The Geneva Conference of 1954

New Evidence from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China

Introduction by Chen Jian and Shen Zhihua

These Chinese documents, translated below as the result of an agreement between the Foreign Ministry Archive of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson Center, are of major importance for two basic reasons. First, following the formal declassification of China’s diplomatic documents, a first in the history of the People’s Republic, the records are being made available to scholars and students. Secondly, they shed new light on the causes, proceedings, and results of the 1954 Geneva Conference, especially on Beijing’s policies as well as the considerations underlying them.

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with the process of China’s “reform and opening to the outside world,” scholars of Chinese Cold War history have gained new access to source materials unavailable in the past. However, until recently, the PRC’s diplomatic archives remained closed to researchers. In many cases, scholars working on the Chinese experience of the Cold War had to rely upon officially or semi-officially published documentary collections. These documents were released selectively and are often incomplete. In the past ten years, many scholars—including the two of us—have also tried to access documents kept at provincial and local archives. However, the documents at these archives usually are the ones that had been “relayed” by the Chinese Communist Party leadership to party organs at lower levels, so they were inevitably limited in their significance, reflecting only part of the overall picture of China’s policymaking and implementation.

China’s laws on archival declassification have established that government documents, including diplomatic papers, should under normal circumstances be declassified after thirty years. In 2003–2004, the Department of Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started the formal process of declassifying the documents in its holdings. The first group of documents was made available for public use (including by researchers from both China and foreign countries) in January 2004, covering the period of 1949–1955. In July 2004, the Archive further declassified another 5,000 documents from the 1949–1955 period, including documents relating to the 1954 Geneva Conference. According to the Archive’s administration, the documents that have been declassified account for about 65-70% of the documents that are held by the Archive for the period.

Differing from the common practice of most Chinese archives in discriminating between Chinese and foreign researchers—oftentimes documents were only made available to Chinese researchers, while scholars with foreign passports were denied access—the Foreign Ministry Archive carries out a new and much fairer practice by treating all users, Chinese and foreign alike, in the same way. All documents have been digitized and can be accessed at the computer monitors in the Department of Archives’ reading room at the Foreign Ministry. Researchers are allowed to take notes of the documents and, in most cases, make copies of the documents for a fee (after going through certain approval procedures).

Among the documents now declassified, the ones on China’s participation at the Geneva Conference of 1954 are among the most impressive and important. These documents cover a wide range of issues. In addition to records of sessions of the conference, there are some documents touching upon internal discussions among Chinese leaders—including telegraphic exchanges between Zhou Enlai in Geneva and Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and other Chinese leaders in Beijing—and between Chinese leaders and their Vietnamese and Soviet counterparts concerning how to form, implement, and, when needed, adjust the strategies and policies of the communist side toward the conference. Among the documents are also transcripts of meetings between Chinese leaders and the leaders of Western powers, such as Britain and France, and non-socialist and non-Western countries, such as India, Laos, and Cambodia.

Scholars of Cold War history have long believed that the 1954 Geneva Conference occupied a critical position in the evolution of the global Cold War. Most important of all, the conference ended the First Indochina War while, at the same time, prepared conditions for the unfolding of the process leading to the Second Indochina War (or, as it is more widely known, the Vietnam War).

These documents shed new light on the Chinese experi-
ence at the Geneva Conference, revealing some key aspects of Beijing’s decision-making and policy implementation before and during the conference. The documents indicate that, from a Chinese perspective, the conference provided the PRC with a valuable opportunity to appear at a major international forum. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in particular paid special attention to using the conference to announce that the “new China” had emerged as an important actor and prestigious force in international affairs. Zhou Enlai thus repeatedly emphasized internally that Beijing had to do everything possible to make the Geneva Conference a success.

The Chinese documents also show that the alliance relationship between China and the Soviet Union was quite intimate in 1954. Indeed, the Chinese experience at the Geneva conference was first and foremost characterized by high-level cooperation and mutual support between Beijing and Moscow. It was Moscow that used the Berlin Foreign Ministers’ meeting several months before to propose that China should attend—as a central participant—the conference on how to conclude the Korean War and the First Indochina War. Prior to the conference, the Soviet leaders provided the Chinese with all kinds of advice, assisting Beijing’s leaders to be ready for the PRC’s debut at a major international gathering. The Soviet and Chinese leaders also conducted extensive discussions on how to coordinate their strategies at the conference, which resulted in a joint Chinese-Soviet strategy, especially toward the settlement of the Indochina issue.

During the conference, when the discussions on settling the Indochina issue nearly deadlocked largely because of the Viet Minh’s unyielding attitudes toward such issues as zones of troop concentration, handling the conflicts in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia separately, and withdrawing all foreign troops from Indochina, the Chinese and the Soviets closely consulted with each other, and jointly exerted great pressure upon their Vietnamese comrades. Consequently, the young Vietnamese communists had no other choice but to follow Beijing’s and Moscow’s advice to accept a peace accord that would divide Vietnam—albeit temporarily, it was intended—along the 17th parallel.

While cooperation and mutual support remained the main theme of Sino-Viet Minh relations at Geneva, the Chinese documents also confirm that disagreement and, at times, tensions developed between the Chinese and the Vietnamese comrades over their aims and strategies. As indicated by the documents, the differences were mainly over the issues of whether or not to adopt a “dividing zones” approach toward settling the Indochina issue, and, if so, along which parallel to establish the demarcation line. The Vietnamese, especially in the wake of their hard-won military victory at Dien Bien Phu, were unwilling to accept a solution that would divide Vietnam, even if such division would only be temporary. When a demarcation solution seemed inevitable, they persisted in demanding that the demarcation line be drawn as far to the south as possible. It was primarily because of great pressure from China—with the full backing of the Soviet Union—that the Vietnamese comrades finally accepted the 17th Parallel.

One of the most important reasons underpinning Beijing’s eagerness to reach a settlement on Indochina was, the records reveal, the profound concern that the United States would otherwise intervene directly in Indochina. Indeed, both in Beijing’s discussions with Moscow and the Chinese leaders’ meetings with the Viet Minh, the possibility of American military intervention in Indochina loomed large on the agenda.

A large number of the declassified documents demonstrate that Beijing’s leaders actively used China’s appearance at Geneva to establish direct contact with Western powers such as Britain and France. Among the documents are the transcripts of meetings Zhou Enlai held separately with Anthony Eden and Pierre Mendes-France, as well as the telegraphic communications between Zhou and Beijing reporting on these meetings. These documents make it very clear that Beijing’s leaders viewed these meetings not only as useful for driving a wedge between London and Paris on the one hand and Washington on the other, but also regarded them as highly valuable for the PRC to be regarded by the whole world as a rising great power. The documents also clearly indicate that Zhou Enlai, head of the Chinese delegation to the conference, played an extremely important role in shaping and handling Chinese policies at the conference.

While there is no doubt that the declassification of Chinese diplomatic documents represents an encouraging development for scholars of Cold War international history in general and of China’s Cold War experience in particular, gaps between scholars’ expectations and research needs and the reality of the archival opening in China continue to exist. The documents now made available to scholars are still limited in content and scope.

Some of the limits are caused by the special nature of the documents held at the Foreign Ministry Archive. Most of the documents kept by the FMA are papers related to the Ministry’s own operations and activities. Although not without exception, the documents held at the FMA are generally the ones about policy-implementation, rather than about policy-making at the highest level. Therefore, for scholars to construct a more comprehensive perspective of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process, it is essential that they should be given access to other archives in Beijing—the Chinese Communist Party Central Archive in particular.

The documents declassified and made available to scholars by the Foreign Ministry Archive only account for 70% of the Archive’s holdings. Among the remaining 30% are many highly valuable—indeed, compared with what has been made available to scholars, more valuable—documents. For example, a careful reading of the documents translated and published here indicates clearly that there are more documents on China’s dealings with Western powers such as Britain and France than on China’s dealings with its communist allies. Also, among the telegraphic exchanges between Zhou (China’s premier and foreign minister) and Mao, Liu Shaoqi and other leaders in Beijing, most of the documents containing critical analyses and strategic and policy deliberations have yet to be made
available to scholars. It is apparent that further declassification of these documents is much needed.

In all these senses, the declassification of Chinese documents on the Geneva Conference, while an exciting development by itself, should be regarded as a hopeful point of departure. It is our sincere hope that continued declassification of Chinese documents—not only by the Foreign Ministry Archive but also by other branches of archives of the Chinese party and government—as well as declassification and access to archives in other countries (such as Vietnam and Russia) will allow Cold War historians to study the rich and diverse history of the global Cold War from a more comprehensive vantage point.

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The Declassification of Chinese Foreign Ministry Archival Documents

A Brief Introduction

By Zhang Sulin

In January 2004, a large set of archival materials, which had been kept in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive since 1949, were made available to the public. While the eventual declassification of all Chinese Foreign Ministry documents will come in stages, the first group of documents now available includes over 40,000 items dated between 1949 and 1960. According to the Archival Law of China, documents should be declassified 30 years from their drafting date. The initial opening of the Foreign Ministry Archive is based on the relevant articles of the Archival Law of China.

About the Foreign Ministry Archive

The Foreign Ministry Archive is a national archive, serving as a permanent depository for archival materials associated with the activities of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and all agreements made with foreign countries (except those of a military nature) as well as materials from six subsidiaries of the Foreign Ministry: the China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, China Foreign Affairs University, the World Affairs Press, the Beijing Service Bureau for Diplomatic Missions, and the Bureau of Administration for the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. While most archival materials are in paper form, materials increasingly come in the forms of photographs, records, videotapes, microfiche, and compact discs. Every year the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive receives around 20,000 items. At present, the archive contains some 360,000 items, with the total shelf length of archival materials being around 2,500 meters. Archival materials such as the “Supplementary Speech Given by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Asian-African Conference (hand-written draft)” and “The Chinese-Drafted Joint Declaration by Chinese and Indonesian Premiers as Revised by Premier Zhou” are included in a special list, entitled, “Heritage of Chinese Archival Materials.”

Declassification Procedures for Foreign Ministry Archival Material

Since the archival documents at the Foreign Ministry Archive are numerous and vary greatly in date, the amount of work involved in declassifying them is enormous. To deal with the challenge, the Archive declassifies all documents in steps based on a general timetable. Documents of a single five-year period are grouped together. In practical terms, this meant that the second group of documents to be declassified were those dating 1956-1960. The first group of documents, covering the years 1949-1955, was an exception to the general principle of five-year groupings.

Procedures for declassification at the Foreign Ministry Archive are outlined in the document entitled “Provisional Regulations on Declassification and Use of Archives at Various Levels.” Specifically, the Foreign Ministry Archive organizes personnel appointed by supervisory departments to examine the documents and manage the process of declassification strictly in accordance with this regulation. Every document that meets the standards of this regulation shall be declassified. The goal is to ensure the highest level of objectivity, accuracy, and speed.

After completion of the declassification, the Foreign Ministry will make a detailed report to the State Council. Upon obtaining approval from the State Council, documents are made available to the public.

The First Group of Declassified Archival Materials and Their Contents

Preparations for the initial opening of the Foreign Ministry Archive began at the end of the 20th century, with the establishment of a division tasked with declassification. Studies and preparations were carried out in order for the project to be implemented smoothly. During the preparation process, the Archive has thankfully received assistance from the Foreign Ministry as well as Chinese embassies abroad. The Archive has also benefited from the experience and technological skills of archivists from various countries as well as a number of foreign government departments that supervise archives, especially those of foreign ministries.

The first group of materials made publicly available contains over 10,000 items, including directives signed or drafted by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, directives issued by the Foreign Ministry, as well as telegrams, letters, and reports sent by Chinese embassies around the world. These documents illustrate three main guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy in the early history of the People’s Republic of China: leaning to one side, inviting...
of the PRC, archival methods were relatively unsophisticated, resulting in problems with collecting and organizing documents. As a result, many documents were unfortunately not preserved. Second, a complex documentation system in China left many documents relating to the same historical event in different departments. As such, materials at the Foreign Ministry are often not complete, as the archive only has materials related to inter-governmental exchanges. For example, with the 1954 Geneva Conference, minutes of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese party meetings between leaders were not deposited at the Foreign Ministry Archive.

**About Archive Serial Numbers**

The foreign ministry archives, collected and kept by the ministry, follow the serial number system decided by the ministry itself since there is no uniform system for archive serial numbers in China. These archives are sorted by department, such as the Department of Asian Affairs, the Department of European Affairs, etc. The archives of each department are sorted chronologically. A few files of the early period archives are sorted by topics, such as the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Asian-African Conference, the Korean Issue, etc.

The serial number of a declassified foreign ministry archive file is made up of three parts. The first part is the code number of the department or the topic, the second part is the sequence number of the declassified files of the department, and the third part is the content sequence of the particular file. Taking 109-0446-01 for example, 109 is the code number of the Department of European and Central Asian Affairs, 0446 is the sequence number of the declassified files of the department, and 01 is the content sequence of this file.

When the first batch of documents from the foreign ministry archives of 1949-1955 were declassified, no electronic copies existed. This prevented us from declassifying certain documents with unsuitable content. But, in compiling the document collection *1954 Geneva Conference* in book form, we have selected some additional documents, which readers will not find in the declassified archives reading room. Documents of this kind have only two parts of the serial numbers, such as 206-Y0054.

In any case, the opening of the Foreign Ministry Archive offers the public access to a large number of formerly classified documents for the first time. This historic step has positive resonance within and outside China, especially in the field of history. We are very encouraged by the positive feedback and feel the hard work over the past few years has been rewarding. We believe that the opening of Chinese foreign relations archives will continue to move forward with support from all parties. As such, more objective and detailed primary sources will be made available for historical research.
DOCUMENT No. 1


[Source: Department of Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRCFMA) 109-00396-01. P26. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

CCP Central Committee:

We request that you convey to [Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Prime Minister] Comrade Ho Chi Minh the process of the discussion at the foreign ministers meeting in Berlin1 of the representatives from the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, the United States, Britain, France, and other related countries holding a conference in Geneva on 26 April 1954 (which, in addition to discussing the Korea question, will also discuss the question of restoring peace in Indochina). Previously we already informed you that “other related countries” in Indochina, according to our understanding, should be the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the three puppet states: [Chief (Quoc Truong)] Bao Dai’s [State of] Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

We know that the Vietnamese friends are concerned about the convening of the Geneva Conference, and whether they will attend the conference. We believe that the CCP Central Committee will agree to our opinion.

As far as the position of France at the Geneva conference, as well as that of the United States and Britain, is concerned, we do not have much material at the present time. As for how we should use this conference to make it favorable to the Vietnamese people, we are very much willing to learn the opinions of the Vietnamese friends.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

1. Editor’s Note: The 1954 Berlin Conference, between the foreign ministers of the US, UK, France, and the USSR, was convened on 25 January 1954. It was intended to address questions regarding East-West tensions and the reunification of Germany. The announcement to hold the Geneva Conference was made in a quadrupartite communiqué of 18 February.

DOCUMENT No. 2

“Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,” Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) and Approved in Principle at a Meeting of the CCP Central Secretariat, 2 March 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0054. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Reaching agreement to convene the Geneva Conference was a great achievement by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Four Powers in Berlin. The People’s Republic of China’s participation in the [Geneva] conference alone has already marked a big step toward relaxing international tensions, and therefore has won widespread support by peace-loving peoples and countries all over the world. However, the bloc of imperialist aggressors, and the US government in particular, has been intentionally underestimating the significance of the Geneva Conference, predicting that it, as happened at Berlin on Germany and Austria, will not achieve any result. But the opinions of the United States, Britain, and France on the Korea issue and especially on the Indochina issue and many other issues of international affairs are far from identical. Sometimes, the contradictions among them are very large, and they are facing many internal difficulties too.

In accordance with the above understanding, we should adopt a policy of actively participating in the Geneva Conference, of enhancing diplomatic and international activities, in order to undermine the policy of blockade, embargo, and expanding armaments and war preparations by the US imperialists, and of promoting the relaxation of the tense international situation. Even though the United States will try everything possible to sabotage reaching all kinds of agreements favorable to the cause of peace, we should still go all out at the Geneva Conference to strive for some agreements, even agreements only temporary [in nature] and limited [in scope], so as to open the path to resolving international disputes through discussions and negotiations by the big powers.

(2) Regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korea question, our side should tightly adhere to the slogan of peaceful unification, national independence, and free elections, and oppose [Republic of Korea President] Syngman Rhee’s [policy of] armed unification, the US-South Korea treaty of defense, and the so-called free elections held when the people have no freedom at all…

(3) Regarding Indochina… we must try our best to make sure that the Geneva Conference will not end without any result; even [if] no agreement can be reached, we still should not allow the negotiations for restoring peace in Indochina to be undermined completely, and should create a situation characterized by “negotiating while fighting,” thus increasing
the difficulties inside France and the contradictions between France and America, so that it will be beneficial for the people in Indochina to carry out struggles for liberation. … On the specific questions related to restoring peace in Indochina, an on-site ceasefire is not as good as a division along a demarcation line between the south and north, such as the 16th parallel. However, only through many struggles can such a favorable situation be achieved.

(4) The agenda of the Geneva Conference is set for discussing the Korea and Indochina questions, but it does not exclude discussion of other specific questions possibly to be raised [at the conference]. At the conference, if there is the opportunity, we may put forward other urgent international issues that are favorable to relaxing the tense international situation. … Therefore, apart from the Korea and Vietnam questions, we must prepare other materials and opinions concerning China, the Far East, and peace and security in Asia. In particular, [we must prepare for] effusive measures toward the development of economic relations, trade exchanges between various countries, and for further relaxing the tense international situation and breaking up the blockade and embargo by the US imperialists. Outside the conference, the mutual relations between China and Britain, China and France, and China and Canada will be touched upon, and we should make some preparations in this respect.

DOCUMENT No. 3


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048. P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top Secret)

Foreign Ministry, and Report to Zhou Enlai and the Central Committee:

I called upon [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.] Molotov this afternoon, conveying to him the preliminary opinions of and preparation work on our side for the Geneva Conference. He says that all opinions are very good, and he will forward them to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and the [Soviet] Foreign Ministry for discussion. He also welcomes the delegations from China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam to visit Moscow in mid-April, to have discussions and consultations on various issues before (the Geneva Conference). Concerning Ho Chi Minh’s plan to visit Moscow, he will report to the Central Committee immediately and will then give us a reply.

During the conversation, Molotov touched upon several questions, and they can be used as reference for us at home.

(1) At the Geneva Conference, apart from discussing the Korea and Vietnam questions, should such questions as relaxing tensions in Asia (including the Taiwan question, opposition to rearming Japan, and opposition to the US-Pakistan pact) also be discussed? He says that these issues should be considered.

(2) Concerning plans for settling the Korea issue, should the issue of North Korea and South Korea “organizing a provisional government for the whole of Korea on the basis of equal rights” be raised? This should be given further consideration. He says that prior to 1950 the Soviet Union had used [the principle of] “on the basis of equal rights” with regard to the German question, but has not used it since then. This is because this statement is likely to cause many new and difficult problems. He says that he has heard that [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Prime Minister] Kim Il Sung does not welcome free elections.

(3) Concerning the participation of foreign ministers from various countries, this [issue] was not clearly defined by the Berlin Conference. Molotov has consulted with several foreign ministers, and they have shown an interest in attending the conference. But they have attached a condition to this: it is possible that they may only attend the conference’s opening ceremony, or may attend only part of the conference.

(4) At the Geneva Conference, the countries which will be invited to participate in discussions of the Korea question have been agreed upon by all in advance. However, the countries which should be invited to participate in discussions of the Indochina question have not been worked out. It is likely that there will be disputes on this issue. As to whether India should be invited, Molotov says that he is not interested in this matter at the moment, as India’s participation may weaken the role played by China at the Geneva Conference.

(5) Concerning the organization of the conference, according to [United Nations (UN) Secretary General
Dag] Hammarskjöld, the institution of the United Nations can be used. However, Molotov emphasizes that the United Nations should not be allowed to get involved and that members of various delegations should be able to use their own institutions, just like the situation during the Berlin Conference.


(7) Concerning the procedure question of the conference, he believes that there will be many disputes over it after the beginning of the conference.

(8) Comrade Molotov will ask Comrade Gromyko and others to make presentations to us on matters needing attention in attending an international conference.

Zhang Wentian
6 March [1954]

DOCUMENT No. 4


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00055-04; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

In order to end the war in Indochina, to restore the national independence and rights of freedom of the peoples in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and to establish lasting peace in Indochina, a comprehensive solution on restoring peace in Indochina is presented here as follows:

(1) The two sides involved in activities of hostility in Indochina have agreed to an armistice. In order to implement the armistice and to guarantee its stability for the purpose of further restoring peace in Indochina, the two sides agree that negotiations should be held immediately, and necessary and proper adjustment will be made to the current zones of military operations.

(2) The United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China will jointly guarantee:
   (a) That from the day of the armistice, no combat plane, armored vehicle, weapons or ammuni-
   tion, other military materials, or any armed force and military personnel should be allowed to enter Indochina.
   (b) No measures should be taken to harm the implementation of the armistice in Indochina.

(3) Within six months after the armistice, all foreign navy, ground force and air force, and military personnel should complete withdrawal from Indochina.

(4) The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the government of the State of Vietnam, the resistance government of Laos and the government of the Kingdom of Laos, the Committee for National Liberation of Cambodia and the government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, with the participation of democratic parties and organizations in the three countries, should establish a provisional joint committee, which should be in charge of the preparatory work for achieving peaceful unification, national independence, and democracy and freedom in the three countries in Indochina. The tasks of the provisional joint committee should be:
   (a) To guarantee that the people in the three countries of Indochina [Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos] should be able to have the rights of democracy and freedom, including the right for all democratic parties to conduct activities freely in the whole territory of the three countries;
   (b) To discuss and decide on plans for achieving disarmament in the whole of Indochina;
   (c) To discuss and decide on plans for restoring transportation, trade, cultural relations in all of Indochina;
   (d) To hold, respectively in each country, general elections in the whole of Indochina after the completion of the foreign troop withdrawal, and to establish a unified government in each country.

(5) The French government recognizes Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as three sovereign states with full independence; the three countries enjoy full power of self-determination in politics, economics, military [affairs], diplomacy, and culture.

(6) After the establishment of unified governments in the three countries in Indochina, they are entitled to carry out consultations and, in accordance with the desire of the people in the three countries, to form a Federation of Indochina.

(7) The unified governments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, sign agreements on economic, cultural, and technological cooperation with France for the purpose of developing the economic and cultural relations between the three countries in Indochina and France.
DOCUMENT No. 5

Telegram, Zhang Wentian to PRC Vice Foreign Minister Li Kenong, Concerning the Soviet Suggestion on Propaganda Work at Geneva, 6 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-04; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Top secret
Comrade (Li) Kenong at the Foreign Ministry:

When Vice Minister of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov received me on the 3rd, he expressed the hope that our delegation at Geneva would make better efforts to carry out additional propaganda work and coordinate diplomatic activities for the purpose of expanding the influence of New China. Such work could include showing movies, organizing speeches, small-size exhibitions, and cultural performances. The Premier instructs that you should immediately consider work on this.

Zhang Wentian
6 April [1954]

DOCUMENT No. 6

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to CCP CC Chairman Mao Zedong, CCP CC Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi, and the Central Committee of the CCP, Concerning Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov's Conversation with Zhou Enlai about the Vietnam Issue, 23 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-08; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Top secret

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Yesterday Malenkov, Molotov, [CPSU First Secretary Nikita S.] Khrushchev, and [CPSU Politburo member Mikhail A.] Suslov discussed the Vietnam question with Comrade Ding,1 as well as me and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wang] Jiaxiang.
(a) They express complete agreement to “Opinions on the situation in Indochina and our strategies and policies,” and they believe that the opinions expressed in this document are all correct. Comrade Khrushchev emphasizes that the document should be made confidential, and that when explanations are made to our cadres, they should be conducted in a way that is as undisguised as in the document, and should be made more skillfully.
(b) The requests of Comrade Ding can be satisfied.
(2) They agree to inform us about their opinion of China’s draft constitution in four months.
(3) Comrade Ding will return to Beijing in two days, and he hopes to go back to Vietnam immediately after meeting with the Chairman and Comrade Shaoqi.

Zhou Enlai
23 April 1954

1. Editor’s Note: “Comrade Ding” is an alias for Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

DOCUMENT No. 7

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Speeches at the Conference and the Situation at the First Plenary Session, 26 April 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-01; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) We have agreed with the Soviet comrades in the last two days that we should let the Korean delegation speak first. Moreover, in their first speech the Korean delegation should present the plans to reunify Korea by peaceful means, withdraw all foreign troops, and oblige major countries (who are directly involved in the war) to ensure and help to bring about Korea’s
peaceful reunification. China and the Soviet Union should, in turn, express their support for the Korean delegation’s positions one day after they speak. Therefore, I should also make a comprehensive statement myself. Right now I am reorganizing the drafts of the opening speech and two statements supporting the Korean delegation, and making changes based on several suggestions from the Soviet comrades. We will also present the principles for an Asian peace charter. However, we will not emphasize the Indochina issue for the moment since we hope to concentrate on the Korean issue in the first discussion. It will also demonstrate that we are not the people who are eager to negotiate.

(2) Regarding the issue of the chairman of the conference, we have already consulted with the Soviet Union and Britain in advance and decided that Thailand, the Soviet Union, and Britain should take the chair in turn. Thailand already acted as the interim chair when this afternoon’s meeting started at 3:00 p.m. Afterwards, the United States proposed that the above three countries take turns as chair. It was instantly put to vote and adopted. The meeting was adjourned thereafter. This meeting took only 15 minutes. Speeches and discussion will start tomorrow.

(3) Today Molotov introduced [British Foreign Secretary Anthony] Eden to me at the meeting. He shook my hand and greeted me.

Zhou Enlai
26 April [1954]

DOCUMENT No. 8

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding a Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Eden,
1 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-03; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

Comrade Molotov invited me to meet with Eden yesterday afternoon, and we discussed the following questions:

(1) The Korean issue. There is no meeting today on 1 May, and the conference will reopen on 3 May. Only the Turkish and Thai delegations made speeches yesterday morning. The meeting was adjourned in less than thirty minutes. Eden suggested holding a restricted session and said that “[the members should be] the five of us plus North and South Korea.” Eden said that he had already talked to [US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles about this, and he assumed that [French Foreign Minister Georges] Bidault would not oppose it either. Molotov and I both agreed to hold the restricted session. We also asked what subjects would be specifically discussed in the restricted session. However, Eden did not answer this question. It is the British and Americans who are taking the initiative and sounding us out, and we should not react too positively except to agree to hold the meeting. Based on the general situation, I assume that Eden’s proposal for a restricted session is related to Dulles’ return to the US next week. Until now, no North Atlantic country except Turkey has spoken yet to support Dulles during the discussion of the Korean issue. Although the United States fired many blanks on the Indochina issue, they could not scare anyone but themselves. The United States is attempting to form an alliance of invaders of Southeast Asia. However, Britain is still hesitating. On the other hand, France’s request for more air support is being refused by Britain and the United States. In sum, it is now impossible for the United States to stop negotiations on the Indochina issue. Eisenhower’s recent words showed his retreat and embarrassed Dulles. Therefore Dulles decided to run away [from the conference] and leave the problems to the Under Secretary of State, [General Walter Bedell] Smith. Eden said that Dulles had already decided to return to the US next week. Molotov responded that “it will increase the responsibilities of the four of us.” The current situation shows that Eden will stay, and so will Bidault since [French Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States] Marc Jacquet of the de Gaulle group and [French Foreign Ministry Political and Economic Affairs Assistant Director Roland Jacquin de] Margerie, who insists on the ending of the Indochina war, came to Geneva from France to pressure him. However, it is still not clear whether or not an agreement on the Korean issue can be reached.

(2) The Indochina issue. Eden said that “I will not use this as a condition for the issue of membership [of countries which should be invited to join the discussion], nor do I require you to answer me. I just want to ask if the Soviet and Chinese sides can push for the withdrawal of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu.” Molotov said: “It can be solved if you discuss this with the Vietnamese delegation.” I said: “It is better to have the two belligerent parties discuss this directly. The two belligerent parties in the Korean War used to discuss directly the issue of exchanging wounded and sick POWs before the armistice in Korea.” Regarding the issue of membership, I said: “Five countries have already been invited to join the discussions on the Indochina issue. It is odd that the decision on the invitation of related countries on both sides has not yet been made. Obviously someone is preventing both sides from attending the negotiations.” Eden said: “I am not preventing it.” It seems that it will take another two days to solve the problem of membership.

(3) The issue of Sino-British relations. When Molotov mentioned that China was complaining about unfairness in international affairs, Eden said: “Britain does recognize China. However, China does not recognize us.” I said: “It is not China which does not recognize Britain. It is Britain which does not
recognize us in the United Nations.” Eden said: “Britain is also dissatisfied with China on some [other] things, but I do not want to mention these things when we are dining together today.” Talking about the improvement of Sino-British relations, Eden said: “I brought the British Chargé in the People’s Republic of China, [Humphrey] Trevelyan here this time [to let him] meet with the Chinese delegation.” I said: “I also brought the Director of the Department of West European and African Affairs, Huan Xiang, here.” Eden said: “Well, we have some thoughts in common.” Trevelyan came to see us immediately after the meeting and had already arranged to invite Huan Xiang to dinner next week.

(4) The issue of British-American relations. Molotov said: “The United States is intentionally creating tensions, and it makes the American people very jittery. This kind of situation does not exist in the Soviet Union. I assume that Britain does not like that either.” Eden said: “Although the United States [government] talks a lot, the American people are peace-loving.” Molotov then said: “Britain is an influential country in the West, and shares the same language with the United States. Britain should not underestimate its role in improving relations between East and West.” Eden said: “You are flattering me. Industrial development in the United States exceeded ours after World War II. It also replaced Britain as the world’s leader. Although we are not jealous, the United States is too impatient.” Eden then cited a playwright [to the effect of]: “We have nothing in common with the United States except the same language.” I said: “Since the United States is not reconciled to the loss of China, it uses every means at its disposal to threaten and massacre people, especially the Chinese people. However, the Chinese people are not afraid of these threats. The American way of doing things only made its own people nervous.” Eden said: “The Americans have some reason to be dissatisfied. The Americans kindly helped China during its war against Japan. However, China repaid kindness with ingratitude.” I said: “The United States helped [Republic of China (ROC) President] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] oppress and kill Chinese people. How could it not lead to the resistance of the Chinese people?” Eden said: “In fact, the British loss in China was greater than that of the Untied States.” I said: “If we do accounts in history, Britain did not lose anything.”

(5) The issue of the Five Powers. Eden said that he does not care if it is Four or Five Powers, the subcommittee should be composed of seven countries. Molotov said: “This is a good attitude. However, some people do not want to talk about the Five Powers.”

Foreign journalists spread the rumor after the dinner that Eden had met with Dulles before his meeting with me. It was said that Dulles was very dissatisfied with Eden’s action. Trevelyan invited [PRC Vice Trade Minister] Lei Renmin for dinner last night. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the British Foreign Office, [Harold] Caccia, and the Assistant Under Secretary [for Foreign Affairs, William Dennis] Allen, were also present at the dinner. Trevelyan stated that three British trade organizations were willing to do busi-

ness with China. Lei said that the representatives of the three organizations could first come to meet with [the Chinese delegation] at Geneva in order to find out detailed information. Trevelyan agreed with him. Trevelyan also invited Lei to come to Britain and visit the industrial exhibition. The Indian ambassador to Switzerland [Yezdi D. Gundevia] came to see me yesterday morning and asked for information about the Geneva Conference.

Zhou
Enlai
1 May [1954]

1. Editor’s Note: The Chinese text literally says “North Atlantic,” probably referencing NATO.
2. Editor’s Note: The Associated States of Indochina were Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
3. Editor’s Note: The Five Powers were the UK, the US, France, the PRC, and the Soviet Union.

DOCUMENT No. 9

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation of the First Plenary Session, 9 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-07; P5-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) The nine-country meeting on discussing the Indochina issue was finally convened yesterday. Bidault took the lead to speak at the conference. The main points of his speech were to deny the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an opponent in the war and to regard it as a rebelling force. Bidault’s proposal, similar to the proposals that Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] used to deal with us [in the Chinese civil war], concentrated exclusively on a military ceasefire. Bidault also favored supervision by an international committee and a guarantee provided by the participants of the Geneva Conference. The essence of this proposal represented a preparatory step by the United States toward measures of collective security in Southeast Asia, and it is apparent that it had been made in accordance with America’s ideas. This proposal, of course, should not be treated as something that deserved further discussion and bargaining. But still it revealed the great role that America’s intrigues on intervention played for the warlike factions in France. This French proposal did not mention anything about the
political issue in Indochina. It is possible that Bidault intentionally left the political issue for Bao Dai at the next session, thus [allowing Bao Dai to] discuss it [while] pretending to be independent.

(2) After Bidault’s presentation, [DRV Foreign Minister] Comrade Pham Van Dong spoke, introducing the question of inviting the representatives of the two resistance governments in Laos and Cambodia to attend the conference. A debate immediately followed at the conference. For details [please see] the report of the Xinhua News Agency. Lastly, Eden, as the chair of the session, announced that the questions under debate should be left for discussion and solution outside of the conference.

(3) Considering the situation of the debate at the conference today, it is not proper to raise again the question of asking the conference to listen to the opinions of the representatives of the two resistance governments of Laos and Cambodia at formal sessions. Therefore, I plan to convey the proposal [inviting the representatives of the two resistance government to Geneva] to the Soviet side by letter, and let the Soviet side put forward this question in discussions outside of the conference.

(4) Comrade Pham Van Dong plans to speak next Monday, introducing the eight-point proposal that has already been prepared. In addition, a note on organizing a committee of supervision by neutral countries will be added to the conditions of ceasefire, so as to help the implementation of a ceasefire, as well as to counterbalance Bidault’s proposal on international supervision. The discussion with the Soviet and Vietnamese friends after the session reached the decision that for now we will not name which countries should participate in the committee of supervision by neutral countries. When it becomes necessary we will propose that India, Pakistan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia [be members of the committee]. If the other side insists that five members [of the committee] are needed, we may choose one more from Indonesia and Burma. We wait for the instruction by the Central Committee whether or not such a proposal is proper.

(5) The whole text of the French proposal is as follows. (omitted)

Zhou Enlai
9 May 1954

1. Editor’s Note: The “nine-country meeting” is the Geneva Conference itself.

DOCUMENT No. 10
Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Reply to Zhou Enlai’s 9 May 1954 Telegram, 9 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-07; P8. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Comrade [Zhou Enlai]:

The telegram of May 9 [above] has been received. We agree to adding one note on organizing a committee of supervision by neutral countries to the conditions of ceasefire; we also agree with your opinion concerning how the committee should be composed.

Central Committee
9 May 1954, 12:00 a.m.

DOCUMENT No. 11
Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Second Plenary Session, 12 May 1954
[Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) There is no session on the 9th (Sunday). The specific proposals raised by Comrade Pham Van Dong in his comprehensive presentation at the first plenary session on the 8th have caught the attention of many. The English language text of Pham’s presentation has been dispatched to Beijing. At one point, the spokesperson of the French delegation rejected the proposal on the afternoon of the 8th. However, on the 11th, he took it back and said that the proposal should not be completely rejected. At the second session on the Indochina issue, convened on the 10th, [the fact] that Pham Van Dong took the initiative to raise the issue of sick and wounded prisoners has produced much impact. Eden and Smith spoke in support of Bidault’s proposal, contending that it should be taken as the basis of further discussion. Although Eden’s tone was relatively moderate, he still favored stationing military forces by dividing zones and taking measures to guarantee a ceasefire. Smith followed Dulles’s stance as expressed in the statement of the
7th and threatened to do everything possible to support France and the three countries in Indochina in resisting outside “aggression.” He also supported France’s proposal for a ceasefire and favored effective international supervision. However, he only said that he had noticed France’s point on guaranteeing a ceasefire by participants of the Geneva conference, and did not make a clearer statement about this. Smith also stressed that the United States was willing to help the development of collective security in Southeast Asia. Toward the end of the session, the representative of [State of Vietnam Chief (Quoc Truong)] Bao Dai stated that the release of sick and wounded prisoners should not be restricted to French prisoners but should also include prisoners of [the State of] Vietnam. Pham Van Dong had no time to make a response then. After the session, the spokesperson of the Vietnamese delegation issued a statement to the effect that the releasing of sick and wounded prisoners would also include prisoners from Bao Dai’s [troops]. I plan to make a comprehensive presentation to support Pham Van Dong’s proposals and to rebut Bidault’s proposal at the third session on Indochina this afternoon. The presentation notes were completed on the night of the 9th, and were agreed to by the Soviet side on the 10th. After repeated revision of the language and text, the notes have been finalized.

(2) [Excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

Zhou Enlai
12 May 1954, 12:00 p.m.

DOCUMENT No. 12

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Plenary Session, 14 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-08; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(I) The British and French delegations spoke for the first time yesterday at the tenth session regarding the Korean issue. Bidault and Eden not only reacted to our criticism, but also defended the United Nations and affirmed their positions to the United States. In addition, Bidault made detailed proposals. He emphasized two things:

1. Elections must be held. It is necessary to establish an all-Korean government.
2. Elections should consider the population distribution in both North and South [Korea].
3. Elections should be based on universal adult suffrage and confidential ballots. [Elections] should be held as soon as possible under conditions of true freedom.
4. The international supervision under the United Nations should be conducted by countries that are acceptable to this conference.
5. Conditions that will enable foreign troops to withdraw should be created. The United Nations forces will withdraw after they achieve the establishment of peace and security in Korea.

The main issues of Eden’s statement were international supervision, elections based on the distribution of population, and the subject of how to withdraw foreign troops. However, his speech was ambiguous. It is obvious that he is attempting to bargain with us.

(II) After yesterday’s meeting, Eden took the initiative in sounding us out through his secretary. He proposed coming to see me this morning at the villa. I agreed to see him. I have already consulted with the Soviet delegation about how to deal with him. I will report the result of the meeting later.

Zhou Enlai
14 May 1954, 10:00 a.m.
Eden: Thank you for allowing me to come to visit you. I have not had the opportunity to talk with you. Today I came to see you before my visit with Mr. [Vyacheslav M.] Molotov, mainly to discuss with you as co-chairman how the conference should be carried on. I am more concerned with the Indochina issue. I am afraid that it is dangerous for everybody to be delivering speeches accusing each other. Therefore, I suggest that we have some restricted sessions to get down to actual negotiations. I have raised five questions. If you think these five questions are valid, then we can discuss them in the restricted sessions. If you think that these questions are not valid, I wonder whether there are other ways to conduct our talks.

Zhou Enlai: At the beginning of the conference, both sides need to state their positions. On the Korean question, if all sides have a common wish for the peaceful reunification of Korea, then the issue could be resolved peacefully. The Chinese delegation supports the proposal by [DPRK] Foreign Minister Nam Il. We are currently studying the five questions that you raised yesterday. On the Korean question, we have tried a restricted session, and we can try some more.

Eden: I am more concerned with the Indochina question, for at least we are no longer fighting in Korea. But I agree with what you have said about trying another restricted session on the Korean question. The reason why I am concerned with the Indochina question is not because of some local problems—I’m not familiar with these problems—but because I’m afraid that the major powers would insist on their positions on the Indochina question, which would lead to international dangers.

Zhou Enlai: China has stated its opinion regarding the Indochina question. As you know, we support the proposal by Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, because we believe that the proposal is comprehensive. On the Indochina question, many people want peace, but some people want to continue the war. That would lead to dangers. On this point, Mr. Eden, you know more than I do.

Eden: So far as I know, everyone wishes that the war would cease.

Zhou Enlai: Of the five questions that you raised, we are not exactly clear about one question, and that is the one regarding the concentration of all troops on both sides in pre-determined areas. I would like to ask you to explain it.

Eden: I am willing to discuss it. Our thought is to concentrate the troops on both sides in pre-determined areas so as to avoid conflicts. These areas shall be worked out by commanders-in-chief on both sides, and then approved by our conference. This is for the purpose of avoiding conflicts.

Zhou Enlai: As I have said before, the solution to the Indochina question must be fair, reasonable and honorable for both sides. We believe that in its present position, the United Kingdom could do some more work to make both sides understand that the negotiations must be conducted on an equal basis. The current circumstances are that the other side does not think this way, and wants to impose some things on this side.
| Eden: Where do you find inequality? | to conduct normal negotiations. But before this can be achieved, a resolution must be reached on the Indochina question. Indochina is important in itself, but what is more important is that this question not affect the relations among the five great powers. |
| Zhou Enlai: In that the French have not discussed the political questions of the military armistice. | Zhou Enlai: China deserves the status of a great power. This is an existing fact. We are willing to work with others for world peace, particularly for peace in Asia. But I must say candidly that this must not be made a condition. |
| Eden: Oh, you are referring to this question. On this point, both sides have some accusations. | Eden: No, I am not saying that it should be made a condition at all. I am only stating my opinion regarding this question. I am worried that Ho Chi Minh might be asking too much. He might be able to get it, but if he were to do so, it would affect the relations for the great powers. |
| Zhou Enlai: No, I am not referring to that. I meant that France had not answered Mr. Pham Van Dong’s political proposal, while only recognizing Bao Dai as representing all of Vietnam and unifying Vietnam under him. This is a completely unreasonable thought. | Eden: I think that the person who is asking too much is not Ho Chi Minh but Bao Dai. In their proposal, the delegates from the State of Vietnam not only asked that Bao Dai be recognized as the only leader of Vietnam, but also that the United Nations guarantee Bao Dai’s status as Vietnam’s only leader after the elections. Ho Chi Minh has made no such demands. |
| Eden: France would like to let the members of the Associated States speak first. My understanding is that France might speak first this afternoon. We hope to achieve military armistice first and then discuss the political questions. Perhaps military armistice can be the first practical question to be discussed in the restricted sessions. The restricted sessions perhaps could be held next week, for the general debate will be continued this afternoon. | Eden: What I was thinking just now is not the contents of the speech, but the thoughts behind the speech. |
| Zhou Enlai: Regarding the proposal for restricted sessions, we will have to discuss this with the Soviet and Vietnamese delegations. | Zhou Enlai: I wonder if Mr. Eden has studied the proposal by Mr. Pham Van Dong. He mentioned in the proposal that before unification, both sides separately manage the areas currently under their respective control. This is equitable. |
| Eden: Certainly, certainly. | Eden: Our hope to concentrate the troops of both sides into determined areas means exactly this. It seems that the French proposal does not reject this point, and thus we have something in common with France on this point. |
| Zhou Enlai: I would like to know what your plans are for the restricted sessions. | Zhou Enlai: France asked Bao Dai’s representative to respond to the political section in Mr. Pham Van Dong’s proposal. But his response was absurd. His response is very familiar to us. Jiang Jieshi once made such a demand: one government, one leader, one army, and the rest are all to be eliminated. I believe that Mr. Allen and Mr. Trevelyan would be fully familiar with these. But we all know how Jiang Jieshi wound up. |
| Eden: I am thinking that besides the heads of the delegations, the sessions would consist of only two or three advisors from each delegation. No account of the proceedings would be given to the press. We tried this method during the Berlin Conference, and it was very useful. The agreement to have the Geneva Conference was reached this way. | Eden: Our wish is to reach military armistice first, and then discuss the political issues. The question of armistice could be the first practical point for discussion in the restricted sessions. |
| Zhou Enlai: I would like to add something. China wants peaceful co-existence with all of its Asian neighbors. The recent agreement that China signed with India on trade in Tibet is sufficient to demonstrate this point. In the preamble, China and India stated mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, reciprocity on an equal basis, and peaceful co-existence. | Zhou Enlai: Political issues must be discussed along with military armistice at the same time. |
| Eden: Right. | Eden: I would like to thank you again for allowing me to come to visit you. If you think there is any- |
thing I can do for you, I would come to visit again.

Zhou Enlai: We welcome you. If you welcome me, I will go to visit you.

Eden: Welcome. I would also like to thank you for sending your staff to talk with Mr. Trevelyan. They had a very good talk, and they both felt satisfied.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Trevelyan raised some questions during his talk with Mr. Huan Xiang, many of which can be resolved. In a few days, Mr. Huan Xiang will have a talk with Mr. Trevelyan again.

Eden: That would be great.

Zhou Enlai: We should both work to improve Sino-British relations.

Eden: Yes, and then we should bring other countries along, too.

Zhou Enlai: Yes! (pointing to Eden)

Eden: Right, that would be my task. Now I will go to meet with Mr. Molotov. I don’t know if we can come up with some good ideas after our talk.

DOCUMENT No. 14

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Requesting Instructions on the Korean Issue and Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Plenary Session on the Indochina Issue, 15 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-09; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Eden came to see me in the morning yesterday. He mostly wanted to gauge my opinion on the Indochina issue and said that he hoped to hold a restricted session. I did not answer his five questions on the Indochina issue directly except to give my support to Pham Van Dong’s proposals. I simply asked him indirectly to explain what he meant by “all forces should be concentrated in the determined areas.” He said that it meant that troops of both sides should be withdrawn to areas determined by their respective commanders, and that this plan should then be ratified by the Geneva Conference. I therefore perceived that Britain does have a plan to delimit [the country]. However, it is still not clear that the British want to delimit [the country] between North and South, or to handle Haiphong differently. Nevertheless, it is obvious that France and the United States do not want to withdraw from the Red River Delta. I have already cabled the summary of my conversation with Eden separately. I agreed to hold a restricted session after consulting with the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese delegations.

(2) Molotov spoke first at the fourth session on the Indochina issue this afternoon. He attacked both Bidault’s misrepresentation of history and Bao Dai’s legal status, and supported Pham Van Dong’s statement on anti-colonial rule and colonial war. The main point of Molotov’s speech was to make the commission of neutral nations’ supervision of the armistice a supplementary proposal. He said that he could not completely agree to the international guarantee stated in France’s proposal. Specifically, he agreed to guarantee jointly collective consultation and collective action, but refused to agree to individual actions. Please refer to TASS’s broadcasts to see the full text of Molotov’s speech. Bidault and the Laotian delegation also made speeches at the session. Bidault still behaved like a colonialist. He refused to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and expressed his support of Bao Dai and the kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. Although Bidault still repeated his unreasonable arguments, his tone was relatively milder than on the two previous occasions he spoke. He accepted Pham’s basic position on peace, independence, unification and democracy. However, he said that all these had already been accomplished. Bidault also responded one by one to Pham Van Dong’s eight proposals, besides explaining three of his own. Bidault said that France had already recognized Vietnam’s autonomy and independence throughout the country as well as the independence of Cambodia and Laos. Cambodia and Laos had already signed agreements with France and became members of the federation. Therefore, Pham Van Dong’s first and fourth points became unnecessary. Concerning Pham’s second point, Bidault said that French troops in a country which is an ally of France cannot be considered as typical “foreign” troops. However, France, on the advice of interested governments, should be prepared to recall its own forces if invading troops will also be withdrawn. Bidault believed that the Laos and Cambodia issues could be resolved simply by withdrawing the Viet Minh troops. However, he argued that in discussions the Laos and Cambodia issues should be separated from the Vietnam issue. Regarding Pham’s third point, Bidault said
that elections must be supervised. A political solution will only be possible after a military settlement. The process of negotiating a political solution will only delay the implementation of a military settlement. On Pham’s fifth point, Bidault stated that since Vietnam had already consulted with France about the economic and cultural interests of France in Vietnam, these would never be conditions [to concluding hostilities].

Bidault agreed to the sixth and seventh points that Pham had raised. On the eighth point, Bidault said that 8(a) was ambiguous since it did not clarify whether or not the agreement on political conditions should be reached before the armistice. He emphasized that the ceasefire in Vietnam should be extended gradually from one region to another to reach a complete armistice. Bidault stated that Pham’s proposals on concentration areas (for stationing troops) and readjustment areas were basically the same as the first point of the first section of the French proposal. Regarding the armistice in Laos, Bidault believed that it wouldn’t be a problem as long as the Viet Minh withdrew its troops. He pointed out that 8(b), on transporting weapons across the border, needed additional and clearer regulations. On 8(c), on the issue of supervision, Bidault believed that international supervision is essential. Bidault also said that it was obvious that the Soviet delegation made the same argument in their speeches. He then proposed to disarm the irregular forces and once again raised the issue of the guarantee [of all these agreements] ensured by participants of the Geneva Conference. The speech of the Cambodian delegation still focused on the same old story of the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops. It was announced at the end that there would be no meeting on the 15th, and a restricted session on the Indochina issue will be held next Monday.

(3) In yesterday’s meeting, Molotov took the initiative and proposed to let the commission of neutral nations supervise the armistice. His speech had a great impact on the meeting and was believed to have carried the meeting one step forward. Eden’s visits to the Chinese and Soviet delegations and the agreement on holding a restricted session on the Indochina issue were also regarded as real progress. Thus the general discussion of the last three weeks finished. Discussions on substantial problems will start next week.

(4) The Chinese and Soviet delegations exchanged opinions on the Indochina issue after the meeting. We also decided to prepare to discuss on the 15th and 16th the commonalities and differences in both sides’ plans. We will also discuss what part can be agreed to and what part should be held or worked on. I will report the result after the discussions.

(5) After the meeting between the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations, we concluded that the current situation on the Korean issue is this: it will come to a deadlock if our counterparts cannot make new proposals except to emphasize repeatedly elections based on the distribution of populations under the supervision of the United Nations, and the withdrawal of the United Nations forces after achieving peace and security in Korea. As the next steps, we plan to make a compromise on the international supervision of elections. We will agree to

let neutral nations supervise the elections, but not the United Nations. In addition, we will also emphasize two things: first, although we agree to let the neutral nations supervise the elections, these must be held after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission [NNSC] should be organized to supervise the elections and to prevent interference by domestic terror groups only after the all-Korean commission, in which both Koreas consult as equals, drafts an election law. This compromise can carry the meeting one step forward. However, we presume that our counterparts will make no concessions on the issue of equal rights. We plan to let the Chinese delegation propose this compromise. We would like to request the Central Committee’s instructions on whether or not to raise the issue of the neutral nations supervising the Korean elections and also on how to raise this issue.

Zhou Enlai
15 May 1954

1. Editor’s Note: The NNSC, comprised of officers from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, was created to monitor and ensure compliance with the Korean War Armistice Agreement.

DOCUMENT No. 15

Telegram, Reply from the CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai's Telegrams of 15 May [and] 17 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-09; P5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Comrade Enlai:

Received your telegram of 15 May. Regarding our next steps on the Korean issue, after discussion, we agree to your suggestions. Specifically, that we should let neutral nations supervise the elections, not the United Nations. In addition, that we should also emphasize two things: first, that although we agree to let the neutral nations supervise the elections, these must be held after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, that the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission] should be organized to supervise the elections and to prevent interference by domestic terror groups only after the all-Korean commission, in which both Koreas consult as equals, drafts an election law. If the Soviet and Korean sides believe that it is appropriate to let the Chinese delegation make this suggestion, then the Chinese side should do so.

CCP Central Committee
17 May 1954
DOCUMENT No. 16

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Second Restricted Session, 19 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) The second restricted session on Indochina, held yesterday [18 May], devoted all its time to the discussion on whether the question concerning Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately. The United States, Britain, and France and three… [original unreadable] countries stood together to emphasize that the Cambodia and Laos questions should be dealt with separately from the Vietnam question. There are no French troops in Cambodia and Laos, so only after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese People’s Army will the issue be resolved. We absolutely cannot agree to this point. Pham Van Dong, Molotov, and I all spoke to rebut this point, pointing out that the armed struggle for national liberation by the Cambodian and Laotian people was caused by the military intervention of France. The resistance governments in Cambodia and Laos have their own troops. Therefore an armistice means that a ceasefire should occur on the territory of their own motherlands. There exists no such “issue” of withdrawing from Cambodia and Laos. Peace should be restored in all of Indochina, and peace should not just be restored in Vietnam. The questions involving the three countries cannot be discussed by separating them. The two sides debated for three hours and [the session] was adjourned without any result. The other side attempts to use this issue as the first issue to test our attitude. Before the end of the meeting, Molotov as chair [of the session] proposed that next day the Korea issue be discussed. However, Eden said that he was afraid that an impression would be created that the discussion on Indochina issue failed immediately after its beginning, so he contended that discussion should be continued on the Indochina issue on the 19th. Our side has agreed to this.

(2) In the previous several days the other side has used the sick and wounded soldiers at Dien Bien Phu as a means for political blackmail and has conducted a series of slanderous propaganda [activities]. To deal with this, [DRV Ambassador to the PRC] Hoang Van Hoan hosted a press conference on the 18th to publicize the facts and to expose the plots of the other side. Consequently, Pravda has published commentaries about this in the past few days. We are also organizing the reporters of the Xinhua News Agency to cooperate in our propaganda [efforts] and expose [the French]. In the propaganda battle, so long as we are able to command the material in a timely manner, we should be able to expose continuously the plots of the other side and to master the initiative.

(3) The French delegation has appointed a person to contact the Vietnamese delegation. The contact will begin today.

Zhou Enlai
19 May 1954

DOCUMENT No. 17

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Third Restricted Session, 20 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-13; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) On the 19th, the restricted session on the Indochina issue continued to discuss whether the Cambodia and Laos questions should be dealt with separately. After three hours of debate, no progress was achieved. Bidault proposed that the Cambodia and Laos questions be discussed by a committee appointed by the whole conference, yet he also stated that he did not intend to regard the resolution of the Cambodia and Laos questions as a precondition to a resolution of the Vietnam question. I pointed out that a ceasefire needed to be carried out throughout Indochina, and that I would not agree to a separation of the Cambodia and Laos questions from the Vietnam question. Before yesterday’s session Eden proposed to Molotov that the meeting be adjourned on the 20th for activities outside of the conference, that the restricted session on the Indochina issue be resumed on the 21st, and that the plenary session on the Korea issue be held on the 22nd. Our side agreed to this plan. There is a rumor [going around] that Eden and Bidault plan to make a trip back to Britain and France during the weekend.

(2) On the Korea issue I plan to take the lead in speaking on the question of having neutral countries supervise the election. The speech notes have been drafted and are in the process of revision. The other side has not…
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introduced any plan for resolving the Korea issue. Probably they are discussing with Syngman Rhee and are waiting for Rhee’s response.

(3) I plan to pay a return visit to Eden on the morning of the 20th. The result of the conversation will be reported separately.

Zhou Enlai
20 May 1954

DOCUMENT No. 18

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Restricted Session,
22 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00045-15; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) At the restricted session on Indochina yesterday our side insisted that the Cambodia and Laos questions should not be dealt with separately. As a result of the discussion, the other side agreed to two points:

a. First, to discuss the general principles regarding a ceasefire throughout the entire territory of Indochina related to the three countries, and then discuss the implementation of these principles, namely, how the questions concerning each of the three countries will be taken care of.

b. The discussion will begin with the first and fifth clauses of the French proposal as well as the first item in clause eight of the proposal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, although other suggestions can be considered at the same time.

After back-and-forth discussion, Molotov, as chair of the session, in summarizing the opinions of all, put forward five main issues as follows:

1. The question of achieving a ceasefire in the whole territory of Indochina.
2. The question of [defining] zones for troop concentration.
3. The question of whether or not to allow troops and ammunition to be imported from outside of the region.
4. The question of having an international institution supervise the implementation of the agreements.
5. The question of guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov also stated that if there were questions apart from the above five, they could also be raised for discussion. Laos and Cambodia continuously insisted upon their uniqueness. Bidault proposed to establish a special committee to draw up agendas, and our side immediately expressed disagreement to this. Eden raised the question of the representatives of the military commands of the two sides dispatching representatives to Geneva, and Pham Van Dong stated that this conference should only discuss matters of principles, and that the concrete issues could be discussed by the commanders of the two sides on site, although the representative of any country might call upon his own military advisors for providing assistance to his work, and this question would be discussed continuously next week.

(2) On the 20th Eden already expressed the willingness to search for compromise while having dinner together with Molotov. On the 21st, the other side made a step toward compromise on the agenda issue. However, they will be persistent with regard to the question of dealing separately with Cambodia and Laos. After the session, the Western press was of the opinion that the conference had made progress. They said that the Cambodia and Laos questions had been tabled, but the reality is that they made concession on the procedures of discussion on this issue.

(3) Regarding the question of arranging a ceasefire and zones for troop concentration, on what principles (and their scopes) should be determined here, and how the discussions here and the discussions by the commanders on site should be defined, we will work out a plan and then report it to the Central Committee.

(4) Regarding the plenary session on the Korea question today, it is our prediction that the other side will put forward the issue of having the United Nations supervise the election and the issue of “the Chinese communists withdrawing first.” So I plan to take the initiative to speak first, breaking up [the plot of the other side] by raising the point of having the neutral countries supervise the elections throughout all of Korea. Bidault returned to Paris on the evening of the 21st, and Eden will be returning to England today. [Indian Delegation to the United Nations Chief V.K. Krishna] Menon will be arriving here today, and I am preparing to have a meeting with him.

Zhou Enlai
22 May 1954
DOCUMENT No. 19

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eighth Restricted Session, 30 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0049. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee:

(1) At the restricted session on the Indochina issue yesterday, the three-point proposal concerning the meeting between the representatives of the two military commands at Geneva (see previous telegram [not printed]) was passed.

(2) During the discussion, the other side continuously stressed that they preserved their own different opinions toward the Laos and Cambodia issue, stating that “the concentration of formal forces in Vietnam should not be detrimental to the political and economic integrity of Vietnam.” [US Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell] Smith particularly stated that the conference should have the right to make new decisions over the proposals put forward by the military representatives of the two sides on the Vietnam and Laos questions.

(3) Pham Van Dong pointed out in his presentation that for the purpose of reaching a ceasefire it was absolutely necessary to adjust zones, and he exposed that America’s opposition to division of zones and America’s emphasis upon unification were actually excuses used for its attempt to block progress of the conference. Pham requested that the conference adopt our comprehensive proposal, as the conference would have to achieve agreement on the general principles concerning terminating all hostile activities. Pham also explained the importance of the on-site contact between the military representatives of the two sides, taking the on-site agreement reached at Dien Bien Phu on the issue of retrieving sick and wounded soldiers as an example. He pointed out that, despite the fact that the other side unilaterally tore up the agreement and bombarded Route 41, due to the efforts of our side, altogether 858 wounded soldiers (of 21 nationalities) of the French Expeditionary Army had been retrieved by 28 May. Thus Pham delivered a satisfactory explanation on the wounded soldiers issue at the conference.

(4) Molotov affirmed in his presentation the items on which the conference had reached agreement to a different degree. He began with explaining that the first step toward restoring peace in Indochina should be that all troops of both sides in the confrontation should stop fighting simultaneously throughout all of Indochina, and that this was the exact spirit of the communique from the [1954] Berlin Conference and the task of this conference. Molotov explained the six points—point by point—introduced in my comprehensive proposal, and expressed his support to them.

(5) Toward the end of the discussion, as a resolution was about to be passed, Smith outrageously stated: “The government of the United States authorizes me neither to accept nor to object to the principles of the British proposal.” And he also said that he reserved the right to explain to the press the attitude of the US delegation. However, because the atmosphere in the conference hall favored passing the resolution, and also because Molotov’s handling of the session was very good, Smith’s statement only embarrassed himself and also revealed contradictions between Britain and the United States. Eden expressed then and there that he was not happy with Smith’s statement.

Zhou Enlai
30 May 1954

DOCUMENT No. 20

Minutes, Director of the Staff Office of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Bingnan’s Meeting with President of the International Federation on Human Rights Joseph Paul-Boncour, 30 May 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-03; P1-7. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 30 May 1954, 5:30 p.m.
Location: Gleyst Mansion (Home of Paul-Boncour’s mother-in-law)
Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Paul-Boncour, [Counselor to the French delegation, Colonel] Jacques Guillermaz, and [French Ambassador to Switzerland] Jean Chauvel

(1) Arrangement for Foreign Minister Zhou to meet Bidault

Paul-Boncour: I had a long conversation with Bidault after our last meeting. He expressed that since it is possible to meet, the earlier, the better (because he will probably attend the Congress of the Popular Republican Movement [Mouvement Républicain Populaire] soon). He suggested next Monday or Tuesday.

We are concerned about ways to keep the meeting secret.
If Foreign Ministers Zhou and Bidault invite each other and have dinner together, the Swiss security would know. All the Swiss policemen communicate through their network, and the information [about the meeting] would leak to the public. So our suggestion is that the two foreign ministers have a meeting after sunset, about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. in the evening. Therefore, the foreign ministers can have a long conversation. If they would like to, they could talk until midnight or even 1:00 am. Regarding their meeting location, we suggest this mansion. The mansion is close to where both foreign ministers are staying. It is convenient for all of us. There are no neighbors around so there won’t be any disruptions from outside. [We’d like to know] if Foreign Minister Zhou agrees [with the arrangement].

Wang Bingnan: What is your security plan?

Paul-Boncour: If we use Swiss security guards, the information will leak. So we suggest Foreign Minister Zhou use his own bodyguards. They may come to the mansion about 9:00 p.m.

Wang Bingnan: How is Mr. Bidault coming here?

Paul-Boncour: He will come here himself. The Swiss security guards as usual will notice that he has left his place. They won’t, however, know where he is going. During the conference hours, the Swiss security guards always escort [Bidault] as they do for all the heads of the delegations. But, outside conference hours, Bidault goes out quite often by himself. On Sundays, when his chef took time off, he and Chauvel went to the countryside by themselves and ate at local restaurants. If Foreign Minister Zhou wants to use the Swiss security guards, we don’t have a problem. We just don’t feel it is the best way.

Wang Bingnan: Has Mr. Bidault ever come to this place?

Paul-Boncour: He has never been here before. However, his wife has been here several times. I still have to repeat one of the points we discussed at the last meeting, that is, to keep the meeting absolutely secret before it starts. The two foreign ministers can decide themselves whether a press release or other documents may be necessary after their meeting.

(Chauvel arrived at this point.)

Chauvel: We can decide whether the Swiss security guards will come or not. If they don’t come, they may just guess. If they do come, they will definitely know the whole arrangement. So it is better not to have them here.

Regarding the issue of who will attend the meeting from the delegations, the French participants will probably include Bidault, myself, and Mr. Guillermaz. We consider it proper not to have many participants from each delegation.

(After the meeting, Guillermaz said that it may be appropriate to add Paul-Boncour [to the list], since he is the host.)

Wang Bingnan: I will report all of your suggestions to the head of our delegation.

(2) The Issues at the Indochina Conference

Chauvel: At the last meeting, Mr. Molotov summarized and outlined the opinions from all sides. Mr. Smith suggested discussing the supervision issue only. The French delegation considers supervision a very complicated issue. If it can be resolved first, the conference is certainly making good progress.

The two specific but important issues at the present are to reach a military agreement on troop regroupings, and to reach a political agreement on supervision. If these two problems are solved, other problems can be dealt with easily.

All of the six points proposed by the Chinese delegation should be discussed. We suggest discussing supervision, which we believe is a central issue. It doesn’t mean that any other issues could not be discussed. If a positive result derives from the solution of the central issue, it will help the discussions on other issues.

We are very much impressed by the recent talks. Especially at the meeting yesterday—we saw genuine progress.

Wang Bingnan: I would also like to talk about our positions. We believe that:

1. The first task is to stop the bloodshed and resume peace in Indochina.
2. Different problems should be dealt with by adapting different methods.
3. Discussions must follow the importance of each issue and then decide which issue should go first.
4. A cease-fire can be achieved after all the issues are discussed satisfactorily.

The composition of the supervisory commission must be specifically discussed by both sides. We believe that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has two tasks:

1. Domestically, to prevent civil conflicts from occurring again.
2. Internationally, to stop entry of foreign troops and war materials into [the region].

We also have concerns about some specific problems of supervision. Our position is that a supervisory location can be identified either inland or in territorial waters to impose a supervision. In short, what we hope for is to establish effective supervision.

The nine nations attending the conference should play a role in guaranteeing the implementation of the agreed settlement. A neutral nation should be among other proper nations besides these nine conference nations. The six points proposed by our Foreign Minister Zhou on the 27th are not for restoring a temporary peace in Indochina, but necessary for establishing a lasting peace in the region. This peace will benefit Asia, France, and the world. We have pointed out during the previous meeting that this war should not become complicated and internationalized. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that some French people intended to make the war more complicated by transferring the war issues to the United Nations. We believe that this doesn’t fit into [serve] the national interests of France.

Mr. Pham Van Dong had said that France could still maintain its economic and cultural enterprises in Vietnam. After peace is reinstalled, Vietnam will consider joining the French Union and build friendly relations with France.

The delegates from Laos and Cambodia also indicated that the Free Laos and Kampuchean Liberation Movements are not
strong forces. If this is true and their people support them, they won’t worry any more after a peaceful order is established.

Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai stated that the United States had to accept a peace in Korea. It should not stop France from accepting peace now in Indochina. At the meeting yesterday, most of the delegates agreed to reach a settlement. It was said that the attitude of the American delegation would be neither supportive nor opposed. This is not helpful for the conference to reach an agreement.

Paul-Boncour: Please allow me to repeat to Mr. Chauvel what I said to Mr. Wang Bingnan at the last meeting. I had said that, if France was forced to accept terms that it had no way to cope with, it would have to ask for external assistance. After Dien Bien Phu fell, the situation changed drastically. If a similar incident takes place in Hanoi, France has no choice but to hand the war over willingly to the others in order to save the lives of its own people.

Chauvel: I am in full accord with what Mr. Wang Bingnan said. The tasks of the supervisory commission of the neutral nations are to prevent internal conflicts from re-occurring and prevent foreign troops and war materials from getting into the country. We also agree that locations for land and offshore supervision can be found, and the debates over the definition of a neutral state can be settled. According to Mr. Menon’s activities at Geneva, he seems interested in this issue and has talked to the press about his opinions.

Mr. Zhou Enlai has a systematic view of the problems of Indochina. He said that each of the three member countries in the Associated States has its own characteristics. Mr. Bidault is not quite familiar with Mr. Zhou Enlai’s points of view because they don’t know each other. Since there is now an opportunity to exchange their opinions, hopefully Mr. Zhou Enlai can talk to Mr. Bidault about any issue.

At this conference France considers some of the countries as its friends. It must give enough attention to their opinions. It can’t agree with any settlement they disagree with. Among these countries friendly to France is the United States. If the US distrusts the conference settlement, it will not endorse its implementation. This is dangerous. America’s attitude toward the conference is not much different from that of France. But America attracts more suspicions. We should pay attention [to it].

Talking about handing over the war to others, there are two ways: handing it over to the left or to the right. If France hands the war over to the United States, then the other people will worry; if France hands it over to the other side, then the US will worry. It is the hope of France that solutions can be reached and agreed to by all sides. When we say to you that a certain problem will cause danger, please believe us, it is true. It must be avoided.

Wang Bingnan: A peaceful solution is beneficial for everyone. Handing the war over to the others doesn’t fit into French national interests. We believe that our current efforts to strive for peace are justified. Problem solutions will arrive one by one. This has been proven by the agreement made yesterday—our efforts have achieved some success. As long as both sides are sincere, the difficulties can be overcome. Our goal is to restore Indochina’s peace. Our desire is to reach that goal through common efforts by all conference delegates. It is not our intention to exclude any nation from the conference agreement. We need to overcome the obstacles, instead of being disrupted by them. Any solution should be based upon a nation’s own interest so that the result will bring about satisfaction.

With regard the discussions of the supervisory commission between Mr. Menon and our Foreign Minister Zhou, they did not touch the specific matters as far as I know. Who are these neutral nations besides the nine nations? What are the French suggestions?

Chauvel: I can’t answer that question at this point. The French delegation will listen to the suggestions from all the delegations at the meeting tomorrow. Then, it will make its statements.

If there is any opportunity from now on, I hope to exchange our opinions anytime. I am very interested in China’s issues. I lived in Beijing for three years and have been in charge of Asian affairs in Paris for five years.

1. Editor’s Note: Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), France, Laos, the PRC, the State of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA.

DOCUMENT No. 21

Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Bidault, 1 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-01; P1-7. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 1 June 1954 , 10:15 p.m. - 11:20 p.m.
Location: Gleystt Mansion
Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Georges Bidault, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Zhou Enlai: We are sorry for arriving a little bit late.

Bidault: Thank you very much for coming. We can discuss the future of this conference together. By now the conference has entered a critical juncture. It can’t be delayed, since [a delayed conference would] not bring any positive result.

I consider the following two specific issues need immediate solutions:

(1) The meetings of the military representatives from both high commands should determine the regrouping areas for their troops.

(2) The restricted sessions should arrive at an agreement on
Zhou Enlai: The reason for us to come to Geneva and attend the conference is to restore peace in Indochina. Our participation shall help make the conference a success, not cause its failure. As long as we have the same determination, the conference will make genuine progress toward a settlement. We are in the position to push the meeting forward. Hopefully solutions will soon develop to deal with these problems. Certainly it needs our common effort.

Mr. Bidault said a little while ago that the military representatives from both high command headquarters have met and discussed the troop regrouping. We consider such a direct meeting as the best way. Mr. Pham Van Dong pointed out in his proposal of 25 May that discussions on these specific matters can start as soon as the principle issues are settled. So far, the commanders from the two sides have been enabled to fully exchange their opinions. Both sides were separated in the past. They have established their contacts so it is now easier to solve the problems.

Mr. Bidault again mentioned a risk of the war’s expansion. In our opinion, the war should be ended according to the interests of the Indochinese people and the national interests of France. Speaking as a neighboring state and for international affairs, we believe that the war can be ended and should be stopped. We should not anticipate a possible enlargement of the war.

If China can make any contribution to the conference at this stage, we must try our best to bring this war to an end and by all means prevent an internationalization of the war. Based upon Mr. Pham Van Dong’s proposal, the opinions from both sides are approachable. The basic requests in his proposal do not go beyond the reality [on the ground]. He doesn’t want to get from the conference table what he didn’t get on the battleground.

In our opinion, the risk exists—America’s intervention. It will hurt France, Indochina, and Southeast Asia; and will threaten the security of Asia and China. That is what we are concerned about.

Bidault: I am in full accord with Mr. Zhou Enlai’s statement. The purpose for our coming to Geneva is to restore peace in Indochina. Nevertheless, we must recognize the fact that, if the conference fails, it is inevitable that the situation will take a turn for the worse. We are a country with a long military tradition, and we don’t like failure. Leaving aside America, our common interest [is] a need to end the Indochina war, and to eliminate all the possibilities for the war’s expansion. Our desire is a reasonable settlement. But if we can’t obtain this, I have to suggest to my government a laissez-faire policy. I believe that your government does not want to see this happen. Thus, we should think reasonably and realistically about the problems.

Zhou Enlai: I remember Mr. Bidault’s statement that France shall achieve a glorious peace. We agree that a glorious peace can be achieved. The restoration of peace is glorious for both sides. So there is no need to mention the laissez-faire policy. Mr. Pham Van Dong emphasized in his speech that after Vietnam receives its independence, it will consider joining the French Union. In his proposal, Mr. Pham Van Dong also accepts the Bao Dai [regime]. These [statements] are based upon the spirit of mutual equality. Our expectation is that both sides can make their common efforts on an equal ground. The French people are peace-loving. To restore peace is the hope of the French people.

Bidault: As Mr. Zhou Enlai said, the French people love peace. We, however, have to live with our history and tradition. Hopefully, this is understood.

Currently, our specific requests are: (1) The two commands conclude their negotiations in a timely fashion on troop regrouping, otherwise the war will continue. (2) The conference soon reaches an agreement on the International Supervisory Commission issue in order to avoid additional delay.

Zhou Enlai: These two problems should be solved. With respect to your first issue, the military representatives from both sides have their meetings. Direct contacts are the most efficient approach. Regarding your second issue, the conference is discussing the problem, and it will be solved. What I am saying is that we should think about ways to reach an agreement, but should not worry about the contingency of there not being a settlement, or ways to reinforce the military and internationalize the war. If the war broadens, it will not help with the glory of France. Its outcome would be nothing but just what our Chinese saying characterizes as another “fisherman’s catch.” The peoples of Indochina and France will suffer miserably, and the traditional glory of France will be damaged. I think this is obvious.

Bidault: Of course, it is obvious. All we ask for is peace, nothing else. What I have brought up are the facts that are evident to anyone. If the problems are not solved reasonably and promptly, a worsening situation could be imminent. As you know, I don’t want to see an internationalization of the war. Mr. Zhou Enlai’s points will be taken well into our consideration.

Zhou Enlai: Therefore I see that Mr. Bidault has a responsibility to prevent such a risk from occurring.

Bidault: The newspapers always say, even though I never read them, that I came to Geneva to prepare World War III. This is so naïve. While asking for an agreement, we can’t accept [just] any kind of agreement. We want a reasonable
settlement, not a preparation for war. I have experienced two world wars, and I am really tired of war. During the first war, I served as corporal. During the second war, I was a sergeant. I don’t want to be promoted to staff sergeant in the third war. I’d like to repeat one more time here what we request: (1) to conclude an agreement promptly, at least a reasonable, temporary agreement; (2) to have the commanders of both sides draw a map of regrouping areas; and (3) to solve the supervision problem.

Zhou Enlai: All of these three points are for peace. We fully support any suggestion that is favorable for peace. Peace is our goal. Hopefully, we can cooperate in order to arrive at a point where our common goal can be achieved. A worsening situation is unfavorable for either side. Thereby, the three main problems pointed out by Mr. Bidault need to be and can be solved soon.

Bidault: We will be very happy, if [these problems] can be solved. Thank you very much, Mr. Zhou Enlai, for your being willing to spend time here tonight and exchange our opinions. I’d like to take this opportunity to present Mr. Zhou Enlai with my precious book as a gift in order to show my respect.

Zhou Enlai: To achieve peace, we are willing to make additional efforts and work harder with you. But there are indeed some people intending to use threats. I hope that Mr. Bidault can stop the attempt of destroying peace so that it can be achieved faster in a more practical way.

Since we have established our contact by now, this kind of contact should continue in order to make our efforts for peace together. I have been to France and know a lot about the wonderful traditions of the French. The French people have a strong sense of national pride. I hope to see that the national status of France in the world rise through your peace efforts.

Bidault: Thank you so much, Mr. Zhou Enlai, for your wonderful memories and praise of France. We hope not to mention the threat, but follow the reality, when we work out solutions for the problems later on.

France hopes to achieve a Southeast Asian settlement that can be accepted by all the parties. Thereafter, the people in this region can be eventually released from disastrous war conditions, breathe freely, and hopefully the entire world won’t be disturbed by either the Cold War or a hot war.

Zhou Enlai: The Cold War and any hot war should end. What we want is peace.

Bidault: As long as we have trust, we can achieve peace and enjoy a relaxation.

Zhou Enlai: This needs our joint efforts. China and France getting closer will help improve the situation.

Bidault: I firmly believe this. Hopefully, Sino-French closeness, which depends on the conference’s progress, will advance forward. I hope there will be other opportunities to see you again. Regrettfully Mr. Zhou Enlai arrived this evening after the sun set. Otherwise, you could have enjoyed the beautiful view of the lake here.

Zhou Enlai: There are plenty of opportunities. We are neighbors; it is very convenient to see each other.

Bidault: Our opinions have already gotten pretty close, just like next door neighbors.

Zhou Enlai: The proximity of our residences can also bring our opinions closer.
been solved through the resolutions passed on the 29th. Our counterparts want to discuss in particular the following four points, especially the issues concerning international supervision and international guarantee.

(2) At the ninth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 31st, our counterparts presented the issue of international supervision, as we expected. [Although] Smith did not present the issue of United Nations supervision at the meeting, he emphasized that the experience of the NNSC on Korea was not good and argued that our side did not act in good faith. He said that Poland and Czechoslovakia obstructed the NNSC’s work and made it impossible for the NNSC to carry out its work in communist[-controlled] areas. Smith especially emphasized that communist countries could not be neutral and cited several paragraphs from the letters that Switzerland and Sweden sent to the Military Armistice Commission on 4 May and 7 May to prove his argument. I immediately spoke to refute Smith’s statement. I first explained that the [North] Korean and Chinese sides do follow the armistice agreement, and Poland and Czechoslovakia are impartial. Several reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission are agreed to by Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. The biased ones are the other two members: Switzerland and Sweden. I affirmed that the work of the Korean NNSC had been basically successful, although they had met difficulties, and their difficulties came from the side of the United Nations forces. I used facts listed in Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s two reports on 15 April and 30 April to prove that the United Nations forces created [those] difficulties for the NNSC. My conclusion is that we can use the experience of the Korean NNSC for reference. I also made it clear that when we discuss the issue of supervision it should be done in relation to other points. Also, we should have a joint commission consisting of members of both belligerents to supervise [the ceasefire] and to take charge of the implementation of the provisions of the [armistice] agreement. Gromyko spoke to support China’s six-point proposal and explained and affirmed it point by point. In speaking of the membership of the organization of neutral nations’ supervision, Gromyko suggested that India, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Pakistan [should be the members]. Our counterparts did not respond to this on the spot. Bidault’s statement had two main points:

1) The main task of the international supervision in Laos and Cambodia is to ensure the withdrawal of the invading Viet Minh troops, not to supervise the armistice.  
2) The representatives of both sides join the work of the international supervision committee. However, the Neutral Nations Commission should have supreme authority over and lead the joint commission.

Bidault also presented the issues of the composition of the NNSC and the authority to which the NNSC should be responsible. He hinted that the NNSC should be responsible to the United Nations. In addition to giving his support to Smith’s proposal, the Cambodian delegate also repeated his shibboleth that regrouping zones do not exist in Cambodia and that the Chinese delegation’s proposal applies only to Vietnam. Pham Van Dong spoke to refute Smith’s argument that only non-Communist countries could be neutral countries and gave his support to the Chinese delegation’s conclusion on the supervision issue. Pham Van Dong claimed at the meeting that he had already appointed [DRV Vice Defense Minister General] Ta Quang Buu as representative of the command. He also proposed that Ta Quang Buu’s assistant meet with the French military representative on 1 June to discuss and decide technical questions, such as the date by which representatives of the commanders of both sides start working.

(3) After the meeting, the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Chinese sides agreed to draft some principles concerning the joint commission, the NNSC, and the international guarantee in order to unify the understanding of the three delegations of our side.

(4) There is no meeting today and we had outside conference activities. Eden invited me for dinner tonight. Bidault said that he wanted to meet with me outside the conference. However, he was afraid that the Americans would find out about this and asked [us] not to let the journalists know in advance. I already agreed with that and agreed to visit him tonight at 10:00 p.m. after Eden’s banquet.

Zhou Enlai
1 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 23

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Regarding Contact with Eden and Bidault, 2 June 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

1. [Excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

2. Yesterday, military representatives from both sides began contact. Preliminary agreements have been reached regarding the date and other procedures of formal talks by the representatives of commanders-in-chief of both sides. Formal talks will begin today.

3. Last night I attended the banquet held by Eden. Eden mainly mentioned four issues:
   a. Eden informally expressed [his opinion] that he did not support the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. He said that it would be better if the supervision was carried out by Asian countries. I said that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on Korea consisted only of European countries, and that some peo-
people opposed it. A commission consisting entirely of Asian countries would have disadvantages (I gave the example that it would be inappropriate for China as an Asian country to have supervision of the Kashmir problem). This time around it would be best if the commission could include both Asian and European countries, as proposed by Gromyko.

b. Eden expressed the wish that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides would open the maps and solve some specific problems.

c. Eden asked whether the conference would come to a conclusion in ten to fifteen days. I replied that it would depend on the efforts by both sides to reach an agreement.

d. Eden said that since the United Kingdom has [British Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing Humphrey] Trevelyan in Beijing, he hoped that China would send its counterpart of Trevelyan to the United Kingdom. I have agreed.

4. I visited Bidault at 10:00 yesterday evening. On the one hand, Bidault explained that he wanted to reach an agreement and not fight World War III; on the other hand, he threatened that if an agreement could not be reached, there would be danger. I pointed out that the danger would be intervention by the United States and the threat to China’s security—these are the things that concern us the most. Bidault expressed his hope that the representatives of the commanders-in-chief of both sides could resolve some specific problems. He also emphasized that the issue of international supervision should be addressed as well. Although Bidault had said beforehand that he wanted to discuss some problems, he did not go deeply into the problems yesterday evening, nor did he bring up specific questions.

Zhou Enlai
2 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 24

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Restricted Session, 3 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-04; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Yesterday morning, the Soviet, [North] Korean, and Chinese sides met and agreed that we should try to hold a plenary session on the Korean issue this week. [We will] let Nam II refute [South Korean Foreign Minister] Pyun Yung Tai’s proposal and statements by the other delegations that supported Pyun. Although I will also speak to refute Pyun, I will emphasize the necessity and effectiveness of the neutral nations’ supervision of the all-Korean free elections. As I reported in a previous telegram, we are planning to let the Soviet side present the “draft agreement regarding basic principles for the peaceful resolution of the Korean issue by the participating countries of the Geneva Conference.”

(2) Yesterday, at the tenth restricted session on the Indochina issue, Bidault presented a comprehensive plan regarding the issue of the neutral nations’ supervision. Its major points are as follows:

1. The NNSC has five functions:

   a. to supervise the regrouping of troops;
   b. to supervise the movement of troops;
   c. to investigate incidents that violate the armistice agreement in non-military zones;
   d. to supervise the prevention of new troops and arms being introduced across the borders of Indochina. However, this point is still not quite clear;
   e. to supervise the issue of the release of POWs and civilian internees.

2. The NNSC should set up local commissions and ad hoc sub-commissions; the decisions of all levels of international commissions should be taken by a majority;

3. The joint commission of both sides should function under the authority of the NNSC;

4. Regarding the issue of the composition of the NNSC, Bidault disagreed with Gromyko’s proposal and said: [“] Communist countries cannot be neutral[“]. He also quoted from Chairman Mao’s On New Democracy that “neutral is simply a deceiving word.” However, he did not say that he agreed with those countries. Bidault especially emphasized that what he had said should only apply to Vietnam since the mission and organizational style of neutral nations’ supervision in Laos and Cambodia is different from that in Vietnam. Smith spoke and cited Switzerland and Sweden’s letter to the Military Armistice Commission on 4 May (the original letter was distributed after the meeting) to explain that the United Nations forces did not violate the armistice agreement. The Korean NNSC was unable to carry out its work because of the two communist members’ obstruction. He said that none of the communist countries could be considered neutral countries, nor could they take charge of supervision. Therefore, he opposed Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s participation and was [only] willing to accept India and Pakistan [as members of the NNSC]. I spoke immediately to refute Smith’s statement and cited Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s letters dated 15 April, 30 April, 8 May, and 20 May as proof (the original letters were distributed after the meeting). I expressed my support for Gromyko’s proposal and pointed out that [we] should not
confuse the non-neutrality of political thoughts with neutral nations that have not participated in the [Indochina] war. Eden made a statement and insisted that we should use Bidault’s plan as a basis for discussion. He suggested that we should set up a technical committee to discuss the issues of functions and structure of the NNSC. Eden also suggested that the NNSC should be composed of Asian nations and emphasized that the joint commission of both sides should be subject to the command of the NNSC. Molotov spoke to refute Smith’s statement[:"] “if Smith basically opposes communist countries joining the NNSC it means that he does not want to settle the problem. This attitude hampers the settlement. Such an attitude that denies all non-capitalist countries a role in the NNSC is close to the thoughts of the anti-communist league.” Molotov also cited documents signed jointly by four member countries of the Korean NNSC acknowledging that the United States violated the [armistice] agreement. However, [he] explained that the NNSC was still effective despite these weaknesses and that the four countries could reach an agreement. The four neutral countries that the Soviet Union proposed included two Asian countries and two European countries. Among those countries, two of them had diplomatic relations with France and the other two with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. They will be able to reflect the opinions of both sides.

(3) Our counterparts have not yet reached a consensus on the issue of the composition of the NNSC. They were unable to make any suggestions at the meeting. Based on newspaper [accounts], it seems that France does not agree with the Southeast Asian countries completely.

(4) I will report the situation at yesterday’s first formal meeting of the representatives of commanders of both sides in a separate telegram.

Zhou Enlai
3 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 25

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session, 4 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-000046-06; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Bao Dai’s delegate said at yesterday’s eleventh restricted session on the Indochina issue that only the United Nations could take charge of the task of supervising. Bidault spoke to support Bao Dai’s delegate and said: ["] the NNSC should be responsible to the United Nations,["] In addition to repeating that the organization of the joint commission of both sides cannot apply to Laos and Cambodia, Bidault also emphasized that the joint commission should function under the authority of the NNSC so that the NNSC can serve as a judicial [organization]. However, since [the members of] the joint commission are parties concerned [in the war]; parties concerned cannot act as judges at the same time. Therefore, the joint commission can only function as a tool and cannot take major responsibilities for supervision. Smith stated the US preference for the United Nations as supervisory authority. However, he said that he probably will not assert this. Smith said: ["] four countries, Switzerland, Sweden, India, and Pakistan are suitable to take charge of supervising, however, [China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam] must disagree ["]. He suggested that the two chairmen should discuss the issue of composition in private. I made statements not only resolutely opposing the United Nations supervision, but also pointing out that the relationship between the NNSC and the joint commission should be equal. The NNSC was by no means to be over the joint commission. Since the two belligerent sides are the main parties concerned, whether or not the armistice agreement can be carried out depends on both sides’ sincerity. The joint commission of both sides should take major responsibility. The division of work between the two is: the function of the joint commission is to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the armistice; meanwhile, the function of the NNSC is to supervise and inspect whether or not the two sides have violated the provisions of the armistice agreement. The NNSC’s functions either inside or outside Indochina will be two-fold: one is to supervise demilitarized areas; the other is to supervise throughout Indochina and along common frontiers with other countries the prohibition of introducing new troops, military personnel, and arms and ammunition, whether by land, sea, or air. Thus within Indochina there would be two kinds of organizations working together. However, the NNSC will be directly responsible for supervising along the borders. Regarding the issue of to whom the NNSC should report, I pointed out that I agreed with Bidault’s original proposal to let the nine [conference] participants guarantee. Chairman Eden agreed to discuss the issue of the composition of the NNSC in private. He stated that a restricted session on the Indochina issue will be held today and a plenary session on the Korean issue on the 5th. The 6th is [Sunday]. A restricted session on the Korean issue will be held on the 7th and a plenary session on the Indochina issue on the 8th.

(2) The Soviet, Vietnamese, and Chinese sides are discussing issues concerning the functions of the members of the joint commission and the NNSC, the relationship between the two committees, and the international guarantee. We are also drafting detailed provisions now. I will report later after we have made decisions.

Zhou Enlai
4 June 1954

★★★★
Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Our counterparts did not refer to the issue of United Nations supervision at yesterday’s twelfth restricted session because of our resolute opposition on the 3rd. What I referred to on the 3rd concerning the issue of the functions and authorities of the joint commission, of the NNSC and of the international guarantee [commission], and the issue of the relationship among these three bodies have already caught our counterparts’ attention. Eden said yesterday that my proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants who have the task of guaranteeing the agreements is worthy of careful consideration. Eden also suggested that the participants should set up a permanent [supervisory] organization. Bidault stated that the French proposal has something in common with mine and hinted that he agreed with Eden on the establishment of a permanent organization. Bidault said that impartial arbiters are needed. He emphasized that the neutral organization must have the authority of supervision and a great number of staff. Bidault also reiterated his two original opinions[:] the joint commission should be subordinate to the NNSC; the current proposal concerning supervision should only apply to Vietnam and the supervision of Laos and Cambodia needs to be decided separately. See attachment for Bidault’s original proposal. Smith spoke next and did not oppose the conference participants joining in [the international] guarantee. However, he still emphasized that the NNSC should have superior authority over the joint commission. Regarding my proposal, Smith said: [it] simply will be a framework for agreements that this conference might reach. However, we must solve two problems first:

① the impartial composition of the international supervisory commissions;
② the nature of the obligations of the countries who participate in guaranteeing the agreements.

Molotov spoke and agreed that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva [Conference] participants who join in the international guarantee. He also pointed out that the agreement by both belligerents has decisive meaning in solving the conflict. The joint commission can also play an important role. Therefore, it should not be subordinate to outside power. In addition, no such subordination exists [in case of the joint bodies representing the belligerents] in Korea. Molotov also refuted three points of [our counterparts’] arguments:

① If, as [our counterparts] said, communist countries cannot be neutral and can only constitute one side [of the negotiations], then capitalist countries cannot be neutral either. This argument violates the United Nations Charter since the UN Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the International Court of Justice are all composed of different countries of different political and economic systems.
② The United Nations has nothing to do with this conference. China, a country of half a billion people, and the majority of the participants of this conference are not members of the United Nations. Therefore, the United Nations should not take charge of international supervision.
③ The NNSC must cover not only Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia.

(2) Molotov put some pressure on our counterparts at yesterday’s meeting since they delayed the establishment of contacts between the representatives of the two commands in the field and expressed hope that these would be established in the near future.

(3) Eden went back to Britain last night. [The conference will] discuss the Korean issue today and next Monday. We will use these two, three days to revise our detailed proposal on the issues of the joint commission, the NNSC and the international guarantee. I will send another telegram to report again after the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese sides have made a decision.

Zhou Enlai
5 June 1954
said to Mr. Zhou Enlai there are currently two critical issues: (1) a decision on troop regrouping areas, and (2) supervision. Regarding the regrouping issue, military representatives from both sides have held three or four meetings. The Vietnamese commanders, however, only addressed principles but not specific issues. Therefore their meetings arrived at no useful result. We are worried about this situation.

The Vietnamese delegation insisted on holding the negotiations at the local level. When Molotov made this suggestion, the French delegation agreed. We, however, think it unnecessary for the two delegations to discuss the same issue at the two different locations before any agreement on regrouping has been reached. It was a problem between France and Vietnam. But, since there is a situation at the present, I’d like to raise the issue for the Chinese delegation’s attention.

Regarding the issue of supervision, we have addressed much in principle, but have not yet reached an agreement on the membership of the supervisory organization. The French delegation states that an objective neutral nation should not be impartial to the nations on both sides. A neutral nation must be one that has no special relationship with any side. Its task is to closely supervise the implementation of the settlement and correct mistakes made by either side. India may be an example. India has relations with France, the Soviet Union, and China. It, however, has not yet recognized Vietnam, and its relationship with France is not very friendly. [Chief of the Indian delegation to the United Nations] Mr. [V.K. Krishna] Menon met delegates from the three member countries of the Associated States a few days ago. It shows that Mr. Menon knows little about these three countries, and he has even raised questions as to whether they have any constitution. France, however, still considers India a neutral nation and is willing to see India play an important role in the International Supervisory Commission. France is also willing to accept other nations from Asia and Africa as neutral nations. What is China’s opinion?

Wang Bingnan: In order to assist the conference in solving the problems smoothly, we agree to stay in touch and exchange our views on all aspects.

Chauvel: This is exactly what I agree to.

Wang Bingnan: We have similar concerns on the slow progress of the conference. It should have [produced] useful results at a faster pace. But the development has been delayed and is still [delayed]. The reason is that the conference has gone through unnecessary detours. This doesn’t help the conference, and instead it slows the settlement development.

Mr. Chauvel mentioned the problems of military meetings and supervision. We are fully aware of that the conference made detours on these two issues.

As far as I know, at the military staff talks, the French presented the Laniel Proposal, like a request for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s surrender. It shouldn’t be [tabled] at all. It is said that the proposal has been withdrawn. However, it delayed the talks. In our opinion, rapid progress can be made through new, equal, and fact-based negotiations. The military staff contacts on the spot have not materialized by this point. According to experience [gained] from past conferences, military representatives should meet at Geneva and on the spot at the same time. Principles are discussed at Geneva while details are discussed at the local level. If you need to deal with the problems of badly wounded and sick prisoners, direct talks should be held on the spot. The earlier local contacts take place, the faster problems will be solved. As a neutral state, we want to see an improved relationship between the two sides through the meetings, which may normalize the relationship between the French people and the Vietnamese people.

With regard to the supervision issue, someone brought up the United Nations. They want to complicate the issues and do not really want to solve the problems. All of the parties have been debating the definition of a neutral nation. If we say a communist state is not a neutral nation, a capitalist nation cannot be a neutral state either. If so, there is no neutral nation at all in this world. When China fought against Japan in the past, the United States helped Japan with steel and iron to kill Chinese people. At that moment, the United States considered itself a neutral state. Therefore, the problem can’t be defined by ideological debates. We believe that a neutral nation is a non-belligerent nation in the war and acceptable to both sides. Someone even nominated Japan. Such a proposal certainly does not help the conference.

Our suggestion is that the supervisory organization includes the following three committees: (1) a joint committee; (2) a supervisory committee of neutral nations; and (3) an international guarantee committee. Working together, the joint committee from the two sides should be responsible for an efficient implementation of a cease-fire. For example, both sides recently worked together to directly deal with the evacuation of seriously wounded soldiers from Dien Bien Phu. Even though some violations of the agreement occurred, all the problems were solved eventually. The task of the supervisory committee of neutral nations should be[ ] domestically, to prevent a civil war from breaking out, and, internationally, to prevent foreign troops and materiel from being shipped into the country. Our [vision] for total supervision includes air, land, and sea. Someone said that the supervisory agreement doesn’t apply to Laos and Cambodia. In our opinion, however, if it were true, the United States could establish its military bases in these countries. So their point is not very thoughtful. The task of the international guarantee committee [of the nine Geneva nations4] should be to identify the unsolved problems that remained at the joint committee and neutral nation committee. The nine-nation committee should have further discussions on these problems submitted by the joint and neutral committees.

Mr. Bidault proposed some solutions toward the supervision issue yesterday. We are now studying his proposal. We will deliver the Chinese delegation’s response after our study.

I am in full accord with Mr. Chauvel’s suggestion on speeding up the conference progress. Nevertheless, I’d like to know Mr. Chauvel’s ideas about how to avoid interrup-
tions and even regression at the conference, and how to push the conference forward practically and realistically.

**Chauvel:** I don’t have much time now. Hopefully, [we can] continue our conversations tomorrow and the next day. In short, I want to add several points. At the military meetings, the French staff presented the Laniel Proposal. Our purpose, however, was not to make the Vietnamese accept it, but to hope that the Vietnamese would tell us why they couldn’t accept it and to let them provide detailed critiques on our proposal. Although the two sides have been fighting the war for eight years, we have no understanding of each other. Therefore, a mutual understanding is desired at the present.

We believe that the most urgent problem at the present is the composition of the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission. If this problem can be solved, other technical problems will be dealt with easily, and the conference will make much progress. During today’s conversation, I present the French opinion. At our next meeting, hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can talk about China’s opinion on India and other countries. Therefore, a face-to-face conversation between two persons should be much easier for problem-solving. At least I believe so.

I must also emphasize my point on the local contact of military representatives. Although the past international agreements stated that principles were discussed at Geneva, and the details were discussed at local levels, they didn’t say these meetings would begin at the same time. We still believe that an agreement of the bottom-line principles has to be reached at Geneva, before any local talk can possibly start on the spot. Anyway, Paris has already notified Saigon, asking them to promptly send the French staff to contact the Vietnamese.

**Wang Bingnan:** Over eight years the war has hurt feelings on both sides. A local contact may be the best way to heal the wounds and change the situation for the better.

Regarding the composition of the neutral nations commission, the Soviet Union has nominated four nations. We support the Soviet proposal. Mr. Chauvel, could you tell me about the French opinion on the other neutral nations besides India?

**Chauvel:** I mentioned India because it is a very typical example of a neutral nation. Among other Asian nations, for example, are Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. None of them has a diplomatic relationship with Vietnam. Besides the nations in Asia, there are only Switzerland and Sweden in Europe. They may not be willing to accept the membership. Thus, it may be a compromise proposal to invite Asian nations only to implement the supervision. It will probably guarantee a balanced stance to cope with the problems. This is what Mr. Bidault has stated at the meeting. [We are] not looking for our allied nations, but inviting the neutral nations that could make their own independent judgments.

1. **Editor’s Note:** French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel had demanded five conditions for a ceasefire: withdrawal of all communists from Cambodia and Laos, creation of a demilitarized zone around the Red River Delta, relocation of communists in Vietnam into pre-determined standing zones, removal of all Viet Minh troops in south Vietnam, and guarantees against reinforcements from abroad.

2. **Editor’s Note:** Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), France, Laos, the PRC, the State of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA.

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**DOCUMENT No. 28**

Minutes, Wang Bingnan’s Meeting with French Ambassador to Switzerland Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz, 6 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-06; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

(Time: 6 June 1954, 5:30 p.m-6:40 p.m)

(Location: Mansion of the French Consul General to Geneva)

Chinese participants: Wang Bingnan and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel and Jacques Guillermaz

**Chauvel:** Mr. [Georges] Bidault just made a trip to the lake. Has Mr. Zhou Enlai gone for some outings?

**Wang Bingnan:** No, Foreign Minister Zhou has no time now for an outing.

**Guillermaz:** [You] should suggest Mr. Zhou Enlai go out.

**Wang Bingnan:** [He] could be interested in an outing only had the conference achieved some of its goals.

**Chauvel:** Mr. Bidault is planning a return to Paris for two or three days. Before his departure for Paris, he intends to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai one more time after the dinner on Monday. [We
are] not sure if Mr. Zhou Enlai has time [for the meeting]. 

Wang Bingnan: Mr. Zhou Enlai is very glad to meet Mr. Bidault.

Chauvel: Wonderful. Let’s say 9:00 p.m. tomorrow [Monday]. We talked about the problems of the military staff meetings last time. It was said yesterday that their meetings have made some progress. Both sides have reached an agreement on tactical methods of regrouping their troops. Since both sides have further clarified their intentions, it should be easier for them to work out a solution.

I would like to add a few more words now about the supervision issue. The Chinese side seems not fully understanding of the French opinion [on supervision]. We did not mean that Laos and Cambodia do not need any supervision. Instead, our opinion is that these two countries have different situations, so that supervisory terms should be accordingly different. Our request is to talk about Vietnam first, and then Laos and Cambodia. We don’t intend to facilitate the establishment of any military bases in Laos and Cambodia, or to prepare for a war in this region. Our fundamental goal is to solve the problems.

If my understanding is correct, Mr. Wang Bingnan proposed three types of committees for the supervisory machinery last time: an international guarantee committee, a neutral nation supervisory committee, and a combined [both sides] committee. We think that an agreement based upon this proposal can be reached.

However, in order to make fast progress, the composition of the neutral nation commission should be discussed first. I expressed the French stand last time. I believe Mr. Wang Bingnan has thought about this issue. [I’d like to] now know about Mr. Wang Bingnan’s opinion.

Wang Bingnan: [I am] glad to hear from Mr. Chauvel that the military staff meeting has made some progress.

Chauvel: Not much yet, only a little bit.

Wang Bingnan: This is a very positive sign, and it doesn’t matter how small the progress is or on which subject. In the spirit of avoiding any delay, we must make vigorous efforts to arrive at further results.

Regarding the supervision of Laos and Cambodia, we have stated that, as long as principles [on supervision] are agreed, implementation methods may be different [from that on Vietnam] according to their specific conditions.

In respect to the composition of the neutral nation commission, I have reported Mr. Chauvel’s opinion to the head of our delegation. Currently, we are carefully studying Mr. Bidault’s proposal, so we can’t answer this question. We are endorsing the four nations suggested by the Soviet delegation. Nevertheless, we believe that, as long as all sides do their studies objectively, the problems can be solved.

Talking about the entire [Geneva Conference], there are some difficulties. However, we should overcome the difficulties and strive for settlements. We’d like to draw French attention to [the fact] that, on one hand, the meeting makes slow progress; on the other hand, it also has impediments. It is not impossible to settle the Korea problem, and all sides have many common points. But someone stubbornly asked for an election [to be] conducted under UN supervision. This unnecessarily impeded the progress of the meeting. In their speeches yesterday, the [North] Korean, Chinese, and Soviet delegations all fully expressed a conciliatory spirit. But Mr. Smith didn’t. Throughout the meeting, not only did he not present any solid proposals, but also did not offer any help for any agreement at the meeting. It was just like his attitude at the Indochina meeting on the 29th, “no objection, but no acceptance.” This continuing negative attitude against the meeting doesn’t do any good to the conference. Our expectation is that the delegates should share their similar opinions first. Then, they can overcome obstacles and solve the different opinions in order to make the conference a full success.

Chauvel: We have noticed recently that Mr. [Vyacheslav M.] Molotov, Mr. Zhou Enlai, and Mr. [Anthony] Eden all look for our common position as what we are doing. This is a good approach. The United States shows their most distrustful attitude toward the conference. Nevertheless, talking about Indochina’s issues, we have some alliances, such as the United States and the three [French] Union member nations. We can only accept solutions accepted by our alliances. It is not easy to convince an allied country. Hopefully, Mr. Wang Bingnan can give [his] attention to it.

Wang Bingnan: With respect to solving the Indochina problems, France is one of the key players. Restoring peace is an advantage to France. Extension or internationalization of the war is a disadvantage to France. Hopefully France can fully play its initiative role, and function as a powerful nation.

The Chinese delegation does not have any selfish purpose in its efforts to strive for peace in Indochina. What we want to see is not a continuous bleeding of France and Vietnam, but a normalization of French-Vietnamese relations and a friendship between the two countries. What we want to see is not the reduced international status of France, but the increasing status of France in the world. We believe that France has the same goal of a successful conference.

Chauvel: I really appreciate it that Mr. Wang Bingnan has such a remarkable opinion of France. In the past years, the Indochinese War was a problem for France and Vietnam. Now it has become an international problem. France seeks an internationalized peace, not an internationalized war. Even though France has difficulties in making its allies accept certain agreements, it is not impossible. We hope to eventually reach our common goal—peace—that is our common interest.

With regard to solving the Indochinese problems, France recognizes China’s role among Asian countries. Therefore, we are glad to exchange our opinions with the Chinese delegation on a regular basis for more help from China.

Regarding the neutral nation issue, France is not satisfied with merely signing an agreement on paper. It wants to see the supervisory organization be truly effective. Mr. Bidault did not enjoy criticizing the Soviet proposal. The Soviet proposal could only make the supervisory commission impotent. This
is what all of us try to avoid. Mr. Bidault is going to meet Mr. Molotov tomorrow morning. They will talk about this issue. That the delegation heads can meet under good conditions is helpful for reaching an agreement at the conference. As long as the atmosphere changes for the better, any distrust between the two sides will disappear.

Wang Bingnan: I have the same feeling.

Chauvel: Peace is like the Pyrenees. Sometime they look dark, sometimes bright. As long as we have confidence, we will eventually see the bright Pyrenees.

Wang Bingnan: The [Chang] Bai Mountains always stand tall without any change. Clouds and rain are only temporary conditions.

Chauvel: I don’t know if Mr. Bidault has any other issues on his mind besides the conference topics when he talks to Mr. Zhou Enlai. I am sure, however, he is willing to talk about every issue that Mr. Zhou Enlai is interested in.

Wang Bingnan: Can you tell me the participants at the meeting?

Chauvel: It’s just like the last meeting. Mr. Bidault, myself, and Mr. Guillermaz.

The two foreign ministers did not release any information on their last meeting to the media. It is desired to keep [things] this way in order to exchange opinions frankly.

I met the Swiss foreign minister at Bern two days ago. He said that it was astonishing that some people could question the neutrality of Sweden. Sweden’s neutrality is not only a fact, but also legally recognized. Anyway, I explained [it] to them, and it is over.

It is said that a general meeting will be held on Tuesday, isn’t it?

Wang Bingnan: That is the plan, as far as I know.

Chauvel: Currently, the French Assembly continues their debates on the Indochina issue. Mr. Bidault is going to speak at Geneva on Tuesday, and at the French Parliament on Wednesday. He hopes for some good news that he can report to Mr. Zhou Enlai. I am sure, however, he is willing to talk about every issue that Mr. Zhou Enlai is interested in.

Wang Bingnan: I hope that he can report some conference progress at the Assembly. This is also what the French people have been waiting for.

Chauvel: This is our common hope.

.Document No. 29

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding the Situation at the Thirteenth Plenary Session,
6 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-09; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) At yesterday’s plenary session on the Korean issue, we took steps to make the meeting a restricted one in which we could solve the problem. In order to do this, we took the initiative in adopting a conciliatory attitude and seeking subjects on which agreement could be reached. The Korean, Chinese, and Soviet delegations all spoke in the session. I have already sent back all three texts of the speeches. Nam II stated that the DPRK was not opposed to the phased and proportional withdrawal of foreign troops. He cited the examples of the United States and Switzerland in order to refute his counterparts’ arguments concerning the organization of an all-Korean government based on the proportional representation of populations. I spoke to emphasize that we could find common ground on which to settle the Korean issue peacefully. At the meeting, Molotov submitted his draft concerning “basic principles and agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.” Although I have already cabled the text of his draft, I need to add three more sentences to one of the sections. Specifically, “elections should be held within six months after the conclusion of this agreement. Elections should be conducted by secret ballot based on the laws of universal suffrage. Representation in the all-Korean legislature should be in proportion to the population of Korea as a whole.” Since three statements from our side all indicated that we tried to seek common ground, the Dutch delegation said in their speech that they would examine Molotov’s proposals immediately after he spoke.

Smith and [ROK Foreign Minister] Pyun Yung Tai were afraid that our efforts to reach an agreement would have a positive influence on the conference. Pyun Yung Tai therefore made a special speech refuting Nam II’s arguments. Smith also spoke to attack my proposal for neutral nations’ supervision [on elections in Korea]. He emphasized that elections must be supervised by the United Nations. He even hinted at last that he would use public opinion to threaten us. I immediately made a brief statement saying that we could not agree to Smith’s explanation for the NNSC’s role in the Korean issue. I also reserved my right to reply to other parts of Smith’s statement to which we could not agree in the future.

(2) According to the media, the 16 countries of the other side held a meeting yesterday in the morning. The United States intended to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue. However, other countries did not agree. Obviously, it is the United States that intentionally creates tension both inside and outside the conference. The Americans are trying to win support under the signboard of the United Nations. They are afraid that our side will undermine the United Nations’ prestige, and that we will desperately oppose the exercise of veto over the issue of neutral nations. They are afraid that an organization of neutral nations on a footing of equality with both sides will be unfavorable to the United States.

(3) In order to expose America’s plot to sabotage [the conference], our side is preparing to provide further specific materials that affirm the achievements of the NNSC on the Korean issue and the effectiveness of the Four Nations’ Agreement.
We will also provide materials to prove that the United States violated the armistice agreement and disrupted the NNNS. Concerning the propaganda issue, we plan to compare our conciliatory attitude and America’s disruptive one during the conference. It will show clearly that our side is trying its best to seek common ground. However, the United States is still insisting on United Nations supervision and is not willing to look for other channels beyond the United Nations to solve the problems.

Zhou Enlai
6 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 30

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Concerning Consultations among the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations, 7 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-10; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top Secret)
Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) I hereby send for your examination the twelve terms on the united committee (the committee on military armistice), the supervision committee by neutral countries, and the question of international guarantee that had been decided upon by the three parties of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam yesterday (see attached). It is planned that these terms will be raised by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the open session on the Indochina issue on the 8th. At the session on the 8th, I plan to make positive explanation of the six points concerning the basic principles in the military aspect that I put forward on 27 May, rebutting the mistaken points of the other side, and, in particular, criticizing the United States for blocking the progress of the conference. Pham Van Dong in his presentation plans to highlight the stand of our side on the political issue.

(2) The telegram of the CCP Central Committee and the reply of the Vietnamese Workers Party have been conveyed to the Soviet Party Central Committee by Comrade Molotov yesterday. The three parties of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China exchanged opinions on these two telegrams yesterday.

Zhou Enlai
7 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 31

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Replying to Zhou Enlai’s 7 June 1954 Telegram, 7 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-10; P5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Zhou Enlai:
The telegram of 7 June has been received. We agree to the twelve terms on the united committee, the committee of supervision by neutral countries, and the question of international guarantee.

Central Committee
7 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 32

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding the Chinese Delegation’s Meeting with the Delegations of Various Popular French Organizations, 9 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00121-02; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

During the 32 days from 6 May to 6 June, the liaison team of our delegation has hosted 256 delegations of Frenchmen, totaling 2,015 visitors.

(1) The French popular delegations consisted of many social groups and various professionals. Some of them belonged to the French National Labors Federation and came as worker representatives from many regions (provinces, cities, and towns) and from different industries, factories, or shops. Some were local citizen representatives. Some belonged to the French Peace Movement Committee and came as local branch committee members. Some were local representatives of the French Women’s Union. There were also representatives of students, teachers, veterans, disabled veterans, city council members, farmers, journalists, and missionarises. The workers’ delegations had the largest number among the others, about 36.5 percent of the total; the citizen delegations as the second, 21.1 percent; the women delegations, 14.6 percent; and the Peace Movement Committee delegations, 14.2 percent. These four groups totaled 86.8 percent. Most of the citizen representatives were the local organizers of the Peace Movement Committee, using the name of the local citizen delegation. They included the local political parties (mostly the Communist Party, Social Party, and Progressive Social Party) and many professionals. They had a very broad representation. Most of these delegations came from cities like Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and their surrounding towns. Each delegation had no more than ten rep-
and friendship between the Chinese and French peoples. The
movement in France, and enhance the mutual understanding
its to a certain extent promote the development of the peace
visits (an average about 70 to 80 visitors everyday). Their vis-
its. Their efforts will be continuing according to the ongoing
diate independence.
expressed the North African People's strong desire for imme-
liberation. They complained about the suffering of the North
they did not have any strong evidence to convince the public.
war materiel. But they still asked for further explanations since
them had been buried underground
during Hitler's occupation, and were retrieved after the war
and kept well until now. Since many of
the French and American delegations, they complained
loudly and called Bidault an American lap dog, not French.
They also complained of the French government's corruption
and the people's suffering. They hope that we understand
the French government and that Bidault by no means represents
the French people. They appreciate our reception and hospi-
tality during their visits. They also asked us to pass on their
respects to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Some of them
were touched with tears (mostly the workers and women who
were harmed by the war). The journalists from the Marseille Daily
headlined their visit in their newspaper, emphasizing
China's sincerity for peace. During their visits, they also raised
some questions. Mostly, they asked about the conference's
progress and requested that China make all efforts to quickly
stop the Indochina war. They hoped to see an establishment of
a Sino-French diplomatic relationship in the near future and an
expansion of the economic and cultural exchanges between the
two countries. Some asked for the information on the develop-
ment of New China. A few visitors, however, asked if China
had ever provided military aid to Vietnam; whether China
would also intervene if the United States wanted to interna-
telize the Indochina war; and if China had religious free-
dom, etc. Some stated that they knew the American and French
governments [started] rumors that China aided Vietnam with
war materiel. But they still asked for further explanations since
day they did not have any strong evidence to convince the public.
In meantime, we also hosted two North African worker del-
egations (ten people) who were visiting France. They were
so excited about the Chinese people's achievement of their
liberation. They complained about the suffering of the North
African people under French imperialist exploitation and
expressed the North African People's strong desire for imme-
rate independence.

(3) The French Communist Party works with the French
Labor Union and the Peace Movement Committee, which
initiated and organized the French popular delegations' vis-
ts. Their efforts will be continuing according to the ongoing
visits (an average about 70 to 80 visitors everyday). Their vis-
ts to a certain extent promote the development of the peace
movement in France, and enhance the mutual understanding
and friendship between the Chinese and French peoples. The
visitors expressed particularly their hatred toward America
and their complaints about the French government. They trust
peace-loving and democratic nations' sincere efforts for peace.
Therefore, [they] should have our attention.

(4) We have appointed certain persons in charge of these
meetings. The reception room is decorated with Chinese car-
pets, palace lamps, traditional paintings, and other artistic dis-
plays. Chinese wine, tea, and cigarettes are served and propa-
ganda materials and other souvenirs are offered. By 6 June,
398 Chairman [Mao]'s buttons have been given (mostly to the
workers), 300 pigeon buttons, and 5,370 pictorial or litera-
ture materials (including the English publications of the 1953
National Game, People's China, New China's Children, New
China's Women, China Reconstruction, Chinese Folk Arts,
Chinese Literature, and New China in the Eyes of Children;
and the Journal of China in French). There have been thirteen
photo pictures taken, 600 feet of film made, and twelve news
reports published. Usually, as soon as the visitors arrived, they
were met with kindness and enthusiasm. All of their questions
during the meetings were answered. The delegations received
adequate information on New China according to their differ-
ent backgrounds. So far there have not been any problems.
Since the buttons and propaganda materials were not stocked
enough beforehand, they have to be shipped in again and
again. Only one publication is in French (but only a few visi-
tors speak English). In the meantime, the other shortcomings
include the lack of systematic reading materials on various
aspects of New China, and not enough news coverage on these
meetings. These need to be significantly improved.

Li Kenong
9 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 33

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,
Regarding Zhou's Conversation with Bidault, 10 June 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

In the evening of the 7th, Bidault visited me and dis-
cussed mainly the issue of neutral nation supervision. He
stated that the nature of the Korean issue was different from
that of the Indochinese issue so the precedent case of Korea
did not apply to Indochina. He didn't agree that Poland and
Czechoslovakia join the supervision of Indochina. Regarding
the membership, he said that only India and Pakistan were
neutral nations, and that a neutral nation should be identified
and accepted by all sides. But he didn't mention any spe-
cific nation for a probe. During our conversations, Bidault
expressed his willingness for peace, and he also hinted at us
not to apply any military pressure. He said, “Don’t worsen the military situation to slow progress. A military situation will cause negative political reactions. Do not continue the war while discussing peace, and do not use the war to antagonize the public feeling of the other side.” On one hand, Bidault said that he hoped to obtain a cease-fire under the condition that the historical relationship between France and the three countries, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, was kept in mind. On the other hand, however, he said that he is opposed to mixing together discussion of military and political issues. Bidault also tried to find out [whether] a better chance for an agreement [would exist] if the Korean and Indochinese issues were discussed together or separately; and a possible result on the entire Asian issue if the discussions were conducted behind closed doors. I told him that the two issues certainly had impact on each other. They all should be solved, not just one, while leaving the other unsolved, or even trying to block any solution. Bidault said that he could avoid the impact of the development of the Indochinese issues on his government and media. He also said that, if necessary, he may have to mention his conversation with me in his speech that would be sent to the Assembly on Wednesday (the 9th). But he didn’t state definitely that he would publicize this matter. He may want to use his contact with China to calm down the complaints in the Assembly, but he was afraid of upsetting America. Bidault also told me that he may have to talk aggressively and offensively at the public meeting on the 8th. He wanted to make a statement ahead that it “won’t be a problem for me to continue the communication with the Chinese delegation thereafter.” During the conversation, Bidault emphasized that my opinion was very close to his. His conversations with me were more constructive than those with other people. I talked about the issues of neutral nation supervision, the experience of the Korean Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and veto rights. I also emphasized that both sides should follow the conciliatory spirits and look for their common points.

[15 characters excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]
DOCUMENT No. 35

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fourteenth Plenary Session, 13 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-14; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

The delegations of six countries of the Western camp spoke at the open meeting on the Korean issue on the 11th. Six countries (France, with Britain and Canada taking the initiative among the other five countries and New Zealand, Belgium, and Thailand giving their support) stated unanimously that if the conference cannot reach any agreement on the Korean issue, it should be returned to the United Nations. Although Bidault is usually the least interested in the Korean issue, he suddenly became active at this meeting in order to obtain more votes when the French Parliament decides on the motion of confidence on the 12th. He returned from Paris and intentionally showed the spirit of conciliation in proposing five ambiguous principles at the plenary session on the Korean issue. In his proposals, Bidault briefly mentioned that elections should be held throughout the territory of Korea, and also raised the issues of the withdrawal of foreign forces and international supervision. However, instead of emphasizing the necessity of the United Nations’ supervision, he simply said that “once the unification has been carried out under legitimate conditions, the UN should be called upon to give their sanction [to this settlement thus reached].” From our side, both Nam Il and I spoke and expressed our complete support of Molotov’s five-point proposal presented on the 5th. We also proposed that the conference should adopt this proposal as the basis for further discussion. I not only fought back Smith’s threatening statement on the 5th that he would appeal to world opinion, but also focused on exposing his plot to interrupt the negotiations. I pointed out that since both sides had already achieved agreement on several points and agreement might be possible on some other points, there was no reason for the conference not to continue. The current situation is that the United States and South Korea want to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean issue, however, other countries who attended the sixteen countries’ meeting on the 4th did not agree. Since Molotov’s five-point proposal on the 5th was full of the spirit of conciliation, it made it difficult for our counterparts to reject it completely. Therefore, the United States cancelled the planned restricted session on the Korean issue on the 7th. At the same time, the US is attempting to mold public opinion and is preparing to end the negotiations at the right moment. At the plenary session on the 11th, the United States therefore instigated the six countries to distort our arguments recklessly and to emphasize that the differences could not be resolved, and attempted to end the conference by proposing to return the Korean issue to the United Nations. However, through the six countries’ delegations’ statements, we perceived that there were still differences among them. Although all six countries defended the United Nations, five of them did not support Pyun Yung Tai’s sixteen-point proposal directly. Neither was their support of the United States enthusiastic. Bidault’s proposals were not quite in step with the other five countries’ statements. Neither did he raise the issue of the United Nations’ supervision. Bidault simply said that [the settlement of the Korean issue] should be reported to and obtain ratification from the United Nations. Therefore, it is still difficult for them to end the meetings on the Korean issue immediately. Our side plans to let Nam Il propose our second original plan in next week’s meetings on the Korean issue.

Zhou Enlai
13 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 36

Minutes, Meeting between Wang Bingnan and French Delegation Member [Jean] Paul-Boncour (Summary), 14 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00104-07; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

(Top Secret)

Time: 14 June 1954, 7:30 p.m.
Place: Paul-Boncour’s office in the United Nations Building
Interpreter and Recorder: Dong Ningchuan

Paul-Boncour: Today I would like to discuss two issues:
(1) The Korean issue.
As we have discussed previously, if the Korean issue is to be discussed at the United Nations, China will be invited. However, Mr. Wang said that China was willing to enter the United Nations only through the front door and therefore had no intention of taking this opportunity. Meanwhile, since the situation is newly changed, I would like to give some personal opinions:
Regarding the issue of the All-Korean Commission, please pay attention to one paragraph in Bidault’s statement. Bidault pointed out that Molotov’s proposals must be revised to: under the guarantee of international organizations, the existing North and South Korean governments should get on well with each other so that they can await free elections. This proposal is not new. I proposed at the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in 1948 that relations between North and South Korea must be improved. It should start with cultural and economic relations, and then gradually realize the political unification. The United States at the time suggested that it should be discussed later. India also knew about this since I used to ask for
the Indian delegation’s opinions.

Fifteen days ago, [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru also stated publicly that North Korea’s political system should not be forced on South Korea. Neither should South Korea’s political system be forced on North Korea. They must seek a way to coexist with each other peacefully. They should begin with cultural and economic issues, and solve their political problems thereafter.

Not long ago we anticipated that the French government would face a crisis, therefore we asked Bidault to present this proposal so that the conference could note it for the record. This is France’s claim on the issue of peace in Korea. It was simply a personal proposal before, however, now the French government is using it for the first time as a proposal of its own. The United States is preparing to invite the other fifteen countries to join it to sabotage the conference on the issue of international supervision. If other countries decide to do so, France will agree with them.

(2) [Paul] Ramadier wants to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai.

Former French Prime Minister Ramadier is a member of the Socialist Party. He is currently attending a conference of the International Labor Organization in Geneva and is also the chair of the conference. He is a good friend of my uncle Mr. [Joseph] Paul-Boncour (former prime minister from the Socialist Party), my wife and I are all very familiar with him. He will return to Paris after the conference and therefore wants to take this opportunity to meet Mr. Zhou Enlai. If Mr. Zhou Enlai agrees, I will arrange a lunch or dinner in a restaurant in the countryside so that two of them will be able to meet there. For the time of the meeting, we prefer next Sunday.

Wang Bingnan: As far as we know, a session on the Korean issue will be held tomorrow. Now I would also like to express some personal opinions:

(1) We have stated many times that this conference has nothing to do with the United Nations. Although this issue was discussed many times in the United Nations before, no result was reached there. Therefore, the Berlin Conference decided to hold the Geneva Conference.

(2) Discussing the Korean issue at the United Nations is completely different from the issue of restoring China’s status at the UN. They should not be confused.

We believe that the Geneva Conference should reach a conclusion on the Korean issue. Since the delegations have all agreed on some basic issues such as unification, free elections, and the phased withdrawal of foreign troops, it made it easy to solve specific problems. We cannot understand why anybody would say that the conference will not succeed.

We constantly insist at the Geneva Conference that we only want the conference to be successful, and we do not want it to fail. It is obvious that the Americans’ attitude is the opposite of ours. They want the conference to fail and do not want it to succeed. If the conference is to be sabotaged on the issue of supervision, our side does not have any responsibility for that. We hope to call the French delegation’s attention to this.

If we share opinions on matters of principle, we should not have any problems dealing with specific issues. For example, if we have decided on the principle that we will hold the Geneva Conference, then there is no need to argue about whether the delegations should come here by plane, train or ship. We cannot say that you will not come to Geneva if you do not take the train. If anybody wants to sabotage the conference by using the issue of supervision, it means that they are intentionally preventing the conference from reaching any solutions.

Paul-Boncour: It sounds very reasonable from the point of view of the Chinese delegation and Chinese public opinion. However, China cannot prevent the other sixteen countries from [considering these issues] from the perspective of the United Nations. To them, their statements are as well-founded as those of China. They have the right to decide whether the Korean issue should be discussed in Geneva or in New York. Therefore China’s attitude should be flexible.

I need to clarify one thing. Mr. Wang Bingnan just said that he wanted to get the French delegation’s attention. I am not speaking as a representative of the French delegation and am simply giving some personal opinions as a good friend of China and the secretary general of the sixteen countries.

Wang Bingnan: We believe that since related countries could not reach any solution at the Geneva Conference, and [some countries are now] talking about how the United Nations can actually solve the problems, isn’t it intentional sabotage?

What does Mr. Paul-Boncour think about the sessions, especially today’s session, on the Indochina issue?

Paul-Boncour: I haven’t yet had a chance to exchange opinions with the French delegation. However, my own opinion is that today’s session made important progress at the end. Mr. Molotov had already agreed to let India take the chair of the Commission of Neutral Nations. It thus denied Mr. Eden’s argument a few days ago. He said at the time that although the conference was still ongoing, it was already hopeless. Therefore, we should be prepared to end the conference. Of course the United States also wanted to sabotage the Indochina
session. However, France is different. France wants the conference to succeed, not to fail.

We have problems translating Mr. Molotov’s detailed proposals. Our two translators have been working on them since three o’clock and still haven’t finished yet. Therefore, Mr. [Jean] Chauvel cannot make any clear statement, simply depending on what he heard from the session. Nevertheless, Mr. Wang Bingnan should pay attention to one thing about which Smith is going to make a disappointing reply. He said that Molotov’s proposals did not contain anything new. However, Chauvel expressed that he was willing to consider them carefully. He did not want to easily put Molotov’s proposals aside before they are discussed.

Wang Bingnan: Although Mr. Paul-Boncour said that these were his personal opinions, I believe that they are similar to our own.

As far as I know, the military session also made great progress, and the atmosphere of the session was very good, too.

Mr. Molotov’s important proposals paved a new way for the conference. We welcome Mr. Chauvel’s attitude of careful consideration. The United States said that there was nothing new in the Soviet proposals. It shows that the Americans’ purpose is to let the conference fail. They obstruct [the conference] immediately every time it makes progress. France is an important concerned party. We hope that, as you said, France wants the conference to succeed. Then we believe that the conference must reach a conclusion.

Paul-Boncour: Unfortunately, France does not have a government anymore.1 However, the French delegation and I all hope to be able to organize a technical committee, which will discuss the issue of supervision. This committee can discuss issues of the membership and authority of the NNNS. After the discussion, it should submit its report to the conference like the session of military experts does. According to the French constitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the three armed services. Although he has no authority to talk about political issues, he can take responsibility for the military issues of the armistice. The expert who is doing research on the issue of supervision in France is [Counselor to the French delegation] Colonel [Jacques] Guillermaz.

Wang Bingnan: Do you think that the restricted sessions or the expert sessions should be continued?

Paul-Boncour: I still cannot answer you now, because we have to discuss Mr. Molotov’s proposals first.

Wang Bingnan: How long will it take to set up the new French government? How many chances does [French National Assembly Member Pierre] Mendes-France have to form a cabinet?

Paul-Boncour: I think it is difficult to form a new cabinet. It will take longer. I hope that Mendes-France will be successful, however, I think he will fail.

Currently, the French delegation is responsible to the president. The negotiation of the armistice issue is led by Chauvel, [French Chief of the Special Staff of the Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States, Colonel Michel] de Brebiisson, [Counselor to the French delegation, Colonel Jacques] Guillermaz, and others.

Russia just joined the International Labor Organization. The meeting between Mr. Zhou Enlai and Mr. Ramadier will be beneficial.

Wang Bingnan: I will answer you after I report to the head of our delegation.

1. Editor’s Note: Joseph Laniel’s government fell on 12 June after Pierre Mendes-France led a vote of non-confidence in the French National Assembly, which passed by a vote of 306 to 293. Mendes-France formed a new cabinet on 19 June.

DOCUMENT No. 37

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, 15 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-01; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 15 June 1954, 11:15 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.

Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhang Wentian, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Attendees on the British side: Caccia, Ford (interpreter)

Caccia: Yesterday Mr. [Anthony] Eden and Mr. [Vyacheslav M.] Molotov discussed the Laos and Cambodia issues. We assume that Mr. Molotov had already informed the Chinese side because the current arrangement is to let every chair inform his partner respectively. However, this time Mr. Eden is especially eager to let the Chinese and Soviet delegations know the British delegation’s position on the Laos and Cambodia issues so that [he could] remove all possibility that might cause suspicions.

Mr. Eden has already stated at the meeting that our basic position is that we insist that the Viet Minh troops should be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia. Whether all the troops in these two countries are Viet Minh troops or a part of them are is a controversial question. However, it is confirmed that there are Viet Minh troops in these two countries. For us, the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops is a matter of principle. We have already made arrangements here so that we can reach an agreement on this issue and thus solve the Laos and Cambodia issues in Geneva. The Ambassador reads newspapers as we do, you must have already known that the Cambodia had already made an appeal to the United Nations several weeks ago. And now Laos is also considering taking the same action. We believe that it is much better to reach the solution here.

I will repeat again that we believe that it is much better to reach the solution here. If we can reach an agreement on the withdrawal of the invading troops, we cannot imagine that any participating countries will use such an agreement to establish
accomplished it. and the Chinese delegation is already here. If [the conference] mean by this. We are glad to have the Chinese delegation here, been here. I think that the ambassador must understand what I of discussion, and in fact the Chinese delegation has already participants guarantee this solution.

The advantage of our current conference is that it is a place of discussion, and in fact the Chinese delegation has already been here. I think that the ambassador must understand what I mean by this. We are glad to have the Chinese delegation here, and the Chinese delegation is already here. If [the conference] were held in another place, we would have had an undesirable situation.

My mission is to clarify the above points. I hope that I have accomplished it.

Zhang Wentian: We understand Britain’s attitude. Mr. Eden has said that before at the meeting. What Mr. Caccia said today is the same.

You understand China’s attitude as well. Foreign Minister Zhou [Enlai] stated it several times at the meetings.

I will report to Foreign Minister Zhou what Mr. Caccia said today.

At tomorrow’s meeting, the Chinese delegation will present its own proposal concerning the Laos and Cambodia issues. This proposal will take into account Mr. Caccia’s statement today.

Caccia: If Prime Minister Zhou wants to meet with Mr. Eden before tomorrow’s meeting Mr. Eden will completely agree with that.

Zhang Wentian: I will also report to Foreign Minister Zhou about this.

Caccia: Please excuse me. I have to leave in a hurry because I need to accompany Mr. Eden to visit Mr. Molotov. Also, I borrowed Mr. Eden’s car when I came.

Zhang Wentian: We don’t need to be too polite with one another. We welcome your visit.

 DOCUMENT No. 38

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fifteenth Plenary Session, 17 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-20; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) The Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations discussed our strategies on the Korean issue on the evening of the 14th. We assume that our counterparts will not accept the five-point proposal that Molotov presented on 5 June since they have already spread rumors outside the conference that the conference will be ended at the plenary session of the 15th. It will be difficult to present easily our side’s second original plan (regarding the consolidation of peace in Korea) as well as the supplementary proposals that we originally planned to use as last steps. We must try to play every card we have at the last session. Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the conference. In addition, it will force our counterparts to take greater responsibility for ending the conference. Therefore we have decided that at the plenary session on the 15th, our side should: let Nam Il present proposals on the guarantee of peace in Korea; let me speak to support Nam Il’s proposals and recommend that the conference should go into a restricted session of seven countries [China, the USSR, the UK, the US, France, the DPRK, and the ROK]; and let Molotov submit a [draft] declaration to guarantee that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. We assume that our counterparts will accept none of these proposals. Therefore, at last, I will make a minimum proposal. Specifically, I will express our common desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and propose to discuss the issues of time and place for the reopening of the negotiations. We presume that our counterparts will not even accept this minimum proposal since the United States’ policy is basically not to reach any agreement.

(2) At the fifteenth plenary session on the Korean issue on the 15th, Chairman Eden intentionally let our three delegations speak first. Nam Il made a six-point proposal on the guarantee of peace in Korea. I spoke to support Nam Il’s proposals and suggested that the conference go into a restricted session of seven countries. Molotov proposed that the nineteen countries should publish a joint declaration assuring that no action will be taken to threaten peace in Korea. We assume that our counterparts will not accept the five-point proposal that Molotov presented on 5 June since they have already spread rumors outside the conference that the conference will be ended at the plenary session of the 15th. It will be difficult to present easily our side’s second original plan (regarding the consolidation of peace in Korea) as well as the supplementary proposals that we originally planned to use as last steps. We must try to play every card we have at the last session. Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the conference. In addition, it will force our counterparts to take greater responsibility for ending the conference. Therefore we have decided that at the plenary session on the 15th, our side should: let Nam Il present proposals on the guarantee of peace in Korea; let me speak to support Nam Il’s proposals and rec...
sented our minimum proposal. Specifically, that the nineteen countries should issue a joint statement indicating a common desire to achieve the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue on the basis of establishing a unified, independent, and democratic country of Korea. I pointed out that if they rejected this proposal, their rejection of negotiations could only have an unfavorable effect on future international conferences. This minimum proposal obviously threw our counterparts into confusion. After debating back and forth [among themselves], the Belgian delegate stated that he was not opposed to the spirit of my proposal and was ready to accept it. Eden agreed with the Belgian delegate’s statement and asked the delegations if he could conclude that the conference had already accepted China’s proposal. Nobody was responding at the time. Smith panicked and immediately took the floor himself with a statement against us. Eden then reversed himself and said that the conference had no procedure for voting. He pointed out that the conference would not be able to reach agreement on any of the proposals, and it was only possible to note the proposals as part of the record of the conference. I immediately praised the Belgian delegate’s spirit of conciliation and said that it was also worth noting that Chairman Eden asked the delegations to consent to China’s last proposal. At the same time, I criticized the opposition and obstruction of the US delegation and pointed out how the US delegation had been preventing the Geneva Conference from being able to arrive at even a minimal agreement. At the end Eden declared that the conference would note all proposals and statements as part of the record and that the meeting was adjourned. In sum, the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations’ repeated efforts disrupted our counterparts’ arrangement and completely exposed America’s decision to sabotage the conference.

3 At this point the sessions on the Korean issue ended. We are considering whether or not the Soviet Union, the DPRK, and China, the three countries of our side, should issue a joint statement or issue statements separately after we return to our countries summarizing the discussions on the Korean issue at the Geneva Conference and explaining them to the whole world.

Zhou Enlai
17 June 1954

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**DOCUMENT No. 39**

**Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others,**
**Regarding Zhou’s Conversation with Bidault, 18 June 1954**

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-22; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

At noon on the 17th, I visited Bidault. He emphasized the purpose of his return to Geneva was to ask everyone not to adjourn the conference too early. He said that since the conference has made some progress because of the constructive suggestions by Molotov and me, it should discuss the possibility of how to achieve some specific results. The conference should not be ended at this moment. I said that I agree with the French opinion to continue the conference because our stance is always to work with the conference to achieve a settlement. Since the British and American foreign ministers are now planning to leave the conference, we hope that the conference may reach certain, if not final, agreements before the foreign ministers’ departures. Bidault said that Eden and Smith are willing not to leave Geneva until next week. He also believed that during their absence their representatives should be at least at the ambassadorial level, not only the experts, in order to continue their work. He hoped that the military representatives from each side should not ask unreasonable or unanswerable questions during their work of exchanging maps. Then I repeated to Bidault what I had told Eden about the Laos and Cambodia issue. I also added a few points especially for France:

The suggestions made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are reasonable and proposed for reaching a glorious peace for both sides. To fulfill the reasonable requests by Laos and Cambodia the reasonable suggestions by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam need to be met. The problem could be solved much easier as long as France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the two major belligerent countries, agree on the issue. We are willing to see Laos and Cambodia become two of the Southeast Asian type countries while they become member countries of the French Union. The cease-fire should take place on site in Cambodia, and both sides should reach a political solution through their negotiations there. In Laos, however, since the forces were relatively large, it may be acceptable to use regrouping areas to solve the problems. These areas are along the borders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and China. At the end, Bidault said that he won’t allow anyone to disrupt the meetings in order to have the military negotiations to obtain a fruitful result.

Zhou Enlai
18 June 1954
Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey (Summary), 18 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00008-07; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Time: 18 June 1954, 12:00 p.m. to 12:45 p.m.

Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, [PRC Foreign Ministry American and Australian Affairs Department Director] Ke Bainian, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)

Attendees on the Australian side: Casey, Lauren (staff of the Australian legation at Saigon)

1. Regarding the Korean issue:

Casey first assured us that he had never thought about excluding China in the future from the discussions on the Korean issue. He then said that the Korean issue is currently a mess. It therefore proved difficult for such a big conference as this one to solve the problem. He said that he originally thought that even if North and South Korea could not be unified shortly, at least some temporary measures could be taken. For example, [measures on the issues of] trade, communication, and so on between the North and the South. However, now the North and the South are like oil and water [and] do not mix.

Foreign Minister Zhou said we also hope that the North and South will not continue fighting each other. Instead, we want them to get closer. However, as Mr. Casey knows, South Korea’s attitude is very unreasonable on these issues. After the sixteen countries published the joint declaration, the South Korean delegation immediately made a statement saying that it would no longer be restrained by the Korean War Armistice Agreement. This statement not only embarrassed the other members of the sixteen countries but even Smith.

Casey said that that was right and they were very angry about that, too.

2. Regarding the issues of the recognition of China and the United Nations

Casey said that currently there were still various difficulties to overcome. Therefore, it was still too early to discuss the issues of recognition and the United Nations. He said that he believes that Foreign Minister Zhou understands political issues and other issues in the world.

Foreign Minister Zhou said: It does not matter. However, Mr. Casey should know that we have complaints about these issues. Casey asked, what did you mean by “complaint”? Foreign Minister Zhou said that China was deprived of the authority and status to which it was entitled at the United Nations.

Casey said that, nevertheless, the improvement of Sino-British relations achieved at this time was very profitable. If [we] take a little bit longer, and use time to ‘heal,’ [I] believe that the situation will get better. He said, he understands that the Chinese people know about “the time cure.”

Foreign Minister Zhou said that the improvement of Sino-British relations was an achievement. I believe that it can also help to deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China through the improvement of Sino-British relations. Mr. Casey just said that the Chinese people know about the ‘time cure,’ this means that Mr. Casey has some understanding of the Chinese people.

Casey said that he believes that the improvement of Sino-British relations will deepen the understanding of the countries of the British Commonwealth toward China as well.

3. The Indochina issue.

Casey said that as far as he knows the discussion on the Indochina issue made progress because of Foreign Minister Zhou’s proposals.

Foreign Minister Zhou briefly repeated to Casey what he had discussed with Eden. For example, [we] hope that Laos and Cambodia become countries of the Southeast Asian type; the two [different] situations of Laos and Cambodia should be recognized; although [Laos and Cambodia] should keep their own defense forces, foreign troops must be withdrawn; and no foreign countries should establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia, and so on.

Casey asked whether holding elections in Laos and Cambodia would be the best way to test the size of the local defense forces. Since a war is ongoing in the region, and the situation is confusing, the elections should therefore probably be held a while after the armistice. He then asked, [“]what do you think about holding an election within twelve months after the armistice? [“]

Foreign Minister Zhou said that elections should eventually be held in the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Although the elections would probably need to be held a while after the armistice, we hope that the shorter this period of time is the better. However, the current problem is to end the war.

Casey asked whether Foreign Minister Zhou had met with the two foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia. They would be glad to know about what Foreign Minister Zhou had discussed with Eden.

Foreign Minister Zhou said that he had not yet had a chance to talk with the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia.

4. Issue of the military bases.

Casey said that if a certain arrangement could be made in Indochina, Australia would definitely respect and not sabotage it. He also said that Foreign Minister Zhou did not have to be afraid of anything. They [the Western countries?], including Australia, will not conduct an invasion. He said he believed that “international communism” can peacefully coexist with “international democratic countries.”

Foreign Minister Zhou said China is willing to coexist peacefully with all the countries of Southeast Asia and the western Pacific Ocean. This certainly includes Australia and New Zealand. This is China’s policy toward India. However, China also applies this policy to all other countries. These are not empty words. It is the policy that we have been following for the last
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five years. The People’s Republic of China will not conduct an invasion, nor should Mr. Casey have any doubts about that.

Casey said that he was glad to hear that. He also said that he believed that it will not be difficult for both sides to reach an agreement as long as China does not establish military bases.

Foreign Minister Zhou asked: Did you mean that if China establishes military bases in Indochina? How could China go to Indochina and establish military bases there? We believe that no foreign countries should establish military bases in Indochina.

Casey said that what he just meant was that China should not establish military bases inside the Chinese territory near Indochina. Then he said, they [the Western nations], including Australia, establish military bases for the purpose of defense, not aggression. However, it was probably difficult for Foreign Minister Zhou to accept this explanation.

Foreign Minister Zhou said, it will be difficult for us to imagine that Australia would go and establish military bases everywhere alone if the United States had not established military bases in the western Pacific Ocean and all over Asia. We believe that only the military bases established in our own countries can be called defensive ones. Military bases established in other countries’ territories are for aggressive reasons. This is our definition.

Casey said, you should not think that the United States is that bad.

Foreign Minister Zhou said, it is the United States that has been taking a hostile attitude towards us for the past five years. Foreign Minister Zhou continued, although Mr. Casey and I can discuss all other issues, we have different understandings of the United States. However, this will not affect relations between China and Australia.

DOCUMENT No. 41

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning the Meeting at Nanning, 20 June 1954, 11:00 p.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrade Enlai:

Your telegram of 3:00 p.m., 20 June has been received.

(1) We approve that you leave Geneva for India by flight on the 23rd. The two telegrams (from you) to Ambassador Yuan (Zhongxian) have been conveyed to him.

(2) We approve that you and Comrade Ding, [Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) General Secretary] Truong Chinh, [Viet Minh General] Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as Comrades [chief PRC military advisor to the VWP] Luo Guibo and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Zhang Hanfu hold meetings and discussions at Nanning. We have telegraphed the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party and [Chief PRC military advisor to the VWP] Wei Guoqing, so that they will be rushing to Nanning to await you there by the 28th.

(3) We will order the Military Commission to dispatch a special plane to wait (for you) in Guangzhou, and to conduct test flights between Guangzhou and Nanning in advance.

(4) The [CCP] Nanning Bureau Branch and Guangxi Provincial Committee will be posted of related developments.

(5) We approve that our delegation [at Geneva] will be led by [PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Comrade Li Kenong, who will remain [in Geneva] and will lead the negotiations on military affairs. [PRC Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Zhang Wentian and [PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Wang Jiaxiang will go back to Moscow.

(6) On such related information as the date, time (of the flight), and the mark and type of the plane (for your trip), and the flight route from India to Guangzhou, please make an early report, so that we at home will complete due preparation in a timely manner.

The Central Committee
11:00 p.m., 20 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 42

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Wei Guoqing, Qiao Xiaoguang and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee, Regarding the Meeting between the Premier and Comrade Ding, 20 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Comrades Wei Guoqing and Qiao Xiaoguang, and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee:

After an agreement was reached at the Geneva Conference on 19 June, the foreign ministers from the main countries have left Geneva one after another. Comrade Molotov went back to Moscow on the same evening, and Eden and Smith left on the morning of the 20th. Comrade Zhou Enlai will return home around the 23rd. During the three weeks that the foreign ministers are absent, the conference will discuss military issues related to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Therefore, our side must quickly decide upon a plan on the division of zones. Comrade Zhou Enlai has consulted with and gained the agreement of Comrades Molotov and Pham Van Dong, and he believes that it is necessary for him to meet with Comrades [President of the DRV] Ho Chi Minh, [General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party

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Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) The four delegations from our side came to our place for dinner on the evening of the 18th to say farewell to Comrade Nam II. On that evening we discussed the two proposals presented by the delegations from Laos and Cambodia. We presumed that we could reach an agreement on the Laotian and Cambodian issues at the meeting of the 19th with our counterparts. On the morning of the 19th, Eden came to see me (see the other telegram for details) to the Soviet Union. Molotov agreed with that. Cambodia does not want to negotiate here. They emphasize that [the parties to the negotiation] should be the Cambodian Royal Command on one hand, and the command of the Viet Minh on the other. They do not want to recognize France as chief representative. It therefore showed the contradictions between France and Cambodia. Now, [the] only solution is to enlarge the ongoing negotiations between the representatives of commands of both sides of Vietnam. It will require more days until the delegations of Laos and Cambodia show up and negotiate directly the issues of the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos.

(2) It was the Western countries that suggested jointly that we should first discuss the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces.

(3) Our side added ‘and foreign military personnel’ after ‘[] armed forces’. We meant the Vietnamese Volunteers. The Cambodian delegate stated that Cambodia needed the service of foreign military personnel. The Laotian delegation claimed that the French military personnel in Laos were dispatched there based on agreements between France and Laos.

(4) During the absence of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and the United States, in order to push forward direct contact between France and Vietnam, I met with the Cambodian delegation on the 20th (see the other telegram for details), and I plan to invite the delegations of Laos and Cambodia to have dinner with Comrade Pham Van Dong on the 21st. [I will] introduce them to each other [so that] they can have more direct contacts in the future. Also, I told Chauvel that I was willing to meet with [French Prime Minister Pierre] Mendes-France if he comes to Geneva in two days. Chauvel has not yet answered me. Even if Mendes-France does not come, I still plan to push Chauvel to contact the Vietnamese side directly. In order to influence France, I also met with two members of parliament from the French Socialist Party. They both insist that [France] should establish diplomatic relations with China (see the other telegram for details.)

Zhou Enlai
21 June 1954

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DOCUMENT No. 43

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Sixteenth Restricted Session, 21 June 1954

(Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-23; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.)

(Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16)
Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel, 22 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-04; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 22 June, 11:45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.
Location: The Chinese delegation’s hotel

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, [Director of the Department of Asian Affairs of the PRC Foreign Ministry] Chen Jiakang, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Chauvel: I visited Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France in Paris yesterday. I have conveyed to him your willingness to meet him. He is very glad. However, since his new cabinet has just formed, he has a minister meeting this morning, and a cabinet meeting in the afternoon. Therefore he will be able to arrive in Bern tomorrow. Right now we have arranged his schedule as the following. He is visiting the officials of the Swiss government at 11:00 am tomorrow morning. He is having a banquet at 12:30 pm. He can meet you at 3:00 p.m. at the French embassy. [We would like to know] if it is convenient for you.

The media and press have broadly publicized the news of this meeting. Some of [the reports] are distorted propaganda. We guess they are cooked by the Americans. I received many early phone calls this morning, asking for my comments on the news. I told them that I didn’t have much to say, and that they should ask Paris for comments directly. In order to avoid any rumors, we need to have a formal announcement. Mr. Mendes-France is planning to announce his meeting with you to his cabinet members at today’s cabinet meeting. After the cabinet meeting, we will issue a news release. Its words may be like this: French Prime Minister will visit Switzerland and meet the officials of the Swiss government. He will make a stop and meet Mr. Zhou Enlai, China’s premier and foreign minister. Are you happy with the news release?

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for Mr. Chauvel’s effort. I know you have many difficulties so that I delayed my schedule for one day. The street news is obviously made by the Americans. They spread the news everywhere. For example, about my trip to India. India and our government have not yet released the news, [but] they already found out [about it] in the airport.

Regarding your news release, I don’t have any problems. It is all right to meet at 3:00 pm.

Chauvel: It is best if the Chinese and French governments can issue the news release at the same time.

Zhou Enlai: After you decide the release time, please ask Col. Guillermaz to inform [Director of the Staff Office of the PRC Foreign Ministry] Mr. Wang Bingnan.

Chauvel: Regarding the contents of tomorrow’s meeting, even though Mr. Mendes-France does not have any particular topic, he will listen to everything you’d like to say. His mission is to quickly reach a peaceful solution over the Indochina problem. By the deadline he has set for himself he has to report the result to the National Assembly.

The problems we face now in the negotiations are the difficulties between France and its alliance. We think we will work out something with them. We are very glad to see that China and France can make common efforts together. After your departure, who is in charge here?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, will stay in charge here. Also, Mr. Chen Jiakang, head of the Asian Division, will stay here. We hope that the French and Chinese delegations will maintain their contacts inside and outside the conference in order to make genuine progress through their efforts. I met the foreign ministers of Cambodia and Laos yesterday and the day before yesterday. I also invited the foreign ministers of Laos, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to dinner here last night. I have told them that our hope is to see the three countries establish a friendly relationship with France. After peace is resumed, they will develop better relations with France on the new foundation. Our goal is to support both sides to achieve a glorious cease-fire. We support and promote the conference, [and are] not derailing it.

Chauvel: This is exactly what we believe. We really appreciate your great efforts and personal contribution to the restoration of peace in Indochina.

I think the main task for the next few weeks will be conducted in the military committees. However, we can’t give the public an impression that the conference of the nine-nations’ has gone [away]. Thus, we feel that the conference should meet and show the media from all the countries that the nine nation conference is continuing. I talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong this morning about this. He said that we don’t need to give this kind of optimistic impression. I think it may not be just an impression, this conference still has certain impact. If [there is] not much business, we can meet two or three times a week, and for one hour each time.

The special meetings can report the result of their discussions to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: I think Mr. Chauvel has a good idea. But we need to discuss this with the delegations of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

It is better for the conference to have some business to work on. And each person doesn’t need to talk a lot, that might [only] intensify the atmosphere.

Chauvel: We will find some business for the conference to work on.

Zhou Enlai: It is important that the military staff meeting should have some achievement.

Chauvel: This is our common basis. I said to Mr. Pham Van Dong this morning that the discussion on the supervision [commission] and its membership does not have any foundation until the map [for regrouping] is drawn. It doesn’t matter to you and us if the conference continues or adjourns. But it
means a lot to some other people. Thus the conference must continue to meet.

We are planning to present two documents at today’s meeting. The first document is about establishing a special committee on the supervision issue. The Americans are not very happy to accept this document. They worry that the conference may not be able to take control after such a committee is established. The members of this committee can be decided later according to its tasks. The second document is drafted according to Mr. Zhou Enlai’s six-point proposal. We intend to use it as the meeting agenda in order to make the conference progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong said that we should add the issue of local troop deployment to this document. Although [Republic of Vietnam Vice Defense Minister Ta Quang Buu] hasn’t given any specific replies, he doesn’t oppose it. We want to know now about China’s opinion. We can cooperate like we did last week.

(Chauvel presented an original copy of the two documents.)

Zhou Enlai: We will let you have our reply before the meeting and after our discussions.

Chauvel: Regarding the special committee suggested in the first document, we consider it the best if a delegation, such as the Chinese delegation, can make a proposal for establishing a special committee on supervision. Then we will endorse it.

Zhou Enlai: We need to study the document.

Chauvel: We hope that the French and Chinese delegations can maintain their active, careful, and secret cooperation during the next three weeks.

Zhou Enlai: This is to our own advantage.


1. Editor’s Note: The “conference of the nine nations” is the Geneva Conference itself.

DOCUMENT No. 45

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Talks with Eden, 22 June 1954 [Excerpts]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0050. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Comrades Chairman, [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee,

Eden came to visit me on the morning of the 19th, mainly to discuss the proposal on the issues of Laos and Cambodia, with a view to reaching an agreement on the same afternoon. In addition, he mentioned that the Viet Minh forces should not engage in large-scale hostilities while the negotiations were under way, and that if an agreement could be reached here, the hostilities should be ceased on the spot. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] He said that he had recently heard the news that the Viet Minh forces had attacked a place on the Cambodian border. I said that we were in favor of an agreement as soon as possible so as to achieve the cessation of all hostilities, that the new French cabinet also wished for a ceasefire, and that we had not learned of any attack on Laos or Cambodia. I said to him, “You understand the nationalist movement sentiment in Southeast Asia,” the hostilities are mutual, and so the French must restrain their forces from large-scale campaigns. There was no major campaign to speak of in Dien Bien Phu, but French airborne troops turned it into a major one. I also told him that so long as reasonable demands were met in Vietnam, no unreasonable demands would be made on the issues of Laos and Cambodia. Eden then raised the issue of adjourning the conference. He said that the foreign ministers would return when the military representatives had prepared a report, and that they did not wish to resolve the issues of the jurisdiction and members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission before the conference was adjourned. I suggested that the foreign ministers return on a regular basis, so that a deadline could be imposed on the work of the military representatives of both sides. Eden agreed. In the end, Eden mentioned that what pleased him most was the improvement of Sino-British relations.

Zhou Enlai
22 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 46


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-06; P1-11. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 23 June 1954
Location: French Embassy, Bern

Chinese participants: Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Minister Li Kenong, [Chinese Embassy in Switzerland Minister] Feng Xian, Huan Xiang, Zhang Wenjin (secretary), and Dong Ningchuan (translator)
French participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Ambassador [to Switzerland Jean] Chauvel, Luwin, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Mendes-France: It is said that [you,] Mr. Premier[,] postponed your trip to India for one day in order to come here. I really appreciate it.

Zhou Enlai: We are so glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister before my brief return to China.

Mendes-France: It is very good to make this meeting happen quickly. I am very glad about this. The reason is that I’d like to solve all of the problems concerning us quickly. Mr.
Premier knows under what kind of circumstance our new national government was established. The French National Assembly has decided on a date and hopes that a settlement will be achieved before this date. This settlement of course must bring about peace.

Zhou Enlai: It is for this reason that the leaders of our two countries have this early meeting to exchange our opinions. I believe this [will be] helpful in making conference progress from now on.

Mendes-France: Mr. Premier has been attending all the meetings. I couldn’t participate in the conference before. But I had the information on your conversations with Mr. Bidault. I’d like to know more about Mr. Premier’s observation and opinion on what measures we should take in order to achieve peace in Indochina.

Zhou Enlai: In the past meetings I have exchanged many opinions with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Chauvel. Nevertheless, I’d still like to talk to the new French prime minister and foreign minister now about the Chinese delegation’s opinion on the conference.

The Chinese delegation’s purpose of coming and attending this Geneva Conference is to resume and realize peace in Indochina. This is our goal, and we do not ask for anything else. We oppose any enlargement or internationalization of the war. We oppose any use of threatening or provocative methods. They do not help negotiations. China, however, is not afraid of threats, as Mr. Prime Minister knows. We need to employ conciliatory methods to help both sides to arrive at an agreement.

It is because of this common spirit, we’d like to address my opinions to Mr. Prime Minister.

To solve any problem in Indochina, the first [requirement] is a cease-fire. Military issues are always related to political issues. The military issue is being discussed presently, and the political issue can be discussed later on. After an agreement is reached, the first [step] is to stop the war. As Mr. Prime Minister said, the French Parliament has expressed this kind of desire, because the people of France, Indochina, and the world all support this. The current situation in Indochina is that all three countries are involved in the war. They have a similar situation. All of the three countries need a cease-fire, and their people demand independence and national unification. The French government has shown its willingness to recognize the independence of the three countries and their national unification. China is willing to see they will stay in the French Union. Our country also intends to establish a friendly and peaceful relationship with France.

The three countries, however, have different problems. Therefore, we should accept different ways in solving the problems in each country. Vietnam, for example, needs a general election for its national unification after the war, and then [the new national government] decides on the type of its political system. This will be determined by the Vietnamese people themselves. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, as long as the people in the two countries are still supportive of their current royal governments, our government will be very happy to see these two countries become part of the normal Southeast Asian countries, like India and Indonesia. I have expressed the same opinion to Mr. [Georges] Bidault.

Of course, on the other hand, we don’t want to see that these three countries become military bases of the United States, or that the United States builds up a military pact with them. This is what we are against. If the United States establishes its military base there, we have to check it out, and we can’t just let it go without checking.

I talked to the foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia a few days ago. They all assured me that they don’t want any American military base in their countries. I said that was good and encouraged them to make friends with France, as long as France respects their independence.

I also heard that [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Mr. Pham Van Dong, representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, talked to them and expressed that Vietnam will respect the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, and assure a non-aggression between them and Vietnam. It was very good when I heard they were talking like this.

Politically, the three countries face different situations. Currently, Vietnam has two governments. The military regrouping areas must be determined, but it doesn’t [require] a [political] division. During a period of time after the cease-fire, a free election will be held through negotiations between the two governments. This is their own domestic affair. We can show our support, even though we can’t intervene. Laos and Cambodia also need to achieve their unifications through elections. I think the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can agree on this point. The question is whether the two royal governments can recognize the resistance movements in their countries, and unite with the resistance governments in order to achieve their national unifications. The Bao Dai government should approach the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through discussions and negotiations, instead of opposing it. Unfortunately, his [Bao Dai’s] political proposal aims exactly at opposition, hegemony, and at inviting the United Nations to intervene. This is unacceptable.

Militarily, the military representatives from both sides are negotiating the issue of Vietnam. We all hope that a settlement will be reached sooner. Laos and Cambodia have two situations. The first is that they have local resistance forces; it is small in Cambodia, and large in Laos. In Cambodia, the Royal government should talk directly to the resistance forces about cease-fire, neutral nation supervision, and political solutions there. So it should in Laos. In the meantime, the royal governments should also join France in the negotiations of both sides to determine the regrouping areas for the local forces. This will lead to their political unifications. The second situation is that all the foreign armed forces and military personnel should withdraw from these two countries. Vietnam had sent some volunteers over there. If it is still the case at the present, they may follow the resolution provided by the military staff meetings, requiring the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from all of Indochina.

By now the representatives from both commands have
reached an agreement in principle about the military meetings. They will meet and talk intensively in the next three weeks. Currently, the meetings of the belligerent states became the center of the conference. France and Vietnam are the most important parties from both sides. Our desire is a direct contact of both sides and a signed settlement [to be reached] soon. All the nations at the conference, including China, are willing to make contributions to genuine progress, and [are] firm to oppose any obstruction or destruction.

These are the main points of my opinion.

Mendes-France: The Premier’s points help me realize that the Premier’s thoughts on the issues are very clear. Of course, I can’t respond to every point, but some particular points should be discussed carefully. What made me glad is that our opinions are pretty close on the main points. I heard that the discussions on Laos and Cambodia have made some progress in the past several days. I also know that the progress was achieved mostly through the efforts by the delegation under the leadership of Premier Zhou. I believe that we don’t have any unsolvable problems between us over the issues of Laos and Cambodia.

As the Premier mentioned, coping with the domestic problems in Laos and Cambodia also requires international supervision. Certainly, a solution requires some work, but I don’t think it is too difficult to find out.

The problem in Vietnam is different. The Premier just said that it is tougher. And then the situation is not optimistic because the war has been [going on] in that country for so long. Moreover, as the Premier said, the two governments there have their own administrations and armies. The Vietnamese people are divided into two sides, and both sides have been fighting the war for many years. One of the points mentioned by the Premier needs to be noticed: that many problems can be solved through direct contact between both sides. If workable, we certainly welcome [direct contact]. In fact, however, it is difficult. Although it is difficult to contact and to obtain any result, we will make our vigorous effort to arrive at this goal. Nevertheless, we agree on this direction. The Premier also said that the goal in this region is unification, and that the methods and procedure can be considered differently. Vietnam is divided into two parts, it is difficult to reach any agreement in a short period of time. It is impossible to complete its national unification as soon as the cease-fire becomes effective. The time issue was just mentioned because the war has been there so long that peace would not be stalled immediately, and that procedure will not be that simple, for example, talking about an immediate election. In fact, if the Vietnamese people really want their unification, they have to cooperate and need certain procedures. Generally speaking, [our] goals are not much different in principle.

There is one more final point. I am glad the Premier made such a suggestion: it is the best to go through two steps. This first is a cease-fire, and the second is a political settlement. I fully agree for the same reasons the Premier stated. For genuine progress, the first step is to concentrate our attention and energy on the cease-fire issue, including the determination of regrouping areas. This is a practical solution, it should be reached quickly. I’d like to ask the Premier if you agree that we have many points in common?

There is another important point. The Premier raised a concern about establishing American military bases. I fully agree on this point. I want to make it clear that we don’t intend to establish any American bases in that region. We don’t have such a plan.

Zhou Enlai: I’d like to explain regarding your points:

You had a very good answer to my last point. France has no intention to establish any American bases. This is very good not only for the three countries, but also good for China, France, and Southeast Asia. All of us hope for a peaceful co-existence and for building a common foundation for the future.

You also said that the military and political solutions in Laos and Cambodia needed international supervision. Our opinions are the same on this point.

The situation in Vietnam is different and difficult. But I think the military and political principles can be reached first. The problem-solving should deal with the troop regrouping and cease-fire issues first, and then turn to the political settlement. It should be two steps, not one step. The length of each step depends on the effort of both sides, and requires discussions between the two sides. France bears more responsibilities for them to get closer, not confrontational. If the two sides refuse to make contact or refuse to talk to each other, it will slow down the cease-fire. I believe that you have found that the Chinese delegation is pushing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to approach not only France, but also Bao Dai Vietnam. France may find it difficult to ask the Bao Dai government to make contact with the others. The Prime Minister knows where the difficulty comes from. That is the situation. Mr. Chauvel knows [it] even better.

Of course, if we want to satisfy the reasonable requests made by Laos and Cambodia, we should meet the reasonable requests in Vietnam made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the military meetings between both sides may reach an agreement more easily.

Mendes-France: I don’t have a whole package of opinions. We have the same opinion on some of the issues. Let me repeat this, it is a good thing if we can help to put the two Vietnamese governments together. The French government really wants to use its influence to facilitate their cooperation. It is, however, very difficult. We just talked about the long war, a long period of division, so that it is difficult for them to come together psychologically and politically. But [they] need to follow this guideline in order to achieve some settlements. It is better for them to set up some kind of foundation for implementing a cease-fire and troop regrouping. As you know, the negotiations between their military experts are still ongoing. Even though they do not seem to be having any major problems, the direction of their meetings is unclear. If we know what the foundation is and an agreement can be based on it, it would be much easier for us to push Vietnam. So far the French-Vietnamese meetings haven’t yet made any...
important progress. Mr. Pham Van Dong made contact with Mr. Chauvel yesterday. Currently, the focus of the conference is on military issues, but there is not much progress. I am returning to Paris tonight and will meet [French Commander in Chief and Commissioner General for Indochina] General [Paul] Ely. I will surely discuss this issue with him in order to further instruct our military representatives here and push the negotiations forward. And, if the Vietnamese government could do the same and give new instructions, it would be very good and easy to reach an agreement. Could [you, Mr.] Premier[,] use your influence over the Vietnamese government to do this like us and help us on this? Once the military experts have made progress in their discussions, arrived at an agreement, and created a foundation, it will be easy for diplomacy to proceed.

I have one more point to make. If we go with the Vietnamese government’s proposal on 25 May suggesting to have two main regrouping areas, only the military experts can provide us a foundation for diplomatic discussions.

Zhou Enlai: To avoid misunderstanding, I’d like to explain one thing. I said the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Bao Dai government should establish their “contact,” not “cooperation.” Since both sides have engaged in the war for many years, it is impossible to talk about any cooperation. Our expectation is that France could influence Bao Dai and make his government contact the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to reduce difficulties and leave no room for any external disruption. The negotiations on the troop regrouping should now enter the phase of discussing specific matters. My opinion is the same as Mr. Prime Minister regarding this issue. The current discussions should get into specific matters. We know that the military representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also intend to achieve early and positive results.

I am very glad to hear that Mr. Mendes-France is going to meet General Ely, commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, after returning to Paris, and that General Ely will give specific instructions to the French military representatives at Geneva. The agreement on the main regrouping areas by both sides will lay the foundation for further diplomatic negotiations. I agree with Mr. Prime Minister at this point. Regarding the main regrouping areas, [I’d like to know] whether Mr. Prime Minister has any specific idea. If you have not decided on this point, [we] don’t have to talk about this issue right now.

Mendes-France: To avoid any misunderstanding, I’d also like to give an explanation. When I said “cooperation,” I meant using “cooperative” methods to solve problems.

I agree with Premier Zhou Enlai’s point. We really hope that the military staff meetings can move into practical phase quickly, and that the Vietnamese representatives will receive their new and clear instructions from their high command. The determination of the main regrouping areas can be used as the foundation for diplomatic negotiations. It seems that the main regrouping areas can be decided pretty soon. Regarding particular ideas on the main regrouping areas, I can’t make any suggestion right now, because I don’t know how the military staff negotiations are going. They are planning to draw a horizontal line from west to east. The line, however, proposed by the Vietnamese staff is much more to the south than the real situation [reflects]. Our experts, who know the field situation, have taken note of all the points proposed by the Vietnamese on 25 May. I think it is possible for them to provide a basis for further diplomatic negotiations. Another [piece of] evidence is that the negotiations on supervision currently are about practical methods. We think that, if the objectives of supervision are known in particular, the problem of supervision could be solved easily. Thus, we should push the negotiations on the regrouping forward and quickly in order to advance the discussions on supervisory issues.

Zhou Enlai: That’s right. We should resolve the problem of the regrouping areas first. I have noticed Mr. Prime Minister’s stance on these issues. We believe that, after the military staff of both sides detail their discussions, the supervisory problem will be solved easily. I have exchanged my opinion on this issue with Mr. Eden. He agrees with my opinion.

Our current efforts should help [the military staff of] both sides to reach an agreement soon, achieving a result within three weeks. This result will bring both belligerent sides their glorious peace, and realize the desires of the people of France, Vietnam, and the world. All the foreign ministers can return to Geneva earlier.

Mendes-France: Three weeks should be the maximum time. During this period, as soon as the military representatives of both sides reach their agreement, they should inform their delegations. Thereby, there will be a few days for the foreign ministers to return to the conference.

Zhou Enlai: The sooner, the better. After my departure, Mr. Li Kenong, our vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be in charge here. I hope that Mr. Chauvel will continue the communication with Mr. Li Kenong.

I am very glad to meet Mr. Prime Minister. I really appreciate you are willing to spend time in Bern.

Mendes-France: This is for our common task for peace.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Mendes-France said in the Parliament
that everything is for peace and friendship. We fully agree with this point.

Mendes-France: This is our first meeting. I hope we will have more contacts later on. I am really happy about this meeting. I’d like to express my appreciation here. Although I am very busy with many things since I have just organized my new cabinet, I really want to come here and meet you.

I have another practical question, that is, what we are going to tell the reporters. What do you think about this?

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Prime Minister can make a suggestion, please.

Mendes-France: I agree with a news release draft suggested by Mr. Chauvel: “We had a frank conversation on the issue of peace in Indochina, not a negotiation. This conversation may lead to our desire that the Geneva Conference will achieve genuine progress.” It seems that not too much besides this can be said.

Zhou Enlai: It is good not to say too much.

Mendes-France: Hopefully, Mr. Li Kenong will contact Mr. Chauvel often later on.

Zhou Enlai: I have a wish. Within the next three weeks, if Mr. Mendes-France comes to Geneva or has other opportunities, I hope you can make a contact with Mr. Pham Van Dong, head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We think such a direct contact beneficial.

Mendes-France: Mr. Chauvel already met Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday. Mr. Chauvel told Mr. Pham Van Dong that I’d like to meet him. But it is not clear when and where the meeting can take place. It may depend on the progress of the conference. I agree that this kind of the meeting is very important. I hope this meeting can happen.

Zhou Enlai: I will be happy to pass on Mr. Prime Minister’s idea to Mr. Pham Van Dong. We hope that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France can build a friendship on the foundation of peace.

Mendes-France: This is also our hope. Mr. Zhou Enlai is a senior and experienced premier and foreign minister. I am a new and inexperienced prime minister and foreign minister. So there are too many things to be handled. But I will try my best to establish a friendly relationship between France and China, and between France and Vietnam.
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China after peace is restored. It is not difficult to solve the political problems of Laos. People of the liberation movement can vote and organize a reconciliation government. If the parliament agrees, we can revise the constitution and even establish a republic after the elections. [Prince] Souphanouvong is the brother of the current prime minister. He does not want to overthrow the king. He only wants to join the government. Problems can be solved if we can discuss them directly.” I told the Laotian delegation: [“] We are trying our best to facilitate the rapprochement among the three countries. [We] respect the independence of the three countries and oppose the United States establishing [military] bases in these countries. We believe that it is understandable that Laos presented its needs for maintaining armed forces for its own defense. We respect other countries’ security and independence [“]. I told him that they do not have to worry about their borders, and that we are willing to join the guarantee by the nine countries.¹ I emphasized that the current French government wants peace, and Vietnam and Laos want peace as well. No one can prevent the realization of peace if the parties concerned demand it. I also warned him to be on the alert so that the Americans cannot sabotage [the peace]. The Laotian delegation hoped to reach an agreement first on the military issues in Laos. I said that we will come to a conclusion in these three weeks and will wait to make a final decision until after the foreign ministers come back. The Laotian delegate expressed his appreciation for introducing him to Pham Van Dong directly.

Zhou Enlai
23 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 49

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] General Staff and PRC Foreign Ministry, Regarding the Trip by [DRV Ambassador to the PRC] Hoang Van Hoan and his Six-Person Group, 24 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P8. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

The General Staff and the Foreign Ministry:

Ambassador Hoang Van Hoan and his group of six will be leaving Geneva by flight today for Beijing via Moscow, and will need to rush to Nanning by the 28th. Please arrange a special plane for them after they have arrived in Beijing. This is important.

Li Kenong
24 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 50

Telegram, Li Kenong to the PRC Foreign Ministry, 24 June 1954

[Source: 206-00049-01; P9. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Foreign Ministry:

[PRC Foreign Ministry American and Australian Affairs Department Director] Comrade Ke Bainian and a messenger are scheduled to fly from Geneva back home tomorrow (the 25th), and they are carrying three bags of top secret documents. Please take the following actions immediately after receiving the documents:

1. The bag for the premier must be delivered to Nanning by a specially arranged plane before the premier arrives in Nanning, waiting to be delivered to the premier at the time of his arrival.

2. The other two bags should be specially delivered to Director Zhang (Zhen) of the Military Operation Department and Comrade Li Qi at the Premier’s Office, and should be accepted by them in person. Please inform us when the above documents have been received.

Li Kenong
24 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 51

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, 23 June 1954, 3:30 a.m.

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Comrade Enlai:

Comrades [Chief PRC advisor to the Vietnamese Workers’ Party] Luo Guibo and [PRC military advisor to the VWP] Xie Fang will travel from Beijing to Nanning, and will be arriving in Nanning before 29 June.

Central Committee
3:30 a.m., 23 June 1954
DOCUMENT No. 52

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, and Convey to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Wang Jiaxiang, Concerning the Content of a Meeting between the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese Delegations, 26 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-34; P1-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Chairman, Comrade, and the Central Committee, and convey to Zhou, Zhang, and Wang:

At 5:30 this afternoon, the Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese delegations met to study the plan prepared by the Vietnamese side concerning division and adjustment of zones in Vietnam and Laos. Concerning Vietnam, the plan introduced by Comrade Pham Van Dong is that the enemy will withdraw from the northern plain and [PingZhaotian], and that our troops in Quang Nam area will withdraw from the southern and central region. Our maximum [goal] is the line from Tuy Hoa, [JiaoYao], and Pleiku, along Route 19, to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border (between the 13th and 14th parallels); the medium goal is the 15th parallel, and the minimum is the 16th parallel. At today’s meeting with the chief military negotiators from the two sides the French side already introduced the principles that its government would follow concerning the dividing line in Vietnam (that is, withdrawing completely from the north, dividing the line along the 18th parallel, and using Haiphong only for the purpose of withdrawal); France’s military negotiator [Henry] Deltiel will go back to Paris to get instructions today; and the two sides have agreed to discuss the situation in Vietnam next Monday (the 28th). Considering these three developments, the Vietnamese side should not delay putting forward the maximum plan. But in order for negotiations to be carried out smoothly, it is necessary to combine introducing the political, military, and economic situation in the three countries of Indochina with the settlement plans, and present them simultaneously, as this will be more advantageous. Concerning Laos, the division of zones plan presented by Comrade Pham Van Dong focuses on pursuing [MengKe] and [MengWei] in upper Laos, and strive to expand the [NanHuHe] area (toward the west expand to Muong Souei, and toward the south to Nam Bac), and in the Sam Neua area expand to [PanPan] and [TaTong] and to be linked with the liberation zone of Central Laos. In central Laos, strive to maintain the liberation zone on Route 12 neighboring Vietnam, and toward the south expand to Route 9. In lower Laos, at the beginning raise the question of maintaining the liberation zone here, but only in this area concessions can be made. In order to maintain the integrity of the liberation zone in upper Laos, at the last stage concessions can also be made regarding the liberation zone in central Laos. In the meantime, Pham [Van Dong] contends that in Laos the question of a division of zones should be solved in connection with the political questions there. If a coalition can be established, then it is not necessary for adjustment or withdrawal to be conducted in various zones, and for special system to be maintained in the administration of our zones. Then Comrade [K.V .] Novikov of the Soviet Union [Foreign Ministry Southeast Asian Department] pointed out that Pham says that he has no mature ideas; in the meantime, he has no clear ideas on the plan for division of zones. (It seems) as if he agrees to Premier Zhou’s opinion, that is, the bottom line is to adhere to maintaining a part of upper Laos, neighboring on Vietnam and China (the whole of Sam Neua, Phong Sali, and a small part of Luang Prabang); however, Pham also wants to expand the liberation zone in upper Laos in exchange for withdrawing from middle Laos. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss to make decisions, so he asks Pham to have further studies and then come up with concrete ideas, and three sides will have another discussion at 11:00 am of next Monday. Before the military affairs conference gets down to discussing the zone division issues in Laos, the two sides should first examine and correct the maps reflecting the current status, and will then enter the discussions about a settlement. This way, (1) we will know more about the situation and thus put forward adjusted plans, and (2) we will get more time to wait for the decisions of the meetings in Nanning.

Li Kenong
26 June 1954
(dispatched on the 27th)

1. Editor’s Note: Many of the Chinese names for locations used in this document are unknown. They have been placed in brackets and rendered phonetically from the original Chinese.
**DOCUMENT No. 53**


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P10. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

(Top secret)

Foreign Ministry:

The Premier instructs that the documents carried by [PRC Foreign Ministry Messenger] Shan Daxin must be delivered to Nanning by the 29th. The Shan group of two will leave Moscow and fly to Beijing on the 26th. Please prepare a special plane to wait for Shan to arrive in Beijing, and he will immediately be flown to Nanning, so that it will be guaranteed that the documents will be delivered on time.

The Embassy in the Soviet Union
25 June 1954

**DOCUMENT No. 54**


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P11. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Wang Bingnan
25 June 1954

**DOCUMENT No. 55**

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, Concerning Hoang Van Hoan’s Arrival in Beijing, 26 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P12. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Minister Li:

Comrade Hoang Van Hoan and another have arrived in Beijing today. The plane to Nanning has been arranged.

The Foreign Ministry
26 June 1954
DOCUMENT No. 56

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry Administrative Office to Li Kenong, 27 June 1954, 3:00 p.m.

Vice Minister Li:

Messenger Comrade Shan Daxin has just arrived. The three bags of documents have been delivered respectively to Li Qi and Director Zhang Zhen of the Department of Military Operations by specially arranged personnel and automobiles. [PRC Foreign Ministry Messenger] Xiao Qing and Shan Daxin will take the plane to send Hoang Van Hoan and his seven-person group to Nanning, and will deliver the other bag to Premier Zhou Enlai. So this special report.

Foreign Ministry Administrative Office
27 June 1954, 3:00 p.m.

DOCUMENT No. 57

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, 27 June 1954

Vice Minister Li:

Because of the sincere invitation by the prime minister of Burma, Premier [and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhou [Enlai] has decided to stay one more day in Burma and will not return home until the 30th. The meeting at Nanning thus will also be postponed for one day. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
27 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 58

Telegram, PRC Department of Military Operations
Director Zhang Zhen to PRC Military Advisor to the PRC Geneva Conference Delegation Lei Yingfu, 28 June 1954

Comrade Lei Yingfu:

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-01; P14. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

DOCUMENT No. 59

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the Central Committee, “Briefing on the Meeting by the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations,” 29 June 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00046-37; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Record number:
(top secret)

Chairman, Comrade, and the Central Committee, Zhou [Enlai], Zhang [Wentian], and Wang [Jiaxiang]:

The Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations, following the usual practice, held a joint meeting at 11:00 a.m. on 29 June. The main points of the meeting are reported here as follows:

1. Comrade [Vasily V.] Kuznetsov mentions that he had a meeting yesterday afternoon with [Jean] Chauvel, head of the French delegation. Chauvel said that the proposed solution put forward by the Vietnamese side at the meeting by the chief military representatives of the two sides on the 28th was much too demanding, which made him very uneasy. Chauvel further said that as this was the first meeting, it is natural that they [the Vietnamese] asked for a higher payout of debts, and this… [the sentence ends abruptly]

   Kuznetsov said that you [Chauvel] proposed the 18th parallel, and that would not work. As a matter of fact, the central part of Vietnam has a small population and is not so much of value, why do they want to have it? Kuznetsov then asked: If it is not of high value, why do you not mention it? Kuznetsov further says: I hope that you will give a comprehensive presentation about the situation of the three countries, so that the question will be settled.

2. At today’s meeting, Comrade Pham Van Dong at one point introduced the idea of discussing economic interests further, and discussing about the zone division issue less. Kuznetsov does not say much about this issue, only says that they will give further consideration to it. Our delegation then had an internal discussion, and we are of the opinion that at the present time the zone division issue remains a key issue concerning Vietnam and Laos, to ask for too little
will be disadvantageous, and to ask for too much will block the realization of an overall agreement. Therefore, we hope that the meeting at Nanning should make an early decision on this issue and inform the Vietnamese delegation as early as possible, so that the negotiation process will be pushed forward.

Li Kenong,
29 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 60

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Zhou Enlai, 29 June 1954

Premier Zhou:

Hoang Van Hoan, his seven-person group, and the [PRC] Foreign Ministry messengers Xiao Qing and Shan Daxin, who are carrying top secret documents for you to receive personally, have left for Nanning by plane this morning at 7:30 a.m. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
29 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 61

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and Li Kenong, 10:30 a.m., 2 July 1954

Vice Ministers Zhang and Wang, and Vice Minister Li:

The meeting with the Vietnamese comrades has been relocated to Liuzhou. [PRC] Premier [and Foreign Minister] Zhou [Enlai]'s plane will take off this morning in Guangzhou and will arrive in Liuzhou at 12:00 p.m. So this special report.

The Foreign Ministry
29 June 1954

DOCUMENT No. 62

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twentieth Restricted Session, 3 July 1954

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou [Enlai], Zhang [Wentian] and Wang [Jiaxing]:

At the twentieth restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 2nd, Kuznetsov spoke and summarized the discussion of these two weeks on the issue of supervision. Kuznetsov pointed out that the opinions in the Soviet proposal of 4 June and the French proposals of 25 and 29 June concerning the relationship between the NNSC and the joint commission became closer. In addition, the other delegations now no longer insist that the joint commission should work under the direction of the NNSC. Opinions on definition of the functions and duties of the two commissions and the lack of need for armed forces for the NNSC became closer as well. Kuznetsov also suggested that we should make a draft resolution on the functions and duties of the two commissions that can be accepted by all the participants. However, there are serious differences over the issues of composition and the voting procedures concerning severe violations of the agreement that may cause the recommencement of hostilities. Regarding [Jean] Chauvel’s previous proposal that the decision of the NNSC should have binding power for both sides, Kuznetsov asked Chauvel by what means we can guarantee the implementation of binding power. After Kuznetsov spoke, Chauvel claimed that the conference can only reach an agreement on a certain document, but does not have the right to make a decision. Concerning the issue of the compulsory nature [of the recommendations] of the NNSC, Chauvel said that the NNSC should have the right to explain the agreement, and such interpretation has legal mandatory power over both sides. Regarding the voting procedure on serious problems, Chauvel said that it was not a simple question, and he could only respond to it next time. The British delegate, Lamb, stated that Britain has not changed its original position. He said that although he had not made any statements at the two previous meetings, it does not mean that Britain agrees that the two commissions should not have subordinate relations. Bao Dai’s delegate repeated the same old story that the communist countries cannot be neutral countries, and only the United Nations can guarantee effective [supervision]. The next meeting will be held on 6 July.

Li Kenong
3 July 1954, 3:00 a.m.
**DOCUMENT No. 63**


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P1. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman, Comrade Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] and Minister Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li [Kenong] in Geneva:

I arrived in Guangzhou on the morning of 30 June. Because of the change in the weather and careless eating I suffered from an upset stomach. I took a day of rest in Guangzhou, and flew and arrived in Liuzhou at noon of 2 July. On the same day I met with Comrades Ding [Ho Chi Minh], [Viet Minh General] Vo [Nguyen Giap], Hoang [Van Hoan], Luo [Guibo], Wei Guoqing, [Guangxi Province Governor] Chen Manyuan, and [PRC military advisor to the VWP] Xie Fang, and had a brief conversation with Comrade Ding. I have read the telegrams from the Central Committee via the Provincial Committee. Those telegrams that are conveyed to the friends are being read by them in turn.

This first meeting was held this morning, and Comrade Vo made a comprehensive presentation. The meeting will be continued in the afternoon, and Wei Guoqing will make a supplementary presentation. It is planned that at the meeting in the evening, I will report on the experience at the Geneva Conference and also on the current international situation. The important issues should wait to be resolved (at the meeting of) the 4th. As to the various issues that have been inquired about in the telegrams from Geneva, I will probably reply this evening.

Zhou Enlai
3 July 1954, 1:00 p.m.

**DOCUMENT No. 64**


[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P2-3. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Chairman, Comrade Shaoqi, and report to the Central Committee, and convey to Ambassador Zhang [Wentian] and Minister Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow, and Vice Minister Li [Kenong] in Geneva:

On the morning of the 3rd, we listened to the report by [Viet Minh General] Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap; and in the afternoon, we listened to the supplementary report by [Chief PRC Military Advisor to the VWP] Comrade Wei Guoqing.

Yesterday evening and today I made a report on the experience at the Geneva Conference, and I have raised some questions that are awaiting solutions. The report is composed of six parts:

1. The current situation and our tasks;
2. The question concerning peace and war;
3. Peaceful settlement plans for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia;
4. The question of negotiation—including policies, procedures, timing and supervision;
5. The policies and tactics of the Vietnamese Workers Party in the future and the tendencies that are in need of attention;
6. The question of arranging work for the future.

About the above questions, [we] have had individual conversations and have had preliminary exchanges of opinions with the Vietnamese.

Comrade Ding says that regarding plans of settlement, arrangements for future military operations, and arrangements on other work, the Vietnamese comrades and Comrades Wei [Guoqing] and Luo [Guibo] will work to make preparations, and we should be able to reach decision after another day of meeting tomorrow. Regarding the various inquiries from Geneva, the responses should be made after tomorrow’s meeting. The return to Beijing has been postponed for one day, and the date is changed to the 6th. So this special report.

Zhou Enlai
4 July 1954, 6:00 p.m.

**DOCUMENT No. 65**

Telegram, PRC Foreign Ministry to Li Kenong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang, 6 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00049-03; P4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Vice Minister Li and Vice Ministers Zhang and Wang;

Premier [and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhou [Enlai] has returned to Beijing safely on the afternoon of the 6th.

The Foreign Ministry
6 July 1954

★★★★
Inside China’s Cold War

DOCUMENT No. 66

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-First Restricted Session, 7 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao [Zedong], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, Comrade [Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

I spoke first at the 21st restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 6th. I explained our position on the issue of the relationship between the joint commission and the NNSC, the issue of the compulsory nature of [the recommendations of] the NNSC, the issue of voting procedures and the composition [of the NNSC], and the issue of [armistice] supervision in Laos and Cambodia. I did not present anything new. I intentionally drew France over to our side and referred to [Jean] Chauvel many times. For example, I noted that his statement deserves attention from the conference. [I also said that] the Soviet proposal of 14 June and the French proposal of 25 June could provide the basis for deciding the functions and authorities of the two commissions. Lastly, I once again expressed my support for Kuznetsov’s proposal of 25 June. I also said that we can push the discussion on the issue of supervision one step forward if we could use the Soviet proposal of 14 June as a basis for discussing proposals from all delegations in the spirit of conciliation. Chauvel spoke next. He said that he had listened to my speech carefully and believed that my speech made a contribution to the conference. Chauvel raised the question of supervising the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia. He asked the Chinese delegation to explain point three in the Chinese proposal concerning the issues of Laos and Cambodia[: “the question regarding the amount and the type of arms that may be introduced into Laos and Cambodia for reasons of self-defense should be the subject of separate negotiations.” The Cambodian delegate stated his reason for opposing the prohibition of the introduction of military equipment and personnel [into Cambodia] and said that point three of the Chinese proposal failed to consider the issue of military personnel. He said that Cambodia needed military experts, and the limitation on the amount of imported arms and military personnel should not damage the effectiveness of ordinary defense. The Cambodian delegate also asked us questions such as how these negotiations will be organized and who will participate. The Laotian delegate also stated that Laos wants to organize its own defense after the withdrawal of foreign troops. However, French [Union] troops that are stationed in Laos cannot be reduced. Also, Laos needs French technicians. I did not respond to the French and Cambodian delegations’ request to clarify [point three of our proposal]. The meeting had a relaxed mood. The next meeting will be held on the 9th.

Li Kenong
7 July 1954

DOCUMENT No. 67

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-Second Restricted Session, 10 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee, also forwarding Zhou [Enlai] and [PRC Vice Foreign Minister] Wang [Jiaxing] in Moscow:

At the 22nd restricted session on the Indochina issue on the 9th, the American and Cambodian delegations once again created difficulties on the issue of the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia. The American delegation made a statement and emphasized the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia and their requirements for self-defense. He [Smith] said that China’s proposal regarding the introduction of defensive weapons into Laos and Cambodia had not recognized Laos and Cambodia’s rights to seek foreign aid and employ foreign military advisors whenever it is necessary to the development of their defensive position. He also required China to clarify its position on French military facilities established in Laos. I spoke and made three points in response:

(1) I emphasized that the prohibition on the introduction of military personnel, arms and ammunition is one of the most important conditions that guarantees the ceasefire. I pointed out that the delegations of Laos and Cambodia had already agreed to introduce weapons for self-defense only on 6 July.

(2) [I stated that] the issue of the introduction of defensive weapons should be discussed based on the principles of prohibiting the establishment of foreign military bases. I also
pointed out that the Cambodian delegation stated on 8 June that Cambodia had no intention of allowing foreign countries to establish bases within its territory.

(3) In consideration of the relationship between Laos, Cambodia and the French Union, [I said] that we can discuss Laos’ and Cambodia’s needs for French [military] instructors and technicians. At last, I said that issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons should also be included in discussions between the representatives of the two commands based on agreements.

Pham Van Dong made an overall statement on the issue of supervision. [Jean] Chauvel spoke to support the American delegation. He disagreed with what I said about letting military representatives discuss issues concerning the quantity and type of defensive weapons. Regarding Pham’s statement, Chauvel said that Pham mistakenly stated that we had agreed in areas where in fact there was no agreement. He denied that he had agreed that there should be a single armistice agreement for all Indochina. He believed that not one single commission, but three commissions [dealing with problems in each of the three countries] are necessary. Also, that there should be three armistice agreements and three different organizations. The Cambodian delegation claimed that Cambodia has no intention of allowing foreign bases to be established on its territory when it is not threatened. This means that [Cambodia] will allow the Americans to establish bases during a war. He also emphasized that Cambodia has the right to choose the origin and quality of military personnel and equipment, meaning that only the quantity [of the equipment] could be limited, not the origin and type. That is, there will be American personnel [in Cambodia] during peace time. Regarding Pham Van Dong’s statement, the Cambodian delegate said that he shared the reservation expressed by Chauvel today, and emphasized that supervision could not be ineffective and the sovereignty of Cambodia should not be violated. Kuznetsov spoke to support my statement and pointed out that allowing foreign countries to build up military outposts in its own territory is, itself, a loss of sovereignty. Kuznetsov referred to the French delegation’s efforts to discuss the issue of supervision in the past three weeks and warned the participants that we should continue these efforts and should not create any problems on issues on which agreement is almost reached.

The next meeting will be attended by the foreign ministers, and the two chairmen will decide the date for the meeting.

Li Kenong
10 July 1954

DOCUMENT No. 68

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 13 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00005-07; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 13 July 1954, 11:35 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.
Location: Foreign Minister Zhou’s Residence
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Bingnan, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)
British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Caccia, William D. Allen, Ford

Eden: I came to visit you this morning before I depart for Paris, mainly to learn your understanding of the prospects after your talk with the French.

Zhou Enlai: After I had a talk with Mr. Mendes-France, I felt that we shared many common points on many issues and our opinions were quite similar. Now the specific issue is the question of demarcation in Vietnam. I said to Mr. Mendes-France that France needed to advance further southward from the 18th parallel. So far as I know, the Vietnamese side is willing to make more concessions for a French move. I understand that Mr. Pham Van Dong is meeting with Mr. Mendes-France today. I hope that their opinions will come close together.

Eden: I hope so, too. Thank you for your message through [British Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing] Mr. [Humphrey] Trevelyan. In that message you mentioned that you had had met with [Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)] Chairman Ho Chi Minh and that you had had a very good talk. Could you tell me more about this interesting talk?

Zhou Enlai: After I talked with you on the 16th of last month, I met with Mr. Mendes-France on the 23rd, and we discussed many things. Afterwards I visited India and Burma, and had talks with the prime ministers of the two countries. I discussed with Chairman Ho Chi Minh the issues covered in these talks. I exchanged with Chairman Ho Chi Minh our opinions on the issues of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and peace in Southeast Asia, and in the end we achieved a common understanding. I trust that Mr. Eden would be delighted to hear this. Regarding the issue of peace in Indochina after my return this time, I believe that from the perspective of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, from the perspective of France, and from the perspective of the British
Royal government as well, a common solution could be found. Likewise, our wish and policies on restoring peace in Indochina have won support from India, Burma, and some countries in the Colombo Conference. Mr. Eden must have read the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese joint statements. I believe that these two statements would promote peace in Indochina. In these statements, we have also said that we would not reject the participation of any country in the effort for peace.

Eden: After Mr. Premier’s visit to India, Mr. Nehru told me about your visit in a telegram. I believe your talk was useful. Everyone hopes for a resolution, and when I say this I include Washington. We very much hope that our arrangements will not only be supported by the participating countries like us, but also involve the Colombo Conference countries in some way.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, I did what I could in this regard during my visit to India and Burma this time. I am especially grateful to Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu for their enthusiastic support. It was a pity that I only had such a short time that I could not visit Indonesia.

Eden: You are truly a tireless traveler. On the issue of Laos and Cambodia, is everything going all right? The reason I am asking this question is that I have met with Mr. Molotov, and so far as I know, the Viet Minh has presented a map according to which they demanded large portions of Laotian territory.

Zhou Enlai: I believe that the question of Cambodia will be resolved after some further contact. As to the question of Laos, I have discussed it with both you and [French Prime Minister] Mr. Mendes-France, and I believe that such a resolution could be achieved. As to the talks by the military representatives, it is possible for their demands to be a little more or a little less, but that is not non-negotiable. Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu both would like to see Laos and Cambodia become Southeast Asia-type countries (“Southeast Asia-type” is my terminology; Prime Minister Nehru used the word “neutral,” i.e. countries like India and Burma), therefore this is our common wish. We do not wish for Laos and Cambodia to become military bases for any foreign countries, nor do we wish for either country to participate in any military alliance that is hostile to the other.

Eden: These could all be agreed upon. Of course both countries must remain unified.

Zhou Enlai: Not only unified, but they also have to be free countries.

Eden: Neither country’s territory should be snatched away.

Zhou Enlai: We both agree that the determined areas in Laos are only temporary, and that unification must be achieved after the elections. Now that we only have a short [amount of] time [left], everyone must make an effort, and we must not let anyone impede us.

Eden: We all hope that Mr. Mendes-France can succeed. Should he fail, it would be very bad for all of us. This would have great implications.

Zhou Enlai: But some people are hoping that he will fail.

Eden: I know what you mean, but my opinion is not exactly the same.

Zhou Enlai: Mr. Eden should know a little more since you have been to Washington.

Eden: I found that there is much mutual suspicion. The United States thinks that China has ambitions in Southeast Asia, not for now but in the long run. I have found that you also think that the United States has ambitions in Southeast Asia, claiming that the US is trying to establish military bases in Southeast Asia and so forth. It would be good to achieve an agreement amidst such mutual fear.

Zhou Enlai: We have issued joint statements with India and Burma, and we have expressed a willingness to issue the same statement with any Southeast Asian country and accept to be bound by such a statement. This proves that not only now do we have no ambitions, but even in the future we will have no such ambitions. However, the US still would not relinquish its plans for military bases and alliances in Southeast Asia. On this issue, the United Kingdom should be able to make a fair judgment.

Eden: As I said just now, each side is suspicious of the other. Our American friends said that we had been deceived, but we are willing to take the risk.

Zhou Enlai: Time will prove everything. Both Mr. Eden’s report to the House of Commons on the 23rd of last month and [British Prime Minister] Mr. [Winston] Churchill’s statement in Washington referred to peaceful co-existence among countries. We welcome this. This is conducive to easing international tension.

Eden: After we left Washington, the US president also used the expression “peaceful co-existence.”

Zhou Enlai: This shows that Mr. Churchill had some influence on him.

Eden: Yes, we had a long talk with him. Let’s discuss these interesting questions after I return from Paris. Mr. Molotov and I agreed to a procedure where we would hold private talks without
formal meetings, and I believe you must have known [about that].

Zhou Enlai: Yes, but we will have to hold a session at the end to conclude the conference.

Eden: Yes, if there is something to make public, of course, a plenary session will have to be held. I must say good-bye now, for Mr. Molotov is going to see me soon.

1. Editor’s Note: The Colombo Conference, held 28 April—2 May 1954, was convened by Ceylonese Prime Minister John Kotelawa, and included Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali.

DOCUMENT No. 69

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden, 17 July 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0006. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 17 July 1954, 11:30 a.m. to 12:40 p.m.
Location: Eden’s residence
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and notetaker)
British Participants: Anthony Eden, William D. Allen, Anthony Rumbold, Ford (interpreter)

Eden: Last night we had a talk, and I think you have learned the contents of it. It seems that the biggest questions are those of demarcation and the date of the elections. Other issues can all be resolved.

Zhou Enlai: Yes, Mr. Molotov has notified me. The three of you had a long talk on these two questions, and I believe a solution can be found in the end. Therefore, I would like to discuss another question with you today. It is the question of a Southeast Asian defense pact. Since the Paris talks, there has been much information from various sources, as well as a lot of publicity. Does the United States intend to sabotage the reaching of an agreement on restoring peace in Indochina with this question? Rumor has it that the three Indochinese states [Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam] will be included in this pact. If this were to be so, then peace would have no meaning other than preparation for new hostilities. So I would like to ask Your Excellency directly, for I could obtain first-hand information from Your Excellency.

Eden: There has been no sudden change regarding this question. As I have said in Parliament, two issues are involved here.

First, to be honest with you, the US might not like any agreement that could be possibly reached here. But we are hoping that they will at least like it enough that they will issue a statement. This is what we are trying our best to urge them to do. Then every one of us will likewise issue a statement to support the agreement. Your Excellency mentioned that you would like the Colombo Conference countries to be involved, and perhaps they can issue a statement, too. Thus the arrangements made here could be reinforced.

Secondly, our Southeast Asia pact with the US [SEATO]: this is a defensive arrangement. A research group is evaluating it in Washington. This is an arrangement that is symmetrical to the Sino-Soviet alliance, and it is defensive just like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with duties exactly like those in NATO.

As to the other point you asked about, I can only give you a personal answer. So far as I understand, there has been no proposal for the three Indochinese states to join in the Southeast Asian pact, but as sovereign states they are free [to do so]. They can issue statements for the conference to notice.

Many things will depend on how we solve the questions here. If an arrangement could be made that is acceptable to all of us, then the atmosphere will improve and confidence will increase. I hope that Laos and Cambodia could become a “buffer” for both of us. So I hope that Your Excellency could help us obtain a guarantee that Laos and Cambodia will be independent. This way, confidence will grow.

[Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

It is precisely for this reason that I am delighted to hear the Premier say that the introduction of arms should be allowed into Laos and Cambodia for self-defense. This illustrates that the two countries can be independent. This has been greatly influential.

I can say with much confidence that the US has no intention of establishing military bases in either of the countries.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you, Mr. Eden, for your explanations. In order for an agreement to be reached on the issue of restoring peace in Indochina, this question needed to be clarified at this important
stage. All efforts must come from both sides. First of all, regarding Laos and Cambodia, our attitude has not changed since I spoke with Mr. Eden on 16 June, and we will keep our promises. During the three weeks while I was away from here, my activities also highlighted this point and proved that I am making an effort in this regard.

We have had Mr. Eden’s repeated assurance; as Mr. Eden just said, it would benefit both sides for Laos and Cambodia to become a peace zone. In order for these two countries to become a peace zone, they must be made peaceful, independent, and friendly to all countries. The two countries must not have any foreign military bases, must not establish military alliances with other countries, and they should have guarantees from both sides, or even from various sides. If the circumstances remain unchanged as Mr. Eden and Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France have promised and as [Indian] Prime Minister [Jawaharlal] Nehru, Prime Minister [of Burma] U Nu and Chairman Ho Chi Minh have witnessed, then our attitude will not change. Thus, peace in Indochina will have a basis. This is the first situation.

Another situation would be that the US includes the three Indochinese states in the so-called Southeast Asian Defense Pact, and the United Kingdom, France, and the three Associated States have agreed to the US requests or have made promises. In such a situation, circumstances would be different. Peace would have no meaning other than to diminish the battlefield of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for American purposes, and to prepare for new hostilities. In that case we would have to be concerned, for it would differ from our 16 June talk.

If I remember correctly, the Americans themselves have said in past meetings that they had no intention to establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia. If you do not object, I will raise your concerns with General Smith when I see him this afternoon.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you. I would like to ask Foreign Secretary Eden to clarify whether the US is already engaged in activities to include the three Indochinese states in the so-called Southeast Asia Defense Pact. This is, in principle, the same as the question of military bases.

When we discussed the questions of Laos and Cambodia on 13 July, I said that Laos and Cambodia must not have any foreign military bases and that the two countries must not enter into military alliances with foreign countries.

Eden: Mr. Eden agreed with me at the time.

As I said just now, the Americans have told me that they have no intention of establishing military bases in Laos and Cambodia. Of course, if the Viet Minh wants to take over Laos and Cambodia before or after an agreement can be reached, then we and the US will express our concern.

I have said just now that I will [confer] with General Smith to get further clarification.

Zhou Enlai: This brings us to the second question. Regarding the so-called Southeast Asian Defense Pact, Mr. Eden presented an argument just now that because there is an alliance between China and the Soviet Union, the UK, the US, and France needed a defense pact. But the Sino-Soviet alliance is concerned with the revival of Japanese militarism and not with Southeast Asia. The problem in Southeast Asia is of a different character. Precisely for this reason Prime Minister Nehru and I are trying to create a peaceful region and expand it. When I was in India, both Prime Minister Nehru and I thought highly of a Southeast Asian Locarno Pact [as] proposed by Mr. Eden. I do not know if our interpretation is correct, but we thought that your proposal meant putting all the Southeast Asian states together to form a collective peace pact. Such a pact would not exclude anyone: if the US wanted to join in, it would not be rejected. Thus regional peace could be guaranteed, and it would include not only the two hostile sides, but also third-party states. This way we can experiment with peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia. If Mr. Eden thinks along similar lines with Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu, Chairman Ho Chi Minh, and me, then an opposing alliance should not be established in Southeast Asia, for it would undermine the idea of collective peace as well as the idea of a Locarno Pact proposed by Mr. Eden. We would like to know how far Mr. Eden has gone with that effort. Of course, the US opposes it, as we have read in the newspapers. But for peace in Indochina, we should try to persuade the US.

Eden: I have run into some trouble. I used the word “Locarno,” not knowing that the US did not like it. I still do not know why they don’t like it. They say that it belongs with things like [the 1938] Munich [Agreement], but in fact it is not so. Mr. Churchill and I have always been in favor of such an idea.

This could be connected to the first part of our discussion just now. If an agreement could be reached here, and if every one issues a statement announcing their support for the agreement
and opposing any sabotage of the agreement, then it would be a Locarno-style arrangement. Perhaps we should not use the term “Locarno.”

I agree with you that not only the participating countries in the Geneva Conference, but also the Colombo Conference countries should be involved in this arrangement.

I do not see how such an arrangement would be incompatible with a NATO-style Southeast Asian pact. The Southeast Asian pact is concerned with a potential situation.

An important issue at the Paris talks was to ask the Americans to come here. We hope that as a result of coming here, they will feel delighted and issue a statement to honor the agreement reached here, agree not to undermine the agreement, and to oppose anyone else sabotaging the agreement. Every one of us should do the same.

Zhou Enlai: If an agreement could be reached on restoring peace in Indochina, and it could have the support of not only all the participating states at the conference but also of the Colombo Conference countries or even more countries, then it would be the result of an effort for collective peace. It would also affirm the idea of a Locarno Pact as proposed by Mr. Eden. Although the US opposes this term, in essence it is so.

Given this, if an opposing alliance is formed, it would create an unstable situation. We could promote solidarity in Southeast Asia and bring about regional peace, but if an opposing alliance is established, it would only divide the scene. In this regard, due to more interactions with the Associated States, Mr. Eden must know that some of these states support it but others oppose it, or at least it is so among the Colombo Conference countries. In consequence, as soon as some positive results are achieved, they would be undermined in some negative ways. This would generate fear, suspicion, opposition, disunity, and disquiet. When I was in Delhi, I discussed this issue with Prime Minister Nehru from various perspectives, and we both believed that it would not be beneficial. At that time we thought that Mr. Eden was trying to counter a Southeast Asian defense pact with [the] Locarno [idea]. If the two were to exist at the same time, it would be unthinkable.

Eden: It is not as bad as that. The idea of a Southeast Asian pact is an old one; it was proposed a few years ago. It is purely defensive in nature, just like NATO. As I have explained in Parliament, two things are involved here: first, everyone has to join in to support the agreement reached; second, our own defense arrangements. It should not cause concern, for, just like NATO, it is defensive in nature. I do not know how many states will join in, and nothing has been drafted yet, but it does not threaten anyone, just like NATO is defensive.

I want to add that it is not just about Southeast Asia; it includes the western Pacific, for Australia and New Zealand are included. Australia and New Zealand had had prior arrangements in the [1952 Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty] ANZUS pact. If it is to be expanded, it will not be a bad thing, but a good thing. You will agree that Australia and New Zealand will not attack others. We are confident that the US will not attack others either.

Zhou Enlai: The ANZUS pact is directed against the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism, just as the Sino-Soviet alliance, and therefore it is somewhat justified. This is because all these countries face the menace of Japanese militarism. But the problem in Southeast Asia is of a different nature.

NATO has created confrontation in Europe, and people are looking for ways to repair the damage. NATO has made it difficult to achieve peaceful co-existence. Now the possibility exists in Southeast Asia, but some people want to create disunity. We not only disdain it but also oppose it. Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu and Chairman Ho Chi Minh all have similar feelings. We are all very pleased by the British effort here, for it brings close together the Southeast Asian countries, and therefore we welcome it. We also welcome the improvement of Sino-British relations. But the creation of disunity separates us. It brings trouble, and it is not beneficial to future development. Undoubtedly the people in Southeast Asia oppose it just like we do, for it will generate fear and suspicion.

Eden: The idea of this pact has no new content. Six years ago I myself pressed for NATO. When [US Secretary of State] Mr. [John Foster] Dulles visited London this April, we openly expressed our support for this idea. Therefore there have been no sudden or bad changes. The better our relations here, the less reason there is for making defensive arrangements elsewhere. I am above all opposed to the creation of disunity.
unity in Southeast Asia, then we oppose them.

Eden: The Southeast Asian pact is not a new idea, and it was not invented at the Paris talks but has been around for some time. I have just said that the better we do things here, the less we need to consider defensive arrangements.

Zhou Enlai: You can say that sentence in reverse: if someone tries to create disunity, it would bring trouble to achieving peace.

Eden: In any event, relations between our countries are good. Please do not worry about this.

1. Editor’s Note: Eden had proposed a “Locarno type” system for guaranteeing the security of neutral states through collective defense. “Locarno” references the 1925 Locarno Treaties.

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DOCUMENT No. 70

Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel, 13 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-05; P1-2. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: 7:00 p.m., 13 July 1954
Location: Premier Zhou’s hotel suite

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, [PRC Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department Director-General] Chen Jiakang, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Chauvel: I am now presenting a document to The Honorable Premier. This document is drafted for the cease-fire agreement and some principles after the cease-fire. It also points out that the current solution is not for separate governments.

The fourth part of this document is about limiting the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia. The discussion of this issue is beyond the responsibilities of the military representatives of Laos, Cambodia, and the Vietnamese government. It should belong to the nine-nation conference. Therefore, after this document is read at the conference, the representatives of Laos and Cambodia will be invited to make a statement. Their statement will be included in the document. It seems the best way to handle the situation.

Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France also talked to Mr. Pham Van Dong about this issue. Mr. Pham Van Dong believes that this document should include the French Union [as well as] French cultural and economic relations with Vietnam. We think that these issues are about the French-Vietnamese relations, not about the conference nations. However, to restrain the armed forces in Laos and Cambodia are different issues. Thus, we would ask Mr. Pham Van Dong to reconsider this.

This is an unofficial document. Nevertheless, we have already handed it out to each delegation at the conference. We asked all the delegations to provide their additional suggestions or further corrections. So far we haven’t yet got everything back from the delegations. But we have collected some of them. Mr. [Anthony] Eden is very happy with this document. The Soviet delegation shows its interest in the document. Mr. Pham Van Dong, however, responded that he agrees in principle, but he needs more time to read it carefully. Other member nations of the Union haven’t sent their feedback. The American delegation hasn’t yet responded to it.

Zhou Enlai: I really appreciate Mr. Chauvel’s effort. As we return here, we saw this document. Even though it is a preliminary draft, it is a document for us to consider. We will study it in detail and provide our response to the French delegation as soon as possible.

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DOCUMENT No. 71


[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0007. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Time: Beginning at 4:45 p.m., 17 July 1954
Location: Mendes-France’s Mansion

Chinese participants: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Wang Bingnan, and Dong Ningchuan (translator)

French participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Jean Chauvel, Jacques Guillermaz, and one translator

Zhou Enlai: Our opinions are gradually getting closer now. We don’t have much time, and we should reach some solutions quickly. At the present, the two issues that have been most debated are how to draw the [demarcation] line and when to hold elections. I talked to Mr. Prime Minister during the last two meetings [and said that] that we wanted to push the conference forward for a settlement. Now two problems remain. The three-person talks tonight and the meeting between Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Pham Van Dong should find some solutions. However, I’d like now to discuss another problem, that is, the so-called Southeast Asia Defense Pact.

After the Paris meeting, there is some recent propaganda that the United States intends to organize a Southeast Asian group, and that it also push the three countries in Indochina to participate in the organization. That is much different from what Mr. Mendes-France, Mr. Eden, and I have been talking...
about. This problem causes us concern. Our wish is that a restoration of peace will be realized in Indochina, and that Laos and Cambodia will become peaceful, independent, friendly, and neutral countries. If they join America’s alliance and establish American bases, then the restoration of peace becomes meaningless. It will increase America’s influence, and decrease the influence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is not beneficial for the Indochinese people or the French people. According to our conversations in the past meetings, I think it shouldn’t happen like this. But there are so many rumors out there, as if Paris has some kind of promise. Thus, I’d like to talk to Mr. Prime Minister directly and frankly.

Mendes-France: I appreciate that Mr. Premier recalls our conversations in the past meetings and intends to maintain a consistent stance. I also want to maintain my previous position.

After our two meetings, as Mr. Premier knows, there has been some development in the situation. Our deadline—I should say my deadline—is now coming soon. But we still face many difficulties.

[Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

Zhou Enlai: I can’t talk about this issue in detail. It should be dealt with directly by Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. Prime Minister. Mr. Prime Minister had said that the current problems are not only to draw the line, but also including the political problems. I have told this to Mr. Pham Van Dong and Mr. [Vyacheslav] Molotov. I guess that it may be easier to solve the two problems if we can connect them together. Tonight’s meeting may bring us some results.

Mendes-France: I can now respond to Mr. Premier’s concerns about the Southeast Asia alliance. I think it unnecessary for Mr. Premier to worry about this. The Paris meeting did not consider any kind of Southeast Asia alliance to include the three countries of Indochina. As far as I know, the United States does not intend to establish any military bases in Indochina. Therefore we don’t need to worry about any change to our previous position in the past meetings. Certainly, if the war can’t be stopped, it will be a different story. If the cease-fire becomes a reality, some country may come up with its own separate statement to strengthen its original position. Nevertheless, I want to assure Mr. Premier that we do not consider any Southeast Asia alliance to include the three countries of Indochina. Please trust me, this is my word without any reservation.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you for your explanation. What we hope to see is the expansion of a peaceful region. If the United States fixes a Southeast Asia pact, including the three countries of Indochina, then, all of our efforts to push these compromises will become fruitless. That is why I want to mention my concerns.

Mendes-France: The best way to consolidate future peace is to solve the current problems reasonably. If Laos can be an example, we hope that Laos can join the French Union, and that it won’t sign any military pact with other countries.
Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and [Laotian Foreign Minister Phou] Sananikone (Summary), 18 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0008. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Time: 18 July, 11:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.
Place: Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s residence
Attendees on the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Li Kenong, Dong Ningchuan (interpreter)
Attendees on the Laotian side: Sananikone, Ku Keolavong (Secretary of Defense), [Director of the General Office of the Foreign Ministry] Thao Lenam.

Sananikone: At our last meeting, the Prime Minister said that you were willing to help us solve problems, therefore I came to ask for your help today. We met with Mr. Pham Van Dong yesterday and the day before yesterday. We believe that there is no problem concerning military issues which we cannot overcome. There are differences on political issues. Mr. Pham Van Dong said that first we must seriously recognize the existence of the resistance movement. Then we can delimit concentration areas and establish an independent administrative organization. This is not different from dividing our territory, and it is in fact the division of the country. It is difficult for us to accept it. Our secretary of defense also attended the meeting. Now I would like to ask him to convey our opinions to the Prime Minister.

Keolavong: Mr. Sananikone said earlier that Laos is a small country and wants to have a peaceful and friendly existence. Regarding the issue of restoring peace, we are willing to try our best to make the biggest compromise. We admit that there is a resistance movement. However, we have to point out that the resistance movement does not have a lot of influence and only has two to three thousand people. In addition, the existence of the resistance movement is based on support from the Viet Minh. Mr. Pham Van Dong suggested that the king¹ should appoint some administrative officials based on suggestions from the resistance movement. This is not suitable to our constitution. We agreed to delimit some concentration areas and to establish several joint committees and a central committee in these areas. During the time when we wait for elections, joint committees can function as a united government. We are willing to consider all suggestions. However, we cannot accept the plan to divide the country. We will be truly appreciative if the Prime Minister could consider our situation.

Sananikone: Right now what we need to achieve is the reconciliation of all the Laotian people. It is not a [true] reconciliation if we cannot live together, and we have to be separated in two different regions after the armistice. Therefore, the disadvantage of the concentration areas is bigger than the advantage. I used to ask Mr. Pham Van Dong why they argued that we should divide [the country] like this. We all need to conduct propaganda activities freely throughout the country during the elections. If we delimit concentration areas, it will be impossible to conduct such activities. Also, they can keep cadres and weapons. They should be able to accept our plan.

[Prince] Souphanouvong has many strengths, and we all know that well. He graduated from Paris Industrial University. There are very few talented people like him in Laos. We believe that after the elections, he will surely get the most honorable position in the government. He can even be our prime minister.

Zhou Enlai: Thank you both for informing me of these situations. I would also like to give some of my opinions.

The Laotian issue can be divided into two parts to discuss: the internal one and the external one. We worked hard in June to suggest that the Vietnamese Volunteers forces and French Union forces should be withdrawn from Laos. We can then begin preparation after the above principles are decided. It is a good thing to confirm these principles in the armistice agreement on Laos. I said in my statements on 16 and 19 June, and also in my conversation with the foreign minister on the 21st, that we hope that Laos will not allow foreign countries to establish military bases within its territory or to form military alliances with foreign countries. We hope to see Laos become a peaceful, independent, unified, and friendly country with all others. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] We are neighbors. We are happy to see such a situation. It will also make us feel relieved.

We believe that these points should be written into the draft agreement presented by the French delegation. However, France did not agree. This is not right. The Foreign Minister also said before that Laos would not allow foreign countries to establish military bases and would not join any foreign military group. Our common desire like this should still be achieved. Then the armistice agreement can [eventually] be reached.

Regarding internal issues, the resistance forces of Laos should recognize the Royal united government; and the Royal government should recognize the resistance forces. The number [of troops] is not an important issue. You said that there are two or three thousand of them. We think that there are more than that. It is important to contact them and then decide on concentration areas. We have already read the eleven points presented in the draft of the Laotian armistice agreement. The concentration areas are scattered in upper, central, and lower Laos, and they are too spread out. It might be because you think that the concentration areas proposed by Vietnam are too large. [However,] such a distribution of [concentration areas] will make all parties anxious and may even cause localized conflict. Therefore, we believe that large areas are better than small ones. I have already discussed this with the foreign ministers, [French Prime Minister] Mr. [Pierre] Mendes-France, and Mr. [Anthony] Eden. [You] should delimit a concentration area in northeast Laos and establish a joint committee to deal with mutual and local relations. After the elections, the resistance movement [should] be able to join the Royal gov-
ernment. This is a good way to handle it.

As far as I know, no one has ever considered Laos [in the same way] as Vietnam. The delimitation of concentration areas is simply a temporary idea. Laos only has one Royal government. This is not a division of the country. After the withdrawal of all foreign forces, Laos can therefore become a peaceful, independent, and unified country. Ports around [Laos] will still be supervised in the future. Therefore, Laos’s security can be guaranteed. During the armistice period, defensive weapons that Laos needs to import can be decided on through negotiations. The foreign minister said on 16 June that [members of] the resistance will be able to enjoy all civil rights and will be accepted to work [for the government?]. This is very good. Resistance forces mostly have fought the French troops. Now we need to help them and unite them. It will be great if the Royal government and Mr. Souphanouvong can meet in Laos and deal with these issues. You should start unifying them not only after the elections but also before the elections. Since Laos is a small country, it should try even harder to unite all forces within the country. I think that Mr. Pham Van Dong also shares the same thoughts.

Sananikone: I appreciate the Prime Minister’s invaluable advice. It is a good basis for us to consider [those issues] carefully. We have discussed with Mr. Pham Van Dong a meeting between our prime minister [Prince Souvanna Phouma] and his brother [Prince Souphanouvong]. [We believe that] if the military conference here does not make any progress it will not be effective, even if they meet in Laos. However, if the Prime Minister believes that it is the right time for the brothers to meet, we are willing to help. In sum, our prime minister is very willing to talk directly with his brother.

Zhou Enlai: It is best [if they can] discuss internal issues directly. Mr. Pham Van Dong is simply the representative of the Laotian resistance movement and cannot discuss details. Therefore, the sooner that they meet locally the better. You are family, there will not be any problems you cannot solve. Isn’t it great to have all forces of the country unified under the Royal government and have all the people of the country support the government in the future?

Sananikone: Regarding the issue of military bases, as we discussed last time, the Laotian-French agreement allowed France to keep two bases in Laos. Mr. Bidault stated at the conference that if Laos requests that France withdraw its troops from Laos, France is willing to do so after the withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops. Therefore, if we ask French troops to withdraw, they will not refuse. However, we want to ask France to withdraw the majority of its troops and keep a few personnel to fulfill security needs. If the prime minister thinks that [we] should not allow the French Union troops to stay in Laos, and France is also willing to withdraw troops, then France should express its opinions at the conference. We are willing to accept that. We will follow the agreement. However, if France wants to abandon it, we will not oppose it, either.

Zhou Enlai: What kind of agreement is the Laotian-French agreement?

Sananikone: It is the agreement we signed in October 1953. Laos joined the French Union based on this agreement. If Laos is invaded, France is to provide protection. However, if the armistice agreement can be guaranteed by all participants of the conference, even by the participants of the Colombo Conference, then we will not necessarily need a guarantee from France. We think that France does not have much interest in keeping a great number of troops in Laos after the armistice since France is having economic difficulties.

I would like to ask another question. If we accept the principle of delimiting concentration areas, what areas does the Prime Minister think they should be? I hope that the Prime Minister can briefly talk to us about that so that we can consider [this issue better].

Zhou Enlai: The details should be negotiated by the Laotian military commission. I said on 21 June that concentration areas could be delimited in two provinces in northeast Laos and should not be scattered in eleven places in upper, central and lower Laos. If so, central and lower Laos can be stabilized. [You] should not [keep] too many troops there. They can be merged into the Royal army or policy forces. Some of them can also be demobilized. This is only a tentative idea. What I said in June is still valid now. Some of the problems can be solved here, the others should be discussed in Laos. Regarding the issues of military bases and military alliance, we are most opposed to American bases and military alliance with the United States. I think you all know this.

Sananikone: The Laotian government has never been formally informed about these issues. We simply learned from newspapers that the United States is planning to establish a Southeast Asian Defense Pact, which will include the three countries of Indochina. However, we do not have such an idea. I have said so to many journalists.

Zhou Enlai: If the conference can reach an agreement, then we all should join together to guarantee that there will be no instances of conflict inside Laos and Cambodia. We hope that Laos and Cambodia become peaceful, neutral areas and do not join any international military groups. Otherwise, the restoration of peace will become meaningless. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

Sananikone: If all countries join together to sign [the agreement], Laos will therefore have a guarantee and should not join any military groups.

Zhou Enlai: Perhaps you will think that China is a big country and will be anxious [about us]. However, after the peace agreement has been reached, the Kingdom of Laos will be a unified country through elections. We are willing to establish a friendly relationship with Laos. The Five Principles [of Peaceful Coexistence] we referred to before can also apply to the relationship between us. We are also willing to make the same statement and will keep our promise. We do not want to threaten anyone; we do not want to be threatened by anyone either.

Sananikone: Thank you very much for this very interesting conversation. We will go back and carefully consider the
points to which the Prime Minister referred. We will be back after we have reached some conclusions. We know that the Prime Minister is very busy, and we have already taken up too much of his time, please excuse us.

1. Editor’s Note: ‘King’ here refers to Sisavang Vong, King of Laos.

DOCUMENT No. 73

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-third Restricted Session, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Chairman Mao, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and the Central Committee:

(1) Eden sent [Harold] Caccia to come and meet with Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zheng [Wentian] on the morning of the 18th. Caccia first said that he wanted to clarify one thing: if the Geneva Conference can reach an armistice agreement acceptable to all the participants, the establishment of foreign military bases in the three countries of Indochina [Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam] and the participation of the three countries in a Southeast Asia defense pact will never happen. These two issues and the issue of the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons across the border will be confirmed in either the armistice agreement or the statement by Laos and Cambodia. Caccia also said that he hoped that the atmosphere of the meeting in the afternoon would not be too tense, and [we] should not attack a certain delegate [meaning US Under Secretary of State General Walter S.] Robertson is sick and is staying in the United States. He asked Smith to send his regards to me. Robertson also hopes that this conference can reach a positive solution, and the relations between our two countries will be gradually improved. Eden asked me if my speech was long, and I said no. Eden said that currently there are not many unsolved problems left except the issues of division, election dates and Laos. I said that there is also the issue of the composition of the NNSC. I asked him if he had already known about the French proposal. He said that he agreed to have India as chair plus Poland and Canada [as members of the NNSC]. I agreed with that, too. Eden told Mendes-France that I agreed. Mendes-France said that was good, but he still wanted to keep it secret because he needed to deal with others. The issue of composition was thus resolved. Mendes-France told me that what he worried about was the issue of Laos. I told him that I had already given my detailed opinion to the foreign minister of Laos. He said that was good. Moreover, Bao Dai’s foreign minister, Tran Van Do, talked with me through the introduction of the French delegation. The foreign minister of Cambodia asked my opinions on Cambodia’s draft unilateral declaration that he presented.

(2) At the same time, Eden also met with Comrade Molotov and gave the same opinions. Comrade Molotov therefore went to consult [Pierre] Mendes-France before the meeting in the afternoon, and told him that we are willing to support his [plan to] establish a ceasefire on the 20th. The tone of the statement of our side at the meeting will be mild, too. Since our counterparts have changed and relatively softened their attitude under our pressure, we accordingly changed the tone of the text of our statement to make it milder.

(3) Comrade Molotov chaired the meeting in the afternoon. His tone was mild when he made the opening speech. He summarized the results that had been achieved [through previous meetings] and expressed his belief [that such success will continue]. He hoped that the parties concerned will display sincerity to agree on unresolved points in the agreement. At last, Molotov said that he “believes that today’s session will help to move forward the solution of problems.” Bao Dai’s Foreign Minister Tran Van Do first spoke to oppose the division [of Vietnam]. He protested it and refused [to accept] the draft declarations of both the Soviet Union and France since they all referred to the division of Vietnam into two zones. Smith spoke after that and made clear the position of the US in these critical days [of the conference]. Smith said: “The attitude of the United States toward the Geneva Conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist in arriving at an honorable settlement. Such a settlement will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and is also not willing to impose its will upon others. However, we have been very interested in this conference. If the agreement concluded here can be accepted by the American government, the American government will declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter Article II and IV, it will refrain from the threat or the use of violence to disturb this agreement.”

(4) An intermission followed after Smith’s speech. All the delegations became lively in the bar and energetically carried out diplomatic activities. Smith came to talk to me, and said to me: “I hope that our two countries can move toward a better mutual understanding.” Smith said: [US State Department Far Eastern Affairs Assistant Secretary Walter S.] Robertson is sick and is staying in the United States. He asked Smith to send his regards to me. Robertson also hopes that this conference can reach a positive solution, and the relations between our two countries will be gradually improved. Eden asked me if my speech was long, and I said no. Eden said that currently there are not many unsolved problems left except the issues of division, election dates and Laos. I said that there is also the issue of the composition of the NNSC. I asked him if he had already known about the French proposal. He said that he agreed to have India as chair plus Poland and Canada [as members of the NNSC]. I agreed with that, too. Eden told Mendes-France that I agreed. Mendes-France said that was good, but he still wanted to keep it secret because he needed to deal with others. The issue of composition was thus resolved. Mendes-France told me that what he worried about was the issue of Laos. I told him that I had already given my detailed opinion to the foreign minister of Laos. He said that was good. Moreover, Bao Dai’s foreign minister, Tran Van Do, talked with me through the introduction of the French delegation. The foreign minister of Cambodia asked my opinions on Cambodia’s draft unilateral declaration that he presented.

(5) The atmosphere of the meeting and the intermission was very relaxed, and everyone was polite. Eden then made the suggestion to Molotov that Britain and France all believe that the meeting does not need to be continued. Comrade Molotov agreed that the meeting should be adjourned after he discussed it with us. The two chairmen also decided to announce the same communique as usual, and then the meet-
ing was adjourned. Neither Comrade Pham Van Dong nor I used the texts of the statements we prepared. The meeting began tensely but ended in a relaxed mood. We do not necessarily need to put any pressure on the conference since the United States made their position clear, Britain and France began showing a true spirit of conciliation, and the issue of composition has been solved. We will try to fend off [our counterparts on] other issues in these two days. If our counterparts are willing to keep making compromises, we believe that we can reach the agreement on the 20th.

Zhou Enlai
19 July 1954

DOCUMENT No. 74

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and [Harold] Caccia, 18 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-02; P1-5. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 18 July 1954, 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m.
Location: Villa of the Chinese delegation
Chinese Participants: [Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs] Zhang Wentian, Huan Xiang, Zhang Wenjin (interpreter)
British Participants: [Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Administration Harold] Caccia, Ford (interpreter)

Caccia said that Eden had dispatched him because the day before Premier Zhou had mentioned certain issues regarding the Southeast Asian pact. Eden had contacted his friends and allies, and it could be said now that if the two sides could reach an agreement here, then the inclusion of the three Indochinese states in the Southeast Asian pact [Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia] absolutely would not be mentioned. The British side believed that in the resolution to be reached, these states would be neutralized so that they would not form any alliance with any side.

Ambassador Zhang then asked the question of foreign military bases. Caccia said that it was a different issue. But it was understood that such questions as bases, armed forces and military equipment would all be mentioned in the draft. So far as he knew, the agreement would include the following four issues: military alliances, military bases, entrance of foreign personnel from outside the country, and foreign arms and munitions. These decisions should apply to both sides. Ambassador Zhang said that Premier Zhou had stated repeatedly that the binding force is equal on both sides: China would not form an alliance with Vietnam, and the three Indochinese states should not enter into any alliance with other countries.

Caccia then said that he had two issues which Eden had instructed him to raise:

First was the question of Laos. Eden had heard the day before that during the French-Laotian and Vietnamese military talks, Vietnam had demanded that half of Laos be marked as the regrouping area. Eden asked China to look into the matter. Laos would soon come up with a counter-proposal detailing a series of regrouping areas, and everyone would recognize it as a sincere and good proposal. The United Kingdom hoped that everyone would deem this as a satisfactory solution. Caccia added that both Premier Zhou and Ambassador Zhang were aware that countries like India and Burma regarded the Laos question as a touchstone for testing whether we were serious about our work.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have not seen the proposal by Laos. Eden had heard the day before that during the French-Laotian and Vietnamese military talks, Vietnam had demanded that half of Laos be marked as the regrouping area. Eden asked China to look into the matter. Laos would soon come up with a counter-proposal detailing a series of regrouping areas, and everyone would recognize it as a sincere and good proposal. The United Kingdom hoped that everyone would deem this as a satisfactory solution. Caccia added that both Premier Zhou and Ambassador Zhang were aware that countries like India and Burma regarded the Laos question as a touchstone for testing whether we were serious about our work.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have not seen the proposal by Laos. As to our attitude towards the question of Laos, Premier Zhou has said that a regrouping area in northeastern Laos should be marked out, that it should be provisional, and that it would be reunified with Laos once the question of the resistance forces is solved in the future. As to the demand by the Vietnamese military representative, it was based on the status quo. They have not formally proposed a final regrouping area. Premier Zhou’s opinion has not changed. The French delegation has proposed a series of smaller areas, which are quite scattered. We are not very supportive of this proposal. We are in favor of a single assembly area in the northeast.

Caccia said that a meeting is going to be held this afternoon, and many questions have yet to be solved. Time is short, too. Take two examples: acting on Premier Zhou’s advice, [Pierre] Mendes-France went to visit Pham Van Dong and discussed the questions of demarcation and the membership of the supervisory commission. Regrettably no agreement was reached. Eden hopes that at the meeting this afternoon, the participants’ attitudes will not be too stiff and polarized, which will make it even harder to solve many of the questions. Hopefully after this afternoon’s meeting, everyone will come closer rather than walk farther away from each other. Mr. Ambassador certainly knows that if a delegation is attacked, its friends will come out to protect it, and such is the case with the other side. As a result, opposition
groups will be formed. The Chinese delegation can rest reassured that the British delegation will never do anything to heat up the temperature, and it hopes that the Chinese delegation will adopt the same attitude.

Ambassador Zhang said that the Chinese delegation also hopes to see everyone come closer rather than standing divided, but both sides must be willing to come closer. For example, the reason why the demarcation question has dragged on is that although the Vietnamese side has conceded to the 16th parallel, the French side still insists on the 18th parallel. If France could adjust its attitude, things would be much easier.

Caccia said, France feels that its concessions in the north could not be compensated by the Vietnamese concession from the 13th parallel to the 16th parallel.

Ambassador Zhang said, this is the opinion from the French perspective. In Vietnam’s view, they have made much greater concessions, giving away their traditionally controlled zones. Both sides say that they have made enough concessions, and the question now is how to solve the problem.

Caccia said, France’s basic attitude is that under no circumstances should Route 9 leading to Laos be controlled by Vietnam completely and unrestrictedly. Fortunately this route does not fall on the 18th parallel, otherwise we would all have to buy our return tickets home.

Ambassador Zhang said, there is also the question of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. This question has been under discussion for a long time, and the other side has not explicitly stated its attitude.

Caccia said, at the talk between the British, French, and Soviet foreign ministers yesterday, Eden has said that he was personally prepared to agree to have seven member states: one communist state, one non-communist state, and the five Colombo states [India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma]. Despite the rather large number of states, some of them could not supply many people. He emphasized that their side had made concessions concerning two principal issues: 1) agreeing to have a communist state as a member, and 2) agreeing to require a unanimous vote on certain issues in the voting procedures. He heard that the other side might accept this new proposal, and Molotov said he would discuss it with Pham Van Dong. Due to late time, it has not been discussed yet. Eden also mentioned a point that would have impact on both sides, which was that choosing yet another state from the Colombo states would be difficult and unfavorable to both sides, or at least the UK thought so.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have chosen two states. Moreover, the fewer the states, the easier it is for our work.

Caccia said that these states, particularly Ceylon, supplied many people.

Ambassador Zhang asked what to do with the specific date for elections. If a deadline is not set, it would be hard to explain to the Vietnamese people. With a specific date, the Vietnamese people could feel hopeful.

Caccia said that we all have to be realistic, and it is better not to promise something that one cannot reasonably accomplish. In fact, even without wars, countries such as India took two to three years to hold elections. He admitted that a specific date would be encouraging. He said that another solution would be not to set a definite date but stipulate that “after the armed forces are assembled, a meeting shall be held by the elections commission, a neutral nations commission, or a certain institution to determine the date for elections.” Every country has its own experience regarding elections. For example, China has its own experience, France has post-World War II experience, and the UK has experience in the elections in India and Burma.

Ambassador Zhang said that our proposal for a definite date is not merely based on China’s experience, but we have also sampled experience from various sides. Once a date is set, there is a goal, and the Vietnamese could see that the reunification of Vietnam is being brought about. Without a definite date, the Vietnamese would have no idea when the elections are postponed to, and when they cannot see good prospects, the people will begin to doubt.

Caccia asked Ambassador Zhang whether he felt that between the two proposed solutions, the former was better, even if the date for elections was far away, for a realistic time had to be found.

Ambassador Zhang said that a definite date has to be set. If we refer to everyone’s experience, we can always find a realistic time. Time, after all, cannot be unrealistic.

In the end, Ambassador Zhang said that he would de brief Premier Zhou on the talk. Caccia also asked the Ambassador to convey the opinions on elections to Premier Zhou, and hoped that the meeting in the afternoon would not be too heated up.

1. Editor’s Note: Route 9 is an east-west roadway located in Quang Tri province. It stretches from Dong Ha in the east to the Laotian border, via Ca Lu, Khe Sanh, and Lang Ve.

DOCUMENT No. 75

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-C0057. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 19 July 1954, 1:30 p.m. to 2:10 p.m.
Location: Premier Zhou’s residence
Chinese Attendees: Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter and note-taker)
British Attendee: Ford (interpreter)

1. The Question of the Demarcation Line in Vietnam

Caccia said that he had reported to Eden what Ambassador Zhang said the day before. Eden had
conveyed the message to Pierre Mendes-France. The French side thinks that France has made considerable concessions in northern Vietnam, but the French side feels that “fortunately Route 9 does not fall on the 18th parallel.”

Ambassador Zhang asked where Eden thinks a demarcation line is south of the 18th parallel that is acceptable to the French side?

Caccia answered that there were two major considerations on this issue:

The first is Route 9, and second [is the fact that] there should be sufficient space north of Route 9 to make those who use and maintain Route 9 feel safe.

Caccia said that there are two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th parallel, one of which enters the ocean at Dong Ha and the other at an unspecified location. These two rivers could both provide some protection for Route 9. Perhaps one of the two rivers can be chosen.

Ambassador Zhang asked whether Eden means that as long as Route 9 is safe, it would be acceptable to the French side?

Caccia said yes, but that the demarcation line should not be a preposterous line. Some topographical details must be taken into consideration, and thus a river is recommended.

Ambassador Zhang asked whether the French side insisted on Route 9?

Caccia answered that [this is] absolutely so. If this cannot be negotiated, we can only buy our tickets home.

Ambassador Zhang said that he would report Eden’s opinions to the premier.

2. The Question of Date of Elections

Caccia said that he had reported to Eden the two solutions proposed by Ambassador Zhang the day before. He had also told Eden that the Chinese side was in favor of determining a date right now. He then said that based on the experience of Burma and India, it would take two to three years, and so it seems that the Soviets had promised an impossible task in their draft by proposing that the elections be held by the end of 1955. He finally said that the elections perhaps could be held in 1956, or by the end of 1956, or as early as possible in 1956.

3. The Question of Military Alliances

Caccia said that some British newspapers had run inaccurate reports of the Caccia-Zhang talk the day before, and so he would like to repeat what he had said. If an agreement could be reached here that was acceptable to all, and if the agreement stipulates the non-entry of the three Indochinese states into any military alliances, then the British side believes that the three states will not be invited to join in any military alliances, and the United Kingdom will by no means do that. At the same time the UK believes that the Chinese side had the same attitude. Caccia went on to say that in saying so he represented not only the UK, but also the countries in the [British] Commonwealth. As to the United States, American representatives had clearly stated their attitude the previous afternoon, and this further proved what Caccia had said the previous morning.

Ambassador Zhang said that we have the same understanding of what we discussed yesterday morning.

Caccia said that, as he understood, Laos and Cambodia would issue their separate declarations saying that they would not enter into any military alliances.

Ambassador Zhang asked in what way the two sides in Vietnam would express this point?

Caccia answered that this point could be included in the armistice agreement. He promised to check the armistice agreement to see whether this point is already included.

DOCUMENT No. 76

Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Pierre Mendes-France, and Eden, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00006-08; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 19 July 1954, 12:45 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.
Location: Premier Zhou’s residence
Chinese Participants: Zhou Enlai, [Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Vice Foreign Minister] Zhang Wentian, Li Kenong, [Director of the Foreign Ministry Staff Office] Wang Bingnan, [Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department Director] Chen Jiakang, Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter), Dong Ningchuan (interpreter)
French Participants: Pierre Mendes-France, Jean Chauvel
British Participants: Anthony Eden, Harold Caccia, Ford

Mendes-France: The conference has now entered into [its] concluding stage, but the question of Laos has not seen much development. I wish to discuss this question with Your Excellency the Premier. The question of Laos has two sides: on one hand, the restoration of peace and the problems afterwards, and on the other, the question of French troops in Laos. French troops are stationed there at the request of the Laotian government, and the number of troops is not large at around
3,000. This is a security measure to help Laos, and cannot be regarded as a danger. I have also discussed this with Mr. Pham Van Dong, and it is not necessary to worry about it. Laos has a border of about three to four thousand kilometers, and it needs an army that can maintain order and safeguard security. Therefore help from French troops is necessary. Would Your Excellency the Premier, agree? I need to repeat that the French troops are by no means aggressive and will not threaten anyone.

Zhou Enlai: The question of the French troops stationed in Laos within a given time, at a certain location, and in a certain number could be considered in connection with other questions. I wonder if the question of regrouping the Laotian resistance force in concentration areas has been solved. French troops should mostly be stationed along the Mekong River, and Xiangkhoang would be too close to the Vietnamese border.

Mendes-France: We have two bases along the Mekong River, and this should be no problem. As to the base in the Plain of Jars,1 we can try to find another way out. We agree to a limit on the number of French troops in Laos, but in terms of duration, I hope we could reconsider the issue, for Laos needs to take some time to establish its armed forces for self-defense.

The regrouping of the resistance force in Laos is a subtle question of principle. But it should not be a big problem, since the number of the resistance troops is not large: in the beginning there were only 2,000, later the number grew to 2,500, and now it is said to be 4,000 which may not even be true. But at any rate the number is small and this question could be solved. We also agree to guarantee that these troops will be allowed to participate in state affairs and will not be retaliated upon. Their civil servants can get jobs in administrative institutions, and soldiers can be incorporated into the national army. They can be entitled to the right to vote, to be elected, and all the other civic rights. However, we do not understand why such military troops should be entitled special political rights and control a special administrative region, even part of a region. It is inappropriate when the majority does not have such political privileges while the minority does. We are willing to consider all specific suggestions in a conciliatory spirit, but it is not a good idea to partition Laos and delimit discriminatory political regions.

Zhou Enlai: The opinions that Your Excellency the Prime Minister has just stated are quite similar to mine. I discussed solutions with the Laotian foreign minister and defense minister yesterday. We believe that a distinction should be made between two questions: one is the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the other is the regrouping of local forces. These forces should be regrouped in one area, rather than at eleven points. The regrouping of the resistance force should be protected, and after the elections, they can either join the national armed forces, the police force, or be demobilized at their own volition. Thus reunification can be realized. After the withdrawal of foreign troops, the international supervision at the ports around the country will serve as a guarantee. A further distinction should be made between two questions. The resistance force is a military organization, and it can be protected after regrouping and political work. When reunification is achieved through elections, they can be placed well. As to the question of local administration, it is a matter of internal affairs and thus the [Laotian] Royal government and the representatives of the resistance forces should meet on the spot to look for a solution. The resistance force stood in opposition to the government during the war, but now that they recognize the Royal government, the Royal government should unite with them. Mr. Mendes-France has also said that they should be granted various rights, given jobs, and placed well.

The central question now is to make the regrouping areas the areas where the resistance forces have been for a long time. This would be conducive to resolving the problem. I say candidly that we are willing to consider the French plan to retain some troops in Laos within a given time and at certain locations so as to train and strengthen Laos’ self-defense forces. We hope to see Laos become a peaceful, independent, free, and friendly country, and be capable of defending itself. We believe that Mr. Mendes-France should also consider delimiting a fairly large regrouping area. Later reunification could be realized through supervised elections, and the resistance force should be taken good care of. This would be promoting reunification from another side. After the withdrawal of the Vietnamese Volunteer Forces, the resistance force should have protection.

We can promote reunification from two sides. We are willing to have Laos become a buffer zone as described by Mr. Eden. I am delighted that Mr. Eden is also here, so that we can discuss ways to reach our common goals. We should all urge upon the Royal government to assume responsibilities. When everything is done through the Royal government, it could be normalized.

Mendes-France: As Your Excellency the Premier has said, our opinions are no longer far apart. The question of French troops in Laos should be easy to solve. The retention of French troops in Laos should not cause anyone to worry; the Vietnamese People’s Army should be withdrawn; the resistance forces should be well taken care of. Specific solutions to these questions should not be too difficult to find. The reason why I proposed eleven regrouping points is that we believe it to be a fairly appropriate solution. If you think there should be fewer points, it can be done easily, but it would complicate the problem to move all the people in the south to the north. Since the resistance force is all over the country, shouldn’t we also consider regrouping points in the south? Most of the
people there are accustomed to local life, and the question should be solved there. The other part of the people can be transferred north. As to regrouping in the north, the question is relatively easy. We suggest that we protect the resistance force as best we can, and grant them all civic rights, but no special political rights.

Laos is a weak country; we all agree that it could be totally independent. What needs to be avoided now is that we should not give Laos and other countries the impression that just as a country is acquiring independence, people begin to consider dividing it up and marking out administrative regions with special positions. The real independence of Laos should be guaranteed, and it should not be threatened either from within or from without, otherwise it would have a negative influence on Asia and on other areas. I hope Your Excellency the Premier would pay attention to this.

Zhou Enlai: I said in a talk with Mr. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden in June that there should be a regrouping area for the resistance force in Laos. But this is different from the situation in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there are two regrouping areas and two governments. Within a specific period they control their respective areas, But the regrouping areas in Vietnam are only a provisional solution, and this does not harm reunification. The proposed eleven regrouping points in Laos will not bring about stability; rather, they might cause local conflicts. The retention of French troops in Laos is to help Laos establish a force for self-defense, reunification, and independence. We will not call this French aggression, but French troops are foreign forces. The resistance forces are local forces and should be concentrated rather than scattered at eleven points. They should have protection, and after regrouping gradually participate in state affairs under international supervision. Laos is not like Vietnam, and the Royal government should be responsible for solving their problems and reassuring them.

It is possible that some people in the south do not want to move to the north. This is a political issue, and can be solved through negotiations by the representatives of the resistance force and the Royal government. Administrative questions should be separated from military questions. What I said in June was based on realistic concerns, and what I say now is the same, without any additions or reductions. On the contrary, we are willing to consider the retention of French troops in Laos. This is a new point.

Mendes-France: Now that our opinions are no longer far apart, I suggest that the discussion be continued by experts.

Zhou Enlai: I agree with Your Excellency the Prime Minister. The questions shall be studied by experts.

Mendes-France: The experts can meet this afternoon.

Eden: If we are through with the Laos question, I would like to propose another thing. [Mr.] Caccia and Ambassador Zhang had a very productive talk. I suggest that they talk again.

Zhou Enlai: Good. Mr. Caccia, why don’t you stay for lunch so you can have a talk.

1. Editor’s Note: A collection of fortified bunkers surrounding an airfield, this installation was built in Xiangkhoang province, near the Plain of Jars, in May 1953 as a landing point for French troops and equipment.

DOCUMENT No. 77

Minutes of Conversation between Zhang Wentian and Harold Caccia, Second Meeting of 19 July, 19 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00093-03; P1-6. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Zhao Han.]

Time: 19 July 1954, 5:45 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Location: Headquarters of the British delegation
Chinese Attendees: Huan Xiang, Pu Shouchang (interpreter)
British Attendees: Ford

Ambassador Zhang said that the information that Mr. Caccia requested this afternoon would be provided now, and that he please convey it to Foreign Secretary [Anthony] Eden.

Ambassador Zhang said that the first point concerned the demarcation line. Now the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has made a further concession, i.e., accommodating the topographical details, the demarcation line is to be set ten kilome-
ters north of Route 9. If the other side still refuses to accept this, we should just buy our tickets home. According to this proposal, the security of Route 9 is no longer a problem.

Caccia said he was afraid that a ten-kilometer area might be too narrow.

Ambassador Zhang said that a five-kilometer demilitarized zone on each side of the demarcation line would be established.

Caccia said that he could not accept this proposal on behalf of the French side. He said that this matter needed to be discussed further by [Pierre] Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong, and that he believed that the French side might want a few more kilometers.

Ambassador Zhang said that the second point concerned the date for elections. The DRV has also made a further concession to hold general elections two years after the signing of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. The precise date and the actual method of the elections would be negotiated by qualified and representative authorities from the northern and southern regions of Vietnam, and a decision was to be made no later than June 1955.

Caccia made no comment on this point and only said that it would be discussed by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong.

Ambassador Zhang said that the third point concerned the membership of the International Supervisory Commission. The International Supervisory Commission is to be composed of representatives from the following three countries: India, Poland and Canada, chaired by the Indian representative. This has been accepted by Mr. Eden and Mr. Mendes-France, and we can confirm it now.

Caccia said that the UK accepted this, and that France had said that it would accept it. The United States had not stated its attitude, but hopefully would accept it, too. For the sake of certainty, Caccia said that he would try to learn the American attitude and telephone the Chinese side about it.

Ambassador Zhang said that the fourth point concerned the timing of the withdrawal and transfer of troops by both sides. The regrouping of the armed forces within Vietnam is to be completed with 245 days.

Caccia said that when this question was first raised, it was divided into two parts. The first part was based upon the material conditions for the withdrawal of troops, such as the railway and ports. Based on calculations of the transportation capacity per day, France proposed 305 days, and later, after some reconsideration, proposed 260 days. The second part took into account estimates of inclement weather, and France proposed two and a half months in addition. Putting forward the present proposal of 245 days is to ask Mendes-France to entrust all his hopes to good fortune, and Mendes-France might feel dismayed by this.

Ambassador Zhang said that, according to our calculations, six months would be enough. The present proposal of 245 days has taken into consideration bad luck. Generally speaking, Mr. Mendes-France has had good luck, and only a few days of bad luck.

Caccia said that this question needed to be discussed by Mendes-France and Pham Van Dong.

Ambassador Zhang said that the fifth point concerned the guarantee by all the participating countries at the Geneva Conference to negotiate the adoption of collective measures when the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission presents the problem of a breach of the agreement. This was the last article of the political declaration. The French draft used the expression “individual and collective measures,” but we think it would be better if we adopt collective measures.

Caccia said that he had not seen the final draft yet, and that he could only say that he had noted our opinion. He said that US representatives said yesterday that if an agreement was reached here, they were willing to honor it. They would issue an individual statement to promise that they would not sabotage this agreement. If someone else had the intention to sabotage it, they would consider it a grave matter. These remarks by the US representatives indicated that they did not want to be bound on the issue of collective measures. Caccia then added that US representatives said yesterday that they would act in accordance with the second and fourth articles of the United Nations Charter, and that any actions taken in accordance with the UN Charter could be said to be collective in some degree. Caccia said that the question of collective measures therefore might encounter some difficulty.

DOCUMENT No. 78

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding Zhou’s Meetings with Pierre Mendes-France and Eden, as well as Discussions Outside the Conference, 20 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0051. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing.]

Chairman [Mao], Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, and the Central Committee:

(1) Mendes-France and Eden visited me in the afternoon of the 19th and focused their talks on the problems of Laos. Mendes-France said that the French troops, about 3,000 men, stationed in Laos for security reasons, [were] not threatening anyone. He agreed to numerical limit of French troops there, but didn’t agree to a time limit. I said that the question of how long, which area, and how many French troops should remain stationed in Laos could be discussed with other related issues. Regarding the regrouping of the Laos resistance forces, he said that the resistance forces had only 2,000 men, not enough to control a special administrative region. I told him that the resistance troops should regroup in one area, not spread to eleven points (the French proposal suggest-
ed eleven points). With respect to their local administration, it is their own domestic affairs that should be discussed through the local contacts between Royal government and resistance force representatives. Mendes-France said that the regrouping points could be reduced, but it would become complicated if all the troops had to move from the south to the north for regrouping since the resistance forces were all over the country. Determining certain regrouping points in the south may be considered, since most people over there have become used to the way of their local life, so that it should be solved locally. I said that the eleven points for regrouping in Laos would not bring peace and stability, and could cause some local conflicts. The resistance forces are local troops that should group together, not disperse to eleven points. They should be protected. After their assembly, they will gradually participate in the life of the state under international supervision. Laos is different from Vietnam. Its Royal government will be responsible for the armed forces so that they will not worry. If someone doesn’t want to go to the north, the resistance movement and Royal government could send representatives to meet and discuss this matter. Then Eden asked me whether I oppose one regrouping area in the south. I didn’t answer him. Lastly, Mendes-France said that our opinions are not too far apart and that [we should] let the experts continue their discussions. He also agreed that the main regrouping areas be in the northwest, and said that there still may be a regrouping area in the south. The specific limits of the areas can be determined on the spot. After the regrouping, the commanding officers of the resistance troops can establish contact with the local governments in order to cope with all the issues after regrouping.

(2) After my meeting with Mendes-France and Eden, Eden’s assistant, Caccia, who came with Eden, stayed and talked to Ambassador [to the Soviet Union and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC] Zhang [Wentian] about the problem of drawing the line. Caccia said that France definitely wanted to have Route 9. “If this cannot be not negotiable, we all have to buy our train tickets and go home.” He also demanded to have enough areas north of Route 9 in order to secure the [French troops’] safety. He suggested that one of the two rivers between Route 9 and the 18th parallel could be chosen as the line. Regarding the election date, he proposed it [be held] during 1956. Talking about the military alliance, Caccia described the position of [the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth] as the following. If an agreement accepted by all the delegations were reached here and the agreement stipulates that the three countries of Indochina [Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos] cannot participate in any military pact, Britain thereby believes that the three countries are not supposed to be invited [to the Southeast Asian military pact]. And Britain itself won’t [invite them]. He said that Laos and Cambodia would make their [own] announcements respectively, saying that they will not join any military alliance.

(3) The delegations of the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam have discussed the final proposal this afternoon, and have presented it to Britain. The main points of the proposal have been telegraphed [to Beijing] yesterday.

(4) I met [V.K. Krishna] Menon this evening. I told him about the proposal that had been presented to Britain. He said that France hopes to draw the line in the area near a river. Regarding the election date, Menon suggested not having a scheduled election date, but scheduling the date for forming an election committee. I firmly opposed his suggestion and said that there is an agreement that the election will be under international supervision. If an election committee is formed, it needs to have both sides plus another country. This may cause foreign intervention in domestic affairs. Both sides in Vietnam won’t accept this kind of suggestion. And China does not agree [with it] either.

(5) Comrade Pham Van Dong met Mendes-France again during the night. Mendes-France proposed to draw the line along the provincial border between Quang Binh and Quang Tri, that is, the 17th Parallel. Pham did not respond. Mendes-France agreed to set up the troop withdrawal deadline within 245 days. But he asked for two more months as a psychological preparation period. He agreed with our proposing the election date, that is, two years. The first year is for discussions and negotiations. Mendes-France disagreed with the gradual withdrawal. Regarding the protection of French economy and business in Vietnam, he presented a new proposal asking for much more than that [contained in] the previous proposal. In short, the only solution so far is the election date.

Zhou Enlai
20 July 1954, 12:00 p.m.

★★★★
Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan (Summary), 20 July 1954 [Excerpt]

[Source: PRCFMA 206-Y0008. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Gao Bei.]

Time: 20 July 1954, 11:00 a.m. to 12:45 p.m.
Place: Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s residence

[Attendees on] the Chinese side: Zhou Enlai, Chen Dingmin (interpreter and recorder)


Zhou Enlai: We have almost finished our working documents except for some problems concerning the Cambodian issue. We will work harder on them and hopefully we can reach an agreement at the same time [with the other agreements] at today’s meeting. I have already read two documents concerning Cambodia: one was [issued on] 16 July, the other was [issued on] 19 July. We have already discussed the longer document, but have not yet discussed the shorter one in detail.

Tep Phan: We have not yet read the document of 19 July. We received a new proposal from the Vietnamese side on Sunday evening [18 July]. Our opinions still have differences regarding political issues and some on military issues as well.

Zhou Enlai: We also have something in common. We can discuss the differences.

Tep Phan: It is difficult for us to accept some of the suggestions from the Vietnamese side. We have already prepared a joint statement for the conference. We also have a unilateral statement to be presented to the conference by the Cambodian delegation. Some points we referred to in the unilateral statement can also be included in the joint statement. There are also some differences regarding military issues. We have not yet exchanged our opinions with the Vietnamese delegation. I wanted to meet with the Vietnamese delegation yesterday but was not able to do so since they were very busy. I hope I can meet with them today. As the Cambodian delegation claimed in the unilateral statement presented to the conference, we will not discriminate against Vietnamese elements in Cambodia. They will enjoy the same rights and freedoms as other Cambodian citizens. We definitely will not discriminate against them. We will make no reprisals against either themselves or their families. After they have returned to civilian life, they can be employed by administrative organizations on the same terms as other citizens.

We would also like to talk with you about [military] personnel. After peace is restored, they can enter military institutes, military academies, and military training schools.

Regarding the issue of foreign military personnel, [we believe that this issue] should be distinguished from [other military issues]. There are French combatant personnel in Cambodia; there are also technicians and experts here, and they are not soldiers.

We accept the provisions of the joint statement claiming that there should be no combatant personnel in Cambodia; however, we should be allowed to keep foreign technicians and experts there. The number [of such people] will not be too many.

In addition, there is [a difference regarding] the issue of the introduction of weapons and armaments. We have already talked about that last time. Under the condition that we do not threaten our neighbors, we wish to be allowed to introduce a certain number of weapons and armaments for our own security reasons. Our troops are in the process of being consolidated. This is for the protection of our own country’s security.

Now I would like to talk about other differences [between the Vietnamese and us]:

First of all, the Viet Minh suggested a six-month period for withdrawal. This is too long. According to our side’s estimate, it will only take one month to withdraw the Viet Minh troops and elements from Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai: The areas are too spread out. There are some difficulties for them to withdraw.

Tioulong: But six months is still too long. There is another suggestion that we cannot accept: the Viet Minh suggested that people who were originally non-Cambodian nationals should remain armed until the general elections or even until the realization of the unification of Cambodia.

Tep Phan: It is unreasonable for us to keep these armed elements gathered in local areas. We hope that all people in Cambodia can join the national community life. It does not matter whether they originally grew up in Cambodia or came here later. In addition, according to our constitution, [military] personnel cannot participate in general elections.

Zhou Enlai: Why is that?

Tep Phan: According to our constitution, people on active service do not have the right to participate in elections or to be elected either.

Zhou Enlai: Don’t you have a system of military service?

Tep Phan: Yes, we do have one. France and many European countries all have this system.

Zhou Enlai: American servicemen can participate in elections.

Tioulong: French police officers can participate in elections. In our country, servicepersons cannot participate in elections; monks do not participate in elections either.

Tep Phan: There are about 60,000 monks in our country. None of them participate in elections.

Zhou Enlai: Why?

Tep Phan: Because they renounce the world, and stand aloof from worldly affairs. They are not interested in politics. The monks I am talking about are people who wear the yellow kasaya robe. In our country everyone is Buddhist.

Tioulong: There is another issue. Some people also ask us to declare that we will not establish military bases within...
our own territory.

**Tep Phan:** Our country is an independent country. We need to have our own military bases and airports for defensive purposes.

**Zhou Enlai:** This is ridiculous. Of course [you] should not make strict rules like these.

**Tep Phan:** It is completely for self-defense. Every Cambodian believes in the independence of our country. We should have the right to build our own bases and airports within our own territory.

**Zhou Enlai:** You surely can build your own airports.

**Tioulong:** In addition, the Vietnamese proposal suggested that we should withdraw our troops two kilometers from each side of the road along which they are to withdraw their troops. We cannot accept that either, since the width of two kilometers extends to places we live. However, our side agreed to guarantee their security when the Viet Minh withdraw their troops. We are also getting ready to provide them all with conveniences and we will provide the means of transportation such as trains, trucks and ships on the railway, on the road and on the sea. We are willing to do so. The above are the differences concerning military issues I would like to point out.

**Sam Sary:** There is another difference regarding the type and amount of the military personnel and weapons imported to Cambodia. [Although they said to] discuss it separately, it is not clear enough to us. With whom on earth should we discuss this? When should we discuss it? And where should we discuss it? I was wondering if we can present the issue in the unilateral statement of the Cambodian delegation on whether we are allowed to introduce a certain number of weapons and military personnel for the requirements of territorial defense.

[Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

**Tioulong:** [Mr. Prime Minister,] our opinions on general and even practical issues can be quite close to [yours] when we discuss them with you. However, they are different [when we talk with] the [Vietnamese] side.

It is also worth studying the way we express ourselves. [For example,] what issues we need to raise in the joint statement for the conference, and what issues we can raise in the unilateral statement of our delegation.

It is stipulated in Chapter 3 Article 5 of the draft armistice agreement of Cambodia: after the restoration of peace in Cambodia, the original non-Cambodian elements can be accepted in the Cambodian Royal Army or local police forces or can be demobilized based on their own free will. After they are demobilized and become civilians they can be employed by all administrative or other organizations of the Royal government of Cambodia.

**Zhou Enlai:** I appreciate that you raised all these differences in detail.

**Tioulong:** We fully intend to make more efforts to help reach the agreement. We hope that we can revise the documents. Moreover, we believe that it is necessary to let our counterparts understand that the agreement should be reached on an equal footing.

I would also like to discuss the suggestion that we should gather these elements together and not disarm them temporarily. However, if they do not enter the military academy, they cannot obtain military ranking. They will be trained at the military academy and should pass their exams. Other service persons will oppose them if these people obtain military positions without military training and passing exams.

**Tep Phan:** We would like to have the Premier’s opinions on the issues we presented.

**Zhou Enlai:** I appreciate the differences you presented. We all hope that we can reach an agreement at today’s meeting. We do not have much time left, so let’s make some efforts together. I deeply regret that agreements on all other issues have already been reached except the issue of Cambodia.

What we have to do now is to work to resolve our differences. We believe that we can settle the differences. I have already said many times that the basic principles concerning restoration of peace in Cambodia are independence, foreign non-intervention, unification and the integrity of sovereignty. We said on 16 June that we had been insisting on and giving support to such an argument. [We hope that we can] reach a reasonable solution that will not interfere with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia and will take care of both internal and external issues.

The Vietnamese People’s Volunteer Forces [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.] will definitely withdraw. Regarding the issues of the period of withdrawal and of passing through the withdrawal route, if [you think] the period is too long, [we can ask them to] cut it short. [However,] one month is too short. Sooner or later they will withdraw.

Regarding the security issue of the withdrawal, the issues of the joint commission and international supervision and the...
issue of the means of transportation, [we believe that] all these
issues can be solved since you have already said that you are
willing to cooperate.

Regarding internal issues, you should categorize all the
soldiers in Cambodia taking their wishes into consideration.
Some of them originally lived there and do not want to leave.
Some of them are from Cochinchina. However, [you] should
donot discriminate against them. If some of them hope to stay
in Cambodia, you surely cannot expel them. However, they
should obey the Kingdom’s laws.

Tioulong: Do you mean those elements who joined the
resistance movement? People who enter Cambodia from
Cochinchina need passes. We inspect all persons who enter
Cambodia from foreign countries. [Only after we check] wheth-
er they are honest and act dutifully, will we allow them to enter.
We have already informed the Vietnamese side about this.

Tep Phan: They surely can choose to leave or stay in
Cambodia of their own free will. However, we have to check
whether or not they are honest. Only people who act dutifully
can stay in our country. We cannot let those dishonest people,
even bandits, stay in our country. We must take the necessary
measures since we are worried about our national security. Mr.
Premier, can we make decisions for our internal affairs?

Zhou Enlai: You surely have the right to deal with [your]
internal affairs. However, you should not expel them and cre-
ate tension. The Royal government should not persecute those
who want to stay in Cambodia and are willing to obey the laws.
[The Royal government] should not discriminate against those
who used to cooperate with the other side, either.

Tep Phan: We have our own constitution and laws. Our
constitution is democratic.

Zhou Enlai: Regarding the armed forces of Cambodia,
[you] can first gather them on the spot, and then settle prob-
lems with peaceful and political solutions. Try your best to
accept them into military and administrative services. As you
just said they can enter the military academy or have other
choices based on their own will. Regarding political issues,
[you] should pay attention to three points:
1. Do not persecute people who used to cooperate with the
other side.
2. Arrange suitable jobs for them.
3. Since they still have some political organizations, parties
and other groups, you should recognize their legal positions
based on the constitution. You can meet and negotiate with the
leaders of local political organizations.

Tep Phan: We have always gotten in touch with them until
now.

Zhou Enlai: It is possible. As long as you keep the door
open, you can reach an agreement. Regarding general problems
of military issues, [you should] not introduce new troops and
weapons from abroad, establish foreign military bases, or join
military alliances. The necessary type and amount of weapons
that are defined as [being] for the self-defense of Cambodia is
not included in this limitation.

Tep Phan: The word “self-defense” can be described by
two words in French. One is autodéfense, the other is défense
to l’intérieur du pays (domestic defense). We prefer the second
one since the first, “self-defense,” which can also be translated
as local defense.

Zhou Enlai: I can agree with this.

Tioulong: Mr. Pham Van Dong also used the word self-
defense. Regarding the prohibition of the introduction of
weapons, we also cannot agree with their interpretation. They
even included shotguns. Meanwhile, we need to add “when
Cambodia is not invaded by foreign countries or threatened by
foreign invasion” to the provision [that Cambodian “should not
establish foreign military bases and join military alliances.”

Zhou Enlai: We can consider that.

Tep Phan: Our country is an independent country. Don’t
we have the right to sign agreements with foreign countries?

Zhou Enlai: Of course you do if you sign a trade agreement.

Tep Phan: What if we sign a military agreement with
China?

Zhou Enlai: China has never signed any agreement of
military alliance with any country. Regarding French military
personnel who are training the troops [of Cambodia]…

Tioulong: (Interrupt) France or foreign countries?

Tep Phan: It’s not limited to France. Regarding France, we…

Tioulong: (Interrupt) We have the experience of being
ruled by France for several decades. We will not be interested
in French “aid” anymore.

Zhou Enlai: You should not be pro-America, either.

Tep Phan: We won’t. Even Mr. [General Walter Bedell]
Smith said that the United States has no intention of provid-
ing aid.

Zhou Enlai: Smith can speak like that. However, there
are still people like [US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Arthur W.] Radford and Vice President [Richard] Nixon in the
American government.

Sam Sary: We can still establish technical collaboration
with countries like India and China.

Tep Phan: However, we are cautious about France.

Tioulong: We are cautious about the cooperation of French
experts and technicians, too.

Zhou Enlai: France has somehow changed its attitude
recently.

Tep Phan: We still have to reconsider joining the French
Union. Last time when we discussed drafting documents with
the French delegation, we asked them not to add the point
regarding joining the French Union to the documents.

Tioulong: Personally, I have already met with the Premier
three times. However, I have never met Mendes-France.

Tep Phan: We are not interested in joining the French
Union [since] we do not want to be ruled by them anymore.
France is no better than the Viet Minh.

Zhou Enlai: However, being pro-America is even worse.
China has its experience [of dealing with the US]. Sino-British
relations have a long history. The United States was a new-
comer. America’s attitude was relatively moderate at first.
However, it changed after the United States excluded British influence [from China] after World War II.

**Tep Phan:** I understand that.

**Zhou Enlai:** It is good that you understand it. The time for the meeting is approaching. I hope that you can reach an agreement with the Vietnamese delegation regarding these issues at the meeting in the afternoon. We will also push the Vietnamese side forward so that the meeting can be successful.

**Tep Phan:** Thank you very much for your help. [Passage excised by the Department of Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

**Zhou Enlai:** I am sure that Vietnam does not have any such intention. Chairman Ho Chi Minh firmly clarified the position of Vietnam when I met with him on the Guangxi border this time. He promised that Vietnam would not invade any countries because an invasion is destined to fail. I am telling you the truth since we are all relatives.

**Tep Phan:** Yes. We need to protect our independence because we want to survive. Our situation is very difficult since our neighbors, such as Thailand and Vietnam, are all big countries. Since our country is a small country, we have no intention of attacking others and only hope that we can survive. In addition, the religion in which we believe does not allow us to attack others.

**Zhou Enlai:** Your situation is relatively good. The conference will publish a joint statement to guarantee [the armistice], and you have the support of the participants of the Colombo Conference [India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma]. It is much better than [the situation in] Korea.

**Tioulong:** I understand this. Cambodia will be a new country after peace is restored. As in China, all the people [of Cambodia] need to make efforts to build up [our country]. The Chinese and Cambodian people also have a blood relationship. For example, I myself have Chinese blood. My grandfather is Chinese. You can tell that from my name. My [last] name is Tioulong.

**Zhou Enlai:** Very good.

**Tioulong:** Our peasants cultivate [crops] and merchants do business. We all hope to live in peace. It will make our economy develop. We are currently opening up wasteland for development.

**Zhou Enlai:** We all want peace. The Chinese people are also conducting peaceful development.

**Tep Phan:** The help we get from you can speed up the achievement of the agreement, and will therefore help us obtain peace and independence. We will need China’s help at all different levels in the future.

**Zhou Enlai:** Yes. We also welcome you to come to visit China in the future if you have the chance.

**Tep Phan:** We would love to. Thank you.

**Zhou Enlai:** We will even have diplomatic relations in the future.

**Tep Phan:** Yes. (Standing at the door and leaving.)

**Tep Phan:** We appreciate the Prime Minister’s help. We hope that Cambodia will become an independent and free country and will peacefully coexist with all its neighbors after peace is restored.

**Zhou Enlai:** I also hope that the friendship between the people of our two countries will be improved.

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**DOCUMENT No. 80**

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle against the United States and Jiang Jieshi after the Geneva Conference, 27 July 1954

[Source: PRCFMA 206-00048-11; P1-4. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Chen Zhihong.]

Ambassador Zhang [Wentian], convey to Premier Zhou (top secret)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

The Central Committee recently discussed the situation related to the Geneva Conference, and it believes that after the agreements in Korea and Indochina, the United States is unwilling to accept its failure at the Geneva Conference, and will inevitably continue to carry out the policy of creating international tension for the purpose of further taking over more spheres of influence from Britain and France, of expanding military bases for preparing for war, and remaining hostile to our Organization of Defense, and of rearming Japan. The United States will surely continue to use Taiwan to carry out pirate-style robberies of ships from various countries coming to our country, and it is likely to expand the sphere of blockade of our country to the areas off the Guangdong coast and to the Gulf of Tonkin area. Recently the United States and Jiang Jieshi have been discussing signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and the United States has repeatedly increased military aid to the Jiang bandits in Taiwan. All of this is worthy of our main attention. According to public information, it seems as if the United States still has some concerns about signing a US-Jiang treaty of defense, and it seems as if they have not made a final decision. But if the United States and Jiang sign such a treaty, the relationship between us and the United States will be tense for a long period, and it becomes more difficult [for the relationship] to turn around. Therefore, the central task of our struggle against the United States at present is to break up the US-Jiang treaty of defense and the Southeast Asian treaty of defense.

We believe that after the victorious conclusion of the war of liberation on our mainland and the victorious armistice of the Korean War, now we are still facing another war, that is, the war against the Jiang Jieshi bandit bloc in Taiwan. Now we are still facing a task, that is, the task of liberating Taiwan. After the end of the Korean War, we failed to highlight the task [the liberation of Taiwan] to the people throughout the entire coun-
try in a timely manner (we were late by about six months). We failed to take necessary measures and make effective efforts in military affairs, on the diplomatic front, and also in our propaganda to serve this task. If we do not highlight this task now, and if we do not work for it [in the future], we are committing a serious political mistake. The introduction of the task is not just for the purpose of undermining the American-Jiang plot to sign a military treaty; rather, and more importantly, by highlighting the task we mean to raise the political consciousness and political alertness of the people of the whole country; we mean to stir up our people’s revolutionary enthusiasm, thus promoting our nation’s socialist reconstruction. In addition, we can use this struggle to enhance our fulfilling of the task of national defense, and learn how to carry out maritime struggle.

Toward this issue the Central Committee has adopted the following measures:

(1) In the political field, a propaganda campaign emphasizing that we must liberate Taiwan and exposing the Americans and Jiang has already begun at home. We are also prepared to issue a open statement about the Taiwan issue in the name of the foreign minister after your return to Beijing, which will be followed by a joint statement by the representatives of various parties. Then, in accordance with the two statements, broad, profound, and prolonged propaganda and education will be carried out among the people of the whole country. In addition, we are organizing broadcast specifically aimed at Taiwan.

(2) In the military field, the Military Commission has already issued a special instruction for enhancing naval and air operations against the Jiang bandits in coastal areas. In the meantime, it is strictly regulated that the operation targets of our navy and air force should be restricted to Jiang Jieshi’s military planes and vessels, and, toward American planes and warships, unless under the circumstance that they attack our troops, they are not permitted to take the initiative for attacks. The shooting down of a British transporter close to Yulin on 23 July was a mistake that is completely possible to be avoided. Apart from taking diplomatic measures to manage this, we also should use this accident to carry out serious education among our troops.

(3) Considering that our struggles against the Americans and Jiang in the coastal area will be a matter of a very long period, and that our troops lack the capacity and experience for maritime struggles, it should become a long-range task to enhance the construction of our navy and air force. Our navy should follow a policy of first constructing boats and then constructing ships, and our air force should learn to carry out operations over the sea. In order to meet the needs of the struggle at the present time with urgency, we plan to increase orders for naval and air force equipment from the Soviet Union in the next three years. The Military Commission has put forward an order of 500 million rubles. There is no financial or budgetary difficulty for putting forward such an order. However, we should find more ways to get foreign aid. About this we will discuss and make decisions after you have come back home.

Please report the above policies and measures to the comrades of the Soviet Party central leadership, and ask for their opinions. Apart from the above, the various aspects of domestic situation are good, except that the flooding disaster of this year is quite serious.

The Central Committee,
27 July 1954

★★★★
The documents printed below, while only fragments of a more substantial record of the 1954 Geneva Conference, offer partial illumination of the degree of co-ordination between the communist participants, of their negotiating tactics, and of the posture adopted by Soviet foreign minister and delegation chief Vyacheslav M. Molotov in his discussions with his French and British counterparts Pierre Mendes-France and Anthony Eden.1

The two key issues at the conference concerning Indochina were the temporary line of demarcation to be drawn in Vietnam, and the timing of the elections which were to unify Vietnam. Molotov was aware that the Chinese, participants at the conference with security interests of their own, had held internal discussions on these matters some time before the opening of the conference, informing him as early as March 1954 that the 16th parallel would be an appropriate dividing line and “to Ho Chi Minh’s advantage”2. Yet in conversation with Mendes-France at Geneva, the Soviet foreign minister, perhaps only somewhat formally, pressed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s case for the 13th/14th parallel, which would later become the “concession” of a division somewhere between the 14th and 16th parallels, before finally the 17th parallel was agreed.

Similarly, the DRV position on the timing of elections (to be held within six months) was to be settled on the basis of a compromise. PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, in particular, showed his flexibility and influence on this issue [Document #5].

While throughout the conference China exerted considerable influence on the DRV delegation, the impression from these documents is that of a similarly influential Soviet delegation which was primarily interested in a political solution, rather than pressing hard for maximum advantage. The Chinese view of what would constitute an acceptable solution to the Vietnam conflict was, no doubt, strongly argued when Zhou Enlai met with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap at Liuzhou, China, in early July 1954 [Document #3].

Aside from specific issues, the mood and dynamics of the conference were determined by the knowledge that the US was a reluctant participant, unwilling to sign an agreement that other parties—for very different reasons—were keen to conclude, but which, from the American point of view, might amount to enshrining French military defeat in a dishonor-able document. Molotov’s conversations with Mendes-France and Eden demonstrate the degree of his willingness to settle at Geneva and an acknowledgement that the US position was outside the penumbra of accommodation. In the end, the settlement was, one might say, agreed over the heads of the US and the DRV, who were to leave Geneva somewhat dissatisfied with the results of the many weeks of negotiation.


2. This was only one of the factors which, many years later, led the Vietnamese to accuse China of ‘betrayal’ of the DRV at Geneva—see the ‘White Book’—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over The Last Thirty Years (1979), 16-23. It might be noted that the White Book states that China proposed the 16th parallel ‘as early as May 1954’ (21).
DOCUMENT No. 1

From the Journal of [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.] Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation between Molotov and PRC Ambassador [to the Soviet Union] Zhang Wentian, 6 March 19541

[Source: AVPRF f. 6, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 7. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

PRC Embassy Counsellor He Bao-Xian and [Soviet Foreign Ministry Collegium Member Nikolai T.] Fedorenko were present.

Zhang Wentian says that Cdes. [CCP CC Vice Chairman] Liu Shaoqi, [PRC Premier and Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai, [PRC Vice-Chairman] Zhu De, and other CCP CC members have requested that their greetings be passed to Cde. Molotov.

Molotov thanks them.

Zhang Wentian reports that the PRC government and the Chinese people, noting the considerable success of the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference, support the decision adopted about convening the Geneva Conference.

He says that, although the Americans will try to wreck the Geneva Conference, the representatives of the democratic camp will try to make full use of the conference in order to lessen international tensions.

He stresses that the PRC is intent on taking an active part in the Geneva Conference and thinks that if no great successes are achieved at it, then any success here will be important since a path for active participation in international affairs is being opened for the PRC.

Molotov expresses approval of the PRC’s intention to take an active part in the Geneva Conference.

Zhang Wentian says that in connection with the Geneva Conference, Nam Il, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Beijing on 5 March at the invitation of the PRC government.

He reports that the PRC government intends to prepare maximum and minimum positions [programny] on the Korea question. The maximum position envisions the following proposals:

1. The creation of an all-Korean committee of representatives of North and South Korea on an equal basis to govern the country until the formation of an all-Korean government.
2. The holding of general elections.
3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops.
4. The unification of Korea.

In the event that this position is not adopted, propose a reduced position, namely: the preservation of the existing situation, the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops, and the regulation of economic, trade, and other relations between North and South Korea.

He noted that both these positions are based on the example of the position of the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference.

He says that the Indochina issue is more complex. Here we are talking about a cease-fire. However, the conditions for ending the war in Indochina are important. Accordingly there ought to be negotiations. This is a lengthy process.

Molotov says that, according to press reports, this process might last two or three months, but in the opinion of several foreign observers mentioned in the foreign press, it could drag out until November. The issue is complex, of course.

Zhang Wentian says that [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru’s proposal about “a cease-fire in place” is hardly acceptable since the conditions for ending the war are important.

He points out that it is necessary to halt American aid to Indochina, otherwise the war will drag out.

Molotov says that if the French want to reach agreement then it is of course necessary to know on what conditions.

Zhang Wentian reports that a proposal about a demarcation line at the 16th parallel exists. This proposal is to Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s President Ho Chi Minh’s advantage and it ought to be accepted if it is officially submitted.

He says that it is advisable to invite Ho Chi Minh to Beijing at the end of March. At this point the ambassador asks about the possibility of inviting Ho Chi Minh to Moscow for a discussion of the position at the Geneva Conference and also for a discussion of intra-party [sic] issues in the CSPU CC.

Molotov favors the possibility of inviting Ho Chi Minh to Moscow, but adds that the CPSU CC ought to discuss this issue.

With regard to the issue of an invitation to the Geneva Conference, Zhang Wentian speaks of the desirability of inviting representatives not only of democratic Vietnam during discussion of the issue of Indochina but also democratic Pathet Lao and Cambodia since the representatives of these three democratic countries are a counterbalance to an invitation to the three Associated States. Otherwise the Pathet Lao and Cambodian representatives will have to be included in the
Vietnamese delegation.

Molotov says that this issue ought to be carefully considered.

Zhang Wentian explores the possibility of a discussion of other issues at the Geneva Conference such as, for example, the issues of Taiwan, the [re]armament of Japan, the US military agreement with Pakistan, and others.

Molotov says that the possibility of a discussion of these issues ought to be studied but it seems to him that such a possibility is by no means precluded.

Zhang Wentian reports that, bearing in mind the agreement of the four [foreign] ministers in Berlin, Zhou Enlai is preparing for a trip to Geneva to take part in the conference, considering that the representative of the Soviet Union will be Cde. Molotov.

Molotov acknowledges the agreement in Berlin on this issue and adds that possibly the ministers will not participate in the conference to the end since it will be protracted.

Zhang Wentian explains the advisability of the PRC, DPRK, and Vietnamese delegations coming to Moscow for several days in the middle of April (between the 10th and the 20th) to coordinate their positions at the Geneva Conference.

Molotov says that such a meeting would be necessary and useful for the matter.

He expresses confidence that the Chinese and Korean comrades are prepared to discuss the Korean issue in a suitable fashion inasmuch as they are better informed in this regard. He also expresses confidence that the issue of Indochina will be properly prepared by the Chinese and Vietnamese comrades, who have the appropriate opportunities to do this.

Zhang Wentian says that work in Beijing has already begun: personnel are already being selected, draft proposals [are being] developed, etc. He notes that the Chinese comrades are counting on aid from the Soviet side.

Molotov promises aid and talks of the need for joint efforts.

Referring to his lack of experience, Zhang Wentian asks that a competent USSR foreign ministry specialist be selected to help the Chinese diplomatic officials in Moscow by sharing experience in the organizational work at international conferences, the methods and techniques of bourgeois representatives, etc.

Molotov promises to grant this request and points out that the ambassador can deal with these issues with [Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister] Cde. [Andrei A.] Gromyko, who has a great deal of experience in taking part in international conferences. He says that the work in the USSR foreign ministry to prepare for the Geneva Conference will be primarily done by Cdes. Gromyko, [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V.] Kuznetsov, Novikov, and Fedorenko.

Zhang Wentian reports that the PRC government has empowered him, Zhang Wentian, with maintaining constant contact with the USSR foreign ministry about questions of preparations for the Geneva Conference and has also included him in the PRC delegation to this Conference.

Molotov expresses approval.

Zhang Wentian touches on procedural issues at the Geneva Conference and is interested in particular in the possibility of Zhou Enlai chairing the conference and other things.

Molotov says that many procedural issues will arise at the Geneva Conference, the chairmanship, the staff, the premises [pomeshchenie], etc. Disputes and discussions are unavoidable. Consequently, it is necessary to make suitable preparations and develop our plan of action here.

Zhang Wentian is interested in the possibility of inviting representatives of neutral countries to the Geneva Conference, India in particular.

Molotov says that the composition of the participants on the Korean issue has been precisely determined but that this remains insufficiently clear regarding the Indochina issue, and serious disputes are possible here.

Regarding the question of inviting India, he says in that regard that its participation in the Geneva Conference is inadvisable since this could lead to a reduction of the role of the PRC which ought to be on par with the four other great powers, which India cannot claim to be. He notes, however, that some in foreign circles favor inviting India and Thailand about the Indochina issue and this question ought to be considered further.

The conversation lasted one hour.

Recorded by N. Fedorenko

Authenticated by Oleg Troyanovsky /signature/

Distributed [to]:
Cdes.Malenkov
Molotov
Khrushchev
Voroshilov
Bulganin
Kaganovich
Mikoyan
Saburov
Pervukhin

№ 151/M

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1. Editor’s Note: The document bears the stamp RF Foreign Policy Archive, 06/13a/25/7, /signature/ V. Molotov, Distributed to CPSU CC Presidium members.

2. Editor’s Note: The Associated States of Indochina were Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

3. Editor’s Note: The 1954 Berlin Conference, among the foreign ministers of the US, UK, France, and the USSR, was convened on 25 January 1954. The agreement (referenced here) to hold the Geneva Conference was made in a quadripartite communique of 18 February.

DOCUMENT No. 2


[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 47, papka 379, d. 7, ll. 69-70. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Paul Wingrove.]

Today at 7 p.m. I visited Comrade Mao Zedong and, on instructions from Moscow [Tsentr], informed him that the CPSU CC considers it necessary to take advantage of the favorable circumstances developing in France to find a resolution of the Indochina question. In this connection Comrade Molotov will arrive in Geneva on 7 July, intending to meet with Mendes-France before the start of the official sessions. I further informed him that in the opinion of the CPSU CC it would be good if Comrade Zhou Enlai could arrive in Geneva before 10 July. I further informed him that the foreign ministers of England and France would be informed, through the Soviet embassies in London and Paris, that V. M. Molotov would arrive in Geneva before 10 July, in order to rest for a few days before the start of the sessions.

Mao Zedong said that he considered us to be absolutely correct in seeking to take advantage of the improving situation in France to find a resolution of the Indochina question. In this connection Comrade Molotov will arrive in Geneva on 7 July, intending to meet with Mendes-France before the start of the official sessions. I further informed him that in the opinion of the CPSU CC it would be good if Comrade Zhou Enlai could arrive in Geneva before 10 July. I further informed him that the foreign ministers of England and France would be informed, through the Soviet embassies in London and Paris, that V. M. Molotov would arrive in Geneva before 10 July, in order to rest for a few days before the start of the sessions.

Mao Zedong said that he considered us to be absolutely correct in seeking to take advantage of the improving situation in France to find a resolution of the Indochina question. At the same time he told me that Zhou Enlai was at present in Liuzhou [Guangxi province] where he was holding discussions with [Vietnamese leaders] Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. These discussions should be concluded on 5 July. Under favorable conditions Zhou Enlai would be able to arrive in Beijing no earlier than 6/7 July. He would be able to fly from Beijing to Moscow on 9/10 July and, thus, would in practice only be able to arrive in Geneva by 12/13 July.

Later, in the course of the conversation, Mao referred to the recently concluded [informal] discussions between [British Prime Minister Winston] Churchill and [US President Dwight D.] Eisenhower [in Washington]. Mao said that he had read with great interest an article devoted to these talks, translated from “Pravda” of 3 July. Mao noted that while the US government was slamming the door on talks with the USSR and other countries of the democratic camp, the British government was expressing itself in favor of these talks. Churchill, boasting of his services as an old fighter against communism, nonetheless declared to the Americans that he was in favor of talks with the communists and of peaceful co-existence with the communist countries. Obviously, remarked Mao ironically, the international situation is such that even reactionary figures like Churchill are beginning to acknowledge Marxist-Leninist principles in foreign policy.

As for the US, Mao continued, they have spread their forces across the globe, but in the event of significant international complications that does not bode well for them. That is why the US tries by all means of its aggressive policy to revive the armed strength of West Germany and Japan. However, relying on West Germany and Japan, in the light of opposition to American policy in those countries, as well as in other countries, especially France, is an uncertain position for the US.

During the conversation Mao gave me, for my information, Zhou Enlai’s telegram sent from Liuzhou on 4 July (we have sent the translated telegram by telegraph to Moscow). The conversation took place in Mao Zedong’s apartment and lasted 30 minutes. The CCP CC director of foreign affairs, Yang Shangkun, and the first secretary of the Soviet embassy, I. I. Safronov, were also present during the conversation.

1. Editor’s Note: The document bears the stamp of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far-East Department, Incoming No. 02768 31.8.1954, as well as a few illegible signatures, one of which is dated 2.IX.

DOCUMENT No. 3

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation at Dinner in Honor of Mendes-France, French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 10 July 1954, 9:30 p.m.

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks the opinion of Prime Minister Mendes-France about the organization of the renewal of the work of the Conference of Ministers. Molotov notes that, being one of the
chairmen of the Geneva Conference, it would be desirable for him to know the opinion of the other representatives about a day acceptable to everyone to convene the Conference of Ministers and also to find out the wishes of the ministers with respect to the method for the further work of the Conference. Molotov adds that it is possible that private conversations might turn out to be useful at this stage of the conference. Molotov asks what day would be convenient for the Prime Minister.

Mendes-France replies that the chairmen set the nearest date for the Conference of Ministers, and that he is ready for the opening of the conference on any following day. Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, at the present stage of the talks unofficial conversations and personal contact between the representatives might be of greater use than the official plenary meetings. In this connection he, Mendes-France, completely shares Molotov’s point of view about the effectiveness of unofficial conversations.

Molotov says that the Geneva Conference has already gone through a period of speech-making. Several decisions have been prepared by now, both during closed meetings as well as in unofficial conversations. Now the stage of the Conference has come when it would be more advisable to move from a general discussion of the issues to a specific discussion of them and, accordingly, to prepare the necessary specific decisions. Molotov asks what wishes the Prime Minister has in order to impart the proper direction to the conference to achieve peace in Indochina.

Mendes-France says that tomorrow he is to meet with DRV representative [and foreign minister] Pham Van Dong and begin a discussion with him of more specific issues. Mendes-France thinks that an opportunity will be presented during this conversation to identify common ground and differences. Mendes-France adds that all the participants of the Geneva Conference are undoubtedly interested in establishing peace in Indochina. However, France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are the directly-interested countries. Mendes-France says that it is necessary to find a basis for agreement on many issues during the conversation with Pham Van Dong. That is why, concludes Mendes-France, he considers it his first business to meet with Pham Van Dong.

Molotov says that the idea of direct talks between the Prime Minister and Pham Van Dong is completely warranted and that, as it seems, all the participants of the Geneva Conference are interested in both directly-interested parties finding a common language and coming to an agreement acceptable to both sides. Molotov adds that the other delegations, including the Soviet delegation, ought to be interested in offering the necessary assistance to the directly interested parties. To be true, at the same time it cannot be excluded that there are also such delegations which possibly desire to prevent the achievement of an agreement.

Molotov then says that he has formed the impression that the conference has made certain progress in recent weeks, which is a definite plus. Consequently, at the present time all the conditions have been created to move on to a discussion of more specific issues and obtain specific decisions. Molotov notes that, according to information he has, the conference has recently dealt more with issues affecting only the north and south of Vietnam. However, they paid no attention at all to the central part of Vietnam. With regard to the issues of Laos and Cambodia, says Molotov, apparently no special difficulty in solving them is foreseen. Then Molotov asks Mendes-France whether his information about the difficulties which have arisen about the central part of Vietnam is correct.

Mendes-France says that certain difficulties actually have been identified regarding the issues of the central part of Vietnam. At first the French delegation assumed that there would be no special difficulty about this issue since initially, as the French delegation thought, the DRV was interested only in the north of Indochina, that is, the Tonkin region.

The French delegation has assumed and [still] assumes that the line of demarcation, which corresponds to natural and historical requirements, ought to pass along the Annames Gates [sic, Annamskie vorota]. This line is narrow and it is easy to monitor. However, the French delegation was deeply disappointed when the French delegation found out that this line cannot satisfy the Vietnamese delegation and when the latter presented new demands. The French delegation, as before, holds to the opinion that the most reasonable border ought to pass somewhere along the 18th parallel. Mendes-France adds that, in his opinion, it was not be advisable to create such enclaves inside each zone. The creation of such enclaves would cause political and military complications. Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, it is most important to create homogeneous zones.

Molotov says that obviously these issues still have not been discussed in all the details by the military representatives. Molotov adds that he knows that the DRV delegation initially proposed to locate the line of demarcation between the 13th and 14th parallels since this corresponds to natural requirements and, moreover, this refers to a number of regions located along these parallels which have been under the influence of a particular side for more than 10 years. According to available information, says Molotov, an attempt was made by the DRV delegation to be accommodating and a proposal was made yesterday or the day before, according to which the line was to pass to the north. As regards the other side he, Molotov, did not know whether a similar attempt had been made.

Mendes-France says that it seems difficult for the French delegation to change [its] position with regard to the line of demarcation. The DRV military representatives are actu-
ally submitting new proposals according to which the line of demarcation is to move back about 40 kilometers to the north. However this proposal does not significantly change the situation. Mendes-France notes that this cannot be about trade but about the need to find objective solutions.

Mendes-France says that he agrees with the accurate comment by Molotov about there being regions in the south of Vietnam which have been under DRV influence for a long time. However, says the prime minister, there are also regions in the north which are controlled by French authorities at the present time. Mendes-France adds that at the beginning of the discussion of these issues at the meeting of the representatives of nine countries Pham Van Dong advanced certain principles according to which regrouping zones were to be determined. The French delegation listened with interest and subscribed to specific principles, and if the determination of the line is to be based on these principles then the 18th parallel is the most reasonable line of demarcation. Mendes-France adds that it would be desirable at the same time to create homogeneous zones.

Molotov notes that the prime minister’s idea about the creation of homogenous zones is undoubtedly the correct idea and it is shared by many conference participants. Molotov adds that up to now the military representatives had dealt more with general issues and less with specific issues, in particular issues relating to the central part of Vietnam. Molotov says that he has found out that French military representatives are attaching special importance to Route 9, which connects Laos with Vietnam. Molotov says that it is not completely clear to him why such great importance is attached to this road. But if it plays an important role then it is possible to talk about its use separately. Molotov adds that the arrival of the prime minister in Geneva will provide an opportunity to discuss these issues more specifically.

Mendes-France says that at the beginning of the talks the discussion was not about Route 9 since according to French proposals this road ought to be in the southern zone, that is, in the zone of the French authorities. This road passes somewhere along the 16th parallel. But if the DRV delegation expresses a desire to use this road in the future then the French delegation does not object to talking about this in particular and coming to an agreement about granting the DRV the opportunity to use this road. Mendes-France repeats that the French delegation holds to its position about the 18th parallel.

Molotov says that the prime minister obviously knows well that Pham Van Dong, the head of the DRV delegation, has already expressed his ideas about a line of demarcation between the 14th and 16th parallels and that the DRV delegation is steadfastly maintaining this position. Thus the question right now is one of discussing the specific issues connected with the determination of the line of demarcation. These are issues of both a technical and political nature. As everyone knows, Molotov continues, much attention has been devoted to military issues recently. But political issues have almost not been discussed [at all] although these issues also have great importance. They ought to be discussed, and solutions for them ought to be found.

Mendes-France says that the political problems undoubtedly exist in connection with the fact that the French delegation is trying to prepare a general statement about political issues which ought to be acceptable to all the participants of the Geneva Conference.

Molotov says that obviously the time has now come when it is necessary to prepare specific decisions which will be acceptable both to the two directly-interested parties as well as to all the participants of the Geneva Conference.

Molotov further adds that, taking advantage of Mendes-France’s presence in Geneva, he would like to exchange opinions with him not only about the problems affecting Asia, but Europe, too.

Mendes-France says that this would please him very much. However, as Mendes-France says, at the same time it needs to be borne in mind that he is, so to speak, a novice in French foreign affairs and that he is not familiar with all the problems. However, he, Mendes-France, will be extremely happy to hear out Mr. Molotov and he will report this to his government. Mendes-France says that such a conversation would be useful.

Molotov says that with respect to the Geneva Conference the Soviet delegation understands its task to be the promotion of the adoption of equitable solutions which are in accord with the vital interests of the peoples of Indochina and the achievement of honorable and fair conditions from the French point of view. The participation of the Soviet delegation will be in accord with the achievement of such solutions. Molotov adds that the Soviet delegation will act in the direction of establishing cooperation with the French delegation in the matter of achieving favorable results.

Molotov stresses that the position of Mendes-France, the prime minister of France, impresses the Soviet delegation. This position, which is directed at establishing peace in Indochina, will facilitate the strengthening of peace in the entire world.

Mendes-France thanks Molotov and says that the French delegation will act in this same spirit.

Molotov asks at what time Mendes-France will meet with Pham Van Dong.

Mendes-France replies that the meeting will be held tomorrow, but [that] the time has not yet been set. Mendes-France adds that a short time remains to reach an agreement.
Molotov notes that time ought to be valued.

In conclusion Mendes-France thanks Molotov for the cordial reception and asks Molotov’s permission to display initiative in organizing another meeting with him.

Molotov says that he is ready to meet with Mendes-France at any time.

Present from the Soviet delegation were V. V. Kuznetsov and S. A. Vinogradov; from the French delegation, [Jean] Chauvel and [de la Tournelle].

Recorded by /signature/
K. Starikov

DOCUMENT No. 4

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation at Dinner in Honor of French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mendes-France, 15 July 1954, 8:30 p.m. ¹

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks whether Mendes-France received the changes and additions that the Soviet delegation made to the draft declaration drawn up by the French delegation.

Mendes-France says that right now the French delegation is familiarizing itself with the changes made by the Soviet delegation and that apparently it will accordingly send its amended draft tomorrow. The draft of the Soviet delegation can serve as a basis, although a number of issues still [handwritten: need discussion]. It can already be said now that the changes by the Soviet delegation are essentially based on the principle of an equal approach to the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, whereas the situation in these countries is different and requires a different approach.

Molotov notes that basic principles are described in the beginning and then the particulars of the situation in each country are examined in the draft sent to Mendes-France by the Soviet delegation.

Mendes-France suggests discussing the issue of elections and their timing. If a very close date is chosen to hold elections then it can turn out that the elections will be held in a situation when all the necessary conditions have not yet been established and they will not lead to a genuine solution of the issue of the unification of Vietnam. If, however, a date is established which is too distant this could cause legitimate discontent on the part of the population of Vietnam. Therefore it would be better to define the main principles at the Geneva Conference on which an exact date for the elections would be set.

Molotov notes that the Soviet delegation draft does not envision the setting of an exact date for the elections but identifies a time limit during which these elections are to be held.

Mendes-France says that is one and the same thing, for a time limit is for practical purposes usually a [one illegible word handwritten above] date. The decision of the Geneva Conference could indicate that the elections ought not be delayed without special reason and determine which bodies ought to be established, under what kind of monitoring the elections are to be held, and what conditions are needed for there to be a possibility of establishing this date.

Molotov says that time for the elections ought to be clearly established in the Geneva Conference declaration. With Vietnam divided into two parts, [its] people will expect a definite answer to the question of the country’s unification from the Geneva Conference.

Mendes-France thinks that it is sufficient to indicate the desire to unify the country in the declaration and not to delay this unification. This is a complex and difficult issue which will be hard to solve in several days.

Molotov agrees that little time is actually left and notes that in the French draft declaration there is a reference to a document about a cease-fire in Indochina. However, the Soviet delegation has not received a draft of this document.

Mendes-France replies that right now the French delegation is working hard on a number of draft documents which it will present to the participants of the Geneva Conference in the very near future.

After dinner Mendes-France asked that the conversation continue one-on-one without any witnesses. Molotov agreed.

Mendes-France says that, in his opinion, the most difficult issues right now are those about determining the line of demarcation and organizing elections in Vietnam. In agreement with Eden [Translator’s note: this phrase was inserted at the beginning of the sentence] he is proposing that work in Geneva be stepped up to establish the practice of tripartite meetings consisting of Molotov, Eden, and himself, Mendes-France, so that Eden can take charge of the coordination of the issues under discussion with the American delegation, Molotov—with the PRC and DRV delegations, and Mendes-France with the delegations of the Associated States of Indochina.

Molotov asks exactly what issues Mendes-France proposes
to discuss in such tripartite meetings.

Mendes-France says that [Translator’s note: An arrow indicates that Mendes-France’s paragraph above is to be inserted at this point]. All issues concerning the establishment of peace in Vietnam ought to be discussed at such tripartite meetings. This would provide an opportunity to more easily find compromise solutions, make concessions on individual issues by compensating on others, etc.

Molotov asks whether it would be impossible [handwritten: proposes] also including Zhou Enlai among the participants of such unofficial meetings. Such a necessity might definitely arise during the discussion of some issues.

Mendes-France objects, for, in his opinion, [handwritten: there would be a risk that] the number of participants of the meetings [handwritten: would grow] to five [handwritten: one would have to invite the Americans, but] this would offend the DRV delegation and the delegations of the associated states.

Molotov agrees to hold unofficial meetings among the three.

Mendes-France offers to hold the first meeting tomorrow, 16 July, after lunch.

After this Mendes-France switches to the question of the organization of the elections. As regards Laos and Cambodia this question, in his opinion, is easily decided, for the domestic laws of these countries provide for holding general elections in the near future. [Faint hand-written sentence crossed out.]

Molotov says that in Laos and Cambodia a special situation [handwritten: has been created as a result of] the war, armed struggle, which has still not ended [handwritten: still going on], and therefore in the question of establishing a normal situation in these countries it would be more correct not to rely on the domestic laws of Laos and Cambodia, but on formulating [handwritten: a certain formulated] desire of the Geneva Conference which might facilitate the quickest possible establishment of a normal situation.

Mendes-France says that [one/we] ought not to confuse the situation in Laos and Cambodia [handwritten: differs from] the situation in Vietnam. There are uniform constitutional laws and government institutions in Laos and Cambodia which ought to be strengthened. The unrest which has taken place in these countries in recent years is mainly connected with events in Vietnam. Therefore after the solution of the Vietnamese problem they [handwritten: Laos and Cambodia] can independently conduct elections in accordance with their constitution(s). Outside interference would infringe their sovereignty of these states and would hinder the creation of democratic procedures of these still young [handwritten: states] countries. The Geneva Conference could remark in its decision that it was noting that the elections in Laos and Cambodia should be held within certain periods in conformance with the local constitutional laws. A careful formulation ought [handwritten: needs] to be found with full respect [which does] [handwritten: not infringe] the sovereignty of these states.

Molotov agrees that no interference in the internal affairs of these states ought to take place. However, he says, the issue of holding elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia has been discussed for a number of weeks at the Geneva Conference and the participants of the Conference, in particular France, are probably interested in expressing their wishes to the governments of Laos and Cambodia.

Mendes-France repeats that [we] ought not confuse the situation in Laos and Cambodia. [It] [handwritten: differs from] the situation in Vietnam, where there are no uniform institutions or uniform legislation is lacking; rather there exist two state institutions and two [bodies of] legislation at the same time whereas Laos and Cambodia have their own constitutions and laws, which need to be strengthened.

Molotov says that actually it is not necessary to lump the situation in these two countries together; each has its own characteristics, its own specifics. [Translator’s note: at this point in the transcript a single diagonal line is drawn from the word “specifics” back through the last two paragraphs to the word “that” at the beginning of Mendes-France’s last statement. It is not clear whether this is intended as a deletion].

Mendes-France says that in Laos and Cambodia it is possible to hold elections before long, for the situation is not so convulsed; the opposition has the opportunity to exercise its rights, and life can soon return to normal limits. This is a comparatively simple issue. To set longer periods [handwritten: Longer periods] are necessary to hold preparations for elections in Vietnam. Before starting to hold elections it is necessary to conduct a number of complex operations. First of all In particular, the evacuation of the troops of both sides from zones which cross to the other side. We have talked about evacuating the delta, he said. It is possible that the proposed periods for evacuation [handwritten: in 3][80] days are too large. This question ought to be discussed more. However, months will be required for an evacuation. There are other steps: the relocation of the population which wants to resettle to another zone and the creation of a new civilian administration in regions which cross to the other side. It is also necessary to grant an opportunity to organize parties, to strengthen them, and to develop their propaganda. All this requires time and it is difficult to determine it right now. In addition, the international situation will [handwritten: also] have great psychological importance. If it improves, developments in Vietnam will proceed more quickly. If it worsens, then this will have an effect also complicate the situation in Vietnam. Therefore it is impossible right
now to set an exact date and time. If a very short time is set there is a risk that the elections will not bring a satisfactory resolution and the impression will be created among the population of Vietnam that we do not want to give them an opportunity to exercise their rights. In addition, nine countries are participating in the Geneva Conference and it is practically impossible to solve this complex issue about the periods for holding elections in Vietnam in the several days remaining. It would be realistic and reasonable not to try to set a mandatory time but to set conditions for setting a time for those who will be entrusted with setting such a time. The setting of the time can be entrusted, for example, to the two interested parties monitored by [pod kontrolcem] the nine countries. Mendes-France amended and clarified: not “monitored by the nine” but under “specific international monitoring.”

Molotov says that if it is difficult to set a time for the elections right now then [we] might think about setting a time to solve this issue, that is, not set a time for the two sides to hold elections but a time by which they should set a date for elections.

Mendes-France says the he will think about this alternative, but at first glance it seems interesting to him. [Translator’s note: The above sentence is circled in the transcript and an arrow indicates that it is to be moved to just before Mendes-France’s next statement].

Molotov says that the best and most obvious solution to the issue would be to set a time limit for holding elections at the Geneva Conference and that [the conference] reserve for itself the right to return to this issue in order to find more flexible and acceptable forms. However [we] might also think about setting a time for the competent bodies of both sides to solve the issue of the date of the elections with instructions not to drag them out, although this would also be a more difficult way.

Mendes-France points on the map of Vietnam to the location of the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel proposed by the French delegation. The French delegation, he says, proceeded from a wish expressed by Pham Van Dong that the demarcation line be possibly shorter, follow traditional administrative boundaries, and take into consideration the distribution of the zones presently occupied by both sides. In the opinion of the French delegation, the border between the former states of Tonkin and Annam following the 18th parallel is such a natural boundary from the point of view of topography and the historical, racial, political, and religious boundary. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed placing the line of demarcation at the 13th or 14th parallel, intending to keep for itself a zone which was under its control for the entire war, a narrow coastal strip between the 13th and 14th parallels and the 16th parallel, about 150 km long. When meeting with him, Mendes-France, Pham Van Dong agreed to move the line of demarcation to the 16th parallel, that is, he abandoned this region which the DRV had apparently been most interested in keeping. This concession, in the opinion of Mendes-France, corresponds to the concession of the Tonkin Delta by the French side. The French are to evacuate about 300,000 troops from the delta at the same time as the DRV is to evacuate about 30,000 men. Such concessions accord with the idea of an extensive regrouping of forces in Vietnam. The question before us is thus about locating the line of demarcation at the 18th or the 16th parallel. This region has always been a zone controlled by French authorities. France is interested in keeping the city of Hue, the political and spiritual capital of Annam, the bay and port of Tourane [Translator’s note: present-day Da Nang] (Mendes-France stipulated that Tourane does not have value for France from the military point of view and the French government is ready to give a commitment not to use it as a naval base), and Route 9, the only route linking Laos and the sea. When he, Mendes-France, described these ideas to Pham Van Dong, Pham Van Dong replied that a special status [reżim] might be provided for Route 9 and Hue. This readiness to immediately make an exception is, in Mendes-France’s opinion, evidence that the 16th parallel line proposed by Pham Van Dong is somewhat unrealistic and inadvisable. [Translator’s note: a single diagonal line was drawn through the previous two sentences and a forward slash was typed at both ends]. He, Mendes-France, will not be able to convince the French government of the need to reject the location of the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel and abandon Hue and Route 9. In addition, the location of the line of demarcation is a temporary measure and ought to be based on the actual state of affairs. French troops have always occupied the region located between the 16th and 17th parallels, and the DRV has no grounds to demand this region for itself.

Molotov says that, when regions being left by the DRV are compared with the northern part of Vietnam being left by the French, it evidently means that the DRV is also leaving [handwritten: to the French side] all of southern Vietnam, including Cochín. Pham Van Dong’s concession is evidence of a desire to simplify the solution of the issue, for the line proposed by the DRV meets the interests of both sides. It needs to be taken into consideration that as few complications as possible arise in Vietnam after the cease-fire agreement is carried out. As everyone knows, in the zone between the 16th and 18th parallels the French authorities control only a small strip of land along the coast, behind which the entire area is in the hands of the DRV. It is also impossible to speak as though the French [handwritten: authorities] exercise full control over Route 9. It would be worth examining the question of the possibility of ensuring such conditions so that the French side can use Route 9 more freely than it has the opportunity to do right now. It would also be worth trying to find an agreement about the issue of Hue. The proposal of Pham Van Dong about locating the line of demarcation at the 16th parallel might serve as a basis for an agreement between the sides. In rejecting a demand to locate the line of demarcation at the 13th parallel, Pham Van Dong
made a great step forward in trying to reach an agreement. One cannot fail to take into account that it was hard for the DRV to give up its own longtime region and to do this required great force of conviction.

**Mendes-France** replied says that if it is hard for the DRV to give up its own region in central Vietnam then it might have kept this region for itself on condition of appropriate compensation for France in the north. Another solution is, of course, possible: both sides remain in their places, but such solution might undermine the principle of an exchange of territory. He again repeated that the French government would never approve a concession on Hue and Route 9.

**Molotov** said that, in making a concession from the 13th to the 16th parallels, the DRV naturally ought to stop at such a line where there would be appropriate territorial compensation from the French side. As regards the use of Route 9, then an agreement might be found which is more in keeping with the interests of both sides.

**Mendes-France** repeated that he considers the concession of the delta as such compensation.

**Molotov** says that the concession of the delta, including Hanoi and Haiphong, is tied not only to the issue of the concession from the 13th to 16th parallels but is in keeping with the DRV concession of south Vietnam and also the concessions on a number of other issues. If it were possible to come to an agreement about the French giving up the delta, including Hanoi and Haiphong, then in the spirit of accommodation it would also be worth finding a solution for central Vietnam.

**Mendes-France** again repeated that he views giving up the delta as a very important concession which is not compensated by all the concessions made by the DRV in the southern part of Vietnam, and right now he does not see any concessions which the DRV might make in exchange for the French giving up Hue and Route 9.

**Molotov** says that he is ready to explain the point of view of Pham Van Dong about this issue again.

**Mendes-France** repeats that he cannot envision such a solution to the issue which would mean the French would give up Hue and Route 9. It would be easier for him to give up the region between the 16th and the 13th or 14th parallels to the DRV for suitable compensation in the north, for this would at least agree with the status quo in this region. If Pham Van Dong agrees to locate the line of demarcation at the 18th parallel, then Mendes-France could find compensation on other issues regarding a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

**Molotov** says that he is ready to meet with Mendes-France and Eden tomorrow, but if Mendes-France has questions right now, he can discuss them right now, [handwritten: that he can explain the point of view of Pham Van Dong about this issue again].

**Mendes-France** says that he would like [one handwritten word illegible] to discuss the issue of monitoring, but the French delegation has still not prepared its draft proposals. The work on this draft is proceeding well, and it is hoped that [handwritten: the draft] might be sent to the Soviet delegation tomorrow.

**Molotov** says that in the French draft declaration there is a reference to a cease-fire agreement; however the Soviet delegation has not yet received the draft of such an agreement.

**Mendes-France** says that the French delegation is working on a number of documents right now which it would submit to the other delegations for discussion in the near future. It is possible that not all the documents will be agreed upon and adopted by 20 July. It is important that a cease-fire agreement based on an agreement in principle about the most important remaining issues be concluded by 19 or 20 July. The other documents might be finished after 19 or 20 July. At this point he repeated that such a deadline had been set by Parliament; he would not be able to receive an extension and would not request one.

**Molotov** notes that much depends on the French delegation and, in particular, on how soon it submits its drafts for discussion.

At the conclusion of the conversation Molotov confirms that he is ready to meet with Eden and Mendes-France and stipulates that he is not authorized to speak on behalf of the DRV and PRC and can express only his own personal opinion, but when an agreement is reached at the tripartite meeting on any issues he will try to describe these ideas to the PRC and DRV delegations objectively and with maximum force of conviction.

The dinner and conversation lasted until 1:00 a.m.

Recorded:

(Kazansky)

[signature]

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1. *Editor’s Note:* Text crossed out in the document was crossed out in the original; words entered by hand or underlined in the original are so indicated. The document bears the stamp RF Foreign Policy Archive 06/13a/25/7.

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DOCUMENT No. 5

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 16 July 1954

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov says that he would like to inform Cdes. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong about the substance of his conversations with Eden and Mendes-France which occurred on 15 July.

1. The Conversation with Eden

Molotov: In the conversation with me, Eden said that he had still not managed to carefully study the changes we (the Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese delegations) had made to the French draft declaration about Indochina, but would like to make the follow preliminary comments: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are placed together in the text of the declaration. In Eden’s opinion, they ought to be separated and spoken of separately inasmuch as the conditions in each of these countries are different. Eden was told in reply that real differences exist but there is also much in common.

Eden stressed that, in his opinion, it is very difficult to set a time to hold elections.

He expressed a desire to exclude military issues from the declaration drafts and move them to the cease-fire agreement.

Eden then said that the representatives of Laos complained to him that an intensified movement of men and weapons into Laotian territory had recently been observed and this is causing them concern. I replied to Eden that I was hearing about this for the first time.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong say that the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense of Laos said nothing in the conversation with them.

Molotov: I told Eden that we have not yet received the text of the draft agreement about the cease-fire from the French delegation and that the French are giving us the draft of this document in parts. Eden said that some delay had occurred with this matter and that now the preparation of the documents ought to be sped up.

2. The conversation with Mendes-France.

Molotov briefly describes the substance of the conversation with Mendes-France about the main issues, elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation, and the timeframes for the evacuation of foreign troops.

Molotov says that as a result of the conversation with Mendes-France he has formed the impression that the French can agree to the establishment of a line of demarcation only somewhere north of the 16th parallel.

Molotov further reports about Mendes-France’s proposal about holding a meeting of the three representatives (Eden, Mendes-France, and Molotov) and about how he reacted to the proposal by Mendes-France.

Molotov asks the opinions of Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong about this question.

Zhou Enlai says that he shares the position taken by Molotov; moreover, thinks it advisable to agree with Mendes-France’s proposal about holding meetings with the representatives of the USSR, France, and Britain. Zhou Enlai adds that the participation of US representatives in meetings would be undesirable to us and therefore it seems inadvisable to insist upon the participation of PRC representatives.

Pham Van Dong expresses agreement with the opinion expressed by Zhou Enlai.

Molotov talks about Eden’s and Mendes-France’s objections to holding elections before June 1955 and asks Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong whether we ought to press for our previous position about this issue or whether it is advisable to offer new proposals during the discussion. For example, propose that the elections be conducted in 1955 or recommend the adoption of this formula: propose that both sides solve the issue of the dates to hold the elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia no later than June 1955.

Zhou Enlai states that it would be advisable to take to the following position about the issue of the times of the elections: insist that the conference establish a time to hold the elections, no later than June 1955. If this proposal is declined then offer a new proposal—direct that the elections are to be held in 1955. If this proposal, too, is not adopted, then, as the last position, insist that a decision be made which provides that both sides are to decide among themselves no later than June 1955 to solve the issue of setting the dates for holding elections.

Pham Van Dong says that he agrees with the above ideas of Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai stresses that the issue about the dates to hold the elections was discussed in detail during a meeting with Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh gave agreement in principle to the third alternative for solving the issue of the dates for the elections mentioned by Zhou Enlai being offered as a last resort.
Molotov then asks what questions Pham Van Dong intends to discuss during today’s meeting with Mendes-France.

Pham Van Dong says he prefers to touch on the main issues about Indochina, primarily the questions about the elections and the line of demarcation. Pham Van Dong added that he will insist on setting definite times for holding elections in accordance with the exchange of opinions between us and also on locating the line of demarcation at the 16th parallel.

Zhou Enlai says that we will probably be able to reach agreement on the issues mentioned above in the next few days but one more very important issue remains which ought not be overlooked. This is the issue of the creation of an American military bloc in Southeast Asia. Zhou Enlai stresses that there is reason to suspect that the US, Britain, and France have in principle achieved some sort of agreement among themselves about this question. If the Americans manage to draw Bao Dai’s Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into a military bloc then the agreement we have drafted about prohibiting the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of the states mentioned would lose the importance which we attach to it. Zhou Enlai added that in a conversation with Nehru in India and in a conversation with Eden in Geneva he stressed that foreign military bases should not be created on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia ought not to be drawn into any military alliances or blocs. Zhou Enlai asks whether Cde. Pham Van Dong ought not touch on this issue in the conversation with Mendes-France and express our position.

Molotov expresses his agreement with the opinion of Zhou Enlai and says that in conversations with Mendes-France and Eden we ought to point to the reports available in the press about attempts being undertaken to create military blocs in Southeast Asia and declare that we are against such blocs. Molotov asks whether any documents need to be tied to this.

Zhou Enlai says that the representatives of the Western powers will hardly agree to write about this in any particular document.

Molotov says that the issue of military blocs in Southeast Asia ought to be touched upon during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of the text of the declaration being prepared on the issue of Indochina.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong express agreement.

Zhou Enlai says that according to information available to him Britain is taking vigorous action to create an alliance of countries in Southeast Asia which would be tied to one another by a system of treaties of the Locarno type. The US is trying to counter the British plan with their own plan. They are relying on the basis of an alliance of the five powers taking part in a meeting in Singapore and creating a military bloc under their aegis including Thailand, Pakistan, Bao Dai’s Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, in addition to these five countries. Zhou Enlai said that we ought to oppose the creation of military blocs in Asia, taking advantage the existing differences between the US and Britain in doing this.

Molotov and Pham Van Dong express their agreement with the opinion of Zhou Enlai.

Molotov asks whether, during negotiations about the issue of the time to carry out the regrouping of forces, [they] ought not say that the transport of French troops from North Vietnam might be accomplished not only by sea but also by rail and highway. He stressed that it would be possible to use this as an argument in order to insist on a reduction of the period of regrouping proposed by the French delegation (380 days).

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong say that the movement of enemy troops from North Vietnam to the south does not seem possible in view of a whole range of circumstances (the lack of suitable roads, the difficulties associated with the supply of the troops with food, etc.)

Zhou Enlai then says that in a conversation with Cde. Molotov Mendes-France might touch on the issue of the schedule for the withdrawal of French troops from the southern regions of Vietnam. In this connection Zhou Enlai would like to direct Cde. Molotov’s attention to the fact that France is counting on keeping its troops in the south of Vietnam a little longer. Zhou Enlai said that such a delay is to our advantage inasmuch as the presence of the French in Vietnam can serve as an obstacle to the establishment of military and political collusion between the Americans and the Bao Dai authorities. Zhou Enlai added that, of course, the French troops ought to be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the time that general elections are held there.

The conversation lasted three hours and 30 minutes.

Recorded by: /signature/ A.Ledovsky
DOCUMENT No. 6

From the Journal of Molotov: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 17 July 1954, 3:30 p.m.

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, l. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Molotov asks Pham Van Dong about his conversations with [British Foreign Minister Anthony] Eden and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia [Tep Phan].

Pham Van Dong says that in conversations with Eden and the representative of Cambodia he had mainly touched on foreign military bases in Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the issues of a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Both Eden and the minister of foreign affairs of Cambodia declared that the US supposedly did not intend to create military bases on the territory of these states; for their part, the governments of these countries also did not want foreign military bases to be created on their territory. In reply to a question about the possibility of the Americans involving Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the military bloc they are planning in Southeast Asia, Eden and the representative of Cambodia replied that they did not give the Americans their agreement to this and did not intend to do this in the future. They added that it was another matter if the three “Associated States” were subjected to aggression. Regarding the creation of a military bloc in Southeast Asia Eden said that the US has been acting in this direction for a long time and that nothing new was added to this in Paris. Eden added that the aforementioned bloc being created by the Americans was supposedly of a defensive nature.

Pham Van Dong said that he had taken a sharply critical position with respect to the creation of foreign military bases in Bao Dai Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and also with respect to the creation of military blocs in Southeast Asia in this conversation with Eden and the representative of Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai says that in the new version of the draft declaration just received from the French, just like in the first version, there is no provision prohibiting the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia and that this provision is also not in the draft documents about Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov says that it is necessary to get the appropriate changes entered in these drafts.

Molotov asks what questions we ought to discuss today.

Pham Van Dong says that, in his opinion, it is necessary to exchange opinions about how we need to act to get an agreement acceptable to us about the line of demarcation, about the elections, and about a number of other important issues, the regrouping zones, the composition of the supervisory commission, etc.

Zhou Enlai suggests first exchanging opinions about the main fundamental issues of our positions and then discussing the texts of the documents that have been prepared.

Molotov agrees and names the main documents and the primary issues which need to be discussed—the line of demarcation, the dates of the elections, the composition and functions of the observation commission, the withdrawal and importation of weapons and military personnel into Indochina, and the prohibition against the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and a military bloc in Southeast Asia. Molotov then says that in the private meeting on 16 July Mendes-France hinted that political representatives ought to discuss the primary issues on which both sides might make mutual concessions.

Molotov raises for discussion the first of the above seven issues (about the line of demarcation) and asks Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong to express their ideas.

Zhou Enlai says that in a conversation with Wang Bingnan, secretary general of the PRC delegation, Colonel [Jacques] Guillermaz, a representative of the French delegation, told the former that the French delegation cannot agree to Route 9 being jointly used and let it be understood that the French would insist on the line of demarcation being located north of this road. Guillermaz also said that the French delegation would insist on the setting of a more distant date for holding elections in Indochina and named a time: two years.

Molotov asks to what final position can we fall back to in the question of the line of demarcation.

Pham Van Dong says that the DRV can concede Route 9 to France and agree to locate the line of demarcation somewhat to the north of this road. He adds that it is necessary to demand concessions from the French in the regions of Tourane [Da Nang] and Hue. Mendes-France hinted earlier to the possibility of such concessions, says Pham Van Dong.

Molotov asks what concessions the DRV intends to demand from France in Tourane and Hue.

Pham Van Dong replies that he intends to demand that France not create a naval base in Tourane. Pham Van Dong says that he does not yet have any specific ideas with respect to Hue and has to think a little [about it]. Pham Van Dong then says that it is necessary to demand agreement from the French to set an exact date for holding elections in Indochina [in exchange] for the indicated concession about the issue of the line of demarcation. He adds that this date can be somewhat extended but it should be named in order that the DRV govern-
ment have an opportunity to get certain organizational work started among the population.

**Zhou Enlai** states that Pham Van Dong’s proposal about a final position on the demarcation line issue accords with the instructions which our delegations have and [they] can agree to it. Concerning the question of Tourane, Zhou Enlai says that, in a conversation with him, Mendes-France hinted at the possibility of concessions on the part of France.

Zhou Enlai asks Molotov if, based on his conversations with Mendes-France and Eden, it is possible to count on our being able to achieve something on the issue of the elections.

Molotov says that Mendes-France and Eden talked about the issue of the elections and stresses that it is necessary to get a definite period set within which the elections ought to be held. With regard to an exact date for holding the elections then [we] might propose that it be set locally [*na meste*] by agreement of the competent authorities of both sides.

**Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong** agree with Molotov’s suggestion.

**Molotov** says that if we ought be prepared to agree to set the line of demarcation north of Route 9 then it is necessary to determine this line.

**Pham Van Dong** says that he will give instructions to his military experts to study this question and prepare an appropriate map indicating the aforementioned line on it.

Molotov raises for discussion the issue of a military bloc in Southeast Asia and asks the opinions of Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong about what our side ought to attempt.

Zhou Enlai suggests getting the representatives of Laos and Cambodia to declare definitely in their statements that they will not allow the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of Laos and Cambodia and that Laos and Cambodia will not participate in any military alliances or blocs.

Molotov says that he considers it advisable to include in the text of the declaration an obligation by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia not to create foreign military bases on their territory and not to participate in military alliances.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises for discussion the issue of the international supervisory commission.

Zhou Enlai says that, in a conversation with [Head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, V. K. Krishna] Menon on 16 July, the latter informed him that the French are inclined to form a supervisory commission consisting of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland. Menon spoke approvingly of this alternative and expressed satisfaction that it did not provide for the participation of Pakistan. Zhou Enlai then said that he touched on this French alternative in a conversation with Eden. The latter expressed his agreement with this composition of the supervisory commission but declared at the same time that Britain cannot submit this proposal on its own initiative since this would produce displeasure on the part of Pakistan.

**Molotov** says that regarding the issue of the composition of the international supervisory commission it is advisable to adhere to the position which our three delegations agreed on earlier.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

**Zhou Enlai** proposes coming to agreement about the scope of activity of the commission. He says that the French delegation submitted a proposal that the international commission conduct observation along the borders (including land and sea) and not at individual points, as was proposed by the Chinese-Vietnamese side. Zhou Enlai thinks that it would be more to the advantage of the DRV and PRC to establish monitoring along all the borders, which would allow for the achievement of more careful observation that the Americans or French do not move troops or weapons to the territory of Indochina.

**Molotov** proposes keeping to this tactic on this question: if the French insist on their proposals then agree with them so as to make a seeming concession.

**Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong** agree.

**Molotov** raises for discussion the issue of establishing the regrouping zones in Laos and Cambodia.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong suggest as a final position agreeing to the establishment of regrouping zones in the northeast part of Laos.

**Molotov** asks who will sign the agreements about Laos and Cambodia from our side.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong think it possible to authorize two representatives, the representative of the People’s Army of Vietnam and the representative of the resistance forces. They add that this issue needs to be studied more.

**Zhou Enlai** raises the issue of the timing of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina. He says that [they] can agree to the establishment of a period of 240 days (instead of 380, as the French propose).
Pham Van Dong agrees.

Molotov recommends proposing the establishment of a separate period for the withdrawal of troops and the period for the withdrawal of weapons, and adds that the period for the withdrawal of weapons can be made longer than the period for the withdrawal of troops.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree.

Molotov raises the draft declaration for discussion.

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agree with Molotov’s suggestion to take the French draft as a basis and make the necessary changes to it.

Then Molotov, Zhou Enlai, and Pham Van Dong exchange opinions about all the points of the text of the declaration and make changes.

The conversation lasted one hour.

Recorded: /signature/
(A. Ledovsky)

DOCUMENT No. 7

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Eden at his Villa in Geneva, 19 July 1954, 10:00 p.m.

[Source: AVPRF f. 06, op. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Present were [Andrei A.] Gromyko, Harold Caccia, British deputy undersecretary for foreign affairs, and Anthony [Rambold], Eden’s principal private secretary

Eden welcomes V. M. Molotov and says that in his, Eden’s, opinion the words about the withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Laos and Cambodia for inclusion in the decision about the negotiations between the representatives of the commands for Laos and Cambodia on which V. M. Molotov insisted at today’s meeting do not have great importance since they are covered by the previous part of this phrase in which it talks about the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov points out that the combination of these two formulations gives this part a nuance which would be less distinct if the words about the withdrawal of foreign military personnel had been omitted.

Eden expresses his satisfaction that the conference has managed to adopt a decision about negotiations between the representatives of the commands for Laos and Cambodia. We have done what we could, he says, and now we can leave with a clear conscience.

Molotov asks whether Eden means that the ministers have already done all their work and that further negotiations ought to be entrusted to the belligerent parties.

Eden replies that he meant that the ministers have done everything that they could at this stage of the conference but, in his opinion, they will have to meet again to approve the reports of the representatives of the commands as well as to settle such issues as supervision, safeguards, etc.

Molotov replies that such a procedure for further work is evidently correct.

Molotov says that he does not understand the position of the French. On one hand, they are seemingly not in a hurry with the negotiations but, on the other, Mendes-France promised in the National Assembly to achieve a settlement of the Indochina issue by 20 July.

Eden notes that he does not understand this either.

Molotov notes that possibly [the French parliament] subsequently intends to extend the deadline indicated by Mendes-France.

Eden says that yesterday he talked with Mendes-France on the telephone and asked him if he planned to come to Geneva. Mendes-France replied no, declaring that he cannot come to Geneva. Thus, Eden continues, he has already lost three days of the time he himself had set.

Eden says that he was glad to hear that tomorrow Zhou Enlai will receive the ministers of foreign affairs of Laos and Cambodia. In his, Eden’s, opinion, a great deal depends on the talks about Laos and Cambodia. He, Eden, already said to Zhou Enlai that he was concerned that if Vietnamese troops continue to attack as they have done recently then this would provide fodder for new accusations from those who have a skeptical attitude toward the Geneva Conference and [would] say that Ho Chi Minh and his supporters are using the talks in Geneva as a front to conduct further combat operations. Eden seems to say jokingly that he hopes that Pham Van Dong will not display too much belligerency in the upcoming weeks when talks will be held with the representatives of the commands.

Molotov notes that Pham Van Dong is a civil person and belligerency is unlike him.
It seems to me, continues Molotov, that, in stressing the importance of the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia, [we] also ought not forget about [those] of first importance, which are the Vietnamese issues.

Eden agrees with this, but says that from the point of view of the Western delegations there is a difference between Laos and Cambodia on the one hand and the issue of Vietnam on the other, since, in the opinion of the Western delegations, there is a civil war going on in Vietnam while events in Laos and Cambodia have a different character.

Eden again expresses the hope that now, when steps have been taken to start talks between the representatives of both commands, no large offensive will be attempted as long as these talks are being conducted.

Molotov states that, in his opinion, the danger is not whether a new offensive will or will not be attempted but that the patience of the people in Indochina, who have already been fighting for eight years, is starting to be exhausted.

Molotov asks whether, in Eden’s opinion, Mendes-France’s elevation to prime minister meant that the French want to find a solution to the issue of the war in Indochina.

Eden replies affirmatively but says that it cannot be forgotten that Mendes-France cannot capitulate and will agree to a peace in Indochina only on terms acceptable to France. The French will exhibit a genuine desire to negotiate, Eden continues, but he, Eden, doubts that Mendes-France’s peace conditions were significantly different from the conditions of his predecessors.

Molotov notes that no one is demanding capitulation by the French.

Molotov says that in yesterday’s conversation with him, Molotov, [US Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell] Smith explained the position of the American government on the issues being discussed at the Geneva Conference. The Americans are evidently afraid that the French will make concessions that are too great, although there is nothing to indicate that, and the position of the US government is evidently to deter the French from finding a way out of the situation which has developed. At the same time as the French and American positions are quite clear, says Molotov, the position of the British is not clear.

Eden, as if joking, replies that the British have no position at all. Essentially, Eden continues, we think that the French ought to decide themselves what conditions they consider acceptable to conclude an agreement. We think that it is not right to tell the French how they are to act. It is possible, Eden added, that the position of the Americans is partly explained by the fact that, as allies of the French, they want the French to gain the most favorable conditions.

Molotov says that, all the same, the impression is being created that the Americans are interested in deterring the French from an agreement. We observed such a picture at yesterday’s meeting, Molotov continues. The French declared that, in their opinion, the Chinese proposals deserved serious attention. The representative of Laos declared that these proposals were acceptable as a basis for negotiations. [US Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Walter S.] Robertson essentially spoke against both France and Laos. It is necessary to understand whether he wanted to be more French than the French and more Laotian than the Laotians.

Eden says that yesterday he received a telegram from London in which it mentioned a conversation which a Briton who had attended a lunch at the Soviet embassy had had with [Soviet Ambassador to the UK Jacob A.] Malik. Malik told this Briton that Eden was just as bad as [US Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles and that he and Dulles had simply assigned roles between themselves at the Geneva Conference in such a way that Dulles was to reflect intransigence and Eden was to play an appeasing role.

Molotov replies that he does not think that Malik could have said this or anything like this. But if Malik actually said that he, Molotov, would try to convince him that he is wrong.

Eden says that he told Molotov about this in passing and that he would not want Malik to have any trouble on account of this.

Molotov says that he received this report in confidence and can only make an appropriate hint to Malik, also in confidence. Dulles spent only several days in Geneva, adds Molotov, at the same time as Eden has been here for eight weeks. This alone speaks about the difference in their positions.

Eden agrees with this.

Molotov notes that Dulles evidently did not favor the Geneva Conference from the very start.

Eden points out that Dulles agreed in Berlin to convene the conference all the same.

Molotov notes that this still does not mean anything.

Eden says that he tried to convince Dulles not to leave Geneva, but that his appeals remained unsuccessful.

Eden notes that Dulles might still return to Geneva if the talks develop favorably.
Molotov says that in yesterday’s conversation with him, Molotov, Smith mentioned his, Smith’s, or Dulles’ possible return to Geneva, but this was said very indefinitely.

Molotov asks Eden what, in his opinion, are the primary difficulties with which the Geneva Conference is still faced.

Eden replies that it is hard for him to answer this question and that all the existing difficulties will come to light in the next three weeks when the talks of the representatives of the commands both sides are held. However, he, Eden, thinks that the primary difficulties concern Vietnam since the issues of Laos and Cambodia are much simpler in their nature.

Molotov notes that all the questions regarding Indochina are interconnected. If the talks about Vietnam go well then it will be easier to solve the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia. On the other hand, success in examining the issues regarding Laos and Cambodia will promote a solution to the issue of Vietnam.

Eden asks whether Molotov is satisfied with the progress of the talks of the military representatives about Vietnam.

Molotov replies that he cannot say that he is satisfied with the progress of these talks. The French have manifested some desire to hold the talks. However, their actions were evidently connected with the government crisis in France.

Eden says that the French informed him that the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have taken a more intransigent position since [French Prime Minister Joseph] Laniel’s government fell [in June 1954]. For his part, he, Eden, thinks that it would be a mistake to think that Mendes-France will turn out to be more pliable than his predecessors.

Molotov says that he has not formed such an opinion that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has taken a more intransigent position recently, since there have been no changes since the fall of the Laniel government in the talks between the representatives of the two commands about Vietnam. The latest proposals of the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were offered even before the fall of this government.

Eden asks what Molotov thinks about the possibility of the ministers returning to Geneva. For my part, says Eden, I think that when the reports about the talks of the military representatives are presented after 21 days we will be able to consult one another diplomatically about the question of our return to Geneva.

Molotov notes that these ideas seem reasonable to him inasmuch as otherwise the ministers might return to Geneva when the ground for their talks still has not been sufficiently prepared.

Eden states that he had formed the impression from recent talks with Zhou Enlai that Zhou Enlai favors a settlement of the Indochina problem.

Molotov replies that he also thinks so. China wants calm south of its borders. This would unquestionably agree with its interests.

Molotov expresses satisfaction that more friendly relations between the Chinese and British have been established in Geneva.

Eden notes that this occurred with Molotov’s assistance.

Molotov says that it depended on Eden and Zhou Enlai in the first place. Relations between the French and the Chinese, on the other hand, have changed little during the time of the Geneva Conference, although some improvement has been noted here.

Eden says that, on the basis of his conversations with Zhou Enlai, he has come to the conclusion that the PRC has no ambitions with respect to Laos and Cambodia and that there is reason to hope that these two countries will be able to lead a happy life as neutral countries without having any foreign military bases on their territory. It is based on this very assumption, Eden continues, that I stayed to work here in Geneva and hope that my assumptions will not turn out to be mistaken.

Molotov says that, in his opinion, Eden is not mistaken. The PRC does not, of course, have any ambitions with respect to Laos and Cambodia, but nonetheless it requires a decision. On the basis of my conversations with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, Molotov continues, I have formed the opinion that the situation in Cambodia is such that a settlement of the issues relating to this country should not cause significant difficulty. The situation in Laos is more complex. Still more complex is the issue of Vietnam. But solutions to all these issues are unquestionably equally necessary.

Eden notes that Zhou Enlai might help in this matter.

Molotov says that it is the business of the French to obtain such aid.

Eden states that, in his opinion, if the talks of the representatives of the commands turn out successfully, then a solution to the question of monitoring might turn out not to be nearly so difficult a matter as it seems at the present time.

Molotov says that Eden previously attached inordinate
Eden says that the question of monitoring still has great importance but its resolution might be made easier thanks to the improvement of relations between the sides.

Eden notes that much work has to be invested in the matter of coordinating the decisions of the Geneva Conference both regarding Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov says that the French have not displayed special initiative in solving these issues. It was possibly explained by the domestic political situation in France. He, Molotov, hopes that the matter will now proceed more quickly.

Eden notes that French governments are different [than other governments] in that they exhibit great energy only in the first weeks of their existence.

Molotov says that during these first weeks they will possibly be able to overcome the current difficulties in the Indochina question.

Eden says that before the Geneva Conference the international situation concerned him very much. However, in his opinion, the conference has done much to relax the tension in international relations. The danger still exists; however the situation has started to become less acute.

Molotov says that, in his opinion, in spite of its shortcomings, the Geneva Conference has played a positive role in this respect.

Molotov, seemingly joking, says that during the upcoming trip to Washington Churchill and Eden will be able to coordinate all the issues and help [bring] a favorable outcome to the Geneva Conference.

Eden replies that what has already been achieved in Geneva will help him and Churchill to hold talks in Washington.

The conversation lasted 45 minutes.

Recorded by:/signature/
O. Troyanovsky

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**DOCUMENT No. 8**

**Memorandum of Conversation, between Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Zhou Enlai, 29 July 1954**

*Source: AVPRF f. 06, o. 13a, d. 25, ll. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.*

**Top Secret**

**RECEPTION OF G. M. MALENKOV BY CDE. ZHOU ENLAI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 29 July 1954**

Deputies to the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang

Cde. Zhou Enlai expresses ideas about several issues of the international situation.

Having suffered defeat in Indochina, the US government is trying to provoke conflict in other regions of the Far East. The chief target of these conflicts is China. With the support of the US the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] pirates are infringing upon the freedom of navigation in the open ocean and plundering ships headed for China. Guomindang aircraft make raids on the Chinese coast.

Recently the Americans moved aircraft carriers to the maritime boundaries of China. Several days ago aircraft operating from these aircraft carriers shot down two Chinese aircraft in the area of the island of Hainan.

Preparations are being made to conclude a defense pact between Jiang Jieshi and the US government. The Americans still have not decided to sign the pact. They cannot fail to understand that this act will provoke still stronger anti-American feelings in China and might hinder the settling of differences with China in the future.

The US government will continue efforts directed at forging a bloc in Southeast Asia. Evidently, this bloc will initially include a limited number of countries: the US, Britain, France, New Zealand, and Australia. It might also include the Philippines and Thailand. The US will exert pressure on Indonesia, which is wavering, trying to force it to join this bloc.

In light of these facts the CCP CC intends:

To again raise the question of the liberation of Taiwan and take steps to disrupt the conclusion of the pact between the US government and the Jiang Jieshi regime. After he, Zhou Enlai, returns to Beijing, a declaration of the PRC government is supposed to be published in which it will be pointed out that at
the present time a source of military conflict exists in only one place, Taiwan; with US government aid, the Jiang Jieshi clique is committing outrages at sea, raiding Chinese territory, and essentially committing hostile acts against China;

To strengthen the defense of the Chinese coastline. The navy and air force will need to be strengthened to do this. The Chinese Armed Forces must be ready at any moment to halt a violation of the maritime or air boundaries of China;

To achieve the failure of the organization of an aggressive bloc in Southeast Asia. To do this means tearing their allies away from the US and exacerbating of the differences between the US and other capitalist countries.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that he heard the ideas of Zhou Enlai with pleasure and says that questions about measures connected with the international situation are examined and decided in the CPSU CC. Cde. Zhou Enlai’s statements deserve great attention. The goal of disrupting the conclusion of a pact between the US and Jiang Jieshi is correct. The question of Taiwan is undoubtedly a critically important problem for China. He agrees with Zhou Enlai’s comment that the goal of achieving an exacerbation of the differences between the US and other bourgeois countries is important.

Cde. Zhou Enlai informs [Malenkov] of the conversations with the Indonesian ambassadors in Delhi, Rangoon, and Beijing: they invited him to visit Indonesia. Zhou Enlai could not avail himself of this invitation since he was soon to return to the Geneva Conference. During Zhou Enlai’s stay in Geneva, the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs, who was in the Netherlands, sent the Indonesian ambassador in Paris to Zhou and repeated the invitation to visit Indonesia. It has become clear from conversations with Indonesian ambassadors that the time has come for a decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with China. Zhou Enlai proposed that a draft of this pact be developed in Beijing by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Indonesian ambassador in order for it to be possible to sign it during Zhou Enlai’s visit to Jakarta. Zhou Enlai is supposed to visit Indonesia in August.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov wishes him success. He agrees with Zhou Enlai’s comment about Indonesia and says that the inclusion of Indonesia in the American bloc being forged in Southeast Asia cannot be permitted. He talks briefly about conversations with [Chairman of the All-India Peace Council Dr. Saifuddin] Kitchlu and Subandrio, the Indonesian ambassador to the USSR, noting in this context that India, and, to a certain degree, Indonesia are gravitating toward a rapprochement with the PRC and USSR. He stresses that the conclusion of a Sino-Indian agreement is a quite successful step by the PRC government. The principles on which this agreement is based are being propagated in the Soviet press in every possible way.

Cde. Zhou Enlai informs [Malenkov] of a conversation with V.K. Krishna Menon, the Indian [permanent] representative to the UN, about the issue of Korea. Menon suggested that elections be held separately in North and South Korea, after which a national Korean body would be formed. Menon tried to also find out what the Chinese reaction would be if the United Nations expressed a desire to convene a Geneva conference again to discuss the Korean issue. He, Zhou Enlai, replied to Menon that China would support the idea of convening a Geneva Conference in order to continue the discussion of the Korean issue. He thinks that, if a Geneva conference were convened again, its membership would have to be expanded, inviting India to participate in it.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov says that Menon also raised this question with Cde. Molotov.

Zhou Enlai says that in connection with the intention of the PRC government to accelerate the strengthening of coastal defense it will evidently have to reexamine existing plans to develop the navy and air force. Zhou Enlai plans to immediately deal with this question on return to Beijing.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov notes that strengthening the defense of the Chinese coast, the navy, and the air force is an important goal.

Referring to the fact that the Soviet military comrades recommend that a long-range heavy bomber division (of TU-4s) be created in China, Cde. Zhou Enlai says that, in the opinion of the Chinese military, these aircraft are obsolete and it is desirable for a division of long-range aircraft to be equipped with jet technology.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that the Soviet military comrades will look into this issue.

Cde. Zhou Enlai asks whether the PRC government might expect the arrival of a government delegation of senior Soviet comrades in Beijing to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Chinese People’s Republic. If such a delegation can be sent then the PRC government will send an official invitation.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov replies that, of course, a delegation will be sent; the CPSU CC will determine the composition of such a delegation.

Cde. G. M. Malenkov asks that greetings be sent to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and the other comrades in the CCP CC.

Recorded by M. Kapitsa
Authenticated by: [illegible signature]

Distributed to members of the CPSU CC Presidium
12 August 1954
to Cde. V. M. Molotov
In 2001, Vasili Mitrokhin, a former KGB archivist who had defected to the United Kingdom after the fall of the Soviet Union, approached the Cold War International History Project about making available to the general historical community the materials he had collected.

Most of these materials consist of notes which Mitrokhin had copiously assembled while he worked in the archives of the KGB First Chief Directorate in Yasenevo, outside Moscow. Mitrokhin had moved from the operational side of the FCD to its archives in late 1956, where it was his job to respond to requests by other departments. Influenced by the bloody suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the dissident movement—all of which he could follow through the files he administered as well as Western records—Mitrokhin became increasingly disaffected with the KGB. By the early seventies he had decided to compile his own account of the KGB’s foreign operations, a project that became feasible when he was put in charge in 1972 of the movement of the FCD archives from the KGB’s headquarters at Lubyanka in central Moscow to Yasenevo southwest of the capital.

The materials are being made available by the Cold War International History Project for publication in its “Vasili Mitrokhin Archive,” integrated in CWIHP’s Virtual Archive at http://www.cwihp.org.

Vasili Mitrokhin would be the first to point out that his notes captured only a small part of the totality of documents; his decade-long work in the archive was a “massive filtering exercise,” with a flood of documents coming through his hands on a daily basis. The documents he saw were mostly informational cables from the First Directorate to the Politburo and Foreign Ministry, a copy of which went to the archives after a month. By no means are the materials therefore a complete record. Moreover, while striving to stick to the facts, Mitrokhin has stated that “I wrote it in a hurry, and as a result certain notes which I wrote to accompany my account took on an emotional tone, creating a rather unbalanced narrative.” This, the author explains, was “a way of expressing my personal perception of events and my rejection of the criminal intentions, calumnies and deeds of the Soviet nomenklatura.”

All the Archive material is ultimately derived from contemporaneous manuscript notes made by Mitrokhin as KGB documents passed through his hands in the Archive Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence or FCD).

The materials fall into three broad categories:

- Top Secret FCD and Directorate S (“Illegals”) files;
- Secret background papers and manuals held in the restricted-access FCD Operational Library;
- Articles taken from the Sbomik KGB, the secret KGB in-house quarterly journal containing (sanitized) case histories and success stories for the edification of the staff.

After his retirement in 1984, Mitrokhin organized his manuscript fragments (initially roughly sorted in dozens of brown envelopes) to compile a series of volumes dealing with KGB activities in various key areas of the world: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and subsequently the USA and the UK. All these volumes were typed out by Mitrokhin himself in the Soviet Union and eventually smuggled out by him to London in 1992.

As each volume was completed, the underlying manuscript notes were systematically destroyed by Mitrokhin, primarily for security reasons, but also to avoid inadvertent duplication.

He also brought over 27 large envelopes crammed with manuscript fragments covering aspects of the KGB’s work which could not be included in the Moscow-typed volumes.

Much (but not all) of this manuscript material was typed out by Mitrokhin in London, and subsequently translated and analyzed. It has extensively been used as source material for the Penguin Mitrokhin Archive Volumes I and II and may also appear in the Chekisms Anthology, which will be included in the Mitrokhin collection after its publication in Britain.

To view available materials, visit CWIHP’s webpage at http://www.cwihp.org and click on the Virtual Archive link.