The End and the Beginning: 
The Revolutions of 1989 and the Resurgence of History

(Washington D.C., November 9-10, 2009)

Conference participants, titles, abstracts and bios
GALE STOKES
(keynote speaker)

● 1989 and the Return to History

Abstract:

What might it mean the return to history? Generally the answer given to this question is that communism’s fall opened the door for East Central and Southeast European countries to return from an unnatural eastward facing geopolitical attachment to their true West European character. But this interpretation has many problems. For example, continental states had little role in the creation of enlightenment principles by the Atlantic-facing countries, so they are not returning to a deeply felt past experience. At a shorter range, the European Union was possible because its founders’ post-1945 experience was one of liberation. Eastern Europe simply experienced the imposition of new kinds of dictatorial systems. When most West Europeans look back at the interwar period, they see it as a foreign land, primarily agricultural, rife with anti-Semitism, dominated by right wing politics. Some East European nationalists, on the other hand, have adopted exactly that experience as their model in what Vladimir Tismaneanu calls fantasies of salvation. Is that the history to which we wish to return? I argue that in fact Eastern Europe is not in some sense returning to a history it experienced in the past, but is rather entering into an era that does not yet have a name, but which Francis Fukuyama called post-history. What Fukuyama meant by his famous phrase “the end of history” is that globalization in general, and the creation of the European Union in particular, has redrawn the rules of how to promote national interests. Throughout human experience, efforts to achieve power and recognition at the international level almost always involved violence, warfare, and aggression through military means. Security was achieved by military strength. Today, at least in the European Union, security has little or nothing to do with military strength. Security is an economic issue, and EU members are pushed, often despite their wishes, into new kinds of less violent interactions. This is the system which the East Europeans have entered, or hope to enter. It is not a return to their past history, but an entry into something new, something unprecedented, in which the parochial nationalisms that continue to exercise so many East European politicians and were so much a part of local pasts are utterly dysfunctional.
Biography:

Gale Stokes is Mary Gibbs Jones Professor Emeritus of History and past chair of the history department at Rice University. A three-time winner of the George R. Brown Award for Superior Teaching at Rice, he specializes in the history of Eastern Europe, Balkan History and Nationalism. Dr. Stokes is the author of *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945; The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe; Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe* and *The West Transformed.* He received the 1994 Vucinich Prize for the best book in the field of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies from the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU
(keynote speaker)

- **Communism and Nationalism before and after 1989**

Abstract:

The nature of the 1989 Romanian revolution and its aftermath reflect the specific nature of the communist regime in that country. Its essential elements constituted a national-Stalinist synthesis: the unflinching emphasis on the party’s leading role; Nicolae Ceausescu’s personality cult resulting in dynastic communism, the celebration of the “socialist homogenous nation”; and politics of pauperization. In contrast to most (if not all) Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Romanian one never renounced its ethos of radical transformism and the obsession with building the “New Man.” The Romanian Communist Party compensated the growing popular discontent with the betrayed promises of the 1968 aborted liberalization through ever renewed social engineering. It therefore opposed the post-1985 attempts at democratization (as in the Moscow Center’s case after Gorbachev’s coming to power) and it deviated from the systemic sclerosis of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, or Bulgaria. A mythic, unified socialist nation was to reach the peaks of History through the realization of the RCP’s project of modernization epitomized in the concept of the “Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society.” A revamped version of political religion, Ceausescu’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, was the functionalist-pragmatic ideological framework for a national eschatology that baroquely combined themes of the far right and far left. The regime’s politics of mobilization converged into the only true center of
power: *Conducătorul* – the Leader (and increasingly his spouse and their clan). In Ceausescu’s cult, Stalinism and Byzantinism culminated in a synthesis of exacerbated ambition, megalomaniac tyranny, and self-serving, strident nationalism.

Socialist paternalism doubled by prophylactic terror hardly left niches for autonomy, political alternatives, and implicitly, for dissidence and civil society initiatives. Therefore, the violent upheaval of 1989 in Romania was the outcome of multiple factors: the sincere and dedicated revolt of a long humiliated and repressed society; the panic of the nomenklatura trying to safeguard its advantages in the post-Ceausescu period; the calculated actions of a second-echelon successor elite preparing for a new regime; and, last but least, the anarchy caused by a population equally atomized by decennia of despotic rule and socialized in the fantasies of a revivalist, anti-intellectual movement: the neo-Stalinist paradigm of the national turn initiated by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and carried to an extreme after 1965 by Nicolae Ceausescu and his associates. In conclusion, we argue that post-1989 problematic pluralism was marked by: legacies of residual Leninism and ethnocentric authoritarianism; onslaughts on civil society and democratic parties (1990-1996); extreme personalization of politics; refusal of the post-communist successor elite to engage in a genuine confrontation with the traumatic past.

**Biography:**

Vladimir Tismaneanu is professor of politics and Director of the Center for the Study of Post-communist Societies at University of Maryland (College Park). Chairman of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (April 2006 – April 2007). Since April 2007, Chairman of the Presidential Advisory for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania. In 2003, he received University of Maryland Distinguished Scholar-Teacher Award. In 2007, the university granted him the Distinguished International Service Award. Prof. Tismaneanu received from the American Association for Political Science a certificate of exceptional achievement for his teaching career.

In 2004, his book, *Stalinism for All Seasons* was granted the “Barbara Jelavich Award” by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS). He was Editor (1998-2004) and chair (2004-2008) of the Editorial Committee of East European Politics and Societies. Professor Tismaneanu is Doctor Honoris Causa of Universitatea de Vest in Timisoara
He edited *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (CEU Press, 2009). For the 2008/09 academic year, he was a Fellow with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., where he worked on a book on democracy, memory, and moral justice. The title of this ongoing project is *Democracy, Memory, and Moral Justice: Romania Confronts Its Communist Past*. He recently finalized the manuscript for a forthcoming book entitled *The Devil in History. Lessons of the 20th Century*.

JEFFREY ISAAC

● Concluding remarks: **Revisiting the Meanings of 1989**

**Abstract:**

The purpose of this conference is to retrospectively assess the significance of a set of watershed historical events associated with "1989" from the vantage point of their twenty year anniversary. As the closing presentation, my talk will attempt to integrate and reflect upon the conference papers, themes, and proceedings. At the same time, it will focus on the broader question of what it means to seek from or attribute meaning to watershed historical events. Why are such efforts indispensable to political judgment? In what ways do such efforts threaten to become reifications that impede rather than foster understanding?

I want to argue for the need to be attentive to the openness of the questions we put to historical events, an openness that corresponds to the openness of history itself. In 1996 I published an essay on "The Meanings of 1989" in the journal *Social Research*. The essay argued, against so-called “post-historical” readings, that "1989" had a plurality of meanings. My talk will expand on that argument, elaborating on how "1989" continues to have a range of
meanings; modifying the judgments offered in that earlier essay in the light of the experience of the past thirteen years; and clarifying the most important meanings we should now attribute to "1989" in the light of who "we" are at this moment in time.

The talk raises a "big" question. In doing so, it draws on notions of political judgment developed by Hannah Arendt. But while the topic and thematic are broad and perhaps even "philosophical," the talk itself will focus on some very concrete challenges facing post-1989 Europe in particular and the post-1989 world more generally.

Biography:

Jeffrey C. Isaac is the new Editor-in-Chief of Perspectives on Politics, the journal of the American Political Science Association, published in association with Cambridge University Press. The James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Indiana Democracy Consortium at Indiana University, he served as Chair of the Political Science Department from 2003-2009. Professor Isaac has published four books: The Poverty of Progressivism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Democracy in Dark Times (Cornell University Press, 1998); Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion (Yale University Press, 1992); and, Power and Marxist Theory (Cornell University Press, 1987). Professor Isaac is co-editor (with Aurelian Craiutu) of America Through European Eyes (Penn State University Press, 2009) and is currently completing a new edition of the Communist Manifesto, part of the “Rethinking the Western Tradition” series published by Yale University Press.

Professor Isaac has written extensively on the political thought of Hannah Arendt, in the books noted above, and also in such periodicals as Political Theory, American Political Science Review, Social Research, Praxis International, and Tikkun. He has also written extensively on the political thought of anti-communist dissidence, in Social Research, East European Politics and Societies, Common Knowledge, and a number of anthologies; on the philosophy of social science; and on the themes of democracy and pragmatism. Professor Isaac serves on the editorial board of Dissent, and as an editorial associate of Constellations. He is also a gigging jazz and blues musician active on the local Bloomington music scene.

AGNES HELLER
Twenty Years After

Abstract:

The Soviet system collapsed twenty years ago. For my generation this happened just yesterday, but for the generation of my grandchildren it is already history. I will speak about the years of 1998-91 first from the position of the post communist states of Central-Eastern Europe and, afterwards, I will turn briefly to the present state of the world. In order to give an account about the self destruction of Eastern European totalitarian regimes, I will first give present my own interpretation of totalitarianism. In order to make sense of my description of the 1989 moment as a fast, sweeping revolution, I am going to also give an account of my concept of revolution. One element that I wish to emphasize in my paper is fact that, as four earlier historical experiences showed, Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), Prague (1968), and Warsaw (1980-81), the periphery could never beat the center unless this was in the interest of the center itself. There hardly were sufficient reasons for the Soviet regime to let its own periphery go, but as so many great events in history, 1989 also happened by accident. Nevertheless, the triumph of the year 1989 remains a triumph of democracy, liberty, and of human rights even if it was soon followed by other and new trials and dangers. In the face of the challenges of post-communism and of the new century, it is the legacy of the present to preserve the hopes of 1989.

Biography:

Agnes Heller is Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at the New School — A University in New York. Agnes Heller was a student and co-worker of Lukács's during the 1950s. She was one of a group of prominent members of the 'Budapest School' who left Hungary for Australia in the early 1970s and taught sociology in Melbourne, at La Trobe University. In 1986, she moved to New York. Agnes Heller has written widely on the philosophy of history and morals, or the theory of modernity: The Time Is Out of Joint: Shakespeare as Philosopher of History (2002); A Theory of Modernity (1999); An Ethics of Personality (1996); General Ethics (1988); Beyond Justice (1987); The Power of Shame (1986); Radical Philosophy (1984); Everyday Life (1984); Lukács Revalued (editor, 1983); A Theory of History (1982); A Theory of Feelings (1979); Renaissance Man (1978); The Theory of Needs in Marx (1976). She
is presently working on two books: *Immortal Comedy: The Comic Phenomenon in Art, Literature, and Life* and *The Concept of the Beautiful*. Agnes Heller received The Sonning Prize, Denmark’s most important cultural award. She is also a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

BRADLEY ABRAMS

- **Consumption and Political Legitimization in East-Central Europe: The Czechoslovak Case**

  **Abstract:**

  The paper argues that three communist regimes of East-Central Europe – Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia – shifted from a primarily ideological way of legitimizing their rule to one predicated on the satisfaction of economic desires in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the wake of the failure of the liberalization movement known as the Prague Spring, which brought a Warsaw Pact invasion in August of 1968, the Czechoslovak regime went perhaps the furthest in this regard. In essence, the party offered what has been called a “tacit social contract” to its citizens: the regimes offered a reasonable and steadily rising standard of living and a social safety net in return for political quiescence. My research draws upon two large-scale sociological research projects (which have never been used before), as well as data from top-secret public opinion surveys (also unused), to describe the contours of the development of consumer consumption in Czechoslovakia and to assess the success of this strategy. In order to do this, I first show the substantial rise in consumption in selected spheres. Then I demonstrate that the growth in aggregate consumption was generalized, and particularly that it was not just the province of Party members. Further, I show that after the mid- to late-1970s, this growth in consumption fell into a deep stagnation. Finally, and at greatest length, I outline the views of the population on their own standard of living. What my research shows it that the population was deeply pessimistic about their life chances immediately after the invasion, but became very satisfied by 1971. The optimism about standards of living, the availability of goods, etc. lasted until roughly 1978, with the public’s dissatisfaction growing stronger as time passed. Since the regime had chosen to rely on an economic way of gaining some semblance of legitimacy for its rule, rather than an ideological one, the economic decay left it with no fallback legitimization strategy, leaving it without a sense of purpose such that the removal of outside support from the
USSR easily resulted in its fall. However, the experience with what might be called “consumer socialism” in Czechoslovakia (as well as Poland and Hungary) almost certainly played a role in the population’s easier adaptation to market behaviors after 1989.

**Biography:**


CĂTĂLIN AVRAMESCU

- **Communism and the Experience of Light: Electrification and Legitimization in Romania before 1989**

**Abstract:**

Communism was famously described by Lenin as the "power of Soviets plus electrification". It is interesting to note that most histories of the Communist regimes have been, to date, histories of Soviet power. This paper attempts to re-establish the importance of the experience of electricity in the context of Communism. From the late 19th century ideologues of Communism have developed a fascination with light. The symbol of the Red Star and the image of knowledge as illumination are just two aspects of this sentiment.

After the establishment of the Bolshevik regime there was an emphasis on the rapid "industrialization" of the Soviet state. This is a process that is quite well understood in specialist
literature. Less discussed, however, is that light itself became an object of public policy. Urban lighting, especially, was meant to fuse together the individual existence into a vibrant, collective body. The new Stalinist regime in Romania, likewise, has staged an attempt to include light as a central dimension of Communist civilization. Until the 1970's the regime was fairly successful in this attempt, especially as the public was able to contrast the radiant present and the obscurity of the war period.

Another dimension of this emphasis on light is the formation of an official rhetoric that stressed the luminous. The Secretary-General of the Party became the "guiding light" and the epoch was baptized "The Golden Years". The economic hardship caused, in part, by the over-stretching of the network of electricity, was one of the factors that contributed to the de-legitimation of the Communist leadership. As the blackouts grew longer and became more frequent, in the 1980's, the people started to question the regime. My personal experience, like that of millions of Romanians, has been one of a progressive blackout.

**Biography:**

Cătălin Avramescu is a former fellow of Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, Institut für Geschichte/Universität Wien and Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia/Università degli Studi di Ferrara. He published articles and studies in the history of modern philosophy, a book on the history of the social contract theories, and translated in Romanian David Hume’s political essays, Thomas Hobbes’ *De Corpore Politico* and Rousseau's *Social Contract*. He is a docent of the University of Helsinki and Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest. His most recent publication is *An Intellectual History of Cannibalism* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

IOAN T. MORAR

- **Romanian Media: From Party Loudspeaker to the Voice of the Oligarchs**

**Abstract:**

My presentation begins with the first glimpses of freedom of press in Romania in December 1989 after the collapse communist censorship. It then turns to the specific mass-media alignments that appeared under the influence of newly established neo-communist successor
elites in power. It will analyze the coming into being of a militant and independent mass-media in the private sector, the short lived experience of party-affiliated periodicals and the even briefer experimentation with campaign publications. One phenomenon that will be emphasized is the relationship between the privatization of formerly state-run newspapers and the financial involvement of local businessmen in the mass media aiming at securing public protection and immunity. The gradual generalization of this latter trend brought about a new phase in the postcommunist existence of Romanian media: the independent mass-media increasingly gave out under the iron hill of ‘jungle/primitive capitalism’. The practice of obtaining the support of newspapers, TV and radio station by means of state funded publicity was a return to past practices of obedience to power and to its protégées. The mass-media of the oligarchs is presently an actor in the public opinion almost entirely lacking democratic credibility. This situation obviously affects both the levels of public and political involvement within the population and the latter’s trust in institutions. The only current counterweight to the strategic groupings of domestic mass-media is the influence over the audience exercised by the international mass media (via cable, newspapers, internet, etc.). Simultaneously, the independent electronic media, the blogs, the news agencies are the only sources of journalistic credibility and balance at the moment, playing the role of a virtual civil society.

Biography:

Ioan T. Morar is a Romanian journalist, poet, dramatist, novelist, literary and art critic, and civil society activist. He is a founding member of the satirical magazine Academia Cațavencu (to which he notably contributes art and culture reviews) and, from 2004 until 2009, a senior editor for the newspaper Cotidianul. He contributes verse, reports, interviews, and essays to the most important Romanian periodicals. He was nominated as one of the three mass-media representatives in the think-tank group for the branding of Romania initiated by the Romanian Agency for Governmental Strategies.

NOEMI MARIN

● 1989 or the Return of Rhetoric: Totalitarian Discourse and Its Impact on Communist Romania
Abstract

One of the responsibilities of rhetoric is to engage with history, examining the shaping and reshaping of political communities through discourse that uncovers “the various worlds, by ‘playing’ with our ‘orders’” at stake (Grassi, 1987, 76). Totalitarian rhetoric unveils one such relationship between rhetoric and history. Adding the communist political history of Eastern and Central European countries to this relationship creates an immense reservoir of resources to explore, articulate, and explicate the various aspects of the notion of “totalitarian” discourse. Romanian case of totalitarianism is one of the most examined in political history and one of the least explored in rhetorical studies. Taking 1989 as the pivotal moment for historical changes in public discourse, this paper examines Romanian communist rhetoric in its totalitarian form, during Nicolae Ceausescu’s dictatorship (1965-1989) in order to assess its legacy in post-communist public sphere. Moving from Stalinist (totalitarian) rhetoric to authoritarian to increasingly totalitarian again (Romanian-style), the paper explores how “totalitarian” qualities of Romanian Communist rhetoric influences the moment of 1989 along with its implications on transitional political discourse of post-communism. Analyzing a set of excerpts from Ceausescu’s speeches, the paper takes a historical approach to Ceausescu’s discourse, in order to extract its specific traits contributing to a fuller understanding of totalitarian rhetoric and of the responsibilities of and for rhetoric in democratic societies.

Biography:

Dr. Noemi Marin, Director of Peace Studies Program, and Associate Professor of Communication at Florida Atlantic University, is the author of the book After the Fall: Rhetoric in the Aftermath of Dissent in Post-Communist Times (2007). Dr. Marin has contributed to edited volumes Negotiating Democracy: Media Transformation in Emerging Democracies (2007); Advances in the History of Rhetoric (2007; 2006); Realms of Exile: Nomadism, Diaspora and Eastern European Voices (2005); Intercultural Communication and Creative Practices (2005); Culture and Technology in the New Europe: Civic Discourse in Transformation in Post-Communist Nations (2000). Scholarly articles have been published in East European Politics and Societies; Migration: A European Journal of International Migration and Ethnic Relations; Forum Artis Rhetoricae; Romanian Journal of Journalism and Communication; Global Media Journal; Controversia: An International Journal of Debate and
Democratic Renewal. Dr. Marin edits the international academic journal *Journal of Literacy and Technology*. Sole contributor to the *International Encyclopedia of Communication* (Blackwell, 2008) on Eastern and Central European rhetoric, Dr. Marin presented over 120 international and national conference papers, focusing on communist and post-communist discourse and societies in transition. This year, Dr. Marin received the Researcher/Creative Scholar of the Year Award, Florida Atlantic University.

JEFFREY HERF

- An Insufficiently Noted Precursor of 1989: Comments on the Historical Significance of the Battle of the Euromissiles of 1979 to 1983

Abstract:

Less than a decade before the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, noted observers worried that the Soviet Union faced a “decadent” or “self-Finlandizing” Western Europe whose democracies faced the prospect in the 1980s of “perishing” as they had in the 1930s. The path to the reverse outcome was anything but a foregone conclusion. My remarks address what I regard as the most important reversal in the momentum of the last decades of the Cold War, one which took place between 1979 and 1983 during what became known as the “battle of the euromissiles.” It was then that the Soviet leadership played its most powerful card, that of threats coming from its military might. I will discuss the contours of that battle and the consequences of Soviet defeat in 1983 for the chain of events that led to the collapse of Communism in Europe and then to German unification by 1991.

Biography:

Jeffrey Herf teaches Modern European and German political and intellectual history at the University of Maryland in College Park. His book, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* is forthcoming with Yale University Press in fall 2009. His publications include include: *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge University Press, 1984); *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (The Free Press, 1991); *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys/ (Harvard University Press, 1997); and *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi
IULIA MOTOC:

- **The Struggle for Human Rights and the Demise of Communism**

**Abstract:**

Human rights have played a fundamental role in the fall of communism? At first glance the answer is yes with regard to the Charter 77 movement and Solidarosc. In reality, human rights had a minor role, considering the general distrust law. It explains the role of human rights in post-communism. Post-communist societies are societies in which human rights discourse and practice are almost non-existent.

**Biography:**

Iulia Motoc is member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. She teaches at the University of Bucharest, where she holds courses on International law, human rights, and European law. She was guest/visiting professor at several universities, including NYU, Yale University, European University Institute (Florence) and UN University (Tokyo). She contributed to numerous collective volumes, most recently in T.Murphy (ed) New Technologies and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009). She is author of several books, along with academic articles, working papers, and UN reports, among which: Plaidoyer Pour Les Droits De L’homme (2008), The Responsibility of State and the Individual: Controversial Aspects of the Right to Democracy (2006) and European Union: The Law and the Politics of Eastwards Enlargement (2001).
Was There a Serbian Havel?

Abstract:

In my paper, I will discuss a notion that has been taken for granted in the twenty years since 1989: that Serbia was on the outside looking in at the events of that tumultuous year. Why did Serbia and its intellectuals diverge so clearly from patterns established in other countries in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s? I will not necessarily take the assumption underlying this question for granted – it is possible, in other words, that the Serbian pattern did not diverge all that much from the norm established in other countries of the East Bloc. In the body of the paper I will discuss the conditions that gave rise to a Serbian opposition to communism (“Titoism” in Yugoslavia) and the ways that those conditions prompted an emphasis on a different type of opposition. Ultimately, I will suggest that the Serbian situation did not differ all that much from others in Eastern Europe in the form that oppositional arguments took, but differed greatly in its particular emphases. I will describe two opposition narratives that emerged in Serbia – one overtly nationalist, the other Marxist-revisionist – and the ways that those two narratives converged after the death of Tito. The 1980s saw the convergence of the two types of opposition, in a movement that arguably supported the search for “truth” and the right to free expression, but ultimately saw the emergence of an intolerant nationalism as its result.

Biography;

Nick Miller is professor of history and chair of the department of history at Boise State University. He has written two books: Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia before the First World War (Pittsburgh, 1997) and The Nonconformists: Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle (Budapest and New York, 2007). He has written many articles on topics ranging from Serbian nationalism to democratization in Serbia, the Serbian community of Croatia, and the challenges of US policymaking towards Serbia. He is now beginning a book project on the liberation of Belgrade in 1944. Miller received his doctorate in history from Indiana University in 1991.
A. ROSS JOHNSON

- **What We Did and Why. Radio Free Europe Broadcasts in 1989**

**Biography:**

A. Ross Johnson is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, adviser to the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Archive Project at Hoover, senior adviser to the president of RFE/RL, and senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Johnson was a senior executive of RFE/RL from 1988 to 2002, serving as director of Radio Free Europe, director of the RFE/RL Research Institute, and acting president and counselor of RFE/RL. He was a senior staff member of the RAND Corporation from 1969 to 1988, where he specialized in East European and Soviet security issues. He was a visiting RAND research fellow at the Foundation for Science and Politics, Germany, in 1983–85. In recognition of his contribution in preserving the archives of the RFE/RL Polish service, Johnson received the Laurel Award from the prime minister of Poland in 2001 and a citation for Meritorious Service to Polish Culture from the Polish minister of culture in 1996. His publications include *Communicating with the World of Islam* (Hoover Press, 2008); "Security and Insecurity in the Balkans," in Klaus Lange and Leonid L. Fituni, eds., *Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation* (Hanns Seidel Stiftung, 2002). He coauthored *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (Crane Russak, 1982) and is the author of *The Yugoslav Military Elite* (RAND Corporation, 1977) and *The Transformation of Communist Ideology, the Yugoslav Case, 1945–1953* (MIT Press, 1972). He is the author of *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; the CIA Years and Beyond*, to be published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press in 2010, and co-editor of *Cold War International Broadcasting; a Collection of Papers and Documents*, to be published by the CEU Press in 2010.

EMIL HUREZEANU

- **Radio Free Europe and the End of Ceausescu’s Regime**

**Biography:**

For more than a decade, Emil Hurezeanu worked for the Romanian department of Radio Free Europe (1983-1994), at Munich. After 1985, he studied political science at the University of
Virginia and in 1990 he graduated from Boston University. In 1994, he was the director of the Romanian department of Radio Free Europe. Then, he worked as director of the Romanian section of the Deutsche Welle from Cologne (1995-2002). Having returned to Romania, in 2002, he collaborated with some of the most important TV stations and newspapers in the country. In 2009, he became director of the Realitatea-Cațavencu mass-media trust. He is author of several volumes of political essays.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK

● Gorbachev and the Road to 1989

Abstract:

The goal of my paper is twofold. First, to reappraise the remarkable noninvolvement of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’s leadership in the Eastern European affairs, even after it became clear that the communist leadership and structures in Eastern Europe were crumbling. Second, to explore linkages between the perestroika’s dynamics and the take-off of revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe. The main conclusion of the paper is that the logic of Gorbachev’s perestroika led simultaneously to the partial dismantling of the neo-Stalinist system in the Soviet Union, and to the emergence of a neo-messianic anti-Stalinist “new thinking” that sought to transcend the Yalta system and the bipolarity of the cold war. Before the revolutions in Eastern Europe even began, the domestic developments inside the Soviet Union dealt crushing blows to the legitimacy of the communist system, to the credibility of Soviet armed forces, and to the very ability of the Soviet leadership to use military force. Simultaneously, the deepening Soviet financial crisis and, most importantly, its growing discussion among the Soviet political elites, led to a consensus that the Soviet Union could not “bail out” any of the struggling communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The shift from the geopolitical discourse of cold war threats to the economic discourse of the “imperial burden” in Gorbachev’s entourage was one of most remarkable transformations, paving the way for “letting go of Eastern Europe.” All this makes us reappraise the role of Gorbachev’s personality in the revolutions of 1989. During that year, the paper argues, Gorbachev acted more as a consensus figure that it has been previously realized. In the party and military leadership, including the KGB, there were no forces ready to stop or prevent the revolutions in Eastern Europe.
Biography:

Vladislav Zubok, Professor, Department of History at Temple University, Philadelphia. Author of numerous articles and several books, including the prize-winning *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* with C. Pleshakov (Harvard University Press, 1996); *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (University of North Carolina Press, 2007); and *Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Harvard University Press, 2009). Director of the Carnegie Corporation’s funded international educational project: “Russia and the World in the 20th century” for junior faculty in humanities and social sciences from Russian regional universities. Former fellow of the National Security Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Consultant to The Likhachev Foundation in St. Petersburg.

TOM GALLAGHER

- **Incredible Voyage: Romania’s Communist Speculators Adapt and Survive After 1989**

Abstract:

In 1989 Romania witnessed a short-lived revolution that was quickly overtaken by the rise of a new leadership from within the ruling structures. An unpopular dictator was killed and the ruling Communist party speedily dissolved but real change remained elusive. Ion Iliescu, was the architect of a new hybrid political system with outwardly democratic features but which was designed in such a way as to foil any change that threatened the hold on power of the new elite. This paper will examine the mainly successful efforts of a speculator class to preserve much of its political influence and secure opportunities to acquire undreamt of wealth through using its dominance in the institutional life of Romania.

A new constitutional order was quickly devised on their terms by the post-communists after they had crushed a nascent opposition in elections held in the spring of 1990. The 1991 Constitution was full of ambiguities and contradictions which impeded effective government. But it enabled Iliescu and his allies to shape a political and economic order that was coming to terms with the end of single-party communism and a state-controlled economy.
There was breathtaking incompetence in the routine management of the state and political splits and infighting. But coherence was provided by a powerful secret police (a large portion of which dispersed into commercial activities) and a defunct party which remained a force through the myriad of connections drawing together second and third-level cadres. To this day, a disjuncture exists between visible processes of decision-making and subterranean forms which are in the hands of unseen and powerful groups.

In perhaps no other former Soviet satellite state have key segments of the communist-era elite been able, so effectively to manage a political transition to suit their political agenda as well as their private economic interests. Various strategies have been pursued to accomplish this end. The post-communist elite has remained determined to defend its primary sources of influence and control in the justice system. A bogus separation of powers has occurred which ensures that supposedly neutral pillars of the state remain subject to political interference. A large-scale and poorly performing bureaucracy is dominated by patronage structures.

But important changes have occurred in the composition of the post-communist oligarchy. Political power is no longer exercised by managers of state enterprises but instead by regional and city political bosses and top businessmen, their success continuing to rest on highly-placed political contacts and adherence to a code of behaviour ensuring the survival of an archipelago of political power adamantly opposed to being made accountable to democratic rules.

Another significant change was the decline of ultra-nationalists and their replacement as legitimizers of oligarchical rule by supposedly mainstream parties with whom a trans-class alliance was established after 2004 to repulse any attempts to alter the rules of power.

The Social Democratic Party, the lineal successor of the communist party has experimented with opposition and emerged reinforced by the experience due to the failure of its weaker rivals to uproot its sources of influence within the state. It has adapted itself to situations that appeared to pose a mortal danger to its survival: as well as opposition, privatisation of huge swathes of the state, entry into NATO, and engagement with the European Union. In its own terms, probably its greatest achievement was draining the process of Europeanization of nearly all progressive content and forcing the EU to accept Romania as its 27th member in 2007 on an extremely limited agenda of change. The EU now provides unparalleled opportunities for this
 adaptable elite to acquire fresh legitimacy, new sources of material wealth and perhaps even geopolitical leverage.

So, an unprincipled system built on terror and hypocrisy and later corruption has proven more resilient in Romania than perhaps anywhere else in Eastern Europe. The paper will explore the reasons for this and several of the consequences not just for Romania. It may not be going too far to surmise that ex-Communist elite has mutated and now enjoys a stronger position than it had for much of the communist period, including considerable influence in the West. This is a cause of concern not just for Romania but for a democratic trans-Atlantic community whose institutions it enjoys full membership of.

**Biography:**

Tom Gallagher is Professor of Ethnic Conflict and Peace at University of Bradford. Since 2005, he has been the Chair of the Research Unit for South-East-European Studies. He was actively involved in various NGO coordinated projects focused on the protection of minority rights and the development of local democracy in Romania. He is author of numerous academic articles and of several volumes on post-communist conflict, democratization, religious diversity in the Balkans and on the relationship between this region and the European Union. Among them are: *Theft of a Nation: Romania Since Communism* (Hurst & Co, 2005); *The Balkans in the New Millennium* (Routledge 2005); *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789 – 1989* (Routledge, 2001).


KONRAD JARAUSCH

● **Germany 1989: A New Kind of Revolution?**

**Abstract:**

My paper on will first explore the long and short term causes of the collapse of communism and discuss the mobilization of the democratic awakening in the GDR. Then it will go on to reconstruct the contention process of the revolution that turned out to be both peaceful and national. Finally, it will analyze on the consequences of transformation in the domestic and international realm, looking also at some of the problems of unification. The conclusion will formulate the thesis that the caesura of 1989/90 has been misunderstood because this was a new kind of revolution.

**Biography:**

Konrad H. Jarausch is Lurcy Professor of European Civilization at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Senior Fellow at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam/Germany. He has written or edited more than three dozen books on German and European history, most recently *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995* (Oxford
In late May 2008, the past came back to haunt Gregor Gysi. Marianne Birthler, the commissioner of Germany’s office for the disposition of the files of East Germany’s former state security service (Stasi) produced records that confirmed what had long been suspected: Gysi, the Bundestag Fraktionschef of Germany’s increasingly popular radical leftist party, Die Linke, had “knowingly and voluntarily” collaborated with the Stasi in 1979. This revelation led to a modest inter-party debate about Gysi’s suitability to be a member of parliament. Several members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) demanded his resignation. In response, Gysi argued that the case against him was based on a flawed understanding of the role of a lawyer in East Germany. But both he and his critics knew what the battle was really about. By 2008, Die Linke had become the fourth-largest party in the Bundestag and was an active presence in many of the Länder. Thus, all of Germany’s mainstream parties were pleased to transmute the accusations against Gysi into a compelling lesson for the voting public: Die Linke was unfit to govern, they argued, because its leaders were unwilling to come to terms with their sordid past. Not to be outdone, Die Linke’s leaders were equally opportunistic in reacting to these attacks. They sought to transform the Gysi case into “l’Affaire Gysi.” The governing parties were, as Gysi himself put it, “distraught by the success of [his] party” and desperately searching for ways to contain its ascendancy. For this reason, to his mind, the Stasi accusations were not about any single person. They were the opening salvos of an historic battle between the status quo parties of old Germany and a new vision of Germany’s future.

At least Gysi wanted us to believe that more salvos were coming. In fact, when the federal elections to the Bundestag took place a year and a-half later in September 2009 and Die Linke squared off against the CDU, Gysi’s Stasi connections came up briefly, but they were still only a blip on the radar compared to the weighty issues of domestic economic policy and foreign...
affairs that separated the two parties. For example, Karl Georg Wellmann, a CDU parliamentarian from Berlin, used the opportunity to equate Die Linke with the East German dictatorship: "They don't say the Stasi was so bad," he maintained. "They think the Wall had some good sides to it. Gysi worked for the Stasi ... in a high level position. I don't trust them, and a lot of Germans don't trust them." But this was not high politics. One way or another, it seemed, the prospects for an “Affaire Gysi,” had vanished.

Nonetheless, the fact that the event did not amount to all that it was promised to be does not mean that it was insignificant. For at least three reasons, this apparently unremarkable episode in the Federal Republic’s history can provide us with useful insight into the long, strange trip that the theme of “transitional justice” has taken since it first emerged as a burning issue in Eastern Europe in 1989. First, there is the matter of prediction. To listen to the experts back then, one could have assumed that a controversy like that surrounding Gysi would not even come up 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It could not be in the Federal Republic’s interest, we were told, to let the communist past get in the way of the full and efficient incorporation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the unified German state. Second, there is the issue of expectations. As interesting as the dispute over Gysi’s past may have been for those observers, such as this writer, who were looking for it, the eastern Europeans who engaged in the heated debates over the merits of transitional justice in 1989 and 1990 had anticipated much more. Whether they were in East Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague, the proponents and opponents of different forms of reckoning with the dictatorial past—criminal trials, political disqualification, property restitution, and truth commissions—had thought that they would be facing a gut-wrenching period of hard decisions and emotional anguish. Yet the attacks on Gysi promised about as much excitement as any routine debate in the Bundestag. Moreover, they were politically transparent, not transcendent. Finally, we must ponder the future. In the 1990s, the proponents of transitional justice in many, although by no means all, post-communist states had the satisfaction of seeing that measures of some kind were being taken to acknowledge past wrongs. But when one considers cases like the Gysi incident, it is hard to be confident that these issues will have any staying power. With every new generation, it seems as though the challenge for policymakers will be less to come to terms with a bygone age than simply to remember it.

In this essay, I propose to draw upon the events that led to the accusations against Gysi to make three general points about transitional justice. First, I will seek to explain why the
expectations of many learned observers about the post-communist future were frequently off the mark. Second, I hope to shed light on why many of these controversies have lost their fire in the 2000s. Finally, once I have considered these two points, I will pose a difficult question: Is transitional justice, once addressed, likely to be less and less relevant to the policy priorities for democratic regimes over time? As I shall suggest, the battles over specific instances of wrongdoing are likely to decline, but those that arise could prove to be illuminating indicators of deeper social and political cleavages in the post-communist world.

Biography:


KAROL SOLTAN

- 1989 and a Moderate Spirit for a New Modernity

Abstract:

In this paper I take a broader look at 1989, not at the year but at a broader historical period of which the year was the high point. The period can be said to begin in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power, followed in 1986 by the “People Power Revolution” in the Philippines, the miraculous year of 1989 in Europe and the tragic year of 1989 in China, then the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the end of the Cold War global system, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the Earth Summit in Rio, also in 1992. The end of the Cod War provoked a broader wave of democratization, whose other high point was the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa. It was roughly a decade of profound political transformation, for which the democratic election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 may serve as a symbolic end point. These events transformed the world. Seen in the broadest context I suggest they help us understand better what seems to be an ongoing transition to the next stage of modernity. They also help us articulate a coherent and ambitious moderate project of political reform for that next stage. I call it a project of civic moderation. Its chief components are:

1. The idea and ideal of civic society, a project now continued on the global scale, with the World Social Forum its global locus.
2. The color revolution model: a non-violent deep transformation led by a mass movement, which is not in fact a revolution. The Philippines and Poland were examples within this period. But just like the idea of a civic society this is now a global model, threatening dictators all over the world.
3. The EU project as a centerpiece of, and exemplar for, of the developing system of global governance.
4. Human rights and sustainable development as the twin goals for humanity, articulated both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Earth Charter, perhaps the most inclusive and elaborate initiative emerging from the global civic society, beginning with the preparations for the Earth Summit of 1992.

**Biography:**

Karol Edward Soltan is Associate Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland in College Park and Director of the Committee on Politics, Philosophy and Public Policy. His writing has centered on identifying the skills and values required for a civic awakening (arguing for a new discipline of civics: "Selznick and Civics" in Robert Kagan and Kenneth Winston, eds. Legality and Community [2002]), and on elaborating a militant or deep form of moderation (e.g. in "Constitutional Patriotism and Militant Moderation", International Journal of Constitutional Law, 6 (2008): 96-116). He has also occasionally practiced what he
preaches, including advising the Kurdistan Government in the constitutional negotiations in Iraq in 2005.

CORNEL BAN

● The “Long March” of European Social-Democracy: From Bad Godesberg to Wall Street (via the Berlin Wall)

Abstract:

How did 1989 affect European social-democracy? The main argument of the paper is that the ideological mainstreaming of West European social-democracy began well before the structural crisis of the former “Eastern Bloc” became apparent in the late 1980s. Thus, between the 1930s and the early 1970s, social-democratic parties had changed from mass parties committed to a parliamentary break with capitalism, to cross-class parties who accepted the ideas and institutions of postwar “embedded liberalism.” Yet the intellectual crisis of Keynesianism in the 1970s pushed social-democrats to seek new foundational ideas. The result was that the “gilded age” of social democracy ended and, by the mid 1980s, the new social-democratic mainstream was a combination of neoclassical economics and continued commitment to the welfare state. Yet even though the “miracle” of 1989 did not trigger this turn to social-liberalism, it nevertheless posed new challenges to social-democracy in Europe. First, in East-Central Europe communist successor parties made claims to membership in Western social-democratic networks, an operation that was fraught with myriad contradictions and organizational difficulties. Second, the economic opening of East-Central Europe added additional pressure on the institutions of the West European welfare state via labor and tax competition. The crisis of the neoliberal economic paradigm begun in 2008 is contemporaneous with the electoral crisis of social-democratic parties. In theory, this should be a critical juncture for scrapping Blairite “Third Way experiments and the forging of a more appealing and socially-sustainable social-democratic agenda. Yet the intellectual poverty of intellectual debates inside social-democratic parties, their self-defeating decoupling from their own militants and from organized labor and the emergence of new global competitors outside the Euro-Atlantic area offer little hope that the social-democratic project can be easily rescued in the new century.
**Biography:**

Cornel Ban, a PhD candidate in international relations and comparative politics at the University of Maryland, is currently a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown university. In addition to work on his dissertation, "Transnational Governance and Development Paradigms: Economic Liberalization in Postauthoritarian Spain and Romania," he will collaborate with Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Richard Synder on projects related to international development. He holds a JD from Babeş-Bolyai University Law School, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and a BA from Babeş-Bolyai University. His research focuses on novel forms of economic transnationalism, and particularly on the transnational diffusion of economic ideas during and after authoritarian rule. His most recent scholarly contribution was published in the fall 2009 issue of International Migration.

VICTOR ZASLAVSKY

- **The Long Death of the Italian Communist Party**

**Abstract:**

The decline of the influence of West European Communist parties has been underway since the early 1960’s. The long-term trends that determined this process ranged from the steady erosion of the working class constituency to the growing standards of living and successful social reforms implemented in Western Europe, in a stark contrast to the stagnating Soviet system. The attempts by major Communist parties in France, Italy, and Spain to reverse the trend by distancing themselves from the Soviet Union in favor of a new Eurocommunist model did not succeed. The underlying social transformation of European societies exhausted the programs and visions of the traditional Communist parties and determined their almost uninterrupted decline. In most of Western Europe, it was exacerbated by the 1989-91 period, when the Gorbachev introduced the *perestroika* policy and refused to use violence against demonstrations in Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the Italian Communist party (PCI) represented an exception in both the national and international contexts. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet collapse, most West European Communist parties devolved into marginal sectarian groups without political influence. The PCI, in contrast, managed not only to maintain the loyalty of its
electorate, but also to be reintegrated in the ranks of Socialist International. This peculiar development followed the disintegration of the Italian party system due to the revelation of massive corruption in the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties – the very parties that dominated the political scene during the post-war period and kept the PCI out of power. By adopting a new name and symbol, the PCI managed to survive the collapse of the Italian political establishment. As a result, during the decade after the Soviet collapse, the ex-PCI became the largest single party in various center-left coalitions and arrived at power as part of coalition governments of 1996-2001. This paper intends to explore this paradoxical outcome by analyzing the strategies employed by the PCI leadership to avoid the charges of political corruption and to join the forces of the European Left.

**Biography:**


**BOGDAN CRISTIAN IACOB**

• co-author *Communism and Nationalism in Romania Before and After 1989*

**Biography:**

Bogdan Cristian Iacob is Ph.D. candidate at Central European University, History Department, completing a dissertation with the title “Stalinism, Historians and the Nation in Romania (1955-1977)”. He was research fellow at the Center of Advanced Studies in Sofia, Center for Advanced Studies at Leipzig University, and the Center for the Study of Post-communist Societies at
University of Maryland (College Park). He is author of numerous articles in Romanian and English on history of communism, comparative ideologies, and transitional justice.

CHARLES GATI

● **discussant** for *1989 and the Legitimacy Crisis of Socialism* panel

**Biography:**

Adjunct Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies, School of Advanced International Studies/Johns Hopkins University. Formerly a senior advisor with the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State and professor at Union College and Columbia University. He is the author of *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (1986), for which he received his first Marshall Shulman Book Award in 1987, *The Bloc that Failed* (1990), and several other books as well as numerous articles in publications including *Foreign Affairs* and *The New York Times*. A study titled "If not Democracy, What?" was published in 1997. His latest book -- *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian revolt* -- appeared in 2006 in English, Hungarian, Polish, Slovak, and Russian and was awarded Dr. Gati's second Marshall Shulman Book Award in 2007.

MILLS KELLY

● **discussant** for *Intellectuals, Human Rights, and the Grammar of Dissent* panel

**Biography:**

Mills Kelly is Associate Professor in the Department of History and Art History and the Associate Director or the Center for History and New Media at George Mason University. During 2009, he is the Associate Dean for Enrollment Development in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences. He is the author of *Without Remorse: Czech National Socialism in Late-Habsburg Austria* (Boulder, 2006). He also wrote many reviews and academic articles on Eastern European history. His has been the co-director or PI of several major NEH-funded web projects in history among which are: Virtual Archive of Central European History, Webography Project, Hurricanearchive.org, World History Matters, Making the History of 1989. He is co-

CHARLES KING

- **discussant** for *Hopes, Illusions, Disenchantment* panel

**Biography:**


LAVINIA STAN

- **discussant** for *The Return of History* panel

**Biography:**

Lavinia Stan is Associate Professor at the Political Science Department of St. Francis Xavier University. In 2009, she participated in the project on "How the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes is dealt with in the member states” commissioned by the Directorate-General of Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Commission. In addition, together with Dr. Nadya Nedelsky, she started work on a two-volume *Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice* that will include over 300 entries on key academic terms, debates and controversies, countries, and transitional justice institutions. The Encyclopedia, on contract with Cambridge University Press, will be published in 2011. She also started working as co-editor for Europe for the peer-reviewed *Women's Studies International Journal*. She is author, co-author, editor of several volume among which: *Church, State and Democracy in the Expanding Europe* (Oxford University, 2009) and *Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania* (Oxford University Press, 2007) (co-author with Lucian Turcescu); and editor of *Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past* (Routledge, 2008). Also in 2009, together
with Dr. Lucian Turcescu I continue to hold a SSHRCC grant to study church-state relations in the enlarged European Union. This research study is on contract for publication with Oxford University Press in 2010.

MARCI SHORE

● Dissidents, Intellectuals and a New Generation (paper to be included in the participants’ welcome package)

Abstract:

“A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism,” wrote Marx and Engels in 1848. Yet communism, once no longer a spectre to come remained no less haunting a spectre from the past. The revolutions of 1989 were a wrinkle a time: time, seemingly halted for so long, suddenly leapt forward. The revolutions, too, were an opening of a Pandora’s box—and a vindication of Freud’s warning that the repressed would return. A certain parallel to Freud’s unconscious—that dark psychic closet into which everything too disturbing is thrown—has appeared in the communist archives. Freud, for his part, had no illusions that coaxing the contents of that psychic closet into consciousness would prove painless. And psychoanalysis, in sharp distinction to Marxism, never promised any happily ever after. In this sense, too, the revolutions of 1989 were rather Freudian: the opening of the archives has had a dark side and fall of communism has brought no happily ever after.

So, too, the dissidents’ seeming monopoly on truth could not sustain itself in the post-communist era. In March 1968, Barbara Toruńczyk was among the Warsaw university students arrested for taking part in demonstrations. Forty years later, the longtime editor of the formerly Paris-based journal Zeszyty Literackie published an open letter to the young Poles of the “new left.” She wrote about herself and her friends, who had grown up under the influence of Marxism and had gradually watched reality confront ideology. They grew fearful of the collectivist spirit and the desire for grand narratives. Their challenge, then, was how to abandon grand narratives without abandoning ethical values. They came under the influence of French existentialism and of the very best of the former Marxists like Jacek Kuroń and Leszek Kolakowski. It was Kołakowski, above all, who guarded them from nihilism, who insisted on always returning to ethics.
Barbara Toruńczyk dedicated this essay to a young man named Sławomir Sierakowski. Born in 1979, Sierakowski is among the leaders of Poland’s new left. And in fact this is a new left—not a post-communist left—whose core is composed of people now in their mid-to-late twenties, too young to have been fully formed by communism. In an open reply to Toruńczyk, Sierakowski wrote that Kołakowski in fact deserved criticism, for he failed to guard Toruńczyk’s generation from the “Hegelian bite”: in this case, a belief in Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.” Sierakowski added that naturally his generation often disagreed with Toruńczyk’s. “Surely,” he wrote, “this is because for us, contemporary capitalist Poland is not a point of arrival, but a point of departure. For you it’s a reward for years of battle against communism, for us it’s a challenge.”

This essay will focus on, in addition to Barbara Toruńczyk’s exchange with Sławomir Sierakowski, a handful of episodes in Czechoslovakia and Poland revealing of both the haunting return of the past and the generational tensions implicit in the attempts to grapple with that past.

Biography:
Marci Shore is Assistant Professor of history at Yale University. She is the author of Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918-1968 and the translator of Michał Głowiński's The Black Seasons. She is currently at work on two projects: The Self Laid Bare, an examination of the central European encounters occasioned by phenomenology and structuralism; and The Taste of Ashes, an account of Eastern Europe’s grappling with its memories of totalitarianism at the century’s end.