The 1970s were in fact the subject of the many contributions to the conference. The stated objectives of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the actual outcome of their efforts. The erosion of empathy and the collapse of détente in the second half of the 1970s were in fact the subject of the many contributions to the conference.

The goal of the scientific committee of the conference was “to gain a greater understanding of the fundamental shift occurred during the 1975-85 period, from the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation to a truly global one, as well as the interconnections of this process with the new industrial-technological revolution and the return of the United States to a position of global economic leadership.” Forty-four speakers, grouped into ten panels, presented papers which were first commented upon by their discussants and then debated with the floor. The ten panels covered the entire spectrum of international relations in the period concerned, from both a thematic and a geographic perspective, by addressing issues such as: the aftermath and impact of Helsinki’s Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975, the Euromissile crisis of 1978-83, the Polish Crisis of 1980-81, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983, European integration, Eurocommunism, and the multiplication of conflicts involving the superpowers in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

After the opening remarks by Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo (CIMA Chairman, University of Florence, Italy), the proceedings began with a roundtable aimed at introducing the general subject of the years 1975-1985, through the presentation of the critical oral history work by James Blight (Brown University, USA) and Janet Lang (Brown University, USA): “When Empathy Failed: Why US-Soviet détente collapsed in the Carter-Brezhnev Years.” Commented upon by Christian Ostermann, director of CWIHP, this contribution verged mainly on the concept of “empathy, which the authors adopted both as a methodological resource and as an explicative category for the events of the late 1970s. As a methodological resource, historians seek to empathize with the protagonists of the events they describe: hence, Blight and Lang examined the Carter-Reagan-Brezhnev years using the critical oral history method, which combines historiographical findings and primary sources with oral interviews of former policymakers. But, according to Blight and Lang, empathy should also be the “next big thing” in the study of war, peace and conflict. In substance, they claimed, no period in the history of the Cold War exceeded the late 1970s in the figurative “distance” between the stated objectives of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the actual outcome of their efforts. The erosion of empathy and the collapse of détente in the second half of the 1970s were in fact the subject of the many contributions to the conference.

The first group of panels depicted a complex picture of the many facets of the crisis of détente after 1975. The first panel, entitled “After Helsinki,” dealt with the long-term effects of the CSCE in undermining the Soviet Union’s hold on the Eastern European countries, with particular reference to the issues connected to the Third Basket on “human rights.” Patrick Vaughan (Jagellonian University of Krakow, Poland) highlighted the approach to CSCE in the Carter administration, particularly the view taken by Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who largely drove the US towards viewing Helsinki as a resource rather than as a retreat vis-à-vis the USSR. According to Vaughan, whose paper was based mainly on Brzezinski’s personal archive and on several interviews with Brzezinski himself, the national security adviser was one of the few “hardliners” in the United States who did not interpret Helsinki as a Yalta II, thereby avoiding the wholesale condemnation of the Final Act that many expected in the United States from President Ford in 1975. The possibilities opened in the following years to US foreign policy by the CSCE’s “Third Basket,” were addressed in particular by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive), who analyzed the KGB and the Soviet government’s response to the emergence of an organized human rights movement after the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act. Her paper discussed Soviet interests and expectations in the CSCE negotiations, as well as the differences within the Politburo regarding the inclusion of the human rights provisions. Savranskaya presented new evidence from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, from the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, as well as from the personal diaries and memoirs of Soviet politicians and diplomats. The paper emphasized the efforts of Soviet dissidents to use the Final Act to put pressure on the repressive state apparatus and highlight human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and the authorities’ response to the new wave of dissent at home.
and its foreign support. Andrzej Paczkowski (Polish Academy of Science, Poland) considered the “Helsinki effect” in his paper on the authorities and the opposition in Poland between 1976 and 1986, based on several Polish archives, including the Archive of the Institute for National Remembrance. According to Paczkowski, the belief that the Helsinki agreements could discourage the authorities from deploying repression became increasingly popular among the opposition movements since 1976. As a symptom of this perception, his paper recalled, for example, that, shortly after Helsinki, Polish party leader Gierek took care to limit the number of prisoners who could be regarded as political and proclaimed an “act of pardon,” releasing the majority of internees detained after earlier disturbances. While the objective influence played by the Helsinki agreements in undermining Soviet control in Eastern Europe was recognized by all speakers, Sarah Snyder (Georgetown University) focused on the “subjective” intentions of those that dealt with the post-Helsinki phase. In particular, she questioned the “crudely drawn dichotomy” that drew a sharp distinction between US President Jimmy Carter’s forceful support for human rights and Ronald Reagan’s scepticism about, criticism of, and supposed shift away from Carter’s human rights policy. Based on records from the Reagan Library, Snyder argued that Reagan came to support the CSCE as a meaningful forum for East-West relations, and his “unexpected” commitment to human rights facilitated change in the communist bloc, particularly after Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1984.

The second panel addressed the first dramatic confrontation that marked the end of détente in Europe, focusing on the Euromissiles crisis of 1978-83 (NATO’s deployment of the cruise missiles “Gryphon” and “Pershing II” and the Warsaw Pact’s deployment of the “SS-20” intermediate range nuclear missiles). All papers converged in showing that the crisis was not simply a US-Soviet affair. By taking a longer perspective, stretching back to the late 1960s, Leopoldo Nuti (CIMA-University of Roma Tre) was able to assess the technological side of the story, the overall context of the transatlantic strategic debate in the early 1970s, the inter-alliance debates on NATO policies, détente and arms control in the mid-1970s, and some of the different Western national rationales for the choices of 1979. From this standpoint, NATO’s Euromissiles decision was a very difficult and unpopular choice, at a time when a large part of the public opinion of the West had become accustomed to seeing détente as a more or less permanent feature of the international system. Nuti’s most interesting conclusion was that Soviet foreign policy paradoxically ended up facilitating the implementation of a NATO policy, as the deployment of the SS-20s and the emotional impulse generated by the appearance of the new Soviet weapons systems provided the West with the necessary leverage to implement a project of weapons modernization which might as well have remained in a limbo. Helga Haftendorn (Free University of Berlin) explored the causes of how and why the ambivalent consensus within NATO on the 1967 Harmel Report broke apart. Using Cold War International History Project sources, US Congressional documents, British and German parliamentary records and the rich body of memoirs and newspapers articles of the time, she showed how the consensus did not survive the contravening domestic pressures on both sides of the Atlantic which questioned the wisdom of détente. The signature of the Helsinki Final Act was overshadowed by the heavy criticism of the SALT and ABM agreements by both defense conservatives in the US and Europeans weary of American-Soviet bilateralism. In Haftendorn’s analysis, the division was not so much between Europeans and Americans, but rather between détente-minded liberals who emphasized cooperation, and anti-communist conservatives who gave priority to containment and confrontation, in a crucial period in which détente turned sour and a “small ice age” in East-West relations occurred. The attitude taken on Euromissiles by selected groupings of countries was analyzed thoroughly in the following three papers in the panel. In particular, the Harmel Report was also considered by Vincent Dujardin (Catholic University of Louvain), although in a different fashion and on the basis of primary sources from French and Belgian state archives. In fact, while the Harmel Report had marked the high point for the international position of a small country such as Belgium within NATO structures, the Euromissiles story told a different truth: the role played by the small European countries, namely Belgium, in the unfolding of the Euromissiles crisis was termed by Dujardin as nothing less than “insignificant.” Gerhard Wettig (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Cologne) focused on the Soviet attitude towards the “dual-track decision” (i.e. NATO’s counterdeployment, conditional on the SS-20 threat), concluding that only when the dual-track project was put on NATO Council’s agenda, the Kremlin began to react. The Soviet leaders were confident that it was possible to prevent NATO’s missile deployment with no concessions on the SS-20s. This conviction was based on the assessment that, despite heavy US pressure, only West German, British, and Italian allies had really supported the dual-track decision, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway had tacitly opposed it. Eventually, after Chancellor Kohl’s visit to Moscow in early July.
1983, there were no more doubts about the Federal Republic’s and its allies’ willingness to abide by NATO’s decision. Marilena Gala (CIMA-University of Roma Tre) emphasized some crucial developments which occurred in the relationship between the United States and European allies after the Helsinki accords. In particular, her contribution focused on the radical transformation eventually produced by the CSCE on shared Western security priorities, bringing to the conclusion that the result of this deep transformation in Transatlantic relations emerged a decade later, when the Reagan administration engaged in the eager promotion of SDI, in spite of the doubts and uneasiness of the West Europeans.

The concluding panel of the first day of the conference focused on the relationship between technological and military advances and the economic bases they rely on. Dima Adamsky (Haifa University) offered the audience important insights on the “conceptual military competition,” showing that the Soviet Union was probably ahead of the United States in elaborating new military concepts in the early 1980s. The analysis of a large set of US and Soviet military publications showed, according to Adamsky, that in this field of military policy the United States was able to catch up only gradually during the 1980s. John Prados (National Security Archive) highlighted how the financing of the program for the Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as “Star Wars”), involving a high budgetary exposure under the Reagan administration, was made possible under the strong pressures of a group of insiders in the Reagan White House (the “policy entrepreneurs”), who constantly and purposely overestimated the data on Soviet strategic capabilities. The use of the National Intelligence Estimates by the Reagan administration was strongly questioned by Prados’ paper. Sean Kalic (Command and General Staff College), analyzed the announcement by President Reagan on SDI, the reactions it sparked, and the diplomatic activity that took place afterwards, in order to clear up the major disagreements with the Western European allies. The political meaning of the military and technological innovations that took place during the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, would be difficult to understand without a precise configuration of the economic context that made them possible. This topic was also addressed by Fiorella Favino (CIMA-University of Urbino), whose paper dealt with Washington’s economic diplomacy in the second half of the 1970s. According to Favino, after 1975 the United States recovered the hegemony it had lost in the first part of the decade, thanks to the convening of a series of summits with its European and Japanese allies (which would conventionally be called the G-6 and G-7). As pointed out by the panel’s chair, Tom Blanton (National Security Archive), the acceptance of the dollar as the world’s main reserve currency, which came about in 1976, was indirectly at the root of Reagan’s ability to finance his weapons program.

The second session opened on Friday, April 28, with a panel presenting a complex view of the European integration process after the first enlargement of 1973. The panel suggested that the West Europeans were initially cast aside by the renewal of Cold War tensions after Helsinki. In the longer run, however, they were also able to exploit the cooperation experimented with at the CSCE in order to promote collective strengthening within the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC). The complex dynamics between national aspirations and collective interests were at the heart of the work by Ilaria Poggiozioni (CIMA-University of Pavia) on Britain’s role in the EEC after 1973. Poggiozioni showed how British leaders first cultivated serious hopes to exert their leadership in the EEC, by taking an unprecedented pro-European stance under the Heath government. With Heath’s fall in 1974, traditional Euro-skepticism made a comeback, and leadership expectations literally “ran in the sand.” National rivalries notwithstanding, the European Community was strengthened in the late 1970s and early 1980s through the enhancement of monetary and political cooperation. The assumption that the EEC began to move towards ambitious goals in the global arena, although with enormous care not to upset the United States, was the backdrop of the essay by Eleonora Guasconi (CIMA-University of Urbino). Under the technical arrangements of the European Monetary System, in particular, lay the will of the European leadership to emancipate themselves from the custody of the US dollar. Based on the archival sources of the Historical Archives of the European Union, Guasconi’s paper reached the conclusion that the monetary plans and the political plans, such as the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981, should be read in continuity with one another. A similar conclusion was reached also by David Burigana (CIMA-University of Padua), whose essay conducted a rigorous analysis of the consolidation of a truly European air industry between 1974 and 1984. The strategic significance of air technology, and its obvious dual-use implications, witnessed, according to Burigana, the willingness by powerful European actors to leave behind the condition of minority long played by Europe under US dominance. In this context, where military alliance coexisted with symptoms of economic rivalry, new factors came about to pose new challenges to Cold War participants: a larger – and more problematic – conception of European integration was in fact the subject of an accurate study by Werner Lippert (Indiana University of Pennsylvania, USA), which highlighted the complex issue of East-West trade. Once again, the Helsinki agreements were the necessary starting point to examine the dynamics that East-West trade brought about, at least from a Western perspective. As ties strengthened and economic interdependencies consolidated, all-European trade could be seen both as a resource and as an obstacle on the road for the elaboration of Western strategies in the late Cold War.

The sixth panel focused on the examination of one of the most dramatic crises of that period, namely the Polish Crisis of 1981-1982. Three panelists debated the events that took place in Warsaw, and produced a valuable set of documentary evidence to discuss the stance taken by several countries on the development of the Solidarnosc movement and on its repression by the Polish leadership. Petre Opris (University A. I. Cuza, Iasi)
explained the attitude taken by Romania in the course of the Polish events: the increasing social tensions in Poland and the emergence of the Polish workers’ large demonstrations in the second half of August 1980 augmented the anxiety not only in Moscow, but also in Bucharest. Nicolae Ceaucescu tried to control the creeping domestic protest with an ideological make-up. But the fundamental ideas of Romanian communism continued to be Stalinist, and Ceaucescu’s limited reforms amounted only to some modifications to the organization of the Party. According to Opris, the Polish events marked also the acme of a crisis in the process of sustained economic growth promoted by Ceaucescu, and the beginning of an unsolvable political crisis. Two valuable contributions discussed the stance of the two superpowers on the Polish events: Mark Kramer (Harvard University) analyzed the attitude of the USSR, while Douglas Selvage (Office of the Historian of the US Department of State) gave several insights on the position taken by the United States. According to Kramer, even though there is every reason to believe that the Soviet Politburo would have sent troops into Poland to prevent all-out civil war and the violent collapse of the communist regime, the members of the Politburo did not want to make a final decision about “extreme measures” unless a dire emergency forced them to. In Kramer’s view, this calculation was amply borne out: the striking success of Jaruzelski’s “internal solution” on 12-13 December 1981 spared Soviet leaders from having to make any final decision about the dispatch of Soviet troops to Poland. Nevertheless, the way Soviet restraint was implemented witnessed that “the Brezhnev Doctrine, far from having died an early death, outlived Brezhnev himself and remained in effect.” Selvage examined the place of the Madrid CSCE review conference in the diplomatic tangle between the Reagan administration and its West European allies over relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the adoption of martial law in Poland. By analyzing the events of the Madrid Conference, the paper aimed at explaining why the Reagan administration agreed in 1983 to a concluding document that provided for the convocation of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, a Soviet desideratum that Washington had been resisting until then. The reason why the United States remained engaged at Madrid, Selvage concluded, was that the conference presented an opportunity to display Western unity at a time when Washington’s NATO allies were publicly resisting US demands for economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. For the Europeans, going on the verbal offensive against Poland and the Soviet Union at Madrid was “the price they had to pay to ensure that the US remained at the conference, the lesser evil in comparison to other alternatives,” such as joining the US in imposing economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, foregoing disarmament talks, or eroding tenuous support at home for NATO’s dual-track decision. While regional crises, such as the Polish, determined peaks of tension that needed to be managed politically, Robert Nation (US Army War College) addressed the underlying military doctrines of the two conflicting alliances, focusing in particular on the Warsaw Pact. The war plans prepared by NATO and the Warsaw Pact demonstrated what warfare between great power peer competi-

Whereas Eastern Europe lived through the crisis of legitimacy and consensus of the Soviet system, in the West Eurocommunism, centered on the Italian Communist Party (PCI), attempted to develop a Western European type of communism, distinct from the monolithic Soviet model. While Eurocommunism potentially represented a challenge for both the East and the West, in fact it was way more effective in the East. Laura Fasanaro’s research, carried out in the East German archives of the ultra-orthodox Socialist Unity Party (SED), discussed two different periods. In the years 1975-79, the renewed Eurocommunist appeal for respect of liberty and human rights in the Communist countries, together with a more general criticism of the governments of the Soviet bloc, circulated in Western as well as in Eastern Europe, therefore publicly challenging the unity of the Communist bloc. In the second period, when détente was finally overwhelmed by NATO’s “dual-track” decision on Euromissiles and by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (December 1979), the Western communists’ attitude towards the issues of war and peace gained a crucial importance in their relations with the Communist parties of the East. In a sense, concluded Fasanaro, this attitude seemed to their Eastern brother parties “even more relevant—and puzzling—than the challenge already launched with Eurocommunism.” A lively debate took place among the panelists on what were the reasons for the success and the early decline of the Eurocommunist proposal, particularly in relation to the Italian case. Silvio Pons (University of Roma Tor Vergata), who carried out his research in the archives
of the PCI, explained the parabola of the Eurocommunist movement, and that of the PCI in particular, as the outcome of internal factors. According to Pons, the leader of the party, Enrico Berlinguer, searched for an impossible third way between Soviet communism and West European social-democracy. This search was pursued with great skill, but failed to recognize that social-democracy was the necessary landing place for the PCI, thereby bringing the party to a deadlock before the end of the 1970s. Duccio Basosi (CIMA-University of Florence) and Giovanni Bernardini (CIMA-University of Padua) used a wide variety of sources (US Treasury and White House archives, German SPD archives, Italian State Archives, PCI public sources and memoirs), in the attempt at placing the parabola of the PCI and Eurocommunism within a broader context, allowing for international economic considerations. In their judgment, the defeat of Eurocommunism was only part of the general defeat of the working-class parties (either communist, socialist, social-democratic or dirigiste) and of Keynesian economics, at a time when neoliberal laissez-faire solutions were beginning to change the entire landscape of politics and society in the West (first in the US, then in Europe and in the rest of the world). This theme, as seen by a prominent character of German social democracy, was also addressed by Bernd Rother (Willy Brandt Foundation, Berlin) in his paper on the activity of Willy Brandt as the president of the Socialist International after 1976. The search for a “third way,” this time between capitalism and socialism, was the leading tune of Brandt’s presidency, although with varying degrees of success. The Nicaraguan situation, with the Sandinista revolution in 1979, was of particular concern to Brandt, who did not hesitate to confront the views held by the US administration. The important role of personalities was at the core of the contribution by Oliver Bange (Mannheim University). Bange analyzed the peculiar relationship between Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker in the years between 1974 and 1982 and their attempts to keep “inner-German relations off the return of Cold War confrontation.” By using a wide range of documents from the archives of SPD, SED, and Stasi, the personal archives of Helmut Schmidt as well as British, French and American sources, Bange offered a comprehensive and coherent picture of the complicated web of interests and influences—domestic, economic, intra-party, intra-bloc and international—that conditioned the two German leaders’ action and the survival of détente in the relations between the two Germanies.

Whereas most of the aforementioned panels followed a thematic approach to the “globalization of the Cold War,” aimed at showing how the bipolar confrontation entered a time of greater complexity, the three concluding panels of the conference enlarged the scope to the “global” dimension reached by the bipolar confrontation in the geographic meaning of the term. They covered the expansion of the Cold War to Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The panel on Latin America dealt almost entirely with US policy in the area and provided a debate on the conceptualisation of the American role in the world in the period under scrutiny. It also underscored the impact that the revived bipolar confrontation had on the choices and styles of the US presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, particularly in such a sensitive area as the Western Hemisphere. Max Guderzo (CIMA-University of Florence) examined Carter’s foreign policy in Latin America, underscoring the peculiar approach of the Democratic presidencies to Latin American issues in terms of “enlightened self-interest.” Carter’s pivotal concept included the idea that the protection of human rights was a key element of the strategic struggle against any Soviet residual hopes of regional or global supremacy. According to the evaluation of the NSC on the accomplishments of the Carter Administration in the area, it changed the way the people in Latin American and the Caribbean viewed the US. The mighty neighbor was associated with human rights, democracy and moderate peaceful social change, and this new perspective enhanced US influence in the area. Using a representative sample of documents produced by the Carter administration, Guderzo provided evidence of the presidency’s awareness of empire-building in the crucial years that the Soviet Union chose to launch its global challenge to the “free world.” In Carter’s agenda for Latin America, Venezuela was probably meant to play a focal role, as Daniela Vignati (University of Milan) suggested in her paper. Cultivating Venezuela made sense economically and ideologically. Venezuela was one of the most stable and lasting democracies in South America and had taken a bold stand against dictatorial regimes, therefore meeting Carter’s principles in foreign policy. Secondly, the Venezuelan government was among the leaders of the terciomundismo, and hence could be an ideal interlocutor for the American administration aspiring at establishing a global approach to Latin America in the frame of North-South economic issues. Finally, Carter’s will to provide the United States with a consistent energy policy, in order to escape vulnerability to the blackmail of the middle-Eastern producers, increased the importance of a dialogue with Venezuela. The improved relationship demonstrated its value in dealing with some important issues, such as the Panama Canal negotiations and the US Caribbean policy. On the other hand, Caracas failed to help the US in freezing oil prices. Washington overestimated its own persuasive powers and demonstrated a scant knowledge of Venezuelan oil policy and history. Carter’s foreign policy principles of human rights, multilateralism and US non-intervention abroad were at the core of the analysis proposed by William Michael Schmidli (Cornell University) on the Nicaraguan crisis in 1978-79. Supported by US archival sources, Schmidli demonstrated the failure of the Carter administration’s policy in Nicaragua, due to a myopic adherence, first and foremost, to the principle of non-intervention. Although US government analysts provided useful and precise reports on the situation, their advice was ignored by top-level policy-makers. The Carter administration, intent on avoiding US entanglement, limited its response to Somoza’s human rights violations—the most significant human rights crisis in the hemisphere—and also failed to fully account for the multilateral nature of opposition to the dictatorship. The White House actively downplayed US
involvement and limited coordinated Latin American efforts to oust Somoza, thereby giving the dictator more time to build up his armed forces and decisively contributing to the failure of the Frente Amplio Opositor, by all accounts Nicaragua’s most amenable political alternative towards a democratic moderate regime. Stefano Luconi (CIMA-University of Florence) proposed an overall examination of the US intervention in Grenada as an evidence of the shift from rhetorical to military offensive in Reagan’s global roll-back of communism. After Carter’s setbacks in foreign affairs, Reagan aimed at restoring the power, respect and prestige of the United States in the world. He intended not only to resist Soviet expansionism, but to reverse the Communist gains that had occurred in developing countries during the 1970s. Grenada offered the Reagan administration a good opportunity for gaining the respect and support of the American public and for demonstrating to Caribbean and Central American leftist regimes that the United States was once again ready to prevent any shift to Communism in the area. By failing to consult Congress and antagonizing its major European allies, the president made it clear that he would not tolerate interference with his plans to re-establish US hegemony and to stand up to those who threatened the nation’s alleged interests.

The second panel of the “geographic” set saw the African events of the late 1970s under the spotlight. Nancy Mitchell (North Carolina State University, Raleigh) previewed some considerations from her forthcoming book on Carter’s policy in Africa, which will focus on the crisis in the Horn in 1977-1978. Drawing on a wide variety of sources, both from archives and collections, Mitchell concluded that the crisis in the Horn was not “a story of naked Soviet aggression and US flaccidity.” Her contribution to the conference actually pointed out the intense difficulties experienced by both Washington and Moscow in the periphery of the Cold War: the US did not apparently anticipate the Cuban involvement, and did not have any leverage to restrain the Somali dictator Siad Barre, just as the USSR could not gain much from helping the Ethiopian dictator Menghistu. Sara Lorenzini (University of Trento) presented the outcomes of her carefully crafted research on the competition of the “two Germanies” in Africa, bringing the dimension of East-South relations at a time of deep crisis in West-South ones. Her main thesis stressed how the new “international history” of the Cold War, drawing on Eastern archives as well as on the Western ones, has finally led historians to regard the foreign policy of the East European countries not simply as a proxy for the USSR. In fact, the important revelations coming from the archives of the former East German foreign ministry show that, while still relying on the USSR to achieve international recognition, the GDR actually pushed its own economic priorities in its commitment to the African continent (namely, in the mediations between Somalia and Ethiopia and in the scientific-technical relations with Angola, Zambia, Nigeria and Congo). Relying on rich documentation from the Jimmy Carter Library, Maria Stella Rognoni (CIMA-University of Florence) analyzed the role of the US government in two critical regions of the African context, namely Congo and Angola. The main argument of her contribution was that American policy-making in Africa from the 1960s through the end of the 1970s was one of continuity: despite a desire to give rise to a new African-American partnership, local developments in Africa repeatedly called for Cold War behaviors. Rognoni’s conclusions are twofold: in terms of bipolar politics the US attitude seems to have proved positive for long-range American interests. On the other hand, the persistent use of African territory by both superpowers for their own Cold War goals seems to have produced negative results as far as the state-building process of African countries was concerned, with an impact that is still visible today. Barbara Zanchetta (CIMA-University of Urbino) came to similar conclusions in her paper on Carter’s policy towards the Horn of Africa (which also offered interesting insights into Carter’s policy in Southwest Asia). Noting how one can distinguish between two distinct phases in Carter’s presidency, Zanchetta argues that initially Carter followed Brzezinski’s assessment that the international context created no reason for alarm in 1977, and therefore no direct US involvement was deemed necessary in the complex web of African problems. The shift back to the predominance of Cold War considerations arrived in 1979, with the fall of the Shah in Iran. Sources from the Jimmy Carter Library actually indicate that, after 1979, in order to achieve these objectives, the US had to assure its direct presence in the area, securing its forces’ access to military facilities in Egypt, Oman, Kenya, Diego Garcia and Somalia. Massimiliano Cricco (CIMA-University of Urbino) presented a paper on Libya. Since the coming to power of colonel Qadhafi, Cricco claimed, Libya has often played the part of a pendulum, swinging sometimes towards the US, sometimes towards the USSR, and sometimes flirting with the PLO. After deteriorating during the Carter years, the relationship between the US and Libya became one of true tension and strain when Reagan took control of the White House. Cricco’s careful assessment of the sources from the Declassified Documents Reference System shows the inability of the US president to gauge the impact of the bombing of Tripoli in 1986, which actually ended up strengthening Qadhafi’s power.

The third part of the session on “Globalizing the Cold War” was chaired by Saki Dockrill (King’s College, London), and focused
on Asia. Enrico Fardella (CIMA-University of Florence) focused on Carter’s China policy. His paper highlighted Carter’s results in building a strategic partnership between the US and China on the eve of the Sino-Vietnamese war. Within the context of the ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism—Fardella concluded—the progressive shift into a market economy of the most populated communist country in the world and its involvement in the international trade marked a massive ideological defeat for the communist bloc. The other large country of the Asian continent was analyzed by Mariele Merlati (University of Milan) in his paper on US policy towards India during the Carter years. Based on documents from the Carter Library and on a number of accounts from prominent Department of State officials, Merlati’s paper gave an analysis on India’s case, as part of the US government’s attempt at developing a new approach to the developing countries. According to Merlati, even though the precise content of Carter’s Indian policy has not been sufficiently clarified yet, the administration’s North-South policy and its effort to cultivate “emerging regional influential” powers proved to be rather ineffective. Either because of the dichotomy in US foreign policy decision making between the National Security Council and the State Department, or because of the limited knowledge of the country, the United States was incapable of elaborating a broader, longer term perspective. According to Merlati, Brzezinski, who created the idea of a policy addressing “regional influential countries,” was totally absent from the economic planning of that policy. As for the Middle East, Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive) offered a very insightful survey of the United States and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. Based on a variety of sources, many made available only from recent declassifications, Byrne’s paper laid out new evidence on the conflict and the United States’ role in it. According to Byrne, in the years of the war the Gulf Arab states were clearly an important factor in the making of events. Their enormous wealth made it possible for the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, to remain afloat even when his production capacity had been significantly reduced. Gulf Arab states were also able to keep Washington and Moscow from intervening beyond a certain point, while they tried to strike a balance between accepting military aid for defensive purposes and not appearing to be too dependent on the superpowers for domestic political reasons. Finally, the United Nations—the Security Council as well as the office of the Secretary General—deserves credit for its role in keeping the crisis from expanding and eventually bringing it to an end. The role of the Middle East in the years of the Second Cold War was also discussed in the paper of Alberto Tonini (CIMA-University of Florence). Quoting from Tonini’s title, Saudi Arabia was “the precious friend” of the US in the global Cold War. The perspective that Tonini stressed was that Saudi Arabia interests were clear: oil and political stability. The main Cold War commitments of the Saudis were their assistance to the Afghan mujahideen, support for the Contras in Nicaragua, intervention in the Somali-Ethiopian war, and support for Eritrea. Tonini’s conclusion was that, during the Carter and Reagan administrations, Saudi Arabia had no capacity to project its military forces outside the Arabian peninsula. Despite the fact that the Saudi involvement in the global Cold War was largely financial, it was significant for the success of US policy. Soviet involvement in the Middle East after Helsinki was the focus of the paper by Maria Grazia Enardu (CIMA-University of Florence), who dealt with Jewish immigration to Israel. The exodus of more than one million Jews from the Soviet Union became massive from 1985 onwards. The main causes were the Helsinki agreements and the protests of several Jewish dissidents with links to the West that eventually became a source of serious embarrassment for the Soviet Union. According to Enardu, “unfortunately, almost all those Soviet Jews wanted to go to the United States, not to Israel,” and it took some behind-the-scenes negotiations between the Israeli prime minister Shamir and president Reagan to direct the flux to Israel.

The concluding session was opened by a final round-table. Methodological and substantial conclusions were sketched out, discussing the value of the sources available to convey the sense of the complex picture of the globalization of the Cold War, as well as the extent to which the conference had achieved its goals. CIMA Chairman Ennio Di Nolfo suggested focusing on a set of keywords, the first of which was “perception.” The conference presented the clear notion that the perception of the impact of the Helsinki Final Act was much higher in Eastern Europe than many in the West believed. The Western difficulty in grasping how Helsinki had been received in the East introduced another keyword, “security.” Many contributions suggested that the CSCE did not enhance global security. The feeling in the Soviet leadership that its legitimacy was hitting a low point probably sparked the late Soviet attempts at playing a global policy in Africa and Asia, which elicited the American reaction and exported the contradictions of the Cold War on a truly global scale. On the other hand, Di Nolfo reminded the audience that the US, if not lacking legitimacy to the same extent as the USSR, fully exploited the relaxation of tensions in the superpower relationship in order to play an aggressive international economic policy. This caused several troubles with the West Europeans, but eventually put the US in a better economic and technological condition to cope with the globalization of the Cold War. This conclusion opened the way to the subsequent remarks by William Burr (National Security Archive), who highlighted the continuous and discontinuities of the 1975-1985 period in relation to US foreign policy after World War Two. From this standpoint, while the issue of “human rights” from Helsinki’s Third Basket did mark a discontinuity, or at least a novelty, continuities seem to prevail: Burr pointed in particular to the long-standing US objective of the “open door policy.” The objective of a world-scale free market, and the geopolitical assumption that free trade would prevent wars among the Western powers, pervaded the policymakers of the 1930s and 1940s as well as those from the Ford and Carter administrations. On the other hand, said Burr, the intrinsic link between the open door policy and the conception of US security remained constant throughout the decades. Burr doubted, however, that the architects of détente could nurture goals of status quo stabilization, while he thought much more probable that they
tried to modify the architecture of the USSR and the world by means of relaxation of tensions. This also sparked some clashes with European allies, which did not share the same objectives and which enjoyed, in the mid-1970s, a period of heightened political cooperation that peaked in Helsinki. This was confirmed by the oral history contribution of Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (Italian ambassador at the CSCE), who also confirmed the need to fully assess the different perceptions of the Helsinki Final Act in East and West, with the East probably developing a clearer picture of the changes that had been set in motion. Perception was also the starting point for Vojtech Mastny (Parallel History Project, Zurich), whose speech concluded the round-table: from a methodological point of view, the need to exploit new methods such as critical oral history, stressing empathy and perception, needs to be balanced by a historical outlook on the past. According to Mastny, both Helsinki and Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 were two events which are now seen as crucial turning points in history, but were simply not conceived as such by their contemporaries. From a more substantive point of view, Mastny questioned whether the conference had indeed reached a clear verdict on the “globalization of the Cold War”: on the one hand, in fact, the two superpowers extended their cold-war rivalry on a global scale, but this did not necessarily imply that the Cold War had gone global, since most conflicts had local origins and finally ended with local settlements.

Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt University, Nashville) and Samuel Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center) elaborated on the prospects for future research: Schwartz focused on those subjects that still need better understanding. The reassertion of US power, well represented by the comparison he made between Robert Altman’s “Nashville” of 1975 with John Milius’s “Red Dawn” of 1984, still suffers from too much military triumphalism, while not enough attention has been paid so far to economics and the importance of multilateral institutions. Domestic policies and their relation with foreign policy are crucial factors, that require further investigation, from the international dimension of domestic political terrorism to the paradox of the Reagan administration, engaged in fighting the unions at home and supporting them in the East (namely in Poland). Finally, he discussed the communication revolution that, rather than globalizing politics, globalized the way politics are represented, and deeply changed the way the public thought about international affairs (from the West European peace movement against the Euromissiles, to the shock of the hostages in the US embassy in Tehran in 1979).

Wells stressed the need to acquire a complex conception of the historian’s job—a duty which, in his view, the conference fully addressed. After mentioning the richness of Pierre Renouvin’s method and legacy in building an international history which took into account economics, technology and social affairs as well as diplomatic ones, Wells concluded by mentioning the perspectives opened by the availability of new sources and by the application of new technologies in opening, storing, accessing, and organizing documents.

Scholars and former government officials convened for a day of discussion on the origins, conduct, and impact of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The critical oral history workshop, held on July 19, was co-sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Middle East Program, in cooperation with the National Security Archive at George Washington University. Participants discussed new historical evidence and provided a stark reminder of how closely connected the current turmoil in the Gulf is to that earlier war and the politics of the time.

To supplement the discussion and shed new light on the subject, the workshop sponsors compiled and distributed two substantial document readers, one filled with recently declassified US government materials culled from the National Security Archive’s public collections, the other consisting of dozens of items gathered by CWIHP from Bulgarian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Iranian, and Russian sources especially for the conference.

In the past, CWIHP and the National Security Archive have hosted similar history workshops involving former high-level officials from several countries on such topics as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and, more recently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (See report on 2002 Afghanistan conference in CWIHP Bulletin No. 14/15, 139-141). But unlike their previous workshops, organizers were hindered by visa problems which prevented former Iranian and Iraqi officials from attending the meeting. Instead, the discussion focused on better understanding US, UN, and Soviet bloc perspectives of the war.

Notable panelists included former Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes; Ambassador William Eagleton, former chief of mission to a number of American embassies in the Middle East including Baghdad; George Cave, a former CIA official and chief of station in Tehran; Giandomenico Picco, the United Nations official who played the central role in obtaining the ceasefire in August 1988; and Ambassador William Miller, former US ambassador to Ukraine whose first Foreign Service post was in Iran. Two East European diplomats who served in Iran attended: Henner Fuertig from Germany and Zsigmund Kazmer from Hungary. A distinguished group of scholars provided thoughtful questions and helped guide the discussion, including Phebe Marr, Shaul Bakhash, Judith Yarpe, and Mark Gasiorowski.

New Evidence

The discussion broke new ground in several areas. It is now clear the United States had learned of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s plans to invade Iran a full year in advance. The US Department of State had sent a CIA operative to Tehran to warn the provisional government in mid-October 1979, but the Iranian government took no action. When militants seized the US Embassy on November 4, 1979 and took 66 Americans hostage, Washington brought that kind of cooperation to an abrupt halt. The hostage crisis lasted until January 1981 when Iran released all remaining American hostages.

These discussions also revealed new information about the origins of the US “tilt” toward Baghdad in late spring of 1982, specifically the role of Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, in bringing it about via Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. American officials viewed the export of the Islamic revolution to the Gulf as a far worse threat than that posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime and went to considerable lengths to warm up to Baghdad. To that end, the Americans provided battlefield intelligence to the Iraqis and possibly acquiesced in supplying military equipment from other countries, while publicly adopting a neutral stance on the war.

From 25-28 May 1986, US National Security Adviser Robert “Bud” McFarlane secretly visited Tehran to negotiate the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The delegation was unable to meet with senior Iranian officials and left without resolving the situation. Discussions at the July conference provided new details about the failed mission and how it complicated US policy toward the war.

Although the key participants were former American officials, several new insights into Iranian and Iraqi thinking emerged during the discussion and in reviewing newly declassified documents. A key figure in the interactions with Iranian officials during 1986 explained some of the motivations and priorities of the officials with whom he interacted. For instance, he learned during those conversations, the Iranians were not initially interested in long-term relations with the United States, but were mainly seeking US weapons that conformed to the equipment the Shah had bought from the United States. But over time, it became clear that top-level Iranians saw a more substantial relationship with Washington as increasingly important to Iran’s interests, a stance that could eventually have provided the basis for a genuine opening under appropriate circumstances.

The conference did garner useful insights from the international perspective. It was already known that Moscow was ambivalent about the war from the start and tried to discourage Baghdad by temporarily shutting down weapons supplies. According to a former Soviet bloc ambassador to Iran in attendance, the Soviets later renewed arms shipments to Baghdad even as they attempted to improve relations with Tehran. Giandomenico Picco discussed the vital role of the moderate Arab states—Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—both in supporting Iraq’s war effort and ultimately, through his collaboration with top UN officials, Saddam Hussein, and members of the Saudi royal family, in negotiating an end to the war.

An Iranian scholar present at the conference said a turning point in Iran’s thinking came with the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in July 1988 by the American cruiser USS Vincennes. That incident apparently led Ayatollah Khomeini to conclude that Iran could not risk the possibility of US open combat operations against Iran and he decided it was time to end the conflict.
From the Archives

Documents freshly acquired for the conference from East European archives provide a wealth of new detail on East European thinking about the war, about relations with Iraq and Iran, and even about the internal situation in Baghdad.

All of the documents presented were especially relevant in gauging US policy at the time and were discussed by US officials for the first time at this conference. A 7 October 1983 State Department memo suggested a possible US shift from neutrality to prevent Iraq’s collapse and improve bilateral relations. Official US policy was neutrality, in an attempt to contain the war and preserve a possible future relationship with Iran, among other goals. The United States then began considering a host of diplomatic, military, and financial efforts to help Iraq develop and restore its damaged oil capability and prevent other countries from selling weapons to Iran. Three years later, as the United States was reeling from the Iran-Contra affair, another State Department memo read: “It is difficult to refute the Iraqis’ underlying accusation that the US has armed Iran to kill Iraqis.”

One US document also revealed concern over chemical shipments in 1984 and a possible Iraqi intent to manufacture chemical weapons. Numerous other records spell out evidence of Iraq’s chemical use and the dilemmas this posed for American policymakers. After the war, in 1989, a document from the East German archives disclosed that Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons but was working to modernize missiles acquired from the Soviet Union.

Other East European documents revealed the enormous toll the war was taking on both countries. The Iraqi leadership wanted to end the war by mid-1986, but could not successfully conclude a political settlement. As the records show, Iraq made extensive efforts to approach each government in the Soviet bloc individually, independent of the Soviet Union, and appeal for expanded economic and other ties, as well as to try to influence Moscow’s thinking. Among other things, the Iraqis worked out a deal with Bulgaria to train intelligence operatives, to which they tried unsuccessfully to add a promise from the Bulgarians to provide intelligence on Iran. In general, however, the Soviets and their allies appeared to have been at least as worried about the United States seeking advantage from the conflict—up to and including seizing the opportunity to move in militarily—as Washington was about Moscow.

One conclusion to take away from these materials is that each Soviet ally, while agreeing with Moscow that the war served only “imperialist” interests, did not appear to be as closely tied to Kremlin dictates, or even fully aware of Soviet policy preferences, as Western observers might have presumed at the time.

More information on this conference, including a full transcript of the discussion, will become available in the coming months on the CWIHP website at http://www.cwhp.org


By Lise Namikas

Forty-four years after the momentous events in the Congo, former officials and scholars gathered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 23-24 September 2004 to discuss the crisis. The conference on the Congo Crisis was one of a series of critical oral history workshops sponsored by the Cold War International History Project (this one co-sponsored with the Africa Program). In comparison to the others sponsored by the Project, including the July 2004 conference on the Iran-Iraq War, this conference plunged further back in time and was the first to put the spotlight on the Cold War in Africa.

A document reader, compiled in cooperation with former Kennan Institute Scholar Lise Namikas (Louisiana State University) and former CWIHP scholar Sergey Mazov (Russian Academy of Sciences), helped guide the discussion. It included documents gathered specifically for the conference from Russian, European, and US archives. Material recently declassified from US and Belgian archives, as well as several key articles on the crisis and a comprehensive chronology were also included. With few veteran voices left to share their personal accounts of events, the testimonials heard at the conference added meaningfully to the historical record.

Participants at the conference included former CIA station chief in the Congo Lawrence Devlin, former Lumumba confidante and Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Kanza, and provincial president of the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) Cleophas Kamitatu. Scholars from around the globe included Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences scholar Sergey Mazov, Wilson Center senior scholar and eyewitness to the events Herbert Weiss, Congolese scholar Jean Omasombo, a consultant on the Belgian Parliamentary Commission enquiry into Lumumba’s assassination, Congo expert Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, currently director of the UN Development Program’s Oslo Governance Center, and histo-
rian Lise Namikas. Representatives from the National Security Archive at George Washington University also attended.

There were several important revelations at the conference, some of the most significant related to the events of September 1960. Lumumba’s dismissal on 5 September has long remained controversial. From the memoirs of Belgian ambassador Jean van den Bosch (1986) we know that Congolese President Kasavubu began talking with Belgian advisors about revoking Lumumba’s premiership as early as July 1960. It is also known that Kasavubu talked with the UN temporary representative in the Congo, Andrew Cordier, who suggested that he was not adverse to Kasavubu’s proposed action. Kamitatu explained that Lumumba was told of Kasavubu’s impending move at least a week before his actual dismissal. Upon learning of this threat Lumumba met with Kasavubu and tried to work things out. But then suddenly, on 5 September, Lumumba was dismissed.

Cordier immediately closed the airport at Leopoldville and shut off access to the radio, abruptly stymying Lumumba’s attempts to rally support. Historians have long suspected US complicity in these events, but there has been little conclusive evidence. Cooperation between US Ambassador Claire Timberlake and Cordier has long been known, but Timberlake’s actions in the days before the coup are not. Timberlake, Devlin recalled, met with Kasavubu shortly before the dismissal and confirmed that he too favored revoking Lumumba, but felt that he had been ignored. Timberlake also met with Cordier before the coup, but the contents of their discussion remains unknown. Pushed by the Belgians and assured of indirect US and UN support, Kasavubu acted. Documents translated by CWIHP revealed that the Soviet Union was also working behind the scenes to urge African states, including Ghana, to put its troops serving under the United Nations operation in the Congo at the disposition of the government of the Congo or create a joint command to aid Lumumba. But before African states could discuss either option events again proved dramatic.

On 14 September 1960, Congolese Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu launched his first coup (the second would follow in late 1965). Again, current documentary evidence does not clarify the US role. But, in a blow-by-blow account of the decisive days and hours, Devlin recalled how, under pressure of events, he agreed that the United States government would recognize Mobutu’s coup. The relationship between Devlin and Mobutu has long raised suspicion, but Devlin confirmed that he met with Mobutu only two times before 14 September 1960. These early meetings, nevertheless, convinced Devlin that Mobutu had leadership qualities. On the night of his first coup, Mobutu told Devlin that if the United States would guarantee recognition of his new government then the coup would go forward. Not unaware of the risks involved Devlin demurred. Impatiently Mobutu again asked what the US position would be. Devlin recounted how he stepped out on a limb and guaranteed US government support. Had the coup failed, and at least Timberlake thought Mobutu was yielding to pressure to allow Lumumba to return, the entire US position in the Congo could have been jeopardized. As it was, the coup did not fail, but it was not an overwhelming success for Mobutu. Washington in effect countermanded the full coup by insisting on the “de-neutralization” of Kasavubu, safeguarding both the US and the UN position in the Congo. Cleophas Kamitatu surmised that the US guarantee might explain why Mobutu neutralized both Lumumba and Kasavubu, since he and others had only been aware of plans to neutralize Lumumba. The conference discussion also provided new details about the funds that Mobutu used to pay his soldiers at the end of September, thereby sealing their loyalty and the coup.

There were other revelations at the conference, particularly about Lumumba’s relations with Kasavubu and the West which had deteriorated long before September. The circumstances surrounding the Congo’s independence attracted much discussion at the conference, as did the relationship between Lumumba and Kasavubu. The two leaders were long time rivals and Kanza recalled that after a secret agreement with Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), Lumumba had little choice but to support Kasavubu as president. Another important misperception was corrected regarding the long-held impression that Lumumba furiously wrote his inflammatory independence day speech during Kasavubu’s speech. In fact Kanza explained that it was written in the days before independence (and, as Jean Omasombo clarified, with the assistance of his European advisors) and reflected Lumumba’s growing anger with Belgian attempts to deny him the position of prime minister. The whole episode, along with the many other revelations of the Belgian Parliamentary Commission enquiry, suggests that tension in relations between Belgium and Lumumba was greater than previously assumed and needs to be reassessed.

The Congolese participants explained the importance of the misunderstandings that colored Congolese foreign relations. Thomas Kanza shed light on the importance of the fiasco with Edgar Detwiler, a shady American businessman who proposed to develop and manage Congolese mineral resources. Kanza recounted how Detwiler was introduced to Lumumba by the son of Belgian minister without portfolio, W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, helping at least in Lumumba’s mind to reconfirm Detwiler’s credibility. A disadvantageous and disingenuous contract was signed. The deal was confirmed by the Congolese parliament, although later revoked. After warnings from US
Ambassador Timberlake, the Guinean and Ghanaian representatives at the United Nations, Diallo Telli and Alex Quaison-Sackey, and even concerned US citizens in the Congo such as the young Herbert Weiss, Lumumba was still surprised that he had not signed a legitimate contract.

In light of the extensive work of the Belgian Parliamentary Commission, the conference did not spend a lot of time on the assassination of Lumumba on 17 January 1961. But it became clear that Lumumba’s supporters feared the worst as the deposed prime minister remained under house arrest and then became a prisoner. Kanza revealed that in September he had discussions with Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, whom he called a “showman,” and more serious discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on the general topic of how to save Lumumba. Kanza learned, with disappointment, that the Soviet Union was apparently in no position to help directly. So he appealed to US President-elect John F. Kennedy through Eleanor Roosevelt. Kanza remembered an informal deal struck with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and Kennedy guaranteeing that Lumumba should remain in Leopoldville at least until Kennedy took office and then be brought to Parliament. Kanza also recalled that he asked Kennedy (again via Roosevelt) to intervene to protect Lumumba after he became a prisoner, but Kennedy responded that the handling of prisoners had to be a UN decision. Lumumba was transferred out of Thysville prison on the night of 16 January, an operation conducted by Mobutu’s men who carefully skirted UN guards, and assassinated the following day in Katanga.

Documents obtained for the conference from both Russian and German archives offered new details about the Soviet role in the crisis. Evidence from the former East German archives suggests that the Soviet Union supported aid to Antoine Gizenga’s “legal” government from December 1960 to March 1961, but did not want to take the international risks involved in delivering that aid. A memorandum of a meeting between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser confirmed that the Soviet Union wanted to send diplomats and military advisors to Stanleyville, but Nasser suggested rather dramatically that the only way to get them into the Congo was to parachute them. On another occasion, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky told Pierre Mulele, Gizenga’s representative in Cairo, that Soviet planes were ready to fly to the Congo, but feared the United Nations forces would shoot them down. Documents also established that early in 1961 Moscow sent $500,000 to aid Gizenga’s “legal” government in Stanleyville. Devlin heard that the payment was to be made in two installments via courier through Sudan. He sent a US operative to distract the courier and snatch the suitcase with $250,000.

The discussions revealed important details on the Lovanium conference of September 1961, called to form a new government for the Congo. The United States and the United Nations feared that Gizenga would be elected prime minister. As Kamitatu related, the nationalist bloc wanted Gizenga to take the job, but Gizenga refused, fearing a trap. The nationalists then agreed that the “moderate” Cyrille Adoula would be the “least evil” choice, not because they had a change of heart over Adoula, but because he was seen as next best leader who could help re-unify the Congo. Adoula agreed to work with the bloc and, escorted by UN representative Robert Gardiner to Kamitatu’s residence, worked through the night with other nationalists forming a new government. At the last minute Gizenga surprisingly accepted the post of vice prime minister but remained in Stanleyville (after a short visit to Leopoldville), leaving his intentions open to suspicion. Gizenga’s suspicions of Adoula ran deep at least partially a result of Adoula’s secret connections with the (Mobutu-supporting) Binza group, of which Gizenga was aware, and which the CWIHP conference brought to light. Adoula’s ties with this pro-Western group were not widely known, but diminish the importance of his former relations with the AFL-CIO. In the end, history would show that Adoula’s premiership would depend heavily on the nationalist bloc. By December of 1962 Adoula, under great pressure from the nationalists, called on the United Nations to use force to end the Katanga secession. UN Secretary-General U Thant felt he had few options, and tired of the whole affair, obliged, giving Kennedy little choice but to go along or see the United Nations withdraw from the Congo altogether.

If there was a single message to take away from the conference it is that the course of events in the Congo were at least as strongly influenced by events on the ground as by decisions emanating from either Washington or Moscow. The conference confirmed that Lumumba had little western support and plans for his elimination, politically and physically, were effectively carried out at all levels, no matter what the coordination. Washington seemed to keep its distance with the result that events could force its hand at the last minute, while Khrushchev tended to be more cautious and reluctant to act without support from the Afro-Asian states. The conference also highlighted the Congolese role in the crisis but without exaggerating its influence. Clearly a general misunderstanding between the Congolese, Americans, Soviets and Belgians overlaid the tragic events of 1960 and 1961—events that still haunt the civil-war-wracked Congo today.
CWIHP Launches New Middle East International History Initiative

By Mircea Munteanu

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is pleased to announce the launch of a new CWIHP Middle East International History Initiative. This important new initiative seeks to explore new archival evidence and facilitate discussion and scholarship on the conflicted international history of a region that has been at the heart of world attention in recent years. CWIHP’s efforts, as with all its other activities, are based on contributions from its global network. In particular, CWIHP seeks to obtain, translate and publish new evidence from the former Communist world archives on the Middle East conflicts. In addition, the Project is actively promoting the inclusion of authentic voices, perspectives and sources from the Middle East through collaborative projects, conferences and publications.

The new initiative is based on an increasing amount of Middle East focused CWIHP research activity in recent years. The Project has already organized a series of Critical Oral History conferences at the Woodrow Wilson Center on the war in Afghanistan (“Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan,” April 2002), the Iran-Iraq War (“The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War,” August 2004), and the Iranian Revolution (The Carter Administration and the Arc of Crisis,” July 2005), co-organized with the National Security Archive and the Center’s Middle East Program. They were followed by an international conference on the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and a CWIHP source workshop in June 2007. Recent CWIHP publications on the international history of the Middle East include several document briefing books, Working Papers as well as the newest addition to the CWIHP Series, The Soviet Union and the Six Day War, a collection of essays on the 1967 Arab-Israeli War edited by Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Stanford University Press/Wilson Center Press, 2008). Forthcoming document additions to CWIHP’s online Virtual Archive include materials provided by Israeli scholar Guy Laron (based on extensive research in the Czech archives) and German scholar Stefan Meining (based on work in the East German party archives). These documents and publications—as well as future updates on this initiative—will be available online at www.cwihp.org. CWIHP is keenly interested in contact with scholars, archivists and other working on this subject. For further information, contact CWIHP at coldwar@wilsoncenter.org.

As a sample of the rich sources the Project and affiliated scholars are working on, we present below two documents recently obtained in the Romanian National Archives in Bucharest. Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime undertook several different secret diplomatic missions in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Vietnam, China, and the Middle East. The two conversations between Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu who in 1972 took an extended trip through North Africa and the Middle East, and Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat provide tantalizing new evidence on a previously discounted Romanian mediation initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following Ceausescu’s visit to Cairo, Israeli Premier Golda Meir visited Bucharest on 5 May 1972 at Ceausescu’s invitation, something that was extensively speculated about in the Western press at the time. Quickly thereafter, official denial from all sides put the idea of a Romanian initiative to rest. Yet the documents below show that Ceausescu had indeed received a mandate from Sadat to discuss with the Israelis. The 1972 conversation foreshadowed a more active role for the Romans in mediating between Egypt and Israel. Five years later, Ceausescu would help broker the contacts between Sadat and the newly-elected Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, that culminated in the Egyptian leader’s unprecedented November 1977 visit to Jerusalem. Future issues of the Bulletin will discuss additional evidence from the files of Ceausescu’s emissary to Tel Aviv and Cairo, George Macovescu.

Memorandum of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Anwar El-Sadat, Cairo, 3 April 1972


NOTE

Regarding the personal conversation that took place between […] Nicolae Ceausescu and […] Anwar El-Sadat, Monday, 3 April 1972, in Cairo.

President Sadat: Regarding the presence of the US and Russia here in the region, and the way in which they follow their interests, I think [they] are alike.

I want to tell you, President Ceausescu, that I am receiving both an American representative and a Soviet representative today. Before you leave Egypt, I will tell you the last position adopted by the US. The US suggested that we send a plenipotentiary representative to the UN, and that Israel do the same, and, together with [Joseph John] Sisco, they should hold discussions without any preconditions. I will not consider the suggestion that the conflict can be resolved in stages; presently they are only interested in opening up the Suez Canal. I told them that I will open up the Canal the day Israel withdraws from the occupied Arab territories.

I talked to Sisco openly before, for three hours. The discussions focused on three points:

[The idea] that Egyptian forces should cross the Canal to take positions on the other shore. Here I gave in, and agreed that Egyptian and Israeli forces could be stationed on the other shore under international supervision.

Israel wants an indefinite cease-fire. I said I agree to a six-month cease fire, which we can renew if the mission of [Swedish diplomat Gunnar] Jarring has any definitive results. I cannot agree with an indefinite cease-fire.

Israel does not want to withdraw to the pre-war borders.
[Israeli Prime Minister] Golda Meir said that this the principle from which one must begin. I said that I cannot concede any piece of our territory. After Sisco left for the US, he send me a written proposal concerning this. I said that I agree with 95% of the proposal. The US State Department was strongly criticized by the Israelis, and, in the end, the Americans said that the proposal was not from the State Department, but was Bergus’ proposal, the special representative of US interests in Egypt. From that moment on I considered Sisco a liar, and stopped trusting him. On 1 January 1972 the State Department, through [Secretary of State William P.] Rogers, said they would provide Israel with 130 Phantom and Sky Hawk planes; even though they know the military balance favors Israel. After a week they announced that they are giving Israel permission to build American weapons and the Phantom plane. As far as Israel is concerned, it is clear that it does not want a solution. They receive weapons, money, and other help from the US, and they do not want a solution.

Regarding the Soviet Union, they helped us strengthen our armed forces, they send us weapons and missiles to defend our territory. But I agree with President Ceausescu on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. In Egypt there is a campaign against the Soviet Union. I cannot say that openly to the people, I have to seek ways to strengthen the morale of the army and the masses. We find ourselves in a difficult, complicated situation.

President Ceausescu: In 1970 I met Golda Meir and we talked for two and a half hours. Before that, my representatives had contacts with the representatives of Israel. She told me that she wants a political solution, that she is ready to make concessions and [find] an acceptable understanding. I spoke with other politicians as well, and other progressive forces that took positions in support of a rapid solution. I believe that presently conditions are not favorable to imposing a military solution. This could complicate the situation further. The US and the Soviet Union are involved in the region, and they will intervene themselves [further]; they will intervene. The consequences of a war are unfathomable. The US could not accept an Israeli defeat. The Soviet Union values its prestige, and does not want to lose it. As far as Romania is concerned, we do not have special interests in the region, and we do not seek a special position in the region. We only have one interest: that peace take hold so that Egypt can develop economically and socially. As far as I know, after the discussions between my representatives and Nasser, a conclusion was reached.

The easiest way would be for the Israelis to leave the occupied territories. The prolonging of the current state of affairs is not favorable to Egypt, a certain status quo is taking hold. In 1970 I asked Golda Meir: do you have territorial aims? She told me that they want to obtain some guarantees, some small rectifications. Of course, things can evolve in one way or another. I believe that in 1967-1968 there was a much better moment for Egypt to resolve the situation. One must think of a new initiative to get things moving. I understand the sentimentality of thinking: “as long as the territories are occupied we cannot sit down at the negotiating table.” A way must be found to start discussions. Maybe one can consider confidential discussions.

Regarding the DR Vietnam, we appreciated it when they said that they want to resolve the situation on their own. Even though they said that they did not talk to the Americans, they had done so for two years prior [to the beginning of negotiations]. I think there will be a solution in Vietnam in the not too distant future. A solution must be found, otherwise the situation becomes permanent, the issue gets complicated, even the Arab population in the [occupied] territories will tie itself economically [to the Israelis]. Regarding the Suez Canal, its closing means you are losing 3-4 dollars per ton of petrol, which means hundreds of thousands of dollars total. The situation cannot last for too long. Maybe a year or two, but after that the negative consequences on the economy and the living standards of the Egyptian people will be seen more easily. A number of Arab countries are looking out for their own interests. I don’t think it is good to give six or twelve months timeframes; this cannot have a positive influence on Egypt’s position.

I spoke [on 26 October 1970] with President Nixon and he said that the US intends [to work for] and sees a solution as a positive thing. Otherwise, they lose. He does not do this out of sympathy, but out of interest. We do not want to play a role on this issue, in the conflict; we could help out with some things if we were to be asked. I am thinking; why not try something through France?

Sadat: Why don’t you want to play a role? Meir says one thing, [Deputy Prime Minister Yigal] Allon another, [Israeli Foreign Minister Abba] Eban, also says something different. The US are not telling me what Israel wants specifically. After all, I’d like to know what the Israelis want.

Ceausescu: We could talk to them, but they are insisting on direct negotiations. They do not trust the Americans. They want to talk anywhere and under any conditions. An inflexible position is not the best choice. Secret negotiations could be carried out. We did not study the “Hussein proposal,” we were in Algeria at the time, but it seems that it’s worth paying attention to. Some Arab countries have done so, even if they declared publicly that they reject the proposal. You must have a concrete initiative, like in February 1971. For this, [your] friends and public opinion could be prepared. The FRG and Japan did not spend resources on the arms race and have obtained great economic power. A solution must be found. Greater international support could be obtained.

We met with [Nahum] Goldmann and believe he is reasonable. He is seeking a political solution and a series of practical actions in the international arena. I agree that the Israeli forces must be withdrawn from the occupied Arab territories, that we must discuss with the Palestinian leadership for resolving, for finding a solution to [the crisis of] the Palestinian population, so that they have normal living conditions, and if there is an agreement, maybe even to create a Palestinian state, in conformity with their national interests. Peace must take hold in the region in order for economic and social progress to happen.

In 1967, we talked to [West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt for five hours. He said that no German could assume the responsibility of recognizing two Germanies and of negoti-
atations with the Soviet Union, because that would be recognizing the status quo, including the postwar borders. We talked a lot. Now it’s clear that we were right. The existence of two Germanies is recognized, a treaty with the Soviet Union was finalized. Of course, there is some opposition [to this] in the FRG, but the opposition can only say that better conditions should have been obtained in the treaty with the USSR. Formally, it seems that the recognition of the two Germanies means that their separation is permanent. Yet German reunification can happen based on a closer cooperation.

In 1968, as you well know, the Soviet Union and some socialist states invaded Czechoslovakia. Given the situation at the time, we thought that there were intentions [on their side] to intervene in Romania as well. We showed the people what the situation was, and there was a great demonstration in front of the RCP Central Committee building. We armed the people; in two days we were able to arm over 800,000 people. [Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev reproached me a few times, [asking] how could I believe that there was any intention to intervene in Romania. I told him that we acted that way to be able to face any possible imperialist threat and that I did not think specifically of the Soviet Union. Rather, I wanted to strengthen the defense capabilities of the country without having to appeal to the Soviet Union. In politics one needs a great deal of courage. In Egypt’s case, a way must be found to resolve the conflict.

If Africa, if we are to look at Angola, I believe that the conditions are ripe to liquidate Portuguese colonialism through fighting. The US would not intervene, since they understand that Portuguese domination is failing, and are interested in obtaining a position [of influence] there. It is known that certain countries give aid to certain liberation movements only so that they can gain a position of influence.

I have an invitation to visit Israel, but I told them that I will go only when they will sign a peace [accord]. Yet we have contacts with their representatives, and we could discuss anything. If we can help do anything with regard to solving the Middle East problem, we are ready to do it. Of course, you must think of a solution and decide.

Sadat: I am thankful to President Ceausescu for the realis-
tic analysis he made concerning the situation. We will have to decide on the next stage.

The conversation lasted one and a half hours.

Memorandum of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Anwar El-Sadat, Cairo, 6 April 1972 [Excerpts]

[Source: ANIC, CC RCP External Relations, 19/1972, pp. 45-56. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.]

Minutes of Conversation

Of the separate discussion between […] Nicolae Ceausescu and […] Anwar El-Sadat, in Cairo, 6 April 1972. Sergiu Celac, acting director in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated.

Nicolae Ceausescu: I’ll ask you that this time the conversation be carried out in English.

Anwar El-Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: We just held a short press conference. Of course, the central issue was the situation in the Middle East.

Sadat: Of course; that’s the way it should be.

Ceausescu: I’d like to refer to some issues that we discussed last time, and in the second part, to inform you of the discussion we had yesterday with the representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, with Arafat and another two.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: Of course, we’ll see what issues my friend, the president, would like to bring up. I thought about the issues we discussed. I now understand better the concerns that you have, the Egyptian government and people have for finding a solution to the crisis in the Middle East in the shortest possible time. I explained a series of concerns that we have, and I will come back to them. However, I want to stress once again that, in my opinion, it is difficult to see a military solution. This is why I believe that finding a political situation must be the principal concern at the moment. That is why, in my opinion, it is necessary to find a way to allow other countries, which want to help find a solution to the war, to do so and help more on this issue.

Sadat: Very true.

Ceausescu: It is necessary to act in such a way as to con-
vince Israel to adopt a more rational position and give up the rigid position is had today.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: I believe it is necessary to act more forcefully to combat any tendencies to annex territory. This suggests a more intense diplomatic activity from other countries as well. Of course, for this to happen, Egypt and the other Arab countries should first request such help. I will tell you, honestly, I am under the impression that, presently, the world public opinion and a slew of international forces are not fully aware [sex-
izate concret] of the Middle East situation. This gives Israel, and especially the reactionary circles in Israel, the possibility to make all sorts of maneuvers. Honestly, I tell you this also applies to some reactionary Arab circles.

Sadat: Very true.

Ceausescu: This makes the policies of the imperialist coun-
tries, including the US, easier.

Sadat: True!

Ceausescu: Starting from these considerations, I think it is necessary for you to elaborate a program of specific activi-
ties for the intensification of political and diplomatic actions, so a political solution to the conflict can be found soon. This would force Israel, [also] other reactionary circles, to reveal their positions and intentions, could lead to better revealing the
progressive forces in the Arab countries, and, in the end, would offer the forces in the socialist countries, of other countries as well, of the international progressive movement, the opportunity to act resolutely in support of this issue.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: The example of Vietnam is very clear here. Of course, you have to take this step. I just wanted to tell you a few thoughts I had as I considered our discussions.

Sadat: I am in full accord!

Ceausescu: In my opinion, there are favorable conditions to do more, and with better results. As I told you last time, we are ready to do everything in our power.

Sadat: Very well!

Ceausescu: It is clear that Israel would like to find out the conclusions we reached [here]. We will inform them, we’ll tell them our opinion.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: You can always count on us that we’ll do everything in our power to help with your struggle. I want to mention again that, aside from all this, that the idea of secret negotiations should not be excluded [from the start]; if not for now, at least [sometime] in the future.

Sadat: That’s true, very well.

Ceausescu: This is what I wanted to tell my dear friend, President Sadat.

Sadat: I have full faith in you! We have the same principles—we [support] non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, we are non-aligned, we want to build our country based on the will of our people. We have the same opinions on all issues discussed.

Personally, I have a great deal of admiration for President Ceausescu, and I wanted very much to meet you. I wanted to meet you personally, like [I did] President Tito, and to have a sincere, open discussion, like the one right now.

I want to tell my friend that I am ready to adopt any daring decision. I don’t want to be the leader of the Arab world; I don’t have any such personal ambitions. I clearly stated that I am ready to sign a peace treaty and recognize Israel. Not one Arab leader has dared to do so in the past 22 years. What is worse is that once I made this decision, in front of the Arab world and in front of my people, and after I obtained [the people’s] approval for it, there was no reaction from Israel, with the exception of the declarations in the Knesset that they will never withdraw to the 4 June [1967] borders. This thing they presented as a principle of their policy. I said it, I don’t seek to impose myself as the leader of the Arab world, I don’t seek anything for myself. I seek, before all else, the good of my country.

If Israel, through your good offices, as a friend in which I have full confidence, and in which I know they too have full confidence, will tell us clearly what they want, then it will be good. I don’t want to get in the same situation in which King Hussein is in now. He talked with Israel. And what was the result? They dropped him! Recently, Madam Meir, talking to some students, said some things that will finish King Hussein. And that after he did everything they wanted him to do. I repeat, I don’t seek anything for myself. But, if I can do something for my country, then I am ready. I don’t seek anything for my own personal prestige. I am ready to take any decision.

I agree with my friend, the President, that a political solution is very difficult. That’s what I said yesterday as well, that I am for peace, because I want what’s good for my country. But peace is not only dependent on my actions. The other side must also seriously consider this thing. I am ready to walk this way, but it must be a just peace. I said this in front of the entire Arab world: I will recognize Israel and its borders, but not the new Arab territories it obtained after the invasion. This was said for the first time in the last 22 years. I said in front of the entire world that they will be allowed to use the Gulf of Aqaba. I am ready to give them guarantees in this respect, and if my guarantees are not sufficient, I am ready to accept that some UN forces be stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh. I made this statement and did not redact it in any way.

If they want this—great! But no one will ever agree to relinquish even a centimeter of Arab land. Believe me! No matter what some Arab leaders might say, the people will never accept [that]. You work with your people. I work with mine. We both know what the power of the people means. As I told my dear friend, I am ready to take any daring decision on the condition that it benefits the country. My person does not matter. But I do not want to end up as King Hussein, completely cut off from the Arab world.

Ceausescu: If I understand correctly, my friend Sadat considers it possible, however, that at some point, a meeting between representatives of Egypt and Israel will take place, under conditions that will have to be settled. (Sadat nods in agreement.) I agree that, for certain steps to be taken there must be full guarantees. This issue is so serious that rushing might ruin it. You can be sure that I will not say these things until I am convinced that all necessary conditions are ripe.

Sadat: Very well.

Ceausescu: I will not tell Israel that you are ready, until I will be convinced that they are serious about it. I will talk with them myself, and, if I reach this conclusion, I will make the next step.

Sadat: I fully agree with this way of proceeding.

Ceausescu: In this context, I will send my personal representative [Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu]. Probably it will be the same representative that had, in the past, contacts with President Nasser.

Sadat: Very well. I know him.

Ceausescu: If something develops, you can send someone to me. I will receive them.

Sadat: Very well. I will do so.

Ceausescu: If there are serious problems, a flight between Bucharest and Cairo only lasts four hours; even three with a good plane. […]

[Section on Ceausescu’s meeting with Yasser Arafat not included. For full document, visit www.cwihp.org]
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