the Soviet military believed that Khrushchev's sabre-rattling had provoked Kennedy's speech and actions. According to Penkovsky, the military believed that Khrushchev's strategy, which they did not support, had backfired due to his crude tactics.²⁰⁶ High-ranking Soviet military officials must have known that Khrushchev's claims of missile strength were false and that his position was therefore very shaky.

On July 26, the Soviet Foreign Ministry received a summary of the key points of Ulbricht's forthcoming speech to the "Conference of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties for the Exchange of Views on Issues Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty," which was scheduled for the first week of August.²⁰⁷ Ulbricht proposed closing the Berlin sectoral border and creating a state border. Presumably, the Soviets had already agreed to this. The public statement on July 30 of U.S.

²⁰⁴ IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130.

²⁰⁵ McGeorge Bundy asserts that Kennedy's focus on West Berlin and neglect of East Berlin in his July 25 speech was deliberate and was intended to show Khrushchev and the American people what the West would and would not fight for. *Danger and Survival*, 368-69.

²⁰⁶ Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, *The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War* (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 209, 241. See also *The Penkovsky Papers* by Oleg Penkovsky, introduction and commentary by Frank Gibny, foreword by Edward Crankshaw, translated by P. Deriabin (St James's Place, London: Collins, 1965), 137.

²⁰⁷ "List of Issues Dealt with in the Draft of Comrade W. Ulbricht's Speech to the Upcoming Conference of August 3-4 in Moscow" and "Summarized Contents of [Comrade] W. Ulbricht's Draft Speech to the Conference of the Member-States of the Warsaw Treaty on August 3-4 of this year in Moscow," AVP, RF, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por. 34, Papka 46.

Senator William Fulbright, the influential chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that he did not understand why the East Germans were not closing their border, which he believed they had a right to close, no doubt soothed Khrushchev's and Ulbricht's worries.²⁰⁸

Kvitsinsky writes in his memoirs that at the end of June or the beginning of July Ulbricht invited Pervukhin and Kvitsinky to his country house and told Pervukhin to tell Khrushchev that "if the present situation of open borders remains, collapse is inevitable" and that "he refuses all responsibility for what would then happen. He could not guarantee that he could keep the situation under control this time."²⁰⁹ Unfortunately, Kvitsinsky does not give any exact dates. After this meeting with Ulbricht, nothing seemed to change, and Kvitsinsky thought Moscow had decided not to do anything. Then "one day" Pervukhin told Kvitsinsky to find Ulbricht immediately and bring him to Pervukhin. Pervukhin informed Ulbricht that Khrushchev had agreed to close the border and that Ulbricht should begin preparations in great secrecy. The operation was to be executed very quickly so as to be a complete surprise to the West. Ulbricht immediately went into great detail about what must be done. He said that the only way to close the entire border quickly was to use barbed wire and fencing. He also said that the U-bahn (metro) and S-bahn (city train) to West Berlin must be stopped and that a glass wall should be put up at the main Friedrichstrasse train station so that East Berliners using the metro could not change over to the train to West Berlin. Kvitsinky noticed that Pervukhin was quite surprised at how much Ulbricht had already thought through these details.²¹⁰

Peter Wyden gives an account of the decision to build the wall, based on information from Jan Sejna, whose account of the March 1961 WTO PCC meeting was recounted earlier.²¹¹ Ulbricht arrived in Moscow on July 31 and was told by Khrushchev that, under certain conditions, he could close the border, but that a peace treaty would not be signed now. Khrushchev wanted to continue exploring options in negotiations with the West. Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan supported Ulbricht's view of the urgent refugee situation. Ulbricht wanted to close the air corridors between West Berlin and the FRG, since this was the main means of exit by the refugees. Khrushchev refused this risky move, so Ulbricht proposed putting a wall around West Berlin on East German territory. Khrushchev decided to put this proposal before the WTO PCC meeting to begin on August 3. According to this account, after making his case to the meeting on August 3, Khrushchev told Ulbricht that he would agree to close the border if Ulbricht could guarantee that his forces could deal with any security and economic complications which might

²⁰⁸ *New York Times*, 3 August 1961, cited in Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 201.

²⁰⁹ Kwizinskij, *Vor dem Sturm*, 179.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 179-180.

²¹¹ The following account is based on Wyden, *Wall*, 132, 139-45, 154-61 and Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 266-68. For Kvitsinky's account of this meeting, which he learned about from Pervukhin, see Kwizinskij, *Vor dem Sturm*, 181-82. This account expresses some doubt about the support of Poland and Hungary for closing the border.

arise. Ulbricht returned to East Berlin on August 4, met with his top officials, received their assurances, and returned to Moscow on August 5. He told Khrushchev that he could handle the situation and asserted that Fulbright's speech was evidence that the West would not hinder them in closing the border. Telling Ulbricht to first use barbed wire and watch the Western response, Khrushchev gave Ulbricht the go-ahead to close the border, but told him, "not one millimeter further," probably meaning not to stray onto West Berlin territory, not to provoke the West, and not to expect a peace treaty.

The extensive but probably incomplete record of the August 3-5 Moscow conference in the Berlin and Moscow archives does not allow us to ascertain the truth of this account. It is not clear whether a decision had been made by the Soviets with the East Germans before the meeting to close the border with a wall or whether this decision was made during the conference and subject to Ulbricht's return to Berlin in the middle of the conference to talk with his officials. There is no mention in the conference records of Ulbricht returning to Berlin. There is also no mention of a wall or of the final decision of the meeting. The speeches seem to indicate that the Soviets and East Germans met before the meeting and that Gomulka may have also been present prior to the conference, at least for a time, since he seems to have been chosen to emphasize the need to act quickly at the conference.

In Khrushchev's opening speech on August 3, he stated that as agreed at the March conference:

The goal of our conference is to have a comprehensive discussion of the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty, to consult about practical measures which must be taken in the near future, and to work out united tactics. This is all the more necessary, since in his recent appearance on American television, the U.S. President Kennedy openly spoke about the intention of the imperialist powers to prevent us from concluding a peace treaty with the GDR. Kennedy threatened us with war if we carried out measures for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. Under these conditions, we must work out a detailed plan of agreed upon action on all lines--foreign policy, economic and military.²¹²

Ulbricht then gave a 43-page speech²¹³ that contained detailed and obviously well thought-out justifications of the need for prompt measures to advance his agenda, which could indicate that he was not sure that his pleas would be heeded. He clearly did not take lightly his task of persuading

²¹² "Speech of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev at the Opening of the Conference on August 3, 1961," IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, pp. 1-2.

²¹³ In the East German archives, the speech is actually labelled "Letter from the CC of the SED to the CC of the CPSU on a German Peace Treaty," but it is obvious from the text that it was Ulbricht's speech at the 3-5 August 1961 WTO PCC conference. IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129 (text in Russian). This is confirmed by the record of the conference in the archives of the TsKhSD.

the other WTO member states of his views on the German and Berlin questions. The following are excerpts from his speech:

In the spirit of the agreement of our conference in March, the political leaderships of the member-states of the Warsaw pact agreed on the coordination at the present conference of concrete political, economic, diplomatic, and practical measures for the conclusion of a peace treaty and regulation of the problem of West Berlin.

I want to dwell on the question of why the resolution of precisely these two key problems of international politics has now become unavoidable....²¹⁴

From the Vienna meeting it became clear, that Kennedy and his advisers realized the huge changes which have taken place in the international correlation of forces....It is obvious that the West German imperialists, primarily all those aggressive militarists such as Defense Minister Strauss, are trying to use Kennedy's fear of future changes in the correlation of forces so as to further strengthen the West German Wehrmacht and equip it with atomic weapons. Thus, the Adenauer government is succeeding in exerting strong pressure on the Western powers and so far has even frustrated the efforts of Kennedy and Macmillan to keep the imperialists on the path of negotiations. But this also clearly shows how dangerous it is to allow the further unhindered arming of West Germany.²¹⁵

...The enemy is trying with all means to exploit the open border between the GDR and West Berlin to undermine our government and its economy, primarily by means of recruiting and trading people. It is necessary to say openly: the aggressive forces of West Germany and the Western powers have already succeeded in causing serious harm to the GDR by these means In the interests of the existence and the development of the GDR, active measures for ending the recruitment of people from our Republic are necessary.²¹⁶

At last, on page 28, Ulbricht gets to the punch line:

This situation necessitates the introduction of a regulation stipulating that at a certain time the government border of the GDR (going through Berlin) could be crossed by citizens of the GDR only in the presence of the corresponding permission for exit or, in so far as it concerns visiting West Berlin by citizens of the capital of the GDR, with a special pass. Visitation of the capital of the GDR by citizens of West Berlin would be possible on the basis of the West Berlin identity card (but not on the basis of the West German passport).

The grounds for this measure: In view of the aggressive policy of the Bonn government, expressed in revanchist demands and in militaristic and

²¹⁴ Ibid., 2.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 3-4.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 25-26.

subversive activity, measures are demanded for the defense of the GDR and of the governments of the socialist camp....

Therefore, we propose that the member-states of the Warsaw pact agree, in the interests of the cessation of the subversive activity, to implement control along the GDR borders, including the borders in Berlin, comparable to the control along the state borders of the Western powers.²¹⁷

A letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev on 30 October 1961 makes it clear that it was agreed at this meeting "to carry out the various measures gradually" so as "not to come to serious complications."²¹⁸ Catudal's account of this meeting, largely on the basis of Sejna's testimony, clarifies this decision to act "gradually": Khrushchev refused Ulbricht's request to build a wall through Berlin, but told him to first seal the border with barbed wire to test the reaction of the West. If there were no problems, then the barrier could be made more permanent.²¹⁹ In fact, four days after the barbed wire was put up, concrete blocks began to be added to the barrier.²²⁰

In Ulbricht's speech to the conference, immediately after urging the creation of a state border between East Germany and West Berlin and West Germany, he said:

If it seems that the Western powers will not support a peace conference for the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states, but only want to reach an agreement on the preservation of their occupation status in West Berlin, then the Soviet government will have to appeal to the governments of all powers, which participated with their armed forces in the war against Hitlerite Germany, with the proposal for the convocation of a peace conference for concluding a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.²²¹
[emphasis in original]

Ulbricht proposed that this peace conference for signing a peace treaty with the GDR be held in Potsdam or Moscow.²²² Ulbricht said that in response to the socialist countries' signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, he doubted that the West "would use military measures. The slogan 'die for West Berlin' is not popular with the masses." More likely, he foresaw an economic embargo against the GDR. Thus, he urged that the "time necessary for Soviet negotiations with the Western powers should be used intensively and thoroughly so as to achieve significant economic independence of the GDR from West Germany." He said that for this, the

²¹⁷ Ibid, 28, 28a, 28b.

²¹⁸ IfGA, ZPA, NL 182/1206.

²¹⁹ Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 211.

²²⁰ Gelb, *The Berlin Wall*, 222.

²²¹ IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129, p. 28b.

²²² Ibid., 29.

GDR would need much help from the socialist countries.²²³ Thus, in Ulbricht's mind, the "border measures" were just a first step towards the final step of the separate peace treaty.

It is unclear what the Soviets told Ulbricht in late July and August about the likelihood of signing a separate peace treaty. It seems that they must have led him to believe that this would happen in the not-too-distant future, or he probably would not have dwelt upon the issue of a separate peace treaty with the GDR so much in his speech at the Moscow WTO meeting. Penkovsky had high-level information in mid-late July that the Soviets definitely intended to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR right after the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress in October and were making all sorts of military preparations in the GDR to do so.²²⁴ It seems that sometime around the end of July and the beginning of August Khrushchev decided to close the border and not to sign a peace treaty then. Whether he still at that time intended to sign a separate peace treaty right after the Twenty-Second Congress is unclear.

Following the Moscow meeting, there was an East German Politburo session on August 7 at which Ulbricht announced that the Moscow talks had yielded a decision to close the border on the night of August 12-13 and that the Volkskammer would meet on August 11 to ratify the decision to take necessary actions in Berlin.²²⁵ On August 11, GDR Stasi chief Mielke informed high-level Stasi officials of measures to be taken to implement a resolution agreed to that day by the Volkskammer promptly to move toward a peace treaty and a solution to the West Berlin problem. His orders hinted at the drastic action to come. "Measures will be taken against flight from the republic, whereby especially the ring around Berlin will be the focus."²²⁶ "Since in the next days, decisive measures will be decided, any hostile activity must be hindered."²²⁷ "All preparatory work is to be carried out under the protection of conspiracy and under the strictest secrecy. The entire operation has the code name 'Rose.'²²⁸

The Aftermath of the Wall, the Concrete "Rose"

Letters from Ulbricht to Khrushchev after the start of the building of the Wall on August 13 indicate that Ulbricht viewed the Wall as only "the first part of the task of the preparation for

²²³ Ibid., 29-35, 40.

²²⁴ Schechter and Deriabin, *The Spy Who Saved the World*, 186, 206-208, 224, 230-32, 239-40, 259, 266. But on p. 105 Penkovsky says that Khrushchev probably will not sign a peace treaty now, because it would mean war and he was not ready yet. See also *The Penkovsky Papers*, 139-42 257-58. Penkovsky also indicated that it was *Khrushchev* himself who supported the provocative move of signing a peace treaty and that others in the Soviet leadership were against this. See Schechter and Deriabin, 212-13 and *The Penkovsky Papers*, 131-32.

²²⁵ "Protocol Nr. 39/61 of the Extraordinary Session of the Politburo of the [SED] Central Committee on Monday, 7 August 1961, in the Conference Hall of the Politburo," IfGA, ZPA, J IV, 2/2/781, 1-2.

²²⁶ "Protocol of the Working Meeting on 8.11.1961," ZAIG 4900, MfS archives, p. 1.

²²⁷ Ibid., 3.

²²⁸ Ibid., 6.

the peace treaty."²²⁹ This was *Ulbricht's* code name for the Wall. In reporting to Khrushchev on September 15, Ulbricht wrote:

The carrying out of the resolution for the closing of the border to West Berlin went according to plan. The tactic of carrying out the measures gradually made it more difficult for the enemy to orient himself with regard to the extent of our measures and made it easier for us to find the weak places in the border. I must say that the enemy undertook fewer counter-measures than was expected.²³⁰

He continued:

The experiences of the last years have proven that it is not possible that a socialist country such as the GDR can carry out a peaceful competition with an imperialist country such as West Germany with open borders. Such opportunities appear first when the socialist world system has surpassed the capitalist countries in per-capita production.²³¹

Ulbricht continued sending Khrushchev many detailed proposals on a German peace treaty and kept pressing him to continue the campaign. In Khrushchev's response to Ulbricht on September 28, he agreed with many of Ulbricht's proposals, but cautioned:

Under the present conditions, since the measures for the securing and control of the borders of the GDR with West Berlin were carried out successfully, and since the Western powers are tending towards negotiations and there have already been contacts established between the USSR and the USA in New York, such steps which could exacerbate the situation, especially in Berlin, should be avoided. In this connection it is especially appropriate to abstain from new measures which would change the control order set up by the GDR government on the border with West Berlin.²³²

A high-level Soviet delegation attended the GDR's twelfth anniversary ceremonies from October 5-8 and may have warned the East Germans then that they would announce at the Twenty-Second Congress that a peace treaty did not have to be signed by the end of 1961.²³³ On October 17, the opening day of the Congress, Khrushchev made this announcement.

By way of explaining the continued East German campaign after the building of the Wall for the conclusion of a peace treaty, Kvitsinsky commented:

²²⁹ See Ulbricht's 15 September 1961 letter to Khrushchev, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130. McAdams comes to the same conclusion, *Germany Divided*, 54, 61.

²³⁰ Ulbricht's 15 September 1961 letter to Khrushchev, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, p. 1.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² Letter from Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 28 September 1961, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, p. 2.

²³³ Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961*, 293.

The Wall itself was the way with a lot of fuss and ceremony to bury the idea of a German peace treaty, in the sense of a separate treaty with the GDR. After the building of the Wall, the signing of a separate treaty with the GDR was not necessary. All issues that needed to be resolved were resolved. Ulbricht saw in a peace treaty a way to receive international recognition. For us, international recognition of the GDR was important, but not the most important. We saw that this would happen no matter what; it was a question of time. After the borders were closed, there would be no other choice than for the West to recognize the GDR. And that is what happened.²³⁴

Another reason for the Soviet decision not to sign a separate peace treaty may have been their intelligence about General Lucius D. Clay, sent by Kennedy to boost morale in West Berlin, and the mock Berlin Wall he had built to practice knocking it down.²³⁵ In addition, Khrushchev may have had some advance knowledge of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric's speech on October 21 dispelling the myth of the Soviet missile advantage and making clear the missile gap favored the U.S. The Checkpoint Charlie stand-off a week later would have further lessened Khrushchev's desire to provoke the West.

The Chinese were not at all happy that Khrushchev rescinded his deadline threat at the Twenty-Second Congress, as [S.] Flato, Minister Counselor of the Polish embassy in Peking, told GDR Ambassador to Peking Josef Hegen and Werner Wenning, counselor at the GDR embassy in Peking, on 1 December 1961:

The Chinese did not agree with the statement made by Comrade Khrushchev at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress that he would not absolutely insist on the conclusion of the peace treaty in this year. They believe that when one makes a deadline, this absolutely must be observed. When one rescinds a deadline which has been set in such a way, one raises not only doubt and lack of a credibility among his own people, but must give the impression to the adversary that he has bluffed. If the adversary gains the impression that he will bluff on such issues, then he must assume that our persistent behavior is just bluff and this will then only induce the adversary to even firmer policies, to greater demands, and to stronger provocations. . . .In the case of the Suez aggression, the Soviet ultimatum, which was taken seriously, scared the imperialists and forced them to stop their aggression. The rescinding of the deadline for the conclusion of a peace treaty, however, has only encouraged the enemy.²³⁶

²³⁴ Author's interview with Yuli Kvitsinsky, Moscow, 26 October 1992.

²³⁵ See Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis*, 133; Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 335; and Raymond Garthoff, "Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991), 142-56.

²³⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Flato, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy [in Peking] on December 1, 1961," written up by GDR Ambassador to Peking, Josef Hegen, and counselor in the GDR embassy in Peking, Werner Wenning, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123, p. 2.

The Chinese also did not support Khrushchev's statement making future developments contingent upon the progress of negotiations with the West, in which the Chinese had no faith.²³⁷

Ulbricht was also not very trusting of or happy with Khrushchev's handling of the situation and wrote a 13-page letter to Khrushchev on October 30, insisting that the Soviets push ahead with measures for the preparation of a peace treaty, including increased emphasis on GDR sovereignty. The tone of the letter is quite condescending, as the following passage indicates:

. . . it is necessary first of all to establish in reality the sovereignty of the GDR and its capital.

We request in this connection that the representatives of the USSR categorically demand in talks with representatives of the Western powers that the control routes of US-military patrols be immediately stopped on the Helmstedt-Berlin stretch [of the transit route]. The present situation in which jeeps with US control officers are accompanied by a Soviet vehicle does not improve the situation. This actually gives the impression of a legalization of this patrol route on the highway. This issue is so important to us, because the Western powers want to create through these regular control trips a fait accompli directed towards the creation of an extraterritorial corridor between West Germany and West Berlin, demanded by West German militarists.²³⁸

Despite Ulbricht's best efforts to get Khrushchev to carry out his promise to him and threat to the West to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, however, Khrushchev decided that this was not in the best interests of the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

In the months leading up to and throughout the Crisis, it became increasingly clear that Ulbricht wanted to deal with the West Berlin issue separately and soon, instead of waiting for a peace treaty, while Khrushchev wanted to wait as long as possible to see if he could come to some sort of agreement, at least a provisional one, with the Western Powers on West Berlin and Germany as a whole. After Khrushchev sent the first ultimatum to the West on 27 November

²³⁷ "The Position of the PRC on the Questions of Concluding a German Peace Treaty, the Resolution of the West Berlin Problem, as well as the Defensive Measures Taken by the GDR Government," top secret report by Liebermann, senior advisor, First Non-European Department, China Section, 23 October 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/115; "Memorandum on a Report of Comrade Bambula about his Conversation with Dr. Müller on November 13, 1961," written by Strauss, Second Secretary of the East German embassy in Peking, 16 November 1961, IfGA, ZPA, IV 2/20/123; "Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Flato, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy [in Peking] on December 1, 1961," *ibid.*; and "On the Position of the PRC on the Questions of the German Peace Treaty and the West Berlin Problem," secret report by Stude, Section Leader, First Non-European Department, East German Foreign Ministry, 1 March 1962, *ibid.*

²³⁸ IfGA, ZPA, NL 182/1206, p. 3.

1958, and then did not follow through with signing a separate treaty with the GDR and handing over to the GDR control of the West Berlin access routes within six months, Ulbricht did not believe that Khrushchev would do this in the near future either. Thus, Ulbricht increasingly took matters into his own hands, in particular by trying to usurp control of the Berlin sectoral border. As the Crisis went on and the numbers of East German refugees increased and the strength of the East German economy plunged, Ulbricht grew more desperate. This led him to work harder to convince Khrushchev that East German economic and political collapse was imminent if the Soviets and other socialist countries did not help soon and that the demise of East Germany would undermine the prestige of Khrushchev and the entire socialist camp. The worsening refugee situation, at times manipulated by Ulbricht, intensified during the Crisis.

The strength of Ulbricht's influence over Khrushchev actually grew as East Germany moved closer to collapse. The Ulbricht who was being dictated to by the Soviets regarding the 4 September 1958 note to be sent by the GDR to the four powers was very different from the Ulbricht who was sending East German delegations to China without giving the Soviets any notice, acting against Soviet wishes regarding the control regime on the Berlin sectoral border, and instructing Khrushchev on how to handle negotiations with the West in 1961. Ulbricht's influence proved strong enough to force Khrushchev to build the Wall--which Ulbricht saw as only an immediate desperate first step to stabilize East Germany--but not strong enough to force him to sign a separate peace treaty, which Ulbricht saw as the necessary second step at the end of 1961.

Ulbricht's maximal and desperately sought after aim was control over West Berlin: annexation. He saw West Berlin much more as a "prize" than the "lever" which it represented for Khrushchev. For both Ulbricht and Khrushchev, a separate peace treaty signed between them was really an option of last resort. Much more desirable was a four-power peace treaty with both Germanys which would legitimate East Germany's right to exist and give the East German populace the confidence to stay instead of fleeing to the West. While waiting for this four-power peace treaty, which Ulbricht knew seemed quite unlikely, or for a two-year provisional solution with the West, which was more likely but still not a very reliable option, or for a separate Soviet-East German peace treaty, which Ulbricht increasingly doubted Khrushchev's will to carry out, the safest option Ulbricht saw for protecting his country from collapse was a series of unilateral steps to increase East German control over the Berlin sectoral border, which would serve both to stem the flow of refugees and to force the Western powers to recognize the East German regime. It would also, he hoped, force or entrap Khrushchev to push for one of the three options just listed. Ulbricht did finally force Khrushchev to act. In the end, Khrushchev agreed to a fourth option proposed by Ulbricht, the Wall. After initially resisting Ulbricht's pleas Khrushchev finally came to see Ulbricht's concrete "rose" not only as a way to save the GDR by stemming the refugee

exodus, but also as a way to wall in Ulbricht in East Berlin so that he could not grab West Berlin by gradually usurping the Soviet border control functions and as a way to end the Crisis without signing a separate peace treaty, thereby reneging on his promise to Ulbricht of November 1960.

In addition to revealing the importance of East German influence on Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis, the new archival evidence also shows that the options considered for Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik* throughout the period were very much influenced by Western policies and by Soviet assessments of potential future Western policies. In a few key instances, and particularly at the beginning of Kennedy's presidency, Khrushchev seemed willing to modify his *Deutschlandpolitik* if the West showed significant interest in substantive negotiations. But he never modified his policy enough to induce the West to make what in his view would have been sufficient concessions. At several points, he tried to prevent Ulbricht from adopting policies which could have provoked the West. The Western powers and the Soviets, however, never really found a common language on *Deutschlandpolitik*, and meanwhile Ulbricht was constantly badgering Khrushchev to help resolve the German problem, especially that posed by East German refugees. The Wall, although proposed by Ulbricht, ended up being Khrushchev's compromise solution for preserving East Germany while not provoking the West.

The new evidence also corroborates the view of scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Bundeswehr played a significant role in the Soviet initiation and carrying out of the Berlin Crisis. The Soviets were trying to do all they could to impede this process through diplomatic notes, propaganda, and bluster.

The role of the weak East German economic situation looms quite large in the documents as a key part of the crisis for the Soviets and the East Germans. The Wall was also meant to protect and support the East German economy from the competition with West Germany. At a time when the Soviets had essentially agreed to do whatever was necessary to support and improve the East German economy, the Wall was probably seen by the Soviets as a way to help do this without putting overwhelming pressure on the Soviet economy. As Kvitsinsky puts it, "the scale of Soviet economic aid to the GDR was unprecedented. The GDR was like a sick child. We had to feed it, cure it, help it as much as we could."²³⁹ The Wall was part of this.

Most importantly, the new archival evidence from Moscow and Berlin reveals that previous understanding of the Berlin Crisis as a U.S.-Soviet crisis, guided mainly by Khrushchev on the Soviet side, is very incomplete. Without understanding Ulbricht's behavior during the Crisis and the role of East German-Soviet relations, previous analyses of the crisis have missed the key dynamic operating on the Soviet side. This finding has added significance when one

²³⁹ Author's interview with Yuli Kvitsinsky, Moscow, 26 October 1992. Kvitsinsky also told the author that as far as he knew, Ulbricht's pressure on Khrushchev to act, especially between March and 13 August 1961, explained 90% of the Soviet decision to build the Wall.

considers that many scholars of international relations have assumed that to understand great power crises in the Cold War, one need only examine the great powers themselves and not any of their allies.²⁴⁰ This Working Paper has shown that this was not the case for the Berlin Crisis. In light of this, it may prove useful for scholars to reexamine the role of important allies of the superpowers in other Cold War crises.

²⁴⁰ See in particular Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

APPENDIX G

Khrushchev's Opening Speech to the 3-5 August 1961 Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.
SED archives, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130.

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's Speech at the Opening of the Meeting on August 3, 1961

Let me in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union warmly welcome the representatives of the fraternal parties of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, who are assembling in the capital of our country.

The current meeting was called, as you know, on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany for the exchange of opinions on questions concerning the preparation for concluding a German peace treaty. This proposal, contained in a letter from Comrade Ulbricht, found support from the fraternal parties of the socialist camp, which testifies to the unanimity and unwavering attempt to resolve at last this important issue--a peace settlement with Germany.

At the last session of the Political Consultative Committee of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact, which occurred in March of this year, we came to the unanimous opinion that if as a result of the meeting with Kennedy and other contacts, the Western powers did not show readiness to find a real path for the resolution of the question of a peace treaty with two German governments, then our countries would start preparing to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR.

As you know, the Western powers met with bayonets our proposal for a German peace treaty and the resolution on this basis of the West Berlin issue. They still have not come up with any sober and constructive approach to the proposals put forward by us. We, of course, must try again and again to use all means and possibilities which we have to persuade the Western powers to agree to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and to the resolution of the question of West Berlin under conditions acceptable to both sides. In addition, evidently, it is now time to occupy ourselves with the simultaneous and immediate preparation for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR so as to implement this step if the Western powers do not give up their negative position.

The goal of our conference, as presented to you, is to have a detailed discussion of the question of concluding a German peace treaty, to consult about practical measures which must be taken in the near future, and to work out united tactics. This is all the more necessary, since in his recent appearance on American television, the U.S. President Kennedy openly spoke about the intention of the imperialist powers to prevent us from concluding a peace treaty with the GDR. Kennedy essentially threatened us with war if we implement measures for liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin. Under these conditions, we must work out a detailed plan of agreed upon action on all lines--foreign policy, economic and military.

I express my certainty that in the course of the exchange of opinions at this meeting, we will work out these agreed upon measures on all issues connected with the preparation for concluding a German peace treaty.

Permit me, comrades, to open our meeting.

[Khrushchev then announces the times of the different sessions and then gives the floor to Ulbricht.]

APPENDICES

Selected Documents from the East German and Russian Archives

Unofficial translations by Hope M. Harrison

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- B. Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 18 January 1961
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- D. Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko, 19 May 1961
- E. Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, June 1961
- F. Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko sent to the Central Committee on 4 July 1961
- G. Khrushchev's Opening Speech to the 3-5 August 1961, Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.
- H. Ulbricht's Speech to 3-5 August 1961, Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.
- I. Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 15 September 1961
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APPENDIX A

Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht, 30 November 1960.
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por 4, Papka 43. Secret.

W. Ulbricht. Permit us to express our gratitude to our Soviet comrades for their great concern for the development of our plan. Reorganizing for independence from West Germany means deep changes in our economy. In many branches of industry, the GDR economy was connected to West Germany. This includes not only exchanges in the area of engineering-technical thought, but also to production itself, which to a significant degree was mutually agreed upon. The West German monopolies used this situation. But on this basis it is impossible to carry out the competition between the socialist and capitalist systems in Germany. Therefore, our goal is to secure ourselves from interference from West Germany.

We are very satisfied that the current economic negotiations between the GDR and USSR are being conducted by such prominent specialists. These negotiations put our economic relations on a new level. It seems that we cannot simply broaden foreign trade; we must start by agreeing on plans for economic development.

The key issue now is the question of West Germany severing the trade agreement with the GDR. We believe that we cannot count on the conclusion of a new agreement. The Bonn government has still not given instructions for conducting negotiations on a new agreement. Today, November 30, they are discussing this question at a meeting of the cabinet and are determining their further tactics.

Our tactics will be the following. Comrade [Heinrich] Rau will [Minister of Foreign Trade] give a letter to [Ludwig] Erhard [West German Economics Minister] which states that we, in connection with the denunciation of the trade agreement by West Germany and its statement of readiness to carry out negotiations, propose to extend the existing trade agreement for 1 year. In these potential negotiations, we propose to agree that from our side we will implement control* fairly over the transit routes to West Berlin, so that no significant conflicts will arise. Since West Berlin also denounced the payment agreement, the practical basis for calculations of the transit of allied military transports also will be breached. Therefore we will send letters to the three commandants of West Berlin for forwarding to their governments, in which we will ask them either to influence the Bonn government so that it will change its position, or we will propose concluding agreements with the GDR on paying us for the services on the transit of cargo of the Western powers. No difficulties on this will arise, since the corresponding expense of our railroads will be left to West Berlin. Conflicts with the Western powers do not have to arise, in spite of our conflict with West Germany. Transports will continue to move as before.

What will Adenauer's tactics be? He said that he would support elastic negotiations. He is against the trade agreement and in the best case would only agree to allow individual transactions with GDR organizations, which we are concluding with FRG state governments. This Bonn plan has existed for a long time and did not originate from the moment of the

* The use of the word "control" by the Soviets and East Germans in these documents usually means "supervision" or "the checking of identification documents" and refers to the activities of the border police.

denunciation of the agreement. Their first plan was the creation of special economic groups in West Germany which would have conducted negotiations with us. Probably during the negotiations with us Bonn will make it known that its key concern is the maintenance of the four-power status of Berlin. Already at today's press conference, the FRG clearly said that in the negotiations it will have to demand the guarantee of the four-power status of Berlin.

We understand that this question affects not only relations between the GDR and the FRG. We believe that this is a question of how trade relations between the socialist camp and the capitalist countries will develop further. Adenauer is trying to involve the member-states of NATO in all of his conflicts with the GDR. Several days ago [Defense Minister Franz Josef] Strauss published an article in which he wrote that the mission of NATO is military, but simultaneously it is an economic, ideological and political mission. Strauss asserts that the economic struggle will be on the agenda at future international conferences. NATO must carry out atomic armament and create a fourth atomic power, but with this the center of difficulty will move to the economic struggle. This is Adenauer's tactic.

How will things develop in Berlin? We will maintain our tactics directed towards strengthening the position of the capital of the GDR and restricting interference by West Germany. However, the situation in Berlin has become complicated, not in our favor. West Berlin has strengthened economically. This is seen in the fact that about 50,000 workers from East Berlin are now still working in West Berlin. Thus, a part of the qualified working force goes to work in West Berlin, since there are higher salaries there. We still have not taken corresponding countermeasures. The situation with the intelligentsia is also not favorable. For example, teachers in the West earn 200-300 marks more than in the East. Doctors also earn two times more there. In addition, by leaving for West Germany they receive large one-time grants there. All of these circumstances exert influence on the less politically conscious part of the intelligentsia. Why don't we raise our salaries for this category of people? First of all, we don't have the means. Secondly, even if we raised their salary, we could not satisfy their purchasing power with the goods that we have, and they would buy things with that money in West Berlin. But still, we will try to do this. In addition, a group of children from East Berlin study in schools in West Berlin. We have a law against this, but we have not yet implemented it, since we didn't want to provoke conflicts.

Now we will try to protect ourselves from these unpleasant things, and the number of conflicts in Berlin will increase. We must do this, since we are obligated to protect the capital of the GDR and we will not allow West Germany to do what it wants there. Until now we have even let the so-called all-German church council meet in East Berlin and speak out against our government. The bishop of the West German Bundeswehr even came to Berlin. The church people are trying to organize a subversive movement among us. We will no longer tolerate this. We have a church leadership in the GDR, and we will recognize only this. Of course, Adenauer won't like this.

Thus, there will not be big conflicts in Berlin, but there will be small conflicts.

How will relations between the two German governments develop? Something in West Germany changed after the statement of the Bonn government on June 20, 1960, in which it proclaimed itself the government of the entire German state. Now Bonn declares that it supports

the status quo, i.e., the preservation of the remains of the war in Germany. They assert that the German question does not need to be resolved in the framework of Germany and Europe and that Germany can develop only in alliance with the USA, i.e, as a satellite of the USA.

The domestic situation in the FRG has become strained in recent years. They maintain that we, the GDR, have strengthened our activity in the FRG. This is partially true. But they are trying to limit any contacts between the two German states, including sports and cultural, and they are arresting our people who are going to West Germany. This means that they are cementing the division of Germany and are afraid of our political propaganda.

What is the situation with preparations for elections in the FRG? Adenauer wants all parties to make statements supporting NATO and the atomic arming of the FRG. He wants the rightist leadership of the SPD to agree with this. In general he has succeeded. Are there differences of opinion within the bourgeoisie on this question? There aren't significant differences of opinion, but part of the bourgeoisie believes that such a policy should not be executed only by the CDU, but of necessity in coalition with the SPD. [SPD leader and Berlin mayor Willi] Brandt also has implied that he is prepared for this. Thus, the aim of the bourgeoisie is for Adenauer to win the elections, but for Brandt to be his deputy. This point of view was recently expressed in an article by the bourgeois philosopher [Karl] Jaspers. Under these conditions our tactics will be to propose a choice to the West German people: either atomic death or peace through disarmament. We will also tie other issues to this demand. The SPD now wants to show that it doesn't have significant disagreements with the CDU on foreign policy questions. They put issues of domestic politics at the center of their struggle, supporting popular action, medical service, and the right to an education. They took some of their domestic political slogans from Hitler and some from us. They do all of this very adroitly, promising everything to everyone. Brandt himself in his speeches copies Kennedy and quotes him saying that the USA chose a young president and the same thing should happen in the FRG. But with this they are trying to put off the big political issues.

The Union of voters and the organization of proponents of peace, resuscitated in the FRG, put the struggle against atomic death and also measures which are of direct interest to the FRG populace at the center of their pre-election campaign. This means that, on the one hand, we criticize the SPD and CDU, and, on the other hand, accept some of their demands. This is not difficult, since some of these measures have already been implemented in the GDR. The question of a peace treaty and West Berlin are connected now with the pre-election campaign in the FRG. Comrade Khrushchev said that we must aim for a summit conference in 1961 to discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany and also to try to find a resolution of the West Berlin problem. We must force Adenauer, who has fallen into a blind ally, to change his position. You know, Adenauer hasn't achieved anything. He promised that he would achieve reunification by arming West Germany, that with the help of the four powers he would succeed in absorbing the GDR, but none of this has happened. So, we must force Adenauer to accept peaceful coexistence. At the same time, this is our method of pressure on the SPD. Now [the SPD official Herbert] and [West Berlin Mayor and SPD candidate for chancellor in 1961 Willi] Brandt are more right-wing than Adenauer and speak out against a peace treaty and against a trade agreement with the GDR. If they persuade Adenauer to change his position, then Brandt also will be forced to maneuver.

We would like to ask you a question about what will happen in 1961. The thing is that we can't repeat our campaign in favor of a peace treaty as we did it before the Paris summit. We can only do this in the event that we actually achieve something. Otherwise, we would be forced to make too big a turn-around. Thus, we are interested to know what tactics we should adopt now. Regarding West Berlin all is clear. Now, regarding a peace treaty. We do not have peaceful coexistence now with Adenauer. We have to induce him to adopt peaceful coexistence with us. We propose making the following propositions: ceasing hostile propaganda by both German states, returning to the earlier Soviet proposal about concluding a nonaggression treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, stopping the atomic armament of the Bundeswehr, and proclaiming a ten-year unconditional peace, as we say "a divine peace." Thus, we would continue to confront each other, but under conditions of peace. If Adenauer refuses this, and the Western powers refuse to conclude a peace treaty, then the Soviet government will conclude a peace treaty before the Bonn elections [in September 1961]. But then an economic blockade would be declared not only against us, but also against the USSR. This is confirmed by what Strauss has said. In connection with this, we must carefully tally our forces. Therefore, for now we will be careful with propaganda about a peace treaty, since among our population there is already a mood taking shape where they say--you only *talk* about a peace treaty, but don't *do* anything about it. So we have to be careful.

We have set forth our political views. Regarding economic questions, we would like to hear what Comrade Khrushchev will say.

N.S. Khrushchev. I would like to clarify one question. I thought that after Paris [the aborted May 1960 4-power summit], when we rejected the possibility of a summit meeting under the existing circumstances, you were in agreement with us that we could not conclude a peace treaty.

W. Ulbricht. Yes, then we could not do that. But now the situation has become complicated.

N.S. Khrushchev. At that time we acted correctly, we took the right step, since otherwise we could have created the impression that we provoked the breakup of the summit in order to conclude a peace treaty. We showed that we did not want that, but that we were trying to create the maximum favorable opportunities for the conclusion of a peace treaty. If we look at what was said in the Western press also and at the meetings which we had here with representatives of the Western powers and even West Germany, then it is clear that this policy brought us a huge success. For example, I recently met with the FRG Ambassador [Hans] Kroll. Of course, he is an intelligent person and doesn't tell the press what he told me. All the same, when I asked him whether he thought they would absorb the GDR and change the existing German borders, he said that he did not think so. In the USA there were also interesting meetings--with Douglas and [Walter] Lippmann. They also support a peace treaty with Germany and the creation of a free city, of course on the basis of a united Berlin. But we rejected this proposal on Berlin, since there can be no question that East Berlin, the capital of the GDR, be included in a free city.

Thus, we have not lost the two years which have passed since the time of the initiation of our proposal, but have shaken up their position. However, it is both our and your fault that we did not think everything through sufficiently and did not work out economic measures. We

should have examined the question of the economic liberation of the GDR from the FRG more closely. But we were taking life easy, for the time being Adenauer didn't give it to us on the nose. We will clear up who was more guilty, but we, the socialist camp as a whole, acted incorrectly here. We must create the conditions so that the GDR economy will not be vulnerable to our enemies. We didn't know that the GDR was so vulnerable to West Germany. This is not good; we must correct this now.

Secondly, after the war, many of the conditions which violate GDR sovereignty remained. But all of this was already won de facto by the West. Now, when you want to liberate yourself from this, you will aggravate the situation. But this is not favorable to us now, since we gave our word that we would not change the existing situation until the meeting of the heads of government. And if we change something now, this will look as if we are violating our word. Since we already missed this opportunity, we cannot now correct the situation unilaterally. Let us wait until the moment before which we said we would not change the situation. There isn't much more [waiting] to endure now.

The other question is whether to aim for a peace treaty with the GDR in 1961. It is less probable that there will be a peace treaty with the two German states. When we put forward the question of a peace treaty we also grant the possibility of concluding an interim agreement, i.e. an agreement between the four powers on a temporary status for West Berlin for an established time, during which both Germanies must agree on their issues. If they do not agree, then we would be free to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. This was our concession to Eisenhower so as to save his prestige and not create the impression that we would expel them from West Berlin. This continues to remain true now. You Germans probably will not agree amongst yourselves and then we will sign a peace treaty with you, and the Western powers will not conclude any peace treaty at all. But this does not worry us.

We will not achieve anything with them. Then we will have to exacerbate the situation and sign a peace treaty. When will we sign it, in 1961?

W. Ulbricht. No!

N.S. Khrushchev. Why?

W. Ulbricht. We don't have the heart.

N.S. Khrushchev. Politically or economically?

W. Ulbricht. Just economically. Politically I am in favor.

N.S. Khrushchev. In the political regard, we are almost certain that the Western powers will not start war if we sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Economically, do you think that they will declare a blockade, economic war? I think they won't. We don't trade with the United States in general. England would not carry out a blockade, Italy is even less likely to, France also wouldn't. Only West Germany remains. But I am convinced that West Germany also would not do this, since it wouldn't get anything out of it. West Germany, for example, exerted pressure on Italy when we concluded a good deal with Italy. But Italy did not reject this deal and in exchange

for our oil even sold us two tankers on which we can transport oil to Cuba. The Japanese also sell to us, which is advantageous since an economic slump is projected in Japan.

Thus, we would lose little economically from it, since the existing situation really would essentially be preserved. However, politically our situation would improve, since it would mean a defeat of the West. If we don't sign a peace treaty in 1961, then when? If we don't sign it in 1961, then our prestige will have been dealt a blow and the position of the West, and West Germany in particular, will be strengthened. We could get away with not signing a peace treaty if an interim agreement on West Berlin is concluded. If there is not an interim agreement, then we will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and let them see their defeat. They will not start a war. Of course, in signing a peace treaty, we will have to put our rockets on military alert. But, luckily, our adversaries still haven't gone crazy; they still think and their nerves still aren't bad.

Thus, if we agree to sign a peace treaty, we must think through everything properly. We are proposing now that West Germany extend economic ties with you. I already told Kroll that you have strong levers in your hands. You know that they understand that by exacerbating this question, they subject Berlin to risk. We have to say this to them directly. I will say this to Kroll tomorrow at the reception. We also must think through how the GDR will say this, but so that it will not look like a threat. We have to ensure that economic sanctions are cancelled. Adenauer noticed the effect of his threat on you. We must be finished with this situation sometime. Adenauer will not permit us to sign a peace treaty, but we must extort a peace treaty from him. Signing a peace treaty will mean de jure recognition of the GDR.

Intentions regarding the FRG's final position on the question of trade with the GDR will be clarified in two-three days. We must work out a maximum program in the event that everything will be broken off for you with them, and a minimum program in case the trade relations will continue. We currently support the minimum, since we don't want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.

In this matter you are also not without guilt, since you did not exert resistance; you did not disentangle yourselves; you got used to thinking that Germany was one. The capitalists themselves helped us by declaring a blockade to us. We became smart, and now you too understand. What do we have to do so that you will be independent from the capitalist world, especially from the FRG? Let the GDR economy be connected with the socialist camp, since you still have a long path before de jure recognition by the capitalist countries. We have little dependence on the capitalist world--especially in relation to the volume of our economy. You are a small country and you feel it more strongly.

Let us make up our mind that a certain amount of metal will be allotted for the GDR and our Gosplan [State Planning Commission] will not have the right to touch it. We have only 5 million tons of steel which are over and above the increase in production. We must give the GDR as much metal as it needs. We cannot be blind money-counters and every time construct our trade around whether to give or not to give them 1000 tons more. Malenkov and Beria wanted to liquidate the GDR, but we fired one and shot the other and said that we supported a socialist Germany. We must create a special group in our Gosplan with [GDR Economics Minister Bruno] Leuschner which will receive everything needed on his demand. There is no other way. The GDR must develop and maintain the increase in standard of living of its populace. Let us look at

what you need in individual categories. We have a plan and everything produced above the plan no longer belongs to Gosplan. But you will not encroach on our gold. Why give you gold? If you need cocoa, coffee, rubber, then buy them in Ceylon or Indonesia. Build something there. But free us from this and don't thrust your hands into our pockets.

W. Ulbricht. But how will we pay then?

N.S. Khrushchev. You will pay the comrades as we do. We just sold Indonesia naval vessels on credit, but for rubber. Sell your goods to the new African countries, and for this they will give you cocoa and coffee. By old habit, you try to do everything through us. You should have learned how to walk on your own two feet, instead of leaning on us all the time.

I say all of this so that we have good prospects if we use our resources intelligently. Of course, we also have our own needs, but we must understand that the GDR's needs are also our needs. We can't permit it that they come to us in such a state that either they sink or we throw them a rope. Let's stop playing games about this question. You can't run an economy this way.

The second question is about the coordination of the economy. For example, the Germans want chemical products very much, but they have few raw materials for this. For chloride you need salt and electro-energy. The Germans don't have coal, and not enough energy. In our country in Siberia, coal costs six rubles a ton. We also have this there and salt and electro-energy. Let's do this--we will make chloride and present it to you. We chatter a lot about coordination and economic ties, but we do little. The Germans try to grab something for themselves, and so do we. With this we only hurt ourselves. They will never be able to compete with us in chloride or brown coal. Let us create joint enterprises on our territory. It is true that when we proposed similar things to Poland or China, they were against it. But we aren't China; we are not afraid of giving the Germans a start. Let us do it such that there are your shares and our shares. We will divide the product; this is advantageous.

W. Ulbricht. Let us at first make some comments on the question of the peace treaty. What you have said satisfies us very much. If we have enough strength to conclude a peace treaty after the upcoming [Vienna, June 1961 Khrushchev-Kennedy] summit, but before [the September 17] West German elections, then this would be a defeat for Adenauer.

N.S. Khrushchev. This would mean publicly carving up Adenauer and [SPD Chairman Erich] Ollenhauer.

W. Ulbricht. The result would be that after the elections Adenauer would have to form a coalition with Brandt. This would be favorable to us, since we could isolate the right-wing leadership of the SPD. But in the event that Adenauer is dealt this political blow, Brandt will maneuver, since he won't want to share the defeat with Adenauer. Then a struggle will unfold in West Germany.

If we succeed in concluding a peace treaty, then we are in full agreement with this. If we don't succeed in concluding a peace treaty, and we return to propaganda for a peace treaty, then we will discredit our policy and we will be able to recover our prestige only after one-two years. We cannot act the same [way we did] in 1960.

N.S. Khrushchev. Now that Kennedy has come to power, we no longer have an interim agreement with them on this question, but we will not conclude a peace treaty. This means that if we do not do this, then our proposal will be rejected. They will say about us: they jabber, but they are afraid. We do not have a way out. It will be very good if we succeed in achieving a temporary agreement. But maybe they will not want a temporary agreement. Then we will sign a peace treaty with the GDR, and they will end up moving towards aggression, towards the "cold war." They will not remove their forces from West Berlin if we do not make the corresponding agreement. But we will not bring in our forces so that they will remove theirs. We will work out with you a tactic of gradual ousting of the Western powers from West Berlin, but without war. For this we will use the levers in the hands of the GDR.

W. Ulbricht. Good. Now onto economic questions. Our domestic situation is not a pretty one now. In 1960 supplies for the population were worse than in 1959. But our political situation is strong.

N.S. Khrushchev. We understand this well. For the Chinese the moral factor seems to decide everything. But our people also make demands for butter and other things.

W. Ulbricht. Here is the issue which worries us--if we proceed from the negotiations which your representative conducted with us, there will be a reduction of our planned figures. According to the figures adopted by you, we would have had a yearly growth in production of 6-7%. But with this growth we can't exist, we can't increase salaries for teachers and other categories of people. To maintain a normal situation we need a yearly growth of no less than 10%. Otherwise we will not provide the necessities. If I cannot pay a worker in Berlin a higher salary he will go to West Berlin. This is the situation. We must improve the position of doctors and the intelligentsia and some workers, since the situation in West Germany is improving faster. In 1961 they already will have implemented a forty-hour working week; they will raise salaries, and we can't even think about this. Discrepancies have grown up between us. We cannot achieve our goals with the help of just propaganda. We can pass a beautiful law about work, but if we don't give answers to concrete questions with this, people will ask us questions. We cannot permit the discrepancies between us and West Germany to keep growing. We must examine this in developing our plans. Thus, a yearly growth must be provided in the plan, even if 9 percent.

N.S. Khrushchev. What concrete requests do you have for us?

W. Ulbricht. Fulfilling the figures of our plan depends on supplies of your materials. We are now impeding socialist competition, since there aren't enough raw materials.

N.S. Khrushchev. We must discuss all these proposals concretely with Leuschner.

W. Ulbricht. Regarding your proposal that a special group be created in Gosplan, we are in agreement with this. Now we must move from the German Industrial Norm to the [Soviet] State All-Union standards.

B. Leuschner. We support all that you have said about the economic cooperation of our countries. Negotiations with our delegation were conducted in a spirit based on the merging of

our economies. Without this merging we won't be able to exist. However, these questions weren't resolved for 1961, and as long as they aren't resolved, we won't be able to "stand on our own two feet." Even if we assume that you will satisfy our present requests, our yearly growth will be 8%. But this is a lower figure than our seven-year plan, and some branches of our industries won't be able to grow. The standard of living of the population also will grow too slowly. Our successes depend on how much raw material we will have. In 1957-58 we received more supplies from you, and everything was good. In 1960 our trade with you grew insignificantly and serious difficulties arose, since the FRG already began to carry out an embargo against us since the beginning of the year. In general we are too economically dependent upon the capitalist countries. Why do we raise the question about gold? In 1960 we could not receive several kinds of raw materials from the socialist countries and bought them in capitalist countries. We went into debt to them for about 500 million marks. Now we need hard currency to pay this off. We have now reached a crisis with raw materials, and we cannot fulfill our export obligations; we cannot make the necessary hard currency. The only way out of this situation is the merging of our economies. Regarding the future, we have good preconditions so that after 1965 we will be able to stand on our own feet.

A.N. Kosygin. In this regard, the issue took its current form only a month ago. Several comments of the German comrades now are explained by the fact that we still haven't discussed our final figures with them. Several of their requests create difficulties for us also, since they request about 50 million dollars of hard currency, and also those goods which we buy for ourselves on the external market. However, we have settled almost all issues except the questions of butter and meat. The proposed figures of our German comrades on butter and meat seem to us a bit inflated. In addition, several questions are not clear to us. For example, they connect their requests for help with oil with their own supplies of fuel to the West. But if they sell this fuel, then our hard currency aid must be less. If our prepared figures are approved, then questions of raw materials will be resolved. The difficulty is that it is now already December, and our German comrades have still not worked out the specifications.

However, all of this suggests that they will agree with the West Germans. We are convinced that a decision for renewing trade will be made. Thus, I believe that basically all of these questions are resolved. The issue of payment from their side remains unclear. Comrade Ulbricht said that they could pay 400-500 million rubles for our supplies. In our figures we proposed the task of working out the complete payment of 800 million rubles. Probably we should place our orders for equipment from them in exchange for our metal. Another question is the issue of replenishing what they received from West Germany. They themselves still don't know exactly what they received. We think that the trade agreement with the FRG will be preserved, but we need to prepare everything in case of a rupture, so a changing of gears can be implemented with any harm.

N.S. Khrushchev. The fact that this issue was brought to such a state is careless. But we must take into account that the question of hard currency is very painful. Here, for example, you ask for 68 tons of gold. This is inconceivable. We can't have a situation where you buy goods, and we must pay for them. We don't have much gold, and we must keep it for an emergency.

H. Rau. If we proceed from the best-case scenario, then the trade agreement will continue. But West Germany will implement a selective embargo against us, as it already did in

1960 when they withheld from or under-supplied to us the scarcest goods. Their policy is directed towards impeding our development. Moreover, it was exactly the same goods, which were also scarce for you, since some of these goods are not produced in any country other than the FRG.

W. Ulbricht. Even in the event that Adenauer continues the trade agreement, we will change its contents so that we will be more independent.

A.N. Kosygin. Even in the event that everything will be okay, we will prepare all necessary measures on our side in case of a rupture.

N.S. Khrushchev. Maybe Adenauer will give us a break, and during this time we must prepare everything so that the GDR will have confidence in its development.

W. Ulbricht. What will we publish about the results of today's meeting? We propose publishing the statement of the GDR Council of Ministers that West German interference and the rupture of its trade agreement demands from workers and engineers that workers take the initiative and find opportunities in the localities for overcoming difficulties which may arise. Something will be achieved in this connection. Regarding reports on today's meeting, we would like to ask that as much as possible be included on the issue of economic aid.

N.S. Khrushchev. We must report that today among other questions, it was discussed that West Germany is refusing supplies to the GDR and agreement was reached that if this intention is carried out by West Germany, the USSR will provide these goods to the GDR. In the other case, the West Germans will celebrate victory.

A.N. Kosygin. Politically this will be seen as if Adenauer tore the GDR away from West Germany.

N.S. Khrushchev. Politically it must be explained that when West Germany severs itself from the GDR economically, this means that it fears reunification.

W. Ulbricht. We will formulate it this way: that by carrying out his NATO policy, Adenauer tore West Germany away from the German association.

N.S. Khrushchev. Well, you are complicating it unnecessarily. It is difficult. If you had about 50 million people, it would be a different matter.

Adenauer gave the GDR up for lost. He decided that everything was done with it and that he had to save Bonn.

A.A. Gromyko. Propaganda is now being advanced in the GDR that the FRG is an illegal state. This doesn't correspond entirely with our position on two German states.

W. Ulbricht. We believe that two states exist in Germany, but the West German state has not implemented the resolutions of the Potsdam Treaty and therefore is illegal.

A.A. Gromyko. But how can a peace treaty be concluded with an illegal state?

W. Ulbricht. A state is still a state.

A.A. Gromyko. But do you know the FRG is a sovereign state?

W. Ulbricht. According to the Paris Treaties, the FRG gave up part of its rights. On this issue, the political and legal sides must be distinguished. Politically, we can and must conclude a peace treaty with them. However, legally they do not represent us, and we do not represent them.

A.A. Gromyko. We can criticize the FRG as a militaristic state. But criticizing it as a non-sovereign state would be harmful for our tactics.

W. Ulbricht. Here the matter is in the consciousness of our people. Our people say that the GDR is a legal state which has fulfilled the Potsdam Treaty. But the Bonn state is illegal.

N.S. Khrushchev. How the GDR internally looks upon these issues is their internal affair. We will maintain our position on this matter. We are not obligated to repeat your position. We have diplomatic relations with both German states and believe that they are both sovereign.

A.A. Gromyko. Do you still intend to appeal to the three Western powers with a letter?

W. Ulbricht. Yes, if you don't object. We will appeal with a letter on this issue to the three commandants in West Berlin for them to give it to their governments. Negotiations with West Germany on the trade agreement will be carried out, but this appeal would be a means of pressure on the Western powers.

A.A. Gromyko. But they will just return that letter to you, and the situation will just be exacerbated.

H. Rau. But you know the trade agreement and also the payment agreement was already denounced. How will our allies pay us for transport expenses?

M.G. Pervukhin. You must mention this issue in negotiations with West Germany.

W. Ulbricht. I do not agree with this. We would demonstrate with our appeal to the three commandants that West Germany has violated an agreement, and we are trying to achieve agreement with the Western powers.

N.S. Khrushchev. We must await the results of the meeting of the FRG cabinet on the issue of the trade agreement. If they decide to extend the trade agreement, it's not worth sending the letter.

(Agreement on report for the press about today's meeting.)

At the end of the meeting Comrade N.S. Khrushchev informed the German comrades about the meeting with the delegation of the Communist Party of China on November 30, 1960.

The note-taker for the meeting was V. Koptel'tsev. January 26, 1961.

APPENDIX B

Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 18 January 1961 SED Archives, Berlin. IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129.

Dear Comrade Nikita Sergeevich!

After the discussion between us in November 1960, we find it necessary to consult with the CPSU CC Presidium on several key issues of policy towards Germany and the 1961 GDR economic policy. A number of proposals are contained in the following letter, for which we would like to know the view of the CPSU CC Presidium.

At the beginning of this year, I gave a report in the Politburo on an assessment of the political and economic events of 1960 and developed the plan for policy in 1961. What follows is the result of this discussion.

1. Proposals to move forward in 1961 with the peaceful resolution of the West Berlin issue and the drawing up of a peace treaty

Since Comrade Khrushchev's statement on the West Berlin issue in November 1958, two years have flowed by. In this time the Soviet Union and the GDR have succeeded in getting many countries to acknowledge that the remnants of the war in Germany and the abnormal situation in West Berlin must be eliminated.

The Adenauer government and the West Berlin senate have kindled a great campaign in the capitalist world for maintaining West Berlin as the forward-most base of the "western world," i.e., of NATO. The governments of the NATO countries are, however, aware that negotiations in 1961 over the elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin are unavoidable.

The possibilities to eliminate at least a part of the remnants of the war in West Berlin and Germany in 1961 are thus favorable, since the Adenauer government is not interested in a worsening of the situation in the period of the Bundestag election campaign, and President Kennedy in the first year of his presidency also does not want any exacerbation of the situation.

Some of the ruling powers of the NATO countries understand that with continued arming for atomic war, the main issue is the economic competition between the socialist camp and the capitalist states. Although the Adenauer government tries to create the impression that it is ready for negotiations, it applies this only to a part of the negotiations on a "controlled disarmament in the world," without West Germany making a contribution to this.

The Adenauer government refuses the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, and regarding the abnormal West Berlin situation, it undertakes everything to postpone negotiations on its elimination as long as possible, but at least until after the Bundestag elections. The Adenauer government aggravates the cold war in Germany, but assumes the orientation of leading the struggle against the GDR, mainly with economic weapons, as well as with wide-reaching use of the Catholic and Lutheran churches.

Since in 1961 a temporary compromise at least must be reached between the Soviet Union and the Western powers on the peaceful resolution of the German problem and the West Berlin issue, a campaign is necessary in the entire world on the necessity of eliminating the remnants of the war in Germany and especially the abnormal situation in West Berlin.

We assume that in connection with the March session of the UN, talks will take place between the powers on the cessation of nuclear testing and the resumption of disarmament negotiations. Thus, we propose that before the March UN session our disarmament proposals for both German states will be established again in a memorandum of the Volkskammer and the GDR government. The proposal for a ten-year peace between the GDR and the West German Federal Republic will be resolved on in the Council of State on February 27 and transmitted to the West German Federal Republic and the Bundestag.

We assume that the Soviet government and the states of the socialist camp will propose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between both military blocs in Europe and also are ready for negotiations on possible proposals for a disengagement of the military blocs. The GDR government will base its position on the proposal for general and complete disarmament in Germany, the cessation of atomic arming and a general cessation of arming.

We propose that until the UN session, GDR propaganda for the elimination of the remains of the war in Germany will be carried out more intensively. With this we will proceed from the necessity of concluding a peace treaty with both German states and transforming West Berlin into a demilitarized free city. Regarding the elimination of the remnants of the war, the GDR demands:

The elimination of the occupation regime in West Berlin, i.e., dissolution of the Kommandantura and abolition of rights exercised on the basis of the occupation status.

The abolition of the military missions in West Berlin and the transfer of their functions to regular consulates which the states in question manage in the West Berlin Senate.

The removal of all military and other agencies of foreign powers and the Bonn government from West Berlin.

The renunciation by foreign states as well as the Bonn government of radio stations and other state and quasi-state organs which take part in the struggle against socialist states.

The reduction of foreign troops in West Berlin with the goal of beginning their complete removal.

The abolition of agreements between the USSR and the Western powers about the military missions of the Western powers on GDR territory.

The transfer of functions still existing in four- or three-power organs, for example, the central air control, the bureau for mail and telecommunications, the travel board at the authorized

organ of the GDR, or a regulation of these issues through treaty arrangements with the GDR and the West Berlin Senate.

The regulation of traffic to and from West Berlin using the transit routes of the GDR through regular treaties with the GDR.

The GDR is prepared from its side to guarantee the traffic between West Berlin and other states, as it currently operates.

We assume that a relationship of peaceful coexistence between West Berlin and the GDR will be established. The GDR has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of West Berlin. On the other hand, it expects that the Western powers and the Bonn government will stop using West Berlin for warmongering and revanchist policy.

We propose that the GDR government appeal to all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and make its stand on the issue of eliminating the remnants of the war, the drawing up of a peace treaty, and a peaceful resolution of the West Berlin issue.

The Moscow Declaration of Communist and Workers' Parties again came out in support of the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city as the best possible resolution of the West Berlin issue.

What achievable objectives do we set for ourselves regarding the West Berlin issue in 1961?

We believe it possible that the positive proposals which were made at the Geneva conference will be taken up in the preliminary negotiations between the Soviet government and the Western powers. On tactical grounds, we don't believe it is expedient now that from our side we should publicly and directly make the demand of taking up the Geneva negotiations.

Any attempt to interfere in any way in the affairs of the capital of the GDR is to be rejected fundamentally. The laws of the Volkskammer and the GDR government and the resolutions of the Berlin city parliament apply to the capital of the GDR.

Since all of Berlin lies on GDR territory, state membership of West Berlin to West Germany cannot be recognized in any way and from now on must be eliminated from every statement.

Under the condition that in West Berlin the West Berlin population decides for itself, and that no foreign states, also not the Bonn government, have influence on its internal development, we are prepared to abstain from any interference in West Berlin and to guarantee ties West Berlin will have with other countries.

The GDR government is prepared to regulate by treaty with West Berlin all necessary issues which the West Berlin Senate wants to regulate.

If the West Berlin Senate makes proposals which designate a representative for economic issues in the free city of West Berlin for the regulation of economic issues for both the GDR government and the Bonn government, we could accept this.

Regarding military traffic, pursuant to basis of agreements between the representatives of the Soviet Union and the Western powers, we propose that, as far as land traffic is concerned, it remain as it is under current regulations until the conclusion of a peace treaty. The regulation agreed upon between the Soviet government and the Western powers on air traffic concerns only military traffic. Since presently civilian air companies of the Western powers use the air corridors in illegal ways, it is important that a contractual regulation be made for civilian air traffic between the GDR and the states concerned.

We propose the consultation of a party and governmental delegation of the USSR and GDR in April 1961 with the goal of raising the authority of the GDR in future negotiations.

We propose that the oral agreement made in November in Moscow and the agreements to be reached in connection with the preparation of the trade treaty for 1961 and the economic plans for 1961 through 1965 be signed in the form of a joint declaration at the proposed consultations of the party and governmental delegations. It must be emphasized that in connection with the four-power negotiations on the preparation of a peace treaty and the peaceful resolution of the West Berlin question, economic blackmail against the GDR will have no chance of success. The aid which the Soviet Union guaranteed the GDR must be reported publicly. The speeches and statements to be published on the occasion of the consultations of both party and governmental delegations must contribute to making the Western powers understand that a compromise absolutely must be reached in the summer of 1961.

The Convening of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact States

Until now, most of the Warsaw Pact states have considered the peaceful resolution of the German and West Berlin questions as a matter which only involves the Soviet Union and the GDR. Although they report in the press about these problems, they basically feel uninvolved in this matter. Thus, we propose that after the consultation of the USSR and GDR party and governmental delegations, a meeting of the Political Consultative Council of Warsaw Pact states take place.

What ideas do we have of a compromise that should be achieved before the West German Bundestag elections?

Our starting point is that the elimination of the remnants of the war and the preparation of a peace treaty is a complicated struggle. Since the unclarities in the Berlin position have been eliminated, especially through the Soviet note on the non-existence of the four-power agreement, and we have clarified the role of Democratic Berlin as the capital of the GDR, conflicts will develop over the elimination of the various remnants of the second World War and the peaceful resolution of these issues. In this conflict, the Bonn government will use all possibilities for influence in the capital of the GDR with the help of its agencies and especially the church. The Bonn government will try to disturb the execution of our economic plans through a selective embargo. We must prepare ourselves for various complicated conflicts. The result of the

conflicts will then be manifested in the negotiations of the four powers. In the negotiations, the enemy will use flight from the Republic as the most important argument. Therefore, the economic stabilization of the GDR so as to reduce flight from the Republic is the main task in 1961.

We believe it is possible to reach a compromise in 1961, i.e., to eliminate only some remnants of the war and to handle the other issues in negotiations on the preparation of a peace treaty.

The core of the compromise is to give the 2 German states 1 1/2 to 2 years for negotiations on the preparation of a peace treaty, disarmament and the establishment of peaceful coexistence as the preparation for later reunification. We assume that the Soviet Union could propose again to consider, in the sense of its earlier proposals in connection with a non-aggression treaty between the NATO states and the Warsaw Pact states, the formation of an all-German commission (a "German peace commission"), whose task it is to bring about a rapprochement of both German states and to find a general basis for the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states in connection with disarmament in Germany.

During the agreed upon time the four powers should prepare in a joint commission the fundamentals of a peace treaty and the convening of a peace conference for the peaceful resolution of the German question.

Regarding the West Berlin issue, negotiations should be conducted about an interim resolution for the next two years along the lines of the Soviet proposals.

We assume that on the occasion of the consultation of the party and government delegations of our two states, the Soviet government will state that the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet and GDR governments with the participation of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition which are prepared for this, will be unavoidable if the Western powers do not arrive at a compromise in the course of the next months.

In order to influence the other states, we propose:

- a) The transmission of a statement by the Volkskammer to the states of the anti-Hitler coalition as well as to the neutral states on the question of the peace treaty and the West Berlin question.
- b) A personal letter from the Chairman of the GDR Council of State to President Kennedy after he comes into office.
- c) A letter from the National Front of Democratic Germany to the most important parties in the states of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the neutral states.

2. Several problems of the 1961 economic plan which have not yet been able to be clarified

The achievement of political success with regard to eliminating the remnants of the war and the safeguarding of peace require serious progress in 1961 in the economic stabilization of the GDR. Without doubt, we have achieved success with regard to increasing work productivity and the standard of living. The difference vis-a-vis West Germany, however, did not decrease in 1960. Domestic difficulties in fulfilling the plan due to late and insufficient material supplies have

even grown. The greatest discontent among the workers and the intelligentsia has led to work stoppages at many factories. The reason is that the economic plan did not correspond with the supplies in many cases.

In 1958 at our 5th Party Congress and with the preparation of the Seven-Year Plan we took into account that a certain stagnation would occur in West Germany's economic development and that a heavier supply of raw materials crucial for our economy could ensue from the USSR and the other socialist countries. West German development, however, has gone a different way. West Germany had the strongest increase in the growth of production and consumption in 1960 since the end of the war, and thus far nothing indicates that this will change. The increase in gross production in West Germany was about 12% in 1960, while the growth in production in the GDR was 8%. Investment is also very high in West Germany. The most important firms were further rationalized and brought to a high technical level. West Germany increased salaries by about 9% and shortened working time, so that the five-day week exists already in some firms. Wage agreements were concluded for the metal and graphics industries, which foresee a gradual shortening of working time to the 40-hour week by 1965. Such salary increases and working hour reductions are not a part of our plan.

In 1960 in the GDR the possibility of obtaining our most important raw materials was significantly impaired. Imports from the USSR could be increased by only a scanty 2 percent over the previous year. Imports from West Germany sank by 10%. To keep our economy in line, therefore, we had to increase imports from capitalist countries by almost 30%. These imports are still not sufficient and have led to serious difficulties in supplying industry with raw materials in 1960. But since we did not have sufficient export goods to pay for these imports, we had to have a short-term debt to the capitalist countries of about 550 million hard currency marks. We must pay back a big part of this debt to the capitalist countries in 1961, i.e., we must supply goods to these countries for which we will receive no imports.

The statement of the Bonn government that it would carry out the struggle against the GDR mainly by economic means and through an intensification of the cold war forces us to execute a change in the design of our Seven-Year Plan. On the basis of the consultations in November it is necessary to carry out special measures in 1961 and 1962 to make the GDR economy as much as possible independent from disruptive measures by West Germany. We ask your opinion on our view that the following things are the most important in the GDR in 1961:

- 1.) Making the GDR economy independent to a significant degree from West Germany with regard to the supply of crucial materials.
- 2.) Achieving a stabilization which enables continuous production in the factories.
- 3.) Reducing debts to the capitalist countries so that we will not have a situation as in 1960 where the GDR was not capable of paying for a time. This means that it is necessary to increase the GDR's foreign trade with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

The main contents of the November consultations last year was to make joint commitments for a close tie of the GDR economy with the Soviet Union, so as to achieve stability

in the GDR economy and to make our economy independent from the disruptive actions of the West German imperialistic and militaristic circles.

Thus, the task of the delegation under the direction of Comrade Bruno Leuschner, which will come to Moscow in the next days, is to agree on the basis of the November meeting how the merging of the GDR economy with the Soviet Union should occur in the next two years and how this should be expressed in the trade treaty.

We are aware that we cannot entirely fulfill entirely the key economic goals in 1961. The Politburo views the situation in the following way--first the development of the GDR economy must be made stable and the greatest possible guarantees must be made against disturbances in the socialist construction of the GDR by the imperialist forces in West Germany. This is a basic condition for the successful resolution of our main economic goals.

At the consultations in Moscow, you drew it to our attention that even with a resumption of the trade treaty between West Germany and the GDR, we will only have a breathing space. After the trade treaty with West Germany is again in force, we intend to use this trade economically. With this, we take into account that the Bonn government, just when we decisively demand the elimination of the remnants of the war, will make create difficulties for us by with the denial of the supply of certain crucial materials through a selective embargo. Thus, we will strengthen the campaign to secure the GDR economy through our own production from the disruptive actions of West German militarists and to gradually bring about interconnection with the USSR economy.

The projected GDR economic plan for 1961 foresees an increase in industrial production of about 7 percent. The Seven-Year Plan foresaw more than 9 percent. Just by this growth in production, with which we will remain even farther behind West Germany, we cannot even out the balance of payments of foreign trade for 1961. The delegation led by Comrade Leuschner must clarify the following issues with our Soviet friends:

1.) How can we actually supply crucial materials (sheet steel, pipes, etc.) which we ourselves cannot produce and which we should not obtain from West Germany in the interest of gradually making ourselves independent?

2.) Which metallurgical equipment can the Soviet Union supply to the GDR, or the supply of which metallurgical equipment through the GDR can the Soviet Union forego, so that the production of sheet materials and special steels can be increased in the GDR? This is additionally necessary, since the small amount of certain special steels will not be able to be obtained from the Soviet Union, in the future, since this is very complicated. In addition, the supply of construction machines was discussed, but was not exactly agreed upon. This question is important both for the building industry and for the reconstruction of the city center.

3.) Although we have already reduced the increase in industrial production to 7 percent, we cannot equalize the balance of payments in foreign trade for 1961. We have a deficit in the balance of payments of about 1.35 million hard currency marks, of which more than 800 million hard currency marks are to the USSR and more than 500 million hard currency marks are to the capitalist countries. We are not in the position to pay for the promised imports from the USSR

entirely with exports. Thus, we request crediting the account vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which is about 170 million rubles (800 million hard currency marks), whereby this credit can be repaid beginning in 1966.

In the Politburo we have examined again in as serious and comprehensive a manner as possible all sides of this issue and related issues.

If it is not possible to give us this credit, then we cannot maintain the standard of living of the population at the level of 1960. We would enter into such a serious situation in supplies and production that we would be faced with serious crisis manifestations, since we would then have to reduce imports of steel, non-ferrous metal, textile raw materials and food, and in addition export goods which are absolutely necessary for supplying the population and for making important investments.

It is unpleasant for us that every year we must direct such requests for help to the CPSU CC Presidium. We will justifiably ask: What are the causes for this, and how must things continue until 1965? We came to agreement on the most important control figures for 1966-1980, but the questions of the economic foundation in 1961-1965 for the fulfillment of these future tasks requires more clarification and agreement.

In order to resolve the basic problems of the GDR and to catch up with West Germany, we must invest more in the GDR for several years and must bring about a close economic association, a merger with the USSR economy. There is no other way.

We are a state which was created without having and still does not have a raw material base, and which carries out the competition between both systems with open borders.

A reason for the difficulties lies of course in the fact that we as the workers'-and-peasants-state for all of Germany must bear the weight which resulted from the crimes and devastations of Hitler's Germany. In addition, the production apparatus in the eastern part of Germany was more heavily destroyed than in West Germany. While in the first ten postwar years we paid reparations by the withdrawal of existing plants and from current production, West Germany made no compensation from current production, and instead received in addition large credits from the USA to save the monopoly capital system and German militarism. We devoted many resources in the first ten years to bring the production on line in Wismut [an East German-Soviet joint industrial enterprise] and to sustain it. Of course, this was all necessary to reduce at least a portion of the destruction which the Soviet Union had suffered, and to strengthen the Soviet Union as the center of the socialist camp. These circumstances, however, brought us enormous difficulties in the competition with West Germany. West Germany could make large investments and achieve an extraordinary modernization of the production apparatus at a very early point on the basis of the millions of aid from the USA. Until the pardoning of reparations in 1954 the per-capita investment in West Germany was double as high as in the GDR. In the years 1950-1959 taken together, the per-capita investment in West Germany reached 7,400DM, while the economic strength of the GDR enabled per capita investment of only 4,650DM. With this we had a strong investment capability only from 1956 on, i.e., we had a significantly later starting point for the modernization of our production capacity than West Germany. Corresponding to our total population, we needed to have 50 billion marks more invested in comparison with West Germany.

This is the main reason that we have remained so far behind West Germany in work productivity and standard of living. Due to this, a constant political pressure from West Germany could be exercised over us. The booming economy in West Germany, which is visible to every citizen of the GDR, is the main reason that over ten years about two million people have left our Republic.

In this situation we were and are forced, to reduce at least gradually the difference in standard of living, to spend continuously more for individual consumption than our own economy has permitted and now permits. This means a constant burden of renovating our production apparatus, which can't be continued for long.

Of course, we have achieved a lot. In comparison to the people's democracies and also to other capitalist countries, we have a high level of production and work productivity. But we are far from being in a position to catch up with West Germany in the difference in production, in investment and in work productivity.

The complicated situation in foreign trade and our great dependence on imports has forced us always to export the overwhelming part of our high quality equipment so as to pay for the import of raw materials and food.

This is the situation in which we find ourselves and which forces us to request credit aid from the USSR.

We request clarification with Comrade Leuschner regarding the open questions of the GDR's economic plan for 1961 and for help so that the plan can be completed.

Further, Comrade Leuschner is instructed to carry out the agreed consultations about the broadening and deepening of our economic relations for the resolution of the basic problems of our economy in the years 1962-1965.

We propose to the CPSU CC Presidium that an official confirmation of these proposals take place with the visit of a party and government delegation in the USSR.

We think you very much for your efforts and help.

With communist greetings,
the first secretary of the SED CC
W. Ulbricht

APPENDIX C

German unofficial translation of letter from Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 30 January 1961. SED Archives, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129.

Dear Comrade Ulbricht!

The CPSU CC has discussed carefully your letter from January 19, 1961 and expresses its agreement with the considerations regarding the measures which should be carried out in connection with the elimination of the remains of the war and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. In the exchange of opinions with you in November of last year in Moscow we fixed our measures in this direction; we are undertaking at this time the steps, which you know about, through diplomatic channels.

We know that you are also of the view that in the present situation after the coming into office of the new American president it is necessary and important to attempt to settle the question of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on the basis of an understanding with the USA as well as with the other Western powers. We are now beginning to initiate a business-like discussion of these questions with Kennedy. The probe which has been made shows that we need some time until Kennedy stakes out more clearly his position on the German question and it becomes clear whether the US government will be desirous of attaining mutually acceptable resolutions.

We of course agree with you that the questions of the elimination of the remains of the war and the occupation regime in West Berlin must be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty with both German states, and if this cannot be achieved, on the basis of a peace treaty with the GDR. In such a case, it would be understandable to the people of the entire world, including also the German people, that the Soviet Union, the GDR and the other socialist countries are striving for the strengthening of peace and a peaceful resolution of the German question, since they are submitting the proposal on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Union, the GDR and the other socialist countries are striving to preserve peace and to resolve peacefully the German question. Therefore it is desirable that the measures dealt with in your letter, which under certain circumstances will prove necessary, be coupled with the conclusion of a peace treaty. If we don't succeed in coming to an understanding with Kennedy, we will, as agreed, choose together with you the time for their implementation.

Of course, we share completely the view expressed by you about measures in the area of the economic stabilization of the GDR and the broadening of economic cooperation between the GDR and the USSR. Concrete proposals on this question will be discussed now together with the GDR delegation led by Comrade Leuschner. We have instructed our delegation to let themselves be guided in these negotiations by the principled agreement between us in November of last year.

We support your proposal about a meeting of a party and governmental delegation of the USSR and the GDR and would be glad to welcome a GDR delegation for the discussion of questions of interest to both sides. The time of this meeting can be settled later. The results of our exchange of opinion could be summarized in a joint declaration. We are in agreement that during this meeting we will discuss your proposal about the convening of the Political

Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty for the discussion of the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

With communist greetings,

N.Khrushchev

January 30, 1961

APPENDIX D

Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko, 19 May 1961. Top secret file, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives. Fond: referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por 34, Inv. 193/3, volume 1, Papka 46.

At the commission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, we submit the observations of the Embassy on the position of the GDR government on the peaceful regulation of the German problem and our considerations on this issue.

Our German friends, as you know, support the Soviet position on concluding a peace treaty with the two German states and the resolution on this basis of the West Berlin issue by granting it the status of a demilitarized free city.

An analysis of the development of the international situation after the publication of the Soviet proposals on a peace treaty with Germany confirms more and more that Soviet proposals have led to a great weakening of the position of the Western powers on the German question and has led to a further strengthening of the international authority of the GDR. Our German friends also share this conclusion.

The GDR government fully approved of the Soviet aide-memoire and the proposals contained in it, which was sent to the FRG on February 17, 1961. As W. Ulbricht remarked at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact (March 1961), these proposals fully correspond to the peace policy of the GDR and the national interests of the German people.

Although on the issue of concluding a peace treaty with two German states, the GDR's position fully corresponds to the Soviet proposals, on the question of concluding a peace treaty with the GDR and on tactics regarding West Berlin, our friends do not always stick to the precise line and allow some vacillation.

Agreeing in principle with the Soviet proposals on concluding a peace treaty with the GDR, our friends at the same time show a clear inconsistency on this issue. Due to prestige considerations, they support the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, having in mind that the conclusion of such a treaty would allow our friends to have the right of full control over all GDR territory, including full control over the links* between West Berlin and the FRG that go through the GDR.

Our friends have expressed their view more than once that they are absolutely not satisfied with the current situation of the GDR, in which the GDR does not have freedom of action in Berlin and over the links between the GDR and the FRG. Moreover, some GDR leaders maintain that the absence of a peace treaty with it leads to a direct violation of the sovereignty of the Republic by the member-states of NATO.

* The Soviets use the term "kommunikatsii" to refer to the transit routes, air corridors, and all such links between West Berlin and West Germany

Our friends would like to establish now such control on the sectorial border between Democratic and West Berlin which would allow them to, as they say, close "the door to the West," reduce the exodus of the population from the Republic, and weaken the influence of economic conspiracy against the GDR, which is carried out directly from West Berlin.

Trying to liquidate the remnants of the occupation period as soon as possible, our German friends sometimes exercise impatience and a somewhat one-sided approach to this problem, not always studying the interests of the entire socialist camp or the international situation at the given moment. Evidence of this, for example, is their effort to stop free movement between the GDR and West Berlin as soon as possible with any means, which in the present conditions would complicate carrying out the struggle for a peace treaty. Recognizing the correctness of our position that the liquidation of the remains of the occupation period is possible only on the basis of a peace treaty, our friends therefore urge a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR.

They also suggest that a peace treaty with the GDR would assure them the possibility of entering into direct negotiations with the Western powers and the West Berlin senate with the goal of concluding an agreement regarding such questions as the use of GDR links [with the FRG] for the needs of the Western powers, disbanding all subversive and espionage organizations in West Berlin, a ban on applying FRG legislation to West Berlin, and a ban on any military production in West Berlin and on Bundeswehr recruiting. In the opinion of our friends, agreements on some of these issues could also be reached with the FRG. In other words, they propose that after the Soviet Union, and other states who are prepared, sign a peace treaty with the GDR, the Western powers and the West Berlin senate will be forced to enter negotiations with the GDR on resolving all issues of interest to them regarding West Berlin by concluding agreements with the GDR.

The realization of these measures, as our friends believe, must lead in the end to de facto recognition of the GDR by the Western powers.

On the other hand, some leading figures in the GDR, recognizing the necessity of a peace treaty with the republic, express the fear that this act would present the GDR to the world public as the party responsible for the division of Germany, which would negatively affect the authority of the GDR as the consistent defender of the national interests of the whole German people. In addition, some believe that concluding a peace treaty with the GDR would not resolve such an important national task of the German people as staving off West German militarism.

This clear inconsistency on the part of our friends also appears on the issue of West Berlin. It is expressed in their restrained attitude toward the measures of the Soviet embassy, and also the embassies of other socialist countries in the GDR [as well in] (Czechoslovakia and Poland), on the development of direct contacts with West Berlin.

Coming out in support of concluding a peace treaty with the GDR, our friends also say that the GDR and even the Soviet Union is not ready economically for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR. They display their obvious preoccupation with the possibility of an economic blockade of the Republic by the Western powers and the FRG in the event of the signing of such a treaty. As you know, GDR industry at the present time is significantly

dependent on the FRG supply of a variety of very scarce metals--certain types of rolled iron, pipes, chemicals, forgings, cast iron and replenished equipment.

Considering that neither in this year and nor in 1962 will the Soviet Union and other socialist countries be in a position to completely satisfy all the declared needs of the GDR in these materials, and also considering the necessity of seriously reconstructing the mechanical engineering industry of the GDR so as to liberate it from economic dependence on the FRG, our friends have grounds for concern about possible difficulties in connection with concluding a peace treaty with the GDR.

The GDR needs a certain period of time for the reconstruction of its economy with the goal of liquidating the dependence of GDR industry on supplies of scarce materials and many types of raw materials from the FRG and other capitalist countries. With regard to the economic situation of the Republic, we also should not underestimate the fact that in the GDR it was only a year ago, and in an extremely condensed time, that the complete collectivization of agriculture was carried out. The emergence of socialist production relations in GDR agriculture is only at the most rudimentary stage and needs, of course, a certain amount of time for its further development and consolidation.

These considerations have their direct relation to the internal political situation of the Republic, which also needs to be considered in signing a peace treaty with the GDR. Our friends so far do not have a clear sense of how the conclusion of peace treaty will affect the mood of the workers, in so far as separate sections of the population correctly perceive the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR. As you know, among some parts of the Republic's population, especially among the intelligentsia, there are strong views against the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR.

The inconsistency of our German friends on the issue of concluding a peace treaty with the GDR is to be explained to a significant degree by the difficult situation in which the GDR finds itself. All of this should be studied to determine the moment to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

Proceeding from all of this, the Soviet embassy would consider it necessary to strive for the following in the forthcoming talks on the German question:

1. In the situation which has been established, it would be useful to come to a provisional solution with the Western powers, to which the latter (the West) could possibly agree. Concretely, this could flow from the provisional agreement on West Berlin, the preconditions for which were outlined already during the Geneva conference of foreign ministers in 1959.

This, of course, does not mean that we must in any way weaken our demands for the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. We should also put before the Western powers the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German governments. However, I must add that realistically we can now only count on achieving agreement on a temporary, provisional settlement on West Berlin, which the Western powers and even the GDR support to a certain extent.

The conclusion of a temporary agreement on West Berlin would give us important advantages. For the time of its operation, we could carry out the necessary measures for liquidating the present existing serious dependence of the GDR on West German supplies of a series of scarce raw materials and thus be prepared for possible economic sanctions by the West in response to the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR. In addition, a provisional resolution of the West Berlin issue would give us time to strengthen the domestic political situation of the GDR.

We would also have a great domestic political victory, in so far as the signing of a temporary agreement would show that the current legal position of West Berlin does not correspond to the new conditions. Our thesis about the abnormal situation of West Berlin and the necessity of its change would in this way receive broader recognition, which would strengthen the Soviet position on the German question as a whole.

2. During the possible talks with the Western powers on a provisional agreement on West Berlin, we should, of course, proceed from the Soviet proposals which were made at Geneva in 1959 at the conference of foreign ministers.

As the conference in Geneva showed, the more serious differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the Western powers appeared on 2 points, namely--on the issue of the rights of the Western powers in relation to West Berlin during the period of the provisional agreement and on the question of creating an all-German committee from representatives of the GDR and FRG for the preparation of a draft German peace treaty.

We can say with certainty that the Western powers now also will not agree to a temporary agreement which would fix in any way a juridical recognition by them of the thesis of two German states, and it is also hard to expect their agreement in the future on concluding a peace treaty with two German states.

Considering this situation, in the new talks with the West we could refrain from insisting on the inclusion in the temporary agreement of the point on the creation of an all-German committee from representatives of both parts of Germany. However, we should propose such a formulation which would preserve the connection of the temporary agreement to the necessity of the agreement of the sides concerning the conclusion of a German peace treaty in the future and at the same time which would to a certain degree be a concession to the Western powers. We could propose, for example, the following formulation:

"During the period of operation of the agreement, the negotiating sides continue (with the drawing in of the German representatives) the exchange of opinions on issues connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

If in the expiration of time of the activity of the temporary agreement an agreement is not reached on these questions, then the governments represented at the conference will carry out new negotiations on the West Berlin issue."

In discussions on this formulation there could be some changes made in it, namely--to speak about an exchange of opinions "on questions, which are connected with Germany, including

a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question," since this was formulated in the communique of the 1959 Geneva conference.

The proposed formulation does not change our principled position on the question of a peace settlement with Germany. It does not weaken the urgency of the problem of a peace settlement with Germany, since it connects the temporary agreement with the proposal of an exchange of views between the four powers on the this problem. In such a way, we would preserve for ourselves the possibility at any time after the expiration of the time of operation of the temporary agreement to raise the question of a German peace treaty and to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, if an agreement was not reached on concluding a peace treaty with both German states.

We must take into account also the possibility that the Western powers could refuse to include such a point in the text of the provisional agreement. In this event, we could propose removing such an agreement from the joint communique. The essence of the matter would not be changed by this.

Considering that a temporary agreement would be a serious step towards normalizing the situation in West Berlin, we could even refrain from demanding a fixed obligation from the Western powers regarding their agreement to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Besides, the absence of such an obligation does not deprive us of the right, both while the temporary agreement is in effect, and also especially after its expiration, of demanding from the Western powers negotiations to conclude a German peace treaty. We could fix this position in a unilateral way, making the corresponding statement during the signing of the temporary agreement. In this statement we could emphasize that we consider the temporary agreement an interim step in negotiations on the question of the peace settlement with Germany and we will insist also in the future on the conclusion of a German peace treaty. We could demand that this statement be regarded as an official document of the conference.

3. We believe it would be useful to raise with the Western powers the question of creating a committee of representatives of the four powers, which would be charged with preparing a draft peace treaty with Germany. For this, adding representatives of both parts of Germany to the work of the committee could also be considered. The activity of such a committee would be advantageous to us. It would allow us to keep attention focused on the problem of a German peace treaty, constantly maintaining it in the field of vision of the world opinion. In statements in connection with the activity of such a committee we could actively continue the propaganda of our proposals on the peaceful resolution with Germany.

Putting forward the proposal about such a committee, we at the same time would show world opinion that the Soviet Union is utilizing all possibilities for the resolution of the problem of a German peace treaty through negotiations.

4. In negotiations about a temporary agreement, the three powers could again raise with us the question of what rights would remain for them in West Berlin during the time of operation of the temporary agreement. To this the Soviet side could say that the cessation of operation of the temporary agreement would not lead to an automatic abolition of the remaining occupation rights of the three powers in West Berlin. At the same time we should declare that if further

negotiations on the conclusion of a German peace treaty do not lead to a positive result, then the Soviet Union, together with other governments which are ready, would sign a peace treaty with the GDR, which would put an end to the occupation regime in West Berlin. Thus, the rights of the Western powers in Berlin would be preserved until the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR. Such a statement would confirm our position regarding the occupation regime in West Berlin.

5. If the Western powers refuse to sign a temporary agreement on West Berlin, then we will have to resolve the West Berlin question on the basis of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR.

In so far as that decision will lead first of all to a certain aggravation of the international situation, it would be very important for us in these conditions to weaken the political reaction of the West to the peace treaty with the GDR. To this end, we should demonstrate again the efforts of the Soviet Union to resolve the West Berlin issue through negotiations with the three powers. The Soviet Union could also declare at the appropriate moment that in the period of preparing for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, the USSR would also be ready to have negotiations with the Western powers concerning the resolution of the West Berlin issue on the basis of granting it the status of a demilitarized free city. Such a proposal would mean that the Soviet Union wanted to agree on the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin in consideration of the interests of all sides. Posing the questions this way would exert an influence favorable to us on international opinion and, most of all, on neutral countries. It would be clear to world opinion that the Soviet Union wanted to use the maximum possibility for the resolution of disputed questions through negotiations with the interested sides.

It would be hard for the Western powers to refuse this proposal, since it would not force them to openly recognize the GDR and would not demand from them the simultaneous signing of a peace treaty with two German governments or the GDR.

If we succeed in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement with the three powers on West Berlin, the GDR would receive the opportunity to carry out under normal conditions all measures for the reconstruction of its economy and would strengthen the political situation in the country even more and raise its international authority as a sovereign government.

USSR Ambassador in the GDR, M. Pervukhin

APPENDIX E

Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, June 1961. SED Archives, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129.

Dear Comrade Nikita Sergeevich!

Through the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Pervukhin, I have already let you know that we fully agree with the memorandum of the Soviet government, which you gave to President Kennedy. In a joint session of the SED CC, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the National Council of the National Front of democratic Germany, a corresponding resolution was made.

In the meantime I have received from you the information material on your conversation in Vienna with President Kennedy. You represented excellently not only the standpoint of the CPSU and the Soviet government, but also that of the states of the socialist camp on the basis of the joint declaration of the communist and workers' parties. This was a great political accomplishment, which served the goal of achieving a resolution of the existing unresolved issues in a peaceful way through negotiations. We warmly thank you for your initiative in the matter of the peace treaty.

After it became clear to the Western powers from their discussions with the West German Ambassador Kroll and Mr. Lippmann that the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states is on the agenda and cannot be postponed any more, a stronger revanchist propaganda by the Bonn government has set in. The Bonn Economics Minister Erhard threatened the repeal of the trade treaty with the GDR in the event of the conclusion of a peace treaty. The GDR would then be a foreign state, which would have to pay for its daily purchases in West Germany in foreign currency.

In the neutral countries, the Bonn government is strengthening its pressure on the governments to decrease the rights of our consulates and trade agencies.

Lastly, it even tried to prevent the participation of the German Gymnastics and Sports Club in the Olympic games. Adenauer categorically stated that the Federal Republic is the German state and on this basis no sports competition of GDR teams can occur in which the national flag or coat of arms of the GDR is displayed.

It is also important through the joint efforts of all socialist countries to further discredit even more German revanchism and militarism, to explain even more in the Western countries the meaning of the peace treaty, and at the same time to thoroughly prepare the conclusion of a peace treaty in the countries of the Warsaw Treaty states.

Comrade Pervukhin informed us here that you would find it useful if a consultation of the first secretaries of the communist and workers' parties of the countries of the Warsaw Pact would take place as soon as possible. The SED CC will appeal therefore to the first secretaries of the Polish United Workers' Party, the Communist Party of the Czechoslovakian Republic, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Rumanian Workers' Party, and the Communist Party of

Bulgaria with the proposal of having a consultation in Moscow on July 20 and 21, 1961, about the preparation of a peace treaty. The goal of this meeting should be an agreement on the political, diplomatic, economic and organizational preparations and also measures for the coordination of radio and press agitation.

We will ask the first secretaries to give their view on this proposal. In case some of the comrades desire a different time, a corresponding agreement must ensue.

As enclosures, I send you material "On the Creation of Offices of Employment and Career Consultation" and material "On Measures Against *Grenzgangers*." [Berliners who regularly crossed city borders for work] As regards the creation of Offices of Employment, they are necessary in the entire Republic including the capital, since the shortfall of the labor force is increasing, and also career advising and employment provision for young people is not covered. There were employment offices in Germany earlier, the majority of which we broke up. But we are now in the position where we must again create the employment offices. Since this is an important political issue, we ask your opinion.

The Politburo has occupied itself thoroughly with the *grenzganger* issue in Berlin. Since this is an important political question, which is connected with the peace treaty and the resolution of the West Berlin issue, we are sending you our considerations. I draw your attention to the fact that this proposal should be handled very confidentially and also will not be dealt with in our central party apparatus. It deals with the fact that a growing number of citizens of the GDR capital work in West Berlin. Due to the exchange rate alone, they multiply their income three or four times as long as they work in West Berlin. Since we cannot expect that in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty an understanding will be reached between the West Berlin senate and the GDR government on the exchange rate, economic measures are necessary to protect the capital of the GDR from more losses and demoralizing. There is also the issue, first: Which economic measures are the most advisable and second: When is the most favorable time? If it is politically necessary, we must postpone the matter until after the conclusion of a peace treaty, but this will create great difficulties for us in the next half year.

We ask your opinion on these questions.

In the next days the Politburo of our party will work on the draft of our proposal to the Bonn government on joint negotiations and the draft of an appeal by the Volkskammer to the West German population.

The CC of our party will take its stand on the peace treaty on July 3 and 4, 1961, and the Volkskammer meets on July 6, 1961.

We warmly thank the CPSU CC Presidium and you, dear friend, for the great efforts which you are undertaking for the achievement of a peace treaty and the resolution of the West Berlin issue.

Enclosures

APPENDIX F

Letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko sent to the Central Committee on 4 July 1961. Top secret file, Russian Foreign Ministry Archive. Fond: referentyra po GDR, Opis 6, Por 34, Inv. 193/3, volume 1, Papka 46.

The Embassy of the USSR in the GDR presents its views on practical measures which will arise from the imminent conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, which could be used in the preparation of materials for the negotiations with our German friends.

The most difficult issues which will arise after signing a peace treaty are the practical exercise by GDR organs of effective control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG and the establishment of a regime over the movement of the population between West and Democratic Berlin. Control over the links and the right to determine the regime on the sectorial border in Berlin does not only emphasize the full sovereignty of the GDR, but also makes it possible to resolve the GDR's quite difficult problem of the exodus of the population to West Germany.

At the present time, as is known, the exodus of the population from the GDR is enabled by the maintenance of an open border between West and Democratic Berlin and the absence of any sort of control over the aerial communications between West Berlin and the FRG. Therefore, to resolve the problem of flight from the GDR after concluding a peace treaty, we can follow two paths--we can either introduce effective control over the movement of the German population between West Berlin and the FRG on all means of transportation, including air, or close the sectorial border in Berlin.

Regarding individual concrete measures in connection with concluding a peace treaty, in our view it would be useful to implement the following:

1. The establishment of GDR control over the aerial communications of West Berlin with the FRG.

a) After signing a peace treaty, the existing 3 air corridors and the Berlin Center for Air Security, guarding the security of flights in the corridors, must be liquidated, and flights of all planes between West Berlin and the FRG will occur only with GDR permission.

For the establishment of real GDR control over air communications between West Berlin and the FRG, it is necessary to resolve the question of airports, at which there can be stops of planes with passengers coming to and from West Berlin.

At the present time three airports are used in West Berlin for air connections with the FRG: Tempelhof (the main airport), accepting all helical civilian airplanes flying into West Berlin and also American military planes; Tegel for French military planes and jet planes of French civilian air companies; and Gatow for British military planes. Flying into and out of West Berlin daily, there are about 96 civilian and 10 military-transport airplanes.

After signing a peace treaty the GDR should propose that West Berlin use GDR airports located near Berlin (Schönefeld and others) for air connections with the FRG and other Western

countries, instead of the West Berlin airports currently used. In their proposal, our friends could argue that using the West Berlin airports without corresponding control by the GDR is a violation of its sovereign rights. In their argument, they could also point out that their use creates a great threat to the security of the Berlin population, since all planes fly through the entire city. They should also point out the advantage of such a proposal for West Berlin, since being based at GDR airports they could use modern jet planes, whereas the main West Berlin airport Tempelhof generally cannot accept jet planes, and the others (Tegel) accept them in small numbers.

We must expect that against such a proposal an objection could be raised with reference to the GDR wanting by this to deprive West Berlin of its own airports, and demands will be made for the further use of West Berlin airports. The GDR position in this case, of course, will depend on what kind of regime there will be on the sectorial border in Berlin. If the sectorial border is open, as now, then the further use of airports in West Berlin could be agreed to only under the condition of the establishment there of control posts by the GDR customs service and border police, which would control all passengers and departing planes from West Berlin airports. If the border is closed, then the use of airports in West Berlin could be prohibited without the above-mentioned conditions, since it would be ordinary transit.

We should keep in mind that the GDR does not have at its disposal near Berlin airports which could fully handle the arrival of all planes in West Berlin. The civilian airport Schönefeld located near Berlin cannot now accept jet planes (TU-104) and, besides, it hardly will be in shape to accept in addition the number of civilian airplanes which now fly to West Berlin. Therefore, the question may arise of transferring to the GDR one of the airports near Berlin now belonging to the Group of Soviet Forces in the GDR.

b) For the practical implementation in the future of control over the flights of foreign airplanes to West Berlin, the GDR should create now a special air control service with its location in Berlin and cadres at fully prepared strength which would establish close contact with the service of the VNOS* of the Military Air Force of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany now before the signing of a peace treaty, and for the time that the Berlin Center for Air Security will still exist, also with the main Soviet controller at this center. After signing a peace treaty, this service would stop exercising the function of guarding the security of flights of foreign airplanes to West Berlin and would support towards these goals the necessary contact with our military air forces in the GDR.

Both the GDR and we must be prepared that the USA, England and France, which currently use the air corridors for flights of their military-transport planes, and mainly of planes of their commercial air companies, will refuse to recognize the right of the GDR to control these flights and will try to carry them out without prior arrangement.

In view of this possibility, the GDR must have at its disposal at the moment of the signing of the peace treaty all technical means for detecting planes violating its airspace and also the airports and the necessary number of military planes for the forced landing of violating planes. Our military command in the GDR must give aid to the GDR military if necessary for

* Not further defined and not defined in Russian military dictionaries; perhaps an air observation service.

familiarization with such technical means, to agree with them on the isolation of airports which would be used for the forced landing of possible violating planes, etc.

In addition, precise agreement on mutual action in the detection and interception of violating planes must be reached in good time between the GDR Military Air Force and the Military Air Force of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

For the preparation of these practical measures it would be useful to begin consultations on all questions concerning this between the military commands of the USSR and the GDR.

2. The regime on the sectorial border in Berlin

About 250,000 people now cross the sectorial border in Berlin every day, mainly on the railway [the largely above-ground express S-bahn], the G-bahn, by foot and also in automobiles. The GDR police carry out selective checking of people going through the sectorial border into West Berlin and in practice cannot really arrest citizens illegally leaving the GDR.

More active measures against the exodus of the population of the GDR would be the introduction of restrictive measures for the visitation by GDR citizens of both Democratic and West Berlin, strengthening the guarding of the border around Berlin, and also limiting free movement between Democratic and West Berlin. However the closing of the sectorial border would bring about displeasure not only in West Berlin but also among the GDR population, which would be used by hostile propaganda for discrediting a peace treaty with the GDR, for kindling anti-governmental feelings.

We must also keep in mind the serious technical difficulties in connection with closing the sectorial border. This would necessitate building obstructive structures for the whole expanse of the border within the city (46 km) and adding a large number of additional police posts, establishing constant police control at the points of crossing the sectorial border by the railway and metro. If the question is raised of organizing the use of the city railway separately in Democratic and West Berlin, then this will cause much inconvenience for the population of both parts of the city and will require a lot of work on the railways in both Democratic and West Berlin. In addition, if this occurs the West Berlin authorities could hinder the GDR from managing the city railway S-bahn in West Berlin, and even remove it from the technical protection of the rail lines between West Berlin and the FRG, which would not be favorable to the GDR.

In view of political considerations and the technical difficulties of closing the sectorial border in Berlin, we must secure the establishment of effective control over the movement of the German populace between West Berlin and the FRG not only by land transport, but also by air, with which the regime on the sectorial border in Berlin could remain without fundamental changes.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to exclude in general the possibility of closing the sectorial border in Berlin in one or another way, since with the exacerbation of the political situation, closed borders could be necessary. Therefore, it is necessary also to prepare a plan of measures in the event of the introduction of a state border regime on the sectorial border.

3. GDR control over rail and highway links between West Berlin and the FRG

a) At the present time, citizens of the FRG and the inhabitants of West Berlin can travel freely between Berlin and the FRG by rail and automobile transport freely by presenting their identity card to be checked by the GDR police. This transit regime, created by the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs, has been in effect since 1953.

The question arises of what kind of transit regime for citizens of the FRG and inhabitants of West Berlin going through the GDR should be introduced after the signing of a peace treaty.

We must expect that if the existing regime on the sectorial border in Berlin remains unchanged, then even with the establishment of GDR control over air communications, the Bonn regime could organize the transfer of refugees from the GDR to the FRG through West Berlin by fictitious documents, under the guise of West German citizens or West Berliners. So as to prevent this, our friends should examine the question of the possible introduction of a visa regime for all people, including Germans, using the links [transit routes] between West Berlin and the FRG, as is done now regarding all foreigners.

We must keep in mind that a visa system would lead to great inconveniences for Germans and would bring about displeasure both in the FRG and in West Berlin. Therefore, at first we should keep the transit order unchanged. If GDR control over the transit routes by the checking of documents by the border police does not lead to a reduction in the exodus of the GDR population through West Berlin, then we will have to introduce a visa regime on the transit routes between Berlin and the FRG for all transit passengers and in the extreme case close the sectorial border in Berlin. It is obvious that in both cases we would have to expect political difficulties.

b) The GDR currently controls all cargo transit between West Berlin and the FRG. It would be important politically that after signing the peace treaty cargo transit between West Berlin and the FRG would continue uninterrupted and would maintain the existing control procedure. This would demonstrate the groundlessness of current allegations that signing a peace treaty with the GDR will allegedly create a threat to West Berlin.

The GDR should define its position regarding payment for this cargo transit. Cargo transit between West Berlin and the FRG occurs now by rail, water and automobile transport. Payment for transit of West German and West Berlin cargo on GDR railways is made by rates which were established for the payment of cargo transport in trade between the GDR and the FRG. These rates are roughly equal to the internal rail rates of the FRG and exceed the internal rail rates of the GDR. Charges for rail transit of cargo between the FRG and West Berlin through the GDR are made under the terms of the agreement of the GDR and FRG on payments which is part of the agreement on inner-German trade. The revenue from this transit is 235 million Westmarks per year.

For FRG and West Berlin cargo transit on GDR waterways a small toll, which was established in 1941 for all of Germany, is levied for the use of canals. Charges for transit by water ways are made the same way as for rail transit under the terms of the above-mentioned agreement of the GDR and the FRG on payments. Revenues for the GDR budget from these duties are 2.7 million Westmarks per year.

For cargo traffic between the FRG and West Germany on the GDR highways, tolls are levied which were introduced by the GDR in 1951. They are paid in cash by automobile drivers. The amount of the toll was raised in 1955. Yearly revenues for the GDR budget from these tolls is about 36 million Westmarks.

Our friends should make the maintenance of the current amount of tariffs and tolls for the transit of West German and West Berlin cargo on the land links of the GDR dependent on the West German extension of trade with the GDR after the signing of a peace treaty. If the FRG stops trade with the GDR in response to the conclusion of a peace treaty, our friends could raise several times the tariffs and tolls which currently exist for the use of their transit routes. This could enable the GDR to compensate for the severing of trade with the FRG to a limited extent.

These measures do not affect the interests of particular firms which conduct transit between West Berlin and the FRG, since all additional expenses connected with this transit are paid by Bonn out of the state budget.

c) Our friends must prepare to exercise control over the transit of military personnel and freight of the US, British and French garrisons in West Berlin, which, obviously, will remain there for a certain period of time after the signing of a peace treaty. For this they should prepare beforehand personnel of the Border Police or National Army who will exercise such control in practice.

We must keep in mind that the current supervision by Soviet military forces of the transit of military personnel and cargo of the US, England, and France between West Berlin and the FRG is really just formal. The [officials at the] Soviet checkpoints do not go into the loads of military convoys, they do not check the documents of each person, and they are limited to the examination of a general list of travellers, presented by the leader of the military echelon. Checking of the group of military personnel which follow in automobiles is also limited to examination of the list. Travel documents are issued by the US, English and French authorities in the name of the ambassadors and of commanding forces of these countries in the FRG and their military commandants in West Berlin. Military transports conveyed in trains and cars are not inspected by Soviet controllers. Thus, the US, England, and France can in reality transport any people and any freight in military echelons, i.e., there is not really control.

In our opinion, this situation should be corrected and effective control be established before a peace treaty comes into force so as to facilitate the exercise of control functions by GDR authorities. For this it would be necessary that Soviet controllers check the documents of every passenger travelling in a military echelon or military automobile and examine all military cargo. In these actions we could refer to the fact that the agreement of the four powers on communications (protocol of the meeting at the headquarters of Marshal Zhukov on June 29, 1945 and the decision of the Control Council of November 10, 1945) provided for the transport of military personnel and cargo of the US, England, and France between West Berlin and the FRG "under Russian control and management." Our right to change the control regime can be deduced from this formula.

d) In our opinion, we should also change the existing practice of payment for the military transport of the US, England, and France on railways and highways before the signing of a peace treaty.

The payment for the transportation of military cargo on railways has been made until now on easy terms, and military personnel are transported for free. The transport of cargo is paid for according to rates which were introduced on September 1, 1939, for the transport of Hitler's army, and after Germany's capitulation it was adapted to the military transport of the occupation forces by resolution of the four powers. At this rate, the transport of military cargo is paid for at a rate of 25 pfennigs per axle per kilometer and for every truck there is a one-time toll of 3.20 marks.

This tariff on easy terms is illegal, since the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of September 20, 1955 provided for the repeal of operation on GDR territory of all laws, directives, orders and other resolutions of the Control Council which were made from 1945-1948.

With this advantageous tariff in the GDR, only the transport of cargo of the National Army and the Soviet forces are paid for. In the FRG, tariffs for the transport of military cargo were raised in 1957. If the rail transport of cargo by the US, Britain, and France through the GDR was paid for according to the rate which exists for the payment of military transport in the FRG, the GDR would have an addition revenue of about 2 million marks (now the GDR receives 700-800,000 marks per year). We must keep in mind that the US, Britain and France settle accounts for the transport of their military cargo on the railways of the GDR not with the GDR department of railways, but with the FRG federal direction of railways.

The US, Britain, and France use for free the highways between Berlin and the FRG for the transport of their military personnel and cargo. The GDR 1951 resolution on the levying of tolls on auto transport of the FRG and West Berlin was not applied to the auto transport of the US, Britain, and France. This system, which corresponded to the conditions of occupation, has no basis at the present time. The GDR could apply to the auto transport of these powers the same regime of payment for transit through the GDR which exists with regard to West German and West Berlin auto transport.

4. On the garrison of Soviet forces in Berlin

After a peace treaty is signed the commandant of the garrison of Soviet forces in Berlin must cease ties with the military commandants of the US, Great Britain and France in West Berlin, since their further existence will be illegal.

With regard to the Spandau prison which is now guarded by a subdivision of the Soviet garrison in Berlin together with subdivisions of the US, British, and French garrisons in West Berlin, we should assume that the status of the prison will remain unchanged after the signing of the peace treaty, since it was not brought about by the occupation. The guarding of the prison will be exercised as before by USSR, US, British, and French personnel.

Since the demand for the removal of occupation forces from West Berlin will be recorded in the peace treaty, we should discuss the question of the time for the removal of the garrison of

Soviet forces from Democratic Berlin. It is obvious that our garrison will be removed from Berlin simultaneously with the evacuation of the occupation troops from West Berlin.

5. Economic questions

In the event of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, we must expect a severing by West Germany of trade ties with the GDR, and also the organization of an economic blockade of the Republic by the NATO countries. Issues of the economic situation of the GDR are illuminated in the political note of the Soviet embassy of July 4, 1961, # 0459/gdr. It is necessary to examine the proposals of the Soviet embassy put forward in the note referred to. In particular, we should speed up the creation in the Soviet Union of the corresponding raw material supplies for the GDR so as to provide these goods to the GDR in the event of an economic blockade of the GDR by the Western powers.

We must keep in mind that the GDR does not have its own resources of basic industrial raw materials. The interruption in supplies as a result of an economic blockade could complicate the already grave domestic political situation in the Republic. Therefore, it is politically important that after the signing of the peace treaty, supplies to the GDR industry and population at least do not worsen.

6. Several other issues

a) The Soviet Union and the GDR must work out a position in case the West Berlin senate declares the nonrecognition of free city status for West Berlin, [which would be] announced to us and the GDR in a unilateral way after the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, and organizes a referendum in West Berlin in favor of the preservation of the existing situation and the maintenance of the Western forces there. In this event we could adopt the following position:

The issue of the occupation regime in West Berlin and the character of its status does not fall within the competence of the West Berlin authorities and cannot be decided by a referendum. If an attempt will be made to proclaim in one or another form the absorption of West Berlin into the FRG, we could declare that the territory of West Berlin is a constituent part of the territory of the GDR and that its status cannot be determined without the agreement of the GDR.

b) Our friends must consider possible measures in case the West Berlin regime continues hostile activity against the GDR after the signing of a peace treaty. In our opinion, in order to exert influence on West Berlin, our friends could utilize their opportunities [to put pressure] on the transit routes between West Berlin and the FRG.

Since what has been set forth above, as well as other practical questions which arise in connection with the imminent conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, demands serious preliminary preparation and agreement with the GDR, the Soviet embassy would consider it desirable in the near future to direct these measures to the attention of the USSR government so that we can carry out the necessary consultations with our German friends and prepare agreed upon measures in a timely fashion.

USSR Ambassador in the GDR, M. Pervukhin

APPENDIX G

Khrushchev's Opening Speech to the 3-5 August 1961 Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.
SED archives, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130.

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's Speech at the Opening of the Meeting on August 3, 1961

Let me in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union warmly welcome the representatives of the fraternal parties of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, who are assembling in the capital of our country.

The current meeting was called, as you know, on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany for the exchange of opinions on questions concerning the preparation for concluding a German peace treaty. This proposal, contained in a letter from Comrade Ulbricht, found support from the fraternal parties of the socialist camp, which testifies to the unanimity and unwavering attempt to resolve at last this important issue--a peace settlement with Germany.

At the last session of the Political Consultative Committee of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact, which occurred in March of this year, we came to the unanimous opinion that if as a result of the meeting with Kennedy and other contacts, the Western powers did not show readiness to find a real path for the resolution of the question of a peace treaty with two German governments, then our countries would start preparing to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR.

As you know, the Western powers met with bayonets our proposal for a German peace treaty and the resolution on this basis of the West Berlin issue. They still have not come up with any sober and constructive approach to the proposals put forward by us. We, of course, must try again and again to use all means and possibilities which we have to persuade the Western powers to agree to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and to the resolution of the question of West Berlin under conditions acceptable to both sides. In addition, evidently, it is now time to occupy ourselves with the simultaneous and immediate preparation for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR so as to implement this step if the Western powers do not give up their negative position.

The goal of our conference, as presented to you, is to have a detailed discussion of the question of concluding a German peace treaty, to consult about practical measures which must be taken in the near future, and to work out united tactics. This is all the more necessary, since in his recent appearance on American television, the U.S. President Kennedy openly spoke about the intention of the imperialist powers to prevent us from concluding a peace treaty with the GDR. Kennedy essentially threatened us with war if we implement measures for liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin. Under these conditions, we must work out a detailed plan of agreed upon action on all lines--foreign policy, economic and military.

I express my certainty that in the course of the exchange of opinions at this meeting, we will work out these agreed upon measures on all issues connected with the preparation for concluding a German peace treaty.

Permit me, comrades, to open our meeting.

[Khrushchev then announces the times of the different sessions and then gives the floor to Ulbricht.]

APPENDIX H

Ulbricht's Speech to 3-5 August 1961 Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty. SED archives, in Russian, J IV 2/202/129. Copies of this speech also exist in the Moscow Central Committee Archives, the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation.

Dear Comrades!

The government of the Soviet Union in two aide-memoires, of which one was give to the Bonn government on February 17, 1961, and the second was delivered by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Comrade Khrushchev, to the President of the USA, John Kennedy during the Vienna summit, minutely and persuasively substantiated why the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the settlement of the West Berlin problem can no longer be postponed. At the same time in both documents it was stated that either a peace treaty with be concluded with both German states, or a peace treaty will be concluded with the GDR by the states who are ready to do this. This corresponded with the declaration of the 81 communist and workers' parties.

Already on returning from the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, Comrade Khrushchev stated on October 20, 1960, that the most important issue of concluding a peace treaty with Germany must be resolved in 1961. In both aide-memoires the Soviet Union pointed out that the resolution of the issue of a peace treaty with Germany has already dragged out too long and that there can be no basis at all for any further postponement. Finally, Comrade Khrushchev in his television appearance about the Vienna meeting with Kennedy stated with all decisiveness that "we can not postpone any more the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, we must achieve a peaceful settlement in Europe this year."

This position of the Soviet government corresponds with the agreement reached during the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact on March 28-29 of this year. It was noted in the communique of this meeting that in the interests of ensuring peace, it is extremely necessary to eliminate the remnants of the second World War by concluding a peace treaty with both German states and, in connection with this, to neutralize the seat of danger in West Berlin, transforming it into a demilitarized free city. The representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries came to the agreement that the conclusion of a peace treaty is necessary in this year. In the spirit of the agreement of our conference in March, the political leaderships of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact agreed on the coordination at the present conference of concrete political, economic, diplomatic and practical measures for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the resolution of the West Berlin problem.

I want to dwell on the question of why the resolution of precisely these two key problems of international politics has now become unavoidable. I cannot say anything principally new. All essential ideas have already been set forth by Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev during the Vienna talks with Kennedy, and also in the aide-memoires of the Soviet government. In his television appearance (and speech on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Great Fatherland

War, Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev already put forward the Soviet point of view on all important contemporary international problems. I want to emphasize that we fully share this point of view and that we especially welcome the carefully-thought-out and resolute defense of the interests of the socialist camp and of peace for the whole world by Comrade Khrushchev at Vienna, and we thank him for this. In connection with the Vienna summit I want to dwell on several questions which are characteristic of the development of the situation in Germany.

From the Vienna meeting it became clear, that Kennedy and his advisers realized the huge changes which have taken place in the international correlation of forces. Corresponding to this is Kennedy's thesis about the equilibrium of forces and his fear that any further changes, whether in Laos or in West Berlin, will disturb this equilibrium and could lead gradually to the superiority of the socialist camp. From here comes the demand to keep everything as it has been in Germany or to allow changes only in favor of the imperialist camp, that is to include all of Germany, hence also the German Democratic Republic, in the Western military bloc of NATO. It is obvious that West German imperialists, primarily those aggressive militarists, such as Defense Minister Strauss, are trying to use Kennedy's fear of future changes in the correlation of forces so as to further strengthen the West German Wehrmacht and to equip it with atomic weapons. Thus, Adenauer's government is exerting strong pressure on the Western powers and so far has even frustrated the efforts of Kennedy and Macmillan to secure the imperialist positions by means of negotiations. But this simultaneously clearly shows how dangerous it is to allow the further unhindered arming of West Germany. Carrying out such a policy, which has been dictated by fear of the further strengthening of the socialist camp, the USA, Great Britain and France only expose themselves to the danger of being pulled into military escapades by German militarists. The Bonn government is not only a vehement enemy of any agreement between both German governments, it is also the main leader of the so-called hard-line course of the Western powers. Both before and after the Vienna summit of Comrade Khrushchev with Kennedy, it tried to slander such a meeting between the ruling figures of the leading powers of the two main world camps. By means of the systematic disclosure of secret information and the dissemination of clearly false reports, the Bonn government is trying to stop or wreck all efforts to reach an agreement on a peace treaty and the West Berlin problem through negotiations.

What basic point of view lies at the base of this orientation of the Bonn government? In general statements on questions of foreign policy in 1961, the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] and CSU [Christian Social Union] as the ruling parties stated that the Bonn government supports the Paris Agreements, that all of Germany must be integrated into the European community, i.e. NATO. In such a way they want to extend the dominion of West German finance capital also to the German Democratic Republic. The first peace-loving state in the history of Germany must find itself under the boots of Hitlerite generals, and they want to establish a military-clerical state power in the German Democratic Republic. In the same way, the military base of NATO would be advanced to the Oder and Neisse.

When appointing the military criminal [F.] Fortsh to the post of the general inspector of the Bundeswehr, Defense Minister Strauss stated that it is necessary to arm the German army with an aviation and naval fleet exactly as the British, American, Belgian and Dutch forces were armed and equipped. In his demand for full economic armament Strauss found support in the NATO document MC-70. On another occasion Strauss remarked that NATO already armed about 50% of the West German Wehrmacht with atomic weapons and that the goal--complete atomic

armament--will be achieved in approximately two years. The Bonn government, however, is achieving not only the complete atomic arming of the West German Wehrmacht, but also its expansion into a mass army. At the beginning of the pre-election campaign, Strauss demanded raising the number of divisions from 12 to 18. In addition, Strauss demands increasing the so-called territorial defenses, which he says "should not under any circumstances be a shadow national army." Strauss said: "NATO obliges us to guarantee the freedom of operation of all of its formations on the territory of the Federal Republic." On this pretext a draft is instituted for the whole male population regarding which it cannot be forgotten that Strauss's Wehrmacht can use not only its own resources, but also the millions of soldiers from the Hitlerite army, who are still fit for military service, who keep ready for new military escapades in various traditional associations.

These facts clearly reveal the lies asserted in the notes of the Western powers to the Soviet government that the Federal Governments allegedly is not striving to obtain its own atomic forces and its own mass army. Behind the efforts undertaken in the notes of the Western powers to justify and minimize the seriousness of the establishment of the Wehrmacht and its arming with atomic weapons is hidden the old imperialist intention of using a militaristic Germany as a shock force against the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. It is obvious that several Western governmental offices still have not understood the lessons of the second World War.

The militaristic-clerical rulers of West Germany are trying to use this effort of the Western powers, at first under the slogan of the right to self-determination, for this aggressive policy against the German Democratic Republic. The West German imperialists want to annex the human and economic potential of the German Democratic Republic so as thereby to be supported by increased military and economic power, to display even stronger their hegemony in NATO, the European Economic Community and the West European Union.

The armament which continues and strengthens the position of West German power in NATO is accompanied by constantly growing revanchism. After the so-called eastern conference in the foreign policy committee of Bonn's Bundestag, the Baltic Baron [Georg] von Manteuffel-Szoegge [CSU] stated:

"A people which has lost a huge part of its territory achieves internal calm only when it is able to live again on its historic land."

This is nothing other than a demand to reestablish the great German empire of Hitler. The false slogan of self-determination is used not only to carry out an aggressive policy against the GDR, but also against all other European states of the socialist camp. The official "Bulletin" of the Bonn government wrote absolutely openly at the beginning of April of this year:

"We are talking not only about the splitting up of Germany. We are talking about the entire eastern part of Central Europe, about all states whose people have been forced into the status of satellites, about almost 100 million people . . ."

We are dealing here with the notorious "Drang nach Osten" [Urge to the East] under the flag of which German imperialism from time immemorial carried out their aggression against the peoples of eastern and south-eastern Europe. We must take into account that revanchist propaganda will grow even stronger, since the right-wing leaders of the West German Social Democrats moved over to the imperialist position. The main force of revanchist propaganda is directed now against the German Democratic Republic. Both Adenauer and Brandt said in meetings with ruling

political figures of the USA that they must and can find the means to organize from within uprisings in the German Democratic Republic with the aim of overthrowing the workers-peasants state. We must, however, note that this was said before the USA suffered the infamous failure with the intervention organized and lead by it against the revolutionary people's state in Cuba. We cannot forget that the West German extremists gave birth to the idea of unleashing civil war in Germany and involving the Western powers in a military escapade against the socialist camp.

Dear Comrades!

Considering this development of events in West Germany, our party and the GDR government approved of the Soviet aide-memoire of February 17 of this year, which gives the Bonn government the opportunity to change its die-hard and aggressive policy of refusing any negotiations on a peace treaty and refusing any negotiations between both German states. In this spirit at the 11th plenum of the Central Committee we appealed to the West German bourgeoisie with the urgent proposal to seek the possibility for agreement on the question of a peace treaty and a compromise with the German Democratic Republic. This political line was developed by us further at the 13th plenum of the Central Committee of our party, at which the initial point of discussion of these questions by us was the results of the meeting of Comrade Khrushchev with President Kennedy in Vienna, and also the conclusion of a peace treaty, its preconditions and consequences.

All party and democratic mass organizations of our Republic unanimously welcome the great chance which the Soviet proposal to the Western powers gives us, i.e., the proposal to appeal to the German governments with the call to reach agreement in any form acceptable to them on questions concerning a peace settlement with Germany and the reunification of the country. As you know, the Soviet government further proposed that the four powers would state earlier their readiness to recognize any agreement which would be reached as a result of the negotiations between the Germans. But this historic chance really can be used only in the event that the Germans themselves act. Therefore, the Volkskammer of the German Democratic Republic unanimously approved the "Peace Plan of the German People" put forward by our party. This plan proposes that the governments of both German states quickly agree on the creation of a German peace commission from the representatives of the parliament and government of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The peace commission must be ruled by the principle that neither side will force its will upon the other side. It must prepare German proposals on the peace treaty and an agreement of good will.

An agreement of good will could be directed towards the rapid improvement of relations between both German governments. It should provide for a refusal of the atomic arming of military forces and the speedy cessation of arming, achievement of agreement on the numbers, arms and distribution of military forces, and also the cessation of military and revanchist propaganda on its territory. Both German states must assume the responsibility of not interfering in the problems of the social system of each other. In addition, it recommends the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between the member-states of the Warsaw pact and the member-states of NATO and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

German proposals on the peace treaty set forth in the "Peace Plan of the German People" are directed towards making a decisive contribution to the preservation of a lasting peace on the

basis of the UN Charter. In agreement with our proposals, a peace treaty must put an end to any opportunities for unleashing a new war by Germany and, on the other hand, it must safeguard forever for the German people a life under conditions of peace and full equality in the family of nations.

On this basis a peace treaty will also create the preconditions for German reunification through the creation of a German confederation. Its aim will be the cooperation of both German states on the basis of peaceful coexistence for the preparation of their reunification in a peace-loving and neutral government.

The proposals for creating a German confederation also envisage an agreement on military neutrality of both German states as the basis for the future united and militarily neutral Germany. In his speeches in West Berlin and Cologne, Adenauer answered with unparalleled rage and insolence the proposal for the military neutralization of Germany, in which he went so far as [making] direct insults to the peoples of neutral states. This is clear proof that the idea of renouncing atomic armament and striving to secure peace by military neutralization has very many adversaries in the broad circles of West Germany.

To all the peace efforts among the West German population, the Bonn governments answer with the extreme force of the cold war against the German Democratic Republic. The campaigns of lies and slander against the German Democratic Republic and the massive recruitment of people from the GDR, which has turned into a real trade in people, pursues not only the goal of spreading alarm and uncertainty in the German Democratic Republic, but also serves to terrorize and suppress the forces of peace in West Germany. The intensification of the cold war by the Bonn "Office for the Carrying out of Psychological War" is a kind of accompaniment to the sharp rejection by the Bonn government of both the Soviet memorandum of February 17 and the "Peace Plan of the German People."

In his pre-election speeches Adenauer compared West German social democracy with a dragon which changes its skin. This comparison, however, better applies to aggressive and predatory German imperialism. Regardless of in which skin it appears, whether in the brown skin of the Nazi regime or in the black skin of the militarist-clerical regime, it remains the same brute which threatens the peace of the peoples of Europe and the whole world.

In the face of such developments in Germany, it is necessary to further strengthen the universal campaign for a peace treaty with Germany. In its last memorandum, the Soviet government proposed convening without delay a peace conference, concluding a peace treaty and resolving on this basis the question of West Berlin as a free city. In the event that the governments of the Western powers are still not ready for this, we looked at the possibility of an interim solution. It consists of the already mentioned appeal of the four powers to both German governments to agree between themselves within six months on the questions of a peace settlement with Germany and its reunification.

In their notes of response to the Soviet government, the Western powers refused to conclude a peace treaty with both German governments, and at the same time passed over in absolute silence the Soviet proposal for an interim agreement for achieving one German peace treaty. Adenauer's government flatly rejected any idea, even such an agreement.

In light of this situation, the conclusion of a peace treaty between the German Democratic Republic and those countries of the anti-Hitler coalition which are ready for this comes to the fore. In connection with this, the question again arises of what the peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic will bring to the German people and what it could do for the preservation and securing of peace?

The conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR would give the West German revanchists the sole argument which has a certain resonance in the international public, and refers precisely to the fact that the Potsdam Agreement provided for the final establishment of the German borders in a peace treaty. A peace treaty will yield an international-legal consolidation of the existing and established borders between the German Democratic Republic and the Polish People's Republic, between the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and also the borders between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

On the basis of the peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic there must also follow a new settlement of the West Berlin question, since it goes without saying that a peace treaty on all GDR territory, which also includes West Berlin, would end the operation of all occupation rights and the West Berlin occupation status. It would also end the operation of the purported "ordinary rights" to which the Western powers pretend, for want of an existing international-legal basis in favor of the preservation by them of the occupation regime in West Berlin. Under the new settlement, we mean further that the corresponding agreements must establish normal relations between West Berlin and those governments with which West Berlin as a free city wants to maintain relations.

After the conclusion of a peace treaty, the German Democratic Republic will fully exercise all sovereign rights on all of its territory, including also those rights, the exercise of which was temporarily given to the Soviet Union in 1955. These are control over the movement of human and cargo transport through GDR territory for the supply of the garrisons of the Western powers in West Berlin.

Essentially, the peace will bring, therefore, an international-legal consolidation of the existing conditions, and it will liquidate all remnants of the second World War on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, including also the occupation regime. In such a way, the peace treaty will strengthen the international-legal position of the German Democratic Republic and will create an important precondition for the establishment by the German Democratic Republic of normal relations with those governments with whom it has not yet had diplomatic relations. Apart from the international-legal side of the matter, the conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic will have great political and educational significance for the German people. All the proposals which were made with the goal of achieving agreements, and also the proposal made in 1952 for carrying out free all-German elections, were refused by Adenauer, who justified his refusal saying that he first he had to make the Federal Republic stronger and fully integrate it into NATO. The conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic will be a complete failure of Adenauer's policy of "negotiating from a position of strength."

After the conclusion of a peace treaty it will be necessary after the whole period of tension to achieve normal political, economic and cultural relations between both German governments. If

the borders between both German governments are consolidated in a peace treaty in an international-legal framework, then the absorption of the GDR by the current Bonn recipe will be impossible. This will significantly promote a diminishing of the danger of war in the center of Europe.

Peace will also be more sound also by virtue of the fact that the West German militarists will have much less opportunity to use West Berlin as a "front city" and as the advance forepost for the preparation of revanchist war. The plunder of the German Democratic Republic which has been carried out until now with the help of West Berlin will then stop. This also will lead to a weakening of Bonn's aggressive policy. Of course, the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR in many ways will contribute to the safe-guarding of peace in Europe and will not remain without influence on the structure of NATO. The conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic will answer, therefore, the interests of all peoples. In connection with this I ask the first secretaries of the fraternal parties that their diplomats will act in this way in all countries in which they are accredited.

In their notes of response to the Soviet government, the Western powers challenge the legality of concluding a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, referring in particular to their occupation rights in West Berlin which they want to preserve for all time. With this goal, they again refer to the protocols of the European Consultative Commission, and especially to the protocol of the September 12, 1944. On this question I must say that all of these protocols are only executive directives for the preparation by the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain of a program for the eradication of German militarism and nazism. In this regard, the US Ambassador [John G.] Winant expressed the following opinion in a telegram of January 10, 1945 to the President of the USA:

"Agreement over control will create the necessary machinery for the implementation of the conditions of capitulation, but in no way will pre-determine the policy which must be carried out in regard to Germany. It will create only the necessary mechanism for the fulfillment of the program, which must be determined by those who carry responsibility for policy."

The program about which this responsible American diplomat spoke then in the European Consultative Commission was formulated one month later at Yalta. It demanded the destruction of German militarism and nazism and was concerned that Germany would never again be in a position to disturb the peace of the whole world. The Yalta Declaration says:

"We will disarm and disband with full resolve all German armed forces, once and forever will abolish the German general staff, which repeatedly promoted the rebirth of German militarism . . . We will eliminate all nazi and militaristic influences from social institutions, from the cultural and economic life of the German people and we will jointly take such other measures regarding Germany which could prove necessary for future peace and the security of the whole world."

In both the Yalta Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement it was established clearly that the occupation of Germany must help the German people liquidate militarism and nazism. The Yalta and Potsdam Agreements were and are the basis of all other protocols, proclamations, order

and directives. The Western powers violated all the principles which were agreed to at Yalta and Potsdam for the occupation of Germany. The agreement concluded at the end of 1946 about the unification of two occupation zones was the beginning of the division of Germany and the restoration to power of the militarists and revanchists in West Germany. With the creation of a separate West German state, with the conclusion of the Paris Agreements and with the inclusion of West Germany in NATO, the Western powers finally unilaterally broke the Potsdam Agreement, this sole valid document in international law for Germany in the postwar period. It is not coincidental that in connection with this a special occupation status of the three powers was established in West Berlin. By this three-sided occupation status, the Western powers themselves confirmed that they violated the international-legal basis of their occupation regime in West Berlin and that this regime was based only on undisguised military force.

The abnormal situation in Germany, and especially in West Berlin, is a result of the one-sided violation of the Potsdam Agreement by the Western powers, the rebirth of militarism and the acquisition of atomic armaments, the penetration by the pernicious nazi spirit of the whole governmental, economic and cultural life of West Germany, the fascist oppression of anti-fascist and peace-loving forces by special laws and other measures of coercion, and an increasingly aggressive revanchist policy. In spite of this abnormal situation, the Soviet government kept trying anew to achieve through negotiations the normalization of the situation in Germany and in West Berlin. The German Democratic republic, putting forward the "Peace Plan of the German People" also demonstrated its readiness for the solution of all disputed questions through negotiations. But all these proposals were rejected by the Western powers and the Bonn government, at the same time that atomic armament and revanchist policy in West Germany pose an ever greater threat to peace. Thus, we are faced with the question of what to do. We propose that the Soviet government appeal to the Western powers with the proposal of beginning a joint discussion of the questions of preparing a peace conference, a peace treaty and the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city. Judging by their notes of response to the Soviet government, the Western powers will refuse a peace conference and negotiations on concluding a peace treaty with both German governments. But in this connection the matter will still probably go as far as negotiations on a diplomatic level. If the matter goes as far as the convening of a conference of the foreign ministers, then we believe it will be necessary that the foreign ministers of both German states take part, as they did in 1959 in Geneva.

We cannot trust the words of assurance about unity and resolve used in the notes of the Western powers. Although on basic questions of relations to the socialist camp they have some common views, on the paths to the achievement of their goals, there are obvious differences of opinion, and also contradictory imperialist interests. In addition, the pressure of public opinion is increasing, especially from the working class who demand the start of negotiations before the beginning of a possible crisis. Even in the notes themselves the possibility of negotiations is openly abandoned. So what could be the contents of negotiations among the four powers at the diplomatic level?

1. The contents of a peace treaty with both German states. In connection with they could also discuss the establishment of normal relations between both German states, especially as the proposal of an interim solution, i.e., appealing to the German governments with the call to agree on a joint position on the questions of a peace treaty and the reunification of Germany, completely avoided in the notes of the Western powers.

2. The abolition of the occupation status of the three powers in West Berlin and the conclusion of an agreement on the transformation of West Berlin into a neutral demilitarized free city. Also concerning this is the conclusion of corresponding agreements between the German Democratic Republic and the West Berlin senate and also between the German Democratic Republic and all states interested in the use of the links of West Berlin with the outside world, which pass through GDR territory.

3. The conclusion of an agreement on guarantees which would safe-guard the free decision of the West Berlin population of all issues of their internal social and political system in the free city and connections of the free city with the outside world.

The Soviet government, as is known, stated in its memorandum that it believes it would be possible to keep a symbolic military contingent of the Western powers or armies of neutral countries under the aegis of the UN in West Berlin. If the Western powers really are concerned about the freedom and independence of West Berlin and not about preserving the "front city" in the Cold War against the socialist camp, then they must recognize that this Soviet proposal goes far towards meeting them half-way. We persistently declare our support for this proposal.

In connection with such an agreement on guarantees it may prove useful to publish the statute for the free city. In our opinion it must provide for West Berlin to stand independently in the governmental-legal sense as a unit, having its base on the democratic principles of a constitution, with popular representation formed as a result of general, equal, direct and secret elections, which would then vote on a senate or government accountable to it. It would have the right to maintain a police for the preservation of calm and order.

The free city would have the opportunity to participate in international agreements and organizations, and it could appoint and receive consuls for the development of economic, cultural and other ties with the external world and for the defense of the interests of its citizens abroad. Participation in international agreements, for the fulfillment of which the free city must use the territory or fixed rights of the GDR, would be possible in accordance with agreement with the GDR. West Berlin, however will not have the right to turn over the conduct of its external relations to another government without the agreement of the governments who signed the agreement on guarantees.

Equal democratic rights and freedoms will be guaranteed to all citizens of the free city. Until the reunification of Germany, citizenship of the free city of West Berlin will be provided for. Citizens of both German states can become citizens of West Berlin only with the agreement of their government.

The statute of the free city will not affect the economic system or property relations in West Berlin. West Berlin will have the right to maintain foreign economic trade with all states without discrimination. The states participating in the agreement on guarantees can assume in the statute the obligation to give aid to the free city in the supply of food-stuffs and raw materials and also through the placing of orders for industries so as thus to guarantee the well-being of the economy and the prosperity of the citizens of West Berlin.

The GDR will provide to the free city, which must respect the sovereignty and laws of the GDR, the right of unhindered ties with the outside world, free movement of human and freight transport, free post, telegraph and telephone connections and other rights. The statute would obligate the free city to demilitarization and neutralization. It will not be able to participate in any agreements or alliances of military or military-political character. Service in the armed forces or other military formations of the existing German states will be forbidden for the citizens of the free city. All activity of military character in the free city will be prohibited, including both the production of arms and equipment. In the same way, the activity of fascist and anti-democratic organizations and military propaganda will be prohibited.

There is no doubt that the proposed agreements on guarantees and the status of the free city of West Berlin would normalize the situation in West Berlin and would provide freedom and independence for its population in the best way. These proposals would also respond to the slander campaign displayed by the imperialists around West Berlin.

In listing those things possible for diplomatic negotiations, the question, of course, arises of what other possibilities might be found for compromise.

In the notes from the Western powers, the return to an all-Berlin decision is recommended, which was proposed by the Western powers on May 26, 1959, at the Geneva conference of ministers of foreign affairs. It boils down to the German Democratic Republic being deprived of its capital--Democratic Berlin--and all of Berlin being made into an occupation regime. With the help of other so-called "resolutions of the Berlin problem" the Western powers also want to achieve through the so-called commission of four powers control over the German Democratic Republic, i.e. the establishment of an occupation regime in the sovereign German state of workers and peasants.

It goes without saying that we do not view such proposals as possible compromises, but only as an unacceptable effort at the gradual absorption of the German Democratic Republic into the aggressive military bloc of NATO.

If we speak of the possibilities of compromise, we have in mind two basic questions for the settlement of the West Berlin problem:

- a) the liquidation of espionage and sabotage centers in West Berlin and the cessation by West Berlin of all subversive work against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries;
- b) the creation of a system of treaties for the use of the links connecting West Berlin with the outside world, which pass through territory of the German Democratic Republic.

I must add several explanations on these two points.

The enemy is trying with all means to use the open border between the German Democratic Republic and West Berlin to undermine our government and its economy, primarily by means of recruiting and trading people. I must say openly: the aggressive forces of West Germany and the Western powers have already succeeded by these means in causing serious harm

to the German Democratic Republic. As long as West Germany surpasses the German Democratic Republic in its economic strength and its standard of living of the population, during this time we cannot reduce the organizational and financial enticement by great means of people from our republic. It is precisely these economic facts which give such dangerous subversive work of the espionage and diversionary centers in West Berlin. But the preservation of the state of the market in West Germany and the economic development in the socialist camp does not allow us to expect that the German Democratic Republic in the near future will catch up with West Germany in the standard of living of the population. In the interests of the existence and development of the German Democratic Republic, therefore, active measures for ending the recruitment of people from our Republic are necessary. Related to this primarily is the liquidation of the espionage and subversive centers in West Berlin and full control over the transit routes. The following situation will arise with regard to the links of West Berlin with the outside world through the territory of the German Democratic Republic. With the exception of military transports for the garrisons of the Western powers in West Berlin all links by land are controlled already by organs of the German Democratic Republic. After the conclusion of a peace treaty, control over the transit of military personnel and cargo transports of the garrisons of the three Western powers in West Berlin must, of course, be transferred to the organs of the German Democratic Republic. Regarding the waterways, the situation will be about the same, except that only after the conclusion of a peace treaty, control should be carried out more carefully than it is now.

The most difficult [issue] will be the matter of control over the air routes into and out of West Berlin. All air traffic into West Berlin, where West German planes are not allowed, at the present time takes place in three air corridors, namely Berlin-Hamburg, Berlin-Bückeburg and Berlin-Frankfurt-on-Main. It is regulated by Air Security Center of the four powers located in West Berlin. We propose that with the conclusion of a peace treaty the Soviet representatives in the center of flight security would declare this institution disbanded. Its functions would be transferred to the GDR Air Security Center. After this, all states who wanted to have regular flights through the air space of the German Democratic Republic would have to conclude corresponding treaties with the German Democratic Republic.

The two West Berlin airports at Tempelhof and Tegel are not in keeping with the regulations on air communications, and their use by planes flying at the same time creates a constant danger to the population in regions close by in both Democratic and West Berlin. The most rational decision would be the concentration of all air communication with Berlin to the GDR airport in Schönefeld. Construction of the airport is being completed in such a way that it will answer all the demands of current international air travel. In spite of Schönefeld being located outside of Berlin, there are convenient connections from it with both Democratic Berlin and West Berlin.

If an agreement on the concentration of all air traffic in Schönefeld proves impossible, then it still will be necessary that some planes in West Berlin use the Schönefeld airport. Other planes taking off or landing at Tegel or Tempelhof, of course, must also be supervised by organs of the German Democratic Republic.

An aggravation of revanchist policy, general statements by the Adenauer government which plan for all Germany to be included in NATO and to spread the internal system in West

Germany also to the GDR, and measures for the preparation of civil war would create a new situation. The Bonn government has resorted, with the support of the SPD leadership, to severing ties between social organizations, to organizing by various means the enticement of GDR citizens and the payment of a poll tax, and causing annoyances and arresting GDR citizens who are visiting West Germany. This situation makes a settlement necessary such that at a given time the state border of the German Democratic Republic (going through Berlin) could be crossed by citizens of the German Democratic Republic only with the corresponding permission for exit or, in so far as it concerns the visitation of the capital of the GDR, with a special pass. Visiting of the capital of the GDR by West Berliners would be possible on the basis of the West Berlin identity card (but not on the basis of the West German passport).

The grounds for this measure: In view of the aggressive policy of the Bonn government, expressed in revanchist demands and in militaristic and subversive activity, measures are required for the defense of the German Democratic Republic and the governments of the socialist camp.

The West German revanchists and militarists are using the peace-loving position of the USSR and the member-states of the Warsaw Pact on the resolution of German question, so as to inflict harm on the German Democratic Republic through subversive activity and the illegal recruitment of citizens of the German Democratic Republic. For this, they primarily use the open border in Berlin. In the interests of the peaceful work and construction by the citizens of the German Democratic Republic and of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact, it is necessary to stop the illegal recruitment and other hostile measures. Therefore, we propose that the member-states of the Warsaw Pact agree, in the interests of the cessation of the subversive activity, to implement control along the borders of the German Democratic Republic, including the borders in Berlin, comparable to the control along the state borders of the Western powers.

If it seems that the Western powers will not support a peace conference for the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German governments, but only want to reach agreement on the preservation of their occupation status in West Berlin, then the necessity will arise for the Soviet government to appeal to the governments of those states who participated with their armed forces in the war against Hitler's Germany, with the proposal for the convocation of a peace conference aimed towards concluding a peace treaty with the GDR. We can propose that only those states of the anti-Hitler coalition who are ready to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR participate in this conference.

Where could this conference for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR take place? We think it is possible that it could take place in Potsdam so as to emphasize by choice of the venue that the conclusion of the peace treaty is based on principles which were worked out jointly by the Allies during the struggle with Hitler and which were set down in the Potsdam Agreement as obligatory for the postwar system in Germany. If this proposal does not meet with approval, then we propose to convene the peace conference in Moscow.

Of course, we must ask ourselves at this conference what conflicts could arise from the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR? In spite of the rattling of weapons in several statements of the Western powers, we find it hard to believe that they will use military means. The slogan "die for West Berlin" is not popular among the people. But it is very probable that the Bonn government could unilaterally denounce the trade agreement between the German

Democratic Republic and the West German Federal Republic and that NATO could enact an economic embargo against the German Democratic Republic. Proceeding from this expectation, we must use intensively and thoroughly the time necessary for the Soviet negotiations with the Western powers so that we can achieve significant economic independence of the German Democratic Republic from West Germany. In the event of the conclusion of a peace treaty, all measures of an economic blockade will certainly be directed primarily against the German Democratic Republic. With regard to the volume of production, our Republic is the second industrial state in the socialist camp. Safe-guarding its industrial production from all interference is therefore in the interests of the whole socialist camp.

The difficulty is that the German Democratic Republic does not have sufficient opportunity for the broad development of its own production of basic materials and production of high quality special steel. GDR exports to the Soviet Union and the people's democracies to a significant degree were connected to a significant degree to supplies from West Germany and several other Western capitalist countries. The clients also in part directly demanded the use of certain units from Western countries. As a result of this, with the growth of exports to countries of the socialist camp, GDR dependence on West Germany also grew. We repeatedly pointed out this danger and proposed changing the scientific-technical cooperation of the socialist countries fundamentally so as to decrease dependence on the capitalist countries. We hope that measures for reorganization carried out in relation to the work of the Committee of the Coordination of Scientific Research Work in the Soviet Union, will exert a favorable influence also on scientific-technical cooperation. The Council of Mutual Economic Aid cannot [both] concentrate on basic issues and organize cooperation.

The difficulty of the task at the present time, therefore, is the following: the economy of the German Democratic Republic is significantly tied to the West German economy; we must make it independent from West Germany. This demands a change in the industrial profile of the German Democratic Republic. Since we don't have industrial and raw material reserves and the national economic plan is not balanced, this task will be very difficult to resolve. By the resolution of the CPSU CC Presidium and the Soviet government, essential industrial help and significant credit was granted to the GDR government. I want to heartily thank the CPSU CC Presidium and Comrade Khrushchev and also the employees of Gosplan USSR for the great aid which they are giving us so as to protect the GDR economy to a significant degree from subversive activity.

But since some of the special steel, chemical products and raw materials are not mass produced in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union cannot give use help in all areas. It is necessary, therefore, to quickly reach concrete agreements with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Polish People's Republic and other socialist governments regarding the additional supplies. We must keep in mind that the peculiarity of the GDR economy, which earlier was dependent on significant supplies of spare parts from West Germany, now needs the reconstruction of part of its industry so that we ourselves can produce these spare parts.

It is clear to all comrades that our adversaries are carrying out a campaign aimed at the acute shortages and needs in the GDR. This forces us to secure regular provisions for the population. The situation existing until now in which the export of goods of mass consumption had priority before the provision of things to our own people cannot be maintained any longer. It

will be necessary to cancel a significant part of the planned export of goods of mass consumption to the socialist countries in the period before the establishment of normal economic relations after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

The open border with West Berlin has brought enormous damages to the GDR economy for many years. To a significant degree the burden of the consequences of the struggle between the two systems lies on our shoulders. This is expressed in the economic subversion and diversionary activity against the GDR, in large-scale sabotage, and in the enticement to the West of the work force with the help of large bribes. The Bonn government is using the state of the market in West Berlin to buy GDR citizens; they are using the exchange rate of West Berlin hard currency at a rate of 1:4 German marks so as to attract citizens of the capital of the GDR to work in West Berlin. As a result, we have serious losses in the work force which of course puts in question the fulfillment of our national economic plan and even the fulfillment of export orders.

The one way for overcoming this difficulties is speedy mechanization and automation. Therefore, the GDR government appeals to the governments of the USSR and of the people's democracies with the request to grant us machines, assemblies and licenses with the goal of rationalization, mechanization and automation.

The most important step which we must take now is an agreement on supplies from the Soviet Union and the people's democracies with the goal of making the GDR economy independent from West Germany. On our side we propose our efforts to change our industrial profile so that the raw materials which the socialist camp has can find clients. The GDR Gosplan will report to the Gosplan of the USSR and other socialist countries and also to the Council of Mutual Economic Aid its proposals on the gradual specialization of industry in the GDR. We are speaking primarily about products which demand a large amount of raw materials or which are produced in an insufficient amount. Only if on the basis of an agreement, specialization will be achieved gradually and we can produce larger parts, which will give us the opportunity to produce industrial wares of a high scientific-technical level, will we advance faster in the competition with the capitalist countries.

Without such measures of economic self-defense by our Republic, about which I have been speaking until now, the question will arise again of what can be done to avert the severing of economic ties or to paralyze its effect. We see three possibilities:

First, the damage which would be suffered by the German Democratic Republic due to the unilateral severing of economic relations by the West German side could be compensated for, if only partly, by the sharp raising of taxes on the movement of West German transport vehicles on the highways, streets and shipping lanes of the GDR.

Second, if economic relations are severed unilaterally by West Germany, the German Democratic Republic cannot guarantee regular passenger and freight movement between West Germany and West Berlin. I already reminded you at our meeting in March that even the fee for the railroad transport of the garrisons of the Western powers in West Berlin is calculated through the trade agreement between both German states. By severing economic relations, West Germany also would be deprived of the basis of its railroad passenger and freight transport into

and out of West Berlin and would make it impossible. But not one capitalist can demand from us that we carry his carriages around on our railways for free.

Third, the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the people's democracies should be prepared to make a break-through of the embargo possible. We must achieve a reduction in the effectiveness of the measures of the blockade by the Bonn government, for example by favorable agreements on the continuation of supplies by Western capitalist firms in a round-about way.

Together with the economic measures, our imperialist adversaries will also take political measures in West Berlin. We can assume with certainty that a referendum will be carried out against the conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and for membership in the Federal Republic and for an appeal to the Western powers to maintain their garrisons in West Berlin.

On this question we must assert: West Berlin is located on the territory of a state--the German Democratic Republic, in an international-legal position in which citizens of West Berlin essentially cannot make any decision at all. Such a referendum, it is true, would only confirm that the occupation statute in West Berlin no longer has any international-legal basis, but nothing would change in the international-legal illegal continuation of the occupation regime. Such a referendum has nothing at all in common with self-determination, which under the conditions of an occupation regime it is impossible to have. It could be characterized only as a transparent maneuver in the cold war.

In the course of diplomatic or other negotiations of the Soviet Union with the Western powers, which would occur before the conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, it could, however, be made clear that in various areas or on individual issues there could be agreement after international-legal facts are created on the basis of the peace treaty. We will search for such opportunities for agreement. This will make it harder for the more aggressive imperialist forces to respond to the conclusion of a peace treaty with military provocations. Therefore, we should think about whether we should not at the very beginning include in the planned peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic an article in which the agreeing sides declare that the German Democratic Republic imposes on itself the duty of carrying out negotiations with other states on the transit routes into and out of Berlin, and also on agreements aimed at guaranteeing the freedom and independence of the West Berlin population. In this spirit, the German Democratic Republic expresses its readiness to enter into negotiations with the West Berlin Senate, and also with the Western powers and West Germany on questions which the participating sides are interested in settling. This includes all issues of links with the German Democratic Republic and through the territory of the German Democratic Republic, including not only normal passenger and freight transit, but also the conveyance of troops, employees and cargo of the Western powers in the event that they still maintain garrisons in West Berlin. We of course are not talking about endless negotiations, with the help of which they want only to maintain the occupation regime for an unlimited time in West Berlin with all the consequences which flow from this. We will have to agree on a limited time period for these negotiations, during which they must lead to acceptable results for those participating.

With the conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, of course, all remnants of the war and the occupation regime must be liquidated. I would like to name several of these which still exist.

The three Western powers maintain military missions at the Main Command of the Soviet Military Forces which are temporarily located in the GDR. The conclusion of the peace treaty will eliminate the basis for their existence and activity. Therefore, it is necessary to take measures for the cessation of activity of these missions.

In West Berlin military missions still exist which are accredited to the former Allied Control Council. It seems essential that all states which conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic liquidate these missions or convert them into consulates which must be accredited to the Senate in West Berlin.

In West Berlin the so-called Bureau of Travel and Communications of the Western occupation forces still exists, which confers on itself the right to issue temporary documents for travel by citizens of the German Democratic Republic. At the NATO meeting in 1958 a decision was made that the member-states of NATO were obliged not to recognize the German Democratic Republic passport. Of course, they treat citizens of the German Democratic Republic as they do inhabitants of colonial countries, for whom any foreign occupation officer will give a passport. By the way, it is a funny thing that this foreign occupation officer is not even located in the state for whose citizens he issues passports. The struggle for the recognition of German Democratic Republic passports, therefore, has great significance. We ask our comrades from fraternal parties to give their diplomatic and consular representatives the order to help us achieve the recognition of GDR passports in all countries where they are not now recognized.

With regard to the remnants of the war and the occupation regime is also the fact that military transport of the three Western powers into and out of West Berlin until now has occurred on our railways with an extremely low military tariff which had its origin already in Hitler's time. If the garrisons of the Western powers will still remain for a time in West Berlin after the conclusion of the peace treaty, it will be necessary to come to an agreement with them on transport on German Democratic Republic railroads, which will preserve the normal payment for transport.

After setting forth this whole series of problems that arise in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin problem, we would like to propose to the meeting the following practical measures:

1. Appointing under the leadership of representatives of the Soviet government a working group which will work out a draft peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and will publish it after agreeing with those governments represented here. The working group will also prepare agreed drafts on the declaration of guarantee for a neutral, demilitarized free city of West Berlin and the statute of the free city.

2. Forming under the leadership of representatives of the Soviet government a commission which will prepare the convocation and carrying out of a peace conference with the task of concluding a peace treaty with the GDR.

3. Concluding agreements between the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries, for example, the USSR, for safeguarding the economic independence of the German Democratic Republic from West Germany.

4. Agreeing on measures between the German Democratic Republic and other socialist states which will ensure that the difficulties connected with the heavier loads of transport can be systematically overcome by means of additional supplies to the GDR. This concerns primarily the links between the USSR and the GDR through the territory of the Polish People's Republic.

5. Instructing the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance to provide for uninterrupted delivery to the GDR population in the 4th quarter of 1961 and in 1962 by concluding corresponding agreements between the GDR and other socialist states and corresponding changes in existing treaties and agreements.

6. We must organize an international information center under the leadership of representatives of the CPSU Central Committee in cooperation with SED representatives, the Czech communist party and the Polish united workers' party. Its task will be the direction of international propaganda in connection with the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany and the settlement of the West Berlin problem. From time to time we should have meetings with representatives of all socialist countries.

Dear comrades!

The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the settlement of the West Berlin problem are the key questions of international politics. We are speaking about extremely important matters--about the safeguarding of peace, about the restraint of German militarism, above all in its revanchist efforts it could bring the world to atomic war. We carry great responsibility for the preservation of peace and the security of the states of the socialist camp. It would be wrong to close our eyes to the fact that in the resolution of the decisive tasks which stand before us, it is possible that there will be military conflicts. Therefore, the present meeting was called to discuss all these problems.

In the struggle to conclude a peace treaty with Germany a new international correlation of forces in the world will be brought to the consciousness of the masses. Public statements by governmental figures of the Western powers and their notes and other official publications are dictated by the effort to keep the masses in ignorance regarding the real international correlation of forces which is determined by political, economic, and military factors.

The peaceful policy of the states of the socialist camp is far superior to the policy of the imperialists. Precisely because of this they spasmodically try to transform the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany into a threat to peace.

In the military area, the socialist camp, primarily thanks to the enormous scientific and technical achievements of the Soviet Union, is clearly superior to the imperialist warmongers.

The fundamental difficulty we have is in the economic sphere. It is true that all socialist countries are superior in their rate of economic growth to the capitalist states, but the initial level of almost all socialist countries was very low in comparison with the imperialist camp, such that they had to overcome huge difficulties so as to compensate for the historic lag. A special situation exists between the two German states. In West Germany there is not only a continuing effective performance of the market and a high standard of living, but at the present time the growth in production is higher than in the German Democratic Republic. Having a highly developed industry at its disposal, the German Democratic Republic had an absolutely insufficient raw material base, and in several areas it was not enough at all. The fact that West Germany has at its disposal the Ruhr area with its coal and metallurgical base as well as a highly developed chemical industry, at the same time that the German Democratic Republic needs supplies from West Germany for its own industry, worked to the detriment of the economic development of the first socialist state in Germany. We must say clearly that this detriment succeeds in confirming that the industrial capacity of the German Democratic Republic will be able to be used fully in the interests of the whole socialist camp only in the event that economic cooperation of the German Democratic Republic with the Soviet Union and close economic and technical cooperation with the other socialist countries is created. The resolution of this task will give us the guarantee that the great political tasks for safeguarding the peaceful development of all socialist countries will be settled quickly.

APPENDIX I

Letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, 15 September 1961. SED Archives, IfGA, ZPA, Central Committee files, Walter Ulbricht's office, Internal Party Archive, J IV 2/202/130..

Now that the first part of the task of preparing the peace treaty has been carried out, I would like to inform the CPSU CC Presidium about the situation.

The implementation of the resolution on the closing of the border around West Berlin went according to plan. The tactic of gradually carrying out the measures made it more difficult for the adversary to orient himself with regard to the extent of our measures and made it easier for us to find the weak places in the border. I must say that the adversary undertook fewer counter-measures than was expected. The dispatch of 1500 American bandits would bother the West Berliners more than we do. The drawing-up of the Soviet troops into a position of readiness as well as the employment of units of the National People's Army in Berlin had a very sobering effect on the adversary. It was of decisive significance that the Warsaw Pact states acted unanimously under Soviet leadership and that the Soviet press reported comprehensively after August 13 and took a position supporting the GDR measures.

We achieved the following things by closing the border around West Berlin:

- 1.) The protection of the GDR against the organization of a civil war and military provocations from West Berlin.
- 2.) The cessation of the economic and cultural undermining of the capital of the GDR by the West Berlin swamp.
- 3.) A change in the political situation will occur. The Bonn government has understood that the policy of revanch and the plan to roll back the GDR by the organization of a civil war and a small war has been destroyed for all time. This will later have great effects on the tactics of the Western powers regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- 4.) The authority of the GDR state, which was weakened by its tolerance towards the subversive measures from West Berlin, was strengthened and a revolution in the thinking of the population of the capital and the GDR has occurred.

The experiences of the last years have proven that it is not possible for a socialist country such as the GDR to carry out peaceful competition with an imperialist country such as West Germany with open borders. Such opportunities first appear when the socialist world system has surpassed the capitalist countries in per-capita production.

The adversary tried to answer our defense measures with a cry about the division of Germany. The attempt to call forth difficulties for us through chauvinistic propaganda and the use of the slogan of the "right to self-determination" failed, because large groups of the population had believed for a long time that it could not continue further as it was. The revolution in the mood of the GDR population was expressed in the happiness that the adversary was dealt a real blow. The authority of the GDR state grew significantly in the people's consciousness. Not only broad groups of the industrial workers, but also the collective farm

workers, are working better than before. The main discussions in the weak sections of the population, especially in parts of the intelligentsia, are basically about perspectives. Many people say that they will no longer be able to visit their uncle and their aunt regularly, but they really think that now the Western orientation is shattered and that there is no longer any other way than to orient themselves on the workers-and-peasants state of the GDR and on the socialist camp. Each citizen of the Republic who hoped for the reunification of Germany through an inexplicable compromise between the four powers or in general through any kind of "concessions by both sides" was forced to think the issue through to its conclusion, i.e., the resolution of the national issue of the German people presupposes the conquest of German imperialism and the victory of socialism in the GDR. The people learned in the days after August 13 to completely think through many questions to the end. I would like to mention that the organized adversaries, who let themselves be led in their struggle against the GDR by RIAS [Radio in the American Sector] and West Berlin agencies, on the basis of the hatred of the West Berlin radio stations in July and the first half of August, were released from prison and some were made safe. I must say that the intelligentsia in general understood the situation relatively quickly. They respected the measures of the state, and there were fewer difficulties with them than before. There were bigger conflicts only with a part of the young intelligentsia which felt the experiences of the capitalist time.

In the GDR capital, some of the citizens who had worked in West Berlin factories took work in our factories. There are young people who were infected strongly by the Western imperialist propaganda and asphalt culture. Some of the younger workers refused to work and roamed around the streets. We transported some of them from the streets into work camps to teach them to work. There were difficulties, because some of the doctors of Charity hospital and other hospitals live in West Berlin and were influenced there not to come to work in the capital of the GDR. Also several large orchestras and theater ensembles are having difficulties which we are trying to overcome by enlisting artistic forces from the Republic (50% of the musicians of the orchestra of German State Opera were West Berliners; the majority of artists at the Comic Opera live in West Berlin).

The present elections for the district parliaments, district councils, and district assemblies help us to carry out great educational work in the entire population and to further consolidate the situation.

A measure of the drastic change in the working class is the resolution on production intentions for raising the production in the same period of time and with the same pay, as well as making the economy free from interference. The agricultural production cooperatives have begun a plan for raising the production for the market in a similar way. We not only want to raise production with this campaign, but also at least in part to correct the violations of the economic laws which occurred due to influences from West Berlin.

The raising of consciousness of struggle is reflected in the commitment of more than 50,000 young men to voluntary duty in the National People's Army. Of course, the older workers also helped with this, since they made it clear to the young men that every young man must complete his military service with defense of the fatherland. There are many resolutions from the factories which request the President of the Volkskammer to move for the Volkskammer to resolve on the institution of the draft. We have stopped this now and postponed these appeals until after the peace treaty.

The visit of the cosmonaut Comrade Major Titov was a great help for us. His visit gave us the opportunity to connect the questions of the securing of peace with friendship with the Soviet Union and with the issues of the future as they are set forth in the CPSU program. Comrade Titov behaved extraordinarily. Even in the most complicated situation he reacted quickly and properly politically, like a true cosmonaut. So, thank you very much for this great help.

Due to our measures of August 13, the whole election exercise was muddled up in West Berlin and West Germany. When Mr. Brandt was summoned to Berlin on August 13, he made an overwhelming impression and demanded countermeasures by the Bonn government and the Western powers, even if they meant extreme risk. The adventurer Brandt overtook even Mr. Adenauer in regard to chauvinism and anti-communism. This does not however change the reality that both Adenauer and Brandt came to West Berlin to see for themselves the fragments of their policy of revanch and the policy of strength.

In West Berlin itself the border areas have become desolate. Many stores and cinemas are closed, many members of the bourgeoisie are moving their homes to West Germany. There are now many villas for sale in West Berlin. The new aspect of the situation is that West Berlin has finished playing its role as a show window of the capitalist West and also will continue to function only partially as a center of subversion. Further, it has been made clear that by the regulation of the use of the transit routes of the GDR to West Berlin, this part of the city will not escape from the difficulties. West Berlin can develop only on the basis of normal relations with the GDR. Until now West Berlin received about one and half million marks in subsidy from the USA and the Bonn government per year. In addition, there are the many buildings which were made with money from the USA and Bonn. The West Berlin Senate demands in addition from Bonn a further one billion mark subsidy each year. From this it is clear how much West Berlin has lived at the cost GDR. After the closing of the border, suddenly there was still present in the GDR capital even in the evenings enough meat of the best quality, while before, especially on weekends, it was already sold out by midday. We also do not have any more problems with bread or butter in the capital. Even the women are satisfied that they can now go to the hair dresser's, since until now the big hair dressing salons were occupied by West Berlin women.

In West Germany, the defense measures of August 13 also led to a sobering up among a part of the bourgeoisie. War Minister Strauss was somewhat repressed and Economics Minister Erhard was pushed more into the foreground. Unfortunately the time until the elections in West Germany on September 17 was too short so that August 13 had only a little influence in West Germany. The German Peace Union cannot master the new main questions in so short a time, although it takes great pains and its resolution on a neutral Germany has gained ground gradually.

The international effect of August 13 was generally a very positive one. The citizens of the people's democracies realize more and more now that the struggle against German militarism and for a peace treaty is the business of every people's democracy. The danger of German militarism has become more clearly visible in the capitalist countries of Western Europe. In the majority of neutral countries the governments have come to the realization that there is a German Democratic Republic, and it is no longer prepared to support the occupation rights in West Germany and West Berlin claimed by the USA. Regarding the USA, it obviously will play the

strong man by bare-faced demands and thinks it will gain a better negotiating position from this. Otherwise, it cannot be explained that the USA claimed an unrestricted right to occupation in West Germany and West Berlin in its last note. The American-oriented West Berlin daily newspaper "Der Tagesspiegel" even refers to the Haager Convention of 1898 in which the conduct of occupation troops in a country captured in war was regulated. This position of leading politicians in the USA and West Germany has induced us to carry out a systematic campaign for the right to self-determination of the West German population with the demand of the right of West Germany to leave the Paris Treaties and the demand for the removal of American occupation troops from West Germany. Since the resolution of the national question of the German people is only possible through the overcoming of German imperialism, we put forward the liberation of West Germany from the shackles of the Paris Treaties of NATO and the departure of foreign troops from West Germany as prospects for the militarily neutral Germany. The strengthening of the workers-and-peasants state of the GDR and the victory of socialism is the basic condition to overcoming the imperialist past and present in all of Germany and to establishing a militarily neutral and flourishing Germany.

We assess the situation such that the GDR will be strengthened further. In this we must see that also when the borders are closed the competition with West Germany will continue. Thus, we must overcome in the next years the losses which we have suffered because of West Berlin aggression; we must carry out economic cooperation with the USSR consistently, and reach the figures of the Seven-Year Plan again in 1963. This requires a corresponding plan for 1962 which will enable the preparation for this goal.

What are our next measures? We are preparing ourselves for the conclusion of the peace treaty. By the time of the talks in the second half of October, we would like to inform you of our view "On the question of the air connections to West Berlin." The question of the air connections over the air space of the GDR is already playing the main role in discussions in the circle of Western powers. We have prohibited the false term "air corridors" to be used.

In the attached, I send you a report of a discussion with a group of House of Commons parliamentarians of the British Conservative Party, which took place on the occasion of the visit to the Leipzig Fair.

The West Berlin commandants are trying through various protests to awaken in the public the impression that a four-power status still exists in Berlin. We believe that we should no longer publish such reports of complaints of the West Berlin commandants to the chief of the Soviet garrison in Berlin. It would be best if such complaints were not accepted in general any more. When the Western powers have requests, they can report these to the Soviet government.

In the Volkskammer session of September 20, we will adopt the law for the defense of the GDR. In addition, we will carry out now the agreed-upon measures on the safe-guarding and strengthening of the GDR border with West Germany.

The key thing is economic, to make the GDR economy safe from subversion by December 1. It will facilitate the international talks if the Bonn government knows that we are well prepared for any possible blockade measures, that such measures will concern us much less than they will concern West Berlin.

We think it is important that the anniversary of the foundation of the GDR, October 7, be celebrated on a greater scale than has been common until now. We ask your opinion as to whether it is possible for the USSR to send a delegation of leading comrades of the party and government. We had the intention of inviting you, dear Comrade Nikita Sergeevich for October 7, but we do not presume to express the request directly, since no doubt you are busy with the preparation for the Party Congress. We request your view on the composition of the Soviet delegation so that we can propose to the people's democracies that they all send delegations of leading comrades.

I have written little about West Germany in this letter. I think, though, that we must essentially change and improve much in our work in West Germany. I will write about this later.

We are very grateful to you that you sent us Comrade Marshal [I.S.] Konev [Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany]. This is a great help. Our cooperation is very good.

Thank you very much for the information about your interesting meeting with Mr. [Amintore] Fanfani [the Italian Prime Minister]. Your statements were very important for my further orientation.

I wish you good health and remain,
with communist greetings,
Yours,
W. Ulbricht

APPENDIX J

Letter from Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 28 September 1961. SED Archives, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130.

We have noted your letter of September 15 with great interest and thank you for the detailed information on the measures for the strengthening and control of the GDR borders with West Berlin.

We share your assessment of the significance which these measures have for the GDR and for all socialist countries, and we congratulate the SED CC very warmly on their successful implementation. Through this our position has been strengthened on the questions of concluding a German peace treaty and on the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis. The governments of the Western powers, under public pressure, recently have been supporting negotiations on the German question more definitely. Many representatives of the Western powers have begun to assess the situation in Berlin more soberly, although the extreme reactionary circles still are trying to complicate the situation in Central Europe. It is also significant that many neutral countries support our proposals for the conclusion of a German peace treaty and recognize the fact of the existence of two German states.

It is necessary to emphasize that we agree with your view on taking measures for further strengthening the economic and domestic political situation in the GDR. We also think it is correct that the question of the air connections to and from West Berlin must be decided with the conclusion of a peace treaty and that this resolution must take account of the sovereignty of the GDR and common international practice. We also do not object to the commandant of the garrison of Soviet troops in Berlin avoiding contact with the West Berlin military commandants of the USA, England, and France on issues which belong to the competence of the GDR. Our commandant already has received the corresponding instructions for his detachments. Under the present circumstances, since the measures for the safeguarding and control of the GDR borders with West Berlin have been implemented successfully, since the Western powers are tending towards negotiations and contacts between the USSR and the US have already been made in New York, such steps which could exacerbate the situation, especially in Berlin, should be avoided. In this connection, it is especially appropriate to abstain from new measures which would change the control order set up by the GDR government on the border with West Berlin.

The CPSU CC Presidium has examined your invitation to a Soviet delegation to the celebrations of the 12th anniversary of the GDR and has accepted this invitation. We will report to you especially on the composition of the delegation. You know, dear Comrade Ulbricht, that I myself also would like to visit your very hospitable country again. You, yourself, however, remarked correctly that due to the preparations for the 22nd CPSU Party Congress, we are deprived of this delightful opportunity. However, we will see each other soon in Moscow and can discuss personally all questions of interest.

I wish you and all SED CC Politburo members health and further success in their work.

APPENDIX K

Letter from Ulbricht and the SED CC delegation to the CPSU 22nd Congress in Moscow to Khrushchev, 30 October 1961. SED Archives, IfGA, ZPA, NL 182/1206.

To the
First Secretary
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev

Moscow

Dear Comrade Nikita Sergeevich!

The members of the SED CC delegation to 22nd CPSU Party Congress request a meeting with representatives of the CPSU CC presidium and CPSU to discuss our further tactics.

As preparation for this discussion, we are sending you in the following several thoughts on our evaluation of the situation and several proposals for further measures.

I.

The resolution of the Warsaw Pact states on the effective safe-guarding of the GDR border as well as its capital against West Berlin has been implemented with success. It has proven tactically correct to carry out the various measures gradually.

Also the decision of August 23, 1961, to reduce the number of control points on the border with West Berlin to 7, including only 1 control point for foreigners, was confirmed by developments thus far as necessary and correct. Experience has shown that it is virtually impossible to check Germans and foreigners simultaneously with a greater number of control points.

The Soviet Ambassador, Pervukhin, on his part raised objections against these measures with an appeal for a 4-power resolution. We, however, could not accept this argument. We are guided by the tactical point of view of moving gradually just so far with our security measures that there will not be serious complications.

The situation on the border normalized itself soon after the implementation of our measures. The civilian representatives of the Western powers also produced their personal identification as identification of themselves. The U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, who specially came to Berlin to try out whether he could cross the border, made no exception to this. Due to showing his employment identification, which legitimated him as the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, he could pass unhindered.

In the meantime, the Bonn government and certain circles of the Pentagon have carried out a counter-thrust in order to reverse at least partially the results of August 13. With this, it is

obviously the intention of the aggressive circles of the Western powers to make a satisfactory resolution of the West Berlin problem impossible through the creation of certain fait accomplis.

The counter-thrust of the Western powers was introduced with the public statement of US Foreign Minister Rusk, about the "rights" of the Western powers in the GDR capital. Immediately after this General Clay organized the well-known provocation on the border with West Berlin. It was announced publicly that the USA would bring by air to West Berlin in large or small groups hundreds of non-commissioned officers of US troops stationed in West Germany and other European countries from there [West Berlin] to drive around in the capital of the GDR without being checked. These provocative actions have begun already.

We know the guidelines of the French commandant in which a reinforced visit by members of NATO occupation forces in uniform and in civilian attire are announced in the GDR capital. Army members in uniform or in civilian attire are told not to show any identification in crossing the border into the GDR capital. The vehicle driver--even when he is a German--should refuse to show his documents. In the guidelines of the French commandant the army members are instructed further to drive through the control points on the border of the GDR capital without stopping. It should also be attempted to break through other control points which are not meant for entry and exit by foreigners.

The provocative character of the proceedings of the Western powers, which undermines the sovereignty of the GDR and is supposed to hinder a peaceful resolution of the West Berlin issue, clearly results from this order.

These actions of the military officials of the Western powers show that obviously we can only arrive at negotiations on the peaceful resolution of the West Berlin question when the basic preconditions of future negotiations are agreed upon to begin with. This means that it is necessary to establish to begin with the sovereignty of the GDR and of its capital.

We request in this connection that the representatives of the USSR categorically demand in talks with representatives of the Western powers that the control journeys of US-military patrols on the Helmstedt-Berlin stretch [of the transit route] be stopped immediately. The present situation in which jeeps with US control officers are accompanied by a Soviet vehicle does not improve the situation. Through this is raised much more the impression of a legalization of this patrol route on the autobahn. This issue is so important to us, because the Western powers want to create through these regular control trips a fait accompli aimed at creating an extraterritorial corridor between West Germany and West Berlin, demanded by West German militarists.

In the last talks between Comrade Khrushchev and myself, as also at the meeting of the first secretaries of the communist and workers' parties, it was agreed that before the conclusion of a peace treaty, there must be an agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers on the West Berlin question. The result of this agreement and the guarantee statement of the Soviet Union and the GDR on West Berlin then must be worked into the peace treaty with the GDR.

II.

Since Comrade Khrushchev declared in the report that the Soviet Union would not insist on signing a peace treaty absolutely by December 31, 1961 if the Western powers show readiness for the resolution of the German problem, it is now necessary to agree on further tactics.

To advance the process of political differences in West Germany, we propose that the GDR appeal again to the West German Federal Republic with a proposal for an agreement.

With this proposal, we believe that it is necessary, as long as the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two German states is not yet possible, to agree at least on a minimum of measures for the safe-guarding of peace and the development of normal relations.

This minimum could be created through the realization of the following proposals:

1. Both German states mutually pledge to respect sovereignty on their territorial areas. The borders between the two German states should be marked so as to eliminate the possibility of any occasion for border conflicts.

2. Both German states enter into negotiations on their positions on the contents of the German peace treaty.

3. Both German states renounce the atomic armament of their armed forces as well as the production of atomic weapons. Both German states pledge to stop arming.

4. Both German states support the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Both German states support their admission into the UN.

5. The representatives of the two German states begin with negotiations on the form of their relations in the spirit of a confederation. These negotiations should lead to agreements, among others, on the following basic issues:

- a) Agreement on the establishment of correct relations between the governments of the two German states.
- b) Agreement on the recognition of bilateral passports as preconditions of a contractual regulation of travel.
- c) Agreement on the abandonment of mutual discrimination of the representatives of both states in other states.
- d) Conclusion of a trade treaty between the proper ministries of both German governments.

In the GDR proposal to the West German Federal Republic, it was emphasized particularly that from the stand point of the interests of the German people, as well as the interests of peace in Europe, a militarily neutral Germany is the only way. These agreements, which later could be broadened into the German peace plan proposed by the GDR, should be in force until the future reunification of the German nation.

III.

The government in Bonn and the West German militarists are exerting strong pressure on the Western powers to prevent negotiations and to prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty and the peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question. We must work against this pressure of the Bonn government on the Western powers through unified measures; this means that we must exercise even stronger pressure on the Western powers. While we carry out the following measures, we will promote the understanding of the Western powers that any further delay of serious discussions in the end will only undermine their negotiating position, since hopes for negotiations over any rights of the Western powers in the capital of the GDR are entirely illusory.

The situation has developed in such a way that it has obviously become necessary to implement a series of measures for the elimination of several remnants of the war in the capital of the GDR so as to create the preconditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

In light of the latest provocations by the U.S. military authorities on the territory of the capital of the GDR, it is necessary as the next step to create an order at the border of the capital of the GDR with West Berlin so as to paralyze any violation of the sovereignty of the GDR. The commandant of the Soviet garrison in Berlin, Comrade Colonel Sobolyov, and the Foreign Minister, Comrade Gromyko, have demanded of the representatives of the Western powers that they respect the sovereignty of the GDR. To make this demand realizable, the preparation of the following next steps is necessary:

The enforcement of the identification obligation of all military and civilian personnel of the three Western powers at the checkpoints at the border with West Berlin by the Border Police or People's Police of the GDR.

If the representatives of the Western powers should refuse to show their personal identification for the purpose of identification to the German Border Police, then the border with West Berlin--with the exception of the transit route between West Berlin and West Germany--is to be closed until there is a result from the government negotiations. This step would establish that these measures should prevent conflict in Berlin until the conclusion of a peace treaty. For the entry of citizens of the West German Federal Republic as well as foreigners into the capital of the GDR, there are GDR border control points in the west, north, south and east of the Republic, as well as at Schönefeld airport. West Berlin citizens, who possess a permit from the presidium of the People's Police can enter through the Invalidenstrasse control point. The step proposed by us in no way touches upon the statement of the USA dealing with the safe-guarding of the route between West Berlin and West Germany or the so-called freedom of West Berlin.

What will probably happen after the implementation of these measures? We can assume that Bonn and NATO will answer with a selective embargo. The resolution of Bonn to begin now, under the pretext of the alleged delay of payments by the GDR, the selective throttling of trade between the GDR and West Germany shows us how West Germany and the Western powers can react.

These measures settle the preconditions for a peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question. After it is made clear that a recognition of any kind of rights of the imperialistic Western powers in the capital of the GDR is out of the question, the diplomatic negotiations

between the representatives of the foreign ministers of the USSR and the USA can concentrate on real negotiations over the peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question.

Moreover, it is certain that the debates over West Germany's Deutschlandpolitik will become sharper.

It is to be assumed that in this situation the Soviet Union must stop sending mail to the area of the Soviet monument in front of the Reichstag and stop further participation in the guarding of the three condemned criminals in Spandau.

The Soviet representative in the Air Security Center could still remain at first, although his presence there--in so far as the interests of the GDR are an issue--is of no advantage.

IV.

So that Bonn and the Western powers do not manage to postpone negotiations on the German peace treaty and the peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question for a long time, furthermore, we think it is advisable that the conference of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty, which was originally agreed upon for the end of November, be carried out in spite of the changed situation at the beginning of December. The SED Politburo will convey to the CPSU CC Presidium in the middle of November of this year its remarks on the Soviet proposal of a peace treaty, which we received in 1959.

The agenda of the foreign ministers' conference should be changed somewhat. We imagine something like the following agenda:

1. Information on the state of or the preparation of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.
2. Issues of the peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin question.
3. Appointment of a commission for the final preparation of a peace treaty and the documents related to it.

The publication of a communique on the foreign ministers' conference could contribute to increasing the readiness of the Western powers for negotiations. The foreign ministers' conference would also be desirable for the political orientation of the population in both German states.

We believe it is advisable that after the beginning of the negotiations between the USSR and the USA for an agreed period of time, the city parliament of Greater-Berlin (the Democratic part) resolve in accord with the GDR constitution that the laws and orders of the Volkskammer, the Council of State, and the Government of the GDR have full validity immediately in the GDR capital.

It could be objected to this that the West Berlin Senate and the Bonn government could take such a resolution as a pretext to declare the membership of West Berlin in the West German Federal Republic through an analogous resolution.

The interest of the Western powers in maintaining the occupation regime in West Berlin, which would be hardly compatible with the recognition of a resolution on the membership of West Berlin to West Germany, speaks against such a fear. It is more useful for the Western powers to maintain the special position of West Berlin and with this at least the appearance of the continued existence of a four-power status in Berlin.

We must expect that in the next months the situation on the issue of air traffic will be exacerbated. The provocative non-stop flights of U.S. transport planes and helicopters in the air space over the GDR capital disturbs air security, threatening the population and must be a demonstration of the policy of strength against the GDR. We draw it to your attention that the representatives of the Western powers have presumed the right to prohibit the flight of an airplane of the Netherlands' Air Company through the air corridors to Berlin and further to Leipzig.

We must expect that the time is coming in which due to the provocations of the Western powers, the representatives of the USSR in the Air Security Center will be forced to leave this institution under protest. Therefore, it is necessary to complete the GDR Air Security Center quickly. Then, after the withdrawal of the Soviet officers from the Air Security Center in West Berlin, the Western powers must establish connection with the GDR Air Security Center.

V.

We suppose that the talks and negotiations between the USSR and the USA and later between the USSR and the three powers will concentrate practically on the issues of the transit routes to West Berlin and the elimination of the occupation status in West Berlin, the gradual decrease of the Western powers' military forces stationed in West Berlin, the removal of West German offices, the cessation of the diversionary and espionage activities of West Berlin, the cessation of the activity of U.S. radio stations in West Berlin, and finally guarantees for a West Berlin cleansed of any of the remnants of the Second World War and the institutions of the cold war. In addition, there remains on the agenda only the elimination of the remnants of the war such as the military missions which practice their mischief in the GDR.

x

x

x

The issues of the renunciation by both German states of atomic arms as well as the production of atomic weapons, the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the two German states and the creation of an atomic-weapon-free zone in Europe can play a role in the negotiations. Partial agreements over this will be possible, however, only after the conclusion of a peace treaty.

VI.

The non-conclusion of a peace treaty in this year and the exacerbation of relations between the two German states threatens the economic plan of the GDR of 1962.

1. The Bonn government has stated that trade with the GDR would be decreased and has seen to it that the least number of treaties possible be concluded on essential materials. The material orders for production in the next year were supposed to have been carried out several months ago. So, we can conclude no treaties with West Germany for important items, and the USSR also thus far has concluded no treaties with us on these items since this material belongs to the special reserve of the USSR Council of Ministers, which must be received only with the severing of economic relations. So, since the situation has changed and we must expect for the time being not a full severing of economic relations, but a selective embargo, we propose to change the original agreements between the Soviet Union and the GDR and that the materials from the special reserve which are necessary for the fulfillment of the GDR economic plan be placed at our disposal in the framework of the plan by the USSR foreign trade ministry. If in the course of 1962, additional supplies from West Germany come, then this can be settled between the two planning commissions.

We further draw it to your attention that the reserves for those raw materials and materials which the USSR bought in third countries for us are developed only for the first half year of 1962. Due to the dragging out of the conclusion of the peace treaty, this term will no longer suffice.

2. As a result of the losses in the first half of this year through the open border, the 1961 plan will probably not be fulfilled on several important items. In machine building we remain about 2.5% and in the building and construction industry about 5.3% under the plan. There is also the fact that by the movement of factories from the border areas, by rearrangements in the traffic in Berlin and in the border areas, as well as the increase in defense preparedness, additional demands for investment resulted.

3. The proposal of the economic plan for 1962 envisages an increase in industrial production of 6.5 percent, an increase in workers' productivity in the nationally owned and central industries of 6.3 percent, and an increase in the stock of goods for the supply of the population by 5%.

The plan provides for the liberation of the GDR national economy from West German disturbances. The establishment of the economic cooperation of the GDR with the USSR was agreed on for important plan items. With regard to the process of the specialization and cooperation in machine building, there are already serious arrears. We have precise information only partially about the wishes of the USSR with regard to machine building products, investment needs, etc.

In the proposal of the economic plan, a decrease in investment intentions is envisaged. Relative to the performance of 1961, a 6.5 percent growth in investments is envisaged. The investment means will be concentrated on making the economy free from disturbances, and the further development of energy and raw material bases, especially coal, metallurgy, the chemical industry and home and city building. The volume of investment is about 2,730 million DM in 1961 and about 3,136 million DM in 1962 lower than was foreseen in the Seven-Year-plan.

4. Imports will increase in 1962 by about 13% compared to the 1961 planned performance. Export supplies will increase correspondingly. It is not possible to equalize the

balance of payments for the year 1962 with regard to the USSR and the other socialist countries. The total negative amount in the balance of payments of 1962, according to present calculations, amounts to 3060 million hard currency DM; of this 2000 million hard currency DM with the Soviet Union, 1000 hard currency DM with the other socialist countries, and 60 million hard currency DM with the capitalist economic area.

We must consider further that probably in 1962 in connection with the preparation of the peace treaty, the trade relations with the West German Federal Republic will be put on the basis of trade between two countries. From then on, the GDR will pay for its goods in inner-German trade prices which are above world market prices. With the changing of trade to the basis of two German states, a foreseen loss in the amount of 250 million DM will accrue to the GDR.

Since in the current talks, further developments can be estimated in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty, it will be necessary to agree on the proposed GDR economic plan for 1962 between the leaders of the planning commission of the GDR and the chairman of the planning commission of the USSR and then to conclude on the governmental level the negotiations and to reach agreements on the regulation of debt. It appears that the safe-guarding of the GDR as a bastion of peace is costly both for the population of the GDR as well as for the Soviet Union and the states of the socialist camp.

We will send the proposal of the 1962 economic plan to the USSR government in November.

With communist greetings!
The delegation
of the Politburo
of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany
to the 22nd CPSU Party Congress
W. Ulbricht, First Secretary

Moscow, October 30, 1961

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Hope M. Harrison is an Associate at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and a Junior Fellow of the Harriman Institute and Ph. D. candidate in the Political Science Department at Columbia University. Her dissertation, of which this Working Paper is a part, is on Soviet foreign policy, the German Question, and Soviet-East German relations from 1953-1961. She will be a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University for the 1993-1994 academic year. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the fourth annual conference of the GDR Studies Association in Washington, DC, 12-15 November 1992 and the Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, Moscow, 12-15 January 1993, sponsored by the Cold War International History Project.