ATOMIC ESPIONAGE AND ITS SOVIET "WITNESSES"

by Vladislav Zubok

No trial jury should render a guilty verdict without solid evidence, and neither should scholars. Therefore historians and scientists reacted with deep skepticism when in his recently-published memoir, *Special Tasks*, Pavel Sudoplatov, a notorious operative of Stalin’s secret service, asserted that the KGB received secret atomic information from several eminent scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr. Sudoplatov’s claim that Bohr had knowingly given sensitive atomic data to a Soviet intelligence operative in November 1945, thereby helping the USSR to start its first controlled nuclear chain reaction for the production of weapons-grade plutonium, generated particular surprise and disbelief given the renowned Danish physicist’s towering reputation for integrity and loyalty in the scientific world.

Only two months after Sudoplatov’s “revelations,” however, an important piece of contemporary evidence surfaced. Sudoplatov’s original 1945 memorandum to Stalin via Lavrenty Beria, retrieved from “Stalin’s File” (*papka Stalina*) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), refutes the allegation that Bohr improperly helped the Soviet atomic program and clandestinely passed secret Manhattan Project data to Beria’s messengers. Notwithstanding journalistic claims to the contrary, Sudoplatov’s contention that the approach to Bohr was “essential to starting the Soviet reactor” has proved to be a mere fantasy.

The cloud over Bohr should have been dispelled, but a larger question remains unanswered: how should one judge the claims of a group of “witnesses” from the Soviet secret police, intelligence, and elsewhere who have recently commented on Soviet espionage activities in 1941-1949 and their significance for Moscow’s atomic program? The situation evokes an old Russian proverb: “Lying like an eyewitness.” Indeed, the claims of these “witnesses” are suspect for a number of reasons, including the possibility of hidden agendas, personal biases, and the corrosive effect of time on human memories even when there is no deliberate intention to distort them, a danger that is particularly acute when people attempt to recall events concerning a subject beyond their expertise and comprehension.

That seems to be the major problem of most KGB commentators on atomic espionage, especially since only a tiny group of intelligence officers at various stages controlled the Kremlin’s atomic “networks” in the United States (Gaik Ovakimian, Leonid Kvasnikov, Anatoli Yatskov, Semen Semyonov) and in Great Britain (Vladimir Barkovsky, Alexander Feklisov). And even they, at the time of their operational work, were nothing more than conveyer belts of technical data between foreign sources and Soviet scientists.

The scientific head of the Soviet atomic program, Igor Kurchatov, sometimes with the help of his closest colleagues, formulated requests for technical information. Only he, and after August 1945 other members of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Soviet atomic project, could competently evaluate the materials provided by Klaus Fuchs and other spies. Kurchatov and other consumers of intelligence knew little or nothing of sources and methods, while Kvasnikov, Yatskov, Feklisov, and others knew very little of the progress of atomic research and development back home. Bohr’s interrogator, the scientist Y. Terletsky, according to a later interviewer, “had no real knowledge of what was going on in the Soviet project, thus Beria was not afraid of sending him abroad.”6 Kurchatov and his people compiled a questionnaire for Bohr and trained Terletsky to use it before his mission. Feklisov received a similar briefing from an unnamed “atomic scientist” before going to London to serve as control officer for Fuchs. “I had regrettably a weak knowledge of atomic matters,” admitted Feklisov in a considerable understatement.

Sudoplatov, the powerful secret police chief who after Hiroshima was given charge of the Soviet atomic project, effectively used this compartmentalization of information to prevent any leaks abroad. This system succeeded brilliantly when Western intelligence failed to penetrate the Soviet atomic project or predict the date of the USSR’s first atomic test in August 1949. Yet, a half century later, this very success produces misunderstandings.

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THE KGB MISSION TO NIELS BOHR: ITS REAL “SUCCESS”

by Yuri N. Smirnov

The reminiscences of Pavel Sudoplatov, a former Lieutenant General of the USSR NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, later the Ministry of Internal Affairs), recently published in the West, attracted widespread attention. And though his book Special Tasks, written with the participation of three co-authors, is not yet known to Russian readers, responses to it have appeared in our country as well. And the chapter which Sudoplatov devoted entirely to Soviet atomic espionage elicited the most interest.

The explanation is simple: it’s the first time one of the “main chiefs” in this area (during the 1945-46 period) started to speak, particularly one who enjoyed Beria’s special sympathy. Moreover, Sudoplatov suddenly “revealed” a piquant “detail”: that the elite of the American atomic project, including world-famous physicists Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, and others, allegedly cooperated with Soviet intelligence to pass atomic secrets to the USSR.

Naturally, this last claim provoked a storm of indignation from veterans of the Manhattan Project, most prominently from Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, and Victor Weisskopf. Teller stressed that the sensational chapter of Sudoplatov’s book, in his opinion, “is certainly wrong in many essential parts and quite possibly wrong in every respect.” Some readers even concluded that the chapter was meant as a provocation.

But the emotional response to Sudoplatov’s book obscured one very significant detail which explains a great deal. Sudoplatov is already 87 years old. And being of such a venerable age, he decided, without going near any documents, to describe from memory the most important events, which demand particular precision, and with which he dealt literally half a century ago. Naturally, his co-authors had to assume even more responsibility. Unfortunately, preference was not given to real, confirmed facts, but to cheap, inflated sensation. Where all this led—we will see in a very telling example.

For illustration I will use the most portentous episode described in Sudoplatov’s “Atomic Spies” chapter—the Russian physicist Yakov Terletsky’s special trip to see Bohr in Copenhagen in November 1945. Paradoxical as it may be, this episode illustrates Beria’s insidious calculations and Bohr’s noble, selfless humanism, as well as political leaders’ cynical desire to subordinate epochal scientific achievements to the goals of “big” policy. For Beria and Sudoplatov were not the only actors in this episode—the shadows of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin are visible as well.

Let’s turn to the facts.

At the end of October 1945, at Beria’s order, two employees of the “S” Department for atomic intelligence activities under Sudoplatov—his deputy head, Colonel Vasilevsky, and the physicist Terletsky, as well as the interpreter Arutyunov—were sent to Denmark to establish contact and speak with Bohr. They managed to meet Bohr at his institute twice, on 14 and 16 November 1945. As the result of this operation, Bohr’s answers to 22 questions which his visitors had asked of him were brought to Moscow and put at the disposal of physicist Igor V. Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear weapons effort.

If we evaluate these plain facts as did the head of the “S” Department, Sudoplatov, at the time, or as did Beria, who headed the institution which carried out this operation, then the espionage approach was undoubtedly a great success. But let us not hurry to final conclusions; let us first see how Sudoplatov himself described Terletsky’s mission, goals, and results in his recent book:

A pivotal moment in the Soviet nuclear program occurred in November 1945. The first Soviet reactor had been built, but all attempts to put it into operation ended in failure, and there had been an accident with plutonium. How to solve the problem? One idea, which proved unrealistic, was to send a scientific delegation to the United States to meet secretly with Oppenheimer, Fermi, and Szilard. Another suggestion to solve the problem of the balky reactor was to send [the renowned Soviet physicist Peter] Kapitsa to see Bohr in Denmark. Kapitsa by that time was no longer a member of the

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and even tensions between the intelligence community and the community of atomic scientists in the former Soviet Union.

For much of the Cold War, the Soviet intelligence elite believed firmly that its activities contributed to the prevention of war and to a stable peace in the dangerous nuclear era. The “old-boys club” of the KGB’s First Directorate viewed its role in the breaking of the U.S. atomic monopoly with increasing pride, and the appearance of (mostly Western) books on the Cold War which described Western plans for “atomic warfare” against the USSR augmented this feeling and deepened the desire for further successes.8

In time, those perceptions and dimming recollections blurred together into “memories.” Feklisov’s book, for instance, is the first in a series of publications, linked with the Association of Russian Intelligence Veterans, ostensibly intended to promote a serious, unsensational view of the history of Soviet intelligence. The book takes into account some published documents as well as the criticism of the earlier journalistic publications on this subject by Yuli Khariton and other nuclear veterans. Nevertheless, it adds to the list of errors and oddities. Feklisov asserts that the Smyth Report (August 1945) contained “disinformation, in order to lead astray scientists from other countries and, first and foremost, the USSR.” He adds that Robert Oppenheimer, director of the secret wartime weapons lab at Los Alamos, “asked to include” Fuchs in the British scientific mission that came to the United States to participate in the Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer, according to Feklisov, also “refused to sign” the Smyth Report because it was “one-sided and deluding.”10 None of these “facts” survive serious scrutiny, but they provide telling indicators of the Soviet intelligence community’s perceptions of the motivation of the U.S. government and foreign atomic scientists.

In another episode described in the book, Fuchs allegedly told Feklisov during their secret meeting in February 1949: “The team of Kurchatov is advancing full speed to the goal. . . . From your questions it is absolutely clear that soon the whole world will hear a voice of the Soviet ‘baby.’” It is indeed possible that Feklisov learned about the impending Soviet test from his “source.” But it is highly improbable that Feklisov would reveal to Fuchs the name of the head of the Soviet “team.”

On the same page Fuchs “tells” Feklisov: “I am sure that the Soviet comrades, of course, will be able to build an atomic bomb without foreign assistance. But... I want the Soviet government to save material resources and reduce the time of construction of nuclear weapons.”11

The thesis that intelligence gave the Soviet project a “short cut” on its road to the bomb is the strongest argument of “atomic” intelligence veterans. Yet, even this assertion is questioned by the scientific director of Arzamas-16 (the long-secret Soviet nuclear weapons design laboratory), Yuli Khariton, who points out that in spite of a good haul of atomic secrets in 1945, the obtained materials “still required an enormous amount of work on a great scale by our physicists before they could be ‘put to use.’”12 And Stalin himself, when he met Kurchatov on 25 January 1946, told the physicist not to spare himself, when he met Kurchatov on 25 January 1946, told the physicist not to spare resources, but to conduct “works broadly, on the Russian scale.”13

At least one of Feklisov’s “memories” (that Oppenheimer was instrumental in bringing Fuchs to Los Alamos) was “shared” by Pavel Sudoplatov.14 Yet, it is important to distinguish between Special Tasks and the memoirs of “atomic” intelligence officers like Feklisov. Sudoplatov’s “oral history,” when it strays beyond the limits of his expertise or immediate experience, hangs on the thread of half-forgotten, half-distorted hearsay. Time pressure on the authors (who squeezed out the book between August 1992 and late 1993),15 plus their extraordinary secretiveness, evidently precluded serious fact-checking. And Sudoplatov’s experience with the atomic intelligence was far more shallow than the publicity surrounding the book implied. He headed Department “S,” an intelligence arm of the Special Committee, the board in charge of the atomic project, for only a year, from September 1945 to October 1946, and it is even questionable whether he had access to operational files.16

Sudoplatov implies that he had developed good relations with atomic scientists (among them Kurchatov, Kikoin, and Alikhanov) by treating them to “lunches and cocktail parties in a Western style.” Indeed, he may have been trying to dispel fear that the scientists, justifiably, felt towards the henchmen under the Stalin-Beria-Merkulov command, who suddenly became their collaborators and supervisors.

After a brief stint in Department “S,” Sudoplatov plunged back into a familiar world of sabotage, disinformation games, and assassinations-on-request. In a word, he continued to link his career to a repressive, murderous arm of the NKVD-KGB. The arrogance, cynicism, and mistrust of intellectuals of many people from this branch contrasted with the cultural sophistication found among most officers from the technical-scientific intelligence service. The eminent Soviet physicist Pyotr Kapitsa complained in his letter of 25 November 1945 to Stalin, for example, that Beria “in particular” conducted himself on the Special Committee like a superman. “Comrade Beria’s basic weakness is that the conductor ought not only to wave the baton, but also to understand the score. In this respect Beria is weak.”19

In time even Beria learned to treat scientists with respect, and some of the NKVD-GULAG’s most capable administrators (Makhnev, Zaveniagin, Zernov, and others) excelled in managing the atomic project. The project’s unique quality and scale, in the eyes of all its principal collaborators, overshadowed the early contributions of “atomic spies.” Sudoplatov, however, did not share this experience.20 With a different personal agenda (after all, he wanted to rehabilitate himself, not to defend the honor of the KGB), Sudoplatov appears to have quickly responded to the blandishments of his American co-authors and/or publisher to produce an “atomic chapter” with little substance at hand.

Even less reliable than Sudoplatov’s “atomic spies” chapter are the writings of Sergei Beria,21 the only son of Lavrenty Beria and Nina Gegechkori, who in 1950 was catapulted from the student desk of a military academy to the position of chief engineer of the Special Bureau (SB-1) of the Third Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers, assigned with the task of building a defense system against a feared atomic aerial attack on Moscow. Along with his father and mother, he was arrested in 1953 and only after a long period of isolation could resume his work inside the missile industry in Ukraine. Despite the fact that he never had any part in the atomic project or
espionage. Sergio Beria stepped into this mine-field in an ill-conceived attempt to rehabilitate his father, with the confidence of a desperado who has nothing to lose.

Hence his laughable allegation that Robert Oppenheimer lived “at the end of 1939” at Beria’s dacha near Moscow.22 With a reference to Gen.-Col. Ivan Serov, he writes that Stalin at Potsdam was “very upset” when he learned about the successful Trinity test. In response to Stalin’s questioning, Beria allegedly said that “plutonium has been already obtained, and the construction of the bomb’s design is underway.”23 For anyone familiar with the stages of the Soviet atomic project, even in sketchy form, there is not enough room for sufficient insertions of “sic” and “?” in this quotation. Also: assessing the first Soviet nuclear test in Semipalatinsk in August 1949 (which he claims to have observed through “a telescope” from a bunker), Sergio Beria stated that Kurchatov and the rest of the State Commission “did not interfere in the course of the tests” and that “nothing depended on Kurchatov” since the “device” was already transferred to the military.24 In fact, the military controlled only the testing-site, not the bomb,25 and the State Commission (Beria, Kurchatov, Zaveniagin, Khariton, and Zernov) gave the order for the detonation.

It is astounding that Beria-junior and the persons who interviewed him dared to publish this mishmash of absurdities. But, as another Russian proverb goes, “paper can bear anything.”

Beria’s book lies beyond the pale, as does much of the “Atomic Spies” chapter in Special Tasks. The responsible officials and veterans of Soviet/Russian intelligence rejected Sudoplatov’s allegations with regard to atomic intelligence. On 4 May 1994, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (FIS) admitted that Soviet espionage, though it rendered “an important and qualified service . . . in the interests of the state,” had “played only a subsidiary role” in the development of the Soviet atomic bomb.26 But even after this announcement, some present-day FIS colleagues of Sudoplatov, after checking their files, confirmed to a Moscow journalist that “the advice given by the Nobel Laureate [Bohr] played a role in helping to get the first Soviet reactor going.”27 That claim sharply contrasts with Kurchatov’s expert conclusion on the results of Terletsky’s mission in November 1945, and that of leading Russian physicist Yuri Smirnov (Kurchatov Institute) in 1994. And it betrays a woeful lack of expertise.

What lessons can be drawn from the case of “eye-witnesses” of Soviet “atomic” intelligence? One conclusion is clear. Only the knowledge of the veterans of Soviet atomic project and Western nuclear physicists, combined with balanced and painstaking research by Cold War historians,28 can integrate the revelations about “atomic espionage” into usable and trustworthy history.

The distance between the two is as big as that between raw uranium ores and weapons-grade plutonium.

2. Ibid., esp. 181, 196, 205-207, 211-12.
7. A memorandum of the CIA’s Office of Reports and Estimates on 20 September 1949 cited the opinion of the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee that a Soviet bomb “might be expected” only in mid-1950 as “the earliest possible date.” That was three weeks after the test of Soviet bomb! See Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 319.
8. There is a similarity between many Soviet atomic scientists and intelligence officers: they saw the Cold War as a sequel to the Great Patriotic War, and regarded the U.S. atomic monopoly with the same concern as they regarded the rise of Nazi Germany.
9. Feklisov, Za okeanom, 150.
10. Ibid., 145-46, 150.
11. Ibid., 159.
Committee on Problem Number One because of his conflict with Beria, Voznesensky, and Kurchatov. Since Bohr had turned down Kapitsa’s invitation to the Soviet Union in 1943, and because of the internal conflicts in the scientific community, we decided to rely on scientists already in the project who were also intelligence officers... We decided that Terletsky should be sent to see Bohr in the guise of a young Soviet scientist working on a project supervised by Academicians Ioffe and Kapitsa. 

Bohr readily explained to Terletsky the problems Fermi had at the University of Chicago putting the first nuclear reactor into operation, and he made valuable suggestions that enabled us to overcome our failures. Bohr pointed to a place on a drawing Terletsky showed him and said, “That’s the trouble spot.” This meeting was essential to starting the Soviet reactor. 

When Niels Bohr visited Moscow University in 1957 or 1958 to take part in student celebrations of Physicists Day, the KGB suggested that Terletsky, then a full professor at the university and a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, should not meet with Bohr. Terletsky saw Bohr, who seemed not to recognize him. 

It is possible to reproach Sudoplatov’s co-authors at once for shoddy research: Terletsky was never a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Bohr participated in the students’ festival at Moscow University on 7 May 1961. Moreover, in fact Kapitsa, precisely as a member of the Special Committee headed by Beria, was even involved in preparations for Terletsky’s mission (Kapitsa was relieved from his activity on the atomic bomb, and hence from participation on the Special Committee, only on 21 December 1945). 

But the most serious error in Sudoplatov’s account of this episode in *Special Tasks* concerns his description of the reason for the approach to Bohr—allegedly difficulties in starting the first Soviet nuclear reactor. His version is consistent with his private 1982 petition to the CPSU CC for rehabilitation, in which he noted: “When an accident happened at one of the Soviet nuclear projects, into which hundreds of millions of rubles had been invested, and our scientists found it difficult to repair the situation, Department S assigned one of its staff, a young physicist, to go to Denmark and meet with the world-known physicist Niels Bohr; the information he brought back enabled us to eliminate the damage, bring the facility back to normal, and thus speed up the building of the nuclear bomb.” Though the reactor is not explicitly mentioned, the word “accident” remains prominent.

But on this very important point Sudoplatov—not only in 1994, but already in 1982—had become confused or forgetful. In fact, at the time of Terletsky’s November 1945 mission, Kurchatov’s collective was still the only Soviet atomic project in Moscow. And the surviving veterans, who had worked with Kurchatov, unanimously dismiss Sudoplatov’s “legend” as false and even nonsensical. For, they point out, they started preparation of the chamber for the first Soviet atomic reactor and the construction of the building for it only at the beginning of 1946! And the reactor itself was started without any complications on 25 December 1946. 

Besides, if Sudoplatov was to inform the leadership in writing about the results of the meeting with Bohr promptly after Terletsky’s return from Copenhagen, would he really have kept silent about having obtained information which “enabled us to eliminate the damage, bring the facility back to normal, and thus to speed up the building of the nuclear bomb”? Of course not! The funny part is that a super-secret report on the results of the meeting with Bohr, as an indication of the Cheka’s success, would have been sent at once to nobody but Stalin personally. Yet, in spite of the fact that Lieutenant General Sudoplatov was marked as the executor of this unique document, 16 pages long and signed by Beria, there is not even a hint in it of any accident which our physicists had had or of any difficulties with the start-up of an (actually as yet non-existent!) Soviet atomic reactor.

Beria informed Stalin:

Niels BOHR is famous as a progressive-minded scientist and as a staunch supporter of the international exchange of scientific achievements. This gave us grounds to send to Denmark a group of employees, under the pretense of searching for equipment which the Germans had taken from Soviet scientific establishments, who were to establish contact with Niels BOHR and obtain from him information about the problem of the atomic bomb. 

The comrades who were sent: Colonel VASILEVSKY, the Candidate of physio-mathematical sciences TERLETSKY, and interpreter-engineer ARUTUNOV, having identified appropriate pretexts, contacted BOHR and organized two meetings with him. 

In the course of the conversations BOHR was asked several questions which were prepared in advance in Moscow by Academician KURCHATOV and other scientists who deal with the atomic problem. 

Now we have reached the most interesting part: what is the meaning of “appropriate pretexts”; what was the nature of the questions prepared in Moscow; and what was so secret in the information Bohr “betrayed” to his Soviet interlocutors, if his answers were as they appeared in the secret document sent to Stalin? After we have dealt with these questions, we will have no trouble in evaluating the true “outcome” of the approach to Bohr. But first let us recall one circumstance, which is extremely vital for an understanding of the whole situation.

That is that on 12 August 1945, the U.S. government published the so-called “Smyth Report” as a book in the United States, the basis of which was specially declassified data on the creation of the atomic bomb. General Leslie R. Groves, the leader of the Manhattan Project, noted in the foreword to the publication that it contained “All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time without violating the needs of national security,” but sternly admonished that “Persons disclosing or securing additional information by any means whatsoever without authorization are subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act.” In other words, in the West limits were set, within which it was possible to discuss freely technical questions related to the atomic bomb. Naturally, the Smyth Report was immediately put at the disposal of Kurchatov and his workers. Here in the USSR the book was quickly translated into Russian and by 10 November 1945, when
Terletsky was still waiting for his meeting with Bohr, it had already been prepared for publication. Therefore, Terletsky’s assertion, having on November 16 received from Bohr a copy of the “Smyth Report,” that “we were, excuse me, the first Soviet people who had seen it,”12 turns out to be untrue. As Bohr’s biographers have pointed out, when he returned to Denmark from the USA in late August 1945, he brought a copy of the Smyth Report with him.13 Moreover, Bohr acquainted colleagues at his institute with it, and the Association of Engineers of Denmark even persuaded him to give a lecture on the topic. And though he asked journalists to refrain from exaggerations, the extraordinary information which had become generally available produced such a strong impression that one Copenhagen newspaper reported the lecture under the headline: “Professor Bohr reveals the secret of the atomic bomb.”14 The lecture which provoked so much fuss took place on 3 October 1945, over a month before Bohr’s meetings with Terletsky.15

Now Beria’s report to Stalin about the meeting with Bohr has been declassified, and anyone can see, by comparing it with the Smyth Report, that Bohr’s answers, as well as the questions put to him (which is especially noteworthy and surprising!), practically do not exceed the parameters of generally accessible information. I used the word “practically” because, being a theoretical physicist, Bohr in two or three cases permitted himself some short general theoretical remarks, which even so did not convey any secret technical information. At the same time, answering his visitors’ very first question, Bohr declared firmly: “I must warn you that while in the USA I did not take part in the engineering development of the problem and that is why I am aware neither of the design features nor the size of these apparatuses, nor even of the measurements of any part of them. I did not take part in the construction of these apparatuses and, moreover, I have never seen a single installation. During my stay in the USA I did not visit a single plant.” (How can we not but recall here again Sudoplatov’s absurd tale about the technical recommendation which had supposedly been obtained from Bohr on starting the first Soviet reactor!)

True, merely as a curiosity, I can say that Bohr once crossed the bounds “permitted” by the Smyth Report. Specifically, he said that every split uranium atom emits more than two neutrons, while in Smyth’s book a less definite formula is used—“somewhere between one and three neutrons” were emitted, on average16—and the precise number (2.5) was considered secret in the USA until 1950. Nevertheless, by saying this Bohr did not reveal any secret, because even before the war physicists had published that 2.3 neutrons are emitted in the course of the disintegration of a uranium atom.17

Finally, Bohr was quoted as making a short remark, consisting of just a few words, of a theoretical nature, starting from a most questionable hypothesis that, as he is supposed to have put it, “during the explosion uranium particles move at a speed equal to the speed of the neutrons’ movement.” Kurchatov, naturally, noted this, and in his comments pointed out that Bohr’s remark “must undergo theoretical analysis, which should be the task of Professors LANDAU, MIGDAL and POMERANCHUNK.” In fact, the thematic “gain” of Terletsky’s visit to Bohr was limited to this abstract, theoretical remark, which was of only hypothetical character, and which did not contain any secret technical information. It is no coincidence that Kurchatov, in his laconic (only half a page!) commentary on Bohr’s answers, which was among the documents sent by Beria to Stalin, noted only this remark of the Danish physicist along with the observation that “Bohr gave a categorical answer to the question about the methods which are used in the USA to obtain uranium 235”—information which, with many more details, could easily be gleaned from the Smyth Report, already long publicly available.18

Thus Bohr did not communicate any secrets to Terletsky, but he did not miss an opportunity to tell him:

We need to consider the establishment of international control over all countries as the only means of defense against the atomic bomb. All mankind must understand that with the discovery of atomic energy the fates of all nations will be very closely intertwined. Only international cooperation, the exchange of scientific discoveries, and the internationalization of scientific achievements, can lead to the elimination of wars, which means the elimination of the very necessity to use the atomic bomb. This is the only correct method of defense. I have to point out that all scientists without exception, who worked at the atomic problem, including the Americans and the English, are indignant at the fact that great discoveries become the property of a group of politicians. All scientists believe that this greatest discovery must become the property of all nations and serve for the unprecedented progress of humankind...atomic energy, having been discovered, cannot remain the property of one nation, because any country which does not possess this secret can very quickly independently discover it. And what is next? Either reason will win, or a devastating war, resembling the end of mankind.

Now we know that these words and Bohr’s position were immediately brought to Stalin’s personal attention. And, it seems to me, in this fact we find the only genuine success of Terletsky’s trip to Bohr, rather than the mythical “secrets” which the great scientist supposedly divulged. Previously, Bohr had expressed his view on the atomic bomb—that it was impossible for a nation to retain an atomic monopoly indefinitely on a basis of secrecy, and that consequently international control was the only hope of preventing a secret nuclear arms race leading to catastrophe—in a meeting with President Roosevelt in August 1944, and he heard from the American president words of support.19 (In a confidential memorandum, Bohr had already warned Roosevelt that “on the basis of the prewar work of Russian physicists it is natural to assume that nuclear problems will be in the center of their interest.”20) Yet Churchill, with whom Bohr had also discussed the issue (in May 1944), rejected the scientist’s arguments out of hand, and, having persuaded Roosevelt to shun Bohr’s plea to notify Stalin of the existence of the wartime Anglo-American atomic project (during their summit at Hyde Park, New York, on 18-19 September 1944), exclaimed to an aide: “The President and I are seriously concerned about Professor Bohr. How did he come into this business? He is a great advocate of publicity...He says he is in close correspondence with a Russian professor [Kapitsa]...It seems to me Bohr ought to be confined, or at any rate made to see that he is very near the edge of mortal crimes.”21
think that Bohr, knowing about the concern over his activities in powerful quarters, could allow himself even the tiniest carelessness when he met Terletsky and his companions. Now the following information emerges, according to recent reports in Danish newspapers. 22 The middle man in the organization of Bohr’s meeting with the Soviet agents who were visiting Copenhagen was not, as is asserted in the Sudoplatov book, 23 the Danish writer Martin Andersen Nekse; rather it was a professor at Copenhagen University, Mogens Fog, a former minister of the government and reportedly a secret member of the Danish Communist Party, who viewed the Soviet Union sympathetically. In early November 1945, Fog asked Bohr whether he could meet confidentially with a Soviet physicist who had come to Copenhagen with a letter from Kapitsa. Bohr replied that any sort of secret meeting was out of the question, and agreed only to a completely open conversation. Niels Bohr’s son, Aage Bohr, writing in the Danish press, related other details, noting that Bohr had immediately alerted not only the Danish intelligence service to the approaching meeting, but also British and even U.S. intelligence. According to Aage Bohr, he had participated in all of his father’s meetings with Terletsky and, though neither of them took any notes in either meeting, “father ascribed great significance to the fact that another person was present and later could explain what had actually happened. Moreover, in January 1946 the leader of the American atomic project, General L. R. Groves, had sent a special agent to Denmark in order to clarify the details, and Niels Bohr had said that Terletsky had requested information about nuclear weapons. 24

But there was one more reason for Bohr to understand the situation. He could hardly have refused to meet any of the Soviet physicists if they happened to be in Copenhagen, especially as Terletsky had a letter of recommendation to Bohr from his old friend Academician Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa. One must assume that this probably was the principal “appropriate pretext” about which Beria reported to Stalin. At the insistence of Beria, with whom Kapitsa’s relations had already been ruined, Kapitsa had written a letter to Bohr dated 22 October 1945 which introduced “the young Russian physicist Terletsky” as a “capable professor of Moscow University.” Kapitsa stressed that Terletsky “will explain to you the goals of his foreign tour.” 25 Yet in his letter Kapitsa did not call Terletsky his friend, as would be customary in other circumstances. Thus an important element, a kind of password in the developed style of friendly scientific correspondence, was missing, and this may well have alarmed Bohr (it immediately attracted the notice of Kapitsa’s widow, Anna Alekseevna, when she saw the letter). 26

As Kapitsa’s former associate, P. Rubinin, later noted, this letter cost Pyotr Leonidovich a lot: he could not but suffer, understanding that he had been exploited (and probably not for the last time) by Beria. 27 The cup turned out to be overfilled and the letter to Bohr became the last drop. A month later, Kapitsa sent his famous letter to Stalin in which he gave a sharply negative evaluation of Beria and declared further cooperation with him impossible. And a month after that, Kapitsa was discharged from work on the atomic bomb and fell into long disfavor.

Now the reader can judge what is left of Sudoplatov’s fantasies about the meeting with Bohr and how they relate to real facts. Veterans of “atomic” espionage should understand a simple thing: nobody is denying or diminishing the role played by the intelligence services in the furthering of the Soviet atomic program. But so this role does not turn into a caricature, the “atomic” spies themselves more than anyone must play their part. They need to accept that only competent specialists, particularly physicists familiar with the nuclear weapons field, together with veterans of the atomic project, can accurately say which espionage materials played a positive role and contributed concretely, and which proved useless or even counterproductive (there were such too!).

Terletsky, recalling his meeting with Bohr nearly 30 years later, noted: “Bohr said that in his opinion, all countries should have the atomic bomb, particularly Russia. Only the spread of this powerful weapon to various countries could guarantee that it wouldn’t be used in the future.” 28 It is not surprising that this distorted thesis was appropriated by certain Russian journalists and that Niels Bohr was rapidly transformed into a supporter and propagandizer of the idea of global nuclear proliferation. (I am not speaking here about the entirely curious article “The Bomb,” published in Moskovskii komsomol’stvo, 29 the author of which, having become a victim of his own technical incompetence, got it into his head to demonstrate that while Bohr was “not a spy, not a KGB agent,” he had evidently been moved by his idealistic conceptions to relate to Terletsky “priceless and top secret information.” 30)

At the same time, in the document sent by Beria to Stalin about Terletsky’s conversation with Bohr and which, naturally, was not put together without Terletsky’s participation, there is no evidence that Bohr made any such comments. On the contrary, while he spoke about the necessity of the “exchange of scientific discoveries and the internationalization of scientific achievements,” Bohr, at the same time, referring to the atomic bomb, supported the “establishment of international control over all countries” as the only method of defense against it. Of course, over the course of three decades Terletsky could forget the essence of Bohr’s remarks and distort them, and for him it was just a hop and a skip to a top secret document. More important, the formulation of the answers ascribed to Bohr in the document which lay on Stalin’s desk, cannot be accepted as irreproachable and precise, given the way Terletsky himself described their preparation: “All day Arutunov and I tried to reconstruct Bohr’s answers from memory. This turned out not to be such a simple task, since Arutunov, despite his phenomenally trained memory, while not understanding the subject had been in no position to remember everything verbatim, while I didn’t understand everything from Arutunov’s translation and had to recall how Bohr’s answers had sounded in English; after all, passively I knew some English, like everyone who had finished the Physics Faculty [FizFak] at MGU.” 31

From all this it is clear that in order to evaluate Bohr’s position on the atomic bomb we had best base ourselves on his own publications. In his June 1950 “Open Letter to the United Nations,” which most fully and clearly articulated his views on the issue under discussion, Bohr stressed that “any great technical undertaking, whether industrial or military, should have become open for international control.” In the same letter he stands up for the necessity of “universal access to full information about scientific discoveries,” including “the industrial exploitation of the sources of atomic energy.” 32 In other words, atomic weapons under international control, and the scientific achievements for the benefit of all mankind.
And now we know that, thanks to the KGB, Bohr was able to send that message straight to Stalin himself in 1945.

3. Actually, having learned that Bohr had fallen into a dangerous situation and had escaped from occupied Denmark to Sweden, P.L. Kapitsa on 28 October 1943 sent Bohr a letter with an invitation to move with his family to the Soviet Union. This was a purely humanitarian gesture from Kapitsa, who was worried by the fate of his colleague and friend and wished to help him in a dangerous situation.

Conjecture to the effect that Kapitsa invited Bohr to the USSR primarily so that the great physicist would participate in the Soviet atomic project does not have even the slightest foundation. In a letter to V.M. Molotov on 14 October 1943, Kapitsa, having noted that he had found out by chance about Bohr's escape, wrote, "Think that it would be very good and appropriate if we proposed our hospitality here in the Union to him and his family during the war. Even if he is unable to accept our proposal, it makes sense to do this. If you consider all this correct, then either the Academy of Sciences [can invite him]...or simply less officially, I can write the invitation." [P.L. Kapitsa, Letters About Science [Pis ma o nauke] (Moscow: Moscow Worker, 1989), 207.]

Bohr replied to Kapitsa from London on 29 April 1944: "Dear Kapitsa, I don't know how to thank you for your letter of October 28, which I received via the Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Zinchenko, a few days after my return from America. I am deeply touched by your faithful friendship and full of thanks for your magnanimous invitation...." [Kapitsa, Letters About Science, 299.]

The exchange of letters between Kapitsa and Bohr attracted the attention of Western intelligence services, and it evidently fanned Churchill's suspicions toward Bohr. [Ruth Moore, Niels Bohr: Man and Scholar [Niels Bohr—Chełovek i uchenyi] (Moscow: Mir, 389.)]

5. Ibid., 211-212.
8. The document is reprinted in Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks, 479-81.
11. Ibid., p. xii.
17. Ralph Lapp, New Power (Moscow: IL, 1954), 42.
18. Presenting such a conclusion as a document of required evaluation of the results of Terletsky’s mission, Kurchatov evidently limited himself to a compliment suitable to the occasion. He could not do otherwise, recognizing that Beria, the main organizer of the entire operation, was not only the chief of the country’s intelligence and punitive organs, but also was at the same time the main administrator of the Soviet atomic project, i.e., his immediate superior.
19. Moore, Niels Bohr, 386-88. [Ed. note: The fullest account and analysis of Bohr’s efforts to convince U.S. and British leaders prior to Hiroshima of the need to inform Stalin about the Manhattan Project officially in the hope of heading off a postwar nuclear arms race may be found in Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Knopf, 1975); citations from 1987 Vintage edition, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Original of the Arms Race.]
23. Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks, 206.
27. Ibid.

Physicist Yuri N. Smirnov is a Leading Researcher of the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute and a veteran of the Soviet nuclear weapons program. This article is a revised version of one which appeared in the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 22 June 1994, Translation for the CWIHP Bulletin by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

**BERIA TO STALIN**

continued from page 51

[handwritten: “Correct: Chernikov”]

3 copies typed.

Copy #1 — to the addressee

“ #2 — to the Secretary of USSR NKVD

“ #3 — Department “6”

Executor Sudoplatov
Typist Krylova.

**DOCUMENT II:**

The Interrogation of Niels Bohr

1. **Question:** By what practical method was uranium 235 obtained in large quantities, and which method now is considered to be the most promising (diffusion, magnetic, or some other)?

**Answer:** The theoretical foundations for obtaining uranium 235 are well known to scientists of all countries; they were developed even before the war and present no secret. The war did not introduce anything basically new into the theory of this problem. Yet, I have to point out that the issue of the uranium pile [kotol; reactor—ed.] and the problem of plutonium resulting from this — are issues which were solved during the war, but these issues are not new in principle either. Their solution was found as the result of practical implementation. The main thing is separation of the uranium 235 isotope from the natural mixture of isotopes. If there is a sufficient amount of uranium 235, realizing an atomic bomb does not present any theoretical difficulty. For separation of uranium 235, the well-known diffusion method is used, and also the mass-spectrographic method. No new method is applied. The Americans succeeded by realizing in practice installations, basically well-known to physicists, in unimaginably big proportions. I must warn you that while in the USA I did not take part in the engineering development of the problem and that is why I am aware neither of the design features nor the size of these apparatuses, nor even of the measurements of any part of them. I did not take part in the construction of these apparatuses and, moreover, I have never seen a single installation. During my stay in the USA I did not visit a single plant. While I was there I took part in all the theoretical meetings and discussions on this problem which took place. I can assure you that the Americans use both diffusion and mass-spectrographic installations.

2. **Question:** How can the space charge of the ionic beam in a mass-spectrograph be compensated for?

**Answer:** If the gas from the vacuum chamber is pumped out completely, we will have to think about a way to compensate for the volume...
charge of the ionic beam. But if the gas from the chamber is not pumped out completely, it is not necessary to worry about compensating for the volume charge. Or, in fact, compensation for the volume charge of the ionic beam is accomplished by means of the incomplete pumping of gas from the vacuum chamber.

3. **Question:** Is it feasible to execute a uranium pile using a natural mixture of isotopes and ordinary [“light”—ed.] water as a moderator?

**Answer:** The question of using ordinary water as a moderator was raised, yet the idea was not realized in practice. The uranium pile with ordinary water is not used. I think that the use of ordinary water as a moderator is not expedient, because light hydrogen absorbs neutrons well, thus turning into heavy hydrogen. This idea is not popular in America. Originally the Americans intended to build piles with heavy water as a moderator, but production of heavy water requires huge expense. During the war the Americans discovered that graphite can serve as a good moderator. They developed this idea in practice and implemented it on a gigantic scale. The construction side, the arrangement and the measurements of this pile, is not known to me.

4. **Question:** What substance is used for cooling the uranium blocks themselves?

**Answer:** Normal water is used for cooling the uranium blocks. The problem of cooling the uranium piles is extremely complicated, since cooling the piles literally requires whole rivers. We note that the water used for cooling is brought almost to boiling.

5. **Question:** What is the temperature change of the multiplication factor, what is the numerical equivalent of the temperature coefficient of the multiplication factor? Or what does the curve representing the relationship between the multiplication factor and temperature look like?

**Answer:** The mere fact that the uranium pile is working means that the dependence of the multiplication factor on temperature is not significant. Otherwise, as the result of the violent reaction, the pile would explode. I cannot provide the numerical significance of this dependence, but evidently it is of an insignificant size. However, this factor must not be ignored. It is necessary to maintain the pile in a certain state by regulating the amount of water coming into it. Normally uranium cores are kept in cold condition. It is necessary to keep in mind that if the pile’s working regime is disrupted, the pile can be easily spoiled. We also note that the possibility of regulating the uranium pile is provided by the existence of a long period of time /about a second and more/ between the fission of the nucleus and the emission of slowed neutrons, which comprise 1% of the total number of emitted neutrons.

/Then BOHR on the basis of his work, done with [Princeton University physicist John A.] WHEELER, explained this thesis to Prof. TERLETSKY in detail/

6. **Question:** Are there other supplementary methods for regulating the uranium pile?

**Answer:** For this purpose, regulating substances which absorb neutrons are loaded into the pile.

7. **Question:** Which substance is used as the absorber?

**Answer:** It seems that the absorbent rods are made of cadmium.

8. **Question:** How many neutrons are emitted from every split atom of uranium 235, uranium 238, plutonium 239 and plutonium 240?

**Answer:** More than 2 neutrons.

9. **Question:** Can you not provide exact numbers?

**Answer:** No, I can’t, but it is very important that more than two neutrons are emitted. That is a reliable basis to believe that a chain reaction will most undoubtedly occur. The precise value of these numbers does not matter. It is important that there are more than two.

10. **Question:** What is the number of spontaneous disintegrations [i.e., fissions—ed.] within a segment of time for all the mentioned substances /uranium 235, uranium 238, plutonium 239, plutonium 240/?

**Answer:** Few spontaneous disintegrations take place, and in calculations it is not necessary to take them into consideration. The period of spontaneous fission is approximately 7,000 years. I can’t cite the precise numbers, but you yourself understand that with such a period of spontaneous disintegration, there is no reason to expect it to influence the process significantly.

11. **Question:** In order to obtain a large quantity of uranium 235, is either the diffusion method or mass-spectographic method used alone, or are these two methods also used in combination?

**Answer:** The Americans use both methods and, besides, they use the combination of these two methods. I think that the combination of these two methods is most effective, because if we presume that we have 0.5% of uranium 235 and if, as a result of applying the diffusion method by passing it through a cascade, we increase the uranium content by 5 times, then by putting the uranium after that into the chamber of a spectograph, we can accelerate the process by 5 times. I do not know for certain, but I think that the Americans use the combination of these two methods very widely.

12. **Question:** How stable is the multi-stage machine?

**Answer:** The fact that diffusion cascades of very many stages already work in the USA shows that the process can and does take place. And it is not new. As you know, the German scientist [Gustav] HERTZ long before the war proved already that this process was possible, when he split helium, neon.

13. **Question:** How is high productivity achieved using the mass-spectographic method; is it by constructing a large number of ordinary spectographs, or by constructing a few powerful spectographs?

**Answer:** Both. You cannot imagine what an enormous number of huge spectographs the Americans built. I do not know their size and number, but I know that it is something incredible. From the photographs which I saw it is possible to conclude that these are gigantic buildings with thousands of apparatuses installed in them, and that many plants like this were built. In such a way the Americans built a large number of big spectographs.

14. **Question:** By what method is it possible to obtain high ion charges of uranium or its compounds?

**Answer:** By constructing a large and powerful mass-spectograph.

15. **Question:** Does the pile begin to slow as the result of slag formation in the course of the fission of the light isotope of uranium?

**Answer:** Pollution of the pile with slag as the result of the fission of a light isotope of uranium does occur. But as far as I know, Americans do not stop the process specially for purification of the pile. Cleansing of the piles takes place at the moment of exchange of the rods for removal of the obtained plutonium.

16. **Question:** How often is plutonium removed from the machine and how are the terms for the removal determined?

**Answer:** I do not know for sure. By unconfirmed hearsay, the removal of the rods takes place once a week.

17. **Question:** Does plutonium 240 split under the influence of slow neutrons? Has the possibility of plutonium 240 fission been proved experimentally?

**Answer:** It is known that the fission of all even isotopes, uranium 234, uranium 238 and plutonium 240, requires significantly more energy than uneven isotopes /let’s recall [Austrian physicist Wolfgang] Pauli’s principle/, and that the energy released by plutonium 240 must be equal to the energy released by the fission of uranium 239. At this point BOHR, illustrating his speech with graphs from his works, gave a detailed foundation for the fact that the question of using plutonium 240 is not very sensible. So far nobody has proved by experiment that it is possible to split plutonium 240.

18. **Question:** Does a uranium pile using heavy water as a moderator exist, or are all working piles uranium-graphite?

**Answer:** All piles working in the USA have graphite moderators. You evidently know that production of heavy water demands an enormous amount of electric power. Before the war the production of heavy water was organized only in Norway. And we all bought heavy water there.
We note that during the war the Germans applied much effort in order to carry out processes with heavy water, but they did not manage to collect the amount of heavy water sufficient to start a pile. The Americans found it possible to use graphite as a moderator and accomplished this idea with considerable success. Therefore, as far as I know, they gave up using piles with heavy water for industrial production. The Canadians chose another way, deciding to construct piles with heavy water, but these piles have not been activated for the same reason: they cannot accumulate for this purpose the necessary amount of heavy water. I consider it necessary to stress that I received this information during informal conversations with my colleagues.

19. Question: Of which substance were atomic bombs made?
   Answer: I do not know of which substance the bombs dropped on Japan were made. I think no theoretician will answer this question to you. Only the military can give you an answer to this question. Personally I, as a scientist, can say that these bombs were evidently made of plutonium or uranium 235.

20. Question: Do you know any methods of protection from atomic bombs? Does a real possibility of defense from atomic bombs exist?
   Answer: I am sure that there is no real method of protection from atomic bomb. Tell me, how can you stop the fission process which has already begun in the bomb which has been dropped from a plane? It is possible, of course, to intercept the plane, thus not allowing it to approach its destination—but this is a task of a doubtful character, because planes fly very high for this purpose and besides, with the creation of jet planes, you understand yourself, the combination of these two discoveries makes the task of fighting the atomic bomb insoluble. We need to consider the establishment of international control over all countries as the only means of defense against the atomic bomb. All mankind must understand that with the discovery of atomic energy, having been discovered, cannot remain the property of one nation, because any country which does not possess this secret can very quickly independently discover it. And what is next? Either reason will win, or a devastating war, resembling the end of mankind.

21. Question: Is the report which has appeared about the development of a super-bomb justified?
   Answer: I believe that the destructive power of the already invented bomb is already great enough to wipe whole nations from the face of the earth. But I would welcome the discovery of a super-bomb, because then mankind would probably sooner understand the need to cooperate. In fact, I believe that there is insufficient basis for these reports. What does it mean, a super-bomb? This is either a bomb of a bigger weight then the one that has already been invented, or a bomb which is made of some new substance. Well, the first is possible, but unreasonable, because, I repeat, the destructive power of the bomb is already very great, and the second—I believe—is unreal.

22. Question: Is the phenomenon of overcompression of the compound under the influence of the explosion used in the course of the bomb explosion?
   Answer: There is no need for this. The point is that during the explosion uranium particles move at a speed equal to the speed of the neutrons' movement. If this were not so the bomb would have given a clap and disintegrated as the body broke apart. Now precisely due to this equal speed the fissile process of the uranium continues even after the explosion.

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DOCUMENT III:
Kurchatov's Evaluation

EVALUATION

of the answers given by Professor Niels BOHR to the questions on the atomic problem.

Niels BOHR was asked two groups of questions:

1. Concerning the main directions of the work.
2. Those containing concrete physical data and constants.

Definite answers were given by BOHR to the first group of questions.

BOHR gave a categorical answer to the question about the use of methods for obtaining uranium 235 in the USA, which completely satisfied the correspondent member of the Academy of Science Prof. [Isaak Konstantinovich] KIKOIN, who put this question.

Niels BOHR made an important remark dealing with the effectiveness of using uranium in the atomic bomb. This remark must undergo a theoretical analysis, which should be the task of Professors [Lev Davidovich] LANDAU, [A.B.] MIGDAL, and [Isaak I.] POMERANCHUK.

Academician /KURCHATOV/

“ of December 1945

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1. [On 15 November 1945, at a summit in Washington, Truman, Attlee, and King issued a tripartite declaration recognizing the impossibility of defense against the atomic bomb or keeping a national monopoly over atomic weapons or science, and calling for the United Nations to create a commission to establish international exchange of scientific information. This policy led to the unsuccessful UN talks over the Baruch and Gromyko plans for international control.—ed.]
The previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 3, Fall 1993, pp. 1, 55-69) contained a selection of translated documents from the Russian archives on Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, and here the series continues. Several documents were provided by the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its Russian acronym), the archive containing the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee, in connection with the January 1993 conference in Moscow organized by CWIHP in cooperation with TsKhSD and the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Scholars working with CWIHP provided others, including several from a special TsKhSD collection known as Fond 89, which contains Soviet documents declassified for the 1992 Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU and other special occasions. The CWIHP Bulletin hopes to publish more translated documents from the archives of the USSR/CPSU and other former communist states in forthcoming issues, and welcomes submissions of documents (and short introductions) from scholars conducting research in East-bloc archives.

I. Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, 1950—“Clarifications”

In the spring of 1950, the most tightly held secret in the world was that preparations were going forward for North Korea to launch a massive military assault on South Korea in a concerted drive to unify the peninsula, divided since the end of World War II, under communist rule. For decades, scholars could only guess at the dynamics of the mystery-shrouded exchanges among the leaders of North Korea, the USSR, and the newly-established People’s Republic of China. However, the previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin included a declassified document from the Russian archives clearly indicating that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had repeatedly petitioned Soviet leadership for its blessing to launch the attack, and that he finally received a green light from Stalin during his visit to Moscow in April 1950. In that document, a 1966 internal Soviet Foreign Ministry report, it was also stated that following this meeting in Moscow, in May 1950, “Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.” (See “New Findings on the Korean War,” translation and commentary by Kathryn Weathersby, CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18, quotation on p. 16.)

The following two documents shed further light on the interplay between Stalin and Mao as Kim sought Beijing’s approval. They were among more than 200 documents totaling over 600 pages from the Russian Presidential Archives concerning the Korean War that were given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam during the latter’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, and were made available to the CWIHP Bulletin by the South Korean Embassy in Washington. The first document is a coded telegram sent to Moscow on the night of 13 May 1950 from the Soviet Embassy in Beijing. It relayed a request from Mao, conveyed via Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, seeking Stalin’s “personal clarifications” of his stand on a potential North Korean action to reunify the country. Mao sought the information after hearing a report from Kim, who had arrived that day in the Chinese capital for a secret two-day visit and clearly claimed that he had received Stalin’s blessing. The second document, a coded telegram from Moscow to Beijing, contained Stalin’s personal response. Using the code-name “Filippov,” Stalin confirmed his agreement with the North Korean proposal to “move toward reunification,” contingent on Beijing’s assent.

Particularly noteworthy is Stalin’s suggestive yet cryptic statement that the Soviet leaders (i.e., Stalin himself) had altered their stance, after long resisting Kim’s appeals, due to the “changed international situation.” Exactly what had changed? “Filippov” doesn’t say, but the apparent timing of his conversion certainly engenders speculation. According to previously disclosed Soviet documents, Stalin had indicated as early as 30 January 1950 that he was “ready to approve” Kim’s request for permission to attack the South, and to render material assistance to assure its success, although he noted, “Such a large matter needs preparation.” (See documents quoted in Dmitrii Volkogonov, “Sleduyet li etogo boyat’sia?” [“Should we fear this?”], Ogonyok 26 (June 1993), 28-29, cited in Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Journal of American-Asian Relations 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58.) Stalin’s statement in a coded telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang came less than three weeks after U.S. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s famous National Press Club speech in which he excluded Korea, and other mainland locations, from the American “defensive perimeter” in Asia. Though Acheson’s speech was primarily devoted to the subject of China, and though he was merely echoing statements by U.S. military leaders in his definition of American military strategy in the Pacific, his statement may have been seen in Moscow as lending credence to the argument that Washington would not intervene militarily to rescue South Korea from being overrun. But of course, Stalin may also have been alluding to other, far more momentous developments on the international scene, especially the Chinese Communists’ consolidation of power after militarily routing their Guomindang opponents, and the Soviets’ own success the previous autumn in ending the four-year U.S. nuclear monopoly.

As for Mao, the sequence of events (perhaps by Stalin’s design) clearly put him on the spot. Though exhausted by the decades-long civil war, and still gearing up for an assault on the Nationalist redoubt on Taiwan, Mao and his comrades in Beijing may well have felt compelled to endorse Pyongyang’s action in order to demonstrate to Stalin their revolutionary mettle, zeal, and worthiness to spearhead the communist movement in Asia—especially given the rather cool and skeptical welcome Mao had received when he had visited Moscow the previous December. Perhaps, as some scholars contend (most prominently Bruce Cummings in his two-volume study), fullscale war between North and South Korea was bound to erupt at some point in any case, since both sides’ leaders were eager to achieve reunification. Yet it appears that Kim was able to strike first on his own schedule by exploiting the mutual suspicion and competition between the two communist giants. The Bulletin plans to publish further reports bearing on the Korean War in future issues. Commentary by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP Director; translations by Vladislav M. Zubok, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., and Kathryn Weathersby, Florida State University, Tallahassee.
CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Destination: PEKING
To whom: Sov Ambassador

SPECIAL

For Mao-Tse-Tung.

“Comr. Mao-Tse-Tung!”

In a conversation with the Korean comrades Filippov [Stalin] and his friends expressed the opinion, that, in light of the changed international situation, they agree with the proposal of the Koreans to move toward reunification [пrijступит k обединнению]. In this regard a qualification was made [пri етом бilo оговорено], that the question should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be postponed until a new discussion. The Korean comrades can tell you the details of the conversation.

Filippov’s.

Telegraph the fulfillment [исполненение telegraf’tе].

Vyshinsky

5 copies
14 May 1950

Copies:
1. Comr. Stalin
2. Comr. Molotov
3. Comr. Vyshinsky
4. Comr. 10th department
5. Comr. Copy

(Source: APRF.)

II. Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis

In this strikingly frank assessment, forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Foreign Ministry informs the Kremlin that in the wake of the Hungarian and Suez crises in the fall of 1956, admiration for the United States has risen and Soviet stock has plummeted in the newly-independent Asian countries that had formerly belonged to the European colonial empires. The December 1956 report on the crises’ impact in the “Colombo Countries”—referring to Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, all former colonies which had gained independence since World War II, and signatories of an agreement on economic cooperation in the Ceylonese capital of Colombo—must have been particularly galling to the Soviet leadership since the countries it covered, especially India, were targets of Moscow’s ardent post-Stalin diplomatic offensive to woo members of the emerging bloc of “non-aligned” nations to its side in the Cold War. In 1955, Khrushchev had hosted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Moscow and then paid his own visit to India and Burma, and had also called on Tito in Belgrade in an effort to patch up Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which had grown bitterly hostile under Stalin.

The Foreign Ministry analysis, however, suggested strongly that recent events had dealt this strategy a serious blow. In all the “Colombo countries,” it reported, there had been a “significant increase” in anti-Soviet views, in public, official, and diplomatic arenas, even among leftists; a disillusioned New Delhi, in particular, had officially told Moscow that the invasion of Hungary “shatter[ed] the belief of millions of people who had begun to view the USSR as the defender of peace and rights of the weakest people,” and Nehru was reported to be coordinating with Tito in condemning Moscow’s actions, and also tightening ties with China and the United States.

Even worse, the report noted a sharp increase in the prestige of the United States and Eisenhower personally, who had welcomed Nehru to Washington in late December 1956. By opposing (at least diplomatically) both the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Anglo-French-Israeli coordinated military assault to capture the Suez Canal from Egypt and its nationalist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Eisenhower had enhanced his credibility as a defender of the rights of small nations against interference by larger powers. This assessment accorded with that of U.S. diplomatic observers, who sensed an historic opportunity to draw India closer to the United States. (See, e.g., the cable from the U.S. ambassador in India, 7 December 1956, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, VIII, 319-25.) But it contrasts with subsequent analysis of Henry Kissinger that “the Soviet Union’s acts in Hungary cost it no influence among the Nonaligned, while the United States garnered no additional influence among that group as a result of its stand over Suez.” (Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 563-64.) In at least some
nonaligned countries, and at least for the short term, the Soviet analysis shows, the conduct of the superpowers in Hungary and Suez had indeed reduced the USSR’s influence and raised that of the United States. 

Introduction by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; document provided by Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Moscow.

* * * * * * *

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

To Comrade ORLOV, A.L.

I forward a copy of a note prepared by the Committee of Information, USSR MFA, “The Influence of Events in the Near East and in Hungary on relations of the “Colombo countries” toward England, the USA, and the Soviet Union.”

The note has been sent to the leadership of the MFA USSR.

Attachment: On 8 pages.

(Signed) I. Tugarinov

28 December 1956
No. 1869/2

* * * * * * *

nm. 32
Copy Top Secret
Copy No. 30

The Influence of Events in the Near East and in Hungary on the Attitudes of the “Colombo Countries” Toward England, the USA, and the Soviet Union

I.

The latest events in the Near East and in Hungary led to the appearance of certain new elements in the attitudes of the “Colombo Countries” toward England, the USA, and the Soviet Union.

During the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt, an anti-English mood was sharply strengthened in the “Colombo Countries.”

In these countries, demands were put forth for the breaking of relations with England and for the withdrawal of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon from the British Commonwealth. Also, on November 3, the Parliament of Indonesia unanimously took the decision to recommend to the government that it review the question of the breaking of relations with England, should the English forces not be withdrawn from Egyptian territory.

One of the most prominent personalities of the Indian National Congress Party [Chakravarti] RAJAGOPALACHARI, suggested that India withdraw from the British Commonwealth in the event that England rejected the decision of the UN regarding the question of aggression against Egypt. Many Indian newspapers and political parties supported RAJAGOPALACHARI’s demand. Analogous demands were put forth in Pakistan and in Ceylon.

The governments of the “Colombo Countries” also officially considered the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt. However, they restrained themselves from taking any actions which might be evidence of a retreat by these countries from the policy which they followed earlier in relation to England. At a press conference on November 2, in response to a question as to whether India might apply these or other sanctions against England, NEHRU answered, “We are not thinking about sanctions.” On November 9, NEHRU directly said that India would act incorrectly, if it were to withdraw from membership in the British Commonwealth because of the actions of England in Egypt. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, [S.W.R.D.] BANDARANIKE on November 12 spoke in a similar vein against a suggestion that India and Ceylon withdraw from the British Commonwealth.

The President of Pakistan, Iskander MIRZA, who recently visited Iran, in a conversation with diplomatic representatives from Arab countries accredited to Teheran, announced that “such a great colonialistic power, such as England, has at its disposal huge military powers, and it is capable of any actions.” Therefore, in questions involving England, it is necessary to follow “a more moderate course,” and not to take headstrong "adventuristic steps.”

Such a position on the part of the ruling circles of the “Colombo Countries” is explained first of all by the sufficiently significant degree to which these countries are economically and politically dependent on England. English capital continues to hold a dominant position in the leading branches of the economies of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, particularly in the plantation economy, manufacturing industry, and also in internal and foreign trade. In India, for example, according to information in our possession, more than 72% of long-term foreign investment is English, and this accounts for more than 30% of all the money invested in the Indian economy.

In India and Pakistan there remain a significant number of English “advisors” and various types of “consultants,” and several Englishmen even occupy official government positions.

A decent number of Englishmen remained in the armed forces of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. As in the past, the general staffs of the armed forces of these countries, along with many officers, are trained in England.

A significant part of the bureaucratic apparatus of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon is preserved from the time of English colonial rule, and supports continued ties with England. The main role in the matter of the continued membership of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon in the British Empire is played by the fact that the great bourgeois and land-owning circles of these countries are not interested in breaking economic and political relations with England.

Currently, as England has begun to withdraw its troops from Egypt, expressions of criticism toward the actions of England in Egypt have almost completely ceased in the “Colombo Countries.”

And so, the English aggression towards Egypt has not led to any sort of noticeable worsening of relations of these countries with England, although, it is without doubt in connection with her aggressive actions in the Near East, England’s prestige in Asian countries has been damaged severely.

II.

Recently, in reaction to the events in Hungary, there has been a significant increase in speeches hostile to the Soviet Union in the “Colombo Countries.” These speeches are found in their most extreme form in Pakistan and Burma.

In the ruling circles of the “Colombo Countries” an analogy was made between the English-French-Israeli aggression in Egypt and the participation of Soviet forces in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary. In particular, a November 14 declaration of the Prime Ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon reads, “each of them has independently already expressed their uneasiness about these events (in Egypt and Hungary—Committee on Information) and their strong disapproval and their chagrin in connection with the aggression and the intervention of great powers against weak countries. This is a violation of a condition of the UN Charter, and also a direct violation of the spirit and letter of the Bandung Conference declaration and the principles expressed in it.”

In the above-mentioned declaration, The Prime Ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon demanded that Soviet forces be quickly withdrawn from Hungary, and that the Hungarian people be granted the right “to decide for themselves the question of their future and to create the government that it wishes to have, without any sort of outside meddling.”

The “Colombo countries” adhered to this position—which is basically unfriendly toward the USSR—during the U.N.’s consideration of the so-called Hungarian question. The Pakistani delegation, occupying a position on the Hungarian question which is openly hostile to the Soviet Union, even was one of the co-authors of a five-
country resolution which called for intervention in the Hungarian matter. According to information received from our Chinese friends, the government of Burma considers the application of sanctions against the Soviet Union in relation to its actions in Hungary a possible step.

In the memorandum of the Indian Government handed to Comrade GROMYKO on 17 December 1956, the current position of the Soviet Union is judged in its essentials, and it is asserted that

“the events in Hungary shatter the belief of millions of people, who had begun to view the USSR as the defender of peace and rights of the weakest people.”

It should be noted that the evaluation of the Hungarian situation by the “Colombo Countries” corresponds to a significant degree with the Yugoslav point of view on this question. According to information in our possession, NEHRU and [Burmese Prime Minister] U BA SWE support close contact with Yugoslavia on the Hungarian question.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that NEHRU, in his speech to the Indian Parliament on 20 November 1956, underlined that TITO is in a position to give a correct evaluation of events in Europe and that India, in working out its foreign policy program, to a certain degree is led by his evaluation. Besides this, NEHRU, speaking about Tito’s speech in Pula [Yugoslavia—ed.], noted that to him many points in this speech seem correct.

The Government of India is in full accord with the position of Yugoslavia regarding [overthrown Hungarian leader] Imre NAGY. And so, NEHRU, in his conversation with CHOU EN-LAI which took place on 3 December 1956, expressed India’s disagreement with the actions of the Soviet government on this question. According to NEHRU, “facts of this type are extremely unfavorable for the USSR.”

Recently, many political parties, organs of the press, and a range of leading political figures of the “Colombo countries” have begun to speak very critically of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, pointing out in this regard that the events in Eastern Europe bear witness “to the insincerity of the Soviet Union” and about its unwillingness to consistently adhere to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

The following comments from the Indian press are representative of these opinions. According to the newspaper “Indian Express,” Soviet policy, which preached its devotion to the principles of “panch shil” [Ed. note: This refers to the “five principles”—of mutual respect, nonaggression, noninterference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—espoused by Nehru to apply to Indian-Chinese relations, and to international relations generally.] is now unmasked. The influential newspaper “Hindustan Standard” wrote in November 1956 that the Soviet government

“by its actions in Hungary has made the most vulgar mistake in the post-Stalin epoch. The trust and good wishes which it received in recent months have quickly disappeared, and now, after this there may follow even more serious events.”

The Prime Minister of Burma U BA SWE said directly that the policy of the Soviet government is directed toward undermining the foundations of the United Nations.

NEHRU, touching on the situation in Hungary, announced at the opening of a UNESCO conference on November 5:

“Now we see that the five principles are just words which have no meaning for certain countries that assert the right to resolve problems by means of overwhelming force.”

In his 20 December 1956 speech at the American United Nations Association, NEHRU asserted that Hungary “had been forced to function in a way which contradicts the will of the residents of the country.”

Judging by facts in our possession, one of the reasons for the cooling off in attitudes toward the Soviet Union in the “Colombo countries” is found in the not entirely exact fulfillment of our trade obligations by Soviet enterprises, which causes dissatisfaction in a range of countries. So, for example, Burmese business circles express serious complaints relating to delays in the delivery of most Soviet goods and violations of terms in the fulfillment of contracts.

Recently, representatives of certain political circles and organs of the press in the “Colombo countries” have spoken in favor of a review of the policy of these countries toward the Soviet Union. And so, the newspaper “Hindustan Times,” which is close to the Indian government, wrote that events in Eastern Europe and the Near and Middle East “oblige India to review its foreign policy.”

At the same time, it must be noted that the relationships of the “Colombo countries” with other countries of the Socialist camp—and particularly with the PRC—have recently undergone further development. Bearing witness to this, for example, are such facts as the extremely friendly reception which CHOU EN-LAI was given in India, and the journey of U NU to the PRC, which took place during the sharpening of the situation in Hungary.

III.

Recent events in Hungary and in the Near East and the position of the USA during these events have made possible an increase in the prestige of the USA in Asian countries.

The general tone of the coverage of the events in Egypt and in Hungary in the press of the “Colombo countries” was extremely favorable toward the USA. The statements of a number of press organs included positive evaluations of the role and actions of the USA in settling the conflict in the Near and Middle East, and also in regard to the question of the situation in Hungary. In this way, the USA was assigned the role as the most active supporter of a peaceful settlement of the situation in Egypt.

The fact that the reelection of President Eisenhower received a favorable reaction in the “Colombo countries” is also noteworthy. Many newspapers in those countries, including those of leftist orientation, expressed satisfaction over the re-election of EISENHOWER as President, viewing it as a “firm guarantee of the maintenance of peace.”

Recently, in the press of the “Colombo countries” there have appeared reports of a possible change in the positions of these countries toward the USA. In particular, in certain reports of Indian newspapers it has been mentioned that it makes sense for India to revise its foreign policy so as to move closer to the USA.

Regarding this, the fact that the USA over a short period of time has taken real steps toward a rapprochement with India has special meaning. In January 1956, the government of the USA announced that it had rescinded a previously-taken decision to reduce economic aid to India by 10 million dollars, and, besides this, had decided to provide India, free of charge, 100 thousand tons of steel products required for restoration and reconstruction of the Indian railroad network. In March 1956, the government of the USA gave India 26 million dollars for the purchase of various types of machinery, and in August 1956 concluded with NEHRU’s government an agreement to provide India agricultural products worth 360.1 million dollars, of which 65% would be given in the form of a loan and 15% in the form of a grants.

The government of the USA is also trying to broaden its political contacts with India and to draw India closer to the USA on a range of international questions. With this goal, the government of the USA, according to information for the Soviet Embassy in Delhi, made it clear to the Indians that the USA wished to renew negotiations towards conclusion of an Indo-American treaty on friendship, trade, and navigation.

The above American measures are received favorably by the Indian government, which is interested in receiving necessary economic aid from the USA. NEHRU himself manifests a certain inclination toward rapprochement with the USA. It is deserving of attention that precisely after the events in Hungary and in the Near East, NEHRU agreed to accept EISENHOWER’s invitation, and visited the USA in December.
1956, even though he earlier, as is well known, had avoided a trip to the USA for a long time.

As is well-known, the joint communiqué about NEHRU’s negotiations with EISENHOWER, published 20 December 1956, does not contain any concrete agreements. At the same time, it mentions that both sides affirm the existence of a broad area of agreement between India and the USA, who are linked by tight bonds of friendship, based on the compatibility of their goals and adherence to the highest principles of free democracy.”

During his visit to the USA, in one of his speeches (20 December) NEHRU strongly lauded America’s “morally leading” role in the Middle East crisis and the events in Hungary.

It is entirely possible that, as a result of NEHRU’s negotiations with EISENHOWER, a real improvement in Indo-American relations will take place, and that could negatively impact the relations of India with the USSR.

Judging by reports in the press, in the near future an increase in American aid to Pakistan, Burma and other “Colombo countries” will be proposed. The Burmese government, with has previously refused aid from the USA, has already at the present time entered into negotiations about receiving American loans. There is reason to suggest that in the near future there could take place a certain strengthening in the relations of the USA with the other “Colombo countries.”

Genuineness affirmed:
Deputy Chairman, Committee of Information, USSR Foreign Ministry.

Correct: [signed] I. TUGARINOV

“28” December 1956
Attachment to No. 1869/2

(Source: TsKhSD.)

III. “A Typical Pragmatist”:
The Soviet Embassy Profiles
John F. Kennedy, 1960

In August 1960, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko forwarded to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy. Khrushchev had met JFK once before—briefly, during a visit to the United States the previous fall, when he was introduced to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Though “impressed” by the young congressman, Khrushchev considered Adlai Stevenson, the unsuccessful Democratic challenger in 1952 and 1956, to be “the most acceptable” candidate to succeed Eisenhower, and the most likely to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. (Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 507; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 488.)

But the twice-defeated Stevenson had rejected a third bid, and at the July 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles, Kennedy had emerged as his party’s standard-bearer to take on Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, for the Soviet leader, choosing a favorite in the U.S. presidential campaign was easy. Khrushchev saw Nixon, his antagonist in the “Kitchen Debate” at a 1959 Moscow trade fair, as an “aggressive” anti-communist who “owed his career to that devil of darkness McCarthy”—and Khrushchev’s post-Camp David fondness for the Eisenhower Administration had dissipated after the U-2 affair in May, which aborted a planned East-West summit in Paris as well as Ike’s anticipated visit to the USSR. Kennedy probably didn’t hurt his stock in Moscow by saying that he, unlike Eisenhower, would have apologized for the spy flight, and Khrushchev later told JFK (at their June 1961 Vienna summit) that he had “voted” for him by delaying the release of the captured U.S. pilot Francis Gary Powers until after the election. (Khrushchev Remembers, 508; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 490-91.)

Still, as Khrushchev later conceded, despite having a clear preference, “We had little knowledge of John Kennedy,” other than that he was “a young man, very promising and very rich—a millionaire...distinguished by his intelligence, his education, and his political skill.” (Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 488-89.)

Khrushchev’s initial assessment was probably informed, at least in part, by the profile reproduced below, prepared by charge d’affaires Mikhail Smirnovsky. Though it inevitably mentions JFK’s wealthy background, the profile does not dwell on his “class consciousness” and presents a straightforward, no-nonsense analysis of his political background, development, and views; his personality; and, of greatest interest to the Kremlin, his likely impact, if elected, on U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite minor slips (Kennedy only narrowly defeated Henry Cabot Lodge in the 1952 Senate race, not by “a wide margin”), what emerges is a surprisingly plausible, balanced, and even nuanced appraisal not so different from those advanced by many subsequent historians, especially not so glowing as to satisfy Kennedy’s most ardent admirers or hagiographers. Foreshadowing Khrushchev’s later description of his counterpart as “flexible,” the embassy finds JFK a “typical pragmatist,” ready to change positions according to shifting calculations of situations and his own interests (as evidenced by his fence-sitting on McCarthy, and his alliance with conservative Democrat Lyndon Johnson despite embracing the title “liberal”). It describes a cautious, dispassionate, energetic yet deliberative politician who can also be sociable and “charming” when required, aman with “an acute, penetrating mind” able to quickly grasp the essence of a situation, and to understand people well. Yet it judges that Kennedy, “while not a mediocrity,” lacks the necessary attributes of originality, philosophical depth and “breath of perception” to be considered “an outstanding person.”

As to JFK’s views on international affairs, the profile presciently senses the “quite contradictory” strains that would characterize U.S.-Soviet ties during his brief presidency. On the positive side, from the embassy’s view, there is Kennedy’s criticism of Eisenhower policies he sees as dogmatic and worse, failures, e.g., “liberating” Eastern Europe and shunning communist China; his support for a nuclear test ban and other arms control measures; and his belief, in contrast to some hardliners, that high-level U.S.-Soviet talks were, in general, worth pursuing. At the same time, though, it correctly notes that Kennedy’s envisioned path to a superpower “modus vivendi” was conditioned upon a significant U.S. military build-up that would allow Washington to deal with Moscow from a “position of strength”—and such a course, the embassy states ominously, would “in practice signify a speeding-up of the arms race and, therefore, a further straining of the international situation” with all its attendant consequences. Worse, on Berlin, Khrushchev’s top priority, JFK was “outright bellicose”—ready to risk nuclear war rather than abandon West Berlin.

Thus, one finds the essential ingredients that would characterize Kennedy’s relations with Khrushchev once JFK entered the White House—a tough stance on inter-
national questions, especially Berlin, that would lead to some of the sharpest crises of the Cold War, yet also the desire to reduce the danger of nuclear war and the flexibility to seek a dramatic improvement in relations once circumstances changed, these latter qualities would animate the relaxation in superpower tensions in 1963, epitomized by JFK’s American University speech and the signing of a limited test-ban treaty, that was cut short by Kennedy’s assassination. Introduction by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; document provided by Vladislav M. Zubok, National Security Archive, Washington, DC; translation by Benjamin Aldrich-Moody.

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To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I send an analysis on Kennedy which is of interest, sent by the USSR Embassy in the USA (by charge d’affaires Comrade Smirnovsky)

A. Gromyko

3 August 1960

* * * * * * *

JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY

(John Fitzgerald Kennedy) [English in original—ed.]

/Political character sketch/

John F. Kennedy was born on 29 May 1917 in Brookline, a suburb of Boston, Massachusetts, in a rich family of Irish extraction.

Kennedy received his secondary education in private schools. After finishing high school in 1935 he spent a semester studying in England in the London School of Economics, then studied for some time at Princeton University /USA/, from which he transferred to Harvard University /USA/, which he completed with honors in 1940 with a degree in political science. In 1940 Kennedy attended a course of lectures in the trade-and-commerce department of Stanford University.

Not long before the Second World War Kennedy visited a series of countries in Latin America, the Near East, and Europe, including the Soviet Union.

In 1941, Kennedy voluntarily entered the Navy, where he served until 1945, commanding a motor torpedo-boat in the Pacific military theater. In 1943 he was injured. [He was] Awarded a medal for displaying heroism in saving the lives of the members of his crew.

After demobilization Kennedy got involved in journalism; he was present in 1945 at the first conference of the UN in San Francisco and at the Potsdam conference in the capacity of a special correspondent of the agency “International News Service.”

In November of 1946, Kennedy was elected United States Congressman from the Democratic party in one of the districts of the state of Massachusetts; in 1948 and in 1950 he was re-elected to Congress from this same district.

In 1952, Kennedy was elected to the USA Senate from Massachusetts, having beaten his Republican opponent, Senator Henry Lodge, by a wide margin. In 1958 Kennedy is elected Senator for another term. He is a member of two important committees in the Senate — the Committee on Foreign Affairs, where he chairs the Subcommittee on International Organizations, and the Committee on Labor Affairs and Social Welfare, in which he chairs the Subcommittee on Labor Affairs, as well as being a member of the Joint Economic Committee in Congress.

At the convention of the Democratic Party in 1956, Kennedy was a candidate amongst the contenders for the post of USA vice-president, although he was defeated.

Immediately after this, that is in 1956, Kennedy began actively preparing to declare his candidacy for the Presidency of the US in the 1960 elections, having composed in past years a branching and well-organized personal political machine. (According to the press, Kennedy at this time had already expended more than two million dollars on his election campaign.)

In the end, despite initial serious doubts in Democratic Party circles about his candidacy, doubts which stemmed from Kennedy’s belonging to the Catholic Church and his relative youth, at the Democratic Party convention which took place in Los Angeles from 11 - 15 July, Kennedy prevailed, having amassed on the first ballot 806 votes with a minimum of 761 votes, after which his candidacy was confirmed unanimously.

Kennedy’s position regarding domestic policy in the USA

In his general philosophical views Kennedy is a typical pragmatist. Accordingly, in his political activity he is not governed by any firm convictions, but by purely pragmatic considerations, defining his positions on any given concrete circumstances and, most importantly, on his own interests.

During the years that he was in Congress, Kennedy’s positions on a given matter, or on analogical matters was not seldom inconsistent and contradictory, and in especially controversial political situations Kennedy generally preferred to avoid revealing his position; an example is his behavior concerning the McCarthyist-profascist tendency in USA political life in the beginning of the 1950s. While not attaching himself personally to this tendency, Kennedy simultaneously avoided condemning the movement, even when the majority of his colleagues in the Senate expressed opposition to McCarthy’s actions in 1954.

All this deprives Kennedy of a clearly expressed political persona, and although in the past few years he has acquired the label of a “liberal,” in fact his “liberalism” is rather relative, as is evidenced in particular by his present political alliance with the representative of the reactionary southern wing of the Democratic party, Lyndon Johnson.

In general and in view of the aforementioned facts, Kennedy’s position regarding the most important aspects of domestic life in the USA can be characterized in the following way.

Like the majority of other Democrats, Kennedy advocates greater governmental intervention in the economic life of the country with the goal of artificially stimulating it by large governmental expenditures on both military needs and on all sorts of programs in the social sphere.

He advocates abolishing the present Republican policy of “hard money” with its high interest rates, which, he believes, is leading to a worsening of the economic situation.

Another method of economic stimulation, believes Kennedy, is the expansion of consumer demand with the aid of a certain income tax cut for definite categories of people: in particular, persons with low incomes. But at the same time he openly announced that he will not hesitate to raise taxes if he considers it economically justified and indispensable for attaining serious political goals.

In the area of agriculture, Kennedy before 1956 spoke out in support of the current Republican policy of variable process for agricultural produce. However, over the past few years, clearly considering the upcoming elections, he switched to the position of advocates of prices supports for agricultural produce at a high level and the reduction of percentage rates on farm credit. On the whole, Kennedy advocates strict control of agricultural production through the limits on the size of the harvest and cultivated land. Kennedy stands for a program of wider distribution of agricultural surplus within the country and abroad.

In the area of work legislation Kennedy came out against the adoption of the famous Taft-Hartley law, not, however, because of its anti-labor character, but because he considered it too inflexible. Along these lines he now advocates revoking this law, proposing to offer the President “maximum freedom to choose the means” in the struggle with strikes instead of the harsh system of measures established by the Taft-Hartley law.

Kennedy himself is the author of a series of bills impinging on workers’ rights, in particular, their right to picket, and leading to the establishment of governmental control over trade union
activity.

At the same time, Kennedy advocates an increase of unemployment benefits and federal government aid to regions especially burdened with unemployment, as well as a hike in the legal minimum wage and a widening of the group falling under the minimum wage law.

In the issue of civil rights Kennedy quite logically advocates granting Negroes rights equal with Whites in all areas of life, observing, however, "proper procedure," i.e. to be implemented by administrative power in compliance with the relevant laws.

In keeping with the general Democratic emphasis on implementing different social programs, Kennedy supports federal allocations for the construction of homes with low rents and slum liquidation; he stands for federal aid to construct school buildings and increase salaries for school teachers and instructors in higher education; for increasing pension sizes; for medical aid to the elderly along the lines of a social service.

Kennedy's position on USA foreign policy issues

On issues of USA foreign policy and, above all, on the aspect of chief importance in foreign policy—relations between the USA and the USSR, Kennedy's position, like his position on domestic policy in the USA is quite contradictory.

Kennedy views relations between the USA and USSR as relations of constant struggle and rivalry, which, on different levels can, however, in his opinion, take on different concrete forms.

Considering that in the world there is a conflict of "basic national interests" of the USA and USSR and that because of this one cannot expect fundamental change in their relations, Kennedy nevertheless grants the possibility of a mutually acceptable settlement of these relations on the basis of a mutual effort to avoid nuclear war. For this reason Kennedy, in principle, advocates talks with the Soviet Union, rejecting as "too fatalistic" the opinion that "you can't trust" the Soviet Union, that it "doesn't observe treaties," etc.

In connection with this Kennedy openly criticizes the position of the USA government and the West as a whole on the question of disarmament, pointing out the West's lack of a concrete plan in this area. For his part, he proposed to create in the USA a single government organ which would develop a "viable program of disarmament" as well as plans for the transition of the American economy from a military to a peaceful orientation and different programs of international cooperation in the socioeconomic sphere. However, in speaking about the need for the United States to develop a realistic plan for disarmament, Kennedy has in mind not some far-reaching program of full liquidation of armaments and military forces of the two states, but instead, again some plan to control existing armaments and military forces with just some reductions.

Kennedy quite logically argues for attaining an agreement on halting nuclear weapons testing, believing that the renewal of these tests could compromise the military position of the USA in view of the threat of widening the circle of countries possessing nuclear weapons. In his letter of 30 April 1960 Kennedy informed Eisenhower that if he, Kennedy, were elected president he would renew the moratorium on all underground nuclear tests, if an agreement about such a moratorium were to be attained between interested countries during Eisenhower's administration.

During the course of events connected with the provocative flights of American U-2 airplanes and the ensuing disruption of the summit conference, from Kennedy came the announcement that in the President's place he would not have allowed such flights on the eve of the summit, and in the situation developing in Paris would have considered it possible to apologize to the USSR for the flights /but not to punish the guilty parties, since in this situation he himself was guilty/.

While placing blame for the fact of the disruption of the summit with the Soviet Union, nevertheless Kennedy sees the fundamental reason for what happened in the fact that the Soviet Union, in his opinion, actually found it more advantageous to use the incident with the U-2 plane for the maximum political effect, rather than going to a summit under conditions when the USA, as Kennedy admits, came to the summit completely unprepared for serious and wide-ranging bilateral talks.

However, Kennedy sees the main reason for the USA's inability, given present conditions, to conduct such talks with the USSR in the USA's loss of a "position of strength" over the past 7-8 years. Kennedy considers the restoration of this "position of strength" the main task facing the USA and a necessary precondition for renewing high-level talks with the USSR. "Until this task is completed," states Kennedy, "there is no sense in returning to a summit meeting." And further: "Above all we must make sure that henceforward we conduct talks from a position of strength—of military strength, economic strength, strength of ideas, and strength of purpose."

In keeping with this conception, Kennedy, having earlier been a supporter of big defense spending "until the attainment of an agreement on disarmament," now in all his public statements emphasizes the absolute necessity of strengthening the USA military capability, not shying away from a significant increase on defense spending. With the goal of liquidating the present gap in USA-USSR "nuclear strike capability," Kennedy proposes implementing a program of "constant vigilance" for USA strategic aircraft, reorganizing the system of USA bases, inside the country and abroad, and simultaneously accelerating the development and expanding production of different missiles. At the same time, Kennedy proposes modernizing conventional forces once having made them maximally mobile and able to fight "lesser wars" at any point on the globe.

In this way, while in principle advocating a search for a modus vivendi in USA-USSR relations in order to avoid worldwide military conflict, Kennedy at the same time stands for such paths to a modus vivendi which in practice signify a speeding-up of the arms race and, therefore, a further straining of the international situation with all the consequences that result from this.

On such issues as the Berlin question, Kennedy's position is outright bellicose: he openly announces that the USA should sooner start a nuclear war than leave Berlin, since "being squeezed out of Germany, and being squeezed out of Europe, which means being squeezed out of Asia and Africa, and then we're /the USA/ next." He sees the possibility of involving the UN in some capacity in the Berlin question only as a means of strengthening the position of the Western powers in West Berlin, not as a way of replacing them there.

Kennedy considers the policy of the former Republican administration of "liberating" the countries of people's democracy [i.e. East European Soviet Satellites—ed.] as unrealistic and having suffered complete failure. However, he is not inclined to admit on this basis the irreversibility of the changes in those countries. He proposes simply to conduct a more flexible policy in relation to countries of people's democracy, trying gradually to weaken their economic and ideological ties with the Soviet Union by granting them America "aid," widened trade, tourism, student and professorial exchanges, by creating American information centers in those countries, and so on. Kennedy was, in particular, the initiator of a Senate amendment to the famous "Battle bill" in order to grant the President wide discretion in granting economic "aid" to European countries of people's democracy. Kennedy reserves a special place for Poland in the plan to detach countries from the socialist camp, considering it the weakest link in the group.

Kennedy also considers the USA policy toward the People's Republic of China to be a failure, insofar as it was unable to achieve its basic goal—the subversion of the country's new order. While admitting the necessity of "reevaluating" USA policy toward the PRC, Kennedy doesn't propose, however, that the USA quickly recognize the PRC de jure and lift its opposition to the PRC's admission to the UN, raising in this connection the usual provisos about the PRC's "aggression" and so on. At this point he only advocates drawing in the PRC to talks about the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, insofar as this
is dictated by practical necessity, and, following this, also about the establishment of cultural and economic contracts between the USA and PRC. In regards to this Kennedy does not conceal the fact that he sees such contacts above all as a means of penetrating the PRC and collecting information about its internal condition. While advocating a “reduction in tensions in the region of Taiwan” and a refusal to “defend” the Chinese coastal islands of Matsu and Quemoy, Kennedy supports continued USA occupation of Taiwan itself and readiness to “defend” the island.

In keeping with his general stand on strengthening the position of the USA in the world, Kennedy lends great importance to strengthening NATO and in general to the issue of USA allies. In connection with this Kennedy holds to the opinion that NATO should be, on one hand, “a vital, united, military force,” and on the other, an organ for overcoming political and economic differences between participating nations and for coordinating their policy towards weakly developed countries.

Kennedy considers the issue of policy toward weakly developed countries, along with that of the renewal of US military strength, to be of the utmost importance in terms of the outcome of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist worlds. In order to prevent a further increase in the influence of the USSR and other socialist countries in the weakly developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Kennedy proposes that the USA, in conjunction with its Western European allies and Japan, work out broad long-term programmes of economic aid to these countries along the lines of the “Marshall plan.”

Kennedy gives India especial attention in plans for aid to weakly developed countries, considering the economic competition between India and the PRC to be of decisive importance in the struggle for Asia. At the same time Kennedy is quite critical of the practice of bringing weakly developed countries into military blocks such as SEATO and CENTO, which, in his opinion, unlike NATO, are “paper alliances,” concluded moreover with reactionary governments that do not have the support of their peoples, and which for this reason do not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weaken the position of the USA in these countries and regions.

**Kennedy as a person**

Kennedy himself and his supporters now are trying however possible to create the impression that he is a strong personality of the caliber of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a leader of the new generation able to lead the country to “new heights.”

Judging, however, on the strength of the available evidence about him, Kennedy, while not a mediocrity, is unlikely to possess the qualities of an outstanding person.

He has, by all accounts, an acute, penetrat-
Students’ attitudes toward the ongoing situation in Czechoslovakia are of two main types. On the one hand, indignation is expressed toward the “brothers,” whom we “have been subsidizing for so many years” and who are now responding with vile ingratitude. This group of students, among whom are participants in the Hungarian events, demand decisive measures and the use of military force. However, this group is small in number.

The rest of the students, who generally take pleasure in anything that causes problems for or conflicts with the official line, are watching the ongoing situation in Czechoslovakia with benevolent curiosity. They have no real sense of what all this can lead to. They are impressed by the Czech students, who have become a major social force. Some even contemplate (albeit hypothetically) the possibility of repeating the Czech experience in our own country. In a discussion with the author of this review, a third-year student said: “It’s interesting to think whether such events could take place here. I personally would take part if they did.”

What has attracted especially great interest is the creation of opposition parties. The very word “opposition” is something students find appealing, and even the most thoughtful of them regard the creation of an opposition party as a solution to the paradox they have encountered: “The struggle for the Soviet regime is against the Soviet regime.” Hence, they are following events in Czechoslovakia with great interest. The excesses cited in the Soviet press seem largely harmless to them, and the official commentaries seem too pointed.

The place where students are afraid of the situation that has unfolded is China....

The events in Poland, given their brief duration, did not attract special attention. From time to time, rumors circulate about anti-Semitic purges in Poland. The Russian segment of the students and the Ukrainians would welcome such developments.

The concept of a “student” in our country encompasses an extraordinarily large number of people. However, the present essay is intended to describe and analyze the behavior of full-time undergraduate students, who are potentially, by virtue of a number of factors, the most socially unstable and most easily swayed group in the population. These factors include the group’s relative youthfulness, the daily contacts the members have with others like themselves, the members’ lack of material obligations (for the most part) before their families, and so forth.

V. Andropov Analyzes the ABM Negotiations, 1971

The document below provides a fascinating glimpse into Soviet intelligence collection, analysis, and support of diplomatic negotiation. It is generally well informed on American negotiating positions and the preferences of various agencies in Washington with respect to the issues in the SALT negotiations in mid-April 1971. Although sources are not directly indicated (with such vague references as “according to information we
have received), there are indirect references including references to "experts close to U.S. government circles," and one reference to a conversation of U.S. SALT delegation chief Gerard Smith with "a diplomat from one of the U.S. allies." The KGB was also privy to the fact that Kissinger was negotiating with a Soviet representative (Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin) through a "private channel," and to at least the main lines of the negotiation—about which neither the CIA, nor the U.S. SALT delegation, were informed at that time.

At one point, while noting that unofficial U.S. sources had been used to inform the Soviet side that the administration wanted an agreement in 1971, presumably to pressure the Soviet Union to achieve progress, the KGB report notes that "in a private talk" Kissinger had commented that it might be preferable for Nixon to attain a pact closer to the next election—which, of course, is what occurred (the SALT I and ABM treaties were signed during Nixon’s summit in Moscow in May 1972).

In one instance, the KGB analysis made the same error as some American scholars in attributing views presented in the U.S. president’s annual foreign policy report to Nixon personally, contrasting one such point to a view expressed by Kissinger in his talks with Dobrynin—unaware that Kissinger was the chief author of the president’s foreign policy report.

The KGB analysis is straightforward, without evident commitment or bias with respect to pending Soviet policy decisions. All in all, it is an impressive document—unlike some other KGB analyses that have become available. Commentary by Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; document provided by the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Moscow.

* * * * * * *

USSR

The Committee for State Security
19 April 1971
No. 983-A To Comrade USTINOV, D.F.
Moscow

The available data bears witness to the fact that the position of the USA on the problem of limiting the arms race remains the same. Nixon’s government proceeds from the fact that the suggestions introduced by the American delegation last August in Vienna provide the basis for achieving an agreement advantageous to the United States. It will use all means to strive for the consolidation of the quantitative balance of strategic weapons between the USA and the USSR at the present-day level, trying to preserve definite advantages in the most important kinds of strategic weapons. In the course of the negotiations, at the end of February 1971, while talking to a diplomat from one of the U.S. allies, the head of the American delegation, Smith, announced that the USA intended to conduct the negotiations firmly, in order to obtain the agreement of the USSR on limitation of offensive strategic weapons. Experts, close to the U.S. government circles, state that the main goal of the USA in the negotiations remains the achievement of an agreement on limitation of the number of big Soviet offensive inter-continental ballistic missiles.

According to information we have received, as far as the present stage of the negotiations is concerned, U.S. government bodies devote their main attention to studying the possibility of achieving a separate agreement on anti-missile defense systems. As noted by American experts, the USSR proposal on limiting the deployment of ABM systems to means necessary for the defense of Moscow and Washington D.C., introduced during the previous stage of the negotiations, put Nixon in a kind of difficult position. On the one hand, as for its contents, the Soviet proposal is very similar to the one on ABM introduced by the US before, together with other questions, and that’s why it would have been difficult for Nixon to reject it completely. On the other hand, Nixon couldn’t refuse to deploy the “Safeguard” ABM system, since it would have been difficult for him to explain this concession in his country. Some time ago he managed, with great difficulty, to get agreement on the allocation of the means needed for its deployment, having persuaded the Congress that ABM “Safeguard” could provide effective defense from a possible USSR first strike, and that its creation would save the USA further big new expenditures on a quantitative increase in offensive strategic weapons.

The harshest objections to the Soviet proposal will come from Pentagon officials, who assert that if it is adopted without the simultaneous achievement of an agreement on strategic offensive weapons the Soviet Union will continue its unlimited increase in its fleet of missile-carrying nuclear submarines and big land-based IBM missiles (“SS-9”) configured with MIRVed warheads, and as a result it will get an opportunity to make a “preventive strike,” which could eliminate the majority of American “Minutemen” ICBMs.

Pentagon representatives also express concern that a separate agreement on limiting the deployment of ABM systems to the defense of just the capitals of both states could inspire strong opposition to the MIRV-type warheads deployment program in Congress and U.S. political circles. Air Force representatives insist on continuing the intensive deployment of a broad system of “Safeguard” ABM.

The ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] attitude is more flexible. It introduced a proposal which provides an opportunity to conclude a separate agreement on ABM systems, under the condition that negotiations on the limitation of the number of offensive strategic weapons will be carried out at the same time, and that during the negotiations the USSR and the USA will undertake the obligation to "freeze" the number of their strategic offensive weapons. Kissinger regarded this as the basic variant during a private channel exchange of opinions on ABM with a Soviet representative.

According to information from American sources, the USA National Security Council (NSC) is studying the proposal of a temporary agreement on the limitation of ABM systems deployment during the period of negotiations on limiting strategic offensive weapons along with a simultaneous “freeze” of offensive nuclear weapons at the present level.

Nixon’s comments about the negotiations in his message about USA foreign policy indicate that he, evidently moving away from the more flexible position which Kissinger expressed to us, is more inclined to accept the Pentagon’s point of view.

Nevertheless, Nixon is not interested in aggravating relations between the USSR and the USA during the presidential campaign, and that is why, while holding to a really rigid position during the negotiations, including the ABM question, he at the same time will try to create an impression of constructivism and flexibility in his approach to Soviet proposals. Tough, uncompromising declarations in official propaganda, to the effect that in the negotiations the USA will firmly insist on its position that a separate agreement on ABM without a corresponding agreement on limitation of offensive nuclear weapons is unacceptable, should, in Nixon’s conception, favorably highlight a possible American proposal to conclude a separate agreement on ABM limitation, which would include the preservation and even further development of the “Safeguard” ABM system in the USA, while at the same time limiting the ABM systems in the USSR to those necessary just for the protection of Moscow.

Judging by information in our possession, the NSC, while preparing recommendations for the American delegation to the negotiations in Vienna, again strongly opposed the inclusion of American means of forward basing on the agenda, motivated in its position by the fact that otherwise the whole structure of NATO would have to be changed, and the USA would lose an important
military advantage, as a result of which the general strategic balance would be changed to the advantage of the USSR. The NSC pointed out that the means of forward basing could be a subject for discussion during negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Countries on the question of balanced limitation of armed forces in Europe.

According to certain information, one of the variants studied by the NSC provides for the American side to put forward a proposal to simultaneously “freeze” the existing number of Soviet intermediate and medium range missiles and the American means of forward basing if, due to great differences in points of view on means of forward basing, the negotiations will come to a dead end and appear to be under threat of breakdown.

Through unofficial channels the Americans inform us that Nixon’s government, while “sincerely wishing” to achieve concrete results during the negotiations, at the same time “can’t wait endlessly” and is interested in achieving an agreement with the USSR by the end of 1971, because the beginning of the electoral campaign will make it difficult for him to bargain with the USSR. But the intent of these statements, it seems, is to influence the position of the USSR during the negotiations. According to existing information, Kissinger in a private talk said that from a political point of view it may be more beneficial for Nixon if the agreement with the USSR were to be achieved closer to the presidential elections. According to a statement by the American representative to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the USA is ready to conduct at least three more rounds (the present one included) of negotiations, striving first of all to get the agreement of the USSR on limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, not being sure that they will manage to obtain the agreement of the USSR on a complex accord on the limitation of ABM systems and strategic offensive weapons on terms acceptable to the U.S., the Americans might put forward a proposal for partial agreement. Most probably it would be a proposal to limit ABM deployment to the “Safeguard” system for the USA and an ABM system around Moscow for the USSR.

And if American attempts to obtain a separate, favorable to them, agreement on ABM systems fail, they would prefer just to conclude a treaty on measures for reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and USSR.

CC CPSU is informed.

Head of the State Security Committee

[signature] ANDROPOV

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 193, Ll. 33-38.)

VI. From Hesitation to Intervention: Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979

Despite the declassification of numerous high-level Soviet documents, the precise reasons behind the USSR’s massive, ill-fated military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 remain murky. If anything, the unveiling over the past few years of records of internal Kremlin deliberations and Soviet-Afghan exchanges in the months prior to the intervention have in some ways intensified the mystery, because they demonstrate that Soviet leaders, including CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, were keenly aware that the direct introduction of outside military forces for use against the Kabul government’s opponents would be a political catastrophe, incurring bitter resentment among the Afghan people and handing a propaganda victory to Soviet opponents around the world. Yet, ultimately, the decision to go ahead with the intervention was taken anyway. (Two English-language accounts of the run-up to the invasion that make extensive use of the new Soviet documentation are Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979,” International History Review 16 (Feb. 1994), 49-69; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 977-1075.)

The documents below offer some indication of the apprehension Soviet leaders felt about sending military forces in the spring of 1979, as well as of the secretiveness surrounding the actual decision to intervene when it was finally made. The first documents concern a visit to Moscow in March 1979 by Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki, whose communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDA) had come to power in the bloody April 1978 coup or revolution (the term depends on who tells the story) that overthrew the non-aligned Daoud government. Since then, his regime had faced rising internal opposition—from Islamic activists who resented the imposition of atheistic and modernist ideas, from fiercely independent tribes who disliked increasing centralization, and, after the dissolution of a short-lived alliance, from the PDPA’s own “Parcham” faction, which Taraki’s more militant “Khalq” faction had methodically purged from the government.

Taraki’s hastily-arranged trip to Moscow had been occasioned by the most serious outbreak yet to threaten his rule, a violent rebellion in the Afghan city of Herat that broke out in mid-March which saw the defection of army units and the killing of Soviet advisers and Khalq officials. CPSU CC Politburo records show that from the outset of the uprising, Soviet leaders considered, yet rejected, urgent telephone appeals from Taraki and his powerful deputy, Hafizullah Amin, to send in Soviet military forces to help the evidently shaky Afghan army suppress the spreading revolt. During a Politburo meeting “About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Our Possible Moves” on March 17, when the situation in Herat appeared grave, the discussion seemed to focus on the unacceptability of allowing the government’s opponents to get the upper hand, as the following comments by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin indicated:

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear—we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won’t have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree—we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we’ve already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force....

Yet, on March 18, as the Politburo continued to deliberate, a consensus emerged, led by KGB chairman Andropov, against direct Soviet military intervention. Even Gromyko, despite his admonition only a day before that Afghanistan must not be surrendered, gave an impassioned, indeed prescient warning against dispatching troops.

ANDROPOV. We know Lenin’s teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever type of situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, but that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a
risk....

GROMYKO. I fully support Comrade Andropov’s proposal to exclude a measure as the introduction of our troops into Afghanistan. The [Afghan] army there is unreliable. Thus our army if it enters Afghanistan will be an aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a [socialist] revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of a détente in international tensions, arms reductions, and much more—all that would be thrown back. Of course, this will be a nice gift for China. All the nonaligned countries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expected from such an action. There will no longer be any question of a meeting of Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev] with [U.S. President Jimmy] Carter, and the visit of [French President Valéry] Giscard d’Estaing at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, battle of one group opposed to another....

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite [Taraki] here and tell him, that we will increase our assistance to you, but we cannot introduce troops, since they would be fighting not against the army, which in essence has gone over to the adversary or is just sitting and waiting it out, but against the people. There would be huge misuses for us. A whole bouquet of countries would quickly come out against us. And there are no pluses for us at all....

GROMYKO. ...We would be throwing away everything which we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotiations which would fly by the wayside, there would be no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political act), there would be no meeting of Leonid Ilich with Carter, and it is very doubtful that Giscard d’Estaing would come to visit us, and our relations with Western countries, particularly the FRG, would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act as the introduction of troops,...

Of the CPSU, March 17 [and 18 and 19], 1979, “Ob obstroeni obstanovki v Demokraticheski Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh” (“On the Aggravation of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and On Our Possible Measures”), translations by Mark H. Doctoroff, CWIHP; see also Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, rev. ed., pp. 992-93.)

On March 20, Taraki traveled to Moscow to plead in person with Soviet leaders for renewed economic and military support to overcome the Afghan government’s domestic enemies. The records of the ensuing conversations make clear that the prime question on the agenda was Kabul’s request for external military intervention. Prior to seeing Brezhnev, Taraki met first with Prime Minister Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov, and Politburo member Boris N. Ponomarev. Buoyed by reports that troops loyal to him were regaining control in Herat, Taraki listened as Kosygin explained the Politburo’s decision—vowing eternal Soviet-Afghan friendship and enhanced Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military aid, but urging the Afghans to be self-reliant when it came to actual fighting (using an eerily ironic example). Introductions by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; translations below by Danny Rozas; documents provided by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

Distributed to the members and candidate members of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Subject to return
(General office, 1st sector)
No. P499

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF MEETING
of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO, D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV with N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979

A.N. KOSYGIN. The Politburo has entrusted us to discuss with you all questions which you believe necessitate an exchange of opinions. As I have already mentioned to you, your meeting with L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first word should be given to you, but since one important question from your side has already been raised, I would like to first set forth our opinion, and then we will attentively hear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the friendship between Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional, dictated by some temporary viewpoints, but calculated for ages. We have given and will continue to give you assistance in the fight against all enemies which act against you at the present time and against those enemies with which you may clash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situation which has developed in your country, we looked for ways to assist you which would best serve the interests of our friendship and your relations with other countries. There may be various ways of solving the problems which have developed in your country, but the best way is that which would preserve the authority of your government among the people, not spoil relations between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and not injure the international prestige of your country. We must not allow the situation to seem as if you were not able to deal with your own problems and invited foreign troops to assist you. I would like to use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people withstood a difficult war with the USA and are now fighting against Chinese aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. They only need to be genuinely united, and created into new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin already to create new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at the given time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the present situation. One only needs to deal with the matter correctly. Let’s take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy would quickly entrench itself there, that the city would become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o’clock in the morning, the military town in Herat where the mutinous part of the 17th infantry division is located, after air-bombardment strikes has been taken by a battalion of [paratroops?] supported by tanks from Kandahar. Troops loyal to the government are strengthening and evolving success.

Our assignment for the current time period as we see it is to defend you from various interna-
tional complications. We will give you assistance with all available means—ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel for use of the most modern types of weapons and military machinery, which we are sending you. But the deployment of our forces in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately alarm the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multiruprized consequences. This, in effect, would be a conflict not only with the imperialist countries, but also with a conflict with one’s own people. Our mutual enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet forces appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy on Afghan territory military groups hostile to you. I would again like to underline that the question of deploying our forces has been examined by us from every direction; we carefully studied all aspects of this action and came to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve, but would worsen. One cannot deny that our troops would have to fight not only with foreign aggressors, but also with a certain number of your people. And a people does not forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be vindicated.

With direct Soviet military intervention ruled out, Kosygin and Taraki go on to discuss diplomatic and political steps to bolster Kabul, particularly in regard to neighboring countries. Kosygin notes that Moscow sent notes to Iran and Pakistan to warn them “in all seriousness not to meddle” in Afghan affairs, and had received a promise to respect Afghan sovereignty and only deliver humanitarian aid to refugees from Pakistani leader Mohammed Zia ul-Haq—a commitment Taraki finds hard to credit, since he blames Zia for “creating camps” to arm guerrillas against his rule. “We are not so naive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq,” replies Kosygin, “but whatever the case may be, the statement has been made and it is binding.” The implications of a recent Iranian order to expel foreign workers are also discussed, with Taraki speculating that exceptions may be made for American helicopter specialists and Kosygin noting that “it is possible that we may have more specialists in Iran than do the Americans.” Taraki expresses concern that a mass influx of Afghan workers expelled from Iran might include rebel sympathizers. Though he insists that “the majority of people remain on our side” and that “We are doing everything [possible] to rule the country not by force of arms, but by revolutionary-democratic means,” Taraki then shifts the conversation to requests for additional military supplies, probing again for the possibility of Soviet (or other foreign socialist) combatants to use them:

N.M. TARAKI. I wanted to touch on the question of the needs of the Afghan army. We would like to receive armored helicopters, an additional number of armored transports and military infantry vehicles, as well as modern means of communication. Also, maintenance personnel would be of great help to us.

D.F. USTINOV. It seems that we are talking about MI-24 helicopters, which have bullet-proof armor. We will give you six such helicopters during June-July and 6 more in the fourth quarter of this year.

N.M. TARAKI. We have great need for these helicopters, and it would be good if they arrived together with pilots.

A.N. KOSYGIN. We can send you maintenance specialists, which would take care of these helicopters at the airport, but, of course, not battle crews. We have already spoken about the matter.

D.F. USTINOV. You must prepare your own pilots. We are training your officers, and we can expedite their release.

N.M. TARAKI. Perhaps we can get helicopter pilots from Hanoi or some other country, for example, Cuba?

A.N. KOSYGIN. As I have already said earlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnam a great deal, but they never asked us to send them our pilots. They only asked for technical specialists. We are training 400 Afghan officers. Choose the people you need, and we will expedite their training.

N.M. TARAKI. We would very much like the delivery of helicopters to be expedited. We have a great need for them.

D.F. USTINOV. But, at the same time, you must worry about pilots for these helicopters.

N.M. TARAKI. Of course we will do that. If we cannot find them in our country, then we will look elsewhere. The world is big. If you do not agree with that, then we will search for pilots from among the Afghans studying with you, but we need trustworthy people, and among the Afghan officers who we sent to study in the Soviet Union earlier there are many “Muslim brothers” and Chinese sympathizers.

D.F. USTINOV. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 [are] helicopter pilots.

N.M. TARAKI. Good. However, the problem is that we don’t know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud’s regime, members of the “Muslim Brotherhood” and the pro-Chinese “Shoalee Javid” organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out. Promised an assortment of free military assistance—not only helicopters but reconnaissance vehicles, anti-aircraft units, troop transports, technical advisers, and training—Taraki bargains for increased shipments of free wheat, pleasing poverty, poor harvests due to land confiscations, and abrogations by Turkey and Pakistan of promised deals. Kosygin, bargaining hard, notes that the Afghans lack the capacity to transport deliveries of wheat beyond what the Soviets were offering, and that since Kabul was “ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money.” He suggests giving the available funds to Moscow, which could then purchase American wheat and transfer it to Afghanistan: “Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat.” Taraki then requests that Moscow build for Kabul a 1000-kilowatt radio station, “which would allow us to broadcast propaganda throughout the world. Our radio station is weak. While any slanderous declaration of some religious leader is spread throughout the world through foreign organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our radio station remains almost unheard.” Ponomarev counters that “We are taking energetic measures to spread propaganda about the successes of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan],” for instance reprinting Taraki’s speech in Pravda and broadcasting it to Moslem countries, and offers to send a “specialist in propaganda.” Kosygin defers the radio request for further study. Then the question of military advisers crops up again, and Taraki once more seeks an opening to secure Moscow’s support for using foreign pilots and tank operators, to the obvious irritation of Kosygin, who not only rebuffs the idea sharply but issues a pointed warning to Taraki to act more judiciously toward his own advisers:

D.F. USTINOV. Concerning additional shipments of military machinery, a need will arise for additional military specialists and advisers.

N.M. TARAKI. If you believe that such a need exists, then, of course, we will accept them. But won’t you allow us, after all, to use pilots and tank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N. KOSYGIN. When referring to our military specialists, we mean mechanics who service military machinery. I cannot understand why the question of pilots and tank operators keeps coming up. This is a completely unex-
pected question for us. And I believe that it is unlikely that socialist countries will agree to this. The question of sending people who would sit in your tanks and shoot at your people—this is a very pointed political question.

N.M. TARAKI. We will see how we can use those Afghani soldiers who were sent to study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you to accept for training those people who we will select ourselves.

D.F. USTINOV. We will, of course, accept them for training.

A.N. KOSYGIN. To sum up this conversation, we can ascertain that there remains the question of the construction of a powerful radio station. There remains also the question of expediting the deliveries of military technology. You, as we understand, will select helicopter pilots from the officers training with us. If you have any other requests or desires, you may inform us through the Soviet ambassador and the chief military adviser. We will carefully review them, and will react accordingly.

We will continue to use political means to defend the DRA from its imperialist aggressors. Our press will also support the DRA.

We think it important that within your country you should work to widen the social support of your regime, draw people over to your side, insure that nothing will alienate the people from the government. And finally, not as a matter of discussion but as a wish, I would like to express my ideas on the importance of a very careful and cautious approach towards your staff. One should take care of one’s staff and have an individual approach towards it. Have a thorough and good understanding with each person before hanging any labels on them.

The meeting breaks up after Kosygin assures an obviously disappointed Taraki that Moscow would reconsider its stand against sending troops should Afghanistan be subjected to foreign aggression:

A.N. KOSYGIN. If an armed invasion of your country takes place, then it will be a completely different situation. But right now we are doing everything to insure that such an invasion does not occur. And I think that we will be able to achieve this.

N.M. TARAKI. I pose this question because China is persistently pushing the Pakistanis against us.

A.N. KOSYGIN. When aggression takes place, then a completely different situation arises. The Chinese were convinced of this through the example of Vietnam and are biting their elbows now, so to speak. As for Afghanistan, we have already taken measures to guard it from aggression. I have already said that we have sent corresponding messages to the president of Pakistan, [Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini, and the prime minister of Iran.

N.M. TARAKI. Must I tell the members of our Politburo that the Soviet Union will give the DRA only political support and other aid?

A.N. KOSYGIN. Yes, both political support and extensive assistance in the line of military and other shipments. This is the decision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev will tell you about this during the meeting with you, which will start in 10 minutes. I think that you will return to Afghanistand confident of our support, confident of your own actions.

21.III.79.
AK-786s
30 copies
21.III.79.

x) This record has not been seen by the participants.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 26.)

Taraki is then ushered into Brezhnev’s Kremlin office. The Soviet leader uses the occasion not only to reaffirm the decision against dispatching troops—a decision, he stresses, that should be kept strictly secret—but to preach to Taraki the importance of widening the base of the government’s support among the Afghan people through political and economic means, and of taking a more moderate attitude toward the military, the clergy, and others in order to lessen fears of persecution. He also expresses mystification at the “abnormal” situation of open borders between Afghanistan and its neighbors given the infiltration of armed rebels. Taraki’s response—essentially defending his present approach—could not have satisfied his Moscow interlocutors.

Subject to return to CC CPSU
(General Office, 1st sector)

No. P486

Distributed to the members and candidate members of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

of L.I.Brezhnev with N.M.Taraki

20 March 1979


L.I. BREZHNEV. Over the last few days we have been watching with alarm the development of events in Afghanistan. From what you said in conversation with our comrades, it seems the Afghan friends are gravely alarmed as well.

We must take steps to correct the situation that has developed and eliminate the threat to the new order in the DRA. And not only eliminate the threat, but also work to strengthen the gains of the April revolution.

As we see it, it is very important to widen the base which supports the leadership of the party and the country. First of all, of great importance here is the unity of your party, mutual trust, and ideological-political solidarity throughout its ranks from top to bottom.

It is worth thinking about creating a single national front under the aegis of the People’s democratic party of Afghanistan as the recognized leader of the people. Such a front could include already existing socio-political organizations and be supported by groups of workers, peasants, petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and students, youth, and progressive women. Its purpose would be to consolidate anti-imperialist and national patriotic forces against domestic and foreign reactionaries. It could also serve in the political upbringing of the population.

In rural areas it would be expedient to organize poverty committees consisting of propertyless and petty peasants and metayers [sharecroppers] to repel feudalists and capitalist landowners.

And, of course, everything must be done so that the army is staunchly on the side of the people’s revolutionary government.

It is important that the commanding ranks in the army feel assured of the stability of their positions. One cannot expect much from an army when commanding cadres are frequently replaced. This is even more true if the cadre changes are accompanied by arrests. Many commanders, seeing their colleagues arrested and disappearing, begin to feel unsure of their own future.

All of this does not mean that repressive measures should not be taken with regard to those who have serious evidence of untrustworthiness to the revolutionary government. But this weapon is very sharp and must be used with the utmost caution.

As for the events in Herat, the normalization of the situation in this city would have a positive influence on the situation of the country as a whole and would have a chilling effect on circles ill disposed towards the revolutionary government.

It seems that the work carried out by the various types of enemies of the new order, including the reactionary clergy, to undermine the new order is much more active and on a greater scale...
than the political work of the government representatives in the area. This point is of exceptional importance not only in Herat, but in the rest of the country as well.

Appropriate work must be done with the clergy in order to split their ranks; this could well be achieved by getting at least apart of the clergy, if not to actually support the government openly, then to at least not speak out against it. This could be best of all achieved by showing that the new government is not trying to persecute the leaders and representatives of the clergy, but only those who speak out against the revolutionary government.

And now for the question of the possibility of deploying soviet military forces in Afghanistan. We examined this question from every angle, weighed it carefully, and, I will tell you frankly: this should not be done. This would only play into the hands of the enemies—yours and ours. You already had a more detailed discussion of this question with our comrades.

Obviously, to announce publicly—either for us or for you—that we are not intent on doing this is, for understandable reasons, not advisable.

We will give you all necessary political support. Already, we are addressing Pakistan and Iran with strong warnings not to interfere in the internal matters of Afghanistan.

It would be well if soviet economic aid, especially things like the delivery of 100 thou. tons of wheat and the increase in the price of natural gas supplied [exported] by Afghanistan, were made known to the Afghan people in the necessary manner, using the means of mass information. This is of foremost importance in strengthening the position of the Afghan government.

The arms and military technology that we are additionally supplying you with will increase the strength of the Afghan army. However, this will only be true if the arms are placed in trustworthy hands and not in the hands of the enemy.

As you have asked, we have sent you numerous advisers and specialists both in military and other matters. You have working for you 500 generals and officers. If necessary, we can send an additional number of party workers, as well as 150-200 officers.

One more question: how do you explain the fact that, despite the complications in the situation and the deployment of a thousand armed people from Iran and Pakistan, your borders with these countries were, in effect, open, and it seems even now are not closed? This is an abnormal situation, and, in our opinion, it should be fixed.

Finally, I would like to emphasize once more that in the current situation the most important factor will be the ability to draw greater circles of the population to your side through political and economic means. It is important to also re-examine the arsenal of methods utilized and eliminate those that may cause legitimate alarm in people and give them a desire to protest.

N.M. TARIK. With regard to creating a single national front in Afghanistan, I would like to say that it essentially exists in the shape of party, komsomol, trade unions and other mass public organizations, which function under the leadership of the People’s democratic party of Afghanistan. However, it cannot yet firmly establish itself in the socio-political life of Afghanistan because of its economic backwardness and as yet insufficient level of political development in a certain part of the population.

However, under the current situation the leadership of the country cannot avoid the use of extreme measures when dealing with accomplices of international imperialism and reactionism. The repressive measures taken against ranks of representatives of the clergy, Maoists, and other persons partaking in open combat against the new people’s government are completely in accordance with the law and no one turns to persecution without lawfully establishing the guilt of the accused.

The Afghan people do not want war with Iran and Pakistan, but if war does break out, then it will not be to their advantage—the Pashtuns and Baluchis would be on the side of Afghanistan. I would like to point out that the present government of Pakistan, and not without the help of China, is trying to play an important role in the incitement of anti-Afghan elements, including Afghans showing up in Pakistan. Our party and government are trying to react calmly to these aspirations on the part of Pakistan and not worsen the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The question of closing our borders with Iran and Pakistan is rather difficult. We are unable to do this because of the absence of the necessary means. Besides, the closing of the Afghan-Pakistan border would create discontent among Afghans and Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluchis who maintain close family ties, and in the final result would significantly damage the prestige of the current government in Afghanistan.

30 copies. 21.III.79. [21 March 1979]

x) This record has not been seen by the participants.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 25.)

Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the Afghan leadership and its handling of events and concern with its lack of support among the Afghan people was evident in a 1 April 1979 special report for the Politburo prepared after Taraki’s visit by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev and reprinted in the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 3, pp. 67-69). That report reaffirmed the correctness of the Soviet refusal to send military forces to repress the “counter-revolution.” But despite the repression of the Herat rebellion the anti-government activity persisted and so did Kabul’s desire for direct Soviet military support. Shortly after his return to Kabul, Taraki was replaced as prime minister by his Khalq deputy, Hafizullah Amin. In April, Amin reiterated the now familiar appeal to Moscow for Soviet helicopter pilots for use against rebel forces, eliciting the following Politburo response, together with the instructions sent to the chief Soviet military adviser in Kabul for transmission to Amin.

* * * * *

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

Subject to return in the course of 3 days to CC CPSU (General office, 1st sector) Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FILE

P150/93

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol #150 of the CC CPSU Politburo session from 21 April 1979

On the inexpediency of the participation of soviet military helicopter crews in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the proposal on this question submitted in the memorandum by the Ministry of Defense on 18 April 1979, #318/3/0430.

2. To ratify the draft of instructions to the chief military adviser in the DRA (attached).

SECRETARY of CC
* * * * *

[attached] to article 93 protocol # 150

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE
KABUL

TO CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER

Inform the Prime-Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan H. Amin that the request to send 15-20 military helicopters with Soviet crews has been delivered to the Soviet government.

Tell him that the Afghan government has already been given explanations on the inexpediency of direct participation of Soviet military sub-units in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the DRA, as such actions would be used by the enemies of the Afghan revolution and foreign hostile forces in order to falsify Soviet international aid to Afghanistan and to carry out anti-governmental and anti-soviet propaganda among the Afghan population.

Emphasize that during March-April of this year, the DRA has already been sent 25 military helicopters which are equipped with 5-10 complete sets of combat ammunition.

Convince H. Amin that existing combat helicopters with Afghan crews are capable, along with subdivisions of land-based forces and combat aircraft, of solving the problems of suppressing counter-revolutionary actions.

Work out for the Afghan command the necessary recommendations pertaining to this question.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 28.)

Yet between May and December 1979, the situation continued to deteriorate, and for reasons that are still not entirely clear, Moscow changed its mind about sending troops. Why the turnabout? Several potential explanations exist. One factor was undoubtedly the grave internal situation in Afghanistan, which Moscow viewed with growing concern, receiving reports from a parade of special emissaries sent to urge Kabul to modify and moderate its course. While blaming outside countries (Iran, Pakistan, China, the United States) for exacerbating the situation, Soviet leaders recognized deep problems with the Afghan leadership itself, and rumors arose that Moscow was angling to replace the Khalqi Taraki-Amin regime with one headed by Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction. Mutinies and rebel attacks continued, and Moscow began to increase its security presence in the country, though still short of sending military forces. In September-October 1979, tensions between Taraki and Amin and their supporters exploded into open warfare, ending with Amin in control and Taraki dead—a result clearly contrary to the Kremlin’s wishes. Surface cooperation between Kabul and Moscow continued, with Amin even requesting the dispatch of Soviet troops. But Soviet leaders were privately convinced of Amin’s “insincerity and duplicity” (the quotation is from a report for a Politburo meeting of 31 October 1979, cited in Trud (Moscow), 23 June 1992, and Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, rev. ed., 1011) and his inability to successfully contain the rebel insurgency, and may well have begun plotting to remove him—although much remains unclear about this period, as it is for the few months immediately preceding the intervention that the fewest internal Soviet documents have so far become available. Still, even the likely defeat of the clearly unpopular government would not alter the reasons why Moscow had rejected intervention the previous spring—so what else had changed?

One possibility concerns the continuing growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and most importantly the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, which had deposed the Shah after a quarter-century in power and installed in his place a theocracy dominated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In their 1 April 1979 report to the Politburo, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Pomomarev had pointed to the “situation in Iran and the spark of religious fanaticism all around the Muslim East” as the “underlying cause” of the anti-Kabul agitation. Moscow may well have also feared the spread of religious zeal into the mostly-Moslem Central Asian republics of the USSR itself—a latent threat that would not become evident to the rest of the world for another decade to come. Since the spring, the fundamentalist tide had only become stronger, with Islamic radicals taking firmer control of the Iranian revolution (and seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November), sparking unrest in Saudi Arabia, and calling for a jihad against other Arab regimes and against both superpowers. These developments related to the larger question of the changed international context since the spring’s decision against non-intervention. Although Brezhnev and Carter had met in Vienna in June 1979 to sign a SALT II treaty, US-Soviet ties had been sinking ever since, with acrimony stirred by the “Cuban brigade” brouhaha later that summer—the flap, regarded by Moscow as a provocation, over the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba that U.S. intelligence had lost track of—and by the failure of the Senate to ratify, or even vote on the ratification of, the SALT II treaty. The concerns Gromyko had expressed in March about the negative international repercussions of a Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan were, in fact, no less valid, but he and other Soviet leaders may have come to feel that there was less to be lost in that sphere anyway—that détente was already effectively dead. Finally, still to be resolved is the argument advanced by some analysts that U.S. resistance in responding to the Iranian Revolution and the capture of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 emboldened Moscow to advance toward its purported goal of a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf. If anything, however, the weight of the evidence in the documents that have become available suggest that Moscow’s considerations were more influenced by fear of losing Afghanistan to Islamic radicalism than by hopes of using the country as a military springboard to dominate the region.

Still, it must be emphasized that the archival documents that have become available so far do not permit a clear reconstruction of Soviet decision-making in late 1979. Further evidence, particularly Politburo transcripts, may reside in the Russian Presidential Archives. But the closest document to a “smoking gun” for the intervention that has emerged is a memorandum dated 12 December 1979, apparently in Chernenko’s handwriting. Six days earlier, the Politburo had approved sending a 500-man “Spetznaz” (military intelligence special unit) force to Afghanistan. And now, the Politburo subgroup of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko (Ponomarev was absent), together with Chernenko, obtained Brezhnev’s signed consent to implement the agreed-upon measures leading to the deployment of 50-75,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan later that month, and (using the “Spetznaz” force mentioned above) to the killing of Amin and his replacement by Babrak Karmal as Afghan leader and head of the PDPA. That a full CPSU CC Politburo meeting was not held to approve the invasion until it had taken place, and that the memorandum was hand-written to avoid informing typists, phrased euphemistically to avoid explicit reference to troops, or even to Afghanistan (“A”), reflect the secrecy with which the fateful step ultimately came about. More Russian documents on the Afghan events will appear in future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin.
Concerning the situation in “A”

1. Ratify evaluations and measures set forth by Andropov Yu.V., Ustinov D.F., and Gromyko A.A. Authorize them to introduce amendments of non-essential character in the course of the execution of these measures.

Questions requiring the decision of the CC [Central Committee] should be expeditiously introduced to the Politburo.

The execution of all these measures should be entrusted to comr[a]des. Andropov Yu.V., Ustinov D.F., and Gromyko A.A.


Secretary of CC [signature: “L. Brezhnev”]

Despite Reagan’s protestations that his Strategic Defense Initiative was only a defensive measure, Soviet leaders had instantly denounced SDI, known more popularly as “Star Wars,” as a diabolical U.S. plot to regain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, as the herald of a nuclear arms race in space, and as an abandonment of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This new twist came against the backdrop of a looming showdown between Moscow and the NATO alliance over the impending U.S. deployment in Western Europe, planned for the fall of 1983, of Pershing-2 and ground-launched cruise medium-range nuclear missiles capable of striking Moscow and the western Soviet Union. Despite Western arguments that the deployment was necessitated by Soviet installation of comparable missiles in the late 1970s, the NATO plan had aroused protests in West Germany and other West European capitals, and Moscow had threatened to break off arms negotiations in Geneva over intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and strategic nuclear arms (START) in Geneva should the missiles actually be sent in (they were, and Moscow did walk out, but only temporarily). Superpower tensions had also risen in the Middle East over the aftermath of the 1982 war in Lebanon—which had included a brief but violent clash between Israel and Syria, backed by opposed superpower patrons—and over what Washington saw as the efforts of Syria, a Soviet client, to torpedo the U.S.-brokered pact between Israel and Lebanon that had been concluded on May 17. Washington and Moscow also clashed via proxies in Third World conflicts, especially Afghanistan and Nicaragua; over human rights issues; concerning relations with China, which Moscow increasingly saw as a hostile U.S. ally; and on other issues.

As the Politburo met, the Western allies had just concluded a summit meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, which, despite being ostensibly devoted to economic issues, had also produced a unanimous endorsement for the missile deployment (in the absence of a “balanced” INF agreement) from Reagan and the leaders of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada, and even Japan, whose leader, Yasuharu Nakasone, had more firmly than ever aligned his country with NATO’s European strategy. The Williamsburg declaration came despite an explicit warning in Pravda on the eve of the
summit that the deployment would provoke the Soviets to deploy additional missiles of their own targeted not only on Europe but on the United States itself.

The anger of Andropov and his cohorts at this latest development shows clearly in the transcript, as does their determination to act “very decisively” to develop a political counter-offensive to swing international, and especially U.S. and West European, public opinion against Reagan’s “aggressive” and “militaristic” programs. One finds Andropov and the Soviet leaders particularly alarmed by Japan’s solidarity with NATO, and searching for ways to weaken that bond, perhaps through a territorial compromise. They also show concern about the need to consolidate the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe—not only the maverick Romanians, but other Warsaw Pact leaders had, in Andropov’s terms, failed to show “strong unity” and were “buried in their national problems,” and should therefore be called to Moscow for a summit conference to reinvigorate Socialist bloc unity and strategy.

Despite obvious irritation with Western actions, the Soviet leaders also display a degree of restraint, or at least caution. Regarding the situation in the Middle East and Central America, Andropov remarks that Moscow should warn the Syrians, as he said he had told the Cubans, to avoid instigating a confrontation, since the USSR would not be dragged into a war on their behalf. And there is discussion of Andropov’s sending a personal letter to Reagan on nuclear arms control issues—presaging the letter he in fact sent Reagan on 4 July 1983, initiating a short-lived yet promising private dialogue that was aborted less than two months later following the Soviet downing of a Korean Air Lines 747 on September 1, triggering renewed U.S.-Soviet hostility.

All of the excerpts below were declassified by Russian authorities as possible evidence for use in the Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992—and perhaps for potential use in discrediting Mikhail Gorbachev and other rivals of Boris Yeltsin—and subsequently deposited in Fond 89. They were provided to CWIHP by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and introduced by CWIHP director Jim Hershberg; Lena Milman translated the following transcript:

Absolutely secret
the only copy
(rough draft).

SESSION OF POLITBUREO OF CC CPSU
31 May 1983

Chairman com. ANDROPOV Yu. V.

In the beginning of the session comrade Andropov expressed words of deep sadness about the death of comrade Arveed Yanovich Pelshe. Comrade Andropov informed that the funeral of comrade Pelshe, according to the decision of the CC is going to be held at 11 o’clock on the Red square by the Kremlin wall. The members of the funeral commission will come to the Dom Soyuzov at the time of carrying out the body; the rest of the members of Politburo, candidates to members of Politburo and the secretaries will come at 11 o’clock straight to the Mausoleum.

[ANDROPOV.] Now I would like to address the issue, which in my opinion deserves the exchange of opinions and suggestions.

Today I’ve talked with a number of members of the Politburo about our government’s announcement of the response connected with the deployment of American missiles “Pershing-2” and cruise missiles in the countries of Western Europe; and also concerning the resolution adopted by the countries of “Big Seven” in Williamsburg. It’s important that we discuss this matter, exchange opinions, and express the suggestions that should be developed.

If you look at the events that are taking place in the Western countries, you can say that an anti-soviet coalition is being formed out there. Of course, that’s not accidental, and it’s highly dangerous. At the session of the NATO countries, that’s going on in Williamsburg, very aggressive speeches are given; and the very resolution adopted by the “Big Seven” is non-constructive, but aggressive.

If you analyze the reaction of the countries of the West on our declaration, then the reaction has two sides. From one side, our declaration had impressed them very much. There are indications, seen through some of the speeches of some of the western politicians that give hope to normal and productive high level talks about the decrease of the arms race and disarmament, especially of the nuclear weapons. On the other side there are indications of absolute fulfillment of the so-called double decision of NATO, which is the placement of nuclear missiles in the countries of West-
nuclear missiles. Maybe we should all think about that idea and make it an official proposal—join the talks about the nuclear missiles in Europe with the talks about the limitation on all the strategic nuclear weapons. We also should think when and where to bring up this proposal. I think that MFA and the Ministry of Defense will decide on that problem.

We have to open up a wider network to win public opinion, to mobilize public opinion of the Western countries of Europe and America against the location of the nuclear weapons in Europe and against a new arms race, that’s being forced by the American administration. The behavior of Japan, and especially of the president [Yasuhiro] Nakasone worries me. He completely took the side of the more aggressive part of the Western countries, and he completely supports Reagan’s actions. Because of that we should consider some sort of compromise in our relations with Japan. For example: we could think about joint exploitation of several small islands, that have no strategic importance. Maybe there will be other suggestions. I, personally, think that Japan could initiate more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

The next point concerns China. I think that the Chinese aren’t going to move any further on their positions. But all our data shows that they could increase their trade with USSR. They did offer us a trade agreement for this year, that substantially increases our goods exchange[compared to] the previous years of trading with China. Because of that we might have to send comrade [First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V.] Arkhipov to China to conduct a series of talks and to “feel the ground.” And if we succeed in improving our economic ties with China through cultural, sports, and other organizations, it could be considered a big step ahead.

Now about the Middle East. To say that the events in the Middle East don’t bother us would be wrong. The fact is that we have very good relations with Syria. But Syria argues against the agreement that was made between Israel and Lebanon, Syria has no friendly relations with Iraq. Recently Syria has been facing minor problems with PLO, and in particular with [PLO Chairman Yasser] Arafat. In one word—here is a problem we have to think about.

If you look at our propaganda, you can come to a conclusion that it’s quite calm when it comes to strategic preparations of NATO. That’s true, we shouldn’t scare people with war. But in our propaganda we should show more brightly and fully the military actions of the Reagan administration and the supporting countries of Western Europe, which in other words means disclosing in full scale the aggressive character of the enemy. We need that, so we could use facts to mobilize the soviet people for the fulfillment of social and economic plans for development of the country. We can’t, comrades, forget in this situation defense sufficiency of our country. These topics should be constant in our media. You remember comrade L. Y. Brezhnev at the XXVI session of CPSU [23 February - 3 March 1981] said, that military threat is coming and because of that we should lead a struggle against the influence of military revivalists ideas of the West. That’s what it came to: Reagan calls up the senators if they support the ideas of the Soviet Union, and charges them with treason. Why don’t we use press to speak against the lazybums, those who miss work [progulshikov], bad workers? I ask the comrades to express their opinions about the questions brought up and maybe comrades have other suggestions. Who would like to take the stand?

GROMYKO. I completely approve of the suggestions that were expressed by Yu. V. Andropov. First of all about the call of the meeting of the leaders of socialist countries, countries of the Warsaw Pact. That kind of meeting, to my opinion, we should gather. [Romanian leader Nicolae] Ceausescu, I think, we should invite to the meeting. I would say, it’s beneficial for us.

ANDROPOV. Right now they are asking for a consultation.

GROMYKO. Particularly they were asking us for that. The meeting of the leaders of the countries of the Warsaw Pact will show the unity of our Pact and prove our principal positions in the questions of nuclear weapons and reduction of arms race. I think that we should adopt at the meeting a document, as rightly mentioned before Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov]. This document should sound very clearly. Along declaration shouldn’t be made, but it should be sharp and concrete. This would be our collective action of the countries of Warsaw Pact. It is needed.

What to do with the talks? I fully support the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich about uniting the talks on nuclear armament in Europe and strategic armament in whole. As you know, Reagan has got a goal, whatever it takes him, to place the nuclear missiles “Pershing-2” and the cruise missiles in the European countries. A question comes up, what should we do, whether we should continue the talks? As it’s known, Western countries, many of them, are ready for deployment. That’s why we should bring in something fresh. And in connection with that this suggestion about uniting the talks will serve our interests.

ANDROPOV. We should invite for these talks the English and French, let them participate, they are nuclear countries.

GROMYKO. I think the English and French will refuse for sure to hold the talks, but we should invite them, that’s right. The main suggestion, I think, is the combined talks. That type of a suggestion deals with the restriction of nuclear armament in the whole, which means that in the talks they will include the tactic missiles, also. In their time Western countries themselves put a question about the talks on all kinds of nuclear weapons.

ANDROPOV. That’s good, let them say that themselves, how they view that suggestion.

GROMYKO. It will be easier for us to keep in contact with those who speak against all kinds of nuclear weapons. I think, that they can try this, in spite of the fact that they will insist on location of nuclear weapons in Europe. In a word, this will give us a break.

ANDROPOV. Anyway, we don’t lose anything.

GROMYKO. New ideas are starting to appear in America, though not officially, but it’s very important. Maybe they will agree to union. Anyway, this line [idea] will have to be fulfilled right away.

We will have an extra plan—it is the continuing of the talks on restrictions of use of strategic nuclear armament in the world and restrictions on nuclear armament in Europe. The United States, as it’s known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think, that they without enough reason wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles. Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and Western Germany. This we also have to use skillfully in our propaganda and in our practical interests.

Regarding Japan, I have an idea: why don’t we use our suggestion regarding the islands of Hamabayi [sic-Habamai?—ed.], Kunashir, and other small islands, that really are very little spots, and draw the border, I mean make an adjustment of the border. It would be then the most prestigious suggestion.

ANDROPOV. When I talked about Japan, I didn’t mean that suggestion. I talked about joint exploitation of several little islands.

GROMYKO. We could do both at the same time. These same islands are small dots in the ocean and they don’t have such a grand strategic importance.

About China. The People’s Republic of China expresses wishes to broaden our economic ties. Even in practice it is starting something in that sphere, for example the increase of goods exchange.

ANDROPOV. This should be checked out, as I said.

GROMYKO. I think, that the Chinese aren’t going to go for anything else. One of the terms for normalization of our relations is the withdrawal of our troops from Chinese borders. It seems to me that we could think about that. But then the Chinese began to push for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

ANDROPOV. I suggest we don’t bring up that question.

GROMYKO. Regarding Mongolia. Maybe we should withdraw part of the army away from the border. There is a danger in the Middle East
that Israel will strike against Syria. If Syria ruins Reagan’s plans, Americans will go bankrupt.

ANDROPOV. I would suggest we turn to Syria to advise it not to pull itself into this conflict. If the events start happening, we should warn Syrian leaders beforehand to work out a corresponding plan.

GROMYKO. Syria sends tanks to Lebanon. Our task is to advise Syrian leaders to withhold from any participation in the events of the war.

ANDROPOV. May be we should write a letter about that to [Syrian leader Hafez] Assad?

USTINOV. All that we do regarding defense we should continue doing. All the missiles, that we planned to install, should be installed. All the airplanes should be stationed at the spots we agreed upon. Reading the resolution that was adopted by the “Big Seven,” I should say, it was very cunning and strict. But it has its weak points and we should figure out how to use them. But everything happens in life, so “they” may be installing the missiles in England, FRG, and other countries.

I consider the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich absolutely correct that we should carry out active work, to counteract against the imperialistic actions of our enemies.

Regarding Mongolia I should say, that if we move the Soviet army, that’s now located there back to our territory then we will lose a very good post. Everything is already equipped there. That’s why we have nowhere to move on the Soviet border.

Regarding Cambodia and Vietnam, we already talked about it not once. I figure that we shouldn’t lose positions won in battles, but we should retain them. The sanctions which were discussed earlier by Yuri Vladimirovich, should be supported. We will look at it very carefully and think about our actions. We also have to think about talks in Vienna and Geneva, in regards to nuclear weapons as well as strategic. In fact I consider very rightful the suggestion to combine both of these talks. Maybe, Y.V. Andropov will consider it rational to speak out with that suggestion, and maybe give another suggestion, let’s say, about decrease of nuclear weapons by 50 percent, including French and English nuclear weapons.

TIKHONOV. England and France will never agree to that.

USTINOV. If they don’t agree, than our proposal will sound all over the world. The middle-range missiles,- Western countries wouldn’t refuse against their location in Europe.

GROMYKO. But what then to reduce?

USTINOV. We can reduce all the rockets.

GROMYKO. We proposed that.

USTINOV. Yes, we already proposed, but we should offer again. About Japan I would like to say that we can look only at very small islands, but the big island Kunashir—we have quite settled there. For example, from the Japanese sea we can only access through the strait of La Pérouse, and, I should say, here we would substantially cut our maneuvering space.

About the meeting with governments of socialist countries. I completely agree with Yuri Vladimirovich. We should expose the Western countries, their offensive speeches and military tone. Maybe Yu.V. Andropov should say something on that topic, too.

GROMYKO. I will have a speech at the session. In that speech, it seems to me, I should spell out a number of suggestions.

USTINOV. Maybe I should give an interview? In one word, we activate the work, gather socialist parties and agree with them on this subject.

CHERENKOV. Even if Romania doesn’t sign, we could adopt a resolution without the signature of Romania.

USTINOV. Japan hadn’t joined the military alliance of the Western countries, yet. That’s why we should act not only upon Japan, but the other countries, also, so that not only we openly spoke out against militaristic intentions of Reagan administration, English, Japanese and others, but the socialist countries did it, too, and the leaders of the socialist countries could have spoken out, too. By the way, in those situation they have kept silent. We have, comrades, to build, strengthen the socialist bloc, but very skillfully. To my regret, the relations between Vietnam and China are very strained. I absolutely agree with the decision of Yuri Vladimirovich about enforcing anti-war propaganda, targeted at the arms race, wrong suggestions of the Western countries and especially at the American administration. It looks like the Americans thought about installing a space command. In a word, I would like to say, that we should more widely speak out about our suggestions and expose the militaristic intentions of the Western countries.

ANDROPOV. Of course, we aren’t going to change Reagan’s behavior, but we will expose his antisoviet, militaristic intentions very decisively.

TIKHONOV. Reagan doesn’t react any more to our suggestions. Regarding the unifying of the talks, this is one more of our important suggestions, and we should bring it in. Missiles, of course, they will place in Western Europe. But [we] should explain it broadly and clearly to our people and all other nations of other countries. The resolution of the Soviet government is a very important document. We now have only to develop propaganda, expose the actions of the West and have a strong influence over people. I think that meeting that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about is vitally important to be held. And with that we should somehow hint to socialist countries that they alone and each one of them, let’s say GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary give a speech. Let’s say a speech for Nuclear-free Zone in Europe and on the other topics. [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov, for example, can give a speech about Nuclear-free Zone in the Balkans. Now about China. All the initiatives about the increase in goods exchange between USSR and China come from China. This is very important. That’s why we should feel the ground about broadening our economic relations with China and send to China comrade Arkhipov for the talks.

Regarding removal of the troops from the Chinese border, to me it seems like an unrealistic act.

Regarding Syria, as comrades have talked about it, everything is correct. If Syria gets involved in a conflict, then we can lose everything we have in the Middle East. And we have to keep Syria in our orbit. That’s why we should conduct more work with the Syrian government. We have to find such a method in our propaganda, such forms and methods of conducting it so as to tell our people the truth about the nuclear war, but not to scare them, as Yuri Vladimirovich correctly pointed out.

CHERENKOV. It’s absolutely correct, that Yuri Vladimirovich gathered us today, and the suggestion is right about a meeting with the leaders of all the members of the Warsaw Pact. If you look attentively at our friends—Czechs, GDR, Hungarians, Bulgarians, you get an impression, that the leaders of these countries don’t worry about the current situation. That’s why the very fact of calling a meeting will mean a lot. I think that we should call a meeting in a near future, as said Yuri Vladimirovich.

VOICES. Support the suggestion about the calling of a meeting.

CHERENKOV. At that meeting we can talk about China, about the Middle East and about other important questions of the international situation. I think that all the questions that Yuri Vladimirovich stated in his speech were very correct. There gathered a “big Seven” of Western aggressive states, but we are also a “big Seven,” and we should meet, but this would be now a meeting of “big Seven,” fighting against nuclear arms and for peace.

About working out the suggestions, that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about, I think, that, including our interests, we should prepare them well and introduce [them] to [the] CC.

GRISHIN. I completely support what Yuri Vladimirovich suggested. The situation is dangerous. The resolution of the “Big Seven” that they will put the missiles in Europe, has an offensive character. Actually, there is being formed a bloc based on an anti-soviet platform. Western countries try to outweigh the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the nuclear weapons. The meeting should be held before the meeting of NATO.

GROMYKO. It could be held even after NATO’s meeting. Then we could find out their point of view on several questions.
GRISHIN. On our meeting we should call socialist countries to active counteraction toward imperialistic countries. About the invitation of Romania, I am for it, though there’s no guarantee they will sign the resolution. They behave very badly. Not long ago, as it was known, Ceausescu hosted [conservative West German politician, Bavarian state premier Franz Josef] Strauss and during the talks he spoke very badly. I think that we should prepare a good, short, but sharp document, that will be adopted there.

I am completely for opening of wide range of propaganda in our press and among our oral propagandists, which was mentioned before by Yuri Vladimirovich.

ANDROPOV. In that sphere we so far don’t do a whole lot.

GRISHIN. I think that with Japan we should look for the way to soften the relations. With China we could develop economic relations on higher levels. Of course, China won’t give up on Cambodia, and on that issue we will never come to an agreement. I think, that we should keep Syrians from unnecessary actions, so that they don’t get pulled into military confrontations.

ANDROPOV. At one point, remember I told the Cubans that we won’t fight for them and won’t send any troops to Cuba. And it worked all right, the Cubans accepted it. We should tell the same thing to Syrians. I think such a saying will prevent them from confrontation.

GORBACHEV. You said it right, Yuri Vladimirovich, that the time now is calling us to increase actions, taking necessary steps to develop a broad program of counter-measures against the aggressive plans of the Western countries. And in the inside plan we have certain serious tasks. We can take some action towards the countries of CMEA [Council on Mutual Economic Assistance], countries of Warsaw Pact, and separate socialist countries. I completely support the suggestions about holding a meeting and other actions, that were suggested here, including the military line.

The United States is moving to Europe. Here we can’t wait. We have to act.

ALIEV. I support all the suggestions of Yuri Vladimirovich. This complex of actions is vital to be carried out. Our external politics has an offensive character, but the character of a peace offensive. The imperialists are irritated by our suggestions. All that you said here, Yuri Vladimirovich, regarding a meeting of the socialist countries, improving relations with China, about the Middle East, especially about starting a wide propaganda—all this deserves special attention and should be adopted.

DEMICHEN. Why don’t we write a letter to Reagan from the name of comrade Andropov?

ANDROPOV. I would modernize a bit the suggestion of P. N. Demichiev and write a letter to the participants of the meeting of the “Big Seven,” and then, maybe later, to Reagan.

PONOMAREV. In response to the actions of the “Big Seven” we should work out our suggestions. Maybe, after the meeting of the leaders of the socialist countries we should hold party activities, and meetings in the country.

USTINOV. This is all correct, but what if we scare the people?

PONOMAREV. On 20 June, for example, there’s going to be an Assembly of Peace in Prague, we should use it for propaganda of our peaceful propositions.

ZIMYANIN. I completely agree with what Yuri Vladimirovich said. I would ask a permission to begin realization of this ideas starting tomorrow. In particular, gather the editors of the leading newspapers, information agencies and tell them about these ideas, especially point the sharp end of our propaganda at Reagan and his aggressive suggestions.

KUZNETSOV. I think, we should activate also the work in parliamentary relations, especially about sending our parliamentary delegations to France, USA, and the other countries. Obviously, on the session in A.A. Gromyko’s speech he should mention these questions.

ANDROPOV. Now I would like to tell you, comrades, the most important [item], what I would like to inform you of, is that I am talking about improvement of our work inside the country, and about the increase of our, leaders’ responsibility of the assigned tasks. It doesn’t only concern me—Andropov, or Gromyko, Ustinov, we all are personally responsible for the departments that we lead. Comrade Tikhonov has to keep a tight grip on Food industry. Comrade Gorbachev has to use fewer weather excuses, but organize a fight for the crops, mobilize people so that they don’t talk about bad weather, but work more, so they use every good day, every minute for gathering more crops, do all we can to increase wheat crops and other grain and meat and dairy. Comrade Aliev has an important task—improvement of the public transportation system. Comrade Kapitonov has to increase the common goods production, more should be done in that field. Comrade Demichiev should be stricter with the repertoire of the theaters, we have too many negative sides, and the other questions in the development of our culture demand more attention. You, Petr Nlyovich [Demichev] are the one to be asked from in this sector. I wouldn’t talk about the other comrades, they all know their departments and their goals. I think that you should gather all your employees and tell them about the ideas and tasks that we talked about today. You can gather all of them or you can gather them in according to groups, whatever is better.

USTINOV. Maybe I should gather with comrade Smirnov all those in defense and we’ll talk about our defense.

TIKHONOV. I will gather all the ministers and their VPs and talk to them about these subjects.

RUSAKOV. We have to, obviously, check everything that’s going on in the socialist countries in these areas and then let them know our suggestions and give them friendly advice.

ANDROPOV. All this, comrades, can be done and I think that you will take these tasks actively. There is a suggestion to give to comrades Gromyko and Zimyanin a task to summarize all that we talked about on our session, and prepare a suggestion about the counteractions towards the actions of the imperialistic states, targeted at worsening of the international situation. Don’t be long with the preparation of those suggestions and entering them in the CC. Agreed?

EVERYONE. Agreed.

ANDROPOV. On this permit me to end our meeting.

(Sources: TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 53, Ll. 1-14.)

1. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Smirnov, head of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK)].

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The intense, neo-Brezhnevite and almost neo-Stalinist conservatism of the brief Chernenko interregnum (Feb. 1984-March 1985) pervades this July 1984 Politburo excerpt. The transcript also illuminates the relationship between fluctuations in CPSU leadership and reassessments of past party history. On this occasion, the Politburo’s consideration of requests for rehabilitation from several one-time rivals of Nikita S. Khrushchev who had been ousted from the party in intra-leadership struggles in the 1950s prompts a vigorous bout of Khrushchev-bashing. (The three erstwhile party stalwarts who had petitioned the Politburo—Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the long-time USSR foreign minister; Georgii M. Malenkov, for a time considered Stalin’s likely successor; and Lazar M. Kaganovich, one of Stalin’s key henchmen and First Deputy Premier under Stalin’s death—were all expelled from the party leadership in 1957 as members of the “Anti-Party Group” that had allegedly plotted to overthrow Khrushchev. Also seeking additional privileges was Alexander Shelepin, once KGB chief under Khrushchev but now denouncing him.) Sympathetically considering the requests of the “Anti-Party Group” to be restored to honored party positions, one Politburo member after another—especially Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Ministry Gromyko, KGB chairman Viktor M.
Chebrikov and Prime Minister Nikolai A. Tikhonov—lament the damage that Khrushchev had supposedly caused the USSR, the CPSU, and international communism as a result of his denunciation of Stalin, his reforms to the state and agriculture, and his rehabilitation of individuals such as Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. Caught up in the anti-reformist spirit, Politburo members even lapse into nostalgia for Stalin himself.

An interesting aspect of the discussion is the cautiously equivocal part played by Mikhail Gorbachev, already clearly a leading contender to succeed Chernenko; he suggests soft-pedaling public announcement of Molotov’s rehabilitation, pipes up in agreement to decry Khrushchev’s impact on agricultural matters (then Gorbachev’s specialty), and declares forthrightly, “This proposal has positive and negative sides,” when Ustinov proposes restoring the name Stalingrad to Volgograd. Translation by Loren Utkin.

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MEETING OF POLITBUCRO OF CPSU
12 July 1984

Chair: Com. Chernenko K.U.

CHERNENKO: Departing from today’s agenda, I would like to inform you about a few letters I have received.

As you know, we have made a decision concerning one of the letters. This was the request of V.M. Molotov about his restoration to the ranks of the CPSU. I received V. M. Molotov, had a talk with him. We heard our decision with great happiness and almost started crying. Molotov said the decision was like being born again. Molotov is now 93, but he looks hearty and speaks firmly. He declared that the Politburo CC CPSU has preserved and continued that work, which the party persistently conducted. The only bad thing is that you work like we used to, until midnight. Molotov talked about how he is interested in the press, reads periodical journals. He declared: you are doing things right, and for this you have the people’s support.

USTINOV: That is an important evaluation.

CHERNENKO: Molotov said that he does not understand people who hold a grudge and remain in the opposition. He declared that he recognized his mistakes and made the necessary conclusions. After our conversation Victor Vasil’evich Grishin in the city committee of the party presented him with his party card.

TIKHONOV: In general we did the right thing in restoring him to the party.

CHERNENKO: And right after this the CC CPSU received letters from Malenkov and Kaganovich, and also a letter from [former KGB chairman Alexandr] Shelepin, in which he declares that he once was against Khrushchev and includes a list of requests.

Allow me to read Kaganovich’s letter. (Reads the letter). A letter with analogous contents, with a confession of his mistakes was sent by Malenkov.

USTINOV: Maybe for now we shouldn’t do anything with these letters?

CHERNENKO: For now we can do nothing, but let’s agree to examine them after the XXVII Congress of our party.

USTINOV: But in my opinion, Malenkov and Kaganovich should be reaccepted into the party. They were active figures, leaders. I will say frankly, that if not for Khrushchev, then the decision to expel these people from the party would not have been taken. And in general those scandalous disgraces which Khrushchev committed in relation to Stalin would never have occurred. Stalin, no matter what is said, is our history. No one enemy brought us so much harm as Khrushchev did in his policy towards the past of our party and our state, and towards Stalin.

GROMYKO: In my opinion, we need to restore these two to the party. They were part of the party leadership and government, and for many years led specific parts of work. I doubt that these were unworthy people. For Khrushchev the most important task was to decide questions of cadres and not to expose mistakes made by certain people.

TIKHONOV: Maybe we should return to this question at the end of this year or at the beginning of next year?

CHEBRIKOV: I would like to inform you that Western radio stations have been transmitting news about the restoration of Molotov into the party for a long time now. And they are saying that to this moment the workers of our country and the party do not know anything about this. Maybe we should include an announcement in the Informational Bulletin of the CC CPSU about the restoration of Molotov to the party?

Concerning the question about the restoration of Malenkov and Kaganovich into the party, I would request a little time in order to prepare a summary of those resolutions which these individuals wrote on the lists of repressed people. Indeed, in the case of their restoration to the party, one can expect a large stream of letters from those who were rehabilitated during the 1950s, who, of course, will be against restoring their party membership, especially Kaganovich. We need to be ready for this. I think that such a summary should be viewed by the Politburo of the CC before making a final decision.

TIKHONOV: Yes, if not for Khrushchev, they would never have been expelled from the party. He soiled and stained us and our policies in the eyes of the whole world.

CHEBRIKOV: Besides that, a whole list of individuals were illegally rehabilitated. As a matter of fact they were rightly punished. Take, for example, Solzhenitsyn.

GORBACHEV: I think that we could go without publicizing the restoration of Molotov in the party in the Informational Bulletin of the CC CPSU. The department of organizational and party work could communicate this in an operational manner to the regional and district committees of the party.

Concerning Malenkov and Kaganovich, I would also support their restoration in the party. And we wouldn’t need to connect their restoration with the upcoming party congress.

ROMANOV: Yes, these people are already elderly and could die.

USTINOV: I will stand by my evaluation of Khrushchev’s activity, as they say, until I die. He did us a lot of damage. Think about what he did to our history, to Stalin.

GROMYKO: He rendered an irreversible blow to the positive image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the outside world.

USTINOV: It’s not a secret that the westerners never loved us. But Khrushchev gave them such arguments, such material, that we have been discredited for many years.

GROMYKO: Basically thanks to him the so-called “Eurocommunism” was born.

TIKHONOV: And what did he do to our economy! I myself have had to work in a Sovnarkhoz [Soviet regional economic organ].

GORBACHEV: And to the party, breaking it into industrial and agricultural party organizations!

USTINOV: We were always against sovnakhozy. And many members of the CC Politburo, as you remember, stated such an opinion.

In connection with the fortieth anniversary of the Victory over fascism [May 1985] I would propose discussing one more question. Shouldn’t we restore the name Stalingrad to Volgograd? Millions of people would support this. But this, as they say, is information for thought.

GORBACHEV: This proposal has positive and negative sides.

TIKHONOV: Recently a very good documentary film was released called “Marshall Zhukov,” in which Stalin is portrayed rather...
fully and positively.

CHERNENKO: I watched it. This is a good film.

USTINOV: I really should see it.

CHERNENKO: Concerning Shelepin’s letter, it, at the end, requests support on the level of former Politburo members.

USTINOV: In my opinion, what he received upon retiring is quite enough. He raised this question in vain.

CHERNENKO. I think that in terms of these questions we should limit ourselves to exchanging opinions. But as you understand, we will have to return to them.

TIKHONOV: We wish you, Konstantin Ustinovich, a good rest during the recess.

CHERNENKO: Thank you.

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Having taken over the leadership of the CPSU and USSR from Chernenko in March 1985, Gorbachev moved only gradually to dismantle the legacy of his more conservative and dogmatic predecessors. This excerpt, from August 1985, finds him dealing with a nettlesome legacy from the past, the case of Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel laureate dissident scientist who had been exiled to the city of Gorky in January 1980 following his criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and his equally outspoken wife, Yelena Bonner. The particular question at issue here was whether to permit Bonner to visit the United States to receive medical treatment and visit relatives, a decision complicated by concern about the potential risk of an embarrassing uproar if her request was denied barely two months before Gorbachev’s planned summit meeting in Geneva with Reagan. This danger was more than hypothetical; not only was Sakharov’s treatment the subject of persistent demonstrations abroad, but the physicist had in May 1984 and April 1985 already twice conducted hunger strikes to demand that his wife be allowed to travel, prompting the KGB to hospitalize him against his will and to force-feed him intravenously. (In briefing Gorbachev, Chebrikov alludes euphemistically to “various situations [which] have arisen” and “[a]ppropriate measures,” all allegedly legal, taken by the KGB in response.)

On 29 July 1985, a month before the meeting, Sakharov had written Gorbachev and Gromyko pleading for a favorable response to his wife’s request, and promising in return to “discontinue my public activities apart from exceptional circumstances,” and acknowledging the state’s right to restrict his own foreign travel because of his past atomic weapons work. To underline his message, he had also launched another hunger strike, and by August 13 his normal weight of 175 pounds had fallen to 138 pounds. (See Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1990), 599-601.) (Again, Chebrikov avoids explicit mention of a hunger strike, referring only to Sakharov’s “poor health” and weight loss.)

Of course, Gorbachev would in December 1986 permit Sakharov’s return to Moscow, restore his rights to travel, speak and engage in political activity (culminating in his election to the Congress of People’s Deputies), and joust combatively with him over the direction of Soviet society until his death three tumultuous years later. But this transcript shows how much disdain and scorn Sakharov and Bonner inspired among the Soviet leadership, and how Gorbachev appeared to fall in with this attitude, as evidenced by his reported crack about the alleged influence of Bonner, a Jew, over Sakharov—“Now there’s real Zionism.” Even with Chebrikov grudgingly acknowledging that Bonner should be allowed to leave for three months, and Prime Minister Ryzhkov supporting that action as “a humanitarian step,” Gorbachev seems eager to show his colleagues, most of whom had been elevated to the Politburo by previous leaders, that his decisions are based purely on hard-boiled realpolitik considerations: “What will hurt us more—to allow Bonner to go abroad or to forbid it?” But at the same time, he moved gingerly to moderate the tension and should be emphasized.

Bonner. But no actions were permitted which endorses were employed in relation to Sakharov and

Now it is clear that we acted correctly by having such a conference. At the April Plenum of the Central Committee and the June meeting of the CC CPSU the party developed a conception of acceleration of the social-economic development of the country and marked out the principle path of its realization. The people fully supported the party’s course. The tension and vitality of party life has increased, as has all social life of the country. In such a case we have the right to calculate that the results of the work to accelerate economic and social development will be reflected in the first year of the Five-Year Plan. It was emphasized that the views of some ministries and departments in developing the plans for next year and the Twelveth Five-Year Plan have aroused concern in the Central Committee. We are asking our comrades to leave their department’s trenches and approach the development of plans from an all-union position.

CHEVRADNADZEE: One observes a huge contrast between the mood of society and the actions of the U.S. administration.

GORBACHEV: As a whole the discussion was heated, but constructive.

Now a few works on another subject. At the end of July 1 received a letter from the not unfamiliar Sakharov. He is requesting that his wife, Bonner, be allowed to go abroad to undergo treatment and visit with relatives.

CHEBRIKOV: This is an old story. It has been going on for 20 years. During this time various situations have arisen. Appropriate measures were employed in relation to Sakharov and Bonner. But no actions were permitted which would have violated the law. This is very important and should be emphasized.

Sakharov is now 65 and Bonner is 63. Sakharov is in poor health. He’s undergoing onco-logical tests because he has been losing weight.
Sakharov as a political figure has basically lost his image of late and has been saying nothing new. Bonner should probably be allowed to go abroad for three months. According to the law, it is possible to interrupt the exile for a short period of time (Bonner, as you know, is in exile). Of course in the West, she could make a statement and receive some award, etc. We cannot exclude the possibility that from Italy, where she’s going to obtain treatment, she could go to the U.S. Allowing Bonner to go abroad would have the appearance of a humanitarian step.

Two variants of her future behavior are possible. First, she returns to Gorky. Second, she refuses to come back and begins to raise the question of reunification of the family, which means giving Sakharov permission to leave. In this case, appeals from Western officials and even some representatives of the communist party could follow. But we cannot let Sakharov go abroad. Minsredmash [Ministry of Middle Machine-Building] is against this because Sakharov knows in detail the entire path of development of our atomic weapons.

According to specialists, Sakharov could continue to work in military research if he would be given a laboratory. Bonner has a strong influence on Sakharov’s behavior.

GORBACHEV: Now there’s real Zionism.
CHEBRIKOV: Bonner has a 100 percent influence over him. We believe that without her his behavior will change. He has two daughters and a son from his first marriage. They behave well and can influence their father.

GORBACHEV: Is it possible to do things in such a way that Sakharov would state in his letter that he understands that he cannot go abroad? Is it possible to convince him to make such a statement?

CHEBRIKOV: We must resolve this question right now. If we make this decision prior to or even right after your meetings with Mitterrand and Reagan, it will be seen as a concession, which is undesirable.

GORBACHEV: Yes. We should make a decision.

ZIMYANIN: No doubt that Bonner will be used against us in the West. But the rebuff of her attempts to reunite with her family could be handed over to our scientists, who could make the appropriate statements. Comrade Slavsky is correct — we cannot let Sakharov go abroad. And you can’t expect any kind of decency from Bonner. She’s a beast in a skirt, an imperialist plant.

GORBACHEV: What will hurt us more—to allow Bonner to go abroad or to forbid it?

SHEVARDNADZE: Of course there are serious doubts about allowing Bonner to go abroad. But all the same we will win politically. We should make a decision now.

DOLGIKH: Is it possible to influence Sakharov?

RYZHKOV: I am for allowing Bonner to go. It is a humanitarian step. If she stays there, of course, there will be a lot of noise. But we will be able to influence Sakharov. He even escaped to the hospital in order to feel freer.

SOKOLOV: I think we need to take this action, it won’t make things any worse for us.

KUZNETSOV: The case is complicated. Not allowing Bonner to go abroad could be used in propaganda against us.

ALIEV: It is difficult to give a precise answer to this question. Bonner is under control now. Anger has pent up inside her over the years. It will pour out of her once she gets to the West. Bourgeois propaganda will have a concrete person for conducting various sorts of press conferences and other anti-Soviet acts. The situation will worsen if Sakharov raises the question of reuniting with his wife. So there is an element of risk here. But let’s take the risk.

DEMICHET: Most of all I am thinking about Comrade M.S. Gorbachev’s meetings with Mitterrand and Reagan. If we allow Bonner to go abroad before this, then in the West a loud anti-Soviet campaign will be raised. So it would most likely be better to do this after the visits.

KAPITONOV: If we let Bonner out, then the story will drag out. She will have a case to unify with her family.

GORBACHEV: Maybe we will do this: confirm that we have received the letter, and say, that we have attended to the matter and given the appropriate assignments. We have to let it be known, say, that we can meet him halfway on his request to allow Bonner to leave, but everything depends on how Sakharov will behave himself and how Bonner will act abroad. For now it is advisable to limit ourselves to this.

(Signed) A. Lukianov.

GORBACHEV continued to move gradually toward a relaxation in persecution of political dissidents. In this September 1986 excerpt, he receives a report from KGB chief Chebrikov that he had requested on “what kinds of people are serving sentences for crimes, which Western propaganda calls political.” Obviously following Gorbachev’s lead, Chebrikov proposes to alleviate the prison sentences of two-thirds of the 240 persons he lists under this category; but, in response to a question from Gromyko, he notes two cases where the guilty parties had already received a sentence that could not be reduced—execution for espionage. Of the two cases Chebrikov mentioned, one, transcribed from the Russian as Polischuk, is not further identified; the other refers to Adolf G. Tolkaacev, a Soviet electronics expert arrested in June 1985, allegedly after being fingered as an American spy by ex-CIA officer Edward L. Howard, who had been recruited by the KGB and successfully escaped to the USSR in September 1985. (See David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away (New York: Random House, 1988), 19, 68, 159, 196, 207-8, 234-5, 248-9, 261-2.) Translation by Loren Utkin.

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MEETING OF POLITBURO OF CPSU
25 September 1986

Chair: Com. GORBACHEV. M.S.

[...]

GORBACHEV: I asked Victor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] to tell us what kinds of people are serving their sentence for crimes, which western propaganda calls political.

CHEBRIKOV: According to our laws these crimes are especially dangerous state crimes. A total of 240 people have been brought to bear responsibility and are serving sentences for committing the aforementioned crimes. These individuals are convicted of espionage, violating state borders, circulating hostile leaflets, hard currency counterfeiting, etc. Many of these individuals made statements about their refusal to continue their hostile activity. They connect their statements with the political changes following the April Plenum of the CC CPSU and the XXVII Party Conference [on 25 February-6 March 1986].

It seems that we could, for a start, free one-third from prison and later one-half of these individuals. In this case, only those persons who maintain hostile positions towards our state would continue to serve their sentences.

GORBACHEV: It seems that one could support such a proposal.

CHEBRIKOV: We will do this rationally. In order to assure that the aforementioned individuals cease their hostile activity, they will be watched.

SCHERBITSKY: How does one explain that relatively few individuals have borne criminal responsibility for committing especially dangerous state crimes? Perestroika?

CHEBRIKOV: It can be explained by the
charges in New York City and Moscow of, respectively, Soviet diplomat Gennadi Zakharov and American journalist Nicholas Daniloff; the standoff threatened plans for a planned Gorbachev visit to the United States, and required intense high-level negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to find a face-saving resolution involving the release from prison and immediate expulsion of both men, as well as the release of imprisoned Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov. While this hurdle had been overcome, allowing the hastily-arranged Reykjavik rendezvous to take place, the Summit’s aftermath had seen a re-escalation of the espionage and propaganda battle: in addition to 25 Soviets affiliated with the USSR UN Mission in New York who had been deported from the country on September 17, provoking Moscow to expel five U.S. diplomats, in mid-October Washington kicked out more 55 Soviet diplomats.

Such actions angered Gorbachev—and at this meeting, on October 22, he ordered in retaliation the removal of 250 Soviets working in service positions at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—but so too did he deeply resent what he viewed as the Reagan Administration’s adamant refusal to acknowledge the great concessions that the Soviet Union had already made at Reykjavik, or to advance any constructive arms control proposals of their own. Some of Washington’s conduct could be written off to the Reagan Administration’s desire to blame everything on the Soviet side and to continue to carry out offensive explanatory work oriented towards American and all international society. Washington politicians are afraid of this. For three days materials featuring my speech at the Reykjavik press conference and appearances on Soviet television have been delayed at customs.

YAKOVLEV: Comrade Bugaev called me and said that this material is still held up at American customs.

GORBACHEV: We need to continue to put pressure on the American administration, explaining our positions to the population and showing that the American side is responsible for the breakdown in the agreement over the questions of reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons. Lately, Reagan and his staff haven’t found anything better to do than commit another hostile act — deport 55 Soviet diplomats. Five of our officials have been declared persona non-grata, as they explain in Washington, in response to our deportation of 5 American diplomats, and 50 are being removed under the guise of establishing equal numbers of American and Soviet diplomatic representatives.

We cannot let this hostile action go unanswered. We should not exclude the most decisive
measures. Americans are making threats and claiming that if we take retaliatory measures, then they will take further steps towards our diplomatic personnel in the United States. Well, I think that given the limited character of Soviet-American relations, our embassy in the USA will be able to handle its assignments.

It is essential to come up with serious proposals. What specifically should we do? We should remove our people who work as service personnel in the American Embassy. Furthermore, the number of American representatives visiting the USA Embassy Moscow on business should be limited. Annually about 500 American citizens come here via this channel. Finally, the number of guests visiting the American ambassador in Moscow, which reaches up to 200 persons annually, should be determined on the basis of equality.

Our people rarely take business trips or visit our ambassador. It is essential that such trips take place on an equal basis in the future.

In general, this confirmed what I said to the President of the United States in Reykjavik, that the normalization of Soviet-American relations is the business of future generations.

SHEVARDNADZE: Our personnel in the embassy in the United States numbers 43, while the consulate in San Francisco has 25 workers. There are 229 people in the USA Embassy in Moscow and 25 in the Leningrad Consulate. Besides that, the Americans have over 250 of our citizens working in service positions. We can have them removed. This will surely hinder the activity of the American representatives. In terms of business travel, about 500 people make business trips to the American Embassy annually.

We, in contrast, hardly ever make use of these types of trips to the USA. Therefore, a principle of reciprocity should be imposed. The Americans will lose more than we will. We also do not make use of private invitations from the ambassador. Up to 180 people visit the American ambassador every year.

DOBRYNIN: And the ambassador doesn’t even know many of these “guests” personally.

SHEVARDNADZE: There are 14 people from Finland working in the American Embassy in Moscow as service personnel. We have to demand their departure as well as the 8 American diplomats suspected of some illegal activity. We also have to take adequate measures against the American military attaché. The result is that we will end up with an equal number of employees—251 in the embassies and 25 in the consulates.

The fact that the quota for our officials was never filled our quota. GORBACHEV: Do my comrades have any doubts about these proposals?

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: No.

DOBRYNIN: It would be advisable to apply these measures to the consulates in Kiev and New York.

GROMYKO: Perhaps their opening should not be rushed in this situation. There is no reason to do it now.

GORBACHEV: This question should be definitively decided. In terms of our overall stance, we have to act calmly but decisively. This is important not only from the point of view of Soviet-American Relations, but international relations as well. If they are talking with the Soviet Union in such a manner, one can imagine how they will act with other countries.

I had a conversation with Nikolai Ivanovich [Ryzhkov]. We should refrain from purchasing corn from the Americans for now.

GROMYKO: Perhaps we shouldn’t announce this outright, but realize it de facto.

SOLOMENSTEIN: The statistics Comrade Shevardnadze was talking about should be included in our document.

DOBRYNIN: The American actions toward our military attaché are unprecedented.

GORBACHEV: We should deport all American military personnel.

CHEBRIKOV: We have another possible course of action which can be employed if necessary. As I already reported to the Politburo, we discovered many eavesdropping devices in our offices in the USA. This fact should be made public in order to expose American espionage, and a press conference should be called with a demonstration of American espionage’s eavesdropping devices.

GROMYKO: How many eavesdropping devices were found in their offices?

CHEBRIKOV: One. The numbers are in our favor—1 to 150.

GORBACHEV: This should be emphasized.

SHEVARDNADZE: When should our announcement be promulgated?

GORBACHEV: As soon as it is ready. After we look it over, it should be transmitted over the radio and television and published in the press.

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: We agree.

GORBACHEV: I was intending to have a press conference and show where the Americans are leading things after Reykjavik. To expose their lies and underhanded actions. But, now is an inappropriate time. It would probably be better to appear on television and communicate these facts to our people, rather than at a press conference.

RYZHKOV: Correct.

GORBACHEV: No new suggestions will appear in the speech. Therefore it is unnecessary to circulate the text of the speech. In the frame of the position which was formulated it should be shown that the USA administration bears full responsibility for the failure of the agreement at Reykjavik and engages in underhanded activity in order to misrepresent facts and mislead society. It could be said that the development of events after Reykjavik shows the inability of Reagan to handle his gang.

GROMYKO: This could be said, but in a form which does not fence off Reagan himself.

GORBACHEV: Yes. Reagan appears as a liar. The appropriate formulation should be found.

Do you comrades have any other suggestions?

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: No. The resolution is accepted.

2. Concerning activities in connection with the death of S[amora]. Machel, President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique.

GORBACHEV: We need to make a decision about measures in connection with the death of Machel. Comrade Aliev will fly to Mozambique tomorrow. The last report of our pilot was: “We have been shot down.”

ALIEV: He [the pilot] is now in the South African Republic.

GROMYKO: All measures should be taken to take him and see him rise through the Red Cross.

CWIHP CONFERENCE
continued from page 49


Recent CWIHP working papers have featured Norman Naimark’s report on the creation of the Stasi #10] and Christian Ostermann’s analysis of U.S.-East German interactions following the June 1953 GDR uprising (#11). More findings from the East German archives will appear in future CWIHP Bulletins and Working Papers.
RUSSIAN ARCHIVES REVIEW

by Jim Hershberg

Scholars conducting research in Russian archives dealing with the Cold War over the past year (since late 1993) continued to report a mixture of positive and negative experiences, with signs of progress mingled with many persistent frustrations. While individual accounts ranged from exhilaration to exasperation, and often encompassed both emotions, reports from Cold War historians visiting Moscow archives in the summer and autumn of 1994 sounded slightly more upbeat, notwithstanding continuing woes over photocopying, fees, access to documents and finding aids, and declassification delays. Although grave financial troubles stemming from inflation and reduced state budgets continue to plague all archives, their dealings with researchers may be growing more connected to laws and regulations rather than to shifts in personalities or political trends. In particular, time seems to have thawed the chill that descended in early 1993 after a controversy erupted over the discovery of a document in the former CPSU CC archives suggesting that North Vietnam held hundreds more U.S. POWs in 1972 than it then acknowledged. In conversations with the author during a trip to Moscow in September 1994, neither Russian archivists nor scholars mentioned the controversy—which led to a temporary clampdown on research in the former CPSU CC archives—for the first time in over a year of repeated visits.

Major complaints persist, however, over access to documents in the so-called Presidential or Kremlin Archive, the collection of sensitive materials known officially as the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF). This archive passed from Mikhail Gorbachev’s personal control to Boris Yeltsin’s after the USSR’s collapse in 1991. Since then, Russian archival officials have repeatedly vowed to transfer APRF historical materials to more accessible repositories under the authority of the Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), such as the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), which holds post-1952 CPSU CC records, but, as only very limited transfers have taken place, the process has been too slow to satisfy archivists and researchers.

Instead, documents have emerged sporadically from the APRF via ad hoc arrangements with particular journals or scholars, and in state-to-state gestures to enhance Russian foreign policy. Recent examples of these practices included the new Lenin biography by Dmitri Volkogonov, head of a presidential commission on the declassification of Russian archives, who cited extensively from APRF materials to which other scholars have not yet had access; and presentations of APRF documents by Russian officials to Hungary and Czechoslovakia (about the Soviet invasions of those countries in 1956 and 1968, respectively), Poland (about Soviet policy on the 1980-81 crisis), and South Korea (about Moscow’s role in the Korean War and the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007). These actions have undoubtedly contributed to the historical record, but have also drawn allegations of politicization and favoritism. The dispute was long mostly limited to scholarly circles, but burst into public view in July 1994 when an Izvestia article criticized APRF practices. Citing the examples of new journals which had published APRF materials without appropriate citations, journalist Ella Maksimova complained that despite promised reforms, “the Presidential Archive (the former Politburo Archive) works according to the same super-secret regime, inaccessible to the mass of researchers and even its very existence is not advertised.”

Maksimova wrote that in 1992 Roskomarkhiv (now Rosarkhiv) chairman R. G. Pikhia, head of the Presidential Administration S. A. Filatov, Volkogonov, and APRF director A. V. Korotkov appealed to Yeltsin to transfer to state archives 12,000 of the rumored 100-150,000 files in the APRF “thus removing grounds for political speculation connected with the preservation of historical materials in archives which are closed to researchers.” Yeltsin reportedly responded: “I agree. Please carry out the necessary work.” If the President had limited himself to this resolution, it would have been possible to hope that everything, little by little, would gradually be returned to society. However, on the list of fondy alongside No. 1 (Party Congresses, 1947-1986) and No. 2 (Plenums of the CC VPK (b) and the CC CPSU 1941-1990) a decisive “No” was printed in that same presidential hand.

Rather than blaming Yeltsin, Maksimova surmised that someone had stood at his “elbow whispering that ‘it’s dangerous, it’s not worth it.’” Maksimova said access to the APRF currently depends on users’ “presence in the President’s circle, their political weight and connections,” and noted that the APRF had been excluded from a presidential order mandating that most state ministries, after periods of “temporary storage,” transfer their files to permanent state archives, which are, the article said, “generally accessible and open to the public.” She concluded:

There are in the world some confidential archives for use by a narrow circle, but they are private. A confidential state archive violates a basic principle of democracy—free access to information. It is a dangerous precedent, especially in the current situation, when, alas, not all of society is eager to dig itself out of the prison of lies of its 70-year history.

The Presidential Archive remains an oasis of the socialist system of information privileges. The Party Archive, although outlawed, fell outside all currently valid laws. The collection of original documentation of the country’s ruling state-political organ, which was the focus of the main organizing ideas, drafts, and decisions which determined over seventy years the life of the people and the world, has been desecrated and held in isolation from scholarship.

It’s regrettable that this has all been done in the name of the President, in his domain, and with his help. One wants to believe that he’s done it unintentionally, and was ill-informed.

The article provoked an uproar, to judge from subsequent comments by Russian scholars and archivists. Scholars named in the article as receiving privileged access denied any impropriety. The issues raised in the article were, for the most part, not new, since scholars, journalists, archivists, and others had clamored for quicker and fuller access to the APRF almost from the moment its existence became known. Still, the ensuing controversy helped prompt a reconsideration of the APRF’s status that resulted, in September, in a presidential decree requiring the transfer of APRF materials to state archives in 1994-95 and established a new commission to declassify CPSU documents (see below). Both archivists and researchers greeted the move as potentially a significant step forward.

While the flap over the Presidential Archive gathered the most press in Moscow, among Russian archives of interest to Cold War historians perhaps the most systematic effort to expand access has been made by Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). Thanks in large measure to a declassification program initiated in cooperation with an international advisory group organized by the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, declassification of Foreign Ministry (MID) holdings for the years 1917-27 and 1945-55 should have concluded by September 1994. Much of this work has been done on schedule and, as reported previously, MID has also opened a new reading room. However, a logjam emerged over the question of declassifying the large number of deciphered telegrams; concerns were apparently expressed by Russian security officials, while foreign scholars contend that data pertaining to codes from those periods would be obsolete and non-sensitive, or at any rate could be easily excised.

Some progress may have been made on this question and another sticking point, the availability of finding aids (opis). In the AVP RF reading room, at an international advisory group meeting with MID officials Igor V. Lebedev and Igor V. Bukharkin in Cortona, Italy, on 22 September 1994. According to reports from participants, technical, not security, concerns are now the main obstacle to releasing deciphered telegrams from before and after the 1940s, and a mechanism was agreed upon to begin to make opis available.
to researchers, who until now have had to make requests to archive staff who then consulted internal finding aids. Some possible progress was also reported on the question of photocopying fees and procedures, about which some scholars have complained. Despite such apparently positive steps, however, it was uncertain whether the results to date were sufficient to enable the international advisory group to raise additional funds.

Several AVP RF staff members have created an organization to assist researchers and support the archive’s work. The International Diplomatic Archives Association, headed by Bukharkin, was organized in 1993 to help researchers, on a contractual basis, locate and submit for declassification desired archival materials related to the history of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. (It should be stressed that it is not necessary to be a member of the association to conduct research at the archive.) The association also aids publication projects of MID materials, modernizing archive facilities, and involving retired diplomats to expedite declassification.


A more problematic situation persists regarding access to Cold War-era Soviet military documents, although in March 1994 Russian Defense Ministry officials participated in a Pentagon-sponsored conference on declassifying NATO and Warsaw Pact Cold War records, and some Soviet General Staff files on the Korean War, Berlin, and Cuban Missile Crises, and other Cold War events have been declassified in connection with specific conferences or projects. The files of the former KGB remain tightly controlled as well, with limited exceptions for families of victims of repression and an agreement with Crown Books to publish a series of books based on selected KGB documents.

Several recent U.S. initiatives to enhance ties with Russian archives should also be noted. In November 1994, CWIHP brought three Russian archival leaders to the United States for meetings with scholars and archivists. The three were Igor V. Lebedev, Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; Sergei V. Mironenko, Director, State Archive of the Russian Federation; and Natalia G. Tomilina, Director, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation. Their program in Washington, D.C., included meetings at the Wilson Center and its Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies; Library of Congress; National Archives I & II; National Security Archive; historical offices of the CIA, State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Holocaust Museum, and National Air & Space Museum; and the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX). CWIHP then brought them to the 26th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) in Philadelphia, where the project organized a roundtable on “Researching the Cold War in Moscow: A Dialogue with Russian Archival Leaders.”

In Philadelphia, the archivists met with a new AAASS/American Historical Association Task Force on the Russian and East European Archives. Its members are Norman Naimark (Stanford U., AAASS coordinator); William G. Rosenberg (Univ. of Michigan, AHA coordinator); William Taubman (Amherst C.); Kathryn Weathersby (Florida State U.); Donald J. Raleigh (U. of North Carolina); Gregory Freeze (Brandeis U.); and David Ransel (Indiana U.). The group prepared a draft report on the situation of the Russian and East European archives, examining the possibility of a “general statement of policies on ... the appropriate use of and access to archives”; exploring ways AAASS and AHA might assist archives in the area; and considering ways to improve coordination among various relevant projects, scholars, and institutions.

Meanwhile, Russian and East-bloc archives and archival materials on Cold War topics were discussed at various other conferences held over the past year, including:

* a conference on “Archives and Research in Russia and Eastern Europe,” in Aero, Denmark, on 3-6 December 1993; organized by a research network based at Odense University and the University of Copenhagen, the meeting heard reports by Russian and East European archive administrators and scholarly users;
* a “Conference on Access to Archives” in Bellagio, Italy, on 28 Feb.-Mar. 3 1994 gathered Eastern and Western archival figures, including U.S. Acting National Archivist Trudi Peterson, Rosarkhiv director R.G. Pikhioa, GARF director S.V. Mironenko and Czech, Estonian, Polish, and Ukrainian representatives;
* a “Conference on Cold War Military Records and History” for representatives of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, held on 21-26 March 1994 near Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Army Center of Military History, which organized the conference in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, intends to publish conference reports and to create a newsletter;
* a seminar on Soviet-Finnish Relations, 1944-48, was held in Helsinki on 21-25 March 1994 organized by the Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, in cooperation with the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow;
* on 29-31 March 1994, a conference on “The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1945-1950: A Reassessment” was held in Moscow, sponsored by the Institute of Slavonic & Balkan Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; the American Council of Learned Societies; the Social Science Research Council; and IREX;
* a conference on “Czechoslovakia and the World, 1968: The New Archival Evidence” was held in Prague, 18-20 April 1994, co-sponsored by the Prague Spring 1968 Foundation, the National Security Archive, and CWIHP;
* on 6-9 May 1994, Brown University’s Center for Foreign Policy Development held a conference involving ex-officials of the Brezhnev and Carter administrations at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, one of a series of planned meetings on the collapse of détente in the late 1970s (the Carter-Brezhnev project is working with MID and TsKhSD, as well as U.S. government agencies, to expedite declassification of relevant U.S. and Soviet documents);
* on September 23-24, in Cortona, Italy, a conference on “The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War (1943-1953)” took place, sponsored by the Institute of Universal History, Moscow, the Feltrinelli Foundation in Milan, and the Gramsci Foundation Institute in Rome;
* on 27-29 September 1994, a conference on “The Caribbean Crisis in the Documents in the Archival Fonds of Russia, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba: Analysis, Outcomes, Lessons” was organized in Moscow by Rosarkhiv and the U.S. Naval Academy;
* on 26-30 September 1994, a seminar on archival issues was held in Moscow at the Historical Archives Institute, Russian Humanities University, with visiting archivists from the Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan and support from IREX, CWIHP organized a session on declassifying Cold War materials.

Other noteworthy developments concerning Cold War-related Russian archives included:
**Progress and Pitfalls,”** *weekly journal,* but OMRI plans in January 1995 to begin a new, has discontinued publication, being moved and reorganized on a semi-private American-Soviet Relations and the End of the years of recent disclosures from Russian sources Comintern Archive and make the collection available; 22 project’s distributor, a catalogue listing the first Peace; according to Chadwyck-Healey, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; taking by the Russian State Archives Service and microfilm finding aids and selected documents director, rather than acting director, of TsKhSD; 88

2. Dmitri Volkogonov, Deputy Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; 16 Gogolovskiy blv., Moscow 121019, Russia; tel: (095) 241-49-31; (095) 925-26-67; fax: (095) 244-51-06; Bank Account: 40702810010000000527, Moscow, branch “Triumphal”; (S.W.I.F.T. BIC: INCOMRUM) via Account/ 890-0056-096 with Bank of New York, USA N 890-0056-096.

10. Contact: Russian publications Project; Center for Russian & East European Studies--4G12 FQ;University of Pittsburgh; Pittsburgh, PA 15260; fax: 412/648-2199; tel: 412/648-74037.

11. Prof. W. Taubman (Amherst C.) and K. Weathersby (Florida State U.) also participated in the roundtable.

12. CWIHP also organized the following sessions at the 1993 annual AAASS meeting:


13. See the announcement printed in the October 1994 AHA Newsletter (Perspectives), p. 27.

14. Conference papers were published by The Research Network: Change and Continuity in Russia, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, Dept. of Slavonic Studies, Odense U.: Campusvej 55; DK-5230 Odense M; Denmark; tel.: +45 66 158600, ext. 3388/3416; fax: +45 66 157892; e-mail: kul@hist.odu.dk; or Inst. of East European Studies, U. of Copenhagen, Nalsgade 78, 3.; 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark; tel.: +45 328 52501; fax: +45 328 5232; Contact Prof. Bent Jensen, Odense U.


16. A conference volume containing English-language versions of the papers, many of them based on Russian archival sources, has been published: Jukka Nevakivi, ed., *Finnish-Soviet Relations 1944-1948* (Helsinki: Department of Political History, Univ. of Helsinki, 1994); copies from: Department of Political History, PL 54 (Snellmaninkatu 14A): 00014 Univ. of Helsinki; Finland; fax: 358-0-191 8942.

17. Contact Dr. Leonid Gatskini, Inst. of Slavonic & Balkan Studies, Moscow, fax: (7-095) 938-2288; or Prof. Norman Naimark, History Dept., Stanford U., Stanford, CA 94305-2024.

18. Contact Prof. Francesca Gori, Fondazione Feltrinelli, Via Romagnosi 3, Milano, Italy 20121, fax: 39/2 86461855; or Academician A.O. Chubarian, Inst. for Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, fax: (7-095) 938-2288.

19. Contact Rosarkhov or Prof. Robert W. Love, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, fax: (410) 267-2256.

20. Contact: Chadwyck-Healey Ltd., The Quorum; Barnwell Road; Cambridge CB5 8SW; UK; tel: 0223 215152; fax: 0223215154; in USA/Canada: Chadwyck-Healey Inc.; 1101 King Street; Alexandria, VA 22314; tel: 703 683-4890, 800 752 0515; fax: 703 683-7589.

21. Two volumes are planned for 1995: Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Friderik Igrechov Firsov, eds., *The Secret World of American Communism,* and Lars T. Lih and Oleg V. Naumov, eds., *Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936;* subjects of future projected volumes include the Katyn Massacre, George Dimitrov’s letters to Stalin (1934-45) and diary (1933-49), the GULAG (1920-89), and Anti-Government Opposition under Khrushchev and Brezhnev: Contact: Yale University Press; PO Box 200040; New Haven, CT 06520-9040; tel.: 1-800-YUP-READ; fax: 203/432-0948.

22. Contact: IDC bv; P.O. Box 11205, 2301 EE Leiden; The Netherlands; fax: 31-71-13 17 21; bankers: ABN-AMRO, Leiden, The Netherlands, account no. 566 314 967/SWIFT no. ABN ANL 2A. IDC also markets a microwebsite of find aids to archives and manuscript collections in Russia, Baltic Republics, Ukraine, Belorusia, and Moldovia, edited by Dr. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted; a microfiche documentary collection on Antisemitism and Nationalism at the end of the Soviet Era, prepared by the Institute of Humanitarian Political Research and “Memorial” (Moscow), and the Second World Center and International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam); and other microcollection of Soviet-bloc materials.


24. The appointment of N. G. Tomilina as director, rather than acting director, of TsKhSD;

* the continuation of the “Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and State” project to microfilm finding aids and selected documents from GARF, RTSKhIDNI, and TsKhSD, undertaken by the Russian State Archives Service and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; according to Chadwyck-Healey, the project’s distributor, a catalogue listing the first 1,000 reels of microfilm is now available;

* Yale University Press has started a publications series, *Annals of Communism,* presenting documents from several Russian archives;

* RTSKhIDNI and the Dutch company IDC have launched a project to microfilm the Comintern Archive and make the collection available on microfiche by 1997;

* RTSKhIDNI and the Feltrinelli Foundation (Milan) have cooperated to publish the minutes of the Cominform Conferences, 1947-49;

* Raymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) has published two works that, collectively, constitute a major effort to integrate several years of recent disclosures from Russian sources and archives into almost three decades of Cold War history: a revised edition of *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan,* and *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War,* both published in 1994 by Brookings;

* with the closure of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich due to U.S. government budget cuts, operations are being moved and reorganized on a semi-private basis via the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting and the Open Society Institute; the RFE/RL historical archives will be located in Budapest, while contemporary materials and activities will be centered at OMRI in Prague; the RFE/RL Research Report has discontinued publication, but OMRI plans in January 1995 to begin a new, weekly, *Societies in Transition.*
Yeltsin’s Directive on Declassification

Translated and Introduced by Mark Kramer

This directive ("rasporyazhenie"), issued by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 22 September 1994, was published in Rossiskaya Gazeta, 27 September 1994, p. 4. The language in the directive is unusually turgid and awkward, even by the standards of government decrees. Hence, the translation is necessarily cumbersome as well. For the sake of clarity, abbreviations used in the directive other than “Rosarkhiv” have been provided in full.

The directive is intended to expedite the declassification of Soviet-era documents up through 1963. Although Points 1 and 2, which establish a declassification commission, pertain only to "documents created by the CPSU," Points 3 and 4 make clear that the directive is also supposed to cover documents created by Soviet state organs, including items preserved in the Russian Foreign Ministry (MID) archives, the military archives, and the former KGB archives. (The KGB has now been split up and renamed: The Foreign Intelligence Service handles foreign intelligence, formerly the province of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB; and the Federal Counterintelligence Service handles most of the old KGB’s domestic functions.)

Point 4 has two potentially important features: First, it provides for departmental documents (i.e., documents produced by MID, the KGB, etc.) to be transferred to archives under Rosarkhiv’s direct jurisdiction once the storage period of those documents has expired. It remains to be seen how this will work out in practice, but it could eventually facilitate access to materials that have been off-limits up to now. Second, Point 4 raises the question of giving the directors of archives under Rosarkhiv’s immediate jurisdiction the power to declassify documents stored on their premises. Presently, the declassification of documents is permissible only if consent is obtained from all agencies involved in the original preparation of the documents. This extremely cumbersome process has all but halted attempts to declassify certain materials. The procedure could be greatly expedited if directors of Rosarkhiv-controlled archives could make declassification decisions on their own.

Perhaps the most important element in the directive is Point 5, which requires a phased transfer of original documents from the Presidential Archive (APRF) to archives under the jurisdiction of the State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv) by the end of 1995. This sort of transfer had been promised since late 1991, but scant progress had been achieved as of mid-1994, sparking complaints in a lengthy article by Ella Maksimova on 13 July 1994 in Izvestiya. The establishment of a set timeframe for the transfer is a decided step forward, but several qualifications should be noted:

1) the transfer applies only to "documents from the former archive of the CPSU CC Politburo," implying that key non-Politburo documents in the APRF, including the personal files of top Soviet officials, will not be turned over to Rosarkhiv. If so, these documents will not be subject to the provisions of the 22 September directive, which apply only to "state archives," "document storage centers," and "departmental archives." The APRF has its own special status under the Russian President’s direct control.

2) the transfer applies only to documents created “in or before 1963.” This implies that documents dating from 1964 and later, aside from those declassified for political reasons, will be released in the future only if there is another Presidential directive. It is unfortunate that the 30-year rule, itself a relic of the Cold War that deserves to be reexamined and pared back, has been so firmly enshrined (both here and elsewhere) in Russian archival policy.

3) the directive does not promise that records transferred from the APRF to Rosarkhiv will be any more accessible than at present. Although the directive implies that transferred files will be subject to expedited declassification, that is not spelled out explicitly.

The composition of the new Declassification Commission is encouraging, because it includes the director and deputy director of Rosarkhiv and the heads of the APRF, of both of the former KGB’s main archives, and of the MID and military archives. Somewhat less desirable is the inclusion of several prominent political figures, whose presence may mean that archival procedures will be even more vulnerable to shifts in the political wind. At the same time, the participation of these officials may be the only way to ensure that archival matters and questions of declassification will be able to command high-level attention in the future.

On balance, then, the directive provides some basis for guarded optimism.

DIRECTIVE

of the President of the Russian Federation

Taking account of the demands of the public, in the aim of speeding up work to remove un warranted restrictive classifications from archival documents in the state and departmental archives as well as in the document storage centers, and also to promote the declassification of archival documents stored there whose period of secrecy has expired, in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation:

1. A Commission on the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU, which will be an integral sub-division of the Interdepartmental Commission on the Protection of State Secrets, is to be formed.

2. The appended composition of the Commission on the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU is affirmed.

3. The Federal Service of Counterintelligence of Russia, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, and the State Archival Service of Russia are assigned the task of working out procedures for the declassification of documents in closed collections of the state archives, the document storage centers, and departmental archives, and for the extension of the periods of their secret storage.

4. The federal organs of state authority, whose directors are empowered to render information as state secrets are to: review, by the end of 1994, the archival documents created in or before 1963 that are stored in their archives and the archival departments of their institutions, organizations, and enterprises, with an eye to determining the basis for their classification and whether this corresponds to the degree of secrecy established earlier; organize in a prescribed manner the prompt transfer of documents, after their period of departmental storage has expired, to the state archives and the document storage centers; and examine the question about delegating powers to the directors of state archives and the directors of document storage centers to declassify documents located in the storage areas and closed fonds of these archives and centers.

5. In the course of 1994-1995, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, together with Rosarkhiv, is to organize a stage-by-stage transfer—from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation to archival institutions under the auspices of Rosarkhiv—of original documents from the former archive of the CPSU CC Politburo created through 1963 inclusively.

6. The Commission on Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU is to present a quarterly report to the President of the Russian Federation on the work it has carried out.

President of the Russian Federation
B. Yeltsin

22 September 1994
No. 489-rp

Composition of the Commission on the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU

Krasanchenko, S. N.—First Deputy Director of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (chairman of the Commission); Yakovlev, A. N.—Director of the Federal Service of Russia for Television and Radio Broadcasting (deputy chairman of the Commission); Pikhoya, R. G.—Director of Rosarkhiv and Chief State Archivist of the Russian Federation (deputy chairman of the Commission); Krivova, N. A.—Assistant to the Director of Rosarkhiv (senior secretary of the Commission); Abramov, E. A.—Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation; Belozerov, A. P.—Chief of a Directorate of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia; Volkogonov, D. A.—Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly; Zolotukhin, B. A.—Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly; Kozlov, V. P.—Deputy Director of
**Russia/Former Soviet Union**


Second largest camp system in USSR gulag from 1939-53, the GUPVI, examined.  (Stefan Karner, *Die sowjetische Hauptverwaltung fuer Zwischenbericht.* ”[The Soviet Main Administration for POWs and Internes: An Interim Report”], VfZ 3 (July 1994), 447-72.)

Ministry of Defense document on Wallenberg’s arrest in 1945 located. (Ella Maksimova, “Wallenberg is Dead; Unfortunately, the Proof is Sufficient,” *Izvestia*, 6/3/93.)


Jukka Nevakivi, ed., *Finnish-Soviet Relations 1944-1948* (Helsinki: Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, 1994), contains papers, many based on Russian archival sources, prepared for a seminar in Helsinki on 21-25 March 1994 organized by the Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, in cooperation with the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Copies from: Dept. of Political History, PL 54 (Snellmaninkatu 14A); 00014 University of Helsinki; Finland; fax: 358-0-191 8942


Author discusses origins of Soviet nuclear project and whether Moscow’s bomb was invented or stolen. (Valeri N. Soifer, “Myths about ‘The Theft of the Century’: Who Profits by Accusing Soviet Physicists?” *Izvestia* 193 (10/7/94), 5.)

Discussion of Stalin’s tactics in 1948 in response to Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreement and suicide of Albanian official Spiru Niku. (V. Tarlinski, “The Fate of the Federation,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 12/17/93.)


Archival documents from Stalin’s death to Beria’s arrest (March-June 1953) suggest seriousness of Beria’s proposed reforms. (B. Starkov, “Something Brand-New on Beria,” *Argumenty i Fakty* 46 (Nov. 1993).)


Court reviewing effects of fall-out from top-secret 1954 nuclear tests in southern Urals. (S. Mstovshchikov, “How a Nuclear Victory was Forged in 1954,” *Izvestia*, 12/17/93.)

Remains of U.S. servicemen recovered from plane shot down by Soviets on 7 October 1952. (“Flier’s Bones Found,” *WP*, 9/15/94.)


Records of Moscow State University party committee show extent of surveillance. (E. Taranov, “We’re Shaking Lenin Hills!: From a History of Subversive Thought at MGU, 1955-56,” *Svodobnaya Mysl* 3 (1993), 52-61.)


Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Malashenko concerning 1956 Hugarian events, including his role in developing military plans (“Compass”) during uprising; initial decision to withdraw Soviet troops on October 31; and subsequent invasion. (E.I. Malashenko, “Special Corps in the Budapest Fire,” Military-Historical Journal 10 (1993), 22-30; 11 (1993), 44-51; and 1 (1994), 30-36.)


Serial publication of Khrushchev’s memoirs. (Khrushchev, “Memoirs,” Voprosi Istori 2-5, 7-10 (1993); 2 (1994), 77-95; and 3 (1994), 77-94.)

Former officials (including Gorbachev and ex-KGB head Semchenstniy), associates, friends assess Khrushchev’s legacy at conference marking centenary of birth. (RFE/RL News Briefs 3:17 (18-22 April 1994), 1-2.)

Materials from Oct. 1964 CPSU party plenum at which Khrushchev was overthrown. (S. Melchin, et. al., “How They Removed N. Khrushchev,” Historical Archives 1 (1993), 3-19.)


Account of 1971 Soviet nuclear testing in Perm Taiga, exchange on whether warheads remained afterward. (Alexander Pashkov, Vladimir Kasatkin, Igor Yufuferov, “Twenty years ago in Perm Taiga were left nuclear bombs, reports our correspondent, but there are no nuclear warheads left in Taiga, insist specialists of MinAtom,” Izvestia 186 (9/28/94), 1, 4.)


CPSU CC archives illuminate Soviet reaction to 1978 election of Pope John Paul II; initial surprise gave way to deep suspicion after Pope’s visit to Poland the following year, documents show. (Felix Corley, “Soviet Reaction to the Election of Pope John Paul II,” Religion, State and Society 22:1 (1994), 37-64.)


Ex-deputy foreign minister and CPSU CC member recounts Afghan events. (G.M. Kornienko, “How the Decision was Made to Send Troops to Afghanistan—Then Withdraw Them,” New and Newest History 3 (1993), 107-118.)


Japanese relatives of KAL 007 crash victims locate remains in Sakhalin. (V. Kulbakov, “Relatives found mysterious remains of the victims of B-747 in Nevelsk,” Izvestia, 9/4/93, 1.)

International investigative report underscores decisive factor of timing in Downing of Korean airliner. (A. Shalnev, “ICAO Closes the Case on the Investigation of the Victims of the South Korean Boeing,” Izvestia, 6/16/93.) Analysis of report. (A. Ilesh, A. Shalnev, “The Mystery of the South Korean Boeing 747 has been Revealed...Will we Forget?” Izvestia, 6/25/93.)

Review of KAL 007 investigation, findings (including Black Box transcripts), journalista’s role in exposing cover-up. (Murray Sayle, “A Reporter at Large: Closing the File on Flight 007,” The New Yorker 69:42 (12/13/93), 90-101.)


CPSU documents implicate party, KGB in subservive activities in Italy, report says; editors blast archivists for denying access to key documents under pretext of state secrecy. (Press conference by editors of Stoliza Magazine on “Italian Trial of the CPSU’s Money,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcasts, 9/20/93.)

Russian Procurator’s Office considers fate of investigation into CPSU finances and attempts to recover funds abroad. (V. Rudnev, “The Case of Party Finances,” Izvestia, 11/19/93.)

Alexander Agentov, ex-adviser to CPSU General Secretaries from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, interviewed. (I. Zamyatin, “An Interview with a Man who was Silent for a Long Time,” Arguments and Facts, 5/20/93, 6.)

Documents from mid-1980s on state surveillance of religious activities in USSR from Council of Ministers. (N. Krivova, et.al., “Religion and the Church in the USSR,” Historical Archives 1 (1993), 137-44.)

Transcript of talks between Gorbachev and Italian Communist Party chief A.G. Occheto in Moscow on 28 February 1989; continuation of series of publications from Gorbachev Archives. (“Gorbachev-Occheto,” Svobodnaya Misl [Free Thought] 4 (1993).)


Politburo records from 5-6 March 1990 on discussion of “urgent measures” on Lithuania’s plans to leave USSR. (A. Chernovin, “How They Opposed Lithuania’s Secession from the USSR,” Historical Archives 1 (1993), 3-5.)


Ex-KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov says he participated in August 1991 coup attempt because KGB had reports that US and NATO planned to dismember the Soviet Union and Gorbachev failed to respond adequately to this information. (RFE/RL News Briefs 2:49 (29 Nov-3 Dec 1993), 3.)


Espionage/Intelligence Issues


Article recounts KGB’s role in Soviet policy on Germany in the 1980s and contends that spy service maintains its network in eastern Germany. (Y. Bovkun, “The KGB in the Bright Kingdom of Capitalism,” Izvestia, 9/22/93.)


Ex-KGB Major Viktor Sheimov describes escape from USSR with CIA aid in 1980. (D.
Radushevsky, “Escape of the Century,” Moscow News 49, 11/19/93, 14.)


St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak alleges that nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky holds the rank of KGB captain and that Gorbachev said in 1990 that the KGB created Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. (Chas pik (St. Petersburg) 1 (1994), cited in RFE/RL News Briefs 3:4 (10-21 Jan 1994), 5.)

Report on KGB archives. (A. Knight, “The Fate of the KGB Archives,” Slavic Review 52:3 (Fall 1993), 582-6.)

Controversy erupts over charge by former Soviet intelligence official Pavel Sudoplatov that leading Western scientists, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard, knowingly passed secret atomic data to the KGB. (V. Esakov, “The Fate of a Journal: Historical Archives” (V. Esakov, “The Fate of a Journal: Historical Archives 1955-62,” Historical Archives 1 (1992), 194-211.)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs resumes documents on Foreign Affairs series after 12-year hiatus with volume on 1939 events. (“The Next Volume of ‘Documents on Foreign Affairs,’” Vestnik 9-10 (May 1993).)

Internal documents inform account of crucial years in the journal Historical Archives’ history. (V. Esakov, “The Fate of a Journal: Historical Archives in 1955-62,” Historical Archives 1 (1992), 194-211.)


Author notes pitfalls of research in military archives, says no more than 15 percent of materials opened. (E. Moskal, “Military History: Problems and Perspectives of its Study.” New and Newest History 5 (1993), 249-51.)

Russian archives head discusses impact of current research conditions in Moscow. (“Hinter sieben Siegeln. Nach wie vor kein Zugang zu den Archiven des KGB. Interview mit dem russischen Historiker Dmitriy Jurassov” (“Behind Seven Seals: Like before, no Entrance to the KGB Archives: An Interview with Russian Historian Dmitriy Jurassov”), DA 7 (July 1993), 868-72.)

Despite new law, bureaucratic and financial obstacles could hamper access to archives. (V. Rudnev, “Law on Archives Removes Barriers to Researchers,” Izvestia, 7/14/93, 5.)

Yeltsin returns text of law on secrecy to parliament committee on security, saying it inadequately protects citizens’ rights to state secrets. (N. Gevorkyian, “Yeltsin Does Not Sign Law on State Secrets,” Moscow News 36 (9/3/93).)

Six scholars express concern that access might be cut off to newly created center for CPSU party archives. (“When they struggle with the Archives, Society Suffers,” Izvestia, 9/9/93.)

Russian archive head Pikoiba rebuts charges of selling original documents abroad. (“Russian Archive Report Denies Selling Documents Abroad,” Mayak Radio, Moscow, 10/17/93.)


Director of “Gosteleradiomfond” audio-video archives Yuri Kornilov was arrested for allegedly accepting a US $5,000 bribe from a US firm (“USSU Art Group”) for access to a collection. (RFE/RL News Briefs 2:47 (15-19 Nov 1993), 6-7, citing Moskovskie novosti 46 and Komsomolskaya pravda, 11/11/93.)

Yeltsin orders creation of commission to be chaired by Dmitriy Volkogonov to investigate fates of foreigners and Russian who disappeared within Soviet Union’s borders during the Cold War. (V. Rudnev, “Russia Continues to Search,” Izvestia, 10/28/93.)

Volkogonov says US-Russian commission on POWs/MIA’s has determined that no Americans were detained in Russia today; says Russian Security Ministry was opening relevant files, but acknowledged mid-level officials treat the commission negatively. (“Volkogonov: No U.S. MIAs Forced to Stay,” Interfax, Moscow, 12/8/93.)
Malcolm Toon, co-chair of commission, reports that Soviet pilots in Korean War tried to down U.S. F-86 fighter jets safely and two were captured and brought to Moscow; question remains whether more important data awaits discovery in Russian archives. (R. Boudreaux, “U.S. Gets New Leads in Search for MIAs,” Los Angeles Times, 12/9/93, A4.)

US-Russian commission chair Volkogonov removed, then reinstated, as head of commission as well as presidential adviser. (RFE/RL News Briefs 3:5 (24-28 Jan 1994), 6, citing Itar-Tass, 1/25/94 and Interfax, 1/28/94.)

In 11/12/93 classified cable, Russian officials are quoted as saying State Department discouraged them from releasing full data about Vietnam-era US POWs because of possible harm to Russo-US ties; State Department denies report. (Steven Greenhouse, “New Doubts Cast On Russo-US ties; State Department denies report. In Briefs 3:5 (24-28 Jan 1994), 6, citing Itar-Tass, 1/25/94 and Interfax, 1/28/94.)


Archives head Pikhoia announces pact requiring Moscow to return to France over 20 tons of documents seized at the end of World War II. (“Moscow returns to Paris Six and One-Half Kilometers of Secret Archives,” Izvestia, 2/4/94.)

Interview with senior Russian archival official V. Kozlovym. (E. Maksimova, “The Treasures of Russia are Being Scattered all over the World,” Izvestia, 2/16/94.)

Despite legal complications, scientist-dissident Andrei Sakharov’s archives near public opening. (M. Lebedeva, “The Sakharov Archives are Opening,” Izvestia, 5/21/94.)

Complaints voiced about preferential treatment given some persons for access to materials in Russian Presidential Archives. (Ella Maksimova, “Merchants of Sensations from the Presidential Archives,” Izvestia 131 (7/13/94); letters in response to D. Volkogonov and S. Cohen, Izvestia, 7/19/94, 8/17/94.)

Interview with Atakan Musayev, head of the Main Archive Administration of the Azerbaijan Republican Cabinet of Ministers. (Aghagulu Nifhaliyev, “Without Archives, There Is No History,” Khalk Gazi (Baku), 10/13/93, in FBIS Report: Central Eurasia, 1/27/94.)

Author assesses KGB’s role in Byelorussia in 1990-91. (A. Starikevich, “Belarus: Back in the USSR.” Izvestia, 2/24/94.)


Policebüro records from 5-6 March 1990 on discussion of “urgent measures” on Lithuania’s plans to leave USSR. (A. Chernovin, “How they Opposed Lithuania’s Secession from the USSR,” Historical Archives (Moscow) 1 (1992), 3-5.)


Internal documents from CPSU archives, including memos of Central Committee of Ukrainian Communist Party, on Soviet leadership’s treatment of Crimean Tatars. (O. V. Volobuyev, “The Crimean-Tartar Issue According to CPSU Documents (From the Late 1950s to the Mid-1980s),” Otechestvennaya Istoriia (Moscow), Jan.-Feb. 1994, 157-69.)

Look at secret services examines reasons for “sketchy” accounts of past activities, charges of involvement in attacks on Pope John Paul II, dissidents. (Kjell Engelbrekt, “Reinventing the Bulgarian Secret Services,” RFE/RL Research Report 2:47 (11/26/93), 41-49.)


Prague court sentences two former police officers to terms of 3 and 3.5 years for beating students in 11/17/89 protest that sparked revolution against communist rule. (RFE/RL News Briefs 3:9 (21-25 Feb 1994), 19.)

Slovakian Interior Minister complains about difficulties obtaining archives of former Czechoslovak secret police (StB). (Ladislav Pittner’s Dissatisfaction, or Who Has the Archives of the Former StB? “Narodna Obroda” Bratislava 3/18/94, FBIS-EU-94-055 (3/22/94), 16.)

**Germany/Former East Germany**

Report on concentration camp system in Soviet-occupied Germany, using Russian archival data, as part of joint project of Institute for History and Biography at Fern University at Hagen, Historical Institute at University of Jena, and Buchenwald Memorial. (Bodo Ritscher, “Zur Herausbildung und Organisation des Systems von Speziallagern des NKVD der UdSSR in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschland im Jahre 1945” “On the Evolution and Organization of the System of Special Camps of the NKVD of the USSR in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany in 1945”, DA 6 (June 1994), 723-35.)


GDR documents indicate that German Peoples’ Congress (1946-49) fed East Germans’ illusion of national unity while quietly advancing separatism, author reports. (Manfred Overesch, “DDR des deutschen Mutterland?” “[GDR: The German Motherland?”], Die Zeit 20 (5/20/94).

Documentary record of early 1947 meeting in Moscow between SED delegation (Fieck, Grotewohl, Fechner, and Ulbricht) and Kremlin leaders, including Stalin and Molotov. (Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordiugov, “Stalin und die SBZ. Ein Besuch der SED-Fuhrung in Moskow vom 30 January-7 February 1947” “[Stalin and the Soviet Zone. Visit by the SED Leadership to Moscow from January 30 to February 7, 1947]”, VfZ 2 (April 1994), 279-304.)


SED archival documents disclose details of policies on German POWs held by USSR, 1949-55. (Beate Ihme-Tuchel, “Die SED und die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion zwischen 1949 und 1955” “[The SED and the German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1955]”, DA 5 (May 1994), 490-503.)

Rise of student self-government at one of the most influential East German universities after World War II. (Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, “Die studentische Selbstverwaltung an der Berliner Universitaet nach 1945” “[Student Self-Government at the Berlin University after 1945]”, DA 8 (Aug. 1993), 915-27.)


Using SED. Stasi records, historian recounts case of ex-SED Central Committee member Paul

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**Czech Revolution in Literature and in the Press**


Russian archival head R. Pikhova gave Czech President Havel a second batch of Soviet documents pertaining to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, including the transcript of an 8/13/68 telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubcek. (“Brezhnev warned Dubcek,” The European, 4/22/94, 2.)

Story of Pavel Minarizh, accused of spying under cover for the Czechoslovak secret police against Radio Free Europe from April 1970-June 1975 and involvement in plots to blow up the Komsomolskaya占mer in Germany/Former East Germany

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**UPDATE**

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SED archives inform reassessment of 1953 East German refugee crisis, contrasting GDR, FRG, and U.S. perceptions. (Valur Ingimundarson, “Cold War Misperceptions: The Communist and Western Responses to the East German Refugee Crisis in 1953,” Journal of Contemporary History 29:3 (July 1994), 463-81.)


SED efforts to obtain Yugoslav recognition of GDR. (Beate Ihme-Tuchel, “Die Bernmuhlen der SED um die staatliche Anerkennung durch Jugoslawien 1956/57” [“The Efforts of the SED for Yugoslav State Recognition 1956/57”], ZfG 8 (Aug. 1994), 695-702.)

Assessment of SED policies toward East German youth during climax of Berlin crisis, including Ulbricht 8/22/61 speech to SED politburo. (Ulrich Maehlert, “Walter Ulbricht ueber die Aufgaben der FDJ im August 1961” [“Walter Ulbricht on the Duties of the Free German Youth in August 1961”], DA 8 (Aug. 1994), 890-93.)

Citing dispute at leading East Berlin university, authors recount relaxation of GDR internal strictures following Wall’s erection. (Ulrike Bresch and Gert Noack, “‘Freiheit in Socialismus.’ Ein Streitgesprach an der Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin 1963” [“Freedom in Socialism.” A Dispute at the Berlin Humboldt University in 1963”]. ZfG 7 (July 1993), 605-21.)

Ruediger Stephan, commentary by Daniel Kuechenmeister and Gerd-socialist leaderships in power. (Reprinted with responsibility toward their own people,” and stating that the USSR would not intervene to keep socialist leaders in power. (Reprinted from secret 1962 survey. [Jens Gieseke, “Die Hauptamtslichen 1962. Zur Personalstruktur des Ministeriums fuer Staatsicherheit” [The Main


Notes found in GDR archive of 10-11 Nov. 1986 socialist bloc conference in which Gorbachev privately broke from Brezhnev doctrine, affirming “independence of the party in each country, their right to make sovereign decisions, their own responsibility toward their own people,” and stating that the USSR would not intervene to keep socialist leaders in power. (Reprinted from secret 1962 survey. [Jens Gieseke, “Die Hauptamtslichen 1962. Zur Personalstruktur des Ministeriums fuer Staatsicherheit” [The Main

Analysis of Gorbachev’s policies on German unification, using transcripts and correspondence from SEM archives to illumine his contacts with Honecker. (Hannes Adomeit, “‘Midwife of His-


Berlin Administrative Court issues mixed decision in suit by Brandenburg Minister President Stolpe seeking to bar head of government agency investigating Stasi from “making public value judgments” about persons suspected of past Stasi ties. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 6/4/93, 4, in FBIS-WEU-93-113 (6/15/93), 40-41.)

Chancellor Helmut Kohl says he favors destruction of Stasi files. (AFP dispatch, 11/15/93.)

Joachim Gauck, head of commission on Stasi archives, discusses arrangements for making files available. (Der Spiegel 52 (12/27/93).)


Investigators in Stasi files buried by an “avalanche” of discoveries of treason, minister in parliamentary inquiry says; more than 2,000 leads being followed, many prosecutions expected; extent of spying estimated. (“A Suspected Person,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg) 23, 6/7/93, 32-34, in FBIS-WEU-93-113 (6/15/93), 41-43.) Based on Stasi files, chief federal prosecutor expected to initiate mass proceedings against so-far unexposed GDR spies in FRG. (DPA, 7/2/93, in FBIS-WEU-93-130 (7/9/93), 34.)

Rainer Mueller, FRG ambassador to Gabon, is arrested on charges of spying for the Stasi since 1974. (Bild, cited in DDP/ADN, 1/6/94, in FBIS-WEU-94-005 (1/7/94), 14.)

Ex-SPD senior official Karl Wienand suspected of working for both Stasi and KGB in what could be “greatest case of treason” in FRG history, newspaper reports; Wienand denies all charges. (Bela Anda and Kai Diekmann, “Was He the Super Spy?” Bild (Hamburg), 1/15/94, 1-2, in FBIS-WEU-94-011 (1/18/94), 21-22.)

Suspicion of GDR spies in Federal Intelligence Service (BND), fed by evidence in Stasi files, raising tensions. (Focus (Munich), 1/31/94, 36-38, in FBIS-WEU-94-037 (2/24/94), 25-26.)

SDP chair Rudolf Scharping says he will request and publish all Stasi records about himself to rebut CDU charges he advocated recognizing GDR citizenship in talks with GDR officials in 1980s. (Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 2/8/94, 4, in FBIS-WEU-94-027 (2/9/94), 31.)

Ex-Free Democratic Party official Johanna Olbrich sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for spying on FDP for GDR from 1969-85. (DDP/ADN, 2/25/94, in FBIS-WEU-94-041 (3/2/94), 29.)

Former Berlin SPD deputy Bodo Thomas and wife charged with spying for Stasi. (DDP/ADN, in FBIS-WEU-94-041 (3/2/94), 29.)

Ex-Stasi chief Mielke denies knowledge of 1983 bombing of French cultural institute in Berlin, despite evidence in Stasi files that spy agency was informed. (Berliner Zeitung, 26-27 March 1994, in FBIS-WEU-94-060 (3/29/94), 13.)


Interview with Klaus-Dietmar Henke, head, Education and Research Department subordinated to the federal commissioner for the Archives of the State Security Service of the former GDR. (Kjell Engelbrekt, “Germany’s Experience with the Stasi Archives,” RFE/RL Research Report 3:18 (5/6/94), 11-13.) Commentary by Henke. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/1/93.)


Archives Developments:

Deutschland Archiv and Arbeitsbereich DDR-Geschichte, Center for European Social Research, Mannheim University, to publish “Aktuelles aus der DDR-Forschung,” to inform scholars and research institutions of historical research on the former GDR. For information, to receive a newsletter, and to register research projects, contact: Herr Ulrich Maehlert, Arbeitsbereich DDR-Geschichte, Mannheimer Zentrum fuer Europaische Sozialforschung der Universitaet Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (tel.: (0621) 292-8472; fax: (0621) 292-8435; e-mail: maehlert@nzes.sowi.uni-mannheim.de. Also see DA 7 (July 1994), 671-2.

Survey of conditions for research in various former GDR archives, and comments on situation for research in Moscow. (Hermann Weber, “Die Aktuelle Situation in den Archiven fuer die Erforschung der DDR-Geschichte” [“The Actual Situation of the Archives for Research on East German History”], DA 7 (July 1994), 690-99.)


Ex-GDR officials form “Society for Legal and Humanitarian Support” to aid those allegedly persecuted because of past SED activity. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/24/93, 5, in FBIS-WEU-93-110 (6/10/93), 21-22.)

Hungary

On 22-23 Oct 1993, gatherings are held across the country to mark the 37th anniversary of the 1956 revolt; justice minister calls for trial of communists guilty of repression. (RFE/RL News Briefs 2:44 (25-29 Oct 1993), 9-10.) Justice Ministry official tells press conference on 22 Nov 1993 that more than 1,000 people were killed during 1956 revolution between 10/23/56 and 12/28/56 when special units fired into unarmed pro-
against the CPSU in the early 1960s—will be published with an introduction in a forthcoming issue of the journal *Chinese Law and Government*, published by M.E. Sharpe Inc., Armonk, NY.


**North Korea/Korean War**

Newly-released Russian documents illuminate Soviet role in origins and course of Korean war; English translations of 11 documents, including correspondence between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, English translations of 11 documents, including Soviet role in origins and course of Korean war; (Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0403 GMT 6/24/94, in FBIS-EAS-94-122 (6/24/94, 18).)

North Korean Institute of International Affairs says Japan was “directly involved” in the war against Korea in the 1950s, including germ warfare. (Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0403 GMT 6/24/94, in FBIS-EAS-94-122 (6/24/94, 18).)


Soviet leaders learned as early as 1985 that North Korea was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, causing Moscow to withdraw most advisers, according to Vladimir Kumachev, adviser to director of Russia’s Institute of National Security and Strategic Research. (AFP, 2/14/94, in RFE/RL News Briefs 3:8 (14-18 Feb 1994), 2.)

KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov secretly reported to Soviet leaders in 1990 that North Korea had successfully developed a nuclear device but had not tested it “in order to conceal from the world public and international monitoring organizations.” (Izvestia, 6/24/94, 4, in FBIS-SOV-94-122 (6/24/94, 11-12; also Yonhap, 6/24/94, citing Sankei Shimbun quoting Izvestia, in FBIS-EAS-94-122 (6/24/94, 31).)


**Cuba**


**YELOTSIN DIRECTIVE**

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Rosarkhiv; Korotkov, A. V.—Director of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation; Krayushkin, A. A.—Chief of a Directorate of the Federal Service of Counterintelligence of Russia; Lebedev, I. V.—Chief of the Historical Documentation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Rausenbahk, B. V.—Head of the Faculty of Theoretical Mechanics at the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, and Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Sevostyanov, G. N.—Deputy Academic Secretary for the Division of History, Russian Academy of Sciences; Semin, Y. N.—Chief of the Historical-Archival and Military-Memorial Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; and Surskov, A. P.—Assistant to the Director of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

**COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT**

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources “on the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst C.) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (U. of Maryland/Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio U./Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington U.). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters, and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies available free on request.

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**UPDATE**