Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta

A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change

by
Paul Francis
Deirdre Lapin
Paula Rossasco

Study prepared for publication by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Africa Program and Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study draws in part upon research undertaken by the authors in the preparation of an unpublished report *Social and Conflict Analysis of the Niger Delta*, originally prepared for internal use of World Bank staff. Since then it has been substantially revised and updated by the authors for a wider audience concerned with the future peace and development of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region.

The authors would like to thank the following for their assistance and advice in preparing the earlier report and the present publication. For their research contributions we are indebted to Aoife Brophy, Ben Jua, Fionnuala O’Neill, and Shonali Sardesai. Our reviewers and advisors included Ian Bannon, Nina Bhatt, Peter Lewis, Chukwudi Okafor, Foluso Okunmadewa, Precious Omuku, Hawanty Page, Onno Ruhl, Caroline Sage, Per Wam, and Michael Watts. For shepherding this publication, we thank Joe Brinley, Mame Khady Diouf, Kathryn Hamilton, Derek J. Langford, Steve McDonald, and Sarah Smith from the Woodrow Wilson Center.
The strategic importance of the oil-rich Niger Delta in southern Nigeria—to national and regional stability and to global energy markets—is a persistent theme widely discussed in policy and military circles, development agencies, human rights and peace organizations, and the popular media. Dissent surrounding fifty years of oil activity in the region gained in intensity over nearly two decades until a Presidential Amnesty in late 2009 brought a measure of peace to the area. Still, the underlying causes of unrest, including chronic underdevelopment and the weakness of local leadership, are barely being addressed. The Africa Program and Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Wilson Center has chosen to publish this thoughtful and comprehensive study in the hope that it will further understanding of the reasons why development and peace have been so elusive in the past and why policymakers and development partners should now actively seize upon this fresh opportunity for peace.

It was in this expectation that my predecessor Dr. Howard Wolpe, himself a tireless peacemaker, agreed to write this Foreword. Sadly, he was prevented from completing his comments by his untimely death. Nevertheless, his words and actions over a lifetime of dedication to Africa and commitment to peacebuilding and conflict resolution show how deeply he cared about creating a platform for sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region. He had a special love for Nigeria. As a young doctoral student he spent two years in Port Harcourt, and the experience shaped his deep sense of African culture, potential and promise and would inform his entire career. In 2008 he became a founding member of the Niger Delta Working Group, an informal Washington-based network for sharing information on the changing situation in the region. That same year, on learning of the late Nigerian President Yar’Adua’s plan to organize a Niger Delta Summit, he opened a direct dialogue with its nominated chairman. When the Summit was succeeded by a Niger Delta Technical Committee, some of its members and advisors were welcomed at the Wilson Center. It was his conviction that an initiative to build trust between and collaborative capacities among leaders in the area, on the model of the Leadership Project, could open a new pathway for stronger governance and development in the delta.

This study “Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change” draws together a vast range of information about Nigeria’s delta region not previously available in a single publication. It richly illuminates the social history and underlying causes of unrest in the area. Equally important, the study
adds to the empirical research available to us about conflict prevention and approaches to post-conflict reconstruction in regions harmed by the extraction of natural resources. It examines the complex interactions between the social, political, economic, environmental, and security factors that drive and sustain conflict. It also reviews the main policy responses and initiatives that have already been brought to bear in the delta and maps out key policy options for the future.

Encouragingly, the study finds that many of the elements of sustainable pathways to development and peace already exist, or can readily be realized. What is needed is a systematic framework and, most critically, a leadership consensus and the political will to marshal them. Nigeria’s development partners are already showing a renewed commitment to support solutions to the delta’s challenges. Imaginative dialogue and partnership between them and with critical stakeholders in government, the private sector, civil society, and communities holds the promise of yielding effective strategies for sustainable development and peace that befit the region’s unique character and history.

This study, then, emerges at a time of particular opportunity and hope. And yet it must be noted that the present time also holds a considerable potential risk. Without appropriate and thoughtful action, the legitimate aspirations of the citizens of the delta and their compatriots in Nigeria as a whole will, yet again, go unrewarded. Dr. Wolpe was a great champion of applying conflict-sensitive approaches to development in the context of unrest. For the Niger Delta today, any plan or project must be rooted in practical and active understanding of the origins and risks of conflict in order to sustain the momentum of peaceful development and avoid planning that does not take into account the dynamics of conflict and its core causes.

Finally, the importance of the issues dealt with in this study extends beyond the delta or Nigeria as a nation. They are much broader when viewed from Nigeria’s place in the sub-region and the world economy. While the delta is unique, there are also lessons that can be learned for other conflict situations, and especially for the expanding number of new oil producing countries along the Guinea coast. For all, the key lesson is that peace is hard work. It requires a leadership committed to equitable government, dialogue with citizens, and sustainable development.

Steve McDonald
Director of the Africa Program and Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity
Woodrow Wilson Center
December 2011
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAPW</td>
<td>Academic Associates Peaceworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEITI</td>
<td>Bayelsa Income Expenditure Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Bayelsa Partnership Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bpd</td>
<td>Barrels per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>Business Partners for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRACED</td>
<td>Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers, Edo and Delta (a regional commission for economic integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Country Analysis Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADP</td>
<td>Commercial Agriculture Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALM</td>
<td>Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-Driven-Development project of the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDP</td>
<td>Cassava Enterprise Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Center for Population and Environment Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRP</td>
<td>Community-based Poverty Reduction Project</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Country Partnership Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNL</td>
<td>Chevron Nigeria Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Country Social Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Community and Social Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reorientation, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESOPADEC</td>
<td>Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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</table>
DPR Department of Petroleum Reserves
DPA Distributable Pool Account
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDF European Development Fund
EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
FOSTER Facility for Oil Sector Transparency
FRN Federal Republic of Nigeria
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GGESS Gulf of Guinea Energy and Security Strategy
GMOU Global Memorandum of Understanding
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI Human Development Index
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
HSE Health, Safety, and Environment
ICG International Crisis Group
IOC International Oil Company
ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission
IDA International Development Association
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC International Finance Corporation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IITA</td>
<td>International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (Ibadan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>IYC</td>
<td>Ijaw Youth Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force (Military)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JV</td>
<td>Joint Venture</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbpd</td>
<td>Millions of barrels per day</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
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<td>MNDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOSOP</td>
<td>Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPP</td>
<td>Micro Projects Program</td>
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<td>MSME</td>
<td>Micro Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>Naira</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDSCA</td>
<td>Niger Delta Social and Conflict Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDBDA</td>
<td>Niger Delta Basin Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDCFI</td>
<td>Niger Delta Community Foundations Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDDC</td>
<td>Niger Delta Development Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDRDMP</td>
<td>Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDRBDA</td>
<td>Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta Volunteers Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEGIP</td>
<td>Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project</td>
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<td>NEITI</td>
<td>Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>NESREA</td>
<td>National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIDPRODEV</td>
<td>Niger Delta Professionals for Development</td>
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<td>NIDECOPP</td>
<td>Niger Delta Coalition for the Advancement of Peace and Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLNG</td>
<td>Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company</td>
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<td>NLSS</td>
<td>Nigeria Living Standards Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOSDRA</td>
<td>National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNPC</td>
<td>Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMPADEC</td>
<td>Oil Minerals Producing Area Development Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTS</td>
<td>Oil Producing Trade Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSOPADEC</td>
<td>Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaS</td>
<td>Peace and Security Strategy</td>
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<td>PCF</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PETS</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Tracking Survey</td>
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<td>PTF</td>
<td>Petroleum Trust Fund</td>
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<td>PTFNDD</td>
<td>Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIB</td>
<td>Petroleum Industry Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Production Sharing Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Production Sharing Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Regional Development Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSDP</td>
<td>Rivers State Sustainable Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>School of Advanced International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDN</td>
<td>Stakeholder Democracy Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEFOR</td>
<td>State Expenditure Effectiveness for Opportunities and Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sustainable Livelihood Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPDC</td>
<td>Shell Petroleum Development Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPY</td>
<td>Supernumerary Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>State Security Services</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
STAND  Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in the Niger Delta
UN    United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNEP  United Nations Environmental Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD   United States Dollar
USG   United States Government
USIP  United States Institute for Peace
WFF   World Wildlife Fund
WPA   Works Progress Administration
YES   Youth Employment Scheme (Bayelsa)

1 US$ = 150 Nigerian Naira from 2009 to November 2011
Major cities in the Niger Delta.

Courtesy: Stakeholders’ Democracy Network
Executive Summary

Few regions in the world have been as unfortunate as Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta. The delta’s abundant natural wealth stands in stark contrast to its palpable underdevelopment. The oil sector accounts for approximately 95 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings and over 80 percent of federal government revenue, but for nearly two decades the delta has been mired in conflict and violence that threatens human security and the national economy. Following the Amnesty offered by former President Yar’Adua in 2009 to over 20,000 armed fighters, an uneasy quiet has settled over the area. Yet, the fundamental conditions of extreme deprivation have remained unchanged. The developmental challenges facing the Niger Delta are still shaped by its turbulent history and are closely intertwined with recurrent patterns of instability. With little provocation, longstanding grievances could once again erupt into another cycle of violence.

This study is based on the exceptionally rich literature available on the Niger Delta area and official documents together with contributions from an advisory group and the authors’ personal engagement with the region. Its goal is to enhance understanding of the factors that have contributed to violent conflict in the Niger Delta, so that development partners and government can form the most appropriate strategies for programs of intervention in this large and deeply deprived area rich in oil and gas. The main objectives are to: (i) advance understanding of the unique social characteristics of the Niger Delta and their influence on local conflict, (ii) outline efforts underway to address conflict-related challenges, and (iii) develop proposals for a conflict-sensitive approach that can be applied by government and non-government actors to help set the region on a pathway to prosperity and peace.

Despite the region’s great potential for prosperity, the Niger Delta faces stubborn challenges. Although Nigeria is constitutionally a federation, the system as practiced does not meet the expectations of a true federation. Underlying the outward appearance of a modern administration with formal structure of institutions are complex, powerful, and deeply entrenched networks of patronage and political alliances. The political economy of oil shapes a system in which the central government is the only vehicle for the collection and redistribution of oil revenues. Given the overwhelming reliance on oil as a source of public finance, securing access and control over an increasing proportion of oil revenue has become the main locus of political struggle for stakeholders at all levels and has led to calls for “resource control” in the Niger Delta, which have at times resulted in violence.

The volatility of the region is further compounded by a sense of injustice driven by the large numbers of people living in poverty, levels of inequality, subjective
assessments of personal deprivation, and relative underdevelopment in the national context. Moreover, almost 60 percent of people in the Niger Delta depend on the natural environment for their livelihood. Destruction of the environment through oil spills and gas flaring has made the poorest communities vulnerable and has direct deleterious impacts. Fishing and agriculture have been affected—seriously in some areas—by pollution related to oil extraction. Hence, protecting the natural environment of the Niger Delta is closely linked to the protection of the economic wellbeing of its citizens.

Consequently, unemployment and underemployment rates are higher in the core oil producing states of the Niger Delta than in any other part of Nigeria, and they are more pronounced in urban areas, reaching levels of fifty percent. The dearth of available and appropriate work limits the avenues available for young people to pull themselves out of poverty. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has helped to drive and sustain high levels of violence and criminality throughout the delta region. In many cases, unemployed youth have been recruited into armed groups waging systematic campaigns against the oil industry and the military to further their demands. At the same time powerful interests, often allied with local unemployed youth, take advantage of the chaotic situation to illegally divert oil revenues and engage in oil “bunkering” or theft. In this manner, political ends and criminal means have become dangerously entwined.

Out of these manifestations of conflict, several issues emerge as sources of tension in everyday life. They include the movement toward social fragmentation rather than social cohesion; a flawed federal system worsened by poor governance; limited economic opportunities associated with an oil-based mono-economy; a political culture oriented around informal networks rather than civic rights; and the weak capacity of the state to ensure the security of its citizens.

Each of these tendencies has its origins in multiple factors that work against stability. These factors operate at different levels of causality and when combined underpin the region’s predisposition to crisis. At the most fundamental level structural factors comprise the latent conditions and the basic ways in which society, government, and the political economy work to make the region vulnerable to instability. Driving factors are the grievances that emerge from the structural factors and constitute the perceptions, inadequacies, and tensions that suffuse the daily lives of many men, women, and youth and dispose them toward discord. Provocating factors exacerbate latent conflict by sparking violence and crime, often for profit. Because these factors typically interact and feed on one another, ending conflict is an enormous challenge. Solutions require a holistic strategy that begins with building common agreement and trust around how these issues must be tackled and galvanizing support for building peace and development.

Investment in the Niger Delta has been grossly inadequate for achieving this aim. Nevertheless, the region has seen a fair number of initiatives by the government, oil companies, and international development partners who in their own ways have sought
to bring peace and a better life to its troubled creeks. The responses of government to the periodic crises in the delta have tended to include heavy-handed repression by occupying security forces; continuous but inconclusive renegotiation of oil revenue to be retained by oil-producing states; and the creation of new states, LGAs, and special institutions intended to develop the delta. Each of these responses has provided streams of patronage for both local and federal actors, while bringing negligible benefits to the lives of ordinary delta citizens.

Left with the task of operating in complex and unstable sociopolitical context, where government services have been few or nonexistent, oil companies have developed a means of ensuring the “social license” so essential to their continued operations. In doing so, they have reached a provisional balance with communities enabling them to continue exploration and production. The extent to which socio-economic benefits have matched their relatively substantial social investments has not always been clear. Corporate approaches to development and peacemaking have evolved over the years, becoming more elaborate and sophisticated, and the companies have in time become major development actors and innovators in their own right.

Nigeria’s traditional development partners, multilateral and bilateral, have supported a number of programs of varying scale and design in the delta. While their engagement has been somewhat reluctant, sporadic, and remote, some successful initiatives have been established. Despite the lack of a common planning framework, coordination among donors is strengthening around a converging vision that espouses local participatory development, good governance, improvements in infrastructure, and employment generation. In addition, a growing number of successful public-private partnerships have been established between the government, donors, and oil companies. Community-based trusts, regional foundations, civic monitoring groups, and other forms of institutional innovation have also begun to emerge. Increasingly, all development actors have begun working in concert within and across sectors, aware that pooling strengths and risks maximizes opportunities for overcoming the region’s monumental development deficit.

Everyone concerned with the future peace of the Niger Delta recognizes that the Amnesty offered to former combatants has opened an unprecedented window of opportunity. Keeping the window open will require an urgent and coordinated program of conflict-sensitive development supported by the government, donor partners, civil society, communities, and the private sector. Addressing the drivers of unrest is vital to checking the resurgence of vigilantism or expansion of illicit livelihoods. Any rise in crime and insecurity could postpone the long-awaited dialogue on the region’s future. It could halt development plans for the region, threaten oil and gas production, and scale back business investments and job opportunities.

Restoring hope and confidence in the people of the Niger Delta is a key element of the “transformation agenda” for 2011–2015 proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan.
In that spirit, this study proposes a collaborative framework for the future rooted in this study’s analysis of challenges facing the region. Components include five pillars on which a durable peace can be built: (i) good governance and political participation, (ii) human security, (iii) wellbeing and development, (iv) protecting the environment, and (v) securing livelihoods. For each pillar, the government, oil companies, development partners, civil society, and communities have vital roles to play. National leaders, oil companies, and the international community have all come to realize that, for peace to hold, swift and sustainable development of the region is the only alternative.

To meet this challenge, this study proposes ten guides to conflict sensitive development for the Niger Delta:

1. Be mindful of the region’s vulnerability to a long history of conflict, underdevelopment, political marginalization, and environmental harm.

2. Focus on local priorities: accelerated development, safety from crime, political rights, environmental protection, and opportunities for employment.

3. Maintain an ongoing dialogue with all types of local groups and listen to their separate expectations, opinions and concerns.

4. Put people in charge of their own futures through initiatives that are locally driven, managed, and monitored.

5. For every future intervention, assess the potential to exacerbate or mitigate local conflict dynamics; avoid creating “winners” and “losers.”

6. Link conflict mitigation to development strategies; aim to make peace a development outcome rather than a pre-condition for engagement or assistance.

7. Pool the risks of development investment by seeking reliable and committed partners in government, civil society, communities and the private sector.

8. Encourage responsible corporate practice toward people and the environment in line with international performance standards.

9. Promote security and peace by upgrading the public relations skills of local police and armed service personnel; link them to community peacebuilding institutions.

10. Strive to be flexible, but remain focused and persistent.

By supporting and applying these methods of conflict-sensitive planning, all friends of the Niger Delta can contribute to peace… a durable peace that becomes an outcome of collective efforts for regional development and their crowning achievement.
Economic Importance of Oil
Nigeria's economy depends heavily on the oil and gas sector, which contributes 95% of export revenues, 80 to 85% of government revenues, and approximately 32% of gross domestic product (GDP). Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and among the top ten globally. Its recoverable reserves were estimated at 36.2 billion barrels in January 2007. Despite the country's relative oil wealth, GDP per capita is 2,400 USD, and poverty is widespread—about 50% live on less than $1.25 per day.

Background
Oil and gas reserves are concentrated in the southern part of the country, known as the Niger Delta. This region is marked by deprivation and underdevelopment. Oil extraction is a capital rather than labor-intensive industry and, therefore, provides little employment. The region is further disadvantaged by (i) the difficult geographical terrain which makes infrastructure costs higher, and (ii) the effects of environmental degradation, caused in part by the consequences of oil extraction—gas flaring, oil spills, etc.—on traditional industries such as fishing and agriculture.

History of the Conflict
32 million people live in the Niger Delta (22% of Nigeria's total population), and 62% are below the age of 30. The region is very heterogeneous with over 40 different ethnic groups who speak 120 mutually unintelligible languages and dialects. The Ijaw ethnic group is the largest; others include the Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ibibio-Efik, and Igbo sub-groups. Historically, fishing and agriculture have been the two main occupations in the region. Soon after Nigeria's independence in 1960, conflicts between local communities, oil companies, and the federal government started to emerge. In 1966 Isaac Boro, leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, declared independence of the Niger Delta's People's Republic and called for oil companies to negotiate with his government instead of the federal authorities. Since the unsuccessful war for Biafra in 1967, successive military governments ruled the country (with brief interruptions) from 1969–1999. During the three civilian administrations since 1999, the state and local governments in the Delta have been more vocal in their frustration at what they believe is a concentration of resources and power at the center. Communities have come into conflict with oil companies, with each other, and with the security forces over a range of issues including payments, land acquisition, and environmental damage. Armed groups have waged systematic campaigns against the government and oil companies to have their demands met, and unemployed youth have often taken advantage of the situation by engaging in criminal acts, including kidnapping and oil theft.

Main Stakeholders in the Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Government</th>
<th>Receives taxes, royalties, and equity income from the oil companies and decides on their distribution among the federal, state, and local governments.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State and Local Governments</td>
<td>The nine oil producing Niger Delta states receive 13% of the revenues from the oil and gas which they produce, along with the statutory monthly allocation given to all 36 Nigerian states. The substantial increase in revenues flowing into these states and their local government areas has not translated into sustained development. Given the high stakes of holding public office, a number of local politicians have been charged with rigging elections in order to win, thereafter misappropriating funds. To reassure their oil producing communities, seven states have created specific organizations to channel oil revenue funds for their development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Stakeholders in the Niger Delta</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Development Institutions</strong></td>
<td>The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC, 2000) is funded by both public and industry sources to plan and implement projects for the region. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA, 2008) has an overarching mandate to implement major regional infrastructure projects and support programs for youth. In general, regional organizations have shown mediocre performance due in part to inadequate planning, poor focus on results, lack of transparency and under-funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Oil Companies</strong></td>
<td>About two dozen international oil companies (IOCs) operate in the region. Nearly all actively contribute to the NDDC and directly fund development in local communities as a way of acquiring a social license to operate within the region. Increasingly, the development projects are applying best-practice development strategies and are being undertaken in partnership with international donors, NGOs, and government institutions at various levels. At times, IOC community projects have been hampered by inadequate planning and co-ordination and poor regional security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resistance and Armed Groups</strong></td>
<td>Since the 1990s, a variety of resistance and armed groups have emerged, a number joining together in 2005 under the umbrella Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Typically they pursue a dual agenda, one a political struggle against grievances of resource control and development neglect, the other violent tactics to further profits from oil theft or other illicit trade. Many “militants” justify violence as a response to the perceived injustice of not benefiting from their own resources while suffering the negative consequences of industry activity. They often demand greater local control, more transparent management of oil revenues, and adequate compensation to those affected by oil extraction. A number of groups have taken advantage of the situation to operate as criminal gangs that engage in petty crime and kidnapping for ransom. The various groups and networks are very diverse, ranging from criminal gangs to non-violent advocacy groups, and they do not fit easily into fixed categories. In October 2009 more than 20,000 ex-combatants accepted Amnesty from the government and have been participating in a program of disarmament, demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR) that will continue until 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communities</strong></td>
<td>Most men and women in the Niger Delta feel politically disenfranchised and disadvantaged in comparison to the rest of Nigeria. They are frustrated that they cannot legitimately benefit from the oil resources, and they often distrust leaders who purport to negotiate on their behalf. Conflict occurs both among and within communities over access to benefits from government and companies. Being designated as a “host community” to an oil facility comes with benefits, but historically this practice has exacerbated jealousy and fighting among communities and has also led to disputes over “oil” boundaries. Surveys show that communities welcome contributions of assistance but prefer to be in charge of planning and managing their own development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since 2000, the functional definition of the Niger Delta has comprised the 9 oil producing states in the south-south and south-eastern geo-political zones of the country: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers, an area of 112,000 km2. The human population of this zone, at 32 million, exceeds that of all but five Sub-Saharan African countries.
Lone woman paddling on creeks near Nembe.

Courtesy: Paul Francis
CHAPTER 1

An introduction to the Niger Delta

Few regions in the world have been as unfortunate as Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta. The delta’s abundant natural wealth stands in stark contrast to its palpable underdevelopment. The oil sector accounts for some 95 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings and over 80 percent of federal government revenue, but for nearly two decades the delta has been mired in conflict and violence that has threatened human security and the national economy. Following the Amnesty offered by former President Yar’Adua to over 20,000 armed fighters, an uneasy quiet has settled over the area. Yet, the fundamental conditions of extreme deprivation have remained unchanged. The developmental challenges facing the Niger Delta are still being shaped by its turbulent history and are closely intertwined with recurrent patterns of instability. With little provocation, longstanding grievances could once again erupt in another cycle of violence.

BACKGROUND AND SETTING

Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta is situated in the south of Nigeria and centers on the natural delta of the Niger River. All of Nigeria’s oil production takes place on the land or waters of the nine oil producing states comprising the extended delta region. (Some of the delta’s key features are summarized in Table 1.1 below.) Beginning in late 2005 and until Amnesty was offered to freedom fighters in mid-2009, escalating unrest led to significant losses in production, at times exceeding 65 percent. Addressing the underlying causes of crisis in the delta has important implications for the economy and security of the whole of Nigeria. For this reason, maintaining the current fragile peace in the region has become a national policy imperative.

Over half of the Niger Delta region is made up of a network of creeks and small islands, making it very difficult to navigate and to establish large settlements. The rural population tends to live in small, scattered hamlets of 50 to 500 persons, some maintaining links with larger towns such as Port Harcourt and Warri. The regional population, estimated to be 32 million, represents over one fifth of the national total; 62 percent are below thirty years of age. This population is also extremely heterogeneous, with approx-
**TABLE 1.1:**

**Niger Delta at a Glance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 States 185 LGAs</td>
<td>South-South Zone: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extended Niger Delta includes: Abia, Imo, and Ondo—all oil producing states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>32 million (22% of total Nigerian population), 2/3 under 30 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>265 people per km²; 13, 329 settlements, 94% with &lt; 5,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups/languages</td>
<td>40 main ethnic groups; around 120 mutually unintelligible languages and dialects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land area</td>
<td>112,000 km² of land area is oil affected; core delta is 75,000 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological zones</td>
<td>Coastal barrier sandy ridge; mangrove swamp; freshwater swamp; lowland rainforest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Petroleum, natural gas, tin, lead, coal, zinc, arable land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>Agriculture and fishing (48%); trading (17%); services (10%);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>education/health (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Economic Indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>120 per thousand (Nigeria: 100 per thousand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Estimated youth unemployment (ages 15–24): 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official average for the South-South: 24% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>43% in relative poverty (2004); 75% perceive themselves as “poor”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>76 to 80% in rural areas and 50 to 55% in urban areas do not have access to safe drinking water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Firewood is the primary energy source for 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34% of population has access to electric power, when available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Oil and Gas Production

| **Crude oil production, mid-2011** | About 2.3 mbpd (including condensate); 3.2 mbpd installed capacity; supplies 95% of Nigeria’s export earnings and 80% of federal government revenue. On average, 25% of production was shut in due to violence or sabotage (2006–2009), at times up to 65%. Production fell from 2.6 mbpd in February 2006 to 1.3 mbpd in May 2009, during a major clash between combatants and the military before the Amnesty. |
| **Main international operators and principal Nigerian companies; all have onshore operations except ExxonMobil** | Shell (Shell Petroleum Development Company, Nigeria, Ltd.); Chevron (Chevron Nigeria, Ltd.); ExxonMobil (Mobil Producing Unlimited); Eni (Nigerian Agip Oil Company); Total (Elf) (Total E&P Nigeria Limited, formerly EPNL) |
| **Main terminals/offshore platforms** | Bonny Island (Shell), Brass River (Eni/Agip), Escravos (Chevron), Forcados (Shell), Kwa Iboe platform (Mobil), Odedu platform (Total), Pennington (Chevron), etc. |
| **Oil reserves** | 36 billion barrels—11th in the world, 2nd in Africa; estimated reserve life of 41 years |
| **Natural gas reserves** | 187 trillion cubic feet—7th largest gas reserves in the world |
| **Oil/gas pipelines & fields** | Over 7,000 km of pipelines; 606 oil fields |
| **Gas plants/LNG** | 30; NLNG Plant with 6 trains; 2 LNG plants in construction in Brass and Olokola |
| **Environment** | 1958–2010: est. 546 million gallons spilled; av. 300 spills or nearly 10.8 million/year. 1986—2003: 50,000 acres of mangrove forest disappeared. Q1 2010: 32% of associated gas flared (127 bcf) |
imately forty different ethnic groups speaking 120 mutually unintelligible languages and dialects. Of these, the Ijaw, who speak four distinct dialects, comprise the largest ethnic group. Others include the Ibibio-Efik, Urhobo, Isoko, the Itsekiri, and Igbo sub-groups living in both the western and eastern delta.¹

Fishing and agriculture have historically been the main occupations in the delta, and they continue to account for almost half of employment. In urban areas, the informal sector predominates, notably trade, comprising twenty percent of overall employment and services, which constitute nine percent (NDDC 2005, p. 20). Young people tend to engage less in agriculture, and they often migrate to urban areas in search of livelihoods.

While the percentage of people living in poverty in the Niger Delta is statistically lower than the national average,² the region performs poorly in comparison with the rest of the country on social indicators such as education, health, and the quality of the natural environment. For example, the region has among the highest levels of infant mortality in Nigeria, a statistic commonly used as a proxy for measuring general welfare. Rates of unemployment and under-employment in the Niger Delta states are especially high despite their large oil revenues, reaching more than forty percent among youth. This condition has contributed significantly to youth restiveness in the region.

A TURBULENT HISTORY

The history of the Niger Delta provides some insight into its unique position in Nigeria and the ways in which it has come to view itself. Its characteristics include a longstanding outward orientation, initially built on trade; dynamic, fragmented and competitive governance; and a fierce sense of independence in the face of perceived domination by outsiders.

Even before it was officially incorporated into the British Empire in 1900, the Niger Delta had a long history of external commercial engagement. (Table 1.2 gives a time-line of key events in the region’s history.) Early outside contact was primarily through the export of slaves, and after the British banned the slave trade, palm oil become a key export commodity. The Royal Niger Company dominated governance and trade, and considerable hostility to its exploitative monopoly practices culminated in an attack on its Akassa headquarters by the king of Brass in 1895. The Company subsequently sold the territories it controlled to the British Government in 1900. The Oil Rivers Protectorate was formed, later incorporated into the Southern Protectorate and then amalgamated in 1914 into a unified Nigeria. The region was governed under the system of “indirect rule” through appointed indigenous chiefs, and where these did not exist, the colonial authorities created them. While ostensibly allowing a degree of self government, this system could generate considerable popular resentment. In 1929 the women...
of Aba in the Niger Delta were provoked by rumors of a new income tax and came into direct and violent confrontation with the police. More than fifty women were killed in the riots that followed (ICG 2006a, p. 4).

During the transition to Independence in the 1950s, the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta began to express their concerns over the form that the Nigerian federation would take. The Willink Commission was charged with investigating them. In its conclusions, the Commission rejected demands for the creation of new states, but it did recommend that a national board be created to address the specific problems of the region (HRW 1999). The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was subsequently established in 1961 for a ten-year period. Largely ineffective, the board’s work was disrupted by the civil war in 1967–1970.

The first major episode of violent militancy in the Niger Delta occurred in February 1966, on the eve of the succession of the Eastern Region, or Biafra, which included the eastern oil producing delta. Isaac Boro, an Ijaw born in Oloibiri and leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), declared the independence of the Niger Delta People’s Republic, consisting of the present day Rivers and Bayelsa States. Boro’s abortive twelve-day revolt anticipated the Biafran civil war. Both conflicts were motivated by the control of oil revenue. Boro called for oil companies to negotiate directly with his government rather than with the national authorities. Over a year later in May 1967 the Eastern Region renamed itself the Republic of Biafra, plunging the country into civil war. In the same month, the federal government broke the East into three states. One of them was Rivers State, which included many of the minority groups of the delta, as well as the bulk of the oil producing areas. However, any expectations of greater resource control were disappointed, as the federal military government transferred the control of oil resources to itself through legislation both during and after the war (Obi 2005). The 1969 Petroleum Decree gave the federal government ownership and control of all petroleum resources in the country. In 1978 the Land Use Decree nationalized all land under the administration of state and local governments.

The centralization of resources reduced tensions between the dominant ethnic groups of the federation, the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Igbo. At the same time, it exacerbated tensions between these large groups and the numerous minorities, especially those in the Niger Delta, who became increasingly marginalized from the political and economic systems. This, together with the progressive degradation of the environment due to oil exploitation and impoverishment, increased the minorities’ feelings of frustration against the federal government (Ebeku, 2001).

In the 1990s, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) launched an era in the Niger Delta that was characterized by protests and subsequent repression. Although MOSOP espoused non-violence, conflict opened throughout the region along many axes: between ethnic groups, within ethnic groups,
### Table 1.2: Niger Delta Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1400s–early 1800s</td>
<td>The slave trade shapes economic and political life in the Niger Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1800s–mid-1900s</td>
<td>After Britain bans its own slave trade in 1807, traders turn attention to delta palm oil. The region, known as the Oil Rivers Protectorate, becomes part of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>The Southern and Northern Nigerian Protectorates are amalgamated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>The Southern Protectorate is officially divided into Eastern and Western Regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Oil is first discovered in commercial quantities in the town of Oloibiri; first export by Shell in 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Nigeria gains independence under a Parliamentary system with much autonomy for the 3 regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The First Nigerian Republic is proclaimed. Nnamdi Azikiwe becomes the country’s first president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Petroleum Decree gives federal government ownership and control of all petroleum resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>The Land Use Decree nationalizes all land under state and local governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>MOSOP issues the Ogoni Bill of Rights. An unrelated oil protest in Umuechem, an ikwerre town, brings the first major military action against civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Third Nigerian Republic is proclaimed and subsequently aborted. Shell withdraws from Ogoni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP leader, is executed along with 8 others. International sanctions are imposed and development assistance to Nigeria and the Niger Delta is severely restricted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The Kaima Declaration by Ijaw youths pledges to “struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice” as well as control of land and withdrawal of the oil industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Militant leader Dokubo Asari announces “Operation Locust Feast” and declares an “all-out war” against the Nigerian State. President Obasanjo reaches a Peace Agreement to disband and disarm militia groups and reintegrate them into the political process. It soon falls apart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Asari is imprisoned in September. Allies form MEND, which emerges in December as an umbrella coalition for armed groups in the Niger Delta. Kidnapping of oil workers, attacks on oil facilities, and sabotage due to bunkering increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>In early months Nigeria attains a peak oil production of nearly 2.6 mbpd for the first and only time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>President Yar’Adua and VP Goodluck Jonathan win the April elections and pledge to give full attention to the Niger Delta; Henry Okah, major MEND arms supplier, is arrested in Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>In June 2008 MEND reaches a deep offshore platform at Bonga; in September a MEND “Oil War” responds to military bombardments in Rivers State; Elem Tombia and Ogboma are razed. A Presidential Technical Committee on the Niger Delta is formed to recommend a way forward on the region. In a separate presidential decision, a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs is created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>On 15 May the JTF launches a major military operation against MEND in the western delta in response to killing and kidnapping of soldiers and foreign sailors; Gbaramatu area razed; thousands flee their villages. Oil production falls to 1.3 mbpd following MEND counter-attacks. An offer of Presidential Amnesty is accepted by most MEND commanders on October 4, and over 20,000 ex-combatants reportedly disarm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>On 6 May Goodluck Jonathan is sworn in as President immediately following the death of President Yar’Adua from a protracted illness. On 1 October, the 50th Independence Anniversary celebration is marred by car bombs. Henry Okah and his brother Charles are arrested with others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Jonathan is returned as President, following federal, state and local elections in April deemed the most free and fair in Nigeria’s history. The President reaffirms his commitment to the development, restoration of hope and confidence of the people in the Niger Delta region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
within communities, between generations, between the state and communities, and between oil companies and communities. All of these avenues of conflict became increasingly polarized and militarized, as stakes were raised and weapons became more accessible. Even after the 1999 return to democratic rule, the army, navy, and paramilitary police continued to be regularly deployed and often resorted to force as a means of dealing with protests (HRW 2002, p. 2). Meanwhile, demands for local ownership of lands and oil resources grew among other ethnic groups in the region. An All Ijaw Youths Conference that convened in December 1998 at Kaiama (the former home of the hero Isaac Boro) crystallized the Ijaw struggle for resource control in the Kaiama Declaration. It subsequently became an article of faith for the Ijaw nation. By 2005 violent community conflicts in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta state typically numbered between 120 and 150 per year, and over fifty armed groups with an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 armed youths were operating in the oil producing region (UNDP 2007, p. 3). Hostage-taking and attacks on oil facilities became common occurrences, particularly with the emergence in December 2005 of the umbrella militant group calling itself the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

In mid-2009 a major defeat of armed groups by the military led former President Yar’Adua to offer Amnesty to all combatants who agreed to disarm. Two years on, more than 26,000 ex-combatants have been engaged at various stages of a locally designed program for their disarmament, demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR). A special advisor to the President is overseeing this continuing process. A fragile peace, punctuated by very occasional outbreaks of violence, currently reigns (see Box 1.1).

From the start, the trust of ex-combatants in the post-Amnesty Program has resided in the persona and office of the President. This trust transferred easily from the late President Yar’Adua to Goodluck Jonathan, who is a son of the Niger Delta. The political and financial capital of the presidency has thus far served as a guarantee of peace. Still, ex-combatants wield considerable power, leveraging the latent threat of renewed violence to gain contracts, political favors, and generous welfare. In addition, hundreds of young men and women still clamor to be included in the Amnesty Program, although registration has been officially closed (SDN 2011b). The military response has been a “get tough” policy, ordering immediate surrender of all remaining arms (Folarinmi 2011). This growing problem may become larger in 2015 when the training, reintegration, and payment of stipends are scheduled to end (Ujah 2011). Sustainable peace in the longer term will require more substantial attention to the underlying factors of regional instability, including regional development.
As soon as he took office in May 2007, the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua initiated a Presidential Peace Initiative with freedom fighters in the Niger Delta and asked the lead MEND field commander Tom Polo to actively engage other fighters in regular dialogue. These negotiations were one side of a “carrot and stick” strategy that combined inducements to disarm with continued military pressure from the joint task force (JTF), Operation Restore Hope. Several offers of amnesty were extended to fighters between mid-2008 and October 2009. They were rebuffed, in part because militants were skeptical that they would receive a full pardon.

That changed in May 2009, following a major clash between the JTF and Tom Polo’s combat forces over illicit oil trafficking. An unprecedented month-long assault spread to the camps of MEND and its allied commanders, and militant leaders were led one by one to accept a final Amnesty. Tom Polo was the last to surrender, in person to the President, at the deadline of 4 October 2009. More than 20,000 delta freedom fighters initially agreed to disarm, persuaded by generous terms and the direct involvement of the President. The government reported that it collected 18 gunboats, 299,032 rounds of ammunition, 3,831 weapons, 4,377 magazines, 2,072 explosives, and a number of rocket launchers (Adedeoja 2010). Nevertheless, some weapons still remain in circulation.

The Presidential Amnesty was a historic opportunity for peace and is considered by many as the late President Yar’Adua’s crowning achievement. For more than two years it has brought an uneasy calm to the Niger Delta. Sporadic violence has been firmly quashed by the JTF. Groups that did not disarm at first have come forward and were granted equal consideration and benefits until registration closed in mid-2011. A total of 26,358 ex-combatants (including nearly 1,000 women) have now joined the post-Amnesty Program of transformation and reintegration, at a cost of $660 million in 2011 (Akintola 2011). Each receives a monthly stipend of N65,000 ($433), more than three times the minimum wage, a largesse that has at times been poorly distributed and occasionally misappropriated by former commanders (Akintola 2011). (Some disillusioned ex-combatants have threatened to “return to the creeks” and “take up arms.”)

Reorientation and reintegration for all ex-combatants is key to the Amnesty Program. By mid-2011, 19,567 men and women have passed through a required two-week non-violence course. Subsequent skills training for social reintegration has matched the capacity and interests of 3,221 amnesty trainees at over 60 Nigerian institutions. Thus far, another 1,019 have undergone specialized instruction in South Africa, the U.S., Malaysia, Russia, Poland, Ghana, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines (Ujah 2011; Ehigiator, 2011) on a range of programs—from boat build-
ing, to business certification, to specialized deep sea welding, and even to university degrees. Only a few have been repatriated or prosecuted for misbehavior (African Examiner, 16 August 2011).

To assure a quick transition from “reorientation” of ex-combatants to their successful “reintegration” into society, the Amnesty Program also includes large infrastructure “amnesty projects” meant to create jobs and hasten the economic development of the delta region. The Nigerian Government has requested the international community—public and private—to assist with financial and technical support, skills training, and especially job placement. In response, the oil industry agreed to employ 3,000 of the former fighters, and has meanwhile offered lucrative contracts to a number of commanders, which they may share with their “boys.”
OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH

The developmental challenges facing the Niger Delta are closely intertwined with patterns of violent conflict and instability in the region. They are also driven by history. Behind the changes in the region’s economic and political systems that have unfolded over the past two hundred years, certain continuities are apparent. Most notable are those associated with the contestation with outsiders over control of local resources and the attendant sense of being unfairly exploited.

Our goal in undertaking this study is to enhance understanding of the factors that have contributed to violent conflict in the Niger Delta so that development partners and the government can form the most appropriate strategies for programs of intervention in this large and deeply deprived area rich in oil and gas. Our objectives are to take a close look at the factors that drive or mitigate violent conflict in the Niger Delta, to examine the dynamic relationships between them, and to draw conclusions for the future peaceful development of the region.

The study is based on the exceptionally rich literature available on the Niger Delta area, together with documents and contributions from an advisory group. The security situation precluded meaningful field consultations, and this must be accepted as a limitation of the study. However, all of the authors have recently visited the region several times, and one previously lived and worked in the area for an extended period of five years.

Chapter Two will examine the main challenges facing the delta and identify the principal economic, social, and political factors that have contributed to the high level of conflict in the region, its escalation, and de-escalation. Chapter Three analyzes past efforts to tackle these challenges in order to improve our understanding of how their strengths, weaknesses, and potential pitfalls might guide future programs and interventions. In particular, it reviews the opportunities arising from these efforts, including the recent Amnesty for ex-combatants, and the risks of returning to the past cycle of violence. Finally, Chapter Four considers actions that the government, oil companies, and development partners can adopt to simultaneously build peace and promote sustainable development in the Niger Delta.

NOTES

1 The Igbo are the dominant ethnic group in eastern Nigeria and dominated the old Eastern Region and the brief break-away Republic of Biafra between 1967 and 1970.
2 The national average for poverty incidence in 2004 was 55%, whereas the regional average was 37%.
3 Decree No. 15 1967; Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 1971; and Decree No. 6 1975.
King Duke IX of Old Calabar, Nigeria. Photograph by Claude Macdonald c. 1895.

Perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, the Niger Delta exemplifies the paradox of poor human and social development in an environment of riches. The region’s abundant natural resources, especially its oil, offer a potential foundation for development and prosperity. Instead, while providing Nigeria most of its wealth, the delta remains underdeveloped and afflicted by conflict and violence. A national debate over how to share oil revenue between federal, state, and local levels, and between oil producing and non-producing states remains an ongoing point of political contention. The proceeds of Nigeria’s oil production have increasingly fed corruption, violence, and the associated militarization of political and civic life. At the local level, communities have come into conflict with oil companies and the security forces over land acquisition, environmental damage, cash payments, employment opportunities, and the provision of social services. Competition over the “benefits” derived from oil extraction has also set communities and neighbors against each other.

Ideology, which is often a difficult factor to manage, is not a primary driver of violence in the Niger Delta. Agitation usually centers on issues of local liberties and opposition to a government seen as corrupt and unresponsive. Often, these issues combine with collective and personal interests. Together, they underpin the rallying calls of “true federalism,” “resource control,” “self-determination,” and “social justice” that have recurred in the rhetoric of Niger Delta activists over decades and have served to mobilize supporters within and outside the region. The grievances of local communities were famously first articulated in the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights. In the twenty years since, the non-violent approach espoused by the Bill’s authors has given way to region-wide frustration and conflict characterized by growing complexity, violence, and intractability. With increasing militancy, armed groups have arisen, waging systematic campaigns against the government and oil companies to further their demands. At the same time, powerful interests, often allied with local unemployed youth, have taken advantage of the chaotic situation to illegally divert oil revenues and engage in oil “bunkering” or theft. In this manner, political ends and criminal means have become increasingly and dangerously entwined.

The last two decades have seen a pattern of violent episodes interspersed with interludes of uneasy calm. Violence reached a crescendo in May 2009 with a fierce battle between the military and armed groups in the western delta. An unprecedented show of
government force was swiftly followed by a Presidential Amnesty offered to all militants in the region who agreed to come forward and disarm. The post-Amnesty period since October 2009 has been relatively calm, and yet the underlying causes of conflict, which are the subject of this chapter, remain largely unaddressed. Inaction on the part of the government and its partners perpetuates conditions that could spark renewed violence.

Unrest in the Niger Delta has its origins in multiple factors having to do with society, the economy, politics, culture, and security. These factors operate at different levels of causality, and together, they underpin the region’s predisposition to crisis. At the most fundamental level, structural factors comprise the underlying conditions and the basic ways in which society, the government, and the political economy work to make the region particularly vulnerable to instability. Driving factors are the grievances that emerge from the structural factors and constitute the perceptions, inadequacies, and tensions that suffuse the daily lives of many men, women, and youth and dispose them toward discord. Provocating factors exacerbate latent conflict by sparking violence and crime, often for profit. Their interplay generates a palpable tension that occasionally erupts into outright violence.

Table 2.1 below elaborates each of these categories of factors more systematically by examining them against five key issues that have thwarted the search for stability in the delta. The first is a trend toward social fragmentation rather than social cohesion; second, a flawed federal system worsened by poor governance; third, limited economic opportunities associated with an oil-based economy; fourth, a political culture oriented toward informal networks rather than civic rights; and fifth, the weak capacity of the State to ensure the security of its citizens. These issues are rooted in the underlying socio-political structures and culture of Nigeria as a whole. Together they constitute a set of circumstances that are not merely causes of discontent and foci of protest but also sources of manipulation and profiteering by political, criminal, or militia actors who incite violence to further their interests.

These factors also interact with one another, making sustainable solutions to these issues a challenge. Many of them cut across several issues at once. For example, the illicit oil trade, or oil “bunkering,” has roots in economic factors (profit from instability), as well as security factors (development of illicit and criminal markets) and cultural/political factors (primacy of informal networks). Their interplay weaves a web of discontent in which many Niger Deltans are trapped.
### TABLE 2.1: Factors Influencing Instability in the Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Factors</th>
<th>Government System</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Cultural / Political</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Social Fragmentation</td>
<td>Strong bonding within groups, weak bridging between groups</td>
<td>Strong center, weak periphery</td>
<td>High dependency on oil</td>
<td>Weak state capacity to protect citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth Bulge</td>
<td>State vs. traditional systems</td>
<td>Capital intensive</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weak state-citizen relationships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Primacy of informal networks</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Driving Factors</th>
<th>Government System</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Cultural / Political</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardening of social identities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception of relative deprivation</td>
<td>Weak rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions over access to oil benefits</td>
<td>'Winner-takes-all' political system</td>
<td>Environmental damage</td>
<td>Poor governance and impunity</td>
<td>Security forces poorly oriented and coordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergenerational conflicts</td>
<td>Sense of relative inequality</td>
<td>Loss of traditional livelihoods</td>
<td>Rent-seeking behavior</td>
<td>Limited presence of the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of inclusive, transparent and democratic political institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of public transparency and accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provocating Factors</th>
<th>Government System</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Cultural / Political</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak mechanisms for dispute resolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception of relative deprivation</td>
<td>Highly profitable illegal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of social protest</td>
<td>Sense of political marginalization</td>
<td>Environmental damage</td>
<td>Poor governance and impunity</td>
<td>Arms proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under-representation</td>
<td>Loss of traditional livelihoods</td>
<td>Rent-seeking behavior</td>
<td>Culture of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of public transparency and accountability</td>
<td>Poorly trained and equipped security forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vigilante justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private security contracts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELTA’S INSTABILITY

Social Factors: Social Fragmentation
The Niger Delta is a patchwork of over forty self-identified ethnicities, further divided into about 120 mutually unintelligible dialect and sub-dialect groups stretching from the coastal backwaters into the upland farming regions (Box 2.1).

Oil—and its political economy—has created conflict between communities and oil companies, other communities, and security forces since shortly after independence in 1960. Issues of contention have included payments of various kinds to communities, land acquisition, and environmental damage. During these conflicts, ethnic divisions are often exploited to mobilize support against other groups, sometimes rupturing the peaceful ties between longstanding neighbors. In addition, a strong bond typically develops within groups, while bridging between groups that once cooperated with one another is weakened. A well-known example of heightened inter-ethnic conflict is the three waves of violence that engulfed the Warri area between 1997 and 2003 (Box 2.2).

As the Warri Wars illustrate, demographic characteristics of the delta also make the region more prone to instability. Within this region, 62 percent of the inhabitants are below thirty years of age, unemployment is high, and there are few opportunities for advancement. Youth are easily mobilized for protest, violence, or criminal activity. States with large oil revenues have especially high rates of unemployment and under-employment, a condition that has contributed to youth restiveness and their persistent demands for “rents” from politicians and oil companies.

Government System: Flawed Federalism
The structure of Nigeria has undergone changes since independence. In 1960 the country had three regions, each dominated by one of the major ethnic groups: Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo. By 1966 the establishment of a federation with twelve states offered some delta ethnicities additional autonomy through the creation of Rivers and Bendel States. By 1976 there were nineteen states, and by 1996 the number had grown to 36 plus the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. Similarly, when the Local Government Area (LGA) was created as a new governing unit by the federal military government in 1979, there were initially 300. Today Nigeria has 774 LGAs, 185 of which are located in the nine oil producing states.

Despite this fragmentation, the extent of autonomy granted to the states has remained limited, particularly during the two main periods of military rule. In fact, the creation of states and LGAs is the outcome of two simultaneous but opposing processes. One tendency is to satisfy the demands of local and ethnic (or sub-ethnic) minorities by
BOX 2.1: THE NIGER DELTA: A CULTURAL MOSAIC

Linguistic and archaeological evidence suggests that the Ijaw people are the oldest population group in the core delta, settling in the area about 7,000 years ago. About eight to ten million strong, the Ijaw comprise Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnicity after the Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa. The winding creeks and mangrove forests of the coastal region have supported small, segmented communities whose isolation contrasts with the larger communities of non-Ijaw groups arriving in the area over the last two millennia. They include the Itsekiri (related to the Yoruba) and the Urhobo and Isoko (both associated with the Edo and the Benin empire). Igbo dialect groups (Ndokwa, Ukwuani) also live in Delta State west of the Niger River, while others (Egbema, Ikwerre, Ekpeye) are concentrated to the east in Rivers, Imo, and Abia States. Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers States are home to the Ibibio, Anang, and Efik peoples.

Whereas neighboring ethnic groups often evolved large state institutions, the Ijaw often lived along the fresh waters of the delta in tiny villages comprised of one lineage or extended family whose leader was the eldest member. Saltwater fishing villages near the coast were usually larger and had a central leader who brought different descent groups together in order to defend their control of the fishing grounds. Trade developed in the eastern delta communities of Nembe, Okrika, Bonny Island, Elem-Kalabari, and Old Calabar, where large city-states grew up, headed by a king, or amanyanabo. Typically, he was supported by numerous chiefs and social, judicial, military, political, and commercial institutions. Although the Ijaw were historically a large and pervasive population in the Niger Delta, they were never politically centralized or widely pre-dominant. Boundaries between settlements were often vague, leaders difficult to identify, and competition and distrust between communities widespread. From their isolated villages or city-states they continuously competed for territory and resources with other Ijaw clans and with non-Ijaw neighbors.
Warri in Delta state is the second most important oil town in the Niger Delta after Port Harcourt. Three ethnic groups—the Ijaw, Itsekiri and the Urhobo—claim portions of Warri as their homelands, and fierce and violent conflict has recently erupted among them on three occasions. Each wave of violence was rooted in historical grievances against the oil industry and the government for development neglect and the loss of local patrimony. The first wave erupted in March 1997. The Ijaw, who had lobbied for the creation of a new local government area (LGA) called Warri Southwest, discovered to their surprise that the headquarters would not be located in an Ijaw community, as they had assumed, but in an Itsekiri-speaking town. Hundreds of people died in clashes that went on for three months, and oil production in the area was severely disrupted. The conflict even continued outside of Warri. By late 2008 Ijaw youths launched a 24-day protest during which they took control of 20 Shell and Chevron oil facilities and shut down one-third of Nigeria’s oil production. In December of that year the Ijaw Youth Council convened 500 delegates to a meeting in Kaiama to demand local ownership of all land and natural resources and the immediate withdrawal of all oil companies and military forces from Ijaw territory. This was the famous “Kaiama Declaration.”

The location of the LGA headquarters was still unresolved when the second Warri Crisis broke out in May 1999, during an election period. Over 200 people were reported killed in militia raids made by Ijaw and Itsekiri groups. This time, the Urhobo also became targets. Thousands of homes were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people displaced. Warri was put under curfew. In June, newly elected President Obasanjo visited to urge peace. At the end of that month, the communities issued a Warri Accord, which asked guest oil companies to meet their “dire and urgent need” for basic amenities. Finally, at the end of 1999 the Delta State assembly passed a bill that moved the LGA headquarters to the Ijaw-speaking town initially proposed.

Unfortunately, the Warri Accord did not quell discontent. Renewed clashes broke out in a third phase during the 2003 local council primary elections. The first spark was an allegation by Urhobo youths that the number and apportionment of local council wards put them at a disadvantage. They attacked an Itsekiri area, and the fighting then escalated into conflicts with the military over illegal bunkering operations. Villagers fled to the oil terminals for refuge. When the terminals themselves became targets, about 2,000 refugees in the Escravos terminal were airlifted by Chevron (CNL). Shell (SPDC) evacuated dozens of others from its terminal in Forcados. More than 40% of Nigeria’s total production was shut in, several Shell and Chevron flow stations were destroyed by militants, and others were vandalized. President Obasanjo and his senior security chiefs opened talks with Niger Delta leaders on ending the unrest. Finally, the local military commander intervened directly with the leaders of the warring groups and urged dialogue, backed by force. This initiative brought about a calm that ended the last phase of the Warri Crisis.

(Sources: HRW 2003, Leton 2006, newspaper sources)
granting them their own administrative units; the second consolidates the strength of
the federal government by keeping the growing number of states and LGAs relatively
weak (Barkan et al. 2001).

Since the restoration of civilian democratic rule in 1999, the degree of autonomy of
the 36 states has increased. However, the hybrid centralized/federal political structure
of the country has created tensions between the center and the states which still rely in
large measure on the decisions and resources of the federal government. In principle,
state and local governments are responsible for nearly all public functions with the
exception of defense, the police, external relations, and customs; yet, they remain fiscally
dependent on the center. Their autonomy is also limited by the provision of the 1999
Constitution, which bars states from having their own constitutions or passing legisla-
tion that contradicts national legislation. The power of the federal government over
weak state and local governments has heightened ethno-regional competition across
Nigeria, and in the multi-ethnic Niger Delta it has contributed to a sense of depen-
dency and marginalization (Collier and Sambanis 2005).

Nigeria’s political economy continues to be dominated by a federal system shaped
largely as a vehicle for the redistribution of centrally collected oil revenues (Suberu
2005). Contention over the distribution of these revenues has been, as it continues to
be, the source of much political debate inside and outside the Niger Delta. Given the
overwhelming dominance of oil revenues, controlling them has increasingly become
the main locus of political struggle for Nigerian stakeholders at all levels. In the land
and waters of the Niger Delta, where nearly all oil reserves are located, the high stakes
involved have led to a call for greater “resource control” and have frequently led to
violence (Watts 2004c). Attempts to accommodate the claims of Niger Delta states have
been made by granting them a greater share of oil revenues. The 1999 Constitution
guarantees oil producing states a minimum of 13 percent of federal income derived
from production. Nevertheless, the 13 percent “derivation” and the creation of special
institutions that channel resources to the region1 have had limited success in bringing
about a lasting political solution. Indeed, the tensions in center-periphery relations have
become all the more vocal and violent following the restoration of civilian government
in 1999. The incentives created by the political economy of revenue distribution have
also fueled rivalries between groups and states over issues such as the location of oil
wells and boundaries, often resulting in violent clashes, as illustrated in Box 2.3 below.

The evolution of the Nigerian Government system has also created tensions between
the traditional legal and governance systems and the constitution and laws of the mod-
ern Nigerian state. The introduction of new institutions and legal frameworks during
the colonial and post-colonial periods has weakened traditional notions of authority and
control over land and natural resources which have their origins in pre-colonial social
and political structures. However, traditional leaders continue to command considerable
BOX 2.3: AKWA IBOM AND ITS NEIGHBORS: OIL WELLS AND BORDER DISPUTES

While Cross River and Akwa Ibom States are two separate states, their peoples share common geography, history, heritage, family, marriage, and economy. Nearly one quarter of Cross River government workers are from Akwa Ibom (Kidzu 2009). However, since the creation of Akwa Ibom State from Cross River State in 1987, there have been several violent communal clashes along the border between the two states. Border tensions are mainly due to competition over an area of land believed to contain oil reserves. They have been exacerbated by ill-defined state and LGA boundaries which cut through smaller ethnic groups, dividing them arbitrarily between the two states, in some cases placing the farm land of some members in one state while their houses lie in the other.

These disputes over oil reserves on land have particularly high stakes because almost all oil reserves of both states lie offshore. Maritime boundaries thus also became a point of contention. In 2002 the issue was further complicated by the federal government decision to exclude offshore oil revenues from the derivation formula. This meant that offshore production revenues were no longer distributed to the oil producing states (Bassey et. al. 2002).

When this “onshore/offshore dichotomy” was abrogated in 2004, conflicts over offshore derivation arose once more. Rivers State, Akwa Ibom’s western neighbor, also became involved. Akwa Ibom claimed 256 wells belonging to Rivers State, as well as 76 wells allocated to Cross River. A “political” solution was adopted by the Presidency, allowing Cross River to retain its 76 wells and Rivers 50 percent of its own. But in 2007 Akwa Ibom reopened the issue and succeeded in acquiring 171 additional wells from Rivers State. Cross River was also required to transfer its 76 wells to Akwa Ibom. This time the reason was not a state boundary, but rather the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. In 2008 Nigeria’s return of the Bakassai peninsula to Cameroon left Cross River without its designation as a “littoral” state. As a result, it was stripped of its oil producing status and all of its derivation revenue.

Despite the back and forth with boundaries, wells, and derivation proceeds, clashes between these states and their people have become less frequent in recent years. In 2007 governors of Cross River and Akwa Ibom announced efforts to increase cooperation through joint projects, investments, and the creation of conflict management commissions. Land conflicts do still occur. In August 2008, for example, the Amazaba Andonis allegedly imported fighters from Rivers State into Akwa Ibom and killed eleven people in Ikot Udo village as part of a plan to acquire Ibibio land. The issue is still not settled, and the intruders have not gone home (Vanguard, 25 April 2010). Today, however, most unrest in the region is associated with more than 100,000 persons displaced following the handover of Bakassi. Meanwhile, luck may have changed for Cross River State, as in June 2010 the Jonathan administration announced a “political solution” and returned a portion of its lost derivation revenue.
respect and authority in Nigeria, especially in cases of inter-ethnic or inter-communal disagreements over land or boundaries. Each community carefully protects its religious beliefs, political rights, and physical security, and community vigilante groups based on youth clubs or age grades have a long history in the region.

Two pieces of Federal legislation, the Petroleum Decree of 1969 and the Land Use Decree of 1978, are particularly credited with having undermined local control over resources in the delta. The Petroleum Decree gave the central government full ownership and authority over the country’s oil and gas reserves. It restated and strengthened the Mineral Oils Ordinance of 1914 and its subsequent amendments, which made oil and minerals legal property of the British Crown. The Land Use Decree of 1978 nationalized all land, both urban and rural, and handed its administration to state and local governments. In place of the customary land tenure that existed in Nigeria prior to 1978, this decree established a new system whereby statutory and customary rights of occupancy formed the basis of land-holdings (Francis 1986). Communities in oil producing areas of the country had previously been accustomed to negotiating directly with oil companies over access to land and compensation (Ebeku 2001). After 1978 however, state governments had the power to revoke rights of occupancy in the case of overriding public interest, including (under Section 28) the use of land for mining, mineral extraction, and the construction of pipelines (Allott 1978).

Resentment of these laws was central to the grievances against the federal government articulated in the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990. Later, the 1998 Kaiama Declaration by Ijaw youth described the Land Use and Petroleum Decrees as laws that “rob our peoples/community of the right to control of our lives and resources” (Kaiama Declaration 1998). In both cases, public demonstrations were ultimately met with violent government repression, exacerbating the sense of political exclusion and economic marginalization felt by these and other Niger Delta communities.

Economic Factors: The Political Economy of Oil
The oil industry, on which the Nigerian economy clearly depends, is highly capital-intensive and creates little demand for local (especially unskilled) labor in the Niger Delta. While there has been considerable foreign and domestic investment in the oil and gas sectors, there has been much less investment in manufacturing and agriculture. Furthermore, it is possible at times that oil revenues have (through the mechanism of the “Dutch Disease”) put upward pressure on the exchange rate, making exports within the agricultural and manufacturing sectors less competitive in the world economy (ANEEJ 2004). Degradation of the natural resource base has also undermined employment opportunities.

The predominance of the informal sector makes it difficult to quantify unemployment in Nigeria, and the formal sector has seen periods of economic stagnation since
the 1990s (EIU 2007). It is clear to the most casual observer that youth unemployment and underemployment are serious problems. Official figures indicate that the unemployment rate for youths 15 to 24 years old in the South-South zone for 2006 was 24 percent, higher than any other zone in Nigeria (see Table 2.2 below for 2006). The town of Oloibiri, the location of Nigeria’s first oil well, was reported to have a youth unemployment rate of 50 percent (Brown 2006). A recent World Bank study shows that jobs for youth throughout Nigeria are in decline (Treichel 2010), and youth unemployment figures as high as 70 percent are popularly cited today in the region.

Unemployment and underemployment rates are higher in the core oil producing states of the Niger Delta than in any other region in Nigeria, and they are more pronounced in urban areas. Lack of available and appropriate work limits the possibilities for young people to move out of poverty. Limited employment also reduces the opportunity cost of turning to violent forms of struggle and criminal activities (Oyefusi 2007). Thus unemployment, particularly of youth, has helped to drive and sustain high levels of violence and criminality throughout the delta region.4 Many young people operate as independent agents with self-interested motives of acquiring oil revenues and related spoils. Violence in these cases is primarily criminal and does not arise from any political program or altruistic purpose. Consequently, the line between activism and criminality has become increasingly blurred, as activities such as oil bunkering and kidnapping are not only methods of protest but also an attractive means of earning an income.

### TABLE 2.2:
Unemployment and Underemployment Rates 2006 (Youth unemployment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Underemployment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>11.3 (33)</td>
<td>33.7 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>6.8 (19)</td>
<td>19.4 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>1.8 (5)</td>
<td>12.0 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>9.3 (21)</td>
<td>29.2 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>8.0 (22)</td>
<td>30.9 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>11.4 (29)</td>
<td>25.3 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>8.8 (24)</td>
<td>26.2 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5.3 (14)</td>
<td>20.2 (17.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nigeria Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 2006
Political Culture: From Patrimonialism to Neo-Patrimonialism

Group identity in the Niger Delta is generally centered on the extended family or clan structures, headed by traditional authorities who are custodians of group assets, such as land and fishing grounds. With the imposition of colonial rule, the traditional socio-political organization of these communities became incorporated into the new administration, reshaping community relations not only with the outside world, but also internally. Under the system of “indirect rule” the colonial authorities chose traditional chiefs through whom they administered the country. Where such institutions did not exist the colonial regime created them and thereby markedly changed the distribution of power and authority within communities. The approach of selecting preferred community interlocutors was not dissimilar to the later modus operandi of the oil companies, which arrived towards the end of colonial rule and assumed many of the established colonial practices in their community relations. To many older residents, oil managers were scarcely distinguishable from colonial authorities.

These external interventions did not so much do away with traditional patrimonial systems as centralize and distort them, putting additional powers and resources in the hands of nominated interlocutors and making them less accountable to popular local pressures. The resulting “neo-patrimonial” systems continue to underpin the social and economic life of Niger Delta communities, shaping the quest for assets, and in particular the control of rents from oil and gas. As local level accountability is weak in the region, some chiefs have misused their privileges for private gain.

While traditional political systems and leaders continue to have considerable influence, their embedding in the political economy of the nation state has changed their structure, role, and style. And, of course, the nation state itself has a dual aspect. Complex, powerful, and deeply entrenched networks of patronage and political alliance underlie the outward appearance of a modern administration with its formal institutional structures. Defective public service delivery in the Niger Delta thus stems not only from the failure of the formal federal system to meet its goals, but also from its remarkable success in delivering spoils, which underpins the neo-patrimonial system of patronage and helps to secure political alliances.

As in some sub-Saharan African countries, a characteristic that distinguishes the Nigerian political economy from an idealized model of pluralist politics and public administration is the lack of a strict division between the public and private spheres (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In such a system, public employment and goods are seen primarily as resources for personal or group advancement rather than a means to serve the public good. Political leaders at all levels of government are under pressure to reward their clients and supporters, and as a consequence the management and allocation of resources may follow the lines dictated by patronage rather than policy (Hyden 2005).
According to these principles, government jobs and other public resources may be distributed by political leaders to reinforce popular support (Okafor 2005). These practices in Nigeria have led to an extremely bloated public sector with widespread duplication of agencies and responsibilities. Much of the budget is consumed in supporting the costs of the bureaucracy itself rather than the services it ostensibly exists to provide.

Patrimonial resource allocation and bloated public bureaucracy compromise the quality of public services, distort the allocation of revenue, and consequently inhibit social provision and economic growth. The system undermines the legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of government and promotes inequality by concentrating resources in the hands of a small number. While this group is likely to invest and spend its spoils outside of Nigeria, they will keep their domestic constituencies satisfied by distributing largesse, thus reinforcing corrupt practices and patron-client networks. In these ways, the powerful neo-patrimonial structures of the delta region, and the country overall, reinforce existing traditional political systems and continue to contribute to social unrest and conflict.

**Security Factors: Weak Capacity of the State to Protect Citizens**

Since Nigeria’s first defense force was established in Lagos Colony in 1861, the national security structure has evolved along a British model, comprised most notably of the Nigeria Police Force, the State Security Service (SSS), and the military in three services: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In keeping with the centralized structure of Nigeria’s government, all are federal institutions. Police are the most pervasive but the least trained, supervised, and equipped. Separate police branches include the armed Mobile Police, the so-called unarmed SPY (supernumerary) police who often serve as guards for oil installations, and the EFCC (Economic and Financial Crime Commission). The SSS is the federal law enforcement agency responsible for domestic intelligence and is sometimes criticized as an instrument of repression. About 95,000 military men and women are deployed domestically to support civil authorities or in foreign peacekeeping operations. They also engage in special security operations in the country and since 2003 about 15,000 serve in the Niger Delta at any given time as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF), “Operation Restore Hope,” comprised of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.5

Deployment of the JTF is an outcome of growing political agitation that began in the Niger Delta in the early 1990s and which was not adequately managed by the police. In 2002 Lt. General (ret.) Alexander Ogomudia noted in a report on the region that the capability of security agencies needed vast improvement, that police stations were absent in most oil producing communities, and that maritime police needed strong reinforcement to counter bunkering and piracy (Ogomudia 2002). Many analysts make the same recommendations today. In the absence of trained preventive security personnel, deployments of the military JTF have become the alternate option throughout
the region. The JTF presence has resulted in a series of highly militarized, reactive, and semi-permanent operations in Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers States, often with considerable damage to communities, displacement of residents, and loss of life.

Despite the deployment of the JTF, a security vacuum pervades the region and results from a confluence of vulnerabilities which include weak rule of law; limited presence of the state in most communities, both as a protector and service provider; and the perception that security forces are badly supervised and coordinated, disrespectful of local citizens, and often corrupt. Indeed, the relationship between citizens and security forces is one of suspicion, mistrust and, in some cases, fear. A history of abuses committed toward civilians by security forces has created a perception that their mandate is not to protect citizens but to safeguard powerful interests, including their own (HRW 2010). Typically, the police are less highly regarded than the military by most Nigerians. According to Afrobarometer in 2005, 72 percent of Nigerian citizens either did not trust the police at all, or trusted them only a little. Of the Nigerians interviewed, 71 percent also believed that all or most members of the police force were involved in corruption (Lewis et. al. 2005). By 2011 a survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) showed little change. While 64 percent of Nigerians had very little or no confidence in the police, 60 percent had a great deal or some confidence in the military (IRI 2011).

Trust building between citizens and the military or police is difficult because all security forces are nationally managed and controlled. Many officers deployed to the Niger Delta come from other geopolitical zones of the country and are therefore seen as “foreigners” by the local population. Few are present in small or remote communities to protect local citizens. These security lapses tend to be met by vigilante groups, private security contractors, and militants. In the absence of official community policing, some states have created their own policing programs in communities, including the Delta State Waterways Security Committee (2007), the Bayelsa Volunteers (2003, reconstituted 2007), and since 2010, a new Bayelsa State force code named “Famou Tangbe” or “Kill and Throw Away.”

**DRIVING FACTORS THAT PROMOTE CONFLICT**

The previous section discussed the underlying structural conditions that promote instability in the Niger Delta. They include a tendency for society to fragment along ethnic lines; a federal government system that concentrates power and resources at the center; a political economy of oil that creates little opportunity and diversity; patronage structures that override civic rights; and the weak capacity of the state to protect its citizens. Driving factors are concerned more directly with underlying grievances that contribute to dissatisfaction and militancy. Table 2.3 shows the sources of dissatisfaction identified by delta residents in a 2005 survey. In this survey governance issues occupy the top
three places and over a half of responses, with environmental damage close behind, followed by insecurity and deprivation. Regional satisfaction with governance may have improved since the 2011 elections.

**Driving Factors in Society: Hardening of Identities, Tensions over Access to Oil Benefits, and Intergenerational Conflicts**

Disputes over the division of the benefits of oil production have fueled conflicts within and between communities in the Niger Delta. For many years the standard oil company practice was to designate certain operational locations as “host communities,” thereby entitling residents to payment for land used for oil facilities, together with additional development goods. Host community status brought with it considerable benefits in the form of jobs on local oil projects, contracts, and compensation to those who successfully laid claim to the land, and fishing grounds where drilling and production activities take place. This practice has caused competition over territory, as well as perceptions of inequality in gaining access to resources and social services. Community identities harden in relation to their neighbors, and occasionally these struggles become lethal.

Formal judicial institutions have been slow to assist when disputes over wells and other assets arise. It may take up to ten years before a High Court judgment is obtained and even longer for subsequent petitions through the Appeals and Supreme Courts (UNDP 2006, p. 118). In the absence of legal recourse, some aggrieved com-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>% of respondents identifying it as most disliked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor leadership</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor governance</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low education</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of infrastructure</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High cost of living</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ERML 2005*
munities have concluded that there are few alternatives to the use of force in asserting their legitimate rights.

When ethnic identities become hardened, relations between groups begin to suffer. At the same time, relationships within groups with a common identity may also start to fray. The forces that typically strengthen collective identity against other competing groups in the Niger Delta may give way to stronger influences. Within communities, for example, conflicts may arise along generational lines. Holders of traditional chieftaincies may use (or be assumed to be using) their positions as a means of controlling compensation payments from oil companies. At times they are viewed with suspicion by other community members, especially among the youth (UNDP 2006). Such intergenerational struggles fester inside communities when younger members repeatedly accuse local elders of garnering land payments, social investments, or other forms of compensation for themselves rather than sharing them for the benefit of the community at large. The erosion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of chiefs is particularly challenging to the local social order, since the settlement of disputes is one of the customary responsibilities of traditional leaders. As the legitimacy and impartiality of traditional authorities are compromised, the ability of communities to resolve conflict in a non-violent way is further weakened.

In this way, a growing sense of distrust has eroded the social capital of many Niger Delta communities and in some cases has led to a complete breakdown of social order. Nembe, in Bayelsa State, is a community where disagreement over the sharing of compensation payments has led to violence in the past. Youth and vigilantes have held a paramount chief responsible for the economic and social crisis which has repeatedly afflicted parts of their community, forcing him to live over one hundred miles away from his subjects (Okonta 2007). Table 2.4 presents an informal typology of conflicts in the Delta with some examples of each.

Because oil production can suffer from these violent outbreaks, companies have recently taken pains to make their support more inclusive. Having understood that development support to host communities is a way of ensuring their local “social license to operate,” they have directly borne the sometimes substantial cost as a supplement to contractual payments on royalties and profits to the government. However, this practice of compensation can also be divisive and exclusionary, at times pitting communities against each other in a proliferation of micro-level struggles which undermine the basis for collective community action. Today corporate community relations policies have become more equitable with time and experience, but they are far from uniform. Most oil producers now extend their social investments to “pipeline communities,” as well as “coastal communities” located near offshore platforms. A more recent approach known as the “GMOU,” or Global Memorandum of Understanding, clusters producing and non-producing communities of similar ethnic origin so that development goods can be shared more equitably (see Chapter Three).
### TABLE 2.4: Types of Community Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of conflict</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Intra-community** | • Struggles develop over claims to customary authority within communities; or new power-brokers emerge to challenge traditional leaders.  
• Disputes between individuals and groups arise over entitlement to oil company payments and their distribution. | In Nembe, youths questioned the authority of the traditional ruler in dealing with compensation payments. Violence ensued within the community and against oil companies. |
| **Inter-community** | • Oil wells and installations bring benefits for host communities, but their location in relation to community boundaries may be unclear, since land ownership is generally “customary,” (rather than registered). Court resolutions may take up to 10 years.  
• Local vigilante groups may be called up to defend community interests. Potential benefits from revenues or jobs add urgency to the conflict. | Relations between Soku, Elem-Sangama and Oluasiri communities (Rivers and Bayelsa states) have been tense due to a dispute over ownership of a gas plant. The dispute was intensified by the oil company when it unwittingly named the facility “Soku Gas Plant” without local consultation. Boundary disputes as well as illegal bunkering activities and high levels of youth unemployment complicated the resolution of the conflict.7 |
| **Inter-ethnic** | • Many conflicts between ethnic groups involve fears over political rights, representation, and by extension control of local funds.  
• Some conflicts are intensified by underlying historical antagonisms | The Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict in the Warri area of Delta State has involved historical disputes over the control of trade, ethnicity of customary rulership, and between 1997 and 2003, a dispute over which ethnic town should be the headquarters of a new LGA (see Box 2.2). |
Driving Factors Stemming from the Government System: Zero Sum Game, Relative Inequality, and Political Exclusion

Presidential systems often play out as zero sum games in which the prevailing faction gains access to all the benefits during elections. Under conditions of high social fragmentation, a “winner takes all” political system may become a source of instability because people’s access to public resources may depend upon electoral success. In Nigeria, this model increases the stakes in every election since access to goods and services largely depends on who is in power.

Historically, the delta’s relatively small ethnicities have been dominated in federal elections by the larger hegemonic ethnic groups. Given the major contribution that the region’s oil makes to federal finances, there is a relative sense of under-representation among the region’s citizens. They perceive that the benefits go to those outside the Niger Delta, while they bear all of the negative consequences of its exploitation, such as physical intrusion, economic inequality, environmental degradation and the destruction of traditional livelihoods. The relative underdevelopment which they see around them, in contrast to the resources which they perceive going elsewhere, has exacerbated feelings of unfairness and resentment against the political center.

Lack of inclusive, transparent, and democratic political institutions compound the sense of exclusion in the region. At the state level, elected governors also wield enormous economic and political power and typically do not open their administrations to public scrutiny. Budgets are rarely published, contract awards and projects are poorly monitored, and elections are often rigged at state and local levels. Governors may favor some local constituencies over others. Worse, to most citizens, the mandates of federal, state, and local governments are unclear. While in some cases, the division of responsibilities in the delivery of services across different levels of government has been defined in legislation, actual practice has led to the overlap of functions in the way in which federal, state, and local institutions are understood, leading to the waste of valuable development resources. This, together with incentives for competition over oil revenues, has fuelled corruption and rent-seeking behavior, especially at the state and local government levels. Citizens do not have a clear sense of who should be held accountable for failures in the delivery of services, and they are forced to rely on patronage networks in order to gain access to services and opportunities. This practice undermines relationships between citizens and the state and deepens a sense of injustice and distrust, further destabilizing the region. (A more detailed discussion of corruption is found in the section on political culture below.)
Driving Factors in the Political Economy: Relative Deprivation, Environmental Damage, and Loss of Traditional Livelihoods

Poverty levels in the Niger Delta are not statistically the highest in Nigeria, but poverty data alone does not explain the level of disaffection amongst its inhabitants. In 2005, the only year in which a Human Development Index (HDI) was measured for the region, the Niger Delta ranked higher than the national average. However, the spatial distribution of scores was uneven. Heavily populated urban LGAs typically had high HDI scores, while many LGAs with oil facilities rated very low, especially in Rivers and Bayelsa States. In all, about three-quarters of Niger Delta LGAs ranked lower than the national average, confirming an uneven distribution in the quality of life.\(^8\) These findings are supported by another study showing that one out of every four households in five key Niger Delta states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, and Rivers) belonged to the lowest welfare quintile, the “core poor.”\(^9\) These two studies indicate high levels of inequality within the region itself.\(^10\)

The region’s profound sense of marginalization is also influenced by perceptions of relative prosperity in other parts of Nigeria. Consistent with this finding, levels of self-assessed poverty are much higher in the Niger Delta than those revealed by household income and expenditure data. In the South-South zone (which includes six of the oil-producing states), over three-quarters of the population (77 percent) consider themselves to be living in poverty, compared to the official statistical measure of one third (35 percent). Furthermore, three out of every ten people in the South-South see themselves as “very poor.” There is considerable variation across states, with Bayelsa, the core Ijaw state, having a particularly high concentration of people assessing themselves as “very poor” (Table 2.5). High prices in the Niger Delta are also considered to reduce the purchasing power of residents, especially when seen alongside the standard of living of those (often from outside) employed by the oil industry (UNDP 2006). All together, the high proportion of people living in poverty and the subjective assessments of personal deprivation create a widespread sense of inequality, an important driver of regional volatility.

The deterioration of the environment is one of the most visible forms of the negative impact of oil exploitation and sets the Niger Delta apart from other poor regions in the country. Environmental degradation, a major focus of local discontent, has often brought communities into conflict with the federal government and oil companies (Amnesty 2009). Oil spills, gas flaring, and shoreline flooding and erosion are the main environmental challenges faced by Niger Deltans.\(^11\) In the early 1990s, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) took the environment as the rallying point for its campaign articulating grievances against oil operations in its area. Since that time, environmental concerns have been inextricably linked to the broader struggle for social and political transformation. The heavy-handed and occasionally violent reac-

Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta
tion of federal security forces to these demands led some groups to adopt more radical approaches to achieve their aims.15

Protecting the natural environment of the Niger Delta is closely linked to the protection of the economic wellbeing of its citizens. Destruction of the environment through oil spills and gas flaring has made the poorest communities vulnerable and has had direct deleterious impacts, such as harming traditional livelihoods. The consequences of oil spills and gas flaring, whether due to operational error or sabotage, are felt across the entire delta region (see Boxes 2.5 and 2.6). The most severe effects tend to be experienced by those who are already economically and politically marginalized. A 2003 World Bank study of the linkages between poverty and the environment in Nigeria found that the poorest half of households surveyed in the Niger Delta obtain 60 percent of their income from environmental resources. If only crop income is included in this category, environmental income constitutes 100 percent (World Bank 2003). The main implications of this dependence are that environmental degradation has a greater impact on the poor than on the

### TABLE 2.5:

**Poverty Statistics for the Niger Delta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Poverty Incidence (%)</th>
<th>Core Poor (%) (quintile 1)</th>
<th>Self-assessed poverty level</th>
<th>Very Poor (%) (self-assessed)</th>
<th>Gini</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>21.37</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2006, the infant mortality rate in the Niger Delta—typically the best proxy for general welfare—was 120 per thousand, significantly worse than the national average of 100 per thousand. One in five children born in the region dies before reaching the age of five. Overall HIV/AIDS prevalence was 5.8% (Nigeria 3.6%, NARHS 2007), rising to 8.9% for youth aged 20 to 24.

Schools and health facilities are often very difficult to reach, especially in riverine communities. On average, there is one primary school per 3,700 people, or an area of 14 square kilometers, while one secondary school serves 14,679 people. Each primary health center is shared by 43 settlements on average, in an area spanning 44 square kilometers; secondary health centers are even fewer. For those who are able to access these facilities, the services are often disappointing. The most basic supplies, such as textbooks and chalk in schools and medicines in health care centers, are simply not available (UNDP 2006). The supply of water and electricity is undependable. Teachers and health care providers have become demoralized to the point where some health centers and public schools have simply been abandoned (HRW 2007, pp. 44–53). Statistics suggest that 80% of children in the Niger Delta attend primary school at some point in time, but the attrition rates are also high. The quality of education received by these children has also been declining in recent years, mainly due to a serious shortage of quality teachers, the lack of basic teaching materials, and the dis-repair of school facilities (UNDP 2006, p. 32).
According to a June 2010 estimate, up to 546 million gallons of oil—or nearly the equivalent of an Exxon Valdez spill every year—have poured into the ecosystems of the Niger Delta over 50 years of production (Nossiter 2010). Between 1976 and 2001 a total of 6,817 oil spills was recorded, with only 70% of oil recovered (UNDP 2006). The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) noted another 2,405 spills between 2006 and mid-2010, with an increasing trend year-on-year: 252 in 2006, 598 in 2007, 927 in 2008 and 628 in 2009, but rising again in 2010 (Ezigbo 2010a). All told, these spills have a significant impact on vegetation, water supply, and marine life, with negative consequences for human health and local livelihoods dependent on agriculture (EIA 2003).

Spills occur for many reasons, and their prevention, mitigation, and remediation have met a variety of blocks. Government environmental regulations are often outdated or poorly enforced. A large proportion of Nigeria’s decades-old pipelines are prone to corrosion, and their replacement, which by industry standards should be done every fifteen years, has been a low priority. A clear protocol for oil spill response has been laid down by the government, but spills linger—sometimes for many years—because of slow and bureaucratic procedures, lack of access to spill sites, or local hostility. Perverse economic incentives encourage communities to enlarge the size of spills or to bar pre-cleanup inspections in the hope of winning remediation contracts or large compensation payments. Clean-up is the responsibility of the operating oil company, whatever the cause. Compensation to affected communities, however, is paid only in cases of operational lapse. Often the cause is in dispute, and judicial remedies can take years to resolve. In recent years there appears to have been an increase in the number of oil spills caused by deliberate attempts to damage oil facilities or to illegally “bunker” or steal oil. According to Shell, 69% of their 241 oil spill incidents recorded in 2006 occurred as a result of sabotage (SPDC 2006). In 2010 the company reported a slightly higher figure (SDN 2011a).

Whatever the cause, oil spills have devastated large parts of the Niger Delta. Its citizens have paid a high and unrelenting price, and full remediation has been rare. A UNEP study of oil and gas pollution in Ogoniland published in August 2011 concluded that a complete clean up of the small Ogoni region alone would require 30 years and $1 billion to achieve (UNEP 2011; LaPin 2011).
rich, and the Niger Delta region has a high vulnerability to poverty because of the high proportion of the population dependent on agricultural income sources.

The negative impact of environmental damage due to oil extraction on employment in fishing and agriculture in the delta has not been offset by the addition of new jobs in the oil industry. While Nigerian staff represent as much as 95 percent of the workforce in some large oil companies, overall employment opportunities in the industry are slim. The perception among the local population is that it is difficult to penetrate the oil industry’s limited job market, and locals are therefore excluded from available opportunities in favor of “people from the outside,” who are often members of more dominant ethnic groups. As one young man in the village of Finima explained, “We have diploma holders, but we have nothing to do” (O’Neill 2007).

**BOX 2.6: “FLARES DOWN” FOR THE SECOND LARGEST GAS FLARING OPERATIONS IN THE WORLD**

Gas flaring is a process of burning off the gas associated with oil production when it is not put to economic use. Productive uses might include cooling the gas to make LNG for export, capturing gas for domestic power generation, or re-injecting gas into wells in order to “lift” more oil. It is estimated that wasting flared gas costs Nigeria between $1 billion and $2.5 billion a year in lost revenue. According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Nigeria flared 32% (an average of 127 bcf) of associated gas in the first quarter of 2010 (*Daily Trust*, 12 April 2010). Flaring operations in the Niger Delta are the world’s second largest after Russia, accounting for at least 10% of the world total. More greenhouse gases are emitted in Nigeria than from all other sources in Sub-Saharan Africa combined. Flares are a significant source of particulate matter emissions, exposing communities to sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, and more than 250 other toxins and carcinogenic substances. It is widely accepted that these pollutants are linked to significant health and environmental problems throughout the Niger Delta, and they have been demonstrated in a recent UNEP study of Ogoniland, (ERA 2005; UNEP 2011).

The 1979 Associated Gas Reinjection Act required every company producing oil in Nigeria to submit a detailed plan for utilization of associated gas after January 1, 1984. A later amendment permitted the Oil Minister to waive the deadline and allow flaring to continue with payment of a set penalty. Since 1985 the deadline for “flares down” has been shifted more than six times. Barriers have included unreliable fund-
Driving Factors in Political Culture: Pervasive Corruption, Poor Governance, Rent-Seeking Behavior, and Lack of Public Transparency

Oil has been central to the nation-building process in Nigeria, and the political economy of its distribution has shaped the style and quality of governance and levels of corruption in the country (Watts 2004b). Between 1996 and 2008 the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published annually by Transparency International showed a general improvement in Nigeria’s composite score. The upward trend could be ascribed to government efforts since 1999 to improve transparency and accountability. However, Nigeria’s CPI declined in both 2009 and 2010 (see Table 2.6). This trend was replicated in the Failed States Index issued by the Fund for Peace. Nigeria’s performance has
TABLE 2.6:
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for Nigeria 1996–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPI Score (max = 10)</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>No. of countries ranked</th>
<th>No. of countries ranking worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Transparency International, CPI reports, 1996–2010

TABLE 2.7:
Rivers State Revenue Compared With That of Four Other African Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>2009 Budget (US$)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>152.3</td>
<td>20.6 billion</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers State</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.9 billion</td>
<td>3,965¹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>342.3 million</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>468.7 million</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>232.7 million</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>334.0 million</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

steadily worsened against the twelve economic, political, and military indicators used by the survey, which measured Nigeria for the second year in a row as 14th out of 177 countries having the greatest chance of becoming a failed state. Box 2.7 describes the most relevant efforts at the federal level to tackle corruption in the country.

State level corruption is if anything more endemic than federal, particularly in the oil producing states of the Niger Delta, with their huge inflows of revenue. With the coming of the democratic Fourth Republic in 1999, there has been a degree of decentralization from the federal government, but decision-making at the state level has remained overwhelmingly centralized. Political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of state governors, whose enormous powers of patronage derive from oil revenues (HRW 2007, p. 79).

In the core producing states, oil “derivation,” representing 13 percent of oil and gas production, exceeds all other sources of revenue. From 1998 to 2002 internally generated revenue in the states of the Niger Delta accounted for less than 15 percent of total state revenue. By 2007 the 13 percent derivation allocation alone accounted for about half of total federal allocations to the Niger Delta states and about 56 to 66 percent of allocations to the four core producing states. For example, in Rivers State in 2009, the GDP per capita was reported by the Governor as $3,965, compared to $2,400 for Nigeria overall and to $300 for Burundi, a country with almost twice the Rivers State population (see Table 2.7).

Since 1999 growing federal allocations to states, combined with rising oil prices, have vastly increased oil revenue at the state level and has made corruption more apparent in state and local government administrations (HRW 2007, p.18). For LGAs, the total monthly allocations increased more than fivefold between 1999 and 2006 (HRW 2007, p. 15). These massive inflows have encouraged rent-seeking behavior across the political system. Furthermore, since these revenues are rents, they do not flow from a direct fiscal relationship with the population in the form of taxation, nor do most citizens expect their state and local government officials to disclose their expenditures (ANEEJ 2004, p. 17). Issac Asume Osuoka, director of Social Action Nigeria, explained, “With all the oil money coming in, the state doesn’t need taxes from people. Rather than being a resource for the state, the people are impediments. There is no incentive anymore for the government to build schools or hospitals” (O’Neill 2007). Budgets are occasionally posted on state government websites, but citizens have great difficulty accessing information on the actual allocation and use of public revenues by state and local governments. They cannot easily hold their representatives accountable (HRW 2007, p. 81). Nevertheless, past and present state governors in the Niger Delta, and elsewhere in Nigeria, have not escaped the scrutiny of anti-corruption agencies (see Box 2.8 below). So far, only one governor has served a sentence, but the arrests may send a message to those currently in power.
BOX 2.7: FEDERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

In December 2002 the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established under the leadership of a senior police officer Nuhu Ribadu in order to investigate financial corruption. The EFCC mission was to “curb the menace of corruption” and by mid-2010 it had listed 55 high-profile cases outstanding on its website along with scores of others. In August 2011 HRW noted that only four convictions had been obtained to date in thirty cases of nationally prominent figures, and those charged had served very little time in prison (HRW 2011b). In the same year the new EFCC chair Farida Waziri reported that the Commission had recorded over 600 convictions and recovered $12 billion (Olabulo and Gbenga-Ogundare 2011), but that it has been unsuccessful in creating a special court to expedite pending, high-profile cases. Many critics allege that the fight against corruption can become politically selective by targeting opponents or protecting friends of the administration. Furthermore, immunity from criminal prosecution enjoyed by the president and state governors while in office further undermines the powers of the EFCC by perpetuating a dangerous culture of impunity (ICG 2006b, p. 17).

In addition to the EFCC, several other agencies, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC), Code of Conduct Bureau, and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) are now actively engaged in anti-corruption efforts. Sound management of budgets has been encouraged with the signing of the federal Fiscal Responsibility Act in late 2007, followed by analogous laws in some Niger Delta states. In late 2009, as part of the modernization of the banking system, the Governor of the Central Bank issued a new regulation requiring banks to report large cash transfers if one account holder was considered “politically exposed.” The 2007 Public Procurement Act has been reinforced in 2010 by a new executive committee mandated to review current practices and compliance. This synergy has made the anti-corruption strategy broader and more integrated.

In February 2004 Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) was launched as part of a global initiative to improve governance in resource-rich countries. A NEITI Bill was signed into law in May 2007, making Nigeria the first of 30 EITI “candidate” countries with a statutory backing for its activities. The initiative brought greater transparency to federal finances by publishing details of budgets and allocations to state and local governments. Since 2004 all oil companies in Nigeria have published annual reports for the NEITI and participate fully in its audit processes. Independent audits of the oil and gas sector required by the NEITI are helping to foster a culture of transparency (EITI 2010b). Nigeria has thus far undertaken two comprehensive audits. The first report for 1999–2005 continues to show an unresolved discrepancy of $16 million in unreported revenue. The second audit for 2004–2005
completed in August 2009 initially showed $5 billion outstanding, which was narrowed in March to $155 million. The report highlighted such issues as withholding or underreporting of revenue by NNPC, poor regulation, and miscounting of the amount of oil produced. The NEITI Chairman lamented that after 52 years of producing oil, “Nigeria does not know the quantity of oil it produces” (Ezigbo 2010b, EITI 2010a). In March 2011, after months of efforts by Nigeria to meet the stipulated standard of compliance, the international board of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative declared it a “compliant country” at its fifth global conference (Ojeme 2011).
BOX 2.8: NIGER DELTA STATE GOVERNORS ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION BY THE EFCC

In August 2011, Farida Waziri, the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, disclosed that 72%, or 26, former governors in Nigeria were under investigation (Olabulo and Gbenga-Ogundare 2011). Those from the Niger Delta who have been arraigned or prosecuted include the following:

- Diepreye Alamaiyeseigha (Gov. of Bayelsa State, 1999–2005) was arrested in London in September 2005 on charges of money-laundering and corruption. He fled to Nigeria, where he was removed from office and subsequently re-arrested and charged by the EFCC in December 2005. He pleaded guilty in July 2007 to six counts of corruption and money laundering. He was sentenced to two years in jail but was released one day later on the grounds that he had already served most of the two-year sentence while in custody.

- James Ibori (Gov. of Delta State, 1999–2007) was arraigned on 170 state counts, quashed in Asaba Federal High Court by a judge for alleged lack of evidence. He fled arrest to Dubai in May 2010 following a second EFCC charge but was detained by Interpol, extradited to the UK, and arraigned in London on charges by the Metropolitan Police of money-laundering and fraud. His London trial is in progress, and Nigeria also hopes to try the ex-governor later on pending charges of its own.

- Lucky Igbinedion (Gov. of Edo State, 1999–2007) fled to the UK, returning in January 2008. He was arraigned on 191 state counts, applied for a plea bargain, and was convicted, but the EFCC has appealed the judgment to seek stiffer sanctions. He is currently out on bail.

- Orji Kalu (Gov. of Abia State, 1999–2007) was convicted of 107 counts but has been on bail appealing judgment since 2008.

- Peter Odili (Gov. of Rivers State. 1999–2007) is widely believed to have committed serious financial crimes while in office, but he has surprisingly not been arrested by the EFCC.

Sources: EFCC website: http://efccnigeria.org; HRW 2011b.
Driving Factors that Create Insecurity: Illegal Activities, Arms Proliferation, Culture of Violence, and Poorly Trained Security Forces

While Niger Delta citizens have legitimate grievances, key groups have taken advantage of the anarchic situation to engage in criminal activities and violence. The deteriorating security situation in the Niger Delta between 1990 and 2009 took visible forms in the disruption of oil production by militant groups and criminal gangs, combined with widespread oil theft and the kidnapping of both foreigners and Nigerian elites. In addition, growing piracy, drug trafficking, gun-running, and petty crime continues to contribute to insecurity.

Among the factors that drive and support insecurity in the Niger Delta is a secondary arms market that thrives in large measure because of the weak capacity of security forces (Okonta 2006, p. 11). Small arms and light weapons of growing sophistication appeared over a decade ago, when many arms may have been brought into the country by Nigerian peacekeeping forces after their assignments with ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Bassey et. al. 2002). According to the National Security Agency, the United Nations (UN) has estimated that about eight million illegal light weapons are in circulation in West Africa, a substantial proportion in Nigeria (Agba and Isuwa 2010). The weapons, after gaining access to the country, are used for trafficking, communal clashes, armed robbery, electoral violence, kidnapping, and militancy. Availability of weapons and the illicit economic crimes they support have helped sustain a culture of violence that can lead to an entrenched casual militarism with its own ineluctable dynamic of escalation and proliferation. The widespread proliferation of weapons in the region and their use in a range of economic and political activities have helped create a culture of violence in which arms become the preferred means through which ends are met.

Efforts have been made to control arms proliferation in the country. For example, in October 2004 President Obasanjo offered an Amnesty to militant leaders and their supporters and paid for each rifle and machine gun handed to the government (ICG 2006b). Peter Odili, Governor of Rivers State reportedly recovered more than 3,000 weapons in 2005 by paying those who turned in their weapons (Amnesty International 2005). Combatants later confessed that the price of the weapons exceeded their value several times over, and the exercise served only to expand their arsenals through the purchase of even more advanced weapons (Junger 2007). Again in August 2009 President Yar’Adua offered Amnesty on condition of disarmament, and by October around 11,000 weapons were reported to have been collected from over 20,000 registered ex-combatants at designated collection stations. As a learning point from the previous arms collection exercises, no payments were made in exchange for the arms. In October 2010 a high-profile arms dealer, Henry Okah, known as the MEND “Master of Arms,” was arrested.
and tried. Nevertheless, a large number of arms are believed to still be in circulation.

Arms proliferation must be considered a symptom of a larger problem for which the underlying causes must be identified and addressed. Unfortunately, efforts aimed at arms collection have been only partially effective because the activities creating demand for weapons—oil bunkering, electoral violence, kidnapping, piracy, and petty crime—continue. For many unemployed youth, these activities are the most attractive opportunities available for making a living (Ukeje 2001).

Efforts to address security driving factors tend to be undermined by the weak capacity of the security forces to control illegal activities, arms trafficking, and other security challenges. The police, armed forces, and other security organizations lack the training and equipment necessary to overcome these challenges. Most security units in the region lack the helicopters, boats, GPS, and communication technology necessary to detect and control activities carried out by criminal organizations, which many times can be better equipped and trained than they. The difficult geography of the delta compounds the lack of equipment and training, making it even harder to tackle security challenges in the region. Furthermore, large dividends from illegal activities have permeated the security forces, leading to the involvement of some of their members in such crimes. The Nigerian military has itself prosecuted several officers found selling government weapons from the armory in Kaduna to Niger Delta fighters and it has continued a publicized campaign to control the illicit arms trade. Unchecked, it could threaten the survival of communities, oil companies, and the state.
PROVOCATING FACTORS THAT SPARK VIOLENCE AND EXACERBATE CONFLICT

The structural and driving factors discussed thus far have given rise to legitimate grievances in the Niger Delta. They have also led to dividends for some persons who seek to sustain conditions of insecurity. Mitigating measures, including those already introduced by the 2009 Amnesty, could eventually lead to permanent stability and a de-escalation of conflict. At the same time, unforeseen events could reignite further destabilization and violence. This section reviews provocating factors that have sparked and exacerbated conflict in the past and which could resurface in the future.

Social Provocating Factors: Social Protest and Weak Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution

Protest weaves throughout the history of the Niger Delta, where demands for resource control and self-determination have their roots in the colonial encounter. Many early conflicts were struggles over political equality and control of trade and resources. In the absence of adequate mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, violent protest has come to be seen as a viable option for redressing longstanding injustice.

Such protests have assumed a common trajectory, at times escalating into violence. The usual cycle begins with a grievance or demand nurtured by a deep sense of injustice. Articulated as a complaint to the government or an oil company, it may be initially ignored or rebuffed. When left unresolved, this challenge is typically repeated in a number of incidents until it develops into conscious and collective action. At this point, superior authorities react by employing methods of repression. Rebellion and sporadic violence often ensue, eventually reaching a crescendo. The uprising is then interpreted as a threat to civic order, and the authorities respond with a significant show of force. Arrests, physical assault, and sometimes armed intervention follow. To contain further reaction, however, the authorities typically employ a strategy of “carrot and stick” by tempering the use of force with appeasement. They may offer promises of contracts, jobs, money, development projects, or even the creation of new states or LGAs. At this stage the cycle reaches a “soft stalemate,” and both sides suspend hostilities. In many cases, the promises made are not fulfilled and the benefits and pay-offs come to an end. Then, the cycle begins again. Many view the present Amnesty Program, with its generous stipends, training, and promise of jobs for ex-combatants, as an illustration of this pattern. Largesse under the Amnesty has calmed the conflict, but the current stalemate has brought at best a fragile peace.

History is filled with examples of protest gone awry because of inadequate responses on both sides. In the 19th century, coastal merchant barons such as Jaja of Opobo, Nana Olomu of Itsekiri, or King Koko of Nembe rebelled when they were displaced as
BOX 2.9: THE MOVEMENT FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE NIGER DELTA (MEND)

Among the scores of non-state armed groups identified in the Niger Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has stood out for the articulation of its political agenda, the size and complexity of its attacks, and its capacity to disrupt Nigeria’s oil production. MEND coalesced in the western delta in the late autumn of 2005 around several seasoned armed Ijaw leaders. All were also business-minded oil bunkerers. They included Tom Polo, the dominant militant leader in the Delta State; Farah Dagogo, who had once been deputy to Dokubo Asari in Rivers State; and General Boyloaf from Bayelsa State, who also fought with Asari. Boyloaf was a close ally of another Bayelsan, Henry Okah, a major dealer in the illicit arms trade, sometimes called the MEND “supreme commander.” The chief rationale and partial motivation of MEND in the early years was the September 2005 jailing for treason of Dokubo Asari—a longstanding advocate for regional independence. A second casus belli was the imprisonment for corruption of Ijaw Chief Alamieyeseigha, former Deputy Governor of Bayelsa State (Asuni 2009b).

MEND’s military-style attacks on oil installations began in December 2005. A Shell pipeline in the Opobo Channel near Port Harcourt was blown up with dynamite, ravaging 21 small villages, killing eight persons, and shutting in 180,000 bpd. Press announcements revealed MEND’s “dual” personality as a movement that combined political slogans of freedom and economic justice with radical and destructive force. These first explosions were the suspected result of a clampdown on the very lucrative activities of illegal bunkerers offshore, activities in which MEND members were involved.

In its early form, MEND proved a sophisticated coordinating power, an “umbrella,” and a “brand” that helped to both plan and give meaning to actions carried out by a coalition of armed franchises in the field. However, in time, MEND’s center weakened. Conflicts between MEND leaders led to the formation of off-shoots, as factions broke up and new camps and groups were formed. The only common thread in this loose
coalition was a shadowy internet persona, “Jomo Gbomo,” who began in January 2006 to email press releases with threats or claims of past attacks, interspersed with political commentary. This faceless spokesman, associated with Henry Okah, provided cohesion and rallied Niger Delta communities to the MEND cause through his strategic communications. Over time, the effects of this broad crusade were seen. The group’s campaign of bombings, kidnappings, sabotage, and theft shut down as much as 40% of production on a sustained basis, drove oil workers out of the region, crimped business, threatened communities, increased military presence, pushed up world oil prices, and stopped most development and construction of infrastructure in the Niger Delta.

Under a Presidential Peace Initiative the Yar’Adua administration actively engaged the MEND commanders. Tom Polo was tasked with organizing fortnightly meetings with fighters and became the key spokesperson on militant concerns. When a major clash with the military in May 2009 began at Tom Polo’s Camp in Gbaramatu, it led to the offer of Presidential Amnesty. Eventually all of the original MEND commanders disarmed, and talks began with former President Yar’Adua and continued with Goodluck Jonathan.

Meanwhile, Jomo Gbomo’s MEND is waiting in the wings. Having rejected the Amnesty in favor of a larger political agenda, it proposed an alternative “Aaron Team” with Wole Soyinka as an advisor as a negotiating group with government. This higher initiative, like the attacks on the ground, has now entered a period of stalemate. In October 2010 Henry Okah and his brother Charles were arrested for masterminding a bombing near Nigeria’s 50th Anniversary celebrations in Abuja that killed more than ten people. With the former “voice” behind Jomo Gbomo now in prison, and the Amnesty Program in full swing, MEND’s press releases have eased to a mere trickle and appear increasingly irrelevant (Stratfor 2011).
middlemen by British traders. All were severely punished. Protests over the appropriation of local resources continued through the colonial period, including the famous Ten Thousand Women’s Tax Revolt in 1929, which spread to Aba and Calabar and was echoed in a second women’s protest in 1952.

More recently in 1990 in the small town of Umuechem, the longstanding need for development assistance escalated into a mass protest at a Shell facility nearby. When a policeman died in an armed scuffle, a large mobile police force retaliated at dawn. They opened fire, destroyed 495 homes, and killed eighty townspeople. In 1995, the military hanging of a non-violent Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni brought international outrage and sanctions upon Nigeria until 1998 and the restoration of democratic rule. Again in 1998 approximately 120 youths occupied Chevron’s Parabe Platform off Ondo State voicing longstanding concerns about impacts of dredging on their fishing grounds. The protest led to a lethal military confrontation, and the outcome was litigated in a U.S. court. In 2002 women from Ugborodo and neighboring villages occupied Chevron’s Escravos Terminal demanding jobs for their sons. When Chevron breached its signed agreement with the women, a second confrontation arose three years later and still remains unresolved. These few illustrations show that, too often, the entrepreneurs who start the violence, and the repressive forces that escalate it, can ruin the lives and livelihoods of many.

The emergence of the militant group MEND in December 2005, which repeated the calls for greater “resource control” and “self-determination,” is in many ways a culmination of the growing process of non-state militarization which began to take shape in the Niger Delta in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Okonta 2006, p. 9). MEND’s attacks seemed to come in waves during its four years of major activity. Often they coincided with political events such as elections, illustrating the tight relationship between political godfathers and their armed security militias. For example, MEND and other groups stepped up campaigns of hostage-taking and attacks on oil infrastructure in the run-up to and immediately following the 2007 presidential elections, claiming grievances about the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. After the inauguration of President Yar’Adua, MEND agreed to suspend its activities for a limited period, but on September 23, 2007, the group announced its decision to recommence its campaign of violence and kidnappings,24 opening a cycle of unilateral cease fires capriciously declared “on,” and then “off.” MEND, represented by the shadowy spokesman “Jomo Gbomo,” did not accept Yar’Adua’s Presidential Amnesty in 2009, unlike its allied field commanders. Table 2.8 offers a sampling of resistance and armed groups in the Niger Delta, and Box 2.9 presents a brief history of MEND.
TABLE 2.8:

Types of Resistance and Armed Groups in the Niger Delta

Note: The table below includes a selection from a broad spectrum of groups that have played a role—whether through action or debate—in the Niger Delta conflict. Features and functions of these categories often overlap. This list is not comprehensive but includes examples of some prominent non-violent advocacy groups and armed groups and coalitions.

### ADVOCACY GROUPS

**Description:** Nearly all major ethnicities in the Niger Delta have created advocacy groups to formally promote their collective interests. Typically they agitate for substantive ethnic and communal demands using non-violent methods. They have played important mediating roles in negotiating community interests with government and corporate entities. **Examples:** The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) issued the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights; the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) became the driving force behind the famous Ijaw manifesto known as the “Kaiama Declaration.”

### CULTS AND CONFRATERNITIES

**Description:** University-based “confraternities” date from 1952, with the founding of the Pyrates by Wole Soyinka. Similar to fraternities in the U.S., they often have business offshoots or “street cults” that typically operate in and around major cities. These and other “cults” or gangs are the main players in petty crimes and local kidnappings for ransom. Usually they are not politically motivated but frequently serve as mercenaries or allies of other armed groups and may join political militias during elections. Many also engage in bunkering, drug trafficking, piracy, and robbery. Gang wars between cult groups flare up with some regularity. **Examples** of confraternities include the Pyrates (inactive), the National Association of Sea Dogs, Black Axe, and Vikings. Cults include the Deegam and the Deywell, Outlaws, Greenlanders, all of which are still in operation.

### VIGILANTES

**Description:** Community-based “vigilante” groups are a longstanding institution in many parts of the Niger Delta. They assure communal defense and protection from criminals or predatory enemies. Sometimes they engage in oil-related border disputes with neighbors. Since the 1990s these local groups have assumed increasing importance in the absence of adequate official policing at the community level. Rogue vigilantes have also become a law unto themselves and practice extra-judicial killings, seizure of personal property, and other serious human rights violations. **Examples** include the Bakassi Boys (Abia), the Bush Boys (Okrika), the Isongofaro (Nembe Ogbolomabiri), etc.

### MILITIAS

**Description:** Armed militias are typically self-motivated and self-sustaining. Modern Ijaw militias have been inspired by Adaka Boro’s 1966 revolutionary band of 150 freedom fighters. Today’s militia men move freely between locations and groups, and this fluid structure makes them highly adaptable. Most militias sustain themselves with oil bunkering, well paid security contracts for politicians or oil companies, political enforcement, armed services, piracy, or trafficking in drugs and weapons. **Examples** include Adaka Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), echoed by Dokubo Asari’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Ateke Tom’s Niger Delta Vigilante Movement (NDVM, also called the “Icelanders”), John Togo’s Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF), etc. Some militias were allied under the MEND brand (see below).

### UMBRELLA MILITIAS: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

Formed in late 2005 by **Tom Polo** (Delta), **Farah Dagogo** (Rivers), and **General Boyloaf** (Bayelsa), all key field commanders in their states, MEND prior to the Amnesty spoke for a loose coalition of field-based militias. Its leadership has been elusive, known publically through an internet persona named “**Jomo Gbomo,**” who is associated with Bayelsan **Henry Okah.** Okah was previously a major arms supplier and supporter of MEND, and was imprisoned in South Africa on charges including masterminding bombings in Abuja and Warri in 2010.

Sources: Sesay et al. 2003, ICG 2006b, Asuni 2009b, newspaper reports.
Provocating Factors Linked to the Government System: Political Marginalization and Under-representation

During many of the fifty years since Nigeria’s independence, citizens of the Niger Delta have felt they lacked a political “voice.” A sense of marginalization and political under-representation stems from a federal system that is highly centralized in practice, giving little power of self-determination to the states. Tensions have also arisen between local traditional systems and the modern government. Most important, political institutions dominated by powerful networks of elites have lacked inclusive, transparent, and democratic processes and have left the region’s inhabitants with a widespread feeling of relative inequality. These perceptions are often exploited by different actors to legitimize the use of violence in order to restore the balance between the center and the oil producing areas which are politically marginalized. In the present political culture as currently practiced, the electoral system offers limited opportunity to equalize the distribution of power and resources among the states and their citizens.

Until the elections of 2011, disillusionment with elections grew in the region alongside the public perception that they had become increasingly manipulated and unfair. An Afrobarometer survey taken in 2000, for example, indicated that 87 percent of people in the South–South, as opposed to 80 percent of all Nigerians, expressed a preference for democracy. When a similar survey was carried out after nationwide elections in 2003, the preference for democracy had fallen by almost 30 percentage points to 59 percent. Furthermore, of all the regions surveyed, the South–South had the highest percentage (18 percent) of people who responded that the type of political system “made no difference to their circumstances.” This evidence suggests that people in the main oil-producing states have in the past felt more alienated from the political system than other Nigerians (Lewis and Alemika 2005). The federal, state, and local elections of 2007 were collectively judged by most observers as the least credible of any in Nigeria’s history. The citizens of the region began to lose faith altogether in the effectiveness of the electoral process as means of redressing their grievances.

The year 2011 saw an important shift in local attitudes toward the political process. Vastly improved elections in April helped to bring about the successful presidential bid by a native Niger Delta son, Goodluck Jonathan (Box 2.10). Having a head of state from Bayelsa, a core Niger Delta state, has restored the sense of political representation. Hope is now high that local grievances may at last be addressed.

Still, the underlying issues analyzed in this chapter have not been resolved. At best the Niger Delta can be said to have paused in its customary cycle of violence, putting aside its battles to enter a period of soft stalemate. At any moment, the optimism arising from new political opportunity can easily turn to disappointment or violence if the promise of development for the region is not delivered; if future elections exacerbate
ethnic tensions through manipulation by political interests; or if general perceptions of marginalization remain unchanged.

**Economic Provocating Factors: Profiting from Instability**

While Niger Delta citizens have legitimate grievances, key groups have taken advantage of the anarchic situation to profit economically by engaging in criminal activities and violence. Provocating factors supporting criminalization include: (i) the usurpation of legitimate social protest for factional or personal ends; (ii) the proliferation of criminal activity, especially theft of oil on an enormous scale; (iii) the gains from contracts with oil companies, and (iv) the use of gangs and violence in electoral campaigns. These, among other factors, have made instability in the Delta highly profitable for certain groups by creating “dividends of conflict.”

Economic gains from instability have also encouraged the creation of groups that have increasingly become involved in extracting rents through violence. Table 2.8 above includes some of the armed organizations that have been or continue to be active in the region, and the increasing role that the extraction of rents plays in financing and sustaining these organizations. Many also profit from related criminal activities, such as gun-running, kidnapping, drug trafficking, protection rackets, and political thuggery. Piracy is also a growing threat in Nigeria’s portion of the Guinea Coast.

Oil theft, or oil “bunkering” as it is known in the Niger Delta, is an especially large, lucrative, and well-organized business (Asuni 2009a). It is estimated that between 70,000 and 300,000 barrels per day (up to 12 percent or more of average daily oil production) are lost to the illegal oil trade. The siphoning and transporting of stolen oil is carried out by criminal syndicates in which local youth are the principal labor force, supported and protected by powerful politicians, military officers, community businessmen, and international cartels. Their own vested interests together with recognition that the bunkering business provides a livelihood to restive and unemployed youth have motivated the complicity of Nigerian law enforcement authorities and others (ICG 2006b).

Profits from the bunkering trade are distributed to all those involved in the syndicate, at local, state, national, and international levels. At the local level, these proceeds have provided many militant groups and petty criminals with the resources to purchase large stocks of sophisticated weapons, easily available in many of the Niger Delta states (Watts 2007). Thus, it is not simply a question of disarming the militias to prevent the further escalation of conflict and violence. Rather, the incentives for participating in the oil bunkering business need to be changed so that it becomes unprofitable and undesirable for militants, politicians, and others to continue this illegal activity. Action by the international community to assist in monitoring and curbing the trade can significantly reduce the corrupting influence of “blood oil” in the region.27
Provocating Factors in the Political Culture: Political Manipulation of Tensions and Rigged Elections

Political authority in a culture of “winner takes all” carries with it almost unconstrained and unquestioned control by office holders over public resources, creating a personal-ized, uni-centric field of power relations. Alliances and loyalty to those in power may be seen as the best or only way of accessing resources. With so much at stake, the incentives to manipulate elections to gain political office are powerful, particularly in the Niger Delta where state revenues are highest. While only a minority is served by such a highly unequal system of spoils, the patrimonial power of those who do benefit makes reform very difficult to achieve. These conditions explain the enormous incentives for rigging, falsification, and electoral violence that have characterized successive federal, state, and local government elections in the region during 1999, 2003, and 2007, with some improvement in 2011. In 2003, European Union observers reported that the presidential polls had been heavily rigged in Rivers, Delta, and Cross River States (EU 2003). State level elections in the same year were similarly flawed. After the April 2007 elections, the consensus of many official observers was that they displayed a higher level of rigging and falsification than any other in Nigeria’s history. That year in many parts of the Niger Delta, presidential and state elections did not take place at all (ICG 2007).

In the Niger Delta, electoral violence has escalated the conditions for conflict at all levels, leading to a vicious cycle of violent political competition and reprisal. In 1999, and especially in 2003 and 2007, politicians recruited armed youth groups to rig the elections in their favor. In many cases, they were the same groups hired as security contractors by oil companies or oil bunkering cartels. In 2003, it is reported that politicians in Niger Delta and other states paid youths to participate in attacks on their political opponents (HRW 2003, p. 25). Similar alliances were forged in the run-up to the 2007 elections throughout the region, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG 2006b), a key factor in creating what many agree were the most massively rigged elections in Nigeria’s history. After elections, well-armed groups allied with politicians have taken on dynamic agendas of their own, diverging from the aims of their former patrons, and even, in several well-known cases, turning against those whose election they had once helped to bring about.

In light of this history, it was feared in the Niger Delta that the 2011 polls could be complicated by the over 26,000 ex-combatants demobilized in the post-Amnesty period, some by their own admission still holding arms. However, the elections and their run-up were marked by fewer violent incidents than in the past, with the exception of some sporadic attacks in Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, and Delta States. Indeed the 2011 elections at federal, state, and local levels were judged in the Niger Delta and nationwide to be perhaps the most transparent in Nigeria’s history, owing to strong management, popular mobilization, and monitoring, and the introduction of computer technology.
In this case, the most violent reaction to the elections took place in the northern states after the presidential election results were counted.  

**Provocating Factors Undermining Security: Vigilante Justice and Private Security Contracts**

Many gangs or armed militias in the Niger Delta have their origins in community-based “vigilante” groups (see Table 2.8). Traditionally, they were meant to assure communal defense and protection from criminals or predatory enemies. Since the 1990s, they have assumed increasing importance in the absence of adequate official policing. Rogue vigilantes have also become a law unto themselves and practice extra-judicial killings, seizure of personal property, and other serious human rights violations. Recently, the tactics of vigilante groups have not been easy to distinguish from those used by aggressive, armed militias. Sometimes they engage in oil-related border disputes with neighbors, and inter-ethnic violence between community vigilantes has escalated over the years, sustained by the lucrative rewards conferred upon some militant leaders. The 2003 Warri conflict between Ijaw and Itsekiri militias is an example in which violence flared and shut down 40 percent of the country’s oil production for a number of weeks (see Box 2.2). Ijaw and Itsekiri militant leaders were appeased with posts in state and local government or private service contracts with oil companies (ICG 2006b, p.2).

The most visible forms of insecurity in the Niger Delta have been the various attempts by militant groups and criminal gangs to disrupt oil production in the region and to create an atmosphere of fear by kidnapping both foreigners and Nigerians. The history of oil production shown in Chart 2.1 illustrates a historical peak of nearly 2.6 mbpd in early 2006, falling to 1.6 mbpd in July 2009, just prior to the Amnesty. Since the height of MEND attacks beginning in January 2006, the industry has struggled to recover from significant declines that have occurred in April to May each year. An overall rising trend has been seen since the 2009 Amnesty.

Records show many instances in which militants engaged in bunkering or sabotage have come into direct confrontation with military security. Escalating militarization on both sides has been further complicated by the complicity of the military in bunkering operations, at times accepting bribes or engaging directly in oil theft. In this way, militants and military officers become players in the same lucrative sport—whether as partners or rivals—and their clashes and crimes threaten the lives and livelihoods of men and women in the Niger Delta, as well as the lifeblood of the nation.

Kidnappings and some killings of oil workers began as early as 1998, but accelerated with the emergence of MEND. Eventually, withdrawal of nearly all “high value” expatriates from the region led kidnappers to turn to wealthy local businessmen and politicians or their relatives. (See Table 2.10 below for examples of kidnappings). Since 2009, state governors and traditional rulers have taken strong measures against hostage takers,
Nigeria went to the polls in April 2011 for the fourth nationwide elections since the restoration of civilian rule in 1999. This time, the presidential candidate of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a son of Bayelsa State. Called by some the “accidental president,” he had been propelled into candidacy by a combination of fortune and forbearance, having twice assumed top posts vacated by their incumbents. He became Governor of Bayelsa State when his predecessor was impeached for corruption and again became President on the untimely death of the late President Yar’Adua. This time the poll would be a direct test of his popularity, as well as an opportunity to end a legacy of mismanaged and corrupt elections, of which the previous round in 2007 was viewed internationally as the worst. Rigging in 2007 was widespread and blatant, through stuffing or snatching of ballot boxes, declaration of poll results without voting, inflation of voter rolls, and other malpractices.

Achieving a credible 2011 election required change—a change in the leadership of the electoral commission, in the validity of voter registration lists, and in the transparency and accuracy of the vote count. A respected academic, Attahiru Jega, was named chair of the electoral commission, and in January he launched a wholly new, computer-based registration exercise in which thousands of trained poll workers, many from the National Youth Corps, captured biometric data from more than 73.5 million voters at 120,000 polling units throughout the country. The Niger Delta was the only region in which the number of registrants fell short of expectations—by more than one million persons. Logistical difficulties of registration in the creeks and outmigration during the long delta crisis are possible explanations.

Success of the registration effort helped to build public confidence for the three April election rounds that followed, the first for the national senate and house of representatives, a second for president, and a third for governors and state assemblies (NOI Polls 2011). The exercise exacted a high opportunity cost. By the end, a fully
participating voter would have visited her or his polling unit six times. Even so, it was a price nearly half of Nigerian voters were willing to pay.

Mr. Jonathan retained his presidential mandate without a runoff, garnering 59% of the total vote and 25% of the votes in all but four of the 36 states plus the Federal Capital Territory, thereby exceeding the minimum of 24% required by law to ensure geographical spread. International observers in their preliminary statements commended an orderly and peaceful process, with many fewer incidents of electoral violence than in the past. They also commented on a notable effort by civil society and the press to monitor the elections process and keep the public well informed by text messages, email, and special websites as the results were announced at each polling unit.

But this high point for the winner was tragically marred by the sudden outbreak of sporadic violence in 12 northern states scarcely a day after the presidential election. More than 800 persons were killed and 65,000 displaced, most notably in Kaduna and Bauchi States. The roots of the violence were complex and may have included resentment over the ruling PDP’s decision to override its customary “rotation” of the presidency between north and south in favor of a member of the southern Ijaw minority. An investigative panel on the violence saw poor governance and endemic poverty as key causes (Shehu 2011). Some analysts suggest the outbreaks were orchestrated (HRW 2011). As significant was a loss of hope among masses of less educated northern youth, who saw in their losing candidate a promise of change from a dozen years of irresponsible government by the winning PDP. In addition, they suspected that the very high turnout of registered voters in the South-South and South-East—nearly all of whom voted for Jonathan—was evidence of election tampering. The challenge now for the president is to build public trust in his government and firmly hold public officials to standards of probity, responsibility, and equity.
CHART 2.1:

Nigeria’s Crude Oil Supply 2001–2011

Source: International Energy Agency, August 2011

ranging from the death penalty (several states) to “amnesty” and rehabilitation (Imo), to sizeable military force (Abia), and to spirit curses arranged by the Oba of Benin (Edo). The overall incidence of kidnapping remained strong and spread to other zones during 2009 and into 2010, especially the South-East. Although the number of incidents has fallen since the Amnesty Program took hold, kidnapping continues to be a lucrative enterprise in a region of poverty and plenty.

Joint venture oil companies are customarily provided security through their majority shareholder NNPC, a parastatal of the Nigerian Government. Yet, assigned Police, Army, and Navy personnel are often ineffective and unmotivated because they are underpaid. They also suffer from poor training and lack of equipment, and companies will often contribute toward filling these needs. In addition, state security forces such as the JTF are not always able to contain security threats, leading oil companies to take extra measures to protect their operations. Typically, they turn to other, more local, sources.

Companies normally spend as much on local security as they do on their community social investments. “Protection work” may be offered to armed groups active in the region, or they may receive *ex gratia* payments as appeasement. Financial relationships between oil companies and armed groups may therefore be formal and “direct,” as in the case of “surveillance contracts” given to local youth groups to protect oil infrastructure, or
they may be “indirect,” as in the case of ransom payments or pay-offs to prevent attacks or shut-downs of oil facilities. The risk in the first case is that these contracts often end up in the hands of the very groups responsible for attacks on oil facilities.30 In the second case, it may be seen as more expedient to make one-off payments to militant groups than to prevent future damage or to address the underlying cause of their grievance.31 Both practices, if poorly managed, can reward and sustain violence by putting security under the control of those who have a vested interest in seeing the vicious cycle of insecurity continue. Despite these pitfalls, most government authorities support the engagement of reliable ex-combatants as company contractors for security and other purposes. A new Local Content Law, passed in 2010, requires oil companies to expand opportunities for local contractors, and security contracts offer one channel for meeting this requirement.

FROM INSTABILITY TO PEACE: THE CASE FOR DEVELOPMENT

More than fifty years have passed since Sir Henry Willink made his famous case that the Niger Delta warranted “special treatment” because it was “poor, backward and neglected” (GGB 1958). His conclusion was echoed as recently as 2007 by a team of national Senators who reported shock on returning from a fact-finding visit to the region’s three core states. The senate leader of the mission noted, “If we are able to make a case for them at the federal level and working with the state, local government, and the oil companies, we can make a difference in the life of these people” (Guardian, 6 January 2008).

As sketched in this chapter, the picture of deprivation, instability, and mismanagement reported by the Senators has been the product of many factors which are intertwined and still evolving. Their roots lie in the centralized power of the federal government, the infiltration of the oil industry into lives and livelihoods, and the neo-patrimonial character of a rentier state overtaken by corruption and special interests. The need for remedy has long been acknowledged. But steps taken have been slow and faltering—by government, whose central mandate is social and economic development; by the oil industry, whose license to operate is protected by social investment; and by local leadership, whose task is to guide the struggle for justice.

Local leadership failed to make a difference because the struggle contained the seeds of its own failure. It crystallized around demands for “true federalism,” “resource control,” and “self-determination,” but was rapidly sullied by the quest for private gain. In time, the demands became battle cries that energized a campaign of low intensity violence against the oil industry. While violence served to expose the region’s inequities to the international press, its benefit for a few stood in the way of a solution for all. Meanwhile, remedies attempted by government and industry were often too late, too little, and too far removed from the people they were meant to help.
### TABLE 2.9:

**Overview of Kidnappings and Selected Incidents in the Niger Delta 2006–2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (held)</th>
<th>Expats taken</th>
<th>Expats killed</th>
<th>Nationals taken</th>
<th>Nationals killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–30 January</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First MEND kidnapping. MEND boarded a boat in the EA oil field and seized a Bulgarian, Briton, American and Honduran. They were soon released, and President Obasanjo declared that hostage taking would not be repeated.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February–1 March</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A barge was attacked by several speed boats. Exchange of fire and nine foreigners were kidnapped: three Americans, one Briton, two Egyptians, a Filipino and 2 Thais.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12–20 August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nelson, an SPDC Community relations officer, was held by the community he was negotiating with. On 20 August, he was freed from his confinement and was on his way back via the creeks in a flotilla of boats carrying himself, local government personnel who facilitated the release, and a number of militant guards who were acting as an escort. They happened upon a unit of armed forces. In the ensuing confused fire fight 10 of the ‘militants’ were killed along with the “freed” hostage and a number of the facilitating government officers. The military personnel thought they had intercepted a militant task force.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–15 June</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three senior management staff of the chemical company Indorama and 4 family members (2 women and two children) were kidnapped with Nigerian staff, 10 in all.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–8 July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three-year-old Margaret Hill (British father, Nigerian mother) was kidnapped on her way to school; MEND condemned the attack. The girl was released, but the father died shortly after from poor health complicated by stress.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (held)</td>
<td>Expats taken</td>
<td>Expats killed</td>
<td>Nationals taken</td>
<td>Nationals killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes: 9 September–19 April 2009. Maguire: 12 September–12 June 2009.</td>
<td>Robin Hughes and Matthew John Maguire were seized with 25 other oil workers when their boat was hijacked by an armed gang associated with MEND. The 25, mainly from the Ukraine and South Africa, were quickly released, but the two Britons were kept as “leverage” by the militants to negotiate release of their leader, Henry Okah, who was on trial for treason and gun-running. Hughes was released after seven months because of illness; Maguire was kept for about nine months.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 (to 12 October)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–7 January</td>
<td>MEND announced it had “declared war” on kidnappers claiming to operate under its umbrella. On the same day, gunmen hijacked a French vessel with 9 crew members aboard, four expatriates and five Nigerians. The vessel and crew were released three days later.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–16 May</td>
<td>Gunmen loyal to militant Tom Polo seized the MV Spirit and abducted 19 hostages (15 Filipinos and four Nigerians) plus the vessel. The same day, they seized the MT Chikana. The JTF later launched a huge offensive and razed Tom Polo’s camp, freeing some of the hostages. MEND claimed 2 Filipinos were killed in crossfire. On 16 May, JTF said they had freed 9 expats and 4 Nigerians. JTF announced on 23 May that they had rescued 3 more of the group. Foreign ministers on 24th confirmed 2 fatalities. The 2 last incidents prompted MEND to declare a full scale war and no fly zone for helicopters of oil companies across the Niger Delta. JTF full force response induced all fighters in the Niger Delta to accept Presidential Amnesty by October 4th, 2009.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The past decade has seen a steady expansion of efforts to address the tangled mix of factors that underlie the propensity for conflict in this long neglected region. Partners from the public and private sectors have begun, separately and together, to develop innovative solutions that attempt the “special treatment” that Willink proposed. For the most part, their efforts have supported five themes discussed here: political participation, human security, wellbeing and development, environmental protection, and securing livelihoods. These constitute the five future pillars of durable peace. The efforts of various actors to support these objectives and to ensure sustainable development in the absence of conflict are the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES

1 See Chapter 3 for further details.
2 The Kaiama Declaration of 1998 was an attempt by Ijaws, as part of the newly formed Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), to reassert their rights over land and resources. The IYC was originally formed as a social movement; however, some of its leaders have since adopted more radical positions due to the violent response of the federal government to community protests.
3 On response to the Ogoni movement, and other cases, see section 4 of this chapter regarding security.
4 Collier & Hoeffler 2001. This is consistent with Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s finding that the lack of alternative economic opportunities, particularly for youth, makes joining militant groups highly attractive and consequently increases the risk of violent conflict.
5 JTF operations have also included Ogoniland 1993–2000, Operation Salvage (Bayelsa, 1997), and Operation Flush I, II, III (Rivers, 1997 onward)
6 Cited in UNDP 2006, p. 120.
7 For a detailed discussion of the conflict dynamics, see WAC Global Services 2003, pp. 54–62.
8 UNDP 2006 shows an HDI for the Niger Delta of 0.564 (2005), compared with 0.453 for Nigeria in the same year.
9 The five wealth quintiles (which are not exactly equal in size) were defined on the basis of a welfare index using a combination of indicators elucidated in the CWIQ survey. A number higher than the national figure of 21.3% implies a greater depth of poverty.
10 The North-East region has been included in the poverty statistics table for comparative purposes.
11 In this section, specific reference will be made to Shell and Chevron’s policies. Other oil companies operate in the Niger Delta region, however Shell and Chevron are the two main international companies that have extensive onshore operations, bringing them into close contact with communities. For further information see the section on the evolution of oil company policy in Chapter 3.
13 Nigeria Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire 2006.
14 Self-assessed levels of poverty and Gini coefficients are from NLSS 2004.
15 An illustration of poor corporate judgment over a peaceful environmental protest is the Umuechem incident of October 1990. Police protection invited by Shell degenerated into clashes that destroyed
the community and took several lives (Frynas 2001, pp. 50–51). It was a bitter lesson for all parties involved. See further discussion in the section on social provoking factors below.

According to Transparency International's International CPI, Nigeria’s performance has been consistently very poor. The Corruption Perceptions Index score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). A CPI score of two or less indicates severe, endemic or pervasive corruption. In 2006, for the first time since the surveys began, Nigeria received a rating greater than two. For more information see: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.

Randomly selected based on similar population size.

National budget figures are taken from the CIA Factbook, except for Nigeria, taken from the Finance Ministry http://fnf.gov.ng; the budget for Rivers State is from the state website, http://www.riversstate.gov.ng, and includes both federal and state-generated receipts.

Odbu 2010, citing Rivers State Governor Amaechi, who also noted great inequity in income distribution in the state.


While the situation is far from ideal at the federal level, several improvements have been made (see Box 2.7).

An expanded table with more detailed information can be found in Annex I.

The South-South zone is made up of the states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers. It is one of six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The zone contains the core Niger Delta states (particularly Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers), where most of Nigerian onshore oil production takes place.


President Yar'Adua ordered an investigation into links between politicians and gangs in the Niger Delta following complaints by Ijaw residents of Port Harcourt (BBC News Africa 2007a).

The violence following the 2011 presidential elections occurred, not in the Niger Delta, but in 12 states in the north, resulting in over 800 deaths and 65,000 displaced (HRW 2011a).

The NDPVF has allegedly been the recipient of these contracts with Shell (ICG 2006b).

An International Crisis Group (ICG) interview with a Shell official based in Nigeria confirms this attitude (ICG 2006b).
Shell-BP oil drilling rig at Alakiri site, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Photograph by Eliot Elisofon, 1959.

Courtesy: Eliot Elisofon Photographic Archives, National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution (EEPA EECL 13256)
Tackling the Challenges of the Niger Delta—Past and Current Efforts

Insecurity and volatility in the Niger Delta have disrupted livelihoods, damaged the ecosystem and created a challenging environment for social and economic development. The Niger Delta is often portrayed as a neglected region, and indeed investment in its development has been grossly inferior to the magnitude of resources extracted. It has nevertheless been the subject of multiple initiatives aimed at bringing peace and development to its troubled creeks. As the preceding discussion shows, such interventions have had uneven and generally quite limited impact on the region’s huge development deficit. The present chapter considers current and previous interventions in the delta by the government, oil companies, and Nigeria’s international development partners. It also examines their impacts and lessons to be drawn from their interventions.

The responses of the government to the periodic crises on the delta have tended to be of three kinds: (i) heavy-handed repression by security forces; (ii) renegotiation of the proportion of revenue to be retained by oil producing states; and (iii) the creation of new institutions with the ostensible aim of developing the region. These bureaucracies have also provided new streams of patronage for both local and federal actors.

Left with the task of operating in a complex and unstable sociopolitical context, where government services have been few or absent, oil companies have since the discovery of oil in 1956 developed their own means of ensuring the “social license” so essential to their continued operations. These approaches have evolved over the years, becoming more elaborate and sophisticated, and the companies have in time become major development actors in their own right.

The last main group of actors considered in this section are Nigeria’s development partners, multilateral and bilateral, who have supported a number of programs in the delta of varying scale and nature. A significant milestone was the imposition of sanctions on the Nigerian government in 1995 by major development partners in response to the hanging of nine Ogoni activists—a low watermark in Nigeria’s relations with the outside world. During this period international donors began to develop ways of channeling assistance directly to communities, largely through a newly flourishing NGO and
When sanctions were lifted in 1998, these donors to a degree continued to circumvent the residual weakness of government institutions in the region by elaborating new community driven approaches such as micro-projects and trust funds.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS

Revenue Distribution Formula: Constant Contestation

In 1946, the Phillips Commission became the first of eight revenue allocation commissions established by Nigerian governments between 1946 and 1979 to apply the twin principles of “derivation” and “even progress” under the concept of fiscal federalism. Under the principle of derivation, the central government would grant the states a proportion of the revenue which each generated for the government. The even progress principle was designed to allow for adjustments in grants depending on each state’s relative need, population, and poverty or wealth.

The Petroleum Decree of 1969 reasserted the federal government’s ownership and control of all oil and mineral resources, a right initially established in 1914 under the Crown. Nigeria’s first (1960) constitution established the principle of sharing profits equally between the national government and the regions (antecedents to the states). Since then, the proportion of oil revenues accruing to oil producing states has changed repeatedly, as seen in Table 3.1 below.

Allocation and use of oil revenues, as noted in the last chapter, are at the heart of political struggles in the delta. Some stakeholders argue that the citizens of all Nigerian states should benefit equally from the country’s natural resources. The other view is that the oil producing areas should receive a greater share of revenue to compensate them for the negative impacts of extraction and injury to their quality of life and livelihoods. Whether and how these opposing principles for allocation can be reconciled remains an open question. However, with strong oil prices and the substantial increases in derivation revenues accruing to the oil producing states since 1999, the effectiveness with which these resources are used for local development is as important a question as the percentage of oil revenue received. From this perspective, an exclusive focus on the derivation formula itself distracts attention from how the massive funds already allocated to oil producing states are spent and accounted for. It is the lack of transparency and accountability in the use of public funds, rather than the lack of resources themselves, that have deprived the region’s citizens of the basic services and infrastructure which are their right. One way of rebuilding these links would be to establish social accountability mechanisms through which the governed can hold their elected officials responsible for their use of public revenue.

The history of revenue sharing between the central government and oil producing areas is complex. In 1958, the Raisman Commission proposed a revenue sharing
## TABLE 3.1:
**Derivation: Niger Delta State and Federal Shares of Petroleum Proceeds 1953–Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>To Producing States (%, Allocated by Proportion of Production)</th>
<th>Earmarks via Regional Development Agencies or “Special Projects” (%)</th>
<th>Federation Account and Remaining Distributable Pool (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953–1958</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1971</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977–1979</td>
<td>25 minus offshore proceeds</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>75 plus offshore proceeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–1981</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–1984</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>“1.5% Commission”: 1.5 and .5 of “Special Projects” managed by the FG are considered “derivation” funds</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>“1.5% Commission”: 1.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1999</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>OMPADEC: 3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1999–2002    | 13 (constitutional “minimum”) minus offshore proceeds, gross equivalent to 7.5 | NDDC: nil  
Funds: (a) 15% state statutory allocations due to the oil-producing states; (b) 3% OIC operating budgets; (c) 50% State Ecological Fund; (d) aid or other contributions. | 92.5 approx. |
| 2002–        | 13 (constitutional “minimum”) including offshore proceeds     | NDDC: nil  
Funds: see above                                               | 87                                                  |

*Source: Adapted from UNDP 2006, HRW 1999 and other sources.*
formula recommending that 50 percent of oil revenues be retained by the oil producing regions, 20 percent by the federal government, and 30 percent by a Distributable Pool Account (DPA). The DPA was administered at the federal level and allocated resources to the states, funds, and special projects. All Nigerian states received a monthly statutory allocation from the DPA on the basis of ten indices related to need and population (Udeh 2002, p. 3).

In 1966 a new formula shifted full powers of revenue distribution to the federal government. This legal device to protect federal interests in the face of Biafran secession eventually ran up against a tide of discontent in oil producing areas that were seeking greater “resource control.” Under successive military governments there was an increase in the number of states created and a gradual decrease in the percentage of oil revenues or “derivation” allocated to the oil producing states. By 1970 their share fell from 50 percent to 45 percent. With the expansion of offshore operations in 1971, the military government began to distinguish between on- and offshore extraction, retaining all offshore revenue for itself. By 1975 oil production and prices had both increased substantially, but the derivation share allocated to oil producing states plummeted in 1977 to 25 percent of onshore production.

Between 1982 and 1999, the number of states and LGAs in the federation continued to climb, as did the competition for revenue shares. A short-lived civilian regime from 1979 to 1983 stopped derivation payments to states altogether and in 1982 shifted 1.5 percent into a special-purpose regional development agency, popularly called the “1.5 Percent Commission” (HRW 1999). It was succeeded in 1992 by an expanded Oil and Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) utilizing 3 percent of oil revenues. With the return of democracy in 1999, the constitution of the Fourth Republic guaranteed a share of oil revenues to the individual accounts of the oil producing states in proportion to their level of production. Derivation was raised to 13 percent, at which level it still stands. Section 162 (2) of the constitution states: “The principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than 13 percent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources [our emphasis].”

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), a new regional development agency created by the 1999 Constitution, was not funded from derivation, but from other sources, including 15 percent from the monthly statutory allocations distributed to the oil producing states and 3 percent of oil company operating budgets. The current revenue sharing formula is the ninth since independence in 1960. By an executive order dated in May 2004, the distributable pool of federal income, including the 87 percent of oil revenues after derivation, apportions to the federal (52.68%), state (26.72%) and LGA (20.60%) accounts. Typically, the nine Niger Delta States and their LGAs receive almost half of the monthly allocations made to 36 states, when the statutory
and derivation payments are combined. Alone, the core oil producing states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers receive approximately a third of all state revenues.\(^2\)

Many groups in the Niger Delta argue that the current 13 percent derivation is inadequate. There is no consensus on what an acceptable new formula would be, with demands ranging from 13 percent to 100 percent. The National Political Reform Conference of 2005, convened to seek out a more equitable balance between the states and federal government, opened an intense debate on the derivation question. Delegates from the Niger Delta initially proposed 50 percent and then agreed to compromise at 25 percent with a gradual increase to 50. Scores of Niger Delta delegates walked out when the conference voted for only 17 percent as a starting minimum.

Nigeria’s revenue sharing formula has been described as a “time bomb” (Mefor 2009). Support for an increase in the derivation percentage is widespread in the delta, where “resource control” is a slogan to which all can subscribe. The Niger Delta Technical Committee Report of November 2008 recommended an increase in derivation from 13 to 25 percent, in addition to further revenues for sustainable development and infrastructure (FRN 2008). The federal government cannot postpone its response to this question indefinitely. A long awaited government white paper on the Report would be an appropriate vehicle for addressing this knotty issue (ICG 2009).

**Federally Mandated Regional Development Organizations and Institutions**

Over the past fifty years a succession of organizations has been created to address the special development challenges of the Niger Delta region. The list is now quite long. The first was the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), which was established in 1960 on the recommendation of the 1958 Willink Commission. The NDDB received British government contributions and continued colonial policy by focusing chiefly on agricultural development. By 1966 it had met few of its aims and was beset by political crises and the outbreak of civil war. The NDDB was succeeded in 1976 by the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA), one of twelve parastatal companies created to manage the national river basins. Again, little was achieved. In 1982, the Shagari administration set up a Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development (PTFND) to formulate solutions to the problems of the delta region, leading to the “1.5 Percent Commission,” a body that had modest funds and little development impact.

In 1993, the Oil and Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPDAEC) was created by President Babangida as a result of strenuous advocacy by Niger Delta regional leaders with support from the oil industry. Despite a more generous statutory allocation of three percent derivation, the body quickly gained a reputation for poor planning, lack of popular consultation with the residents of the delta,
expensive and unfinished capital projects, and routine corruption. After five years, the
commission had also run up debilitating debts. As the sole national entity mandated to
receive derivation funding, OMPADEC’s failure to return value from oil production to
the region only served to compound rising anger.

Soon after the 1999 election, President Olusegun Obasanjo established a commit-
tee that led to the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).
NDDC’s mandate is to “Conceive, plan, and implement… projects and programs for
the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation,
including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, industrialization,
agriculture and fisheries, housing, and urban development, water supply, electricity, and
telecommunications” (NDDC Act, section 7(1) (b)). NDDC is financed, under the Act,
from four sources: (i) 15 percent of the monthly federal statutory allocations due to the
oil producing states; (ii) 3 percent of the operating budgets of the oil and gas producing
companies; (iii) 50 percent of the Ecological Fund due to the Niger Delta States; and (iv)
any foreign aid or other private sector contributions. Even so, the Commission claims
that it has been chronically underfunded. In July 2010, President Jonathan request-
ed a new allocation for 2010 totaling $1.57 billion—84.3 percent more than NDDC
received in 2009—of which $1.48 billion was earmarked for projects (Ekott 2010). In
2011 the revised NDDC budget fell back to $374 million, a level roughly equal to its
actual expenditure during the previous year.

In addition to planning programs and executing projects, the NDDC was tasked with
the creation and implementation of a comprehensive plan for the region, called the Niger
Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NDRDMP). Conceived as a blueprint for
the sustainable development of the area, this fifteen-year, $50 billion initiative remains
NDDC’s most significant unrealized opportunity. Designed from studies begun in 2001
and launched in March 2007, the NDRDMP is Nigeria’s first integrated development
plan based on extensive participatory inputs from all local stakeholders. The plan drew
on expert analytical guidance in 25 sectors coalescing around the priorities of promot-
ing economic growth, infrastructural development, community needs, and environmen-
tal preservation. Details of the plan are not publicly available, and in January 2010 the
NDDC managing director noted that it is “due for review” (Okon 2010).

In contrast to the participatory process that underpinned the Master Plan, the NDDC
continues in its existing programs to pursue a tradition of top-down decision-making
and relies on contractor outsourcing for most of its project planning and execution.
The Commission shows a partiality for high-cost, prestigious projects such as regional
roads, planned towns, major hospitals, and post-primary educational institutions. Owing
in part to regional unrest, few large projects have been completed, or for that matter
initiated. NDDC has yet to define a role for community participation in the selec-
tion, ownership, and future maintenance of these projects, and its management suggests
that engaging with communities to reduce conflict during project execution is chiefly the responsibility of its many contractors. In May 2009, the acting managing director disclosed that the Commission had “embarked upon” 2,416 infrastructure projects, of which 841 had been completed (Daily Trust, 6 May 2009). By the end of 2009, the NDDC website listed 509 physical project contracts in train, of which 261 were completed and only 55 (20%) “commissioned” or officially put to use (see Table 3.2). Slow and incomplete implementation explains why in 2009 NDDC spent only about one quarter of its allocated funds.

In recent years, the NDDC has sought to balance its portfolio with the expansion of more human-centered projects. Human capacity development and job creation are stated priorities (Onwukwe and Berwind-Dar 2010). Examples of this approach are non-violence education, free short-term medical missions, youth skills training and internships, scholarships, micro-credit for small businesses, and a service-oriented Technical Aid Corps for communities.

In a fashion similar to its antecedents, NDDC continues to be hampered by lack of transparency, under-funding, inadequate planning, and a failure to consult with beneficiaries. There is also continuing evidence of endemic corruption and political factional-

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**TABLE 3.2:**

**NDDC Project Contract Status in 2009**

(Notes: 10 (7) = 10 contracts of which 7 are completed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Abia</th>
<th>Akwa-Ibom</th>
<th>Bayelsa</th>
<th>Cross River</th>
<th>Delta</th>
<th>Edo</th>
<th>Imo</th>
<th>Ondo</th>
<th>Rivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>10 (7)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>10 (6)</td>
<td>9 (5)</td>
<td>10 (6)</td>
<td>10 (3)</td>
<td>10 (5)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar Water</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>10 (0)</td>
<td>10 (3)</td>
<td>10 (0)</td>
<td>10 (3)</td>
<td>9 (8)</td>
<td>10 (6)</td>
<td>8 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrification</td>
<td>9 (8)</td>
<td>10 (9)</td>
<td>10 (4)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>10 (9)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10 (4)</td>
<td>10 (6)</td>
<td>11 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>10 (9)</td>
<td>10 (8)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
<td>10 (8)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>10 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7 (5)</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
<td>10 (3)</td>
<td>10 (5)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>10 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>5 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shore Protection</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>10 (1)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>6 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetty</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11 (5)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>10 (9)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10 (9)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ism. In August 2008, the then NDDC chairman was arraigned for the misappropriation of up to $5.3 million of Commission funds. In early 2010, his successor became alarmed by significant lapses in procurement practices by the senior NDDC management team. Calls for probes of the organization were heard from a broad range of stakeholders, including governors, activists, MEND, NGOs, and community leaders. In March 2010, the then Acting President Jonathan responded to this crisis of confidence by reconstituting the Presidential Monitoring Committee on the NDDC. In the following June execution of 500 project contracts awarded under “controversial circumstances” was stopped (Aborisade 2010). Further revelations of financial impropriety emerged in November. By July 2011 President Jonathan had constituted a committee to review the governance and outputs of the Commission. Its highly critical report in September led to the dissolution of the NDDC board. This was the third major shake-up in the Commission’s short history.

Poor management performance has meant that NDDC has been substantially unable to attract partners among donor organizations, states, oil companies, and international finance institutions. Technical support from such partners could help reposition the Commission as a more inclusive, participatory, and dependable organization.

In addition to the NDDC, a new Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) was created by President Yar’Adua in September 2008, following the regional model suggested by the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. This decision seemed to affirm the government’s strategic commitment to the region in a year of political tumult and escalating violence. The Ministry was charged with a dual mission: coordination of “mega” regional infrastructure and environmental projects and youth empowerment and training. Each activity was overseen by a respective senior and junior minister. Headquartered in Abuja, the Ministry planned to create field offices in each of the nine Niger Delta states. Meanwhile, the NDDC, which already has a number of state offices, was in theory to become a parastatal under the Ministry, but this plan has a number of vocal critics in the delta who believe consolidation will reduce the total funds available for regional development.

Several years after its establishment, the MNDA now has staff and offices in Abuja, but has otherwise achieved little. Its entire $333 million budget for 2009 was absorbed by existing road contracts and constituency projects earmarked for funding by elected officials under their representational budgets. A piecemeal program emerged after a series of consultative visits by the Minister to state leaders and constituents. In view of an increased, though still modest budget of $430 million for 2010, the list of proposed projects reflected political inspiration rather than pragmatism. It included a portfolio of projects replicated for each state with a costly coastal road running from Calabar to Ilaja in Ondo State. In 2011, the Ministry’s initial budget fell to its 2009 level of $333 million,
although President Jonathan later unsuccessfully sought an upward adjustment of $220 million. A prominent business leader projected that the Ministry would need about six billion USD over three years—about five times its current allocation—to develop infrastructure and create economic growth in the region (Ike-Okoh 2009). Little progress has been made on the MNDA’s proposals. A promising sign came in June 2010, when the Minister announced the formulation of a new “framework” for Niger Delta development. It envisages collaboration with UNDP and a technical working group of donors in order to strengthen the Ministry’s human and financial capacity. This effort remains a work in progress. In April 2010 a journalist appropriately titled his review of the institution “Waiting for the Niger Delta Ministry” (Akunne 2010).

The respective roles of the NDDC and the MNDA remain nebulous, and they continue to operate independently of each other. The plans and pronouncements of the two agencies create a confusing impression of overlap, duplication, and competition. In mid-2009, the first MNDA Minister noted, “The Ministry will concentrate on mega regional projects while the NDDC will execute specific projects and programs in order to complement the program of States and Local Governments” (Ekaette 2009). However, in October 2009 the NDDC was assigned 44 “megaprojects” defined in the post-Amnesty Plan. The respective mandates of, and relationship between, these two federal government development organizations need to be rationalized, as well as their respective responsibilities in implementing the government’s post-Amnesty Plan. Their roles and relationship to the state governments in the delta also need clarification.

State-Level Development and Peace Initiatives

Several states in the Niger Delta have used portions of the generous derivation revenues allocated to them to create development programs or agencies that devote a portion of derivation income to special assistance for oil-affected communities. The first of these, established in 2001, was the Ondo State Oil Producing Area Development Commission (OSOPADEC). This was followed in 2006 by the Rivers State Sustainable Development Program (RSSDP), the Bayelsa Partnership Initiative (BPI), and the Delta State Oil Areas Development Commission (DESOPADEC). Edo, Imo, and Abia States have since followed suit (see Box 3.1). The remaining delta states, Cross River and Akwa-Ibom, have limited onshore community impacts and have not created similar commissions.

The state-level development agencies are meant to serve as dedicated conduits for projects and programs that address the human and environmental impacts of industry activity, especially basic welfare, poverty alleviation and job creation. Some have set out clear strategic objectives and developed a focused portfolio. For example, the Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency (successor to the RSSDP) targets rural economic development through skills creation, infrastructure, and youth empowerment.
DESOPADEC deploys its yearly $200 million budget for an impressive range of projects, from large infrastructure to free child healthcare services. Imo and Ondo States have made conflict prevention and resolution central to the mandates of their agencies. Bayelsa State has not created an independent agency because nearly all of its communities are oil affected. The Bayelsa State Partnership Initiative (BPI) functions as an overarching strategy which involves state ministries in the facilitation of greater cooperation between the government, the private sector, and foreign partners in accelerating Bayelsa’s development. For example, BPI has partnered with Statoil Nigeria and Pro-

**BOX 3.1: PERCEPTIONS OF THE NDDC AND THE MNDA**

Residents of the delta do not have a favorable opinion of the effectiveness of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) or the more recently established Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA). In 2006, a survey revealed widespread doubts about the NDDC’s commitment to local development, and criticism of its top-down planning approach (UNDP 2006; LaPin 2009). Such perceptions compounded the already deteriorating relationships between communities and the federal government and the oil companies (Hopfensperger 2006). Popular frustration has also been expressed through violence. For example, in January 2004, a group of Ijaw youths vandalized the NDDC offices in Warri to protest the marginalization of their communities (ICG 2006a). The announcement of the new Ministry in September 2008 only deepened skepticism among activists who charge that government-sponsored efforts to solve past problems have simply failed. A human rights lawyer Anyakwee Nsirimovu told the British Broadcasting Company (BBC): “To create another bureaucracy that …stalls the Niger Delta problem would be difficult to take” (Walker 2009). MEND greeted the new Ministry as “yet another avenue for corruption and political favoritism” (This Day, 12 September 2008).

Some prominent leaders view greater government support to regional institutions as way of addressing militant demands for accelerated development (Akunna 2006; Ike-Okoh 2009). NGOs have been less positive, referring to such organizations as “private estates.” MEND has made its opposition to both NDDC and the
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Natura International to provide funding for the Akassa Foundation to promote community planning and development (Akassa 2006).

With the intention of diversifying their local economies, most states have held investment forums at home and abroad. In March 2008, a Regional Development Summit invited the public and private sectors to consider the theme “Positioning the South-South for Global Competitiveness.” The first full-fledged South-South Economic Summit was held in April 2009 and proposed a permanent coordinating body to oversee regional economic integration. By February 2010, a single South-South Chamber

MNDA clear. In December 2006, it claimed responsibility for a bomb detonated near the NDDC headquarters in Port Harcourt and in a related statement charged the managing director with acting “against the interest of the people of the Niger Delta” (Arubi and Onoyume 2006). More recently, ex-combatants have complained of corrupt practices and bias in favor of contractors from outside the Niger Delta. In 2010, the ex-MEND commander, Tom Polo, sued the Ministry for choosing a northern firm to execute a $12,000 shore protection project in his home area rather than his own local business, KFT Odogbo & Co (Leadership, 24 May 2010).

The changes that came about as a result of the Amnesty Program have brought heightened expectations of the Ministry and the NDDC, and have led to protests and violence on occasion. Scores of youth congregate daily at the NDDC headquarters office in Port Harcourt or send text messages to petition the director (Onomo 2009). On 10 May 2010, a former MEND militant claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on the NDDC office in Warri, although the police attributed the incident to a faulty air conditioner. On 27 May 2010, a bomb scare closed the NDDC headquarters in Port Harcourt. Some observers have linked this campaign to internal political and financial conflicts within the NDDC (Ogabu and Iwori 2010). President Jonathan reactivated his NDDC Monitoring Committee in 2010, and as the crisis escalated, he requested a full review of the management and projects by another special committee in July 2011. On 13 September, following submission of the committee report, the entire NDDC board was dismissed (Taiwo-Obalonye 2011).
### TABLE 3.3:
State-Level Oil-Producing Area Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Key Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>ASOPADEC</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td><strong>Abia State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Manages 50% of state Oil Derivation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mandate: rehabilitation and development of oil-producing communities; liaise with IOCs on erosion, spills, and pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Responds to community demands for “royalty arrears” paid for longstanding local oil production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akwa-Ibom</td>
<td>No state agency at present</td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of an agency catering to specific needs of oil-affected communities was suggested by stakeholders in May 2010 in the wake of a large offshore oil spill (Udoma 2010). By 2011 no state commission had been created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>BPI (policy support to donor partnerships at local-level)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td><strong>Bayelsa State Partnership Initiative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Planned expenditure of $40m in state resources in 2006 and $80m in 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mandate: poverty reduction, employment generation, conflict mitigation in riverine areas (USAID 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Has not evolved into a clear independent structure with earmarked funds, but encourages local donor partnerships. Since 2008, the state has launched a state-level public-private sector “PPP” initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Announced a “stimulus package” in March 2010 with inputs from donors (Tajudeen 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>No state agency at present</td>
<td></td>
<td>Since the transfer of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, Cross River is technically no longer a littoral state and its 76 wells were ceded in 2009 to neighboring Akwa Ibom. Since May 2010 the federal government has been paying some monthly compensation to the state equivalent to about 50% of its prior oil-producing status. It remains an oil-affected state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>DESOPADEC</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td><strong>Delta State Oil-Producing Area Development Commission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Created by former Governor Ibori to energize welfare and rural development of oil producing areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Board reconstituted in 2007 by Governor Uduaghan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Manages 50% of state derivation funds, $200m/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mandate: education, healthcare, infrastructure, agriculture, micro-credit facilities, training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• By November 2009 1198 contracts had been awarded since inception with 447 completed and 751 at various stages of completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Board being reconstituted in 2011 (Uyi 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Key Features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Edo         | EDOSOPADEC        | 2007     | **Edo State Oil-Producing Areas Development Commission**  
• Limited activity between 2007 and 2008  
• Legislative investigation in 2008, reconstituted  
• Board dissolved by Governor Oshiomhole in Jan. 2009 |
| Imo         | ISOPADEC          | 2007     | **Imo State Oil-Producing Areas Development Commission**  
• Created informally in 2000, by law in 2007, amended 2009, reconstituted after board conflict in 2010  
• Responsible for managing most of the 13% derivation, which is contributed by two LGAs  
• Mandate: poverty reduction through skills acquisition, micro-credits, health services; construction projects; conflict prevention through a youth committee |
| Ondo        | OSOPADEC          | 2001     | **Ondo State Oil-Producing Area Development Commission**  
• Manages 40% of state derivation funds  
• Mandate: roads, clearing waterways, rural electricity, rural water supply, aquaculture, rice cultivation, scholarships, conflict resolution  
• Helped broker peace in Ilaje—Ijaw conflict, replacing destroyed homes |
| Rivers      | RSSDA (RSSDP, 2006)| 2007     | **Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency**  
• The RSSDA is an autonomous agency aimed at rural economic development through skills creation, infrastructure, and youth empowerment  
• Seeks to partner with donor and oil company experts  
• Funds include 5% of state’s annual capital expenditure  
• First phase RSSD Program 2006: $20m for Quick Results Projects in aquaculture, cassava processing, micro-credit, ceramics, etc.  
• Second phase RSSDA law 2007: sustainable framework that chiefly supports job and business development, e.g. scholarships, training, internships, computer centers, agriculture, small manufacturing |
of Commerce was established, called the BRACED Commission, with a headquarters in Port Harcourt. In an agreement signed in June 2011, the member states committed themselves to regional economic cooperation and integration, as well as collective development of the Niger Delta region.

While special state agencies send a message of commitment and promise enhanced development for local oil producing areas, they have their share of drawbacks. Their management burden and administrative costs to the state in terms of money, time, and personnel are high and may be hard to justify, especially if their activities appear to duplicate or compromise the programs and projects of other federal, regional, and state institutions.

Further concerns relate to the quality of governance and the adequacy of consultation with citizens. Most state development agencies tend to follow a top-down “contracting” rather than a bottom-up “planning and execution” approach to projects and programs, even though local engagement and participation often figure in their governing principles. Failure to include community “voice,” share resources equitably, or fulfill stated commitments can generate disaffection, alienation, and anger, as well as creating competition and conflict between communities. Furthermore, charges of corruption, favoritism, and factionalism within their boards have led to the dissolution or reorganization of agencies in two states and have undermined public confidence in at least two others. Public committees have been formed in several states to monitor the funding and execution of projects planned by these state-level commissions, some with technical support from NGOs.

OIL COMPANIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In a rentier state such as Nigeria, which depends much more on oil revenue than on taxes from citizens, it has proven nearly impossible for Niger Delta communities to hold the central government accountable for their local development. Given the lack of services, the aspiration for greater “resource control” is often channeled into expectations that oil companies should provide public goods and economic opportunity directly to communities in order to gain a social license to operate. About two dozen international oil and gas companies operate in Nigeria, including seven “majors.” Acreage developed by local companies, especially in marginal fields, is steadily increasing and is encouraged by government policy. Shell d’Arcy, established in 1937, was the first exploration and production company in Nigeria, and today Shell has the largest proportion of onshore oil and gas fields. ExxonMobil operates all of its 300 wells offshore and in 2006, following the onset of MEND attacks on oil installations and staff, overtook Shell with the highest overall production. Many of Nigeria’s major oil and gas projects are still funded as joint ventures (JVs) between the international oil companies (IOCs), the Nigeria...
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and often additional partners. All partners in a joint venture, including the government, must contribute to the operating costs in proportion to the number of shares they hold in the company. More recent projects, especially those located offshore, are typically structured as production-sharing contracts (PSCs)\textsuperscript{14} in which the operators and investors wholly finance and manage the initial development and pay the government a share of their profits when production begins. Table 3.4 below shows a list of the major JV and PSC companies with some details of their operations.

Under the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the JVs and the government, the participating companies pay the central government a Petroleum Profit Tax of 85 percent and royalties between 16.35 and 20 percent of the official selling price. The non-NNPC shareholders are also guaranteed a minimum fixed margin of $2.50 per barrel. For example, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) calculates that on a barrel of oil priced at $60 the government receives 95 percent of the returns in the form of taxes, royalties and equity share (Shell 2007, p. 11).

A new Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) has been debated for several years and proposes major reforms in Nigeria’s oil industry. Numerous versions of the bill have been issued since 2008, and they variously treat such issues as restructuring NNPC to create an independent national oil company, changing the revenue regime of royalties and taxes, stronger provisions for transparency and competitiveness in awards and licenses, and enhanced oversight of management. Some versions envisage giving host communities ten percent of the government share of revenues from the JVs (Sayne 2010). Certain terms of the proposed PIB fiscal regime, especially for offshore activities, have been contentious to the IOCs. The future of the PIB remains uncertain, but the potential advantages for all parties could include access to private financing (instead of government cash calls), provisions for local community development, expanded Nigerian content, and the expectation of greater accountability and transparency in business operations.

As elsewhere, oil companies in the Niger Delta are businesses, and their main concern is to make a profit from the extraction of oil and gas. Corporate social and environmental responsibility can be seen as an investment in their future operations and a means of acquiring a local “social license to operate.” As in many countries, Nigerian oil companies and other private firms are expected to make an active contribution to local communities. Corporate responsibility is understood not as philanthropy, but as an obligation and one of the costs of doing business (Frynas 2005, p. 582). In the case of the Niger Delta, the failure of the various levels of government to provide adequately for the security and development of its citizens, despite access to huge oil revenues, has increasingly persuaded oil companies to fill the gap.

Prior to the 1990s, oil company development assistance programs were for the most part rooted in the immediate needs of the business, for instance, providing scholarships.
### TABLE 3.4:

**Major Oil and Gas Companies in the Niger Delta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Operator/ (Entry)/ Est. Av. Production</th>
<th>Principal Companies</th>
<th>Operations and Community Footprint</th>
<th>History: Status of Shut-Ins as of January 2008 (bpd)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXXONMOBIL</strong> ExxonMobil (1955) 620,000 bpd&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (JV-MPNU) Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (PSC - EEPNL)</td>
<td>No onshore production. Produces around 720,000 barrels a day of crude, condensate, and natural gas liquids from 90 offshore wells</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROYAL DUTCH/ SHELL</strong> (1937) 510,000 bpd NLNG: processes 3 bcfd&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt; of gas</td>
<td>Shell Petroleum Development Company (JV-SPDC) Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (PSC - SNEPCO) Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (JV-NLNG)</td>
<td>Produces around 630,000 barrels a day of crude, condensate, natural gas liquids (drop from 1 million in April 2006) <strong>Onshore</strong>: SPDC: production area of 31,000 km&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Imo, Rivers <strong>Communities</strong>: 1,200 <strong>Near Offshore</strong>: EA field <strong>Bonga</strong>: Deep Offshore <strong>NLNG Communities</strong>: Bonny Island, Finima</td>
<td><strong>Onshore</strong>: Forcados 280,000 since Feb. 2006 <strong>EA</strong>: Shallow offshore SNEPCO 115,000 from Feb. 2006 <strong>Bonga deep offshore Field</strong>: 19 June 2008: failed MEND attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Operator/ (Entry)/ Est. Av. Production¹⁵</td>
<td>Principal Companies</td>
<td>Operations and Community Footprint</td>
<td>History: Status of Shut-Ins as of January 2008 (bpd)¹⁶</td>
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<tr>
<td>500,000 bpd</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000 bpd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENI S.p.A (AGIP) (1962)</strong> 150,000 bpd</td>
<td>Nigerian Agip Oil Company (JV - NAOC), a subsidiary of ENI Other: Nig. Agip Energy and Natural Resources (PSC- AENR) and Nig. Agip Exploration (PSC-NAE)</td>
<td>Onshore: Four fields in Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Imo, and offshore fields. Participates Communities: 300 Offshore: AENR, NAE</td>
<td>40,000 as of April 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to train potential geologists and engineers or building roads and power grids to serve remote flow stations. Large agriculture extension programs or model farms helped to introduce new food varieties and technologies in order to preserve livelihoods compromised by land take, canal construction, or pollution of fragile wetlands. Heightened security threats in the region from the 1990s onwards have pushed oil companies to constantly reevaluate both community development and security strategies (Omeje 2006, p. 481). With rising community demands, increasingly punctuated with violence, development projects funded by oil companies have become one method for buying a stable working environment through the provision of development goods.

Under the influence of these pressures, the approach taken by oil companies has evolved from an initial focus on corporate philanthropy to a more sustainable and long-term strategy with increasing emphasis on community involvement. At the same time there has been a substantial growth in funds allocated to community development (see Box 3.2 below). In the case of SPDC, whose involvement with communities began in the 1960s, the company adopted a top-down, “community assistance” approach that comprised “giving things,” such as a new school or health center, which the company or local leaders felt the host community needed. Over time, as critics noted, such projects were often implemented haphazardly (WAC 2003, pp. 18–19).

By 1998, Shell was implementing a bottom-up, community-driven “community development” approach to encourage greater community ownership and improve its social investment performance. A multi-year, rolling development plan and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) set out development priorities selected by youth, women, and men through a facilitated process agreed by the community at large. In-house development specialists—or at times partnering donor agencies or NGOs—trained communities in planning and helped them design new types of projects (LaPin 2000).

In 2004, following the devastating “Warri Wars” in Delta State, and serious losses in production, Chevron adapted the bottom-up, community-driven approach to a new model that established regional trusts covered by the multi-community agreements known as “Global Memoranda of Understanding” (GMOUs). These structures created federations of communities that focused efforts on coordinating projects to meet long-term goals. The Company established eight federations on an ethnic basis managed by “Regional Development Councils” (RDCs), covering 850,000 people in 425 communities in five states. In 2006, Shell announced plans for 67 similar structures clustering 1,200 communities under “Community Development Boards.”

An independent survey undertaken in 2009 showed that communities in the Niger Delta prefer to manage their development through community-driven structures that assure community-based planning and greater local empowerment. At the same time, they also seek more support from oil companies, the international community, and federal structures (NOI 2009). Trusts, therefore, offer an advantage to both companies and
BOX 3.2: RISING LEVELS OF OIL COMPANY INVESTMENT IN COMMUNITY PROJECTS

In 1996, Chevron allocated about $3m to community projects. By 2007, its social investment rose to $26m for its own development projects and $30m as statutory payment to the NDDC (Chevron 2007). A typical community trust under the Chevron GMOU model is likely to receive as much as $2.5m a year in funds placed under management by the local Regional Development Council.

In 1996, the total spend on community development by companies operated by Shell was around $22m. By 2006, Shell companies were contributing $53m to fund their own community projects and $76m as a statutory 3% payment to the NDDC. Contributions in 2009 were $58m and $157m respectively, with an additional $45m paid to the Nigeria Education Fund (Sunmonu 2010). In 2009, the oil industry collectively contributed $300m to the NDDC, and with increased production following the Amnesty this figure has risen somewhat.

communities by creating structures for local management of village clusters and thereby reducing corporate in-house management effort or direct involvement in the process of implementation. An evaluation of the GMOU, supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has shown that many community stakeholders believe the approach promotes more sustainable development, ownership, and transparency and has improved company relationships with the communities. Communities, however, did express concern that the new structure would limit their direct access to company staff in the event of a problem. The evaluation also noted that projects were initially slow to take off because of inexperienced local management, causing some loss of faith in the process at the outset (RTI/SFCG/CBI 2008).

The GMOU can create a huge technical, political, and management burden for the community volunteers responsible for financial management and project implementation. For this reason the Shell approach includes a year of NGO technical assistance to each community management team. Chevron has also engaged local NGOs to carry out sustainable livelihood assessments that contribute to the preparation of future development plans (Chevron 2006, p. 23). More recently, Chevron has reached formal respective agreements with USAID and a Nigerian NGO to build RDC capacity in governance and project management.

Since 2000, nearly all of the major oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, even small indigenous firms, have begun to engage communities in development projects, stepping up their support for infrastructure (a natural fit to the upstream oil industry) as well as health, education, and agriculture. In addition, education programs, skills training, and business mentoring are seen as high priority to help promote non–oil sector employment. Companies recruit in–house professional staff or consultants and all the majors have created technical institutions to expand Nigerian capacity for sophisticated industry jobs. Stipends donated by companies now subsidize the academic studies of over 40,000 secondary, university, and post–graduate students, approximately half of whom are from the Niger Delta.

Over the long term, the preferred strategy for industry is to strenuously advocate for greater commitment from government to the sustainable development of the delta region. Companies have increasingly sought to leverage their own social investments by expanding public–private partnerships with government, donors, NGOs, or other private entities (see Annex 2). One example of corporate leveraging is Chevron Corporation’s $100 million “Partnership Initiative for the Niger Delta” (PIND), a foundation meant to serve as multi–donor platform to support sustainable economic development in the Chevron operating areas of the region. In 2011, USAID became the foundation’s first major partner.

By far, the most meaningful measures of social and environmental performance relate to the conduct of a company’s core business. Policies on local hiring, procurement,
CHART 3.1: The Shell “GMOU” Model

Enjoying a participatory approach to improve dialogue and help communities drive their own development

Source: Royal Dutch Shell 2010.
Community engagement, and social investment must be matched by rigorous standards of safety, health, and environment. To meet this need, the World Bank’s Business Partners for Development initiative in 2001 helped Shell (SPDC) to develop new corporate environmental impact assessment guidelines that would highlight the social and health effects of oil operations (BPD 2002). Soon thereafter the federal government intensified efforts to stimulate environmental responsibility on the part of oil companies, adopting a new approach in 2003 that required compliance with environmental regulations as a condition for securing future drilling rights. The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) was subsequently established in 2007 to set and monitor environmental standards and coordinate the efforts of stakeholders, including oil companies.

Further improvements in industry practices and priorities are needed. For example, gas flaring and pollution owing to insufficient or aging infrastructure remain persistent negative externalities of oil production. Although these effects are slowly diminishing with current practices, market incentives, and laws, they remain compounded by damage to infrastructure due to conflict and oil theft. In order for the interaction between oil companies and communities to be sustainable, community development partnerships must be accompanied by a credible change in the setting of corporate priorities and their alignment with the way core business activities are carried out. This requires an active oversight role for industry trade groups, civil society partners, and government regulatory bodies. Only by building an effective coalition of the willing can an enabling environment be created in which corporate social responsibility efforts truly contribute to sustainable development of the Niger Delta (Idemudia 2007).

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Despite the deep development deficit of the Niger Delta, many donors have been reluctant to engage in the region. Difficult terrain, insecurity, communal conflicts, and low government capacity make it difficult and expensive to operate in the delta. Nevertheless, a number of donors, often multilateral, have been able to make significant progress through partnerships with NGOs and communities, strong communication strategies, and regular monitoring. Such initiatives are expanding and are now complemented by a growing willingness to engage with state governments. These developments are encouraging, since peace in the delta is likely to emerge as a result of successful development intervention and should not be considered a precondition for such engagement.

In 1995 many donors suspended or significantly curtailed their development cooperation with Nigeria in response to the Saro-Wiwa crisis and did not resume partnership until 1999 or soon thereafter. Subsequent to the financial and trans-
BOX 3.3: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP—CASSAVA ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (2003–2009)

USAID, Shell, IITA - $11.3m

In 2003, a five-year Partnership Agreement was signed under the USAID Global Development Alliance in which the SPDC provided 75% of funding and USAID provided the remaining 25%. An in-kind contribution valued at $1.3m was also made by the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA); the implementing agency. Field implementation was carried out in all oil producing states except Ondo (plus three other states in the SE Zone) from October 2004 to September 2009. The goal was to boost economic opportunities through sustainable and competitive cassava production, processing, marketing, and agribusiness enterprise development. Project management and an independent project evaluation summarized the results (Mitchell Group 2008; Sunmonu 2010):

1. Reduction in Cassava Mosaic Disease (CMD) with the introduction and distribution of 10 improved cultivars leading to an increased yield output from 10 to 30 t/ha in 11 states.

2. Over 450 projects supported or constructed, including mobile graters, intervention centers, micro-processing mills, and medium-scale processing centers.

3. Product improvement and market linkages for cassava products to the U.S., UK, and Benin Republic.

4. Technical and business skills training provided for 11,000 farmers and processors, leading to 3,600 full-time and 9,000 part-time employment opportunities.

The partnership will continue in 2011, adding fish farming activities.
 transparency reforms of the Obasanjo administration, donor funding for Nigeria grew significantly. Between 2008 and 2011 total development commitments and disbursements of the major donor partners were expected to reach roughly $3 billion (EU 2009; Annex 3). In the Niger Delta, the European Union, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the UN agencies, and the World Bank have taken the lead, chiefly supporting local governance reform and alleviating rural poverty. USAID and DFID have also funded initiatives directed at regional conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. The region is now served by a modest catalogue of international and local NGOs.

Until recently, many donor agencies concentrated their support on “lead” or “focus” states. In the Niger Delta only Cross River State has consistently met the qualifying criteria for governance and accountability. While donor aloofness has compounded the sense of neglect felt by the Niger Delta population, a plethora of NGOs and civil society groups have meanwhile been active in the zone, many funded by donors or oil companies. In 2007, the Living Earth Foundation led a study to map sustainable development projects in the Niger Delta and concluded that “not enough attention had been paid to the positive things that were happening in the field of development in the region” (Living Earth 2008).

A more detailed account of donor activities is given in Annex 3. Below a few examples of good practice are highlighted.

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is responsible for implementing the UNDP Youth Empowerment Program (YEP) for job training and development in Delta State. The Project expects to expand to Rivers and Bayelsa States (see Box 3.4).

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has recently undertaken the first full environmental assessment of 300 sites in Ogoniland contaminated by oil industry activity (see Box 3.5). Its findings were issued on 4 August 2011 amid considerable controversy (UNEP 2011; LaPin 2011).

The Niger Delta was the first region supported in the European Union’s 2002 resumed program of cooperation with Nigeria following the lifting of sanctions in 1999. Since then, it continues to show the strongest on-the-ground support among donors to community-based development in the Niger Delta, chiefly through its Micro-Projects Program (MPP) (see Box 3.6).

As these examples and those given in Annex 3 illustrate, it has proven possible to establish a number of successful interventions in the areas of environment, governance, and livelihoods. At the same time, there is a danger that donor interventions, which often command resources on a large scale, may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, problems of conflict and governance if they are executed without an operational understanding of the nature and drivers of conflict in the region.
BOX 3.4: THE YOUTH EMPOWERMENT PROJECT (YEP) A NIGER DELTA JOB CREATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION INITIATIVE

There is a growing focus on youth training and job creation as viable solutions to youth militancy and unemployment in the Niger Delta. The Youth Empowerment Project is a UNDP program funded jointly by state governments and the SPDC. Started in January 2008, YEP is implemented on behalf of UNIDO by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Starting with a world-class training facility for 200 trainees in Egbokodo-Itsekiri near Warri in Delta State, the project is expected to extend to Bayelsa and Rivers States.

Job creation and placement are the expected deliverables of activities including sensitization and mindset change, counseling and referral services, and vocational training and livelihood skills development. These activities are combined with civic education and HIV/AIDS awareness. Training covers skills relevant to the oil and non-oil industries, e.g. agriculture, agribusiness, tailoring, hair dressing, welding, electrical wiring, maintenance, masonry, carpentry, and mechanics. Career development services are also provided, including industrial attachment where possible. YEP is appropriately positioned to pave the way towards the reintegration of ex-combatants as well as to develop skills in non-militant youth. YEP also provides an opportunity to support the Nigerian government’s ongoing demobilization, disarmament, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR) programs under the current Amnesty.

Women show off their hats at an NGO skills training center in Yenagoa. Courtesy: Paul Francis
BOX 3.5: UNEP IN OGORILAND: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF CONTAMINATED OIL PRODUCTION SITES

Over 2,400 oil contaminated sites have been identified by the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta. As yet, a full environmental assessment has not yet been undertaken in the region. Many local residents believe that environmental damage related to the oil industry has undermined their traditional livelihoods. As a start, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) launched in November 2009 a yearlong field assessment of over 300 sites in the Ogoni area, near Port Harcourt, to identify the impacts of oil on land, water, agriculture, forests, fisheries, and air as well as the indirect effects on biodiversity and human health. Oil production started in 1958 in Ogoniland, but was suspended in 1993 due to local unrest. To date, environmental contamination from these operations has not been fully remediated. Further spills in the past 15 years have been the result of a lack of maintenance, oil tapping, and damage to infrastructure. The project has been undertaken in a manner that maximizes benefits to the community—through employment, capacity-building, information and consultation. The findings of the assessment led UNEP to the conclusion that “pollution has perhaps gone further and penetrated deeper than many may have previously supposed.” Among its recommendations was the creation of three special-purpose agencies to help orchestrate a cleanup expected to cost one billion USD over 30 years. The $9.5 million cost of the assessment was provided by SPDC, the operating company, on the “polluter pays” principle. (Ezigbo 2010; Environmental News Service, 30 November 2009; UNEP 2011, LaPin 2011.)
BOX 3.6: THE MICRO-PROJECTS PROGRAM (MPP) EUROPEAN UNION AND LOCAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

The Micro-Projects Program (MPP) provides a robust model for grassroots development in the Niger Delta, which began in 2002 to meet basic rural community needs in water supply, sanitation, income-generation, micro-credit, agriculture, and healthcare services. Managed by an international development partner selected by the EU, the program started with 60 to 100 small projects annually, carried out by local NGOs or community groups. Guiding principles of the program are full community participation and ownership, community co-financing (25% community contribution), sustainability, accountability, and local institutional capacity-building. Communities receive hands-on guidance from local civil society organizations (CSOs), who in turn are trained in project management. The MPP’s most notable program innovation is transparency. In the first phase, a well-designed website, accessible to the public, solicited project proposals, and tracked the progress and financing of each project. The project has been implemented in three phases. From 2002–2006 Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta States were supported by MPP3, while MPP6 covered the remaining six oil-producing states from 2004–2008. Currently, the EU plans to invest about $65 million in the current MPP9 to serve all Niger Delta states. By 2011, this last phase expects to complete 1,200 micro community projects or 400 per year.
Other promising signs on the international front are the growing coordination and harmonization between development partners. Advocates for the region have long emphasized the urgency of adopting a coordinated approach to Niger Delta development, including the engagement of outside parties. For the program period 2010–2013 the World Bank Group and DFID joined with USAID and the African Development Bank (AfDB) to prepare a joint Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Nigeria. In distinction to earlier initiatives, the new partnership does not propose a common set of focus states, but rather suggests that “need”—in addition to “performance”—is a valid criterion for targeting assistance (World Bank et al. 2009). This less restrictive approach creates opportunities for the Niger Delta. The consolidated donor strategy for Nigeria underscores the urgent need to strengthen government systems to improve outcomes in human development, growth, and peace. For the Niger Delta in the post-Amnesty period a special strategy is envisaged, targeting conflict mitigation—including demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration for ex-combatants—combined with building a more democratic and prosperous environment. More recently, UNDP has led the development of a common post-Amnesty strategy, which is intended to extend beyond donors through deliberations that include government and corporate social investment managers. Revitalized donor coordination, ideally within the framework of an overarching regional plan, will help kick-start the vital development process.

A second important form of collaboration is public-private partnership. The substantial financial and managerial resources of the oil industry, along with its crucial presence “on the ground” make it an important partner for development planning and intervention. Donors generally operate selectively in the region, and often from a distance, whereas oil companies and their contractors through the nature of their work, daily and directly, confront local development and conflict issues. Experience with public-private partnerships has yielded a number of important lessons about the synergies and challenges that emerge from different ways of working, attitudes, and expectations. A recent evaluation of the Cassava Enterprise Development Project (CEDP, Box 3.3) found that combined strengths outweighed the drawbacks of a public-private partnership. For example, donors contribute their technology, quality assurance, and a mediating role with communities, while companies offer in-depth knowledge of the region and its population. The private sector can also contribute a focus on entrepreneurship and support rigorous monitoring and evaluation. Nevertheless, companies also bring legacies of past practices with regard to doing business, thereby raising community expectations for “compensation” or in-kind contributions (Mitchell Group 2008, pp. 14–15).
Violence in the Niger Delta in recent decades has devastated communities, curbed services and development, and depressed oil production at times by more than 60 percent. Efforts to resolve these problems, in particular through the proliferation of new institutions, have largely failed to address the underlying causes of instability analyzed in the last chapter.

As we have seen, the habitual reaction of the government to the periodic crises of the delta has been a combination of repression, buying off through the redistribution of revenue, and the creation of new development institutions. However, in a field shaped by a patrimonial political economy, the proliferation of institutions has either resulted in temporary and costly islands of success, the duplication of mainstream programs, or subversion to the ends of unaccountable actors. Meanwhile, top-down planning and implementation, which bypasses community priorities and initiatives, often persist.

Oil companies have reached a tentative balance with communities that allows them to continue their operations, though the extent to which the benefits of their social investments have consistently been commensurate with their expended resources is debatable. Even where successful, the creation of parallel or substitute services has long-term implications for sustainability, coordination, and governance. While continuing to share ideas, knowledge, and skills, the collaboration between corporate entities and government sectors should not drift into duplication or competition (for example, between the company MOUs with communities and state or LGA development plans). Some perceive the larger GMOU structures as another bureaucratic layer between the community and the LGA. For these reasons, it is critical to involve government officials in the planning and implementation of IOC-supported projects and to seek integration with plans at state and LGA level.

A balance also must be struck between development and security. Social investments help foster a climate of peace, but they cannot address criminal behavior or threats to business continuity in the short term. Oil companies spend substantially on security provided through local sources, on “stand-by” local laborers, and on *ex gratia* payments to community youth groups. Attention needs to be given to aligning short-term and unplanned pay-offs with the objectives of long term development and peacebuilding, since they can indeed lead to further instability down the line by incentivizing violence and intransigence (WAC 2003). A systematic approach, however, has yielded success for companies, communities, and even state governments. For example, security contracts with reliable local youth organizations for pipeline surveillance or monitoring waterways are fast becoming accepted methods of exchanging local knowledge and services for much desired income.

Donor intervention has been, to a degree, reluctant, sporadic, selective, and managed remotely. However, pilot projects have already been established and proven promising, and there is a renewed resolve among development actors, in recognition of the
debilitating economic implications of continuing crisis, to work around the weaknesses in existing institutions, experiment with new strategies, and strengthen community-based management and oversight.

Despite the lack of an overall planning framework, coordination between donors has also risen markedly in recent years—a sign of progress—and a convergence of thinking has been emerging around development issues on the delta, centered on the twin necessities of local participatory development and massive investment in infrastructure and employment generation.

There have been other promising signs. The government has shown an increasing resolve to promote development; states have created development agencies to support oil producing areas; trust funds have been established by donors and oil companies to promote community-driven development, which move away from top-down development approaches; successful public-private partnerships have been established, along with other forms of institutional innovation; and a knowledge base has been developed in the form of numerous studies, reports, and the Master Plan for the Niger Delta (NDRDMP).

Certainly, a more secure and less politicized environment may have facilitated and expanded these efforts, but they nevertheless represent a break from the largely ad hoc, top-down development approaches of past decades. At the same time, divergence and inconsistency of motives, means, and capacity among the players has militated against effective coordination. For its part the government has not yet provided an overarching development framework for the Niger Delta to guide key stakeholders and define their respective roles. These missing elements are not for want of substantive information, ideas, or plans. In November 2008, the Niger Delta Technical Committee reviewed the rich array of information found in dozens of studies and reports. The most comprehensive of these, the Master Plan, was formally approved in March 2007. Although it is often mentioned and discussed, it has never been seriously utilized. The next chapter turns to the ways in which these initiatives can be built upon and integrated into future opportunities for the Niger Delta region.

NOTES

1. The distributable pool is based on the benchmark price of oil estimated in each annual budget. This practice ensures the budget is funded with predictable revenues with the balance captured in a “rainy day” Excess Crude Account (ECA). For example, although the 2008 budget was based on an oil price of $53.83 per barrel, the price of oil increased substantially in the first half of 2008, reaching a high of $147.27 a barrel on 11 July (more than quadruple 2002 prices). By late 2008, however, oil prices had fallen dramatically, reaching a four year low of $40.50 a barrel on 5 December. Such unforeseen increases and declines in oil price at times require the government to
significantly alter spending plans and to resort to supplementary distributions from the ECA.

2 http://www.fmf.gov.ng/portal/detail.php?link=faac
3 Cited in HRW 2002.
4 In 2009 the NDDC actually spent only one-quarter of its total allocation, owing to internal governance problems.
5 http://projects.wri.org/sd-pams-database/nigeria/ Niger-Delta-development-master-plan. During its development the Plan benefited from both financial inputs and full-time staff support from UNDP, oil companies, and other agencies. In July 2007, President Yar’Adua personally convened the first Stakeholders’ Forum on Plan.
6 http://www.nddc.gov.ng/. Chapter 6 of the NDRDMP, which is devoted to the implementation plan, is not readily available, and the version of the chapter posted on the NDDC website has been corrupted and inaccessible since 2007.
7 *Vanguard*, 27 May 2010.
8 Office of the Presidency official website: http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article-9510.shtml
9 Past attempts at partnership have included a Peace and Security (PaS) Strategy and Secretariat (with the Petroleum Ministry, states, oil companies, police and security, EFCC, NGOs, etc.), youth skills training centers (with oil companies, UNDP), and road projects (with oil companies).
10 Even in the oil-rich region, however, allocations vary widely. For example, the statutory and derivation allocations in March 2010 were $60 million for Akwa-Ibom, the highest oil and gas producer, and $9.5 million for Cross River, the lowest. (Federal Ministry of Finance. 2010. Abuja, Nigeria) http://www.fmf.gov.ng/ FMF_Revenue_Alloc.aspx
12 BRACED stands for the states of the South-South geo-political zone: Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo, and Delta
13 A Joint Venture (JV) is a structure formed between two or more parties to create a new entity by both contributing equity, and they then share the revenues, expenses, and control of the enterprise.
14 A Production Sharing Contract or Agreement (PSC or PSA) is an agreement with a host country regarding the percentage of production each party will receive after the participating parties have recovered a specified amount in costs and expenses.
15 Figures are approximate total daily crude oil production only, attributed to the operator; taken from consolidated company and government sources mid-2010. Total July 2011 production was around 2.3 mbpd.
16 These figures are for crude production shut-ins as of January 2008, according to EIA sources (London Energy Desk).
17 Barrels per day.
18 Billion cubic feet per day.
19 Mutiu Sumonu. Shell Nigeria Briefing at the World Bank, 6 May 2010. The SPDC strategy began in Rivers and Bayelsa States with 21 agreements in operation, 11 to be implemented in 2010, and eventually extending to Delta and other states.
20 Official development assistance (ODA) rose from $6.4 billion in 2005 to $11.4 billion in 2006, related in part to the settling of $30 billion in external debt (OECD 2010). Meanwhile, private foreign direct investment had acceded $20 billion by 2008 (Ogbodo 2009).
21 Living Earth website http://livingearthinigeria.org/SDMapping/background.html
Hope of the future—schoolchildren in Yenagoba.

Courtesy: Paul Francis
CHAPTER 4

Building a Framework for the Future

President Goodluck Jonathan’s national Transformation Agenda for 2011–2015 includes proposals for restoring hope and confidence in the people of the Niger Delta. His plan acknowledges longstanding issues and challenges that must be tackled: “Past development planning efforts have failed to adequately address the region’s needs due to implementation lapses.” The plan promises that “Government will intensify action on proper coordination of efforts of all stakeholders towards the realization of Nigeria Vision 20:2020 … and significantly enhance the living standards of the people” (FRN 2011, p. 106).

It is unprecedented in Nigeria’s history for a head of state to develop a plan that gives so much attention to the Niger Delta, and in such detail, for redressing the region’s high levels of poverty, unemployment, environmental damage, and ethnic and communal conflicts. Proposed strategies and targets envisaged set a high bar for regional development, and the plan is ambitious when compared with past performance. For example, an infrastructure investment of $19 billion over four years is proposed for roads, railroads, river ports, skills acquisition centers, land reclamation, and shore protection. A social development program aims to halve poverty and unemployment, clean up half of currently polluted sites, and minimize conflict and social tension. The plan also pledges to protect and conserve the environment by “matching economic goals with environmental conditions” (FRN 2011, p. 120). Meanwhile, the Amnesty Program initiated by former President Yar’Adua has also rekindled hope for change. Two years of fragile peace has demobilized and disarmed more than 26,000 youth. Practical education and training for all ex-combatants is planned and, for most, is already underway. Yet, for these former fighters, full reintegration into society as productive law-abiding members requires a change, not only in their personal attitudes and behaviors, but also in their socioeconomic environment.

The Presidential Amnesty offers an historic opportunity to pursue a fresh development agenda by bringing relative peace and stability to the region. However, any solution to the region’s problems will require extraordinary political will and mobilization on the part of the government and other stakeholders, as well as massive investments in development. Led by an active champion, working through able and
well governed institutions, a process of implementation should be laid out to define the objectives, roles, and tasks of all stakeholders—from the federal government down to each Niger Delta community.

This renewed effort may imply updating and revising the Niger Delta Regional Development Regional Master Plan (NDDC 2007). Based on thoughtful research and extensive stakeholder input, the Master Plan can serve as a starting point for designing a comprehensive roadmap that goes beyond the current tendency to create lists of unrelated projects and initiatives for the delta. Similarly, the institutional set up for development in the region should be revisited. The fact that there are two key federal institutions established for this purpose—the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC, 2000) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA, 2009)—has raised questions about duplication of effort and the efficiency of their cooperation. The NDDC’s recurrent history of internal wrangling and financial impropriety has recently been assessed by a special presidential commission and found to hamper the quality and delivery of badly needed projects and commitment to executing the all-important regional Master Plan.

The development of a broad framework for coordinating Niger Delta peace and development has been proposed by government, civil groups, and donors. Several forums have already discussed future prospects and plans for the region. Most of these consultations were held in preparation for a major Niger Delta Summit scheduled by the Yar’Adua Presidency for late 2007. Postponed several times throughout 2008, the Summit initiative was eventually abandoned and replaced by a regionally-driven Niger Delta Technical Committee. Its thoughtful and thorough report consolidated fresh inputs in addition to highlighting recommendations from dozens of past regional studies and commissions. The government’s promised White Paper outlining actions based on the report’s suggestions is still awaited.

Meanwhile, in December 2009, key bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors to the Niger Delta region presented to the government a Strategy Paper, which compiled their views on the way forward for the region. The Strategy Paper proposed that an overarching framework should be created to coordinate the inputs of all public and private actors engaged in regional development (UNDP 2009). Under this umbrella, inputs from partners could be solicited to fast track a program focusing on public infrastructure, social services, community development, and institutional strengthening.

The following sections suggest the elements of a way forward rooted in the analysis of challenges facing the region, as put forward in this report. The chapter points to five key pillars on which a durable peace can be built: (i) promoting good governance and political participation, (ii) safeguarding human security, (iii) ensuring well-being and development, (iv) protecting the environment, and (v) preserving livelihoods. In each section, the potential contributions of government, oil companies, development part-
BOX 4.1: STEPS TO PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE NIGER DELTA

Keep doing…

• Consult with all stakeholders on a broad regional development framework.
• Expand the capacity and confidence of communities to create their own futures by engaging them in the planning, implementation and oversight of local projects.
• Improve access to basic health, education, and safe water supplies.
• Promote business solutions, large and small, for development.
• Create training and employment opportunities for youth.
• Tackle corruption through improved government systems and strengthened watchdog institutions.
• Promote peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms through both traditional and non-traditional systems.

Keep doing, but do differently…

• Accelerate employment through programs for on-the-job training and marketable skills.
• Whenever possible, assure local ownership, manpower, and management of infrastructure and other development projects.
• Share benefits of the oil and gas business with communities through best-practice corporate strategies.
• Repair communities torn by conflict by rebuilding their social capital and peace-making institutions.
• Maintain dialogue: communicate always, in all ways, and with all stakeholders.
• Always link citizen monitoring and public reporting to public sector governance, environmental protection, and development.

Stop doing…

• Promising without delivering on proposals, plans, and projects.
• Selecting projects ad-hoc and top-down.
• Contracting—not planning—development programs and projects.
• “Buying peace” in the short-term rather than building a strategy for conflict prevention, management and mitigation.
• Postponing oil spill prevention and response, remediation and the flaring of non-essential gas.
• Relying chiefly on armed forces to ensure regional security rather than engaging civil society and communities in a multi-stakeholder security strategy.
ners and communities are discussed. Given the region’s recent experience of insurgency and the fragility of its present peace, special attention must be given to conflict-sensitive strategies. The 2009 Donor Strategy Paper for regional development recommended that “Development partners need to be aware of how their initiatives impact upon conflict as well as how they are impacted by the conflict. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development should be a fundamental principle guiding implementation” (UNDP 2009, p. 11). As a starting point, Box 4.1 summarizes some lessons for development which conflict-sensitive approaches can build upon in the Niger Delta.

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

The Amnesty Program has indeed opened an unprecedented window of opportunity. Keeping the window open will require an urgent and coordinated program of conflict-sensitive development supported by the government, donor partners, civil society, communities and the private sector. In the medium-term, the true gains of the current peace will be measured by how fully security and welfare for all citizens has been achieved, together with how successfully ex-combatants have been reintegrated into its social and economic life. To realize this aim, a new regional setting must be created, one that promises stability, opportunity, and fairness.

Components of a possible framework for the future are described in the following sections. They stress transformation—at state, local, and community levels. Their immediate focus is tackling the “driving factors” of instability and conflict discussed in Chapter Two. These are the perceptions, inadequacies, and tensions that emerge from the underlying “structural factors” that make the region prone to instability because of the particular way in which society, government, and the political economy works in the delta. Driving factors lie at the root of the grievances that suffuse the daily lives of many men, women, and youth. Because they propel political unrest and insecurity, they also help create conditions for the “provocating factors” that spark agitation and violence.

Many observers are concerned that the peace brought by the Amnesty Program will be short lived because it has not resolved the region’s more fundamental problems. And indeed, addressing the drivers of unrest is vital to checking the resurgence of “provocating factors” such as vigilantism or widespread expansion of illicit livelihoods—oil theft, kidnapping, piracy, arms dealing, and petty crime. Any rise in crime and insecurity could postpone the long-awaited dialogue on the region’s future. It could
halt development plans for the region, threaten oil and gas production, and scale back business investments and job opportunities. Should such a scenario unfold, the present peace would be overtaken by escalating violence throwing the region through another destructive cycle of instability.

The Niger Delta’s fragile peace indeed calls for intervention, but any action must avoid reigniting conflict. The best-practice strategies discussed in Chapter Three will help. They include putting communities in the driver’s seat, coordinating with partners in other sectors, improving environmental management, and strengthening development institutions.

A selective start could also be made on deeper structural factors, such as revisiting the country’s political and legal framework, adjusting the political economy of oil, or curbing the dynamics of patrimonial interest groups. However, these very important issues in the regional debate typically have a longer term horizon because their solutions are national in scope. In the mid-term the region’s most pressing problems are the factors that drive instability and conflict: poor governance and corruption, inadequate security, relative deprivation, environmental damage, and unemployment. The sections below suggest priority actions that could help mitigate each of these driving factors.

I. PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA

a) Establish a regional development institution with a clear technical mandate and composition.

The two federal institutions that currently serve the oil-producing region have overlapping mandates, portfolios, and practices. The Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry (MNDA) compete for projects and erratic federal financing. Both are burdened with the political and contracting expectations of their constituents, and they rarely focus their effort on envisioning or planning the future of the region. Their performance has not commanded broad endorsement from Niger Delta citizens, civil society, or international development partners.

A reformed federal institution for Niger Delta development would place priority on technical capacity, professional management, strong planning, and results. Assignment of board members and staff should be based chiefly on technical selection. An extra-budgetary fund could also be created to provide reliable and continuous financing by drawing from both governmental and non-governmental sources. Donors and other partners should be encouraged to offer technical assistance to strengthen planning capacity, internal governance and accountability. Greater civic and local community involvement in the processes of planning, project selection, budgeting, monitoring and reporting should be institutionalized.
b) Support reform efforts in state government administrations.

Today, state governments in the Niger Delta have enormous resources at their disposal, but these funds have often been poorly managed. Development outcomes in most states have been disappointing. Many states lack capacity in planning, budgeting and financial management. Strengthening these skills and processes will encourage more effective expenditure. Good governance reforms should begin with the publication and distribution of detailed state and local budgets in order to facilitate citizen political participation and oversight. Applying the principles of the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) at state and local government levels would further contribute to promoting transparency in the receipt and distribution of revenues throughout the value chain.5

Partly in response to the patchy development performance of state ministries and local government councils, a number of special state development commissions for oil-producing areas have evolved utilizing a proportion of state derivation revenue. Their purpose is to bring oil-related benefits more directly to the areas affected by the negative impacts of exploration and production. Such state-level commissions are on the whole popular with oil producing communities, and similar institutions could also benefit oil-producing states that do not yet have them.

c) Clarify the respective mandates and responsibilities for development of the Niger Delta by government institutions at all levels.

Special state-level commissions should not be seen as a substitute for effective and transparent performance by established federal and state ministries and agencies. Many institutions are tasked with development in the delta region, including the federal NDDC and MNDA and the normal complement of federal, state and local government institutions. All have shown technical and management weaknesses and frequent flaws in governance which have scarcely been resolved by occasional reorganizations. For this reason, careful coordination and clear demarcation of mandates and responsibilities between all of these institutions are essential. With more systematic community involvement in project selection and implementation, they could raise their local reputations, improve their effectiveness, and become less prone to exacerbate any existing conflicts through their activities. A review of existing arrangements and effectiveness of development institutions in the various delta states would be a good starting point for learning the lessons of experience and suggesting actionable institutional reforms.

d) Build workable governance structures for community-driven development.

In Nigeria’s federal government system, state and local governments have primary responsibility for development at the community level. Too often, such public services
are seriously inadequate. Increasingly, international and corporate donors are choosing to channel their assistance through community-centered models which ensure that financial and technical support flows directly into the neighborhoods, villages, and hamlets of the oil producing region. The aim is to build community-based institutions able to design and implement their own projects while at the same time building social capital to create a climate for local peace.

Communities hosting oil installations have historically had a special claim to this support in recognition of the risks to their welfare and environment. Yet, most communities in the region suffer from underdevelopment in much the same way, and the current trend is toward a more inclusive approach based on criteria of social affinity.

Decentralized strategies that build on community strengths and broad stakeholder involvement typically require painstaking and transparent management. Local NGOs and other civil society organizations are often enlisted to provide technical support and oversight. Because the Niger Delta is highly fragmented, both socially and geographically, community-focused projects must be flexible and tailored to fit the groups they serve. Achieving the right project design has been an experimental process, and project types are highly variable. Examples can be found in the Community-Driven-Development (CDD) projects of the World Bank, the excellent EU-funded Micro-projects Program (MPP), the Bank’s Community Foundation Projects in Rivers State, and community trusts from oil companies, managed by multi-community boards under the so-called Global Memoranda of Understanding (GMOU, see Chapter 3). Clustering communities by proximity or ethnicity under the new GMOU approach has reduced earlier tensions between “host” and “non-host” communities. Nevertheless, many communities still suffer residual effects of historical inter- and intra-communal conflicts and have been left with limited social capital to effectively manage their own affairs. The most successful community-focused projects should be showcased so that results can be shared with all actors in the Niger Delta development community.

A broadly institutionalized approach to creating community trusts has also been proposed in some versions of the Petroleum Industry Bill currently under debate by drawing upon ten percent of each state’s national oil and gas income. Actual mechanisms for distribution and management of these funds are not yet designed. If implemented, such a scheme would increase local stakes in oil production. (Transnational Crisis Project 2010; Sayne 2011). If implemented caution must be exercised to ensure that the new burdens for communities in managing these local trusts do not spark further tensions. Technical guidance must be offered for building local institutions and supporting processes of negotiation, management, and in some cases reconciliation.

e) Continue to improve oil company policies and practices.
Oil companies can improve their prospects of long-term operation in the Niger
Delta only by aligning short-term production goals with measures that ensure future social stability and protection of the environment. Increasingly, major joint-venture operators such as Shell, Chevron, Exxon, Total and Eni have begun to adapt their practices to meet international guidelines for industry and corporate performance. Smaller local operators and the majority joint venture shareholder, NNPC, have been slower to comply. Together, industry and its government regulators must strive for continuous improvement in their social and environmental policies and practices. Application of this principle has become even more urgent as some major operators begin to divest their older fields to new or local industry players. Technical support and monitoring by third parties such as the UN can help speed progress toward continuous compliance.

A comprehensive approach to corporate responsibility goes beyond community investment programs or statutory standards for health, safety and environment (HSE). While these “good citizenship” initiatives have expanded considerably in recent years, local communities believe that many practices in the everyday core business still need reshaping to eliminate, or at least mitigate, unwanted social and environmental impacts. As a first step, companies can communicate clearly with stakeholders on aspects of business that affect their lives and livelihoods. Engaging communities through regular and frequent communication would reduce the tension and distrust that often spoils business operations. For example, local citizens seek more timely information about opportunities for local employment and open bidding for contracts. They also seek opportune advisories about environmental impacts and full disclosure of compensation paid for land use or pollution. Companies could also release to the public a more detailed breakdown of expenditures, including costs for social investment, HSE, security, and payments to state and federal governments.

**f) Expand citizen monitoring and reporting on governance and the political process.**

Local communities are an excellent source of knowledge on many aspects of governance, including service provision, expenditures, environmental quality, electoral practice, and human rights. Until recently, the community “voice” was represented chiefly through the press or reports by national or international NGOs. Social accountability through structured reporting by citizens is now being piloted in selected Niger Delta states by a number of agencies, and this is likely to prove a valuable option where other mechanisms of accountability are insufficient. The NGO Niger Delta Professionals for Development (NIDPRODEV) for example issues a quarterly citizen report card in five Delta State communities on public services, good governance, and infrastructure development. The Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) is piloting a social networking website, Niger Delta Watch, to solicit community alerts and comments on local
development projects and peace building efforts, as well as incidents such as oil spills, community clashes, or human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{9} Also, the Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform (NDCBP) has been conducting budget oversight in Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta and Akwa Ibom States during the last few years, including the publication of state budgets and the preparation of budget analyses.\textsuperscript{10}

Violent conflict in the Niger Delta is closely correlated with the election cycle, and making the voting process more transparent can do much to reestablish confidence in the political process.\textsuperscript{11} The credibility of the 2011 federal, state and local elections was partly ascribed to the use of transparent and computer-based systems for voter registration and reporting of election results. However, their success was boosted dramatically by hundreds of civic and community groups and individuals who monitored the process and results, many using social networking tools, and worked in cooperation with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), foreign partners and Nigerian Government agencies (Asuni and Farris 2011). Citizen feedback educates people about their civic rights and obligations; it ensures that voters’ registers are accurately compiled; and it promotes vigilance of authorities against election rigging and voter intimidation. Above all, it encourages individual freedom of choice in elections beyond local patrimonial authority.

II. SAFEGUARDING HUMAN SECURITY

In the complex terrain of the Niger Delta, the wellbeing of people, protection of the environment, and integrity of oil and gas infrastructure are intertwined. The practice of oil theft or “bunkering,” for example, not only threatens the integrity of oil installations, but may lead to fires and pollution that damage the environment and harm human health. In this sense, human security is a fundamental condition for development in the delta. The measures recommended below would help to improve the twin aims of both security and development.

a) Maintain a vigilant, disciplined, and culturally sensitive government security force.

Security in the Niger Delta region has at times seemed a three-way contest between government forces, informal militias, and communities. Since the Ogoni protests and the early Warri Wars in the 1990s, Joint Task Force teams have been deployed almost continuously for special operations in areas of the Niger Delta. Today, these teams have been consolidated under the Joint Task Force (JTF) “Operation Hope” and its constituent services—the army, navy, air force, police, and the State Security Service (SSS).

More routinely, public security is assured by the more permanent Nigerian police force. This centralized federal institution has little accountability to local citizens and is
at times subject to political interference at federal and state levels. Police have historically been under-resourced, sparsely staffed, poorly equipped, badly paid and inadequately trained (OSI 2010, HRW 2010, IRI 2011). Predatory, criminal, and violent tendencies among some security forces working in the Niger Delta region have been a longstanding source of tension and distrust.

Protection of the population is further complicated by the presence of informal security details who fill gaps in community policing or serve special political interests. Militias formed by local politicians overlap with militant groups and criminal cartels. Often they are financed through state governors or local council chairmen who receive generous “security votes” covering miscellaneous expenditures for which no accounting is required. Typically, these groups are funded and equipped by politicians and their supporters with the intention of intimidating rivals and voters while ensuring their personal protection. The government, despite its stated intentions, may be unable to put adequate protections and disincentives in place to prevent political contestants from building election militias composed of gang members and sometimes security forces. In past post-election periods, such armed groups have retained their weapons but lost their temporary incomes and have therefore turned to crime. Skirmishes often develop around community disputes or criminal activities. In the absence of effective peacemaking structures or tactics, security forces may respond with undue force, prompting a violent civilian reaction.

Not surprisingly, most men and women of the Niger Delta are ambivalent about government security forces, and their experience may lead them to view these personnel as occupiers or agents of big men and industry more than guarantors of human security. Recently, some security personnel have been exposed to a new “hearts and minds” orientation that expands interpersonal and community liaison skills. While the need for reform is being recognized, action for improvement must be stepped up. Priorities could include stronger administration and regular payment of salaries to all security forces; systematic penalties for unprofessional, violent, or corrupt conduct; ending the practice of privately financed police details for protecting elites and their families; training on the use of intelligence and other non-violent, unarmed methods; and guidance in building relationships with ordinary citizens and creating working partnerships with community security groups. Overall, the most effective approach for curtailing personal and economic crime would consist of joint efforts between members of security services, community leaders and civic conflict management groups.

b) Develop an integrated system for security that pools the strengths of community-based and government institutions.

Community members are often the indirect victims of militants, oil bunkerers, kidnappers, or other criminals operating in their villages. As recently as December 2010, villages have been severely damaged in battles between militant groups and the military.12
Many communities, especially in remote parts of the Niger Delta, rely on vigilantes, traditional war canoe and hunter societies, or “youth watch” groups to maintain peace and ensure ongoing protection. Some of these local institutions are very well organized and effective. They have provided models for state-level security forces such as the Delta State Waterways Security Committee.

National Security Advisor Gen. (ret.) Iwoye Azazi recently commissioned a military services reform plan that includes cooperation with communities (Oloja and Onuorah 2011). He is also working in cooperation with the British development agency DFID on a program for “community policing.” Meanwhile, a national debate has opened about decentralizing the current police structure and reviving the 1960s practice of operating independent police forces in each state. This system, it is argued, would improve citizen relations with police through a shared culture. A more integrated and community-friendly approach would also reduce the dependency of oil companies on ad-hoc security arrangements for their installations and personnel.

c) Relaunch a coordinated international effort to secure maritime waterways and curb illicit trade in “blood oil” and other contraband.

Lucrative traffic in oil, arms and drugs is linked to maritime smuggling and piracy in Nigerian waters, which are ranked by the International Maritime Organization as the world’s second most active region for maritime crime.Kidnapping sailors and commandeering cargoes also creates hardship for law-abiding Nigerian nationals as well as foreigners. Over 290 attacks on fishing trawlers between July 2006 and 2010 stole catch and other valuables at an estimated cost of over $200 million and in some cases killed crew members (Punch, 6 July 2010).

In 2008, former President Yar’Adua formally requested international support in curbing trade in “blood oil.” International agencies have joined a discussion about possible solutions, which include tracking of vessels and shipments through intelligence, aerial surveillance, electronic monitoring, and “fingerprinting” oil molecules for signatures of their source fields. While stepped-up patrols by the Nigerian Navy in the nation’s territorial waters will help guard against illegal trade and piracy, broader international efforts would be more effective. One model for such an effort is the now inactive Gulf of Guinea Energy and Security Strategy (GGESS) created in June 2005 drawing together Nigeria, the U.S, Britain, Canada, Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, and the Gulf of Guinea States. Reviving a similar institution, perhaps as an extension of existing collaborative frameworks such as the U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission, would help reduce many causes of crime and violence in the Niger Delta.
III. ENSURING WELLBEING AND DEVELOPMENT

a) Mobilize a structure for multi-sectoral development cooperation and coordination.

Since the Presidential Amnesty of 2009, the government has begun to work on strategic planning for development in the Niger Delta with major donor partners, companies comprising the Oil Producing Trade Sector (OPTS), and in meetings held by regional organizations with local stakeholders. All of these separate efforts have yielded useful inputs for creating an overarching framework for the future that can meet the objectives of the president’s 2011–2015 Transformation Plan. Thus far, the broad lines of the framework, described in the 2009 Donor Strategy Paper, have provided a structure for common planning and information sharing through a Technical Working Group on the Niger Delta. The next step envisaged is to elaborate the framework in three key areas: (i) public sector investment in large infrastructure and town development; (ii) post-conflict community rehabilitation of infrastructure, capacity building, and reintegration and employment; and (iii) creation of an institution capable of delivering the plan, including managing a multi-stakeholder trust fund to finance regional projects. When fully designed, this collaborative development framework is expected to serve as the principal platform for mobilizing and harmonizing the efforts of all public and private partners toward conflict-sensitive development in the oil-producing region.

Success of the framework in the medium-term will rest on the strength of its guiding institution, the management and commitment of its collaborating partners, and the political will of its key national champion. An urgent and dynamic approach is needed. Advocates for the region must not only press for leadership commitment, but they must also sustain their own technical and financial assistance while also supporting regular monitoring and reporting. As the larger plan is being readied, some quick-win initiatives are suggested below.

b) Launch an accelerated program of massive infrastructure development that maximizes benefits to host communities.

Rolling out the long-expected “mega-projects” couched in the Presidential Post-Amnesty Program will serve as a visible demonstration of commitment to the region. Their execution will also create jobs, build an enabling environment for business, and greatly improve basic services and quality of life for residents. They promise to open up isolated creek communities through a network of local and interstate roads and bridges, expand the number of gas and power plants, and improve water supply and other critical services.

Most of these projects are drawn from a vast list of infrastructure proposals for the region that were already planned, are ongoing, or suspended in the past for reasons of security.
Thus far, the most visible effort has been the continuing construction of the dual East-West Highway linking Warri and Port Harcourt; sadly, its completion has now been postponed to 2013. Further delays in performance of these projects, as well as dozens of other infrastructure schemes proposed in state or federal plans, could worsen local tension and frustration in the absence of explanation or consultation with beneficiary communities.

c) Scale up private sector-led growth.
Backing for local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in agriculture and other sectors must be stepped up. SMEs have received some limited support over the past decade under a variety of entrepreneurship programs run through the NDDC micro-lending program, a fledgling “Technical Aid Corps,” the state governments, or corporate social investments. Financing for small start-ups has been an obstruction. The Central Bank has acknowledged that micro-credit schemes through national banks have been disappointing, but success has improved with the addition of NGO intermediaries. Legal requirements to increase local content in the corporate supply chain now offer an incentive to both the public and private sectors. It is now time to professionally evaluate past support to SMEs, improve program design, pilot new strategies, and then rapidly scale up in order to quickly expand local business.

Meanwhile, over half the state governments in the Niger Delta have sought with modest success to complement their public economic development plans by soliciting or marketing proposals for private investment from other countries. Most common areas are power supply, water systems, waste disposal, manufacturing, telecommunications, and hospitals. These efforts should be continued and extended to include the revival of national agribusinesses in palm oil, rubber, cassava, and rice under the government’s privatization program.

d) Reinvigorate basic services at the local level.
Most broad infrastructure projects and many services driven by the public and private sectors will fail to reach the most deprived communities of the Niger Delta simply because of their isolation. Such communities must be helped to drive and manage their own local development solutions. Sustainable, inexpensive and low maintenance technologies for safe water supply, sanitation, and power generation should be actively piloted and encouraged until pipe-borne water and or the electrical grid can be reliably extended in the longer term. Some very successful local experiments have been made in solar applications for water pumps and low-power computers. They should be replicated, and similar innovations quickly expanded.

In most communities all-important basic services are so poorly delivered by local governments that the gaps are being buttressed in many localities on a piecemeal basis by state oil development agencies, oil company contributions, churches, donor partners,
hometown associations, local philanthropists, and community members themselves. A regional “Essential Services Corps” similar to the National Youth Service Corps or the SME “Technical Aid Corps” could be established to fill the severe deficit in basic health and education services at the local level. This program could also create jobs for young secondary and post-secondary graduates. Meaningful incentives and capacity building for public sector health workers and teachers in very isolated communities would also greatly help.


In 2004–2005, UNDP undertook a groundbreaking study on the Niger Delta, its first-ever regional human development report. However, by 2006, attacks by MEND had initiated widespread insecurity, reduction in donor presence, and business relapse. Together, these effects set in motion a decline in essential services, especially for the most vulnerable. In the years that followed, many communities were torn by chronic internal conflicts, criminal leadership, or armed battles among militants and security forces. This important regional study should now be revisited. Solid, up-to-date data and analysis will be extremely helpful for grounding a rational program of recovery, restoration and development.

IV. PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

a) Strengthen procedures for environmental regulation, monitoring and response.

The causes of environmental damage in the Niger Delta weave a web of ominous failures. They start in the boardrooms with imprudent business priorities that favor production over environmental protection. They trickle down into the communities, where regulatory disregard combines with illegal oil tapping and misguided actions by poor villagers to worsen their already precarious surroundings. Ageing pipelines, unchecked oil spills, continued gas flaring, and shoddy clean-up by untrained local contractors pose a constant threat to health, welfare, and safety.

Solutions require the collective will and effort of industry, government, and citizens. The government must provide stronger guidelines and professional oversight over environmental performance. The national oil company (NNPC), as majority shareholder of the large joint ventures, must agree to a financial and operational plan that values and incentivizes investment in pipeline replacement, remediation, and associated gas gathering for flare reduction as much as it does profits from production. The major international companies, who are the joint venture operators, have set corporate environmental
guidelines, many exceeding international standards. They have also launched innovative projects with partners in studies and bioremediation (UNDP 2009). But they must also set high environmental expectations from their staff and build measures of responsible performance into their remuneration and career advancement.

Corporate managers responsible for health, safety and environment should also cooperate with the government in setting stronger national guidelines for environmental impact assessments and environmental management plans. Meanwhile, civil society can work with communities on environmental education to discourage oil tampering or other activities that pose risks to safety and health. Above all, local leadership should facilitate rapid investigations of spills by joint inspection teams organized by the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) to ensure speedy remediation. A recent environmental study on the Ogoni area commissioned by the government from UNEP noted that measures to enforce prevention, mitigation, and remediation in the Niger Delta have not met international standards, corporate guidelines, or national laws (UNEP 2011).

b) Undertake a comprehensive survey of industrial impacts on the human and physical environment; follow with a full remediation plan.

A debate has been underway for the past two decades about industry practices and environmental impacts of oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta. The thorough environmental assessment undertaken in 2009 and 2010 of oil-impacted sites in the Ogoni area led to a truer appreciation of oil pollution and its effects. Regrettably, apart from this report on the small Ogoni region, the debate about harmful environmental impacts in the Niger Delta has unfolded without the support of reliable and comprehensive scientific data.13 The UNEP findings, however, serve to underscore the urgent need for a fresh environmental review of the entire region. Such a study would deepen understanding of the relationships between poverty, conflict, and degradation of the ecosystem. It would also serve as basis for tackling the environmental and economic problems of the region. Specifically, a region-wide study should lead to a medium-term action plan for remediation of all areas adversely affected by the extraction of oil and gas and a program of recovery for human health and natural resources.

V. PRESERVING LIVELIHOODS

Historically, economic life in the Niger Delta has centered on fishing, farming, trading, and artisanal pursuits. The oil economy has created few local jobs, and most of them are in the industry supply chain and ancillary services. Other forms of economic invest-
ment are still very limited. Meanwhile, industry activity has damaged or altered lands and waterways, along with personal and cultural property. These environmental impacts combined with the pressures of urbanization and population growth have diminished available resources and the value of traditional livelihoods. All of these influences converge to make unemployment, especially among youth, the region’s greatest social and economic challenge and the most imminent threat to durable peace.

a) Maintain the momentum of the Amnesty Program by assuring the “reintegration” of ex-combatants.

Momentum of the Presidential Amnesty must be maintained by achieving the timely “reintegration” of ex-combatants. This last stage in the roadmap for disarmament, demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR) is the most crucial step to an enduring and collective peace. Under the scheme, all 26,358 registered ex-combatants must participate in a planned two-week reorientation course and then pass to the more individualized process of reintegration. This transition to a legitimate, productive life can entail skills training, internship, or apprenticeship, jobs, self-employment, and business credit according to personal interests and abilities. The international donor community and industry have offered technical support, skills training, and some job placements, but accommodating thousands of very lively youth with meaningful and sustainable livelihoods presents a huge challenge. Taking these efforts to scale will require a solid plan, rapid mobilization of potential partners and employers, and good coordination and supervision.

New employment opportunities are initially unlikely to be as lucrative as the gains from criminality. Some youth will seek to continue their illicit livelihoods. According to a recent youth opinion survey, only 4 percent of respondents in the South-South chose “agriculture” and 2 percent “fisheries” as desirable occupations, while 20 percent chose “business and trading” (NOI Polls 2009, p. 42). Combining these two occupations through an integrated agribusiness system with improved technologies offers one opportunity. Meanwhile, the government must maintain strong disincentives to crime through sensitive security and anti-corruption measures, while working with the private sector to offer increasingly attractive alternatives. The business sector must also avoid reinforcing criminality by paying for “protection” in the guise of security services.

b) As an urgent priority, create wide-ranging and sustainable employment opportunities for all Niger Delta youth.

In addition to ex-combatants, hundreds of thousands of young men and women in the delta, many university graduates, are seeking pathways to secure and productive lives. An innovative and multi-faceted effort is needed to link this pool of skills to business investment and labor needs. Potential strategies include:
Identifying through market analysis in each LGA those areas most ripe for economic expansion and growth.\textsuperscript{15}  

To meet new labor demand, expanding existing training programs at basic, vocational, and post-secondary levels, including those supported by UNDP vocational centers, the oil industry, or state and regional development agencies.

Taking entrepreneurship programs to scale and packaging them with a range of supports, including credit, mentoring, apprenticeships, internships, internet access, business incubators, and contract guarantees.

Encouraging small regional business owners to become “partners” in accepting job trainees, apprentices, or members of the planned NDDC Technical Aid Corps; offering these businesses in return commercial upgrades, expert technical assistance, contracts, and credit.

Designing the contracts for development projects to ensure that contractors set clear targets for local employment and on-the-job training.

Offering external private investors in Niger Delta States targeted incentives to create local jobs.

Expanding and modernizing traditional livelihoods such as agriculture and fisheries by introducing new techniques and inputs, modern production methods (e.g. integrated poultry and fish farming), and integrated agribusiness.

Ensuring private sector compliance with provisions of the new Local Content Law, and keeping the focus on “very” local.

Creating a special youth employment scheme for remediation of polluted areas, and restoring land and waterways to agricultural or other productive use.

c) Consider creating a broad “Youth Works” scheme for the Niger Delta.

In the current Nigerian economy, job creation on a large scale cannot be left to market forces alone. Even with the provisions of the Local Content Law, the pace of job supply in the near term is unlikely to meet the employment needs of the thousands of ex-combatants or other unemployed and underemployed Niger Delta youth. Their underutilized intelligence and energy could be harnessed though a broad development, training and “works” scheme. This large-scale development strategy could also incorporate existing training and entrepreneurial schemes which are appropriate. For example, a “transition to work” program of further education or subsidized apprenticeships and internships has already been envisaged under the Amnesty Program. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs
has announced that it will support university studies and the NDDC has planned vocational training for 13,000 youth. The ongoing youth and infrastructure programs in Delta State, the Bayelsa Youth Employment Scheme (YES), and the Rivers Youth Training and Business Development Program offer further local models. The military and other institutions have established short-term youth camps focusing on values, confidence-building, and reorientation. Government intervention, together with donor and private partners, could also draw inspiration from international models such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and related national development programs of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” that put hundreds of thousands of Americans to work on development and cultural projects during the 1930s. Nigeria’s 2011 elections, which activated and trained thousands of young ad hoc workers, have shown that youth can be effectively mobilized and will work with passion and commitment for a nation-building effort.

FOR A FUTURE OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY: KEYS TO CONFLICT-SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT

Few regions in the world have had a history as unlucky as the Niger Delta. Unable to prosper from its vast resources, the delta has seen its strengths transmuted into liabilities. The region’s rich cultural and ecological diversity has made it vulnerable to a political economy of exploitation. Its efforts to redress injustice have often played into the selfish interests of dishonest and illegitimate leaders. Slowly, the forces that stand to gain from regional peace and prosperity have begun to respond, testing measures evolved through trial and error to relieve the extreme deprivation into which much of the region has fallen. National leaders, oil companies, and the international community have all in their own ways come to realize that, for peace to hold, swift and sustainable development of the region is the only alternative.

No one would deny that the challenges are daunting. Difficult terrain increases complexity and cost; a history of broken promises has spawned widespread distrust; the very low bar of current services and infrastructure means there will be no quick wins. Yet, progress is wholly possible with a flexible and sustained effort based on the principles of a conflict-sensitive approach (Box 4.2).

One benefit of conflict-sensitive strategies for development is that they effectively manage risks that often provoke or sustain conflict. For the past decade, regional insecurity has been a deterrent to many prospective development actors. That restraint is loosening slowly, as the Post-Amnesty Program period completes its second year. Introducing an approach mindful of potential hazards and vulnerabilities will serve as a positive force to stabilize social, economic and political life in the Niger Delta.
BOX 4.2: TEN KEYS TO CONFLICT SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NIGER DELTA

1. Be mindful of the region’s vulnerability to a long history of conflict, underdevelopment, political marginalization, and environmental harm.

2. Focus on local priorities: accelerated development, safety from crime, political rights, environmental protection, and opportunities for employment.

3. Maintain an ongoing dialogue with all types of local groups and listen to their separate expectations, opinions and concerns.

4. Put people in charge of their own futures through initiatives that are locally driven, managed, and monitored.

5. For every future intervention, assess the potential to exacerbate or mitigate local conflict dynamics; avoid creating “winners” and “losers.”

6. Link conflict mitigation to development strategies; aim to make peace a development outcome rather than a pre-condition for engagement or assistance.

7. Pool the risks of a development investment by seeking reliable and committed partners in government, civil society, communities and the private sector.

8. Encourage responsible corporate practice toward people and the environment in line with international performance standards.

9. Promote security and peace by upgrading the public relations skills of local police and armed service personnel; link them to community peacebuilding institutions.

10. Strive to be flexible, but also remain focused and persistent.
A new style of development cooperation and innovation is now emerging in the delta through an unusual mix of public and private contributors. The government, donors, oil companies, non-governmental organizations, and communities are all sharing the effort. Creatively, they are building on their respective cultures and capacities to test and improve models of planning, training, and service delivery. To win adherents to these strategies for reform, new financial support is coming from sources beyond the government’s own revenues. Habits of public mismanagement and neglect will take time to overcome. For this reason, corporate social investment, international donor assistance, and other forms of external financing can help to speed the process of change. By supporting and applying the methods of conflict-sensitive planning, all friends of the region can contribute to peace … a durable peace that is less a pre-condition for intervention but one that becomes an outcome and the crowning achievement of their collective efforts for regional development.

NOTES

1 Altogether, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs will devote $2.23 billion to infrastructure projects. Ten ongoing “mega-projects” designated under the Presidential Amnesty will also be completed. Completion of the long-awaited dual East-West Highway from Port Harcourt to Warri is expected, and a start will be made on a Niger Delta coastal road to “open up” the riverine areas and enhance economic activity and local security. A railroad line from Benin to Calabar is planned to link six Niger Delta States. The massive $12.3 billion proposed for the Coastal Road assumes financing will be forthcoming from international development partners and the oil industry.

2 Initiatives proposed to mitigate the impacts of the oil industry will include the following: (i) persons displaced by oil production activities will be identified and given jobs; (ii) oil revenue sharing will follow procedures that “ensure social justice and equity”; (iii) the private sector will triple its current contribution to the region’s economic growth and development to 75%, an increase presumably achieved by expanding local content in employment and procurement.

3 To date, none has achieved its objectives. A “Partners for Sustainable Development” group convened by NDDC met in mid-2007 to begin harmonizing inputs for the 2007 Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NDRDMP). The United Niger Delta Energy Development Security and Strategy (UNEDESS), a non-governmental organization, held a workshop in 2008 as a “unifying platform for all peoples in the region” to discuss regional justice, development and progress. Concurrently, the Presidential Peace Initiative held meetings with select militant groups, including the Ijaw Youth Leadership Forum under the militant commander Tom Polo in order to develop a “Roadmap to Peace.”

4 In March 2010, a Post-Amnesty Conference planned by Vanguard newspaper in Warri sought to reopen dialogue on the impacts of the Amnesty Program in the context of a broad framework for the future. The meeting was disrupted in its early hours by a car bomb attack claimed by an ex-militant. Nevertheless, the aims of the dialogue remain valid. The people and leadership from all
sectors of the Niger Delta, together with donors, business community, and civil society, continue to express interest in a fresh opportunity to collectively review the Master Plan, the Technical Committee Report, and the Post-Amnesty Program in order to define a coherent way forward for sustainable peace and development in the region.

For example, the Bayelsa Income Expenditure Transparency Initiative (BEITI) aims to bring transparency through the constant monitoring of public expenditure, setting up open electronic “e-procurement” systems, and by auditing government federal receipts, internal revenues, and actual transfers to LGAs. See http://www.beiti.bayelsa.gov.ng/about.html.

International industry guidelines such as the ISO 14001, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation, and the Equator Principles should be thoroughly reviewed and adapted as needed to local conditions. The active participation of industry in the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) has contributed to promoting transparency in the management of oil and gas revenues at the federal level.

The recently released UNEP study on oil damage in Ogoniland contains actionable recommendations for curbing pollution, accelerating remediation, and improving environmental practice and oversight (UNEP 2011).

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SDN observed the local government elections in Bayelsa State and reported that the state election commission “went ahead to declare winners in areas where election never took place” (SDN 2010).

In early December 2010 a JTF campaign against the camps of the militant commander John Togo caused severe damage and displacement of residents in the nearby town of Ayakuroma. MEND charged “summary executions of countless indigenes” and “genocidal action” by the JTF. It was confirmed that at least eleven local people died, and some were injured by the JTF bombardment. President Jonathan promised to rebuild all the structures damaged during the encounter and sent relief materials to alleviate the suffering of the people in the area. Some signs of rebuilding were seen as of mid-2011.

An ambitious Niger Delta Environmental Survey was initiated in 1995 by the oil industry. Under the direction of an independent secretariat, it collected massive data on topics ranging from biodiversity to human health, but only interim findings were published. The African Development Bank planned an environmental study in tandem with the 2007 Niger Delta Regional Master Plan, but results have not been forthcoming.

Possible growth areas are likely to include services, manufacturing, agribusiness and food processing, fisheries, environmental remediation and waste disposal, transportation, communication technologies, power generation and distribution, construction, trades, engineering, professions, or small business.
A worker at the Calabar Oil Palm Estate (COPE) carrying four big bunches of oil palm fruit to a central collection point, Calabar, Nigeria. Photograph by Eliot Elisofon, 1959.

Courtesy: Eliot Elisofon Photographic Archives, National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution (EEPA EECL 10527)
ANNEX I

Examples of Resistance and Armed Groups in the Niger Delta

OVERVIEW

At the height of the Niger Delta insurgency (2006–2009), it was estimated that 20,000–25,000 youth in the Niger Delta worked full or part-time with armed groups. Typical salary range was N10,000—N40,000 ($85–$340) per month, lower than the 2009–2015 Amnesty stipend for ex-combatants at N65,000 ($410). This table includes a selection of known organizations that exemplify the broad categories of groups that engaged in the Niger Delta conflict. These categories are not rigorous, and their features overlap. Group names, heads, membership, stated objectives, and alliances are highly fluid. Base locations and range of operations for armed groups have tended to grow or shrink, depending on their activities, affiliations, and influence. Many of these groups are still cohesive in the post-Amnesty period and now organize Amnesty stipend payments to their members and engage in economic activities such as government or industry contracting or illicit bunkering. A number of militant leaders have become influential in politics.

Advocacy Groups

**Description:** Peaceful regional and ethnic interest groups formed in the Niger Delta during the colonial period, but the majority rose in the 1990s inspired by the example of MOSOP and the Ogoni Bill of Rights. Nearly all major ethnicities in the Niger Delta have created advocacy groups to formally promote their collective interests. Typically, they agitate for substantive ethnic and communal demands using non-violent methods. Their channels of action include mass media, rallies, petitions, seminars, conferences, position papers, and lobbying. They have played important mediating roles in negotiating community interests, such as development goods, compensation payments, and jobs, with government and corporate entities. Some have militant arms that resort to hostage taking or other more aggressive tactics in order to achieve their aims and may therefore share features with ethnic militias that sponsor violence.
### Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP, 1990)

Co-founded by the late Kenule Saro-Wiwa and G. B. Leton, MOSOP is headquartered at both Port Harcourt and Bane, the Saro-Wiwa Ogoni family compound. Active members are drawn from Ogoni youth. Typically, all adults among the 500,000 Ogoni pay levies to the organization.

Ken Saro-Wiwa authored the Ogoni Bill of Rights, calling for greater Ogoni autonomy, share of oil revenue, compensation for environmental damage, and eventual withdrawal of Shell from Ogoniland’s 96 oil wells and five oilfields.

Website: http://www.mosop.net

Saro-Wiwa and eight followers were imprisoned in 1994 for allegedly conspiring to murder four Ogoni chiefs acting as negotiators with the government. The Ogoni Nine were hanged in November 1995 in what MOSOP termed an “extra-judicial murder.” The execution led to a three-year period of international sanctions against Nigeria by many Western nations, including suspension from the Commonwealth, until the death of military dictator, Sani Abacha, in 1998.

### Ijaw Youth Council (IYC, 1998)

Founded by Oronto Douglas, Asumo Osuoka, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari, and others, the IYC was formerly headed by Chris Kiero and currently by Abiye Kroymiema. This vocal advocacy and civil rights group seeks justice and equity for the oil-bearing Ijaw communities in the Niger Delta. The IYC militant wing, the Egbesu Boys, was headed by Asari until late 2003 and is now inactive.

The IYC became the driving force behind the famous Ijaw manifesto or “Kaiama Declaration.” Today, the IYC regularly dialogues with the government and industry to seek common ground on issues or to resolve conflicts. The group also negotiates for security contracts and other forms of employment for Ijaw youth.
**Confraternities and Cults**

Confraternities were initially established nearly sixty years ago in Nigeria as private university student clubs with lifetime membership. They emphasize social and secular activities, and at times, promote political or ideological views. Cults typically display authoritarian and sometimes spiritualist features. Both group types reinforce cohesion and loyalty among members through rigorous codes of conduct, rituals, symbols, fees, and adoption of motivational objectives and agendas. They may serve throughout life as powerful networks in pursuit of common goals and mutual self-help. Cult groups may also form the nucleus of urban youth “gangs” that mimic features of traditional religious cults. They may respect protective and guiding deities, such as Egbesu, the Ijaw God of War and often reinvent traditional beliefs, ritual practices, symbols, and systems in order to enforce internal discipline and loyalty and to achieve their political or business objectives. Often, they resort to armed aggression and violence. Members sometimes wear identifying clothing, charms, or tattoos similar to traditional medicine or body markings. Many operate in businesses of oil theft (bunkering), drug trafficking, piracy, and petty street crime. They frequently serve as mercenaries or allies of other armed groups. “The end justifies the means” is a common modus operandi for cults.

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<th>Group</th>
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<td><strong>Supreme Vikings Confraternity (SVC, 1984)</strong></td>
<td>The Vikings was founded at the University of Port Harcourt and then spread to other campuses. SVC has penetrated deeply into student and post-student life in the Niger Delta.</td>
<td>Some senior PDP politicians in Rivers State during the Obasanjo and Yar’Adua administrations were widely reported to be members of the SVC. This alleged association between Party and cult has limited the credibility of politicians in curbing violence or brokering peace among militant groups.</td>
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These two groups are often at odds. Deegbam operates in Rivers State, especially Ogoni, Buguma, Degema, and many slums of Port Harcourt.

The founder, “Occasion Boy,” or Onengiefori Terika, was killed in 2003 by Deywell.

Deywell operates in peri-urban areas of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, and other large cities and towns in the eastern Niger Delta, including Bayelsa State.

Deegbam is a “street” wing of the Klansmen Konfraternity. It was once allied with Dokubo Asari’s NDPVF, created in 2004 (see below).

Deywell is a “street” wing of the Supreme Vikings Confraternity (SVC). It attracts petty criminals and controls drug and other forms of trade in peri-urban areas of Port Harcourt.

Vigilantes

**Description:** Community-based “vigilante” groups have been a longstanding institution in many parts of the Niger Delta. They may take the form of religious, security, or social enforcement societies meant to assure communal defense and protection from criminals or predatory enemies. Typically, they operate under the guidance of local headmen and draw on voluntary contributions of time or material support from their beneficiary community. Since the 1990s, such local vigilante groups have assumed increasing importance in the absence of adequate official policing, especially in rural and remote areas. As a federal agency, the Nigeria Police Force is not easily adapted to local needs, even though it has adopted methods of community policing in recent years. With militarization and conflict spiraling in the region, rogue vigilante groups that set aside collective community interests in favor of personal benefit have emerged. Some have become a law in themselves and practice extra-judicial killings, seizure of personal property, and other serious human rights violations. Recently, the tactics of vigilante groups, especially those engaged in border disputes with neighbors, have not been easy to distinguish from those used by aggressive, armed militias.
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<td>Bakassi Boys (Aba, Abia State, 1999)</td>
<td>This notorious group was founded in the Ariaria Market of Aba Town (Abia State). At first Bakassi Boys worked as shoemakers in the “Bakassi” section of the market. They later organized to combat an armed robbery ring called the “Mafia” in markets in Aba and Owerri (Imo State).</td>
<td>Initially, market traders’ associations funded the Bakassi Boys for protection against armed robbery. In time, the group began to act with impunity, extorting large sums from townsfolk, arresting criminals arbitrarily and without evidence, and publicly molesting, torturing, or executing them. Politicians have also solicited their services to intimidate their opponents.</td>
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<td>Bush Boys (Okrika, Rivers State, mid-1990s)</td>
<td>“Peacemakers of Okrika” Based in the Okrika Area, Rivers State, the Bush Boys are considered internal Okrika security agents. They may also operate in Bayelsa State. On 14 July 2007, at the inauguration of President Yar’Adua, the Bush Boys renounced violence during a religious ceremony held with six other groups in Okrika. The peace was broken in the following month.</td>
<td>The Bush Boys defended Okrika in a conflict with Eleme over “ownership” of the NNPC Refinery as an oil asset in 1999 through 2002. They also fought major battles with militant leader Ateke Tom for control of Okrika and the local oil bunkering business.</td>
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**Militias**

**Description:** Militias are trained armed forces that are typically self-motivated and self-sustaining. Some groups are large and highly organized, while others resemble small gangs of freelancers who work under a warlord. Most are from the Ijaw ethnic group and many take their inspiration from the ideological history of Adaka Boro and the Niger Delta struggle for greater autonomy and share of oil resources. Unlike vigilantes, they are not grounded in the space or service of a community, and members move rather freely between locations and groups. This fluid structure makes militias highly adaptable, difficult to capture, and able to expand at will through cell phone and internet communications. Militias sustain themselves with well-paid security contracts in the public or private sector, political enforcement, armed services, piracy, oil bunkering, or sales of drugs and weapons. Groups vary in their policies. For example, the NDPVF (Dokubo Asari) is strenuously opposed to hostage-taking. Some groups unite around a charismatic spiritual leader who offers a sense of purpose and belonging in the fight for a common cause.

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<td><strong>Isaac Adaka Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF, 1966)</strong></td>
<td>NDVF was the first Ijaw nationalist armed group, which in 1966 called for creation of an independent Niger Delta Republic. This action pre-dated the well-known secession of Biafra, contiguous with Nigeria’s then Eastern Region. The leader Isaac Adaka (“Leopard”) Boro has been a point of reference for Ijaw nationalists ever since. He was a native of Kaiama, hence the symbolism of the 1998 Kaiama Declaration. Dokubo Asari (below) named his Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force after the original NDVF.</td>
<td>Isaac Boro is an Ijaw hero who mobilized a force of 150 men that fought valiantly for 12 days until they were arrested on charges of treason. Boro was later pardoned by General Gowon and led the Federal forces in their first attacks against Biafra in the coastal Niger Delta. He was killed in battle at the age of 30 and is remembered by Ijaws throughout the world on “Isaac Boro Day.”</td>
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<td>Niger Delta Peoples’ Volunteer Force (NDPVF, 2003)</td>
<td>NDPVF has been led by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari since declaring “all-out war” on the Nigerian government in 2004. The group has now become a non-violent political platform for Asari’s demands for self-determination in an “illegitimate” federal Nigerian State. He justifies bunkering as a form of resource control. A breakaway faction from Asari’s NDPVF is the “Martyr’s Brigade,” whose spokesperson “Cynthia Whyte” announced MEND’s first 2005 attacks. She (or he) also speaks for a high-minded political umbrella group, the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC).</td>
<td>Asari was famed for his violent clashes with militant Ateke Tom (below) over territory, bunkering routes, and political alliances. They vied for the role as former Rivers State Gov. Odili’s “Chief Security Officer.” Asari was arrested on charges of treason in September 2005 after calling for the dissolution of Nigeria and was released in June 2007 as part of a political arrangement aimed at engaging militants in dialogue. In 2008, Asari organized a conference on the Niger Delta in Abuja, opened by then VP Goodluck Jonathan. He is now a “militant statesman” who did not accept the 2009 Amnesty because his acceptance would, by implication, cast him in the role of a criminal, not a rights campaigner.</td>
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A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change
Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta

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<td>Niger Delta Vigilante Movement (NDVM, 2003)</td>
<td>Led by Ateke Tom, and based in the Okrika area of Rivers State, this large force was independent of MEND, but was occasionally allied for specific operations. Known for sophisticated and lucrative bunkering operations, a direct pipeline from the Port Harcourt refinery to Tom’s camp was found in March 2008.</td>
<td>In December 2007, following increased incidents of piracy and sabotage, the JTF launched an aerial attack on Ateke Tom’s camp. On Christmas and New Year’s Days, the NDVM counterattacked in PH, shooting up a major hotel and other targets. Tom and his men have accepted the Amnesty.</td>
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<td>Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF, 2010)</td>
<td>This recent militia group coalesced around “General” John Togo and former fighters who did not accept the 2009 Amnesty. Based in a camp near Ayakuroma in Delta State, the NDLF was attacked by a determined JTF offensive in December 2010 causing considerable collateral damage to the Ayakuroma community. John Togo, who became the militants’ “last man standing” in the post-Amnesty period, was crushed in later clashes with the JTF and died in May 2011 of battle wounds.</td>
<td>During its brief period of activity, the NDLF’s principal raison d’être was oil bunkering. It damaged installations and production in sporadic attacks throughout the Niger Delta. A spokesman, “Mark Anthony,” issued threats and offered political commentary in a style and tone reminiscent of Jomo Gbomo of MEND and Cynthia Whyte of the JRC. A favorite theme was to call for a sovereign national conference. Mark Anthony continues to issue press releases.</td>
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Umbrella Coalitions: MEND and the JRC

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) are pan-delta militant coalitions that press for a new political reality in the Niger Delta by combining militant action with a political rationale. The JRC, at times described as the most overarching resistance group, focuses on political statements. Its spokesperson, Cynthia Whyte, has typically served as the final word for the Niger Delta struggle. While the JRC castigates laws and structures that limit delta autonomy and criticize the corrupt political class, its expressed aims do not include government overthrow or regional secession. MEND, which overlaps with the JRC, began to crystallize in 2005 and resembles a “brand,” with networks led by several charismatic field commanders franchised across the delta. Tactics of these allied warlords include planned, coordinated attacks on multiple sites using high-tech equipment, abduction of hostages, arms trafficking, and other crimes. A shadowy spokesman, “Jomo Gbomo,” types MEND’s shrewd internet communications, which combine scolding threats and motivational rhetoric. Dokubo Asari has dismissed Jomo Gbomo as an “internet militant,” claiming MEND is an idea rather than an organization. Indeed, the match between words and deeds has not always been consistent across or within the MEND armed groups. Struggles develop over proper tactics and how to maintain purity of purpose. For all the high-minded rhetoric, the allied field commanders achieve power and relevance because they are adept entrepreneurs, competing within and among themselves in order to generate income through the standard militant occupations—providing political and security services, taking hostages, and trafficking in arms, drugs, and oil.
**Group** | **Description** | **Activities**
--- | --- | ---
**Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND, 2005)** | MEND was formed in late 2005 by Tom Polo (Delta), Farah Dagogo (Rivers), and General Boyloaf (Bayelsa), all key commanders in their states. MEND's real leadership is elusive. Its spokesman is an internet persona named “Jomo Gbomo,” who has historically been associated with Bayelsan Henry Okah. Okah was previously a major arms supplier (“Master of Arms”) and supporter of MEND. Some have at times considered him the group's supreme commander, but this status has not been confirmed. MEND began its operations in December 2005. Its political agenda is resource control and self-determination, but it combines rhetoric of social justice with violent action. It is well known for coordinated military-style attacks on oil installations, oil kidnappings, and sophisticated bunkering. Henry Okah himself accepted the 2009 Amnesty and returned to his home in South Africa. He was arrested and imprisoned without bail by S.A. police for masterminding a twin car bomb explosion on 1 October 2010 near a parade ground prepared for Nigeria's 50th anniversary celebration. His brother Charles and two others were also arrested in Lagos and are being tried separately in Nigeria. | Tom Polo (Chief Government Ekpmupolo), based in Oporoza, Gbaramatu Kingdom, was regarded as the most educated and respected MEND leader. In 2007, he was asked by the President Yar’Adua to head an Ijaw Youth Leadership Forum to open peace dialogue with the government. Dokubo Asari and Chris Ekiyor were also members. The effort lost momentum by December 2008. On 15 May 2009, the JTF launched a military operation against Tom Polo’s camp in response to his killing and kidnapping of soldiers and foreign sailors. The JTF's unprecedented show of force led to the capture and deaths of some militant fighters and the destruction of more than a dozen villages. The assault ushered in the Amnesty of 4 October 2009. Tom Polo was the last MEND field commander to surrender. The “Jomo Gbomo” created by Henry Okah has continued to email political commentary and threats of renewed conflict, despite the jailing of both Henry Okah and his brother Charles. But MEND now appears to be a spent force with little impact or influence on combatants or politics. |

*Sources: Sesay et al. 2003, ICG 2006b, Asuni 2009b, Stratfor 2011*
## ANNEX 2

### Selected Examples of Strategic Corporate Development Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGIP (NAOC)</td>
<td>International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA); other Nigerian Agricultural research institutes; State Governments; Central Bank (loans); NGO: Community Development Foundation</td>
<td>1987 ongoing</td>
<td>Bayelsa, Imo, Rivers, Delta states (14 locations)</td>
<td><strong>Green River Project (GRP)</strong>&lt;br&gt;A sustainable integrated food production system: land management; high yield, disease-resistant seed varieties; fish farming; co-operatives; micro-credit; and food processing centers. <strong>Burma Rice Farm Project: Bayelsa</strong>&lt;br&gt;In 2000, the project expanded into the swamp areas of Bayelsa State for large-scale rice-production. <strong>Fish Hatchery Project: Imo State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEVRON (CNL)</td>
<td>USAID (GDA)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Community clusters served by Regional Development Councils (RDCs)</td>
<td><strong>Advocacy, Awareness, and Civic Empowerment program. Strengthening the governance, LGA engagement, and effectiveness of the RDCs managing GMOU trusts.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEVRON (CNL)</td>
<td>New Nigeria Foundation, others</td>
<td>2009, follow-on from 2004</td>
<td>Community clusters served by RDCs</td>
<td><strong>Participatory Partnerships for Community Development (PPCD)</strong> to increase the capabilities and level of activities of the RDCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXXONMOBIL (MPNU) $50m</td>
<td>UNDP - $20m; Akwa-Ibom State - $15m</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14 communities in Akwa-Ibom near Eket terminal</td>
<td><strong>Integrated Community Development Project</strong>&lt;br&gt;Included a variety of local initiatives such as commercial rice farming. Not all have been completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXXONMOBIL (Mobil Liquefied Petroleum Gas Plant); Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG); Shell (SPDC)</td>
<td>Merck Sharp and Dohme; Bonny Kingdom; USG: PEPFAR</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Bonny Island. Rivers State hosts the Shell Bonny Export Terminal, the Mobil LPG Plant, and the NLNG Plant.</td>
<td><strong>Ibani-se HIV/AIDS Initiative</strong>&lt;br&gt;The public-private partnership provides education about transmission and prevention, as well as anti-retroviral treatment. The initiative is strongly supported by a local committee of leaders and community members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier Oil and Gas and Gulf of Guinea Energy</td>
<td>Pro-Natura International (Nigeria)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Eket and Esit Eket Local Governments, Akwa-Ibom State</td>
<td><strong>Eket Community Development Foundation</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Esit Eket Community Development Foundation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Initial PRAs, institutionalization, and planning phases completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOCs</td>
<td>Federal Government: National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)</td>
<td>1980's onward</td>
<td>Operating area</td>
<td><strong>NYSC</strong> is a mandatory one-year youth service required of all university graduates. IOCs sponsored youth corporers to teach science, math, and other technical subjects in local secondary schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELL (SPDC)</td>
<td>USAID(GDA) -- $2.5m, IITA—$1.3m in-kind, (Follow-on: USAID $2.5m)</td>
<td>2003–2009 (Follow-on extended to 2012)</td>
<td>Operating area</td>
<td><strong>Cassava Enterprise Development Program</strong>&lt;br&gt;Seeks to increase economic opportunities of cassava farmers across the Niger Delta through competitive production, processing, marketing, and enterprise development. Follow-on to 2012 will include fish farming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELL (SPDC)</td>
<td>Various private sector entities, including Globacom; NDDC, other partners for “skooolNigeria.com”; Intel, and the Nigerian Education Trust Fund</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7 Niger Delta States</td>
<td><strong>LIVEWIRE</strong>&lt;br&gt;Small business development –2,200 trainees. <strong>Telecoms Self-Employment Program (TELSEP)</strong> 446 telephone kiosks run by local youth. <strong>“skooolNigeria.com”</strong> A web-based tool for teaching math and science.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| STATOIL                              | Pro-Natura International (Nigeria) Additional partners, e.g. UNDP | 1998       | Akassa: 19 communities in Bayelsa State        | *Akassa Community Development Foundation*  
Building community management skills for local development; Model has become a “living university.” |
| Total E&P Nigeria Limited (TEPNG, Formerly EPNL) | Pro-Natura International (Nigeria) | 2002 onward | Opobo/ Nkoro, Rivers State; Eastern Obolo (Iko Town), Akwa Ibom State; Egi region, Rivers State | *Opobo Nkoro Community Development Foundation*  
(Additional donors: SPDC, USG, EU).  
*Eastern Obolo Community Development Foundation*  
Fully handed over to the community.  
*Egi Community Development Foundation* |
| Total E&P Nigeria Limited (TEPNG)    | University of Port Harcourt; IFP School (France) | 2003       | University of Port Harcourt                   | *Institute of Petroleum Studies*  
To support and MSc Degree in Petroleum Engineering and Project Management. |
Key Activities in the Niger Delta Supported by Development Partners

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP)

UNDP leverages its modest annual funding of about $18 million to Nigeria by exercising its customary function as a coordinating body for UN agencies and, by extension, the wider donor community. A consistent partner in the Niger Delta, it undertook feasibility studies of each oil producing state in the mid 1990s in preparation for increased governance support to local councils. In 2006, with funding from SPDC, it produced the first regional *Niger Delta Human Development Report*, now a key planning tool for development actors. It maintained a selective presence throughout the troubles, building the capacity of LGA community development assistants and training state legislators and secretaries in five states in budgeting and pro-poor policymaking. The agency has also collaborated on a number of joint projects with oil companies on youth job creation and LGA development planning.

UNDP began a program of support in late 2007 to the Office of the Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, who chaired the Presidential Initiative on Peace in the Niger Delta under former President Yar’Adua. The President invited the UN to support a proposed 2008 Niger Delta Summit on achieving permanent peace in the region. When the Summit was aborted, a new Presidential Technical Committee on the Niger Delta invited strategic inputs from all stakeholders. UNDP coordinated the combined donor response in a paper stating unequivocally that the engagement of partners in the delta depended “crucially” on a “settlement” (UNDP et al. 2008). Donor deliberations continued after the Amnesty declaration in July 2010 and evolved into specific proposals for support to the process of disarmament, demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants. They also led to the formulation of a common donor strategy in a working paper outlining issues, approaches, and options for support to regional stabilization, recovery, and development (UNDP et al 2009). UNDP was also instrumental in coordinating a Technical Working Group of donors to draft a proposed “Collaborative Development Framework” for the Niger Delta (FRN 2010). Details
of the donor prognosis for the post-Amnesty period are discussed in Chapter Four, together with an analysis of opportunities and risks.

The current UNDP program for 2009–2012 includes a component devoted to sustainability and risk management to protect the country’s resource base. This program will assist the federal government and selected Niger Delta states to “secure a participatory policy and institutional environment conducive to sustained peace and equitable development” by addressing development planning, fiscal responsibility, public procurement, and local governance (UNDP 2009).

OTHER UN AGENCIES AND FUNDS

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and its sister agency the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) have maintained an abiding interest in the Niger Delta through pro-poor local policy reforms, expanding incomes of small-scale farmers and fishermen, and ensuring rural access to financial and social services. In 2005, IFAD, with World Bank support, launched an $82.2 million, eight-year, Community-Based Natural Resource Management Program for the Niger Delta that hopes to improve the standard of living and quality of life of 400,000 poor, rural women and youth. The program, co-financed by the states and NDDC, uses a community-driven strategy to build local infrastructure, protect land and fish stocks, and develop sustainable enterprises. Meanwhile, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has continued to partner with the government, teaching hospitals, and NGOs on programs in maternal and child health, with a focus on immunization, nutrition, and pediatric HIV/AIDS. A special Niger Delta strategy in basic education was recently launched “to make education an effective instrument for social and economic re-engineering to achieve a more peaceful and politically stable environment” (UNICEF 2010). Components include improving the quality of teacher training and the curriculum by increasing their relevance to a conflict environment, and providing social and financial education to out-of-school boys vulnerable to militant recruitment.

WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (IFC)

As seen in Table A3.1 below, Niger Delta states host 10 of the World Bank’s current $4.23 billion portfolio of 37 projects planned or underway, together with 3 projects financed by the IFC. Since 2001, the Bank has supported poverty reduction initiatives in parts of the Niger Delta through the Community and Social Development Project.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Niger Delta states covered</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fadama III</td>
<td>All Niger Delta States: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, Rivers</td>
<td>Increases incomes of users of rural and water resources in flood plains and low-lying areas; reduces rural poverty, food security, and conflict between users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governance and Capacity Building</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>Enhances efficiency and accountability in the management of financial and human resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Small and Medium Enterprise Project</td>
<td>Abia (beneficiary of the Business Development Services Fund)</td>
<td>Increases performance and employment levels of MSMEs in selected non-oil industry sub-sectors and in pilot areas of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based Urban Development Project</td>
<td>Abia, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Ondo, Cross River</td>
<td>Increases access to basic urban services in eight cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Social Development Project (CSDP)</td>
<td>Abia, Bayelsa, Cross River</td>
<td>Empowers communities to develop and manage micro-social infrastructure and safety nets; strengthens LGA capacity for community support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Agriculture Development Project (CADP)</td>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>Strengthens agricultural production systems and facilitates access to markets for targeted value chains among small and medium scale commercial farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project (NEGIP)</td>
<td>Selected sites in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>Improves the availability and reliability of gas supply to increase power generation and distribute quality electricity to the consumers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger Delta Community Foundations Initiative</td>
<td>Rivers State</td>
<td>Provides grants through a community-managed foundation to encourage local skills and development, build management capacity, and internal conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Good Governance in Nigeria’s Niger Delta</td>
<td>Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Supports a social accountability plan for the education sector; promotes public participation in government planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Expenditure Effectiveness for Opportunities and Results (SEEORP—proposed)</td>
<td>Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers</td>
<td>Strengthens public financial management systems; supports youth skills development and employment; promotes effective community service delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleme Chemical Plant (Indorama, Port Harcourt) IFC commercial investment, with Trust Fund support for corporate community development</td>
<td>Rivers (Eleme)</td>
<td>Converts hydrocarbons such as natural gas liquids into intermediate products used in plastics. Note: The adjunct advisory project on community development was deferred by the kidnapping of the company MD, two staff members, and four family members in June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Power. Ltd., Aba. IFC commercial investment, with Trust Fund support for corporate community development</td>
<td>Abia (Abia)</td>
<td>This independent, natural gas-fired, thermal power plant will serve commercial and residential consumers in Aba town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Management. IFC, with co-financing from the Nigerian and Norwegian Governments</td>
<td>Industrial Centers, Niger Delta</td>
<td>Upgrade the capacity of local fabrication companies to provide complex local content to the oil and gas industry, sub-sea and offshore.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(CSDP). For the first time, the popular Fadama project, focusing on agribusiness and food security, may become widely available in all states of the region. Abia, which has a large industrial park in the city of Aba, has been selected as a pilot state for the Micro-Small and Medium Enterprise Project. Rivers State will benefit from an ongoing project to strengthen state governance and capacity building and

Cross Rivers is expected to serve as a pilot state for the new Commercial Agriculture Development Project (CADP). The World Bank seeks to make community participation central to all stages of its community projects, from selection and design through to implementation and monitoring.

Thus far, three World Bank projects have been designed to address the specific social and economic needs of the Niger Delta region. A pilot “Niger Delta Community Foundations Initiative” in Rivers State was established through a $1.8 million grant in order to create a parent Community Foundation that acts as an equitable, grant-making body serving smaller, community-based development organizations. The objective of the model is to engage local people, especially youth, in using the local community grants to plan and implement activities that meet community and individual needs, reduce tensions, and mitigate conflict. The Foundation also seeks to establish a funding platform that fosters a partnership between communities, civil society actors, private sector firms, bilateral donors, and the government. Once the model takes root, it can be replicated in other states of the Niger Delta.

The $750,000 project, “Promoting Good Governance in the Niger Delta,” was designed to support the efforts of Bayelsa State to improve governance, including its establishment of the Bayelsa Expenditure and Income Transparency Initiative (BEITI) in 2008. Under this initiative a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) is being undertaken by the education sector in the state.

Features of this innovative project have been taken up in a new $200 million “State Expenditure Effectiveness for Opportunities and Results” (SEEFOR) project that expands the intervention into Delta and Rivers States. The proposed project builds on the twin strategies of improving governance and social accountability, but also links them to job creation. It aims to strengthen public financial management systems and service delivery while promoting community-driven development, especially small public works projects and agriculture, that will help generate immediate and short-term employment for youth.

Support for local infrastructure is a priority for both the World Bank and the IFC. An agreement with the government signed in May 2010 for the Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project (NEGIP) will harness some of the region’s associated gas in order to increase power generation and distribute electricity to consumers in selected national areas, including Port Harcourt. The project is expected to improve quality of life in the delta by reducing flaring in rural communities and increasing power supply. Similarly,
IFC invested $4 million of early equity in the independent Geometric Power Project launched in 2008 for the commercial hub of Aba. A gas-fired power plant will produce 188 megawatts, distributed privately by the company for both commercial and residential customers. Other investments seek to upgrade the capacity of local fabrication companies to provide complex local content to the oil and gas industry in both sub-sea and offshore operations. Again, near Port Harcourt, IFC assisted Indorama in its privatization purchase of the Eleme Petrochemicals Company from NNPC. By 2009, the company was for the first time running at 90 percent capacity. In an unprecedented decision, the Bureau of Private Enterprises agreed to sell 10 percent equity to host communities and staff. This step anticipated a significant proposal made to host communities some months later in order to grant them 10 percent equity in all joint-venture oil companies (Ujah 2009). IFC investments in strategic areas of infrastructure, oil and gas, and manufacturing in the Niger Delta should advance the local economy (IEG/IFC 2009).

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AFDB)

The AfDB cooperation with Nigeria focuses on human capital development through health and education (technical and tertiary) and the stimulation of non-oil growth through enhanced infrastructure and agricultural/rural development. Activities in the Niger Delta have included a community-based poverty reduction project in Edo State; support to the national program for food security in Ondo and Cross River States; and a Niger Delta Social and Environmental Study, resulting in a database of current social and environmental issues that will eventually lead to a comprehensive Environmental and Social Management Plan. The study is intended to complement the regional Master Plan. AfDB also participates in the Fadama Project.

THE EUROPEAN UNION/EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EU/EC)

The European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU’s primary vehicle of support to Nigeria. A new Country Strategy Paper 2008–2013 plans to expand this regional support, assuming “visible and sustained progress” is made on the Amnesty. The program proposes substantial appropriations to the peace process and conflict prevention in the Niger Delta, including reduction of small arms and light weapons. As a corollary, it will help to improve governance and service delivery in the states and LGAs once a peace settlement is effective. Meanwhile, collaboration on non-violent and transparent elections is foreseen through its participation in the multi-partner Deepening Democracy in Nigeria project. The program also hopes to enhance the competitiveness of the pri-
vate, non-oil sector as a strategy for securing the peace. As a related initiative, a new Gas to Power project involving DFID, Shell, and three NGOs will harness natural gas development to sustainable community-based energy facilities, starting in Rivers and Bayelsa States. Finally, Cross River—as one of six EU “focus” states—will benefit from further interventions as set out in the assistance program (EU 2009).

THE UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID)

DFID has had a country office in Nigeria since 2001, and its current support to Nigeria is guided by the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2010 to 2013. Governance is the program hallmark. To promote better management of oil revenues and the government’s NEITI, a new Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) project will, over five years, work through a variety of multi-sector stakeholders to increase demand for oil transparency and disclosure of information on a broad range of related issues. In the Niger Delta, DFID has pursued two main strands of activity: the STAND project (Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in the Niger Delta), which works through NGOs to build the capacity of communities to hold local governments accountable; and various small projects including support to the National Orientation Agency for youth training and work with Action Aid to establish a conflict early-warning system in the delta region. Beginning in 2010, under its Nigeria Country Assistance Plan, nearly all DFID support specific to the Niger Delta will be channeled through a new Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Fund. In a favorable environment, up to $15 million is likely to become available to support peace building and related conflict mitigation activities in the near post-Amnesty period. In addition, the program will engage in strategic analysis, conflict-sensitive development activities, capacity building, and support activities designed to challenge the underlying causes of conflict.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

USAID works with the government, civil society, research institutions, and the commercial private sector in carrying out its projects in Nigeria. Its current program for 2010–2013 is coordinated under the CPS. In the Niger Delta, USAID’s most important projects have been the Cassava Enterprise Development Program (see Box 3.3), and the conflict mitigation and early warning project CALM (Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation). Support for health initiatives such as prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB is uneven among delta states, with the exception of Cross
River. As a former “lead” state, it has also benefitted from assistance in governance and reproductive health. The MARKETS agriculture and income-generation project has doubled cassava yields and supply in both Ondo and Imo States and introduced improved rice farming in Imo. In addition, between 2007 and 2009, a dozen Niger Delta applicants won small community grants under the U.S. Ambassador’s Self-Help Program, totaling about half of all such grants awarded in the country.

In April 2010, the U.S. and Nigeria formally inaugurated a Bi-National Commission that provides a framework for mutual diplomatic and development efforts under four working groups. The Niger Delta and Regional Security Cooperation working group expects to support plans to provide tangible development and economic opportunity to the people of the region as well as augment partnership on regional security (USG 2010). The first meeting of the Niger Delta working group took place in September 2010.
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Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta


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With the support of the World Bank’s Post Conflict Fund, the Africa Program launched a major capacity building initiative in Burundi, designed to increase the ability of the country’s leadership to advance the post-war transition and economic reconstruction. The strategies and techniques developed in Burundi are now being adapted to conflict and post-conflict situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and other countries worldwide.

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