The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis

For most researchers probing the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cuban archives have been the final frontier—known to exist, undoubtedly critical, yet largely and tantalizingly out of reach. For a little more than two decades, even as important archives remained shut (except to a few favored scholars), Havana has occasionally and selectively released closed materials on the crisis, often in the context of international conferences. This process began with Cuban participation in a series of “critical oral history” conferences in 1989-92 with U.S. and Soviet (and then Russian) veterans of the events, which climaxed in a January 1992 gathering in Havana at which Fidel Castro not only participated actively during all four days of discussions but several times, with a figurative snap of the fingers, “declassified” important Cuban records.1

Ten years later, in October 2002, to mark the 40th anniversary of the crisis, Fidel Castro and the Cuban government again hosted an international assembly of scholars and former officials, co-organized with the National Security Archive (a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University) and Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies.2 For the conference (“La Crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 años despues”), in cooperation with the US co-sponsors, Cuba released hundreds of pages of additional documents pertaining to the events of the fall of 1962, from a variety of sources—party, military, intelligence, diplomatic, and more.3

While many of these materials have been made available to specialists in the original Spanish through the National Security Archive’s website and Digital Archive, only a handful have either been translated into English or published in any form. What follows below is a selection of some of the most significant, high-level materials made available by Cuba for the 2002 conference, which are appearing in English and in print for the first time. They include: a record of a meeting of Fidel Castro and his military commanders on 24 October 1962—the day the U.S. blockade (“quarantine”) of the island went into effect—as they discuss preparations for a potential American invasion; a chronology of Cuban contacts at the United Nations apparently prepared by Havana’s ambassador, Carlos Lechuga Hestia, and a bit of cable traffic between Lechuga and Cuba’s foreign minister, Raúl Roa, regarding a Brazilian “denuclearization” proposal to declare Latin America an atomic-free zone (offering a wider cover for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba); a report to Fidel Castro from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos regarding a conversation with Soviet (i.e., Nikita Khrushchev) emissary Anastas Mikoyan near the end of his three-week November 1962 stay in Cuba; a summary of Mikoyan’s subsequent conversation in Washington with US President John F. Kennedy, conveyed to the Cubans at the UN in New York by Moscow’s ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin; an internal report by communist party leader Blas Roca Calderío on his travels in Europe at the time of the crisis; and—perhaps most valuable for those seeking to understand Soviet-Cuban interactions after the crisis—a record of the conversation in Moscow in December 1962 between Nikita Khrushchev and a visiting Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, evidently the first face-to-face meeting between the Soviet leader and a senior Cuban communist figure since the Soviet leader’s decision to withdraw the missiles, a step taken without advance notice to or consultation with Havana that aroused consternation among the Cuban leadership and populace. (The last-mentioned document is particularly valuable since the Soviet version has yet to emerge from the Russian archives.)

While these documents are fascinating and important to understanding Cuban conduct, they unfortunately remain exceptional: Only a small percentage of the Cuban materials opened for the 2002 conference (or a predecessor in March 2001 to mark the 40th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs/Playa Giron events) dealt with top-level Cuban decision-making or exchanges with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Havana is not known to have made any further significant releases of historical documents on the 1962 crisis in the past decade, and as a result, far more materials have been available on the Soviet (and Soviet bloc) perspective on the events—especially the Mikoyan mission, detailed in the just-published book The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, which includes essentially the complete record of those November 1962 Soviet-Cuban exchanges from the Soviet side.4 This new book, in turn, builds on an already substantial record of Soviet materials previously (and now) made available, including scores of diplomatic cables from Moscow’s embassy in Havana published by the Cold War International History Project.5

Consequently, the Cuban side of the 1962 events—both the “October crisis” confrontation with the United States, and the ensuing Soviet-Cuban crisis over Khrushchev’s handling of the missiles’ removal—remains largely inaccessible due to continued restrictions on Cuban sources. Worse, from a Cuban perspective, this means that the most important accounts continue to interpret and reconstruct Havana’s actions (and Soviet-Cuban interactions) through the lens of other countries’ sources—from CIA reports to Soviet cables (and Russian memoirs) to the documents...
of many other nations, whether communist, neutral, or Western, that are represented in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. Judging from the documents printed below, further releases of Cuban material and openings of Cuban archives could add a valuable fresh perspective on this event beyond the documents of the opposing nuclear superpowers, and help inform a more balanced narrative of one of the twentieth century’s most significant episodes. -JH

★★★★

Record of Meeting of Fidel Castro and Military Chiefs, 24 October 1962

Important aspects contained in the information offered by the military chiefs, meeting on 24 October 1962, in the General Staff with Commander Fidel Castro.

Captain Pedro Luis (Information):

We believe that in case of aggression against us, the possibility of mobilization of United States forces would be between 5 and 6 divisions, and no more. They have 10 divisions, but it is not possible to deploy them all against us. These facts are interesting for making our operation plan, because we think that they might in the first step use 2 or 3 divisions that would be moved in 120 or 130 ships, a considerable amount of force that must be detected by us in time.

The American base at Key West [Florida] has been reinforced, and has acquired a quite interesting importance. Our opinion, based on the concrete facts that we have, is that there is no evidence of any immediate aggression against us – based on the information we have – but rather that they will enact the blockade, and if a grave situation should arise because of this, they have the possibility of moving between 4 and 5 divisions and launching them against us, but could not do this in fewer than six days. However, using the airborne division, they could move their first troops here in five or six hours. But if they move the 82

Captain Flavio Bravo (Operations):

A particularly interesting fact: according to the average mobilization, the permanent units were moved in 3 hours to their zones of concentration; the reduced divisions, from 8 to 9 hours; and the wartime divisions, from 12 to 13 hours, in less time than what was figured; and anti-landing divisions 2[unreadable] 2 hours.9 I suggest that the operation plan be made taking the following into account: first, the possibilities of the enemy in each army zone; later, the movements of forces, and last, the mutual aid between forces.

Commander Fidel Castro:

The reserve anti-aircraft batteries in Havana must be in such conditions that they can be moved when it is necessary. To lend mobility to the reserve batteries we need more trucks, and a further increase of 200 to the requested amount is needed.

The 30mm anti-aircraft guns are very effective weapons against landings, and have an enormous value, as they serve to fight on the coast, against infantry, airplanes, and everything; they are the weapons that can demolish the highest number of tactical aircraft. They should be concentrated in three points, at least 24 batteries in three points; not disorderly, but carefully placed, not in assigned places but so that they can be moved toward any other place.

I would have the reserve batteries in three groups, for example, to facilitate their removal in case it is necessary, since it is more difficult if they are widely dispersed.

The Artillery requires many trucks; the situation with the rocket launchers is fine but we must figure out those trucks. We can use the three for the rocket launchers, one for each;
for the Artillery Brigades, another three, and one for the Battalion of Tanks. Seven total.

Captain Flavio Bravo:

An idea that we have is that we must think through a reserve to cover the highways in case of immediate aggression, in order to move through them.

The most dire deficiency we have is in communications. Those that we should have are still coming by sea or leaving the Soviet Union. Our primary method of communications is telephones. With respect to communications, the air force in wartime will have great difficulties, and we want to draw attention to this. We have radio communications as well but there are many things yet to arrive that have not; they were expected between October and December, and this is a grave difficulty that comrade Chief of Communications knows well.

Commander Pedro Miret (Artillery):

All artillery groups that were ready to fight, occupying their zones of concentration within a time between one and one-and-a-half hours. The Brigades took a little longer, but the groups in general occupied their positions in this time.

All units were provided between 95 and 100% of both armaments and fleet. All units are provisioned with the modules that correspond to them.

With the fleet of Soviet rocket launchers, we have a problem with respect to transportation. We need some more trucks to move the munitions.

Commander Fidel Castro:

It is good that the weapons found in Ceiba del Agua have been moved. In SAU we are very poor in vehicles, because we have less than one full module. In 82mm mortars, we are a little short with 0.83 modules, however, there is a huge number of mortar projectiles.

To improve the supply of vehicles, we urgently need the roads from Managua repaired. Additionally, some 400 workers need to be located there for loading and unloading of packages in storage facilities. And at the same time, we must ask infantry units of the Army of the West to send trucks without personnel, only a driver and helper. I believe it is very important to facilitate mobility from the storage facilities, with strong people accustomed to carrying much weight.

We must be careful placing personnel in the storage facilities for explosives.

Yesterday ten enemy aircraft entered our national territory and examined Mariel and Baracea, some 10 km to the east, in two groups of two and two groups of three. They dropped to some 100 m above the ground and, once back on the coast, ascended to 3,000 meters.

Commander Alto Santamaría (Tanks):

Specifically, I believe the most serious weakness that we have among tanks, is that of the independent companies [2 lines redacted and part of a third] because they are very small units and to not have real control over them makes it difficult to have security in general.

Commander Rolando Díaz Aztarain (Marines):

Analyzing them quickly, regarding the combat preparation of the LT, we can say that they have made up to nine daily torpedo launches, but have not conducted any at night, since we are precisely in that stage of training. During the day, they can act completely, and at night also with reinforcement from the torpedo boats, but there has not been enough practice.

The frigates do not have personnel with very good experience in shooting artillery devices.

We consider one of the problems we have to be the lack of rapid coordination with our aviation and coastal forces to know the regions in which we can operate. It is highly necessary to establish this coordination.

The General Staff approved in the last few days some antiaircraft equipment for our bases, but they have not arrived yet. We have a concern about the base of Baneis; we need, at least, to have a battery in Baneis, one in Cienfuegos, another in Siguanea and also in Cabañas, primarily.

Commander Fidel Castro:

The one in Siguanea is not important; there you do not need anti-aircraft capabilities; for the others, yes. The two in Cabañas and the 30mm in Cienfuegos make three.

Captain Fausto Díaz (Communications):

For communications, the worst situation is that of Aviation. What they have are radio stations, fixed or mobile, but still taking them away from the fronts of battle. The worst in terms of this are Aviation and anti-landing battalions. Those battalions have some German stations that are not ideal for military uses, and they consume a great deal of current from the batteries.

I have a proposition regarding all this: there are two R-104 radio stations that the Headquarters of Artillery received. One can be given to the Independent Battalion of Tanks,
which does not have communications, and one taken away from the Services Command Post to give to the Anti-Landing Battalion. These stations are very secure, and these comrades do not need them right now.

Captain Joaquín Ordoqui (Services)

We are coordinating the problem of distribution of medicine with Public Health, and besides, developing plans to present to the Chief of General Staff, to see if they will let us use second-year medical students and promote them to the level of Nurses, now that they have some experience and are presently on vacation.

[One paragraph redacted]

Castro: We should do as much as possible to resume fumigation, because lacking that can damage us more than the enemy. I believe we should see how soon fumigation flights can be reestablished.

I think there are some of our zones into which we should not let pass the Yankee planes that are violating our territory. I believe we should study some zones and put good anti-aircraft weapons so that when they fly there we will be able to shoot them and bring them down, primarily with 30mm anti-aircraft guns and when they pass, in obvious places and in low flights, bring them down. We would have two or three sites, not all that close to the coast, where they would be over land and not say that we had taken down the aircraft in waters under their jurisdiction, and place aircraft-hunters there.10 We have no political reason, of any type or any kind, that prevents us from shooting down a plane that flies above us at 300 feet. If it’s still over the sea, one, three miles…fine, but anything flying here, we bring down, making sure it falls in our territory.

However, we should not give a general order, for we cannot have them shoot down one of our planes. I would look for four or five places and place four or five batteries in these sites, and give only to these crews orders to shoot at that moment. Concentrate batteries of 30mm guns in four or five places, and when a plane passes over these, flying low, “fry it.” We must establish good coordination to avoid the possibility of one of our planes passing over these sites.

It is necessary to start to fire some shots, because the [Americans] have a mess stirred up. Planes that are flying within our territory, at 200 feet, we must take them down. If they begin with the “little mess” we will start to fire, but controlled shots, because now they will begin flying Piper (planes) over our defenses.

[Source: Provided by the Cuban Government for the October 2002 Havana conference (“La Crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 años despues”) organized by the National Security Archive. Translated from Spanish for CWIHP by Chris Dunlap.]
suspension of medium and intermediate range ballistic missile plans in order to make a contribution to peace. He says that the US and USSR gave encouraging answers toward a peaceful solution.

27 — [Soviet UN Ambassador Valerian] Zorin and U Thant. U Thant stated: 1) Stevenson proposed inspection of ships on the high seas or in Cuban ports. Zorin said it was a matter for the Cuban government and that was a variation of U Thant’s proposition. 2) That an agreement had come about on Soviet ships not advancing into the blockade zone and US not intercepting Soviet ships. 3) That Dorticós’ words were a crucial point in the negotiations.

— It is said that Latin Americans will express to U Thant: a) the necessity of negotiation, b) denuclearization of Latin America, c) observers in Cuba.

— U Thant said, concerning the inspection of ships, that Zorin had rejected it because it was against peace-time law and that verification in Cuba was an issue for Cuba and meant a capitulation on construction of bases and assembly of planes, and that the Soviet Union said no more were being made there. About Khrushchev’s letter [to US President John F. Kennedy] referring to Cuba and Turkey, he confirmed that his reaction was positive. He said that their presence in Cuba would halt an invasion.

— [Mahmoud] Riad, [the ambassador] from the United Arab Republic [Egypt], said that the US insisted on the liquidation of the bases as a foundation for understanding and that they were prepared to give Cuba guarantees…Stevenson told him that observers were necessary but it would be preferable to the UN not only to have observers, but also a no-invasion guarantee.

28 — U Thant said that, during his stay in Cuba, “Radio Havana” lowered the pitch of its denunciations.

Journalist Donald Grant [of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch] said he had spoken with Clayton Fritchey, from the American mission [to the UN.] Fritchey said “that the policy of the CIA in Cuba had ended, that the letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev was the recognition of the social regime here; US would accept first four points and not the last for reasons of its own prestige, that they were ready to resume economic and diplomatic relations.

29 — Bulgarian Vice Minister of Foreign Relations told U Thant that Fidel’s letter had matched up with that of Khrushchev.

— U Thant introduced the issue of verification on the high seas by the Red Cross, neutrals, or the UN, to the Soviets. The USSR accepted Red Cross verification under the following conditions: cessation of the blockade; verification taking place on Soviet or neutral ships. U Thant said it would be better in the destination port and that Soviets had said it was a matter for Cuba.

1 November: Chile, Venezuela, and Ireland (and permanent Western powers) will oppose a long-term solution in the Security Council. Ghana and the UAR [Egypt] have asked for instructions.

1 — [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii V.] Kuznetsov says [Fidel Castro’s] 5 points make a good base for negotiation.

2 — US will take USSR acceptance of inspection as a precedent for disarmament and pressure it to accept the Western plan.

2 — Kuznetsov: U Thant’s idea was to propose a variation on inspection, considering not only Cuba but the entire Caribbean as an area of tension, and that UN troops would operate in the entire zone including the US. I suggest that to complicate the matter, some country should suggest inspection of Puerto Rico, Central America and the Panama Canal. Soviets do not have a clear idea on Council procedures.

2 — Arinos suggests that Cuba invite neutral ambassadors based in Havana, without prior warning, to resolve Cuba inspection issue. They would visit bases and after dismantling, make declarations in confirmation. He sees an advantage, that this would be the initiative of the Cuban government and not another from outside. He says this is his own idea and if it is accepted, he will convince Brazil to support it.

3 — Zorin explained to me that the idea of Red Cross inspection is not a Soviet one, but rather U Thant’s; as U Thant and Kennedy said yesterday, that the US had proposed three alternatives, namely UN, neutrals, or Red Cross, and that they preferred the Red Cross. The three ideas were proposed by the US to U Thant.

Lippmann and said that at present direct conversations between Cuba and the US were difficult, but later on, through Latin American positive influence they would happen, and Dorticós' support was a good foundation. He called it the "Dorticós alternative."

3 — The impression [exists] that socialist countries were worried about war and that they still are.

3 — Danish Ambassador [Aage Hessellund-Jensen] informed me that his Government asked Cuba to reconsider the negative vote on UN inspection because it would damage U Thant’s administration and that it was advisable to strengthen the UN for the defense of small countries. Urged Cuba to cooperate with the UN and said that UN intervention contributed to halting the crisis and it would be better to support the UN in future steps.

Nov. 4 — Irish Ambassador [Frederick H. Boland] said in conversation that he regarded as appropriate Cuba’s demand that US counterrevolutionary activities be stopped and that this increased tensions in the Caribbean and incited militaristic hysteria in American public opinion.

5 — U Thant consults with countries for the Council session. Also awaits the return of [Anastas] Mikoyan.

5 — In interview with [former] president of the Red Cross [and Swiss UN ambassador, Paul Rüegger], I was asked if Cuba accepted their inspections on the open seas. Said that US and USSR were in agreement and that our acceptance was missing. Agreed that Red Cross would select a group of inspectors from neutral countries and impartial people: that they would do inspections under the superior authority of the United Nations. Possibly they would use Swedish ships.

Nov. 7 — USSR mentions that inspection would be done within next five days. Impression in United Nations is that there is no time.

8 — U Thant confidentially proposed that accredited Latin American ambassadors in Cuba be invited by our government to visit bases and later make an informal declaration. His idea is that the group would continue afterwards to serve as a link between Cuba and the UN for a permanent solution. He believes this is crucial in getting the US to give guarantees, lift the blockade, and suspend its flights. U Thant has written an unsigned letter about this, but awaits a reaction. Last night he told me that the USSR and US reached an agreement that warships from the US would inspect Soviet ships carrying missiles on the way to the Soviet Union.

8 — Communicated the Red Cross’ answer. They will do no more inspection of Soviet ships going to Cuba. At the last minute, Red Cross said its constitution forbids carrying out inspection with its insignias and those of the UN would need to be used, because in practice they were the body doing the inspection.

Nov. 9 — Based on what Fidel told me, I will vote in favor of Brazil’s motion. Socialists will do the same as us.

10 — Brazil asked me to study an amendment to the motion. This came about because I said we objected to the reference to verification for the connotation it has right now. Socialists agree as they always favor denuclearized zones and will make a similar area in Europe as a precedent. They tell me they accept control or verification because it can be no other way. I see as positive the negotiations among Latin American countries because a door is being opened.

10 — Zorin reports to me that in the last meeting with Americans, they insisted on inspection and avoided giving guarantees; upon proposing some demands containing the five points, McCloy said that the hand of Castro lurked in the background.

10 — Arinos told me that in a meeting in New York between the US and other NATO countries, they said the possibility for future negotiations with Cuba exists, as well as for the resumption of diplomatic and economic relations.

10 — Algeria's ambassador said his Government will accept inspection in the Caribbean and not only Cuba. (Recently, others have done the same.)

10 — I have the impression that the US insists on inspection and shies away from giving guarantees so that they strengthen their negotiating position. It is very difficult that they incite worsening of the crisis. After the elections, public tension will dissipate, and after the missiles are withdrawn, the US lacks political justification. They seem to feel relieved by the agreement with the USSR. Every day their position in the UN is weaker as they try to win a political victory in this second stage.

10 — Regarding the Brazilian plan [for Latin American denuclearization], I understand that Puerto Rico and Panama must be mentioned specifically [as locations where the United
States cannot possess nuclear weapons]. Zorin told me his observations that the prohibition on bomb transport equipment must not be accepted, because they might apply to the ILUSHIN-18 that are in Cuba. He also affirms that nuclear weapon states must guarantee not to use such weapons against Latin America since the US can do so from their bases. This is also in [Polish foreign minister Adam] Rapacki’s plan for Central Europe.

10 — Letter from the president of Mali [Modibo Keïta] to Fidel stating he proposed to solve the crisis 1) expulsion of Cuban refugees from the US who propose invasion by American personnel, 2) lifting of the blockade, 3) cessation of the transport of nuclear weapons to Cuba. US and Cuba should submit themselves to UN arbitration.

11 — UAR ambassador [Mahmoud Riad] says that a group of 45 countries that made appeal to U Thant never acted as such a group, and that the majority of them feared displeasing the United States; the appeal was aimed toward peace and not solidarity with Cuba. Almost all of them presently agree with inspection to various degrees. The group has disintegrated. Chanderly [not further identified] also confirmed this to me. However, they can continue to use it.

Nov. 11 — I passed on an answer to U Thant at his request. He told me of the difficult situation in which the Soviets found themselves due to Khrushchev’s letter and the United States’ insistence. U Thant now proposes the same but with countries from different geographic areas, almost all from the group of Belgrade [i.e., the Non-Aligned Movement], and neutrals. He did not mention countries but proposed Guinea and Ghana from Black Africa, Mexico and Brazil from Latin America, Austria and Sweden from Europe, and reminded me that Sweden is opposed to the blockade; Indonesia and India for Asia and the UAR [Egypt] from the Arab nations. He will send a letter to Fidel so that, should he maintain his rejection of the inspection, considering the idea that those countries offer their “good offices” for a permanent solution to be a meritorious one. Then U Thant would talk with the United States about the two letters. It occurred to me that the acceptance of “good offices” will serve to nourish 5 points propaganda. The letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev refers to missiles, and no subsequent solution. Until something positive has been achieved, the Council will not be convened. [But] if there is no agreement on the high seas and the blockade continues, they are considering calling the Council anyway.

Nov. 12 — U Thant letter (previous)

12 — U Thant brought to my attention that now there would be no inspection, but rather verification. I told him the effects were the same.

12 — Seeking joint interview with the USSR and us for U Thant to present him with a protocol. Kuznetsov had the idea that he and I would go to see the Americans tonight to present the plan, and I told him no.

13 — Interview with U Thant. I talked about the protocol in general terms. The Soviets made modifications and I too (smaller ones) and until Havana is aware of it, I will not present it formally. I asked Kuznetsov not to see the Americans until I received confirmation. USSR anxious to conclude this as soon as possible.

13 — Connected to modification of the protocol. Changes to Article 12 for U Thant.

13 — Explanation by U Thant of Article 12.

14 — About Kuznetsov and modification and my criterion, by which it was substantially altered.

16 — Stevenson reacted harshly to Fidel’s declaration on flights over Cuba. He spoke of the absurdity that [Fidel?] would send a note in protest. Regarding the protocol he said it was unacceptable and stated that it contained the five points. Soviets said it was the basis for negotiation, Americans that they saw it as difficult. Zorin recalled that the Council had agreed on this after UAR and Ghana delegates had spoken.

16 — Modification of Brazil plan

17 — Arinos told me he would postpone voting on the plan.

17 — Kuznetsov with U Thant. U Thant told him that negotiations would be tripartite [i.e., US-Soviet-Cuban—ed.] through the UN. He spoke also on Article 12 of the protocol. U Thant said that he saw no problem in presenting his proposal on this issue if the parties could agree on eleven of the articles. He announced that he was developing a plan to create mobile verification groups for the UN, comprised of representatives of neutral countries approved by all parties. The headquarters would be in New York. Verification would occur in all places agreed on by the three parties. Each party would be able to send groups to determined locations on its own initiative, as would the Secretary General.
19 — [US negotiator John J.] McCloy's reaction on the protocol and other matters. (They suspended flights after Fidel's declaration, and also no more U2 [flights] going forward.)

19 — U Thant said that the president of the mobile groups will be a person of global stature accepted by all.

21 — U Thant gave me a letter for Fidel acknowledging receipt of his note from November 19. He noted that the Cuban government is prepared to withdraw its IL-28 bombers, and also that Cuba is open to a wide-ranging solution. U Thant expects to continue contact through me.

23 — To avoid the Council meeting and doing nothing, I suggested the possibility that U Thant give a boost to the idea of “good offices” with neutrals so that the matter stays within the auspices of the UN.

26 — US declaration plan.

26 — U Thant invited Mikoyan and the Soviets to dinner, and they asked that he also invite the Americans. Tomorrow I will have lunch with Mikoyan.

26 — I told U Thant that the Americans have said nothing about the documents that the Soviets gave them. In the past few days negotiation has taken place between the USSR and US without participation by the UN. I told U Thant and the Soviets that it was very important that the UN not lose control. Today, I repeated this to U Thant. The Americans have two alternatives for the proceedings to continue in the Council. One is that each party makes a declaration and the President summarizes them. The other would be to not hold a session and send written documents then gather them in a dossier. The Americans submitted this idea to the Soviets. I asked U Thant if now there might be an opportunity to obtain a letter about the neutrals. He told me he would include it in his report.

Nov. 29 — Soviets trying to make a similar declaration with the Americans that contains minimum points. If they succeed, they will write a second one about the matters on which there is no agreement, supporting the 5 points.

Dec. 4 — I gave the Cuban declaration plan to U Thant in case there is agreement among the three parties.

5 — Soviets and Americans — two interviews. One six hours long with McCloy and Yost [Yost] and another last night with Stevenson. Nothing. I told K. to think about a date for the Council and that the topic was losing steam in public opinion. The Americans continue flights and don’t promise anything. I told U Thant the same thing.

5 — About proceedings and differences.

7 — American modifications to the plan. Suppressed reference to the Treaty of Rio.

7 — Brazil will postpone the Latin American group meeting.

10 — USSR supports Cuban plan to read [to] Council.

13 — US will today present its joint declaration plan to the USSR on behalf of both countries.

19 — I asked U Thant to make an appeal in his letter with documents for the president of the Council and not consider the Caribbean crisis to be concluded. I told the Soviets to ask this of U Thant also.

19 — Americans have not accepted any procedure. They are waiting for Kennedy to return from the Bahamas [where he was meeting UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan]. It is possible they will accept something, but will add other documents. McCloy told us that he did not wish for the USSR to send its letter from October 27, because Kennedy did not refer to it in his own letter.

3 January 1963 — Americans say if USSR sends letter from October 27 and 28 then they will send additional documents. New Soviet proposal is that US and USSR not send any documents to the UN Security Council, but rather a letter. McCloy’s observation in the letter was that the Caribbean area was mentioned, and not Cuba.

4 January — Americans accept Soviet proposition to send only one document and noted some modifications. McCloy submitted the modified document today.

5 January — Moscow accepted modifications.

7 — US and USSR agree to send document tonight after 8 pm or tomorrow morning. They will not go in person. We will wait but turn in ours in person. In my judgment they will send it because if they go alone they will have to (THERE ARE WORDS HERE THAT I CANNOT MAKE OUT.
THEY ARE TWO SHORT WORDS) [in original—trans. 13]
and since Cuba is alone, it will go alone.

7—Documents will be submitted today [at] 5 pm and to propaganda at 8 pm.

10 — Very cordially, I explained to U Thant that his proposal concerning informal (or unofficial) invitation, besides being an abdication of our position on principle, is futile, since the Yankee government is inspecting Soviet ships, and it is known that the dismantling and packing have concluded, and they are now making their departures.

11—Government opposes inspection. It is auspicious that efforts will lead to permanent solution and in agreement that U Thant send confidential letter along the lines indicated. Even though they are opposed to returning planes, we have reached agreement with the USSR that demands an end to the blockade in exchange for their withdrawal.

Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Amb. Carlos M. Lechuga), New York, 10 November 1962

Republic of Cuba
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Secretariat of the Minister
11 November 1962
CLASSIFIED
Cuba Mission to the UN

Very cordially, I explained to U Thant 14 that his proposal concerning informal [i.e. unofficial—trans.] invitation [sic: i.e., inspection—trans./ed.], besides being an abdication of our position on principle, is futile, since the Yankee government is inspecting Soviet ships, and it is known that the dismantling and packing have concluded, and they are now making their departures. On the other hand, so that you may decide your course of action, informed visitors represent countries that are practically on the side of the enemy.

Regarding the Brazilian project [i.e. draft—ed.], await instructions from the government. Regards.

Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York, 11 November 1962

Republic of Cuba
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Secretariat of the Minister
11 November 1962
CLASSIFIED
Cuba Mission to the UN

Government resolved to present following amendments to Brazilian proposal. First: Specifically include Puerto Rico and Panama Canal Zone as territories with the objective of denuclearization. Second: Guarantees from nuclear powers – should give guarantees not to deploy bombs against Latin America. Third: Withdrawal of all existing military bases in Latin American territory and Africa belonging to nuclear powers. This, obviously, includes Guantánamo. Explicit instructions to discuss and negotiate amendments (mentioned) first and second. Inflexible attitude around third amendment related to bases. In case it is not accepted Cuba will vote “abstention”, explaining that although it may be in essential agreement with the substance of the motion, it cannot vote for it because [the] Cuban amendment is not included. Friendly and explanatory arguments and language for Brazil. Absurd that other nuclear powers cannot have bases in Latin America and the United States has one in Cuba. A promise not to use Guantánamo as a nuclear base is not enough, because it lacks effective validity. Regards, ROA

11 November 1962
Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York, 20 November 1962

Republic of Cuba
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Secretariat of the Minister
20 November 1962

Acting in a coordinated fashion with Soviet delegation on Brazil proposal. Insist with [Brazilian UN Amb. Afonso] Arinos [de Mello Franco] on inclusion of our points of view and if not, present them as amendments. Essential to demand nuclear powers promise not to have bases in Latin America and guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against it. Obtain formulation of paragraph [illegible, one letter or number] of Article Two, the part on devices, to avoid characterizing these devices, and vehicles for air and naval launches, as nuclear weapons when they are not. [Excised] Establishing a denuclearized zone is worth nothing without guarantees against the only nuclear power on the continent. Remember a fundamental point is withdrawal of military bases by nuclear powers. In any case, it should be asked that voting on the resolution be separate, the goal being to vote affirmatively on whatever position or abstain. If the resolution excludes Cuban concerns vote against position according to agreed terms. Send word of the situation to receive final instructions. In truth, it does not interest us to push the Brazilian proposal. [5] [Soviet politburo member Anastas] Mikoyan stated that USSR and USA have agreed that after announcement to retire [IL-28] bombers [illegible] they will do so within a month’s time. We have expressed our non-opposition to this. Prepared to consider U Thant proposal on Article Twelve, always within the general and permanent solution envisioned in the protocol project.

ROA

[Source: Provided by the Cuban Government for the October 2002 Havana conference (“La Crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 anos despues”) organized by the National Security Archive. Translated from Spanish for CWIHP by Chris Dunlap.]
Comrade Fidel:

Here I will inform you about the conversation with comrade Mikoyan last night when he paid a visit to my house. This visit was announced to me by the USSR’s ambassador to Cuba, comrade [Alexander] Alexeiev [Alexeyev], who told me that Mikoyan wished to greet me in the presence of my family.

I thought this was a visit for pure reasons of courtesy, because by way of my presence in the USSR as the Cuban ambassador, I met him and we got together countless times, and I befriended his son Sergo, but Mikoyan quickly began to talk about the USSR’s position with respect to the decision taken on the Cuban problem.

I began to talk about his trip to Santiago [de Cuba] and his return that was barely an hour later, but he immediately jumped to the topic of discussion.

First, he made a long statement, and upon finishing, I indicated to him that I already knew, through reports of the comrades in the Secretariat and by those which he too had learned our points of view. [several lines excised]

Immediately a dialogue developed, the essence of which – and what Mikoyan primarily expressed – are the following:

**Position of the USSR with respect to Cuba:** “Humanity has been freed from a catastrophic war, and Cuba from its complete liquidation. It must be understood that the situation has improved for Cuba. The missiles accomplished their task. We thought about six months beforehand; then Cuba had no missiles and there was the danger of an immediate invasion. The problem was stopping the aggressors, and this has been accomplished in Kennedy’s promise not to invade Cuba. We must believe this promise. Besides, in the next election, he will doubtlessly be reelected and will need to keep his word. So we think Cuba will not have problems for the next five or six years.”

“If Cuba is assaulted in another way, it must be understood that the USSR will retaliate in other parts of the world in which the Americans are very interested, and other points closer to the USSR. Cuba is far from the USSR and close to the USA. But those other important parts of the world are close to the USSR and far from the United States, say, Laos or Berlin.”

“In Berlin they are in a mousetrap; we have them in a fist. With just some artillery and a few tanks, we will crush them. If not having the missiles in Cuba ceases to be an advantage, (this answer to one of my questions remained unclear, despite my insistence on it. I don’t know if the translator is at fault or if Mikoyan preferred leaving it this way.) we must tally what has been achieved regarding the guarantees not to invade Cuba from the United States. And the USSR does not need bases near the United States, as its missile forces are powerful and precise enough to strike the enemy in any place in the world from within the USSR’s own territory. Recall that Khrushchev said that the precision of our technology permits us to hit a bull’s-eye on a point situated out in the cosmos. However, what was the situation of that military advantage over the United States? Our missile bases in Cuba, having been discovered by the USA and become perfectly known to them. This situation allowed them to destroy the missile bases before they could be used. Therefore, there was not such an advantage.”

And if they had not discovered those bases, do you think that advantage would exist?

“If they had not been discovered, it would be as if they did not exist. The situation would have been different as it would not have produced the crisis. Talking about this point, one can reach the conclusion that Mikoyan tried to indicate that the USSR transferred and installed missiles in Cuba thinking not of using them, but rather as a political maneuver. And that they proceeded to install them in a way that allowed the US to discover them.”

“The moment of liquidating imperialism has not come. The fate of imperialism and socialism is not tied up in a war. This goes against our principles, against all those on which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union bases its fight. Peaceful coexistence is the path to follow for the development of humanity toward socialism and the defeat of imperialism. The ideas of communism are not carried on bayonets. Communism is not imposed by cannon fire or nuclear bombs. Our guarantee or assurance that war can be avoided, that imperialism can be stopped, is in our military strength. It is clear that if we did not have that military power, the situation would be different and we would have war instead.”

“We have large missile installations. They are very costly, because they are made deep under the ground, but we have already made them. We can affirm that the immense territory of the USSR ends up being inappropriate for such installations. Here is our assurance in what we say. The cause of communism has emerged stronger after this proof.”

[Approximately 27 lines excised]

[14 characters excised] - “The outcome of the crisis in Cuba will help the movements of liberation. Our line for peaceful coexistence is correct. Before, the men of the USSR could not go to Africa. But today it has relations with many of these countries, and one encounters our technicians and
diplomats there. Right now there are Soviets in Cuba. Could anyone have imagined this?"

[Approximately 11 lines excised]

This is in general what was said by Mikoyan during an hour and a half of conversation and brought together here to the extent that our memory could recall.

COUNTRY OR DEATH, WE WILL WIN!
Fraternally,
[signed:] F Chomón

[Source: Provided by the Cuban Government for the October 2002 Havana conference ("La Crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 años despues") organized by the National Security Archive. Translated from Spanish for CWIHP by Chris Dunlap.]

Letter from Cuban Communist Party leader Blas Roca Calderio, Passed by Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos to Emilio Aragones, 27 November 1962

Havana, November 27, 1962
“YEAR OF PLANNING”

To Capt. Emilio Aragones

I send to you, enclosed, a copy of the letter sent by Comrade Blas Roca for your knowledge.

Fraternally, HOMELAND OR DEATH
WE WILL WIN
Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado

[Letter from Blas Roca16:]

In Copenhagen, I did not state in my speech, nor in any declaration, that peace could have been saved. I don’t know how this version was given or who might have thought it. A French journalist from Le Monde asked me for an interview, but I did not grant one. I did a television interview, but all the questions were insinuating and the main interest seemed to be David Salvador.17 I said a few words to another local journalist in Copenhagen before the meeting began, but at no time did I use a phrasing that would reflect my thoughts to even a minimal degree.

Despite the fact that since I left Cuba I have not had information or even received the HOY newspaper or any other, my principal interpretations of the crisis have aligned fully with those of the National Leadership. My opinions and words, up to and including in many details, coincided with what I have seen since in the newspapers and Fidel [Castro]’s speeches. I am in complete agreement with what I have learned of the interpretations and points of view of the National Leadership, and also with the attitude that leadership has adopted in the face of the crisis.

I agree entirely with the opposition to any kind of UN commission, or that of any other organization, inspecting Cuba. Cuba does not need to be inspected. The United States, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua should be inspected, and other countries that violate rules and principles of international law and the UN Charter itself – they have been organizing, arming and conducting mercenary invasions from their territories against Cuba and today they train mercenaries, arm pirate ships, infiltrate saboteurs and assassins, etc. Cuba has not violated any principle, rule, or international law. It had the right to arm itself and did so. It had the right to install atomic weapons, and installed them.

I agree completely with the FIVE POINTS presented by Fidel [on 28 October 1962]. Only if they are fulfilled by the United States, those Five Points will create relative security if that nation disarms the apparatus of the military invasion of Cuba. Achieving these Five Points would give us a decided advantage in the entire situation. The most important – and what I consider among the greatest probability of success – is the withdrawal of the [US] naval base at Guantánamo. The incongruence of the existence of the base in the current status of relations between Cuba and the United States has been made quite obvious.

This base today lacks its value for defense of the Panama Canal. Its only value is as 1) a point of support for aggression toward Cuba and center of hostility to our country, 2) a point of departure for primitive and interventionist actions against Venezuela, Colombia, the Guyanas, Brazil, and the Caribbean islands. 3) A calm sea for training and teaching. The existence of the base is a point of friction more dangerous to the United States’ troops than for us. It is inconceivable that troops would now leave from that base to intervene in Venezuela or whatever Caribbean nation. The American leaders understand very well that this base, surrounded by well-armed enemy troops, is ineffective and dangerous for its occupants. Can you imagine what we would have to do in this situation?

The other points, save that concerning the economic freeze [i.e., embargo—ed.], ask the United States to stop
committing crimes and inadmissible acts under international law, and actions contrary to explicit laws of the United States itself. The economic freeze, or, better put, the suspension of all import and export trade with Cuba, in spite of its absolute lack of morality, has a certain foundation in the fact that each country is free to trade or not trade with another, to have diplomatic relations or not. To maintain the suspension of import and export trade with Cuba is to maintain economic aggression. To keep economic aggression is to keep the door open to military aggression.

Even so, I see no possibility that this kind of aggression might cease, unless the leaders[hip] of the United States does a U-turn and tries to establish similar relations with Cuba as they have with Yugoslavia and with the same ends, if they have some hope for a similar arrangement.

But as I see things, this is not likely. With the exception of the cardinal difference between our leadership and the Yugoslavian one, of course, here I have only thought of the ideas that might move [US President John F.] Kennedy. The United States must try to defeat the Cuban Revolution so that no doubt remains among Latin American nations that the path of Cuba cannot be taken. The US cannot renounce the fight against the Cuban Revolution in the same way that we cannot give up the struggle against capitalism. The problem is that of the forms of conflict. Effectively, the US turning to invasion can be avoided. There are many reasons for this:

FIRST: Invasion leads to world war, which would mean risking everything for Cuba.

SECOND: The socialist camp is stronger and its strength is a significant factor – precisely against invasion, when faced with the prospect of war.

THIRD: Invasion of Cuba is costly in terms of life for the Yankees because Cuba is well armed and prepared to defend itself with the spirit of Homeland or Death.

FOURTH: It is not possible at this stage to carry out an invasion that would quickly triumph. No matter how much the invasion drags out, its results would be uncertain and problematic, even in the case that it did not lead – as it would [certainly] lead – to world war.

FIFTH: The invasion of Cuba, as soon as it unfolds, would unleash a series of anti-American actions in Latin American countries as well as others in the world. This crisis, despite its brevity, led to the destruction of American property, businesses, and institutions in various Latin American countries. If it had taken even one week longer, what happened in Venezuela would have been equaled or surpassed in many countries.

These factors can weigh decisively in the intentions of the Yankee leaders to obligate them to accept and respect the promise of non-invasion of Cuba.

But what they cannot seriously promise is not to seek many other ways of fighting against the Cuban Revolution, in hopes of diverting, corrupting, or crushing it.

I am in complete agreement with the way that comrade Fidel set out the matter of our relations and discrepancies [i.e., divergences—ed.] with the Soviet Union. We have much to be grateful for from the USSR and we are thankful. We know of the respect that they have shown for our sovereignty and the rights of our State. We are identified with them in the ideal of socialism and communism and the theory of Marxism-Leninism. We trust in their Government, in their Party and in their people. We are brothers, bosom friends. But even between brothers and friends, differences arise. As we have done, we wish to overcome these differences within the framework of fraternal discussion, direct and private, or semi-private, since the differences are very obvious and the points of view of all concerned are well enough known.

Frank, brotherly discussion of differences should lead us to strengthen our relations, to make them better, and to make unity stronger. This is how I have viewed and interpreted Fidel’s statements. Cuba, in the socialist camp, means a great deal. It is the beginning of the Revolution in Latin America. It is the first hedge against the United States, the center of great influence over still-undecided governments of Asia and Africa. At the same time, the socialist camp means a great deal to Cuba. It means weapons, breaking the economic blockade, facilitating the construction of socialism to the maximum extent. It means, in a word, the guarantee of economic and social victory in the shortest time possible and with the fewest possible sacrifices. That is why Fidel’s position, which I share from the heart, is so wise and fair, and so Marxist-Leninist.

I share the point of view that we have no reason to trust in Kennedy’s statements. I have previously stated the reasons I believe a non-invasion pledge to be possible. These reasons make the promise possible, but it also could be that no such promise is made.

I share the justified feeling of affront at the fact that the Cuban government was not previously informed [by Khrushchev] of the step that would be taken. Even more seriously, the necessity of relying upon the Cuban government was not stated in the document. I consider even worse the fact that the Soviet document would accept in principle inspection within Cuba, despite Cuba’s categorical rejection of the same
for solid and sensible reasons. Apparently, there is no solution for this besides accepting what would satisfy the Soviet government, guaranteeing us in the future that it would not happen under any circumstances, and fighting together for the FIVE POINTS of guarantee against direct military aggression by the United States against Cuba. Of course, I believe that, with firmness and good sense, resolute opposition to inspection must be maintained, whether in Cuban territory or Cuban waters.

My primary reaction to the problem of the provocative Yankee flights is to shoot down the planes. The brazen Yankees exploit the USSR’s eagerness for peace and Cuba’s good sense to commit these unspeakable acts of abuse. The only thing that goes against my first reaction is that previously, we have tolerated these flights and starting to shoot down planes now could appear to be a desire to provoke a situation that would make agreement impossible. And we must be very careful not to give that impression. Our policy does not make difficult—or impossible—any valid and worthy accord in favor of Peace. Our opposition to inspection defends Peace, because if Cuba gives up its sovereignty and declares itself defeated by the United States, there cannot be peace in the world. Some impatient people say: “Inspection is not important.” “You all decide what countries would [make up the inspection authority]” … “That will make an agreement easier…”

We say: No. This will not make an agreement easier; it will only make countless new, humiliating petitions presented by the United States easier. Inspection is important because if we accede to it, the United States will present themselves [i.e., itself] as victorious and omnipotent. It will not facilitate an agreement because inspection is not necessary to prove that the bases were dismantled and missiles withdrawn. We would not choose the countries or the personnel. We would have to accept countries that the United States finds acceptable; the United States would, in reality, choose the personnel. In the inspection debate, something similar happens to that concerning control and disarmament. The United States backs control, and the USSR opts for disarmament.

Many believe that the USSR should have agreed to control measures sought by the United States because it would not agree to guarantee an immediate agreement on disarmament. It is not so. Accepting control as the United States wishes is to make disarmament more difficult and accelerate preparations for war. Going along with inspection is to speed up the march to a situation advantageous to the imperialists that also would bring us closer to war. In [East] Germany, I visited the Soviet ambassador [Mikhail] Pervukhin to sort out matters concerning the trip to Moscow, before receiving any indication that it should not be done.

In the conversation, the crisis became the main topic. I said:

It has been very dire that the USSR did not previously warn Cuba about its determination [to remove the missiles] and that the message [from Khrushchev to Kennedy] did not take the government of Cuba into account. More serious yet is that the message discusses inspection, when it is known that Cuba will not accept this in any way. I believe the crisis could have gone another way that would have given us advantages and guarantees for the peace and integrity of Cuba. The solution reached is no victory: it is a compromise and we should see it as such.

In Prague, I talked with Caderca (in the same airport), with Hendrix, with the leaders of the International Journal, Soboliev and Rumiantsev. In these conversations I stated the same thing, with a heavier emphasis on one matter or another, according to the conflict most pertinent to the argument. With Caderca, for example, the subject was that we could not consider it a victory, but rather a compromise. With Hendrix, it was that I thought bringing Soviet cruise ships to the Caribbean and having merchant vessels cross under their protection would not provoke war. Hendrix was laconic in his expressions and told me that the Czech government supported the FIVE POINTS of Fidel. The [East] Germans, in a not very explicit way, led me to understand the same. They believed that the course that the crisis had taken delayed the solution to the Berlin crisis. They also showed a great deal of interest in the normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

In conclusion, here I have done as much as I could in the middle of a complex situation in which I, unfortunately, lacked reports, sometimes of the most basic kind, since the lack of language hindered me from seeing information in the press directly and in its entirety.

With regards and an embrace, Blas.

[Source: Provided by the Cuban Government for the October 2002 Havana conference (“La Crisis de Octubre: Una visión política 40 años después”) organized by the National Security Archive; translation from Spanish for CWIHP by Christopher Dunlap.]

Confidential Memo from Cuban Mission to the United Nations Concerning Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations with US President John F. Kennedy (and Secretary of State Dean Rusk), 2 December 1962, with cover note from Cuban President
Dorticos to Foreign Minister Roa, 5 December 1962

5 December 1962

Havana, 5 December 1962

“YEAR OF PLANNING”

To Dr. Raúl Roa García

I am returning the confidential memo from 2 December, directed to you regarding the interview of Mikoyan with Kennedy.

Fraternally,

HOMELAND OR DEATH, WE WILL WIN

Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado

永久使命: 五角大楼，12月 2日

Raúl:

Mikoyan sent to New York the USSR’s ambassador in Washington, Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin], so that he might inform us about his interview with Kennedy.

The version is the following:

Mikoyan spoke extensively on his visit to Cuba. He said the Revolution had accomplished many tasks, and especially pointed out the schools and hospitals, referring also to production. He stated that Fidel Castro concerned himself very much with the people and spoke of the public atmosphere that exists in Cuba, and of support for the Government.

Kennedy made no comment. He only expressed “that he was pleased [that] Castro worried about the people.” Immediately after, he stated that the Cuban government continued a plan of subversion within Latin America and that this behavior greatly worried the United States government.

Mikoyan spoke of Cuba’s distrust of “American imperialism” (they told me he had used that expression) and blamed the USA for the crisis in relations with Cuba. He added that the project [i.e., draft—ed.] of the US declaration before the Security Council is not satisfactory because it cancels, in practice, American obligations emerging from the exchange of messages between Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Kennedy said that the idea of agreeing on the three declarations before the Security Council is generally not acceptable because they cannot vote for Cuba’s declaration and Cuba was not going to vote for that of the United States. He said it would be better not to arrive at similar declarations and limit the process to U Thant taking note of the declarations from the USSR and USA, without any voting by the Security Council. He also suggested not going to the Council in any form – neither to the session, nor to the proceedings through U Thant – but rather producing the declarations, he in Washington and Khrushchev in Moscow.

Mikoyan rejected the idea and said it would be better to go to the Council and continue negotiations between the Soviets and the Americans, and between the Soviets and us [Cubans] in New York.

Kennedy stated that if they went to the Council they would have to mention the Rio de Janeiro Pact and inter-American obligations because the USA and the other Latin American countries were signatories of that Pact.

Mikoyan (said) that the Rio Pact could not be mentioned because it is not the object of the negotiations, and besides, the USA might facilitate separation of Cuba from the OAS. “Therefore, the USA does not have the right to mention the Pact in this situation.”

Kennedy stated that the Soviets wanted to receive an official document from the USA that promised not for two months, but for two years, which is what remains of his presidency, or for six years if he is reelected. The USA had to guarantee to the Western Hemisphere (countries) that the USSR would not send missiles to Cuba again and that Cuba would not carry out acts of subversion in Latin America. He added that in this situation (the USA) feels obligated to fly over Cuban territory, even though the USSR criticizes them for doing so. He then showed a newspaper clipping in which it was said that Cuba was still hiding some Soviet missiles, and asked Mikoyan, “What would you do in my position after reading this allegation?”

Mikoyan said that this all seemed like the talk of crazy men, and expressed his confidence that the USA would not be swayed by such foolishness.

Kennedy laughed, but did not comment.

Mikoyan related that Fidel asked him in Cuba: with what right does Kennedy or the USA speak of attacking Cuba? What law lets them fly over our territory?

Kennedy did not answer.
Mikoyan declared that the USSR would never accept the American “right” to interfere with these flights, as this was against international law.

Kennedy said they would not carry out any more low-altitude flights, but that higher flights would continue.

Mikoyan responded that low flights were an act of blatant piracy, and the rest were piracy in the high skies. He added that if the USA had suspicions, that they should accept multilateral inspection (of Cuba.). He stated that Fidel had accepted it because it involved a basis of reciprocity, and that was a proposition by U Thant. In that way, he said, the USA could assure themselves that Cuba was not subverting order in Latin America, a charge that he rejected. He added that Cuba could also talk of subversion in its territory, not only by the United States but also by other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Continuing the conversation, he mentioned that the additional propositions contained in the declarations of the USA before the Security Council did not appear in Kennedy’s messages, and it seemed that the USA was attempting to reject the results of the negotiations. “It appears that the USA doesn’t want to put out all the sparks in the fire, and we want to resolve this matter as soon as possible in order to be able to move on to other problems and resolve them too. What can I tell Khrushchev? Do I tell him that you are going to fulfill the obligations you have laid out, or that you don’t intend to?”

Kennedy said that it seemed that the translator had not summarized his observations well, and that he was prepared to reiterate the promise of no Cuban invasion, but that there were some difficulties in the editing of the text. “We will give instructions to Stevenson and you give them to Kuznetsov, so that conversations in New York on this matter can continue.”

In the interview of Mikoyan with Dean Rusk, the next day, the Cuban issue was not discussed. They discussed nuclear tests and other matters. Rusk, however, spoke of Brazil’s proposal to denuclearize Latin America. (He said the same as [Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin M.] Martin to the Brazilian ambassador [to the United States Roberto de Oliveira] Campos, whom I informed in a recent confidential memo.)

Rusk told Mikoyan that they were prepared to add Guantanamo and the Panama Canal to Brazil’s resolution for a territory free of nuclear weapons, with the only reservation being that the USA could use the Canal to transport nuclear arms from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or vice versa.

[Source: Provided by the Cuban Government for the October 2002 Havana conference (“La Crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 anos despues”) organized by the National Security Archive. Translated from Spanish for CWIHP by Chris Dunlap.]
but we have seen how we had arrived at the end victorious, suddenly your rude war and spend enormous sums of money, when we believed Cuba, the effort that brought us to move men, weapons, risk made an extraordinary effort by situating the missiles in egg on the enemies, who are strong.

"sense of moderation."

However, we must not get excited. It is necessary to show a to place our missiles there. We accomplished our objective. that the attack would come, and because of that we decided to answer them, though they have used even the press organs closest to Kennedy. Why not? Because if we were to use brusque arguments to answer them, if we were to show that we had won a victory and boasted too much about it, those arguments would work against Kennedy and not allow him to develop his policies, making him feel obligated to threaten Cuba again.

But what is fundamental is this: We have achieved our bottom line. Let us ask ourselves: Why did they not attack Cuba? The only answer is: because of the missiles. We were certain that the attack would come, and because of that we decided to place our missiles there. We accomplished our objective. However, we must not get excited. It is necessary to show a “sense of moderation.”

Cuba is in a different situation. Cuba can shout more. However, speaking frankly, we do not think it is necessary to egg on the enemies, who are strong.

We have become bitter about the fact that after having made an extraordinary effort by situating the missiles in Cuba, the effort that brought us to move men, weapons, risk war and spend enormous sums of money, when we believed we had arrived at the end victorious, suddenly your rude criticism of us crops up. And afterwards, we have seen how your attitudes get in the way of solving problems, not only in Cuba but elsewhere. (This version is not literal, but rather more free in interpretation; the word “etorban” was that used by Comrade Khrushchev.)

I must admit to you that we have not moved beyond this shock either. When Fidel declared that he was opposed to moderation, we asked ourselves: “What the hell pushed us to send the missiles to Cuba? Why have we done this, risking so many things?” And always, we have had to answer: We did it thinking of Cuba, we have thought principally of Cuba, and now they answer us in this way.

[One paragraph excised]

If we speak of blasphemy, we are in better conditions to do so; we have 45 years of experience in speaking blasphemies to the imperialists, and if this were all that we had to do, it would be very easy.

“We are convinced that if we had not placed missiles in Cuba, Cuba would already have been crushed.” (Literal) Kennedy had launched this attack before the elections. In his interview with Adschuvey [Adzhubei21], he made an ominous comparison between Cuba and Hungary. He told him: “We have not finished our work in Cuba. We failed there. Khrushchev resolved his problems in Hungary in three days.” It was a grim announcement. Because of this, we decided to place the missiles to frighten the imperialists.

Of course you are proud, for you can “die like heroes,” you are prepared to do it, but that does not resolve our problems. I asked [Soviet Defense Minister Rodion] Malinovski, who knows all that you have in Cuba, how much time it would take him with forces like those of the United States to occupy Cuba, and he answered three days. I am completely in agreement with Malinovski’s judgment. The Americans’ war capabilities are extremely powerful. We could, for example, bombard the territory of Cuba from a distance, without reaching [its] airspace. We must think about this. The people do not want to die; they want to live. We cannot give them a program to die.

Mikoyan reminded me of the lyrics of a song from the [Russian] civil war (Mikoyan says that actually it was Khrushchev that remembered this song) in which we too talked about dying heroically, but that is good for songs.

We have ordered the Soviet troops to die alongside the Cubans. You can be certain that they would.

In making our decisions, we have thought this action would be beneficial to Cuba, but it did not seem this way to you. You walked out in order to bring up our differences.

There is another way to solve this problem, through nuclear strikes, but we will only do this when there is no other way out. For then, we are not talking about a war game, but
a terrible nuclear war, with enormous losses for humanity. [2 lines excised]

Cuba is not a convenient weapons station. Its small size and geographic conditions do not let it become such a thing.

You have Spanish blood – you are proud, you speak of principles. Maybe you think that we Russians have a different temperament, and maybe you do not appreciate this about us, but we too are proud. Khrushchev then reminded us that Lenin in 1905 tried for a revolution, failed, and was required to emigrate. He said then Lenin was neither scared nor desperate, that he carefully prepared the revolution, organized the Party, assembled the revolutionary forces, and in the decisive moment initiated combat. This is what must be done; this is Marxism-Leninism: measure the forces of the enemy, know how to distinguish the appropriate forces, and only then fight. [1 line excised]

He then explained that previously the United States did not accept the presence of forces of socialism in the Americas. They talked about the Monroe Doctrine, etc. Now they have left that aside, and have accepted Cuba’s survival, including public guarantees of non-invasion. This is a decisive shift. They have yielded guarantees, besides, from other States not to invade.

“This skirmish has been the most interesting in all of history between imperialism and socialism, and it is imperialism that has retreated.” (Literal)

We have retreated tactically, but they have withdrawn in essence. I repeat: We have not retreated on any front, we are not in any way on the defensive; I insist, not anywhere, even in Cuba. Everywhere, we are on the offensive. (Mikoyan said some words corroborating this statement.)

But the Cubans did not understand us, and they began to attack us in their press, using the words of the Albanians and the Chinese. If you are in favor of this position, please tell us so, and we promise you that we can shout more than the Albanians and the Chinese.

We have sent men, weapons, and spent hundreds of millions of rubles on this war. In transport alone, we have spent 20 million dollars, since we had to concentrate our whole fleet on this operation and rent capitalist vessels for the shipment of our merchandise to other countries. [1 line and a couple words excised] Now there is the promise not to attack Cuba, now Cuba exists. Cuba will be a catalyst for the revolution in Latin America. We have dedicated all of our efforts to saving Cuba, so that it may serve as an example to the region, and all the efforts and expenditures will be justified, in our judgment, since Cuba exists [as a revolutionary country].

“We saw it all when we transported the missiles – we knew that they would put us on the brink of war and that we could collapse into war itself.” (Literal) When the decision reached the diplomatic core, we had more problems with you than with Kennedy. Mikoyan barely left Cuba alive (laughing). I’ve told Mikoyan that only he would be able to complete that mission, that no other member of the Presidium could carry it out.

I have told him that if I had gone to Cuba, in spite of how much I love and respect Fidel, perhaps we would have fought and I would have exited long before Mikoyan did. “We are satisfied, however, having achieved the principal goal.” (Literal)

Now we have a situation in which imperialism is not on the rise anywhere, nowhere, even in Cuba. Underline: nowhere. [approximately 2 pages excised]

However, time has now passed. At the beginning, we were quite upset, but when Mikoyan arrived, he softened us up. I don’t know what you did to him there, what kind of treatment you gave him. I have told him “You have become a Cuban agent, they will have to interrogate you.” (Mikoyan clarified that nothing similar has been said to him.)

“We are very pleased about Cuba, and at the same time, we are upset. We are very proud of you.” (Literal)

We share your ideas, we support them, but at the time it was necessary to do things more sensibly. You have behaved something like fighting roosters. We know that for you things have been difficult, but for the United States they have not been easy. Later we will know how many pairs of underwear have been changed during this crisis.

We think that the non-aggression against Cuba is assured for six years. We know that Kennedy has two years left, and we are sure that he is a manipulator and will win a second term, which will give us four more years. Six years is a good period. In these years, the correlation of forces will be favorable to us. It may be that Brazil and other countries enter the revolution.

We feel that it has been hard to resolve these things with you, the bearded ones, but things have been settled.

Khrushchev burst out laughing, and said: “Well, I am tired, and I have vented to you now, comrades.”

When comrade Khrushchev finished speaking, an hour and a half had passed. I asked him if he had time to listen to me, because I had to talk about many topics. He told me that he did. I told him then that before getting deep into the matter I wished to “clear up” some problems about which I believed they had certain erroneous interpretations. Jokingly, he replied, “You think you’re going to talk and everything will be clarified?” I said to him: I don’t expect that. I only mean to put forward a few things about which I am profoundly convinced, and that I hope they will also be convincing [to him].
I then began to tell him that I thought they had the impression that the Cuban people and leadership underestimated their Soviet counterparts, that we believed them to be a people susceptible to weakening in the face of danger, while we thought Cuba and its leaders capable of all types of heroism. I argued that this was an erroneous opinion, that the Cuban people knew the history of the Russian people and the history of the Soviet Revolution, that we had a deep appreciation for all the Russian people had done and for all the work of the Soviet Revolution; we well knew the admirable heroism of the Russians and Soviets during the Second World War and, on our part, a great admiration existed for all their actions and heroism. Certainly, we Cubans were proud, as he said, but our pride in the bravery of our people, and in their revolutionary position, we did not regard relative to other countries, but only with respect to our own national attitude.

He added that comrade Mikoyan had been able to confirm this admiration and affection by the Cuban people for the Soviet people, because in spite of the crisis, and notwithstanding the bitterness of the Cubans, he found everywhere the affection to which I had referred. (Mikoyan interrupted to say this was true and to tell short anecdotes of his travels with Raúl and Fidel, the messages at the Santiago Airport, the reception by the university students and other similar things.)

I told him that, secondly, I wanted to make perfectly clear that in the attitude of Cuba during this crisis, not a trace of the Chinese position could be found, nor did Cuban positions derive from Chinese ones. I expressed that they knew well, and I did not wish to hide it from them, that among our leaders there were some who sympathized in concrete ways with some of the positions of our Chinese comrades, but I wished to explain how, in this crisis, even the comrades that felt more sympathy toward some Chinese positions found the attitude of the Chinese government erroneous, and that the solidarity they had expressed was too late and not sufficiently enthusiastic.

I stated, thirdly, that I wished to pause to discuss some statements by comrade Khrushchev which had given off the impression that he had attributed to comrade Fidel a position prepared to provoke a war, discounting the importance of nuclear devastation, and that comrade Khrushchev insisted upon interpreting Fidel’s letter from the 27th [of October 1962] as a proposition that the Soviet Union would launch a nuclear war. I told him these ideas were false and one of the things that most irritated Fidel during the crisis had been the letter from Khrushchev in which he insinuated these opinions. I had carefully read Fidel’s letter, and in it many things had been made clear in the sense of warning of the imminence of the attack on Cuba, expressing the Cuban disposition to resist until the end. At the same time, it advised him, once the attack against Cuba was done, not to vacillate on deploying [i.e., using—ed.] atomic weapons, since the attack on Cuba would be apparently followed by atomic aggression against the Soviet Union and socialist countries should not allow an imperialist force to destroy, for the second time, all that their peoples had created.

I expressed categorically that it was unfair and completely false to present Fidel and the Cuban leadership as having an attitude supporting war at any cost against imperialism. I told them, instead, the way in which Fidel had personally conducted events and had given orders to impede incidents, even at the cost of our pride, as they said, of our own love and even our military needs; they had tolerated situations (that I described) that other leaders would have found difficult to withstand, all to block a conflict that could degenerate into a war of universal proportions. I explained the firm but cautious position of Fidel in the whole process of relations with the United States.

I then told him that I wished to get more deeply into the matter. I set out with all possible clarity our points of view, although with a little more care in expression, than I had done in the Havana conversation with comrade Mikoyan, warning Khrushchev that they were points unanimously shared by all comrades in the leadership.

I said that I wanted to speak starting from the great respect that I had always possessed toward the Soviet Party and the Soviet Union, and asked that my words not be misinterpreted, but that I understood that a serious error had occurred in the process. The fundamental error had consisted in not treating us as a Party, and furthermore, not even as a State to which things should be explained. If they had developed a strategy that imagined the withdrawal of the missiles at a given moment, this strategy had to be discussed carefully with us. Things had not been this way, and we had all held an interpretation of the presence of the missiles that, evidently, did not correspond to the intentions of the Soviet government.

I explained that for Fidel, the acceptance of the missiles was not grounded in the needs of Cuba but in the consideration that installing the missiles meant the Soviet Union was devising a global strategy, and the presence of the missiles would be beneficial for the socialist area. (At this time, Khrushchev spoke to Mikoyan as if surprised by what he was hearing.) When we accepted the missiles, we had also accepted the danger of atomic destruction, in the same way that they had risked atomic warfare by placing the missiles [in Cuba], but that we had done so thinking it was best for the socialist world, even though at its extreme ends, if things led to war, Cuba would practically disappear from the map.
I told him as well that the comrades that had led the first discussions were convinced that the missiles had come there to stay, as part of a global strategy. His [Khrushchev’s] interviews with Che [Guevara] and [Emilio] Aragonés [when they visited the Soviet Union in late August/early September 1962] had left some comrades with this impression, and that he had even said things more or less along the lines of “the Yankees will scream, but they will have to put up with the missiles.” The reference to the sending of the Baltic Fleet and other related things had confirmed our opinions and therefore, when we learned of the offer to withdraw the missiles, and after his decision to remove them, we were overwhelmed by the surprise and disoriented by the choice they made. We understood that there was sufficient time to discuss the matter with us and, besides, the way in which the problem had been brought up left us in a harmful situation that has threatened the influence and prestige of the Cuban Revolution and the sovereign character of our country, obligating us to make a public expression of our differences, things that for Fidel and all others have been a bitter decision. As a result of this way of leading the process, Cuba has had to adopt a position that clashed with the commitment from the USSR.

Once these two initial positions had been adopted, each had its logical development. The development of each made convergence of our positions practically impossible, which brought us to maintain different positions until the last possible moment in the UN, in spite of all the efforts that we were making to reduce these divergences to a minimum. In our leadership there had been an overwhelming desire that the process unfold at the UN so that we did not remain in this dead-end alley, to which we had been driven by the way the crisis was managed.

Khrushchev answered as follows: “If we are going to return once more to the problem of the missiles, I should say that I do not understand the Cuban interpretations. It is absurd to think that we placed the missiles to defend the socialist world. The missiles were placed for Cuba and thinking only about Cuba. We have intercontinental missiles, capable of striking severe blows against the United States and all countries allied with them – why would we need Cuba as a missile base?” He then focused on explaining the incapability of Cuba serving as a weapons storehouse, due to its narrowness, the vulnerability of the missile sites, the fact that the open emplacements could have been destroyed or rendered ineffective by bombs exploding many kilometers away from its coasts, but with waves able to destabilize the sites. He expressed his irritation with the Soviet generals, and even spoke about Marshal [Sergei] Biryuzov [sic; Biryuzov] in a way that I did not understand clearly and that I refused to confirm because it did not seem opportune to me (I am referring to the Chief of Soviet Missile Forces.)

Then he explained what we already know about the way to emplace the missiles, about the security from palm forests where the missiles would not be seen, about the lack of attention to Khrushchev’s order to locate them in horizontal positions during the day, etc. etc. I made a small intervention, insisting on what had been said about our interpretation of their propositions and he said: I cannot understand the reason behind these interpretations. [3-4 lines excised]

(He then told us what Mikoyan had said about what Khrushchev brought up upon returning from Bulgaria [after his visit from 14-20 May 1962—ed.]). In my conversations with Raúl, I started from the idea that no declaration would be sufficient to contain the Americans, so we decided that the missile forces could provoke a shock, though their placement would be very dangerous, yet we decided to send them because we were convinced that the result would be that the Yankees would have to reconcile themselves to the Revolution and accept it as a done deal.” Then he said this: “Probably we will too share the blame for not having made the plan clear, though what is certain is that we spoke. The fault is ours for having spoken badly, but in spite of all the serious dangers that have threatened us, we can all be happy today, because Cuba exists, the Revolution exists, and the red flag flies. Today you criticize us harshly, but someday you will understand us.”

We were convinced that Kennedy had a complex, having failed in the previous invasion, and therefore felt a necessity to raise his prestige by attacking Cuba, and had the forces to do it. His references to Hungary, comparing it to the case of Cuba, were statements of this sort of inferiority. The imperialists have tried to “appeal” to our conscience so that we understand their actions, starting from what they understand us to have done in the Hungarian case. Kennedy insisted that Cuba is to them what Hungary is to us.

Only the missiles could contain the United States, only the fear. We expected the aggression before the American elections on November 6, so we began the transport of weapons and incurred great costs in currency to rush the date of arrival. But things were done poorly, and the agents of the Federal Republic of Germany were the first to discover them. They were surprised. Their reports said that the way in which the Soviets were acting gave the idea that they wanted to impress, that they wanted Western powers to know that they had the missiles in Cuba. [almost 3 pages redacted]

My idea came from there. I did everything in the interest of Cuba. It cost three times as much to install the missiles there as to add a device of the same power among the intercontinental missiles installed at Soviet bases. Apparently, our ideas were not clear from the beginning.

Regarding the military agreement, this is a problem that has concerned us. What should we do? How do we leave
things in a way that Cuba remains fully protected with some assurance that it will continue in the same manner? He added that tomorrow, I would have the opportunity to hear a report [to the USSR Supreme Soviet] that would contain a strong declaration on Cuba, in that if the Americans did not fulfill their promises, neither would the Soviet Union, and the USSR would feel free to act in whatever manner necessary. He also explained that the report would link the problem of Cuba to the beginning of a war.

Then comrade Khrushchev said he must confess that we Cubans had scared them. He laughed, and said: “We find it difficult to sign treaties with you, because you don’t leave space to maneuver.” You have scared us a great deal, apparently, as relations are worse now. [2 lines redacted] We’ll think, and give a satisfactory solution. We must think, and have some amount of control. I don’t have the formula right now. We’ll keep thinking about this and return to the discussion. (At this time, I tell him that in the conversations between Fidel and Mikoyan an idea has come about, the possibility of transforming the content of the military pact so that Soviet soldiers presently in Cuba remain as specialists, similar to those who stayed and worked in Indonesia, exactly as he talked about them in the conversation with us. These specialists would stay in Cuba, showing Cubans how to operate weapons, and leave the country as soon as our troops were prepared to use all kinds of armaments. We had to find the proper balance through which our people and others of the world, as well as the imperialists, would come to know that Cuba would have the level of military readiness necessary to contain aggression.

Khrushchev said verbatim: “This is not a problem. However, I don’t think it would be sufficient. Something else must be considered, although tomorrow in my report I will talk about the same thing in a way that I hope you will find satisfactory.” (It would be good if we continued thinking about and discussing this matter.)

Khrushchev said: Tomorrow I will say that if Kennedy does not come through, we will feel unconstrained. Besides, I’ll state that we will never stop supporting Cuba and that we will stand by our duties toward Cuba.

[some other lines excised] Mikoyan left at this time, 7:15 in the evening, for an interview with the Yugoslavians, as Khrushchev joked that he would look after the revisionists. I said that it was already too late. [3/4 page excised]

He stood up and said, laughing, “I’ll do this; Tomorrow, on television, I’ll say that we have spoken, that you have told us your needs, and that we still have differences around this problem... (I then interrupted him and said) “but, as you are a Marxist-Leninist, you will help us.” Then Khrushchev said, “Yes, I will also establish publicly that we have differences.”

I began to excuse myself, and Khrushchev said to me, “No, we are going in the same direction, so come with me. Put on your coat and we’ll leave together.”

Leaving the place where we had put our coats, the news that we were heading out with Khrushchev caused a firestorm, since on principle, people did not understand what it meant. Then we left together. Khrushchev asked the driver to go to some other places to show me the other new things that were along the way, and finally we arrived at the home.

I climbed out of the car, and we said goodbye, but the car had to drive around the residence to be able to get out. Two or three comrades came to the door, and Khrushchev greeted them at a distance then stepped out of the car. We invited him to enter and he accepted with great enthusiasm. He came in, we had some time together telling stories and joking, and soon after he left for his own house.

The meal with Khrushchev

The day of the session of the Supreme Soviet, a little before they began, comrade Mikoyan told me that Khrushchev had invited me to dine with them, and that I should choose the comrades who would accompany me. I decided that my guests would be all the official delegates, and they were officially invited during the session.

When the session ended, Tito left immediately, and Khrushchev directed me to sit down and take tea. For some time, they commented on the Congresses of Prague and Italy. [CPSU politburo member Frol] Koslov [Kozlov] said he had seen [Cuban Communist Party leader] Blas [Roca], who had spoken with him, and that [Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro] Togliatti’s report was very good, the position of [Italian Communist Giancarlo] Pajett [Pajetta] and other comrades had completely changed, and their speeches had been very enthusiastic.

Brezhnev then said that Blas had not been able to go to Czechoslovakia, but that [Cuban foreign minister Raúl] Roa had vetted his speech with him by telephone from Geneva. He never gave his opinion on the speech, but said that there had been 69 [national communist] Parties, that all but four had condemned the Chinese position. I felt somehow implicated in this statement but did not think it necessary to say anything in response.

After this, we went toward the official residences. Khrushchev drove me in his car. Mikoyan went with [Cuban foreign trade minister Alberto] Mora, etc. Upon our arrival, Mora told us that he needed to send off his mother at the airport and, as he had not known about the dinner beforehand, he would need to leave. I explained the matter to Khrushchev. He said that of course it was necessary for him to go to see his mother off, but he wanted him to have a drink with us first.
Notes


2 Key coordinators at the co-sponsoring US institutions included Peter Kornbluh at the National Security Archive and, at the Watson Institute, James G. Blight and janet M. Lang (the organizers of “critical oral history” projects not only on the missile crisis but on the collapse of US-Soviet détente, the Vietnam War, and US-Iranian relations), who are now at the Babišille School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.

3 On the October 2002 conference in Havana, see esp. reports on the National Security Archive website. The Cuban documents were contained in two “briefing books” for participants in the conference; see the Archive’s digital archive for these (Spanish-language) materials. Around that time, scholars were also able to obtain an important Cuban record of a secret speech by Fidel Castro in January 1968 to a closed party meeting that covered the 1962 events during a discussion on Soviet-Cuban relations. See James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

4 Lechuga may have subsequently prepared these chronologies based on contemporary documents (e.g., cables or journals) in connection with two books he later authored on the missile crisis: In the Eye of the Storm: Castro, Khrushchev, Kennedy, and the Missile Crisis, trans. May Todd (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1995) and Cuba and the Missile Crisis (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 2001).


7 See esp. the two most important secondary accounts to emerge since the end of the Cold War—Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”—Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997); and Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008)—both of which rely heavily on US-Soviet diplomatic cables in connection with contemporary documents (e.g., cables or journals) in connection with two books he later authored on the missile crisis: Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

8 Before releasing the documents, the Cuban authorities evidently carefully reviewed them, and censored some passages (or entire pages, in the case of the Rodriguez-Khrushchev memon) which are indicated in the text.

9 Translator’s note: In the original, there is a clear numeral 2, then a letter (possibly an E overstruck by another letter), then a clear letter n. This could be “zen,” or “2 in” 2 hours, or simply an error and thus a redundant 2 that doesn’t convey any additional information.

10 Trans. note: This is one of Castro’s more innovative turns of phrase, as it does not seem to be common military slang in the present day.

11 Ed. note: Mario García-Inchaustegui was replaced as Cuba’s ambassador to the United Nations by Carlos M. Lechuga, until then Havana’s ambassador to Mexico, at the end of October 1962. On a cover page to this document there is a handwritten note reading, “Notes from Carlos Lechuga in a bookcase located in New York.”

12 Trans. note: My best estimate, as “cerece,” a typographical error, resembles “cerece” meaning to lack or fall short.

13 Trans. note: This is part of the original text, in capital letters and in Spanish.

14 Editor’s note: Presumably when he visited Havana on 30-31 October 1962—ed.

15 Ed. note: Brazil withdrew its denuclearization proposal due to the Cuban insistence on the removal of all military bases belonging to nuclear powers—i.e., Guantánamo—a condition which the United States predictably rejected.

16 Ed. note: Roca made an extensive trip to Europe in October-November 1962, including stops in Denmark; East Germany (where he attended annual commemorations of the founding of the German Democratic Republic and spoke at a “Hands off Cuba!” rally in East Berlin on October 26); Czechoslovakia; Bulgaria (where he attended the Bulgarian Communist Party Congress in Sofia on 8-14 November); and Hungary (where attended the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Congress in Budapest on 20-25 November). According to a report from Hungary’s ambassador in Havana, Roca had been scheduled to represent Cuba at the annual commemorations of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow, but his instructions were changed and he was instead directed to fly from Prague to Sofia. See the 30 November 1962 report on signs of Soviet-Cuba strains from the Hungarian Embassy in Cuba, printed in the collection of Hungarian documents elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.


18 Trans. note: Given the context, I feel this must be an error, since the author seems to wish to make the opposite point. But “no” — that is, “not” — is indeed in the original Spanish text.

19 Ed. note: For the Czechoslovak record of Roca’s conversation with senior Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) figure Jiri Hendrych, dated 3 November 1962, see the collection of translated Czechoslovak documents on the missile crisis published elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

20 Ed. note: Relations between the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Cuba were normalized on 11 January 1963, prompting the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to sever relations with Havana under the so-called Hallstein Doctrine in which the FRG broke or reduced relations with countries recognizing the GDR (with the prominent exceptions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). See the translated West and East German documents and accompanying commentary elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, in particular Mark Kramer’s translation and analysis of a record of a January 1963 conversation between Blas Roca and an East German communist official.

21 Ed. note: Alexei I. Adzhubei, the editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev’s son-in-law, interviewed Kennedy at his home in Hyannis Port in November 1961, a conversation that was subsequently published, but the reference here is to his private talk with JFK in Washington in January 1962. In his report on this conversation, the translation of which appears in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, Adzhubei quoted Kennedy as saying, after slamming his fist on his desk: “Once I summoned [CIA director] Allen Dulles and rebuked him. I said to him: ‘Learn from the Russians. When they had a tough situation in Hungary, they put an end to the conflict in just three days. When they didn’t like the events in Finland, the president of that country went to meet with the Soviet premier in Siberia, and everything was worked out. And you, Dulles, couldn’t do a thing.’”
Chatting with Che:
Conversations in 1961 between Cuban Revolutionary Ernesto
Guevara and the Soviet Ambassador in Havana—and a Brazilian
Record of his Meeting in Punta del Este with JFK Aide Richard
Goodwin

Introduced by James G. Hershberg

Ernesto “Che” Guevara was one of the most iconic figures of the Cuban revolution—and of revolution in general (long before his image morphed into a fashion icon in the decades after his death).1 The Argentine-born prospective medical student who left the land of his birth to promote revolution, joined Fidel Castro’s cause in Mexico in the mid-1950s, and followed him (on the legendary Granma boat voyage) to Cuba to wage guerrilla war against Batista, becoming one of the scraggly “barbudos” (bearded ones) who came down from the mountains and seized power in Havana in 1959. As Castro consolidated control, Guevara emerged as one of the top government figures, occupying various posts (head of the national bank, trade minister, et al.) and traveling frequently on international missions (including contacts with communist diplomats abroad to forge new relations).

In 1965, amid considerable mystery and conflicting rumors, he furtively left Cuba to promote revolution abroad—first in the Congo (a futile effort to overthrow the American-backed Mobuto regime that left him somewhat disillusioned2), and then, finally, in Bolivia, where he was killed by CIA-assisted government troops in 1967.

This issue of the CWIHP Bulletin adds some fresh evidence on this controversial actor in the Cuban drama, who while admired in some quarters as an idealistic revolutionary and adventurer—as depicted in novels and movies such as The Motorcycle Diaries (2004)3—is reviled in others as a bloodthirsty communist who in the name of revolutionary “justice” personally killed many enemies. Among newly-translated materials found elsewhere in this Bulletin are the Chinese records of Che’s conversations with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai when he visited Beijing in November 1960, and with China’s ambassador in Havana around the time of the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962; reports on Guevara from Soviet-bloc (and other) diplomats stationed there; and the (now uncensored) interview by a visiting Italian communist journalist shortly before the missile crisis.4

Presented below are Soviet and Brazilian records documenting six conversations with Guevara in 1961, before and after the failed April 1961 invasion at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) aimed at toppling the revolutionary Cuban government by anti-Castro Cuban exiles who were secretly—but as these conversations and Cuban intelligence reports printed elsewhere in this Bulletin confirm, not so secretly5—financed, armed, trained, equipped, and (to the extent possible for this unruly and discordant crowd) organized by the US government. The first five talks are described in cables from Moscow’s ambassador in Havana, Sergei Kudryavtsev, and mix sometimes quite technical discussions of bilateral economic relations—predictably enough, given Che’s portfolio at the time—and broader reflections on the fluid situation in Cuba and international affairs, especially the looming threat of a U.S. or U.S.-backed attack, the ongoing fight within Cuba against “counterrevolutionary” forces, and the attitude of the incoming president, John F. Kennedy, who took office on 20 January 1961.

At the time of the first few conversations (Documents 1-2) with the Kremlin’s envoy, in January 1961, Che was president of Cuba’s national bank; by the time of the fourth and fifth conversations (Documents 3-4), in April—just before the Bay of Pigs—and June, he had become the Minister of Industry, in which position he also ran the powerful National Institute of Agricultural Affairs (INRA). While there is no room here for a detailed analysis of the political, economic, or military significance of Che’s comments, which bear on a wide range of topics, one impression that leapt out was his misjudgment of the incoming U.S. president’s likely handling of the plans for an anti-Castro military assault, covertly supported by the United States, that he was clearly inheriting from the outgoing Eisenhower Administration. Days before Kennedy entered the White House, the Soviet envoy’s report of his talks with Guevara reveals (see Document 1), Che
assessed that not only that the “danger of a direct aggression on the part of the American armed forces has essentially passed,” but also judged that the new Democratic administration had no appetite for covert action against Cuba and “do[es] not want the Republicans to put them in a difficult situation on the eve of assuming power.” In fact, Che made an erroneous inference from recent exposés in what he described as “the Democrats’ press” that “started to actively reveal the training of the Cuban counterrevolutionaries by the Eisenhower government in Florida, Guatemala, on the Swan Island and in other locations for an attack on Cuba.” Those “revelations,” noted Guevara, “in our opinion, clearly speak to the fact that Kennedy does not want to associate himself with this kind of operations from the start, and wants to make it impossible for Eisenhower beforehand.” In fact, Kennedy was not behind the press revelations, and would go forward, albeit grudgingly and in a constricted form (to minimize the “noise level”), with the covert operation that had begun a year earlier under Eisenhower—leading to the utter failure that got the foreign policy part of his presidency off to a disastrous start. If only Kennedy had followed Che’s reasoning—in other words, if he had cancelled the operation, blaming the loss of operational security due to premature press disclosures—the new US leader could have avoided the Bay of Pigs debacle yet deflected blame for doing so.

Even just a few days before the Bay of Pigs intervention began (see Document 3), Che still misjudged Kennedy’s intent and, at the same time, read the actual situation more accurately than the US president or most of his advisors (especially from the Pentagon and CIA). Though the situation remained “quite tense,” he told Kudryavtsev on 14 April 1961, “he personally believes that the danger of invasion of the country by large beachheads of the external counterrevolutionary forces has now in all likelihood receded. The counterrevolution understands that given the presence of large contingents of well-armed people’s militia and the revolutionary army, an operation of deploying paratroopers, even numbering several thousand troops would be doomed to failure. Therefore, mentioned Guevara, it is unlikely that the forces of external counterrevolution would undertake such a risk now, knowing that it would be senseless to count on any kind of extensive internal uprisings in Cuba.”

Events would soon vindicate Che’s analysis, and refute the calculations of those advisors who had convinced Kennedy to take the gamble of authorizing the operation. By June (Document 4), after Cuban forces had not only crushed the invasion but used the event to crack down on perceived or potential alleged enemies of the revolution throughout the island, Che was confidently asserting that, “after the defeat of the counterrevolutionary landing force, the revolution in general grew even stronger,” and the “counterrevolutionaries would need at least two to three months to recover from the strikes against them implemented by the organs of Cuban counterintelligence.”

Little wonder, then, that when Che met furtively a couple of months later with a representative of the Kennedy Administration, he began their conversation by thanking him for the Bay of Pigs. The final document offers a fresh perspective on that encounter, which has entered the lore of the US-Cuban confrontation: the secret post-midnight August 1961 meeting in Punta del Este between Che and Richard N. Goodwin, the young Kennedy advisor who was a key force behind the conception of JFK’s Alliance for Progress, the program of economic aid, introduced five months earlier, that had occasioned the meeting of high-level representatives of member-countries of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the coastal Uruguayan resort. Although the massive program of proposed US economic aid to Latin American countries was depicted simply as an effort to promote economic development and political democracy in the hemisphere, it was also perceived, correctly, as an anti-Cuban tool—an effort to stem the potential spread of “Castroism” by promoting a more moderate, and more pro-Washington, alternative to both communism and to military-ruled regimes that favored a relatively small elite.

The Punta del Este meeting took place during an intriguing interregnum in US policy toward Cuba. The Kennedy Administration was still licking its wounds from the failure at the Bay of Pigs four months before, and had not yet agreed on the covert CIA program (known as “Mongoose”) to undermine Castro that would be organized in the fall. One thing that had not changed was the pervasive hostility in US domestic politics and the US government that precluded any formal or open contacts or negotiations with Havana—yet, informally, Brazilian and Argentine diplomats at the Punta del Este conference, advancing their governments’ promotion of US-Cuban reconciliation, were able to bring Goodwin and Guevara together for a lengthy face-to-face conversation lasting several hours behind closed doors at a cocktail party in a private apartment—a meeting that in fact would constitute the highest-level direct talk between US and Cuban officials during the Kennedy Administration, or during this stretch of the Cold War, for that matter. In his memoir, Remembering America (1988), Goodwin vividly described his experience, both his nocturnal conversation with Che
(sporting “green fatigues, and his usual overgrown and scraggy beard”) and report on it to President Kennedy in the Oval Office after he returned to Washington—including his delivery of revolutionary’s gift of Cuban cigars: JFK famously lit one up, then wondered, perhaps facetiously, whether Goodwin should have smoked the first one. One may also read declassified contemporaneous US documents on the episode, including Goodwin’s written report to JFK.

While, unfortunately, no comparable documentation on this episode has emerged on the Cuban side—which is a particular shame since Che’s impressions of Goodwin, as reported to Fidel Castro and the leadership, could indeed have been fascinating—the Brazilian record presented below finally offers a non-US perspective on the Che-Goodwin meeting. While space limitations preclude a careful analysis of the significance of the Brazilian record, which would require careful comparison to the existing record both of the meeting and overall US-Cuban relations, it clearly offers fresh information. In addition to its significance to the story of the evolving US-Cuban confrontation—and the enduring controversy over whether a reasonable chance might have existed to limit the mutual hostility or even to attain (as Che put it) “at least an interim modus vivendi” if not a genuine “understanding”—the story possesses some significance for Brazilian political history. Following the Punta del Este conference, Guevara continued on to Rio de Janeiro, where he was cordially greeted by Brazilian President Jânio Quadros and decorated with the country’s most distinguished honor, the cruzado do sol, sparking an outraged outcry from conservatives. Amid the tumult from that and other causes, soon afterwards, at the end of August, Quadros resigned suddenly, triggering a political crisis, and was eventually succeeded by João Goulart, who would seek to continue the policy of delicately balancing relations with the United States and Cuba and trying quietly to mediate between them—an effort that climaxed during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Soviet documents presented here were generously contributed by the Mexican scholar (and former foreign minister) Jorge Castaneda, who obtained them from the Russian archives in the course of researching his book, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf, 1997). They were then translated by Svetlana Savranskaya of the National Security Archive for circulation at the March 2001 conference in Havana to mark the 40th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, which the National Security Archive (led by its Cuba coordinator, Peter Kornbluh) co-organized together with Brown University’s Watson Institute of International Studies (James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, now at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada) and several Cuban partners, including the University of Havana; some of the translations have appeared on-line, but never in print. The Brazilian document was obtained by James Hershberg from the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations archives in Brasília, and can also be found in a collection of Brazilian documents contributed to the National Security Archive by the Brazilian scholar Luis Alberto Moniz Bandera, author of De Martí a Fidel: A Revolução Cubana e a América Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1998). The translation from Portuguese, by Hershberg, was also circulated to participants at the Havana conference but, until now, has not appeared in print.

### Document No. 1

**Record of Conversations between Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Sergey Kudryavtsev and Che Guevara, 11 and 17 January 1961**

From S. M. Kudryavtsev’s Diary

Top Secret

Copy No. 1

15 February 1961

No. 42

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION**

with President of the National Bank of Cuba Ernesto Guevara

11 January and 17 January 1961

In accordance with my instructions from the State Bank of the USSR, I informed Guevara that at the present time we could sell up to thirty tons of pure gold in blocks no less than 99 proof at the fixed gold prices in London on the day of payment in pounds to the National Bank of Cuba. In accordance with the preference of the National Bank of Cuba, the purchased gold could be deposited in the State Bank of the USSR in Moscow in the National Bank’s disposal, or, by instruction of the latter, at the disposal of third persons or organizations. The State Bank will not charge any fees for depositing the gold. The payment for the gold purchased by the National Bank will be
processed on the day of depositing of the relevant amount of gold to the account of the National Bank of Cuba. The State Bank will process transactions in pounds. Then I said that of course we believe that by the time of the gold purchase the National Bank will have the needed resources in its account at the State Bank of the USSR. Then I informed Guevara that the State Bank would send specifications for the deposited gold to the National Bank of Cuba through our Embassy. The National Bank, on its part, can give instructions to the State Bank to give the authorized representatives of the National Bank in Moscow a part or the whole of the gold deposited in the State Bank in its name at any time, or to transfer a part or the whole of the deposited gold with given destination to other locations. All expenses incurred in connection with transportation of gold to the locations specified by the National Bank will be the responsibility of the National Bank. The details regarding transportation of gold and relevant transactions will be coordinated between the State Bank and the National Bank in each individual case. All correspondence regarding these issues should be conducted confidentially through our Embassy in Havana or the Cuban Embassy in Moscow. Guevara said that he was very grateful that the State Bank of the USSR was willing to satisfy the requests of the National Bank regarding the purchase of gold. We will probably buy part of the proposed gold because at the present time our gold reserves have decreased significantly, noted Guevara, and we probably will not be able to buy all 30 tons. However, before I give you a final answer to this proposal, said Guevara, I would have to discuss this issue with Fidel Castro. We decided to return to this issue some time later.

On 17 January, Guevara informed me that he consulted with Fidel Castro on the issue of buying gold from the Soviet Union. As a result, it was decided to buy gold for the overall sum of 20 million dollars from the State bank. The Cuban government, said Guevara, presently has 25 million dollars in its account in Mosnarbank in London. In addition, they are presently processing a transfer of 8 million dollars. However, the sum of over 20 million dollars that the Cuban government has at its disposal, is needed for other expenses. Guevara stated that they agreed to purchase approximately 20 tons of gold on the conditions proposed by the State Bank, which we discussed in our conversation on 11 January.

In the conversation with Guevara, in addition to the question mentioned above, we touched upon some other issues of the situation that are developing in Cuba. In this respect, Guevara expressed the following considerations.

The internal political situation, in the opinion of the Cuban government, does not give any reason for concern at the present time. The danger of a possible American invasion of Cuba has united the masses around the government even more. The implemented mobilization of the people's militia helped the Cuban government to be assured of the further growth of the revolutionary consciousness of the masses and their readiness to defend their Motherland, on the one hand. On the other hand, the mobilization helped the government to discover a number of organizational drawbacks and mistakes, which are being corrected now, and that in its turn will enable it to further strengthen the entire governmental structure, and to improve the preparedness and the organization both of the people's militia and the army in general.

Using the experience of the mobilization, the Cuban government, continued Guevara, drew a conclusion that the people's militia was the main force on which it could rely on fully both in the political and in the military respect. During the period of mobilization, the internal counterrevolution has noticeably decreased its activity. This can be explained, on the one hand, by the measures introduced by the government, beginning from 4 January, and by the general demoralization of these forces hostile to the Cuban revolution, which were hoping that the US would come to their rescue immediately after the breakup of its relations with Cuba, on the other hand.

At the present time, continued Guevara, we are observing the flight of the counterrevolutionaries from the cities, and especially Havana, to the mountains. The main center of concentration of counterrevolutionaries is located in the area of Escambray mountains, where there are up to 400 armed counterrevolutionaries overall. Those counterrevolutionary forces in Escambray are not united, and they represent separate spots of resistance. Presently, the revolutionary army and the people's militia, said Guevara, have surrounded all the locations where those counterrevolutionaries are located. Gradually, the army and the people's militia are pursuing elimination of those groups. The operations for clearing mountain forests of those counterrevolutionary groups will continue for some time, noted Guevara, because the counterrevolutionaries avoid clashes with the people's militia and hide carefully in the mountain caves. Those isolated and surrounded counterrevolutionary groups in Escambray, noted Guevara, in our opinion, do not present any danger to the government today. The most important counterrevolutionary group in the province of Pinar del Rio, said Guevara, had been totally liquidated.

In the course of further conversation, we touched upon the question of the danger of possible direct military intervention on the part of the U.S. against Cuba. In this connection, Guevara said that in his opinion, danger of a direct aggression on the part of the American armed forces has essentially passed. It is impossible for Eisenhower, for a number of internal reasons to embark upon an aggression against Cuba now. In any case, Kennedy and the Democrats do not want the
Republicans to put them in a difficult situation on the eve of assuming power. It could be seen clearly from Kennedy's statement regarding the break-up of relations with Cuba. Besides, in the last several days, the Democrats' press started to actively reveal the training of the Cuban counterrevolutionaries by the Eisenhower government in Florida, Guatemala, on the Swan Island and in other locations for an attack on Cuba. Such revelations, noted Guevara, in our opinion, clearly speak to the fact that Kennedy does not want to associate himself with this kind of operations from the start, and wants to make it impossible for Eisenhower beforehand.

In the course of our conversation, I told him that everything said notwithstanding, they should still exercise caution and restraint in order not to give the Americans any pretext for any provocations against Cuba, especially in the days left before Kennedy assumes power.

Guevara said that he personally understood it very well. However, noted Guevara jokingly, presently we do not have anything where we could respond to the Americans' new challenges as we have done it in the past. All that remains is essentially the American base in Guantanamo. However, in this question, of course, we will exhibit maximum caution, said Guevara in conclusion.

The rest of the conversation dealt with general issues.

USSR Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba (Signature). Kudryavtsev)

[Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 0104, Opis 17, Folder 118, File 3, pp. 23-26; Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive).]

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**Document No. 2**

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Sergey Kudryavtsev and Che Guevara, 30 January 1961

From S. M. Kudryavtsev's Diary

Top Secret

Copy No.

15 February 1961

No. 45

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Record of Conversation with President of the National Bank of Cuba

Emesto Guevara

30 January 1961

1. I visited Guevara at the National Bank and in accordance with my instructions informed him that the State Bank of the Soviet Union, in accordance with the preference of the National Bank of Cuba deposited 17,523,008 grams of pure gold in the name of the National Bank of Cuba. On 23 January, the State Bank received 11,874,800 pounds from the Mosnarbank in London and deposited them to the account No. 7 of the National Bank of Cuba. The State Bank withdrew 7,124,377 pounds from this account for the amount of gold mentioned above, which was transferred to the National Bank of Cuba. Specifications for the deposited gold will be sent to the National Bank shortly after they are received from Moscow. I also informed Guevara that the State Bank would credit 3.75% annually to account No.7 unless any changes are made.

Thanking me for the information, Guevara told me that the storage of gold and currency reserves proposed by the State Bank of the USSR fully satisfied the Cuban side, and that they would act in accordance with the proposed procedure.

2. In the course of further conversation, I asked Guevara about the progress of the selection of 100 Cuban students, who were supposed to be sent by the ship “Cooperation.” I said that “Cooperation” must leave Cuba no later than 8 February of this year.

3. In response, Guevara said that he was personally involved in this issue. The students were being selected, although there were certain problems involved. However, he was confident that they would be able to send if not all 100 people, then at least 70 to 80 people in accordance with the signed agreement.

4. In the course of further conversation with Guevara, we touched upon the issue of Kennedy's speech to the U.S. Congress. In this connection, Guevara said that he personally never expected Kennedy to change the U.S. hostile policy toward Cuba. His speech in Congress has only confirmed my conviction. The United States will continue the policy for strangling the Cuban revolution as they did under Eisenhower. Kennedy, noted Guevara, would also actively support the internal and the external counterrevolution in the hope to undermine the stability inside the country with its help, and to create an opportunity for an extensive uprising of counterrevolutionaries.

5. We are convinced, continued Guevara, that Kennedy would continue the economic blockade in order to create
internal difficulties. I personally, noted Guevara, am absolutely convinced that Kennedy will not stop before a direct military intervention, when he sees that all his calculations for overthrowing Fidel Castro’s revolutionary government with the help of forces of the internal and external counterrevolution are failing.

6. At the present time one can be sure, continued Guevara, that Kennedy’s main efforts would be directed at achieving a more perfect isolation of Cuba from the countries of Latin America and the external world. At the present time Cuba has air communications only with Mexico, and that line is hanging by a thread. In such circumstances, emphasized Guevara, our task should be to conduct ourselves in such a way so as not to allow realization of these designs of the U.S.. We should conduct our foreign policy in such a way, emphasized Guevara, so as not to allow isolation of Cuba from the countries of Latin America. At the present time, we have great, though maybe unfounded hopes for [Brazilian President Jânio] Quadros’ assumption of power in Brazil. Quadros, representing interests of Brazil, cannot benefit from the U.S. strangling of Cuba. Therefore, it would be possible to rely on him, or rather use his interest in strengthening the national independence of Brazil in the Cuban interests. It seems to rile, noted Guevara, that Quadros, guided by precisely those considerations, and in particular by the need to strengthen the Brazilian positions vis-a-vis the United States, would most likely want to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union.

USSR Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba
[signature]

(S. Kudryavtsev)

[Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 0104, Opis 17, Folder 118, File 3, pp. 58-59; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive).]
is presently increasing its assistance to the forces of external and internal counterrevolution. The main emphasis here is toward undermining the Cuban economy through stronger acts of sabotage, subversion and the like. This serves as a kind of supplement to the economic blockade, which is enforced against Cuba from the US. Recently, well-trained groups of subversive elements equipped with the newest technology for conducting explosions and arson are deployed in Cuba from the US. Also, the U.S. is transferring large quantities of explosives and weapons to Cuba.

In the recent days the internal counterrevolution, continued Guevara, stepped up its activity and has practically begun an attack. It would suffice to say that just in the last several days there were explosions in the Havana water system, power station; several warehouses were burned down, a sugar plant was burned down, and finally the biggest store ‘El Encanton.’ All this occurred over the period of 3 or 4 days, and it is extremely difficult for the government to undertake anything effective to prevent acts of that kind. The El Encanton store, as it has been established, was put on fire with special thermal bombs, which produce very high temperature and burning for 20 minutes. The bombs themselves, however, are very small in size. One of such bombs was found unexploded in the store building after the fire with a stamp ‘US Army’ [on it]. Damages from sabotage and subversive acts, continued Guevara, are estimated in tens of millions of dollars. One can say that the internal counterrevolution has inflicted a serious economic damage upon us during these days.

Guevara said then that the revolutionary government would respond to these strikes of the counterrevolution with counterstrikes. First of all, the repressive measures will be strengthened. A significant number of captured terrorists and subversive elements will be executed, and the people will be called to even more vigilance and more decisive struggle with the enemy of the revolution.

The political situation in the country, emphasized Guevara, is generally good. The pressure of the internal counterrevolution only unites people and revolutionizes them. Almost all the peasants stand behind the government. Recently the position of the government in the working class has strengthened significantly. If winning of the peasantry over to the side of the revolution has been already accomplished, noted Guevara, much still can be done in regard to the working class.

The economic difficulties, which, according to Kennedy’s and the counterrevolution’s calculations, should lead to dissatisfaction in the country and create the conditions for an internal explosion, will, in our opinion, said Guevara, have just the opposite effect. These difficulties will unite the people, because the overwhelming majority of the population understands that this is not the government’s fault, but rather the consequence of American imperialism’s fight against revolutionary Cuba.

In the course of further conversation, Guevara said that the revolutionary government is presently seriously studying the question regarding the ways of overcoming the growing economic hardships. The government would not want to be in the role of beggar, especially because realistically the Soviet Union is the only country among the countries of the socialist camp that can help Cuba, but the Soviet Union already provides enormous assistance and support to Cuba. And yet, nonetheless, said Guevara, it looks like we will have to ask the Soviet Union to help us in some areas, especially in supplying some kinds of raw materials to ensure uninterrupted work of our industry.

Evidently, we will not be able to avoid rationing on fat-containing products and soap. As it is known, continued Guevara, Cuba imported all fat-containing products and raw materials for production of soap from the US for hard currency. At the present time, the hard currency inflows do not cover the needs of the country, and therefore, we would have to sharply cut the import of fat-containing products and ingredients for soap production. Introduction of rationing cards is very undesirable politically, but it is unavoidable. The main task now, emphasized Guevara, is to provide the industry with raw materials and the workers with work. The nationalized industry works well, and its organization is improving. However, production quotas are under-fulfilled by 15 to 20% as a result of deficit of raw materials, and also as a result of distraction of a significant number of workers from production in the period of mobilization of units of the people’s militia.

In the course of further conversations, we touched upon several general issues. I informed Guevara about the scheduled trips to the Soviet Union for a number of Cuban delegations, and also gave him a film about his stay in Moscow.

USSR Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba.[Signature] (S. Kudryavtsev)

[Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 0104, Opis 17, Folder 118, File 3, pp. 181-184; Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive).]
From S.M. Kudryavtsev's Diary
Top Secret
Copy No. 2
12 July 1961
No. 226

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
with Minister of Industry of the Republic of Cuba
Ernesto Guevara
3 June 1961

During the conversation, Guevara, touching upon the internal situation in Cuba, noted that the situation in the country was in general good. Elections to the organs of state apparatus both in the center and in the provinces were proceeding successfully. Last week he, Guevara, completed his tour of the province Oriente, with which he was very satisfied. In the province Oriente, he inspected the state of industrial objects, and first of all the progress of work on opening the nickel plant in Moa, and also the functioning of the nickel plant in Nicaro, where Soviet specialists were employed.

In this connection, Guevara expressed great satisfaction with the Soviet-Cuban agreement signed in June on providing technical assistance in organizing the Cuba nickel industry, and he asked me to pass his gratitude, as well as the gratitude of the entire Cuban leadership to the Soviet government for providing help in this area, which is important to Cuba.

Speaking about the internal political situation, Guevara emphasized that after the defeat of the counterrevolutionary landing force, the revolution in general grew even stronger, and started moving ahead with more confidence. Touching upon the possibility of revitalization of the internal counterrevolution's activity, Guevara said that in his opinion, the counterrevolutionaries would need at least two to three months to recover from the strikes against them implemented by the organs of Cuban counterintelligence. Only after that the counterrevolution would be able to renew its fight against the revolutionary government. It is likely that the U.S., continued Guevara, will keep sending their agents to Cuba during these months in order to create new terrorist and sabotage groups, which has been proven in no unclear terms by the recent statement of former Cuban Minister of Public Works [Manolo] Ray, who as it is known is the main organizer and leader of the terrorist and sabotage activities against the Cuban state. Ray recently left the so-called “[Cuban] Revolutionary Council” of Miro Cardona. This shows, noted Guevara, that the external counterrevolution would remain split, and that the contradictions within individual groups would grow deeper.

In the course of further conversation, Guevara stated that in his opinion, it was unlikely that the internal counter-revolution would succeed in organizing some activities in the country that would present any serious threat to the internal situation. The organs of Cuban counterintelligence, said Guevara, would deal with the counterrevolutionaries decisively, and would not allow them to raise their heads again, as it happened before the invasion.

Touching upon Fidel Castro’s plan to exchange the captured participants of the intervention for tractors, Guevara said that apparently it would not work. The US would drag this process out and would not agree to pay compensation because it is not in their interest politically. He got such an impression from his conversations with the commission of prisoners of war, who participated in the intervention, who recently returned from the US, and who conducted negotiations with the American authorities and with the [Eleanor] Roosevelt [Tractors for Freedom] committee.

In the course of further conversation we spoke about the economic situation of the country. In this connection, Guevara expressed the following considerations. The economic situation remains in general satisfactory, although, of course, our difficulties are growing as well. These difficulties, however, turned out to be much smaller than the government expected in the beginning of May. The assistance from the Soviet Union and a number of countries of the socialist camp played a big role in removing those difficulties. However, the issue of supplying the country with fat-containing food products still remains problem number one.

Speaking about the international situation developing around Cuba, Guevara said that the United States now has to face the growing resistance on the part of Latin American countries in realization of the Kennedy plans of Cuba’s isolation. The mission of acting Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs [Carlos] Olivares to the countries of Latin America was successful overall and helped strengthen Cuban positions in such important countries as Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador.

Of course, noted Guevara, Communist parties of many Latin American countries could do much more in defense of Cuba, but unfortunately the majority of them acts extremely indecisively. Presently, the United States, according to their information, said Guevara, proceed with hostile actions around Cuba, trying to encourage the countries of Latin America to participate in collective sanctions, which should be approved by the Organization of American States [OAS]. We do not exclude a possibility that the recent assassination of [Dominican Republic President Rafael] Trujillo would most likely be used in the United States to create a certain precedent for future interference in the Cuban affairs. At this moment, the United States apparently will try to get an OAS agreement to introduce order in the Dominican Republic. They need it in order to be able to persuade the OAS to interfere in the Cuban affairs. It is
very difficult to directly accuse Cuba of the involvement in the assassination of Trujillo, although some Americans make statements to this effect. However, nobody believes such statements, and the United States probably will have to leave them behind soon. The Kennedy government in all likelihood will use the crisis in the Dominican Republic in order to create a certain precedent of interference in the internal affairs of that country with the approval and sanction of the OAS, so that they could use this precedent also against Cuba at a later stage.

The rest of the conversation dealt with general issues.

USSR Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba [Signature] Kudryavtsev

[Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 0104, Opis 17, Folder 118, File 4. pp. 65-67; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive).]

Document No. 5

Telegram from the Brazilian Secretary of State for External Relations (Afonso Arinos) for the Cabinet in Brasilia, 19 August 1961, describing conversation between Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Richard Goodwin, Montevideo, Uruguay, 18 August 1961

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

SENT

FOR THE CABINET IN BRASILIA

ON/19/VIII/61

CONFIDENTIAL

600.(24h)
SEC/DPC/DEC/Dor/591.7(24h)

Cuba. Information for the interview
Of the President of the Republic with the Minister of Economics of Cuba, Mr. Guevara.

707 – I request to transmit to the Mister President of the Republic: “I judged to be of interest of Your Excellency to know the following information that was presented to me by Ambassador Barbosa da Silva about an interview realized in Montevideo at an informal gathering in the early morning of the 18th [of August] between, Commandante Ernesto Guevara and Mister Richard Goodwin, with also the participation of Mister Rodrigues Larreta, of Argentina. In this meeting, Mister Guevara and Mister Goodwin, speaking as [falando-se de] "enemies", made a general appreciation of Cuban-American relations. Affirming that Cuba today definitely was of the sphere of influence of the United States, Commandante Guevara declared: 1) “the Cuban revolution has an irreversible character[']”; 2) there is no possibility of the overthrow of the Government, since the people participated integrally in the revolution; 3) there should be dispelled the myths that the leaders of the revolution can be recovered [recuperados]; 4) it is an illusion to think that one can hope for a schism in the Government by the forces of the "moderates"; 5) they will continue to accelerate the socialization of the economy of the country; 6) the Cuban leaders do not have a Marxist theoretical formation, being [xxx], Guevara, the one that have greater readers in this camp, considering that the case of Cuba will be to illustrate completely the correctness of the Marxist doctrine for the solution of its problem; 7) Cuba, in order to be a socialist State, has a natural sympathy for similar systems, but this does not imply a political alliance; 8) the Cuban Government does not intend to invade the base at Guantánamo; 9) the United States provided a great service to the revolution by supporting the failed invasion [i.e., the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961], since it rallied the people around the Government. The success transformed the position of the Government from a "small offender" to an equal to equal, in whatever negotiations that will be realized; 10) Cuba does not intend “to export revolution,” but cannot prevent that its example influences powerful sectors of opinion on the [South American] Continent; 11) although it does not finance or participate directly in the “pro-Cuba clubs” or similar activities, the Cuban Government knows that its example has, in many cases, the power to regiment the left, every time that Cuba was attacked. This regimentation of the left can be illustrated by the example with what occurred in Uruguay. Continuing in his exposition and insisting about the necessity of establishing a dialogue between the Cuban Government and the American Government, Commandante Guevara pointed out that both have ahead serious difficulties, as is known: I) United States: a) the great discontent of the Latin American peoples; b) some deilities of the “Alliance for Progress” program with which the United States seeks to combat this discontent, owing to the intrinsic contradictions of capitalism and the internal problems that the execution of the program will be susceptible to in various countries; II) Cuba:
economic problems: a) certain deficiencies of its foreign commerce, including the loss of the American market for its exports of sugar; b) lack of consumer goods to meet the popular necessities, amplified by the extremely accelerated process of development realized by the revolution; c) lack of spare parts for the factories “inherited” by the Government, which frequently are paralyzed or diminish their rate of production for reason of the lack of the aforementioned parts. Political problems: the action of provocateurs and saboteurs who are not despicable \textit{(não eram desprezíveis)}; b \textit{(sic)} the reactions of the bourgeoisie to the socialization of the country; c \textit{(sic)} the reaction of the Catholic Church. Mister Goodwin explained to Mister Guevara that he did not have qualification, nor authority, to appreciate, concretely, all \textit{[quais-quer]} aspects of the problems raised in the conversation. He explained, however, that there did not exist illusions in his country regarding the irreversible character of the revolution and the unrecuperability \textit{[irrecuperabilidade]} of its leaders, but that it was judged to be possible other solutions with another government… [ellipsis in original] As for the decision of the Cuban Government not to attack Guantánamo, he lamented to be deprived of the possibility of making [an expression of] gratitude similar to that which was made to him regarding the failed [Bay of Pigs] invasion… [ellipsis in original] It is not judged possible any negotiation between the two governments, given the irreconcilability \textit{[irreductibilidade]} of its leaders in principle that exists between the two. Mister Guevara recognized these difficulties, saying, however, that perhaps one could think of official conversations about a secondary aspect of the Cuban-American problems, like, for example, the theft of airplanes \textit{[hijackings]}. The American Government would have problems in order to justify the start of official negotiations owing to the reactions of public opinion, which would not be the case of the Cuban Government. The discussions about a secondary aspect, as the cited \textit{[example]}, perhaps would be a solution. By the way, Guevara stressed that the Cuban Government had nothing to do with the theft of airplanes. Mister Goodwin asked him if the affirmation was valid for the first airplane hijacked. Guevara responded affirmatively, saying that the performer of the theft was a good boy, who acted on his own account, he being presently incarcerated. Asked about the last hijacking, he said again that it was not his responsibility, the Cuban Government having judged until the same \textit{[action]} was realized by “provocateurs.” Mister Goodwin declared that such could not be, since the American Government has not explained this act to its public opinion. He registered the information and suggestions of Commandante Gueva and assured him that they would be transmitted to the highest level of his Government. Saying farewell with a handshake, Mister Guevara, Ambassador Barbosa da Silva and Mister Rodrigues Larreta continued in conversation until 5:30 in the morning. Ambassador Barbosa da Silva stressed the importance of his affirmation that the sympathies or affinities of the Cuban regime had not led his Government to the point of a political alliance or other form of affiliation \textit{[with]} the Soviet Union. He pointed out the affirmative reiterations of a general character made by the Brazilian Government in the sense of which Brazil maintains its commitments in the ambit of the democratic west. The firm Brazilian position, \textit{[as]} would be in case of a collective action against Cuba, \[and\] would be on other international questions such as Algeria, for example, indicates the independence of the Brazilian position within the western camp. Without prejudice to the position of the President of Brazil, one may ponder \textit{[ponderava]} regarding the gravity of the situation that is created for Brazil, in case Cuba is \textit{[viesse]} to incline for an alliance with the Soviet world. Mister Rodrigues Larreta mentioned the identity of the Argentine position with Brazil, to which Mister Guevara responded that he well understood \textit{[this]}. As a matter of fact Argentina and Brazil, but above all Brazil, maintain an enviable position of independence, which lamentably is not the case of other American countries, above all the countries of the Caribbean. He was asked about why he came to Punta del Este and why there he maintained a moderate and conciliatory attitude, he responded that he saw in the “Alliance for Progress” program some positive aspects for the people of the Continent and that he hoped some Cuban suggestions would come to be incorporated in the final document, as in fact occurred. He was asked if he did not see in the result of the conference a significant political triumph for the United States, he declared that no, once that the internal problems that are created for the consultation of the postulates of Punta del Estate will generate many difficulties to resolve dissatisfactions. Cuba could not adhere to the document, not only owing to the political incompatibilities about the concepts in the same contents, but also because it has the certainty that it will not facilitate any of the recourses linked to the Alliance for Progress. Mister Guevara mentioned next that Cuba does not ignore the American condition, but that his country was constantly attacked, including by things that were not realized \textit{[fizeram]. In a certain moment the help of President [Romulo] Betancourt of Venezuela was procured, but straightaway since the signing of the Commercial Accord with the Soviet Union, President Betancourt has made public declarations \textit{[aleívoas]} for the Cuban Government. It is not fit to blame if Cuba counts on the spontaneous support in various countries, but in this it does not intend to intervene deliberately. However, he emphasized, in the case of Peru, if it can create a “bundle/ intrigue to \textit{[President Don Manuel] Prado}” \textit{[“lio a Prado”]}.}
[Cuba could] not fail to make [one]. The conclusion is that the Cuban Government demonstrates such fundamental interest in negotiations with the United States and in appeasing the reactions of the American Republics for fear of the defeat of the revolution by the play of factors on three planes: 1) the internal sector, where are presently the economic and political factors already mentioned; 2) the continental sector, where exists latent possibility of collective action against Cuba; 3) the international sector, where the East-West conflict can assume such magnitude that Cuba will come to be bargained between the United States and the Soviet Union. The appeal for negotiation with the United States, made in a speech at the opening of the conference and in the private conference, reveals a preoccupation so strong that it betrays the professed confidence in the stability of the regime. The preoccupation on making a good impression on the American Republics reveals unquestionably the fear of continental collective action. The desire to reopen its commerce with the United States, given to understand that it would pay indemnities for confiscated properties with resources withdrawn from its exports, show that the Soviet Union not only is not able to give all that is necessary, but it also does not give articles of quality that it needs. Moreover, [Cuba’s] exclusive dependency on the East weakens its negotiating position, and would characterize its exclusion from American environment. The peaceful coexistence inside the Continent would be of interest for the Soviet Union, in order to maintain in check the American policy and, at the same time, constitutes the assurance of that the investments that it has made in the Cuban economy would not be lost in consequence of the fall of the present Government. It seems, since, that the principal desire of Mister Guevara to catch sight of Presidents [Janio] Quadros [of Brazil] and [Arturo] Frondizi [of Argentina] is motivated by his interest in strengthening the non-interventionist line, eliminating doubts as for its alliance or political affiliation [with] the Soviet Union. I believe that this information could be useful to Your Excellence in your audience with Mister Guevara. Respectfully, Afonso Arinos”.

CABINET—RIO

…/VIII/1961

[Source: AHMRE 600(24b)—SIT. POL.—CUBA 1961 (Moniz Bandeira Collection, National Security Archive), Ministry of External Relations archives, Brasilia, Brazil; translation from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg, George Washington University.]

Notes

1  See such biographies as Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997); Jorge G. Castaneda, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Paco Ignacio Taibo II, Guevara, Also Known as Che (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).


3  See the “Bibliography of Che Guevara” page on Wikipiedia for a lengthy of compilation of films, novels, documentaries, and plays, as well as non-fiction works, for examples of “Che” in popular culture.

4  Despite the voluminous publications in Cuba of Che’s diaries and writings, the lack of open scholarly access to pertinent party and state archives in Havana containing the original records of Che’s official activities, views, and actions unfortunately compels increased reliance on foreign, non-Cuban records.

5  See Cuban G-2 intelligence documents from January-May 1961 on anti-Castro Cuban exile preparations to attack Cuba, in Guatemala, Florida, and elsewhere—supplementing what was appearing in such open publications as The Nation magazine and The New York Times before the Bay of Pigs—published elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.


7  A little more than twenty years later, in November 1981, an even higher-level furtive U.S.-Cuban diplomatic encounter occurred when U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met near Mexico City with senior Cuban official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. For the detailed Cuban record of that conversation—given to the Soviet ambassador in Havana and translated into Russian, then found in the Moscow archives after the Soviet collapse and translated into English—see CWIHP Bulletin no. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997).


Before the Bay of Pigs—What Did the Cubans Know?

Cuban Intelligence Reports, January-May 1961

Ed. note: The attempted invasion of Cuba by CIA-backed anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs/Playa Girón in April 1961 was a milestone not only in the intensifying confrontation between Cuba and the United States, and between Fidel Castro and John F Kennedy—it was also a crucial step toward the Cuban Missile Crisis (a year later, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would justify sending nuclear missiles to the island on the grounds that this would deter the Americans from trying another military assault, this time with their own military forces). Its failure—and many of the books on the affair bear titles attesting to that result, from The Perfect Failure to The Brilliant Disaster—also dealt a severe blow to the new Kennedy Administration’s foreign policy and to the movement of anti-Castro Cubans, both in exile and on the island, hoping to foment an insurrection to topple the bearded revolutionary who himself had overthrown the Batista dictatorship two years before.

Since April 1961, one enduring question has been: What did Castro’s government know, and when did it know it, about the threat of an impending assault supported by the US government? Did their advance knowledge help the Cubans to crush the operation? Of course, any careful reader of such publications as The New York Times and The Nation in the winter of 1960-61 knew that anti-Castro Cubans were being trained, in camps in Guatemala and elsewhere, with evident US government aid, for a military assault to try to recapture their island from Castro. In fact, such published reports led one senior Cuban revolutionary, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, to speculate to the Soviet ambassador in Havana in January 1961, days before Kennedy took office, that such reports had been deliberately leaked by Democrats to allow them to disavow an operation they had inherited from the Eisenhower Administration; even a few days before the invasion began, Guevara, then head of Cuba’s national bank, still doubted that an attempted invasion was imminent, since it would undoubtedly fail.2

It is still not known precisely what Fidel Castro and his top associates thought was coming, but the four translated Cuban intelligence documents published below—three reports on the anti-Castro groups’ preparations for military action in the first months of 1961, including on the eve of the Bay of Pigs, and then a post-mortem a couple of weeks after the attempted invasion was defeated and a massive crackdown launched on potential domestic enemies of the Castro government—offer some contemporaneous evidence as to what Cuban authorities actually knew at the time, beyond the published reports. They and many other Cuban docu-
Document No.1


[Box] DIY. INT. G-2 MINFAR
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APR 7 1961
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THIS REPORT IS EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE CHIEF OF REVOLUTION TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED.

IT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE DEPARTMENT CHIEF INF G-2 MINFAR [MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES]

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Dr. Tec. 0. Inf. G-2
To: Commander Ramiro Valdes Menendez
Department Chief. Inf. G-2 MINFAR

Dpt. Inf. G-2 MINFAR
January 12, 1961
“YEAR OF EDUCATION”

Re: Report on mercenary camps and bases in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida

In 1959, the “yanki” [Yankee, i.e., US] Department of State made the Dominican Republic its main mercenary training center. Adventurers and murderers from different countries, Falangists from the Blue Legion, Nazis, Japanese, “yankis”, war criminals, European renegades, and other riffraff assembled there and trained under the direction of [Former Batista General Jose] PEDRAZA [Cabrera] and [Dominican Republic President Rafael] TRUJILLO’S Officers for an invasion of Cuba. Every day, the Dominican radio spewed insults and defamation against the Cuban Revolution and its leaders.

But then Washington changed its plans. TRUJILLO turned out to be spoiled goods for the peoples of America. This devoted lackey was already very “burned.” Plans were made to “sacrifice him” at the OAS [Organization of American States] (a sacrifice that later turned out to be apparent, not real) in order to stage a farce in that International Organization that would lead to condemnation of the TRUJILLO dictatorship along with the CASTRO “dictatorship.”

As these “highly strategic” political plans were being developed, plans in which “democrats”[former Costa Rican President] PEPE “CACHUCHA” FIGUERES, [Venezuelan President] ROMULO BETANCOURT, and [Puerto Rican Governor Luis] MUNOZ MARIN were not uninvolved, the forces of imperialism transferred out of Santo Domingo their most important preparation center for an attack against Cuba. From that day forward, Guatemala became the main focal point for mercenary training in camps and bases established there. The distinguishing feature was that this operation was no longer run by PEDRAZA and TRUJILLO, but rather by the CIA, with North American officials directly training the mercenaries, and provisioning them with equipment, arms, supplies, aircraft, etc.

Thus, by the first few months of 1960, an important airstrip, as well as a major mercenary camp, had already been built in Retalhuleu under the direction of “yanki” officials. This base was built with utmost haste by a “yanki” company and “yanki” engineers at a cost of over one million dollars supplied, according to reports, by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and businesses such as the United Fruit Company.

More than twenty such camps were quickly established in different areas of Guatemala, comprising a total of more than six thousand mercenaries as well as a large number of airplanes and huge quantities of arms.

By this past October [1960], the climate of hostility toward Cuba and preparations underway in Guatemala for an invasion were evident.

In mid-October there was a marked increase in activity on bases established in the Department of Retalhuleu. The number of airplanes arriving and unloading was higher than usual. People working in those centers observed that there was every indication of an impending attack on Cuba. The airplanes had unloaded parachutes, field hammocks, and stretchers.

The mercenaries were concentrated mainly in the Department of Retalhuleu. At “Helvetia” farm, 600 tents were divided into two camps of 300 tents each. An individual who was in one of those tents reported that there was an average of ten men in each tent, which added up to six thou-
sand mercenaries. These included Cubans, Guatemalans, other nationalities, and North Americans. They were paid about ten dollars per day. There are approximately two hundred North Americans, who direct training, construction, the radar station, etc. One of these camps is situated 3 kms. north of the center of the above-mentioned farm.

The airstrip at Retalhuleu airport is built to withstand bombardment and to last an average of two years. Its estimated cost is placed at over one million dollars. Although this airstrip was recently built, repair crews are there every day, which can only be interpreted as a preventive measure in case of reprisal from Cuba.

When the Retalhuleu airport was first opened, President YDICORAS [Fuentes] said that it was to be used to export products from western Guatemala. It has been closed to the public for the past several weeks, however, having been placed under military jurisdiction during the state of siege. And although it is ostensibly under the control of the Guatemalan Army, the fact is that the airport actually is controlled by North Americans, to the extent that truck drivers who arrive there to unload cargo are replaced by North Americans to keep them from entering. Moreover, the Governor of the Department does not even have access to this airport.

There are an estimated 48 airplanes based in Guatemala for use in the attack and invasion of Cuba. There are B-26 airplanes, some propulsion aircraft, and Globemaster transport planes. Most of these planes are based at the Retalhuleu airport and in Chinaja, while the rest are distributed between the central "Aurora" airport near Guatemala City, and Puerto Barrios on the Atlantic coast.

Flights take place at night. The majority of the planes are unmarked and most are painted black. Activities are generally nocturnal. This can be construed not only as a means to remain inconspicuous and cover up these activities, but also as a means of preparing the men to operate at night against Cuba. As a result, there have been a number of air accidents on the coast of Retalhuleu and the area known as Flores, in the Peten. The plane that crashed in the Peten (Flores) had taken off from Tapachula, located almost on the Mexican-Guatemalan border. Nighttime parachute drills also are taking place.

Training sessions are held using real firepower. As a result, the Ydigoras government has publicly acknowledged that several men have been killed or wounded, while alleging that this occurred during the training of Guatemalan troops with modern weapons.

On the "Helvetia" farm, municipality of El Palmar, Department of Quetzaltenango, but also accessible via the municipality of San Sebastian, Department of Retalhuleu, in the area known as Cerro Nil, on the banks of the Nima River, a radar station was installed. Another radar station recently was installed on the central Guatemalan Air Force base located at "La Aurora" airport in Guatemala City, and on the base at San Jose airport on the Pacific coast.

The areas where the aggressors have focused their activities are Retalhuleu; Chinaja; "La Aurora" international airport which also houses the FAG [Guatemalan Air Force] base, located on the outskirts of Guatemala City; the base located at the port of San Jose on the Pacific coast; and the base in Puerto Barrios, on the Atlantic coast. But the main mercenary concentration point is located in Retalhuleu, near the Guatemalan-Mexican border, whose airport is situated between kilometers 186 and 188 of the highway leading to Champerico port; the new airport was secretly built on the national (government-owned) farm called "La Aurora" located in the municipality of Nuevo San Carlo, also in Retalhuleu, whose airport is made of concrete cemented on piles ten meters deep and two meters wide and is outfitted, according to unconfirmed data, with underground hangars.

Other information sources indicate that there is a 45,000-gallon gasoline tank covered over with sandbags and garbage in Retalhuleu airport. Airplanes usually take off from Retalhuleu on Mondays at four o'clock in the morning and return on Wednesdays between four and five o'clock in the morning. During the first week of last October, a cargo of leather boots was received for the alleged invaders. US Air Force planes numbers 850 and 854 reportedly were painted with Guatemalan insignia.

The apparent chief or authority in the Retalhuleu camps is a North American who goes by the assumed name NORTH. There are an estimated fifty North American aviators.

Since 11 August 1960, several jets and Mustang airplanes have landed at the base at the port of San Jose. On the 13 August, a Globemaster landed at the main "La Aurora" airport in Guatemala City supposedly to deliver milk to CARE, but was actually carrying weapons and ammunition that were unloaded by Guatemalan Army soldiers. The following week, other Globemasters landed at the San Jose airport and their cargo was transported to Retalhuleu.

Airplane arrivals and departures then intensified. On October 14, two North American B-29 bombers and a transport plane landed at "La Aurora" central airport in Guatemala City. During the third week of October, airplanes marked with registration numbers, or alleged registration numbers, L-F-5, L-F-8, L-F-9, L-F-11 conducted night flights between "La Aurora" central airport and Retalhuleu airport. This past October 14, a large number of airplanes landed at Retalhuleu airport. Also, [Avro] Lancaster air-
planes, Canadian-made bombers. By October 26, 47 bombers had been assembled at the secret airport located on “Aurora” farm, as well as a huge arsenal of five hundred and six hundred pound bombs which, arranged in a row, cover 150 meters.

It is possible that the northern zone of Retalhuleu Department has been chosen for mercenary camps because several national farms are located there. In other words, farms that were owned by Germans, were expropriated following World War II, and are now administrated by the Guatemalan government. The most important of these farms is “Candelaria Xornutz.” Others currently occupied by camps are “Aurora,” “La Suiza,” “Tambor,” “Culsin,” and “Helvetia” itself, owned by brothers ROBERTO and CARLOS ALEJOS ARZU, who are YDIGORAS stalwarts.

“Helvetia” farm, currently owned by ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, former coordinator of “North American Aid to the Guatemalan Government,” friend and advisor of YDIGORAS, currently diplomatic representative of the Knights of Malta, and his brother, CARLOS ALEJOS ARZU, currently the Ambassador to Washington, is one of the most important mercenaries concentration points. Reports indicate that, possibly in the month of August or earlier, 185 mercenaries and 45 specialists were there, most of the latter North Americans. Later, Batista followers and other mercenaries began to join them. In late July or early August, 500 soldiers and non-commissioned officers from the Guatemalan army also were taken there, 20 of whom were taken to the United States and the Panama Canal Zone for special training. Many workers and peasant farmers from the national and private farms in the area were persuaded, or obliged, to sign up. At the end of the third week of October, a large number of North American soldiers were brought in by railway via Puerto Barrios, and were taken to “Helvetia” farm.

Some regular troops of the Guatemalan National Army, about four infantry companies, have been assigned to guard the zone and are deployed at “Helvetia,” “Aurora,” “La Suiza,” “Tambor,” and “Culsin” farms.

Reports have been received regarding the presence of an airplane-launching catapult at “La Suiza” farm, which serves the dual purpose of instructing pilots for aircraft carrier based operations and impeding detection of the base from the air. These installations were built by the North American company “Johnson Powers.”

Other camps worth mentioning are located at “Rancho Florida” farm in Escuintla Department, “Campo Corriente,” owned by United Fruit Company; “Helvetia” and “Aurora” mentioned earlier, and those in other zones.

Last November, AUGUSTO MULET, Press Secretary of the Guatemalan Presidency, confirmed the existence of secret training camps at more than TWENTY farms where forces are instructed in commando and guerrilla tactics; he identified the Retalhuleu air base and “Helvetia” farm as one such camp.

It is common knowledge that the Retalhuleu airport was outfitted hastily by North American engineers at an estimated cost of more than one million dollars. Its main facility is the airstrip. Funding was supplied by the “Central Intelligence Agency” (CIA) and by corporations such as United Fruit Company among others.

Other reports provide the following information:

The meteorological Service at the port of San Jose in the Pacific has been under military control recently and other meteorological centers in the country also operate under a quasi-military system.

A ten kilowatt radio transmitter has been installed at Puerto Matias de Galvez, at a cost of 35,000 dollars. Its broadcasts on official frequencies and primarily target Belize. It is therefore possible to surmise that its broadcasts could also reach Cuba on other frequencies; that it is able to broadcast instead of, or in conjunction with, Radio Swan; and that it could be put into service during an invasion, since its geographical location and power enable it to broadcast a clear signal to Cuba.

YDIGORAS’ chauffeur makes two trips per week to Puerto Matias de Galvez to deliver tape recordings of speeches recorded by “a Cuban” in Guatemala City.

A fleet of fishing vessels on the Atlantic Coast is well equipped with artillery, data that was gleaned from a public statement made by MARCO ANTONIO VILLAMAR, secretary of the organization PUR.

Military preparations also extend to other areas of the country. A few kilometers from Champerico Port, work has begun on a new air base in a place called “El Manchon,” some eight kms. to the east, and for the installation of troops on “Montecristo” farm, approximately 12 kms. from there. Punta de Manabique, enclosing Amatique Bay in the Atlantic, is fortified. On the banks of the Polochic River, what appears to be a new airstrip is under construction; and construction took place at a rapid pace in an area known as “Rama Blanca,” Izabal Department.

Other reports indicate that it is likely that YDIGORAS and the “yankis” plan to unleash hostilities between Guatemala and Cuba by falsely claiming the incursion of an alleged Cuban aircraft that would be shot down in Guatemalan territory. This would permit the “legal” use of Guatemalan territory for operations against Cuba, which
would be followed by an attempt to provoke a collective OAS response.

In addition to sparking protests by the Guatemalan people, the existence of over 20 mercenary training camps has raised concerns inside the army over preparations for an attack on Cuba. Certain reports indicate that last 26 October, there were discussions inside the army chief of staff headquarters [Estado Mayor] regarding the position the army should take regarding these matters.

At the same time, the political opposition to YDIGORAS in the Parliament denounced the existence of the camps, issuing summons in the matter and calling for an immediate investigation. At first the government rejected their demands, but a few days later, YDIGORAS invited opposition legislators to visit the Retalhuleu base. This offer was rejected because the legislators in question asserted that, on 27 October 1960, the authorities had just finished dispersing the mercenaries to other areas.

The considerable level of air traffic registered during the first weeks of October in the zone of Retalhuleu diminished and nearly disappeared after the opposition began to agitate.

Whether because the opposition faction in Parliament had requested that an investigatory commission be sent to Retalhuleu; or because of the stance taken by many Army Officers; or perhaps because the YDIGORAS administration and the “yanki” Embassy in Guatemala already were aware of a conspiracy involving numerous officers (which culminated in the 13 November military uprising), the fact of the matter is that most of the mercenaries were removed from “Helvetia” farm on the night of 27 October.

Mercenaries taken out of “Helvetia” farm were distributed more or less as follows: some four thousand mercenaries boarded thirteen war vessels, with no flags or registration numbers, anchored in the bay at Puerto Barrios and embarked for Nicaragua. Upon arriving in that country, they disembarked at the mouth of the Prinsapolka River, where an air base is located, and were later taken to a camp six miles away.

The ships left Puerto Barrios at 22:30 hours on that night, 27 October. This mercenary contingent was mainly composed of Cubans, as well as Salvadorans, Hondurans, etc. Other reports add that some of these mercenaries were left in the area of Puerto Cabezas, Blue Fields, Cabo Gracias a Dios and the Islas de Maiz (leased to the US) in Nicaragua. It also indicates that a group disembarked at Swan [Cisne] Island in Honduran territory.

That same night, 27 October, another group of some fifteen hundred mercenaries was removed from “Helvetia” farm in an extraordinary movement of trains and aircraft. They were taken to a camp adjoining the Chinaja airstrip, where they were seen over the following days.

The Chinaja airstrip and camp mentioned earlier is described as follows: Chinaja is located in northern Alta Verapaz department, latitude approximately 16 degrees north and longitude 90 degrees, fifteen minutes. Because there are no roads, this area is virtually cut off by land from the rest of the country. It is located in an area spanning 271,601 hectares, that was obtained by a North American corporation, “The Ohio Oil Company,” through oil claim number three. This was where the first oil well was drilled in 1958. The Company built an airstrip there, which is the longest in the country and currently is used by aircraft stationed there by the United States for the invasion of Cuba. As stated earlier, a camp currently has been established there with part of the troops previously located at “Helvetia Farm.”

We should also mention that some distance from Chinaja, in the Peten, there are airstrips in Poptun and Flores.

Airports also were under construction in Champerico and in Carmelita, on “Concepcion” farm, equipped with radar and military personnel stationed there by the CIA.

Following the transfer of mercenaries from the “Helvetia” base and other nearby national farms, the situation was as follows:

The four Guatemalan army companies remain on “Helvetia” farm, to which another contingent of 500 regular troops has been added, in other words a total of one thousand soldiers.

Many North Americans also remain on “Helvetia.” The rural workers and peasant farmers who signed up were demobilized and returned to their agricultural pursuits, although under strict vigilance. This is presumably a temporary situation.

Some reports point to a total of 60 aircraft, for the attack on Cuba, while others report as many as 150 aircraft. Although the latter figure coincides with YDIGORAS’ statement on 13 October, the start of the military uprising, in his threatening words to Guatemalan Air Force (FAG) pilots who refused to bomb Zacapa and Puerto Barrios, so far we have not been able to obtain exact figures.

North American instructors had already concluded other aspects of mercenary training; therefore, those who remain camped at “Helvetia” and other bases are only undergoing training in parachute jumping, for which a huge transport plane is used.

Public protests against preparations for the invasion of Cuba that took place in Guatemala:

The fact that a Cuban invasion was being planned was widely reported in Guatemala and had a strong impact on public opinion there. Beginning in July, the “Guatemalan
Labor Party' ["Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo"] made a number of charges and statements on the subject.

Several publications, especially radio news programs such as "Guatemala Flash" and "Radio Noticias," and the newspaper "Prensa Libre," reported on the issue. Colonel CARLOS A. PAZ TEJADA's allegations, widely circulated and published on an entire page of Guatemalan newspaper "Prensa Libre" with a daily circulation of some thirty thousand papers.

The declarations of the "Association of University Students," the "Association of Economic Sciences Students," the "Association of Students in the School of Humanities," in the capital. The declarations by the "Western Association of Law Students," and the "Salvador Orozco Circle," both in Quetzaltenango. Another prominent event had to do with the summons of the Foreign Minister that was issued by congressmen JULIO VALLADARES CASTILLO and MARCO ANTONIO VILLAMAR CONTRERAS, and the public letter issued by the latter.

The allegations emanating from within the Guatemalan Congress and the motion presented by congressman VALLADARES CASTILLO of the PUR, at the request of the Student Associations, calling for an investigation of the activities and camps at Retalhuleu; the declaration by the "Federacion Autonoma Sindical," the protest demonstration and rally held in front of the United States Embassy in Guatemala City; and the rally last 20 October, the XVI anniversary of the Guatemalan Revolution, attended by the above mentioned FAS, the Sindicato de Pilotos Automovilistas, etc., were all demonstrations of open solidarity with the Cuban revolution and outright rejection of the military preparations taking place against Cuba, all of which had an impact on YDIGORAS' frame of mind and that of his "yanki" protectors.

The military uprising of 13 November 1960

The YDIGORAS government, consumed by a serious economic, political, and social crisis, a substantial foreign debt, and completely discredited in public opinion, is facing the active opposition of the Guatemalan masses.

For some time, a significant number of Army Officers had been expressing their disagreement with the YDIGORAS regime. In late June, 1960 a conspiratorial circle had formed comprising some 60 officers. Most of those involved were young officers from different army divisions and a few troop commanders. In July, when the teachers and students movement emerged around the seniority law and other demands, this group of soldiers tried to act, seeking the opportunity and means to bring about a change of government. A huge demonstration took place at that time and there were street disturbances for several days despite the declared state of emergency; but these officers never managed to act.

The group continued to attract more officers to its cause, achieving a certain degree of organization as well as a core of five members who directed the conspiracy. These officers contacted Colonel CARLOS A. PAZ TEJADA and, following his statements against the mercenary camps and military bases on Guatemalan territory, essentially placed him at the head of the core directorate, discussing with him the actions that they planned to take.

They reached agreements with PAZ TEJADA on several points: agreeing to publish a proclamation clearly signaling their opposition to the mercenary army's presence in the country, the derogation of the 1956 Constitution in effect, and the formation of a Junta to be headed by PAZ TEJADA and a government cabinet including three or four PUR Ministers.

Nonetheless, the position taken by these Officers was patently indecisive and opportunistic. They did not want to be identified with the 1944-1954 Revolution; nor did they wish to acquire commitments with the revolutionary organizations that would entail difficulties with the North American government, or publicly express sympathy for the Cuban revolution.

After the overthrow of LEMUS in El Salvador, these officers considered doing something similar in Guatemala.

To summarize, this military movement was not proposing structural changes in the country, but rather sought to preserve the country's existing dependency on "yanki" monopolies and native exploiters. In fact, their conspiracy tended to hamper grassroots revolutionary action, and sought to establish the traditional government by military junta, accompanied by a lot of "democratic" rhetoric and the same submission to imperialism in practice.

Last 28 October, Lieutenant Colonel SESSAN PEREIRA, who while not part of the plotters' leadership was very much taken into account because of his personal commitment and his influence at Military Zone I General Headquarters, was willing to launch a coup and requested the approval of the Group's leadership. After initially giving its approval, the group changed its mind after considering the situation, and told him it would be better to wait awhile and further develop the plans.

Inside the army there was considerable concern over preparations underway in the mercenary camps for an attack on Cuba. Unconfirmed reports indicated that on 26 October, a discussion took place inside the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters [Estado Mayor] regarding the position the army should take with respect to these events.
The Officers’ conspiracy followed its course. On 30-31 October, a large officers meeting was held in the capital, where discussion centered on whether or not the army should continue to support the YDIGORAS administration or form part of the Junta that would replace him. By a narrow margin, the vote came out in favor of continuing to support the government and, although the conspirators received a significant number of votes, they stopped acting at that time.

The conspirators then distanced themselves from Colonel PAZ TEJADA. They expanded their directorate to seven members, with a strengthened centrist position favoring a coup d’etat that did not involve alliances with the left so as to avoid confrontations with the “yankis.” They later made contact with certain leaders of the “Revolutionary Party” [PR] who reinforced their already indecisive and sell-out [entreguista] mentality. PR members succeeded in influencing the officers in support of their halfhearted approach, pushing aside Colonel PAZ TEJADA and his friends.

On 5 November, the army officers presented YDIGORAS with a memorandum giving him 72 hours to modify certain aspects of his policy of internal repression and to remove from the country all mercenaries remaining in the camps. It appears that, from a military standpoint, these officers viewed the presence of government-sponsored armed mercenary groups as a blow to their military ego.

For its part, the YDIGORAS government had already taken precautions against the conspiracy and internal army opposition, which was quite pervasive if we consider the narrow vote in favor of continuing to support the government.

The deadline set by the Officers expired on 8 November and YDIGORAS, far from complying with their petitions, ordered repressive measures to be taken against the disgruntled officers. On 11 and 12 November, the principal officers who had presented the memorandum were arrested, and 97 others were relieved of their duties and discharged. The detainees were taken to jail cells located in the General Headquarters of Military Zone 1 (“Justo Rufino Barrios”), a hub of rebellion since Colonel SESSAN PEREIRA had taken control of the base at Jutiapa.

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On 5 November, the army officers presented YDIGORAS with a memorandum giving him 72 hours to modify certain aspects of his policy of internal repression and to remove from the country all mercenaries remaining in the camps. It appears that, from a military standpoint, these officers viewed the presence of government-sponsored armed mercenaries as a blow to their military ego.

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On the morning of 13 November, the plotters easily took control of the General Headquarters of Military Zone 1. And they were confident of their ability to coordinate with certain officers to take over the Mariscal Zabala Regiment, the best complex, with more troops and equipment than anywhere else in the country, save the mercenary camp installed by the “yankis” at the “Helvetia” base.

Other young officers assured the plotters that they could take control of Military Zone No. 2 in Zacapa. They were also confident that they could take control of the bases at Puerto Barrios and Jutiapa.

But the rebellious officers were unable to take over the Mariscal Zabala Regiment. With the few officials [officers?] they had, they were only able to neutralize the guard, passing without difficulty in front of the Regiment with some two hundred soldiers from the General Headquarters of Zone No. 1 and six large trucks carrying weapons, taking over the Atlantic highway. The Zacapa zone was taken over as planned, as was Puerto Barrios, but they failed to gain control of the base at Jutiapa.

The rebels gained military control over the departments of Zacapa and Izabal; but their best hope for triumph had been placed in the rapid support they anticipated from their counterparts in the capital, that could lead to a rapid coup d’état without too much struggle. They also were counting on the fact that the Guatemalan Air Force would not attack them.

Thus, awaiting the decision of their co-conspirators in the capital, without ties to the people or revolutionary organizations, lacking a concrete fighting plan, refusing to arm revolutionaries in Zacapa and Puerto Barrios who came to request that they do so (Colonel SESSAN PEREIRA wanted to arm the people, a position virulently opposed by his colleagues); all of these factors gave YDIGORAS time to react and take measures to counteract the rebels.

They published just two proclamations, one in Zacapa and the other in Puerto Barrios, about which the rest of the country remained virtually unaware. The plan essentially was to wait and see how the situation played out in the Capital.

YDIGORAS had difficulties mobilizing the Air Force against the rebels. Approximately 25 pilots, more than half, refused to attack their fellow soldiers. The President could only count on the full support of the Air Force chief of operations, who also piloted his Comander aircraft, and two or three other aviators. On that day, 13 November, YDIGORAS was compelled to go personally to the FAG and threaten the pilots with the use of the organized military force at the “Helvetia” base where, the President warned, there were 6,000 men and 150 aircraft.

His threat notwithstanding, YDIGORAS, did not trust the FAG; the bombing and strafing operations that ensued
were primarily carried out by North American pilots. On that same day, 13 November, the United States Embassy's Air Force Attache, together with other “yanki” military attaches, directed operations from the Presidential Palace, where pilots presented themselves in person to report and receive their instructions. In addition to the pilots operating out of “La Aurora” central airport, we understand that other aircraft also operated out of Retalhuleu and Chinaja. Some Guatemalan FAG pilots were used for nothing more than to taxi the aircraft out onto the runway where they would deboard the plane and a “yanki” pilot would take over the controls. They used B-2 bombers and Mustangs.

Later, there were reports from Puerto Barrios that “Catalina” airplanes had been sighted, which could have taken off from the “Shan-gri-la” aircraft carrier.

While the FAG had few bombs, during those days they were amply stocked from the arsenals of the North American mercenary bases. This included Napalm bombs.

YDIGORAS’ army chief of staff, AUGUSTIN DIONIS KESTLER, with strong ties to the “yankis” dating back to 1954, stated that the Army Chief of Staff intended to request the deployment of North American marine infantry if the situation got complicated. This plan to request US assistance was furthered, without YDIGORAS’ prior knowledge, by [US President Dwight D.] EISENHOWER’s order to send, as he did, several US Marine units and an aircraft carrier to guard Guatemala’s Atlantic coast.

13 and 14 November were very insecure days for the government. However, YDIGORAS’ prompt use of the “yanki” aviators and the immediate maritime intervention decreed by EISENHOWER, coupled with the rebels’ indecisiveness, successfully prevented other officers and units from joining the rebellion, and the movement failed in the wake of intense bombing in Zacapa and Puerto Barrios.

The rebellious troops were subjected to intense air fire and bombardment, which was enough, without calling in the infantry, to compel them to retreat from their positions in Puerto Barrios and Gualan. The Government regained control in the other areas without resorting to armed force. As for the mutinous soldiers, who numbered close to a thousand, some fled into the mountains, others were captured, and still others surrendered. One group of chiefs and officers reached the Honduran border. Colonel EDUARDO LLERENA refused to leave Puerto Barrios, and remained in hiding in the area.

On 16 November, the uprising was considered to be under control, but the army remained very divided. The movement led by the group of officers had implicated some two hundred officers, of which at least fifty had participated actively in the rebellion. Others who were part of the plan to rebel did not do so, and some of these probably were discharged for suspicion. Still others remained on active duty. Several young officers who played prominent roles in this military action are university students, and others had received specialized “ranger” training in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone. Some non-commissioned officers also participated, but the rank and file were not clearly aware of what they were doing. Although it is still weak, a certain nationalism is unquestionably taking root among young officers, and some wish that “things not continue as they are.”

Democratic forces continue to struggle to overthrow YDIGORAS and change the situation. To this end, they organize and assemble, awaiting new battles in the struggle against the sell-out government.

The military uprising has accentuated the government’s internal contradictions and weaknesses. Colonel JOSE LUIS CRUZ SALAZAR, a favorite of the North Americans and the government’s Minister of Communications and Public Works, at one point during the uprising looked for an opportunity to carry out a coup d’etat with Castillo Armas followers.

Colonel ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, who was named Chief of Operations during the revolt, now is emerging as a new US favorite and is the man IGIDORAS [sic; YDIGORAS] is grooming to be his presidential successor by appointing him Minister of National Defense.

YDIGORAS and the forces of imperialism tried to take advantage of this army uprising devoid of revolutionary plans against Cuba, by accusing it of links to Fidel, which events soon proved false.

The uprising, as stated earlier, was quashed without infantry troops, through the exclusive use of intense aerial bombardments, including rockets, carried out by the mercenary air force and piloted by “yanki” aviators (they used B-26 airplanes numbers 16 through 21). Puerto Barrios was attacked by more than 800 rockets.

The units that participated in the uprising were: a) those from the Military Police headquarters in the Capital; b) those from the Zacapa zone; c) the Puerto Barrios garrison.

The entire city of Zacapa was bombed and, particularly, the railway stations. Part of the city of Puerto Barrios was bombed, the airstrips, and the recently-built radio station. Military casualties were insignificant on both sides, but many civilians, women and children, were killed in the bombings of Zacapa and Puerto Barrios.

Current situation in Guatemala

YDIGORAS, who in late October, 1960 had been obliged to disperse the mercenaries in the face of public protest and
allegations and inquiries in Parliament, now, in January 1961, has resumed its activities in the camps and bases established for an attack on Cuba.

YDIGORAS' attitude can be explained based on the following: In putting down the 13 November 1960 military uprising, he had had the opportunity to purge the Army's ranks of disgruntled officers, disaffected with his administration. Further, EISENHOWER'S active support of his floundering government, the deployment of naval guard units in Guatemala's Atlantic waters, is considered a decisive factor likely to quell any threat by the opposition against his regime. YDIGORAS, then, is considered to be in a strong position, in charge of the situation. And therefore, in compliance with orders from his "yanki" bosses, he is resuming mercenary activities in the Guatemalan camps.

In light of Guatemala's internal situation at the end of October, 1960, it is easy to appreciate the threats that hovered over the mercenary camps and, as a consequence, over the "yanki" plans to attack Cuba. That explains why the North American government did not hesitate to mobilize part of its fleet and openly declared its willingness to use any means to prevent the downfall of the YDIGORAS government, which would put a serious wrench in the CIA's invasion plans.

In fact, they justified their open intervention in support of YDIGORAS by invoking the already stale and false excuse of a possible attack by Cuba and communism.

This reactivation of the mercenary camps has become so obvious that it has been reported openly in the "yanki" press, including the "New York Times" among others, provoking a scandal of worldwide proportions.

For example, on 9 January, correspondents JOSEPH MARTIN and PHIL SANTORA wrote in the New York "Daily News" that the activities of counterrevolutionary groups operating in the United States and Guatemala are financed by North American industrial interests. They added that each week, fifty or sixty counterrevolutionaries depart from Miami International Airport in a plane headed for one of the three secret training camps.

They confirmed that, as part of this operation, pilots are trained on an airstrip located in Guatemala just 56 kms. from the Mexican border. The existence of the secret base was revealed by another journalist, DON DWIGGINS, in an article published in the weekly "The Nation."

Both journalists affirmed that these forces have 12 B-26 light bombers and at least 6 troop transport planes, which have been sent to the secret base in Guatemala.

This past 9 January, the "Sunday Times" of London published an article, including text and photographs, on Cuban counterrevolutionary training camps in Miami, reporting that preparations are openly underway to invade Cuba.

The "New York Times" reported that combat forces in Guatemala are being trained in guerrilla warfare by foreign personnel, most of whom are from the United States. A dispatch from Retalhuleu reports that "this zone is the focal point for Guatemalan military preparations, for which Guatemalans believe that a clash with Cuba is virtually unavoidable." It later adds that the United States is supporting this action not only with personnel, but also with materials and the construction of facilities for air and ground services.

While ground forces train on the spurs of the mountain range a few kilometers from the Pacific, intense air training is taking place here in a partially camouflaged aerodrome. President YDIGORAS admitted in an interview that training in guerrilla warfare was taking place on the spurs of the "Helvetia" hacienda, located a few kilometers from the provincial capital. He further stated that the air base located approximately 5 kms. west of the Capital on the Pacific side was being used for military purposes, but that he expected that it would be turned over to commercial use in the near future.

A Guatemalan authority at the "Helvetia" farm indicated, according to the Times, that the project had grown so quickly that they had imported foreign instructors. According to this source, most of these were North American guerrilla warfare specialists; experts also had been imported from other countries. He added that the latter group included Cubans, but the authority at "Helvetia" denied that Cuban citizens currently were being trained there.

The Times went on to report that, according to a source, a group of United States military personnel were at the air base, as well as other foreigners, for training purposes.

CARLOS ALEJOS ARZU, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, acknowledged on 10 January that North American officials are assisting Guatemalan forces and troops of other nationalities with training in the environs of the Retalhuleu air base and other parts of the country, but said that the training was not for the purpose of invading Cuba. The declaration was made after revelations published by North American journalists in the "New York Times," "The Nation," and the "New York Daily News."

The Department of State in Washington announced at the last minute that it would have no comment or statement to make about reports published in the "New York Times" to the effect that commandos were being trained to attack Cuba from Guatemalan bases. This announcement was made by LINCOLN WHITE who had stated at noon that the Department would have an official statement to make on the subject.
The journalists mention GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ VEGA, a Cuban who passed himself off as a counter-revolutionary and was in the training camps, and fled the camps before the Christmas holidays, seeking asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala. Upon being denied safe conduct he fled the Embassy and headed for Mexico where, according to reports, he informed the Cuban Ambassador of the invasion plans.

That same day, 10 January, President Ydigoras categorically denied that preparations were underway to invade Cuba.

A dispatch from the Guatemalan city of Retalhuleu signed by “New York Times” correspondent PAUL P. KENNEDY, reports that this zone is the focal point of military preparations in Guatemala against Cuba. The dispatch adds that the base at Retalhuleu is used to train commando forces with the assistance of specialists from North America, Cuba and other countries.

KENNEDY asserts that the base was built with financial assistance from the United States, which also supplied arms. He added that an official who participated in the negotiations in Washington confirmed for him that the North American government refused to send more arms than those already sent, because it believed that the supplies requested exceeded the requirements of defensive operations.

He added that the base’s main facility is an airstrip built by a North American firm, but that the aerodrome is not a military facility in the true sense of the word. He went on to report that military personnel wearing North American uniforms have been sighted in the city of Retalhuleu.

Colonel ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, Guatemalan Minister of Defense, stated that: “There are indeed troops stationed in Retalhuleu because it is a Guatemalan military base where Guatemalan regular army troops are trained to repel a second attack, whether it be launched from within Guatemala or from the outside.

“There are North American officers in Guatemala and they belong to the Air Mission. In addition, a Naval Mission will be arriving shortly.

They provide valuable training services to Guatemalan troops because that is why they have come to Guatemala, as they have gone to almost all Latin American countries.

“Guatemalan troops who are being trained in guerrilla warfare in Retalhuleu were airlifted to the battles in Zacapa and Puerto Barrios last November.”

As can be observed, there are two falsehoods in these statements by YDIGORAS’ Minister of Defense: the first being when he states that the troops were airlifted to the battles in Zacapa and Puerto Barrios. It is common knowledge that infantry forces did not operate there and that the air power used was operated by “yanki” pilots. The second lie has to do with affirming that Retalhuleu is a Guatemalan Army base, when it is well known that it is a foreign mercenary base. In fact, it appears that YDIGORAS now wants to cover up these mercenary activities by saying that they actually correspond to the Guatemalan Army.

After visiting Guatemala last November, the head of UPI [United Press International] in Mexico confirmed the presence of an air base in Retalhuleu. At that time, he cynically commented that the base was being prepared as a potential future facility to protect the Panama Canal, and as a center from which to launch an attack on any invading fleet.

The “New York Times” correspondent was able to prove that the base was isolated from the surrounding road and that armed soldiers man a guard post on a neighboring agricultural farm, from which they are able to observe activities in the military center and keep strangers from entering.

In September and October of last year, a considerable number of North Americans, military in appearance and with tattoos customary among members of the United States Armed Forces, were observed around Retalhuleu and on nearby Pacific beaches.

The opposition asserted that those North Americans were responsible for training commandos, but the government only stated that they were engineers assisting with construction of the base.

As Guatemalan Minister of Defense Colonel Enrique Peralta just indicated, recently there has been a resumption of intensive activity at Retalhuleu.

The “New York Post” called journalists MARTIN and SANTORA careless for reporting that these counterrevolutionary activities are financed by American industries whose properties in Cuba were nationalized by the Revolutionary Government.

In the New York-based “The Nation,” DON DWIGGINS reported that he had been able to confirm the existence of a military base in Retalhuleu. All access routes to the aerodrome are closed off. Rifle-bearing guards are posted on roads leading to the base. According to reports, the aerodrome’s airstrip is eight thousand feet long, which would seem rather short for operating jet propulsion combat planes, although it can be done since the aerodrome is at sea level.

The airstrip is built on terrain belonging to MANUEL RALDA, a prominent Guatemalan cattle rancher. It is said that the construction was completed in record time, over 80 days in the summer of 1960, under the worst conditions of heat and humidity. Since there are no flights to and from the Department of Retalhuleu, there is no doubt as to the purpose of the base there.
Dr. ROGER HILTON, Director of the Hispanic American Studies Institute of Stanford University, recently returned from Guatemala with proof that the country was replete with exiles who were planning a Cuban invasion via Isla de los Pinos; this information was published in “The Nation.”

According to Dr. HILTON, they expect to establish a Formosa-style government there (referring to Isla de los Pinos), that would serve as an assembly point for enemies of FIDEL CASTRO. In coordination with the invasion plans, forces would be concentrated in Puerto Barrios, which would serve as a springboard during the maneuver.

One report indicates that Retalhuleu is a training base for air and ground forces pertaining to a burgeoning “volunteer” army comprising OAS member countries. Other reports describe the aerodrome as one of many in a growing network of military bases from which it would be easy to launch a coordinated attack against Cuba.

On 10 January, the “New York Times” reported that the United States is supplying Guatemala with training personnel, materials, and other assistance to ready a guerrilla force for a possible clash with Cuba. Times correspondent KENNEDY reported from Retalhuleu that the US also has helped finance the construction of a landing camp where daily training in air maneuvers is taking place. He also reported that the hacienda is mostly owned by ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, one of the largest independent coffee growers in Guatemala and an intimate friend and advisor of YDIGORAS.

Two B-26s and two DC-4 or DC-6s, without registration marks, operate on the airstrip. The camp structures appear to be army barracks, one of which is used as a radio station. News correspondent KENNEDY said that he was able to penetrate twelve kilometers into the hacienda where the Guatemalans are being trained. A Guatemalan authority told him that Guatemalans originally were in charge of training at the base, but that the project expanded so quickly that guerrilla warfare specialists, mainly from the United States, were brought in.

It was reported that they used two Russians so that the recruits could get used to hearing Russian commands. The source denied, however, that Cubans currently are being trained on that hacienda.

Officers who appear to be wearing United States Air Force uniforms have been seen driving vehicles in downtown Retalhuleu, but none with that type of uniform have been seen on foot in the streets.

The Minister of Defense stated that “in fact we have forces stationed in Retalhuleu, but they are Guatemalan army soldiers who are there to receive training in guerrilla warfare.” He added that this was not for the purpose of armed action, but rather part of the Army’s routine activities. With regard to the presence of North American officers, it must be recalled that there are United States military and air missions in Guatemala, which usually provide valuable assistance to our Army. The Ministry of Defense is developing plans to reorganize the military bases in the country: the seven bases now in existence would be reduced to four bases, which would better equipped and organized than the existing facilities. These plans include establishing a strong military base in Retalhuleu. The troops there played a successful role in putting down the 13 November uprising against the government.

The Minister said that it is not true that Retalhuleu is the focal point of Guatemalan preparations for an inevitable clash with Cuba.

For approximately one year now, the opposition has been alleging that mercenary forces are trained in Retalhuleu for an invasion of Cuba.

Persistent rumors are circulating unofficially about unusual troop movements in Retalhuleu, especially on “Helvetia” farm, owned by the ALEJO brothers. These rumors even describe mercenary groups leaving Retalhuleu for Isla Cisne in Honduras; in recent weeks, there has been talk of the presence of numerous Cubans in Retalhuleu, which official sources deny.

As can be observed, all of these reports by North American correspondents that caused an international scandal provided very little information about the mercenary bases in Guatemala. This G-2 Information Department already had complete information, which was recounted in the first part of this report. These activities were condemned in a timely fashion by the Cuban government and by its representative at the U.N., Dr. RAUL ROA.

**Mercenary activities in Florida.**

Besides Guatemala, the United States is the other country where significant mercenary and counterrevolutionary activity in training camps is visible.

Florida has become an important center for conspiracy and training camps operate blatantly in different parts of the state.

The camp run by the FRD [Frente Revolucionario Democrático; Democratic Revolutionary Front] [led] by TONY VARONA is well known and contains some 1,400 mercenaries. Although the titular chief of this camp is former Colonel EDUARDO MARTIN ELENA and former Lieutenant MANUEL ARTIME, the true leaders are North American officials working for the CIA.
In addition, there are other camps run by PEDRAZA, MARTIN DIAZ TAMAYO, GARCIA TUNON, SANCHEZ MOSQUERA, MEROB SOSA, ROLANDO MASFERRER, and others.

All in all, approximately 5,000 mercenaries are receiving training in different regions of the United States.

On 10 January, the "Miami Herald" reported that the city could be linked to the air transport of anti-Castro forces to a training center in Guatemala.

Its editor, JAMES BUCHANAN, reported that an unmarked airplane with its lights off landed at the rarely used Opa-Loka aerodrome, and this was explained as merely an airplane that was low on gasoline.

Last 13 January, Dade County Commissioner ARTHUR H. PATTEN, made a proposal to assemble mercenaries throughout Florida in Opa-Loka, for an invasion of Cuba.

The newspaper also stated that a few weeks ago Hendry County police authorities were investigating similar cases of unmarked planes, with their lights off, picking up groups of men from an abandoned air strip near Clewiston [Florida].

The newspaper further reported that recruits, some of them North American, have been active in the Miami area for several months, screening exiles for men considered to be qualified and trustworthy. One agent screened volunteers from his home. The recruits are not allowed a single suitcase, nor can they carry identification documents or money; they are allowed to take only the clothes on their backs which is exchanged for a field uniform once they arrive at their destination.

On 10 January, a 28-year-old North American named DEL GURULE in Denver, Colorado, stated that he was trying to assemble a force of about 500 men in the Rocky Mountain region to join the invasion of Cuba scheduled for next June. GURULE, a Korean war veteran, said that the force he plans to mobilize will join the invading force undergoing training in Florida. He cited part of a letter signed by RAMON [S?]UAGO, a Cuban Army Colonel, to the effect that five thousand men are being prepared in Miami for the invasion.

"Parade" Magazine in New York published an article by ROBERT MAY stating that the United States has at least eleven espionage services headed by the CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, for a total of 45,000 spies who meddle in the affairs of Cuba, Guatemala, El Congo, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Burma, Laos, and other countries. He went on to say that, based on conservative estimates, the CIA spends approximately one billion dollars annually to obtain intelligence and promote subversive activities abroad. The article reports that the CIA has espionage centers disguised as business establishments in many cities. In Formosa, for example, it uses a publishing house and in the Philippines, a restaurant.

In Los Angeles, California, there is talk of an incredible air raid operation planned for early 1961. They are offering 25,000 dollars to pilots willing to participate in this mission. Those offering the money are "big shots" in the Government. According to the plan, six A-20 planes equipped with 600-pound bombs, whose pilots are only waiting to receive the offered money up front and in cash, are scattered among aerodromes in Los Angeles, Miami, Haiti, and Venezuela. The plan is to fly low over the water, appear suddenly on the Cuban coast at four o'clock in the morning, and bomb petroleum tanks and refineries.

A North American journalist recounts that, in a Caracas bar, an aviator [was] described [as] an intermediary who handles secret messages for members of the recently formed "Caribbean Legion" comprising mercenary aviators. These salaried pilots are bringing into the Caribbean a heterogeneous fleet ranging from English jet propulsion "Vampires" to B-25s and P-51s from the last war.

Mercenary training in the United States is carried out so blatantly that the 31 October edition of "Life" magazine included photographs of mercenary camps in the State of Florida. Last 25 October, CBS television (Columbia Broadcasting System) ran footage of several of these counter-revolutionary centers in Miami.

Last 22 November, the "Diario de las Americas" reported the death of North American RUSSELL F. MASKER, victim of a stray shot from Cuban ROLANDO MARTINEZ CAMPANERIA during military instruction in a camp located in "Cayo Sin Nombre," thirty miles from Cayo Hueso.

There have been reports of a paratrooper base in Tucson, Arizona, as well as small mercenary groups on the Andros Islands, in Nassau, in Cayo Sal and Cayo la Roque. There is also talk that mercenaries assembled in camps in Miami, Orlando, Homestead, Fort Lauderdale and Fort Myers earn 25 dollars a week in pay and a stipend for family members, based on the number.

Mercenaries have been transferred from these Florida training camps to Guatemala and Isla Cisne in North American Army transport planes and civilian cargo planes. The same practice is followed for those who complete instruction in Guatemala. Isla Cisne is used as a transfer point where mercenaries remain for several days before being transferred to Guantanamo Naval Base.

The first group transported to Guantanamo comprised 150 men who traveled last 24 October on United States Navy warship "Burman," commanded by Captain JOSEPH MCDONALD. Since that date, there have been weekly embarkations of groups of 150 men with weapons, sup-
plies, medicines and food rations. Recently, mercenaries in Guatemala have gone directly to the Guantanamo Naval Base without stopping over in Isla Cisne.

Mercenaries located in Guantanamo, wearing the camouflage olive green, caramel and white uniforms used by the Marine Infantry in the Second World War, are the best troops and have the best weapons. The plan is to launch several small commando-type expeditions to different points on the Island, synchronized with attacks and acts of sabotage in the cities. These expeditions will depart from Florida, some adjacent keys, and possibly Isla Cisne. During disembarkation, mercenaries camped at the Guantanamo Naval Base will head toward Sierra Maestra, which will be used as an operations center to launch attacks on several cities in the Oriente province, with air support from bases in Isla Cisne and Guatemala. The mercenary air force also plans to bomb different locations in the La Habana province.

One of the Miami recruitment centers is located on 17th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, where mercenaries openly are signed up to join an invading army:

There already have been reports that the FRD under TONY VARONA has the approval of the United States authorities and transfers contraband weapons, supplies, and explosives to the Island. Further, [in] this counterrevolutionary group's camp, mercenaries may not return to civilian life after they have been accepted. They receive correspondence from family and friends through a post office box in Miami, using a system similar to that employed by the North American army during the Second World War to conceal the status of the troops.

On New Years Eve, AP reported from Miami that a group of 200 Cubans and 23 North Americans camped in warehouses near the downtown area of the city were preparing to disembark in Cuba. The group, led by ROLANDO MASFERRER, included North Americans KENNETH PROCTOR, age 33, from Boston; LARRY BRICENT, age 22, from Columbus, Ohio.

We also know of, and have duly reported, radio programs maintained and financed by the Washington administration, that engage in defamation and encourage treachery while simultaneously transmitting coded orders for counterrevolutionaries based in Cuba, all under the CIA's direction.

One such group which produces radio programs maintains a luxury home in Miami where programs are taped and later transmitted from a 35-foot long vessel based in that city.

From New York, another program called "By Cuba and For Cuba" is broadcast five times a week by shortwave radio and rebroadcast sixty minutes later on longwave by Radio Swan on Isla del Cisne [Swan Island].

The vessel that leaves Miami every day broadcasts the program "Radio Independent Cuba" in which they give directions to sabotage cinemas, theaters, and other meeting places.

As it is known, Radio Swan is on the air since last August, appearing to be operated by the firm "Gibraltar Steamship Company" located in New York City. Every night, it broadcasts four hours in Spanish and recordings are made in the United States, then sent twice per week by airplane to Isla Cisne [Swan Island].

Isla Cisne serves as a transit point for groups of mercenaries. Though it belongs to Honduras, it is occupied by the United States, which has installed a Meteorological Bureau station for the Caribbean to study hurricanes there. This island is almost entirely the property of Summer Smith, a merchant from Boston and descendant of Captain Alonzo Adams, who established himself there in 1893.

The past December 21st, the "Committee for the Liberation of Cuba" was created, led by John McClatchy, who will buy radio station time to make propaganda against Cuba. He is supported by Representative [Roman] Pucinsky of Illinois, and retired Commander Pilot Nicholas Nonnemather.

Everything stated above is as much as we can report to the present moment about the mercenary camps in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Florida, as well as other counterrevolutionary activities. "We will win."

Capt. Alberto

The preceding report is submitted to Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, Citizen President of the Republic, for his knowledge and consideration.

Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, Commander Chief Dept. Infirmary G-2 MINFAR

[Source: Released by Cuban Government for 22-24 March 2001 conference ("Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After") in Havana. Translated by National Security Archive.]

★★★

Document No.2

Cuban Intelligence Report, 17 March 1961

17 March 1961

"Year of Education"
To M-1, from MN-1

Re: Information about preparations of American warships and transfer of mercenaries and henchmen by air to Panama

Yesterday we received a communication from Section “L” addressed to Section “M,” dated 8 March 1961 that had the following reports attached:

A memorandum note that says “The ship Vicente Comas that is in Havana leaves this morning with a group with destination Cayo Hueso.”

And another communication from the same [name excised] to Lieutenant Matos in the airport dated 22 February 1961, that says:

“Dear Comrade,

The information that follows is to be immediately conveyed to the headquarters of DIER and G-2, such that it arrives in the hands of Dr. Fidel Castro at once.

Yesterday afternoon, the loading of three USA destroyers was completed at the naval base of Key West. These ships travel loaded to their maximum capacity and carry weapons of all classes including bombs to be launched from airplanes, obusos [shells, as for artillery], munitions of all calibers, and have double the number of mortars than they do of other weapons.

These vessels left today in the early morning, headed for the naval base at Guantanamo, carrying only regular crew members in each destroyer.

From the air base (Bocachica) in Key West, Boxcar type transport planes are leaving daily, as of five or six days ago, with Panama as their destination. Each plane carries an average of 80 to 100 men, who are being transferred to this place, since after these flights, the planes return empty in order to return with another contingent.

The majority of these flights have left for Panama in the night and early morning hours, and return to Key West in the afternoon or at dusk. This is clear evidence that an attack on our Island is being prepared, since these men could also be transported from Panama in the vessels of the American Marines.

Please respond to this.”

It does not say whether they have communicated to the appropriate Section the departure of the ship destined for Cayo Hueso, but if they have not, it must be done immediately in spite of the time that has passed, since sometimes there are difficulties or the ships do not sail, or else they go a short distance and return.

Regarding the notice given about the three destroyers that are loaded to bursting in Cayo Hueso, even though they are on maneuvers until the end of this month, it would be advisable that the group in the East be notified immediately of the part pertaining to the mortars.

We inform you of this as appropriate.

Regards, MN-1

Note: We are enclosing the communication of Section L to Section M with its own enclosures.

We have also enclosed another communication from Section L with Section M from 4 February 1961, the contents of which we have already noted. We have returned this document to the archive prior to 12 March 1961. “Homeland or death. We will win”

[Source: Released by Cuban Government for 22-24 March 2001 conference (“Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After”) in Havana. Translated for CWIHP by Christopher Dunlap.]

Document No.3

Cuban Intelligence Report, 15 April 1961

15 April 1961
“Year of Education”

From Director, Tec. O. [Infantry] G-2
To: Commander Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, Chief of Department of [Infantry] G-2, Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces [MinFAR]

In Washington, meetings and exchanges of opinions [took place] between public officials in the Department of State, the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon, but there were no common, unanimous views with regard to Cuba. Opinions were divided into two families, each one of which included its reasoning and conclusions. Ultimately, it had to be [US President John F.] Kennedy himself who would say the last word and approve one of the two plans.

The CIA and some elements of the Department of State and Pentagon maintained the stance that the most auspicious plan to overthrow the government of Cuba must be launching one invasion on a grand scale using mercenaries trained in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Florida, and other places.
Other officials of the Department of State, Pentagon and some advisers to Kennedy expressed their dissent from this plan, pointed out its risks and advocated another, consistent with the idea of introducing in Cuba relatively small groups in various locations, acting from inside and in contact with groups of clandestine resistance, which would be able to bring about the conditions for an “internal uprising” and general strike that would begin on a predetermined date.

The counterrevolutionary groups, mere peons of imperialism, have neared one of the two positions as well.

[Part of line excised] affirmed that Kennedy’s advisers were divided. While the CIA applied pressure to the President to support an invasion with bases in Florida and Guatemala, a position that was shared by some officials in the Department of State, other members of the White House and the same Department of State exhorted Kennedy not to act hurriedly, because this decision would have to end the matter. [Marker bleed-through for approximately 3 lines] Already in the past month of March, [heavy black excision line through next line with bleed-through over the rest] had brought up the points of view of the MRF, who discarded the “grand invasion” and trusted instead in a “popular insurrection” as the best form of bringing down our government.

This project of the MRF put forth by [Ramón] Barquín, in front of his masters at the Pentagon, also contemplated the acceptance of a final plan of action by all clandestine groups, that is, enacting a “general strike” and “internal uprising” on a determined date across the entire island.

In the first few days of the present month of April, Kennedy and his advisers in Washington made a decision: they rejected the plan for one large-scale invasion and agreed on another idea, that is, dividing the invasion among multiple command landings, where groups would move between small combat units and [large] battalions of 500-600 men, which would then act in coordination with clandestine sabotage and terrorism groups.

In this way, they hope to stir up internal difficulties, divide the Government’s attention, and hinder the effective use of the Militias and Rebel Army forces against them.

The creation of small “liberated territories” that they would later try to expand into wider zones figures into their calculations.

Also, their plans consider the establishment of a “government in arms” in the most propitious of the “liberated territories” that they will come to occupy, which would immediately seek recognition from the United States, and from the other countries who have severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, like Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, etc.

As they calculate, then, this recognition will not be followed by intervention – “a word so unpleasant to Latin America,” but rather military aid and all forms of support of this same “government in arms.”

Possibly this aid would not be facilitated by the United States but rather, for example, by Guatemala itself, whose government would send the majority of the trained mercenaries from their camps, the matter thus appearing to be something between Latin American governments, unconnected (?) to the government in Washington.

In this manner, it seems [excision or marker bleed-through] facing them9 with principles of non-intervention and the free determination of peoples, which until now has been exercised in Latin America with interventionist aims against Cuba.

[Part of line excised] have discarded the idea of sending one large invasion because it would lay bare to America and the world the flagrant intervention of the government of the United States against the Cuban people, whereas sending small units to multiple locations now9 combined with the intervention of sabotage and terrorist groups, could imply that this was a matter to be decided among Cubans. And if as a result of this activity the “puppet government” is established in a place inside Cuba, they believe it will not be difficult to “demonstrate” to Latin American opinion that this “government” is the product of struggle by Cubans against Castro, that Washington has nothing to do with it.

Furthermore, it has been estimated that this “puppet government” would be recognized immediately by countries that have broken relations with Cuba, the United States among them, and for example, after [one or two words illegible by marker bleed-through] puppet [Miguel] Ydígoras [Fuentes of Guatemala] – they have recognized they can send the invasion force of mercenaries that train there as assistance to the request that [Cuban Revolutionary Council head José] Miró Cardona made.

And if, in the struggle, the mercenaries perceive themselves to be in a hurry, the possibility of more direct assistance from the United States cannot be discounted, which would be considered then not as an intervention but as help for the [illegible from date on declassified stamp] of the puppet government of Miró.

There is a significant fact: [approximately ¾ of one line excised] reported from Miami that on 5 April, orders of mobilization had been given to the mercenaries on bases in Florida and Louisiana, who then left on ships and planes for regions of the Caribbean and Central America, and added that patrol boats had been constantly entering into and exiting from Florida ports in the last few days, in transport missions to Central America.
[informant’s name excised] also said that this operation had been coordinated by José Miró Cardona as chief of the “[Cuban] Revolutionary Council.”

This constant transfer of mercenaries and weapons carried out in full daylight and almost in view of everyone, led to the belief that an invasion against Cuba was beginning. Some were so convinced that special reporters started to arrive in Miami from all Yankee and Spanish publication organizations in anticipation of the sensational news of the invasion.

However, [a few words excised] it was known that was not the prelude to the invasion, but a mobilization of the mercenaries from the FRD and other groups in American territory toward Central America, with the goal of preparing them to infiltrate Cuba from Guatemala and other locations far from Yankee soil, in order that they would unite with sabotage and diversion groups that they presume to be placed here.

About this mobilization it was said [approximately 3 lines excised] those knowledgeable of what is happening report that this mobilization is not for an invasion, but to reinforce guerrillas that number more than eight thousand men, found operating in the Sierra Maestra, Sierra Cristal, and the Sierra del Escambray.

It is quite possible that this mercenary mobilization and others to insert them into Cuba as a group are being done with the aim of not moving the bulk of them from Guatemala and Nicaragua, to keep them in reserve and move them only when the Miró puppet government asks for assistance from other countries.

Of course, [a few words excised] that the plan they agreed to would give power to Miró in its first phase: with only assistance of multiple command groups, and the sabotage groups, the “general strike” and the “internal uprising” without needing to make use of the second part of the plan—sending the mercenaries as assistance from Guatemala and Nicaragua. It would please Washington much less to find itself needing to come partially to the aid of these mercenaries, “sheared” or “fleeced” in Cuban territory.

[Illegible, bleed-through] possibility of [illegible, possibly “remitir” = “send or transfer”] in case a [bleed-through, illegible 2-3 lines] scale contemplated by the same Miró Cardona when, speaking a few days ago in New York, he stated that an invasion on the part of the anti-Castro exiles was not being planned for now, it is not part of our plans at the moment, but if it is necessary there will be an invasion.

As it is known, Miró made a “call to arms” indicating three phases that they are considering to overturn the Cuban Revolution:

1) Organization of liberation forces in exile.

2) An offensive proceeding from the mountains and cities of Cuba.

3) Establishment of a provisional government in Cuban territory.

When journalists asked him where his exile army was training, Miró categorically denied that they were training in Guatemala, where he said only Guatemalans trained, which had been “clarified” by Idigoras’ [Ydigoras’] government. He concluded by saying “I cannot speak of our future plans because they are plans for war.”

[Before!] the 13th Miró Cardona and Tony Varona continued to make statements in New York, which reflected the points of view of their Yankee masters. Miró said: “The United States is not lending any hand to the counterrevolution in Cuba.” Varona stated, “There will be no invasion of Cuba from any place, let alone the United States,” and added that the struggle “would emerge from within Cuba, by the Cubans themselves.” Another swine of lesser importance, Sergio Alcacho, representative of the FRD in New Orleans, also said: “The forces that will invade Cuba are not trained in the United States.”

According to [3-4 lines excised] they have arrived at the conclusion “that an invasion directed toward one point could only be a risky enterprise, the failure of which would deliver a tremendous blow to all the plans to overthrow Castro’s regime.” Additionally, “from the political point of view, this invasion would create (in Latin America) the impression that external intervention was taking place.”

He concludes by saying [several words excised] “the acceptance of the strategy of multiple attacks constitutes a vindication for the MRP [Revolutionary Movement of the People]” (which approved this aggression plan).

[Name excised] also said that “Ray has strongly advocated for the theory that the subterranean movement must bear the bulk of the fight against the regime,” adding that the MRP operates closely linked with the “November 30th Movement” and with elements of the MRR (Movement for the Revival of the Revolution).

In a New York Times editorial on the 11th day of the present month [April 1961], following the guidelines of the Department of State, he reported that “the Cuban problem can only be resolved by Cuba and the Cubans, because without the support of the people no revolution will triumph.”
Everything stated previously in this report is the result of study and analysis of the plan of aggression against Cuba, put in practice by Kennedy and all of his advisers.

The declarations of Kennedy:

In his statements on Cuba from 12 [April], Kennedy said this among other things: “There will not be, under any condition, an intervention in Cuba on the part of the armed forces of the United States” and “this government will do whatever is possible to not have Americans implicated in any action within Cuba.”

a) The failure of Washington to achieve collective or majority support by Latin American governments to bolster an agreement against the revolutionary government of Cuba.

b) The position decided by [illegible] Mexico and Ecuador in favor of non-intervention [illegible] determination by the populace [illegible] vacillation [illegible] to break relations with our country and through pressure by [illegible] it is not decided either to abandon the defense of the principle of non-intervention.

c) After declaring that the United States would not intervene militarily in Cuba, Kennedy tried to give the impression that the US did not wish to meddle in the internal matters of Cuba, concealing [his intentions while] trying to calm Latin America, alarmed by the repeated announcements [illegible] Yankee government is assisting all [readicados] counterrevolutionaries in that country, in an essential way with weapons, equipment, airplanes, money and Yankee instructors to the mercenaries in the [ampamentos?]11 of Florida, Louisiana, Guatemala, [illegible, bleed-through] other places. Of course, Kennedy’s objective here is in vain.

d) Kennedy can say this because the United States continues organizing aggression against Cuba, not exactly using its military forces, but arming and training counterrevolutionaries and adventurers in different locations.

e) Kennedy is careful to clarify that he will do whatever is possible to not have Americans implicated in any action in Cuba, by which he tries to throw a blanket over the participation of American officials and technicians in training mercenaries (not inside) but indeed outside of Cuba in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

Afterwards, Kennedy said that he would oppose any effort to launch an offensive against Cuba from the United States.

Naturally, he can say this at present, since his plans are in fact otherwise, that is, launching small commands from Central America that integrate Cuban mercenaries with those from other countries, except the United States. In this way, he believes international denunciations will be avoided, for which reason Yankee instructors and technicians from the camps remain in the country.

[2 lines excised] reports the latest statements of Tony Varona and Miró that the United States is not aiding them, and an invasion against Cuba will not come from there.

Of course, the matter of the participation of the Yankee government in support and direction [3-4 lines excised] have reported, on various occasions, about the CIA mercenary camps in Guatemala and other places.

Following his statements, Kennedy made reference to holding Rolando Rasferrer under custody in a hospital, saying that American authorities will act against “those who want to establish in Cuba a regime in the style of Batista.”

Kennedy [2 lines excised] knows of the continent’s snub of Batista, the protégé of Eisenhower. Therefore, Washington has now relegated the Batista supporters to a lower level. Kennedy prefers to use the services of Tony Varona, Miró, Ray and company, thinking he can better trick the Cuban people and Latin American opinion in this way, dressing these lackeys with the attire of “democrats” and “revolutionaries.”

In addition, according to his plans, it is not advantageous to Kennedy now to have an expedition leave from the Yankee coasts. Because of this, in part, they have detained [Rolando] Masferrer in fear that he, now diminished in importance, will rush to send another expedition of Cuban and Yankee mercenaries, as he did the other time, which would give the US government a “headache” at present.

In regards to the expropriation of American goods in Cuba, the Yankee president says that it will not be carried out, assuming “formal and normal negotiations with a free and independent Cuba.”

[One short paragraph excised]

Kennedy also affirms that “the matter of Cuba is not between the United States and Cuba, but among Cubans themselves.”

Here Kennedy finds himself obligated to admit the huge failure that his government has had in trying to impose upon
the peoples and governments of Latin America the judgment that differences between Cuba and the United States were not merely a matter between the two countries, but rather one that affected the entire Continent.

The posture of some Latin American governments is firm enough on this issue that their delegates at the UN recently rejected the United States delegate's intentions to include in a project the “arguments” contained in the “white book” of the Department of [several words illegible, bleed-through] a project [i.e., draft resolution], in turn, which advocated a solution to the differences [illegible] through peaceful methods [illegible] in the UN Charter [illegible].

The delegations of Guinea and Mali, accompanied by other African and Asian countries, are also preparing a similar project [draft].

Regarding this “white book”, it demonstrated Yankee interference in Cuba to Latin American populations, which provoked declarations by the governments of Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador, concerning their defense of the principles of non-intervention.

Once Kennedy stated that the basic matter of Cuba was to be left among Cubans, he showed his boundless cynicism. He attempts to present the problem as an issue among Cubans when everybody already knows that it is squarely between Cuba and the government of the United States.

Kennedy's statement is based on the recently approved plan of aggression toward Cuba, one that tries to frame the attack on our country as a problem only among Cubans. We have already, in another part of this report, pointed out plans that make the infiltration of numerous groups in our territory into the norm. These plans save for later the dispatch of a mercenary invasion from Guatemala, which they will attempt to present not as an act of intervention by the US and its puppets, but rather as simple assistance from another country (Guatemala) to the appeal from the puppet government of Miró Cardona.

In another part of his statements Kennedy “screws up” again and says that the position of his government is “understood and shared” by the counterrevolutionary refugees in the United States; that is to say, that the puppet government of Miró [illegible] understand and are in agreement with this plan [2 lines illegible]. One of the journalists attending the presentation put Kennedy in a tight spot when he asked, “Do our own laws of neutrality or the treaties of the OAS [Organization of American States] not prevent giving aid or weapons to the anti-Castro elements in this country?”

Kennedy, after being confronted, looked perplexed and confused, did not know what to say and only managed to mumble some endless sentences to try to hide the truth, never arriving at a concrete answer.

In summary, Kennedy's declarations say nothing new or positive, but fit more closely with the counterrevolutionary line that the government in Washington follows at present regarding the Revolution.

“Homeland or death. We will win.”

Capt. Alberto

1) [one line excised] among other things the following:

The means of support of the clandestine groups [words excised] is the alliance of MRP groups and the November 30th Movement. Thousands of clandestine papers are distributed among the two groups every month, keeping an innumerable flow of information [2-3 lines excised]. In the four months as head of the movement's action in Cuba, Manuel Ray, ex-Minister of Public Works under Castro and now leader of the MRP in the United States, was never bothered by the police [several lines excised]. The basic unity of the MRP is the nucleus composed of seven men, set up in a way that the rest of its members would not put another group in danger. Around these nuclei there are five functional sections (laborers, students, professionals, propaganda, and sabotage), each represented in the national executive of the MRP. To ensure that the movement does not lose all its leaders in one stroke, the national executive has met only four times in plenary session in seven months. A happy group of 15 Cuban youth and their friends on the beach of Varadero hid one of the recent conclaves of the MRP.

[2-3 lines excised]. They carry detonators and fuses inside shopping crates. All people active in the clandestine force try in every way to lead a normal life. They even register for the Militias [one line excised]. If one of them has a feeling that he is being pursued or watched, the organization tries to send him outside the country or obtain asylum in the embassy of a friendly nation. One of the instructions that they give to anyone involved in these activities is “Do not trust the Mexican Embassy.”

[One line excised] Manuel Ray’s assistant was detained three times [a few words excised]. “Eugenio,” [Ray's?] successor in Cuba, was also arrested and set free, as was his assistant from “November 30” who is called “Alejandro.” “November 30” builds its own bombs in more than twenty houses in Havana, and another clandestine group organizes “meetings” in the afternoon. [One line excised] Each “firecracker” is lined with dynamite cartridges. When the fuse is lit, the firecracker serves as a detonator.

Cap. Alberto
Document No. 4

Cuban Intelligence “Report on subversive groups that the CIA sent to Cuba clandestinely in order to prepare conditions that would allow for a mercenary invasion,” 5 May 1961

The Department of State of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency, seeing the squandering of money by different counterrevolutionary groups in their country, devoted themselves to the task of directly organizing these groups, as well as the training of the mercenaries and saboteurs in the camps already set up in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and some marine bases in the states of Florida and North Carolina, and also in Puerto Rico. They recruited mercenaries in different parts of Florida and those which were chosen among war criminals displaced from political power, and also from the national bourgeoisie, and from some organizations that played a role against tyranny [i.e., Batista—ed.] like the Second Front of Escambray, the OA and elements of the right wing from 26 July and the Directorate. This recruitment led to the result that a so-called Government would be formed in exile, into which they integrated, among others, Miró Cardona as President and Tony Varona as Vice [President]. They did this with the goal of uniting all counterrevolutionary groups under one leadership, as well as for the effect of propaganda, preparing the way for when the invasion came and power was taken, according to them, over a piece of our land, a beachhead. They would be able to dedicate all necessary aid and possibly be recognized by some puppet governments in [Latin] America, and therefore gave themselves over to the work of preparing these personnel in the handling of weapons and armed struggle.

They chose different groups to accomplish their preparation in sabotage, clandestine work, assassination, communications, military information and uniting these groups into an organization which they call FUR, the United Revolutionary Front, for whom they chose as organizer the now-executed ex-Commander Sori Marín, one known by Rafael as someone named Francisquito, also shot, calling the mercenary army that would invade our land the “Liberation Army,” and putting as its leaders [Manuel] Artimes, [Pepe] San Román, and others, all known as thieves and elements of the worst caliber, the majority prisoners, after the failed invasion.

After the group that constituted the FUR was imprisoned and the majority shot, the CIA chose another Executive for the composition of the FUR, including Commander Gonzalo Miranda of the Marines of the Revolutionary War and others, almost all being detained.

Here is a diagram of how the FUR is organized in our country, following direct instructions from the CIA in Washington, its form of operation and current conditions, and measures that should be taken for its annihilation.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Below CIA — two groups: Liaisons, Revolutionary United Front

Under Liaisons: Operational Groups: Armament, Sabotage, Radio

Under FUR: Military Coordinator, Supplies, Finances, Propaganda, Coordination, Action and Sabotage, Political Coordinator

1. CIA, intelligence and counterintelligence organization of the United States government, controlled directly by the President of that nation, charged with preparing any actions that can harm our Revolutionary Government, from an act of sabotage to an assassination.

2. FUR, Revolutionary United Front, encompassing at its core all counterrevolutionary groups that operate in our country, forming an Executive [committee], who is chosen by the leaders of counterrevolutionary organizations, and whose function is military and political coordination, supplies, finances, propaganda, action and sabotage, communications, etc.
3. These counterrevolutionary groups are formed by the following organizations. Some “nomes de guerre” appear among leaders, almost always highlighting them as a CIA Delegate, for example, Rafael, mentioned above, now shot, appeared as National Coordinator.

1) Liberation Movement – Justo
2) Radical Anticommunist Action – Pepe
3) Save Cuba Movement (SAC) – César
4) Independent Revolutionary Group (ARI) – Ramón
5) Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR) – Dr. Jorge
6) Democratic Revolutionary Marines (MRD) – Abel
7) Mazones15 Anticommunist Movement (MMA) – Benito
8) Anticommunist Civic Action – Nasario
9) Democratic Liberation Movement (MLD) – Felipe
10) Anticommunist Youth of America (JACA) – Raúl
11) Constitutional Democratic Legion (Nelson Granado)
12) November 30th - Alejandro
13) Anticommunist Organizations Block (Jibarito)
14) Cuban Action – Demetrio
15) Insurrectional Democratic Organization (OID) – Ludovis
16) Student Revolutionary Democratic Federation (FERD) – Raúl
17) National Democratic Union (May 20th) – Marcelino Toro
18) Christianity Against Communism (CCC) – Teté
19) Anticommunist Front (FAC) – Felipe
20) Naval Revolutionary Corps – Benito
21) Action 62
22) Anticommunist League
23) Insurrectional Movement for the Revival of the Revolution (MIRR)
24) Revolutionary Dissident Recuperation Movement (ADRA)
25) Union of Anticommunist Medical Professionals Revolutionary Group
26) National Anticommunist Union
27) Revolutionary Liberation Movement – Montenegro
28) Free National Anticommunist Organization
29) Cuban National Movement – Mazones

Work accomplished by the executive committee of FUR

Cm – Military commander, position once occupied by ex-Commander Sorí Marín, shot, and now occupied by Commander of the M.G.R. Gonzalo Miranda, presently detained; work consisted of coordinating military matters, attempting to capture members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, as well as all those who were discharged soldiers for whatever reason and still assisted active military personnel, and those who were prisoners or fugitives.

A – Supplies. Someone named Marcial, as a nom de guerre, was responsible for supplies: Tobarich, as well, was in charge of Action and Sabotage, and substituted for Engineer Ray, responsible for various bombs that produced an explosion in Havana, and the entrance of arms and explosives into the capital, including among their missions the occupation of Celimar and the lading near Eufemio Cay. This individual, now deceased, carried out two functions within the Executive of the FUR.

F – Finances. This position was occupied by Salvador García (nom de guerre Octavio) who found himself a fugitive, and substituting for one within the group who had been shot previously, as the CIA had foreseen that its leaders would be taken prisoner and stipulated that each Executive member would have a substitute. His work consisted of distributing money for operations and the counterrevolutionary elements’ needs.
P – Propaganda. This task fell to Bebo Borrón, prisoner, and Tony Díaz, fugitive; their obligation comprised the propaganda for said organization although they carried out an infinity of other work.

c) They travel with a lot of money, and use lighted watches that they had in the camps.

d) They frequent elegant clubs, bars, and cabarets.

e) They often use women as camouflage, who dress as militiawomen and travel on buses, just as all these elements go unarmed.

C – Communications. Executive office unknown to he who occupied it, his task being possibly, but never surely, that of communicating with the CIA and preparing places for the installation of a plant.

The CIA, after the failures to launch weapons from airplanes, adapted the system of launching said weapons in sets of 30 cavalries, and where they had trusted personnel, promised to launch no fewer than eight tons, between weapons and explosives, and according to the latest news, between Havana and Pinar del Río more than 120 tons have been launched, as one of their tactics was to introduce in cities vast quantities of arms around Havana as well as in the provinces, where surveillance is less effective. Just as all the cells that operate in Havana have their troops in surrounding areas, around 100 agents have entered the country.

In Matanzas, reports say that they have deposited weapons in all municipalities.

Measures that must be taken for the destruction and obliteration of these groups

a) Introduction of activists in the prisons.

b) Addition of VR in hotels, guest houses, clubs and cabarets, in order to infiltrate the greatest number of active personnel among the counterrevolutionary organizations.

c) Recruitment of troops among elements that have been marginalized by the Revolution, in one way or another: soldiers and clandestine fighters.

d) Increased vigilance on the part of the CDR.

[E] Liaison Group. This group is formed by four CIA officials of Cuban nationality, serving as the linkage between operation groups and the FUR, as well as directly to the CIA, with the following nom de guerre: Mendoza, Ernesto, Bran, y Luis Acosta, who uses the abbreviation code 2637.

(GO) Operations Group Operation groups of infiltration for action and sabotage. These groups were organized by the CIA in cells of three: one responsible for weapons, one for sabotage, and another as radio operator, specialized in all classes of weapons, as well as sabotages, demolition, assassination and communications, which they carry out directly with the CIA. They also have the function of teaching counterrevolutionary elements that the political apparatus, FUR, positions them to accomplish sabotage, as well as armament and disarmament, which they learn through the Liaisons. The chief of these operations groups is Frank Bernardino, who received training outside the country, remaining within the country in the coastal zone lying between Matanzas and Havana, in the northern part, until the moment of his introduction; some were also brought in by parachute through the province of Camagüey. When they come by sea, they do so by boat, which upon nearing the coast, receives signals from land, as almost always the arrival is done by agreement with groups that operate within the country and, upon receiving the signal, launch a rubber boat that takes them to the shore; now 27 cells are operating within our territory.

These groups have the following characteristics:

a) They have been recruited from the youth of the petty bourgeoisie, industrial workers, members of the right wing of July 26th, Revolutionary Army ex-members, as well as the Army of the Dictatorship.

b) They have false documents: a fingerprint wallet and a card from the labor census (these cards have smaller numbers than the authentic ones.)

c) They travel with a lot of money, and use lighted watches that they had in the camps.

d) They frequent elegant clubs, bars, and cabarets.

e) They often use women as camouflage, who dress as militiawomen and travel on buses, just as all these elements go unarmed.

Notes

2 For examples of this motif, see, e.g., Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer, The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962); Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (New York: Norton, 1987); Grayston L. Lynch, Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1998); and Jim Rasenberger, The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion

2 See the Soviet ambassador’s reports of his conversations with Guevara on 11 and 17 January 1961, and 14 April 1961, respectively, published in the “Chatting with Che” feature elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

3 On the conference, see the news releases and other reports on the website of the National Security Archive. See also James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, The Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), incorporating the findings from a prior “critical oral history” conference held in the United States, organized by the same US co-sponsors, which included veterans of the Kennedy Administration and representatives of the anti-Castro émigré invasion force, but not yet leaders of the Castro government.


5 At the March 2001 conference in Havana, in which Fidel Castro actively participated, the general sense was that the Cuban government had perhaps over-estimated the size of the impending assault, which in turn prompted an even larger mobilization by the Havana authorities to prepare for its landing, wherever it occurred—they did not know in advance the precise landing spot, which had in fact changed in the weeks preceding the invasion. Author’s recollection.

6 Trans. note: Throughout this document, I have attempted to keep excisions distinct from “bleed-throughs”, sometimes marked as “illegible.” Excised text is covered with a heavy black line. These documents were probably originally printed on both sides and the black marker used to excise bleed through to the other side, but those marks are more diffuse and sometimes readable text shows through.

7 Trans. note: the “(?)” appears in the original Spanish text after the word “ajena,” meaning unconnected, alien, or strange.

8 Trans. note: Without the context in the preceding few excised words, it is difficult to translate “enfrentarse,” which means something along the lines of meeting, facing, or confronting.

9 Trans. note: Partial erasure/excision makes this word difficult to read, but “ahora” [“now”] can be made out with some uncertainty—trans.

10 Trans. note: “Anticu,” typed word, is not a word in Spanish, but resembles “antos” (“before”) which seems chronologically related to the date of the 13th.

11 Trans. note: The word “readicados” is clearly in the original document in print, but I cannot make it into a word that makes sense in this context, even by substituting vowels or correcting likely typographical errors. “Ampamentos” is less clear in type, partially obscured by bleed-through, but also does not lend itself readily to making into a real Spanish word.

12 Trans. note: The typing is very faint, but the word could be Ray.

13 Trans. note: This seems extreme, but an atentado is an attempted killing, or more generally, an attempted crime. Here its meaning seems more specific and sinister.

14 Trans. note: Spanish “radista” is not commonly used and does not appear in major dictionaries but is my best educated guess based on context in this document.

15 Trans. note: Original Spanish “Mazónico” looks very similar to “Masonic,” and may be a typo, but given mention of the name Mazones later and context, this interpretation seems correct.

16 Trans. note: Illegible initials written above this word “país”, possibly “N.A.” or “N.D.”

17 Trans. note: Spanish “activos” is difficult to translate well here, and I am not sure, given the limited context of the list, that my interpretation is fully correct. The gist seems to be that prisoners will be recruited into the counterrevolution unless the Cuban government and military introduce some kind of oversight or propaganda mechanism (via human presence) into these prisons.
Esquema de como está organizado en nuestro país el F.U.R. siguiendo instrucciones directas de la CIA en Washington, así como su forma de operar y condiciones en que se encuentra, medidas que se deben tomar para su aniquilamiento.

1. CIA, organización de inteligencia y contrainteligencia del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, controlada directamente por el Presidente de esa nación, encargada de preparar todos los actos que puedan perjudicar a nuestro Gobierno Revolucionario desde un acto de sabotaje, hasta un atentado.

2. F.U.R., Frente Unido Revolucionario, abarca en su seno a todos los grupos contrarrevolucionarios que operan en nuestro país, formando un Ejecutivo, el cual es elegido por los jefes de organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, siendo su función, coordinación militar, coordinación política, abastecimiento, finanzas, propaganda, acción y sabotaje, comunicaciones, etc.

3. Estos grupos contrarrevolucionarios están formados por las siguientes organizaciones, apareciendo algunos nombres de guerra de sus jefes destacándose casi siempre como jefe un Delegado de la CIA, ejemplo, el tal Rafael, ya fusilado, el cual aparecía como Coordinador Nacional.

1) Movimiento de Liberación
2) Acción Radical Anticomunista
3) Movimiento Salvar a Cuba SAC
4) Agrupación Revolucionaria Independiente ARI
5) Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria MAR
6) Marina Revolucionaria Democrática MRD
7) Movimiento Madrónico Anticomunista MMA
8) Acción Cívica Anticomunista

Justo
Pepe
César
Ramón
Dr. Jorge
Abel
Benito
Nasario
Although there is nothing astonishing in the documents that follow, they are highly significant for what they say about the Cuban Missile Crisis as experienced by Mexico, Latin America, and the Organization of American States. Aside from the story of Brazil’s mediation efforts in Cuba, we still know relatively little about how the crisis affected Cuba’s Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, let alone the significance it had for the inter-American system. To be sure, we know that the OAS voted to support the United States on 23 October 1962, but we know very little about how the Cuban Missile Crisis was viewed inside different Latin American states, either by governments or different sectors of the population. This is now beginning to change thanks to the opening of archives in the region. Indeed, in the years to come, we can expect new research and revelations on the crisis as seen from Latin America along with studies of how it altered Cuba’s relationships with its neighbors. This will be highly significant to those of us seeking to understand the Cold War in Latin America. After all, this was where Cuba most actively supported revolutionary endeavors and where the United States and Cuba (sometimes, but not always, in conjunction with the Soviet Union) battled intensively for influence. By the early 1960s, most regional governments also regarded Cuba’s revolutionary government and Cuban-inspired guerrillas as their countries’ biggest security threat while many on the Left, many of them part of a younger generation, looked to Cuba for inspiration and leadership.

The missile crisis broke out slap bang in the middle of all this. For Latin America, it was neither a faraway event nor a short-lived finite emergency determined solely by the superpowers. Instead, it forms one episode in a longer story about of the acute regional fall-out following the Cuban Revolution, US and Latin American sponsorship of counter-revolutionary intervention against Castro’s government (the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 being one of many incursions), the presence of hundreds of Cuban exiles in neighboring countries hoping to overthrow Castro, Cuba’s understandable feeling of insecurity, and mounting tensions that had arisen over Cuba’s influence and stated aims of supporting socialist revolution in the region. In fact, given the way that events had unfolded over the two years before October 1962, the crisis was a showdown that many in Latin America had been expecting and fearing, only worse.

If some sort of crisis over Cuba was not a big surprise, the way it was resolved had lasting relevance for the Cold War battles in Latin America, making them arguably more intense and centered on Cuba. In part, this was because many governments in the hemisphere were alarmed both by President Kennedy’s promise not to invade Cuba in return for Khrushchev withdrawing the missiles and by the continued presence of thousands of Soviet troops on the island. Having attacked the US position on Cuba for its “paralysis and lack of foresight” before the crisis, Guatemala’s far-right military president embraced Kennedy’s insistence that the missiles must be removed as evidence that Washington was finally ready to do battle. Guatemala’s armed forces were proclaimed ready for action, a state of emergency was imposed in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica offered its ports and airspace to help impose a blockade (“quarantine”), and Argentina proclaimed its navy was ready to defend the Western Hemisphere. When the crisis ended, however, Castro was still in power, more intransigent and revolutionary than ever, now in open defiance of the Soviet Union and even more committed to supporting revolution abroad.

Moreover, the perceived danger revolutionary Cuba posed to the region was magnified by the severity of the crisis and the nuclear threat it had brought to the hemisphere. In this context, many Latin American representatives at the OAS voiced concerns about the United States position and demanded more leadership from Washington when it came to protecting the hemisphere from communist “subversion.” What proposals did the United States have for action? Argentina’s representative to the OAS asked; what was being done to coordinate with Cuban exiles and deal with the fact that Cuba remained “ferociously” armed? the Venezuelan representative wanted to know; were there any other quid pro quos and secret compromises that had been made to get Khrushchev to withdraw the weapons that the Latin American should know about? El Salvador’s OAS representative asked. The Cuban exile leader, José Miró Cardona, was so angered by what he saw as a lack of support from the United States in the shadow of the crisis that he resigned his post as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council in exile, citing what he saw as US negligence as the reason.
Meanwhile, Brazil tried to mediate a solution (both on its own and at Washington’s secret request) and US spokesmen tried to calm OAS members’ fears by emphasizing the risks in re-escalating tensions, its promise to support governments that felt threatened by Cuba, and its progress in negotiating with the Soviet Union (which was also alarmed by Cuba’s position). Preoccupations about the fragility of the status quo after October 1962 nevertheless continued into 1963 and efforts to isolate Cuba escalated, culminating with the imposition of collective OAS diplomatic and economic sanctions against the island in 1964. Rather than being imposed on Latin America by the US as is commonly assumed, what the Mexican documents below show is that the call for harsher, more resolute action against Cuba was very often also coming from Latin America in direct relation to the missile crisis and its resolution.

Mexico was caught in the middle of all this, famously being one of the only countries in Latin America that refused to break relations with Cuba (and the only one at the end of 1964 that still had diplomatic ties with the island). On the one hand, its refusal was grounded in its proud tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as a cardinal principle of its foreign policy. President Adolfo Lopez Mateos was also wary of domestic opinion and a widespread support for Cuba within Mexico. Alongside, and in coordination with, Brazil, it therefore abstained from US-backed OAS resolutions sanctioning the use of armed force against Cuba to enforce the “quarantine” and condemnation of the Cuban regime at the OAS during the crisis. Raising a reservation (on constitutional grounds) only to the part of the OAS resolution that sanctioned the use of armed force, Mexico tried to square the circle: preserving its non-interventionist position and not being seen as advocating an invasion of Cuba while not opposing the basis for the OAS’ position of support for the removal of Soviet missiles and an end to the transport of offensive weapons to Cuba overall. Meanwhile, its diplomats batted away questions about collective armed action from other countries and avoided insinuations from US diplomats that it was not doing enough.

However, Mexico could not remain totally aloof either from mounting tensions over Cuba before the crisis or from how the crisis itself played out in the hemisphere. For one, it was not only a member of the OAS, but a country in Latin America that others wanted to follow and coordinate with. President Lopez Mateos was under considerable pressure from the United States to clamp down on the Left in Mexico and to oppose Fidel Castro as a condition for good relations with the United States.7 Due to its proximity to Cuba, Mexico was meanwhile a transit route for goods travelling to the island, a market for Cuban purchases, and a staging ground for counter-revolutionary raids against Castro’s regime. As the documents below – and others held at Mexico’s National Archive – illustrate, Mexican intelligence kept a close watch on Cuban exiles in Mexico, and their relationship with the United States embassy, without appearing to do anything to intervene against them. The Cuban government, meanwhile, sought direct diplomatic support from Mexico and the Mexicans remained relatively well informed about what was happening in Havana.

Indeed, Mexico’s government and diplomats had a panoramic view of developments. True, Mexico did not influence events significantly: its diplomatic position appears to have been more of conditional support for the US and reactive waiting. This fit within a broader policy that aimed to keep Mexico on good terms with both the United States and Cuba, described by Kate Doyle as “Double Dealing.”3 However, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, in 1963, the Mexican government started to “deal” far more with the United States when it came to clamping down on the left and Cuban operations via Mexico. This in turn sparked suspicion and distrust from the Cuban government who came to regard Mexico as being awash with CIA operatives. But in many ways Mexico’s officially non-committal stance on Cuba allowed it to remain a bridge within Latin America and the inter-American system, a home to exiles of different political persuasions, and a nationalist Third Worldist country at the same time as belonging to the US sphere. The downside to this position, as suggested by these documents, is that Mexico never seized the initiative or stood out as a leader of inter-American politics but rather seemed to avoid the direction in which they were headed. Indeed, so close both to the United States and Cuba, dependent on US trade, with a revolutionary history and a sizeable left-wing population, the Mexican government remained torn between different positions and unable to fulfill its bridge-building potential between them.

This collection is merely the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Latin American perspectives on and experiences of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, two key points emerge from them that will be of interest to scholars of the crisis, the Cold War, and the inter-American system: first, the crisis cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger story of how the Latin Americans and the inter-American system as a whole reacted to and interacted with the Cuban revolution and, second, rather than being dictated to, it seems as if most members of the OAS were looking to the US for more leadership and action against Cuba after the crisis that helped propel the Cold War conflict and battle over Cuba forward. Mexico and Brazil (until its military
coup in 1964) may have attempted, respectively, to avoid or avert an escalation of tension. However, the crisis amplified already hysterical fears about Cuba and strengthened those calling for anti-Castro measures within the Western Hemisphere.

Telegram from Mexican embassy, Havana, 1 September 1962

TRANSLATION OF CODED TELEGRAM
PROCEDURAL COPY
HAVANA, 1 September 1962

RELATIONS MEXICO, DF.

URGENT

601. – With appropriate reservations and taking into account the typical exaggerations of the Cuban people, I must inform you that we are only dealing with rumors without knowing anything concrete. 1. The press announces that there has been an increase in commercial maritime traffic between Cuba and socialist countries and counter-revolutionaries are circulating news suggesting that Soviet boats are bringing war materiel [elementos de guerra] and troops from said country and African republics, asserting that until now up to now, thirteen thousand men have landed in provincial ports. 2. A functionary of the Ministry of Foreign Relations told us today in an informal way that that three hundred and sixty counter-revolutionary Cubans tried to land in the Province of Las Villas, in an invasion plan having been annihilated by MiG airplanes. The press does give news about this because it is said that….

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro and translated by Tanya Harmer.]

Czechoslovak Ambassador in Washington about US-Cuban tensions over Guantanamo, 25 September 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUMBER
FILE XII/442/16
SUBJECT: Information about the situation in Guantanamo
Mexico, D.F., 25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM

C. General Directorate of the Diplomatic Service
Building [‘Edificio’]

Considering it of interest to this General Directorate and your very honorable position, I am providing you with information here that our representative at the Council of the Organization of American States has just transmitted to this Secretariat [Ministry] about the information that the Czechoslovakian Ambassador to the White House entrusted him with about the situation that, as he conceives it, prevails on the North American naval base of Guantanamo:

1. – The Czechoslovakian Ambassador told Sánchez Gavito that in a recent visit to Cuba he had made an extensive tour “of the border” and that he could verify not only the violation of Cuban air space by airplanes coming from Guantanamo, but at the same time that the North American airplanes fired machine guns over Cuban territory.

2. – Without explaining the reason why this shooting continues, the Czechoslovakian Ambassador limited himself to reporting that Cuban troops are “in trenches” and that this is why until now they have not suffered any losses; he also assured, that the practice of shootings [descargas] continues, and that he fears that in one moment or another an extremely serious incident will occur.

3. – Equally the Czechoslovakian Ambassador expressed that it is very possible that Cuba will refer to this situation in its speeches during the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly; that he is convinced that representatives of the UN could easily verify the aforementioned facts, and that, although he doubted that the Cuban government would take the step of asking for
an inspection, it would be very useful to put an end to a situation which he described as extremely serious.

Furthermore, I permit myself to transcribe below a reflection that Ambassador Sánchez Gavito made about the source of the previous information:

“For the first time since I have occupied this position, the Czechoslovakian Ambassador to the United States government invited me to have lunch with him. He had offered this attention to different colleagues of mine and I remember that [his invitation to] Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría – who at that time represented Colombia at the Council – preceded the April invasion of Cuba last year by a few days. As I knew that on that occasion the aim of the invitation as I found out months later had been to assure the Colombian Ambassador that an invasion against Cuba was going to be launched, I accepted the invitation with the keenest possible interest, made greater because the topic of Cuba, during the last few weeks, attracts maximum attention in Washington.”

Attentively,
ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL
Lic. María Emilia Teléz

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro, translated by Tanya Harmer.]

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Mexican Ambassador to Brazil, 23 October 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Today at 12:45, Ambassador [Alfonso] García Robles called by telephone from Rio de Janeiro and communicated to the Director General of the Diplomatic Service that that morning, at the request of [Hermes Lima,] the Prime Minister and [acting] Minister of Foreign Relations, he had a long meeting with him to examine the Cuban situation.4

Professor Lima informed Ambassador García Robles that the government of Brazil had asked its Ambassador in Cuba – the same as the Ambassador of Cuba in Rio de Janeiro – to transmit to the Cuban government the conviction of the Brazilian government that it would be advisable for Cuba to examine the possibility of taking the initiative itself of suggesting a UN Investigating Commission (composed naturally of countries that have an independent position) go to the island.

The Brazilian government thinks that this measure could contribute towards finding a solution and undoubtedly lessening the current tension.

Prime Minister Lima also expressed that Itamaraty [Brazil’s foreign ministry] had knowledge that a draft resolution would be presented to the Security Council of the United Nations, that in this respect the Brazilian Representative at the Organization had received instructions to standardize [normar] his posture, in conversations with other delegates, according to the following points: a) favor whatever draft resolution asks for an investigation; b) for now this should not go further; c) for the measures that should eventually be adopted, wait for the result of the investigation in keeping with the process of the United Nations Charter.

In relation to the Organization of American States [OAS], Professor Lima assured Ambassador García Robles that the Brazilian delegate had refrained, together with the Mexican [delegate], from voting in favor of calling the Provisional Organ of Consultation for lack of instructions. With regard to the essence of the matter, instructions have been sent to

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Telegram from Mexican Embassy, Havana, 23 October 1962

HAVANA, 23 October 1962
2509
Relaciones Mexico DF.

741. – Faced with the declarations made by President Kennedy yesterday, the government of Cuba gave the order to be at battle stations [orden de alarma de combate] to all its armed forces in anticipation of an air attack against this country. [The] press announced that all combat units found themselves ready to fight and that all mass organizations were mobilized for the defense of the country.

INSUNZA

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Tanya Harmer.]
the Brazilian Representative this morning stating that Brazil would have no objections if, on the basis that resolution 8 of Punta del Este was approved, a system of control, was established to obstruct the transfer of arms, without this going further than that for the moment. On the other hand, whatever resolution [that is approved] should make reference to the investigation that the United Nations carries out and indicate that they should await results of this investigation.

The Prime Minister of Brazil asked the Mexican Ambassador that he communicate this to this Secretariat [Foreign Ministry] with the wish that Brazil keeps in closest possible contact with it in these moments.

Finally Ambassador García Robles asked that he be kept up to date with what the Secretariat [Ministry] of Foreign Relations considers pertinent to communicate.

Mexico, D.F., 23 October 1962

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jim Hershberg. Translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer, LSE.]

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**GUATEMALA, 23 Oct. 1962**

Relaciones Mexico.

170. – The President of the [Guatemalan] Republic, commenting yesterday on the President of the United States of America’s speech, said the following: “I consider that the moment has arrived when they will believe in us. How many times have I publicly expressed the danger that Castro in Cuba embodied, I was branded as trying to camouflage a movement against my government that was not communist, making it seem as if it was a projection from Cuba. My government warned of the danger of Castro in Cuba in March 1960 breaking off diplomatic and commercial relations with this government.” "President Kennedy’s speech tells us that the giant finally woke up and that it will abandon its paralysis and lack of foresight, for a state of arms at the ready and alertness. Guatemala in its great anticommunist majority as it demonstrated on 20 October, is prepared as a democratic country to align with our brothers of America, and its army will occupy the position that is required to, within its borders and in strict keeping with the pacts of Rio de Janeiro,
in whichever place where its commitments obligate it to resolve by arms what has not been able to be resolved within the assigned peace that our countries, enemies of war and of aggression, deserve.

SILVA

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Tanya Harmer.]

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Telegram from Mexican Embassy, Santo Domingo, 23 October 1962

TRANSLATION OF CODED TELEGRAM
PROCEDURAL COPY
X/442/17

SANTO DOMINGO, 23 October 1962 [received 24 October]

187 - The Ministry of Foreign Relations convened the entire diplomatic corps today [and] announced that the Dominican people had, signed by President of the Republic and Council of the State, [a document] in which it showed solidarity with measures adopted [by] the Cuban blockade and others that the OAS as well as International Organizations may adopt. [The] Government of the Republic affirms Cuba has turned into an imminent danger to peace by permitting [an] aggressive Russian base with nuclear weapons. Given [the] state of emergency, measures have been given [for] public force to suppress possible disorders and [an] agreement [for the] government to give wide protection [to] embassies. According to non-official sources [there is a] possibility of [a] suspension of individual guarantees with decreeing [a] state of emergency [in the] country. This afternoon the text communicated [will be] delivered [to the] diplomatic corps so that it can be made known fully to our governments. [The] Apostolic Nuncio [in his] character [as] senior member [of the] diplomatic corps convened a meeting this afternoon. [The] city is restless because of troop movements maintaining order. I will keep informing.

125545
SOTO REYES.

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Tanya Harmer.]

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Message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, [n.d., approx. 23-24 October 1962]

To Gilberto Bosques
To deliver urgently to Mr. President Dorticos.
14460
Mr. President:

On board [a] plane on [a] return flight to my country ['patria'] after a friendly mission to four countries in Asia, the essence of which was to express the need to preserve peace, to seek an end to the arms race, and to abolish the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, I learned of President Kennedy's message, in which he reported on the installation in Cuba of platforms to launch missiles of medium and long range capacity able to transport nuclear weapons. In repeated occasions, your ambassadors in Mexico Mr. [Jose Antonio] Portuondo and [Carlos] Lechuga [soon to become Cuban ambassador to the United Nations] assured me that the Cuban government was only receiving defensive weaponry and training for its use but that there was no intention at all of acquiring or installing any type of aggressive weapons and even less so of so-called atomic [bombs].

I consider that the possible existence of the installations of the type referred to could constitute a serious threat not only to the security of the peoples in the American continent [i.e., hemisphere—ed.] but for the peace of the world.

I think that neither the government nor the Cuban people wish to be constituted as a threat to the peoples of America nor as factors that may lead to a breach of the peace. Humanity as a whole would be in danger.

In the name of the friendly relations that unite and have united our countries, I fervently wish that Cuban territory has not become a base for weapons of aggression and in the case that this were to have occurred, I believe it is my duty in the name of peace which all the Mexicans have the wish to preserve, to cordially make a call to your government so that those bases are not used in any form whatsoever and the offensive weapons are withdrawn from Cuban territory.

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]
Message from Mexican Embassy, Washington (Antonio Carrillo Flores), 24 October 1962

Number 2617
Washington, 24 October 1962
Manuel Tello

140. - As the OAS session was ending Secretary Rusk took care to thank our country for its attitude.
Carrillo Flores

Memo of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Chilean diplomat, Mexico City, 24 October 1962

X/442/17
MEMORANDUM
Mexico, DF, 24 October 1962

The Chilean Chargé d’Affaires visited Second Undersecretary [Pablo] Campos Ortiz this afternoon. He told him that he had instructions from his government to communicate to us, first, that Chile would vote in the OAS, in favor of the draft resolution presented by the United States (meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the terms of the TIAR [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, i.e., the 1947 Rio Treaty], and that it will also vote in favor of the draft resolution that the United states will present to the meeting of the Provisional Organ of Consultation; and second, that Chile will vote, in the [UN] Security Council, in favor of the United States’ Resolution.

This Chargé d’Affaires commented with regards to the first point, that the information was late, since the resolutions had already been approved. With regards to the second point, Campos Ortiz thanked him for his information, and mentioned the fact that Mexico is not member of the Security Council.

The Chargé d’Affaires ended by saying that his Government would have, as always, special interest in exchanging information with Mexico in everything related to the situation of the moment.

P.C.O.
Memo of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Peruvian Diplomat, Mexico City, 25 October 1962

MEMORANDUM
Mexico, D. F., 25 October 1962

The Peruvian Chargé d’affaires Mr. Don Carlos Pérez Cánepa, visited the Second Undersecretary [Pablo] Campos Ortiz, last Tuesday the 23rd. He said he had instructions from his Government to ask us what our point of view was regarding possible action – military (in which all the republics of the continent would take part) against Cuba.

Campos Ortiz answered him that he did not have any piece of information about this matter, but that he would confirm this later.

Campos Ortiz, after having talked with Mr. Undersecretary [José] Gorostiza, communicated with Mr. Pérez Cánepa and confirmed what he had previously expressed, that is, that no government, nor any American [i.e., Western Hemispheric—ed.] Foreign Ministry had informed us on this matter. Campos Ortiz asked him, even, if it might not be a Peruvian initiative.

Today in the morning, the Peruvian Chargé d’Affaires called to express that he had received a telegram from his Foreign Ministry which told him, with regards to this matter, that it was not a Peruvian initiative.

The text of the telegram that Mr. Pérez Cánepa received from Lima the day of the 23rd, said as follows:

“The Peruvian Foreign Ministry would like to know the opinion of the Mexican Government about a military meeting to consider possible armed action against Cuba.”

P.C.O.

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Memo of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Canadian Ambassador, Mexico City, 25 October 1962

MEMORANDUM
Mexico, D. F., 25 October 1962

The Ambassador of Canada visited the Second Undersecretary Campos Ortiz. He dealt with the following:

That the government of Canada has dictated the necessary provisions so that airplanes with a Cuban flag that land in Canadian territory will be inspected, in search of weapons. That this will proceed as such in accordance with provisions contained in international agreements, according to which civilian airplanes are not allowed to transport arms unless previous approval is obtained. The Ambassador added that the above is independent of the provisions also dictated by the Canadian authorities, to the effect that Russian airplanes will not be permitted to fly over Canadian territory nor land at Canadian airports.

The Ambassador asked what was the meaning of the reservation that Mexico had made when the vote was being taken by the [OAS] Provisional Consultation Organ in its session in Washington on the 23rd of the current month, against the Resolution that the United States presented.

Campos Ortiz answered that in the vote on the second paragraph, Mexico abstained because the said paragraph mentions the possible use of armed forces, being that the employment or use of armed forces outside national territory, is not under the Executive’s authority, but requires previous authorization by Congress. Campos Ortiz noted that Mexico had voted in favor of the Resolution overall.

P.C.O. [Pablo Campos Ortiz]

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Telegram from Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, 25 October 1962

X/442/17
LETTERGRAM [CORREOGRAMA]
Washington DC
25 October 1962
C. Manuel Tello,
Secretariat [Ministry] of Foreign Relations,
General Directorate of International Organizations,
Mexico, D. F.

135. - In the following I allow myself to inform you about the development of the extraordinary session celebrated by the
Council [of the OAS] on the 23rd of this month, to consider the request by the Government of the United States that the Council, in accordance with what is established in Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, that the organ of consultation be immediately called and authorized, in accordance of Article 12 of that Treaty, to act provisionally as such. As annex 1 I enclose the note from the Representative of the United States.

Once the request was read, the Secretary of State of the United States of America, [Dean Rusk,] representing his country, read a long declaration about the situation in Cuba that has been created because of the existence in this country of weapons of an offensive character.

Once his declaration was finished, the Representatives in the Council pronounced in favor of the call. It was my turn to speak after the Representatives of Argentina and Guatemala. As I reported by telephone to the Secretariat [Ministry], my intervention was along the following lines:

The last session of the Council that was convened to examine a request to call the Organ of Consultation was that of 14 November 1961. On that occasion, as the request, in the Mexican government’s opinion, did not fill, among others, the requirement of alleging that the inviolability or territorial integrity or the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State had been affected, the Mexican Delegation [Representación] declared that it would not support it.

Announcing this position at the Council, I permitted myself to remind, and I cite textually from the act, that "on as many occasions when a Member State had requested calling a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations, Mexico had voted favorably.”

Consistent with the above, the Secretariat [Ministry] of Foreign Relations has given me instructions to vote in favor of the draft resolution presented by the United States Delegation, to call the Organ of Consultation and ask the Council to constitute itself and act provisionally as such.

Submitted to a vote, the Resolution that I enclose as annex 2, was approved by the 18 favorable votes. Bolivia and Uruguay abstained. The Representatives of these two countries expressed that they were doing so because of a lack of instructions, which were not late in arriving in the case of Bolivia and that the Representative of Uruguay has now received, as a result of which it is possible to say that the call was approved unanimously.

Once the voting was made, a recess of half an hour was agreed.

Once the Council’s session continued, now provisionally acting as the organ of consultation, US Ambassador [deLesseps S.] Morrison asked, in name of the North American government, that the resolution be read, that I enclose as annex 3 and requested that the session be suspended until three in the afternoon in order to give time for the Representatives to ask for instructions. In a separate oficio, I will inform you about the afternoon session on the same 23rd of October.

Very attentively,
Vicente Sanchez Gavito
Ambassador

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Letter from Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, to Mexican Foreign Minister, 26 October 1962

X/442/17

SUBJECT: Organ of Consultation

Washington DC
26 October 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

C. Manuel Tello
Secretariat [Ministry] of Foreign Relations
General Directorate of International Organs [Organismos]
Mexico, DF

Please find enclosed three examples of the reports by Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States and the Dominican Republic, about the measures that their respective governments have adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Resolution of the 23rd of this month.

As it would be helpful for you to remember, in paragraph 4 of this Resolution, members are urged to keep the Organ of Consultation dutifully informed about these kinds of measures. The day after the adoption of the Resolution, [in response] to my question, Mr. [Ward P.] Allen, from the North American delegation, answered that the State Department was planning to request a meeting of the Organ of Consultation today, Friday, precisely to receive the information that has been sent to me by mail.
Undoubtedly wishing to be attentive, this American functionary communicated last night with Minister [Andrés] Fenochio to inform him that the State Department had given up on the aforementioned project [draft] and suggested to the governments that were taking measures to record the corresponding information in writing. Mr. Allen added that in this way it would be possible to avoid governments that have not yet taken measures and those that have decided not to take measures of any kind, being seen to be placed in an embarrassing situation. He summed his thinking by the use of the idiomatic phrase “we do not want to put countries like Mexico on the spot.” [in English in original—trans.]

Although his attitude had displeased me a great deal, today I did not look for Mr. Allen since I knew that he had interest in talking to me about the need of summoning the Commission on Judicial-Political Affairs that I preside. In fact, he has just called me; we agreed to convene the Commission and, at the end of the conversation, I alluded to the one that I had had yesterday with Mr. Fenochio.

When he confirmed to me what he had said, exactly in the same terms that Mr. Fenochio had communicated to me, I told him that he could be sure that, in the whole process that the OAS observes with respect to the serious situation that we are going through, the Mexican government would never view itself as being in an embarrassing situation and that, for the same reason, this possibility should be discarded when he would be collaborating in determining the course of action of the Delegation of the United States. Undoubtedly referring to my violent reaction at the secret meeting that the North American Delegation organized on the eve of the of the Budget vote, he told me that it was very difficult to get on with me since I was unhappy when my feelings were not taken into account and I was also unhappy when they took them too much into account. I limited myself in saying to him that the difficulty lies in his lack of understanding and that, instead of going over things that have already past, the important thing, was to clearly establish that the Mexican Government has no objection to the Organ of Consultation having as many meetings as the member states wish.

Very attentively,

Vicente Sanchez Gavito
Ambassador

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]
ence by means of messages addressed to the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly. As far as I am concerned I have the intention of doing this as soon as possible.

I ask that you excuse me for the liberty that I have taken and for the brevity of this message, which is the consequence of the seriousness of the situation and its urgent character.

For my part, I would be very grateful to receive any of your suggestions or opinions in respect to the meaning and content of any subsequent action.

Cordially yours.

Joseph Broz Tito.

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Air Letter from Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, 27 October 1962

AIR MAIL
From Brazilian Embassy
Number 1607
Expedient 81-0/210

SUBJECT: Brazil's international policy
Rio de Janeiro, 27 October 1962

C. Secretary of Foreign Relations
General Directorate of the Diplomatic Service [Dirección General del Servicio Diplomático]
Mexico, D.F.
1900

On the occasion of the recent international crisis, the Minister of War, General Amaury Kruel, declared on the 23rd of the current [month], to the “Journal do Brasil” that “the armed forces of Brazil are united and closely adhered to the position adopted by the Government in the current international situation.” General Amaury Kruel added, “we are ready to carry out the decisions of the last Conference of Punta del Este, especially in the anticipated case that a foreign nation provides offensive weapons to another nation of the Continent.”

In its edition on the 24th the said newspaper published a journalistic summary of these declarations (see Annex 1).

On the other hand, the Foreign Minister [Canciller] Hermes Lima affirmed on the 24th of the current month before a group of women and students that went to the Itamaraty to express their support for the measures adopted by the North American Government that Brazil voted in favor of necessary measures to impede the traffic of offensive weapons in the Continent, but that it will not vote in favor of a condemnation of the Cuban regime, because “it does not correspond Brazil to condemn or authorize the invasion of the island.” The Brazilian Foreign Minister was referring to the position taken by the Brazilian Delegate in the Council of the Organization of American States [OAS], acting provisionally as an Organ of Consultation, in the course of the voting of the resolution that was approved on the 23rd of the current [month].

Professor Hermes Lima added that: “we voted [for] the necessary measures to impede the transport of offensive weapons to Cuba, and to any other country of America, in keeping with what we approved in Punta del Este, with respect to the prohibition of such weapons in the Continent. We voted without indecisions and freely, against the accumulation of nuclear material in America [i.e., the Western Hemisphere]. What we did not vote on and will not vote for is a condemnation of the Cuban regime or for an authorization of the invasion. It is necessary to distinguish between the accumulation of nuclear weapons in the Americas and the measures that tend towards overthrowing a population’s domestic regime. The “Jornal do Brasil” on the 25th of the current [month] publishes a journalistic report about this. (See Annex 2)

Finally, I enclose the text of an editorial published the same day in the “Diario de Noticias” that refers likewise to the Cuban question.

I reiterate to you the assurances of my most esteemed and distinguished consideration.

EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. NO REELECTION.

THE AMBASSADOR


[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]
Telegram from Mexican Embassy, Washington (Flores), 29 October 1962

TRANSLATION OF CODED TELEGRAM
PROCEDURAL TELEGRAM

Number 2551
Washington, 29 October 1962
RELACIONES MEXICO

144. - I [am writing to] confirm [our] telephone conversation last night. Secretary Rusk summoned Ambassadors to the White House and OAS to specify [the] development of the international crisis in the last few days. He told [us that the] message transmitted by Moscow yesterday and [the] immediate response by President Kennedy had fundamentally alleviated tension. He insisted several times however that [the] crisis has not ended as difficulties could arise regarding various sorts of interpretations and executions of the commitments made in the message and letter previously cited. Rusk asked us to tell our governments that the imminent danger had been removed through withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Cuba but that the Cuban problem remains alive and that President Kennedy has not nor will he take any commitment contrary to resolutions approved at the consultation meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este [in January 1962] without consulting the Organization system. [In a] long oficio [official letter—ed.] I [will] expand information and commentary.

CARRILLO FLORES
[...] 510719
arp. --

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Message from Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, 29 October 1962, enclosing memorandum of meeting of US Secretary of State Rusk with Latin American Ambassadors, 28 October 1962

MEMORANDUM about Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s declarations during the meeting with the Latin American Ambassadors at the State Department on Sunday 28 October 1962

Mr. Rusk began his briefing by referring to the following 3 Soviet documents:

1. - The letter of 26 October, from Mr. Khrushchev to President Kennedy, which Rusk qualified as vague, long and anguished, which says that the USSR is prepared to withdraw weapons of an offensive character from Cuba;

2. - The message disseminated by radio [Moscow on] the 27th [of October] in which Mr. Khrushchev related Cuba with Turkey. Rusk expressed that no connection exists
between the two issues; that the United States could not even consider the possibility of putting Europe in danger in order to solve the Cuban situation and that, consequently, the United States decided to reply to the letter of the 26th and not allude to this message of the 27th;

3. - The message disseminated on the morning of the 28th in which the USSR announces that it is prepared to suspend the construction of the bases in Cuba, dismantle them and return the armaments to its territory, all under supervision of United Nations representatives. As a counterpart, the aforementioned power has requested assurances that the United States will not launch an armed attack against Cuba. The Secretary of State reported that his government had accepted this proposition and that the same terms of the North American agreement are present in the letter from President Kennedy [to Premier Khrushchev] on the 27th of this month (Annex 10 of the complete collection [juego completo] of letters and messages that the Delegation has enclosed for the Secretariat [Ministry]).

Immediately after, the Secretary of State emphasized the following points:

It cannot be assumed that the problem is settled. In the following days it is possible that difficulties may arise. For example, the Undersecretary [Deputy Minister] of Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union, [Vasily] Kuznetsov, is about to arrive at the United Nations “and no one knows what he brings in his briefcase.” Castro, in today’s speech, refers to “the abandonment by the United States of Guantanamo” and that is even more problematic than the issue of Turkey, because as long as a regime like that of Castro’s remains in power, one cannot even take seriously the possibility of modifying “the statute of the referred American base.” In summary, the United States has reacted favorably to today’s Soviet message, but it remains in a state of alert and will proceed very cautiously.

Nothing of what the United States says and does will alter its attitude towards the pressing situation in Cuba. Next Mr. Rusk reiterated and expanded on this concept, reading the text: “We are not going to give Castro nor any other Cuban regime assurances of any kind that are incompatible with our obligations and with the agreements that we reached at Punta del Este” [in January 1962].

Ambassador Lima, from El Salvador, then took an opportunity to ask for clarifications. Although he was extremely cautious, he gave the impression of being seriously worried about the turn that events had taken. The Secretary of State, in reply, made clear what he had already expressed, saying that the quid pro quo had operated exclusively on the terrain of the violence [el terreno de la violencia]: assurances that the United States will not invade Cuba in exchange for the dismantling and return of the offensive weapons to Soviet territory, under the vigilance of the United Nations. With regards to this last issue, he announced that the Secretary General of the United Nations, with a group of numerous experts, will go to Cuba on the 30th of this month. Likewise, he repeated that one should not consider that there had been “a great victory” and that the problem had ended. With regards to the latter, he told us that it is his understanding that there had been changes in the Kremlin over the last two days and that it was important that the position of Mr. Khrushchev did not weaken too much.

With regards to the question of the [El] Salvadorian Ambassador, Mr. Rusk also said that there had been no deals [componendas] or secret arrangements; that the “record” from the letter of 26 October onwards is public.

With regards to the next steps, after making clear that the task of the UN experts does not require review by nuclear physicists, but rather exclusively the participation of engineers and military personnel, Rusk expressed that the “quarantine” will continue while the arrangements are put into practice; that the United States did not believe that incidents would occur since the Soviet ships are already now on their way to their country; and, finally, that the Department of State does not believe that for now there is any need for “formal action” by the Organ of Consultation.

Ambassador [Roberto] Campos, from Brazil, then formulated two questions that served so that the Secretary of State would confirm that the situation on the day before, Saturday, had reached the point of extreme danger and that surely Moscow’s knowledge of this had influenced the decision to dismantle the bases. In this part of his briefing, Rusk clearly gave the impression that, the previous day, the United States has been about to bomb the bases. As an example, the following is a transcription of one of his phrases: “Khrushchev yesterday noticed that the situation was as dangerous as it could ever be and saw clearly that this armament could not remain in Cuba.” At this point, he praised Mr. Khrushchev saying that he had revealed “a certain amount of caution” and remembering that he had abstained from issuing ultimatums.

At the end of the meeting, the Secretary of State said that “the solidarity of the OAS had been a magnificent contribution to peace and that it had made a deep impression around the entire world, especially in Moscow.” His last words constituted an appeal to his interlocutors for them to be discreet in their declarations to the press given that the situation facing the world continues being delicate.

Washington DC, 29 October 1962.
TRANSLATION OF CODED TELEGRAM
PROCEDURAL COPY

Number 2557
Prague, 29 October 1962
RELACIONCES MEXICO

DEL RIO
510599
fb
port certain cargo that the Japanese ship brings [with it] destined for Havana.

Campos Ortiz responded to the Chargé d’Affaires [saying] that the answer was negative, since the opinion that Mexican authorities have in this respect and that was applied the first time in the case of the Norwegian Ship “Teneriffa” applies in respect to any port facility, use of the dock, use of quay or transfer inside the ship.

2.- The Chargé d’Affaires asked if it was true that the Spanish ship Monte Ayala had left shipment with destination to Cuba in Progreso [Yucatán].

Campos Ortiz told him that the information in this respect, which appeared in the newspapers on the 29th, has no basis whatsoever and that Excelsior on this date published an explanatory about the specific case.

3.- The Commercial Attaché said that Cuban authorities through various companies have acquired from CONASUPO [the National Company of Popular Subsistence] four thousand five hundred tons of rice; that this operation is already concluded and that the only thing missing is to send it to Veracruz, where a Cuban ship or a ship that the Government of Cuba charters will pick it up. Mr. Sinobas added that an operation to buy one thousand five hundred tons of beans is also about to be concluded, an operation that is being carried out by the Agricultural Bank [Banco Agricola]. The beans would be sent to Cuba at the same time as the rice. The ones in charge of the shipment of this merchandise, Mr. Sinobas continued, have informed the Cuban Commercial Agency (Agency that depends on the Cuban Embassy in Mexico) that the [Mexican] Secretariat of [the] Navy has told them that at the request of the [Mexican] Secretariat [Ministry] of Foreign Relations, Cuban ships cannot transport said merchandise.

Mexico, 30 October 1962

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Memorandum Re Message from Mexican Embassy, Caracas, 30 October 1962

NO Passo

TOP LEVEL INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Our Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, in [an] oficio dated 30 October recently past, informed this Secretariat [Ministry] about the most important events registered in that country, in relation with the crisis that the Caribbean zone is going through.

In the collection of information that the Embassy enclosed for me the topics to be noted can be summed up as follows:

In a message directed to the country on 24 of this past month of October, President [Romulo] Betancourt announced the grave situation that was coming and made a call to National Unity in order to face the danger of the Russian atomic bases in Cuba; likewise he announced that the Venezuelan Government had the firm intention of carrying out every and each of its international commitments, not only for the feeling of loyalty to the written texts that are in unavoidably binding form but by a sense of national coexistence.

The same day Mr. President Betancourt noted that Cuba, before transforming into a Soviet atomic base, was already exporting slogans, money and weapons to […] and destroy democratic American regimes.

During an interview granted to the Foreign Policy Commission by Foreign Minister Marcos Falcón Briceño, he answered to a series of questions about the international policy of Venezuela referring specially to the area of the Caribbean and the situation created between the OAS and Cuba; the Foreign Minister said that direct belligerent actions against Cuba had not been talked about, and that the OAS Charter binds member countries [not] to use the Armed Forces but that, however, all member countries of that Inter-American Organ agree that no communist regime may form part of our community,… the whole hemisphere is convinced of the goodness of the representative democratic system.

Los Organismos

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Message from Chilean Embassy, Mexico City, to Mexican Foreign Ministry, 31 October 1962
EMBASSY OF CHILE
MEXICO
PRIVATE FOR MR. UNDERSECRETARY
DON JOSE GOROSTIZA.-

1. Chile wishes to emphasize with Mexico, with respect to the Cuban case, the exchange of information and to coordinate, if possible, the future action of both Governments.

2. In consideration of the new events in Cuba, that mean the implicit acceptance of Prime Minister Khrushchev, of the USSR, of the installation in Cuba of eminently offensive weapons and the presence of Russian elements [i.e., people—trans.] for their military use, strong sectors of Chilean public opinion deem that the Cuban problem will suffer a change in interpretation that will merit a modification of Chile’s position with regards to the matter.

3. In addition to communicating these facts to the Mexican Foreign Ministry, the Chilean Government would be greatly indebted if you could give your points of view about the specific matter.

Mexico City, 31 October 1962

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Air Letter from Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, 31 October 1962

AIR LETTER ['Correo Aereo']
Reserved
Office EMBASSY OF MEXICO

Number 1619
File
SUBJECT: Press interview granted yesterday by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Relations, Professor Hermes Lima.
Rio de Janeiro, 31 October 1962
C. Secretariat [Ministry] of Foreign Relations
Mexico, D.F.

In relation to the coded telegram number 348 that I sent yesterday to this Secretariat, I wish to inform you that the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Relations Professor Hermes Lima, conceded a group press interview yesterday in which he, in keeping with the coincidental version published in the newspapers today, expressed, amongst other things, what follows:

1) Brazil has taken on “on its own behalf and risk” the role of mediator, offering its good offices aimed at establishing a modus vivendi between Cuba and other American countries. General Albino Silva was chosen as instrument of this mission “because he is the Head of the Military House of the Presidency of the Republic and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and because he is a member of the Armed forces and one of the General Officers of great political clarity.”

The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister emphasized that the most important [thing] in this respect would be the reestablishment of the relations between Cuba and the other American countries that are broken since this “will be a guarantee for Cuba as much as for said countries.”

The Prime Minister denied that part of the Brazilian envoy’s mission was to propose that Cuba held elections, affirming that a proposal of this kind would constitute interference in the internal affairs of Cuba.

2) The Government of Brazil and its envoy are well aware that the fundamental conditions for overcoming the crisis will be “proof of the existence of the nuclear bases and its [sic] dismantling,” which must have as a counterpart the commitment of the United States to not invade Cuba.

3) The Prime Minister affirmed that “with the nature of the nuclear weapons that the great powers possess, they are the ones who must have the most patience and care, for they are the ones who possess nuclear armaments, the first and greatest victims of an atomic war in contrast to what happened in the past to the better armed nations […] Faced with the danger of a nuclear war breaking out, Brazil felt that a critical moment of the international crisis had arrived and that a supreme effort was necessary so that the mechanisms of international organizations worked in order to reestablish the contacts, the conversations, and to open a door so that the harmony between peoples was reestablished […] the United States, with its nuclear superiority, gave an example of prudence and care. This proves the high political capacity and statesmanlike ability of President Kennedy. The same can be affirmed of Prime Minister Khrushchev.

The “Jornal do Brasil” publishes, about this same matter, the declarations of a spokesman of the President of the
Republic which say that President [João] Goulart considers that the “solution of the conflict between Cuba and the United States has definitely been left under the competency of the United Nations.” The mission of the personal Representative of the President is to present the Cuban Government a conciliatory proposal communicated to the diplomatic representatives of the United States and the USSR in Brazil and that seems to be on the way toward being accepted by the governments of both powers.

I take the opportunity to reiterate to you assurances of my most high and distinguished consideration.

EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. NO REELECTION.

THE AMBASSADOR

[...] Alfonso Garcia Robles

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Memo of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Cuban diplomat, Mexico City, 1 November 1962

MEMORANDUM

1 November 1962

The Cuban Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Ramon Sinobas, requested to be received by [Foreign] Secretary [Manuel] Tello. The Secretary gave instructions to Mr. Licenciado [Pablo] Campos Ortiz to receive him in his name.

Mr. Sinobas said that he had instructions from his government to ask the Mexican government for its support in the United Nations, to obtain acceptance of the five points that Prime Minister Castro had just made known.

Campos Ortiz asked Mr. Sinobas if he had an official text of the said five points. He answered that he did and that he would send it to him immediately.

Mr. Sinobas expressed to Campos Ortiz that the Cuban government considered the support of Mexico, in this case, as being of the highest importance.

Undersecretary Campos Ortiz, without expressing any opinion, limited himself to telling Mr. Sinobas that he will immediately inform the Secretary of Foreign Relations about what he had just made known to him.

P.C.O.

Annex: Note of the Embassy of Cuba of this same date.

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]

Memo of Conversation between Mexican Foreign Ministry official and Cuban diplomat, Mexico City, 7 November 1962

MEMORANDUM

Mexico, DF, 7 November 1962

The Cuban Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Ramon Sinobas, visited today, by prior appointment, the Undersecretary [Pablo] Campos Ortiz. He touched on the following points:

1. He said he had instructions to ask us if we could give him an answer yet to the request his government had made to us for the Delegation of Mexico to give its support in the United Nations, more concretely in the General Assembly, to the Five Points that Prime Minister Castro made known recently, and that are related to the crisis situation that has been taking place between Cuba and the United States.

Mr. Sinobas dealt with this matter with Undersecretary Campos Ortiz in the visit he made to him on 1 November. He did not have with him the text of the Five Points, but he gave it to us that same day in the afternoon in a note.

Campos Ortiz said to Mr. Sinobas that the General Assembly of the UN could not approve any resolution nor make any recommendation about this matter, as it is already being considered by the Security Council. That is set out, Campos Ortiz added, in the first paragraph of Article 12 of the Charter, which he then read. This, he added, because of what the four first Points that Prime Minister Castro’s Declaration includes.

Mr. Sinobas asked Campos Ortiz if we could disclose to him what would be our position would be in the event that the matter was discussed in the Assembly. Campos Ortiz told him that, should that case arise, we would consider the matter, but that for now we could not disclose anything.

With regards to the fifth Point of the Prime Minister’s Declaration, that is the one relating to the Base in Guantanamo – Campos Ortiz continued – we consider that because the Base exists by virtue of a Treaty, the return of it to
Cuba should be a matter of negotiation or bilateral arrangement between Cuba and the United States, as long as this is in keeping with the stipulations that the Treaty contains in this respect, that is adjusting to the general applicable principles on this matter. In addition, Campos Ortiz added, given the current state of extreme tension between Cuba and the United States, the North American Government would consider it very unfriendly, not only any effort, but even more still a position in favor of Cuba, that any Government took on this point, as a result of which the Mexican government will abstain from pronouncing on this problem in any way. Campos Ortiz added that in analogous cases, but in other circumstances, the Mexican position has been different; for example, in the recent case of Panama (efforts of the Panamanian Government regarding the Canal) or in the case, a while ago, of the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, that the Cuban Government obtained.

2. The second point that Mr. Sinobas touched upon refers to the Cuban Government’s purchase of 4,500 tons of rice, that were obtained from CONASUPO [the National Company of Popular Subsistence] and of 1,500 tons of beans, that were obtained from the Agriculture Bank. Mr. Sinobas had already informed the Secretary about these transactions. It is now to do with, the Chargé d’Affairs said, their dispatch to Cuba. Since the 3rd of November – he added – the steamship “Bahia de Marriel” has been in Veracruz, but the merchandise has not been able to board given that the Head of the ANDSA [customs agency?] at the Port, a gentleman with the surname Vega, is not allowing its dispatch because of not having, he says, instructions for it from the seller. In addition, Mr. Vega is requesting that the proper contract of the freight be presented. Mr. Sinobas considers that perhaps there is a misunderstanding in this case, given that the Embasy’s Commercial Counselor was informed that CONASUPO had given instructions for dispatching the merchandise. With respect to the freight contract, Mr. Sinobas commented, he understands that this is not necessary, as the buyer of the merchandise is the Cuban Government and the boat that plans to take it to Cuba is property of the State. In addition, he added, in the previous cases, similar to this one, presentation of the freight contract has never been requested.

Mr. Sinobas added that the loading of a separate box with merchandise consigned to Cuba onto the “Bahia del Marel” has not been permitted either and that it was in the Port on standby for a boat. A customs official said that he could not authorize the dispatch of this box, as he had instructions not to authorize any dispatch of merchandise to Cuba without specific instructions in every case.

Mr. Sinobas thinks that just as in the case of the rice and the beans as in the case of the separate box, it is possible that there has been a confusion caused by what happened recently in the case of Steamship “Teneriffa”, a Norwegian steamship that was not allowed to unload the load that it carried destined for Cuba in Coatzacoalcos or in Veracruz.

Mr. Sinobas requests that, if possible, instructions be given to those whom it may concern so that the shipment of this merchandise – rice, beans, and the separate box – [can] be carried without difficulty. Campos Ortiz offered to communicate with him by telephone during the course of the day in this respect.

3. Thirdly, Mr. Sinobas told Campo Ortiz that he had telegraphic instructions from his Government to kindly request that the Secretariat of Foreign Relations provide all possible information about the nature of Mexico’s policy and attitude in relation to the problem of territorial waters and jurisdiction over its air space. He would also like to have, he added, reports regarding Mexico’s posture in International Organizations on these two matters.

Campos Ortiz answered Mr. Sinobas that he would do what was possible to provide him with the concrete data about these points throughout the course of tomorrow and in addition, possibly, an official publication of the Secretariat.

Mr. Sinobas thanked Mr. Campos Ortiz’s offer and commented that he would very much like to have these reports in time to send them to Havana on next Friday’s airplane.

4. Fourthly, Mr. Sinobas asked Undersecretary Campos Ortiz if any resolution had been taken yet in relation to Cuba joining the Convention on the Inter-American Indigenous Institute. Campos Ortiz answered him that an answer to the note that the Cuban Embassy had sent with regards to this matter was still pending.

5. Lastly, Mr. Sinobas said that he had communicated with [Cuban UN] Ambassador [Carlos] Lechuga, who told him that he is thinking of coming to Mexico, that he does not yet know exactly when, but that at latest it will be by the end of the United Nations General Assembly meeting.

By way of conclusion, Campos Ortiz repeated what he had told Mr. Sinobas in respect to the Five Points contained in the Declaration by Prime Minister Castro, because he wanted, he told Mr. Sinobas, to be very precise on this point so that Mr. Sinobas, in turn, took note, very clearly, of our answer.

P.C.O. [Pablo Campos Ortiz]
Memo of Conversation between Mexican officials regarding shipment to Cuba, 7 November 1962

MEMORANDUM
Mexico, D. F., 7 November 1962

Undersecretary [Pablo] Campos Ortiz called the Undersecretary of Customs by phone to ask him if he had any information about the rice and the beans that the Cuban government had acquired in Mexico and for whose shipment Cuba had especially sent a Cuban boat, the “Bahía de Mariel”.

Mr. Moreno answered that, in effect, it appears that it has not yet been possible to authorize the dispatch of the merchandise, that he has no more information, but that he suggests speaking to the Undersecretary of Revenues ['Ingresos'], Mr. Romero Castañeda.

Campos Ortiz also referred in his conversation with the Undersecretary of Customs, to the separate box consigned for Cuba that is to be dispatched in the “Bahía del Mariel”. In this respect Mr. Moreno said that this was a box that contained food preserves and some machinery spare parts, and that the dispatch of said box had already been authorized.

P.C.O. [Pablo Campos Ortiz]

Memo of Conversation between Mexican officials regarding trade with Cuba, 8 November 1962

MEMORANDUM
Mexico, DF, 8 November 1962

Undersecretary [Pablo] Campos Ortiz was not able to communicate with the Undersecretary of Revenues ['Ingresos'] yesterday; he did so this morning.

Mr. Romero Castañeda told him that, in effect, they were trying to send three tons of machinery on the “Bahía del Mariel”, a box (or boxes) of preserves, and two tourist automobiles which had entered over the border, and that the dispatch of the two automobiles as well as the boxes of preserves and the three tons of machinery were already authorized.

With respect to the rice, he said that the 4,500 tons of rice that were obtained from CONASUPO and that brings in $9,000,000, appeared consigned to a Swiss firm in Lausanne, but that it was later known that the rice was destined to Cuba. That because of this, the Treasury communicated with Mr. Amoroz and he (Mr. Romero Castañeda) does not know what was resolved with regards to authorizing the dispatch of the 4,500 tons of rice.

Campos Ortiz told the Undersecretary of Revenues that there were more than 1,500 tons of beans that had been acquired from the Agricultural Bank; that the Embassy had informed us of the two operations and had asked us, if possible, for the necessary authorization to be obtained so that this merchandise could be dispatched to its destination.

Mr. Romero Castañeda told Campos Ortiz that, apparently, the implications that the dispatch of the merchandise to Cuba could have has been considered, given that, as is known, the American [i.e., US] authorities have announced specific measures for countries whose ships transport merchandise to Cuba and that even in this case which concerns a Cuban boat it is possible that similar measures could still be imposed on countries that simply send any type of merchandise to Cuba. Mr. Romero Castaneda (who asked Campos Ortiz to call him through the private network to deal with this matter) said that in the course of the morning he would perhaps have some additional information for him.

P.C.O. [Pablo Campos Ortiz]

Letter from Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) to Mexican Foreign Minister, 14 November 1962

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]
Yesterday at 5:30 in the afternoon, Mr. Edward Martin, Assistant Secretary [of State] for Latin [i.e., Inter-American] Affairs, met with the Ambassadors to the White House and the OAS [Organization of American States] to continue the exchange of views, initiated by the Secretary of State, about the Cuban crisis.

On this occasion, the summary of the most recent events, which is the way that this type of meeting invariably starts, was so cautious that it did not even include the news, that we have just read in the Evening Star, that the International Committee of the Red Cross had decided not to take charge of the inspection of boats that leave Cuban ports. Mr. Martin also did not refer to the “slight progress” that, according to newspapers this morning, North American and Soviet representatives have achieved in the negotiations that are taking place in New York.

The central idea of Mr. Martin’s presentation was the futility of making concrete plans while the results of the conversations between [Anastas] Mikoyan and [Fidel] Castro are not known. He emphasized the importance of the IL-28 airplanes being removed from Cuban territory as well as an effective system of inspection being established that assures Cuba will not return to being a base with aggressive capabilities.

Regarding this last item, Martin gave his opinion that the UN is the ideal organization and that perhaps the draft, co-sponsored by Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile for denuclearization [of Latin America], is indicating the path towards a solution.

Regarding the internal conditions in Cuba [parts missing—trans.]

He finished his presentations, assuring us that the Department of State would inform us of the development of negotiations and that our governments would be consulted regarding the solution to concrete problems such as:

a) the removal of IL-28 airplanes;

b) Effective inspection; and

c) Measures to increase pressure on the Cuban regime.

Unfortunately, he did not offer us his ideas on this last point and it did not appear to me to be convenient to ask for clarifications.

In my view, the interesting part of the meeting revolved around the interventions of the Ambassadors who, with the exception of the Brazilian and Costa Rican [ambassadors], appeared to have previously agreed to participate in a marathon of senselessness and lack of dignity.

This part of the meeting began with the acting Representative of the Dominican Republic at the Council, who declared that he had instructions from his government to declare its opposition to any draft [resolution] of denuclearization in Latin America “because Castro still has atomic bombs in Cuba and for other reasons.” He added that, according to his government, Castro is equally dangerous with nuclear arms as without them “among other reasons because they have discovered links between Cuba and subversive activities in the Dominican Republic and will very probably present these complaints and evidence [for them] before the [OAS] organ of consultation soon” (quotation).

Ambassador [Guillermo] Sevilla Sacasa [of Nicaragua] repeated the extraordinary intervention that, on the 5th of this month, he made to the [OAS] Council (paragraph 4 of my airgram 146 and my annex to today’s oficio 1004). Although this time he was less violent and his declaration did not lack humor. He asked if the Department of State considered that Castro without “rockets” was no longer a danger and he maintained that “communist penetration is the most deadly of its weapons.” He finished saying that when in his country communists are not pursued his government is accused of being unfriendly to the United States and when “we apprehend communist agents the New York Times accuses [us] of being a dictatorship.”

Mr. Martin limited himself to answering that the United States has not changed its position regarding Cuba and that, for the moment, it had only been able to refer to the problem of denuclearization.

Mr. Martin limited himself to answering that the United States has not changed its position regarding Cuba and that, for the moment, it had only been able to refer to the problem of denuclearization.

The Ambassador of El Salvador referred to the conversations in New York to inquire if they have been limited to denuclearization. He seemed to suggest he was worried they were discussing some points of friction between the United States and Cuba. Martin replied that the Soviets had mentioned Fidel Castro’s five points but that the North American [i.e., US] negotiators had refused to take these into account.

The Ambassador of Guatemala to the White House referred then to the rumors that the re-entry of Cuba to the OAS was being prepared and said that the Cuban regime, with or without atomic bombs, is incompatible with the Organization. He gave the impression that his government did not attribute importance to the problem of denuclearization. By contrast, it does appear to be very worried about the activities of communist agents, with the Ambassador having informed us that last Saturday [10 November],
two Guatemalan communists had arrived from Cuba in Guatemala, and “attacked” a radio transmitter. “With luck we will find proof of this, and in this case, we will present it to the Organ of Consultation.”

The overall impression of these interventions is, undoubtedly, that the governments in question will not be satisfied while the United States, directly or indirectly, does not overthrow the Cuban regime. The method that they use for this, does not interest them, given that all their attention seems focused on the time factor.

Ambassador [Roberto] Campos, of Brazil, elevated the tone of the meeting. In effect, in a brief and perfectly ordered presentation, he described the draft regarding denuclearization, clarifying that it is not aimed at bringing about the re-entry of Cuba into the OAS nor at bringing the Cuban and North American governments closer together. It is an effort, he said, to avoid the [nuclear] proliferation and all possibility of future competition over nuclear arms in Latin America.

The Ambassador of Costa Rica said that his government studied the draft with “great sympathy” and that the lines it pursued are, in his view, exactly those that Ambassador Campos had just mentioned.

The meeting ended with the following question from the Acting Representative from Uruguay at the Council, that is not lacking interest: “Will the North American possessions in the geographic zone known as Latin America also be denuclearized, like those in Puerto Rico?” Mr. Martin said that it was premature to get into this problem; that the United States would hope that it would be invited to a corresponding conference, “not about denuclearization but so that it agrees not to install nuclear weapons in the zone that is agreed.” According to him, it would not be until the document that was going to be signed was made known that “on which side Puerto Rico was, if with those that had nuclear weapons or those that had agreed never to have them” could be determined.

It is my opinion, that we should connect the presentation made by Venezuela before the Organ of Consultation (my airgram 146 on the 9th of this month), the interventions, summarized above, of the representatives of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and Martin's declaration about the “measures to increase the pressure on the Cuban regime.”

Among a considerable number of Latin American representatives there undoubtedly exists unrest over the possible repercussions of a North American agreement not to invade Cuba. In effect, many of my colleagues have been talking, both in the Council and in conversations with me, about the neutralization and “Finlandization” of Cuba.

It is my understanding that, until now, the Department of State has limited itself to reassuring them that this would not be the result of an agreement not to invade, that this is the quid pro quo for the removal of offensive weapons and nothing more. But as this explanation has not reassured these governments, nor those of Honduras and Panama, and as all these make a common cause with those of Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia, there is various evidence that the Department of State is trying to find a way of pleasing its most dedicated allies in the battle against the Cuban regime.

I do not think that what they are doing now in the OAS will be sufficient. All the representatives of the cited governments, have shown themselves to be happy with the important role that Ambassador Lavalle, from Peru, has been given in the collective struggle against communist penetration and subversive activities. They hope, as well, that the Commission for Cultural Affairs, under the dynamic direction of Ambassador [deLesseps] Morrison, of the United States, will be able to begin a big campaign of propaganda. But they believe, perhaps with reason, that this will not achieve the overthrow of Fidel Castro and this is their sole purpose.

The violent reaction to any suggestion that the Cuban people are the only competent ones to resolve this problem is also symptomatic of the current mood of these representatives. They maintain, for example, that far from discrediting Castro the way that the crisis is being resolved is strengthening him and they refer to the lack of progress in negotiations regarding inspection as a Cuban “triumph.” The day that the United States ratifies its agreement not to invade, my colleagues’ complaints will only be comparable to those that continental [mainland] China seems to have directed at Khrushchev for having given way in its confrontation with the United States.

A new Meeting of Consultation could very well be an escape valve. It would admittedly be a way “to increase pressure on the Cuban regime.” But the certainty is that the course of future events – holding another Meeting of Consultation included – is not being determined, in any way, at the OAS. Ours [the OAS] is a ring for light-weights [compared] to those locked in the so-called cold war and the capacity of this ring decreased even more with the exclusion of Cuba. At the moment, all events of real importance for the solution of the Cuban problem have as their stage, like yesterday, Cuba in first place and, in second, the place that the United States and the Soviet Union choose to hold their negotiations.

However, the reaction of the majority of the Latin American governments to these events will create growing problems for us in the Council. I will continue carefully observing the direction they [events] take, I will endeavor to
reduce their proportions, and I will keep you informed of any new development that presents itself.

Very attentively,

Vicente Sánchez Gavito
Ambassador

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro, translated by Tanya Harmer.]

Message from Mexican Foreign Ministry to Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, 17 December 1962

511949
GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE
Dept.- Latin America

JNR
III
III/210(…)/31558
SUBJECT: Press interview granted by Mr. Hermes Lima.
Mexico, D. F., 17 December 1962

O. Ambassador of Mexico,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

I have the pleasure of making reference to your attentive oficio number 1619 dated this past 31 October in which you informed this Secretariat [Ministry] at length about the press interview granted on the date of the 30th of the present month by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil, Professor Hermes Lima.

This Secretariat is aware of the Brazilian government’s various proposals to intervene in the resolution of the Cuban-North American problem.

Attentively
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. NO REELECTION.

PO. DEL SECRETARIO.
EL DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERINO.

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.]


Mexican Delegation
Organization of American States
Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington D. C.

MEMORANDUM

This morning, at the request of the United States, the Council of the Organization [of American States] met, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, in a secret session, with the objective of listening to a speech by [US United Nations] Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in relation to the issue of Cuba.

After having initiated the session and immediately agreeing to a break, so as to be able to speak informally, the Ambassador announced that he was going to summarize the negotiations conducted by him, in New York, with the representatives of the Soviet Union, after the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev last October.

First he referred to the efforts aimed at replacing the quarantine established by the United States with an inspection by the International Red Cross. He reported that the USSR agreed that its boats would be inspected but that it could not do anything to make other nationalities of the Soviet bloc do the same. Another aspect, that he was examining at this stage of the conversations, related to whether representatives of the Red Cross should use a North American boat, a Soviet one, or one from a neutral country. He added that, by this time, the USSR had already withdrawn the offensive arms that it had in Cuba and begun to dismantle the corresponding platforms. Finally, an agreement was reached so that the missiles and bombers that were withdrawn, would go on the deck of the boats so that the United States could verify their withdrawal on the high seas easily. In this way, he added, 42 missiles of
an “intermediate” range left Cuba. The North Americans were never able to see the nuclear cones [conos nucleares], but the government of this country has reason to believe the assurances that Russia has given it that they left Cuba in the first boat and that it set sail after the fundamental letter from Prime Minister Khrushchev.

The next point was the IL-28 bombers. After quite a lot of time and at the cost of great effort, [Anastas] Mikoyan persuaded “President Castro” to allow these bombers to leave, having the operation verified by means of reconnaissance and aerial photography. Immediately afterwards the United States lifted the quarantine.

There then still remained two aspects to the problem: (1) inspection on the ground to verify the departure of the offensive arms and (2) the guarantee that they would not be reinserted in Cuba.

Stevenson said that in view of Mikoyan’s efforts with Castro, in relation to the inspection having failed, the Secretary General of the United Nations [U Thant] had suggested the establishment of a United Nations inspection system that would include the territory of the United States and countries of the Caribbean. The United States replied that if the inspection was not going to limit itself to Cuba, it would have to cover not only the United States and the Caribbean, but also Soviet ports. In this way, this chapter of the negotiation was brought to an end.

By then, the United States had become convinced that it was very doubtful that the United Nations could carry out an effective inspection on the ground. On the other hand, aerial reconnaissance had produced very good results. Even so, the North American plan was as unacceptable to the Soviet Union as the Soviet one was for the United States. As an example, Ambassador Stevenson alluded to the reference that the United States wanted to make to wish to continue flights by its airplanes over Cuban territory and to the Soviet position that this was violating Cuban air space.

Given the way things were, presenting independent declarations to the Security Council was considered, but when they were examining the texts, the United States concluded that it would not be prudent to reopen the debate before the Security Council, where Cuba would be present and could take advantage of the opportunity to begin launching diatribes and insults again. Fortunately, Stevenson said, the USSR did not share this point of view but, in fact, gave the appearance of having an even greater interest than the North American delegation of avoiding debate in the Security Council.

During the next stage, the possibility of sending a joint letter to Secretary General of United Nations was examined and, after this, what would be two separate letters with the interpretations of each government. This procedure did not meet with success either, however, as each Delegation considered the other’s plan unacceptable.

Finally, both countries agreed to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, in which they thanked him for his efforts to help them find a solution to the crisis; they refer to the agreement that they reached as having been achieved “in considerable measure,” and assure that, although it was not possible to resolve all debated points, they thought that the topic did not need to occupy the Security Council’s attention. The note ended saying that the two governments entertained the hope that the differences that they had been able to settle helped to eliminate other difficulties that existed between both of them. This note, Ambassador Stevenson added, would be delivered tomorrow and immediately distributed to the Security Council. At the same time, he added, its text would be sent to the North American diplomatic missions throughout the Continent and respective Foreign Ministries.

Finishing his declaration, Ambassador Stevenson offered to answer any questions that members of the Council wanted to ask him.

The first to ask a question was the Alternate Representative from Uruguay to investigate what conclusion had been reached in relation to the presence of Russian troops in Cuba. Mr. Stevenson expressed that the Soviet Union had withdrawn at the very least a thousand soldiers of the twenty-one thousand that were calculated to have been in Cuba and he added that, naturally, despite these troops leaving, there was still a strong Soviet base in Cuba, [and] although it does not have nuclear weapons, undoubtedly it has existing and effective anti-aircraft equipment.

As it appeared that with this question the questioning had finished, Mr. [Edwin M.] Martin, Assistant Secretary of the Department of State for Latin [sic: Inter-] American Affairs, indicated that our Permanent Missions in New York were also going to be informed in the same way as had been done here in Washington. Mr. Stevenson expressed his thanks to his Latin American colleagues in New York for the support that they had offered and the advice that they had given him throughout the difficult negotiations.

In turn, Mr. Martin expressed that the negotiations with the Soviet Union were finished as of this morning, meaning that the problem of Cuba and its relations with American countries would continue to be a question for consideration in the Council. We should bear in mind, he said, that the Soviet [Union] could establish an offensive base in Cuba. The United States has reserved its right to aerial reconnaissance. The other members of the OAS would also have to keen on guard. Castro’s policy, in relation to Latin America, Martin continued saying, had not changed at all: radio transmissions
continue being aggressive and incite people to rebellion; Prime Minister Fidel Castro's speech, on 2 January [1963], was as “bellicose” as any other. My government, he added, will not allow any of our republics to be attacked and is ready to act where necessary. Our policy continues being the one outlined by President Kennedy last 20 November in his press conference. He also alluded to the Miami speech. He finished saying that, for now, they do not have concrete proposals to make and that what is next is to undertake consultations to consider what measures can be taken.

The Alternate Representative of Venezuela recalled the declarations made by Mr. [U. Alexis] Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Department of State for Political Affairs, made on 17 December [1962] before the Council (see the Delegation’s oficio 1096 of this date) in the sense that the United States did not want to undertake any measure that could slow down negotiations but that now that these had finished, he wanted to know the North American opinion regarding the permanence of Russian troops in Cuba, and leaving this [Cuban] government alone, armed “ferociously” (“ferozmente”) as it was, and committing all sorts of subversive acts, of sabotage, etc.

Mr. Martin clarified that before the exchange of letters with the Soviet Union, the presence of Russian troops was ignored as these had not been included in the agreement, that, up to now, it had not been possible to support the notion that the term “offensive weapons,” employed in the correspondence, included the troops; that until now it had not been possible to obtain a guarantee for the withdrawal on the part of the USSR and, lastly, that his government shared Venezuela’s preoccupation.

In turn, the Argentine ambassador asked if there was any news about the Soviet Union’s proposals or plans for the propagation of communism in America [i.e., the Western Hemisphere]. Mr. Martin declared that for now there were no indications that these activities were going to decrease.

The Argentine ambassador asked if there were signs that communist China would try to spread in America what he called the most aggressive doctrines of communism. Mr. Martin’s answer was this was what they were trying to do around the whole world but that China does not count, in Latin America, on resources that the Soviet Union has.

The Uruguayan Representative asked to speak again to ask if it was considered useful for the Organ of Consultation to continue in “permanent session.” Mr. Martin replied that this was one of the points that the Department of State wanted to consult other American Foreign Ministries about.

With an intervention by the Venezuelan Representative, who wanted to arrange a certain date for the next meeting of the Council acting as an Organ of Consultation, to which he was not given an answer, the session ended.

Washington, DC, 7 January 1963

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro, translated by Tanya Harmer.]

Memorandum from the Mexican chargé d'affaires in Washington (OAS) regarding a meeting between Alexis Johnson and Latin American Ambassadors, 28 June 1963

X/442/17
CONFIDENTIAL
LETTERGRAM [‘Correograma’]
Washington, DC
28 June 1963
JC

C. José Gorostiza
Undersecretary of Foreign Relations
Office Manager [‘Encargado de Despacho’]
General Directorate of International Organizations
Mexico, D.F.

91. At the request of the United States Delegation, the Council of the Organization [of American States] met this morning, in a “secret” session, acting provisionally as an Organ of Consultation, on the case of Cuba.

The object of the meeting was to listen to Mr. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, about the latest developments registered in Cuba.

The talk was divided into three parts, namely:

1) Presence of Soviet troops on the island;
2) Visit by Prime Minister Fidel Castro to the Soviet Union;
3) Internal situation in Cuba.

1) Presence of Soviet Troops in Cuba.

With regards to this issue Mr. Johnson reported that his government calculated that at the moment there were between twelve and thirteen thousand Soviet nationals on the
3) Internal Situation in Cuba.

In the communiqué that was issued after the meeting, on which he based nearly all his information on, he reported that emphasis is being placed on the need to consolidate Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba. He declared that the Cuban economy is continuing to deteriorate and, as an example, he mentioned the fact that, this year, the production of sugar will only be 3.8 million tons, which is the lowest figure registered until now. He mentioned the shortage of certain items such as shoes and others, which they are rationing. In terms of transport, he said that the situation is also difficult due to the lack of replacement parts, since they have run into serious difficulties with the equipment that the Soviet Union has provided them with. He reported that the level of morale among workers was very low and that the lack of certain products obliged the government to take measures that aggravated the situation. In spite of this, he added, you could not say that the regime in Cuba was in a dangerous situation, given that, the security measures that it had adopted, are very effective. He commented that the subversive radio propaganda from Cuba had declined while, in other countries in America, it had increased. That the United States are trying [están tratando] to cooperate with the Governments that see themselves as seriously threatened. Finally, he said that the lack of controls on journeys to and from Cuba continues to be a real problem but, he added, [particularly] via Europe.

Ending his speech, Undersecretary Johnson offered to answer questions to him. Permit me to mention only the following:

Argentina: What course of action does the United States government have in mind in which the OAS could intervene?

Johnson: The measures that that are being thought about are of an economic character on the part of the countries of Western Europe. He said that trade between these countries and Cuba had notably declined. That some of them had adopted what you could call “public measures” and others, that have not able to do so in an open way, have decided gone for “official measures.” He reported that those adopted by the Organ of Consultation [of the OAS] had been very useful to other Governments and he ended saying that, for now, they did not have in mind any proposal that the Organization of American States could intervene in.

Venezuela: What is the real situation of the Cuban exiles in the United States in terms of their possible collaboration in ending Castro’s regime?

Johnson: The Cuban exiles are very divided. The American government would like to see them united in one single Party.

2) Visit by Prime Minister Fidel Castro to the Soviet Union.

Undersecretary Johnson reported that, apparently, the purpose of Mr. Castro’s trip to the Soviet Union was to “inject new life” into the alliance between both countries. He notes that it is a triumph for the Soviet Union that Prime Minister Khrushchev has obtained Castro’s support in relation to the existing dispute between his country and Communist China and, in relation to this point, he stressed the importance that was given, during the conversations that both prime ministers had, to “coexistence,” in relation with other affairs that were only loosely touched upon. He gave Laos as an example. That, even so, the North American government harbors serious doubts about Castro’s intention to tie himself totally to the political line followed by the Soviet Union. He concedes great importance to the fact that the Soviet Union, in referring to Prime Minister Castro, talks of the “First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba” and he adds that this type of conduct is similar to the one that the Soviet Union has followed in relation to other socialist countries. It seems, he said, [that] it is about giving more importance to the “Party” than the “person” of Fidel Castro. By way of a comment he added that he would not be surprised if in the more or less near future the Soviet Union tried to get rid of Castro. At the same time, he gives a lot of importance to the fact that it wants to continue, in Cuba, the same policy that it is observed in other socialist states, that is to say, specialize each of them in a certain activity, production, industry, etc. In the case of Cuba, he said, the only product that was spoken about during the talks was sugar. At no point is the possibility of establishing industries of any kind mentioned. As a result, he indicated that Cuba remains limited to the role of producing primary materials, in this case, sugar. He finished this chapter indicating that Khrushchev’s triumph had amounted to presenting Castro to the world as an example of the good results of his policy.
but it could not force them to do this. On this issue, he added, I am not an optimist. In the case that any change in this situation is registered, this would originate within Cuba and the role of the exiles would only be to help their compatriots on the island.

Very attentively,

CHARGÉ d’AFFAIRES

Andrés Fenochio
Minister

[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro, translated by Tanya Harmer.]

Notes


4 Ed note: Prime Minister Hermes Lima at that time was temporarily also serving as foreign minister due to the illness of San Tiago Dantas.

5 Ed note: This refers to a resolution passed at the January 1962 meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, at which hemispheric countries approved measures against Cuba.

6 Ed note: See previous document.

7 [López-Mateos’ trip to Asia took place from 3-24 October 1962—T.H.]
Ed. Note: Relations between the Kennedy Administration and anti-Castro Cuban exile groups, never easy or simple, deteriorated significantly after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, and even more so after the Cuban Missile Crisis ended with Washington, in exchange for Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw the missiles, effectively foreswearing any plans to invade Cuba.1 Historians have long faced difficulty in documenting this sometimes tense relationship due to the classification of many pertinent US documents. However, the five translated documents below represent a potentially valuable new source base to explore this aspect of the US-Cuban confrontation—the Mexican archives. They suggest rising dissatisfaction among the anti-Castro activists at the declining level of US government support, finally leading to the resignation in April 1963 of one of the leading figures, Jose Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, whose lengthy and somewhat bitter resignation letter (found in the Mexican foreign ministry archives), detailing his secret contacts with the Kennedy Administration, is included here. The intelligence reports on the activities of the anti-Castro Cuban exiles are contained in a much-larger collection of records produced by the Mexican Federal Directorate of Security which is now available in the Archivo General de la Nación. The documents were obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro and translated by Tanya Harmer.

Document No.1
Information Memorandum, 1 November 1961

In the month of September 1961, a report from Guatemala reached us, from an entirely credible source – the same [source] that gave us reports on the preparations for the aggression in April [i.e., the Bay of Pigs] – which points out the following:

“The invasion planned for the near future is imminent. It will be more violent, much more than the one in April.

Place of departure: Yucatán Peninsula, Quintana Roo [Mexico], and Belize.

Number of men in camps, according to lists with names in our hands:

- Rancho Viejo, 131 men; Santa María, 132 men; Leona Vicario, 159.
- There are other camps that have not been localized, all directed by Yankees.
- Arms seen: M-1, M-3, machineguns, pistols and abundant ammunition.”

It also informs us that in the first days of September Prieto, at the request of the State Department, visited Mexico in order to unify all the groups of counter-revolutionary Cuban immigrants, including the Batistianos. The idea was the formation of only one supposed Cuban government-in-exile with Dr. Pio Elizalde and with other representatives of the Cuban immigrants. He met in the house of Licenciado Jorge Castro Leal, in the street Marina 706 where a few Mexicans were also present.

Among the participants of these meetings of counter-revolutionaries [were] the Cubans Dr. Pio Elizalde, José Rodríguez and Julieta Zambrano, the Spaniards Luis de la Garza, Eduardo González and Felipe de la Rosa, the Chilean journalist Luis Farias, the Mexicans Castro Leal, Fernando del la Mota, Prieto Laurens and the priest [by the name of] Germán Fernández.

We have received information that in Puerto Juárez [today, part of the city of Cancún] there is a center of recruitment, that men of different nationalities go to and are distributed to different training centers. The closest center is in Santa María, some 8 km from Puerto Juárez, and where there are around 200 men well equipped with machineguns and M-1 and M-3 rifles, with abundant ammunition. An airplane supplies them at night; there is a landing strip in the middle of the wilderness, 1,200 metres long and 100 metres wide. The men are of different nationalities.

Another center is situated in Rancho Viejo (Mato Chilero). In this place there is a group of about 100 men as with the group before of different nationalities. There is a small airstrip approximately 800 meters in length. This place is about 10 km from Puerto Juárez.

In Leona Vicario, along the coast to the right [sic] of the town by about 2 km, and 14 km from Puerto Juárez, there are movements of about 80 foreigners, who carry long weapons [armas largas] and pistols.
The counter-revolutionaries that are camped in these camps do not have uniforms yet, they are hoping for them on the date of departure.

According to subsequent information it has become known that the individuals that are to be found in the three aforementioned places, received orders to move to Cabo Catoche, which had not yet happened at the time of the report due to the bad weather that existed in this region.

On 2 September some counterrevolutionary fugitives arrived from Cuba: 17 men and 5 women. They took them to Valladolid. They arrived with on a boat with a Guatemalan flag.


Document No. 3

Memorandum from Mexican Federal Director of Security re Democratic Revolutionary Front (Cuban), 15 January 1962

FEDERAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY

OFICIO NUMBER:

SUBJECT: Information relating to the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (CUBAN).

Mexico, D. F., 15 January 1962

CARLOS FERNANDEZ TRUJILLO and Drs. ALDO FOREST and ROLANDO ROJAS, Directors of the Front mentioned above, have officially expressed today that it will stop functioning because it does not count on the economic means necessary, now that the subsidy that the Embassy of the United States had been giving them and that they basically depended on has been withdrawn.

Notwithstanding the above, the declarants affirmed that the members of the Front in question would continue to meet periodically to maintain a nucleus of resistance against Castro’s tyranny.

The Cuban Department of Industrialists and Tradesmen in exile [La Sección de Industriales y Comerciantes Cubanos en el Exilio] will continue to function as it has been doing until now, directed by AMADO ALVAREZ TORMO, in its offices on Mariano Escobedo No. 360-1, in this capital.

Respectfully

EL CORONEL D. E. X.

FEDERAL DIRECTOR OF SECURITY
Document No. 4

Memorandum from Mexican Federal Director of Security re Cuban Revolutionary Council in Exile, 9 April 1963

FEDERAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY

OFICIO No.

SUBJECT: Information relating to the CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN EXILE [‘Consejo Revolucionario de Cuba en el Exilio’]

Mexico, D. F., 9 April 1963

In the offices of this Organization, situated on Calle Paris No. 10, 4th floor, of this capital, with telephone number 46-20-[unclear] and whose Delegate in Mexico is CARLOS FERNANDEZ TRUJILLO, it became known that JOSE MIRO CARDONA, President of the Council in Miami, FL, U.S.A., met with president JOHN F. KENNEDY and asked him for greater support for anti-Castro forces [anticastristas], in relation to the raids that they are launching against the present Cuban Government. In view of the fact that the answer of the aforementioned president was negative, MIRO CARDONA chose to resign the position that he occupies, “because the anti-Castro forces can not count in any way, on North American backing.”

At 1600 hours today, in Miami, FL, Cuban leaders in exile met, to try and stop and convince MIRO CARDONA not to resign, saying “anti-Castro Cubans without North American support or support from another nation, should form combat brigades on their own in every country, whether their governments oppose them or not, that is to say, that these groups would integrate themselves clandestinely.”

Respectfully,

EL CORONEL D. E. M.

FEDERAL DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

Document No. 5

Resignation Letter of Jose Miro Cardona to the Revolutionary Council of Cuba, 9 April 1963

Revolutionary Council of Cuba

I Resignation

It is my duty to address the Revolutionary Council of Cuba, which I chair, to resign from the post which I have held to this day, which I was appointed to on 22 March 1961 by unanimous agreement of the organizations and dignitaries which I am honored to address.

The only reason for my irrevocable decision is extremely serious. Its basis could cause temporary discouragement to our compatriots who are anxiously waiting for the minute of liberation. Despite this – with a full sense of the enormous responsibility which rests on my shoulders, with a deep knowledge of all the implied consequences of my resignation, putting an end to a tormenting conflict of motives - a duty of clear loyalty, has led me to bring about this necessary crisis, in the hope of resolving it.

II Historical Account

Before explaining the main reason for my irrevocable decision, I feel obliged to give, in a short synthesis, an account of the main events which occurred after 17th April 1961. I made it my duty to maintain absolute silence regarding the agreements with the United States and the Council’s plans, thinking it would better serve the cause. That judgment stopped me, until now, from clearing up the situation and offering the guidance, which exile continuously demands. Today it cannot be negated in any way.

a) Two Bitter Years

The last two years, after the defeat on 17 April 1961, have been, in truth, hard and bitter for all Cubans; for the men and women of the sacrificed underground; for the brave mountain
guerrillas, for the proud political prisoners; for the heroic combatants of the Bay of Pigs; for the civilian population of Cuba dominated by terror; for the long-suffering émigrés; for the revolutionary organizations that have seen their fighting units decimated; for the Council and for me[,] [E]ncouraged by faith, I have resisted the onslaught of fierce adversaries without weakness, without responding to straight criticism of those justifiably impatient and poisonous diatribes of gratuitous adversaries, in order to avoid useless controversies.

After the Playa Girón episode - which in due course we will clarify in depth and detail, with reference to people, circumstances, precise dates and relevant details - we have worked with fervor and in silence for a homeland for everyone. To summarize the road after the disaster, we put Cuba above our pain. For this reason, we were able to suppress anger, close the road to resentment, not listen to ungrateful voices of hurt pride and dented dignity. And with a spirit clean of all hostile sentiment, we started the great task of reconstructing the forces of the broken Revolution.

b) Two Important Dates: 20 April and 4 May 1961

On 20 April 1961, the Honorable President Kennedy—who with the exemplary honesty of a head of—government—had taken complete responsibility for the experienced failure, in clear pronouncements that also expressed “his decision not to abandon Cuba,” and warned the Hemisphere that if Latin American countries did not fulfill their duty, the United States would fulfill it with those who joined it, informed by inter-American treaties and agreements. Fourteen days later, on the 4th May, on my return from a trip to Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the Virgin Islands, [that I undertook] at his behest, [to conduct] a painstaking search for survivors, in the company of the doctors [Antonio] Maceo and [Manuel Antonio de “Tony”] Varona, President Kennedy planned the immediate future of Cuba with me in a meeting for this purpose. His offers of cooperation were categorical and his backing absolute and total. Thanks to his personal decision, permanent economic aid to the widows and orphans of the expeditionary forces, was made possible. He also made it possible to provide help for clandestine forces in Cuba, [and] he planned the first recruitment program of Cuban volunteers in different US military units for very brief training and then [proposed] grouping them into one military corps with their natural leaders at an opportune moment, which we would discuss together. In his name, I invited officials from the Cuban Armed Forces (professionals, “rebels,” and of liberation [sic]) to receive specialized courses in different US schools aimed at fighting on Castro’s island, as well as other things that it is not necessary to record at this moment. The road travelled between May and October of 1961 was unforgiving at times. We did not waver in expressing our disagreement with the President’s collaborators about methods and tactics, with a spirit of cooperation, it must be said, always prevailing. On 31 October of that year all the differences were harmonized and agreements were finalized in an “Agreement,” which history will recover one day.

Only one thought gave me strength in the daily toil: the assurance that we had found the right path leading straight to reconquering Independence. It did not matter that adversaries rejected me ["me negaron el pan y la sal"]. The alliance between free Cubans and this nation became crystalized on “the basis of mutual respect” in order to eradicate communism from the homeland of Martí and to reaffirm the pillars of Democracy. [that were] in the throes of perishing on the American Continent.

c) The Activities of the Council

The revolutionary organizations represented on the Council coordinated the actions that needed to be implemented with the clandestine forces of Cuba and the agreed plans were put into action. The presiding organization also had to fight on other fronts. In October we appeared before the Inter-American Press Society to mobilize continental public opinion in favor of Cuba. The backing of the journalists from the continent was unanimous: to denounce Castro’s crimes at the Commission for Human Rights of the Organization of American States [OAS] (October 1961) and to put a stop to the increasing wave of shootings; to oppose, with ample reasons, the relocation of exiled Cubans, who are now, being forcibly dispersed throughout the Union, before the American Senate (6 December 1961); to offer conclusive facts regarding the nature of the established regime in Cuba, its penetration throughout the continent, its links with Soviet Russia and communist China, and the repeated breach of all human rights to the Inter-American Commission for Peace of the Organization of American States (26 December 1961), in charge of harmonizing and supporting Peru and Colombia’s motions. The relationship of interviews with Continental diplomats and politicians seemed to go on forever.

d) The Honorable Dean Rusk

With the actions agreed by the Revolutionary organizations represented on the Council already under way (November and December 1961), we had a long…meeting with the Honorable Secretary of State to hear about the policy that would be advocated at the [OAS] Conference of Foreign Ministers due to take place in Punta del Este, Uruguay. In
that opportunity, I was also the conveyor of a message from the University Student Directorate to the illustrious Secretary of State. After analyzing each nation's position, he put an end to the meeting in the appropriate manner with these words: “I assure you that the San Jose de Costa Rica declaration will not be repeated and I beg you to inform your people that the United States will not permit Communism to continue in Cuba. I will inform the President of your points of view this evening. He will be very pleased to know them. The three of us are in agreement, he, you and I.”

c) Punta del Este (Uruguay)

We set off for Uruguay immediately. The fate of our country was discussed there. We contributed as far as we could and it was possible to unify the American [ie. Western Hemisphere] way of thinking. The Hemisphere was in firm solidarity with the Cuba in combat and exile; the right of individual and collective legitimate defense of American nations in danger was consecrated, as well as other measures which were agreed. It was a brilliant and fruitful conference in terms of results. We returned rejoicing. A long, complicated and difficult chapter of diplomatic negotiations had been concluded in order to begin a new one: military action. Everything pointed to our being at the threshold of great achievements.

f) Richard N. Goodwin and Mac [i.e., Mc]George Bundy

On returning to Miami, after the Conference of Punta del Este closed [on 31 January 1962], we had to leave for Washington in order to make urgent efforts regarding the political prisoners, whose “status” had been unidentified by Fidel Castro, who was already planning the dubious tactic of holding trials. On that occasion Dr. Varona and I went. We had several meetings with important officials at the State Department, and principally with Mr. Richard N. Goodwin, one of the President's closest advisors. With this official, we raised various aspects of the Cuban problem, as well as the political prisoners; but in this case, he evaded the conversation. Instead of answering, he asked. His attitude, in my opinion, was in contrast to the personal assurances given to me by the Honorable President [Kennedy] in the meetings which took place on 4 May, 13 June and were confirmed in writing in a letter to me on 25 September [1961], which put an end to one of the crises I alluded to earlier and to which the “Agreement” of October, which I have referred to, formally put an end to. As Mr Goodwin was dealing with the questions about Cuba very reluctantly, I, there and then, asked for a meeting with President Kennedy.

We returned to Miami, reported to the Council and in the hope that the requested interview would be granted, we left for Washington again. Castro's announcement of the unfair and illegal trial prompted us to do this. Whilst engaging in anxious requests, which I will have to refer to immediately, I reiterated my request for Dr. Varona and myself to have an audience with the President. We were handed over to another person, Mr. Mac George [sic] Bundy. Our conversation was polite but cold. Imprecision, procrastination, vagaries. He did not commit to any opinion. The seriousness of this correct gentleman was only lifted slightly as a result of a certain expression by Dr. Varona, regarding the fate of the prisoners who were to be tried the next day, 29 March [1962]. Tremendous vigil by all those in exile! I remember having declared the following: “Prevented from fulfilling my duties as a lawyer for the men of the Brigade, I send them my most heartfelt regards. My son is amongst them. It is a privilege to suffer and die for the homeland. May God be with them.”

Dr. Varona agreed with me that we should stay in Washington until the end of the trial and that I should try to have a meeting with President Kennedy. He returned to Miami. The efforts I referred to earlier continued. We approached the representative of the Nuncio S.S. in Washington, all the ambassadors, and by telegram, all the governments of the world. We were not asking for clemency. We quoted the stipulations on “prisoners of war” in the Geneva Convention, with the aim of stopping the iniquitous and illegal trial. Cuba was a signatory to the Convention. To our honor and satisfaction, the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic, Jose Bonilla Atles, acted as the lawyer at the Organization of American States for the Cuba or Martí [José Martí]. He worked tirelessly until he managed to get an agreement, with “the inevitable abstention of Mexico and Brazil,” on a declaration in support of the proposal put forth by the Council. The United Nations, as always, was deaf to our appeals. The neutralists in the useless and prejudiced organization have a narrow outlook on human rights when they are violated by a Communist regime.

g) Robert F. Kennedy

During those days, a meeting occurred, which seemed decisive for Cuba's fate, with a person of indisputably good will and essentially executive [power]. I am referring to the Attorney General, the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy. Two journalists, true friends of Cuba, made that meeting possible, Hal Hendrix and Joe Mallin, both editors at the Miami News. I aired two subjects with Mr. Kennedy. The first, because of its urgency, was the freeing of the prisoners, an issue which until then Mr. Goodwin had disrupted or delayed. After listening
to me with undivided attention and giving thought to the arguments, he promised to take charge of solving the matter. He committed himself to it with real devotion. The second regarded the problem of Cuba. I gave him a summary of the whole question and I expressed my worries about the differences I had observed between Mr. Goodwin's vagueness and the assurances of the Honorable President. He answered: “I don't know all the details, but I assure you that the President's policy has not changed.” He gave me a date for a further meeting on Tuesday 10th April [1962] at 4 pm.

h) The Meeting of 10 April

After talking briefly with the Attorney General in his office on the appointed day, he invited me to accompany him to the President’s house. I went, as on previous occasions, with Dr. Ernesto de Aragon. Richard N. Goodwin was there. The meeting with the President lasted one hour exactly. It was satisfactory and enlightening. During the meeting, I outlined Cuba's internal crisis, the hemispheric crisis, the crisis of a lack of trust of those exiled and the troubled position of the Council. It was not a protocol or cold meeting. We had a genuine dialogue in which he assured me emphatically, conclusively and with finality “that it was essentially a military problem of six divisions,” and that the Council had to contribute the largest contingent of fighters possible; that unilateral action should not be adopted, because, in total agreement with my judgment, it would be a very serious error with continental repercussions. He listened to my opinions attentively and repeated his request that the Cubans should continue their training in the military units. When I informed him that the agreed plan was on its way to being a disaster, because of the bureaucratic delays, excessive demands of certain physical conditions, because of the limit on the agreed age and because officers had not been invited, he asked Mr. Goodwin for explanations [line missing—trans.] I answered, I have been asking, nearly daily for the fulfillment of what was agreed.” With little opposition, the Honorable President dictated orders, then and there, for massive recruitment, without as many requirements and with a formal invitation to the Officers. The meeting, obviously, also covered aspects which it is not my place to reveal. He put an end to our conversation with words that I shall never forget: “Your destiny is to suffer. Do not waver. You have my support and I reiterate my pronouncements. Pass on to the Council my most cordial best wishes.” I left the White House certain that the liberation of the homeland with a Cuban presence at the forefront of battle, was getting close.

I went back to Miami. The atmosphere of the exiles was charged. We were attacked “for not declaring war.” The crisis within the Council intensified. Absences were noticed at the session we held for me to inform them of my efforts. The councilors, fully aware of the need for discretion, did not want me to be too explicit. At Dr. Varona's request, it was agreed to approve the plans and I was given a vote of confidence to put them into effect and I was congratulated for the patriotic work I had undertaken. The internal crisis was averted but I lost the effective collaboration of nationally relevant figure at the time I most needed them. Pleas were not worthwhile.

j. General Lansdale

The sugar quota
Trip to Central America

From that moment on, whilst tremendous attack by the exiles in opposition, whilst the revolutionary organizations were carrying out truly brave acts, we prepared a register of possible combatants and without vetoes or exclusions, the lists of officers, within the age limits given. General [Edward] Lansdale came to Miami to discuss certain aspects of the military problem, which had no simple solution and implied inevitable delays.2 Whilst these matters were being fleshed out, the Council defended Cuba’s right to the sugar quota at the House of Representatives (25 May 1962), under the direction of Professor Arturo Manas, who I am grateful to. Afterwards, for international political reasons, I visited the nations of Central America and Panama (7 to 19 June 1962), whose unity of thought and action were due, in part, to the agreements of Punta del Este. The exiles who were there welcomed us affectionately. I met with all the presidents and ministers. President Kennedy’s visit, which had just taken place, was outlined. We found the nations of the Isthmus, united, proud, in solidarity with Cuba, but powerless.

k) Recruitments, Meeting of Ministers

On our return, we had to wait a while longer, which was inevitable. But it was an intense time of meetings with Latin American diplomats. In the meantime [Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev was arming the island of Cuba. The clandestine organizations did a great job of providing intelligence. There were many public opinions, all contradictory, that were made about the missile bases and the presence of Russian troops. On 25 August [1962], at a press conference on the subject, we denounced the arsenal in the Antilles and the invasion of Russian troops. We asked for a naval and air blockade of the island, we alerted all the nations of the continent. At that
moment a reckless action, due to its heroism, was undertaken by the Revolutionary Student Board and the Monte Cristi Association. A month later, after many conversations at the Pentagon, I was told about the massive recruitment program. I opposed some of its aspects. My objections were accepted, and on 25 September the Council made a proclamation urging Cubans of military age "without distinction of age, creed or political alliances, to put aside all the attitudes and motives which separated and divided them and to join, on mass, the ranks of the combatants." On 3 October (with all the factors adjusted in perfect synchronization), the Informal [OAS] Conference of Foreign Ministers took place [in Washington]. The proclamation made was a sign of great future events. The continent was closing ranks. I felt confident, despite criticism of the proclamation, which was described as flimsy and insignificant as was the announcement calling for recruitment. Nonetheless, the offices were filled with volunteers of all ages. Women also responded.

l) A More Important Meeting: Mr. Adan [Adam] Yarmolinsky

Invited by the “Chicago Council,” I went to Chicago in the month of October, to give a talk in commemoration of the Grito de Yara [the start of Cuba’s war of independence in 1868]. An appointment was made there for me to attend a meeting with important people in the city of Miami, on Sunday 14 [October] at 3 in the afternoon. The meeting took place. Mr. Adan [Adam] Yarmolinsky [a senior Pentagon aide to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara] was chairing it, with the assistance of Mr. Robert F. Hurwitch [Hurwitch], an exemplary official [Special Assistant for Cuban Affairs] from the State Department and high-ranking officials from the Pentagon. Dr. Varona, Captain Ernesto Despaigne, and I attended for the Council. The meeting which took place at the Carrillon Hotel that Sunday, lasted exactly four hours. We were asked, with unusual urgency, for a massive incorporation of all Cubans of military age, even those who were arriving every day from Cuba, “that they should join before registering at the Refuge.” All matters related to the Officers (rebels, professionals and liberators) were discussed. The problem arising from the use of airmen and the triple legal situation of the use of medics (refugees, resident and North American citizens) was examined. And the classification of “cadres” and of “civil advisers” according to whether they were professional or rebels. This delegation worked all Sunday night and early Monday morning. Those recruited to Fort Knox were undergoing intense training. The crisis was imminent. We were eight days from 22 October. I was reassured by the approach that it had been the right way ahead. I was tormented by one preoccupation: the situation of the political prisoners, but I worked harder than ever. We discussed the situation with the revolutionary organizations of the Council who alerted, with no indiscretions, their fighting cadres in Cuba. The Economic Corporations worked at a fast pace in the next twelve months to ensure Cuban supplies. They worked extremely discreetly, as the Miami pessimists continued to dole out their unrelenting criticism.

m) 22 October 1962

The 22nd of October arrived. I was informed in good time of the content of the Proclamation that the Honorable President was to make public at six [sic; seven] in the evening. The free world resonated with enthusiasm at President Kennedy's Proclamation. Nations of abstention, neutrality, and indifference aligned themselves with the United States. There were many who mobilized their forces. The Cubans at Fort Knox were on the alert, impatient for action. I made all the necessary arrangements. The Council declared itself to be in permanent session and its members in their designated places. We waited. The 23rd and 24th were days of unbearable tension. At four o’clock in the afternoon of that day of the 24th, aware of the course of events, I was told “that the circumstances varied, but not the aim and that the planned course of action was delayed for a short time.” Khrushchev was negotiating, I warned that delaying tactics were being employed, which favored the Soviet and his Caribbean commissar. The agreed date arrived, the “quarantine,” that is to say the blockade, was lifted. Public spirit fell. This produced a negative reception at Fort Knox. A wave of disaffection started in an impressive way. Mistrust was being reignited in force and defeatism spread. All arguments put forward to halt it were useless.

n) The Return of the Combatants; Orange Bowl

Another intensely dramatic event rekindled the lost confidence. I am referring to the return [in December 1962] of Bay of Pigs combatants, whose fighting spirit could not be broken by two years in prison. Those who did not return, those who succumbed in the battlefield, were present in their absence. The survivors returned with their slogan: that of returning, with decorum, to save Cuba. That moving event was followed by another of great political importance. I am referring to the President Kennedy’s presence at the Orange Bowl proceedings [in Miami on 29 December 1962]. Before those men, punished by lead, he made statements of unequivocal alliance, as he picked up the flag of the Brigade. The leader of Democracy spoke and he spoke as leader. His words were vibrant, strong, decisive, and binding. He reiterated his commitment to Cuba.
before the world. In that way he confirmed what President Villeda Morales had said before, in the City of Miami after having had a meeting with the President in Washington: “Soon, very soon, Cuba will be liberated.”

III
The Current Situation

After that, three more months have transpired with despairingly slow progress. During this time, [in answer to continuous requests] I have received the same assurances given to me beforehand. However, there have been events that obviously contradict them. Such as: 1) the continued change of positions with the corresponding surrender of points of view that the United States had excessively emphasized. I refer to: a) the direct inspection of terrain, put forward as a indomitable question and compromised by the United States after the mediation of U Than [sic; U Thant] and Mikoyen’s [sic; Mikoyan’s] mysterious visit to Cuba; b) the withdrawal of Russian soldiers – not Agricultural technicians whose number exceeds 20,000, as the Cuban underground has informed – to which a specific date was fixed for evacuation, but which was not able to be realized, [even though] the United States [with its] science and patience, should know already that Khrushchev will change his strategy and battle tactics in a continuous way, a thousand times if necessary, in the pursuit of his objectives. For communism, “the word of honor is nothing more than this; a word.” Honor, for them, is a naïve bourgeois prejudice. 2) the inaction that revolutionary organizations have been forced into. These two things persuaded me to put together summary memorandums (14 February and 28 March) for the Office of Coordination established in Miami after 22 October [just] past and that will be made known at a proper time.

a) Commando actions ['Las acciones comando']

Having issued the Memorandums I have referred to (I have not received an answer to the first of these) two commando actions were carried out by groups of Cubans (not North Americans) against Russian vessels (not American) out of the territorial waters of this country. As a consequence of these six things happened at breakneck pace, that I list as follows:

1) The illuminating Russian note of protest that warned the United States that it had violated agreements.
2) The note from the Department of State “condemning Cuban actions that had been carried out,” which contradicts the Joint Resolution of Congress in September 1962. It is significant that the action carried out by the Revolutionary Student Directorate and the Monte Cristi group before 22 October [1962], did not receive the same condemnation.
3) Castro’s attack on a North American vessel. Fidel Castro suspiciously suddenly observes — now! — formal diplomatic courtesies and offers excuses that are accepted. Before the broken agreement that Russia referred to in the note that we have made reference to [in point 1], Fidel Castro shot down [on 27 October 1962] an airplane that the unfortunate [US Major] Rudolph Anderson piloted, without any reprisals and it has tirelessly undertaken piratical actions, of real international delinquency, such as the continued robbery of airplanes, the attacks on North American fishing boats, the kidnapping of ten Cubans that live in a Key, far from the territorial waters of Cuba and the United States, the violation of law adding to his habitual insolence. Of course, he did not give explanations.
4) The categorical order that has been communicated to various compatriots confining them to [Florida’s] Dade County.
5) The embargo on Cuban vessels, two of which belong to the Organizations of the Revolutionary Council, to immobilize them and, finally,
6) The strangest and most disconcerting of all the measures adopted: the warning to England for it to stop or pursue in each case, Cuban combatants that sail in territorial waters of its American possessions. In this way Fidel Castro [page cut off—trans.] Khrushchev’s most sinister designs protected by the most efficient maritime police of the two most democratic powers in the world.

b) Critical analysis of the adopted measures

Wracked by uncertainty, I have thought about three reasons for the adopted measures. They are the following:

1) These measures are justified by the need to mask actions of an immediate warlike character with ones of apparent ostensible friendship. I discarded this, because in this case 240 Cuban patriots who had completed their period of training would have been held back in Fort Jackson. They told me in Washington that, despite my opposition, they would be graduates in a few days [i.e. not retained for immediate action];
2) The agreed measures are perhaps related to the fact that Cuban actions compromise a far-reaching strategy. I discarded this reason as well because, in accordance with what was agreed, I should have been previously informed, a condition that was adhered to by cable on 22 October 1962.
3) The agreed measures are probably due to not wanting to interrupt the prolonged process of evacuation of the Russian technicians (that comprise more than a division of soldiers of a
Soviet army) or the freeing of North American prisoners. This did not satisfy me either, as the argument was contradictory. The reason is evident: On 22 October the Russian soldiers were to be found in Cuba, and North American and Cuban citizens in prison were freed a long time after this.

Faced with all the arguments the force of events leads to this conclusion: the Cuban struggle is in the process of being liquidated by the government [of the United States]. This conclusion appears confirmed, very forcefully confirmed, by the warning that every refugee has received with their monthly subsidy, forcing them to relocate. In its final part, it says: “Each Cuban refugee carries with them [i.e., him/her] a message of the real Cuban spirit, their love of freedom and longing to convert the sadness of leaving their homeland into the inspiration to prepare themselves for a brilliant future in the land of freedom.” This provision that signals a brilliant future to Cubans in a Nation that is not their own, is not autonomous. I want to say that it is prepared by the Office of Coordination that, after 22 October, controls all, absolutely all, activities in relation with Cuba.

c) The trip to Washington

I left for Washington filled with intense anguish. My mood in these moments became known to a journalist friend of mine whom I respect and admire: Howard Handelman, editor of the magazine, “US News and World Report.” “I am going, I said, to request that they revoke the orders issued against the brave expeditionaries and, principally, in search of clearing up grey areas in my thoughts.” In the capital, free of the pressure that the ideas I had come up with had been agitating me over the course of 48 hours in Miami, after a serene analysis, I adopted, in principal, the decision that I am making known today. I made it conditional, however, on the result of my meetings. My frame of mind was permeable to the slightest argument in which they might offer me the minimum sense of security. The future Cuba was in dispute.

d) The Meetings in Washington

The answers that I hoped for to all the questions I raised, very calmly, but with real passion, did not alleviate the doubts that the United States had caused me to have. When I did not manage to get the necessary definitions, even though after 17 April 1961 they had promised to discuss with me before any change of policy they were considering, my doubts were confirmed. All the circumstances that I have made reference to, by themselves constitute a series of rational indications, vehement indications, that lead, in an inevitable way to the following conclusions:

[e]) Conclusions

First: The United States of America has been the victim of a masterful Russian game. With the scarecrow [espantajo] of installing missile bases, that necessarily had to be photographed and quickly accepting to withdraw them, at the first demand, Khrushchev proposed pacts that did not need to be agreed to and achieved his immediate objectives: a) to retain his barracks for attack and subversion in the Caribbean; b) strengthen the military capabilities of Fidel Castro to destroy the first attempt at insurrection; and c) consolidate the Communist Regime in [Latin] America, [through] the first step for peaceful coexistence, the immobilization of the United States and with the United States the rest of the Continent, [which is] as disappointed as the Cuban patriots and as bewildered as them with respect to the future.

Second: With the United States immobilized, Cuba became entrenched in the strange twists and turns of a willing psychological war between the two great powers of the world, [as a result of which] it has become necessary to also immobilize Cuban patriots, in an obscure agreement.

Third: Cuba, heroic and martyred, shattered and hungry, has been used as a bargaining chip, despite the Monroe Doctrine, the “Joint Resolution” of 1898, the Rio de Janeiro [Inter-American] Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the agreements of the Organization of American States, the Punta del Este Resolutions, the sovereign will of this nation expressed in the Resolution of Congress in September 1962 and the repeated offers of cooperation I have received.

Fourth: The Office of Coordination for Cuban Affairs, recently created and with headquarters in Miami, implementing a rapid liquidation of the Cuban process that is reflected, among other things, in the following facts:

1) the speedy relocation, outright dispersal of Cubans
2) the effort to stop at all costs the establishment, although transitory, of revolutionary Cuban bases of operation outside the Union’s territory and its territorial waters
3) the persecution of revolutionaries in the ways I have outlined already, committed now to inquisitive interrogations

IV

General Considerations
These are, in grim reality, the facts. The repeatedly expressed assurances, the constantly renewed promises, have been suddenly broken, without notice – and without signaling new paths. Until today, I was encouraged, not by optimism without any basis, but rather by a rational feeling of security that Cuba would be liberated soon as a result of joint action by Cuban and North American forces with the unlimited support, moral and material, of the majority of the nations in the Hemisphere. But a violent and unexpected shift in the policy of the United States government has taken place – as dangerous and sudden as another previous one of sad recollection, that does not have any other reasonable explanation than the deal that refers to Russia's protest against Cuban action.

It is necessary to understand this fact well: the attack on the Russian vessel was not carried out by North American forces nor in territorial waters of that country. Such a deal should be condemned with total vehemence, not only by the Cubans but by all free men of the Continent. No power can change the fate of our Homeland, because our freedom cannot be an object of negotiation.

Faced with this unexpected situation that destroys the patient work of the two years that I have been overseeing it in a minute, with the Council's total trust in me, I am left with no alternative but to resign the thorniest position that I have held. More so that my conduct can be judged fully throughout this long, interminable process that ends in distressing frustration, I should express the principles here in this instance that, in the midst of many compromises, I have rigidly upheld in the course of these two years.

a) The Alliance for Progress

First: I have maintained and I maintain that the “Latin American experts” do not sense the imminence of disaster for the whole Continent. They guarantee that the Alliance for Progress alone is the panacea for all the social ills of the common homeland. It is certainly a generous and necessary effort, whose success, in my opinion is conditional, on the eradication of the Cuban Communist Regime.

b) Isolation and the Economic Blockade

Second: I have maintained and I maintain that this is has a criminal purpose – [sentence missing—trans.] the economic asphyxiation that is exerted through a total embargo, prolonging “without end” “[sine die]” the martyrdom of a people that has reached intolerable limits of its resistance to provoke an internal rebellion, can not be justified if the moment when it will end is not predetermined. To promote or attempt an insurrectional movement determined by desperation without coordinating it with warlike actions projected from abroad, among a population dominated by terror, will lead: 1) to rewriting the bleak story of Budapest [i.e. the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolt in 1956—ed.]; 2) to creating the myth of the invincibility of Fidel Castro; and 3) to bringing about negotiations for a coexistence that America has just condemned.

c) Feared World War and Permanent Revolution

Third: I have maintained and maintain that Khrushchev will not trigger a world war, due to the presence of North American troops combined with the efforts of Cuban combatants. Geographically, Cuba is outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Khrushchev will not provoke armed conflict. He showed this last 22 October. To the contrary, protected by his policy of threats, his hold over local communists in different parts of the Hemisphere will grow, day by day, and he will continue to extend his frontiers in [Latin] America. Permanent revolution is his objective. Venezuela is already burning thanks to Castro's decision, Colombia is burning thanks to Castro's decision, the convulsion in Argentina is consistent, and Marxist ferment in all other nations is a frightening sign of great cataclysms.

d) Cuba Outside the Regional System

Fourth: I have been opposed and I oppose the idea that the problem of Cuba is separated from the regional system and situated within a global strategy that leads the Comintern of imperial Russia towards achieving its unceasing hegemonic purpose. Cuba is essentially a regional problem. To isolate it from the American [i.e. hemispheric—trans.] community so that eventually, on any day of an uncertain year, Cuba's fate is unilaterally decided, is totally unacceptable for the decency of those of us that are proposing an honorable alliance. This would mean the nation's sovereignty would be devastatingly shipwrecked. I will never accept the idea of receiving an occupied island as a favor with attached conditions.

e) The alliance with the United States

Fifth: I have said and reiterated that the Cuban-North American alliance is justified by reasons that have deep historical roots and brings together the vital, permanent, and reciprocal interests of both peoples perfectly: a) the Independence of Cuba and, b) the security of this nation, aspects that provide the tone and inform the political content of the Joint Resolution of 21 April 1898. “Cuba is and has
the right to be free and independent,” the legislative power of this nation [the United States] said on this historic occasion. By virtue of the “rough riders” under the leadership of “Teddy Roosevelt [“] and the Mambises [the term used for Cubans who fought for independence—trans.] under the orders of Major General Calixto García they fought together in the hills of San Juan and put an end to Spanish power in America. This declaration is continuous. It is valid. Today our country has been converted into a Soviet province and the security of the United States is being threatened by a communist fortress in the Caribbean.

f) Our reiterated standpoints

Sixth: For the reasons outlined above and many others that could be added I have favored the alliance with the United States so that it is understood, with very good reason, that Cuba should be helped by the whole hemisphere. This obligation corresponds equally to all nations in the Continent because the survival of the essential values of man and of western civilization are being contested in these moments in Cuba: God, homeland, and family; as are as a consequence invaluable assets such as: democracy, independence, freedom, justice, and social well-being. The battle that Cuban patriotism is upholding is far more profound that the insurrection of a people against a typical [Latin] American dictatorship. It is a battle against a new phenomenon in America: the installation of a Communist Regime that demands everyone’s assistance to destroy. This is what the unavoidable fulfillment of treaties demands.

f) Interventionism

Seventh: I am opposed to any type of intervention in the internal political affairs of another country when, as occurred in the past, the intervention is undertaken in favor of the intervening power. But in the Cuban crisis a completely reversed situation has arisen. With an extra-continental power having intervened evidently in our Homeland, the Rio de Janeiro Treaty [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance] and other international instruments demand collective hemispheric action to put an end to this intervention. These instruments specifically state that this type of action does not constitute intervention.

f) Holocaust

Eighth: I have said and exhaustively repeated that we aim to raise, through joint effort, a monument to Victory, not an obelisk to martyrdom. As a result, in a constant way, with absolute clarity, I have suggested coexistence once again, the necessity of establishing an alliance on basis of mutual respect for a joint military action. This assumes “coordination of all forces” and “Cuban presence in the direction and execution of the plans that are agreed”. To clarify my thinking: we are asking for coordination, we offer collaboration, but we will not allow Cuba to be excluded from the process. Our proposal was rejected in this opportunity. So we demanded, another time again, that we be given an analogous warlike capability to the one that Fidel Castro receives from the Soviet Union, so as to win a battle alone or succumb to a Holocaust together. The result was as sharp no. They closed all the doors. They have inexplicitly shut off our alliance from 1898.

V Final [Conclusion]

With the principles that have shaped my conduct in this process made clear I should say, so that it is known, not now by the Council, but rather by all compatriots, that after my last conversations in Washington, I can not believe in words that they outline, without defining, confused prospects for an imprecise and far-off liberation, denied by objective facts in the present. Dominated by the specter of uncertainty and the having lost trust in the realization of offered assurances, I cannot continue in the position of chair of the Council.

Cuba, however, cannot be delayed in its struggle. Today it needs, more than ever, all its forces to make the Homeland that its founders wanted a historic reality. The Revolutionary Council – that has offered exceptional work without publicity worthy of everyone’s gratitude and that will be known in good time – should close ranks and confront adversity, as always, with resolve; examine the current reality with calm objectivity; study developing politics in relation to Cuba, Latin America, and the United States and continue the harsh road [ahead]. The sources of Cuban patriotism are inexhaustible, as inexhaustible as its moral reserves. God help everyone on this new journey!

I leave this post with the hope that another Cuban will be appointed who, with the same love for his homeland but with more capacity and more ability than I, can achieve better auspices in the struggle that we are committed to. I leave this post, I repeat, but I do not desert the ranks. I will continue fighting as I have done until today, without measuring the hours, until I destroy Fidel Castro and his dishonorable regime if, by the will of God, something does not happen beforehand to rescue us from all our anguish and suffering.

Miami, Tuesday 9 April 1963

José Miró Cardona
[Source: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by Jorge Mendoza Castro, translated by Anita Harmer and Tanya Harmer.]

Notes

1  The US withheld a formal commitment due to the lack of UN on-site inspection of the missiles’ dismantling and removal, yet most observers—including Khrushchev—viewed JFK’s vow as politically binding, at least on his administration.

2  Ed. note: Gen. Landsdale had been put in charge of the CIA’s “Operation Mongoose” program of covert operations against Cuba in 1961.
Brazil and the Cuban Missile Crisis:
Documents from the Foreign Ministry Archives in Brasilia

Documents obtained, translated, and introduced by James G. Hershberg

The translated Brazilian documents presented here, mostly ciphered telegrams from Rio’s diplomatic outposts in Havana, Washington, and New York from October-November 1962, illuminate the foreign policy of South America’s most populous and, arguably, most politically significant country during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Though often shortchanged (i.e., omitted altogether) in most narratives and the resulting historiography, Brazil actually played a quite active and interesting role in the missile crisis—an extension of its part as the confrontation between Washington and Havana expanded into not only a hemispheric conflict but a cold war flashpoint.

The documents were obtained during a 2000 research visit to the Archives of the Ministry of External Relations in Brasilia and contributed to the author’s 2004 analysis of Brazil and the missile crisis—particularly its quiet mediation effort between Washington and Havana—in the Journal of Cold War Studies, part of an ongoing project on the triangular US-Brazilian-Cuban relationship in the early 1960’s.

First some context. At the time of the crisis, Brazil was being moved to Brasilia but most government business, including the work of Itamaraty, the foreign ministry, had not yet been transferred—for support. Brazilian leaders and diplomats, in turn, saw both danger—not only of an escalating conflict but potential reverberations in domestic politics and relations with Washington—and an opportunity to use its diplomacy to elevate their nation’s standing on the world stage.

The documents below, in addition to relaying reports on developments and conversations in the US and Cuban capitals (and others) and at the United Nations and Organization of American States, offer information on several distinct aspects of Brazilian diplomacy at different locales related to the crisis.

The first relates to the politics at the Organization of American States (OAS), to which the Kennedy Administration turned on 23 October—the day after JFK announced the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba—to seek support for the blockade (“quarantine”) of the island to bar the entry of additional “offensive” weapons. Carefully hedging its bets, Brazil ended up voting for the “quarantine” but refused to endorse the use of force for any other objectives.

A second theme of many reports, especially but not only from Brazil’s ambassador to the United Nations, concerns Brazil’s promotion of a scheme to “denuclearize” Latin America (and possibly Africa) as a means to defuse the crisis over nuclear missiles in Cuba. As the documents show, at various moments Brazilian diplomats obtained encouraging hints from American and Soviet (and even Polish) officials that such a plan would be acceptable. Indeed, after Brazil advanced the idea at the UN at a time when Kennedy and his advisors were desperately seeking a way to get the Soviet missile out of Cuba without risking World War III, the denuclearization proposal received some favorable comment at the Excomm. After several weeks of diplomatic discussions, however, the plan ran into trouble: the Cubans insisted that any denuclearization plan also apply to US bases in Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone, and be linked to a demand for the evacuation of foreign military bases in the hemisphere, including Guantanamo, as Castro had demanded as one of his...
“five points” on 28 October. All this, of course, Washington rejected; and with Cuba so strongly opposed, Moscow also backed off; and by late November the plan had foundered, to Brazil’s considerable disappointment and chagrin. Yet it was not a total failure, as it foreshadowed the adoption, within five years, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was signed in Mexico City in 1967 (going into effect the following year) and prohibited nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(In another ultimately futile initiative at the UN, Brazil also promoted the notion for ambassadors from neutral countries to inspect the dismantling and removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in an attempt to sidestep Fidel Castro’s objections to inspection; Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant liked the idea, but failed to convince Havana to go along.)

Perhaps the most mysterious Brazilian initiative during the crisis, however, concerned its sending of an emissary to Havana to meet with Fidel Castro just after the crisis climaxed, in an apparent “mediation” attempt (which the author described in depth in the Journal of Cold War Studies piece mentioned above). In fact, Brazil had periodically sought to mediate between Washington and Cuba’s revolutionary leadership since early 1960—both through its ambassador in Havana and various special missions—but it was during the missile crisis that this effort reached its climax. As reflected in the Chilean documents on this episode (see sidebar), many outside observers who noticed the sudden trip to Cuba by Goulart’s military aide, Gen. Albino Silva, presumed it was a purely Brazilian initiative, most likely in a misguided, vain, and even pretentious gesture to try to claim its relevance to the event that had seized the globe’s attention. What no one realized, however, was that in fact the trip had been inspired by a secret US appeal to Brazil on the night of 27 October to convey directly to Fidel Castro—in its own, not Washington’s name, and by a courier, without using diplomatic cables (which could be intercepted)—a potential deal: if the Cubans evicted the Soviet missiles (and broke off the wider military relationship with Moscow), they would be welcomed back into the hemispheric system, even by the (North) Americans. By the time Gen. Albino Silva made it to Havana, of course, Khrushchev had already agreed to remove the missiles, and exactly what transpired between him and Castro (who was unaware of any US inspiration for the Brazilian’s visit), and the consequences, if any, remain somewhat mysterious. The Cubans have not released any records on the visit, and the Brazilian’s own 14-page record has not been found. Yet, the Brazilian Embassy in Havana cabled a summary of the talk with Castro on 29 October, and it is included here.

The bulk of the cables reproduced here are reports from Brazil’s ambassadors in Washington, Roberto Campos, and in Havana, Luis Bastian Pinto, who convey both their contacts with host government official and other diplomatic colleagues, and their own interpretation of events. Both enjoyed fairly high-level access, which makes their cables particularly valuable; Campos had conversations with Dean Rusk and President Kennedy himself; while Pinto, during the crisis and immediately afterwards, had regular encounters with Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, relayed an important talk with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos on 27 October, amid fears of an imminent US invasion; and facilitated the visit of Gen. Albino Silva. The presence of a Brazilian embassy in Havana, contrary to US wishes, permitted an informed observer behind the “sugar cane curtain” to maintain ongoing contacts with not only Cuban government officials but also an eclectic group of diplomatic colleagues; Bastian Pinto worked closely with the Yugoslav ambassador during the crisis, and also—as the cables reveal—used contacts with communist diplomats to try to pierce the secrecy surrounding Anastas Mikoyan’s November conversations with his Cuban hosts. In addition to spot cables, several longer analyses of the impact of the crisis are also included.

It is also important to note what is missing from these documents. For one thing, as diplomatic cables, they do not discuss directly the Brazilian domestic political component of the missile crisis, which was very critical. US officials at many points suspected domestic political motives for Goulart’s actions (i.e., a desire not to alienate Cuban supporters and sympathizers on the Brazilian left). Washington also closely (and happily) monitored what was widely believed to be a serious blow to Cuba’s image in Brazil sustained by the revelation that it had permitted the Soviets to station nuclear weapons on the island. In addition, as foreign ministry documents, they do not reveal much about decision-making processes or international contacts in other parts of the Brazilian Government, most importantly the president or prime minister’s office, although “Jango” Goulart in some cases directly communicated with his ambassadors in Havana, Washington, and New York during the crisis, as the documents do reflect. Finally, even within the foreign ministry materials, while I had considerable success obtaining cable traffic between Itamaraty and various Brazilian diplomatic missions, I was generally unable (with a few exceptions) to find the personal records of the foreign minister himself (i.e., contacts with other senior officials or with foreign counterparts or ambassadors) or the records of diplomatic contacts in Brazil itself—hence their absence from this collection.

It’s not clear whether additional Brazilian sources have subsequently become available (and there have been some disturbing reports of access to the Brazilian foreign ministry Archives shrinking since I visited in 2000), but it is clear that
the Brazilian Archives—and those of other Latin American
countries often marginalized in the historiography of the mis-
side crisis (which focuses on US and Soviet actions) and even
the now half-century-long US-Cuban confrontation—can
greatly enrich the international history of both stories, and of
the cold war as a whole.

Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600. (24h)—SITUAÇÃO
POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962///,” Ministry of External
Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese
by James G. Hershberg.

Document No. 2

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana, 11:30 p.m.,
Tuesday, 2 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
11 817

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/2/3/X/62

SECRET
DAC/DOr/600.(24h)

Internal political situation of Cuba. Russian armament and
military personnel.

323 – TUESDAY – 23hs30 – Supplementary to my secret
ofício nº 239. Until now there is the following improved
information in respect to the military situation in Cuba: 1) in
the last two months there have arrived a great number
of Czechoslovak and Russian anti-aircraft batteries already
known here. Personally, I have seen on the quay of Havana
roads, there are some already disembarked, of the models used
here for transport of these armaments; 2) convoys of tanks
and some launchers against torpedoes have been sighted in
the early morning on the roads near the port of Mariel; 3) the
latest news is up to that radar installations and electronic
equipment are arriving, having, however, only speculation of
what is its exact application; 4) there is no information about
rockets of any type; 5) various news about the arrival and
movement of paths of concrete [caminhões de concreto], that
there appear to be significant application of known Cuban
program of underground installations and anti-aircraft ware-
houses; 6) all indicates that the number of Russian military
personnel recently disembarked already quite exceeds the total
of four thousand and hundreds admitted by North-American
sources. The true military technicians are, however, in a very
limited number, The overwhelming majority are of an age
little greater than 20 years and, according to agreement of all of the observers, do not constitute troops in the classical sense of the word and, yes, young military personnel that have as their charge the operations of disembarkation, transport and installation of electronic equipment and of radar. Beyond the experts of the systems of communications, they have, also, chauffeurs, builders, etc.; 7) the Russian military personnel are seen in encampments of canvas in areas situated around Havana, Trinidad, Caibarien, and Banes. Before they are installed, the local residents have been evacuated. Arms have not been seen in the encampments. All wear ordinary sports clothes. This afternoon, I was personally this afternoon in two sites where some hundreds of them are camped. There is no doubt that they exist and that their physical type is unequivocally Russian. (I retransmit this telegram to Ambassador Luiz Leivas Bastian Pinto, in Washington).

José Maria Diniz Ruiz de Gamboa

[Source: ANEXO Secreto—600. (24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962///, Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 3

Telegram from Brazilian Delegation at the 17th Session of the UN General Assembly (Afonso Arinos), New York, 9:15 p.m., Sunday, 7 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
12 022

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK ON/7/8/X/62

SECRET
DEA/DNU/DAC/DOt/600.(24h)

Meeting of Chancellors. Interview with the Polish Chancellor.
ARCHIVES, BRASILIA, BRAZIL. TRANSLATED FROM PORTUGUESE BY JAMES G. HERSHBERG.

Document No. 4

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (de Gamboa), 4:45 p.m., Monday, 8 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS


330 – MONDAY – 16hrs45 – Supplementary to my telegram no 327. The speech of Cuban President Dorticós, in the UN, was extremely ponderous and even conservative, by Cuban standards. He alluded at length to the North-American threats against this country, evidencing therefore, one more time, the “complex of invasion” that has motivated in large measures the comportment of the revolutionary government in international politics. Enlarging the tones of the Cuban communication of the 30th [of September], Dorticós declared that his Government is ready to negotiate its differences with the United States and to challenge that country to introduce an identical proposition. He affirmed, moreover, that Cuba desires a “policy of peace and of coexistence” within an “absolute respect to the principle of non-intervention.”

JOSÉ MARIA DINIZ LUIZ DE GAMBOA


Stars 💫

Document No. 5

Telegram from Brazilian Delegation at the 17th UN General Assembly, New York, 7:45 p.m., Monday, 8 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 12.597 FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK ON/6/8/X/62 SECRET-URGENT DNU/DAC/600.(24h)

Informal Meeting of Chancellors. Question of Cuba in Council of OAS.

BRAZIL WAS IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE REST OF THE NATIONS OF AMERICA IN COMMON EFFORTS AGAINST IDEOLOGICAL INFILTRATION AND REVOLUTIONARY SUBVERSION OF COMMUNISM. THAT THIS LINE IS MAINTAINED, SINCE WE ARE ABLE TO RESOLVE OUR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY IN A DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT. THIS REMARK OF SHARP FORM WAS HEARD WITHOUT COMMENTARIES. THAT BRAZIL ALSO DEFENDED, I REPEAT DEFENDED, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION AND OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THEREFORE, [WOULD] NOT HAMPER WITH AGGRESSIVE SYSTEM AGAINST CUBA BECAUSE OF THE REGIME [ALÍ] IN FORCE. THAT SUCH A PRINCIPLE WAS NOT OUR THEORETICAL POSITION BUT A UNIQUE FORM THAT WE CONCEIVE TO DEFEND THE PEACE. HE SAID THAT BRAZIL WITHOUT BEING A MILITARY POWER, WAS, HOWEVER, A COUNTRY WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN DEFENSE OF WORLD PEACE AND THAT SUCH DEFENSE DEPENDS ON THE RESPECT TO THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLES, SINCE IN A NUCLEAR ERA EITHER THIS WILL FOLLOW OR DISASTER WILL COME FOR ALL. THE PRESIDENT SAID THEN THAT HE UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES WITH OUR POSITION AND ASSURED THAT CUBA NEVER WILL CARRY OUT ANY ACTS OR ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE BRAZILIAN ORGANIZATION THAT RESPECTS THE FORM OF OUR WAY OF LIFE [ESCOLHIDA PARA VIVER]. HE REITERATED THE DESIRE OF CUBA TO RESOLVE PEACEFULLY ALL OF ITS PROBLEMS, INCLUDING WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CITED HERE THE CASE OF GUANTANAMO. HE SEEMED TO ME SERIOUSLY PREOCCUPIED AND TENDING TO NEGOTIATIONS. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TRY OUT [words undecipherable] SAID WITH A CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER, [AJUTANDO] THAT HE HAS BEEN ALWAYS WORKING FOR PEACE, THAT HE HEARD FROM SECRETARY RUSK THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ATTACK CUBA EXCEPT FOR IN EXTREME CASES, THAT HE QUOTED. THE PRESIDENT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND RETORTED THAT HIS VIEW THAT THE RISK CONTINUES SINCE THIS COUNTRY HAS RESERVED THE RIGHT IN CERTAIN CASES OF INTERVENTION AND CONSIDERING THAT SUCH CASES WERE ABLE TO BE MANUFACTURED [FORJADOS]. HE ENDED SENDING WARM COMPLIMENTS TO PRESIDENT JOÃO GOULART. IN WHOSE NAME I RESPONDED.

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELLO-FRANCO


Document No. 6

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m., Monday, 22 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 12619

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON/22/23/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT DAC/DAS/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

770 – MONDAY – 19hs00 – Since yesterday, Sunday [21 October], [the mood has been] large and expectant in Washington, provoked by the sudden return to the capital of President Kennedy, who was on the electoral campaign, under the allegation that he had the flu; the return of President Kennedy coincided with the immediate meeting in Washington of the Vice-President [Lyndon B. Johnson], who was in Hawaii, of Adlai Stevenson and the Parliamentary [Congressional] leaders such as [Everett] Dirksen, [Leslie C.] Arends, [Charles A.] Halleck, [Bourke B.] Hinckenlooper and [J. William] Fulbright, the head [chair] of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate. I observed also that since yesterday there have been frequent meetings and consultations between the principal members and organs of the government, especially of the Department of State and the Pentagon. Until this moment nothing has transpired, but all leads to the [belief] that an elaborate decision of great significance
is in progress. It is speculated that this decision may refer to Berlin or to Cuba or to the situation of the conflict between India and China. The facts however appear, to indicate that it probably deals with Cuba; the aircraft carrier “Enterprise” was launched yesterday from the coast of Puerto Rico, sailing toward the south; one finds in the area of the Caribbean 20,000 men, 40 ships and 6,000 American naval riflemen in readiness; the Navy cancelled, suddenly, maneuvers that were planned, without much explication; the group of Cuban exiles, known as “Alpha 66,” shows itself each time more aggressive, appears disposed to attack English [British] ships in the Caribbean, already having undertaken military actions against the coasts of Cuba. I continue to think on the hypothesis of [word cut off] have verified some of the predicted cases of President Kennedy, which justify drastic actions on the part of the United States of America, such as the supply of offensive arms to Cuba or exportation of military equipment of Cuba for some countries of the Caribbean. The Council of International Security [National Security Council] met today at 1500hs with the President, who convened the Cabinet at 1600hs today. It is expected that Senator Fulbright will make a declaration this afternoon and the president himself will speak to the nation this evening at 19hs00, speculating about the possibility that he will announce the initiation of a blockade of Cuba.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: MD—Washington—Telgr.-Cartas—Receb.-Exped.—1962 (7 á XII), (Cx 324), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 7

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the Annual Conference of CIES, Celso Furtado), Mexico City, 9 p.m., Monday, 22 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12.610

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF CIES – MEXICO ON/22/23/X/62

SECRET—URGENT
DAC/DAS/DCET/DEA/600.(24h)

Return to Washington of the North-American Secretary of Treasury. Question of Cuba.

19 – MONDAY – 2100hs – In a conversation with him which I had today, the secretary of the treasury [C. Douglas Dillon] of the United States declared to me that he would return tomorrow for Washington, in view of the situation described in the speech of President Kennedy, relative to Cuba. As I pondered to him the repercussions that his departure can have on the Conference and made to him an appeal to remain here, at least until the representatives of Latin America have made their speeches, Secretary Dillon literally lost control, declaring, visibly upset, that the situation in Cuba was of such gravity that he could not say if there will be or not a world nuclear war by the weekend.

CELSO FURTADO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600. (24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 8

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the Annual Conference of CIES, (Celso Furtado), Mexico City, 11:30 p.m., Monday, 22 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12611

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF CIES – MEXICO ON/22/23/X/62

SECRET—URGENT
DAC/DAS/DOt/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

20 – MONDAY – 2330hs – Supplementary to my telegram no 19. In the conversation with [US Treasury Secretary C.
Douglas] Dillon, I recall the impression that the American government considers the speech of Kennedy as an ultimatum to the USSR on the Cuban question.

CELSO FURTADO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 9

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1 a.m., Tuesday, 23 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
12602

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
ON/22/22/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL—URGENT
DAS/DAC/DOt/DEA//600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. Declaration of President Kennedy.

774 – TUESDAY – 0100hs – Adding to my telegram 773 and referencing the text of the speech of President Kennedy, already delivered by Ambassador [Lincoln] Gordon to the President of the Republic. I have been informed, after a meeting at the Department of State, that [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk justifies as follows the severity of the American reaction to the installation of remote-controlled missiles of medium and intermediate range, detected by aerial photography, only on the 14th [of October]: 1) Cuba and the USSR were warned by the United States that it would not tolerate offensive installations: North American inaction would undermine the credibility of the Western system of defense; 2) the remote-controlled missiles in Cuba are of the type never supplied not even to the satellite members of the Warsaw Pact, indicating a visible intention to intimidate Latin America, putting, in the first place, all the Caribbean and the north of South America, reaching Lima, the Northeast of Brazil, Columbia and Venezuela under nuclear sight. Beyond this, the internal political press blocks Kennedy from any accommodating attitude. The plane of action is as follows: 1) to obtain the endorsement of the OAS on the base of article six of the Treaty of Rio for a naval quarantine and interception of ships of any nationality that carries offensive materials, with the hope not to permit the arrival of new offensive remote-controlled missiles, but, also, of nuclear warheads [cargas] for those already installed, not knowing, until this moment, if the respective missiles [ogivas] have already arrived in Cuba; 2) the resolution approved by the OAS, the Soviet government will be notified and be given several hours’ time to return its ships to Russian ports, avoiding North American naval action; 3) the blockade will be suspended when the UN observers visit Cuba and monitor the dismantling of the offensive installations; 4) how many of the nuclear missiles [porventura] already arrived in Cuba, it is not specified which means of eliminating them, constituting a subsequent problem of the United States that, probably, must be resolved by an ultimatum to Cuba to destroy or return the missiles. The Council of the OAS will convene tomorrow, the 23rd, at nine o’clock in the morning and transforming in[to] a provisional meeting of consultation, the United States is hoping, also tomorrow, for approval of the resolution the text already transmitted to Ambassador Penna Marinho, authorizing individual and collective action, including the use of armed forces[,] for blocking the arrival of offensive armament or installation of missiles. I call attention to the language used in paragraph two of the resolution giving a blank check [carta branca] not only for the blockade but for any other military action, in the individual judgment of the country that adopts it, agreeing that we are alerted by not having specified the measures. Simultaneously, the United States convened the UN Security Council to pass a resolution, calling on the Soviet Union to cease its offensive shipments for Cuba and declaring that the blockade will cease when UN observers, admitted onto Cuban territory, verify the dismantling of the offensive remote-controlled missiles. In case of a probable veto in the Security Council the matter will be raised to the General Assembly. The situation is extremely dangerous, the State Department admitting of the hypothesis of nuclear war, with which it anticipates that one of the following hypotheses will prevail: A) Russian retreat, choosing the return of its ships; B) American interception without a Russian nuclear response; C) increasing the Russian pressure in other areas, without nuclear conflict.
Document No. 10

Telegram from Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Brazilian Delegation at the OAS, Washington, Tuesday, 23 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TO THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES -- WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
On 23 of October of 1962
SSE/DEA/DAS/DAC/DAM/DOR/600.(24h)

Telegram No. ........ to send
Index: Question of Cuba in Council of OAS.

- 221 -

SUPPLEMENTARY TO MY TELEGRAM N° 220 COMPLEMENTING THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT I TRANSMITTED IN THE MORNING, YOUR EXCELLENCY IS AUTHORIZED TO VOTE, IN CASE OUR SUGGESTIONS IN THE FORM OF AN AMENDMENT ARE NOT ACCEPTED, FOR THE PART OF THE NORTH-AMERICAN RESOLUTION THAT PRESCRIBES THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THE INSPECTION OF SHIPS THAT DEMAND PORTS IN CUBA. THIS ATTITUDE IS JUSTIFIED AND CONSISTENT WITH THE VOTE THAT WE CAST IN PUNTA DEL ESTE ON THE PART OF RESOLUTION N° 8 THAT DETERMINED THE EMBARGO OF COMMERCE OF ARMS AND WARLIKE MATERIAL FOR CUBA, IN THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE COUNCIL DECIDING FOR AN IMMEDIATE VOTE OF PARAGRAPH 2° OF THE NORTH AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, IN CASE THE USE OF ARMED FORCE IS FORECAST, YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL DECLARE THAT BRAZIL WILL BE ABLE TO DETERMINE ITS POSITION AFTER AN INVESTIGATION ON THE PART OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, IN ORDER TO PROVE THE ACCUSATIONS FORMULATED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AGAINST THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL ADD THAT AS I DECLARED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY, THE BASES FOR LAUNCHING REMOTE-CONTROLLED MISSILES ARE STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION, THERE SHOULD NOT BE AN IMMEDIATE RISK FOR THE SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE IN THE TIME THAT SHOULD ELAPSE NECESSARILY BETWEEN TO TAKE A FINAL DELIBERATION ON THE PROBLEM AND THE INVITATION OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS. IF IT IS STILL LIKE THIS YOUR EXCELLENCY CALLED TO VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE CURRENT TERMS, YOU SHOULD DECLARE THAT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR SOLIDARITY WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE HEMISPHERE AND WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE FUTURE POSITIONS THAT WE WILL ADOPT IN LIGHT OF THE MAIN EXPLANATIONS REGARDING THE SITUATION, WE ARE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN VOTING FOR WE DO NOT HAVE, IN OUR OPINION, THE COMPLETED PROCESS NECESSARY FOR TAKING SUCH GRAVE DECISIONS.

EXTERIORES


Document No. 11

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1 p.m., Tuesday, 23 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
12 633
FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
Question of Cuba. Denuclearization of Latin America.

777 – TUESDAY – 1900hs – [Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American Affairs Edwin] Martin addressed me with appeal to check the possibility of voting for a unanimous resolution alleging that Mexico [and] Chile have joined. In the company of Ambassador Penna Marinho I addressed the State Department proposing that we accept dismembering [aceitassem desmembrar] two distinct paragraphs the actual paragraph two for it to be unanimous to accept the blockade becoming only subject to the prior proof by UN observers of the character of the offensive arms already installed in Cuba by further measures intended to stop their nuclear activation. Ambassador Penna Marinho and I argued that this separation is harmless since the current draft was so full that to justify actions such as bombardment or invasion measures of such gravity that should not be taken before Cuba and the Soviet Union, under international pressure, have had an opportunity to interrupt the installation of remote-controlled missiles. Martin responded 1) That there is no time for further negotiations with a view to the unanimity of the text since it is necessary to have a solution even today preferably, before 16 hours [4 p.m.] when the UN Security Council will meet; 2) That they are not able to predict the rapid evolution of events which the necessary measures [quais as medidas necessárias] the North American government does not desire to be dependent on the UN and the OAS making new decisions if one admits various hypotheses as voluntary decisions of the Russians or Cubans to suspend the assembly of the remote-controlled rockets[,] pressure of the mode of the blockade to provoke an insurrection in Cuba[,] limited bombardments specifically on rocket bases[,] and invasion. Contrary to what seemed prior to yesterday I have the impression that the American government foresees the possibility to have to undertake military action perhaps through non-nuclear very limited bombardment if it is proven that Cuba already possesses nuclear missiles and if these are not dismantled or returned to the Soviet Union; 3) That the Russians and Cubans have not since yesterday denied the offensive character of the equipment for which exists full confirmation from aerial photographic information; 4) That the American government gave instructions to its armed forces for the application of the blockade to make it possible to avoid bloodshed, [and] should in case of necessity shoot against the rudder of the ships that try to force the blockade; methods of intercepting aerial transports were also being studied, without revealing details. The OAS Council now starts the session headed to approve the North-American draft resolution. Ambassador Penna Marinho will vote [votará] in favor of the blockade, abstaining from vot-
ing on the second part of the second paragraph, giving the explanation of the vote and will vote in favor of the body of the resolution. The Secretary Martin put forward that, soon, there will be fully disseminated, to convince Latin American public opinion of the gravity of the threat, photographs of the remote-controlled missiles in Cuba.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: MD—Washington—Telgr.-Cartas—Receb.-Exped.—1962 (7 á XII), (Cx 324), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 13

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 5 p.m., Wednesday, 24 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED
12.698

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

ON/24/24/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT

DAS/DAC/DOr/DNU/DEA/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

781 – WEDNESDAY – 1700hs –Disconnected rumors continue about the possible Russian reaction. As for the negative aspects aggravating the tension, one can cite the refusal of Fidel Castro to accept inspection and the declaration of [Soviet Ambassador Valerian] Zorin in the Security Council that not one nation that is respected would tolerate interference with its ships. The journalistic speculation is divided into three courses: (A) that the Russian navies have received orders to continue on route, creating naval incidents with the Americans; (B) that the navies have been held on the high sea, awaiting the protection of the Soviet fleet; (C) that they are making preparations for an invasion of Cuba. There is not, however, any authorized indication of the Soviet reaction to the quarantine that is initiated today, at the 10 hours, except the suggestion of Khrushchev, in his letter to Bertrand Russell, that the Soviet Union will not take hurried measures and would favor a summit meeting. There is an urgent necessity for creative formulas that, avoiding humiliation for both sides, reduces the tension. I return, for this reason, to suggest the possibility that the Latin Americans and the Africans present immediately in the UN, where Venezuela, Chile, the UAR [Egypt] and Ghana are seated on the Security Council, a proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America and Africa under UN inspection. In case the question by virtue of a veto in the [S]ecurity Council, it can pass to the General Assembly, where Brazil itself could lead [capitanear] the pro-denuclearization movement, certainly all of Latin America and the neutral world would combine, with perhaps the exception of the UAR, given the nuclear program of Nasser. In this hypothesis, the naval inspection would pass from American hands to an international force and maybe, still later [it may be] possible to persuade Fidel Castro to accept the inspection on Cuban territory. A subsidiary hypothesis would be the denuclearization as well of the Middle East, that taking in Israel and … the abandonment of NATO’s nuclear installations in Turkey, today already considered obsolete. These measurements represent a smaller price to pay for world peace than concessions in Berlin, where the allied position is irreducible, and in Formosa, where it can become more difficult, [in view of--dada] the Chinese aggressiveness in relation to India.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: MD—Washington—Telgr.-Cartas—Receb.-Exped.—1962 (7 á XII), (Cx 324), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 14

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 5:15 p.m., Wednesday, 24 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED
12695

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
ON/24/24/X/62
CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT
DAS/C/430. (22)(42)
Postponement of visit of President Kennedy's visit to Brazil.


ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: MD—Washington—Telgr.-Cartas—Receb.-Exped.—1962 (7 á XII), (Cx 324), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 15
Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5 p.m., Wednesday, 24 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
13050
FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/24/25/X/62
CONFIDENTIAL URGENT
DEA/DNU/DAM/DAC/D0z/600.(24h) 964.

Question of Cuba. Lack of communications and of food. Retention of European navies for eventual departure of families of diplomats.

342 – WEDNESDAY – 1700hs – With the interruption of all routes of aviation for Cuba we find ourselves, now, totally isolated. The supply of foodstuffs and other articles for members of this Embassy and for the asylum-seekers will become a grave problem within a few days. It is possible, also, that at any moment telegram and telephone communications may be cut as has already happened here several times, including recently, during the attack on Havana, last August. The Western diplomats are very worried, including with the problem of eventual evacuation of their families; some are intending to hold back, in their efforts for this end, two European navies that one encounters here.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “MDB—Telegramas Recebidas—Havana—1962/1964.” (Cx 229), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 16
Telegram from Brazilian Delegation to the OAS, Washington, 9:30 p.m., Wednesday, 24 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
12729
FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES -- WASHINGTON
ON/24/24/X/62
CONFIDENTIAL
DEA/DNU/DAM/DAC/D0z/600.(24h) 964.

Question of Cuba in Council of OAS.

507 – WEDNESDAY – 2130hs – The Council met today, again, in ordinary session, to consider the matter to which was referred in my telegrams 488 and 496. The Council persisted, by decision of the president, to take as the basis of its decisions the press communication of the Informal Meeting [of Foreign Ministers in early October], I made a long declaration protesting against the criteria adopted and whose text was sent
by CT [carta telegrama]. Expressing my opinion afterward, about the merit of the motion presented by the American delegation, I said that I was unable to approve it in first place for referring to the “press communication,” a document of which we have not recognized the status as a final act or the basis of deliberation of the Council, and in the second place, for doubts regarding the possibility that the Consultative Commission of Security, still without statutes, can have other functions besides those clearly prescribed in the second Resolution of Punta del Este. At the proposal of Venezuela a modification was made, withdrawing the expression “press communication.” But, even so, I abstained. Accompanying me in abstention were Mexico and Chile that supported me fully and still without instructions Uruguay and Ecuador. With this position I wanted also, to demonstrate that our solidarity is not rhetorical in that it is substantive, fundamental, but we guard our full freedom of action except that which we consider adjective and operational.

ILMAR PENNA MARINHO


Document No. 17

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 12:45 p.m., Thursday, 25 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12 761

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/25/25/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT

DEA/DNU/DAC/DAM/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. Declaration of Minister of External Relations.

345 – THURSDAY – 12hs45 – I have just been with the Minister of External Relations [Raul Roa] who requested me to assure Your Excellency of the total falsity of the accusation that, in Cuba, there exists any offensive armament and that Cuba solely desires effective guarantees in respect to its integrity and sovereignty and, in this case, is ready even to dissolve its Army. He appeared to be relatively cheerful with the latest news originating from the UN.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO


Document No. 18

Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, Thurs. eve., 25 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO THE EMBASSY OF BRAZIL IN

FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS/Dor/DAC/DNU/DEA/600.(24h)

On 25 October 1962

Telegram No. …. To send

Index: Question of Cuba.

About the note of the Soviet government concerning the Cuban situation, [Brazilian] Ambassador [in Moscow] Vasco Leitão da Cunha has the following commentaries: 1) it seems to me less firm than expected and certainly less firm than the pronouncement of President Kennedy; 2) he feels that the Soviets fear war more than the North-Americans; 3) at no point does the Soviet government specifically refute the North-American affirmation that it is sending an amount of offensive armament with Cuba, limiting itself to reiterating that the Cuban-Soviet accord of 3 September for defensive military help to Cuba continues in force; 4) it does not say explicitly what this Government will do when the Soviet boats on route to Cuba are searched, limiting itself to the
generic affirmation that such measures can have catastrophic effects for all of humanity; 5) before the extremely hard tone of the North-American note, the Government looked to [associate] itself, with evidently propagandistic proposals, in legal clashes [embates jurícos], such as the illegality of the blockade and the alleged violation of the UN Charter; 6) the presence of warlike offensive material in Cuba has an objective more political than military, to dramatize in the extreme the question of military bases on foreign territory, a question that until the present moment has not been raised with due account for vast segments of world opinion; 7) at no moment does the Soviet note establish a counterpart to the declaration of Kennedy in the sense that the attack of the United States against Cuba will be considered an attack of the United States against the USSR. Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha informs that even if diplomats accredited here manifest apprehension on the measures announced yesterday by this government, it is making difficult a retreat for considerations of international prestige and national pride. Others yes, manifest apprehension before the fact of that about two tens of Soviet ships if find the way to Cuba. The decisive test of intentions of this Government will be given at the time of the review of the ships by the North-American war vessels, in order to put in practice the points announced by Kennedy.

I request to give knowledge of this telegram to Ambassador Afonso Arinos.

EXTERIORES

[handwritten approvals indicate it was sent on the evening of 25 October 1962, after 9 p.m.]

[Source: MD—Washington—Telgr.—Cartas—Recib.—Exped.—1962 (7 á XII), (Cx 324), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 19

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), Noon, Friday, 26 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12.830

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON/26/26/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL—URGENT

DAS/DAC/DEA/DNU/DOr/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

OF PRESENT OFFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS – ADDING THAT THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES ARE READY TO PREPARING FOR WHATEVER EVENTUALITY; 2) PROPOSE TO THE OAS A DRAFT RESOLUTION [IN WHICH] THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT INSISTED INTRANSIGENTLY ON PRIOR AND IMMEDIATE ENDORSEMENT OF ACTIONS CAPABLE TO REALIZE ITS TWO OBJECTIVES; 3) [ON TUESDAY], CONFORMING TO MY TELEGRAM 777 EDWIN MARTIN INDICATED TO ME, WITHOUT A SHADOW OF A DOUBT, THAT THERE HAS BEEN [QUE HAVIA], INCLUDING, THE IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT ACTION AGAINST CUBAN TERRITORY; 4) IN THE LETTER THAT YESTERDAY HE DIRECTED TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PRESIDENT KENNEDY INDICATED POSITIVELY THAT THERE WAS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR THE SUPENSION OF THE MILITARY MEASURES IN PROGRESS AND IN THE FUTURE:[] THE PROMPT REMOVAL OF THE OFFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA; 5) YESTERDAY ALSO, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO Evade FROM THE DIRECT QUESTION OF [ADLAI] STEVENSON, [VALERIAN] ZORIN PRACTICALLY ADMITTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SUPPLIED AND IS INSTALLING OFFENSIVE ARMAMENT IN CUBA; 6) IN THE LAST TWO DAYS, SOME PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS, AFTER CONFERENCES WITH KENNEDY, HAVE DECLARED THAT IF THE INSTALLATIONS WERE NOT DISMANTLED SOON THE UNITED STATES HAS TO REMOVE THEM; 7) THE SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE, [ARTHUR] SYLVESTER, DECLARED THAT, ACCORDING TO AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY OF 17 HOURS INDICATED CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE INSTALLATION OF REMOTE-CONTROLLED MISSILES CONTINUED AT THE SAME PACE; 8) UNIDENTIFIED VOICES OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE INSINUATED CLEAR DEEDS, IN THE PRESS THAT IT WILL HAVE TO DESTROY THESE INSTALLATIONS, IN CASE THEY ARE NOT REMOVED BY THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS THEMSELVES ALREADY, THAT THE SAC [STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND] AERIAL BASES, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GREAT PART OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, WILL BE EASILY VULNERABLE TO MISSILES COMING FROM CUBA, ADDING THAT ALL THE NETWORK OF CANADIAN AND NORTH AMERICAN RADAR IS ORIENTED TOWARD THE ARCTIC, THERE IS NOT YET A FUNCTIONING SYSTEM OF UNIDIRECTIONAL RADAR THAT PERMITS, EVEN ON SHORT NOTICE, TO DETECT THE CUBAN MISSILES; 9) VARIOUS POLITICAL COMMENTARIES ALREADY SHOW HOW THE DECISION WAS AGREED THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL PROCEED LIKE THIS AT WHATEVER COST. THIS CONJUNCTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES LEADS ME TO THE THOUGHT ON THE PROBABILITY THAT SOON THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE A DEFINITE TIME FOR INTERRUPTION OF THE WORK AND THE REMOVAL OF THE OFFENSIVE WARMAKING MATERIAL AND, IF ITS ULTIMATUM IS NOT HEEDED, PROCEED ALTERNATIVELY TO A) BOMBARDMENT OF THE LAUNCHERS [RAMPAS]; B) ORDER A TOTAL BLOCKADE, INCLUDING PETROLEUM, PARALYZING THE CUBAN ECONOMY; OR C) INVASION, HYPOTHESIS LESS PROBABLE [IF?] NOT TO BE IN SUPPORT OF AN INSURRECTION IN CUBA. OF THIS FORECAST EQUALLY RISKY AND THE SOVIET CONDUCT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT IN THIS HYPOTHESIS. THE INTERPRETATION SEEMS ADMISSIBLE THE INTERPRETATION ...THEY HAVE THE FACT [QUE SE TEM DADO DE QUE] THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACCELERATING THE ARMAMENT OF CUBA FOR COMPLETING IT IN THE PERIOD OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTIONS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO, THEN, CREATE A CRISIS CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN AND THAT A DRASTIC AMERICAN DECISION SURPRISED MOSCOW AND DISRUPTED ITS PLANS. THE APPARENT MODERATION OF THE SOVIET REACTION, SUCH AS REFLECTED IN THE DECLARATION OF ITS GOVERNMENT ON THE 23RD [OF OCTOBER] – THAT IN TRUTH CONSTITUTED ONLY A TYPE OF INTERLOCUTOR [PROBE?] – AS WELL AS IN THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET NAVY THAT PEACEFULLY RECOGNIZED THE NORTH AMERICAN BLOCKADE, SEEMS TO PROVE NOT ONLY THAT IT WAS A SURPRISE, BUT ALSO THAT MOSCOW MARKS STEPS TO A CHANGE OF TACTICS. IT IS FITTING TO SPECULATE AT THIS POINT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ABLE TO SEE EVENTUAL CONCESSIONS IN CUBA AGAINST AMERICAN CONCESSIONS IN RELATION TO BASES IN OTHER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS TURKEY. THIS POSSIBILITY, WHICH HAS BEEN ADVANCED ALSO IN THE UNITED STATES, ENCOUNTERS, HOWEVER, INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES OF INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION, INCLUDING THOSE CONNECTED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS.
OF GENERAL DISARMAMENT, STILL WITHOUT SOLUTION. OTHER ALTERNATIVES THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD AIM AT WILL BE TO GAIN TIME FOR THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UN, ACCELERATING SIMULTANEOUSLY THE INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA, IN ORDER TO LEAD THE UNITED STATES TO A DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CUBAN TERRITORY, VICTIMIZING CUBA AND OBTAINING WITH IT A POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL ETHICAL POSITION SUPERIOR TO THE UNITED STATES. FACED WITH SUCH POSSIBILITIES, THE ONLY HOPE IS TO STILL INTENSIFY THE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON HAVANA AND MOSCOW, IN THE SENSE OF IF OBTAINING OR IN EXCHANGE FOR CONCESSIONS OR A RAPID ADVOCACY OF A PLAN OF DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA THAT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BE EASILY REFUSED BY ELEMENTS OF THE LEFT SO MUCH ON THE INTERNAL FRONT AS MUCH AS ON THE INTERNATIONAL.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: MD—Washington—Telgr.—Cartas—Receb. —Exped.—1962 (7 á XII), (Cx 324), Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

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Document No. 20

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6 p.m., Friday, 26 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
12.851
FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/26/26/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL—URGENT
SUBSTITUTION

DAC/DAS/DOR/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.

346 – FRIDAY – 1800hs – Cuba continues totally mobilized, and the other activities are, practically, paralyzed, with incalculable damage for the economy of the country. Since yesterday, one can perceive a certain relief with the efforts of the Secretary-General [U Thant] and of numerous member-countries of the UN to avoid aggravating the situation. The Cuban press and radio give prominence to this news, while they continue to summon the people to prepare themselves for the defense, at the same time, insisting that world opinion is mobilizing in favor of Cuba. By the way, the Minister of External Relations [Raúl Roa] told me yesterday that they consider firm enough the position of Mexico and Bolivia in favor of Cuba, and even the same for Uruguay, meanwhile Chile seems to be vacillating; few references were made to Brazil, and nothing he told me when I returned to explain the sense of the suggestion of Your Excellency for Cuba to take the initiative to invite the UN observers. However, a high functionary of the chancellor said, still yesterday, to my colleague that Cuba considers Brazil more firm, in its favor, than Mexico.

LUÍZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO


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Document No. 21

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6 p.m., Friday, 26 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
12856
FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/26/27/X/62

SECRET
DAC/DAS/DNU/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.

347 – FRIDAY – 1800hrs – The ambassador of Yugoslavia [Boško Vidaković] has just informed me that he was today, at 3 in the afternoon, with President [Osvaldo] Dorticós, in order to inform him about the gesture of President Tito to gather together various heads of state, including the Brazilian, and to probe regarding the receptivity for a proposal of a solution of the crisis. Dorticós, extremely perturbed, told him that American planes are making low-level [rasantes] flights over Cuba and, according to information obtained in recent hours, the American attack is imminent; it would even be a “miracle” if the attack does not come this evening, repeat: this evening. He said that Cuba is ready to negotiate any solution, including the disarmament, the denuclearization, and the neutralization, repeat the neutralization, since it would not surrender with tied hands to the United States of America. In case Your Excellency thinks it appropriate, it may be possible to get in touch with the president [Dorticós] to confirm the account.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962//,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 22

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the OAS, Washington, 6:30 p.m., Friday, 26 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
12 853

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES -- WASHINGTON
ON/26/26/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL
DEA/DNU/DAS/DAC/DOr/964

663.000(4)
De-nuclearization of Latin America and Africa.
600.(24h)

515 – FRIDAY – 1830hs – [...]
I was informed by the substitute deputy representative of the United States in the OAS [Organization of American States] Council, Mr. Ward Allen, that the State Department determined that the American Delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations would enter into contact with the Brazilian Delegation to examine the proposal for banning nuclear arms in Latin America and Africa. It seems to me that the North American interest in the proposition aims at neutralizing the effect of the Soviet manifestation regarding the opportune Brazilian proposal, well-received on the part of some member countries of the United Nations. I am led to this supposition for it is obvious that the Soviet Union will see with great interest and sympathy the de-nuclearization of the above-mentioned regions, as I incidentally had an opportunity to confirm in a conversation with one of the secretaries of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Goundarev, who saw this Delegation on a courtesy visit.

JOSÉ BARREIROS


Document No. 23

Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, 1 a.m., Saturday, 27 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
SENT
13 519
FOR THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/27/X/62

SECRET—EXTREMELY URGENT
G/SSE/DEA/DAS/DAC/DM/DOr/DNU/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.
170 – SATURDAY – 100hr – Responding to your telegram no 347. I confirm my telegram no 169 on what gestures can be made next to that government in order to paralyze [halt] the construction of the bases. It would be appropriate for Cuba to permit, at the choice of the Cuban government, a small commission of the United Nations to certify the paralization and dismantling of the bases that the commission judges necessary to dismantle. I reaffirm our full support to obtain guarantees for the territorial integrity of Cuba.

EXTERIORES

NOTE OF DCA – This telegram was dictated by telephone by the Mr. Minister of State.

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 24
Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Mexico (Pio Corrêa), 7 a.m., Saturday, 27 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED 12.880 FROM THE EMBASSY IN MEXICO ON/27/28/X/1962
SECRET DAM/DAC/DAS/DEA/DOt/DNU/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.
316 – SATURDAY – 700hs – Referring to my secret oficio no 497. I have just had a long lecture with the under-Secretary of External Relations, who communicated to me his conviction that the United States is not disposed to negotiate [em torno] on the Cuban question and has decided to intervene militarily on the island, since it is persuaded that the military and political base that has been established by the USSR disturbs the world equilibrium between the two blocs. The under-Secretary continued saying that, in the opinion of Mexico, the revealed facts about the existence of offensive arms in Cuba modifies substantially the situation, truly revealing a threat to the peace and the security of the continent that has affected the Mexican attitude. He told me even that Mexico judges that the recourses to avoid an anti-juridical solution of the Cuban case have been exhausted and will not oppose [não se oporá] a forceful solution that it will be unable to impede, but it will not cooperate in such a sense as for the situation in the long term; he finds indisputable that in case of an acute aggravation of the world crisis, historical, geographical and ideological reasons make doubtless the homogeneity of the position of the American countries, in spite of some possible internal dissent in some of them. Mexico does not anticipate any dissent, since the government has solid control of the internal situation.

MANOEL PIO CORRÊA

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 25
Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:45 p.m., Saturday, 27 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED 12.884 FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA ON/28/28/X/62
SECRET—EXTREMELY URGENT DEA/DNU/DAS/DAC/DAM/DOt/600.(24h) 961
Question of Cuba.
351 – 1745hs – SATURDAY – Due to lamentable confusion the telegram of Your Excellency no 170 reached my hands [only] this afternoon, after I had been with the
[Cuban] Minister of External Relations [Raul Roa]. I was unable, therefore, to speak to him about the permission for the coming of a small commission of the United Nations but requested him to try to do it with maximum speed. I remind Your Excellency that this matter is very delicate in view of the publicly reiterated affirmation, of this [Cuban] government, that it would not accept any type of audit [fiscalização] or inspection. However, already today, the response of Fidel Castro to the UN Secretary General, in his long initial section, strongly affirms to reject the blockade as the pretension of the United States of America to determine the sovereign acts of Cuba such as the types of defensive arms, its relations with the USSR and the steps of internal politics; but does not make any reference to inspection or to an audit [fiscalização], which could indicate a softening in this matter.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

NOTE OF D.C.A. – This telegram was communicated by the Chief of Division to the Mr. Minister of State.

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962//,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 26

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 7:15 p.m., Saturday, 27 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

SENT

13.530

FOR THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/28/X/62

SECRET—URGENT

SSE/DCA/DEA/DAS/DAC/DAM/DoR/DNU/546.2

Transmission of telegrams.

Question of Cuba. Invitation of Fidel Castro to the Secretary-General of the UN to go to Havana.

352 – SATURDAY – 1915hs – I request immediate transmittal to the Minister of State. In spite of the demand to lift the blockade, it seems to me that the response of Fidel Castro to UN Secretary-General [U Thant], offers favorable possibilities that should be explored. I believe that the immediate visit of the UN Secretary-General to Havana will be of major importance and, I have the impression that the Cuban government is disposed to make important concessions in direct negotiations with him. The Yugoslav Government still insisted today, with the UN Secretary-General so that he accepts the invitation of Fidel Castro. Permit me to suggest a similar gesture by Brazil, next to the UN Secretary-General.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

NOTE OF DCA: -- This telegram was communicated to the Mr. Minister of State by the Chief of Division.

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962//,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 27

Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, 12:30 p.m., Sunday, 28 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12.883

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/27/28/X/62

SECRET—EXremely urgent

DEA/DNU/DAS/DAC/DAM/DoR/600.(24h)
171 – SUNDAY – 1230hs – With reference to my telegram no 168 and to the first part of yours of no 351. We are of the conviction that the delays in the delivery to this Embassy of our messages, of vital importance at this moment, are deliberate. We are making an energetic protest here together with Radiobrás and I suggest to Your Excellency to act in the same form to the correspondent of this company there. I request to inform that there are in this capital European telegraph companies who would be able to have our telegrams sent.

EXTERIORES

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962//,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 28

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday, 28 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12895

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

ON/28/28/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS/DAC/DO/DNU/DEA/DAM/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

799 – SUNDAY – 1400hs – The acceptance on the part of the United States and Russia of a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships, committing the United States to avoiding a direct confrontation – constitutes a brief alleviation, soon destroyed by the rejection by Kennedy of the second part of the proposal by Khrushchev, as is known, the simultaneous abandonment, under international inspection, of the Soviet installations in Cuba and the American [installations] in Turkey, with an exchange of commitments of non-aggression. The attitude of Kennedy is based on the following reasoning, accepted by the National Security Council, when it met yesterday: 1) Russia was dangerously altering the nuclear status quo, desiring now to obtain advantages in an exchange of incomplete installations in Cuba for operational installations in Turkey; 2) the NATO missiles in Turkey, in a number estimated at thirty, of the Jupiter type, of intermediate range, were openly installed, are not considered offensive, that are under the collective and defensive control of NATO and not unilateral of the United States; 3) there does not exist parity in the commitments of non-aggression, in that Turkey does not serve as a base of ideological infiltration, a step that Cuba, protected by a commitment of non-aggression, would continue with impunity in the task of infiltration and the subversive character of Marxist-Leninism; 4) the problem of the European bases could be negotiated in the general sphere of controlled disarmament, [but] any North American relaxation in the current crisis would generate future Soviet demands if not in relation to Berlin, known to be not negotiable, at least in relation to Northern Italy, where there exist roughly thirty Jupiter missiles. It is rumored that Washington already has made it known to Moscow and Havana that if within a few days, probably by the middle of next week, they will not cease the construction of bases and have admitted international inspection inside of, Washington will take “other measures,” most probable being the precision bombardment of the missile sites [rampas], combined, if necessary, with the launching of paratroopers to assure the destruction of the installations. The other possible measures, total blockade, support to guerrilla wars and invasion, the first two having a slow effect and the extreme danger before the previous declarations of Khrushchev, significantly not repeated since of the beginning of the current crisis, that the Soviet Union would intervene in defense of Cuba. The policy of rejection of the offer of the exchange of bases does not encounter unanimous support in this country, since in liberal circles, including influential journalists like [Walter] Lip[p]man, to whom I explained the Brazilian denuclearization proposal, have already been propagandizing for some time for the abandonment of the bases in Turkey, arguing: 1) that the ethical posture of the United States in international opinion would be weakened [by] the attempts to preserve the Monroe Doctrine in this hemisphere and the Truman Doctrine in Turkey; 2) that the bases in the Middle East have become obsolete with the appearance of Polaris submarine projectiles. Exists in Latin American diplomatic circles in Washington (visible preoccupation) contrasting, before the State Department, the vigorous support that is being given to the OAS resolution, including the offer of ships and bases to support the blockade, with the call of the Brazilian [tibieze], based, as some allege, on an insufficient comprehension of the essentially expansionist character of the Castroist ideology and the fundamental alteration in the balance of power in Latin America that would result in the
contrast between nuclearized Cuba under adventurist leadership and the conventional armies of many countries. I denied tendentious news in the Miami newspaper according to which this Embassy is being pressured by the Soviet Embassy to obtain authorization for landing rights in Northeast Brazil for a Soviet airlift.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil (copy courtesy of Roberto Baptista Junior, University of Brasilia. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 29

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday, 28 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12 894

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

ON/28/28/[sic—X]/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS/DAC/DOt/DNU/DEA/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

800 – SUNDAY – 1400hs – Supplementary to my telegram no 799. The White House still declares that it has not received officially the third proposal of Khrushchev, which he has already fully divulged on the radio. It implies a Russian retreat to accept: 1) immediate dismantling of the bases; 2) international inspection; 3) abandonment of the demand for reciprocity in Turkey. The first note of Khrushchev, responded to by Kennedy on Friday night, had been encouraging, for not having mentioned the Turkish quid pro quo. The second note, to which Kennedy has referred only indirectly, in the response to the first, opened the problem of reciprocity and specifically that a North American commitment of non-invasion did refer only to the North American forces, but to expeditions mounted in North American territory, or originating from other Latin American countries. The note of Kennedy accepted curtly [secamente] a commitment of non-invasion on the part of the United States, indicating that the Latin-American countries, probably, would agree with similar guarantees, without promising explicitly, however, to impede the operation of guerrilla war or infiltration on the part of the Cuban exiles. It is possible that the United States maintains the point-of-view that which, given the nature of Cuban ideological infiltration, it’s not under absolute prohibition of counter-infiltration. The immediate demand of a quid pro quo in Turkey abandoned, the United States agreed to reexamine the matter of European bases in the general quadrant of disarmament and preferably through collective negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is rumored here that Castro is feeling betrayed by the Soviets, indications being in: a) that Havana radio until yesterday night did not give notice to the proposal of Khrushchev to bargain over Turkey; b) that Castro has limited the invitation to U Thant to go to Havana, demanding to avoid a purely bilateral discussion between Washington and Moscow over Cuba’s fate, without mentioning international inspection; that Castro has made different conditions than the Soviets, since he also demanded the return of Guantánamo and the cessation of the economic blockade, not consistent with the note of Khrushchev. In Washington it is considered that the incident: 1) demonstrates the truth of the North American accusation of the existence of nuclear arms; 2) the judgment of the Pentagon to be correct that in at this moment the Russians recognize the North American nuclear superiority; 3) that after an extreme cost of efforts in the last four months, with expenses estimated at a million dollars per day, the Soviets have returned to the point of departure, extracted from the United States only a guarantee of non-invasion, a declaration that Washington had already made unilaterally…time [si tempoa], since Cuba was maintaining a defensive posture it is recognized, however, that the moral posture of the United States suffered strain and that, in spite of having originated the crisis, Khrushchev appears in the eyes of neutralist world opinion as a peace-maker. It is admitted, also, the obsolescence of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and in Italy and equally of the Thors in England, becoming thereby negotiable, in that: 1) in the general sphere of disarmament, preferably in collective negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 2) since the Soviets abandoned their intransigent opposition to international inspection, considering that it encouraged procedure created in Cuba. Convened by [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk, I will attend today at five hours [5 p.m.] [a meeting] at the Department of State with many Latin American Ambassadors.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS
Document No. 30

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Sunday, 28 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12893

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/28/28/X/62

SECRET—EXTREMELY URGENT
DAC/DAS/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

353 – SUNDAY – 1730hs – I request to communicate immediately to the Minister of State: This government will receive with much pleasure General Albino Silva. The flight authorization has already been granted, but, in view of the emergency measures, it is indispensable to know with all urgency the type of plane, the insignia [indicativo] and the name of the commander [pilot]. The secretary-general of the United Nations has just communicated to this government that he will arrive in Havana the day after tomorrow, Tuesday [30 October].

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil (copy courtesy of Roberto Baptista Junior, University of Brasilia. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.)]

Document No. 31

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:45 p.m., Sunday, 28 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12897

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/28/29/X/62

SECRET—EXTREMELY URGENT
DAC/DAS/DAM/DOr/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)


354 – SUNDAY – 1845hs – I have just conversed with the Minister of External Relations [Raul Roa] and told him, in my strictly personal opinion, that I found excessive, at this moment, the demands formulated by Fidel Castro in his proclamation today, such as the evacuation of the American base at Gua[n]tanamo, etc. The minister of external relations told me, [textualmente] verbatim, that the proclamation was directed not only to the United States but also to the USSR, to show to both, that Cuba is not a toy in the hands of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations; he also told me that, [textualmente] [verbatim?], that these demands would be, repeat, would be, an object of negotiations. He referred at length to the important and sympathetic role of Brazil in the present crisis. He informed me that the low-level American flights over Cuba have ceased since yesterday.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: "ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962//," Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 32

Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, 6:45 p.m., Sunday, 28 October 1962
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM
SENT
13532

FOR THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/28/X/62

SECRET—EXTREMELY URGENT
SSE/DAC/DAS/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

172 – SUNDAY – 1845hs – Continuing here on the official mission of the government this night General Albino Silva, chief of the Casa Militar of the President, that I communicated personally the mission of which he/you is in charge. Your Excellency and the general have the necessity of an immediate encounter with Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Take actions already for the realization of the interview. I will communicate shortly the nº of the flight and hour of departure. I am requesting Your Excellency keep me informed by telephone.

EXTERIORES

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 34

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the OAS (Barreiros), Washington, DC, 2:30 a.m., Monday, 29 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
12899

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES -- WASHINGTON
ON/28/28/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT
DEA/DNU/DAS/DAC/DAM/DOt/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)


516 – SUNDAY [sic—actually MONDAY, the 29th] – 0230hs – I was called upon by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, together with the ambassadors to the White House and the representa-
tives of the Council of the Organization of American States, to transmit to our respective governments the development of provocative events in regard to the situation in Cuba. Secretary Rusk recapitulated the negotiations started by the UN secretary general [U Thant] and continued with the messages sent directly by Prime Minister Khrushchev, to conclude saying that the letter dated today, 28 of October, in which this chief of state presents real assurance to begin a compromise regarding the Cuban crisis to be an important contribution for peace. However, Secretary Rusk declared that one should not believe that the Cuban crisis is resolved, since it is not impossible that another Soviet message could come to be published tomorrow, presenting other conditions. I understood this declaration of the secretary of state as a prudent position in case of new demands on the part of Soviet leaders who advocate a “harder line” (“linha mais dura”), making them, the conditions established by Fidel Castro in the pronouncement already published by the world press. As concrete fact, Secretary Rusk communicated the texts of the message transmitted today by Premier Khrushchev and the response of President Kennedy. In this last document, President Kennedy praises the efforts already developed by the UN secretary general and expresses hope that the necessary measures would be taken, immediately, through that organization, conforming to the suggestions of Premier Khrushchev, in order that the US might suspend the quarantine presently in force. It was said the president is leaving to the cognizance of the organization of American States the facts that were related in the letter directed to the “Soviet Premier.” Naturally the president is referring to a meeting of the provisional Organ of Consultation to call, there are a few hours, for tomorrow, the 29th at 15 hours [3 p.m.]. However, at the end of a meeting at the Department of State it was decided to postpone the Meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the pretext that they already have all information and no new facts exist, before the visit of U Thant to Cuba, scheduled for the day after tomorrow. I request to Your Excellency to orient me about the line of conduct I should assume in discussion of the next meetings of the Organ of Consultation.

JOSÉ BARREIROS

Document No. 35

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1:30 p.m., Monday, 29 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

12962

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

ON/29/29/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS/DAC/DOR/DNU/DEA/DAM/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

801 – MONDAY – 13hs30 – In a meeting yesterday, Sunday, in the Department of State, [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk after accenting the decisive importance of the solidarity of the Latin American nations in the last meeting of the OAS, which had an obligatory impression on the Kremlin, until then confident in a schism within the continent, Secretary Rusk informed me: 1) that the first indication of the possibility of the abandonment of the bases was given in a private letter of Khrushchev to Kennedy, on 26 October, a letter that is still not published and that Rusk described as “long, vague and disturbing”; 2) that the second letter of Khrushchev, of the 27th, added the condition of the dismantling of NATO bases in Turkey; President Kennedy only responded to the first of these letters; 3) on the 28th by the hand of Moscow radio announced the letter in which Khrushchev communicated the decision of dismantling of bases; this letter was responded to by Kennedy in an affirmative tone, even before receiving the official text; 4) the United States of America has not made any bargain, not even assuming a weak attitude, of North American compromises with the inter-American system of defense.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil (copy courtesy of Roberto Baptista Junior, University of Brasilia); translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]
Document No. 36

Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, 3:45 p.m., Monday, 29 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

SENT
13 546

FOR THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/29/X/62

SECRET—URGENT
DCA/346.2(24h)
Transmission of telegrams.
Question of Cuba.
600.(24h)

174 – MONDAY – 1545hs – Supplementary to my telegram no 171. I request to confirm receipt of my telegrams 172 and 173 transmitted by Western. We are no longer transmitting telegraphed dispatches by Raidobrás, that we transmitted Via Tropical-New Orleans.

EXTERIORES

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

★★★★

Document No. 37

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 p.m., Monday, 29 October 1962 (received 30 October 1962)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM 12971
RECEIVED

FROM EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/30/30/X/62

SECRET – MOST URGENT
DAC/DOr/DAS/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.

359 – MONDAY – 2330hrs – [For] Your Excellency to learn of and to transmit to the President of the Republic the following message: “We have just received in our Embassy in Havana a visit from Prime Minister Fidel Castro with whom took place a prolonged conference lasting more than one hour. On this opportunity Minister Fidel Castro manifested satisfaction regarding the interest demonstrated by President João Goulart in cooperating for an honorable solution to the present crisis, well translated by the initiative of sending his personal representative to this city. This action was received with visible gratitude, put forward by the prime minister, even before the meeting with other members of the Council, the favorable disposition of the Cuban Government. He considered the evacuation of Guantanamo the basic point of understanding on course, which can lend a sense of demonstration of the sincerity of the decision to confer on Cuba a real guarantee against aggression. He rejected, de plano [on principle?], the unilateral inspection by the UN of the territory of Cuba as offensive to the self-esteem [brio] of his people. He viewed, however, with sympathy [the idea] of the realization of the same method of simultaneously [conducting inspections] on the territories where are situated frank threats to the integrity and sovereignty of this country; he explained that he would make a communication from this meeting to the Russian Embassy. I arranged a new conference after an understanding with the UN secretary general. He expressed to me, in particular, that he had all confidence in frank language and the objective of using [it] during the lecture that we held. General Albino Silva.”

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

★★★★
Document No. 38

Telegram-Letter from the Brazilian Delegation at the Organization of American States, Washington, 31 October/16 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

LETTER-TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
11 580

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES—WASHINGTON ON/31/X/16/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL
DEA/DAC/DAS/DoR/DAM/DNU/600.(24h)

Situation of Cuba.

TO AFFIRM THAT, ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 19
OF THE CHARACTER OF THE ORGANIZATION,
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION WOULD NOT BE
INTERPRETED AS INTERVENTION. THERE WERE
PRESENT THREE BRAZILIAN TRAINEES AND TWO
MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL.
JOSÉ BARREIROS

[Source: “O.E.A.—TELEGRAMAS RECEBIDOS E
EXPEDIDOS—1962—Confidencial,” Ministry of External
Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese
by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 39

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington
(Campos), 6:30 p.m., Wednesday, 31 October 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13053

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
ON/31/XI/1/XI/62

SECRET—URGENT
DAS/DAC/DEA/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.

810 – WEDNESDAY – 1830hs – I am informed that the
chief of delegation of Brazil in the JID and the Military
Aides of this Embassy are suggesting today to [EMFA] and
to the chiefs of the respective bigger states that the Brazilian
government offers elements of our Armed Forces for col-
aboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS
and executed by the American government. I should explain
that until this moment I have not received any request or
pressure from the State Department in this sense. I have, yes,
sensed the desire of responsible elements that the Brazilian
government do so and a certain disappointment for not
having done so until now. It is my opinion that if there is
a political possibility for so much, the decision should be
taken as soon as possible, in case of a return to applica-
tion of the blockade, because: 1) a gesture of cooperation,
through an offer of elements of the Navy and auxiliary, the
Air Force, constitutes a powerful factor capable of counter-
balancing, in the Congress of this country, political currents
unfavorable to our interests, especially as for application of
the new foreign assistance law, holding a strong hand to the
executive in its more liberal interpretation of the same with
relation to Brazil; 2) the majority of Latin American coun-
tries have offered contributions, including [pressurosamente];
3) the affirmative vote of Brazil for the blockade, in the
OAS, and the new comprehension of the Cuban problem,
on the part of the Brazilian left, conforming to the reflec-
tion in the recent declaration of Governor Brizola, is not a
healthy foundation to explain [não são de molde a explicar],
to American public opinion, the Brazilian abstention on
the application of the blockade; 4) the eventual Brazilian
offer will probably be a limited gesture of solidarity, if its
implementation does not become perhaps necessary; 5) an
eventual offer should precede any diplomatic management/
gesture [gestão] either political pressure or of American pub-
lic opinion in the same sense. I request to conserve the secret
character of this communication.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO
POLÍTICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External
Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese
by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 40

Brazilian Embassy in Washington, Analysis of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, 1 November 1962

Washington, 1 November 1962

CONFIDENCIAL

Analysis of the Cuban Crisis.
600.(24h)
Mister Minister,

I have the honor of sending to Your Excellency the attached
memorandum of analysis of the developments of the Cuban
crisis until the 30th of last October, elaborated by the Political
Sector of the Embassy.
2. As Your Excellency may verify, the work in regard is composed of an introductory episodical retrospective and of a rigorous analysis, for which permit me to solicit the attention of the Secretary of State.
I take advantage of the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the protests of my esteem and my distinct consideration.

[signed]
Roberto de Oliveira Campos
Ambassador

To His Excellency Senior Professor Hermes Lima,
Minister of State of External Relations

LVP/zw
CONFIDENTIAL

Analysis of the Cuban crisis.

I – Retrospective

Chronological picture of the events that led President Kennedy to change his attitude in the face of the Cuban problem:

8 August – the press published that more than 4,000 Russian soldiers have arrived in Cuba. The administration said it did not have any information in this respect.

22 August – President Kennedy declared that he had information of the arrival in Cuba of technical equipment; but, in addition, he did not know for certain about the arrival of soldiers.

24 August – American government sources, not identified, declared that 20 cargo ships and an unknown number of passenger ships have, since July, transported technicians and equipment to Cuba. On the same day, President Kennedy declared that “we do not have any evidence of the arrival of troops in Cuba. I believe it would be an error to invade Cuba. We do not have at our disposal complete information about what is happening in that country.”

31 August – Senator Keating affirmed that he had certain information that 1,200 men, dressed in the uniform of the Soviet army, have disembarked in Cuba, during the month of August.

1 September – The Soviet Union announced that it has decided to supply arms and specialists to Cuba, in order that this country possesses power to face “the threats of invasion.” Senators Keating and Thurmond advocated the invasion of the island.

4 September – President Kennedy declares that Russia is supplying missiles to Cuba. However, he said, they do not have evidence that these are of an offensive character. If, subsequently, it is verified that they are of such character, the administration will consider the adoption of pertinent measures.

7 September – The President asked Congress for authorization to call up 150,000 reserves, due to the international situation, “chiefly in Berlin.”

11 September – The Tass Agency gave publicity to a communication in which the Soviet Union declared that it would retaliate with nuclear arms to any attack of the United States on Cuba or Soviet ships, sailing toward that island. It was added that the government of the Soviet Union would discuss the problem of Berlin after the American elections.

13 September – Kennedy said: “We are watching carefully the shipments of arms being done by the Soviet Union. The last shipments do not constitute a threat on any part of the hemisphere. A unilateral military intervention would not be justified.” He criticized what he described as “irresponsible conversation” about invasion.

18 September – Ex-Vice-President [Richard M.] Nixon called for a “quarantine” of Cuba.

26 September – Congress approved a resolution authorizing the administration to use force, if necessary.

2 October – President Kennedy declared to the Ministers of External Relations of Latin American countries, meeting in Washington: “that we have to act to avoid the exportation, to the other countries of the Hemisphere, of Cuban communism.”

10 October – The Administration revealed that it is elaborating its project for an economic blockade of Cuba. On the same day, Senator Keating said: “according to trustworthy confidential information that I have just received, there are being constructed, in Cuba, six ramps for launching rockets
capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which can reach the Panama Canal."

13 October – President Kennedy, speaking in Indianapolis, spoke *verbera* against the "self-appointed generals and admirals who want to send someone else's sons to war" (sic) (published in the “Wall Street Journal”—24/X/62).

15 October – Secretary of Defense [Robert S.] McNamara examined the latest aerial photographs of the rocket launching ramps, under construction in Cuba, some of which had aroused suspicion.

16 October – President Kennedy ordered an intensification of aerial surveillance of the island.

18 October – President Kennedy received in the White House the minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, [Andrei] Gromyko. He reiterated that the arms that were encountered in Cuba are of a defensive character. The president did not reveal to his interlocutor the information that he had in hand.

21 October – At 2:30 the President received information that missiles with a 1,000 [mile] range were in position of launching; platforms for launching missiles of 2,000 miles range, under construction.

22 October – President Kennedy called the party leaders urgently to Washington. He passes all the evening in conferences with Rusk, McNamara, [Martin] Hille[n]brand, etc. At mid-day it was announced that the President would speak to the nation at 7 that evening, about a matter of high urgency. Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin was invited to the White House and gives him knowledge of the points which were covered in the speech and delivered to him a letter for Khrushchev. Following that the Latin American chiefs of mission were invited to the White House, at 19 hours [Kennedy] addressed the Nation announcing the existence of offensive nuclear armaments in Cuba.

22 October – In the face of this, he determined a severe maritime blockade of the island and announced the eventual adoption of "other measures," in case the referred-to bases are not dismantled. The crisis is reaching its “climax.” The United States considers itself to be on the brink of war and waits anxiously for the Soviet reaction.

23 October – The Tass Agency described the American blockade as an act of piracy. The OAS approved the plan, presented by the United States, in the sense of avoiding by all means, including by use of force, which Cuba continues to receive armament from the Soviet Union. In the United Nations, Stevenson requested a withdrawal of the Russian bases from Cuba. Zorin called for the lifting of the blockade and proposed negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Cuba. The neutral countries did not show a disposition to support the American military action in Cuba and made pressure in the sense of realizing negotiations.

24 October – Responding to a telegram of Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev declared that his Government would not take any precipitous decision and suggested negotiations at a high level. Russian ships, transporting planes to Cuba would change course, avoiding thereby, for the moment, a confrontation with the American ships.

25 October – U Thant makes an appeal to Kennedy to lift the blockade, to Khrushchev to cease the sending of armament to Cuba and to Fidel Castro for an acceptance of negotiations. Khrushchev accepts the proposal of the Secretary-General and is ready to negotiate. Kennedy accepts, pointing out, however, that U Thant, in his appeal, did not mention the dismantling of the missile bases in Cuba.

26 October – U Thant received promises, from the United States and from Russia, of avoiding incidents with their respective ships. The White House declared that the construction of the bases, in Cuba, continues at an accelerated pace. Khrushchev sends a letter to Kennedy, whose text still has not been divulged. Dean Rusk referred to it as confused, making one think of internal difficulties inside the Kremlin. Kennedy said that the referred letter contained the following proposal:

a) The Soviet Union agrees to withdraw its missile bases from Cuba, under inspection of the United Nations, and will not send more warlike material to Fidel Castro;

b) The United States will lift the blockade and will give guarantees that Cuba will not be invaded, either by the United States, or by Latin-American countries.

27 October – A second letter of Khrushchev appears more firm. It offers to withdraw their bases in Cuba if the United States agrees to proceed in the same form in relation to its bases in Turkey. The White House declares that, before any negotiations, it is necessary to stop the construction of the Soviet bases in Cuba and render inoperative the ones that exist [porventura existentes]. It gives publicity to the text of the letter of Kennedy to Khrushchev, responding to the two of his. Kennedy set out the following line:

a) Russia should dismantle its bases in Cuba under
inspection of the United Nations and suspends the sending of armaments to that country;
b) The United States agrees to lift the blockade and to give guarantees that Cuba will not be invaded.

28 October – The text of Khrushchev’s third letter to Kennedy is published. It announced that it has ordered the dismantling of the bases and the re-embarking of the same with the destination the Soviet Union.

29 October – Fidel Castro demands the return of Guantanamo as a basis for negotiations. The observation flights of the American planes continue over Cuba.

30 October – U Thant visits to Cuba in order to verify the dismantling of the Soviet bases. As a gesture of courtesy, Kennedy orders the lifting of the blockade during the stay of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Cuba.

II – Soviet Motivation

An analysis of the events seems to reveal that the Soviet motivation has been as follows:

1) The creation of an atomic offensive capacity in Cuba, before the American elections of 6 November, with the objective augmenting its ability to bargain with the United States in future crises of negotiations over Berlin and American bases in Europe, Africa and Asia;
2) the alteration, in favor of the Soviet Union, of the equilibrium of forces in the Western Hemisphere;
3) the creation of a capability of atomic retaliation against the United States, on the part as well of the Cubans, in case of an American invasion or [an invasion] by refugees;
4) the possibility of atomic “blackmail” in Latin America, with a view to favor communist infiltration.

Probably, it was assumed in this plan:

1) that the United States would not prove the installation of offensive capacity, before it was finished;
2) that the American government would not react drastically, in case of proof, in view:
   a) of the proximity of the elections;
   b) of world public opinion
   c) of the previous behavior of the United States in other crises;
   d) of the disagreements in Latin America.
3) that, if the United States reacted drastically, the North American government would lead a direct attack against Cuba, in case of which, in spite of taking the risk of losing Cuba, the Soviet Union would gain:
   a) the loss of prestige of the United States that appears in the eyes of the world as an aggressor nation;
   b) a definitive break in the unity of the Americas, since the United States would be against a [sigmande] part of the governors and the public opinion of the Latin American countries;
   c) the possibility of a split, other than in our governments, at least in the public opinion of the countries of Western Europe;
   d) the possibility of adopting parallel measures in other areas of tension, notably Turkey, Iran or Southeast Asia, otherwise Berlin.

III – American Action

In place of inaction or intertemperate action, the North-American government:

1) fixed the basic principle that any nuclear attack on the part of Cuba on any nation of the Western Hemisphere would be considered an aggression of the Soviet Union on the United States and, as such, the Soviet Union would receive full retaliation (this principle is already being called “the Kennedy corollary of the Monroe Doctrine”).
2) Established two imperative conditions:
   a) cessation of supply of offensive material;
   b) dismantling of the offensive installations that already exist;
3) to force the realization of the first condition:
   a) it obtained the unanimous support of the OAS
   b) it imposed a partial blockade, as an “initial measure;”
   4) to realize the second condition it:
      a) it obtained the support of the OAS
      b) it made political and military preparations for direct action against Cuba;
5) simultaneously, it raised the question to the UN, leaving the door open to negotiations.

IV – Soviet Reaction

The Soviet reaction to the American action seems to demonstrate the disorientation of the Moscow government, probably determined:

1) by the evident error of calculation how much the American action in itself;
2) by the “escalation” or “graduation” of the American action (partial blockade, possibility of negotiations, eventual direct action – and no immediate attack)
3) by possible disagreements within the Kremlin;
4) by possible disagreements within the Soviet bloc,
especially with China; The Soviet disorientation seemed to be demonstrated:  
1) by the Soviet note of 23 October, clearly “interlocutorial;”
2) by the sudden return of Gromyko to Moscow;
3) by the rapid succession of different Soviet proposals and suggestions for a peaceful solution;
4) by the acceptance of the two conditions of Kennedy in a relatively short time;
5) in brief, by the lack of an immediate alternative plan: the Soviet initiatives became movements of adaptation.

The Soviet movement of adaptation seems to obey the following rationale:
1) There were no vital interests of the Soviet Union at stake in the Caribbean;
2) it does not have, therefore, reason to risk a nuclear war;
3) it does not meet the interests of Soviet expansion to have a war with the United States;
4) accepting the two conditions of Kennedy, it kept the United States impeded from the undertaking of direct military action against Cuba, that would destroy Castro;
5) it conserved Castro as a “political base” in the Americas, keeping a “spot on the flank” of the United States;
6) the Soviet Union could capitalize on its “pacific action” and its bargaining position, although diminished.

V – Current Balance of Positions

If the dismantling of the offensive bases in Cuba is to be confirmed, in exchange for a non-invasion commitment on the part of the United States, it will lead to [ter-se-ia], broadly [grosso-modo], the following balance of positions:

I - The United States:

i) has neutralized, in the strategic plan of the cold war, a tactical advantage of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere;
ii) has, in the first place, secured the unity of opinion of Latin America with relation to the danger of Soviet penetration in the continent;
iii) has shown to Latin America that Cuba is not only a socialism of nationalist source, acceptable, as Rusk in Punta del Este, as an economic regime, but also an internationalist sectarian socialism;
iv) in the Afro-Asian and neutralist world, if it did not have political gains, at least not did suffer a substantial loss;
v) with relation to its NATO allies, has increased its prestige and proved its determination to face the Soviet Union on these points on which it has vital interests at stake;
vi) not having destroyed the Castro regime, will continue suffering the pressures of Cuban refugees;
vii) on the plane of internal politics, the Democratic administration will come off, gaining prestige, with positive consequences in the elections of 6 November.

II – The Soviet Union

i) will capitalize on the withdrawal of its bases in Cuba as an attitude for the salvation of world peace;
ii) has introduced the problem of Cuba definitively in the general sphere of the cold war, making it more clear that it is no longer controversial, that is, that the United States is not able to obtain a unilateral solution of the problem;
iii) has dramatized the problem of bases in foreign territory, provoking, even in the North American press, a strong current against the existence of bases (obsolete) in Turkey;
iv) formalized the American guarantee of non-aggression toward Cuba, assuring, at least temporarily, the existence of a socialist regime in the Americas;
v) has spent, only in operations, US $…..1,000,000 per day from July onwards, which, adding up the expense and wear and tear of material and the cost of return transport, able to make any political advantage very onerous in terms of economic costs;
vi) has suffered a great political stress and strain in the communist area, principally in relations with China; the satellites of Europe and China, beyond the natural resentment for not possessing the more modern arms that exist[ed] in Cuba, considering the Soviet climb-down as a demonstration of weakness in the communist bloc before the United States;
vii) has suffered a loss of prestige in non-radical sectors of the left in Latin America.

III – Fidel Castro

He will be the great loser of the whole crisis, if he does not get, as is almost certain, the major advantage, which would be the return of the Guantanamo base, since:

i) he will lose the mystique of the leader of a socialist revolution of a national character, passing to be a figure of the third plane in the United States-Soviet Union dispute;
ii) he will run the risk of losing part of the Soviet economic help, in view of the heavy onus that the crisis represents for the Soviet Union and the high cost of maintenance that Cuba represents;
iii) it will be proved that his regime, before being a socialist revolution aiming at nationalization and statization of
the means of production, is, above all, a communism of a propagandistic and sectarian character, becoming confused with an instrument of foreign policy of the Soviet Union; iv) with the loss of the mystique of a hero of the national revolution, with the loss of prestige in the international sphere, with the aggravation of the economic crisis, he will run the risk of, if he does not counter with an adequate political mechanism and instruments of efficient propaganda, having to face with the recrudescence of the internal guerrilla war.

VI – The Brazilian Position in the OAS and UN

I have in the view that the American action itself, that brings the problem of the aggravation of the Cuban crisis for the field of negotiations in the OAS and UN, that Brazil adopted, in these two organizations, measures that were able to call, in the first of these, for immediate consequence [alcance] and, in the second, for more long-term objectives. Such measures, although considering the modification that …[advinha] in the Cuban problem as a consequence of the installation of offensive missile bases, were subordinate to the main directives of Brazilian foreign policy, which are the respect to commitments freely assumed, the defense of certain basic juridical postulates, and the objective of world peace.

1) Position in the OAS

Consistent with the position assumed in the Conference of Punta del Este and in compliance to the stipulations of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil:
   a) supported the resolution presented by the Delegation of the United States, in the sense of convening the Organ of Consultation, in agreement with the provisions in the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and authorizing the OAS Council to function, provisionally, in that quality;
   b) defended the necessity of the Council to make a distinction between the measures the United States requested against Cuba, missile bases, were subordinate to the main directives of Brazilian foreign policy, which are the respect to commitments freely assumed, the defense of certain basic juridical postulates, and the objective of world peace.

2) Position in the UN

With the immediate objective of lessening the crisis in the Caribbean and, in the longer term, as part of its policy favoring progressive and controlled disarmament, with the freeing of funds for programs of assistance to the economic development of underdeveloped countries, Brazil presented, on 29 October, to the Political Committee of the General Assembly a draft resolution [handwritten: “(approved)”] in the sense of denuclearization of Latin America and Africa.

3) Long-run consequences of the Brazilian position

The serene and firm attitude of Brazil in the OAS, abstaining from supporting more violent immediate measures against Fidel Castro, [handwritten inserted word illegible; “aimed”?] to contribute for alleviating the international tension (that in the UN it obtained with its denuclearization project), aimed to not alienate Cuba totally from the inter-American system, that would eventually permit, as soon as the currently exacerbated emotional climate ceases, a return to the position defended in Punta del Este, that is, the thesis that Cuba, neutralized and not infiltrationist, could coexist competitively with the representative democracies of the continent. Such a coexistence would be subordinate to the condition that Cuba (a) accepts a statute of negative obligations, with the effect of renouncing the techniques of subversive propaganda, infiltration, and sabotage, (b) abandoning its subservience to Soviet foreign policy and military interests (c) respecting the interests of continental security and the right of other countries of realizing their own political experiment.

VII – Appreciation of the Brazilian Attitude in the United States

Although part of public opinion and a portion of the Administration recognized the positive aspects of the Brazilian performance in the OAS and UN, certain sectors of the press and of Latin-American diplomatic hands in Washington commented unfavorably that:

a) Brazil still does not realize the existing difference between communism of national character and internal communism, sectarian, infiltrationist, and instrument of Soviet foreign policy and, [the danger] this last type of regime represents for countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, through
stimulation of internal agitation from leftist sources; b) that Brazil, perhaps due to its geographic distance from Cuba, did not sense the disequilibrium of power in the hemisphere—and the consequent danger—that Fidel Castro in plain possession of atomic arms would certainly produce; and that any doctrinal orientation that would be encouraged, such disequilibrium will produce a strong reaction, at least in the Caribbean. c) that the development of national communism not aggressive will be difficult to conceive of without a substitution of leadership, since Fidel Castro is so excessively involved with the Marxist-Leninist line and, by his previous attitudes, has aroused irreconcilable antagonism not only in the United States but in various areas of Latin America, making impossible the production of formulas of coexistence.

Washington, on 1 November 1962.

[Source: Maço “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1,962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 41

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m., Thursday, 1 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
13087
TELEGRAM
RECEIVED

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
ON/1/3/XI/62

SECRET – URGENT
DAM/DAS/DAC/DEA/DNU/Do(1)/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

815 – THURSDAY – 1900hrs – [Anastas] Mikoyan requested a private meeting with the American negotiators and today dined in New York in the house of [John J.] McCloy, with Undersecretaries [of State and Defense] George Ball and [Roswell] Gilpatric, [and] apparently confirmed a conciliatory disposition toward the United States of America. White House sources, which cannot yet be identified, have expressed suspicion [suspicácia] in relation to the mission of General Albino Silva, which is interpreted as helping facilitate the survival of Castro, all the more since Brazil and Italy have been in the Western world the least cooperative countries in the present crisis. This reaction appears hardly comprehensible [pouco comprensível], since, according to information from the Secretary of State [Dean Rusk], Ambassador [Lincoln] Gordon was fully informed of the results of this action, with which he expressed agreement. Before receiving the day before yesterday the High Military School [National War College?] [Escola Superior de Guerra], President Kennedy and I conversed privately for some minutes, but he was limited to requesting to be transmitted to President Goulart his disappointment that he must postpone his voyage to Brazil, impossible now due to the international situation, and that whatever manner will be more useful in the coming year, when the institutional problem will be resolved by plebiscite and our economic planning will be more advanced. He referred in passing to the mission of General Albino, asking about the ideological inclinations of the official in question. I responded that his affiliation is to the anticommunist nationalist line and that he gave support to the mission of U Thant for maintaining the system of international inspection. I added that, according to the telegram of Your Excellency, Ambassador Gordon was fully informed of the objectives of the mission and certainly the State Department was kept current on the result of the Brazilian gestures with Cuba. In view, however, of the rumors referred to above, it would be appropriate, beyond the work of explaining that was carried out here privately, that Ambassador Gordon was informed of the misunderstanding that appears to be emerging here. With reference to the meeting next Monday [5 November] of the Organ of Inter-American Consultation, already communicated to Your Excellency through the mission at the OEA [OAS], permit me to call attention to my telegram n° 810.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—OUTUBRO DE 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]
Document No. 42

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations, New York, 8 p.m., Friday, 2 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13094

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK ON/2/3/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DNU/DEA/DAS/DAC/DAM/DO/604.(04)

953.(00)

953.(04)

Denuclearization of Latin America and of Africa. 600.(24h)

119 – FRIDAY – 2000hs – Adding to my telegram no 116. I exposed, today, before the Latin American group, the motives that underlie the Brazilian draft about the denuclearization of Latin America. I explained that the fact that the Brazilian Delegation has presented the draft only with its signature as a result of the extreme gravity of the situation created with the introduction of nuclear arms by the Soviet Union on Cuban territory and the urgency of presenting a proposal that could constitute a solution for the crisis. The Delegate from Panama praised with enthusiasm the Brazilian initiative and raised a question of great importance relative to the second subparagraph, in paragraph 3. The Delegation from Panama desired that the draft extend the explicit way the prohibitions mentioned in the referred subparagraph to the territory of the Panama Canal. The Nicaraguan Delegation supported that of Panama. The Panamanian suggestion was counterpoised with the North American [i.e., US] desire, since [Arthur] Dean already has declared to me that the American Government desires to reserve the right to transport nuclear arms through the Panama Canal. Obviously I did not reveal the opinion of Dean. Belaunde, Head of the Peruvian Delegation, raised vague doubts about the opportunity of the project, alleging that the rockets-anti-rockets [anti-missile missiles] could carry nuclear warheads and that, however, the denuclearization could see the continent deprived of an important arm of defense. The Argentine Delegate also expressed reservations to the draft, alleging: 1) that it did not appear to him clear the notion of denuclearization; 2) that, if denuclearizing, Latin America would tie its hands from the future onwards, since the technological development would perhaps transform the nuclear arms into defensive arms. I perceived, behind the long exposition of the Argentine Delegate, perhaps a glimpse of the intention of that country to develop a nuclear potential for non-pacific aims. I responded to all the objections and made in a special manner in relation to the reflections of the Argentine Delegate, pointing out that in my view Latin America should dedicate itself to the utilization of nuclear energy solely for peaceful ends. I recalled that any nuclear competition on the continent, in view of the tremendous financial cost of the same, would imply a gigantic delay in economic development in the entire continent. The Haitian Delegate, after praising the Brazilian initiative, recalled the necessity of coordination with the African countries, in order to increase the electoral base of our proposal [in the UN General Assembly]. All the Delegations recalled the Brazilian initiative and showed profound interest in the same[]. Given the exceptional importance of the matter, it would stay combined [and] that the group would meet again in order to study it.

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO—FRANCO

(Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembre de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.)

Three stars.

Document No. 43

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Warsaw (Valente), 4 p.m., Monday, 5 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13166

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WARSAW ON/5/5/XI/62

SECRET

DAC/DO/DAS/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.
250 – MONDAY – 1600hs – In an interview today in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they revealed great Polish interest in moving to the mission of General Albino Silva in Cuba. According to my interlocutor, Brazil is the only country capable to mediate, although “the rigidity” of Fidel Castro constitutes the major obstacle. After pious [piedosas] words about Khrushchev’s “desire for peace,” he admitted that Kennedy was under pressure from “reactionary circles” and from the Pentagon not to abandon the base at Guantanamo. Poland looks with sympathy on the Brazilian motion in the United Nations about the denuclearization [desatomização] of Africa and Latin America and its possible favorable reflection in a solution of the Cuban crisis. Continuing on a “tour d’horizon” [French in original] of the international situation, the same source told me that the intransigence of Adenauer’s in not having diplomatic relations with Warsaw provoked a hardening of Poland in the sense of its joining the German Democratic Republic to demand express recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, under which De Gaulle realistically would accept to recognize that the “status quo” could only be modified through war. The Polish position, contrary to that of Bonn, is that the frontier is definitive, not being an object of negotiations. Passing to the Chinese intransigence, which I took to be similar [procurei assimilar] to the Cuban intransigence, my interlocutor admitted as inexplicable the aggression toward India. Before departing for Brazil, I requested an interview with [Polish Foreign Minister Adam] Rapacki to inform myself better about the Polish position in relation to Cuba.

MAURY GURGEL VALENTE

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA—Novembro à dezembro de 1962,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

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232 – MONDAY – 1615hs – In the last days Novotny, Ulbricht and Gomulka visited Moscow and held encounters at a high level with the Soviet authorities. These rapid encounters with those who have not counted before now leave no doubt that the principal motive is the Cuban crisis and its repercussions. The recent international events ought to have brought a reasonable [dose] of confusion between the leaders of countries of the socialist bloc, above all because the reactions and likewise the concessions of this government were excessively rapid for which, certainly, it did not have time to consult its allies. On the other hand, the relations with China have encountered the edge of new important events by cause simultaneously of the questions of India and of Cuba. There is the impression that the recent international events have created a state of disorientation in the community of socialist countries and that the great challenge of Khrushchev will be to accommodate this state of affairs in the short term. Since the question of Hungary [in 1956] the leadership of Khrushchev has not suffered a more difficult test.

VASCO TRISTÃO LEITÃO DA CUNHA

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

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Document No. 44

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow (da Cunha), 4:15 p.m., Monday, 5 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

13.144

FROM THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

ON/5/5/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DO/DAC/DAS/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. Visit of Novotny, Ulbricht and Gomulka to Moscow.

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Document No. 45

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:45 p.m., Monday, 5 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/5/5/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL—URGENT
DAC/DAS/DEA/DOr/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

367 – MONDAY – 1645hrs – It is noted here, in the last days, a general relief that the most acute phase of the crisis has passed, considering remote the immediate danger of bombardment or invasion. The speech of [US President John F.] Kennedy on last Friday [2 November] contributed to this, above all for not having threatened to adopt new measures against Cuba. On the other hand, the speech of [Cuban Leader] Fidel Castro, on last Thursday [1 November], was skillful, since he led the facts, with frankness, to the knowledge of the people and, at the same time, was conciliatory in its relatively moderate tone. Still it is difficult to perceive what will be the effects of the last events regarding the internal prestige of Fidel, but it does not appear to have had a noticeable effect on his popularity.

In the last days the official propaganda has concentrated on the “five points” of Fidel, transmitted in my telegram number 363. The Minister of External Relations [Raul Roa] intends to travel soon to the UN in order to defend personally the Cuban position that the solution to the crisis only can be attained on the basis of the Five Points. Therefore, this government insists, during the dispute, on separating the immediate problems (removal of the Soviet bases and inspection) and solution of the more long-term problems, “above all the guarantee of the integrity of Cuba.” But in view of the accord between the American and Soviet governments about some immediate questions, in the present moment, I have the impression that the crisis has entered a less critical phase and will go on in a type of status quo, in case it does not return to become suddenly aggravated.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: Maço “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 46

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Monday, 5 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13.153

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/5/5/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT
DAC/DOr/DEA/DAS/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.
Visit of A. Mikoyan.

368 – MONDAY – 17hs30 – Mikoyan intends to remain in Cuba, at least, one week. This will permit a complete review of relations between Cuba and Russia, in face of the last events. Until now I have not obtained information of interest about these negotiations, but the declarations of Mikoyan in New York and the optimism demonstrated by some authorities, with whom I conversed, seem to indicate that the prospects of future Soviet aid are good for Cuba.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

★★★

Document No. 47

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday, 5 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13.151

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
New Representative of Cuba in the UN Carlos Lechuga.

369 – MONDAY – 1815hs – The new representative of Cuba at the UN, Carlos Lechuga, enjoys prestige in this government beyond being an experienced diplomat. I believe that he could be useful for contacts that Brazil, eventually, desires to establish with Cuba in the ambit of the UN.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 49

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations (Afonso Arinos),  New York, 8 p.m., Tuesday, 6 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13073

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS – NEW YORK

ON/6/6/XI/62

SECRET – EXTREMELY URGENT

DNU/DEA/DAC/DAM/DOr/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

Brazilian mediation.

128 – TUESDAY – 2000hs – For the exclusive information of the Minister of State and of the Secretary General, Ambassador Carlos Alfredo Bernades. I was received by Secretary General U Thant who gave me the following confidential information about the situation in Cuba: 1) the Soviets and Americans are combining to effect an inspection on the sea of Soviet ships or [ships] rented by the Soviet government; the Red Cross accepts, in principle, to make an inspection but is reluctant to accept a review of possible alleged arms that its regulations do not permit this; 3) the discussions continue about this point; 4) Fidel refuses to authorize a UN inspection in Cuba alone declaring that it is not against the UN but considers it blocked from heeding this suggestion due to acts by the United States;
5) Khrushchev did not consult Fidel about his decision which was communicated to the Cuban government after its transmission to Washington; 6) Fidel responded with his legendary [lenço] declaration against inspection three hours after receiving the note from Khrushchev; 7) Fidel is strongly supported by China; 8) the situation is aggravated between Peking and Moscow to the point that China will not send a delegation to the commemoration tomorrow of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution; 9) in the American delegation [Adlai] Stevenson and [John] McCloy will meet this afternoon with the Russian delegate [Vasily] Kuzuetsov [sic—Kuznetsov]; 10) Stevenson is more conciliatory and McCloy more firm; 11) the American government focuses entirely on the problem of inspection in Cuba, which the Cubans reject; 12) until today U Thant has not seen any progress in the negotiations of [Anastas] Mikoyan. In making this explanation U Thant asked me if Brazil, which is “the country most respected in Latin America,” was not able to make some contribution. I took advantage of the opportunity, however, to repeat to him the suggestion that I made already some days ago in a personal character to the Cuban ambassador [Carlos] Lechuga, who promised to send it to his government. This suggestion was as follows: 1) Fidel invites the diplomatic representatives of some countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland, Sweden, India and perhaps, others, to comprise a group of inspection in order to bear witness to the dismantling and the departure of the arms considered offensive; 2) these representatives will supply a report to the American and Soviet governments and to the secretary general; 3) the solution will not represent neither foreign inspection nor an American imposition; 4) after mediating, U Thant declared that he considered my suggestion worthy of examination and asked me if I received a response from Lechuga; 5) I told him that [I had] not and explained that Lechuga accepted [it] well but feared an American rejection; 6) U Thant asked me if I desired that he handle the proposal to the Americans; 7) I told him that yes but that would ask such a thing of him [que o fizesse como coisa dele], because it would give more authority and because I did not have authorization of Your Excellency; 8) without hesitating U Thant responded that he would take on the initiative and requested me to maintain secrecy until he called on me again. As U Thant spoke to me of the importance of a personal demarche of [Brazilian] President [João] Goulart, I consult Your Excellency [whether] it would not be appropriate for the president of the republic to telephone the prime minister of Cuba.

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO FRANCO

Document No. 50

Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 5 p.m., Wednesday, 7 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

SENT

13 882

FOR THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK ON/7/XI/62

SECRET—EXTREMELY URGENT

SSE/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

46 – WEDNESDAY – 17hs00 – Response to your telegram n° 128. I approve the suggestion of Your Excellency to the secretary general agreeing also in that the scheme will gain visibility if it is presented to the directly interested parties by U Thant. Your Excellency, however, should coordinate your action with that of the secretary general, insisting together to the Cuban representatives about the advantages that a solution of this nature would have for the Government of Havana. As for the intercession of the president of the republic, that would depend on the progress made in these first contacts.

EXTERIORES

Document No. 51

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday, 7 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
13269

FROM THE EMBASSY IN H AVANA ON/7/8/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL
DAC/DAS/DOr/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

372 – WEDNESDAY – 1730hs – The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment; it is also conscious that, after the [US] elections of yesterday, it could produce in the United States of America at most a favorable pull for negotiations, but that the American Government has not given up its intentions. The young Cuban rulers are not losing their impetus of struggle, as Fidel Castro showed on 28 October to respond in a few hours to the Soviet decision to dismantle the bases; as far as the inspection on Cuban territory, Fidel Castro is very busy before public opinion, that it is difficult to find an acceptable formula; and continues here the insistence on the “Five Points” of Fidel Castro, even supported yesterday by the Soviet Ambassador [Aleksandr Alekseyev] in a speech; but the revolutionaries comprehend the gravity of the situation and some are visibly affected in the most acute moment of the crisis and know, for survival, they will have to make concessions. In this sense the conversations of [Anastas] Mikoyan are certainly decisive, that continue in maximum secrecy; until now I have not obtained any positive

information in this respect, but I hope to be able to transmit to Your Excellency some impression in the next hours.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 52

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 5:30 p.m., Thursday, 8 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
13.310


SECRET

DEA/DAC/DAS/DAM/DNU/DOr/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

OTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH PROCEED IN GREAT SECRECY. HOWEVER THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL INSPECTION CONTINUES TO BE THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO THE FINAL ACCORD.

AFRONSONO ARINOS DE MELLO FRANCO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA—Novembro à dezembro de 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 53

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 a.m., Friday, 9 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13.369

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA

ON/9/9/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DAC/DAS/DOr/DNU/DEA/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

374 – FRIDAY – 1130hrs – The conversations with [Anastas] Mikoyan proceed in total secrecy. The day before yesterday, in the Soviet Embassy, I conversed with Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, both expansive but we did not speak on this matter; Mikoyan made long and elegiac references to the independent policy of Brazil and of President [João] Goulart. The [Cuban] Minister of External Relations [Raul Roa] told me that the secrecy was indispensable to not prejudice the result of these conversations and the negotiations in New York. On the other hand, from a fairly sure source, we obtained information that the declarations of Governor Brizola profoundly impressed the Cuban leaders and Fidel Castro, that they are utilizing them to explain to Mikoyan the necessity of the Cuban Government maintaining a minimum of its own demands as a signal of its independence in relation to the Soviet Union;

it is the same to suppose that the reaction of independent Latin American leaders has contributed to the crystallizing of the position of Fidel Castro in terms of his program of five points. In these conditions, while the Soviets pay more attention to his politics of the maintenance of peace, Fidel Castro was [estava] conscious that in Latin America public opinion is much more concerned with the sovereignty and the independence, not having in this continent important pacifist movements. According to the same source, Mikoyan is demanding to demonstrate the necessity of Cuba permitting the Soviet solution to the benefit of the unity of the socialist camp; the divergence in position perhaps can be resolved by a systematic compromise [sistemazizando compromiso] by which the Soviet Union would accept to support the Cuban intentions [pretensões] in the UN on future occasions, while Cuba would accept the Soviet formula for a solution to the immediate crisis. However, I do not have the ability to confirm this information, I transmit it with due reservations.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: Maço “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1,962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 54

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the UN General Assembly, New York, 2:30 p.m., Friday, 9 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13 364

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK

ON/9/9/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL—URGENT

DNU/DAS/DAC/DOr/DEA/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. Denuclearization of Latin America.
139 – FRIDAY – 1430hs – In the session in the morning, the Delegates from Canada, Sweden, and Ghana referred exhaustively to the Brazilian draft about denuclearization of Latin America and expressed support to the ideas it contains. The Delegate from Ghana formulated an appeal to the government of Cuba in the sense to accept the idea of inspection on the part of the United Nations. Given the reticent attitude, although cordial, of Padilla Nervo, I suggest a gesture together with the government of Mexico in the sense of obtaining its support to the Brazilian draft.

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO FRANCO

[Source: "600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 55

Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 7:30 p.m., Friday, 9 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13383

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK
ON/9/9/XI/62

SECRET
DAC/DAS/DNU/DEA/DO/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba. Russian-American negotiations.

144 – FRIDAY – 1930hs – [Soviet deputy foreign minister Vasily] Kuznetsov invited me today for a conversation in the headquarter of the Soviet Mission. There he appeared with Ambassador Silos and we heard from the Soviet Vice-Minister the following: he wanted to inform us about the development of the Russian-American negotiations on the Cuban case. He considered that they have arrived to a deadlock in virtue of the Soviets having complied with the obligations assumed by Prime Minister Khrushchev without the North-Americans having complied with the commitment relative to the guarantees of non-invasion of Cuba. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [vacía] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba. [Ajuntou] considered a delicate situation because in brief the Soviet Union is not able to accept more indeterminate prolongation and there are risks of “the situation becoming worse than it was before.” He observed that it was a moment for peaceful and prestigious countries like Brazil to reflect about this and offer suggestions in this respect. He praised highly the efforts of non-aligned countries in the Geneva Conference, especially of Brazil, and the peaceful initiatives of our Government in the Cuban crisis. I have the impression that the Soviet Minister insinuated our manifestation in the sense of exposing to the Washington government our disquiet faced with the possibility of a return of the crisis that was so difficult to surmount. By the way of the situation in Cuba I am able to inform Your Excellency that there are already various signs in the sense of compliance by the North American government of the promise relative to the non-invasion of Cuba and the suspension of the coercive measures against that country. In a meeting with a Latin American group, [US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai E.] Stevenson alluded to the possibility of the Organization of American States to meet and, having verified the compliance of the commitment of the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government, to suspend the coercive measures taken in the last meeting of Consultation of the Chancellors. Stevenson alluded equally “to the return of Cuba to the American family.” In another meeting, with European delegates, Stevenson repeated his previous declarations and, according to what I collected from various sources, had even referred to the reestablishment of economic help to the Cuban government. These declarations transpired this morning and were commented on in private conversations by various correspondents accredited to the United Nations.

AFRONSO ARINOS DE MELLO FRANCO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA—Novembro à dezembro de 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]
Document No. 56

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 7:45 p.m., Friday, 9 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13387

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA 
ON/9/9/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL – URGENT
DAC/DAS/DOr/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. Declarations of the Cuban Minister of External Relations.

377 – FRIDAY – 1945hrs – My lengthy conversation with the [Cuban] Minster of External Relations [Raúl Roa] this morning confirmed my impressions, transmitted by my telegram nº 372, in the sense that the Cuban government, conscious of the gravity of the situation, is disposed to make concessions to reach a minimal guarantee; he requested anew the support of Brazil that Cuba “has the right” to present in the UN its program of Five Points only, I repeat, as a basis for discussion; he insinuated plainly the disposition to renounce the fifth point relative to the [US] Naval Base of Guantanamo; he did not hide the fear how much the measures that were proposed to the OAS and insisted in the present confidence that Cuba reposed in the attitude of Brazil that he knows will be very firm; and judged, however, that the discussions in the UN will be decisive. He told me that [Anastas] Mikoyan will be here some more days then following [he will go to] New York. The minister himself intends to appear before the Security Council as soon as it will meet.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: Maço “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICO—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 57

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday, 12 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13466

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA 
ON/12/13/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL
DAC/DAS/DOr/DNU/DEA/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

382 – MONDAY – 1815hs – The general mobilization of the country causes great damage to production, although the Government affirmed that its effort to reduce its effects, though emergency measures. The shipping is diminishing progressively by pressure of the United States regarding other countries, by the attitudes of dockers of various ports, who refuse to operate ships that stop in Cuba, and, now, by the blockade, which greatly damages foreign commerce. There is contradictory information that it is possible to obtain how much is the reserve of gasoline, foodstuffs, and consumer goods. Evidently, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICO—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]
Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 7 p.m., Monday, 12 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

13 458

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK ON/12/12/XI/62

SECRET—EXEMPLARY URGENT

DNU/DEA/DAS/DAC/DOt/DA/604(04)

Denuclearization of Latin America.

600.(24h)

151 – MONDAY – 1900hs – I REQUEST TO TELEPHONE INCONTINENTE [sic—IMMEDIATELY?] MINISTER OF STATE OR AMBASSADOR [CARLOS] BERNARDES OR MINISTER GUERREIRO: TELEGRAPHIC BULLETIN 38 ADDRESSED TO THIS MISSION CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING: “BRAZIL MODIFIED PROPOSAL DENUCLEARIZATION LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA PRESENTED IN THE LAST DAY TWENTY NINE [i.e., 29 October 1962] GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. PRINCIPAL ALTERNATION WAS CIRCUMSCRIBED DRAFT ONLY LATIN AMERICA, EXCLUDING AFRICA BEYOND SMALL ALTERATIONS OF THE TEXT. BRAZILIAN DELEGATION TOOK THE DECISION TO ALTER DOCUMENT PRESENTED INITIALLY TO AVOID INTRODUCTION OF AMENDMENTS BY DELEGATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, WHICH WOULD MODIFY ENTIRELY THE SPIRIT OF THE PROPOSAL. SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD MAKE RESTRICTIONS OF THE PROPOSAL, GIVING IT TO STAND OUT FROM IT POSSIBLY SOME NUCLEAR ARMAMENT. FRANCE ALSO HAS AN INTEREST TO UTILIZE THE SAHARA DESERT AS A TESTING GROUND AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT DENUCLEARIZATION. THE ACTION OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES [sic—other country besides France not identified—trans.], WHO LEAD GROUPS IN THE UN, WOULD EVEN BRING DOWN THE PROPOSITION. THEREFORE IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO ELIMINATE THE PART RELATIVE TO AFRICA. AS FOR THE TEXT, IT HAS MODIFICATIONS IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH HAVING BEEN ABOLISHED THE ITEM WHICH CALLED ON ALL MEMBER STATES TO ABSTAIN FROM USING TERRITORY, TERRITORIAL WATERS AND AIR SPACE OF AFRICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR TESTING, STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS OR THEIR DELIVERY VEHICLES. THE SUPPRESSION OF THIS ITEM OWED PRINCIPALLY TO AN ACTION OF ARGENTINA, WHOSE MILITARY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE ITEM RESTRICTIVE OF OTHERS, AND ALSO SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, NEXT TO UNITED STATES TESTING AREAS WHO USE THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS AND THEIR AIR SPACE TO TRANSPORT NUCLEAR ARMAMENT TO TESTING GROUNDS. BRAZIL DECLARED YESTERDAY IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT ITS PROPOSAL TO DENUCLEARIZE LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY THE CUBAN CRISIS. AMBASSADOR AFONSO ARINOS CHIEF OF THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATION SAID THAT THE INTENTION OF THE BRAZILIAN INTENTION [sic—PROPOSAL?] IS TO GENERALIZE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS. ARINOS ADDED THAT THE ORIGINAL BRAZILIAN DRAFT, WHICH REQUESTED TOGETHER THE DISATOMIZATION OF AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND WHOSE LAST VERSION THE AFRICA QUESTION WAS REDUCED TO RECORDING THAT ON TWENTY FOUR NOVEMBER NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY [24 November 1960] IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE ASSEMBLY THE NECESSITY TO CONSIDER THE AFRICAN CONTINENT A DISATOMIZED ZONE.[?]—trans. WE CONSIDER THE PUBLICATION OF THIS NEWS OF MAJOR GRAVITY BEING ABLE TO HAVE UNFAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY AND TO PREJUDICE APPROVAL OF THE BRAZILIAN DRAFT ON DENUCLEARIZATION. THE GRAVITY OF THE MATTER IS INCREASED BY THE FACT THAT THE NEWS SEEMS TO BE BASED PARTIALLY ON MY TELEGRAM No 140 THAT TRANSMITTED INFORMATION AND COMMENTARIES OF A STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER. I TAKE EVEN THE LIBERTY TO SUGGEST THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY TO COLLECT INFORMATION TO VERIFY IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCE THE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVULGED THIS NEWS AND AT THE SAME TIME I ASK YOUR EXCELLENCY TO INSTRUCT IMMEDIATELY THE EMBASSIES RETRANSMISSIONS
IN THE SENSE TO ELIMINATE THE BULLETIN THE PASSAGE TO WHICH I ALLUDED IN ORDER TO AVOID DIPLOMATIC DIFFICULTIES WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELLO FRANCO

[Source: “ANEXO Secreto—600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA—Novembro à dezembro de 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 59

Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 13488

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON/10/13/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS/DAC/DEA/DNU/DOr/600.(24h)

Cuban situation.

CT 370 – In addition to my oficio n° 994 of 1º November of 1962. In conversation with a high official from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, he announced three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment: (1º) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; (2º) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and (3º) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The first hypothesis seemed to him impractical since it would demoralize all the communist efforts in Latin America. Also he did not believe plausible the third hypothesis due to the following motives: (a) the raised cost of operation of development, that it would only have efficacy as a long-term measure and demand a minimum of 500 million dollars per year; (b) the present disorganization of the Cuban economy, whose industrial machines of North American origin will have to be completely re-equipped under penalty of facing an inactive period due to a lack of parts; (c) difficulties of personnel and organization, given the low organizational talent of the revolutionary leaders [and] the escape of the great part of the technical and professional class; (d) the opposition of other Iron Curtain countries, who need their own support [and] will protest against a greater Soviet engagement in an area considered distant and insecure; (e) Soviet responsibility in Asia, where the Chinese rivalry obliges the Soviets to an intense economic and military effort under penalty of losing the leadership of the socialist states; (f) permanent risk of subversive movements in Cuba, even as the risk of invasion attenuates as a part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding about dismantling the bases. In these conditions it would seem to him more reasonable the second hypothesis, that would bring a tolerable economic effort to assure the economic survival of Cuba without transforming it into a model of development. I argued that this policy does not seem to me viable without a combination of hypotheses two and three because (a) the economic un-success or stagnation of Cuba will turn the Castroite movement unexportable (b) it would aggravate the prospects of internal subversion in Cuba. To these arguments the alluded functionary responded that one the great conquests of communist technique has been the creation of systems of rapid communications, of military units' movements and of the political apparatus of espionage of such order that communist regimes of mediocre economic “performance” such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Viet-Minh have managed to maintain themselves in power. He added that these conditions seem already to exist in Cuba. The electronic and telecommunications equipment set up to serve the remote-controlled rocket bases probably will continue in Cuba, improving the system of communications on the island. The various military units were highly mechanized and have become capable of rapid movement to liquidate subversive movements that can arise in any part of the island. Finally, through the committees of political vigilance in the villages, factories and cooperatives constitutes an efficient apparatus of espionage. All of this will facilitate the indefinite maintenance of the repressive regime. As for the economic model of development, the Soviets will renounce this, …ing [fiando-se] more in the eventual success of the local communist movement, that will demand access to power through the mechanism of popular fronts and of
infiltration in other democratic parties. Likewise they will not lograssem the conquest of power they will get perhaps the more moderate objective of pointing out the capitalist development. As for the North American attitude in the present negotiations about dismantling the bases in Cuba, he indicates that, for internal political motives, it would be extremely difficult for the United States to abandon the demands of international control, since, the dissatisfaction of this requirement, would increase the political resistance, already enormous, to the commitment of non-invasion. In any case, if the impossibility of the assembly of a system of international inspection is verified, by virtue of the resistance of Fidel Castro, the Russians agreeing however to the verification on the high seas of the return of the missiles evacuated from Cuba, it would be possible to keep the general lines of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. However, beyond the qualifications that already have figured in the declaration of Kennedy of the 12th of September [sic—November?] – preservation of Guantanamo, Cuban abstention from aggression to other countries of the continent, non-installation of offensive capacity that would increase other conditions limiting limitativos the commitment of non-invasion such that as the maintenance of the blockade with international inspection and periodic overflight by American or neutral planes of Cuban territory in order to document the non-reestablishment of aggressive equipment. The functionary stressed that en causa these were all observations of a personal character, seeing that the policy of the American government has not yet crystallized, in view of the constant evolution whether of the Soviet position or of the Cuban.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 60

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 12:15 p.m., Wednesday, 14 November 1962

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13576

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/14/14/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT
DNU/DEA/DAS/DAC/DO/DAf/600.(24h)
Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa.

384 – WEDNESDAY – 1215hs – Response to the telegram of Your Excellency n.° 179. I was this morning with the Minister of External Relations [Raúl Roa], who told me that, in attention to our request, the Cuban government examined yesterday, thoroughly, the Brazilian draft and yesterday evening sent instructions to its ambassador in the UN to support the draft of this government, to which he would present the following amendments: 1) denuclearization, as quickly as possible, of Puerto Rico and the Panamá Canal Zone; 2) the commitment, on the part of all nuclear powers, to not use these arms against Latin America; 3) elimination of military bases of the powers in Latin America, which refers to Guantanamo, without citing. I said that Cuba does not give up, in this third amendment; I did not know until this point [that] this affirmation is valid; it can be one of the frequent Cuban contradictions or a new position, after the beginning of the negotiations with Mikoyan; until now, I was fairly sure that Cuba would give up its demand of the elimination of this American naval base (see my telegram n.° 377). I recalled that the denuclearization of Africa was an initiative of Fidel Castro in the UN in 1960, and he praised the Brazilian draft, saying that, with the Cuban amendments, it would be an effective guarantee for Latin America and an important step toward disarmament and the suspension of nuclear tests.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 61

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 3:15 p.m., Wednesday, 14 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED
13610
FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/14/14/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL—URGENT
DAC/DEA/DNU/DAS/DAM/DOr/600.(24h)
Substitution
Question of Cuba.
Conversations with Mikoyan.

385 – WEDNESDAY – 15hs15 – The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with [Anastas] Mikoyan. However, from a generally well-informed source, I obtained in this respect the following information: 1) Fidel Castro, before the arrival of Mikoyan to Havana, held various meetings with Raul [Castro], [Cuban President Osvaldo] Dorticos, [Ernesto] “Che” Guevara and Carlos [Rafael] Rodriguez, in order to fix a monolithic position around the questions that would be discussed with the Russian leader; 2) this position was revealed to be extraordinarily rigid in the course of the conversations. The Cubans began to complain that during the first weeks of the crisis they were not consulted nor informed by the Soviet Government. They pointed out, [word illegible], it had been an error [to make?—word illegible] the Russian proposal to trade the Cuban bases [for those—words illegible] in Turkey, since, in the first place, Cuba is a socialist country, that it could not be, however, an object of negotiations with the West. The Cuban leaders stressed that the referred position lessens the prestige of the Cuban revolution on the continent. The result would have been otherwise, better [acrescentaram], if, in place of Turkey, the Soviet Government had thought of Guantanamo. With indelicacy, they complain that the Soviet Government did not previously consult the Cuban Government about the international inspection of this country; 3) Mikoyan retorted with identical violence, explaining that the Soviet Union worried itself with saving the peace, but also created conditions that guaranteed the integrity of Cuba. The Soviet Government did not make concessions and also felt, in the end of the first week of the crisis, exactly as the Cuban Government, that the invasion of Cuba was a question of hours. In the second place, Mikoyan made clear that the Soviet Union did not admit that Cuba interferes in its international politics. He criticized strongly the speech of Fidel Castro of 28 of October, in which he rejected the international inspection, affirming that its result was to complicate the crisis, aggravating the danger of war; 4) the conversations were extended to plan the general strategy, having Mikoyan invested against the declaration of Havana, which he considers suicidal politics that tend to deprive Cuba of the support of other Latin American countries. The anti-American ideological line advocated in this document is prejudicial to the left on the continent and in this respect various complaints have arrived to Moscow. The USSR is against the declaration of Havana, which was in frank disagreement with the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The affirmative Cuban response, [words illegible], was that the peaceful coexistence is an adequate policy for the maintenance of world peace, and should permit Cuban support to the anti-imperialist revolutions beginning on the Continent; 5) the basic proposal of Mikoyan was that Cuba should accept a formula [words illegible] solution of the immediate crisis and therefore to create conditions for, in the following moment, to obtain the adequate guarantees against a North American aggression; 6) the Cubans refuse to accept the international inspection and, in a rigid and even extremist manner, want consciously to make difficult a solution of the crisis with the objective to give a public demonstration of its independence in the face of the USSR obligating it to assume a more concrete responsibility in relation to the created situation. I transmit this information with due reservations, although I believe sufficiently in its veracity. I judge it usable to understand the Cuban position and the antecedents of the joint Cuban-Soviet proposal presented, yesterday, to the Secretary General of the UN.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962/6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 62

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:30 p.m., Friday, 16 November 1962
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13671

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/16/16/XI/1962

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT
DAC/DOr/DAS/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

388 – FRIDAY – 1630hs – In his letter of yesterday to the UN secretary general, Fidel Castro accepted the “unilateral inspection,” when, beforehand, he always rejected inspection of this character. This seems to confirm the rumor that circulated, here, in recent days, in the sense that Fidel is inclined to accept some type of inspection that is not limited to Cuba, perhaps including Guantanamo or other territories; it coincides, also, with what he told to General Albino Silva (see my telegram no 359). But, faced with the continuing surprises that Fidel Castro offers, this observation should be taken with reserve.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO


Document No. 63

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday, 16 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13680

FROM THE EMBASSY IN HAVANA
ON/16/17/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL—EXTREMELY URGENT
DNUE/DEA/DAC/DOr/DAf/600.(24h)

Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa.

389 – FRIDAY – 1830hs – I am very thankful for telegram no 180, in which was retransmitted to me the telegram of the Embassy in Moscow. From what it is possible to observe in Cuba, I agree entirely with the considerations and conclusions of Ambassador Vasco Tristão Leitão da Cunha. Also, in his direct relations with Cuba, Khrushchev has shown an attitude [that is] pacifying and open to compromise. I have pointed out to Your Excellency that this country depends each time more on Soviet economic help; but Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications; for this and perhaps for to be convinced that the USSR will not leave to help it, Fidel Castro [timbra] to show his independence and even arrogance. It is each time more ostensible the Cuban frieza for with Mikoyan that, in the last days, which are not mentioned in the newspapers; however his presence here, for fifteen days, is evidently proof of Soviet goodwill. The Cuban intransigence, similar to the Chinese line (although there has not been here direct political influence from China), contributed without doubt for making difficult the conciliatory position of Khrushchev and, to what seems, is leading the Russians to admit, at least in part, the basic Cuban line expressed in the program of Five Points. Some foreign observers here judge, however, that the USSR will have in the near future to modify radically its policy for [dealing] with this country. In this isolation and before the surprising reiterations of the Cuban Government it is each time more difficult to make forecasts and even precise observations, but all of these observers are convinced that the United States will not yield its intention to overthrow Fidel Castro; it is also […] and is certainly influences his attitude.

LUIZ LEIVAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: "600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembre de 1.962/6223," Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 64
Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly (Afonso Arinos), New York, 7:30 p.m., Friday, 16 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED
13603

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII GENERAL-ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS—NEW YORK
ON/16/16/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DNU/DAM/DAC/DAf/DOr/DEA/DAS/600.(24h)
604(04)

Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa.

167 – FRIDAY – 19hs30 – [CUBAN] AMBASSADOR LECHUGA CAME TO SEE ME TODAY IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE MISSION AND COMMUNICATED TO ME THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE DENUCLEARIZATION DRAFT. IT IS THE FOLLOWING: CUBA WILL PRESENT AMENDMENTS INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY PUERTO RICO AND THE PANAMA CANAL IN THE DISPOSITIONS; PROHIBITING FOREIGN BASES IN LATIN-AMERICAN TERRITORIES, THAT AIMS AT GUANTANAMO; AND ADDING A PROVISION IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR POWERS WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR ARMAMENT AGAINST ANY LATIN AMERICAN TERRITORY. I OBSERVED TO HIM SINCE AS SOON AS THE AMENDMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AND THAT, EVEN GETTING A MAJORITY OF THE COMMISSION, IT WOULD NEVER ARRIVE TO OBTAIN TWO-THIRDS OF THE VOTES IN THE PLENARY. I ARGUED QUITE A BIT, SEEKING TO DEMONSTRATE TO HIM THE CONVENIENCE OF CUBAN SUPPORT TO THE PRESENT TERMS OF THE DRAFT. LECHUGA, IN RESPONSE, DECLARED TO ME THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF THE DRAFT IN HIS SPEECH TOMORROW, BUT THAT AS FOR THE AMENDMENTS HIS FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO PRESENT THEM. I ASKED HIM, HOWEVER, IF CUBA WOULD APPEAR AT SOME CONTINENTAL MEETING AIMED TO ELABORATE A TREATY OF DENUCLEARIZATION, IN CASE OUR DRAFT IS APPROVED, HE DECLARED TO ME IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPOND, BUT THAT PERSONALLY HE UNDERSTANDS THAT YES, [AT] ONE TIME THAT THE IDEA IS CONSIDERED WELL BY HIS GOVERNMENT, I FEAR THAT THE CUBAN ABSTENTION WILL PROVOKE THE DEFECTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA THAT CONSIDER THE COMMITMENT OF CUBA NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY...FOR THIS REASON I [PEÇO] YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT EXAMINE THE CONVENIENCE OF AN INSTANT AND FINAL JOINT “DEMARCHE” TO THE HAVANA GOVERNMENT, AT A HIGHER LEVEL, REQUESTING THAT IT SUSPEND THE PRESENTATION OF THE AMENDMENTS.

AFRONSO ARINOS DE MELLO FRANCO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portugal by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 65

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 9 p.m., Friday, 16 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED
13 679

FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
ON/16/17/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DNU/DAC/DAS/DEA/DAf/DOr/600.(24h)
604(04)

Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa. Aggravation of the Cuban situation.
The Cuban situation, which has been the object of contradictory information, has been aggravated, for the following reasons: A) the threat of Fidel Castro, apparently transmitted by [Cuban UN Ambassador Carlos] Lechuga to U Thant, in the sense of that American observation planes, that overfly Cuba, will be attacked; B) the American declaration that, if necessary, these planes will have a military escort; C) the Cuban intention to suggest amendments to the denuclearization proposal, impossible to be accepted by the United States of America, already that reopen the problem of the bases and the denuclearization of so-called dependent territories (Panama and Puerto Rico); D) the position of [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer favorable to the strong line in relation to Cuba. Not knowing the results of the Mikoyan Mission, having the following interpretations: Mikoyan has gone to Cuba in order to assure the necessary cautions for the removal of the missiles to be made without violation of the military secrets, that would have to be effected, whether by American espionage, or by Cuban interference, if it is attempted to hold the dismatingling; B) he has gone to make a complete evaluation of the state of the Cuban economy to calculate the economic and political cost for the Soviet Union of: I) maintain the present level; II) increase [promover] its development; III) abandon her to her own fate. This evaluation would serve as a subsidy for the formation of Russian foreign policy with relation to Cuba, today the object of stiff criticism, whether by Stalinist elements of the Soviet Union, or by China, a controversy that may be reached in the Meeting of the [CPSU] Central Committee, on the (next) 19th. The American position will be, probably, to abandon the blockade in exchange for the removal of the bombers, that, according to the latest aerial photographs, continue to be uncrated; it will maintain the aerial inspection and the non-invasion commitment, linking some form of effective inspection that will not be controlled through neutral diplomatic representatives in Havana, a formula apparently suggested by Lechuga and [Soviet deputy foreign minister Vasily] Kuznetsov and judged unsatisfactory. In a meeting with Latin American Ambassadors in the Department of State, I had to intervene in defense of the Brazilian denuclearization proposal, which was being criticized by the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Venezuela, because: A) they associate, erroneously, the idea of mediation and reintegration of Cuba in the inter-American system, considered unacceptable by these countries, the Dominican Republic declared that it would present, in brief, proof of subversive activities fomented by Cuba, joining it [was] Venezuela in the demand of stronger sanctions [against] Castro; B) because the draft has been presented in the UN and not in the OAS. I responded, explaining, that the Brazilian proposal in the UN had an objective more limited, not seeing the reintegrarion of Cuba in the OAS and yes [rather?] A: I) to avoid the proliferation of nuclear armaments; II) to avoid competition in Latin America in bases of nuclear arms, with the diversion of necessary resources to economic development; III) to facilitate the maintenance of a system of international inspection, that Cuba would be able to accept, without suffering what it calls a national humiliation. As, principally, the proposal contemplated, also, Africa and the continuation, even, in expectation of Cuban acceptance, the UN was the more appropiate forum, not having, however, hindered the participation of the OAS in the regulation of the implementation of the project. The Uruguayan Representative recalled the convenience of our coordination with the Joint Inter-American Defense [JID], with fear that it had seen the proposal of the utilization of tactical nuclear arms as part of the program of defense.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]
Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa.

64 – FRIDAY – 2100hs – Your Excellency is authorized to postpone the voting on the draft resolution about the denuclearization of Latin America in order to await the deliberations [ponderações] that were made to you by the North American government. We insist, however, in that the same draft will come to be voted in the Commission and in the plenary before the present period of sessions of the General Assembly is closed.

EXTERIORES

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 67

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Belgrade, 12:30 p.m., Monday, 19 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13733

FROM THE EMBASSY IN BELGRADE

ON/19/19/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DO/DAC/DAS/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. Increase of Chinese political influence.

83 – MONDAY – 12hs30 – Reference to my telegram nös 76 and 77. In line with the confidential conversation that I had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the current thinking in the Government is as follows: 1) it is the Chinese that are the instigators of the intransigent position of the Cuban Government; furthermore, it is believed that the action of Peking in Cuba is in line with broader plans, as tested in the support of the Albanian communists against the USSR, the attempts to replace in Asia, in general, the historical influence of Soviet communism and, now, the military operations against India; 2) Fidel Castro has shown his political skill and guaranteed the permanence of his regime if, [word unclear] to reply with the challenge of the five demands, [word unclear] however in accord with the UN secretary general on the basis of the word emphasized to the Head of the Russian Government by the North-American President in his solemn message of 27 October [word unclear] climate of conciliation, that the opportune Brazilian mediation still more favorable.

BUX RIBEIRO COUTO

[Source: “600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962//6223,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Document No. 68

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow (da Cunha), 6 p.m., Monday, 19 November 1962

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

13.736

FROM THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

ON/19/19/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DO/DAC/DAS/DEA/DNU/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba. No revelation in the Soviet press about the Cuban problems.

253 – MONDAY – 1800hs – I believe it is interesting to point out that the Soviet press has hidden from its readers the recent evolution of the Cuban problem, and, systematically, informed only on the collateral aspects of the visit of [Anastas] Mikoyan to Cuba. I am led to believe that the Soviet readers ignore the problems or the rising divergences between this Government and Fidel Castro, above all, the rejection of Castro to permit the local verification. The recent letter of Fidel Castro to U Thant about the threat of downing North American planes was not published here.

VASCO TRISTÃO LEITÃO DA CUNHA
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

MEMORANDUM for Mr. ADJUNCT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
DAS/36.
On 20 of November of 1962

Question of Cuba
600.(24h)
Permit me Your Excellency to recapitulate, in a manner more succinct and focused, only, on aspects of the question that interest the aims of the present Memorandum, the current development of the Cuban crisis, in that it refers particularly to the three parties directly involved – United States of America, USSR and Cuba.

I – UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2. In that which concerns the United States of America, it appears to have fully attained the objective of its naval and aerial blockade, which was to impede the entry to Cuba, of warlike material of an offensive nature. Moreover, even, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw, or dismantle, our place, the armaments which had been installed on Cuban territory, under its control. On the other hand, in the bilateral negotiations that have been between the United States of America and the USSR, the Washington government gave guarantees of non-invasion of Cuba.

3. To reach a final solution to the Cuban question, the American Government, still, demands: a) the withdrawal by the Soviets, of additional armaments – long-range bombers – b) the inspection, by an international group, on Cuban territory, of the works of dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive and nuclear war material. As for the first demand, Moscow alleged that it is not a fitting initiative in the matter, since the planes at issue have already been incorporated into the Cuban air force. In this case, the Government of Cuba has to agree to return to the Soviet Union the machines at issue.

II – U.S.S.R.

4. Beyond the direct action of the USSR in the question, already mentioned in previous paragraphs, there is to consider the current position of the government of Premier Khrushchev, in view of the information received by the Embassy in Moscow.

5. Ambassador Leitão da Cunha commented on the immediate effects that the events in the Caribbean have had regarding the line of foreign policy of Moscow. It appears to have fixed on a new idea of “compromise,” in solution of international disputes in which the Soviet Union is a direct party. Still according to Ambassador Leitão da Cunha, the line followed by Khrushchev of “peaceful coexistence” has undergone a change of direction, which approximates the Brazilian idea of “competitive coexistence.”

6. This new philosophy was not adopted without the Soviet Premier having to overcome obstacles, in front of difficulties and criticisms, above all on the part of its more radical allies. The current intransigence of Fidel Castro to gestures of Mikoyan, causes discomfort in the Soviet environment [meios soviéticos]. On the other hand, it has inspired that he will be [inspirada que seja] – certainly he is – in egotistical motives and of the momentary strategy, the current attitude of Khrushchev has been conciliatory, pacific, and, evidently, all solutions should be searched that would not put them to lose ground already conquered or compromise future negotiations.

III – CUBA

7. Pressured by the Soviets, Fidel Castro has ready now conformed in abdicating certain demands that he initially made – withdrawal of the Americans of the naval base of Guantanamo – as conditions for agreeing with an international inspection [i.m.j.], that the government of Fidel Castro is disposed to accept an international solution for the question, within which would be, in part, protecting his prestige next to the Cuban people. It may not be, therefore, that he would be lead to assume a position of intransigence, compromising irremediably the conciliatory solution that he searches to reach.
8. In these conditions, and on a merely speculative basis – a time that, as is natural in case, there is not the DAS, up to date with the intentions of the Government, in that it respects its direct and future participation in the unrolling of the events in the Caribbean – permit me to recall to Your Excellency the possibility of Brazil suggesting the path of a conciliatory solution for the question of Cuba, in which would participate the Governments of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and of Havana.

9. The idea would be to launch in an informal manner, for example, in an interview granted by the Mr. Minister of State with a highly-regarded foreign correspondent. It would not assume the form of an offer of good offices or of mediation on the part of Brazil, but an indication of a formula that all would be able to accept. Another form of action in this sense would be of a gesture together or isolated on the part of Latin American Governments that maintain diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro.

10. Such a solution would consist in the mentioned Governments assuming a commitment of “negative obligations.”

11. Already on the occasion of examining the matters that would be tackled by President João Goulart and Kennedy, was thought of a high hierarchy in this Case that the attitude in front of the Cuban Government that would bear better fruits for the community of the Hemisphere would be for them to realize gestures together to Fidel Castro in the sense of assuming negative obligations, instead of following the path of isolation of Cuba, and of reprisals.

12. In synthesis, this compromise, that would be the object of a formal declaration, together or isolated, of the three interested Governments, would extend to the following negative obligations:

   on the part of the United States of America:
   – not to intervene, directly or indirectly, in Cuba.
   on the part of the Soviet Union:
   I – not to supply offensive armament to Cuba.
   II – not to intervene, directly or indirectly, in Cuba.
   on the part of Cuba:
   I – not to install offensive armament.
   II – not to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the politics, of other countries of the continent.

13. The suspension of the naval and aerial blockade of Cuba, on the part of the United States, as well as agreement of the Havana Government to withdraw the bomber aircraft and in relation to inspection by an international commission, is obvious, precedes the formalization of such a compromise or there will be a concomitant process.

14. The initiative of the Brazilian Government on the above lines indicate that it would be perfectly coherent with its position toward the events in the Caribbean, and, more still, would present an opportunity for us to reaffirm certain principles that guide our foreign policy in the hemisphere; the self-determination of peoples; the opposition to armed methods [corridas armamentistas]; and the rejection of infiltration and imposition of political ideology [infensa] to our democratic system.

Respectfully,
[signature]
(Jorge Alberto Seixas Corrêa)
Chief of Division of [Setentrional] America

[Source: Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil, copy courtesy of Roberto Baptista Junior (History Department, University of Brasilia); translation from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]
it was already excluded from the Inter-American system and coinciding with the beginning of a new phase in its relations with the USSR, the Cuban attitude in relation to Brazil shifted. Since then, the Cuban Government always manifested its recognition to Brazil and its confidence in that we would not alter our policy favorable to Cuban autonomy. It requested, at times, support for questions of less importance; treated me, personally, with exceptional amiability, but, in truth it was that this Government has not demanded or solicited our support or intervention in that it referred to great international questions, on which depended its very survival. In the present crisis this attitude became, still, more evident.

Twice on 23 and 27 of October, the gravest moments of the crisis, and, according to the instructions of Your Excellency, I requested this Government, in order to transmit to it the suggestion and even appeal of the Brazilian government that, if heeded, without doubt would have altered the course of events. My appeal was received with attention and deference, but with total refusal. I do not refer to the Mission of General Albino Silva, which had an exceptional character and about which the General himself informed Your Excellency, but I call attention to the [fact that the] Havana press has not made, practically, any mention of this special mission and, still more, that the Cuban censorship has cut, totally, the telegrams sent from here, in this respect, by foreign correspondents. I consider very strange that, in the present circumstance, the Cuban government has not taken advantage of the opportunities Brazil offered to it and our evident sincerity to help it on the path to a solution acceptable for Cuba. I judge that I should bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency these observations, which I believe will be useful. In the following telegram I transmit some impressions about the probable causes of this attitude.

LUIZ LEITAS BASTIAN PINTO

[Source: "ANEXO Secreto—600. (24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLÍTICA—CUBA—Novembro à dezembro de 1962!," Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg.]

Notes

1 Professor of History and International Affairs, George Washington University (jhersbh@gwu.edu).
3 See esp. the transcript of the secretly-recorded 30 July 1962 White House conversation involving President Kennedy, his ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, and aide Richard Goodwin and other sources in Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,” pt. 2, pp. 11-12.
6 Interestingly, the Brazilians also sensed some Argentine reluctance to back its denuclearization plan, and behind that potential nuclear ambitions—piquant evidence of the traditional South American rivalry. “I perceived, behind the long exposition of the Argentine Delegate, perhaps a glimpse of the intention of that country to develop a nuclear potential for non-peaceful aims,” observed Brazil’s UN ambassador in a 2 November 1962 cable reporting a discussion of the denuclearization proposal with his Latin American colleagues.
7 The Treaty barred the “testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” and the “receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons.” According to Wikipedia, “Cuba was the last country to sign and to ratify, in 1995 and on 23 October 2002, completing signature and ratification by all 33 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba ratified with a reservation that achieving a solution to the United States hostility to Cuba and the use of the Guantánamo Bay military base for US nuclear weapons was a precondition to Cuba’s continued adherence.”
8 See, in particular, Brazilian UN ambassador Afonso Arinos’ 6 November 1962 report of his conversation with U Thant after the UN leader returned from Havana.
9 In fact, as one Brazilian cable shows, international awareness of the Brazilian emissary’s mission was limited at the time by Cuban censorship, which suppressed mention of it in reporters’ dispatches. See the 20 November 1962 cable from Brazil’s ambassador in Havana, Luis Bastian Pinto.
10 Two other Brazilian ambassadors represented in the collection also deserve particular mention: Afonso Arinos, at the UN, had formerly been Brazil’s foreign minister, and the translations here include records of his meetings with such figures as U Thant, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, and Cuba’s ambassador to the UN; and in Moscow, Vasco Leitao da Cunha sent analyses of the Soviets and the crisis informed by his prior experience as Rio’s ambassador in Havana during the Cuban Revolution, when he had close contacts with the Castro leadership.
11 Goulart actions that caused some US officials in Washington to roll their collective eyes included waffling on the American-backed OAS measures; what they viewed as insufficiently supportive language in Goulart’s correspondence with JFK during the crisis; and Goulart’s touting of the alleged

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success of his mediation efforts (which to US officials seemed non-existent). At the same time, Goulart seemed to express strong support for JFK's actions in his talks with US ambassador Lincoln Gordon. See Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,” pt. 2.

12 For example, a colleague who visited the foreign ministry Archives in Brasília several years after I did was unable to see previously opened files of records of Brazilian diplomacy in Chile during the Allende period (1970-73).

13 Ed. note. Adenauer was then visiting Washington. For translated West German records of his discussions with US President Kennedy regarding Cuba, on 14 November 1962, see elsewhere in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*. 

ed. note: On 22-31 January 1962, foreign ministers of countries belonging to the Organization of American States (OAS) gathered in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to discuss Cuba—specifically, harsh steps recommended by the United States and other like-minded states to punish the island nation for its close and expanding ties to the Soviet Union, including its possible expulsion from the OAS. (These proposed diplomatic measures were part of a broader US effort to isolate Cuba and if possible topple the Castro regime, including an economic embargo, covert operations—“Operation Mongoose” had been devised but not yet formally started—and assassination plotting.) In Brazil, the need to formulate an approach for the impending Punta del Este conference led Foreign Minister Santiago Dantas to convene a secret two-day meeting of senior aides and diplomats on 26-27 December 1961. As shown by the translated (and apparently verbatim) record below, the planning sessions offered an opportunity for candid discussion of the conflicting pressures on the issue, and the policy options available.

An official ally of Washington by virtue of the 1947 Rio Treaty, Brazil clearly belonged to the US sphere of influence, politically and economically, and formally opposed Soviet or communist penetration of the hemisphere. Yet, within Brazilian domestic politics there was considerable leftist admiration and sympathy for the Cuban revolution, and a widespread belief that the island should be left to determine its own destiny—without interference or intervention from the United States or anyone else. Moreover, Brazil’s diplomats represented a nation eager to show a more independent posture to the world (it had recently even sent an observer to the first conference of the “nonaligned” movement in Belgrade), even as it had to safeguard its crucial relationship with Washington. Behind closed doors, Dantas and his colleagues could hash out bluntly many of the pertinent issues in a way they could not in either public forums (susceptible to press attention) or diplomatic channels where a stray word might exacerbate US fears. Ultimately, at Punta del Este, the Brazilians, led by Dantas, would resist and significantly water down the sanctions promoted by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

--- J.H.

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**Document No. 1**


State Minister [Santiago Dantas] – The reason for asking you to meet here was to discuss the matter brought forward at the VIII consultative meeting. I get the impression that we will have to get prepared to stipulate very clearly what Brazil’s position is and examine all implications brought forward by it, not only with regard to the inter-American system but also the development of our bilateral relations with the United States.

So far there is no indication that the United States is committed to the bilateral relations maintained with our country, especially regarding financial help, to any kind of political attitude adopted by us concerning the large hemispheric problems, notably the Cuban problem. Nevertheless we cannot discard such an hypothesis in just a simple manner. However, we should be able to admit it and make use of such an element for study purposes, inasmuch as it is undeniable that the visit of President [John F.] Kennedy to two of the major countries in South America is an event that cannot be left unnoted. Moreover, we need to take into consideration that, at present, one of them has severed relations with Cuba, putting itself into a position of an anti-Cuban policy center, while the other has assumed the position of intermediary of the State Department at the OAS.

To this date the enunciation of our government policy towards Cuba has been very explicit and simple: unconditional respect to the principle of non-intervention; unconditional respect to the principle of nations’ self-determination, considering that only people are the legitimate instrument for the choice of a regime, especially if such a regime is a democratic one. If the goal to achieve is the re-democratization of Cuba, whatever could be considered an imposition from...
outward would certainly represent a real contradiction to the

democratic principles themselves, aside from being the viola-
tion of the self-determination principles.

It can be said that such is the line inherited from the Jânio
[da Silva] Quadros administration [January – September
1961]. However, I have been insisting that there is a slight
difference between what we have been trying to do and what
characterizes Jânio Quadro’s line towards Cuba. Along that
line there seemed to be a slight trace of ideological sympa-
thy and a systematic denial and sometimes a kind of evasive posi-
tion to hold an opinion of the democratic character of Fidel
Castro’s government. This point was considered a matter of
fact. Even Minister Afonso Arinos in one of his visits to the
parliament, categorically declared that he had not seen any
evidence that Fidel Castro’s regime was a communist one,
leaving the impression that the fact of such proofs existing or
not could be of great importance. Moreover, attitudes such as
awarding Commander [Che] Guevara with a decoration [in
August 1961] showed that his sympathy had nothing to do
with self-determination, rendering to such an official attitude
a rather more controversial characterization than what we have
been trying to notice.

Ours was an opposite idea. We started with the sincere
recognition that the Cuban regime was not a democratic one.
No matter whether it was either a communist or a socialist
regime. This, because it is very difficult to define whether a
regime is in fact a communist or a socialist one. What really
mattered was to classify it as a non-democratic regime accord-
ing to the Santiagist’s declaration pattern. Thus, the problem
of ideological sympathy was eliminated. The Brazilian gov-
ernment is not in ideological sympathy with Fidel Castro’s
regime. Even though there might be political groups within
the government, the latter has only sympathy with what is
part of the Constitution or its treaties.

The non-intervention principle and the respect of self-
determination have gained new force because they acquired
more absolute character once the question of knowing
whether the regime was a socialist or democratic one ceased
to exert any influence on them.

From this point on we begin to look for a solution due to
the increasing probability that the countries will be convok-
ed for a consultative meeting. We were afraid of such a gathering
as it was set from the start by calling upon the Rio de Janeiro
Treaty and only for two purposes: either to find out a potential
offense by the Cuban regime and, consequently, conform to
violation of the Article 6; or else, characterizing the regime as
a communist one. The latter being the case, as per Resolution
93 of Caracas, it is marked as an amplification or addendum
to the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, namely, a presumed aggression.
The simple fact of being communist and being affiliated to the
international communism presumes the regime’s aggression
and brings forth the application of sanctions.

Based on our fears we started to develop a series of possible
reasoning which con-substantiated, I believe, in the Meeting
at Casa das Pedras.

At Casa das Pedras we worked out a idea based on a sug-
gestion of Ambassador Leitão da Cunha which started gaining
many improvements. I will recapitulate the idea notwithstanding
the fact that is within the spirit of many of us. First we tried
to postpone the consultative meeting the utmost. In conse-
quence of said adjournment we tried a diplomatic move towards
the United States to obtain from their government a com-
promise of a pledge for the non-use of violence against Cuba.
At that time there were signs of a planned invasion of Cuba
launched by Nicaragua or Guatemala, or both countries alto-
gether. There was a great number of trained Cuban volunteers
in the United States army; works or preparation at ports and
airports in Guatemala that could be related to the new invasion
attempt. There was also an extremely confidential information
report] that a prestigious governor had attended a conference
with President Kennedy insisting on the idea of an invasion.

We were under the impression that Cuba feared such
invasion twice as much: as one fears an invasion and because
it knew that its possibilities of counting on a support of the
Soviet Union were becoming smaller every day. On one
hand, because from the USSR’s economic point of view the
purchase of more than a million tons of sugar for a country
that has an excess of such a product was too expensive; on the
other hand, because the Soviet Union never left any doubts in
the air that it could not come to Cuba’s defense. All it could
offer would be a retaliation in a country close its boundaries
or by adopting other more symbolic policies.

We were under the impression that should we manage
to obtain from the United States a non-violence pledge, we
would be able to count on Cuba itself to obtain from Fidel
Castro’s government a progressing observance of Santiago’s
Declaration. Said Declaration plays a very important role
because it is the sole document signed by Fidel Castro’s gov-
ernment in which the recognition of democratic principles is
clearly indicated. We could ask Fidel Castro’s government,
strengthened by the non-violence pledge, to accept a gradual
evolution for its observing the Santiago Declaration.

If such binomial non-violence vs. Santiago’s Declaration
could eventually take root, we would try to further develop
the scheme and move in the direction of some kind of neutral-
ization of Cuba, maintaining their basic social achievements,
the establishment of a democratic state, and the break of their
ties with the Soviet Union. This was the idea resulting from
the meeting at Casa das Pedras and which was the subject of
two good investigations. The first one with [US] Ambassador
Lincoln Gordon, who praised such an idea. There was no written reaction of the State Department, but the ambassador conveyed a rather complete memorandum about the matter insisting, as he still insists, on the convenience of a personal understanding between the [US] Secretary of State Dean Rusk and myself. The second one was with Cuba’s ambassador who also highly praised the idea and informed the Havana government accordingly.

This third stage, however, ended with Fidel Castro’s speech with the well known statement of ideological affiliation which turned any kind of understanding based on Santiago's Declaration as something he could ever return to. So our scheme can be considered useless. The importance of that speech was not to reveal anything but to preclude a scheme of diplomatic action which was to make a return to free elections possible. It occurred sometime before the meeting of 4 December. Although having a small draft articulated with Argentina and Chile to postpone the meeting to allow some time for the understandings about violence, we took the decision not to present any draft at all and exerted upon abstention.

Here I have to open some brackets to cover the question of the remaining South-American countries. During a trip to Buenos Aires our impression was that the position of Argentina, coincident with ours, has become much stronger. This because President [Arturo] Frondizi [Ercoli] fully agrees with it although if he encounters difficulties in sustaining same it is due the opinion among the military forces which is much more divided among right and left than ourselves. The fact of having had that agreement with us became a cause of strength in his hands. Thereafter, although we keep being reticent with regard to the duration of the Argentine position, we lack concrete facts pointing in the direction of weakness. With regard to Chile, Ambassador Vale was present shortly after the Buenos Aires meeting in Chile and had a productive conversation with Chancellor Martinez Soto Mayor. He shared the same tendency and Chilean attitudes have been firmly in line with ours. Mexico has adopted an independent line. We have only had the opportunity to establish coincidence. Uruguay’s vote in favor of the consultative meeting was explained as voting against instructions received from the Chancery. Bolivia shows the same position with a good left public opinion to support it. Ecuador is the one I consider, at this moment, the more dubious because the government is extremely unstable, characterized by a line of opportunism trying to take the support of Velasco Ibarra’s government position. Also, according to some information the present Ecuadorian chancellor would have taken many initiatives with the ex-president of the Republic in favor of a severance with Cuba. This entire group voted for abstention, with the exception of Mexico that voted against and, in other words, left no doubt about its position contrary to the consultative meeting.

In the United States the reaction to this attitude is not sympathetic. Ambassador Gordon is an ambassador of exceptional value, an intellectual, a man concerned in making a good-will diplomacy which has positive and negative aspects. One of the negative ones is that he hides from us a little the hostile reactions in the American environment with respect to our attitudes. Very kindly he insinuated that our consultations reiterated with Argentina, Chile, and other American countries had been considered by the State Department as an effort of our chancery to sabotage the consultative meeting. In fact, up to now the North American reaction to our attitude consisted of two notes, both giving strong support to the Colombian proposal and both duly retorted by us with other notes in which we clearly demonstrated that the Colombian proposal is unacceptable.

As far as the present is concerned: the meeting is set for 22 January in Montevideo and our long elaborated plan at Casa das Pedras is out of use. What we now have to do is to set a line of conduct and the impression is that we have first to set it under the form of an internal philosophy for the motivation of our own conduct. Secondly, under the form of tactical measures to be adopted at the consultative meeting. It is about the aforementioned that I would like the Planning Commission integrated by the Working Group organized for the consultative meeting to mediate, by means of intensive meetings so that we could altogether reach a very clear definition. If we succeed such a definition would be taken to the Cabinet at one of its meetings, in a written form to be submitted to the President of the Republic, to the prime minister and finally submitted for the approval of the Cabinet. The next step would be running the risks of its execution.

The following is what I have been thinking about the subject. I think that the Meeting of Consultation comprises many dangers. The first due to the fact that it was convoked based on the Rio de Janeiro Treaty which means, minimally, to deliberate on sanctions. We already go to it with 13 American countries having their relations with Cuba broken off and a great probability that Ecuador will be the 14th. We already have a two-thirds majority necessary to make decisions mandatory. It is evident that countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile as well as Mexico, cannot go to the meeting just to be presented with an already taken decision and to be bound to a legal norm without having had any possibility to re-discuss it. The second risk has to do with a preliminary which already involves the value of the subject. This is the difference we have to make between obligation and aspiration within the American system. Every system has developed in the sense that there are defined obligations in treaties and
aspiration in defined declarations. It has been admitted as a development of the regional international law that normally aspirations are the prior forms or else, a period of germination of future obligations and that the system develops while changing aspirations into obligations. The principles of non-intervention and of self-determination are the field of obligations and are not only of regional obligation as they belong to the world's public international law. Commitment to the democratic representative government belongs to the aspiration field instead.

I do not believe that Resolution 93 might have changed that. It is a resolution of difficult legal interpretation. Santiago's Declaration that came thereafter reaffirmed that the principles it enunciated were mere aspirations and qualified itself as an instrument of public opinion for educational action over the nations of the hemisphere.

What happens when a Latin American country breaks a commitment to the organization? If the break causes aggression or danger of aggression it is within the scope of the Rio Treaty for a sanction to be found. If not there, in any other text.

And what happens if a country strays from the common aspiration defined in Article 5 of the treaty or Santiago's Declaration? This is the Cuban case. We have to reason about it as an example because we are not free from seeing other American countries becoming socialists in the next years. Conditions do not seem calm enough to prevent us from witnessing similar movements in other countries. We are taking Cuba as an experimental case. The decision taken will be for all.

The first hypothesis would be that when a Latin country would become or declare itself communist, with risk to the hemispheric democratic unity, the remedy would be to defeat the government by force. If this were true there would be no difference between aspirations and obligations. To this legal argument political arguments should be added as well: the loss of moral authority of the inter-American system, the automatic conversion of the independent regional system into a satellite system, the low capacity to think of seriously developing the inter-American system. Moreover, the severance of relations is not justified, at a time when Brazil re-establishes relations with socialist countries as other countries do maintain relations.

At the moment the idea that seems worthy of a study would be:

The OAS is a regional organization. Not necessarily all countries of this hemisphere are its members due, in the first place, for reasons of geographical location. There are also other conditions for a membership. Canada, FIO [not further identified—ed.] are not members, for example. Other countries could also share the same status. It is an organization based on obligations and aspirations. The obligations are the ones that no country can fail to comply with. The charter, in its Article 5 indicates the membership purposes, and thanks to it conditions of co-operation between OAS countries that are difficult to accept by countries that have different social and economical goals have been accepted. It is understandable that between Brazil and the Soviet Union might exist a change of commercial relations, but said regime is communist: what is given is what is received. On the other hand, within the inter-American system it has been admitted that the most developed states should give more than what they receive in the benefit of the strengthening of social and economic characteristics that belong to the system's aim. A country that gives up such an aim declaring itself as communist and adopting an anti-democratic government and economic pattern cannot possibly have its government defeated by force. It cannot as well be condemned to diplomatic isolationism by means of its relations being severed. However, there is a speculation to be made about the repercussion caused by such an attitude within the Organization mainly with regard to the share in rights and advantages which are the result of the common search of a democratic life and government level. We have to admit the possibility of a socialist country in America. The idea that the emergence of a socialist country involves a military action or economic blockage to discard it is practically unsustainable due to the internal structure of all the other American countries' public opinion.

However, the idea of living in America with socialist countries may involve another consequence that cannot be overlooked, namely, that any relation that such a country might establish with the Soviet camp would cause a latent military danger. Thus, the presence of a socialist enclave in a hemisphere of countries strongly linked by defensive alliances of democratic basis would call for the need of neutralization. Here we have the Finland's parallel, which was mentioned during the first phase of our studies at Casa da Pedra.

If in the socialist world a democratic enclave like Finland is accepted at the price of neutralization, it does not seem out of the question to admit that also in the democratic world may exist a socialist enclave protected by neutralization. Such a neutralization does not happen without a series of difficulties. From the Soviet point of view there seems to be no interest in maintaining a military commitment in Cuba. Neutralization is accepted and considered the best business such a socialist spear-head within the Eastern world. From the Cuban point of view I think there will be no major difficulties, although I would rather leave my comments for later on. From the American point of view there remains the problem that a neutralization may involve Guantanamo Base. Maybe through a
constructive agreement one could find a solution similar to that of Bizerta, of a gradual retreat.

When [Cuban] Ambassador [Carlos] Olivares paid us a visit we were hoping to obtain some information or receive a proposal, but the conversation only showed interest in finding out how the consultative meeting was going to be carried out. From here he visited with President João Goulart and the next morning had an appointment with Minister Tancredo Neves. From both he obtained the same information, namely, that Brazil was inflexible with respect to the non-intervention principle; that we would not turn our backs on defending the inter-American system.

As far as the method in which that attitude would be converted into a diplomatic action was concerned, they would have to obtain that information from the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Neither the President of the Republic nor the Prime Minister offered a single word about this. On his way back Olivares showed sympathy with the idea of neutralization.

I gave Ambassador Gordon a general idea of that scheme. Although the ambassador was also favorably impressed by the idea he did not feel in a condition to discuss it any further here. He insists on the invitation he made to me in order to discuss it with Secretary Rusk in Washington. This is a point I leave to this group to speculate.

Ambassador [sic; White House aide Richard] Goodwin arrived two days ago. I will have a conversation with him today and it seems that he wishes to discuss the consultation. We now have the problem of the line to follow at the consultation. At this point I must say that there are already signs that the American point of view is not favorable to the approval of the Colombian proposal. Instead, there is an interest in a document of sanctioning character which allows that after a period of time the conduct of the Cuban government be established with the help of a commission. Sanctions would be applicable thereafter.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the idea of invasion by neighboring countries has been declining in recent weeks. There are no signs of increased militarization and apparently what is expected is an internal revolution. It is possible that such a revolution may already have started at the time of the Consultation Meeting takes place in that case it will have to change all arguments conceived so far. We could follow the methodology described below:

1. Revise the philosophical line that I have recapitulated in general terms;
2. Examine the Consultation considering:
   a) the possibility that when it takes place no revolution has yet broken out and
   b) the possibility that the Consultation takes place after the revolution. For either hypothesis we must have at least an acceptable and flexible tactical solution.

Another point to check is about the suitability to proceed with the consultations around these practical suggestions. Under-Secretary Renato Archer — It looks like the consultation should be preceded by a formal condemnation. Should Brazil, before declaring itself contrary, follow what others are doing might give the impression that we are willing to divide responsibilities.

Minister Carlos Duarte — Would appreciate it if Deputy Renato Archer were to provide clarification. Shall he speak now or during the Meeting.

Under-Secretary Renato Archer — This would indicate a type of behavior that would reward Brazil. At the time of President Jânio Quadros statements [they] took effect before any consultation. These statements strengthened Brazil’s position which was firm and of its own regarding the involved subjects. He can carry on his conversations on the basis of a position he already has. Trying to divide the responsibility with other countries will weaken our position.

Ambassador Dias Carneiro — I would like to say a few words about a legal question. To what extent are obligations and aspirations conceptually different when included in the same Treaty?

State Minister — Sometimes the distinction is very easy, sometimes it is not. It depends on the reason why the subject is formulated. For example, in the case of the Santiago’s Declaration it clearly enunciates that it covers aspiration. In the Rio de Janeiro Treaty it is an obligation. The OAS charter presents some doubts. Some subjects are explicit while others are dubious.
Brazil with regard to the different problems. I think that this government will obtain a good average.

State Minister – I think that rather than considering the Cuban problem as a separate issue we would profit by including it in the general picture of our position towards various other problems. We have some problems with France, Portuguese Africa, the Common Market and the Cuban problem should be dealt with by means of integrating same into these problems. The next point to withdraw is the final thought. It has more to do with the relation of the government towards public opinion than the relations between governments.

Ambassador Gibson – I consider Minister Maury’s statements worthy of the greatest consideration. I really think he offered a good contribution to the committee’s concerns. However, I would like to ask for permission to go back in time a bit regarding the Cuban problem, after having pondered his complete explanation of yesterday and recall what all of us still have on our minds but which, perhaps, may not always be remembered. We have gone through two essential phases concerning the Cuban problem: the first, which I would call the most constructive and positive one. The second, the one we are just facing, a negative and evasive phase. To conclude, I would propose that we tried to achieve or merge that second phase into the first or else, get back to the first stage.

At the beginning, the Cuban problem was just bilateral – between Cuba and the United States. There is no doubt about that and we, in Brazil, when the question arose, tried to situate it as such because we considered it to probably be the best way for an approach, with a view to find a positive and constructive solution for the problem. The United States always reacted and tried to deal with the problem in a continent-wide framework. In fact, it became a continental problem, not so much because of Cuba but by influence of the United States. After the failure of the invasion attempt the United States clearly understood that the only way to treat the problem was in a continent-wide manner. Thenceforth, by a strange coincidence, they started to note a flexibility among various American countries vis-a-vis Cuba.

From the moment on it became of continental interest it turned into a problem of diplomatic tactics for each country other than the United States. Today we are not in search of a solution for the Cuban problem, but a solution to the menace in the form of the crisis of the inter-American system, which is negative. It is of great importance but negative. At best, if we continue this line of reasoning we shall find a way to save the system and, at the same time we, Brazilians, will come honorably out of a situation which places us in a minor-ity position. This is a negative “optimum” because the real “optimum” is a solution for the Cuban problem.

If our efforts were towards forgetting the dazzling sensation we are feeling at present with these two problems of undeniable magnitude – the diplomatic situation in America and the public opinion about the impending menace to the American system – I would ask why we should not use some sunglasses to protect ourselves from the two suns and go back to a solution for the Cuban problem that might provide the key for both questions. I cannot assure that the answer will be affirmative but it would certainly be worth its try. There would at least be an advantage: it would demonstrate our seriousness concerning the subject. I would go as far as saying that in the present stage it would be a novelty. What in June and July was just common would now become a novelty: a country in America that was in fact looking for a solution of the Cuban problem rather than looking for the system’s solution as it stands now.

Minister of the State – What was the June or July solution?

Ambassador Gibson – Our line was turning around the feasibility getting the United States to accept intervention offered by these countries. It was not a good plan. My opinion was that the matter required a maximum of discretion and a modesty of any country's action before making approaches to the United States with a view of obtaining acceptance of the latter regarding an understanding with Cuba. Because the problem was located in Washington and not in Havana. It has always been the American government that demonstrated an attitude of intransigence in dealing with the problem. Until the invasion phase, even though the aggressive actions had started in Washington, it was more approachable than Havana.

It looked to me that a country like Brazil could, on that occasion, have presented an idea to the United States with regard to the problem that could have convinced some of its interest to solve the problem in such terms. For that purpose it was necessary for Brazil to refrain from any kind of publicity (the reverse of “OPA” [Operation Pan-America, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek's late 1950's proposal for hemispheric economic development—trans.]) trying its best to reach a solution for the problem. This for a simple reason. The State Department would never accept facing the public opinion with a confession that it had been lead by the Brazilian, Mexican, or Argentine diplomacy. The idea had to have had its origin in the United States. It had to be seen as a generous act by the United States. Around this point arose the action of Ecuador, Mexico, and Argentina which damaged the history a little bit. It was a matter of three countries and one of them being Ecuador, a country which lacks serious-
ness because of its involvement in a conflict with Peru, aside from playing a prestige game. Mexico did not accept much. Colombia was sympathetic. Argentina immediately brought in Brazil. Thereafter came Chile. There was a possibility to handle the question on that occasion. The idea of details was in mind at that time. We undertook conversations about this matter in detail like how negotiations between Cuba and the United States could materialize in regard with the expropriated domains, whether they would leave this for a system that would relapse into the Bogota Treaty.

I am not optimistic with regard to any success of a behavior within this line but it seems that we would not have much to lose if we considered the possibility of a conversation on this subject now, maybe only between ourselves and the United States. It does not look like an idea to be discarded without some examination. I am not too enthusiastic about it, though.

State Minister – It is a little overtaken by the events because at the stage when one thought that everything seemed to turn around a possible matter of re-absorption, so as if the problems were of indemnity for expropriation of confiscating nature or the absence of certain guarantees to private rights. Now everything denotes that we are dealing with an extra-hemisphere problem besides how Fidel Castro’s posture adjusted itself to such an American interpretation of the events. The core of your idea encloses two points that impressed me. You think we are leading to an evasive attitude. What is your understanding of it? Escaping from the Cuban problem means evading the same kind of problem of the hemisphere or evading the problem’s responsibility itself?

Ambassador Gibson – Evasion in two directions. Evasion because we are no longer looking for a solution to the problem as we think that the phase for a solution of the problem is too late. Also in the sense that being the minority within the organization we are seeking for the less unfavorable position for Brazil, in particular. To conclude, in my opinion, all that has happened in the last four months and culminating with Fidel Castro’s speech excluded almost irreplaceably a solution of the problem. I see the problem as a bilateral one: United States-Cuba. It is possible that such a position may not be feasible anymore. This is the way it placed itself towards the continental public opinion. It is very difficult to convince people that the problem does not concern the United States alone, but the hemisphere. If the United States succeeded in obtaining an agreement term with Cuba there would be no more problem in the hemisphere.

Ambassador Henrique Valle – The placing of the problem developed from a flexure to the establishment of a communist regime within the hemisphere. This is its present position at the consultative meeting. (I take the opportunity to say that the United States presented a memorandum stating that during that meeting the severance subject would not be considered.) We have just received from the Embassy of Bogota the American proposal ordering that relations be severed within 30 days if the OAS Council, after the Resolution is approved, does not state that it has returned to the system and has refrained from having relations of that sort with the Soviet bloc, etc. On the other side another proposal of various other countries orders that relations be severed immediately. (He reads the note.)

Ambassador Araújo Castro – I will try to summarize my impressions. I can understand Ambassador Gibson’s frustrations. We, at this stage, are no longer concerned with the solution of the Cuban problem but with a solution for the inter-American problem. More specifically, making use of a Brazilian diplomatic solution, not only with respect to what is of the latter’s interest but how we are to explain it to the public opinion which, in this case, is split. The matter is maximizing and in January the Cuban subject will become the great issue of the Brazilian politics. It is in fact impressive to note the problem of the left wing’s pressure in Brazil. It gives the impression that they are mobilized about the Cuban problem. The other subjects are of secondary importance. In the case of Goa, for example, the reaction was null. Even our abstention in the case of Argelia was unnoticed, which demonstrates the public opinion’s mobilization about the Cuban subject, be it the parliament or the press.

I go under the impression that it may be a personal reaction although I would rather place the Cuban problem within the Brazilian diplomatic field in order to explain our position. Evasion is unfeasible. The present situation does not belong to the past. There has been an invasion; there has been an American position which we all know will put an end to Fidel Castro.

State Minister – I was told by Ambassador Goodwin that he only believes in an internal revolution within the next six months.3

Ambassador Araújo Castro – The public opinion was poisoned by the State Department itself. The Department thinks to be a prisoner of pressure groups which he himself helped to create. The change of the American position in relation with Russia involves, at least, a political power game; as far as Cuba is concerned the problem is of an ideological nature
and a more serious one. On the other hand, we are well acquainted with the importance of semantics in the American politics. They are terrified of the word “revolution”. As a highly collectivized country they are horror-struck with the word “socialism”. The fact of Fidel Castro having characterized himself as a Marxist-Leninist regime has a fundamental relation in the United States. In my opinion, any possibility to attenuate the American position in respect with the Cuban problem seems non-existent. This being the case, in addition to the United States failing to assume any compromise of a non-violence method, makes it obvious that any mediation on our part would be fruitless, suspicious and would place us in a position where we would be left at the mercy of two groups: either the United States or Fidel Castro. I also consider the latter’s statement of the 3rd inst., as a desperate attempt to qualify the Cuban problem as a cold war and an East-West problem. It is not the case of having faith in what Russia is going to do but the lack of alternative. He thinks the American position heads toward invasion and not toward an unlimited confidence with regard to the efforts of Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, not only concerning its strength but also its stability. They think the problem should be situated as a cold war [problem] instead. Taking this smallest possibility into consideration we should reflect on the Brazilian position. I think we cannot have an evasive attitude. Our attitude should be firm and previously defined. We should arrive with a determined position. I would not, at this point, try a new attempt of approach with Cuba or United States. Not even sounding the matter out or trying a large diplomatic articulation against the project. I would declare to be against it and vote against it. As a matter of fact, I would neither assume total responsibility for the solution of the Cuban problem nor for the inter-American system in a case which seems already lost. I think this case will turn out badly for the Pan-American system.

State Minister – Do you think the inter-American system is finished off?

Ambassador Araújo Castro – That is what I think. We hold a solid position. Let us proclaim it to the countries that followed us without influencing to the point of a plot of conspiracy. Thus the Brazilian diplomacy would remain dissociated from the Cuban one. We would have no more contacts with them inasmuch as at this point mediation seems almost impossible. Furthermore, if we maintain coherence until the date I think we will be in a position to face the storm with the required serenity. Once resolved we would have complied with the determinations. Otherwise we would have failed to consider the Rio Treaty.

A statement trying to establish the Brazilian diplomatic concept should be considered as well. Under the guise of general action principles we could take advantage of the colonial question showing that the Brazilian diplomacy is all around independent. Intrinsically it does not seem the right time to concentrate the Brazilian position in face of the problem. By trying to conciliate and adjust a position we will reach but indecision which may create an accusation from either side. An accusation against Brazil from the State Department will produce large internal effects.

On the other hand, if we define that Brazil is against either the application of sanctions, or the severance, if voted against we shall comply with it while staying in a very safe position. However, shall we make any attempt of mediation it will result in our impairment, in our hesitation until the last moment and, thereafter, position ourselves so as to be hit by both sides.

State Minister – The problem is the following. I think that the moment we start taking a public attitude giving it all determination and a clear-cut characterization there are two or three matters on which we cannot fail to comments about.

One of them concerns the existence of the socialist regime clearly linked with the hemisphere. This, because by stating that we are against the application of sanctions, severance of relations, in favor of the ”status quo” maintenance is a position that no matter how much it may gain by its perseverance, by being clear and firm still opens a very large flank to inquiries that cannot remain without an answer. The Brazilian public opinion is completely convergent to the examination of the problem and will not fail to question us: your position is against the relations severance but what is your opinion? The more Marxist or Leninist the better? To what extent besides the manifestation of being against do our explanations have to go.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – I am under the impression that it would be vital that we reach a position about what we are going to do and enunciate it in the best possible manner. The emphasis given was against the thought that the diplomatic action is still possible. Maybe the opposite side has kind of exaggerated. It is not the fact that I do not consider Cuba as a real danger. My emphasis, however, is about the unfeasibility of an arbitrating action and about the excess of activities on our part.

State Minister – Do you think that in our clear statement we should also immediately say what we think of a communist country in the hemisphere?

Ambassador Araújo Castro – Yes, I do.
Ambassador Henrique Valle – We should clarify our position, make it really clear. We would as a first attempt find a neutralization. We should accept a socialist country within the continent and outside of the system. Otherwise, we have an open flank.

State Minister - It is time that we choose our enemies. I am making reference to the internal enemies. By means of taking from three to four positions, we should say who are the ones that shall throw the stones at us.

Ministry Maury Valente – It would be favorable to Brazil to guarantee a formula of declaring at once that Cuba is outside the inter-American system because it dissociated itself from the aspirations.

Ambassador Henrique Valle – Even the consequences of non-intervention lead us to admit it within the continent but outside the system.

State Minister – One thing is Brazil going to a conference ready to comply with its deliberations. The other is going to a conference where there is no longer any deliberation to be taken and where the proposal that has just been read is co-sponsored by 14 countries whereas our role is to offer our approval of the application to the system.

Ambassador Gibson – I think I need to make a clarification. I did not intend to say that we should, for example, start an offer of mediation to deal with the Cuban problem. I have no fancy optimistic ideas with regard to any success. But it is my opinion that we moved from the constructive to the negative phase. It was in this respect that I had requested your attention. The confirmation of this fact, when I mentioned a Brazilian conversation this year, is that I was thinking of a conversation between you and Rusk or with the ambassador here. I was not meant with a view of offering mediation or insinuating same but the statement must also be made to the United States. This bears a character of seriousness to the Brazilian politics and covers a certain field of repercussion of our attitude. Moreover, because what will be resolved will not present any solution to the Cuban problem.

State Minister – Ambassador Gibson would like to clarify that in case the proposal is approved, the very next day the Cuban problem would still be the same. The only thing we could think of it is that the resolution would have had the aim of placing Cuba even more outside the defense and more in defense of another action.

Ambassador Valle – This is the first step to agree with a collective action. Once the relations have been broken off the second step would be much easier.

Ambassador Gibson – We shall reach a situation where constructive and affirmative elements must be assembled and it seems to me that this is one of them. We shall reach a moment when we will have to give full explanation of our position because the military intervention does not solve the Cuban problem.

State Minister – The military intervention works as a power of great destruction. It will involve the overthrow of the Government, the defeat of a great number of party members. A slaughter always breaks a path to something. It would bring forth new problems because to massacre Cubans, causing the overthrow of the government by force, would create in other American countries totally incurable reactions of internal character. Each country's internal political fight will be exclusively marked by it. From the communist point of view it is the splitting being brought up and the transformation of the hemisphere political fight into an ideological fight.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – The communism in Latin America has never been a continental subject. However in this manner it would be converted into it. They are much more interested in a gradual and methodic penetration than in penetrating into Cuba where they know that the problem cannot last.

Ministry Maury Valente – The best would be that the inter-American system be prepared to accept an eventual existence of a Finland in the hemisphere.

Ambassador Dias Carneiro – I have some remarks: 1 – We cannot back out, especially of our non-intervention and self-determination with regard to Cuba. That seems totally impossible. 2 – We must recognize that the Cuban danger exists. 3 – We must give the Americans a pre-notice. 4 – In our consultative meeting we must take an affirmative and a drastic position of our disapproval of the Colombian proposal. 5 – Total repudiation, which already exists, to the pre-fabricated position. 6 – These are feasible positions before the Cuban revolution takes place and in case it gains a victory. In the case of a revolution the matter changes and maybe becomes different. In brief: unfeasibility of backing out of the
position we have taken; recognition of the Cuban problem; need of a pre-notice; our position would be of disapproval of the Colombian proposal and our repudiation to the pre-arranged solution for this meeting; need of neutralization of Cuba, that can be made through Cuba’s membership identification within the inter-American system.

State Minister – With regard to the pre-notice given to the United States, I go under the impression that what could most damage our relations would be the lack of such a pre-notice and taking them by surprise.

Ambassador Dias Carneiro – Also, the fact of not going to Washington and the lack of a pre-notice would be a hostile attitude.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – A vivid diplomatic articulation some days preceding the Conference would ruin our relations.

Ambassador Gibson – We have already fallen under this line.

Minister Carlos Duarte – I would like to make reference to the practical aspect of the subject as far as the facts we are facing are concerned. To my knowledge there has been no open dialogue so far with the North Americans and Colombians in objective and practical terms. We shall not forget that, whether we are willing to or not, we will have to face these resolution drafts that will be voted at Punta del Este. Thus I would ask whether it would not be a more tactical attitude, instead of ignoring it, that we try to talk with the Colombians and the American in objective terms, stating that we were unable to give our approval for one or another reason.

State Minister – This will lead us to end up agreeing with something.

Minister Carlos Duarte – Argentina itself, according to a memorandum that has been given to us and which was presented by Frondizi to the Canadians offers a series of suggestions (he reads the memorandum).

Ambassador Henrique Valle – I would like to ask whether I can talk with Goodwin who is going to have lunch with me now and inquire if he has knowledge of said memorandum.

Ambassador Gibson – Is there any general consensus about it being suitable that we comply with the resolutions that will adopted?

State Minister – I make a distinction.

Ambassador Henrique Valle – If we do not comply with it the inter-American system ends by being “de juris.”

State Minister – I make distinction between the fact of going to a consultation at which we make deliberations and reach a conclusion, in which we are a defeated vote, and going to a pre-fabricated conference. The Rio Treaty only admits a two-thirds rule for the unchained or imminent aggression. The simple fact of coming with a resolution that within the next 30 days....proves that we are misusing the Treaty.

Ambassador Gibson – I do not say we should not comply but I preliminarily am of the opinion that we should not let our conversations with the United States demonstrate our conviction that we shall comply with what is approved. We shall leave the greatest doubt in this respect.

State Minister – Anyway, we must keep in mind that we have to protect the position in the most dramatic manner.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – We are reaching the time when we either internally or through our declaration at the Chancellors Conference shall use rather hard words with Fidel Castro. I believe we can no longer ignore the communist regime characterization and, maybe this is the moment to undertake a position against violence as far as Cuba is concerned.

Ambassador Leão Moura – I agree with the general consensus about the position that Brazil shall adopt. I was very concerned with the pre-notice. This has already been asserted by you. I consider it essential that they might not be taken by surprise. With regard to the matter that Ambassador Araújo Castro has just mentioned about our statement concerning Fidel Castro, I think there is a need for a more explicit declaration.

Ambassador Henrique Valle – I would like to go back to what Minister Maury Valente said with regard to the statement about external politics. I do not say it should necessarily be made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It could eventually be taken over by the President of the Cabinet. A statement about this matter by the prime minister is also missing.

State Minister – I am sure that the prime minister will accept that suggestion and shall make a speech, however, our line of conduct has been to attract on us the problems of external politics. The President of the Cabinet has already a great problem on his shoulders which is to support the govern-
ment. He cannot take a position. We have no interest in
having him make a statement that may possibly reduce the
cabinet’s political support basis. This is our conduct in case
relations will be re-established. We succeeded in avoiding
that the criticism raised by the re-establishment of relations
was divulged to the cabinet. It remained confined. There
was a proposal to take a censorship motion to the minister
of foreign relations but at no time any one thought about
including the image of the prime minister and the cabinet
as a whole. This makes sense at a time like the one we have
to face. On the other hand, the president of the Republic
cannot make statements in that respect, going beyond his
constitutional limitations. I think I will have to make such a
statement myself.

Ambassador Dias Carneiro - In this respect you mentioned
before that it is suitable to know from where we shall expect
the stones to be thrown at us. Is it appropriate to have a few
or many stones thrown at us?

Ambassador Henrique Valle – The best would be a few stones
coming from the same direction.

State Minister – Ours is a critical situation. In regard
with the Brazilian external politics our position is more
or less the following: we do not have restrictions inside
the army. I have carried on conversations with General
Segadas Vianna, with the Minister of the Navy and with
some Admirals and have also had some contacts with the
Air Force through General Travassos and two or three
other Generals. The re-establishment of relations did
not produce a negative effect within the military forces.
Amidst the people the external policy is well accepted.
It is not very popular because the Quadros government
was a more admired one. Today the external policy lacks
an interpreter with the needed positive reputation in the
country. President João Goulart is not in charge of the
external policy. Tancredo Neves has been very careless in
the external policy. And, as far as I am concerned, due to
the fact that the position of the minister of foreign affairs
is rather limited and also because I am not much that type
of a statesman. I am known as a man with positions skills
rather than one who formulates positions.

Ministry Maury Valente – Would there be any interest for
taking a firm position with regard to characterizing the inter-
American crisis? Stating that the inter-American right is
incapable to face the situation would be a legal argumentation
that might penetrate well.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – We lack the courage of failure.
It is the government’s general intention by reason of internal
political convenience to consider that certain politics was a
success when this was not the case. I do not consider it inop-
portune to state that we are concerned about it, that we have
no glimpse of a solution.

State Ministry – Our victory will consist of gradually giving
up such a success towards the public opinion. This was the
Jânio Quadros government pattern which I feel was sometimes
impressing because once in a while this success corre-
sponds to a wrong demeanor. It does not represent a reward
for good politics. The great advantage for us was to have our
self-respect being flattered a little bit.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – It is not the purpose that is
important but the means. If there would not exist the least
of opinion’s support regarding a determined type of politics
there would be no support to achieve such a politics.

State Minister – What we have to consider with respect to
the consultative meeting is giving the impression of great
determination. We cannot hesitate about anything even
though such a resoluteness may cause us to face a decrease in
popularity. No need to say that it must remain within the
bounds of safety, beyond which our government may sink.
However, always aware that our position must bear a charac-
ter of determination.

Summarizing our conversation, the following ideas are worth
being considered:
We shall completely give up the idea of an elaboration
through consultations. We have to develop our own lines
and stipulate them with our particular moral and political
authority;
Make sure that such a line be no surprise to either Cuba or
the United States or even to Brazil. Consequently, it cannot
be elaborated for presentation on a given date but must be
made apparent and face any and even a prior criticism impact
that it might arise.

Minister Carlos Duarte – My intervening was just with the
purpose of pursuing a line of frankness.

State Minister – Another point is that in that statement we
shall preferably seek for a general solution. We shall not only
position ourselves with regard to Cuba. We shall situate the
matter within the general picture of the Brazilian external
politics and clearly show that one part suggests the other.
Ambassador Araújo Castro – In our statement, possibly by means of a newspaper interview, there would be no need for a specific backing up of the enclosed draft because some of these drafts are trusted to diplomatic means. However, a definition of Brazil in Montevideo will maintain the principle of non-intervention.

State Minister – I am considering some kind of statement that may extend itself to the point of containing the analysis of all that has been presented at the consultative meeting and not the solution of the problem. I think that such a thesis is too strong and, consequently, we cannot give our authority’s support to a certain amount of measures which in itself do not hold any outcome as this runs the risk of only being a stage before something else comes up. We would be heading towards giving the American politics a continental ideological theme which the communist propaganda failed to offer. We are not evading from sanctioning Fidel Castro in a strong manner. It is not our intention to act as his body-guards. What we are doing is to be aware that an inaccurately performed surgery in that spot will open a new incurable problem of large proportions.

Ambassador Araújo Castro – Something that must be stated with special care is the idea about the external politics problem. In fact, problems are more serious now than a year ago. At that time we were in the stage of principles enunciation while now everything deals with making use of such principles. The Jânio Quadros Government did not really have an external politics problem except the matter of Santa Maria.


1 This Punta del Este gathering followed a separate OAS foreign ministers’ gathering at the Uruguayan resort, in the summer of 1961, at which Washington presented its plans for the Alliance for Progress.


4 Kennedy had recently visited Venezuela and Columbia.

Chile and Brazilian Mediation during the Cuban Missile Crisis:
Secret Documents from the Foreign Ministry Archives in Santiago

Documents obtained and translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer

In the three documents which follow, obtained by Tanya Harmer from the Chilean foreign ministry archives in Santiago, the Chilean embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported on a mysterious “mediation” effort undertaken by the Brazilian Government at the climax of the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹ In particular, Brazil’s president, João Goulart, dispatched his top military aide, Gen. Albino Silva, to Cuba on 29 October 1962, a day after Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed under American pressure to withdraw the nuclear missiles deployed to the island. During his two-day stay in Havana, Gen. Silva met with a variety of figures, including Fidel Castro and UN Secretary General U Thant (then on his own visit to Cuba), but what, if anything, he accomplished on his mission remained unknown. Sharing the widespread puzzlement on what had prompted Goulart to attempt this diplomatic intervention into a global crisis, Chile’s ambassador quoted newspaper editorials ridiculing the government for a pointless, futile, and misguided exercise, and clearly indicated his own skepticism toward the action. What the Chilean and most other observers (especially diplomats, including the British ambassador, who cabled London with a comparably skeptical report²) did not know was that Washington had secretly requested that Brazil send an emissary to Castro, to carry a proposition—evict the Soviets and good consequences would follow, including a welcome back into hemispheric institutions (Cuba had been effectively sanctioned by the Organization of American States at the January 1962 Punta del Este conference) and a lifting of the economic and political isolation campaign by the United States. Though the Brazilians were supposed to convey this offer on their own authority, it had in fact been fashioned in Washington, and delivered to Brazil’s prime minister (and acting foreign minister), Hermes Lima, on Saturday night, October 27, by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon (before Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles the next morning). Although the role undoubtedly suited Brazil’s belief that it deserved to play a major role in world affairs—and in the United Nations the country had promoted a scheme to denuclearize Latin America (and possibly Africa as well) as a method to defuse the crisis—in this case, it was seeking to cooperate with the North American power with whom it had sometimes uneasy relations, and was willing to endure a modicum of diplomatic discomfort in the process. The Kennedy Administration’s secret use of Brazil to indirectly and circuitously send a proposition to Fidel Castro remained hidden until it emerged in declassified documents and was described by historians decades later.

★★★★

Document No. 1
Telegram from Chilean Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Ruiz Solar), 1 November 1962

REPUBLIC OF CHILE
Ministry of Foreign Relations.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
9184
From Rio de Janeiro
Mr Minister of Foreign Relations
Santiago, Chile

Nº 303
1 November 1962 -

Fulfilling instructions of your telegram No. 183, I met with heads of Itamaraty [Brazilian foreign ministry—ed.] who agreed [that it was] necessary to keep close information and exchange points of view on the Cuban case as they have done so far in all the international problems, also adding: Brazil will maintain [its] proposal before the United Nations for the denuclearization of Africa and Latin America, [with] the assurance [that it] will obtain approval by a large majority.

SECOND. - Questioned about true reach of the so-called “Brazilian mediation” led by General Albion [Albino Silva], [the military] Representative [of] President [João] Goulart, I have been informed that it consisted of the following: a) Demilitarization of Cuba to the point of eliminating offensive weapons and limiting defensive ones; b) Prohibition of ideological exportation from Cuba; c) Acceptance of the installation
THIRD - When asking him whether these statements coincided exactly with the United Nations Secretary General’s effort they recognized in a confidential manner that the Brazilian effort did not exactly constitute a mediation but rather straightforward support for U Thant’s intervention.

FOURTH - They also told me that Brazil maintains its decision not to break relations with Cuba, but that if that Government does not accept the dismantling of bases, [Brazil] will support immediate employment of armed force in accordance with article eight of the Rio Treaty (TIAR [Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca]).

As a result of prolonged conversations I was able to verify that [the] Government is maneuvering [this] so-called “mediation” in order to impress on public opinion the “important action and global position [of] Brazil,” consequently diverting accusations of [a] weakly defined policy [regarding] the Cuban case. - [MARCELO] RUIZ SOLAR.-

[Source: Archivo General Historico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile. Obtained by Tanya Harmer and translated by Eduardo Baudet and Harmer.]

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Document No. 2

Telegram from Chilean Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Ruiz Solar), 8 November 1962

Chilean Embassy

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Political Affairs

Beginning and end of Brazil’s “mediation” in the Caribbean

Rio de Janeiro, 8 November 1962

Confidential

No. 1342/63

Minister:

The whole big display of publicity, classified by one commentator as diplomatic pyrotechnics, with regards to the so-called “mediation” of Brazil in the Caribbean crisis, has had fleeting existence.

The personal representative that President [João] Goulart sent to Havana to “act at the same time with the United Nations Secretary General [U Thant] and with Fidel Castro himself” has returned very discreetly, trying to explain that his action was the result of the “opportunity that presented itself, but that – given the international situation – [we lacked] the background information on Brazilian diplomacy that it [is] the custom to examine in crisis moments.” With those expressions, General Albino Silva makes an unquestionable reference to the surprise that the announcement of his trip received, even though within government circles, efforts to send some experienced diplomat to Havana for this type of negotiations were already known beforehand.

In his desire to define the reach of his effort more precisely, General Albino [Silva] has officially explained that “the exact meaning of the mission carried out by Brazil in Havana was to move the problem of military action into the sphere of the United Nations.” He added that in order to avoid his action having the character of mediation, he had separate conversations with U Thant, Fidel Castro, and [Cuban] Foreign Minister Raul Roa and that, thanks to the idea that exists with respect to Brazil, due to the coherence of its attitudes in the international organizations defending principles and not systems, the reception of its action by Cuba and by the Secretary General of the UN was made a lot easier.

His satisfaction at the accomplished work was illustrated by the humorous remark he made when he arrived [saying] that he brought “the World Cup of Diplomacy,” adding that “he came very impressed with U Thant, who heard me lecture for one hour without even blinking or saying anything, with an impassivity to be expected of an oriental.”

The apparent frivolity of this oficio [report] is born of the lack of importance that the return of President Goulart’s personal representative has had, following the rousing announcements by the press about the Brazilian action to save world peace. Moreover, as one can gather from the editorial from the “Estado de Sao Paulo,” one of the most prestigious journals in Brazil, the fact that the intervention of General Albino did not achieve the impact that was expected is not being hidden. This editorial contains the following:

“Brazilians should reflect before forming an opinion about facts that have been built up around the Government’s action in relation to the international crisis provoked by the Cuban case.

We understand the unease with which the readers of newspapers are made aware, upon opening the pages of their preferred newspaper, to keep up to date with the news, of actions and official expressions which in all honesty the [several words illegible—trans.] to its sisters of the Continent, but
that it perseveres in acting against the legitimate and general interests of the Hemisphere.

The political primacy of the improvised governors responsible for the awkward position in which Brazil was placed in that encounter is not denied. The verbal intemperance of the Prime Minister [Hermes Lima] in affronting the national conscience with expressions that run contrary to traditional beliefs of the country is not debated. Even less is the insufficiency unacknowledged, of those that, in the circumstances, thought to assume the direction of Brazilian diplomacy and extend the definition of our international political diplomacy precisely at the moment when facts served to undermine their assurances and prove their obvious unimportance. That – political primacy, the verbal intemperance, the insufficiency – is what in the first place clashes with the sensibility of those who are made aware of such a lamentable path of events. This is already a lot, but at the same time it still falls short of explaining the enormity of the ‘gaffe’ made by the Brazilian Government, taking [an] initiative without anyone asking it to and without any prior consultation with anyone, of proposing ‘mediation’ with Fidel Castro, in the reaffirmation of the curious doctrine of the self-determination of dictators [so that they can] bloodily enslave the people – with the goal of solving a conflict between the United States and Russia: The whole world smiled at such a provincial presumption. However, in official declarations that represent a humorous spark in an uneasy international moment, the President of the Republic declared himself to be euphoric and proud of the success in Havana, of General Albino Silva, his special envoy, in the efficient leveling of the terrain for the salvation of world peace, giving pause to two formidable giants in dispute.**

Another important and circulated publication, “O Globo,” comments on the mission in the following terms:

“All the movement of our diplomacy, if we consider a call by [Yugoslav leader] Marshal [Josip Broz] Tito that was made to Brazil, when a circular went out to all countries that claim to be ‘neutral,’ seemed without content. If we went to ask for the dismantling of the nuclear bases that Russia had already agreed to withdraw, we went through an open door. From that simple withdrawal one cannot deduce that Cuba will reintegrate itself within the democratic coexistence of the Continent. This would only result from a consultation with the people – similar to what the President of the Republic wants to do – as to whether it accepts or rejects Castro’s regime. Since this one [Castro] does not admit international organizations’ scrutiny even over the withdrawal of the nuclear bases, he will surely reject an identical evaluation process over a possible plebiscite …

Therefore, ‘what did we go to do in Cuba, with a special emissary of the President of the Republic?’”

Nothing.

It was not worth the effort that Itamaraty prepared itself for angrily, launching a discharge as occurs after a great diplomatic feat in war or in peace… Pyrotechnic diplomacy, to fool the idiots. That is what we have done in this entire episode.***

** Be what they may, the commentaries about “Brazilian mediation to save world peace,” objective or exaggerated, the truth is that General Albino Silva’s trip to Havana has had a silent official epilogue, born out of the laconic communiqué delivered after the representative gave [his] account of his mission: “The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister received General Albino Silva returning from Havana. The Head of the Military Office [“Casa Militar”] of the Presidency reported on the conversations in that capital with the Head of the Cuban Government and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. The Brazilian government trusts that the serious situation that concerns us all will find a solution in the realm of the UN. The international organization, where all the parties directly interested are gathered, has all the elements to bring about the negotiations that are deemed indispensable on good terms.”

God save you.

Marcelo Ruiz Solar
Ambassador of Chile

[Source: Archivo General Histórico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile. Obtained by Tanya Harmer, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Harmer.]

★★★★

Document No. 3

Telegram from Chilean Embassy in Río de Janeiro (Ruiz Solar), 17 November 1962

REPUBLIC OF CHILE
Ministry of Foreign Relations.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
9607
From Río de Janeiro
Mr. Minister of Foreign Relations
Santiago de Chile -

No. 321
17 November 1962.-
[Not] Finding the Foreign Minister and concurrently Prime Minister [Hermes Lima] in Brazil, [and in] fulfillment of instructions in your telegram no. 203, I met with Undersecretary [Carlos A.] Bernardes whom I made aware of all your arguments and observations. He answered in the following way:

FIRST.- He finds great similarity in proposals contained [in] your telegram with [regards to] points of view held permanently by Brazil as well as with the current efforts of [U] Thant which, according to reports in his possession, is on its way to being accepted.;

SECOND.- According to the Undersecretary, Thant’s proposal mainly consists in establishing permanent inspection in Cuba by representatives of neutral countries chosen by the Cuban Government.

THIRD. - He believes that Castro’s government has no other alternative other than accepting the aforementioned proposal.

FOURTH.- He qualified your proposal as “very good” and added that he inclines towards collective action through a separate note of equal tenor to the one you propose. However, he stated his opinion needed to be confirmed by that of the Minister who would later call Brasilia, promising to give me his answer as soon as possible.

FIFTH.- He ended by telling me that, should the effort be accomplished, very careful language would need to be employed, given Castro’s arrogant character.

He referred to letter g) of your proposal the text of which I previously paraphrased and had left in his possession, that in his view could be considered a veiled threat. The rest of the text in principal did not merit observations for him. I will keep you informed. RUIZ SOLAR

[Source: Archivo General Histórico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile. Obtained by Tanya Harmer, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Harmer.]

Notes

1  On this episode, see James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,” parts 1-2, Journal of Cold War Studies 6:2 (Spring 2004), pp. 3-20, and 6:3 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-67.