Deng may have had something more philosophical in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the daily output of the historians. This section of the Bulletin aims to provide enough archival material for historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation between the two communist powers and the emergence of tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China is best remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be neglected.

Within weeks of the conversation from which the epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideological jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin’s “gray cardinal.” And Deng always gave as good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, Zhou, and, Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng.2 Vlad Zubok, in an insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the Soviet “older brother” may have saved his life when the Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian’s “Rejoinder” only strengthens this impression, while providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 and 1963 talks, together with six memoranda of conversations between Deng and Soviet representatives, are excerpted in this Bulletin. Additional materials can be found at the CWIHP website: cwihp.si.edu.

The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will.3 Although the Soviet Union was well enough informed about affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly released materials are only now making clear the depth of division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid.

Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with China is it impossible on the grounds that we have divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are identical with America, England, France and India to allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws the experts from China and doesn’t transfer technology, while sending experts to India and giving technology. So what if China doesn’t have experts? Will people die, I don’t believe it.

Ho’s reaction was: “That’s a pretty strong statement.”4 In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that “speaking as one Communist to another,” a full break between the parties was not a possibility.5 But what does this divergence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the disastrous famine that accompanied the “Great Leap Forward” and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of China’s dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate policy, despite Mao’s rancor and radicalism. If this is indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But only additional documentation, especially from the Chinese side, can answer these critical questions.

The search for a current of moderation in a period usually identified with deepening estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An October 1997 gathering on “Sino-Soviet Relations and the

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**In Memoriam:**

**Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War**

*In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and history, which makes the final conclusions.*

General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S.V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)
Cold War” (see conference schedule below) of Russian, Chinese, West European and American scholars in Beijing focused on new documentation, both Russian and Chinese, that made it possible to identify smaller positive eddies and swirls amidst the generally accepted trends of Sino-Soviet divergence. Similarly, the January 1996 CWIHP conference in Hong Kong examined documents from the early 1950s, the heyday of Sino-Soviet friendship, and found grounds for incipient strife.  

Document-based studies can also help us to draw a detailed and more human portrait of a giant of the twentieth century. What is certain is that the history of the Cold War will not be complete without an archive-based biography of Deng Xiaoping. CWIHP, together with all scholars of the Cold War and China, looks forward to the speedy release and publication of Deng-related materials by the appropriate PRC “units” with actual archival access, especially the Central Archives with their holdings of CCP documents. CWIHP is continuing its collection of materials from which to piece together the lifework of Deng Xiaoping and hopes that readers with such documents will forward copies to the Project.

1 TsKhSD (Tsentral’noe khranilishche sovremennoi dokumentatsii) [Central Repository for Contemporary Documentation], f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 255.
2 Kang Sheng’s diatribe against the Soviet treatment of Stalin is probably the most powerful piece of oratory in this Bulletin.
4 See Yang Kuisheng “Toward the Breakdown, 1960-3,” p.5 (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997)).
5 See Odd Arne Westad, “Who Killed the Alliance?” pp. 7-8. (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War” (Beijing, 1997).
6 More on this can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 and 8-9, where the Russian version of a message from Mao to Stalin (2 October 1950) suggests great tensions in the earliest phases of the Korean War, a supposed highpoint of socialist internationalism. The previously accepted Chinese version, claiming identity of views on the sending of “volunteers” to Korea, now appears to have been a draft telegram never sent. Only declassification of the document and examination of its archival context can clarify this contradiction further.

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Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War
An International Symposium Sponsored by
The Cold War International History Project, The Wilson Center; Institute of Contemporary China, CASS;
Center for Oriental History Research, Chinese Association of Historians; Fairbank Center, Harvard University
22-25 October 1997, Beijing

Wednesday, October 22, 1997
Brief Introduction of Conference Organization
SHEN ZIHHUA (Director, Center for Oriental History Research)
DAVID WOLFF (Director, The Cold War International History Project)

Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations
Speakers: LI LIAN, ANATOLII HAZONOV, WARREN COHEN, YAN MINGFU, WU LENGXI, HUANG HUA, ZHU RUIZHEN

The Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance
DIETER HEINZIG (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Germany)  
The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources
SHEN ZIHHUA (Center for Oriental History Research)  
The Signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1950 and Soviet Strategic Aims in the Far East
XUE XIANTIAN (Modern History Institute, CASS)  
Soviet Strategy toward Xinjiang during the Postwar Period
LEONID NEZHINSKI (Russian History Institute, Russian Academy of Science)  
The Changing Theoretical Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War

Discussants: LIU GUOXIN (Institute of Contemporary China);
VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

Thursday, October 23, 1997
Sino-Soviet Economic Relations
WILLIAM KIRBY (Harvard University)  
China, the Soviet Union, and East Europe: Trade Relations
ZHANG SHUGUANG (University of Maryland)
Western Economic Embargo against China and Sino-Soviet Relations

LEONID SHIRKORAD (St. Petersburg State University)
The Cold War and Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s

DISCUSSANTS: LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science);
ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)

International Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations

KATHRYN WEATHERSBY (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC)
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Korean War

LI DANHUI (Institute of Contemporary China)
Sino-Soviet Relations and China’s ‘Assist Vietnam and Resist America’

HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College)
China and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962

CHEN DONGLIN (Institute of Contemporary China)
China’s Responses to the Soviet Union’s Military Interventions in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia: A Comparative Study

DISCUSSANTS: CHEN JIAN (Southern Illinois University)
BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

Friday, October 24, 1997

Changing Relations Between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s

MIKHAIL PROZUMENCHIKOV (Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents, Moscow)
The Year 1960 as Viewed by Soviet and Chinese Leaders

NIU JUN (American Studies Institute, CASS)
Changing Chinese Policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cultural Revolution

ANATOLII HAZONOVO (Oriental Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)
Soviet Policy toward China during the Khrushchev Period

LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science)
Reflections on the Beginning of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

DISCUSSANTS: LI JINGJIE (Institute of East European and Central Asian Studies, CASS)
ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Chinese and Soviet Leaders and Sino-Soviet Relations

ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)
Mao Zedong and Sino-Soviet Relations

VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)
Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split

WILLIAM TAUBMAN (Amherst College)
Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations

DISCUSSANTS: HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College); YANG KUSONG (Institute of Modern History, CASS)

Saturday, October 25, 1997

Sino-Soviet Split and the Cold War

LI JIE (CCP Central Institute of Documents)
The Origins, Process and Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Polemic Debate

ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)
Who Killed the Alliance? An Account of Politics, Hunger, and Refugees

YANG KUSONG (Modern History Institute, CASS)
The Path toward the Split: How the CCP Leadership Dealt with the Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations, 1961-63

BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Institute, Russian Academy of Science)
The Sino-Soviet Split in the Environment of the Cold War

DISCUSSANTS: LI HAIWEN (CCP Central Institute of Documents); DAVID WOLFF (Cold War International History Project)
“Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!”

Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1963

by Vladislav M. Zubok

In November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, a high-level Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow to take part in a major conference of communist parties that was convened by Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev to grant a new international legitimacy to his leadership, which had already weathered years of domestic power struggle following Stalin’s death. In Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s entourage were CC CCP [Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party] general secretary Deng Xiaoping; director of the CC Central Administrative Office, Yang Shangkun; Mao’s political secretary Hu Qiaomu; Defense Minister and Vice-Premier of the State Council Peng Dehuai; interpreter Li Yueran, and physician Dr. Li Zhisui. To the West the Communist reunion in Moscow looked like an ominous triumph of enemy forces, bent on expansion and untroubled by inner rifts. In reality, the rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese leadership was already in progress.

American journalist Harrison Salisbury, who interviewed Chinese veterans about this episode, writes that it was the first time Deng handled such a role and he “proved tireless in fighting for Mao’s position.” Deng Xiaoping was the Chinese representative on the ten-nation committee that drafted the conference’s final manifesto. “China swept the day,” Salisbury’s Chinese sources told him. “Mao Zedong was never to forget this. It caused him to brag about his ‘little guy’ to Khrushchev—the man who ... bested Mikhail Suslov, the tall Soviet ideologue.”1

Future biographers of Deng Xiaoping will have to pay more attention to his prominent role in the drama of the Sino-Soviet split.2 New evidence from Eastern-bloc archives reveals that Deng earned many of his stripes in the ideological struggle for preeminence between Mao Zedong and Moscow. Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi alternated as ideological spokesmen in the relationship with Soviet leaders. The performance in November 1957 was one of Deng’s first exploits in the Sino-Soviet ideological competition. His last was his face-off with the Soviets as the head of a Chinese delegation at the Sino-Soviet consultations on 5-20 July 1963.3 After that, the tenuous dialogue between the two communist powers degenerated into polemical brawl. Between these two dates were several significant episodes, including Deng’s participation in the Beijing “summit” between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev in July-August 1958, and his participation in the Conference of the communist and workers’ parties in Moscow in November 1960.

As Mao Zedong passed from cautious partnership with the Kremlin to greater assertiveness, tension, and open rivalry, Deng’s political star continued to rise. He performed his job of ideological “terrier” well: he challenged the Soviets, teased them, and knocked them off balance with a dazzling array of arguments. Besides ideological recriminations about who better interpreted Marxism-Leninism, Deng skillfully found “soft” spots in the Soviet armor, episodes of post-Stalin foreign policy and events inside the communist camp that deeply disturbed and even inwardly split Moscow echelons of power.

In this article I will trace Deng’s role as Mao’s agent in struggling for China’s equal place and then for ideological supremacy in the communist camp. I will also compare the emerging evidence on the main events in Sino-Soviet relations in 1956-63 and the way Deng interpreted them in his polemics with the Soviets in July 1963. I will also reflect on the place of this episode in Deng’s political biography.

The prelude to the story is Deng’s two visits to Moscow in 1956. The first visit was in February 1956, when Deng Xiaoping and Zhu De attended the 20th CPSU congress at which Khrushchev denounced I. V. Stalin in a “secret speech” and declared that two systems, capitalist and socialist, could coexist and a world war was no longer inevitable.4 In his memoirs, Shi Zhe, an interpreter to the Chinese delegation at the congress, recalls that the Chinese were not invited to the closed session where Khrushchev made his famous speech, but the Soviet leader provided them with a copy of its transcript on the next day.

The Chinese delegation discussed the speech and was not quite sure how to react. It was Deng Xiaoping who emphasized that Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin was not an “internal matter” of the CPSU, but had “an international impact,” and therefore it warranted extreme caution. He then refrained from further comments on the speech until the delegation returned to Beijing to report to Mao Zedong. In the following months dramatic international events demonstrated the correctness of Deng’s first reaction.5 Through luck and political acumen, Deng Xiaoping began his perilous walk across the egg-shells of de-Stalinization.

The second visit was in October 1956, when Deng Xiaoping together with Liu Shaoqi participated in Sino-Soviet consultations on the revolutions in Poland and Hungary. It was a key turning point in the history of Sino-Soviet relations after Stalin’s death, because for the first time the Chinese leadership was able to play the role of mediator between the Big Brother and its clients in Eastern Europe. For my knowledge of this episode and Deng’s role in it, I am greatly indebted to Canadian historian Leo Gluchowski, and particularly to American-Chinese

3 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
The notes of the head of the CC CPSU General Department Vladimir Malin on the discussions in the Kremlin reveal that Soviet leaders, even after they returned from Poland and the face-off between Khrushchev and Gomulka, contemplated military pressure and insisted that Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, - the Soviet citizen installed by Moscow after World War Two as Polish Defense Minister whose ouster the Polish communists had demanded - should remain the head of the Polish army. Also the CC Presidium discussed inviting to Moscow “representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria.”

However, the Polish leadership managed to appeal to the Chinese behind the Soviets back with a plea to intercede and prevent a possible Soviet military intervention. Later, after the fact, Mao Zedong asserted that “the CCP categorically rejected the Soviet proposal [for intervention] and attempted to put forward the Chinese position directly by immediately sending a delegation to Moscow with Liu Shaoqi at its head.” Mao blamed the crisis in Poland on the tendency toward “great power chauvinism” in Moscow that repeated the worst patterns of Stalin’s behavior from many, including himself, had suffered so much in the past. The Chinese leaders told the Polish ambassador in Beijing on October 27 that “between 19-23 October a CCP delegation...in Moscow convinced Khrushchev about the correctness of the political changes in Poland” and warned him that the use of military force would represent a return to the same Stalinist methods that Khrushchev had repudiated.

There is still ambiguity regarding the exact timetable and details of Sino-Soviet consultations on the Polish, and particularly on the Hungarian crises. It is not clear why the Polish ambassador was misled about the dates of the Chinese delegation’s stay in Moscow; actually it arrived on October 23, shortly after noon and stayed there until the late evening of October 31. Deng Xiaoping was still number two there after Liu Shaoqi who was considered a key ideologue and theoretician of communist bloc affairs. The rest of the delegation included lower-ranking officials Wang Jiaxiang and Hu Qiaomu, as well as interpreter Shi Zhe (Karskii). Khrushchev met the delegation at Vnukovo airport outside Moscow and already in the car began to talk with them about the Polish situation. The Malin notes mention only Liu by name, but according to Shi Zhe also Deng Xiaoping and other members of the Chinese delegation were invited to several sessions of the CC Presidium on 24, 26, the evening of 30 and the night of 30-31 October. On October 29 a crucial round of consultations took place between the Chinese and Khrushchev, Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin at Stalin’s former dacha (Lipki) near Moscow. It was there first, Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, that “we agreed upon a common opinion not to use our force” in Hungary. Liu and Deng maintained regular radio-communications with Mao Zedong in Beijing.

On October 29-30, according to the Malin notes and Shi Zhe, the Chinese pushed the Russians to accept the five principles of Pancha Shila, namely equality and mutual noninterference between states (as postulated by Indian Premier J. Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai), as a new basis for relations between the USSR and its allies. After reporting on the situation in Hungary, Khrushchev informed the Presidium about his (and Molotov’s) talks with “the Chinese comrades” and told them: “We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people’s democracy” if they demand it, and “the entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position.” After the declaration was drafted, the Chinese delegation, according to Shi Zhe, joined the session and approved of its text and publication.

The Chinese sources indicate that the Chinese changed their position from nonintervention to interventionist right at the moment when the Soviets agreed with their previous stand. As Chen Jian reconstructs these events on the basis of Chinese memoirs, “on the evening of October 30, after receiving a report from Liu and Deng Xiaoping from Moscow that the Soviet leaders were planning to withdraw their troops from Hungary, Mao Zedong chaired a meeting of top CCP leaders, which made the decision to oppose Moscow’s abandoning of Hungary to the reactionary forces.” The reversal of the Chinese position on Hungary most likely happened very late on October 30. Shi Zhe’s memoirs and the Malin notes suggest that there was an urgent night session of the Presidium with the Chinese. At first Pavel Iudin, the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, informed the Presidium members about “negotiating with the Chinese comrades,” then “Com. Liu Shaoqi indicate[ed] on behalf of the CPC CC that [Soviet] troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest.” Shi Zhe’s dramatic description of this event has Deng Xiaoping making three proposals to the Soviets: the Soviet army should not withdraw from Hungary, everything should be done to help the loyal Hungarian communists to resume political control and, together with the Soviet military, restore order. Deng stressed that the Soviet troops had a chance “to play a model role, demonstrating true proletarian internationalism.”

Later Mao Zedong (and the Chinese leadership along with him) and Khrushchev greatly diverged in the reconstruction of these events. Khrushchev in his memoirs did not make a single mention of the Chinese factor when he described the Polish events, and when he came to the Hungarian events he insisted that the intervention in Hungary was his own decision, taken in a sleepless night after serious brooding. After that, he claims, he convened an emergency session of the CC Presidium, announced his new decision and made all present go to Vnukovo airport to inform the Chinese delegation about the Soviet decision to intervene.

The differences between the Chinese and Soviet versions of that momentous discussion were not fortuitous. They, as well as zigzags in both sides’ positions on
Hungary, could be explained and understood only if we look at them from within the world in which the participants themselves lived and thought. In this world each side maneuvered with a careful eye on three factors — one was the legacy of Stalin, the embodiment of power and unity of the communist camp; another was the power struggle inside Moscow and Beijing; the third was the emerging struggle between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev for seniority and revolutionary legitimacy within the communist world. Mao Zedong had been outraged when Khrushchev in February had denounced Stalin without consulting the Chinese leadership. Mao realized, to his extreme displeasure, that this funny, bald-headed Soviet leader had just undercut his, Mao’s, intention to turn Stalin into a pedestal for his seniority in the world communist movement — while building his own legitimacy as a paragon of de-Stalinization. From 1956, Mao began to regard himself as the potential leader of the communist camp and Khrushchev as a time-server and political liability. Evidently Deng Xiaoping was one of those who avidly shared this new perception in Beijing.

In July 1963 Deng Xiaoping challenged the Soviets on what had happened on those fateful days. Deng Xiaoping said that “after the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the wholesale renunciation of Stalin, a wave of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaigns was provoked around the whole world...The most prominent events which took place in that period were the events in Poland and Hungary.” Deng Xiaoping was careful to indicate that the Chinese leadership had never concealed this position from the Soviets. In fact, on 23 October 1956 when the Hungarian revolution started, Mao Zedong had told Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin that the Soviets “had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us with it.” Khrushchev’s method of criticizing Stalin, Mao had implied, was “the same as if having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one’s own feet.”

Continuing his commentary on the events of 1956, Deng added, “We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them by means of coercion and even trying to resort to the use of military force.”

Deng Xiaoping then glossed over the major zigzag that occurred in Beijing vis-à-vis the Hungarian events and went right to the conclusion that underlined Mao’s decision on October 31 to insist on intervention: that the Hungarian events were fundamentally different from the Polish ones since it was an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet counterrevolution and not merely a protest against great-power chauvinism. “And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary?” asked Deng Xiaoping. “The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and us. I do not want to dwell on them too much.”

Yet, as an experienced orator, Deng returned to this subject again and again, reminding the Soviets of other “details:” “On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-round analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.”

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On the opposite side of the table were CC CPSU Secretary Mikhail Suslov and Iuri Andropov, immediate participants in the Hungarian events. But only Suslov had taken part in the CC Presidium discussions in October 1956, and even he was not present at the crucial session on October 30-31. Therefore the Soviet delegation had no response other than to give a general rebuff and avoid a slippery debate on details.

“We do not plan to examine these issues anew,” Suslov said. “We will simply note the complete lack of foundation for your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by the materials of the fraternal parties, as well as the errors of the fraternal parties, is the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin’s actions...”

“You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that the Soviet Union allegedly committed errors and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation. This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than bizarre arrogance on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons’ lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary? Did it not come to
But in fact in this particular game Deng Xiaoping held a good hand of cards and Suslov knew it. After the October 1956 events the influence of the CCP on the political moods and the power struggle in the Kremlin was at its peak. This influence had no precedent under Stalin and it declined later, when Khrushchev ousted his rivals and moved to the position of unchallenged leader of the party and state. This phenomenon, as well as the importance of the Chinese pressure on the Soviets during the Polish-Hungarian “October,” has not been understood by Western observers and scholars; nor was it admitted then and later by the Soviets themselves. Yet, like the events in Hungary and Poland, the changing equation between Moscow and Beijing was a direct result of Khrushchev’s cavalier de-Stalinization and the turmoil it caused in the communist movement and the ranks of the Soviet leadership itself. Internationally, Khrushchev’s revelations had shattered the traditional hierarchy of the communist world, with Moscow at the top. Internally, the Soviets weakened themselves with internal strife and were eager to cater to the Chinese in order to preserve “the unity of the socialist camp.” Khrushchev, who a year earlier had attacked Stalin’s and Molotov’s role in antagonizing Tito’s Yugoslavia (See Plenums section of this Bulletin), was determined to avoid the same mistakes with Communist China, whatever Mao said about Stalin. And Molotov and other opponents of de-Stalinization in the Soviet leadership looked at the Chinese as their potential allies against Khrushchev.

A majority of the Presidium secretly agreed with Chinese assessments of the situation and Khrushchev felt the danger of a united front between Beijing and what would become in June 1957 “the anti-party group” of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, as well as Pervukhin, Voroshilov, and Dmitrii Shepilov. During Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow in January 1957 the CC CPSU Presidium de facto reversed the policy of de-Stalinization and Khrushchev had to name Stalin publicly “a great Marxist-Leninist.” This was Khrushchev’s forced tactical concessions to the growing opposition, and as Molotov sardonically observed in June 1957: “Of course, when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to lean over backward [raspisivatsia] that Stalin is such a communist that one wishes everyone would be like him. But when Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing it.”

In fact, the Chinese leadership preferred to abstain from the power struggle in the Kremlin, perhaps because Mao underestimated Khrushchev’s chances for political survival and triumph. At the same time they began to see the CCP and themselves as the central and more senior and experienced “unit” in the world communist movement. After his visit to Moscow, Zhou Enlai reported to the CC Politburo and Mao Zedong that the Soviet leaders (and he meant Khrushchev, Mikoian, and Bulganin in the first place) “explicitly demonstrate weakness in considering and discussing strategic and long-term issues.” The report went to describe examples of Soviet “swashbuckling,” internal disagreements and equivocation. Of particular interest was a comment apparently saved for Khrushchev: “extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and knowing little the ways of the world, some of their [Soviet—VZ] leaders have hardly improved themselves even with the several rebuffs they have met in the past year...They appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs or relations with other brotherly parties.” On the positive side, however, Zhou’s report noted with obvious satisfaction that “now the Soviet Union and China can sit down to discuss issues equally. Even if they have different ideas on certain issues, they must consult with us.”

Soon after Khrushchev emerged victorious from the power struggle, Mao’s exasperation with him began to show. Mao’s agreement to participate in the Moscow international conference of communist parties in November 1957 was just a lull in the growing tension. Soon Mao’s wrath was triggered by two Soviet proposals: to establish along the Chinese coast a set of long-wave radio stations to guide Soviet submarines in the Pacific Ocean, and to build a joint Sino-Soviet nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Mao Zedong interpreted the first proposal as a Soviet attempt to gain new military bases in China and the second as a rejection of an earlier Chinese request for Soviet technology, in order to enable the PRC to build its own nuclear submarines.

On 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong vented this rage at Soviet ambassador Pavel Iudin regarding the ostensible resumption of unequal treatment of China by the Soviet leadership. The transcript of this meeting, translated by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, highlights what happened beneath the surface of the Sino-Soviet friendship around November 1957 and sheds new light on the role of Deng Xiaoping as Mao’s right-hand man. As Mao told Iudin, in Moscow in November he had “often pointed out [to the Soviet leaders], there had existed no such thing as brotherly relations among all the parties because, [your leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it; as a result, the relations between [the brotherly] parties can be described as between father and son or between cats and mice. I have raised this issue in my private meetings with Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades....Present were Bulganin, Mikoian, and Suslov...From the Chinese side, I and Deng Xiaoping were present.” [my italics—VZ].

“While in Moscow,” Mao Zedong continued, he assigned “Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] issues. We won’t openly talk about them even in the future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade Khrushchev’s [political position]. In order to help consolidate his [Khrushchev’s] leadership, we decided not to talk about these [controversies], although it does not
mean that the justice is not on our side."23

When Khrushchev secretly flew to Beijing on 31 July 1958 and tried to resolve tension during long talks with Mao Zedong around a swimming pool at his house (and even in the pool), Deng Xiaoping was at Mao’s side. According to Salisbury’s sources, “Mao heard Khrushchev out, then turned Deng Xiaoping loose. Deng flew at the Soviet leader like a terrier. He accused the Russians of ‘Great Nation’ and ‘Great Party’ chauvinism.” Deng told Khrushchev that China had no objection to long-distance wireless communications for the Soviet fleet, but they must be Chinese-built, Chinese-operated, and Chinese-controlled. He criticized the conduct of Soviet advisers in China.24 Chinese recollections (and apparently Deng’s monologue) repeated almost word by word Mao’s harangue to Liu. But Deng could be even more blunt than Mao Zedong and he did it with relish.

Later, during the July 1963 consultations with the Soviets, he told them that in April-July 1958 the CPSU had sought “to put China under its military control. But we guessed through your intentions, and you failed to achieve this aim.” He then teased the Soviets further, claiming that Khrushchev’s decision to send Soviet missiles to Cuba was dictated by the same imperialist logic. “...In shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under your control.”25

The barbs hit their target, hurting Soviet pride. Suslov apparently had to dip into Soviet archives to quote from the transcript of the Khrushchev-Mao conversation, in order to respond to Deng’s allegations. “Com. Deng Xiaoping,” he said on 10 July, “after all you were present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have you really forgotten the following statement made by Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation: “Never have we at the CC of the CPSU ever had the thought of jointly building a fleet...We considered it necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither thought about or considered it necessary to construct a joint factory or a joint fleet.” According to Suslov, Mao responded to these words: “If it is so, then all the dark clouds have dispersed.”26

Documentary evidence is still lacking on Deng’s role in the Sino-Soviet disputes and meetings of 1959, particularly during the famous confrontation between Khrushchev and the Chinese leadership in Beijing in October 1959. The traces of Deng Xiaoping become once again visible in the first months of 1960, when he met with Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko. Clearly, Sino-Soviet tension was on both their minds. Chervonenko, the relatively new Soviet man in China, did his best to tell Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo what they were eager to hear.

When Khrushchev denounced Eisenhower and the CIA in Moscow and derailed the May 1960 summit in Paris after the infamous U-2 incident, his image in the Chinese leadership dramatically improved. The Soviet ambassador reported that, according to Deng Xiaoping, “comrade Khrushchev’s report [at the Supreme Soviet, when he revealed that the Soviets had Francis Gary Powers in captivity] made a huge impression,” and “important new measures in the area of internal policy had once again displayed the Soviet Union’s strength to the whole world.” Historians would be interested to know that Chervonenko, on Khrushchev’s instructions, informed Deng Xiaoping “about the position of the Soviet Union in connection with the summit conference.” Deng noted that Khrushchev “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should have gone.” He also said that the Soviet leader “fully uncovered the true face of Eisenhower and the imperialists.”

What came next from Deng Xiaoping, however, could not have pleased the Soviets. In a disingenuous twist of topic, he compared Khrushchev’s denunciation of Eisenhower with Zhou Enlai’s denunciation of the Indian Prime Minster Nehru during Zhou’s trip to India.

“Nehru’s true face was uncovered,” said Deng Xiaoping, knowing perfectly well that he was talking about one of Khrushchev’s great friends and allies in the third world. The Sino-Indian border conflict would drag on, Deng continued, because Nehru uses it to receive American economic assistance. “Many political figures in the countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasum [Iraq], Sukarno [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the same positions as Nehru. Nehru stands out among them; he is the cleverest. He did not waste the time he spent studying in England; the English are more experienced than the Americans in political tricks.” “The struggle with bourgeois figures of this sort is one of the most important problems facing the international communist movement.”

Chervonenko, however, preferred to conclude his memo to Moscow on a brighter note. He cited Deng as saying that “the issue of developing a movement in support of Khrushchev’s statement [at the Supreme Soviet] was being examined in the CC CCP” “Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CPSU. The Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp is inviolable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals.”27

People in the Kremlin and the Soviet embassy in Beijing apparently treated this as an encouraging signal. The Embassy’s Political Letter in July 1960 specifically referred to this conversation and mentioned there were “grounds to expect” Sino-Soviet rapprochement on the basis of a common anti-American line.28

It did not take long for the Soviets to see their hopes dashed to pieces. In early June 1960, at a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping turned his “bad side” to them. The most recent evidence on this and subsequent events in Sino-Soviet...
relations comes from transcripts of CPSU plenums. Reporting to the plenum on 13 July 1960, Khrushchev’s party deputy Frol Kozlov reported that on 5 June the Politburo of the CC CCP “had invited around 40 communists—leaders of foreign trade unions, to dinner, followed by a conference” of trade unionists. Liu Shaoqi opened this conference, and then “com. Deng Xiaoping took the floor, and his speech contained a number of absolutely false positions, which contained an obvious distortion of the line of the CPSU.” Deng, according to Kozlov’s story, declared that the CPSU and other fraternal parties had “tossed overboard the main points of the Declaration” of the communist conference of November 1957. Perhaps this pushed Khrushchev over the edge leading to the abrupt removal of Soviet advisors and technical personnel from China.

The trade union conference in Beijing was, as it turned out, China’s preparation for the clash with the USSR at the congress of “fraternal parties” in Bucharest in late June 1960, where Khrushchev and the leaders of the East European countries all participated. With Deng Xiaoping absent from the Bucharest congress, the role of ideological hit-men fell to Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu Xiuquan, and Liu Xiao. It is not clear what the little “terrier” was busy with at that time. Three years later he explained it away with a joke. “I said [then] I was fortunate that [instead of me] went com. Peng Zhen. His weight is around 80 kilograms, so he endured. If I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I would not have endured.” Deng Xiaoping referred to the atmosphere of heckling in Bucharest that he blamed on the Soviets.

This first open split at a major communist forum led to the first bilateral consultations in Moscow on 17-22 September 1960. Deng Xiaoping headed the delegation which included Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Yang Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Zhengqi, Wu Xiuquan and Liu Xiao. The Soviet team included Suslov (head of the delegation), Khrushchev’s first deputy Frol Kozlov, Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il’ichev, philosopher Constantino, Grishin and Ambassador Chervonenko. The transcripts of the discussions, found in the East German archives, reveal tactics and positions of both sides. Apparently the Soviet delegation’s main goal was to rescue the November conference and, while conducting ideological polemics with the Chinese, achieve some kind of a fraternal understanding. Deng must have understood that Khrushchev and the Soviets had a vital stake in preventing an open split. Yet he deliberately tested the Soviet mettle.

In one instance he drew a distinction between Khrushchev, who “stands at the head of Soviet comrades who attack China,” and Kozlov and Suslov, from whom the Chinese “have not heard [anti-Chinese] speeches.” That provocative pitch evoked indignant rebuffs from both. In another instance, Deng told the Soviet delegation that allegedly Khrushchev had remarked to the Vietnamese delegation in Moscow that the Chinese were planning to give substantial means for restoration of the tomb of Ghengis Khan and that this smacks of “yellow peril.”

For his attack on Khrushchev, Deng singled out the Soviet Chairman’s failed attempt to reach accommodation with President Eisenhower and Khrushchev’s refusal to support China in its conflict with India in the second half of 1959-early 1960. “Why did comrade Khrushchev speak with such high expectations about Eisenhower?” “We would like to ask you with whom would you line up in the moment of trouble? With Eisenhower, with Nehru, or with the fraternal socialist country, with China?” Then, to maximize the power of his attack Deng rolled out a complete list of complaints: Stalin’s violation of Chinese sovereignty in the treaty of 1950, the discussion of radio stations and joint fleet in 1958. He explained to the Soviets that this was necessary to overcome “father-son” syndrome in the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the Soviets, who had heard it many times before since 1954, genuinely wondered why it was necessary to “unearth” all those issues that had been long resolved. The discussion revolved around the same issues without making any progress.

Still, the Chinese did not burn their bridges to Khrushchev at that time: the Soviet chairman definitely “improved” after the U-2 incident. For that reason Deng Xiaoping, while criticizing Khrushchev and his foreign policy of the recent past, said words that were honey for the hearts of the Soviets: that “differences in opinions” between Beijing and Moscow would be gradually overcome through the mechanism of periodic consultations and in the interests of joint struggle against “the common enemy.” Reciprocating, Suslov asked the Chinese “to pass most sincere greetings on behalf of our delegation and the Presidium of our CC to the Central Committee of the CC of China and to comrade Mao Zedong.” He then invited the Chinese delegation to lunch with the Soviet delegation. Once again, Deng was a tactical winner: he put the Soviets on the defensive by his criticism and still kept them at bay by dangling the promise of renewed friendship.

Deng Xiaoping soon came to Moscow again in October to take part in the work of a Commission and an Editorial Group, to prepare documents for the congress of communist parties in November 1960—the largest ever in the history of the communist movement. After the first two quiet days, according to Suslov’s report, Deng criticized a draft declaration of the congress proposed by the Soviet side as “inadequate” and directed against the CCP. After that the confrontational atmosphere came back. At that time the Chinese delegation acquired a first satellite—the Albanian delegation.

Mao’s terrier leaped forward again amid the work of the great Moscow congress. After Khrushchev’s major address to the meeting, in the presence of communist delegates from 67 countries Deng Xiaoping, according to Suslov’s account, suddenly began to speak instead of Liu
The target of the Chinese delegation at the meeting was Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization. Kang Sheng delivered a most unrestrained speech. “Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin ‘a murderer,’ ‘a criminal,’ ‘a bandit,’ ‘a gambler,’ ‘a despot like Ivan the Terrible,’ ‘the greatest dictator in the history of Russia,’ ‘a fool,’ ‘shit,’ ‘an idiot.’ All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.” Kang Sheng continued sarcastically: “Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred than it reserves for its enemies?”

“Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the newest technology in the Soviet Union in several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of ‘fool’? Can it really be that the bases for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union have been laid down under the leadership of some sort of ‘fool’? ...Can it really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during World War Two was won under the command of some sort of ‘idiot’? ...Can it really be that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary people of the whole world had a ‘bandit’ as its great leader for several decades? ...Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of ‘shit’ to be their flagbearer for several decades?”

“Let us take, for example, com. Khrushchev. He heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin’s leadership...on Stalin alone while he presented himself as being completely clean. Can this really convince people? If the memory of men is not too short, they will be able to recall that during Stalin’s leadership com. Khrushchev more than once exorted Stalin and his policy of struggling with counter-revolutionary elements.”

As we have seen, Deng Xiaoping, by comparison with Kang Sheng, used specific examples from recent international history and history of the crises and tensions inside the communist camp in which he was often a direct participant. He, as a leader of the Chinese delegation, found the weakest spot in Khrushchev’s defenses—his inability to end the Cold War with the West and the zigzags of his foreign policy. First, Deng Xiaoping implied that Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU was the result of his political egotism which produced a severe crisis in the communist movement and alliance.

“After the 20th congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, wholesale denial of Stalin, an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world. Taking up a good chance, the imperialists, Titoist clique and reactionaries of various countries unleashed an offensive against the Soviet Union, socialist camp and communist parties of different countries and created grave difficulties for many parties.”

On 23
October 1956...com. Mao Zedong said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin and had thrown this sword away. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us with it. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one’s own feet.”

Second, Deng Xiaoping condemned Khrushchev’s diplomacy of detente toward the West as futile and self-destructive and here he rose to the height of his rhetoric: “Frankly speaking, into what chaos you have plunged the beautiful socialist camp! In your relations with fraternal countries of the socialist camp you do not act at all in the interests of the entire socialist camp but you act from the position of great power chauvinism and nationalist egotism.” “When you consider that your affairs go well, when you believe you grasped some kind of a straw handed to you by Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nehru or somebody else, then you are beyond yourself from joy and in all fury against those fraternal parties and fraternal countries which do not obey your wand and do not want to be under your sway, and then you condemn the socialist camp to total oblivion.”

“When you are in trouble, when you suffer setbacks because of your erroneous policy, then you get enraged and vent it on fraternal parties and countries who stick to principles and the truth, then you make them ‘scapegoats,’ then you even sacrifice the interests of the entire socialist camp in order to cater to imperialists and reactionaries and to find a way out.”

Some of the Soviet representatives seated on the other side of the table, particularly Suslov, a crypto-Stalinist, had their own grave doubts about Khrushchev’s foreign policy that coincided with Deng’s observation. Yet, as loyal apparatchiks they expressed outrage at “personal attacks on com. N.S. Khrushchev.” Mikhail Suslov described Khrushchev’s great leadership qualities: “By his work and struggle, unshakable faith in the cause of the working class, by flexible revolutionary tactics, com. Khrushchev deals precise blows to the imperialists, cleverly uses contradictions in their camp, reveals to broad masses methods of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for peace, democracy and socialism.” It was of course the same Suslov who directed criticism of the ousted Khrushchev slightly more than a year later, at the October 1964 Plenum of the CPSU.

There was “the dog that did not bark” in the course of the discussion. The Soviet delegation emphasized the nuclear revolution and the danger of nuclear war as the core of their rethinking of international relations. More concretely, the Sino-Soviet meeting took place in the shadows of the momentous American-British-Soviet negotiations in Moscow that began on July 15 and ended on August 5 with a signing in the Kremlin of a Limited Test-Ban Treaty. In the background exchanges and consultations with Khrushchev, the Americans implicitly and sometimes explicitly proposed to join efforts to thwart the efforts of Beijing to become a nuclear power. On July 15, Kennedy instructed his negotiator Averell Harriman “to elicit K’s view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept U.S. action aimed in this direction.” Harriman and other U.S. representatives who met with Khrushchev several times in the period between July 15 and 27, noted that “China...is today Soviet overriding preoccupation” and sought to exploit it by raising the issue of joint preemptive actions against China’s nuclear program. However, to the Americans’ disappointment, “Khrushchev and Gromyko have shown no interest and in fact brushed subject off on several occasions.”

Knowing the precarious state of Sino-Soviet relations, it is easy to imagine how dismayed and fearful the Soviet leader could have been. For instance, in the morning on Monday July 15 Peng Zhen talked about “serious disagreements” between the CCP and CPSU and appealed to “value unity” between the two countries. And only in the evening of the same day Harriman probed Khrushchev on the Chinese nuclear threat! If the Chinese had only learned about the American entreaties, they would have had deadly ammunition for their attacks against Khrushchev. He would have been compromised in the eyes of most of his own colleagues.

Deng Xiaoping must have been under strict instructions not to touch on the Soviet-American test-ban negotiations. Only in a few instances did he let the Soviets feel how displeased the Chinese were with the rapprochement of the two superpowers on the grounds of mutual regulation of nuclear arms race. “On 25 August 1962,” he said, “the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind China [in its attempts to join the nuclear club—VZ] by the hands and feet through an agreement with the USA.” In commenting on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Deng Xiaoping said that Khrushchev “committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba, you indulged in adventurism, and then, in showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitulated.”

Without seeing cables and instructions from Beijing, it is not possible to say what prompted Deng Xiaoping on July 20 to suggest suspension of the consultations.

Researchers have long suggested it was a reaction to the CC CPSU open letter to the Chinese published on July 14. But it is equally plausible that the start and progress of the U.S.-Soviet test-ban talks in Moscow made Mao Zedong increasingly impatient with the consultations. Immediately after the breakup of the consultations the Chinese side began attacks on the talks and on three occasions, 31 July, 15 August, and 1 September 1963, published official statements condemning the Moscow treaty.

What was the significance of all these episodes for Deng’s political career and the development of his views? The July 1963 performance of Deng Xiaoping was highly
Soviet leaders were too embarrassed to repeat this criticism almost verbatim Deng’s criticism of the Soviet leader’s ideological exploits in Moscow (he mentions only one in November 1957) earned him Mao’s gratitude and a relatively mild treatment during the Cultural Revolution. If this version is true, then Deng Xiaoping proved his credentials as a loyal subordinate of Mao Zedong and demonstrated his ability to work very successfully together with the Chairman in the area of foreign policy.55

But does it mean that the “little terrier” had the same views on Stalin, Stalinism and international relations as Mao Zedong? There is a more complex explanation of Deng’s role. According to recent revelations of Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao’s personal physician, Deng Xiaoping, as well as Liu Shaoqi, lost Mao’s trust at the Eighth CCP Congress in September 1956, when they spoke too fervently about the impossibility of any cult of personality in China.54 Mao Zedong considered Deng a politician with a great future (as he told Khrushchev in November 1957) and considerable political ambitions. However, in the atmosphere of power struggle and Mao’s emerging dictatorship this praise could bring Deng as easily to the gallows as to the pedestal: Mao, like Stalin before him, had shrinking tolerance for men of political ambition in his immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is only logical that Mao should have watched Deng very keenly and tried to find tasks for him where Deng’s energy would have been utilized for Mao’s benefit rather than against his interests. According to this logic, Mao Zedong wanted to send Deng to Moscow not because he particularly trusted his loyalty, but for the opposite reason, because he wanted to neutralize his potential opposition to his rising cult of personality.

To understand this logic, it is perhaps useful to start with the opposite pole, the Soviet one. After 1960 the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization tied the hands of the Stalinists in Moscow like Suslov. According to Georgi Arbator’s thoughtful observation “from 1962-1964 the Chinese factor weakened the position of the Stalinists in the USSR. As it developed, the conflict with China had positive influences on the policy of Khrushchev, who had been slipping back to Stalinism only too often since 1962. The debate with the Chinese leaders provided the anti-Stalinists with the opportunity, while defending our policies, to speak out on many political and ideological subjects that had lately become taboo.”55

Actually, when Khrushchev was overthrown at the CC Presidium in October 1964, Alexander Shelepin, Secretary of the CC and the former head of the KGB, repeated almost verbatim Deng’s criticism of the Soviet leader’s “two mistakes” during the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, the Soviet leaders were too embarrassed to repeat this criticism at the plenum, because it would have implied that the Chinese had been right all along. Therefore, Khrushchev’s foreign policy errors were not criticized at the top party forum.

In China the same logic worked the other way around. Mao Zedong may well have cleverly decided to direct the energy of his potential critics, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, for external, foreign policy use. Deng Xiaoping must have been critical of Mao’s exercise of power and his disastrous “great leap forward.” Since 1960 he and Liu expressed an inclination to oppose the leftist economic experiments of the Chairman. But in foreign policy Deng enthusiastically shared Mao’s goal to strive for China’s equality in the communist camp. As a delegation head, Deng Xiaoping must have been held on an extremely short leash by Mao. In any case, Deng’s personal role in implementing the Sino-Soviet split made him a committed advocate of this policy. According to his biographer, during the early 1980s, when Mao’s role in the politics of the PRC was being reassessed, Deng was “at great pains to stress that Mao Zedong’s policy in foreign affairs had been correct and highly successful.”56

This must be a missing part in the explanation why, in 1956-1963, the reformer of contemporary China had been the central figure fighting de-Stalinization and reform in the Soviet Union, instead of being a reform-minded analyst of the damages that Stalin and the logic of his tyranny had caused to the Soviet Union, China and other “socialist” countries.’

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3 The bound copy of the transcripts of the meeting were found in the papers of the International Department of the former Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the GDR in the Bundesarchiv, Berlin. (SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 is the Russian version.) The conference’s participants on the Chinese side were, besides Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing and secretary of Beijing’s Party Organization (Deputy Head of the delegation); Kang Sheng, Mao’s security specialist and probably his “eyes” and “ears” in the delegation; and Yang Shangkun, long-time head of the CCP’s General Office. That was a senior “troika,” who had been close to Mao Zedong and knew the history of Sino-Soviet relations well. Kang Sheng and Yang Shangkun, like Deng himself, had studied and lived in Moscow. The delegation also included the head of the All-Chinese Federation of Trade Unions Liu Ningyi and two other CC CCP
members, Wu Xiuquan and Pang Zuli. The members of the Soviet delegation were Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Ilichev, two influential members of the CC CPSU Secretariat in charge of ideology; Viktor Grishin from the Moscow Party Organization; Irurii Andropov, head of the CC International Department (socialist countries); Boris Ponomarev, head of the CC International Department (capitalist countries); Pavel Satiukov, editor-in-chief of Pravda; and Stepan Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador in Beijing.

4 David Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution*, p. 55. The book refers to a Chinese source, Liao Yilu, “Deng Xiaoping zai Suliangong ershihao” in Yang Guoyu and Chen Feigin, eds. *Ershiba nian jian: cong shichengwei dao zongsheji* (Volume 3), 1992, p. 106 in claiming that Deng Xiaoping “heard” Khrushchev’s speech. However, foreign guests were not invited to the last session of the Congress to hear the “secret speech.”

5 Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin: Shi Zhe’s Memoirs*, Chapter 14, “De-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary: 1956” (being translated by Chen Jian; quoted with permission).


8 The documents from the Polish archives were related in Leo Gluchowski’s paper “Poland’s ‘China Card’: Sino-Polish Relations and the Soviet Union, September-October 1956.”


10 Malin notes, CWIHP *Bulletin*, no. 8-9, pp. 389, 393; Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin*.


13 Quoted in Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956.”


15 Shi Zhe, *At the Side of Mao Zedong and Stalin*.


18 The transcripts in Russian were sent by the CC CPSU to the leadership of theSED in the GDR, which translated them into German, although with some excisions. SAPMBo MARCH, DY 301, JIV 2/201. Akt 697.

19 Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 73.


26 Stenographic Report, p. 142. To strengthen his arguments, Suslov cited interesting statistics on Soviet military and economic assistance to the PRC. “The 24 defense enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military-technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of the MIG-17, MIG-19, MIG-21-F, and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, “air-to-air,” “ground-to-air,” “ground-to-ground,” “air-to-ground,” and “ship-to-ground” missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and fast boats of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis of a nuclear industry.” Stenographic Report, p. 141.

27 Memo of conversation with General secretary of the CC CCP member of the Politburo of the CC CCP Deng Xiaoping, received at the CC on 6 June 1960. I am grateful to Odd Arne Westad and to the Cold War International History Project for bringing this and a number of other Chervonenko-Deng memcons to my attention. [Ed. note: Six are presented in this section of this *Bulletin.*]

28 Political letter of the embassy of the USSR in the PRC for the second quarter of 1960 [no date recorded in my personal notes], TKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 340, l. 133.

29 Kozlov’s report at the CC CPSU Plenum, 13 July 1960, TKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 458, l. 10.

30 Stenographic Report of the Meeting, p. 93.

31 Report of Suslov to the CC CPSU Plenum, 10-18 October 1961, p. 34.

32 Kurze Wiedergabe der Verhandlungen, die zwischen einer Delegation der KPdSU mit einer Delegation der KP Chinas gefuehrt wurden, 17 September 1960, SAPMBo Barch, JIV 2/202-280. The author thanks Christian Osterrann and David Wolff of the CWIHP for sharing this information. [Ed. Note: CWIHP in turn, thanks Dr. Tim Trampedach of the Free University – Berlin for his aid in obtaining this document.]

33 Kurze Wiedergabe, pp. 7, 13.

34 Kurze Wiedergabe, p. 14.

35 Kurze Wiedergabe, pp. 17, 31-32.


38 Report of Suslov, pp. 72-73.


Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s “Continuous Revolution,” and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder

By Chen Jian

Deng Xiaoping is a legendary figure in the political history of modern China. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao Zedong twice purged him, but did not destroy him (as the Chinese Chairman did to Liu Shaoqi, China’s second most important leader from 1949 to 1966, who died in disgrace in 1969). Early in 1973, after Deng had been absent from China’s political scene for more than six years, Mao pardoned him and brought him back to China’s decision-making inner circle. Three years later, when Deng was again expelled from the Party’s Politburo and Central Committee due to his alleged “unchanged reactionary attitude” toward the Cultural Revolution, he retained his Party membership and was never exposed to physical torture by the “revolutionary masses.” He would reemerge and eventually become China’s paramount leader after Mao’s death in 1976.

It is apparent that Deng Xiaoping’s purge and survival during the Cultural Revolution were primarily Mao’s work. But Deng’s image in Mao’s mind must have been extremely complicated, otherwise his experience would not have been so tortuous. While it will take a much more comprehensive study to reconstruct the relationship between Deng and Mao, thanks to available Chinese sources one thing is certain: both Deng’s purge and survival were related to Mao’s changing memories of the role he played in promoting or resisting the Chairman’s grand enterprise of continuous revolution aimed at, among other things, preventing a Soviet-style “capitalist restoration” from happening in China.

Indeed, the “Soviet factor” played a crucial role in determining Deng Xiaoping’s political fate during the Cultural Revolution. If the causes of his downfall were symbolized in the label placed on him of “China’s Second Largest Khrushchev,” one of the main reasons for his reemergence could be found in the fact that Mao again remembered that Deng was once an “anti-Soviet revisionist” hero. On 14 August 1972, less than one year after the death of Marshal Lin Biao, Mao’s designated successor during the Cultural Revolution, who then betrayed Mao in 1971, Mao commented on a letter Deng wrote to him about ten days earlier: “After we entered the cities, it is not true to say that he [Deng Xiaoping] has done nothing that is good. For example, he led the [CCP] delegation to Moscow to negotiate [with the Soviets]. He did not yield to the pressure of the Soviet revisionists. I have talked about this many times in the past. Now I want to repeat it once more.”

The transcripts of the meetings in Moscow between Chinese and Soviet Party delegations in July 1963 will help us to understand why Mao’s memory of Deng’s experience of “not yielding to the Soviet revisionists” was so persistent. Deng, simply put, was a fighter. As shown by the meeting transcripts, he fully believed that truth was on the side of the Chinese Communists. Indeed, as far as the mentalities of the two sides are concerned, the Chinese exuded a strong sense of superiority. If for half a century the Chinese Communists had been willing to accept Moscow’s dominant position in the international communist movement, in 1963 they acted in accordance with a different underlying assumption. They obviously believed that Beijing, rather than Moscow, should play the leadership role in the world proletarian revolution. Deng Xiaoping’s passionate performance indicated his seemingly wholehearted embrace of this belief.

The divergence between Beijing and Moscow, as
reflected in the transcripts, was certainly substantive. While de-Stalinization was Khrushchev’s most important achievement as the Soviet party’s first secretary, Mao and the CCP leadership claimed that “Khrushchev had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin and had thrown it away, allowing the enemy to seize it and to kill us.”2 While the Soviet leadership believed in the utility of pursuing détente with the West, the Chinese leaders emphasized that the socialist camp must stick to revolutionary principles and should have no illusions regarding the evil intentions of Western imperialist countries. While the Soviets pointed out that the danger involved in a nuclear war could never be exaggerated, Mao and his comrades were unconvinced by the Soviet emphasis on the destructive effect of nuclear slaughter, and argued that communists all over the world should not shrink from revolution because of the concerns about triggering a nuclear war.

But what really distanced Beijing from Moscow was not just the divergence over these issues concerning strategy and policy. The debates between Chinese and Soviet communists focused on two more fundamental and interrelated issues: how to define “equality” and how to interpret history.

The “equality” question had been a staple of conversations between top Chinese and Soviet leaders since the mid-1950s. As a general tendency, the Chinese leaders became increasingly accustomed to accusing the Soviets of having failed to treat other fraternal parties, including the Chinese party, as equals. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, used every opportunity to defend their own behavior, arguing that although Moscow, for historical reasons, had played a central role in the international communist movement, it never intentionally treated other parties as inferior.

Such differences over remembering and interpreting the past drove almost every meeting between top Chinese and Soviet leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s into an extensive review of history. Indeed, the Chinese leaders, especially Mao, had endeavored to cite historical cases to argue that the Soviets (since the years of Stalin and continuing after Stalin’s death) had mistakenly interfered with the internal affairs of the Chinese party and the Chinese Communist state, as well as many other fraternal parties, and that such behavior proved Moscow’s failure to treat communists in other countries as equals.3 The Soviets would categorically deny that the new Soviet leadership after Stalin’s death had continued to commit such mistakes. The transcripts of the July 1963 Sino-Soviet meetings indicate that this pattern was again followed.

Why, one must ask, are these two issues so important? This must be understood by keeping in mind that these issues not only are closely related to the legitimacy of each party’s self-perceived position in the international communist movement, but are also interwoven with legitimizing the domestic programs pursued by each party’s top leaders, Mao and Khrushchev in particular.

In his essay, Vladislav Zubok has convincingly demonstrated that Khrushchev fully understood how intimately the legitimacy of his leadership role within the Soviet party and state was interconnected with the Soviet party’s position in the world proletarian revolution. In other words, Khrushchev fully understood that his domestic programs, as well as his own position as the Soviet Party’s top leader, had to be justified by maintaining and enhancing Moscow’s continuous dominance of the international communist movement.

In the case of China, Mao’s criticism of “Soviet revisionism” was an integral part of his constant efforts to enhance his “continuous revolution” as a dominant theme of China’s political and social life. This was particularly true after 1958, when the disastrous consequences of the “Great Leap Forward” began to result in an ever increasing division among top Chinese leaders, while at the same time breaking up the myth of Mao’s “eternal correctness.” The criticism of “Soviet revisionism” provided Mao with an effective weapon to combine his need to create momentum for continuous transformation of China’s party, state and society with one of the Chinese revolution’s ultimate goals—reviving China’s central position in the international community through establishing China’s centrality in the international communist movement.

Under these circumstances, “equality” was given a meaning much more complicated than what may be obtained in a superficial reading of the word. In actuality, each side talked about “equality” with an assumption that they were superior to the other. For Mao and his Chinese comrades, talking about “equality” meant that they occupied a position from which to dictate the values and codes of behavior that would dominate relations between communist parties and states. This fundamental assumption made Beijing’s conflict with Moscow inevitable.

Deng Xiaoping was assigned the task in 1963 of leading the Chinese delegation to Moscow for several reasons. The most obvious one was that he had long been known within the CCP as a talented leader, who was able to use concise language to effectively argue on complicated issues. As Zubok documents in his essay, the other reason was that by 1963 he was a veteran in representing the CCP in its dealings with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. But Mao’s choice of Deng to lead the CCP delegation could also have been based on more complex considerations. As is well known, by 1963 Mao had already developed a real distrust of some of his close colleagues, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, because of his sense that not only were they unable to follow the logic of his “continuous revolution” programs, but also that they might attempt to weaken, or even to challenge, Mao’s authority and power as China’s paramount leader. By choosing Deng to head the CCP delegation, Mao would effectively use Deng’s talent to bolster the international legitimacy of his “continuous revolution,” while at the same time further testing Deng’s
political attitude and loyalty toward his “continuous revolution.”4 Here, once again, Mao demonstrated his mastery of Chinese party politics.

Deng did not disappoint Mao. His stamina and eloquence in Moscow, together with that of Kang Sheng and other members of the Chinese delegation, put the Soviets on the defensive. This proved both the correctness of the Chinese stand and the superiority of the Chinese mentality. When members of the Chinese delegation returned to Beijing, they would be welcomed by Mao at the airport, which was a highly unusual gesture by the Chairman. Moreover, Mao was so confident that the transcripts of the meetings in Moscow would enhance his “continuous revolution” that, on 28 July 1963, he ordered them to be printed and distributed to low- and middle-rank CCP cadres.5 This was the only time in the CCP’s history, to the best of my knowledge, that the transcripts of top Party leaders’ meetings with foreign party leaders were relayed to the whole party.

Deng Xiaoping certainly made history. His outstanding performance in Moscow in July 1963, as mentioned earlier, had created such a strong impression in Mao’s mind, that it would contribute to his survival and reemergence during and after the Cultural Revolution. This would allow his name to be linked with China’s history from the late-1970s to mid-1990s in such a dramatic way that this period has become widely known as “The Deng Xiaoping Era.”

Deng Xiaoping’s debates with the Soviet leaders in July 1963 represent a historical juncture in the development of Sino-Soviet relations as this was the last substantive exchange of opinions between the Chinese and Soviet parties. The failure of the meeting led to the great polemic debates between the two parties, which would quickly expand into a confrontation between the two communist powers. Even Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 1964 could not reverse the trend of deteriorating relations.

In February 1965, when Mao told Soviet Prime Minister A. N. Kosygin that his struggle with the Soviet “revisionists” would last for another 9,000 years, the CCP Chairman had virtually proclaimed the demise of the Sino-Soviet alliance.6 In a few short years, Beijing and Moscow would proclaim the other as primary enemy, even worse than capitalist-imperialist America.

In a broader historical perspective, Deng Xiaoping’s meetings with the Soviet leaders in July 1963 represented a defining moment in 20th-century history. Up to this point the communists in the world had acted under a profound belief that history and time were on their side. The great Sino-Soviet split, to which Deng Xiaoping made such a crucial contribution, drained both the material and spiritual resources of international communism. While the Soviet Union, with China emerging as a potent enemy, fell into an ever-worsening overextension of power, the Communist world as a whole spent much of its resources on internal fighting. This effectively weakened, and eventually eliminated, its ability to compete with the capitalist and free world in holding the initiative of historical development.

More importantly, the great Sino-Soviet split destroyed the idea among communists and communist sympathizers all over the world that communism was a solution to the problems created in the world-wide process of modernization. Nothing could be more effective in destroying the moral foundation of communism as an ideology and a revolutionary way of transforming the world than the mutual criticism of the communists. Therefore, the events leading to the Sino-Soviet split, in which Deng Xiaoping actively participated, marked the beginning of the final decline of international communism as a 20th-century phenomenon.
From the Diary of
P.A. ABRASIMOV

SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation
With the General Secretary of the CCP,
com. DENG XIAOPING

3 July 1957

On 3 July 1957, I visited Deng Xiaoping and on the instructions of the CC CPSU gave him the full texts of the decision of the CC CPSU’s July Plenum on the anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov and the CC CPSU’s closed letter to all party members and candidates. In the conversation which ensued, Deng Xiaoping talked about the struggle with rightist elements in the People’s Republic of China. He said that it was calculated that this struggle would go on for a long time; the Chinese Communist Party had the strength to crush the rightists in two or three days, but there was no need for that. The rightists will be given a further chance to finish stating their case, since by doing so they are giving the people and the CCP a good lesson.

By showing their true face, they are actually helping to educate the broad masses and intermediate elements. Without encouragement from the CCP, they would not dare to open fire and begin to act on such a broad scale. The rightists, noted Deng Xiaoping, resemble a snake which has slithered out of the earth, scented danger, and wants to slither back in, but has been strongly seized by the tail.

The positive side of the struggle with the rightists which has unfolded is that it has given cadres the opportunity to garner experience and to be tempered. Some party workers were afraid to provide the rightist elements the full freedom to state their opinion. Experience, however, has shown that where the rightists had the chance to express themselves fully, the struggle with them has proceeded more successfully; in those cases, the object of the struggle has been exposed, and a target for a counterstroke has been revealed; in those cases, the masses were convinced of the obvious hostility of the rightists to socialism and the party organizations have had the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in their conduct of the struggle.

In some establishments and organizations, the rightist elements were not given the chance to speak out and thereby reveal their true face. There were even cases where “rightists” from other places were invited to give speeches. In such establishments, the struggle was aimless and did not attain its goal.

The shortcoming of the given movement was the fact that at the necessary time, not all party organizations had clarified sufficiently for themselves the goals and tasks laid out by the CC CCP for this struggle. The CC CCP avoided micromanagement and detailed elaboration on these issues and wanted the party organizations themselves to work out the Central Committee’s tactic in the course of the struggle, to understand deeply the necessity of conducting this tactical line and its advantages.

Deng Xiaoping added that great courage and calm were needed to endure the stream of abuse which the rightists unleashed on the CCP both orally and in the press. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping observed that the campaign of struggle with the rightists was proceeding unevenly. In some places, they went over to the counterattack too early and the enemy hid himself. However, to be late in this struggle would have been unforgivable. It was necessary to deliver the blow before the opening of the session of the All-Chinese Convention of the People’s Representatives. Of course, it would have been possible to listen to the rightists for another ten days, but as a whole the conditions for a counter-attack had already come together. The leaders of the rightists had already shown themselves, and their views were widely known to the masses. “The big fish was already in the net,” Deng Xiaoping observed. I noted that com. Zhou Enlai’s speech to the session of the All-Chinese Convention of the People’s Representatives was not only a report on the government’s work, but was also the first strong blow delivered by the party against the rightists. Having agreed, Deng Xiaoping added that the popular masses received com. Zhou’s speech in precisely that way. The rightists also clearly acknowledged this side of the report by the Premier of the State Council.

I inquired as to how the rightist elements were behaving after the collapse of all of their attacks.

Deng Xiaoping answered that they now want to hide themselves, but they will not be able to. Squabbles and divisions have begun among the rightists. In Shanghai, prominent representatives of the rightists denounced ringleaders with the most reactionary tendencies. Some of the rightists have already capitulated, but others are continuing to resist.

The CCP is not only not crushing this resistance, but is even, in a certain sense, supporting it. The rightists are unmasking themselves completely and on that basis, it will be possible to teach the masses a good lesson. Zhang Naige and others are not recognizing their mistakes, and are continuing to resist. The CCP considers that even if they continue to hold out stubbornly for a year, the party will also conduct painstaking explanatory work with them for the entire year.

The same policy will be carried out in the country’s institutions of higher learning. Rightist elements among the students will be left in the institutions of higher learning, and some of them after graduation may be left in their respective institutions of higher learning as instructors. They will even be given the opportunity, for instance, to speak their views once every three months. That will help us to conduct educational work [with] object [lessons] among the students. The same applies to the instructors of the institutions of higher learning.
To my question of approximately what percent the rightist elements comprise among the students, Deng Xiaoping answered that on average among the students, the rightists comprised only one percent, and that there were many more waiverers and individuals deceived by the rightist demagogues, but that at present they were once again reverting to the correct path.

In some institutions of higher learning, the percentage of rightists was higher, as, for instance, at Beijing University [there were] about 3%, while in some institutions of higher learning there were up to 10%.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping noted that this year prospects for the harvest were good, but that at the end of July and the beginning of August flooding often occurs.

In China every year, an average of 20 million people suffer from natural disasters. In the first five-year period, there were strong floods three times, and each time about 40 million people suffered, and last year, 70 million people suffered from natural disasters.

Having thanked com. Deng Xiaoping for the conversation, in my turn I told him about the progress of the preparation for the Sixth Worldwide Festival of Youth and Students in the USSR.

The head of the chancellery of the Secretariat of the CC CCP, com. Yang Shangkun, was present at the conversation.

Chargé d’affaires of the USSR in the PRC (P. Abrasimov)

[Source: AVPRF (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki rossiiskoi federatsii) [Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive], f. 0100, op. 50, p. 424, d. 8; obtained by Paul Wingrove; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

From the diary of
P.F. IUDIN

SECRET. Copy No. 2

Record of Conversation
with member of the Standing Committee
of the Politburo
CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING

17 April 1958

I visited Deng Xiaoping and on instructions from the Center informed him of the letter from the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia [UCY] to the CC CPSU of 12 April of this year.

During the translation of the Yugoslav letter, Deng Xiaoping expressed his indignation at the first sentence in the letter in which the Yugoslavs state that they were “surprised” by the CC CPSU’s letter. Deng Xiaoping reacted in the same way to some of the Yugoslavs’ arguments in the letter about their attitude toward the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

Referring to the Yugoslavs’ words to the effect that the UCY’s draft program is based on a belief in the victory of socialism, Deng Xiaoping recalled that the Yugoslavs believe in the victory of socialism in America through an augmentation of the role of the working class in the bourgeois system of government. Deng Xiaoping noted that the Yugoslav draft program devotes more space to this than to many other issues.

After the translation was completed, Deng Xiaoping said that the Yugoslav response fully accords with the Chinese comrades’ expectations. He noted that “this is a very logical step by the Yugoslavs.” It is difficult to imagine, Deng Xiaoping said, that the Yugoslavs could easily change their positions and quickly correct the most serious mistakes contained in the program. As for changing selected phrases, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that this would not change the character of the Yugoslav document since what was at issue in the given case was an entire system of erroneous views.

I set out for Deng Xiaoping the CC CPSU’s decision regarding the CC UCY’s answer. Having heard out what I had to say, Deng Xiaoping said that this was without doubt a correct decision. At present, he said, we have absolutely no basis for reviewing the resolutions which we previously adopted regarding the UCY’s program and its congress.

“On the whole,” Deng Xiaoping said, “it is a good thing (khoroshee delo)––I consider that the upcoming struggle in the international communist movement will be very lively and interesting, and that all communists, all fraternal parties should join in this struggle.”

Having pointed out that the Yugoslavs talk a lot in their letter about the need to “develop Marxist thought,” Deng Xiaoping noted that on that point we can support the Yugoslavs. Right now, he said, we are repulsing Yugoslav
revisionism, and in the course of this fight we will develop yet further the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

I noted that a collection of Lenin’s statements about revisionism had been published in our country. Deng Xiaoping answered that he had heard about the collection and had ordered its translation into Chinese. Deng Xiaoping went on to comment that “we must study and compare the old Bernstein and the new Bernstein [to determine] the similarities and differences between them.” I noted that the old Bernstein did not hold state power and that probably this was the essential difference between them. Deng Xiaoping agreed with this thought. [Ed. note: At the turn of the century, Lenin and Eduard Bernstein polemicized over the correct path of social democracy. Lenin labeled his opponent a “revisionist.”]

Afterwards, I informed Deng Xiaoping about the conversation between the USSR’s ambassador in Poland and com. Gomulka as to the UCY’s answer to the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping reacted to this information with great interest and was especially happy to hear com. Gomulka’s statement that the PZRP [Polish United Workers’ Party] would not send a delegation to the Seventh Congress of the UCY. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping said that the Poles had tried to persuade the Yugoslavs, but became convinced that this was futile. Deng Xiaoping noted that some interesting points had come up in the Poles’ own position in the course of the discussion about the UCY’s program, and that for that reason, he said, one could conclude that for our understanding of the PZRP’s position, this too “was not a wasted episode, and also showed us something.”

Deng Xiaoping warmly expressed his thanks for the information. He noted that timely information from the CC CPSU permitted them to keep abreast of these Yugoslav affairs. Deng Xiaoping furthermore stated that in connection with the most recent hostile speech by the Yugoslavs, the CC CPSU had adopted entirely correct and very good decisions.

I pointed out that an article on the UCY’s draft program would be published on 18 April in “Communist.” At this, Deng Xiaoping commented that of course the Yugoslavs would have to be taught a lesson, insofar as “they got themselves into this.”

In the course of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping touched on the issue of other parties’ attitudes to the Yugoslav congress. Having touched on the position of the Italian communist party, Deng Xiaoping stated that the Italians’ motives as set out in their letter to the CC CPSU were incomprehensible to the Chinese comrades. Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping noted, “let them, the Italians, make their own decisions.”

Deng Xiaoping informed me that according to information they had received a few days ago from the PRC’s ambassador in Switzerland, the Swiss comrades were planning to send their delegation to the Seventh Congress. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the CCP had not informed the Swiss party about their [the CCP’s] decision on this issue. I said that I did not know whether that party [the Swiss] was informed of the CPSU’s position. Deng Xiaoping expressed the thought that several minor (melkije) parties might end up not being abreast of things and might mistakenly send their representatives to Yugoslavia….

“You,” Deng Xiaoping said, “are catching up with America. At present, we do not have the strength to do this, but we are trying to catch up with England. However, we are still thinking about how to present the following task to our people in some form: to catch up with the United States of America in 25 years or more.” Again making the caveat that they were only thinking this issue over at present, Deng Xiaoping then added that such a slogan would help them to move forward….

AMBASSADOR of the USSR in the PRC [signature] /P. Iudin/

[Source: TsKhSD (Tsentr’noe khranilishche sovremennoi dokumentatsii) f.5, op.49, d.131, ll.71-74; translated by: Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

From the diary of P.F. IUDIN

SECRET Copy 1
3rd June 1959

Report of Conversation
with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING

27 May 1959

While visiting com. Deng Xiaoping on the instructions of the Center, I informed him about the course of the negotiations in Geneva.

Deng Xiaoping requested that I convey great thanks to the CC CPSU for providing this information, and also said that it would be reported to Mao Zedong and other leading figures in the PRC forthwith. In passing, Deng Xiaoping said that Mao Zedong was not feeling well—was sick with the flu. Liu Shaoqi is also not quite well—his right hand hurts. Zhou Enlai is not in Beijing at present.

Touching on the issue of a summit meeting, Deng Xiaoping agreed with the opinion that the meeting evidently would take place. He also inquired as to the background (kharakteristika) of the new US Secretary of State, [Christian A.] Herter. I talked about the information we have on this issue from MID [Foreign Ministry] USSR.

Having mentioned the upcoming visit by [Averell] Harriman to the Soviet Union and his intention to visit the PRC, Deng Xiaoping stated that they had already dis-
cussed the issue of the expediency of Harriman’s visit to China and came to the conclusion that at present the visit would not be useful. However, he added, we are not ruling out a visit by Harriman to China in the future.

I briefed Deng Xiaoping on the basis of the information we received from MID USSR on Sukarno’s stay in Turkey. Having displayed a great interest in this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted that, of all the nationalist countries in Asia at present, Indonesia is taking the best position. This is particularly evident in the example of Indonesia’s attitude toward events in Tibet.

Afterwards, we touched on the issue of Yugoslavia, of Tito’s trip through the countries of Southeast Asia, of Yugoslavia’s position on the Tibet issue, and on the difficult state of the Yugoslav economy. In the conversation, it was noted that nationalist bourgeois circles in Arab countries were accepting Yugoslav ideology. We both agreed that it was necessary to strengthen our common propaganda in the Arab countries in the interests of exposing the Yugoslav provocation policy.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that in some ways the Yugoslav revisionists were now more dangerous than the Americans and the social democrats of the Western countries, and that, as a result, it was a very important task to expose the Yugoslav revisionists. We are devoting a lot of attention to this issue, he said, which is the reason for the Yugoslav’s particular protest. Deng Xiaoping said that after a report by a Xinhua correspondent in Belgrade about a strike by Yugoslav students protesting poor food was published in the Chinese press, the Yugoslav authorities made a statement of protest and warned the Chinese correspondent that if such an episode occurred again they would take appropriate action against him.

Touching on the plan thought up by Tito and Nasser for a meeting of the leaders of four countries - Tito, Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno—with the aim of “coordinating neutrality policies in connection with the Geneva conference,” Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru was firmly opposing the meeting. Sukarno was showing a vague interest (kak-budto proiavliaet nekotoryi interes) in the plan. Foreign agents report that [Indonesian Foreign Minister] Subandrio has allegedly decided to communicate with the authors of the plan (Tito and Nasser) about the concrete details of the proposal. As of yet, it is hard to say what Sukarno’s final position will be on this issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, although it is already clear that Tito and Nasser are very interested in calling such a meeting.

Having noted that the Americans need an instrument like the current Yugoslav leaders and that the Americans are making fairly good use of that instrument, not economizing in their spending on it, Deng Xiaoping expressed confidence that in the end that money would be spent in vain, as was the money spent on Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-Shek].

I inquired as to the situation at present in Taiwan.

Deng Xiaoping expressed the opinion that Jiang Jieshi would probably not give up power and would remain “president” for a third term. If Jiang Jieshi remains as “president,” he said, that would be better for us than if Chen Chen or even Hu Shi occupied the post. The Americans would be happiest with Hu Shi; in the worst case, they would agree to Chen Chen. Jiang Jieshi suits them least of all. On the Tibetan issue, Deng Xiaoping noted, the views of the PRC and Jiang Jieshi coincide: both we and he consider that Tibet is Chinese territory and that we cannot permit the Tibetan issue to be put before the UN.

In answer to my question as to what the economic situation in Taiwan was, Deng Xiaoping said that the Jiang Jieshi-ites were living at the USA’s expense. That, he added, is not a bad thing. Let the Americans waste their money. In the final analysis, Taiwan will be returned to the bosom of its native land - China. However, for that to happen, we need time; we must wait a bit. The circumstances are becoming more and more favorable for the PRC and less and less so for the USA. The Jiang Jieshi-ites in Taiwan are beginning to think hard about the prospects which await them. There are many factors contributing to this: the growing international authority of people’s China, its economic successes, the long separation from the native land, and so on. The most important thing of all is that they know the Americans want to wash their hands of them (otkazat’sia). The USA does not trust Jiang Jieshi, and he does not trust the United States.

Later on in the course of the conversation, several issues of the domestic situation of the Soviet Union and China were touched on.

I told Deng Xiaoping about the preparation taking place in our country for the CC CPSU plenum.

Deng Xiaoping noted that at present throughout China, prospects for the harvest are not bad. In some regions, up to 50% more wheat will be harvested than in 1958. The overall wheat harvest will probably be up to 20% higher than the previous year’s harvest. It is somewhat worse with the early rice harvest. In places, crops suffer from flooding—in others, from drought. If rains come soon to the drought-affected regions, the situation could be corrected.

Deng Xiaoping went on to note as a serious shortcoming the fact that, of last year’s total harvest, a lot of grain was used as free food for peasants in communes. This, he emphasized, has had a negative effect on the supply of grain to the cities. Deng Xiaoping recounted that before the introduction of free food provision for the peasants, much less grain was consumed; they used it economically, and if the grain situation was difficult, they found a way out. Now, 500 million mouths are constantly demanding cereals, are demanding plentiful and tasty food. At present, the biggest shortcoming, he repeated, is that the peasants are consuming a lot themselves and are not giving enough grain to the state. The resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the CC CCP on regulating the communes provides for a gradual restoration of order in this important matter.
From the diary of
S.V. CHERVONENKO

SECRET

8th December 1959

Memorandum of Conversation
with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, DENG XIAOPING

6 November 1959

I had my first visit with Deng Xiaoping and had a conversation with him. Deng Xiaoping told me that he had not yet fully recovered after breaking his leg. He is going back to work in two days, but the doctors are allowing him to work for only four hours at a time. Afterwards, he asked what was my impression of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the PRC. Answering Deng Xiaoping, I noted that the celebration had been organized on a grand scale. It demonstrated the huge enthusiasm of the people and their solidarity.

Deng Xiaoping said that he was present at the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. [Ed. Note: Moscow, November 1957. Due to the Soviet government's 1918 conversion from Julian to Gregorian calendars, the October Revolution was feted on November 7.] In the USSR too, he added, everything had been organized on a grand scale. It demonstrated the huge enthusiasm of the people and their solidarity.

I answered that the solidarity of the fraternal peoples has already shown its great significance more than once. If, for instance, after the victory of the October Revolution, Ukraine had remained alone and had not been in the family of the other Soviet republics, it could have been overwhelmed and dismembered by the imperialists. Friendship is the greatest force of all and sometimes we do not fully recognize its significance. History will show what a huge significance it has.

Deng Xiaoping responded that unity and solidarity truly were the most important thing. With our solidarity, we do not fear any imperialists. “We are exerting every effort to preserve peace, and imperialism will perish in peaceful conditions. If madmen nevertheless unleash a war, they will only meet with their downfall. The entire affair consists of the fact that we are making progress, while they are being torn apart by contradictions. We have many friends, including in the USA - [those friends] are...
the working people.”

I noted that comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s visit demonstrated the great interest of the workers of America in our country and in socialism.

For that reason, Deng Xiaoping said, the ruling circles in the USA were afraid of that visit. They wanted to isolate comrade Khrushchev, but the people broke through the dike. Moreover, having agreed with [my] observation that even while making progress and augmenting socialism’s strength it is necessary to display great vigilance toward the machinations of the imperialists, Deng Xiaoping said: “The imperialists especially want to undermine the unity of our countries, but that is a futile endeavor…”

To my observation that the most important thing in overcoming every difficulty is the presence of the leading role of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping said that both the one and the other were important, the leadership of the CCP and help from the Soviet Union. “At present,” he went on, “we are in a better position than you were right after the October Revolution. If a new socialist country arises, it will, given the existence of the entire socialist camp, be in an even better position than we are. We are very happy that the situation in the Soviet Union is good in all respects. As for us, we are also not in a bad position.”

I noted that even in a situation where our affairs are going well, we [always] take measures to use all our existing capacities as much as possible; we are self-critical of ourselves, and strive to root out all our shortcomings. We also have shortcomings, Deng Xiaoping answered, and they will always exist. One must even on occasion heed criticism coming from an enemy.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping said that we would meet again and more than once.

I thanked Deng Xiaoping for the conversation and expressed the hope that in its work, the Embassy would encounter assistance from him and from the CC CCP apparatus as before.

Head of the protocol division of the CCP Foreign Ministry, Yu Peiwen, assistant head of the division for the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe Yu Zhan, [USSR] embassy counselor B.N. Vereshchagin and third secretary B.T. Kulik were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

(S. CHERVONENKO)
size that “this was and remains our point of view.” It would be good, if as a result of pressure by peace-loving forces, results were attained, great or small. While at present, fruitful work by a summit conference is impossible, the very fact that the imperialists unmasked themselves is not a bad result. Deng Xiaoping further said that the logic of the American imperialists is the logic of robbers; however Eisenhower tries to “white wash” (obeli) himself, nothing more will come of it for him; practically he is helping us. Even this result of the meeting in Paris speaks to the fact that the victory is ours. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that comrade N.S. Khrushchev “acted completely correctly by going to Paris; he should have gone.”

Throughout the course of the conversation I noted that some diplomats - representatives of the capitalist countries of Western Europe in Beijing, in particular the English and the Dutch, are trying to defend the United States, and constantly emphasize that no great significance should be lent to the incursion by the American [U-2] airplane onto the Soviet Union’s territory; that all countries behave in this way, but that the USA got caught. Deng Xiaoping said that Nehru, U Nu, and almost all the political actors of the bourgeois world make the same argument. Deng Xiaoping told about some of Zhou Enlai’s impressions in connection with his trip to the countries of Asia which had just finished. Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing today and told about the negotiations with Nehru, about which he, Zhou Enlai, had formed a particular opinion. Deng Xiaoping said that Zhou Enlai’s trip to India to a certain extent played the same role as N.S. Khrushchev’s trip to Paris for the summit conference. N.S. Khrushchev exposed the American imperialists, and as a result of Zhou Enlai and other Chinese comrades’ trip to India, Nehru’s true face was uncovered. Deng Xiaoping said: “Both of the trips were necessary, correct, and yielded a [positive] result.”

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that Zhou Enlai’s visit to India fully confirmed “our previous opinion and position in relation to Nehru.” First, Nehru is the central figure in the anti-Chinese campaign in India. Nehru is not in a position where rightist and other reactionaries are putting pressure on him; he himself seeks the attainment of his goals by all means possible. Nehru has never lost control over the situation in the country, nor has the situation ever gotten out of hand. Nehru knows how to hold the country firmly in his hands. Second. The trip confirmed that Nehru does not want to solve the issue of the Chinese-Indian border under any circumstances, even for some sort of limited period. In this, he is operating on the basis of his interests, both internal and external. Nehru speaks out against the communist party of India; for this reason, it does not profit him to resolve the border issue with China. Also for foreign-policy reasons it is not profitable for him to resolve the issue. Deng Xiaoping said that if Nehru had eliminated the conflict with China, he would not have received the latest American aid, a sum of 1.2 billion dollars.

Deng Xiaoping noted that at present in the Chinese press, articles are being published which are uncovering Nehru’s real face. He further said that many political figures in the countries of Asia—Nasser [Egypt], Kasem [Iraq], Sukarno [Indonesia], U Nu [Burma]—are taking the same positions as Nehru. Nehru stands out from them [in that] he is the cleverest. It was not in vain that he studied in England; in India he is called a half-Englishman, and the English are more experienced than the Americans in [playing] political tricks.

Deng Xiaoping emphasized that the struggle with bourgeois figures of this sort is one of the most important problems facing the international communist movement. Such figures as Nasser or Kasem unmask themselves; in India this work must be done under more difficult circumstances. Some Indian communists even praise Nehru. But in the end, said Deng Xiaoping, Nehru’s behavior is educating these communists as well. With pleasure we see, he continued, that at the last meeting of the National Committee of the Indian Communist Party, important resolutions on internal issues were adopted, namely a statute about the fact that the struggle with reaction cannot avoid a fight with the National Congress Party and with the Congress government (materials about the resolutions of the National Committee of the Communist Party of India were published on the May 17 in “The People’s Daily” -S.Ch.). The organ of the Indian Communist Party has begun to include open public statements against Nehru.

Returning to the meeting in Paris, Deng Xiaoping said that the issue of developing a [Chinese] movement in support of N.S. Khrushchev’s statement was being examined in the CC CCP. On May 18, the leaders of social organizations in the PRC will make statements in the press on this issue, and two to three days thereafter, when the circumstances become clearer, further steps will be taken in this direction. Our common position consists, he said, of exposing the imperialists and of explaining the correctness of the position of the countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of the leaders of the CC CCP. The Americans are closing ranks against us, he said, but their closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and the solidarity of the countries of the socialist camp, is inviolable, since it is founded on a unity of ideas and goals.

In connection with this, the great significance of the upcoming visit by the Chinese party-governmental delegation to the Soviet Union for the further development and strengthening of fraternal friendship between our peoples and parties and for the unity of the whole socialist camp was once again emphasized by me.

In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping said that he would convey everything that he had been informed of by me to comrades Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.
The conversation took place in warm, friendly circumstances.

The counselor to the Embassy, I.I. Safronov, and the First Secretary of the Embassy, B.V. Kapralov, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC
Signature
(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF f. 0100 op.53, p.8, d. 454, ll. 165-9; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

The Short Version of the Negotiations Between CPSU and CCP Delegations (September 1960)

CPSU Delegation: Suslov (leader), Kozlov, Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il’ichev, Konstantinov, Grishin, Chervonenko


The first talk took place on 17 September 1960 from 1300 to 1500….

In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping asked, as he said, the essential question: What does the CC CPSU and the Soviet government want to do with Soviet-Chinese friendship?… Only after the clarification of this essential question made up of many facts, can one ascertain which assumptions are necessary for us to solve our disagreements…

[Second Session : 19 September 1960]

First of all com. [Frol] Kozlov explained that we have always assumed that truly fraternal relations corresponding to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism must be established between our parties, states and people…

Secondly, Comrade Kozlov noted that as causes of the serious disagreements that supposedly have long existed between the two CCs, the Chinese comrades’ letter mentions events that are related to Soviet-Polish relations as well as the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. These questions were resolved long ago between the CC CPSU and the CCs of the Polish party and Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. We have [reached] unanimity with these parties in our evaluations of the events of fall 1956.

We do not hide that at that time the Chinese comrades really did give us advice, but this advice was completely different from that now cited in the Chinese comrades’ letter. Comrade Kozlov rebuts the Chinese comrades’ claim and then asks: why do you now wish to return to the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. We think that this is not done for the sake of clarifying the evaluation of these events. One sees, however, that such a questioning can only stoke nationalistic moods in Poland and Hungary in order to undermine the tight fraternal and heartfelt relations of the USSR and the CPSU with Poland and Hungary.

[Third Session : 20 September 1960]

The next accusation by Deng: We are also very puzzled by the following fact. Following his meeting with Comrade Khrushchev and several other leading figures in the USSR, Comrade Ho Chi Minh made a stop-over in Beijing on his way home and reported the following news: During the conversation with him and other Vietnamese, Comrade Khrushchev stated that enormous efforts were being spent in China to restore the gravesite of Genghis-khan and that this smelled of “yellow peril.” The creation of Genghis-khan’s empire involved three countries—Mongolia, our autonomous territory, and Soviet Buriatiia. Whereas it is usually stated in your country that it was primarily the Europeans who had to suffer from the attack by Genghis-khan, it was actually the Chinese who suffered the most from the attack.

Ponomarev: One should strike his grave, not celebrate him.

Pospelov: Why do they celebrate him as a progressive figure? Many nations had to suffer under his attack.

Peng Zhen: How could we interfere in the internal affairs of the Mongolians who want to restore the gravesite of their ancestors? [?] You, for example, like Peter I. You intended to erect a monument in Port Arthur to three Russian generals—Kuropatkin, Alekseev, and Makarov, who had led an aggression against China.

Pospelov: This was never the case with Kuropatkin and Alekseev, only with Makarov; because Kuropatkin and Alekseev had betrayed the interests of Russia.

Peng Zhen: And now concerning the question of the Korean War.

Then the entire conversation with Khrushchev on June 22 was repeated and the attempt was made to whitewash Mao Zedong of any guilt. Mao Zedong reportedly stated at the beginning of the Korean War: “If the enemy transgresses the 38th parallel, China—since it is not up to the Soviet Union to send troops for the protection of North Korea—is prepared to protect the common interests of the socialist countries, to send its own volunteers.”

Following further discussion of the topic Deng declared: in explaining all of these facts we would like to ask the Soviet comrades to rethink whether all that they have done with respect to their enemies and with respect to their friends was appropriate. We have no doubt that overall you are taking a stand against imperialism.

Ponomarev: We, however, had the impression that all our deeds were also directed to support American imperi-
alism.

**Deng:** But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak with such esteem about Eisenhower?

**Suslov:** One cannot mix up matters of principle with the diplomacy of the struggle.

**Deng:** Comrade Suslov, do not jump to conclusions too easily. You are not used to listening to others. Under such conditions it is difficult for us to finish our discussion. There is no state of equality. We would like to ask you, however, on whom you can count when difficulties will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a fraternal socialist country, on China?

**Kozlov:** There is no such question for us.

**Deng:** It would be perfect if such questions did not exist. But in reality such facts exist, and they cause concern.

**Kozlov:** Then you yourself want a decline in our relations. You yourself are pushing this line. We state that there is no such question, but you maintain that it exists nevertheless. We declare in the name of our country, in the name of our people that we will defend you in case of an attack with all means [available to us]; but you doubt this.

**Deng:** I ask you that your actions meet your recent statements.

**Suslov:** This statement is offensive to us.

**Deng:** I declare in the name of our party, in the name of the entire Chinese people, and fully aware of the responsibility, that regardless of all the circumstances and the attacks on the Chinese people, the People’s Republic of China and our party will take the side of the socialist countries in all difficulties.

**Suslov:** Did we not act this way when there was a difficult situation in the GDR in 1955 [1953?], did we not take full responsibility when we dealt a blow to the counterrevolution in Hungary?

**Deng:** But during the Chinese-Indian border conflict you did not act that way.

**Suslov:** But you were not threatened by a dangerous aggressor.

**Deng:** You unilaterally withdrew your experts from China, you transferred the ideological differences to the sphere of international-state relations, and I do not agree that India did not threaten China. You declared that you took a neutral position in the question of the Sino-Indian conflict. It is news to us that a fraternal socialist country can take a neutral position in the conflict with bourgeois India with regard to another socialist country.

In his further remarks, Deng spoke about the disagreements which had occurred in the relations between China and the USSR, among other things about the negotiations of the supreme command of the Far Eastern military district on joint air defense on 4 February 1955 and those on air defense between the military districts of the USSR and China on 27 September 1955. Peng Zhen thoroughly explained once again the question of the construction of a long-wave radio station. Deng stated in conclusion: As is well known, an extremely unequal treaty existed according to which China did not have the right to permit representatives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business whether we permit the entry of persons from third countries or not [?]. These questions were discussed with Comrade Mikoian during his trip to the PRC, and it was resolved. We appreciate that you resolved these questions.

**Suslov:** And why do you now raise these long-resolved questions once again? What is your point?

**Deng:** Unfortunately, the proposals with regard to the construction of a joint fleet, a long-wave radio station, and negotiations on a basis of equality [sic?] came from Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Mao Zedong back then had asked Comrade Khrushchev: What should we do when you raise these issues, should we act according to your proposals or according to our thoughts. If we act as you wish, we would have to cede our entire coast to you, as was the case with Port Arthur [Lushunkou] and Dalnii [Dalian]. Comrade Khrushchev responded: You cannot act like that. Where would you go? Comrade Mao Zedong then stated: We will go into the mountains as partisans.

**Suslov:** We think this is a joke.

**Deng:** This was not a joke. This was a very serious conversation. It must be stated that following this conversation, you stopped delivering to us technical documentation and equipment for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, while the CC CPSU communicated to the CC CCP on 20 June 1959 that the USSR would terminate the deliveries of technical documentation and necessary materials for the production of atomic weapons…

With regard to the Chinese-Soviet border incidents, Deng stated: on this question, we will communicate our response through diplomatic channels, and therefore we will not take a position at this point….

**Deng:** …I take advantage of the opportunity to ask you to transmit our greetings to your Party and to com. Khrushchev. At the same time, please transmit the following wish: since last September com. Khrushchev has personally attacked our country and Party many times causing us alarm. As the leader of the Soviet party and the Soviet state, com. Khrushchev exercises powerful influence over world affairs. Therefore, we ask you with all our hearts and sincerity to deliver this message [to Khrushchev], asking him to pay attention to it. With great satisfaction, we ascertain that both sides consider this meeting useful and are of the opinion that this is a contribution towards gradually overcoming our differences…

[Source: SAPMO (former Socialist Unity Party [SED] Archive) JIV 2/202-280. Bd.3; provided by Tim Trampedach (Freie Universität-Berlin); translated by Christian Ostermann.]
From the Diary of

S.V. CHERVONENKO
12 October 1961

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

Transcript of Conversation
with General Secretary of the CC CCCP

DENG XIAOPING

30 September 1961

In connection with 27 September instructions from the Center, I made a request to meet with Mao Zedong. On September 30, the Secretariat of the CC CCP informed us that Mao Zedong had instructed Deng Xiaoping to receive the Soviet ambassador. On the same day I met with Deng Xiaoping.

At the beginning of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping by way of explaining why Mao Zedong did not receive us, said that the “other comrades of the CC are very busy receiving kings” (at that time, the king and queen of Nepal and the Belgian queen were located in Beijing).

I gave information in an oral form on the Albanian issue (it is our opinion that they were already informed of the matter). Having heard our message, Deng Xiaoping said: “Bad news. Have you reached the culmination point of mutual relations between your two countries and two parties?”

I answered Deng Xiaoping that as he knows from our formerly delivered letter, the Soviet government has more than once made efforts directed at normalizing Soviet-Albanian relations, but the Albanian leaders are taking steps in the opposite direction. Their last step is damaging the security of the member-countries of the Warsaw pact and the basic security of the entire socialist camp.

Deng Xiaoping stated that everyone must not take extreme measures in order to leave room for a settlement.

I again emphasized that after the Moscow conference, the Soviet side undertook multiple steps in order to eliminate misunderstanding in the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. For instance, a readiness by N.S. Khrushchev to meet with the Albanian leaders was expressed, although the latter, as the Chinese comrades well know, stubbornly refused such a meeting. I added that such a position by the Albanians is incomprehensible to us.

We, Deng Xiaoping responded, are acquainted with the correspondence over this period between the Soviet Union and Albania. Between the CCP and the CPSU there were also great disputes. It is well that both you and we did not take the matter to extremes. We have always stood and stand for this. We said and still say to the Albanian comrades that relations between you should improve and not worsen.

Then Deng Xiaoping thanked [me] for the message and expressed the hope that this bad news would be the culmination point after which an improvement would ensue.

I said that for our part, we would like to share this opinion, but that the situation was not of the Soviet Union’s making (za Sovetskum Soiuzum). As for the Albanians’ most recent act, it affects the interests of all of the Warsaw pact countries, of the whole socialist camp. For that reason, efforts were needed which would lead to unity on the part of all of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

In reply, Deng Xiaoping said that he was not in the mood to immerse himself in the essence of the Soviet-Albanian differences. We have, he emphasized, a single desire—that the relations between your countries improve. In reply to my words that the CPSU had no other desire than to improve relations between the USSR and Albania, Deng Xiaoping again moved the conversation to Soviet-Chinese relations. Having mentioned that relations had been very strained between the CCP and the CPSU and the PRC and the USSR, Deng Xiaoping stated the opinion that since the Moscow conference, these relations have been developing fairly well (neplokho). Having noted that in Korea, F.R. Kozlov invited him to lunch, and he [invited] F.R. Kozlov, Deng Xiaoping said: “We spoke about the importance of solidarity. I said to Kozlov that, of course, on this or that concrete issue we might not have identical opinions, but on the whole after the Moscow conference, our relations have been developing fairly well. Kozlov agreed with this.” On a series of important international problems, Deng Xiaoping continued, we expressed and continue to express support for your actions. Between the USSR and the PRC, very good cooperation has been established in the international arena; for instance, at the Geneva conference on Laos. Of course, on certain questions we have not entirely identical opinions. It is true that in Korea we did not speak about the Albanian issue with Kozlov, he added.

Further, Deng Xiaoping stated that “there are 12 countries in the socialist camp, but the issue of relations between the USSR and Albania stands out most of all. Is there really no possibility of finding some way to resolve this issue? For our part, we hope and wish that such a path be found.” Deng Xiaoping reminded [us] that Zhou Enlai and he (Deng Xiaoping) had earlier already stated their opinion on Albanian affairs. It is true, he noted, turning to us, that you were not content, especially with my (Deng Xiaoping’s) statement.

On that note the conversation about the Albanian issue ended….

At the end of the conversation, I inquired as to whether the CC CCCP had received the CC CPSU’s congratulatory telegram on the PRC’s national holiday. Having received a negative reply, I informed Deng Xiaoping on this issue. Deng Xiaoping expressed thanks to the CC CPSU for the congratulations. Afterwards, he noted that a solemn celebration dedicated to the PRC’s
12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid to the Chinese people’s holiday.

The candidate of the secretariat of the CC CCP, Yang Shangkun, translators for the CC CCP apparatus, Yan Mingfu and Zhu Ruizhen, as well as the counselor to the embassy, F.V. Mochul’skii, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

signature

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF f. 0100, op. 53, p. 8, d. 454, ll. 175-8; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

From The Diary Of
S.V. CHERVONENKO

Top Secret.
Copy No. 1

“28” March 1962 and “8” May 1962

Transcripts of the Conversations (Excerpts)
With the General Secretary of the CC CCP
DENG XIAOPING

1 March 1962

At the beginning of the meeting, Deng Xiaoping and CC CCP Secretariat candidate member Yang Shangkun were cautiously reserved, noticeably nervous, and evidently ready to receive a document of a different character.

[Deng said] “...we draw your attention to the fact that your letter talks about the necessity of improving relations with Albania. In the end, the larger party should take the initiative on such issues. Issues of prestige do not exist for a large party and a large country. In the past we had disagreements with other parties and we have experience in resolving them, as we told com. Khrushchev. As we told you earlier, we have experience in relations with Korea. The CPSU has much experience in relations with Poland. For this reason, given a desire to improve relations, of course, a resolution will be found.” ... The meeting, which continued for about an hour and a half, took place in an even, calm tone. After the Chinese comrades had acquainted themselves with the contents of the CC CPSU’s letter, their reserve (skovannost’) disappeared; they acted more freely and cordially. In parting with us, Deng Xiaoping said: “Your letter calls for solidarity—and that is good.”

9 April 1962

On April 5, in keeping with instructions from the Center, I turned to the CC CCP with a request to meet with Mao Zedong, or with a person to be named by him, in order to inform the Chinese side of the negotiations of com. A.A. Gromyko with [US Secretary of State] D[ean] Rusk on the German issue. After a silence lasting for four days, they replied to us that Deng Xiaoping had been instructed by the CC CCP to meet with the ambassador.

I visited Deng Xiaoping in the CC CCP building. In connection with Deng Xiaoping’s question about my trip to Moscow, I told him in detail about the work of the March Plenum of the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping then handed me a letter from the CC CCP of 7 April 1962, which is an answer to the CC CPSU letter of 22 February 1962.

Since these letters by the CC CCP are long, Deng Xiaoping stated that he would not read it. The basic content of the letter of the CC CCP to the CC CPSU, he continued, is that, no matter what, the CPSU and the CCP must close ranks and, in a spirit of unity, resolve their problems....

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]
In the past we never spoke about this openly, because we were taking into account the situation you were in. We only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen in the past few years in the international Communist movement were provoked by the violation of the Declaration of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties... We have always considered and still consider that the 20th Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Especially serious are two issues: the issue of the so-called “peaceful transition” and the issue of the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so-called “struggle with the cult of personality”...

Here I want just briefly to say the following: a criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good thing. However this criticism must be correct both from the point of view of principles and from the point of view of methods.

Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the facts demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of issues... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, the wave of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world...

The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.

We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to resort to military force. We consider that such a method is not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also evidence of adventurism.

Following this, the counterrevolutionary mutiny in Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the issues associated with the events in Poland, which were issues of an internal sort [vnutrennego poriadka], between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even trying to resort to military force.

And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and to us. I do not want to dwell on them greatly... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal sort [vnutrennego poriadka], the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no grounds for [saying] that.

In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known to you.

Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Com. Iudin.

Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that “Stalin’s errors and contributions are divided into equal halves;” “whatever happened, all the same Stalin’s contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes 30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around [vsestoronnaya] assessment.”... In October 1956, Com. Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Com. Ponamarev, who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our [CCP] party. In discussion with Com. Ponamarev, Com. Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, “no preliminary consultation was carried out with fraternal parties”; secondly, “an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking” in relation to Stalin; thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU “lacked self-criticism”. These are the three points which Com. Zhou Enlai talked about.

On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another opinion, and also have a different opinion about some other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one’s own feet [podniav kamen’ brosit’ ego sebe na nogi].

On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin’s leadership was correct and that one must not treat one’s comrade like an enemy.

On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other
hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of self-criticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.

Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation with Com. Iudin, and Com. Zhou Enlai during the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with Com. Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin.

It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Poland mistakes of great-power chauvinism which took place during Stalin’s leadership as well... From that very time, you, considering that your internal problems have already been resolved, started to direct the cutting edge [ostrie] of your action against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the PRC, and this activity is of a serious character.

What has been done by you over this period? Let us cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear.

From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not able to attain your goals.

Following that you started both in statements and in actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal policies of the CCP, in particular on the people’s commune.

By way of example one can refer to the conversation by Com. Khrushchev with the American Congressman [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech by Com. Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative in July 1959.

In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear industry and in producing atom bombs.

Following this, on 9 September 1959, TASS made an announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, making the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union clear to the whole world for the first time.

In November of that year Com. Khrushchev openly accused China of having acted “stupidly” and “regrettably” in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian daily “New Age.”

At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in September 1959, Com. Khrushchev began to preach to the whole world of a “world without arms, without armies, without wars”, (look good in all sorts of different ways) made the leader of American imperialism, considered peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagated the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet friendship decides the fate of humanity. All of this practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature of imperialism had already changed, that Marxism-Leninism was already obsolete.

During this very period you started to propaganda the so called “spirit of Camp David” everywhere. Incidentally, Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any “spirit of Camp David”.

During this very period you, counting on some “spirit of Camp David,” clutched at the straw extended by Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in your statements without restraint.

On 30 September 1959, in his speech at a banquet held by us on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the PRC, Com. Khrushchev stated that one must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force. On 6 October 1959 in his speech in Vladivostok, Com. Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking for war, like cocks for a fight [kak petukhi k drake].

On 31 October 1959 in his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Com. Khrushchev said that some, similarly to Trotsky, want “neither war nor peace.” On 1 December 1959 in his speech at the 7th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Com. Khrushchev demanded “a checking of watches.” In that same speech he stated that “if the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, then that can play into the hands of the enemy.”

In February 1960 during the meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact, Com. Khrushchev spoke rudely using an expression like “old galoshes.” Meanwhile, the CC CPSU in its oral presentation to the CC CCP accused China of committing such mistakes as a “narrowly-nationalist approach,” and of acting on “narrowly-nationalist interests,” in relation to the issues of the Indian-Chinese border.

The sense of all these statements and speeches is understood by you and by us, and also by our enemies... In such circumstances we could not remain silent any longer. We published three articles “Long live Leninism!” and others, in which we defended Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration, and exposed some revisionist and opportunist views to criticism. But in these three articles, we as before directed the brunt of our struggle for the most part against imperialism and Yugoslavian revisionism without open criticism of comrades from the CPSU.

Following this, such events occurred as the intrusion of the American “U-2” plane into the USSR’s airspace, the collapse of the meeting of the heads of government of the four powers in Paris and the collapse of the entirely non-
existent so-called “spirit of Camp-David.” All of this proved the error of the views of our comrades from the CPSU and the correctness of our views...

In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign by a whole group of fraternal parties against us...

On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts and agreements were broken...

On 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind China by the hands and feet through an agreement with the USA.

After India started a major attack on the border regions of China in October 1962, the Soviet Union began to supply India with even larger quantities of military materiel, to do its utmost to give [India] an economic blood transfusion, to support Nehru by political means, and to spur him on to the struggle against China.

Your position on the issues of the Indian-Chinese border conflict received praise from the USA. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Averell] Harriman, said: “I consider that the maintenance of relations that are as friendly as possible between India and Moscow serves its own interests well and also serves our interests well.” Harriman made this statement on 9 December 1962. Further, on 18 December 1962 in conversation with a Japanese correspondent, Harriman also stated that the USA wanted to see the Soviet Union help India in the matter of supporting its defense capabilities.

On the issue of Chinese-Indian relations you went too far. With all [bad] intention, you spoke out together with Kennedy and Nehru against China. Where then did the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which existed under Lenin and Stalin, go?

In October 1962 there was a crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea. During these events we consider that you committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba you indulged in adventurism, and then, showing confusion in the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitulated.

People understandably [zakonne] ask why you began to ship missiles to Cuba. In this regard we have our own experience. Judging by our experience, your actions in this regard remind us in their character of your efforts to develop a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet in China. For Cuba’s defense no missiles are necessary at all. And so, in shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under your control.

You failed to consult with fraternal countries on such an important issue. You daily speak about the danger of thermonuclear war. But in the given case you rashly played with nuclear weapons.

You justify your actions by saying that you wanted to obtain some sort of “promise” from the USA, and you say that you truly received such a “promise.”

But what are the facts? The facts are that under threat from the United States you were obliged to remove your missiles. By all sorts of means you tried to convince Cuba to agree to so-called “international inspection,” which encroaches upon their sovereignty and constitutes interference in their internal affairs. Besides that, you also conduct propaganda among the peoples of the world, convincing them to believe in some sort of promise by Kennedy, and thereby you adorn [priukrashivat] American imperialism.

In his letters to Kennedy of the 27 and 28 October 1962, Com. Khrushchev wrote: “You are working toward the preservation of peace” and “I express my satisfaction and recognition of your manifestation of a sense of moderation and an understanding of the responsibility which now rests on you for the preservation of peace in the whole world.”

But the question remains did the USA in the end give some sort of promise? Let us look at [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk’s statement of 11 January 1963. Rusk stated: “To whatever extent President Kennedy took on obligations not to encroach on Cuba at the moment of the Cuban crisis, these obligations have not come into force.” He further said: “In general no such obligations exist.”...

At the Congresses of these parties another strange phenomenon was observed: on the one hand at these Congresses they attacked the CCP and completely removed the Albanian Workers’ Party, and on the other hand, they forcibly dragged the Titoist clique in Yugoslavia into the ranks of the international communist movement and tried to rehabilitate that clique. In addition, at the Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there was noise, whistling, and stamping right at the time when our representative subjected Yugoslav revisionism to criticism on the basis of the Moscow Declaration by citing the Moscow Declaration verbatim.

What do the facts we have cited above, which took place after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, testify to? These facts testify to the fact that comrades from the CPSU have taken further steps to create a split in the ranks of the international communist movement, and, moreover, have done so in an increasingly sharp, increasingly extreme form, in an increasingly organized [way], on an increasingly large scale, trying, come what may, to crush others.

I would like to note that using such methods is a habitual affair for you. You began using such methods as far back as the Bucharest conference. During the bilateral meeting between the representatives of our two parties in
1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party.

**Ponomarev.** And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference.

**Deng Xiaoping.** I understand you.

**Peng Zhen.** Wait. You will have [your] time; you will be able to say as much as you want then. We are ready to hear you out...

**Deng Xiaoping.** I have already taken 5 hours in my statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow?

**Suslov.** We propose a break until the day after tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with your statement.

**Deng Xiaoping.** We agree. Who will speak the day after tomorrow, you or we?

**Suslov.** By the order it will be our turn.

**Andropov.** By the principle: we, you, we, you.

**Deng Xiaoping.** That is Com. Andropov’s invention [*izobretenie*]...

**July 10**

**Suslov.** Again, as in 1960, you are putting in motion the practice, which has already been condemned by communist parties, of personal attacks on Com. N.S. Khrushchev. Such a practice in the past did not provoke anything but indignation in any true communist, and will do the same now.

Com. N.S. Khrushchev is our recognized leader. Reflecting the collective will of the CC CPSU, he has gained unlimited authority for himself in our party, in the country, in the whole world through his selfless devotion to Marxism-Leninism and through his truly titanic struggle to build communism in the USSR, to preserve peace in the whole world in defense of the interests of all working people...

For obviously demagogic ends you are trying to connect the decisions of the 20th Congress with the well-known events in Poland and also with the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary in 1956... We do not plan to examine these issues anew. We will simply note the complete groundlessness of your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th Congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by materials of the fraternal parties, comes from the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin’s actions: elements of unequal rights in the relations between socialist countries which took place during that period by the fault of Stalin. How could the 20th Congress, which abolished these elements of unequal rights and fully restored the principle of respecting national sovereignty, be reason for dissatisfaction on the part of the Hungarian people?

You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that allegedly the Soviet Union committed errors, and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation.

This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than strange pretension [*pretenziea*] on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons’ lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary; did it not come to the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult hour?...

Throughout the whole period of existence of the PRC, the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government invariably gave help to China in creating and strengthening the defense of the country. The 24 defense enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military-technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of MIG-17, MIG-19, MIG-21-F, and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, “air-to-air,” “ground-to-air,” “ground-to-ground,” “air-to-ground,” and “ship-to-ground” missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and cutters of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis for a nuclear industry...

Several words on the issue you raised about the so-called “joint construction of a naval fleet.” Com. Deng Xiaoping stated that apparently our party tried to stick China with the joint construction of a naval fleet and that by doing so we allegedly encroached upon the sovereignty of the PRC. Com. Deng Xiaoping, after all you were present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have you really forgotten the following statement made by Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation.

“Never have we at the CC of the CPSU even had the thought of jointly building a fleet. You know my point of view. During Stalin’s reign I was against the “joint companies [*smeshanne obshchestva*].” Later, N.S. Khrushchev announced: “We considered it necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither thought about or considered it necessary to construct a joint factory or a joint fleet.” In response to this Com. Mao Zedong stated that: “If it is so, then all the dark clouds have dispersed.” There is no issue, but you have...
brought it up again today. What do you need it for?...

We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientific-research institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People’s China? Up until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical enterprises constructed in China with help from the USSR. Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed in China with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientific-technical documentation, including more than 1400 plans of whole enterprises...

Deng Xiaoping. Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov).

Suslov. Fine, until ten o’clock, yes?

Deng Xiaoping. Fine, we agree...

July 12

Deng Xiaoping. Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People’s Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it “putschism,” “adventurism,” and “terrorism.” It accused Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him was a “total mistake” [splosnaya oshibka], “caused by a petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on the masses.” It even openly demanded of Com. Castro that he renounce “putschistic activities,” and “the erroneous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the people.”

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began to propagate the “danger” of national-liberationist war, advocating the attainment of independence through compromise, and in doing so fully wasted its place in the political life of the country.

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Communist party of Iraq renounced the correct line, which it at one time had implemented, and began dreaming about the realization of a peaceful transition in Iraq. This led revolution in Iraq to serious failures and to defeat. During the counterrevolutionary coup of 8 February 1963 the Communist party of Iraq found itself in a condition of complete unpreparedness and suffered heavy losses...

July 13

Suslov. Com. Ponomarev will speak today for our delegation.

Speech by the representative of the CPSU Com. B. N. Ponomarev:

Comrades, yesterday we heard the second address by the head of the Chinese delegation. Our delegation cannot hide the fact that we came out of the meeting feeling deep sorrow and distress. Of course, this was not because the address allegedly contained criticism, which is what Deng Xiaoping had in mind when he talked about “bitter, but necessary medicine.” We communists are steadfast people, and more than once have come across not only groundless criticism, but also malicious slander.

No, that was not what left us with a bitter taste. The second address by Com. Deng Xiaoping confirmed our worst fears, formed toward the end of his first speech. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the delegation of the CC of the CCP came here not to find agreement and to eliminate our differences. Your design, evidently, is different — to bring a whole load of dirt [privetzti...tselyi voz griazi] to Moscow, to dump it on us, to do everything, not shying away from any tactics [ne stesniats’ v sredstvakh], to defame the policies of the CPSU and thereby further worsen the relations between our two parties and countries...

Ponomarev. Fabrication Number 4. You fabricated an undoubted falsehood to the effect that the USSR did not aid the Algerian people’s war of liberation. Here are the facts. In the most decisive period of the war, from 1960-1962, we supplied free to the People’s Liberation Army of Algeria 25 thousand rifles, 21 thousand machine guns and sub-machine guns, 1300 howitzers, cannons and mortars, many tens of thousands of pistols and other weapons. Over 5 million rubles’ worth of clothes, provisions and medical supplies were supplied to Algeria by Soviet social organizations alone. Hundreds of wounded from the Algerian Liberation Army were saved and treated in the Soviet Union. Soviet wheat, sugar, butter, conserves, condensed milk, etc., streamed into Algeria.

Finally, Fabrication Number 5. You again and again repeat your lying version of Soviet policy towards Poland, Hungary and Cuba. Who are you [to set yourselves up] as judges in these matters, if the party and governmental leaders of these three countries fully, decisively and publicly for the whole world reject your insinuations and declare to you that it is impermissible for representatives of a communist party to try and split the USSR, Poland and Hungary through fabrications? Com. Fidel Castro in speeches in the USSR and on returning [to Cuba] clearly described the internationalist policies of the CPSU. By the way, why didn’t you publish these speeches? They would have shown the Chinese people that your position during the Caribbean crisis [Ed. note. This is what the Russians
call the Cuban Missile Crisis] was erroneous and contradicted the interests of the Cuban, Soviet and Chinese peoples...

Andropov. As for you, you long ago ceased any sort of consultation with us. In 1958, the Chinese side did not inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions to carry out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan straits which was carried out soon after Com. N.S. Khrushchev left Beijing. According to the later admission of Com. Mao Zedong, during Com. N.S. Khrushchev’s presence in Beijing the Chinese comrades had already decided on this operation and had prepared it, but you did not consider it necessary to inform the Soviet government about it.

Despite this, during a dark hour for the Chinese government, the head of the Soviet government informed the US President Eisenhower that an attack on China would be taken as an attack on the Soviet Union.

Over the last several years the government of the PRC has completely failed to inform the government of the USSR about the Chinese-American negotiations that have been going on since 1955 at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. Judging by the press reports, over 100 meetings were held there. Since May 1958 you have twice sharply changed your political course on relations with Japan, and, in both cases, despite the Treaty of 1950, you did so without consulting with us...

Kang Sheng. In your criticism of Stalin, you do not take the position of seeking the truth and do not use methods of scientific analysis, but resort to demagoguery, slanders and abusive language.

Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin “a murderer,” “a criminal,” “a bandit,” “a gambler,” “a despot like Ivan the Terrible,” “the greatest dictator in the history of Russia,” “a fool,” “shit,” “an idiot” [ubitiia, uglovnik, bandit, igrok, despot tipa Ivanova Groznogo, samyi bol’shoi diktator v istorii Rossii, durak, govno, idiot].

All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.

Trying to justify Com. N.S. Khrushchev, in your address of 10 July you stated that allegedly he gave Stalin an “objective and all-around assessment,” that allegedly he adhered to the “heart of the matter” [printsiial’noe otnoshenie]. Is this not the same as telling cock-and-bull stories with your eyes shut [nesti nebylitsty s zakrytymi glazami]?

Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred then it shows its enemies?

From your statements it emerges that allegedly the great Soviet people lived for thirty years under the tyranny of “the greatest dictator in the history of Russia.” Can it really be that such a great leader who for many years enjoyed the general recognition of the Soviet people really turned out to be “the greatest dictator in the history of Russia?” Can it really be that the experience of the first state in the world to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, which the Soviet people shared with the peoples of the whole world, has been the Soviet people’s experience of existence in the conditions of tyranny under some “dictator?”

From what you have said it appears as if the first socialist country in the world was built thanks to the fact that a “fool” headed the leadership. Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the latest technology in the Soviet Union during several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of “fool”? Can it really be that the basis for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union has been laid down under the leadership of some sort of “fool”?

From what you have said it appears as if the Supreme Commander of the great Soviet Army turns out to have been some sort of “bandit” at the head of its leadership for 30 years. Can it really be that the CPSU which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world had a “bandit” as its great leader for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the ranks of the international communist movement which grew and became stronger from year to year were under the leadership of some sort of “shit.” Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of “shit” to be their flag-bearer for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the great proletarian leader for whom imperialists and reactionaries of different countries felt fierce hatred for a long time has turned out to be all-in-all some sort of “gambler.” Can it really be that the Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of all countries struggling against imperialism and reaction considered their teacher some sort of “gambler”?

Comrades, you, so to speak, having picked up the stone, have thrown it on your own feet. How can you treat Stalin in such a way? Your actions in this regard not only go counter to historical reality, but also put you in a very awkward position.

In depicting Stalin as such a bad man, you also blacken the entire leadership of the Soviet state and the CPSU; and, at the same time, as comrades who then took part in the leadership of the state and the party, you cannot justify yourselves by saying that you do not carry your portion of responsibility for the “crimes” you talk about.

Let us take, for example, Com. Khrushchev. He heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin’s leadership, especially the excesses committed on the issue of counter-revolutionary elements, on Stalin alone while he presented himself as being completely clean. Can this really convince people? If the memory of men is not too short,
they will be able to recall that during Stalin’s leadership Com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and the policy he was then carrying out of struggling with counter-revolutionary elements.

Com. Khrushchev constantly praised Stalin, calling him “a close friend and comrade-in-arms of Lenin,” “a very great genius, teacher, great leader of humanity,” “a great marshal of victories,” “a friend of peoples in his simplicity,” “one’s own father” [rodnoi otets] and so on and so on.

On 6 June 1937 in his report at the 5th party conference of the Moscow oblast’, Com. Khrushchev said: “Our party will mercilessly crush the band of betrayers and traitors, will wipe all the Trotskyist-rightist carrion from the face of the earth... The guarantee is the unshakable leadership of our CC, the unshakable leadership of our great leader, Com. Stalin... We will annihilate our enemies without a trace to the last one and will scatter their ashes in the wind.”

Later, for example on 8 June 1938, while speaking at the 4th party conference of the Kiev oblast’, Com. Khrushchev said: “Yakiry, balitskie, liubchenki, zatomskie” [Ed. note: Famous purge victims] and other bastards wanted to bring Polish nobles [Pol she pany] to the Ukraine, wanted to bring German fascists, landowners and capitalists here... We have destroyed quite a few enemies, but not all. For that reason one must keep one’s eyes open. We must firmly remember the words of Com. Stalin, that as long as capitalist encirclement exists, they will send spies and provocateurs [diversanty] to us...

Frankly speaking, on the issue of criticism and self-criticism you are inferior to Stalin. Having made mistakes, Stalin sometimes still practiced self-criticism. For instance, Stalin gave some mistaken advice relating to the Chinese revolution. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, he recognized his mistakes before Chinese comrades and friends. And how are you acting? You know well that you slough off [svalivaete] all of your mistakes onto others and ascribe all successes to yourself...

Suslov. Our delegation states a decisive protest against the distortion, falsification and slanders made in relation to the leadership of our party and to Com. N.S. Khrushchev, against our party and the decisions of its Congresses.

The delegation of the CPSU also states its protest against the sort of propaganda that has begun in the last few days on Peking radio. We consider that the entire responsibility for these actions rests with the leadership of the CCP...

Deng Xiaoping. Com. Suslov has expressed some sort of protest. If we are talking about protest, then we have an even greater basis for voicing even more protests...

Already two weeks have gone by since our meeting began. At the meeting both sides exchanged their views. Although as of yet it has been difficult to attain a unity of both sides’ views right away, still, a frank exposition of views by both sides in this circle where the representatives of the two parties have been meeting is very useful for mutual understanding, for gradually finding a common language, for searching out a way to eliminate disagreements and strengthen cohesion. For that reason we consider that it serves as a good start...our delegation is introducing a proposal temporarily to adjourn the current meeting; the representatives of the CCP and the CPSU, both sides, can continue their meeting at another time. The time and place of the next meeting will be set through a consultation between the Central Committees of our two parties...

Our delegation once again expresses the sincere hope of our party that we and you will not spare our efforts towards an all-around, repeated, and most careful discussion of the disagreements existing between our parties. If a single meeting is not enough for this, it is possible to hold a second meeting, and if two meetings do not suffice, a third can be held...

20 July

Suslov. We will give you an answer tomorrow...

Deng Xiaoping. In conclusion I would like to say a few words.

However great the disagreements between us may be, we hope that we can gradually find the way to eliminate those disagreements, since unity between us is too important.

Despite the fact that in the course of the discussion both our sides have stated more than a few views with which the other side does not agree, and despite the fact that you have said that our words are not pleasant to the ear, and that we have also said that your words are not pleasant to the ear, despite all of this, our current meeting will serve as a good start. Moreover, we have agreed with you to publish a communiqué on the continuation of our meetings. We consider this a good thing.

We have come to the agreement that it is necessary to continue our meetings and that the time and place of the next meeting will be agreed by the Central Committees of our parties.

Here I would like to express in passing the following hope of ours: if your delegation, if the CC of the CPSU agrees, then we would like to invite the delegation of the CPSU to Beijing for the continuation of the meeting. That issue, of course, could be agreed upon separately.

Suslov. This is also a question for discussion between our Central Committees. Finished [vse]. Will I see you [later] today?

Deng Xiaoping. At six?

Suslov. Yes, at six.

[Source : SAPMO Barch. JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 (in Russian); obtained by Vladislav Zubok; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]