New Russian Documents on the Korean War

by Kathryn Weathersby

In the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1-29), I described the collection of high-level documents on the Korean War that Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also presented translations of six key documents from that collection that illuminate the decision-making behind the outbreak of the full-scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the publication of the Spring 1995 Bulletin, the base of documentary evidence on the Korean War has been enriched even more by the release of virtually the entire collection of high-level documents on the war declassified by the Presidential Archive in Moscow, which numbers approximately 1,200 pages. Through a joint project of the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University and the Cold War International History Project, these documents are now available to all interested researchers.

The Presidential Archive (known officially as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) is the repository to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin leadership sent its most sensitive records for safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings are therefore more selective than those of the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major repositories used by historians of the Cold War. The release of a large portion of the APRF’s documents on the Korean War consequently provides a critical addition to available evidence on the high-level decisions and deliberations of the communist side during this pivotal conflict.

This article presents translations of and commentary on a sizable portion of this recently-released APRF collection on the Korean War. It begins with most of the released documents covering February 1950 through January 1951, providing a close look at the Soviet role in Korea during the significant first months of the conflict. Unfortunately, some key materials from this period, particularly the months immediately preceding the war, have not yet become available. For key documents from mid-September to mid-October 1950, covering events from the Inchon landing to China’s decision to intervene in the war, see the article by Alexandre Y. Mansoury elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. It then offers a more selective sample of documents from spring 1951 through the end of the war, focusing primarily on Stalin’s approach to the armistice negotiations. As the reader will quickly discover, these documents of high-level decision-making within the Soviet government and within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang alliance shed light on many questions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance, or DPRK-Soviet relations during the first months of the conflict.

The documents presented below begin where the records published in the previous Bulletin left off, with Stalin’s telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 30 January 1950 informing Kim Il Sung that he would “assist” him in the matter of reunifying Korea by military means. Document #1 reveals that Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambassador T.F. Shtykov interpreted Stalin’s message as approval to plan an offensive campaign against South Korea. The North Korean leader received Stalin’s telegram with “great satisfaction” and informed Shtykov that he would begin preparations for a meeting with Stalin at which the details of the campaign would be worked out. Shtykov’s telegram to Soviet Defense Minister A.M. Vasilevsky on February 23 (document #4) supports accounts given by former DPRK military officials that Stalin began taking steps to strengthen the North Korean military forces even before Kim II Sung’s secret trip to Moscow in April, by appointing Major-General Vasiliev, a Hero of the Soviet Union and section chief for War Experience Analysis in the Soviet General Staff, to replace Shtykov as principal military adviser to the Korean People’s Army (KPA).

From Shtykov’s telegram to Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on February 7 (document #2), we see how closely Stalin supervised events in North Korea, deciding whether the DPRK could issue a bond, form an additional three infantry divisions, convene the Supreme People’s Assembly, or send textile workers to the Soviet Union for training. Documents #5-9 indicate the reason why the highly nationalistic Korean communists allowed such interference in their country’s affairs. As I discussed in the previous Bulletin, prior to the Korean War, North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for the substantial quantities of goods and the broad range of expertise needed to construct a new socialist state out of an abruptly truncated portion of the former Japanese empire. From 1945-1950, the only place to which the DPRK could turn for this support was the Soviet Union. Though many North Korean communists had close ties to the Chinese communist party, the latter was not in a position to aid its Korean comrades.

In early 1950, the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing led by Mao Zedong was itself forced to turn to Moscow for economic and military aid. As documents #11 and #13 indicate, in the spring of 1950 Mao Zedong and Kim II Sung were both interested in the possibility of developing wider trade and closer communications between the PRC and the DPRK. Close economic and military ties between Pyongyang and Beijing developed after the Chinese entered the Korean War; they were not in place prior to October 1950.

At Stalin’s insistence, after secretly receiving the Soviet leader’s conditional green light for an attack against South Korea during a secret summit in Moscow in April (for
which records still, alas, remain unavailable), Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing in May 1950 in order to secure Mao Zedong’s approval for the planned offensive. Documents #11 and #13 show that in his discussions with Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong was considerably less worried about the possibility of military conflict with the United States than was the Soviet leadership, arguing that “the Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory.” It also appears that in May 1950 Kim Il Sung, perhaps to counter the oppressive Soviet influence in North Korea, took a tentative step toward the strategy he later used so extensively of playing China and the Soviet Union against one another. He reported to Soviet Ambassador Shtykov that he had at first intended to ask Mao for ammunition for the Korean troops that had recently been transferred from China to North Korea (whose weapons were of Japanese and American manufacture rather than Soviet) but he decided not to raise the issue after all, since he was informed that the KPA had sufficient ammunition. Furthermore, he had no other requests to make of Mao “since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there.”

Shtykov’s telegram to Vyshinsky on May 12 (document #13), reveals that before departing Pyongyang the following day for Beijing, Kim Il Sung reported to Shtykov that he had ordered the chief of the general staff to prepare his forces for the military operation against the South and that he wished to begin the operation in June, though he did not know if they would be ready by then. Unfortunately, the documents from the Presidential Archive in Moscow are quite sparse for the crucial period of April–June 1950 and prospects for gaining access to those records in the near future are not encouraging. Many important questions about how the North Korean offensive was planned thus remain obscure. However, a British Broadcasting Corporation documentary team that conducted research on the Korean War in Russia in 1994 has discovered a revealing report on the preparations for the attack and the first day of the operation. Written by Shtykov and addressed to the head of the special Soviet military mission sent to North Korea to oversee the operation, this report (document #14) reveals that troop concentration was carried out from June 12 to June 23, as prescribed in the General Staff’s plan, and that Soviet advisers participated in reconnaissance and in planning the operation at the divisional level. However, Soviet advisers were apparently withdrawn from the front line before the attack began, with negative consequences for the efficiency of the operation. This accords with Khrushchev’s recollection that Stalin pulled back Soviet advisers from the front at the last minute, out of fear that they might be taken prisoner and thus expose Soviet participation in the operation.

Consistent with his withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the front, Stalin’s queries to Shtykov on July 1 (document #15) indicate that he was agitated and nervous about the situation in Korea following the American entry into the war. Shtykov’s reply (document #16) cautiously raises the question that was at the root of the Soviet leader’s anxiety, namely the possibility that a disaster in Korea might draw Soviet troops into combat against American armed forces. Shtykov reports that Kim Il Sung and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong “understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war” and “are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources,” though some in the DPRK leadership were inquiring about possible Soviet entry into the war.

We see that as early as the first week of July, Stalin began the strategy toward the war in Korea that he was to continue for the remainder of the conflict. In order to avoid committing Soviet troops to fight the Americans in Korea, he encouraged the Chinese leadership to take steps toward entering the war should the tide of battle turn against the DPRK. Chen Jian revealed in his recent book7 that the Chinese leadership decided on July 7 and 10 to send troops to the Korean border to prepare for possible intervention in Korea; discussion about sending troops to Korea thus began well before the UN advance into North Korea in early October. Stalin’s telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Beijing on July 5 (document #18) reveals that in advance of those mid-July meetings, the Beijing leadership consulted with Stalin about the proposed troop transfer. Stalin informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on July 5 that he approved of the plan and also promised to try to provide air cover for the Chinese troops.

Stalin’s rather rude message to Mao Zedong on July 8 (document #21) appears to have been a further attempt to prod the Chinese to move toward entering the war. Stalin was also quite brusque in his message to Mao on July 13, indicating that he had not been informed whether the Chinese had decided to deploy troops on the Korean border and offering again to provide air cover. He also informed Beijing that he intended to train Chinese pilots in two to three months and to transfer the necessary equipment to them, presumably for use in Korea. On August 27, Stalin informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (document #26) that he would send 38 air force and air defense specialists to China. These advisers and the large amounts of equipment that accompanied them were the first installment of what became massive Soviet support in constructing an air force for the PRC, a process which continued throughout the Korean War.

Stalin’s message to Kim Il Sung on 28 August 1950 (document #27) is particularly revealing of the Soviet leader’s approach to the difficult situation created by American entry into the Korean War. While North Korea was suffering saturation bombing by American planes, Stalin exhorted Kim Il Sung to take courage from the example of the Red Army’s triumph against great odds in the civil war of 1918-20 and the great war against Germany of 1941-45. He offered to send additional aircraft for the small North Korean air force, but did not suggest sending Soviet air force units or ground forces. Avoiding military confrontation with the United States remained the Soviet leader’s foremost concern.

Stalin’s difficult and dramatic negotiations with the Chinese leadership in October 1950 over the entry of Chinese armed forces into the war in Korea is the subject of a separate article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov. I have therefore omitted those documents from this selection, but will point out that the terms of Chinese entry—that the PRC would provide troops, the USSR matériel and advisers, and China would pay the Soviet Union for all military supplies—engendered considerable bitterness on the part of the Chinese leadership. Stalin’s approach to the armistice negotiations, which will be discussed below, and his insistence on timely and high payments for military supplies to China during the Korean War, thus constituted an important cause of the eventual
collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Resuming the story in late October 1950, document #31, the Politburo decision of 25 October 1950, suggests that the Soviet leadership worried that the United States might use the war in Korea as a pretext for rearming Japan. Stalin’s continued fear of a resurgent Japan may seem surprising, but in 1947 the U.S. military had considered rearming Japan to buttress the forces available along the Soviet Pacific border, a move vigorously opposed by the Soviet representative to the Far Eastern Commission. Furthermore, two weeks after the North Korean attack on South Korea, U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime minister to create a “National Police Reserve” of 75,000 men, some of whom were, in fact, deployed to Korea. (At the same time, analogous moves toward constituting a West German military contribution to the Western alliance were stepped up.) We have no record of Japanese participation in the battles referred to in the Soviet statement cited here, but forty-six mine sweepers with 1,200 Japanese military personnel were dispatched to the eastern coast of North Korea between 2 October and 10 December 1950, to clear the way for an amphibious assault by UN forces. Japanese participation never became a major issue during the Korean War, either militarily or diplomatically, but it does appear that one of Stalin’s reasons for taking the risks associated with a North Korean offensive against South Korea was to eliminate the possibility that a resurgent Japan would be able to use southern Korea as a beachhead for an attack on the Soviet Union. (This argument also animates Stalin’s arguments to Mao in early October 1950 in favor of Chinese entry into the war to save the North Korean regime; see documents accompanying Alexandre Mansourév’s article.)

Despite Stalin’s concern to avoid direct military conflict with the United States, he finally agreed to provide air cover for Chinese ground troops crossing into Korea. Given the intensity of American bombing, Chinese troops could hardly have entered the war without such cover and they did not have the means to provide it for themselves. On 1 November 1950, Soviet air force units first engaged American planes in air battles over the Yalu River bridge that was the route for Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) entering Korea. Stalin’s military envoy to Mao, S.E. Zakharov, reported on 2 November 1950 (document #35) on the results of the first day of combat between Soviet and American pilots. Zakharov’s report also reveals that Korean pilots were still flying in November 1950, from bases in Manchuria, and that American planes were bombing air bases in Manchuria as well as targets in North Korea.

Soviet air force units in Korea proved to be highly effective against American bombers and fighter planes. On 15 November 1950 (document #38), Mao expressed his appreciation to Stalin for the heroism of the Soviet pilots guarding the Yalu crossings, who had shot down 23 American planes in the previous 12 days. Mao’s message also reveals that Stalin reinforced Soviet air support by sending additional MiG-15s to China and creating a command apparatus for the air corps. Over the next few months Soviet air force involvement in Korea grew to quite substantial proportions. Nonetheless, Stalin continued to attempt to minimize the damage to Soviet interests that might ensue from the presence of Soviet pilots in Korea by ordering the Soviet Air Force to train Chinese pilots as quickly as possible so that they could be sent to the front to replace Soviet air crews (documents #68, 74, 76).

In addition to providing air cover against American planes along the Korean-Manchurian border, the Soviet Union also played the critical role of providing military supplies and advisers for the Chinese and North Korean war effort. In this selection of documents I have included the requests for supplies and advisers from November 1950 through February 1951 (documents #36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 53, 62, 64), and then have limited the selection to only a few such requests for the remainder of the war (documents #72, 73, 91, 92, 106, 111). I should emphasize, however, that Chinese and North Korean requests for supplies and advisers constituted a large part of Stalin’s correspondence with Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung until his death in March 1953. It is interesting to note that Stalin himself negotiated with Mao and Kim over the amounts of the various supplies that would be delivered, the schedule of delivery, and the terms of payment. Stalin’s personal attention to the supply issue probably reflects the severity of the burden this role placed on Soviet production capacity, which was still rebuilding from the devastation of World War II.

These documents corroborate the impression produced by recently-disclosed Chinese sources that Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai played the central role in operational planning during the Korean War (e.g. documents #50, 54-57). They kept Stalin informed of the military situation and of proposed operations and asked his advice whenever a question of the “international situation” was involved, such as in planning the “fourth operation”—a possible offensive—in late January 1951 (document #56) or in general strategic planning in early June 1951 (documents #66, 67). The documents also reveal that Stalin offered advice on military planning whenever he wished, such as on 5 June 1951 (document #65), and that he intervened more often and more directly with the command of North Korean troops than with the Chinese (documents #19, 58, 59, 61).

While the Chinese leadership had primary responsibility for managing the battlefield, the Soviet leadership played the central role in formulating diplomatic strategy for the communist side during the war. We see that in November and December 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised Zhou Enlai regarding the best approach to take to the question of Chinese participation in the UN Security Council (document #37) and to a response to American proposals declaring China an aggressor in Korea (document #46). When UN representatives asked Chinese representatives in New York in December 1950 to inform them under what conditions China would accept a cease-fire in Korea, Zhou Enlai reported to Stalin his proposed terms and asked for the opinion of the Soviet government before responding (document #48).

Stalin’s reply to Zhou and the Politburo directive the same day to UN Ambassador Vyshinsky suggest that the success of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in turning back the American advance in November 1950 sharply altered Stalin’s approach to the war. On December 7 the Politburo informed Vyshinsky (document #47) that his draft proposal for a cease-fire in Korea was “incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans are more and more often advancing a proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops.” With the unexpected and undoubtedly welcome sight of the supposedly fear-
KOREA MAP

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some American armed forces retreating before the troops of his junior ally, Stalin ordered Vyshinsky to propose instead terms that the Americans would surely reject. In the same vein, Stalin replied to Zhou (document #49) that it was not yet time “for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated,” and advised him to adopt the more cunning strategy of requesting US and UN opinions on conditions for an armistice. When the UN group presented its proposal on 11 January 1951, Zhou again turned to Stalin for “advice and consultation” (document #52), and in accordance with Stalin’s recommendation the PRC rejected the UN proposal.

Stalin’s telegram to Mao Zedong on 5 June 1951 (document #65) reveals the new attitude toward the war that Stalin adopted after Chinese successes on the battlefield had removed the threat of an American advance toward Chinese and Soviet borders. He informed Mao that he agreed that “the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of Anglo-American troops.” We have no record of Mao’s reaction to Stalin’s enthusiasm for this costly “learning experience” for China and one may imagine that the Chinese leadership may have been less enthusiastic about the massive casualties suffered in Korea, which ran to many hundreds of thousands by the end of the war. At the same time, however, Mao’s correspondence with Stalin indicates that the Chinese leader was in fact willing to continue the war until he obtained from the United States terms he considered acceptable. Russian records of Mao’s correspondence with Stalin thus lend support to Chen Jian’s argument that Mao Zedong intervened in Korea primarily in order to reassert China’s place in the international order and to revive revolutionary momentum within China.12

Despite Stalin’s interest in continuing the war in Korea, the serious losses suffered by Chinese and North Korean troops in their failed offensives of April and May 1951 forced the communists to consider opening negotiations with the UN command. On June 5 Soviet Ambassador to the UN Jacob Malik informed the American diplomat George F. Kennan that “the Soviet government wanted peace and wanted a peaceful solution of the Korean question—at the earliest possible moment” and advised the United States “to get in touch with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in this matter.”13 A few days later Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang, a Chinese leader with close ties to the Soviet Union, went to Moscow to discuss the situation with Stalin (documents #67, 69-72). Mao Zedong considered it advisable to open negotiations with the UN command because for the next two months the Chinese and North Koreans would have to occupy a defensive position (documents #73, 74, 76). If the Chinese and North Korean forces could avoid facing an enemy offensive during this period, by August they would be strong enough to launch their own new offensive. Stalin agreed with Mao that armistice negotiations were desirable at that time (see document #69) and instructed Moscow’s ambassador to the United Nations to take the appropriate initiative.14 This evidence suggests that the “hawks” within the Truman Administration who opposed opening negotiations in Korea on the grounds that the enemy was only trying to buy time to build up its forces were, in fact, correct. From Mao’s assessment of the condition of the Chinese and North Korean troops in the summer of 1951, it appears that if the UN forces had pushed their advantage in June and July 1951, before the Chinese had time to dig fortifications, they may well have advanced the line of the front, and hence the eventual border between the two Koreas. After August 1951 the CPV and PLA were sufficiently well dug in that the war remained a stalemate.

An examination of Chinese and North Korean strategy during the armistice negotiations, which lasted from July 1951 to July 1953, is beyond the scope of this essay, though the Presidential Archive documents provide extensive evidence on this subject. I will note only that it appears that while Mao Zedong opened negotiations in 1951 primarily in order to buy time to reinforce his position on the battlefield, his communications with Stalin in July and August 1951 (documents #84-88) suggest that if he had been able to secure satisfactory terms in the negotiations, he may have been willing to conclude an armistice. However, the documents reveal that Stalin consistently took a “hard line” toward the negotiations, advising Mao that since the Americans had an even greater need to conclude an armistice, the Chinese and North Koreans should “continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations” (document #95).

The evidence presented below suggests that as the fighting dragged on through 1952, the North Koreans became increasingly desirous of ending the war (documents #102, 106). The Chinese approach to the war, however, seems to have been contradictory. On the one hand, Mao Zedong was clearly anxious to avoid undermining the prestige of the PRC by accepting unfavorable armistice terms (document #108). As Zhou Enlai explained to Stalin in a conversation in Moscow on 20 August 1952 (the transcript of which is published elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin), the Chinese leadership felt that as a matter of principle it could not yield to the Americans on the issue of repatriation of POWs. Zhou also reported to Stalin that Mao believed that the war in Korea was advantageous to China because it kept the United States from preparing for a new world war. Specifically, by fighting the Americans in Korea, China was helping to delay the next world war by 15-20 years. On the other hand, however, Zhou stated toward the end of this conversation that if America makes some sort of compromise on the POW issue, the communist side should accept it.

We need additional records from China in order to determine more clearly the Chinese leadership’s thinking regarding the war in Korea during the long months of armistice negotiations. However, from an internal report on the Korean War written by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1966 (published in Issue 3 [Fall 1993] of the Bulletin), it appears that by the time of Stalin’s death in March 1953, Beijing was eager to bring the war to an end. According to this report, during conversations held while Zhou Enlai was in Moscow for Stalin’s funeral, the PRC foreign minister “urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of an armistice.” As the tortuously worded USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 19 March 1953 (document #112) reveals, ending the war in Korea was also a high priority for the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow; in the midst of the great anxiety and confusion following Stalin’s death, the new leadership drafted and approved this major foreign policy decision in only two weeks. The evidence thus suggests that Stalin’s desire to
continue the war in Korea was a major factor in the prolongation of the war; immediately after his death the three communist allies took decisive steps to reach an armistice agreement.

The timing of the Council of Ministers’ resolution also suggests that it was Stalin’s death rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the armistice negotiations. The Eisenhower Administration later asserted that it finally broke the stalemate at Panmunjom by virtue of its “unmistakable warning” to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China if an armistice were not reached—a claim that had great influence on American strategic thinking after 1953. However, Eisenhower’s threats to use nuclear weapons were made in May 1953, two months after the Soviet government resolved to bring the war to an end. The Russian documents thus provide important new evidence for the debate over “nuclear diplomacy.”

The final two documents presented below provide intriguing information about Mao Zedong’s attitude toward the Korean War and the effect the war had on his relations with Moscow. In a discussion with Soviet officials in Beijing on 28 July 1953 (document #114), Mao was remarkably bellicose, speaking of the war as though it had been a great victory for China. He even commented that “from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year.” Mao may have been mainly posturing before the Russians, part of a larger effort to redefine his relations with Moscow following the death of Stalin; the Soviet documents need to be combined with the new Chinese sources before one can draw firm conclusions about Mao’s thinking. It is clear, however, as the excerpt from a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing in April 1956 (document #115) suggests, that the Korean War profoundly affected relations between the PRC and the USSR. Stalin desperately wanted Mao Zedong to pull his echelons out of the fire in Korea, but the PRC’s stunning success against the formidable American foe, combined with Moscow’s tightfistedness toward its ally, made the communist government in Beijing much less willing to tolerate subsequent Soviet demands.

As is apparent from the documents presented below and the others from this collection published in this issue, the documents declassified by the Presidential Archive greatly expand our knowledge of the Korean War and of Soviet foreign policy in general in the late Stalin years, particularly Soviet relations with the new communist government in China. It will be some time before these new sources can be adequately analyzed and integrated with documentary and memoir evidence from other countries. In the meantime, readers may wish to consult the following recent publications using other new sources from China and Russia in order to place this new evidence in a broader context: Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Thomas Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” International Security 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-54; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Michael Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” Political Science Quarterly 107:3 (Fall 1992), 453-78; William Stueck, The Korean War, An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Zhang Shu Guang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995).
Il Sung further stated that he will prepare himself for the meeting.

Regarding the question of delivering lead from Korea to the USSR, I read the second point of your order. Kim answered that he will take all necessary measures to secure the delivery to the USSR from Korea of the quantity of lead indicated by you. He promised to work out all necessary measures regarding this question in the course of 10-15 days.

31.I.50. [T.F.] SHTYKOV

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF), Listy 123-124, Fond and Opis not given; and Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter AVPRF), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 92-93]

2. 7 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim II Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, Copy.
From Pyongyang, No. 4040. 10 hours 10 minutes. 8.II.1950
Special File
To Vyshinsky

On 4 February I had a meeting with Kim II Sung at his request. During the meeting Kim II Sung raised the following questions:
1. Can they adopt a central committee decision about issuing a loan, about which he earlier asked my advice[?] They have already calculated the loan at 2 billion won. They have already prepared an example of a bond. He asked agreement to send their representatives to Moscow with draft bonds in order to formulate orders for these bonds. I answered that I had communicated Kim II Sung’s request to Moscow, but had still not received an answer.
2. Kim II Sung asked my advice about whether they can proceed toward forming three additional infantry divisions, so that the total number of the army will be brought to ten divisions. I answered that this question is large and serious, that before adopting a decision you must think through whether you have the necessary material resources for this. I also need time to think through this question before I give you advice on this measure.
3. Kim II Sung asked me if he can appeal to Comrade Stalin with a request to use in 1950 the credit the Soviet government had allocated for 1951. With this credit they would like to buy in the Soviet Union arms for the three infantry divisions they intend to form. I answered that I will report this question to my government.

4. Kim Il Sung further communicated that they intend to call a session of the Supreme People’s Assembly for February 25 with the following agenda:
1. Regarding the budget for 1950. 2. Regarding the criminal code. 3. Regarding the results of the fulfillment of the national economic plan in 1949. They still do not have a firm decision regarding whether to raise the three questions.

Kim II Sung reported that he had commissioned Pak Hon Yong to write a request to the Soviet government about sending a group of textile workers to the Soviet Union in order to prepare them to work on the Soviet equipment that is arriving. I answered that as soon as I receive his letter I will report it to my government.

I ask your orders about what to answer Kim II Sung regarding the first three questions raised by him [as reported] in this telegram.

7.II.50 SHTYKOV

In the margins Stalin wrote “it is possible” beside points 1, 2 and 3, “we don’t object” beside point 4 and “let him write it” beside the last paragraph. He wrote a note at the top to Malenkov to “give an answer today.”

[Source: APRF, Listy 125-126, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 145-146]

3. 10 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim II Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
Copy From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky

Today, February 10, I visited Kim II Sung and in accordance with your order verbally transmitted to him the answer to his questions of February 4 of this year. Kim II Sung received my communication enthusiastically and several times asked me to communicate to Comrade Stalin his gratitude for his assistance.

I promised to present a letter to the
government of the USSR within three days concerning all the questions touched upon in your telegram.

10/II-50. SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 129, Fond and Opis not given]


Ciphered telegram
Strictly Secret
Copying prohibited

From Pyongyang
To Vasilevsky, Copy to Vyshinsky.

Lieutenant-General Vasiliev has arrived and has taken over the responsibility of main military adviser of the Korean People’s Army. He has familiarized himself with the position in the staff and units of the army.

In connection with this I understand that the functions of main military adviser are removed from me.

I ask you to confirm.

23.II.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 130, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 149-150]

5. 9 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting note from Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government

Ciphered telegram
Strictly Secret
Copying is prohibited

From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky.

I transmit the text of a note received from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK:

“The Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic reports to you about the following:

In 1950 the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, in order to strengthen the people’s army and to fully equip it with arms, ammunition and technical equipment, asked the Soviet government to send to Korea military-technical equipment in the amount of 120-150 million rubles, in accordance with an application made earlier to the Government of the USSR.

The Korean People’s Democratic Republic correspondingly will deliver to the Soviet Union this year:

- 9 tons of gold — 53,662,900 rubles
- 40 tons of silver — 1,887,600 rubles
- 15,000 tons of monazite concentrate — 79,500,000 rubles

In all a sum of 133,050,500 rubles.

Korea is interested in the soonest possible receipt of the goods indicated in this application.

I ask you to inform the Soviet government of our request.

Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.”
9.III.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, Listy 131-132, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 149-150]

6. 12 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov) transmitting message to Kim Il Sung

[handwritten]

MID USSR
Top Secret
Copying is Prohibited
Ciphered telegram

To Pyongyang
To Soviet Ambassador

Communicate to Kim Il Sung, in answer to his letter of 10 February, that the Soviet Government will satisfy the request of the government of the DPRK about using in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 that was allocated by the Soviet Union to Korea in accordance with the Agreement of 17 March 1949.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

A. Vyshinsky

[Source: APRF, page 141, fond and opis not given]

7. 16 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting 14 March 1950 message from Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram
Strictly Secret
Copying is Prohibited

From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky.

I transmit the note we received on 14 March 1950 from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung:

“I have the honor to inform you of the following:

In connection with the agreement of the Government of the USSR to allocate to Korea in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 in the amount of 70,700,000 rubles, the Government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic would like to acquire with this sum arms, ammunition and military-technical equipment for the Korean People’s Army in the amounts indicated in the attached [list].

The Government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic hopes that the Government of the USSR, understanding well the needs of the young Korean Republic, will complete the delivery of all the special goods in the shortest period.

Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic

A copy of the note was transmitted by me to the trade representative of the USSR in Korea. I will send the original note by diplomatic post. The arms and military equipment indicated in the attached [list] will go to the formation of 3 divisions.

16.II.50 SHTYKOV

attached is a seven page list, divided into sections for artillery armaments, ammunition, [illegible], engineering equipment, military-medical equipment, and military aviation supplies.

[Source: APRF, Listy 133-140, fond and opis not given]

8. 18 March 1950, message, Stalin to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)

PYONGYANG
To SHTYKOV
Transmit to Kim Il Sung the following answer from Comrade Stalin:

“First. I received your communication of March 4 about agreement to send the indicated amount of lead to the Soviet Union.

I thank you for the assistance. As concerns the equipment and materials you request, and also the specialists in lead industry, the Soviet Government has resolved to fully satisfy your request.

Second. I have also received your proposal of 9 March about the delivery to you of arms, ammunition and technical equipment for the people’s army of Korea. The Soviet government has decided also to satisfy fully this request of yours.

With respect I. STALIN”. 
9. 21 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky.

In accordance with your order on March 20 I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung, at which [DPRK Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong was present. During the meeting I transmitted to Kim the text of the telegram of Comrade Stalin.

During this meeting Kim asked me to transmit to Comrade Stalin his request that he, together with Pak Hon Yong, would like to have a meeting with Comrade Stalin at the beginning of April.

They want to make the trip to Moscow and the meeting with Comrade Stalin unofficially, in the manner as [it was done] in 1945.

Kim Il Sung said further that they are completing the preparation of all materials for the trip and intend to raise the following questions at the meeting with Comrade Stalin:
1. About the path and methods of unification of the south and the north of the country.
2. About the prospects for the economic development of the country.
3. Also possibly several party questions. I ask your order.

21.III.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 142, Fond and Opis not given]

10. 24 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky.

On March 24 I visited Kim Il Sung and communicated to him that Comrade Stalin has agreed to receive him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong.

Kim Il Sung plans to leave Korea for Moscow on March 30 of this year. I consider it advisable to arrange a special plane for transporting Kim and Pak to Moscow. For this purpose I request a corresponding order to apportion a plane. The designated plane should arrive in Pyongyang on March 29 of this year. In case it is not possible to send a plane, the departure from Korea can be organized by naval transport from Seisin to Vladivostok. From Vladivostok to Moscow [Kim and Pak can travel] by train in a special car.

Kim intends to take with him to Moscow as an interpreter Mun Il, who was interpreter during the negotiations in Moscow, and the personal adjutant of So Chen Diu, who was also with him in Moscow in 1949.

I request an order regarding whether it is necessary for someone from the embassy to accompany Kim to Moscow.

I ask for corresponding orders.

24.III.50 Shtykov

[Source: APRF, Listy 146-147, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 96-97]

11. 10 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Soviet representativeAlekssei Ignatieff in Pyongyang Ignatiev to Vyshinsky

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky.

The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK has reported to me about the following:
1. A report to Kim Il Sung was received from the ambassador of the DPRK in the Chinese People’s Republic Li Zhou-yuan in which he reports about a meeting between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan that took place in Beijing at the end of March 1950.

In the conversation between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan, at the initiative of the latter, the question of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed.

Mao Zedong responded positively to the question of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and selected the end of April or the beginning of May of this year as the approximate time for this meeting.

Mao Zedong connected the proposed meeting with the question of the unification of Korea, indicating in this regard that if there is a concrete plan for the unification of Korea, then the meeting should be organized secretly [not openly], but if there is not yet such a plan for unification of Korea, then the meeting with Kim Il Sung can be conducted officially.

Li Zhou-yuan has not given a concrete answer to the question of the time and form of the meeting, referring to the fact that Kim Il Sung is presently undergoing medical treatment. [Ed. note: Kim was making a secret visit to Moscow.] Further, Mao said in the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan that if a third world war begins, Korea will not escape participation in it, therefore the Korean People’s Democratic Republic should prepare its armed forces.

In the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan, Mao Zedong expressed the wish to develop wider trade between the Chinese People’s Republic and the DPRK.

2. Kim Ch’aek has reported that Kim Dar Sen, the leader of the partisan detachments in the south of Korea whom the southern press and radio have repeatedly officially reported as killed in battles with punitive units of the South Korean army, arrived in Pyongyang from South Korea on April 3. Kim Dar Sen came to North Korea to report about the position of the partisan movement in South Korea and to receive orders on this question.

Kim Ch’aek asked me to transmit the above indicated questions to Kim Il Sung through Comrade Shtykov.

10.IV.50. [A.] IGNATIEV

[Source: APRF, Listy 148-149, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 98-99]

12. 25 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Ignatiev to Vyshinsky

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky.

25 April at 16:00 hours local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong arrived in Seisin (North Korean) from Voroshilov by plane. Both feel well.

25.IV.50 IGNATIEV

[Source: APRF, List 150, fond and opis not given]

13. 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung
Ciphered telegram  Strictly secret
From Pyongyang  
To Vyshinsky

At the request of Kim Il Sung, on May 12 I had a meeting with him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong. During the conversation Kim Il Sung reported to me that upon his return from Moscow he received a letter from Li Zhou-yuan (ambassador to China), in which he reported about a meeting that took place with Mao Zedong and [PRC Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai. During this meeting the question of the necessity of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed. Zhou Enlai proposed that the meeting have an official character. Mao, turning toward Li as if asking when you intend to begin the unification of the country, without waiting for an answer stated that if you intend to begin military operations against the south in the near future, then they should not meet officially. In such a case the trip should be unofficial.

Mao Zedong added further that the unification of Korea by peaceful means is not possible, solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory.

Kim Il Sung further reported that since Li Zhou-yuan did not have a commission from the Central Committee to meet with Mao Zedong and to discuss questions about his meeting, i.e. Kim Il Sung’s, with Mao Zedong, they decided to summon Li Zhou-yuan and give him corresponding rebukes and instructions.

Li Zhou-yuan came to Pyongyang and on May 10 left for Beijing with corresponding commissions.

Today, May 12, Li Zhou-yuan reported that he met with Mao Zedong, who agreed to the arrival of Kim Il Sung at the time indicated by him. Kim Il Sung reported that they intend to leave for Beijing in the morning of May 13 and asked me if the plane coming for him will be ready by this time. I answered that the plane is ready.

Kim Il Sung further reported that they decided to go to China with Pak Hon Yong, that they have not discussed the question of a meeting with Mao Zedong in the Central Committee, that he has only spoken about this question with Kim Ch’aek (member of the Politburo).

Kim Il Sung reported to me that they intend to discuss roughly the following questions with Mao Zedong:

1. To inform about their intentions about unifying the country by military means and to report about the results of the discussions on this question in Moscow.
2. To exchange opinions on the question of the conclusion of a trade agreement between Korea and China. He intends to propose that they sign a trade agreement in the nearest future, but that they sign an agreement about friendship after the unification of the country.
3. To inform Mao about several questions which were placed under discussion with Comrade Stalin in Moscow and about the establishment of closer communications between the Central Committee of the labor party of Korea and the communist party of China.
4. To exchange opinions on several questions which interest both Korea and China, such as the electrical station at Suiho, Koreans who live in China and so forth.

Kim further asked my advice, about what kind of questions he should raise before Mao Zedong from the point of view of assistance in the intended operation. I declined to answer, stating that it is clearer to him, what he has insufficiencies in and what the Chinese can help him with. Then Kim Il Sung answered that he intended to ask for ammunition for the Japanese and American arms which the divisions that arrived from China have and for some number of horses. However, after a conversation with the chief of staff of the army, who reported that they have more than 3 b.k. [boekomplekt, standard load of ammunition] of ammunition, he decided not to raise these questions. He stated that he doesn’t have more requests for Mao about assistance, since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there.

Kim Il Sung reported to me that with regard to the question of the preparation of the operation he had given all necessary orders to the chief of the general staff, who already has begun to implement them, that his wish is to begin the operation in June, but he is still not convinced that they will manage it in this period.

13 May at 5:20 local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong flew to Beijing.

12.V.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, Listy 151-154, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 100-103]

[Ed. note: For the texts of an exchange of messages between the Chinese leadership and Stalin on 13-14 May 1950, during Kim Il Sung’s secret visit to Beijing and concerning his plans to attack South Korea, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 60-61.]

14. 26 June 1950, top secret report on military situation by Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov

Top Secret
To Comrade Zakharov

I report about the preparation and course of the military operations of the Korean People’s Army.

The concentration of the People’s Army in the region near the 38th parallel began on June 12 and was concluded on June 23, as was prescribed in the plan of the General Staff. The redeployment of troops took place in an orderly fashion, without incident.

The intelligence service of the enemy probably detected the troop redeployment, but we managed to keep the plan and the time of the beginning of troop operations secret.

The planning of the operation at the divisional level and the reconnaissance of the area was carried out with the participation of Soviet advisers.

All preparatory measures for the operation were completed by June 24th. On June 24th divisional commanders were given orders about “D”[day] and “H”[hour].

The political order of the Minister of Defense was read to the troops, which explained that the South Korean army had provoked a military attack by violating the 38th parallel and that the government of the DPRK had given an order to the Korean People’s Army to go over to the counterattack.

The order to counter-attack was met with great enthusiasm by the soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army.

The troops went to their starting positions by 24:00 hours on June 24th. Military operations began at 4 hours 40 minutes local time. Artillery preparation was accompanied in the course of 20-40 minutes by direct fire and a ten-minute artillery barrage. The
infantry rose up and went on the attack in good spirits. In the first three hours individual units and formations advanced from 3 to 5 kilometers.

The attack of the troops of the People’s Army took the enemy completely by surprise.

The enemy put up strong resistance only in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. The enemy began to put up a more organized resistance after 12:00 on the first day.

On the first day of battle the following towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Kaesong, Sinyuri—(map 1:1,000,000 published by the General Staff in 1943).

In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. [People’s Army] advanced 12 kilometers.

On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 kilometers.

On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio area and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 partisans.

The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out successfully.

The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining it.

The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the People’s Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no losses.

On June 26 troops of the People’s Army continued the attack and, with fighting, advanced deep into the territory of South Korea.

During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin peninsula and Kaisin peninsula were completely cleared and units of the 6th division made a forced crossing of the bay and took the populated point in the direction of Kimpo airport.

In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th divisions took the cities of Bunsan and Tongducheb and the 2nd division took the provincial center Sunsen.

On the coast of the Sea of Japan the advance has continued. The port of Tuburi has been taken.

During the course of the day there has been no communication with the 12th Infantry Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the mechanized brigade attacking through Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif.

Conclusions regarding the North.

It is necessary to note the following substantial insufficiencies in the operations of the People’s Army:

1. With the beginning of military actions and the forward advance of units and formations, staff communication was lost from top to bottom. The general staff of the People’s Army already on the first day did not direct the battle, since it did not have firm communication with a single division.

The commanders of units and formations are not trying to establish communications with the senior staff, command posts from combat level and higher change the senior staff without permission, the General Staff still has not established communications with the brigade operating along the eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Division.

2. The command staff of the KPA does not have battle experience, after the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers they organized the battle command poorly, they use artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose communications.

3. However, our military advisers note great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean People’s army and a general aspiration to fulfill their allotted tasks.

4. The political mood among the people of North Korea in relation to the beginning of military operations is characterized by a general enthusiasm, by faith in the government of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the Korean People’s Army.

On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an appeal to the Korean people in the name of the government of the DPRK, in which he described the situation that has been created in the country and laid out the tasks for the defeat of the enemy and the unification of Korea.

5. The Command of the Korean People’s Army is taking measures to put right the troop communications and the organization of the battle command. To this end the Army Command Post has been moved to the Tepuges area. The War Minister, the chief of the General Staff and the main military adviser, along with a group of officers, will go out to the Command Post.

Conclusions regarding the South.

The first two days of military operations have shown the following:

1. The enemy is putting up resistance and while fighting is retreating deep into the territory of South Korea, mass taking of prisoners from the South Korean army has not been noted.

2. The South Korean puppet authorities have begun to throw in troops from deep in the rear and are trying to halt the advance of the People’s Army.

3. In the first day the attack of the People’s Army caused confusion in the South. The South Korean authorities and the ambassador of the USA personally in their radio speeches called on the people of South Korea to stay calm. The staff of the South Korean army is broadcasting false reports about the successes of the South Korean army.

SHTYKOV
No. 358/sh
26.6.50.

[Source: collection of Soviet military documents obtained in 1994 by the British Broadcasting Corporation for a BBC TimeWatch documentary titled “Korea, Russia’s Secret War,” to be broadcast in the UK and the USA in 1996]
In October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership sent “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV) to Korea to fight against United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border. Although China’s intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing leadership’s hopes of overwhelming the UN forces. Therefore, when the Korean War ended in July 1953, Korea’s political map remained virtually unchanged, while America’s military intervention in Korea and China’s rushing into a conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a Sino-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States that would last nearly twenty years.

The newly established Chinese Communist regime faced enormous problems during its first year, including achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a war-shattered economy, and finishing reunification of the country. Why then did Mao decide to assist North Korea in fighting a coalition composed of nearly all the Western industrial powers? How was the decision made? What were the immediate and long-range causes leading to Beijing’s decision to enter the Korean War? Finally, was there any opportunity that might have prevented the direct confrontation between the PRC and the United States? More than forty years after the end of the Korean War, scholarly answers to these questions are still limited and remarkably inadequate.

In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed China’s entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of worldwide expansion, believing that the entire international Communist movement was under the control of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions. The Korean conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential part of a life-and-death confrontation between the Communists on the one hand and the “free world” on the other.\(^1\)

The North Korean invasion of the South, as viewed by President Harry Truman—and many later students of the Korean War—represented the first step in a general Communist plot to “pass from subversion” to “armed invasion and war” in their scheme of world conquest.\(^2\) Correspondingly, Beijing’s entrance into the Korean War was regarded as an action subordinate to Moscow’s overall Cold War strategy. Scholars in the West widely believed that Beijing’s policy was aggressive, violent, and irrational.

In 1960, Allen S. Whiting published his landmark study, *China Crosses the Yalu*,\(^3\) which has strongly influenced a whole generation of scholars. Using Western intelligence sources and Chinese journal and newspaper information, Whiting argued that unlike the Soviet Union, Communist China had not directly participated in the planning for the North Korean invasion of the South. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whiting believed, Beijing tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement, and only after the attempts for a political solution failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin necessary military preparations in early September. Whiting emphasized that after the Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing tried through both public and private channels to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only after all warnings had been ignored by Washington and General Douglas MacArthur and therefore, in the Beijing leadership’s view, the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded that Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese Communist perception of America’s threat to China’s national security. Lacking access to Chinese archival materials, though, Whiting’s study had to focus more on the analysis of the environment in which the Beijing leadership made their decision to go to war than on a close examination of the decision-making process.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more critical perspective on the Sino-American confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam, the normalization of Sino-American relations, and the declassification of new archival documentation. Building on Whiting’s thesis, scholars paid more attention to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ concerns for China’s national security as the decisive factor underlying their decision to enter the Korean War. They generally argued that Beijing did not welcome the Korean War because China faced difficult tasks of economic reconstruction and political consolidation at home and gave priority to liberating Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of these scholars stressed that Beijing’s decision to enter the Korean War was simply a reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to the physical security of Chinese territory. And while most scholars believed that the American decision to cross the 38th parallel triggered China’s intervention, some speculated that if UN forces had stopped at the parallel China would not have intervened.\(^4\) A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to share these assumptions, as can be seen in Chinese publications on the “War to Resist America and Assist Korea” that appeared in the 1980s.\(^5\)

As a lecturer at Shanghai’s East China Normal University in the early 1980s and then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in the United States, I became increasingly interested in the emergence of Sino-American confrontation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In my study I too believed in the standard interpretation of China’s reasons for entering the Korean War. Not until 1988-1990, when the work on my dissertation led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I begin to feel doubts. For example, to my surprise, I found that early in August 1950, more than one month before the Inchon landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership had been inclined to send troops to Korea, and China’s military and political preparations had begun even a month earlier. I also found that the concerns behind the decision to enter the Korean War went far beyond the defense of the safety of the Chinese-Korean border. Mao and his associates aimed to win a glorious victory by driving the Americans off the Korean peninsula. It was no longer possible to accept the well-established view of Chinese and American historians.

\(^{continued on page 85}\)
The leadership of the DPRK and the People’s Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) correctly evaluate the complicated military-political situation in Korea, believe in full victory and are directing all efforts toward a subsequent broad attack on the south of Korea.

KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war against the DPRK and in connection with this they are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources for the war.

KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about forming additional infantry, tank, and naval units and formations. They intend to introduce universal military service in the DPRK.

However, some portion of the leading figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties of conducting a war against the Americans with the forces of Korea and in a cautious way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG reported to me these facts, about a conversation of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN KHI with KIM IL SUNG.)

The rightist and centrist figures that are entering the government of the DPRK are supporting all measures of the government, but so far are not displaying the necessary direction of activity in the mobilization of their parties in the south of the country.

I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that the government of the USSR has satisfied his request for arms and ammunition.

The general situation in the KNP [Korean People’s Republic, apparently a misspelling of DPRK] continues to remain favorable and makes it possible to continue the active offensive of the People’s Army. No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV.

17.4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405840/sh. From Pyongyang Sent 4.7.50 0:05
Received 4.7.50 3:55
Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 4.7.50 4:10
To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].
Today July 3 I met with KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG.

At the beginning of the conversation KIM IL SUNG described the situation at the front. In his opinion the troops are moving very slowly, especially in the Central direction. The troop crossing was disorganized, although there was a minister in place there. He expressed dissatisfaction with his [the minister’s] work.

Further, noting the seriousness of the situation at the front and in the liberated territories and the danger of landings by American troops in the rear or at North Korean ports or airborne landings of troops, he asked me to report to you his request for quick delivery of arms in the following amounts: 50,000 rifles; 5,000 PPSh sub-machine guns, 5,000 [sub-machine guns]; 1,500 light machine guns; 350 heavy machine guns; 20082mm mortars; 78 120mm mortars, 80 76mm ZIS-3 artillery pieces; 24 122mm howitzers; 60 37mm anti-aircraft guns; 120 machine guns; 500 trucks.

All these arms are needed for the formation of two divisions, 12 battalions of marines and for the formation of security detachments.

Because of American air attacks on the railroad stations in the region of Kanko, Seisin, he asked that the arms be sent on an accelerated schedule through Manchuria [along the route of] Andong-Singsiu-P'yongyang.

He also communicated that they have begun fitting out reserve regiments and 2 tank brigades and that these need arms and tanks.

Further in the conversation he asked advice about how better to organize troop command in the complicated situation. Since the People’s Army is fighting against American troops, he considers it necessary to strengthen the leadership of the army.

Further he asked advice about how better to organize troop command and what kind of organizational command structure to choose so that the General Staff is brought closer to the troops.

After consulting with General
VASILIEV we proposed the following structure:

1. To create two army groups headed by Military Councils composed of: a commander, a member of the Military Council and a chief of staff.
2. To place 4-6 units under the command of each army group.

1. To create a front headquarters headed by a commander of the front, a chief of staff and a member of the Military Council of the front.

The front headquarters should be created from [the facilities and personnel of] the General Staff.

3. To preserve the Ministry of National Defense, since it already exists only in a reduced form.

The Ministry’s task should be the supply of combat troops with everything needed (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as well as the training of reserves, new troop formation and the organization of anti-aircraft defense for the northern part of the republic.

4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme Commander of troops. He agreed with our proposals.

The restructuring will proceed without harm to the military operations on the front.

He then asked our opinion about how best to arrange the disposition of commanding cadres.

From my part I proposed to appoint the following group commanders: Deputy Minister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left flank group, and for the commander of the right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (presently commanding an operational group). To appoint as commander of the front the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Industry, Kim Cha’ek (he knows military affairs, was a partisan and served in the Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man).

To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General Staff.

The Minister of National Defense will remain in his post. He will manage the formation of new units and the organization of anti-landing defense, and also supplying troops with everything needed.

They want this measure to be passed through the military committee on July 4 or 5. I judge that in this complicated situation this measure will yield positive results.

The staff of the front will move to Seoul in the near future.

I ask your permission:

1. To have two advisers in every army group (adviser for the group commander and adviser for the artillery commander).

2. To ask your permission for the main military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go to Seoul with a group of officers, together with the staff of the front, and to be permanently located there with the staff.

3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the questions touched on.

SHTYKOV

No. 439/sh.

4.7.50.

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-114]

18.5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the People’s Republic of China [PRC] N.V. Roshchin)

Ciphered telegram No. 3172

Beijing, Soviet Ambassador.

To your No. 1112-1126:

Transmit to Zhou Enlai:

1. We agree with the opinion of the Chinese comrades regarding the mediation of India on the question of the entry of people’s China into the membership of the UN.

2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units.

3. Your report about flights of Soviet planes over Manchurian territory is not confirmed. An order was given not to allow such flights.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 373/sh

5.7.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115]

19.6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shytov

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678

Pyongyang. To Comrade Shytov.

To No. 439/sh

1. The arms will be sent through Manchuria, Andong, Singisiu.

2. Concerning the location of the chief military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it more useful for him to be in Pyongyang.

3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we consider that the main thing is not this but to fill out the existing divisions and to increase their strength approximately to 12,000. It is necessary to have attached to the divisions an apparatus for the formation of troops, which would receive the reinforcements, check and train them and after this, transfer them to reinforce the divisions. This is the main thing.

FYI-SI [Stalin]

No. 374/sh

6.7.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116]

20.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shytov to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh

From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26

Received 8.7.50 11:15

Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35.

By telegraph.

To Comrade FYI-SI [Stalin],

I received the following letter from KIM IL SUNG addressed to us.

“To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo Comrade Stalin, I.V.

I ask that you accept the expression of deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluable assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, continually render to our people in their struggle for independence.

Being confident of your desire to help the Korean people rid themselves of the
American imperialists, I am obliged to appeal to you with a request to allow the use of 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of the 2nd Army Group, since the national military cadres have not yet sufficiently mastered the art of commanding modern troops.

Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK.

Pyongyang. 8 July 1950.

SHTYKOV

No. 481/sh

8.7.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151]

21.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin in PRC transmitting message to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231

BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador.

Only by telegraph

Sent 18:40 8.7.50
Delivered 8.7.50

Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that the Koreans are complaining that there is no representative of CHINA in KOREA. A representative should be sent soon, so that it will be possible to have communications and resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to have communications with KOREA.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].

No. 379/sh.

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117]

22. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305

BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph

SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15 13.7.50

Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO ZEDONG the following:

“1. The English have officially appealed to us through their ambassador in Moscow and declared that they, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, cannot now make proposals regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but if the Korean People’s Democratic Republic withdraws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this could hasten a peaceful resolution of the Korean question.

The English ask the Soviet government to express its opinion.

We consider such a demand by the English to be impertinent and unacceptable.

We intend to reply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie that the Korean army is strictly adhering to the Geneva convention with regard to prisoners, and [that they should] let the Koreans make a statement in the press exposing the slander of the American press regarding poor treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It would be good for someone among the prisoners to make a statement on the radio that the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is very good.

FYNSI [Stalin]

No. 4.4781

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov.

13.7.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 148]


To the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Comrade Shtykov, T.F.

I ask you to transmit to the Government of the USSR the following:

In connection with the appeal of the English to the Government of the USSR with a demand about the withdrawal of troops of the Korean People’s Army to the 38th parallel, the Government of the DPRK considers, as does the Soviet Government, that such a demand of the English is impertinent and unacceptable.

We are in full agreement with the opinion of the Soviet Government that the Korean question [should be] discussed in the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea.

The Government of the DPRK [will take measures] quickly to clear the entire territory of Korea of American interventionists.

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK

Kim Il Sung.

14.7.50.
25. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

MID USSR
Tenth Department Received 4 hours 30 minutes 25/VII.1950
Dispatched 5 hours 55 minutes 25/VII.1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
To Beijing To Soviet Ambassador Roshchin

SPECIAL
TOP PRIORITY
To Your No. 1503.

On the authorization of Filippov, transmit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we agree with the proposed procedure and time period for training Chinese pilots on jet planes.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

VYSHINSKY
25.VII.50
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 108-109]

27. 28 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962
Beijing
To Comrade Kotov
To No. 1726.

Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the reply to his telegram about military advisers.

To Comrade Zhou Enlai.
The Soviet Government has satisfied your request about sending Soviet military advisers—specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the Eastern and Northeastern military districts. 38 advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in VVS.

As regards the remaining 26 advisers, we consider that there is no special need to send them, since the work of these advisers can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can advise the work of the Chiefs of the operational and intelligence departments of the PVO district; Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the VVS can advise the work also of the Chief of the Operational Department of the Staff of the VVS district.

The 38 advisers will leave for China soon.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 94]

28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shytkov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From Pyongyang, Sent 31.8.50 11:32
Received 31.8 17:27
Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35
By telegraph
FYN-SI [Stalin]
To No. 483/sh.

In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL SUNG listened to my communication and asked permission to write down its contents, which I dictated to him. KIM IL SUNG received your letter very well, thanking you several times, underscoring that it is a very good letter.

Afterwards he asked my agreement to summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong and read him your telegram.

After exchanging opinions with Pak Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about whether he can bring it to the notice of the members of the PolitSoviet [Political Council] of the CC, in connection with which he underscored that this is a very important letter and he needs to communicate its contents since some members of the PolitSoviet are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful to them to know the contents of this letter.

I replied that if he considers this neces-
sary then he can do it. KIM IL SUNG replied that he would convene the PolitSoviet tomorrow and read them the contents of this letter.

SHTYKOV

No. 1001
30.8.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162]

29. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) transmitting letter from Kim II Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
FYN-SI [Stalin].
I transmit the letter I received.

According to the report of KIM IL SUNG’s secretary, MUN IL, this text of the letter was confirmed by the PolitSoviet of the CC of the Labor Party.

SHTYKOV
No. 1011/sh
31.8.1950
Copies to Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of the 8th Department.

“DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.

We are deeply touched by your attention.

We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.

In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.

We wish you many years of life and health.

Yours faithfully,

KIM IL SUNG

(upon commission of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor Party of Korea)
city of PYONGYANG
31.8.1950.”

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 159-160]

30.13 September 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III.
From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 13.9.13:15
Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.
By telegraph.
Extremely urgent.

Moscow—Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.

In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.

In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.

We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic about the position which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question.

We ask your orders.

SHTYKOV
No. 1154/sh.
13 September of this year
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 163-164]

[documents from 21 September 1950 through 14 October 1950 appear following the article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov]

31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee Politburo decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington

All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P78/332 To Comrades Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.
Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b).

Decision of 25 October 1950
332. - About the use by the United States of Japanese in the war against Korea.

To confirm the draft order of MID USSR to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission (attachment 2).

SECRETARY CC
To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78
Attachment 1

NEW YORK TO VYSHINSKY

353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon-Yong, in one of your next speeches in the
USA of Japanese servicemen in the war against the Korean people. The Soviet delegation considers that the Far Eastern Commission must not disregard the aforementioned facts, which testify to the direct violation of the agreed-upon decision on the demilitarization of Japan.”

Give the statement to the press.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]

32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From Beijing Received 19 hours 50 minutes 28.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

27 October I received the following telegram from Mao Zedong addressed to you: “Comrade Filippov!

In connection with the military situation that has developed in China at the present time, we urgently need to acquire from the Soviet Union the following armaments for the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes.

I therefore intend to send immediately to Moscow by plane the commander of the navy Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Comrade Kuz’min in order to conduct negotiations with the responsible comrades of the Soviet Navy on the question of the request for the above mentioned arms and on the question of the construction of the Chinese navy in the future.

Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, two other comrades from the navy administration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy chief of the rear administration of the navy Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Moscow].

I ask you to review the aforementioned and give me a corresponding reply.

MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950.”

Note:
Comrade Zakharov has familiarized himself with this telegram and considers that the trip of the naval commander with adviser Kuz’min is necessary.

ROSHCHIN

No. 2623
28.10

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 62-63]

33. 29 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - to Comrade Zakharov
For MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram about naval matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of XIAO, JINGUANG and the other comrades. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

29.10.50.

Copies: Stalin, Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 64]

34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222
TO SHTYKOV

You request that our officers and advisers remain in the disposition of the [North] Koreans for the formation of Korean divisions. Such a point of view of yours is well known to us. But we do not know the points of view of the [North] Korean government, we do not know whether it wishes to have Soviet officers and advisers in the future or prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not communicated the point of view of the Korean government on this subject. We cannot impose our advisers and officers on the Korean government. Let KIM IL SUNG communicate his point of view regarding this.

FYN SI [STALIN]

1 November 1950

Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the General Staff to Shhykov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347,
Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416
Copies: Stalin(2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Shhtemenko, Lomov
From Beijing 15 hours 30 minutes 2.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY E
FYNSI [Stalin]
To No. 5228 of 2.11.50
I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, adviser to the Korean air force, I have obtained the following specific information:

1. By the first of November a regiment was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are located in An’ dun.
2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes of this regiment went into battle for the first time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were downed. Two Yak-9’s did not return from the battle.

The first report from comrade Belov to me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU was thus imprecise.

The losses relate to a battle in the region of ANSIU.

3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in MIG-15’s and two planes were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes [were downed].

We had no losses in the air battle.

4. MIG-15’s of Comrade Belov flew from airbases at MUKDEN and AN’ SHAN’. In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport.

5. At present there are 16 battle [as opposed to training] Yak-9’s at the airbase at ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is possible to restore them. In addition, 2 planes were lost while patrolling.

In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not return from the region of ANSIU.

In addition to the Yak-9’s there are:

a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully combat ready and are carrying out night missions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during landings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 planes were lost while on missions.

b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to now there are no planes for them.

6. The command of the mixed air division of Koreans in ANDONG has been formed. It is headed by General LI FART.

7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about the possibility of receiving 25 IL-10 planes and 10 PO-2 planes.

[S.E.] ZAKHAROV

No. 2702
2.11.50
Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade Zakharov about the fact that there are discrepancies between his report and Belov’s report about the air battle in the region of Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this discrepancy and report about the participation of Korean planes in battles and about the fact that two of them did not return.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188]

36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637
Copies: Stalin(2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shhtemenko
From Beijing 02 hours 00 minutes 7.11.50

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

In view of the fact that the infantry arms of the People’s Liberation Army are mainly trophies captured from the enemy, there is a great variety in the calibers of the rifles.

Such a situation creates great difficulty for the manufacture of ammunition, and in particular for the production of rifle and machine gun cartridges, especially as our factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.

At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divisions of the twelve armies, which are taking part in military operations in KOREA, have only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun cartridges. In the future, in connection with the development of military operations, we will have a very great need to supply the army with ammunition. If there is no change in military production, then the rearmament can be begun in the second half of 1951.

For overcoming the difficulties of the present time I ask you to review the question of the possibility of the delivery of small arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course of January and February 1951, according to the following list (name, quantity in pieces):

1. Soviet rifles 140,000.
2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000.
3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000.
4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns 80,000,000.
5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000.
6. Cartridges for light machine guns 37,000,000.
7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000.
8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns 20,000,000.
9. Pilots’ handguns 1,000.
10. Cartridges for pilots’ handguns 100,000.
11. TNT 1,000 tons.

I ask you to communicate to me the results of your review of my request.

I wish you health.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 2784
7.11.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 80-81]

37. 9 November 1950, VKB(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Roshchin with message for Zhou Enlai

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P78/448 To Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.
9 November 1950

Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]

Decision of 9 November 1950
448.- Question of MID USSR.

To confirm the attached draft of a telegram to Comrade Roshchin on the question
BEIJING

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

For transmission to Zhou Enlai.

I have received your telegram with the request for a consultation on the question of the participation of China in the [UN] Security Council.

In our opinion two variants are possible.

The first variant is to refuse to accept the invitation in the manner in which it was formulated in the Security Council. Motives: the invitation deprives the Chinese people’s republic of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most urgent questions of China, in particular the question of the military intervention in Korea and the question of the seizure of Taiwan by the United States of America, its right being limited only to the review of the report of MacArthur.

The second variant is to accept the invitation and to commission the Chinese delegation to make a statement in the Security Council on all the abovementioned questions, turning the discussion of the question into an indictment of the USA. If they do not allow the Chinese delegation fully to lay out its position, the Chinese delegation will walk out of the meeting and refuse to discuss even one report of MacArthur.

It seems to us that the first variant is more advisable.

You should not connect yourself to the conduct of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council, where he voted for the resolution of the English delegate [Gladwyn] Jebb, especially since, speaking between us, Soviet delegate [Jacob] Malik did not have an instruction to vote for the English resolution, but had a direct directive to put in a veto if the Soviet resolution was rejected. Malik apparently was carried away by the fact that he had nevertheless forced the Americans to vote in favor of inviting China, but he did not take into account that the form of the invitation adopted by the Security Council would place China in a disadvantaged position.

Telega graph the fulfillment.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 371, Listy 4-5]

38. 15 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26901.

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

From Beijing Received 06 hours 10 minutes 16.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV:

I fully agree with your proposal to reinforce Belov’s aviation force by an additional delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two lots, numbering 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces and to create a command apparatus for the air corps.

As concerns questions regarding the airports in MANCHURIA and the strengthening of all PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] measures, we will resolve them together with comrade [S.E.] ZAKHAROV.

I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes. I think that this is worth reporting to you.

I congratulate you on the successes!

MAO ZEDONG.

Nov 15, 1950.

NEW PARAGRAPH.

To Comrade FILIPPOV.

I report.

Your telegram was communicated at 20 hours 30 minutes local time 15.11.

ZAKHAROV

No. 2910

16.11

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 116 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 189]

39. 16 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26935

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

From Beijing Received 20 hours 15 minutes 16.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

At present the number of our troops operating in Korea has increased from 18 (eighteen) divisions of 6 (six) armies to 30 (thirty) divisions of 9 (nine) armies. Moreover we have another 9 divisions of 3 armies in reserve. In connection with this, transport is faced with very large tasks. With regard to automobiles, we have already received agreement from the Government of the Soviet Union about delivery of 3,000 automobiles before December 15.

It is necessary that we urgently resolve the question of gasoline and lubricant. I ask you to confirm the delivery of gasoline and lubricant in the quantity indicated below:

1. New request: 10 thousand tons of gasoline, 2720 barrels (capacity of 53 gallons, the same as below) of lubricating oil for the air corps:

   - 1. New request: 10 thousand tons of gasoline
   - 2. I ask you to ship the following oils on your own account:
     - Diesel engines, transmission oil 220 barrels, brake oil 110 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 144 barrels.

2. I ask you to ship the following oils on the oil quota agreed upon in the request made by the Ministry of Trade of the Chinese People’s Republic to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR: gasoline 7000 tons, diesel lubricant 2380 barrels, transmission oil 190 barrels, brake oil 95 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 126 barrels.

3. The total quantity of various oils (1 and 2), which we must acquire from the Soviet Union: gasoline 17,000 tons, diesel lubricant 5100 barrels, transmission oil 410 barrels, brake oil 205 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 270 barrels.

I ask you to deliver the first half (50%) of the aforementioned gasoline and oil by the end of December, and the second half (50%) by 20 January 1951.

Will this be subject to regulations?

We await your answer.

With bolshevik greetings.

ZHOU ENLAI

No. 2917

14/16.11.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 117-118]
Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev
From Beijing Received 20 hours 45 minutes 17.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT
To Comrade Filippov [Stalin]

According to a report from Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient number of automobiles engaged in transport to the rear, enemy planes are inflicting losses on autotransport, and also it is not possible to ensure the supply of local human and material resources, food supply and winter clothing cannot be secured in time and the troops are experiencing hunger and cold.

A new operation will begin soon. Railroad bridges across the Yalu are subject to bombardment by enemy planes every day.

The river is beginning to freeze, and it is not possible to build submerged bridges and pontoons. Therefore until such time as the river is frozen, so that automobiles can cross the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days transport at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and ammunition. If we do not, it will have an influence on the next stage of the fulfillment of the operation.

In view of this, besides the mobilization of all automobiles in Manchuria that could be mobilized on the front, we can mobilize a maximum of 200 automobiles from Northern China and immediately send them to the front to relieve the difficult situation.

I earnestly ask you to give a command to the commander of the Soviet Army on the Liaodong peninsula about the transfer of 500 automobiles for our army. These 500 automobiles will be reimbursed on the account of the portion which you promised to send from 25.11 to 25.12, numbering 3,000 automobiles.

Can you satisfy my request? I await your swift reply.

With bolshevik greetings.
Zhou Enlai
No. 2933
17.11 10:00

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 122-123

41. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5708
BEIJING
To Comrade Zakharov
For Comrade Zhou Enlai

I received the telegram with the request for urgent delivery of 500 automobiles. Your request will be satisfied by us. In order to speed up the transfer of the automobiles to you, having in mind to give you new automobiles, orders have been given to our military command not to give you old automobiles from Port Arthur, but to send new automobiles to the Manchuria [railway] station and to transfer 140 automobiles to Chinese representatives on 20 November and 355 automobiles on 25-26 November.

We will speed up the shipment of the remaining automobiles and another 1,000 automobiles will arrive at the Manchurian station before 5 December.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
17 November 1950

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 124

42. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Shytov to Gromyko transmitting 16 November 1950 message from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600742/III
From CORRESPONDENT 13 Sent 17.11.50 Received 18.11 4:03-19:35
Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces USSR 18.11 4:20-19:50
By telegraph extremely urgent
To Comrade GROMYKO

I transmit a note I received from the Korean People’s Army who are being trained on the territory of the Soviet Union.

I hope that you, comrade STALIN, will assist us in the resolution of these questions.

With respect KIM IL SUNG

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 5, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 180-181

43. 20 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shytov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75835

To Comrade SHTYKOV for Comrade KIM IL SUNG

I have received your telegram about the preparation of pilot cadres after a delay which was the fault of the Soviet apparatus.

In the opinion of our military this question is more expediently resolved in the following manner:

1. To organize the preparation of 200-300 pilots from Korean students, in the flight school already existing in YANTSZY on the territory of MANCHURIA. An additional contingent of Soviet instructors will be given for this.

2. The preparation of pilots for two jet fighter regiments can be organized at one of our jet divisions of MIG-15’s located in MANCHURIA. After the preparation of the pilots, the appropriate number of MIG-15 planes will be delivered.
With regard to the preparation of pilots for one bomber regiment, it is more convenient to prepare them in the Korean school we have in the Far East Maritime Region. The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber regiment, will also be given.

3. We agree to accept an additional 120 men in the Korean pilot school that we have in the Far East Maritime Region, to train them as technicians and crew for attack planes.

4. It is better that the Korean pilots receive flight training in the place where they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in our Maritime Region.

If you agree with these proposals, corresponding orders will be given to our military command.

FYNSI [Stalin].
No. 4/7556
20 November 1950
Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182]

45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR
To transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!
I received your telegram No. 3153.
I thank you for the information about the state of affairs in China, in connection with the successful offensive of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea.
Your successes gladden not only me and my comrades in the leadership, but also all Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the soul you and your friends in the leadership, the People’s Liberation Army of China and the entire Chinese people in connection with these enormous successes in their struggle against the American troops.
I have no doubt that in the war against the up-to-date and well-armed American army the Chinese army will receive great experience in contemporary warfare and will turn itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in the struggle with the first-class-armed German army received experience in contemporary warfare and turned into an up-to-date well-equipped army.
I wish you further successes.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
1 December 1950

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 5]

46. 5 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing (with message for Zhou Enlai)

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P79/167 To Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko
December 1950
Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of Politburo CC
VKP(b)[Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]
Decision of 5 December 1950
167.- Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. 802.
To confirm the draft orders to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to Comrade Roshchin (attachment 2).

TOP SECRET
Attachment 1
to p.167(op) pr. PB No. 79

New York
To Vyshinsky
802. We are answering point by point.
Regarding point one. We agree with your proposal. However, you should not make the stipulations you proposed, that the Assembly has the right to review a question of aggression if the Security Council turns out not to be in a condition to fulfill its obligation regarding peace. Such a stipulation would mean that we recognize as having legal force the resolution of November 3, which the Soviet delegation declared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Charter.
Regarding point two. We agree with your proposal. As for the invitation to a representative of the Chinese People’s Republic to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly, do not introduce a proposal about the invitation before you receive from us an additional order, which we will give after the government of the PRC makes it clear whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.
Regarding point three. We agree with your proposal.
By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO

TOP SECRET
Attachment 2
to p.167(op) pr.PB No. 79

Peking
Soviet Ambassador
Urgently visit Zhou Enlai and communicate to him the following.
According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, the Americans will introduce into discussion at the [UN General] Assembly a question under the heading “The Intervention in Korea of the Central People’s Government of the Chinese People’s Republic.”
The Soviet delegation will express opposition to the inclusion of this question on the agenda. If it nonetheless is included, the Soviet Government needs to know the opin-
47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

COPYING PROHIBITED

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Cop. From Beijing No. 35379 6 hours 55 minutes 7/XII 1950

Special Nos. 2522, 2523

TOP PRIORITY

SPECIAL

On December 7 at 3:00 Beijing time Zhou Enlai invited me to his [office] and transmitted the following in the name of the Chinese government:

At Lake Success representatives from India, England, Sweden and the general secretary of the UN Trygve Lie have recently appealed several times to the representative of the Chinese people’s republic [General] Wu Xiu-quan asking under what conditions it is possible to end the military operations in Korea.

Their aspirations are to hold the position in Korea at the 38th parallel.

Not wishing to put ourselves in a disadvantageous position and having the goal of holding the initiative in our hands and also showing assertiveness on this question, the government of the Chinese people’s republic intends to give the following instruction to Wu Xiu-quan for answering the representatives of India, England, Sweden and Trygve Lie:

“Military operations in Korea will be ended under the following conditions:
1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. The withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan strait and from the territory of Taiwan.
3. The Korean question must be resolved by the Korean people themselves.
4. The participation of a representative of the Chinese people’s republic in the UN and the exclusion from the UN of a representative of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek].
5. Convening a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the four great powers for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.
6. If the five aforementioned conditions for the cessation of military operations are accepted, the five great powers can send their representatives to convene a conference for signing the conditions of an armistice.”

Zhou Enlai transmitted the enumerated conditions in written form.

Further, Zhou stated that before sending the present conditions for cessation of military operations in Korea, the Chinese government wishes that Wu Xiu-quan consult with the government of the USSR and asks the Soviet government to express its opinion on this question.

Zhou Enlai earnestly asked [me] to transmit to the Soviet government that the Chinese government wishes to receive an answer today.

I stated to Zhou Enlai that what was communicated by him; the report, the conditions for ceasefire in Korea and the request for an answer will be immediately brought before the government of the USSR.

7/XII.50 ROSHCCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6]

48. 7 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bol’sheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P79/189 Copies to Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko.

7 December 1950.

Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 7 December 1950.

189. Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. 825.

To confirm the proposed draft order to Comrade Vyshinsky.

SECRETARY CC to p.189(op) pr.PB No. 79

New York

To Vyshinsky

No. 825. Your proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea we consider incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans more and more often are advancing a proposal about a cessation of military operations in Korea, in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops.

The draft of the Soviet delegation should include the following:

1. The immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. The resolution of the Korean question must be left to the Korean people themselves.

The text of your preamble does not elicit objections.

By order of Instantsia [i.e., Stalin].

A. Gromyko

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 23-24 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 7-8]

49. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

COPYING PROHIBITED

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Cop. From Beijing No. 35379 7 hours 5 minutes 7/XII 1950

Special Nos. 2522, 2523

TOP PRIORITY

SPECIAL

To BEIJING To SOVIET AMBASSADOR SPECIAL FILE

MID USSR No. 23343

Tenth department Received 19 hours 10 minutes 7/XII 1950

Dispatched 20 hours 40 minutes 7/XII.1950

Special No. 1691,1692

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

To BEIJING To SOVIET AMBASSADOR

SPECIAL FILE

TOP PRIORITY

2522. Immediately visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the following:

“We completely agree with your conditions for a ceasefire in Korea. We consider that without the satisfaction of these condi-
tions military activity cannot be ceased. In addition, we consider that you should not be too open and show all your cards too early before the representatives of the three states, who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. We think that the time has not arrived for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could use China’s five conditions to box us on the ear by [making] a UN resolution. It is not necessary to give this advantage to the USA.

We therefore think that it is possible at the present time to limit oneself to the following:

1. The Chinese Central People’s Government along with you, gentlemen delegates of England, Sweden, India would welcome the soonest possible conclusion of the military actions in Korea. China is applying all its strength in order to conclude quickly the military activity forced on Korea and China.

2. Therefore, we would like to know the opinion of the UN and the USA with regard to conditions for an armistice. As far as we know, you have not been commissioned by the UN or the USA to discuss with anyone the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, the delegation from England together with the delegation from the USA, France, Norway, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced into the First Committee [of the General Assembly] of the UN a resolution condemning China, thereby hindering the matter of a settlement of the Korean question.

3. In view of this we will eagerly await the opinion of the UN and USA about the conditions for a cessation of military actions in Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].”
Telegraph the fulfillment.
GROMYKO.
7/XII-50
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197]

50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak II U to Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 0200 hours, 40 minutes 8.1.1951
EXTREMELY URGENT T. TO FILOPPOV [Stalin].
I send you a copy of the telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak II U, sent 24:004.1 [January 4].

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it:
“To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We are simultaneously sending a copy to the commanders of the corps and army Comrades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Zhzhou Biao, Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast.

1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry division and a unit of troops from the 117th infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of Siumsens was also taken on 3 January by units of our 66th army.

The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen and to areas further south.

It is supposed that the next attempt by enemy troops will be the defense of the river, which is beginning in the area of Chemul’po [Inchon], Kimpo, lokhei, and is going on along the south bank of the Kanko river, through Gensiu, Seikheisio to Korio.

It is possible that the enemy, regrouping behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko river and the mountainous areas, will gather the remnants of its forces, gain time and make preparations for new military operations.

Another possibility is that, in case of further more powerful strikes by our troops, the enemy will withdraw to the south.

2. If we give the enemy the possibility to continue to occupy defensive positions along the south bank of the river Kanko, to control the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at Chemul’po for supply, then although Seoul will be in our hands, it will be under constant threat from enemy air force and artillery, which will be extremely disadvantageous for preparing our troops for a spring offensive.

If, in the presence of success, our troops make one more effort and destroy another unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to retreat from the south bank of the Kanko river, then we not only will be able to take the Kimpo airport and control the port of Chemul’po, but this will create more advantageous conditions for the preparation of our troops for a spring offensive.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals the following plan has been worked out:

a) To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the People’s Army for garrison duty in the city of Seoul.

The main forces of the corps will be deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, Dzinsori, Mokudo.

After rest and regrouping, in three days they must prepare to make a forced crossing of the Kanko river and at the appropriate moment occupy the Kimpo airport, Chemul’po port and consolidate themselves there.

b) Troops of the left column as before are under the unified command of Khan’ Sian’-chu.

The 50th army will continue to advance in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kirudo and the area to the northwest of these points. It will send out immediately a strong detachment to control the bridge across the Kanko river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river). This detachment will find out what the situation is, make active preparations for a forced crossing of the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the south bank and continue to carry out the battle in cooperation with the main forces.

If the enemy continues to withdraw to the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing him, to occupy Suigen and to wait for further orders.

The line of delimitation between the 50th army and the 1st corps of the People’s Army runs through Kokusekiri, Riuzan, Kasaivairi. The line itself and the areas to the west of it belong to the 50th army, the areas to the east of this line belong to the 1st corps.

The 38th, 39th and 40th armies will put themselves in order, rest for three days (until 7.1 inclusive) and prepare for a forced crossing of the Khokukan-kö river above and below Seisen. They will first strike the enemy in the area of Iuokhei, after which they will develop an offensive along a line from the southeast to the northwest on the enemy positions in the area of Risen, Kosiu, Suifen, Eitokho.

A detailed plan is being worked out by Comrade Hun Xianchu.
c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Biao, and also the 3rd and 5th corps of the People’s Army under the unified command of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint forces plan established earlier, must destroy the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Odzio, and afterwards await further orders.  

All the aforementioned troops must send spies and outposts toward the enemy troops located in front of the frontline.  

When the troops of the right column begin a new offensive these units must be ready to render assistance.  Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, Pak Il U.  24:00 4.1.”  

With bolshevik greetings.  

MAO ZEDONG.  

No. 103  

7.1.51.  

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 88-90]  

51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Zakharov to Filippov (Stalin)  

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY  

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15451  

Copies: Stalin (2)  

From BEIJING Received 00 hours 50 minutes 13.1.51  

EXTREMELY URGENT  

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]  

I report - your ciphered telegram of 11.1 of this year to MAO ZEDONG was handed to ZHOU ENLAI at 23 hours local time 12.1. of this year.  

ZAKHAROV  

No. 207  

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 121]  

52. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry  

2. Kim insists on war, Stalin disagrees  

While Stalin tried to prevent a war in Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, demanding permission to liberate the South.  

On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow Kim II Sung said: “We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means.” The Soviet leader disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th parallel, and the possibility of American inter- 

vention.  

Stalin added that only if the adversary attacked Pyongyang could they try military reunification by launching a counterattack.  

“Then,” the Kremlin chief explained, “your move will be understood and supported by everyone.”  

In August and again in September 1949, North Korean leaders resumed pressure on Moscow, hoping to convince it that: a) peaceful reunification was totally impossible; b) the Korean people wanted liberation and would not understand if the chance for reunification was missed; c) Northern armed forces were superior to the Southern army; d) after 

continued on page 87
35. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)  

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY  
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15607  
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Vasilevsky, Men’shikov  
From BEIJING  Received 14 hours 45 minutes 16.1.1951  

EXTREMELY URGENT T  
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]  
1. I received your telegram of 4.1.51. I fully agree with all the arrangements contained in your telegram. I thank you and the Soviet Government for the assistance you are rendering to us.  
2. We have studied the draft agreement on military credit.  

We fully agree with the draft of this agreement, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd points of the third article, to which were introduced changes on the basis of your telegram of 4.1 of this year, about which we requested Comrade Zakharov to inform you.  

With regard to the signing of this agreement, Comrade Zhou Enlai will resolve this question together with Comrade Zakharov.  
3. You communicated in your telegram that in the first nine and a half months of 1950 the USSR has agreed, in accordance with the agreement on credit of 14.2.1950, to deliver to China military goods in the amount of 140 million rubles.  

Not long ago Comrade Wang Jia-xiang brought the requests of February and May for military goods that he received from the military-engineering administration of MVT to the general sum of 237,548,103.64 rubles, of which the request for February is 114,415,274.67 rubles and for May 123,132,828.97 rubles.  

Thus, the total value of the military goods delivered, contained in our telegram, is 97,500,000 rubles less than the value of the military goods in the February and May requests.  

Should it be considered that the military goods ordered in the requests have been sent only in part? Will this difference be covered in 1951? I ask you to communicate about this.  

4. That you have established the amounts of military credit for 1951 is very good. As soon as we sort out the first two requests we will make an application for military goods for 1951, with a careful calculation of the cost of this military hardware, so that the total sum will not exceed the amount of 400,000,000 rubles established by you, so that the Soviet government will not be burdened by the fulfillment of our military applications.  

5. I thank you for your decision about the delivery of railway equipment as a part of the military credit in accordance with the agreement on military credit, with a reduction of 25% of the cost of this equipment.  

6. We agree that 5,000 automobiles delivered to us in 1950 and 12,000 automobiles which will be delivered in 1951 should be paid through trade exchange. I hope that you will review my request and communicate an answer about the delivery ahead of time of the remaining 12,000 automobiles for satisfying the needs of the front.  

7. I ask you to communicate to us whether gasoline and aviation fuel, for military purposes, included in the application for military equipment sent after 19.10.1950, will be included in the military equipment stipulated by the agreement on military credit. Is the agreement on military equipment applicable to the aforementioned gasoline?  

With bolshevik greetings!  
MAO ZEDONG  
No. 262  
14.1.51  

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, delo 337, List 4-5]  

54. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 14 January 1951 message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung  

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY  
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15603  
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov  
From BEIJING  Received 14 hours 45 minutes 16.1.1951  

EXTREMELY URGENT T  
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin].  

I send you a copy of my telegram of 14 January 1951 to Comrade Peng Dehuai for transmission to Comrade Kim Il Sung.  

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it:  
“To Comrade Peng Dehuai. I ask that the contents of this telegram be transmitted to Comrade Kim Il Sung.  

The approximately 100,000 Korean recruits being trained in Northeast China must be incorporated into various corps of the People’s Army in the next 2-3 months, in the period of rest and reformation, so that the companies in all divisions of the People’s Army will be fully manned. There must be more than 100 men in each company and 10,000 - 15,000 men in each division.  

In the Korean army there are too many units of the division and brigade type. It is necessary that all personnel be consolidated into fifteen divisions (approximately) and Soviet arms be apportioned to them so that these Korean divisions, cooperating with the Chinese volunteers, provide major support to them during the spring offensive (April - May), with the goal of finally resolving the South Korean question.  

In the next two to three months the Chinese volunteers and the Korean troops must carry out serious and major work, in particular to replenish the troops with newly trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly trained soldiers imitate the experience of the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop armaments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store food and ammunition, to improve the work of transport and the rear service. Carrying out this work can secure the final victory.  

It is possible that the enemy command will have two variants for conducting subsequent military operations:  
1. Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. If this happens, it will be the result of our carrying out thorough preparations, because the enemy, having received information about the preparation work being carried out, will be convinced that our military forces have grown even greater, and therefore, fearing difficulty, he will withdraw from Korea.  

2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.  

If this happens, it is necessary for us to
carry out good preparation so that it will be possible to continue to fight. In the opposite case, we can repeat the mistakes allowed by the Korean troops in the period from June to September 1950.

But it is also possible that objective causes will force us to make a single operation in February, after which again to continue the respite and reformation for the purpose of completing the necessary preparation for the next operation. This also must be taken into account. However, if this does not happen, then conducting the last decisive operation after finishing the necessary preparation in two-three months, which was discussed above, will be necessary and practicable.

Chinese and Korean comrades must be patient and carry out the necessary preparation.

I ask you to communicate your opinion.

MAO ZEDONG.

With Bolshevik greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 260

15.1.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 1-3]

55. 27 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filipov (Stalin) conveying 19 January 1951 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao re meetings with Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 minutes 27.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you a copy of the telegram from Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January 1951.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it.

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG.

I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL SUNG’s in the evening on 16 January 1951 and returned on the evening of 18 January 1951.

I report about the results of our meeting:

1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his comrades think that it is not possible to pursue the retreating American and puppet [South Korea] troops with the forces of the Korean People’s Army alone. This would also take on an adventurist character.

They stated that the Politburo regards as correct the proposal made from my side about the necessity of conducting rest and reformation for two months in order to make a forward advance cautiously, without hurrying. Although Comrade PAK HON-YONG had his own opinion, after the second elucidation I made on 17 January, about the positive and negative sides of a risky forward advance without carrying out preparation and a cautious forward advance with advance preparation, he was satisfied.

The Soviet adviser also agreed that the next operation is decisive, therefore with the approval of the Politburo of the Korean Workers’ party, it will be conducted better.

2. The question of the defense of the sea coast.

Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade RAZUVAEV put forth the following opinions: 26 brigade will be based in TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24 brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in BUGTKHENG, 69 brigade in KORIO. These brigades will occupy by battalion, portions of the defense along the western and eastern sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 men, and moreover their combat capability is not high.

In addition to this, three newly organized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO. No decision was made about which units to leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL’PO. They also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volunteers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to leave one army, which will be located in TET-SUGEN.

1000 sea mines and 200,000 anti-tank and other mines have been received from the USSR. So far a decision was made to use 100,000 mines for defense of the sea coast and to place the sea mines in the most important ports. The task of defending the sea coast to the south of the SUJENG-SANSIOKU line was assigned to the forward units. Defense of the port RIUGANPO, which is located in the area of SINGISIU, they asked to assign to troops VO of northeast CHINA (one regiment is sufficient for this). In the main I agreed with the aforementioned plan for the defense of the sea coast.

I ask you to review.

3. The question of restaffing five corps.

It was decided that each corps must be composed of three divisions. At present, all five corps, with the exception of 1st corps, have 4-5 divisions. However, these divisions are not fully manned, there are 3,000-4,000-5,000 men. It is proposed that each corps fill out three divisions using the fourth division of the corps. In this way each division can be brought to an average of 7,000 men. I introduced a proposal to apportion 20,000 men per five armies from among the South Korean prisoners, but they did not agree with me.

With regard to my proposal to fill out the existing corps with the newly organized three corps, they did not agree with this. Although such a proposal was advanced by me, I considered it awkward to defend it further. They are planning the participation in the next operations of three of their corps.

4. A sufficient number of cadres were not prepared for carrying out work in the newly liberated regions.

SEOUL earlier had a population of 1,500,000 persons, at the present time it probably still has around 1,000,000 persons. There are great difficulties with food and fuel. No assistance is being given to refugees and the unemployed. There is only just enough food for the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Volunteer troops. In the regions to the west of KAIDZIO and to the south of SIARIN there are large gangs, which have even seized some locations. We agreed to send one regiment and four battalions from the People’s Army to destroy these gangs. In addition it was decided to send one division from the 39th corps to the region to the west of the RINSINKO river to assist. Thus, with the destruction of these gangs we will be able to receive several dozen tons of food.

Agreement in principle was obtained from our side in the discussion of such questions as: fortifying the areas under control; demoralization of the enemy—for example preparation for the spring planting in Northen KOREA; assistance to refugees; partial restoration of production in several factories; developing a political offensive in the areas temporarily occupied by the American and puppet [South Korean] troops; creation of armed detachments which will include
party and administrative workers and leaders of mass organizations which will penetrate the enemy’s rear, where under the cover of armed units of the detachment they will carry out organizational work in the locality; the combination of legal and illegal forms of struggle; striking a blow at the most reactionary elements; assistance to the progressive elements; attracting to their side the intermediate elements; and also all methods of carrying out these measures. However, in the future it will be clearer how to begin the organization of the implementation of these measures resolutely and with the correct placement of cadres.

PENG DEHUAI 12:00 19.1.51.”

With bolshevik greetings!

MAO ZEDONG
No. 449
26.1.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 37-40]

56. 29 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16052
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 18 hours 40 minutes 29.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T To FILIPPOV [Stalin]

At the present time the American troops are trying to attack the regions of the southern bank of the Kanko river adjacent to Seoul and Chemul’po [Inchon]. Such a situation has developed that our troops are deprived of the possibility of continuing rest and reformation and are forced immediately to begin preparation for the fourth operation. I send you my telegram of 28.1.51, addressed to Comrade PENG DEHUAI.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and communicate your opinion about whether this is advisable from the point of view of the international situation:

“Comrade PENG DEHUAI!

1. I received your telegram of 27.1.51, 24:00, and your order about preparation for conducting military operations sent to all armies.

2. Our troops must immediately conduct preparations for the fourth operation, with the goal of the destruction of 20,000 to 30,000 American and puppet [South Korean] troops and the occupation of the area to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary.

3. In the course of the preparation for this operation it is necessary to hold Chemul’po, the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river and the city of Seoul, and also to draw out the main enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region.

After the beginning of the operation the main forces of the North Korean and Chinese troops must break through the enemy’s line of defense in the region of Gensiu and make attacks in the direction toward Eisiu and Anto.

4. The withdrawal of Chinese and North Korean troops for 15-30 km to the north and the publication of a communication about support for the proposal about a temporary ceasefire is disadvantageous for us, since the enemy precisely wishes to cease military operations only at the time when our troops withdraw some distance to the north and in order that he (the enemy) can blockade the Kanko river.

5. After the conclusion of the fourth operation, it is possible that the enemy will conduct peace negotiations with us regarding a resolution of the Korean question. Conducting negotiations will then be advantageous for China and Korea. However, the enemy at present is calculating to return the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river, to the south of the line Seoul-Chemul’po and to blockade the Kanko river, so that Seoul would be under threat of shelling from enemy artillery, so as to thereby to force us to cease military operations and begin peace negotiations. In this way the enemy wants to place China and Korea in an disadvantageous position, which we can in no case allow.

6. Our troops have not been able to receive reinforcements. Transporting troops is also inadequate. We have a very great difficulty in this regard. However, we are in a position to concentrate the main forces and with a strike in the direction of Gensiu-Eisiu destroy a unit of American troops and four to five divisions of South Korean troops.

I ask you explain this to a meeting of the high command. This meeting must be completely directed to the preparation of the fourth operation.

7. After the Chinese and Korean troops occupy the region to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary, they must again make a two to three months long preparation, after which to accomplish the last, fifth, operation of decisive significance. This is advantageous in all respects.

8. The ninth army group must in the near future be redeployed to the region of Pyongyang, Seoul, Chemul’po, Suigen for rest and reformation. At the same time they must fulfill the task of defending the given region so as to give the possibility to enemy troops to land in Chemul’po an Tsinnampo. At the time of the fifth operation the given army group must participate in military operations on the western portions of the front.

9. At the time of implementing the fourth operation I ask you to think over the question of whether it will be better for the main forces of the Chinese and North Korean troops to divide into two echelons. Troops of each echelon must have a five day dry ration. Troops of the first echelon must make the breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the enemy to a determined border, and the troops of the second echelon must continue the pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation will continue for 10-12 days and that in this time it will be possible to destroy as many enemy troops as possible.

I ask you to communicate your opinion.

MAO ZEDONG, 28.1.51 19:00.”

No. 478.
28.1.51. MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 41-43]

57. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 633
BEIJING TO ZAKHAROV FOR COMRADE MAO ZEDONG

Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I received your telegram to PENG DEHUAI of 28 January. I agree with you. From the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that CHEMUL’PO and SEOUL not be seized by the enemy, so that the Chinese-Korean troops can make a serious rebuff to attacking enemy troops.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
No. 60/sh
30 January 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 44]

58. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100269
To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

Discuss the following telegram with Comrade Kim Il Sung and his closest friends and communicate their opinion.

1. It is possible to consider it incontestable that the present [North] Korean divisions are less battle capable than the old divisions in the summer of last year. This is explained by the fact that the Koreans had 10 divisions, well fitted out with officer corps and more or less satisfactorily trained. And now the Koreans have 28 divisions, of which 19 divisions are at the front and 9 are in Manchuria. It is clear that the Koreans are not in a position to supply such a large number of divisions with officer corps. According to our norms, each division, having, let’s say, 8,000 men must have at least 800 officers, not counting sergeants. I have in mind the genuine officers, capable of cementing a division, and not hastily commissioned officers. It is clear that the Koreans still don’t have such a number of officers. Therefore the present Korean officers are understrength, unstable and little capable of battle. The Koreans increased the number of divisions and forgot about quality, but quality plays the decisive role here.

2. It would be advisable in the given situation to have not more than 23 divisions in the Korean army, so that the officer corps of the reduced 5 divisions can be used to fill out the officer corps of the remaining weak divisions, and the rank and file to use as reinforcement. This will strengthen the divisions, lessen the expenses and make for a gain in arms. The same needs to be said regarding the four Korean infantry brigades which are in poorly combat readiness and which also can be used to fill out the divisions with officers and rank and file.

3. At this stage the organization of corps administration is inadvisable, since there are no, or almost no, commanders capable of leading the corps, but there are already army apparatuses. It would be better to organize the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions in each army, so that the army apparatus itself directly commands its divisions. In this case the Korean armed forces would have in its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the main command for assisting the most needy armies according to the course of the operation. With time, when the commanders mature, when there will be enough of them and when they learn to command joint divisions, then it will be possible to transfer to a corps system.

Of course, this reform should not be carried out now, but during a time of rest after conducting the operation.

Discuss these proposals and communicate your opinion.
30 Jan 1951
FYNSI [Stalin]
No. 4/854
Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shemenko

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 15-16]

59. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Razuvaev

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100319
To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

You did not understand my telegram of January 30 about the Korean divisions. This telegram is not a directive, but my proposal for discussion together with Korean comrades. I asked you to communicate to me the opinion of the Korean comrades and your own opinion. You answer me that my order will be fulfilled by you. You did not understand my telegram. Once again I ask you to familiarize KIM IL SUNG and his friends with my telegram and after my proposal is discussed, communicate to me the opinion of the Koreans.

FYNSI [Stalin]
3 February 1951
No. 81/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 20 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 198]

60. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si(Stalin) to Kim Il Sung via Razuvaev

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100320
To RAZUVAEV for KIM IL SUNG
To Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

We have insufficient lead not only for satisfying the needs of China and Korea, but also for our own needs. In view of this we have decided to send to Korea a group of Soviet specialists to assist the Korean organizations in working out measures for the restoration of mines, concentrating mills and lead factories for the purpose of increasing the production of lead. We would like also to organize the export of lead ore to the USSR, since it is not being processed now in Korea for [industrial] processing.

We hope that you will not be opposed to this.

We await your answer.
FYNSI [Stalin].
No. 83/sh.
3 February 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 20]

61. 4 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Razuvaev to Fyn-Si (Stalin) reporting message from Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 500361/sh
From Correspondent 20 Sent 4.2.51 14:35
Received 4.2. 15:10
Sent to the 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 4.2.15:25
To Comrade FYNSI [Stalin].
To No. 4/854 and No. 81/sh.

I report:

KIM IL SUNG and the Korean comrades discussed your telegram about the composition of forces of the Korean People’s Army and arrived at the following conclusion:

1. To raise the battle readiness of the troops and to improve their quality, it is necessary to lower the number of army administrations and the number of divisions.

2. To produce the decrease in army administrations and divisions by increasing the three army administrations from Manchuria.

To reduce: two army administrations; —four pd [infantry divisions]: 2nd army
- 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one pd by increasing 8th army

3. To temporarily keep naval brigades for the defense of bases and coastline.

To strengthen the naval brigades to significantly reduce VMU [“battle friction” that results from being understrength]; the sailor school and apparatus of naval command.

4. To carry out further reductions after the next operation, which will begin February 7-13, 1951.

5. To have the total number of army units and divisions be within the numerical limits that you recommended.

RAZUVAEV.

No. 375/sh
4.2.51
Copies: Stalin (2), Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Administration

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 25-26 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 199-200]

62. 16 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1078
Sent 22:03 16.2.51
Transmitted 22:55 16.2.51

BEIJING - To Comrade ZAKHAROV for MAO ZEDONG or ZHOU ENLAI

As is obvious, in the nearest future there will be major military operations in Korea by the Chinese and Korean liberation troops. It is apparent that you will need a large number of aviation both at the front and in the rear. In a previous telegram we accepted your proposal about shifting the base of Belov’s air force to Korea, in the rear of your troops, but with the condition that two Chinese fighter divisions be placed in the Andong region to cover this area. However, we see now that in view of the forthcoming major operations, you will need the largest possible aviation force at the front. We have therefore decided to send to Andong from the USSR an additional large fighter division so that the two Chinese fighter divisions which were designated for covering Andong would be sent to the front for use in operations at the front. We hope that you will not object.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 139/sh
15 March 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, List 118 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 202]

64. 29 May 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with message for Kim II Sung

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101255

PYONGYANG

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

Visit KIM IL SUNG and communicate to him that we have received their application for additional delivery of rifle-mortar arms that was sent through you. Communicate to Comrade KIM IL SUNG that we unfortunately cannot now fully satisfy this application, since he sent it almost in the middle of 1951, while arms were already allocated for the Peoples Democracies in February. At this time we can send to KOREA during the month of June: 25,000 carbines, 5,000 sub-machine guns, 1,200 light machine guns, 550 medium machine guns, 275 TShK machine guns, 500 antitank rifles, 700 82 mm mortars, and 125 120 mm mortars. Telegraph the fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 4/2761
29.V.51
Copies: Stalin (2)

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 29 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 28]

65. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3410
BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram of June 4, and also the two directives of Comrade Peng Dehuai.

I also think, as do you, that the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the Anglo-American troops.

In my telegram I wrote mainly about the fact that it is risky to conduct maneuvers if there are no strong defensive fortifications in the rear, to which the main forces could be quickly withdrawn. Comrade Peng Dehuai writes that he is creating three defensive lines in the rear. If this is done and the defensive lines are truly serious, then the affair will proceed in a better way and the troops will not fall into encirclement.

You complain that you have little artillery, antitank guns and other arms. I communicated to you two months ago that the Poles have retracted their orders and we therefore could make for you additional deliveries of arms in this year, thus increasing the volume of military credit for 1951. Comrade Zhou Enlai welcomed this report of mine and told us that you will soon send new applications. However, there are no new applications from you. Why is this? How is this explained? Again I communicate to you that we could make new deliveries of artillery for you if you want this.

Comrade Peng Dehuai is right that it is necessary to strengthen the operations of partisan detachments in the enemy’s rear. This is absolutely necessary.

Comrade Peng Dehuai writes about the presence of a relatively high fighting spirit among the Anglo-American troops, and about
the fact that “serious rightist moods” have appeared among the Chinese troops. In my opinion this is explained by the fact that your local maneuvers with some forward advance but then a falling back, repeated several times, create among your troops the impression of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, but create among the Anglo-American troops the impression of their might. I fear that this situation can undermine the spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will not be possible to crush these unhealthy moods unless you prepare and carry out a serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of three to four enemy divisions. This would lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Anglo-American troops. This, of course, will not be broad and far from being an offensive, will be only a serious short blow against the enemy, but this will be the kind of blow that will sober up the enemy and raise the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. Moreover this would give you the possibility of undertaking then wider and more successful local maneuvers needed to exhaust the enemy.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
No. 297/sh
5 June 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 17-18]

66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448
Copies: Stalin (2)
From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951 SERIES G T.
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

In the course of conducting the war in KOREA we have run into such serious questions as the financial question, the question of the conduct of military operations directly at the front, the question of the danger of a possible enemy landing on the sea coast in our rear.

We intend to send Comrade GAO GANG to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to inform you regarding the aforementioned questions and to ask your directions in the matter of the resolution of these important questions.

At the present time Comrade KIM IL SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of these questions with you.

I ask you to communicate your opinion about the possibility of this trip.

MAO ZEDONG
No. 2787
5.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 23]

67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY
for Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram about the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG and to discuss with them the questions indicated in your telegram.

On 8 June in the morning we will send a plane from Moscow to Peking to transport Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing on 9 June.

We ask you to give an order to your authorities about the unimpeded flight of the plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 303/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33]

68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meeting in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557
BEIJING, TO ROSHCCHIN

Deliver immediately to the addressee.

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Today there was a conversation with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea [Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three questions were raised:

First—about an armistice. We recognized that an armistice is now advantageous.

Second—about military advisers. If they are very necessary to you, then we are ready to satisfy you.

Third—about the delivery of arms for sixteen divisions. There will not be objections from our side.

I won’t write about the details, since your representatives will report to you about them.

We consider it absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. We think that besides two or three aviation divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the front from central and southern China five or six divisions of MIG-9’s, which operate very effectively against bombers. Eight fighter
divisions on your front could fully satisfy the needs of the front. According to our information your pilots are already ready to fly. It is necessary to put them into battle more quickly, so that they will be not paper pilots, but battle pilots. We trained our pilots for action at the front in five months. Seven to eight months of training is fully sufficient for the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be the main question now for your front.

After the end of the conversation we received information that the Anglo-Americans intend to appeal soon to you and to the Koreans in the name of the sixteen nations fighting against Korea with a proposal about an armistice. But before making this proposal they want to strike a blow against our troops. It is possible that these are merely rumors, but it is fully possible and probable that these are not merely rumors, but corresponds to reality. We therefore advise you to hold tight the line of defense and not allow the enemy to advance.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

For Roshchin.

We ask you to familiarize Krasovsky with this telegram. We are sending him a special directive.

FILIPPOV

No. 302/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 31-32 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 31-32]

70. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20772

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 19:55

13 June 1951

Series “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

To my [telegram] No. 2967 (vkh. No. 20757),

13.6.51 at 22:00 Beijing time I received the following telegram addressed to you from MAO ZEDONG.

“To Comrade FILIPPOV.

I received your telegram of 13 June. Today I received a telegram from Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. I communicated our opinion on the question of an armistice to Comrade GAO GANG in order for him to relay it to you and receive instructions from you. I won’t write about it in detail here.

Comrade PENG DEHUAI very much needs Soviet advisers on strategy and tactics. It would be desirable if you could send them as soon as possible.

With regard to the participation of eight fighter divisions in battles, in accordance with your advice, I gave an order to the General Staff to draw up a plan. In addition, I gave an order to Comrade PENG DEHUAI that our troops firmly hold the line of defense at the second and third defensive lines and create a new defensive line.

The position at the front in June will be such that our forces will be comparatively weaker than those of the enemy. In July we will be stronger than in June and in August we will be even stronger. We will be ready in August to make a stronger blow to the enemy.

MAO ZEDONG

13.6.51

ROSHCHIN

No. 2974

13.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 55-56; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, List 34]


To Comrade Stalin, I.V.

We have received a reply telegram from Comrade Mao Zedong. We ask you to receive it and if time allows also to receive us today. We very much ask you to show us such a high honor. Then we will have the possibility to depart tomorrow to resolve all the questions in accordance with your instructions.

With communist greetings!

Gao Gang

Kim Il Sung

14 June 1951

[attached handwritten letter].

“To Comrades Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung:

I received your telegram of 13 June.

Concerning how to raise the question of negotiations about an armistice, we consider it inadvisable for Korea and China themselves to advance this question today, since the Korean army and Chinese volunteer troops must occupy a defensive position for the next two months.

It is better to act in this way:

1. To wait for the enemy to make an appeal.

2. It is hoped that, on the basis of the statement of [State Department official on-leave George F.] Kennan, the Soviet government would make an inquiry to the American government about an armistice.

It is possible to bring this about in two ways simultaneously, which are that from one side the Soviet government makes an inquiry, and from the other—if the enemy puts forth the question of an armistice, then Korea and China will express their agreement to this. We ask you to share opinions about which is more advisable and decide with Comrade Filippov.

3. Conditions for the armistice: restoration of the border at the 38th parallel; to apportion from both North Korea and South Korea an insignificant strip [to serve] as a neutral zone. A proposal that the neutral zone come only from the territory of North Korea will by no means be accepted. North and South Korea [should not] interfere with one another.

As concerns the question of the entrance of China into the UN, we consider that it is possible not to raise this question as a condition, since China can refer to the fact that the UN has in fact become an instrument of aggression, and therefore China does not at the present time attach a special significance to the question of entrance into the UN.

You must think about whether it is worth raising the question of Taiwan as a condition. In order to bargain with them, we consider that this question should be raised.

If America firmly insists that the question of Taiwan be resolved separately, then we will make a corresponding concession.

In the interests of the cause of peace we will resolve first of all the question of Korea. I ask you to appeal to Comrade Filippov and to receive orders from him.

4. We have ordered Deng Hua and the commander of the armies of the 13th army group immediately to return to the front and to hold firmly the present line of the front. In June and July preparations will be carried out intensively. In August we will carry out a larger operation. If the enemy does not make a large-scale amphibious landing in our rear, then our goal can be achieved. If the enemy
does not send new reinforcements to Korea and does not make an amphibious landing, then in August we will be significantly stronger than now.

5. Right now we are planning the transfer of our aviation units to the front.

Mao Zedong
13.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37]

72. 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21039

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING  Received 21:15
21.6.1951

SERIES “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

1. Comrade Gao Gang has returned and transmitted your opinion on various questions.

I consider that they are all correct and we must do precisely thus.

As regards the question of planting rubber trees, we intend immediately to start the planning.

I hope that the Soviet government will send its representatives to assist us in formulating plans.

2. Our troops’ eight months of experience in conducting war in Korea has clearly shown the great difference in the equipment of our troops and the troops of the enemy and the extreme necessity of improving the equipment of our troops. This is why we commissioned Comrade Gao Gang to appeal to you with a request about delivery to us of arms for sixteen divisions, to which you agreed. This is the minimal requirement of our troops in Korea for the present year.

Upon his return Gao Gang said that you consider our requirements in arms for each division insufficient and proposed to strengthen each division with tanks and artillery.

I consider this completely correct. This is necessary in war against imperialists.

I already sent a telegram to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian [with instructions] to conduct the negotiations fully in accordance with your opinion.

3. According a telegram received from Comrade Siu Sian-tsian after his preliminary negotiations with representatives of the Soviet General Staff, of the total quantity of arms for sixty divisions according to the calculation of the Soviet General Staff, arms for only sixteen divisions will be delivered this year (including for three Korean [divisions]), and arms for the remaining forty-four divisions will be delivered in 1952-1953. This is in contradiction to the needs and time frame of the Korean theater of military operations.

4. For the goal of satisfying the urgent needs of the Korean theater of military operations, I ask you to study the applications transmitted by Comrade Gao Gang to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian, and explore the possibility of fulfilling all deliveries of rifles, artillery, tanks, airplanes, automobiles, spare parts for automobiles and GSM, medicines and other military equipment, at 1/6 [of the total] monthly, from July to the end of the year, so that the various military units in the Korean theater of military operations receive replenishment according to the presently existing organizational structure, what is advantageous for the conduct of military operations.

5. With the availability this year of deliveries of arms according to our applications, the missing quantity of arms needed for units in accordance with the new organizational structure proposed by the Soviet General Staff can be delivered in the next year. Simultaneously with this, in accordance with the delivery of arms, we will reorganize the selections for this division and in that way gradually convert the sixteen divisions to the new organization.

6. We have delayed our applications for three months and have thus brought great harm to ourselves. Today we suddenly have appealed to you with such large numbers and want all this to be delivered in six months. This places before you great difficulties, especially in the area of transport. I do not know if this can be done. I ask you to do as much as is possible.

Mao ZEDONG
No. 3107  21.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 64-65]

73. 24 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - Comrade KRASOVSKY

For Comrade MAO ZEDONG

We received your telegram of June 21:

1. You must already know from [Soviet ambassador to the UN Jacob] Malik’s speech that our promise about raising the question of an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. It is possible that the matter of an armistice will move forward.

2. As concerns arms for 60 divisions then I must say to you directly that to fulfill this application in the course of a single year is physically impossible and altogether unthinkable. Our production and military specialists consider it completely impossible to give arms for more than 10 divisions in the course of 1951. The fulfillment of the application for 60 divisions is possible, and at that with great difficulty, only in the course of 1951, ’52, ’53 and the first half of ’54, i.e. in the course of three years. Such is the final opinion of our production and military specialists. I have tried in every way to shorten these periods even if by a half year, but unfortunately upon examination it has turned out that this is impossible.

I will communicate about all this in more detail in a separate telegram and also about the staff-organizational structure of the present Chinese divisions.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
24 June 1951
No. 635177

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 38]

74. 26 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing relaying telegram from Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - TO KRASOVSKY

We have received the following telegram from Mao Zedong:

“The government of the Chinese People’s Republic intends to send fighter divisions armed with MIG-15s to Korea for participation in the military actions, which will be much better than sending divisions armed with MIG-9 planes. It is therefore necessary in the course of one and a half to two months to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th
fighter divisions, which are armed with MIG-9s, on MIG-15s, with a calculation of sending them to the front in September 1951. The government of the Chinese People’s Republic asks you to give an order to the Soviet comrades in China to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter divisions on MIG-15s in the indicated periods.” As is obvious, Mao Zedong does not want to take MIG-9s from the Chinese airports for transfer to the front, but prefers to leave them in place, and to use at the front only MIG-15 divisions. Speak with Mao Zedong, and if our supposition is confirmed, tell him that your people will begin the retraining of Chinese pilots now flying MIG-9s for flights on MIG-15s. It seems to us that this does not require two months, but if the Chinese insist, then train them in the course of two months. Report the fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
26 June 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 81 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 39]

75. 26 June 1951, letter, Kim Il Sung to Stalin

Moscow, Kremlin
TO COMRADE STALIN, I.V.
I am happy to inform you that despite the complicated military situation, our Korean organizations were able to secure the fulfillment of the plan for sending to the Soviet Union lead, lead ore and lead concentrate.

As of 24 June of this year, in connection with the plan for delivery of 7,000 tons, 8,379 tons were delivered, of which 7,239 tons were transferred to Chinese territory.

By the same date we delivered 10,714 tons of lead concentrate and 10,714 tons of enriched lead ore, of which 9,749 tons were transferred to Chinese territory.

The government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic will also in the future devote maximum attention to the matter of securing and increasing the delivery to the Soviet Union of materials of lead content.

KIM IL SUNG
26 June 1951.
Pyongyang.
This copy was received July 30, 1951 by diplomatic post from Pyongyang and sent to A.N. Poskrebyshev by A. Gromyko.

Gromyko notes that the text of the letter was transmitted by Soviet ambassador Razuvaev by telegraph, using the telegraph line of the Ministry of War USSR.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 34-36]

76. 28 June 1951, ciphers telegram, Krasovsky to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21266 Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 11:12 28.6.1951 SERIES “G”
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
I report:
A meeting took place 27.6.51 at 19 hours 30 minutes Beijing time.
In the conversation Comrade Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter aviation divisions, which have been trained on MIG-9s, must retrain on MIG-15s before being sent to the front. The period of retraining was established as one and a half to two months, so that these divisions could take part in the forthcoming operations in Korea.

To the question I raised about the construction of three additional airbases for the deployment of Chinese divisions, Comrade Mao Zedong answered that Nie Rongzhen, in the name of the Prime Minister sent a telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung with a request to select a place to the south of Pyongyang and as soon as possible build three airbases there for jet planes.

The commander of the VVS [Air Force] of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] of China Liu Yalou, who was present at the conversation, stated that they have in mind using the MIG-9s in the future in schools and in the PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] system of the country.

An order was given by me to the commands of the 17th, 144th and 328th fighter aviation divisions immediately to begin retraining the 6th, 12th and 14th Chinese fighter aviation divisions on MIG-15 planes, according to the confirmed program.

KRASOVSKY
28.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 85-86 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 40-41]

77. 30 June 1951, ciphers telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21336 Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 11:30 30.6.1951 SERIES “G” T
To Comrade Filippov (Stalin)
A telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung.
“Comrade Mao Zedong!
Malik’s speech on the radio on June 23 of this year aroused interest among the Americans in the question of the cessation of military actions in Korea. In the United Press report from Washington on June 28 it says: “Among American generals and senior officers the hope for a cessation of military actions in Korea grows with every day. [U.S. Commander Matthew] Ridgway constantly maintains contact with the chief of the American General Staff on the question of the possibility of a cessation of military actions.

From the reports being circulated it is known that as soon as Ridgway receives an order from the Ministry of National Defense of the USA, he will enter negotiations with the commander of the North Korean troops. A report about this will be made by the staff of UN troops.

How should we relate to this? How should we answer, if Ridgway wants to conduct negotiations.

I ask you urgently to communicate your concrete opinion on this question.

Kim Il Sung 29.6.51”
Mao Zedong
No. 3261
30.6

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 92 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 11]

78. 30 June 1951, ciphers telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 11:20 30.6.1951

SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
1. I have received your two telegrams (of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with your opinion.
   a) As regards the time periods for the delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions, we should act only on the basis of the productive and transport possibilities of the Soviet Union, that is [we should] complete the deliveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the course of three years, and in 1951 complete the deliveries for ten divisions.
   b) The staff-organizational structure you have proposed for the present Chinese infantry divisions is very good. We are implementing it. With sixteen divisions armed in accordance with this staff-organizational structure, the Chinese army will be far stronger than at present.

2. Malik’s statement secured us the initiative in the matter of conducting peace negotiations. On 28.6.51 I received through Comrade Roshchin the main positions of the contents of the conversation of Comrade Gromyko with the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, [Alan] Kirk. At the end of the text is stated: “Only two representatives must participate from each side. Moreover these representatives must be from the command of the corresponding military units, and not representatives of the governments.

Thus, from the Chinese side a representative of the volunteer troops must participate and not a representative of China, as a warring state.” I consider this completely correct.

I have received a telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung in which he asks how he should answer if Ridgway calls for negotiations to begin.

I have already communicated to Comrade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai that on the one hand we must carefully watch the military situation so as not to give the enemy the possibility of using this moment to his advantage, and on the other hand Comrade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai must discuss this question and be prepared, in case of a demand by the enemy to begin negotiations, to send corresponding representatives to conduct negotiations.

As regards how to answer Ridgway, after receiving a demand from Ridgway, the contents should be discussed and an answer formulated. What is your opinion on this question?

If negotiations begin, it is extremely necessary that you personally lead them, so that we do not find ourselves in a disadvantageous position.

I send you for familiarization the telegram of Comrade Kim Il Sung.

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3260
30.6

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 90-91]

79. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin); note: no photocopy available—text copied by hand and therefore exact heading not presented

The commander of the troops of the enemy, Ridgway, today made a statement with a proposal that representatives of both warring sides meet on a Danish ship in the port of Genzan for a meeting about the cessation of military activities. Simultaneously with this he stated that a corresponding guarantee is required, and only in this case can military actions be ceased.

I report to you my opinion on the given question.

I ask you to study [it] and give an answer, and I also ask you to communicate it immediately to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

1. Comrade Kim Il Sung presumably must give an answer to Ridgway on the 2nd or 3rd of July. In this answer he must express his agreement to representatives of both sides conducting negotiations about a cessation of military operations, and to propose a time, place and number of participants for the meeting.

2. As concerns the place for holding the negotiations, Ridgway suggests the port of Genzan.

Considering that Genzan is a fortified sea base of North Korea and the enemy intends to make a landing there, it seems to me disadvantageous to agree to hold negotiations in Genzan. Is it impossible to propose for the conduct of negotiations the town of Kaidzio, a point on the 38th parallel?

3. For the goal of securing for our representatives time for full preparation for the meeting it seems to me advantageous to name July 15 as the opening day of the meeting.

4. In light of the compressed period of time and the great importance of the given meeting I ask you to immediately communicate with comrade Kim Il Sung, personally to lead this meeting and simultaneously to inform me.

Mao Zedong.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 93-94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 12-13]

80. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3917
BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY
For Comrade MAO ZEDONG
Your telegrams about an armistice have been received.

In our opinion it is necessary immediately to answer Ridgway over the radio with agreement to meet with his representatives for negotiations about an armistice. This communication must be signed by the Command of the Korean People’s Army and the command of the Chinese volunteer units, consequently by Comrade KIM IL SUNG and Comrade PENG DEHUAI. If there is no signature of the commander of the Chinese volunteer units, then the Americans will not attach any significance to only one Korean signature. It is necessary decisive to refuse the Danish hospital ship in the area of Genzan as a place of meeting. It is necessary to demand that the meeting take place at the 38th parallel in the region of Kaesong. Keep in mind that at the present time you are the bosses of the affair of an armistice and the Americans will be forced to make concessions on the question of a place for the meeting.

Send to Ridgway today an answer roughly like this:

“To the commander of UN troops General RIDGWAY. Your statement of 28 June regarding an armistice has been received. We are authorized to declare to you that we agree to a meeting with your representatives for negotiations about a cessation of military actions and the establishment of an armistice. We propose as a meeting place the 38th
parallel in the area of the city of Kaesong. If you agree, our representatives will be prepared to meet with your representatives July 10-15.

Commander in Chief of the Korean People’s Army

KIM IL SUNG

Commander in Chief of the Chinese Volunteer Units

PENG DEHUAI

Date.”

In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him].

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

30 June 1951
No. 335/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 95-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 14-15]

81. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Razuvaev to S.M. Shtemenko reporting message from Kim Il Sung to Filippov (Stalin)

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From Correspondent 20 Sent 1.7.51 5:30
Received 1.7.51 7:16
Dispatched to 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 1.7.51 7:25
By telegram
Extremely urgent
To Comrade SHTEMENKO S.M.
I report:
1. The text of an answer of KIM IL SUNG to a meeting on negotiations was given by me according to the line of MID. It is proposed to give an answer 2-3.7.51.
2. Agreement of MOSCOW is urgently needed.
3. The composition of the delegation from the Korean People’s Democratic Republic is proposed to be three persons—the chief of staff of the Korean People’s Army NAM IL, the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs PAK DENCHO and [one] from the Chinese volunteers.
4. It is proposed that NAM IL declare the following points:
   a) Time of ceasefire and cessation of military operations;
   b) Withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel to the north and south for 5-10 km;
   c) Crossing the 38th parallel by land or air is prohibited from the moment of the ceasefire;
   d) Withdrawal of naval forces from the territorial waters of NORTH KOREA and removal of the blockade;
   e) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from NORTH KOREA within a two month period;
   f) Carrying out an exchange of prisoners of war and return of civilian population.
   Comrade KIM IL SUNG awaits corresponding advice of Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin].
   I ask your orders.

RAZUVAEV
No. 1751
1 July 1951
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Department

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 3-4]

82. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvae with message for Kim Il Sung

8TH ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101529
To Comrade RAZUVAEV.
We received your telegram of July 1, No. 1751.
I transmit to KIM IL SUNG that the Korean government must come to an agreement on the questions raised in the telegram with the Chinese government and together work out the proposals.
From the telegram received it is not apparent that the proposals of KIM IL SUNG have been agreed to by MAO ZEDONG.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].
No. 4/3208
2 July 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 5]

83. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 30 June 1951 message from Kim Il Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21404
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 12:10 3.7.1951
SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Telegram of Comrade KIM IL SUNG.
“Comrade MAO ZEDONG!
I propose to create our delegation with a composition of three persons: chief of general staff of the People’s Army of Korea NAM IL (head of the delegation), deputy minister of foreign affairs PAK DON CHO and one representative from the volunteer troops.
During the meeting of representatives of both sides we propose to advance the following points:
1. Beginning from a certain day and hour (according to Pyongyang time) both sides must cease fire and all other military operations.
2. Beginning from a certain day the troops of both sides must within three days withdraw from the 38th parallel for a distance of 10 km and create a buffer zone in that region.
3. Both sides must cease the transfer of land, naval and air forces across the 38th parallel.
4. Withdraw all foreign ships from the territorial waters of North Korea and liquidate the blockade of the sea coast north of the 38th parallel.
5. In the course of two months from the day of the ceasefire all foreign land, naval and air forces will withdraw from Korea.
6. In the course of two months from the day of the ceasefire an exchange of prisoners will be conducted.
7. The civilian population forcefully taken by the American and Rhee Syngmann troops from regions north of the 38th parallel must be returned.
I ask you urgently to give an answer after familiarizing yourself with the telegram.

KIM IL SUNG 30.6.1951.”

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3304
3.7.51
3.7.1951
From BEIJING Received 13:55
Copies: Stalin (2)
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21405
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
84. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao
Listy 6-7

Series “G” T
To Comrade Filippov [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!
During the meeting of military representa-
tives of both sides we intend to advance
the following 5 main points:

1. “Both sides must simultaneously is-
 issue an order for a ceasefire. Land, sea and air
forces of both sides, after the issuing of the
order on a ceasefire, must within all the
borders of Korea cease fire and halt all other
hostile actions.”

This point will possibly be accepted by
the enemy without qualifications.

2. “Land, sea and air forces of both sides
 must withdraw from the 38th parallel for a
distance of 10 English miles and create a
buffer zone in the region 10 English miles
to the south and to the north of the 38th parallel.
The civil administration of the buffer zone
must be as it was before 25.6.1950, in other
words to the north of the 38th parallel under
the jurisdiction of the Korean People’s gov-
ernment and to the south of the 38th parallel
under the jurisdiction of the South-Korean
government.”

It is possible that there will be some
divergences [from this proposal] among the
enemy but we consider that our proposal is
extremely just and it will be difficult for the
enemy to refute it.

3. “Both sides must cease the transport
of arms, troops and reinforcements (includ-
ing land, sea and air transport) into Korea
from outside the country and also the afore-
mentioned transports to the front line on the
territory of Korea.”

We think that the enemy for his part will
also advance a proposal on this question, and
we therefore intend to take the initiative in
this. But perhaps it is better to leave off the
last part of our proposal?

4. “To create a control committee of
neutral states which would supervise the
fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this
committee there must be an equal number of
representatives of neutral states that have not
taken part in the Korean war and that have
been selected by both sides.”

We think that the enemy also will ad-
 vance an analogous proposal, therefore we
intend to show initiative in this. However,
there will be numerous difficulties in the
fulfillment of this point.

“Members” of the control committee
proposed by the enemy will monitor our
military transport on the Chinese-Korean
border and at important communications
points in Korea. Or should we not take the
initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to
advance his proposal, after which we will
accept it?

I ask you to communicate your opinion
about how to proceed expeditiously. To com-
pletely refuse to create a control committee
seems also inadvisable.

5. “Both sides must carry out repatria-
tion of prisoners of war. In the course of four
months after the cessation of military opera-
tions to conduct a full mutual exchange of
them, in separate batches.”

The enemy will possibly propose to
conduct a one for one exchange. We must
demand repatriation of all prisoners of war.
However, the enemy has taken prisoner a
relatively larger number of North Koreans,
who have already been included in the ranks
of the South Korean troops, and therefore
this situation will possibly elicit an argu-
ment.

In our opinion the 5 basic points indi-
cated above must be accepted at the meet-
ing of military representatives of both sides.

In addition there are some other points:
1. “All foreign troops including Chinese
volunteer troops must completely leave North
and South Korea within a specified period of
time (for example within three-four months),
in separate batches.

This is also a very important point. How-
ever, the representatives of the enemy possi-
ibly will think that this question belongs among
political questions and should not be re-
solved at this meeting.

I ask you to study and communicate
whether our side should advance this point.

2. “Within a specified period of time
(for example in several months) refugees of
North and South Korea must be returned to
the areas where they lived previously.”

Comrade KIM IL SUNG insists on ad-
vancing this point. However, to bring this
about is very difficult. It is apparent that with
regard to this question many differences of
opinion and many arguments will arise be-
tween the representatives of North and South
Korea, which can have an influence on the
resolution of other important questions.

Or is it possible to advance this pro-
sal?

If it leads to arguments and is not re-
solved, then transfer it for discussion at an
international conference of a political char-
acter.

I ask you to communicate your opinion
on the points indicated above. Furthermore,
yesterday we sent Deputy Minister of For-

gien Affairs Comrade Li Kenong and his
assistant to Korea. He will arrive approxi-
mately on 5.7.1951 and will discuss with
Comrade KIM IL SUNG and other comrades
various questions concerning the peace nego-
tiations.

After this he will go to the area of
Kaesong, whence he will secretly lead the
negotiations.

I am also sending you the telegram which
lays out the opinion of Comrade KIM IL
SUNG on this question.

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3305
3.7.51

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339,
Listy 8-10

85. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov
(Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3950
BEIJING, TO KRASOVSKY.

For Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

“Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram of 3 July.
With regard to the first two points of your
proposal, we have no objections. It is pos-
sible to delete the second part of the third
point, but if the Americans advance such a
proposal, it can be accepted. The fourth
point should not be advanced. But if the
Americans advance a proposal about a con-
trol commission from the UN, then this pro-
sal should be rejected, with reference to
the fact that the UN occupies the position of
a warring side, but you should then advance
your proposal about a commission of repre-
sentatives of neutral states named with the
agreement of the sides. The fifth point should be proposed and you should insist on it.

As concerns your remaining two points (about the withdrawal of all foreign troops and about refugees), both of these proposals should be advanced and should be insisted on.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].

No. 340/III

3 July."

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 11]

86. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 2 July 1951 telegram from Mao to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21412
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 13:50 3.7.1951

SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade Filippov!

I send you the text of my telegram to Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG.

“Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG!

The period of preparations for and conduct of negotiations with representatives of the enemy will occupy approximately 10-14 days. I ask you with all seriousness to fulfill the following points:

1. In the course of the 10 days that we have, to make every effort to increase the personnel of the front line units and especially to replenish them with arms and ammunition.

I ask Comrade GAO GANG to transfer from the rear to North Korea in no more than 10 days the personnel, arms and ammunition marked for transfer. It is necessary to be prepared for the fact that after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations it will be impossible to transfer the aforementioned personnel and armaments.

2. To heighten vigilance up to the limit. Units of the first line must be prepared to repulse a possible large-scale attack by the enemy and intensive bombing of our rear either before or during the negotiations, which the enemy may undertake in order to force us to sign a disadvantageous agreement.

If the enemy begins a large-scale attack, our troops must go over to the counterattack and defeat the enemy.

3. It is necessary to issue an order to second corps Yang Chengan and to the 50th corps to depart quickly for the indicated regions so that the enemy cannot make use of the opportunity to make a landing in Genzan. Our 38th, 39th and 42nd corps must be ready to repulse possible landings by the enemy on the western coast.

4. I ask you to think about what could occur after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations and be prepared for everything that needs to be done.

MAO ZEDONG 2.7.51.”

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3308 3.7.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 14-15]

87. 13 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 12 August 1951 telegram from Li Kenong to Mao re armistice talks

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 22834
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin
From BEIJING Received 17:20 13.8.1951

SERIES “G” T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

I send you for familiarization the telegram received from Comrade Li Kenong on 12 August 4:00.

“To Comrade Mao Zedong.

1. I received your telegram of 11 August 7:00.

2. At the evening meeting the mistaken views of the enemy became even more intensified. The enemy considers that it is possible through pressure to force us to abandon discussion of the question of the 38th parallel. He has already four times expressed his wish to discuss a proposal about a military demarcation line and a buffer zone on the basis of the present line of the front and the present military situation.

We consider that the goal of this is to avoid defeat in the area of propaganda but also secretly to show that he can alter his proposal. Taking this into account, in our statement in today’s meeting we pursued the goal of striking a blow against his unfounded theory of refusal to discuss the question of the 38th parallel, and also tried to ascertain if he intended to abandon his unfounded proposal.

At today’s meeting the enemy displayed some interest in the portion of our statement where we tried to ascertain his intention. However, in his statement in the second half of the day the representative of the enemy expressed a strong [sense of] injustice and tried to lay on us the responsibility for the impasse that has been created in the negotiations.

Our statement for tomorrow will be constructed on the basis of your instructions. The goal of the statement will be to smash this [claim of] injustice of the enemy, to unmask his capacity for deception and simultaneously to advance such questions as to force the enemy more clearly to express his position.

The main goal of the statement is once again to underscore that if the enemy does not renounce his unfounded proposal, there will be no progress in the work of the conference. We consider that we can also express our wish to change the proposal about the buffer zone in the area of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line only in such case as the enemy clearly gives us to understand that he abandons his earlier proposal.

3. After the resumption of the work of the conference, the mistaken views of the enemy have become even more intensified and the enemy has become even more convinced that we yearn for peace, and therefore it is possible to get concessions from us. All this was possible to foresee.

However, from the entire course of the conference and the general situation outside the conference it is apparent that it is not possible to force the enemy to accept the proposal about the 38th parallel. In the course of several days the enemy on the one hand will put pressure on us and try to force us to be the first to make a concession, and on the other hand will prepare for a possible breakdown in the conference.

Therefore we consider it necessary to work out a definite resolution with regard to...
We urgently ask your instructions for future 
the situation has been studied superficially.
intend to choose only the path of a schism.
he is at present insisting on, then we also
way abandon his unfounded proposal, which
years time for preparation of forces.
military operations at the present front line.
question of cessation of military operations
the 38th parallel.
If our final goal consists of conducting a
struggle for the principle of the determina-
tion of the 38th parallel as the military de-
marcation line and if in this regard we can
admit only certain alterations, then we should
have in mind a breakdown in the negotiations
and we must prepare for this.
In the opposite case we should have
some kind of compromise position deter-
dined. Our past proposal, it is true, could not
foresee the possible development of the present situation, but it is also not possible to
win much time through action in accordance
with your orders contained in the telegram of
17.7.51 about a concession to the enemy for
the purpose of gaining time,
4. We (Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang
and Qiao Guan-hua) suggest that the final
goal of the enemy is to cease military opera-
tions at the present front line. In relation to
this the enemy may allow small alterations.
It is thus necessary for us to decide: to
struggle for the 38th parallel and prepare for
an end to the negotiations or, avoiding a
breakdown in the negotiations, to carry on
the struggle for the cessation of military
operations and to study the question of the
cessation of military operations at the present
front line.
Having studied, on the basis of the lim-
ited materials we have, the general world
situation, the needs of our state and the fact
that at present Korea cannot continue the
war, we think that it is better to think over the
question of cessation of military operations
at the present front line than to carry on the
struggle for the 38th parallel and bring the
conference to a breakdown.
In connection with this it is necessary to
take into consideration that it is possible to
gain some concessions from the enemy in the
discussion of the proposal about cessation of
military operations at the present front line.
Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5
years time for preparation of forces.
Of course, if the enemy does not in any
way abandon his unfounded proposal, which
he is at present insisting on, then we also
intend to choose only the path of a schism.
Having limited materials at our disposal,
the situation has been studied superficially.
We urgently ask your instructions for future
actions.  
LI KENONG12.8.51 4:00."
MAO ZEDONG
No. 4061
13.8.51
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341,
Listy 56-58]
88. 27 August 1951, ciphered telegram,
Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23256
Copies: Stalin(2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Bulganin
From BEIJING 01:30 27.8.1951
SERIES “G”
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade Filippov!
In view of the fact that the enemy was
not in a position to withdraw from the im-
passe created in the course of the negotia-
tions on the question of a military demarca-
tion line, he has undertaken a whole series of
provocational actions.
On August 19 enemy troops, dressed in
civilian clothes, made a raid on our security
forces in the neutral zone in Kaesong, as a
result of which one man was killed and one
was wounded. After an investigation by
representatives of both sides, the enemy in
justifying himself stated that this was [com-
mitted by] partisans from the South Korean
partisan detachment active in our region, and
therefore he does not take any responsibility
for this.
After this, on the night of August 22, one
enemy plane dropped nine bombs on the
territory of the neutral zone in Kaesong and
fired on the house where our delegation is
quartered. Although American officers came
to investigate that same night, the enemy
impudently refused to acknowledge their
actions and contended that the fragments and
craters found there are not from air force
bombs. After this, the enemy, contradicting
the former, said that the raid was made by an
unidentified plane.
The enemy dared to make these impu-
dent provocational acts because he considered that
our side would not make a breakdown in the
negotiations over this. He therefore wanted
to use this measure to put pressure on us.
Of course, it is possible [that it was] a
South Korean secret service plan to break up
the negotiations, but the possibility is ex-
cluded that Syngmann Rhee could send a
plane to make an attack on Kaesong in the
region of the building where the negotiations
are being conducted on his own initiative,
without agreement from the Americans.
Therefore, the provocational acts of the en-
emy have caused us to make a decisive
counterstroke.
We have declared a temporary cessation of
the negotiations until the enemy accepts
responsibility for what has happened. The
negotiations will not be resumed until we
receive a satisfactory answer—we’ll let them
cool their heels. However, we do not want to
take the initiative in declaring a breakdown in
the negotiations.
We suppose that the enemy will not
openly acknowledge his provocational acts.
The dragging out of the negotiations can
end in two ways.
First, the delay may bring the negotia-
tions to a breakdown.
We are forcefully preparing ourselves
to resist a possible attack by enemy troops
directly at the front. We are simultaneously
strictly defending the ports on the western
and eastern coast of North Korea from land-
ings by the enemy. For the last several days
enemy planes have passed through the area
of the following cities on the China coast:
Tsingtao, Shanghai, Hangchow. This was
also done for provocational purposes.
Simultaneously with this, the enemy
wanted to reconnoiter the air defense of our
coastal regions. With regard to this, we want
to strengthen our command in Korea and the
air defense of the cities located in the coastal
region. In a subsequent telegram I will com-
municate to you a draft [plan] for sending
Soviet military advisers to work with the
Chinese volunteer troops in Korea.
Simultaneously with this I will ask you
about an additional delivery of artillery am-
maments.
Second, it is possible that as a result of
the delay in the negotiations the enemy will
find the means to extricate [himself] from the
impasse and an agreement will be reached on
the question of a military demarcation line.
At the present time we want to use the
period of the break in negotiations for con-
ducting a cold war in order to expose the
impudent provocational acts of the enemy.
However, we suppose that the enemy will
not openly acknowledge his provocations.
If after some period of time the situation
will develop so that the enemy wishes to
renew the negotiations, then we think that at
our own initiative we can propose a way
which would lead to a turn in the negotiations and to force the enemy to agree with this.

Comrade Kim Il Sung suggests for the purpose of securing the neutral zone at Kaeson to ask representatives of neutral states to participate at the conference as monitors and witnesses for the period of negotiations, as a necessary condition for the resumption of the negotiations. Moreover, these representatives can be used in the future as a control organ for the implementation of the ceasefire.

How do you view this? Do you consider this necessary or do you have a better way? I ask your orders on the above.

With greetings. Mao Zedong.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 86-88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53]

89. 28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from 

Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P83/280
28 August 1951 Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky
Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]
Decision of 28 August 1951
280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong of 27 August (No. 4279)
To adopt the attached draft answer of Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong.
SECRETARY CC
To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83
TOP SECRET
BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY
For transmission to MAO ZEDONG
"Comrade Mao Zedong!
We received your telegram of August 27.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations in Kaeson and with your line on the necessity of getting a satisfactory answer on the question of the incident provoked by the Americans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. As before, with regard to this we will proceed from the fact that the Americans have greater need to continue the negotiations.

We do not see the use in inviting, according to your initiative, representatives of neutral states to participate in the negotiations as monitors and witnesses during the present period of negotiations. The negative side of this proposal is that the Americans will view it as [an indication] that the Chinese-Korean side has more need quickly to reach an agreement about an armistice than do the Americans. If you are of such an opinion on this question, then you must communicate this to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, continued on page 92]
90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951

SERIES “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I agree that it is not advisable to take the initiative in inviting representatives of neutral states as monitors and witnesses at the present stage of the negotiations. I have already communicated about this to Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4358
30.8.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 4-5 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 54-55] The telegram was sent to Beijing on August 29 [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89]

91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951

SERIES “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I have already communicated about this to Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4492
8.9.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 56]"}

92. 10 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

BEIJING

To Comrade KRASOVSKY

for Comrade Mao Zedong

"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We have received your telegram of 8 September.

We agree to send a main military adviser and a group of military specialists as military advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea.

We consider it advisable to resolve the question of sending military advisers to the armies and corps after the main military adviser familiarizes himself with the situation on location and presents his considerations on this question.

As main military adviser for the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send General of the Army Zakharov.

If you agree with this decision of ours, then General of the Army Zakharov can depart soon for Beijing for further movement to the location of the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

3-ae.
10.IX.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 109]"}

93. 14 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25902

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 13:40 14.11.1951

SERIES “G” T.

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV!

After the resumption of negotiations for cessation of military operations in Korea, in view of the large losses at the front over the last two months and the increase in demands within America and outside its borders for cessation of military operations, the possibility of the American side accepting the conditions for an armistice has increased. However, at the same time, taking into account internal and external politics, the American government is still trying to keep the international situation tense, and therefore the Americans, while actively engaged in spying and carrying out a policy of an advance in the course of the negotiations, are trying to drag out the negotiations.

The main question in the negotiations is the determination of the demarcation line. In place of the demand for designation of the demarcation line deep in the rear of our troops, the enemy has proposed to designate it on the basis of the present line of the front, with some alterations and with the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone.

At present the enemy is already demanding the designation of the line in fact contiguous with the line of the troops at the time of the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations as the demarcation line without the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. We are insisting on the cessation of military opera-
tions at the present front line and the designation of the present line contiguous to the troops of both sides as the demarcation line with the introduction of alterations in the line contiguous to troops of both sides in case of alterations of it in the period of the achievement of an agreement on all points of the agenda. At the present time the enemy is fighting with us precisely on this question, but we assume that this fight will not continue for long.

Our proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line and our agreement to set aside the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the convening of a political conference, was made not only because the present negotiations are negotiations about cessation of military operations and [because] the enemy will not in any case want to exchange eastern mountainous regions to the north of the 38th parallel for low-lying regions to the south of the 38th parallel, but also because in case the enemy refuses to leave the eastern mountainous regions we also have mountainous regions there [that are] advantageous for defense; as regards the western coastal plain to the south of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us because it has a much greater population than the eastern regions, and furthermore it is rich in agricultural products, plus the region of Kaesong is an advanced post for taking Seoul.

Comrade Kim Il Sung during the discussion of armistice conditions in Beijing in June of this year had the same opinion on this question. This time it also was done with his agreement.

As regards the discussion of the question of monitoring at the negotiations, we earlier suggested to propose to create an organ for cessation of military operations, in which would be included representatives of both sides, and to assign to it the task of monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the cessation of military operations and monitoring in the buffer zone.

However, the enemy is sure to demand the establishment of monitoring in the rear of both sides, in order to limit the transport by both sides of reinforcements and military goods.

We intend to agree to the establishment of monitoring at 1 or 2 border points of both sides and in accordance with your instructions to propose to transfer the monitoring functions to neutral states, in other words to states that are not participating in the war. We want to invite three states to fulfill these tasks: the Soviet Union, Poland and India.

It is possible that the Americans will oppose this at the beginning. Then we will propose to introduce [as monitors] representatives from Sweden and one state of Latin America.

As regards the exchange of prisoners of war, we will oppose exchange according to the principle of 1 for 1 and will propose exchange according to the principle of return of all prisoners of war by both sides.

I think it will not be difficult to reach agreement on this question.

On the question of the governments of the interested states convening a conference of high level officials, three variants are possible:

1. Convening a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting negotiations. (It is possible that America will propose this variant.)

2. Convening a conference with the participation of four states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England and representatives of North and South Korea.

3. Convening a conference with participation of seven states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England, France, India, Egypt and representatives of North and South Korea.

I ask you, proceeding from the international situation, to give instructions regarding which of the three variants is best or propose a new variant.

At the present time, on the basis of the aforementioned we will achieve cessation of military operations this year. At the same time, we will carry out the necessary preparation in case of a dragging out of the negotiations by the enemy and their breakdown. Expecting that the negotiations will be drawn out for another half year or year, we have moved toward economizing on our human and material forces in the Korean theater of military operations and we are pursuing the tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal of holding the position we presently occupy and inflicting great manpower losses on the enemy, in order to gain victory in the war.

Within the country we are preparing for the reorganization of the army, reduction of the bureaucracy, introduction of a regime of economizing, increasing production and further strengthening of the campaign to aid Korea and struggle against American imperialism, for the purpose of ensuring the further conduct of the war in Korea, securing also by financial means the stabilization of the scene within the country, and also strengthening state construction and mainly construction of defense.

In the present year, in light of rendering aid to Korea and the struggle against American imperialism, the budget of the Chinese state in comparison with 1950 has increased by 60%. 32% of the total budget is directly being used in the Korean theater of military operations. (Military credit extended to us by the Soviet Government is not included in this calculation.)

Thus, if a regime of economizing is not introduced now, in the next year the budget will increase even more, which inevitably will have an influence on finances and lead to a great rise in the prices of goods, which in turn will create difficulties at the front, and also in the area of construction in the rear. It is true that achieving peace as a result of the negotiations is advantageous for us, but we also are not afraid of dragging out the negotiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able to achieve victory. At the same time we will be able successfully to carry out various measures within the country and secure stabilization and further development in the area of politics and the economy.

I ask your instructions on the above.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 5631
14.11.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 16-19]

94. 19 November 1951, ciphers telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Mao Zedong to Filipppov (Stalin)

Ciphered Telegram

Copies: Stalin (2), Copy
From BEIJING 17:1019/XI.1951
Special No. 1821
TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

19 November at 18 hours Beijing time I was invited to visit Zhou Enlai, who asked me to transmit to Comrade Filipppov the request of Mao Zedong to give an answer to the telegram of Mao Zedong to Comrade Filipppov [Stalin] on the question of negotiations in
Korea, which was transmitted to the Center on 14 November through Krasovsky.

Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the telegram and added that while awaiting the reply of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had already twice declined to meet with American representatives in Korea.

19 XI.51 ROSCHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62]

95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/421

19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky

Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951 421. Telegram of Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

To adopt the attached draft answer of Comrade Filippov to the telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

SECRETARY CC

To p.421(op) pr.PB No.84 Top Secret

BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

For transmission to Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

“Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram on the questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations.

The entire course of the negotiations for some time past shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly concluding them. This is based on the overall international situation.

We consider it correct that the Chinese/Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.

We consider your position on the definition of the line of demarcation and the establishment of monitoring in one or two border points to be correct. We also agree with you about the composition of the commission for the fulfillment of monitoring functions.

Your position on the question of an exchange of prisoners of war is completely correct and it will be difficult for the opponent to dispute it.

As regards the possible variants of convening a conference for the further resolution of the Korean question after the conclusion of an armistice, it seems to us that it would be more expedient to convene a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting the negotiations, with the obligatory participation of representatives of North and South Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin] 19 November 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828 [9], Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy of the telegram sent to Beijing in found in [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23]

96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko 19 November 1951

Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]


To adopt the attached draft instruction to Comrade Razuvaev.

SECRETARY CC To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84 Top Secret Top Priority

NORTH KOREA To RAZUVAEV 1352. From your telegram it is not clear in connection with what and on whose initiative the question arose about an appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and the Security Council with a demand concerning a speeding up of the resolution of the Korean question. It is also not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, since you do not communicate anything about this in your telegram.

An appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops along the front line and the creation of a two kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean side, which is politically disadvantageous.

Therefore, not having the text of the appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chinese comrades and not knowing the motives which are guiding the Korean friends, we consider it necessary that you advise the Korean friends to set aside resolution of the question of an appeal until the elucidation of the aforementioned questions.

We await a more detailed report from you.

Confirr receipt.

A. GROMYKO 19/XI/51

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 65-66]

97. 20 November 1951, Gromyko to G.M. Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to Razuvaev

To Comrade MALENKOV G.M.

I am sending a draft telegram to Comrade Razuvaev. I ask you to review it.

A. Gromyko 20 November 1951

No. 334/ag Copies: Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev TOP PRIORITY

NORTH KOREA SOVIET AMBASSADOR

We draw your attention to the inadmissibility of your actions in connection with the appeal of the Korean friends to the UN on the question of speeding up a peace settlement in
You elucidated this only when you had recourse to the General Assembly and the Security Council with demands: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops from the front line and creation of a 2-kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea—asking if such an appeal would contradict the statement of Comrade Vyshinsky.

Since we knew nothing about the proposed appeal of the Korean friends with a statement of the indicated demands, or at whose initiative arose the question of putting these demands before the UN, we asked you to elucidate (our No. 1059). Without waiting for an answer to your telegram, in which were laid out the deficiencies of the Korean proposal, we informed you (Your No. 1353 of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 November, the text of the statement by Pak Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the radio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry (our No. 1059), on the question of the indicated demands of the Korean friends you limited yourself only to a report that you had raised the question at your own initiative and to a repetition of the question of whether there is a discrepancy between the proposals of Comrade Vyshinsky about withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel and agreement in Kaesong to the point of the agenda about the establishment of a demarcation line. Concerning the appeal, you also only reported that it would be announced 19 November.

Thus, both in telegram No. 1353 of 19 November and in telegram No. 1355 of 19 November, you informed us that the Korean friends will announce their appeal, even though at that time you did not have instructions from us and could not yet have received an answer to your inquiry. As a result the Korean friends made the appeal without agreement with us.

In that way you acted inadmissably thoughtlessly. Your guilt is aggravated also by the fact that you did not even take the trouble to find out from the Korean friends whether they had reached agreement with the Chinese friends about the appeal to the UN with the aforementioned demands, and you elucidated this only when you had received a direct order to do so and after the Koreans had already made their statement. Learn this in the future.

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 46-48 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 27-29]

98. 21 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Razuvaev

MID USSR
Tenth Department Received 18:35 21.XI.1951

Sent 20:50 21.XI.1951
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
To NORTH KOREA
To RAZUVAEV TOP PRIORITY SPECIAL

On 20 November the following directive from Comrade Filippov [Stalin] was sent to Roshchin:

"Explain to Mao Zedong and also to Kim Il Sung through Razuvaev, that there is indeed a difference between Vyshinsky’s demand about the immediate withdrawal of USA troops across the 38th parallel and the present position of the Chinese-Korean comrades about the delineation of the demarcation line at the present front line. Vyshinsky could not speak otherwise in order to demonstrate the injustice of the USA position of refusing to withdraw their troops beyond the 38th parallel. Vyshinsky’s position is advantageous to the Chinese-Korean comrades, since it demonstrates from one side the greediness of the Americans and from the other side the tractability and peaceableness of the Chinese-Korean comrades, who are making serious concessions for the sake of achieving peace.”

In view of the fact that Comrade Roshchin does not have communications with you and therefore cannot fulfill through you the order about transmitting to Kim Il Sung the elucidation given in the directive of Comrade Filippov, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is sending the directive to you.

Confirm receipt.
Immediately telegraph the fulfillment. 21.XI.51 GROMYKO

21.XI.51
Copies: Stalin, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 67-68]

99. 25 December 1951, memorandum, Gromyko to Razuvaev

To Comrade STALIN I.V.

According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, reports have been published lately in French and American newspapers as blackmail, done for the purpose of putting pressure on the Korean-Chinese side.

As regards the communiqué proposed by Vyshinsky, in the opinion of MID, it is scarcely necessary to give advice to the Koreans and Chinese on this account, since they systematically publish reports which disclose the line taken by the Americans in the negotiations about an armistice in Korea. From the other side, the distribution of a Korean-Chinese communiqué as a document of the UN will not give any practical results, and a request from the Koreans and Chinese about this can be evaluated as a sign of their weakness.

In view of this, MID considers that to give any kind of advice to the Korean and Chinese governments regarding the communiqué is inadvisable.

A draft resolution is attached.
I ask you to review.

A. Gromyko
25 December 1951
No. 396
From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951

Bulganin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008

ARMY

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF

Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

Copies: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan,

Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khru
dchev.

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,

Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis

5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77]

100. 31 January 1952, ciphered telegram,

Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET

ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008

Copies: Stalin(2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,

Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951 Series “G”

T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

For the past period of time, in view of the

deliberate prolongation of the negotiations

by the enemy in the course of the negotia-
tions for an armistice in Korea, up to the

present time a final agreement has not been

achieved.

However, on the basic questions of the

cessation of military operations, for example:
on the question “Establishment of a military
demarcation line between the two sides for

the purpose of establishment of a demilita-
rized zone” an agreement has already been

reached on three points.

On the question “working out practical

measures for the implementation of a

ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including

the personnel, powers and functions of the

apparatus for monitoring the implementa-
tion of the conditions of the ceasefire and

armistice” an agreement has already been

reached on six points (the texts are attached).

However, on the questions “Measures

about prisoners of war” the enemy in prin-
ciple cannot oppose the liberation of all pris-

oners of war. As a consequence of this, the

negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long

time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to

drag out the negotiations under the pretext

of a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding

and construction of airports after the cessa-
tion of military operations and also a demand

about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary

basis. However, in view of the fact that our

side decisively opposes these proposals and

also in view of the fact that it is very difficult

for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for

continuation of the war in Korea, the satel-
lites of the enemy and the USA itself are

trying to bring an end to the war in Korea,

therefore in recent days the enemy was forced
to set aside the discussion of the question of

limiting restoration and construction of air-

ports in Korea and moved to discussion of

small questions concerning the agreement.

According to the concrete conditions of

the text of the agreement on an armistice

proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as

before, this text is not final, in other words

that, as before, the enemy has included con-
ditions about limiting the restoration and

construction of airports and about liberation

of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after

having declared that these conditions can be

omitted and it is possible not to discuss them.

From this it is obvious that the possibility of

reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of

course, we never have and are not now count-
ing only on these possibilities.

We simultaneously will vigilantly fol-

low the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA

who in view of the growth of internal and

external opposition will carry out as before a

policy of prolonging and even of breaking
down the negotiations in order to strain

the international situation even more. How-
never we are prepared in military and in politi-
cal relations to inflict decisive blows on the

enemy in order to shatter its plans. At the

present time both sides in the negotiations

have already moved over to detailed discus-
sion of the questions.

For the purposes of achieving a final

agreement on an armistice it is necessary to

receive your concrete instructions on the

following questions:

1. About the monitoring organ com-

posed of representatives of neutral states.

The American side proposes that both

dies each invite three states whose armed

forces are not participating in the military

operations in Korea, and also that each in-
vited state name one senior officer as a rep-

resentative (in all 6 persons from the neutral

states of both sides) for the creation of a

monitoring organ of neutral states.

We intend to agree with this arrange-

ment and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and

Czechoslovakia to send representatives so

that they could discuss the matter on an equal

basis with representatives of the three states

invited by the USA and also have the right to

veto.

2. Each of the abovementioned neutral

states must name one deputy representative

who could participate in the meetings of the

monitoring organ in the name of its represen-
tative. All representatives can take with
them assistants-advisers from among the citi-
zens of their country. All invited neutral
states will provide the necessary number of
administrative workers for the creation of a
secretariat responsible for keeping proto-
cols, transmitting documents and transla-
tions.

3. The functions of the monitoring organ

of neutral states are:

a) Practical control and monitoring of

the observation of the agreement by both

sides—not to transport to Korea from abroad,

through mutually agreed upon points, ship-

ments to the rear as reinforcements, military

personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
tanks, arms and ammunition after the armi-
stice agreement is signed and goes into force,

and also to carry out an exchange of military

personnel of both sides on the scale stipu-

lated by the agreement and in identical num-

bers;

b) Report about places where an inci-
dent occurs, about the guilt of anyone from

the [two] sides outside the demilitarization

zone who violates the agreement on armi-

stice, and also the carrying out of practical

observation.

At the request of both sides or one side

of the commission on military armistice, the

monitoring organ must immediately send a

neutral group for inspection and observation

and also for bringing the results of the inves-
tigation to the commission on military armi-

stice.

4. Simultaneously with the establish-
ment of the functions indicated in column

“A” point 3, the American side also proposes

that both sides after cessation of military

operations must present information about

precise places of deployment of the land, sea

and air units which are participating in the

military operations in Korea, and also must

not change the deployment or carry out a

concentration of their troops. We intend not
to agree with this, since it was not stipulated

in the points on which agreement was reached.

5. As concerns the points of disembar-
kation in the rear where observation must be

established, the American side proposes to

establish in South Korea Seoul, Chemulpo

[Inchon], Dzioio, Gensiu, Taiden, Dzen-
tiu, Gunzan, Taiko, Dzenten, Pusan—in all 12 points. In North Korea to

establish Singisiu, Manphkohin, Kange-

ghesandun, Khekido, Sengdzii, Kaisiu—in
all 15 points.

At each point a region of operation for the neutral state must be established within a radius of 30 miles from the center of the point.

We consider that the enemy has proposed too many points, the area of operation is too broad, and the number of open points is not equal. We intend to agree that both sides open 3–5 points each in North Korea: Singuisu, Seisin, Khanko, Manphkodin and one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We also intend to propose that the radius of operations of the neutral group be established as 5 kilometers from the center of the point.

6. Neutral groups of observers will be attached to the monitoring organ of neutral states. The group must be organized as a minimum from four mid-level officers (lieutenant-major), two officers each from the representatives of neutral states invited by each side. In case of necessity subgroups can be created attached to the monitor groups, composed of two representatives, one person from each side.

The American side proposes to create 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider that this is too many. If an agreement is reached that both sides will each open 5 of their rear points, then it will be sufficient for fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring organ to have 16 neutral groups of observers, of which 10 groups will be permanently located at mutually agreed upon points of disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as reserves to send to the site of incidents.

7. The monitoring organ of neutral groups and the commission on the military armistice must be located in one place. The neutral groups of observation during the fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and observation do not have the right to study the “construction and characteristics” of all types of arms and ammunitions.

As concerns the reports about results of the work of the neutral groups of observation, we consider that official reports must be adopted by the majority of the members of the given group, but reports not adopted by the majority of members or reports from individual persons cannot be official documents. They can be used as reference materials.

8. Material supply of the monitoring organ of neutral states and the groups subordinate to it must be provided by both warring sides. Both sides must provide the monitoring organ with transport for trips of its members to points and to places where a violation of the agreement on armistice occurs. All the 8 points set forth above concern questions of monitoring by neutral states in the rear regions of both sides outside the demilitarized zone.

I ask you to review whether our point of view is correct and whether anything needs to be added.

If you agree with our opinions, then do you consider it necessary to communicate about this in advance to the comrade leaders of the parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia[?] I ask you to give your answer.

Note: The texts of the agreement reached on two agendas was sent to you by separate telegram.

With greetings.
MAO ZEDONG

No. 326
31.1.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 73–77]

101. 3 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 709
TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY

Transmit the following answer to MAO ZEDONG.

“Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegrams of January 31 concerning the negotiations on questions of an armistice.

We agree with the plan outlined by you and the evaluation of the course of the negotiations which you give. The firm position taken by you has already given positive results and must force the enemy to make further concessions.

We consider that you must make an agreement with the leading comrades of Poland and Czechoslovakia about including their representatives in the commission of observers, and they, of course, will agree with this.

With greetings. FILIPPOV [Stalin].”

Confirm receipt.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

No. 72/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80]

102. 8 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 22 January 1952 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1962 reply from Mao to Peng Dehuai

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16293
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin
From BEIJING Received 21:45
8.2.1952

SERIES “G” T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you for familiarization the abbreviated text of the telegram to me from Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year and my answer of 4.2 of this year.

The telegram of Comrade Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year.

1. 16.1 of this year the Minister of Foreign Affairs of [North] Korea Pak Hon-Yong was at my place. In a conversation he said that the Korean people throughout the country demand peace and do not want to continue the war.

If the Soviet Union and China consider it advantageous to continue the war, then the Central Committee of the Labor Party will be able to overcome any difficulties and hold to their position.

I answered that a peaceful settlement on the basis of justice and rationality is advantageous for us. I also explained to him about the favorable conditions of our side in the present military situation and about the increase in the difficulties of America. Therefore an agreement on an armistice can be reached. However in military relations we will carry out active preparation of our forces for further conduct of military operations.

While departing, Minister Pak Hon Yong agreed with my point of view about the general situation and said that his visit had the goal of a simple meeting and his opinion is not the opinion of the Central Committee of the Labor party and the Korean government, but purely his personal opinion.

2. In 1951 the Korean government col-
lected agricultural taxes in kind in grain in the amount of 650,000 tons, which constituted too large a percentage of the entire yield. At the present time 10 percent of the population is suffering from hunger. The majority of the peasant population will be able to subsist only until April-May.

If there is no assistance soon, then this will influence not only the carrying out of spring sowing but also the gathering of the harvest.

They say that our government has already resolved to deliver to the Korean government 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, is this true? If it is not true, I consider that it is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of 30,000 tons of grain in March for the purpose of providing assistance so that the peasants can engage in spring planting.

3. I consider that although our budget is also very strained, in 1952 we nevertheless need to plan to apportion 1,600,000 million yuan (which constitutes approximately 237 million rubles) according to the plan of 1951 budget year for rendering aid to Korea. This amount can hardly be reduced. I ask that all this possibly be planned earlier in the general budget.”

My answer of 4.2 of this year.

“I received your telegram of 22.1 of this year. As concerns rendering aid to Korea, in our budget for 1952 we have already included expenditures of 1,500,000 million yuan (approximately equal to 222 million rubles), which somewhat exceeds the sum of the trade credit extended by China to Korea in 1951, the sum granted by China for urgent restoration of Korean railroads and also the sum granted by China for maintenance of Korean citizens located in Manchuria.

If military operations in Korea are ended, then it is assumed that expenditures for aid to Korea will be increased.

At the end of January of this year the Minister of Trade of Korea Comrade Chan Si U came to Beijing for negotiations about deliveries of goods in 1952. As a result of these negotiations the total value we established for goods delivered by us comes to 700,000 million yuan (approximately 103 million rubles).

Korea will not deliver anything to us in exchange, and therefore the aforementioned amount was established as the sum of trade credit.

As concerns foodstuffs stipulated in the application, the delivery according to this application will be carried out from February to May. In each month 5,000 tons of rice and 5,000 tons of chumiza [a cereal grain in Northeast Asia] (in all 40,000 tons of rice and chumiza will be delivered), in each month 200 tons of bean oil.

In addition, in February 3,300,000 meters of cotton fabric will be delivered.

Negotiations will be concluded soon. According to your practical observation, if military operations in Korea cease, what is necessary to restore in Korea as first priority?

The army of the Chinese volunteers can render assistance as a work force to restore the highways and agricultural economy. What other kind of aid is needed from us?

I ask you to study these questions and communicate your opinion.”

MAO ZEDONG

No. 431
8.2.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 81-83]

103. 5 March 1952, memorandum, Gromyko to Stalin

To Comrade STALIN I.V.
The Ambassador of the USSR in Korea Comrade Razuvaev proposes to advise Kim Il Sung to publish an interview with a TASS correspondent concerning the negotiations for an armistice in Panmunjom. (telegram No. 188).

In the draft presented by Razuvaev the interview touches on three questions: the dragging out of the negotiations by the American side; inviting representatives of the Soviet Union to a neutral organ for monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the armistice; the position of the Korean side in case of a breakthrough in the negotiations by the American side.

In the opinion of MID USSR, the proposal of Comrade Razuvaev is unacceptable. The publication of such an interview could be interpreted as a manifestation of haste and nervousness on the Korean-Chinese side. Moreover, the elements of threat, contained in the answer to the third question, could be used for accusing the Korean-Chinese side of trying to complicate the course of the negotiations for an armistice.

Draft resolution is attached.

I ask you to review.

A. GROMYKO

5 March 1952

[As indicated in the file in AVPRF, the Politburo decision was taken on March 7 to reject Razuvaev’s proposal, l. 82. Draft resolution to this effect is on l. 83]

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, List 3 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 81-83]

104. 14 April 1952, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Stalin to Kim Il Sung

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P87/104

Copies: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyshinsky, Shtemenko

14 April 1952

Excerpt from protocol No. 87 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 14 April 1952

104. Question of Korea.

To confirm the attached text of a telegram.

SECRETARY CC

To p.104(op) pr.PB No. 87

BY CIPHER

PYONGYANG

To Soviet Ambassador RAZUVAEV

Hand Over Immediately

For Comrade KIM IL SUNG

It has become known to me that the Korean people are in need of bread. We have in Siberia 50,000 tons of prepared wheat flour. We can send this flour as a gift to the Korean people. Telegraph your agreement. We can send the flour immediately according to your instruction.

With greetings. I. STALIN

14 April 1952

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 778, Listy 22-23]

105. 16 April 1952, ciphered telegram, Babkin to Shhtemenko conveying letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 501587

From CORRESPONDENT 20 Sent 16.4.52 13:00 Received 16.4. 14:44

Dispatched to the 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 16.4 14:50
Exremely urgent.
To Comrade STALIN.

I transmit the reply letter of KIM IL SUNG to Comrade I.V. STALIN, No. 1448, sent by BABKIN, 16.4.52.
Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, File of 8th Administration (2).

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

The government of the DPRK is moved by your fatherly concern about the urgent needs of the Korean people.

Your proposal to send us 50,000 tons of bread, which we accept with endless gratitude, is one more expression of the selfless fraternal assistance of the great Soviet people to Korea, which has suffered from American aggression but is prepared to defend to the end its freedom and independence.

A grateful Korean people wishes you, dear leader and teacher, many years of life and health for the happiness of mankind.

KIM IL SUNG
16 April 1952

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 60-61]

106. 16 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Kim Il Sung to Stalin via Razuvaev

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 502597/sh
From Correspondent 20 Sent 17.7.52
18.45 Received 17.7.20.50
Sent to 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 17.7.21.10
Extremely Urgent
To Comrade A. Vasilevsky
To Comrade A.Ia. Vyshinsky.
I report the letter from KIM IL SUNG to Comrade STALIN I.V. of 16.7.52.
Razuvaev
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky.
No. 2250
17.7.52.

“Respected comrade ambassador, I ask you to bring to the attention of Comrade STALIN I.V. the contents of the following telegram:

“Dear Comrade STALIN I.V.,

I consider it necessary to report to you, Josef Vissarionovich, about the following: proceeding from a general analysis of the situation in Korea the possibility is not ex-
cluded that the negotiations for an armistice can be drawn out for an indefinite period of time.

Over the past year of negotiations we have virtually curtailed military operations and moved to a passive defense.

Such a position has led to the fact that the enemy almost without suffering any kind of losses constantly inflicts on us huge losses in manpower and material values.

Thus, for example, just recently the enemy put out of operation all the electrical stations of Korea and because of the active operations of VVS [air force] does not allow the possibility to restore them, which has caused and continues to cause huge losses to the entire national economy of the DPRK.

In only one 24 hour period of barbaric bombing, of only one city of Pyongyang (on July 11 and the night of July 12) more than 6,000 peaceful inhabitants were killed and wounded.

The enemy, making use of this situation, makes demands in negotiations that are unacceptable to us.

Naturally, the Chinese friends refuse to accept these conditions. We share the opinion of Comrade MAO ZEDONG on this question.

However, in order to spare the DPRK and its people suffering and unjustified, needless losses, it is necessary for us hopefully to provide cover for the most important sites and to go over to active operations.

For this it would be desirable:
1. To strengthen antiaircraft defense. By our accounting, for this it is necessary to receive additional arms for ten antiaircraft regiments (including three middle caliber regiments and seven small caliber regiments).

It is desirable in connection with this that the Chinese comrades put out half and that the KPA receive arms for five artillery regiments directly from you.

2. To activate the night operations of the VVS [Air Force] of the KPA [Korean People’s Army] and CPV [Chinese People’s Volunteers]. It is necessary to cover North Korea in the daytime with fighter aviation, if only up to the line of Pyongyang.

VVS of the KPA is prepared at any time to begin active military operations. Along with this, in the near future 40 crews of KPA TU-2 pilots will finish their training in the Soviet Union. We would like for these pilots to come to the DPRK together with TU-2 airplanes so that they could immediately take part in active military operations and bring influence to bear on important enemy sites.

3. To carry out a number of ground operations, appreciable to the enemy, so as to divert the operations of the enemy VVS from our rear and to influence the course of the negotiations in Kaesong.

Aside from all of this, to raise the battle capability of the KPA it is extremely necessary for us to receive from you in the nearest future technical goods and materials according to our note of January 10, 1952 and July 9, 1952 and application for 1952 in the note of October 6, 1951, within the limits of your possibilities.

4. In Kaesong we need simultaneously to move decisively toward the soonest conclusion of an armistice, a ceasefire and transfer of all prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva convention. These demands are supported by all peaceloving peoples and will lead us out of a passive position in Kaesong.

The change in the character of military operations on the ground and in the air will have a corresponding, desirable influence on the enemy.

A telegram of analogous content was sent to comrade MAO ZEDONG.

The Korean people are boundlessly grateful to you for the enormous selfless assistance being rendered to the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.

We await your orders and advice on the aforementioned questions.

We wish you good health and long years of life for the well-being and happiness of progressive humanity.

With deep respect and esteem
Your Kim Il Sung
Pyongyang 16.7.52.”

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 65-68 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 40-43]

107. 17 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 4018
BEIJING -
TO KRASOVSKY
Transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG the following answer:

“Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We consider your position in the negotiations on an armistice to be completely
Today we received a report from Pyongyang that Comrade KIM IL SUNG also agrees with your position.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
16 July 1952

Telegraph the fulfillment.

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 69 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 89]

108. 18 July 1952, ciphers telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 15 July 1952 telegram from Mao to Kim Il Sung and 16 July 1952 reply from Kim to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21646

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Krushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky

From BEIJING Received 12:15 18.7.1952

Series “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send to you for familiarization the text of my telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year to KIM IL SUNG and the text of the reply telegram to me from Comrade KIM IL SUNG of 21:00 16 July of this year:

“To Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

Copy to Comrade LI KENONG.

After we wrote a telegram to comrade LI KENONG we received your telegram of 18:00 14 July of this year.

After a two-day study by us of the given questions our comrades unanimously consider that at present, when the enemy is subjecting us to furious bombardment, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy, which does not signify in fact any kind of concession, is highly disadvantageous for us.

We will look at the positive and negative sides of this question:

Rejecting the proposal of the enemy will bring only one harmful consequence—further losses for the Korean people and Chinese people’s volunteers. However, once the war began, China began to help Korea, the Korean people already honestly stood on the front line of defense of the camp of peace of the whole world.

At the cost of the sacrifices of the Korean people a strengthening of the position at the 38th parallel has been won, North Korea and Northeast China have been defended.

The people of Korea and China, especially their armed forces, have received the possibility of being tempered and acquiring experience in the struggle against American imperialism.

In addition, in the course of the struggle of the Korean and Chinese peoples, their might has been strengthened, which is inspiring the peace-loving peoples of the whole world in the struggle against aggressive war and is facilitating the development of the movement for defense of peace throughout the world. This also limits the mobility of the main forces of American imperialism and makes it suffer constant losses in the east. As the stronghold of peace throughout the world—the Soviet Union can strengthen its reconstruction and can exercise its influence on the development of the revolutionary movement of peoples of all countries. This will mean the delay of a new world war.

The presence of these great movements testifies to the fact that the Korean people are no longer alone.

In the first place, the Chinese people want to apply all their strength to overcome the difficulties of the Korean people. Therefore at the present time we ask you not to be ashamed to appeal to us with questions which demand an urgent resolution of the situation in Korea.

If we are not able to resolve your questions, then we will together with you appeal to FILIPPOV with a request to render assistance for the resolution of these questions.

As concerns the acceptance of the proposal of the enemy, that will bring great harm.

In the first place, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy under the influence of its bombardment will place us in a disadvantageous position in political and military relations.

The enemy will surely use this weakness of ours for further pressure on us, which will lead to new provocations from the side of the enemy. Then, being in a disadvantageous position, upon putting pressure on the enemy we possibly will suffer even greater failures and the aforementioned positive sides will lose their significance. This will signify an unsuccessful course, because of which the whole game will be lost.

Therefore to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our prestige.

If we display resolution not to accept the enemy’s proposal and to prepare ourselves for a breakdown in the negotiations from the side of the enemy, the enemy surely will not cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

In the process of a further delay of the negotiations, upon decisive insistence by our side on our point of view, it is possible that the enemy will make a new concession.

If the enemy will not concede or breaks off the negotiations, then we must continue military operations so as to find in the course of the war, which the enemy cannot resolve, a means for changing the present situation.

We will report to Comrade FILIPPOV about this proposal and the course taken by us and we will ascertain his opinion.

We will report to you the results upon receiving an answer from him.

With greetings! MAO ZEDONG, 3:00, 15.7.52"

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

Your telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year was received.

As a result of careful study and discussion of it, we have arrived at a unanimous conclusion. We consider that your analysis concerning the present situation is correct.

At the same time, considering our present position, you have communicated to us that we henceforth not be ashamed to raise questions about the assistance we need, for which we are sincerely grateful to you.

We consider it necessary to activate military operations in the long struggle against the enemy. If we do not show aggressiveness in military operations and continue a passive defense, the enemy will not take into consideration our forces, and will continue furious bombardment for the purpose of putting military pressure on us.

We therefore propose to implement the following urgent measures:

1. It is necessary to strengthen anti-aircraft artillery, by at least 10 regiments. It is necessary to strengthen PVO [Anti-aircraft Defense] of the city of Pyongyang and all important industrial sites, for example: Shuifens-kaya, Chandzinganskaya, and Puchenganskaya electrical stations.

2. It is necessary to make the air battles of our VVS [Air Force] more active:

a) To improve the command of the VVS
so that it correctly directs the air battles on Korean territory.

b) The diameter of operations of aviation units must not be limited only to the present line along the Yalu river. At the least, it is necessary to extend it to the border of Pyongyang and to strengthen by all measures the PVO of the capital and important industrial sites.

c) It is necessary to send already trained air force bomber units on night actions deep in enemy [territory], to boldly carry out air battles, subjecting to bombardment a number of airports, warehouses, barracks and other military installations of the enemy.

3. In infantry operations it is necessary to make local attacks on several parts of the front in order to put military pressure on the enemy.

I ask you to review the opinions indicated above and to make a decision about rendering us assistance.

With highest respect toward you.  KIM IL SUNG.  21:00  16 July 1952.”

MAO ZEDONG

No. 2084
18.7.52"

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 72-75 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 90-93]

109. 16 September 1952, hand-delivered note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin conveying telegram from Mao to Zhou

To Comrade STALIN, I.V.

I send you a Russian translation of a telegram I received from comrade Mao Zedong.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and indicate a time of meeting convenient for you for receipt of your personal orders.

With communist greetings.

Zhou Enlai

16 September 1952.

Comrade ZHOU ENLAI.

1. According to our information, the Korean question will be discussed at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the UN. Regarding the question of prisoners of war Mexico has advanced a proposal consisting of 3 points, which are: first, both sides immediately conduct an exchange of prisoners who have expressed the wish to return to their homeland; second, the remaining POWs will be transferred to the temporary protection of UN member states and be subject to repatriation according to an agreement which will be concluded; third, after a normal situation is established in Korea, to guarantee that these POWs can return to their homeland and to provide them with the possibility for this. Until the restoration of a normal situation in Korea, if the POWs ask to return to their homeland, then the corresponding government also must take measures and present to them all possibilities for repatriation.

Apparently, the proposal to discuss the Korean question in the General Assembly of the UN was advanced at the initiative of England. The proposal of Mexico arose at the initiative of the USA. The latter have already expressed the wish to discuss this question in the UN General Assembly.

We intend to express opposition to such a variant.

I ask you to consult with comrade FILIPPOV about what our position should be on this question.

2. India and Burma have made indications that they would like to sign a non-aggression pact with us, and also hope that you will visit these countries. The essence is that [Indian leader Jawaharlal] Nehru would like to visit China, with a view, however, that you will go to India on a return visit.

We received this information from our ambassador in Burma liao Chzhun-min.

I suggest that it is highly possible that India and Burma will advance these questions for an exchange of opinion. If India and Burma make these proposals officially, then it would be inconvenient for us to refuse.

I ask also that you consult with Comrade FILIPPOV about whether it is advisable for China to conclude such pacts with India and Burma.

Mao Zedong.

15 September 1952

110. 17 September 1952, hand-delivered letter, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG

We agree with you that the proposal of the Mexicans is unacceptable, since it reflects the position of the USA in the negotiations in Korea. As is obvious, the USA, not having achieved successes in negotiations in Korea, intends now to receive approval of their position in the UN and to make those same demands in the name of the UN. The Mexicans are the agents of the USA.

If the Mexicans advance their proposal in the UN, the delegation of the USSR will reject this proposal as not corresponding to the interests of cessation of the war in Korea, and will try to attain the following:

“1. Immediate cessation of military operations of the [warring] sides on land, sea and air.

2. Return of all POWs to their homeland according to international norms.

3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops, including also the Chinese volunteer units, in the course of 2-3 months and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question in the spirit of the unification of Korea, carried out by the Koreans themselves under the observation of a commission with the participation of the sides directly interested as well as other states, including states which have not taken part in the war in Korea.”

As concerns the proposal about temporarily withholding 20% of POWs from both sides and returning all remaining POWs, the proposal of the Soviet delegation will not touch on this and it will be left with you in reserve.

On the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with India and Burma we completely share your point of view.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

17 September 1952

Stalin’s handwritten draft is attached.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 97-103 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 99]

111. 27 December 1952, Semenov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

BEIJING

To the Main Military Adviser

for Comrade MAO ZEDONG

Comrade Mao Zedong!
We have received your telegram of 17 December.

Your observations regarding the probability of an attack by the Americans in the spring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present American command in Korea, who are operating under the leadership of the Truman government. It is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhowser government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.

We have reviewed your application for military goods for 1953 and the application for urgently needed military goods.

The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry divisions, this means that we must deliver for each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of various types and other goods.

Taking into account the situation you speak of in your telegram, with great difficulty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions [already] earmarked, with equal shipments until the end of the year, approximately one-fourth of the quantity you stated in your telegram of 17 December, specifically: 600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of artillery of various types, tractor artillery, detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts of the deliveries of each will be determined by our War Ministry.

Thus, with a calculation of the arms and ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 pieces of artillery of various types, as opposed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952.

As regards the applications for materials for military production mentioned in your telegram, transmitted to us by Minister of Foreign Trade Comrade E Tszi Chzhuaman—this application is now being studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade.

SEMENOV [Stalin].

27 December 1952.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 115-116]

112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR RESOLUTION
Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc.
Moscow, Kremlin

Question of MID

The Council of Ministers of the USSR RESOLVES:
1. To confirm the attached draft letters of the Government of the USSR to Comrades Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

To transmit the present letter to Comrade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will immediately be sent to Pyongyang.

2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

Representative of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov
Business Manager of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly reviewed the question of the war in Korea under present conditions and with regard to the entire course of events of the preceding period. As a result of this, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in a firm peace throughout the world and have always sought an acceptable path toward the soonest possible conclusion of the war in Korea.

It is not necessary to dwell in detail on all that the aggressor has done in the course of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest people of the whole world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea more and more expose that bloc, and especially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an international factor that is pursuing a policy of preparing a new war and is ready to shift to a policy of broadening the war solely in order to dictate to people their aggressive imperialistic will, which expresses an aspiration for world domination, for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic aims.

The Soviet Government considers that we should regard all these important circumstances of the international order in the same way that we have regarded them until now. This does not mean, however, that in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peace-loving peoples.

In connection with all the abovementioned and taking into account the concrete facts of late regarding the war in Korea, we consider it urgently necessary to carry out a number of measures, in particular:

1. It is necessary that Kim II Sung and Peng Dehuai give a positive answer to the appeal of General [Mark W.] Clark on February 22 on the question of an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

2. Immediately after the publication of the answer of Kim II Sung and Peng Dehuai, an authoritative representative of the government of the PRC (best of all would be Zhou Enlai) should make a statement in Beijing in which is underscored a positive attitude toward the proposal on an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also to indicate that the time has arrived to resolve the entire question of prisoners and, consequently, to secure the cessation of the war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

3. Simultaneously with the aforementioned statement in Beijing, the head of the government of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, should make a statement in Pyongyang which declares full support for and the justice of the aforementioned statement of the government of the PRC.
4. We consider it also advisable that immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and Pyongyang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR make a statement in Moscow with corresponding full support for the Beijing and Pyongyang statements.

5. In accordance with the four measures enumerated above, the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly of the UN in New York should do everything possible to support and move forward the new political line which is laid out above.

We consider it necessary to give the following elucidation of the abovementioned:

First. About the answer to General Clark.

We consider that the response letter of Kim II Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark should express full agreement with Clark’s proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, with an indication that they have in mind a positive resolution of this question in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

In the answer to Clark indicate that the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners has the greatest significance for a successful resolution of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, for a successful resolution of the question of the cessation of the war and the conclusion of an armistice. In view of this, propose to resume the negotiations in Panmunjom between the main representatives of both sides to negotiations for an armistice.

Propose that the date of the negotiations be established by the officers connected with both sides.

In the course of the negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that “not a single wounded and sick prisoner of war can be repatriated against his wishes during military action,” add the receipt of a guarantee from the American side that in relation to prisoners of war, under no circumstances will forcible measures be applied to prevent their return to their homeland.

Propose also to establish a commission of representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assistance in returning sick and wounded prisoners to their homeland.

In the negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed from the fact that the task consists not only of securing a positive resolution of the indicated question, but also in securing a positive resolution of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, to remove the obstacles to the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of military action and the conclusion of an armistice. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention should be used for this, especially the second paragraph of this article, which stipulates the conclusion of “an agreement on repatriation or internment in a neutral country of healthy prisoners of war who have spent a long time in captivity.”

In the negotiations propose that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be repatriated immediately, but the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country in order to secure a fair resolution of the question of their repatriation.

With regard to these prisoners add that a classification according to nationality and place of residence be made, as was proposed in the letter from Kim II Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark on October 16, 1952 (this is also in accordance with the Indian draft on Korea).

After the classification, prisoners of war immediately receive the right to return to their homeland, which will be facilitated by the assistance of all interested sides.

Second. About the statement in Beijing.

In this statement it would be advisable to say that the government of the PRC has discussed the question raised by General Clark with the government of the DPRK and both the government of the PRC and the government of the DPRK have reached the same conclusion about the necessity to give their representatives in Panmunjom an order to enter into negotiations with General Clark on the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, having in mind the achievement of a positive resolution of this question in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, and also a positive resolution of the question of prisoners of war as a whole. In the statement indicate that in the course of the negotiations between both sides in Kaesong and Panmunjom, agreement was reached on all questions except the question of prisoners of war.

Thus, agreement was reached that commanders of military forces of both sides “give an order for the full cessation of any type of military action in Korea by all troops under their command, including all units and personnel of land, sea and air forces, going into effect twelve (12) hours after the agreement on armistice is signed, and guarantee the fulfillment of this order.”

There was also agreement on the following important conditions for the armistice:

1) About the determination of a military demarcation line, which must run along the line contiguous to [the position of] the troops of the warring sides on the day the armistice goes into effect, in other words along the line of the front, from which “troops of both sides will withdraw for two kilometers in order to form a demilitarized zone...” (point 1 of the draft agreement on armistice).

2) About the establishment of a Military Commission on the armistice composed of 10 senior officers, from whom five will be named by the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the UN and five by the Command of the Korean People’s Army and the Command of the Chinese volunteers (point 19). The Commission must monitor the observance of the armistice agreement, including monitoring the work of the Committee on repatriation of prisoners of war and regulate through negotiations possible violations of the armistice agreement (pp. 24 and 25).

3) About the creation of a Commission of neutral states to supervise the armistice, composed of representatives from Sweden and Switzerland named by the Commander in Chief of the UN Military Forces and representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia named by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese Volunteers. (pp. 36 and 37)

The Commission may create inspection groups composed of representatives of those states. (p. 40).

The Commission of neutral states must supervise the implementation of the agreement on the armistice and fulfill the functions of control (p. 41).

Inspection groups of neutral states will disembark at the ports of Synyidzhu, Chongchin, Khungnam, Manpo and Sinandzhu (North Korea), Inchon, Taegu, Pusan, Kanchung and Kunsan (South Korea).

Moreover, the sides reached agreement that the commanders of both sides must “recommend to the governments of interested countries of both sides that a political conference of all sides at the highest level be
convened within three months of the signing and implementation of the armistice...for the resolution by means of negotiations of questions regarding the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops, the peaceful resolution of the Korean question etc.” (point 60).

A significant portion of the articles of the draft agreement concerning prisoners of war was also agreed to, with the exception of the question of repatriation of prisoners. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK), following its policy of preserving and strengthening peace, striving for a peaceful resolution of the Korean question and applying all its efforts to the immediate cessation of the war, proposes to resolve also the question of prisoners of war as a whole. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK) on its side is prepared to adopt measures to eliminate the disagreements on this question, which is at present the only obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on ceasefire and armistice. Toward this goal, the Government of the PRC (DPRK) proposes that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be immediately repatriated and the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country to secure a just resolution of the question of their repatriation.

The Beijing statement must also say the following:

Our new step, which is directed at the conclusion of the war in Korea, should also serve as an example for a positive resolution of a number of other important and urgent international questions, first of all the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statement in Pyongyang. We suggest that in this statement Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate that the aforementioned statement of the representative of the PRC was worked out jointly by the governments of the PRC and DPRK and that the Government of the DPRK fully shares both the evaluation of the political situation contained in the Beijing statement and the concrete conclusions and proposals contained in it. In connection with this, underscore not only the full support for, but also the justice of, the statement of the representative of the PRC.

Fourth. About the statement in Moscow. We consider expedient a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, which should be made immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow statement to be underscoring before the whole world the full solidarity and concordance of action between the USSR, PRC and DPRK on the question of the war in Korea.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly of the UN in New York. The Soviet delegation in the General Assembly must act in accordance with the entire abovedescribed political plan with regard to the war in Korea. In this connection it is necessary that as soon as the Polish draft resolution “On Averting the Threat of a New World War” comes up for discussion, the Soviet delegation would secure the introduction of the corresponding alterations to this draft in the part concerning Korea and also the necessary statements by the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Sixth. Additional notes. It goes without saying that at the present time we cannot foresee all steps and measures which the governments of the USSR, PRC and DPRK will need to make. However, if there is full agreement between our governments in the conduct of a general line on this question, for which we fully hope, then the remaining points can be agreed upon in the course of the affair.

DIRECTIVES FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN.

1. To commission the delegation of the USSR in the General Assembly (Comrade Vyshinsky), upon the presentation for discussion of the resolution of the Polish delegation, the part concerning Korea, to make a statement with firm support for the last proposals and statements of the PRC and DPRK.

Having set forth the position of the Soviet Union in the question of exchange of prisoners of war as a position which fully corresponds to generally acknowledged principles of international law and the positions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which demands repatriation of all prisoners of war, the representative of the USSR must point out the following. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed and is proposing to recommend to the warring sides in Korea that they immediately and fully cease military operations on land, sea and in the air.

At the initiative of the Soviet Union, negotiations between the warring sides were begun in Kaesong in June 1951 for a ceasefire and armistice in Korea. These negotiations led to agreement on all questions except the question of repatriation of prisoners of war. The Soviet Union continues to consider the position taken in this question by the Chinese People’s Republic and the Korean People’s Democratic Republic to be just and fully in accordance with the principles of international law and international practice, and also the positions of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The Soviet Union fully supports this position.

The question of the exchange of prisoners of war is the single unresolved question in the negotiations between the warring sides in Korea. The governments of the PRC and DPRK have declared their readiness to adopt measures from their sides toward the settlement of this question, in order to remove the last obstacle to a ceasefire in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

The Soviet Union welcomes the noble initiative of the Chinese People’s Republic and the Korean People’s Democratic Republic on this question. The Soviet Union fervently supports the proposal on resumption of negotiations in Korea with the goal of achieving an agreement on exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also on settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, also the question of cessation of the war in Korea and conclusion of an armistice.

Commission the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly to reach an agreement with the Polish delegation about introducing into the draft Polish resolution on the question of averting the threat of a new world war the following alterations in the part concerning the Korean question: in place of the old text of p. “b)” (about returning all prisoners of war to their homeland) to include the following text: “b) immediate resumption of negotiations on an armistice between the sides, having in mind that at the same time the sides will apply all efforts to achieve an agreement on the question of exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war as well as on the entire question of prisoners of war and will thus apply all efforts to remove the obstacles that are hindering the conclusion of the war in Korea.”

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 60-71 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis]
5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 54-65]

113. 29 March 1953, ciphered telegram from Kuznetsov and Fedorenko in Pyongyang [from notes taken at AVPRF; photocopy not available]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From PYONGYANG
Top Priority
Special File

In response to your communication No. 359.

During the second meeting on March 29, Kim Il Sung again declared that he fully agrees with the proposal of the Soviet government on the Korean question and considers that this proposal must be implemented as soon as possible.

Kim Il Sung further underscored that the time has come to show initiative from our side on the question of the conclusion of the war in Korea and achievement of peace. It is necessary, Kim said, either actively to carry out military operations or to end the war; a further dragging out of the existing situation is not in the interests of the DPRK and PRC, or of the entire democratic camp. In connection with this, Kim pointed out that the losses on the Korean side at the front and in the rear (daily nearly 300-400 persons) are very significant and it is hardly advisable to conduct further discussion with the Americans regarding repatriation of a disputed number of prisoners of war. In the present conditions, Kim said, the proposal of the Soviet government is the most advisable and correct.

Kim Il Sung is taking measures to prepare for the anticipated negotiations: the number of sick and wounded prisoners in the DPRK is being determined, materials for the negotiations in Panmunjom are being prepared, a statement from Pyongyang is being prepared, etc.

Following your instructions (Your Communication #242) we agreed with Kim Il Sung that the representative at the negotiations (if they resume) will be Nam II, as before. In connection with this, the publication of a decree of the President of the Supreme People’s Assembly about naming Nam II Minister of Foreign Affairs will be delayed. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is temporarily being held by Li Don Gen. Kim Il Sung will inform the Chinese friends about this.

29.III.53 Kuznetsov, Fedorenko SPRAVKA [Report]: No. 359 (bkh. #8265) 29.III.53

Comrades Kuznetsov, Razuvayev and Fedorenko have reported that on March 29 they were received by Kim Il Sung in the presence of General Nam II, that Kim Il Sung was given the document which arrived from Moscow and that they agreed to meet again after Kim Il Sung has familiarized himself in detail with the document.

No. 242 (iskh. No. 6277) 24.III.53

Molotov gave an order to transmit to Kim Il Sung that Moscow advises that the decision of the question of naming Nam II as Minister of Foreign Affairs be postponed until Malik’s arrival and that it would be good at the present moment to be limited to the naming of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would meanwhile serve as minister."

[Source: AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122]

114. 29 July 1953, ciphered telegram, Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From BEIJING From Kuznetso
To MID USSR URGENT
Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Zorin, Podstero

[reporting a meeting of July 28]

After listening to the greetings of the CC CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP. Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach an armistice not only by force of military reasons but also by force of political and economic reasons. In military matters the last year has shown that the enemy is not only not in a condition to advance on land but is also not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front. The Chinese troops had begun not only to conduct a positional war but also to break through the front.

Among the political causes that forced the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao noted the military contradictions in the camp of the imperialists and the significant activation of world social opinion, which is speaking out against the war in Korea.

Concerning economic causes, Mao stated that in the first two years of the war the American monopolists amassed colossal profits in military orders and deliveries, but with the end of the negotiations for an armistice, and also as a result of the strengthening of the movement to end the war in Korea, their profits began to fall sharply.

Having returned to the military side of the matter, Mao noted that from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year in order to occupy more favorable borders along the Changan river. Further movement to the south would risk stretching out the flanks in the west and east shore of Korea. In this case the danger of landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean troops would grow significantly.

Touching on further steps after the signing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the government of the PRC has a number of questions about which it would like to consult with the government of the USSR. By approximately 10 August, we will prepare a proposed plan of measures about which it is necessary to consult with the Soviet government.

Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting. KUZNETSOV

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158]

115. 20 April 1956, ciphered telegram, excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassador to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Strictly Secret
From BEIJING

31 March I visited Comrade Mao Zedong...

...The important moments that apparently somewhat strengthened Stalin’s trust in the CCP were your (my) information about the trip to China and the Korean war—the performance of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, although in this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not sufficiently consulted. On the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow [in December 1949-January 1950] we came to an understanding about everything, the issue was not about the seizure of South Korea, but about the significant strengthening of North Korea. But subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow,
where some kind of agreement was reached, about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us beforehand. It should be noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of South Korea...

P. YUDIN

[Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Delo not given]

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF Archive of the President, Russian Federation
AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation
CC Central Committee (of a communist party)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers (the designation given PLA units sent to fight in Korea)
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
KPA Korean People’s Army (the army of North Korea)
MID Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Army of the PRC)
PRC People’s Republic of China
VKP(b) All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)
VVS Voennye Vozdushnye Sily Air Force

INDEX OF NAMES

Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR
Belov, General M., Chief of Staff for Soviet First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter Air Corps
Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR
Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Army Corps of the People’s Liberation Army, in June 1951 became Acting CPV Commander and Political Commissar
Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at the Soviet embassy in Beijing
Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for deciphered telegrams
Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for deciphered telegrams
Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party
Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade-Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist Party who established a rival government in Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland China by the PLA in 1949
Kaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR
Kim Ch’ae’k, Deputy Commander of Korean People’s Army
Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party
Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force, PRC
Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR
Malik, Ia., Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations
Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Communist Party
Matveev, pseudonym used by M.V. Zakharov
Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade, USSR
Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR, until restored to Foreign Minister’s post following Stalin’s death in March 1953
Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff of People’s Liberation Army
Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korean People’s Democratic Republic
Pak II U, Minister of Internal Affairs, DPRK, named by Mao Zedong as deputy commander and deputy political commissar of Chinese People’s Volunteers
Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese People’s Volunteers
Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
Razuvaev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to DPRK following Shhtykov’s dismissal in December 1950
Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 appointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in Korea
Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China
Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Political Adviser in North Korea
Shhtemenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
Shhtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK until December 1950
Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delegation to United Nations, had served as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Korea 1946-48
Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR
Vyshinsky, A.Ia., Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Wu, General Xiu-quan, Head of special delegation to the United Nations from the People’s Republic of China in December 1950
Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of the People’s Republic of China
Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People’s Volunteers
Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special Military Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matveev)
Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Commissar sent to Beijing during Korean War as Stalin’s personal military envoy
Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People’s Republic of China

Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Professor of History, Florida State University (Tallahassee), is working on a book on the Soviet Union and the Korean War. She contributed articles on new Russian archival evidence on the Korean War to CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 (Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP Working Paper No. 8 on “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives.”
The reexamination of the Korean case led me into a broader question concerning the proper understanding not only of Communist China’s foreign policy but also, probably, that of any sovereign country: is it appropriate to comprehend the foreign policy behavior of a country, especially one that had historically viewed itself as the “Middle Kingdom,” as totally reactive and without its own consistent inner logic? The assumptions underlying most of the existing scholarship on China’s entrance into the Korean War, though seemingly critical of Washington’s management of the Korean crisis, emerge ironically as American-centered in a methodological sense. Lacking a real understanding of the logic, dynamics, goals, and means of Communist China’s foreign policy, they treat Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis simply as a passive reaction to the policy of the United States. They thus imply that American policy is the source of all virtues as well as evils in the world—if something went wrong somewhere, it must have been the result of a mistake committed by the United States. It was time to rethink Beijing’s entrance into the Korean War.

My study, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), retraces China’s path to involvement in the Korean War with insight gained from recently released Chinese materials. It argues that China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border. To comprehend China’s decision to enter the war, one must first examine the CCP leaders’ perception of China’s security interests and their judgment of to what extent and in which ways such interests had been challenged during the Korean crisis. This examination requires an extended analysis of a variety of basic factors shaping the CCP’s understanding of China’s external relations. Among these factors, the most important ones include CCP leaders’ perception of the outside world and China’s position in it, the nature and goals of the Chinese Communist revolution and their impact on the CCP’s security strategy and foreign policy, the influence of the CCP’s domestic policies on the party’s foreign behavior, and the leverage of historical-cultural factors (such as the Chinese emphasis of the moral aspect of China’s external relations, Chinese ethnocentrism, and Chinese universalism) upon Mao and the CCP leadership. Only with a better understanding of the logic and dynamics of the CCP’s outlook is it possible to reconstruct the interactions that led China and the United States into a major confrontation in Korea.

My three-part study begins with an analysis of Communist China as an emerging revolutionary power. Focusing on the pre-1949 period, I first discuss the domestic sources of the CCP’s foreign policy, the party leadership’s perception of the outside world and China’s position in it, and Mao’s central role in the CCP’s policy-making structure. The second part explains how the conflict between the CCP and the United States escalated and the strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow developed in 1949 and the first half of 1950: On the eve of the Korean War, Beijing and Washington had perceived each other as a dangerous enemy, and the stage for Sino-American confrontation had been set. The third part examines Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis from late June to mid-October 1950, focusing on how the decision to enter the war was made and how it withstood both internal and external tests. Emphasizing that Beijing’s decision to enter the war was based on the belief that the outcome of the Korean crisis was closely related to the new China’s vital domestic and international interests, I argue that there was little possibility that China’s entrance into the Korean War could have been averted.

A note on the Chinese sources used in this study is appropriate here. Since the mid-1980s, thanks to China’s reform and opening policies, many fresh and meaningful materials concerning China’s entry into the Korean War have been released, which offer the basis for this study. These new sources include personal memoirs by those who were involved in Beijing’s intervention in Korea, scholarly articles and monographs by Chinese researchers with archival accesses, official academic publications using classified documents, openly or internally published collections of CCP Central Committee’s and regional bureaus’ documents, and the internally and openly published collections of Mao Zedong’s papers. While it is apparent that these sources have created new opportunities for fresh studies, it is also clear that they were released on a selective basis and, sometimes, for purposes other than a desire to have the truth known. Indeed, unless scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese, are offered free and equal access to the original historical documentation, there is always the possibility that a study might be misled by its incomplete databases. Fully aware of this danger, I have made every effort to double-check my citations as much as possible (such as checking documents with information from interviews, and vice versa, and comparing Chinese materials with non-Chinese ones). Wherever necessary, I pointed out what I consider to be dubious sources in the notes.

My study was also based on my four research trips to China respectively in 1987, 1991, 1992, and 1993. During these trips I established and updated my research databases, and interviewed those who were involved in Beijing’s policy-making during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and those who have access to classified CCP documents (because of the political sensitivity involved in the issues under discussion, unless authorized by the interviewees, I do not identify their names, but I restrict myself to using unidentified interviews only when absolutely necessary). I have not been able to get close to Beijing’s CCP Central Archives (which, by the way, is located in the city’s remote western suburb). But by a combination of effort and good luck, I gained access to some important classified documents (including correspondences and telegrams of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other CCP leaders, and a few minutes of CCP leaders’ decision-making conferences) for the 1948-1950 period. To balance the need to protect my sources with the general practice of Western scholarship, I cite them in my book by pointing out their forms (telegram, correspondence, or minute), dates, and where their originals are maintained (the Chinese Central Archives or Chinese Military Archives). I believe that this is the best one can do in the current circumstances. It is my hope that China, my motherland, will follow the internationally accepted practice of declassifying historical documents on a legal basis, so that all researchers, including myself, will soon be able to get free access to them.


5. This approach can be found in a wide range of Chinese publications, such as Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., *Zhongguo renmin zhi yuanjun kangeyi yuanhao zhanshi* (History of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea by the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), chap. 1; Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo wojiaijun* (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1987), 37-38; Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, in “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” *The China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990) 94-115, attempt to offer an alternative to Whiting’s thesis but generally follow Whiting’s stress on Beijing’s concerns for the safety of the Chinese-Korean Border.

6. In a series of recent studies, scholars in the U.S. have begun to use the new Chinese sources. Russell Spurr’s *Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea* (New York: Newmarket, 1988) was the first one in this regard. Allegedly supported by “information which is based largely on hises and fiction-style imitation.” Harrison Salisbury devotes a whole chapter to China’s decision to enter the Korean War in his new book, *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), which is based on a few interviews and a haphazard reading of secondary Chinese sources. Lacking corroborative documentary sources, this book contains many errors. The studies by Michael Hunt and Thomas Christensen represent the best efforts to reinterpret China’s entrance into the Korean War with the support of new Chinese sources. Hunt, in “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” *Political Science Quarterly* 107:3 (Fall 1992), 453-478, offers enlightening analyses of Beijing’s management of the Korean Crisis and Mao’s direction of the CPY’s first-year operations in Korea. Christensen, in “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” *International Security* 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-154, uses Beijing’s response to the Korean crisis to challenge the traditional view based on deterrence theory. Also of note is Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), which offers interesting, though sometimes highly speculative, interpretations of the Sino-Soviet alliance and its relation to the origins of the Korean War.


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**WILSON CENTER ASIA PROGRAM BOOK ON CCP FOREIGN RELATIONS**


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the withdrawal of American troops from Korea, the 38th parallel lost its meaning; e) a counterattack was no longer possible since Seoul postponed its plans for an overall offensive against the North.6

Finally Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending, on 11 September 1949, instructions to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political, and international aspects of a possible attack on the South. The embassy gave a negative view on the matter (14 September 1949), and on 24 September 1949, the CPSU CC Politburo rejected the appeal of the North Koreans to start the war, concluding that the North Korean army was not prepared for such an attack militarily, that “little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle,” and that an unprovoked attack by the North “would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs.”7

As can be seen from this Politburo document, Moscow no longer flatly rejected the idea of military reunification of Korea. Instead it called upon Pyongyang to get better prepared for the operation. Evidently encouraged by this shift in the Kremlin’s mood, the North Korean leadership increased pressure to win Soviet support for the war. On 17 January 1950, Kim Il Sung complained to Soviet ambassador Shtykov: “I can’t sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause... is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people.” Kim Il Sung requested permission to make a new visit to the USSR to receive “orders and permission” from Stalin for the offensive.8

3. Stalin blesses the invasion

After ambassador Shtykov informed Moscow of this wave of demands by Pyongyang, Stalin (on 30 January 1950) replied (through diplomatic channels): “I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I’ll always be ready to receive him and talk to him... I am prepared to help him in this matter.”9

So, Stalin finally took the decision to initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the same time that the above mentioned exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was present in the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decision to launch an attack on the South as well as his invitation to Kim II Sung to come to Moscow.

Kim Il Sung and his delegation spent almost the whole of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was: ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means.10 Stalin gave his approval to an invasion of the South and outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR) and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington’s positions and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia.

Stalin was now more confident of the Communist bloc’s strength, less respectful of American capabilities and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves.

2. Stalin did not consult Mao in advance because he wanted to work out the plans for the Korean war himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it. While in Moscow Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was negative to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country.

4. China’s position on “liberating” the South

China was involved in the process of working out communist strategy in Korea in the late 1940s. Basically Mao supported Kim’s “desire to liberate” the South and even promised to help with troops if necessary. Mao, however, recommended not to hurry things up, to wait until the Chinese completed their revolutionary war.

In the beginning of May 1949, North Korean Politburo member Kim II had meetings with Chinese leaders. Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that a war in Korea could start at any moment. If the war dragged on, the Japanese could interfere, but this was not a reason for worry. Mao pointed out: “If necessary, we can throw in for you Chinese soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will not see the difference.” Mao at the same time warned Kim not to advance to the South in the near future. He cited the unfavorable situation in the world and the preoccupation of Chinese communists with the civil war. Mao Zedong recommended to postpone the war until China was united under the leadership of the Communist party.11

In the end of March 1950, Mao Zedong, talking to the North Korean ambassador, stressed that peaceful unification in Korea was impossible, it was necessary to employ military means. Mao said one should not be afraid of Americans because “they would not start a third world war over such a small territory.”12

After completion of Kim Il Sun’s April 1950 visit to the USSR, of which Mao seemed to know nothing, Stalin authorized the Soviet ambassador in China to tell the Chinese leadership the following: “Korean comrades visited us recently. I’ll inform you shortly about the results of our conversations.”13 Simultaneously Kim Il Sung requested a visit to Beijing to execute Stalin’s instructions: to continue with the war plans only if Chinese supported the idea. On the eve of the visit Kim Il Sung said to the Soviet ambassador that he did not intend to ask anything from the Chinese since “all his requests had been met in Moscow.”14

Upon hearing from Kim Il Sung about the decision to attack South Korea, Mao requested additional information from Stalin. On 14 May 1950 Stalin sent the following cable to Mao Zedong: “In the conversations with Korean comrades Filipov [Stalin’s alias] and his friends expressed the opinion
that due to the changed international situation they agreed with the proposals by the Koreans to set upon unification. The final decision of the issue must be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades disagree, the decision must be postponed till a new discussion.15

In talks with North Korean leaders Mao approved their analysis of the situation and stressed that he supported a speedy military solution of the Korean problem. He was sure of its success. Mao did not exclude the possibility of American interference. In such an event, China would help.16

5. Preparations for the war

Even before Kim Il Sung received, in January 1950, the first hints from the Kremlin that Stalin had become more favorably disposed to a war in Korea, Pyongyang had embarked upon a concerted effort to upgrade its military potential. Stalin responded positively. After Kim’s talks in Moscow in April 1950 the war was energetically prepared by the two sides jointly.

On June 1949 a special protocol was signed between the USSR and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) on military-technical assistance. Moscow agreed to supply its ally with large numbers of air force planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, engineering equipment, etc.17

At the end of 1949 Kim Il Sung again addressed himself to Moscow a request for large quantities of armaments and ammunitions necessary for the creation of new 5 round units and enlargement of the fleet.18 In March 1950, Kim Il Sung asked to use the Soviet credit allocated for 1951 in 1950 and to acquire additional quantities of military hardware; these requests were met.

In April 1950, leaders of the guerilla movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang to work out a program of action for before and after the invasion. On 12 May 1950, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador that his General Staff had already started to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to attack in June but was not sure that preparations could be completed by that time.19 By the end of May, the armaments which had been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan of the invasion was ready. Kim Il Sung insisted on an attack in June, not in July as Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that information about the imminent attack could leak to the South; and that in July rain would slow the advancement of troops.

While making final preparations for the war, the North continued a propaganda campaign, proposing initiatives on the peaceful unification of Korea. Initially the communists wanted to strike at the Ongjin peninsula, but at the last moment the strategy was changed. It was believed that Seoul had learned about the attack and beefed up its defenses in the Ongjin direction. The North Koreans now asked Moscow for permission to attack along the whole front.

Unfortunately the final period (May-June 1950) before the attack is not well documented, and additional research in the archives is required to get a clearer and more detailed picture of the final preparations by the communist side for the war.

6. The initial stage of the war

Throughout the initial stage of the Korean War Stalin was clearly in charge: his word was final on the date of the invasion, he told the Koreans how to fight and he kept instructing the Sino-Korean command on its every move. As for the mood of both Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was quickly changing for the worse as the adversary hit back harder and harder.

Already on 1 July 1950, Stalin seemed to be worried about a halt in the advancement of North Korean troops and the impact of American air raids on North Korean territory.20 Soviet Ambassador Shpykov admitted that American air raids had worsened the political mood in the North. Doubts regarding final victory surfaced and some officials began to hint that it was difficult for Pyongyang to rely purely on its own forces in the war with America.21 Meeting with the Soviet ambassador on July 3, Kim II Sung confirmed the seriousness of the situation on the front due to American bombing. He wanted Soviet advice on how to reorganize the command of the military actions, and also hoped for new supplies of weapons.

On July 8, Kim II Sung requested Soviet military advisers in order to strengthen his army. Stalin agreed to provide some of these advisers, but his main preoccupation was to give moral support to Pyongyang. In an August 28 cable to Kim, he emphasized the fact that “the great liberation struggle of the Korean people ... was conducted with brilliant success,” that Kim Il Sung “should not feel embarrassed ... because of delays in advancement and because of some local defeats... The biggest success of Korea is that it has become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the liberation movement in Asia against the imperialist yoke.”22 Kim Il Sung expressed deep gratitude to Stalin for this letter, and for “fatherly care and assistance.”23

But the outlook for the North Koreans soured following the successful U.S./UN landing at Inchon in mid-September. On September 27, the Soviet Politburo, frustrated by problems at the front, approved a letter to Ambassador Shpykov which contained devastating criticism of the North Korean military leadership and Soviet military advisers. The letter explained in detail what to do and how to do it in the course of the fighting. With the situation getting more and more complicated for the North Koreans, Stalin, after persistent requests from both Kim Il Sung and Moscow’s representatives in Korea, consented to station air force units in the North. Meanwhile, the situation for the communists was becoming desperate.24

The North Korean leadership forwarded on September 30 a letter to Stalin literally begging for direct military assistance by the Soviet Union or “volunteer units of China and other countries of people’s democracy.”25 Realizing that the situation was desperate, Moscow responded in the following ways: 1) giving constant advice to North Koreans on tactical matters; 2) withdrawing Soviet representatives from Korea; 3) preparing plans for the evacuation of the Pyongyang regime and its troops out of the country; 4) training troops for a comeback to Korea in the future; 5) pressuring the Chinese to enter the conflict.

7. China’s role in the war’s initial stage

As was mentioned earlier in this paper, China supported an attack on the South. However, quite soon Beijing became distressed and offended by the fact that the North Koreans did not consult with them and did not pay heed to their advice. Moscow attempted to calm the emotions of the Chinese.

On 2 July 1950, Zhou Enlai in a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin complained that the North Koreans had un-
derestimated the probability of American military intervention, ignoring Mao Zedong’s warnings back in May 1949 and 1950. Zhou passed on Mao’s advice to the North Koreans to create a strong defense line in the area of Inchon, because American troops could land there. The Chinese leadership feared landing operations by Americans in other parts of the Korean peninsula as well. In this conversation Zhou Enlai confirmed that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops, disguised as Koreans, would engage the opponent. Three Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden. Zhou inquired if it would be possible to cover these troops with the Soviet air force.26

By July 8, Stalin was already showing a certain irritation with China. In a cable to Ambassador Roshchin he ordered: “Tell Mao Zedong that Koreans complain that there is no representative of China in Korea. They should quickly send a representative... if, of course, Mao Zedong feels it is necessary to have a communication link with Korea.”27

On July 13, Stalin approved the Chinese decision to deploy troops in the vicinity of the Korean border and promised to train Chinese pilots and to provide China with military planes. In August-September 1950, on a number of occasions, Mao personally expressed concern over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean Peninsula “to mince” American divisions. Simultaneously the Chinese leaders complained that the North Korean military command had committed many mistakes and ignored Beijing’s recommendations. Moreover, Pyongyang did not even inform China of developments on the front.28

On September 20, Stalin in a cable to Mao agreed that it was not normal and correct that the North Korean leadership did not properly inform their Chinese comrades about the development of combat activities in Korea. Stalin, however, defended the Koreans, explaining the aforementioned fact by the lack of proper communications and noting that Moscow too had only received “sporadic and outdated” information from the front. Stalin reminded Mao that the (North) Korean People’s Army was very young and inexperienced and it had to fight against perfectly equipped foreign troops, not simply South Koreans.

In general, Moscow and Beijing held similar views at that time on the strategy and tactics of the war, though with the landing of Americans at Inchon, the mood in China started to change. In a conversation with Roshchin on September 21, Zhou Enlai admitted that there were persons in China who complained that the Korean war would drag on and would require sacrifices on the part of Chinese. It is also significant that China’s authorities leaked to the Soviets intelligence information, showing the Kremlin’s policy in Korea in a bad light. Thus, at one point Moscow was informed by Beijing that the British consul in the Chinese capital had reached the conclusion that the USSR and the USA had colluded in Korea, trying, with the help of the war there, to prevent China from capturing Taiwan, completing the civil war and becoming a strong power.29

8. Stalin pressures a reluctant China to enter the Korean war

On 1 October 1950, Stalin came to the conclusion that China had to come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime. On that day he sent an urgent message to Mao and Zhou asking them “to move to the 38th parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give our Korean comrades a chance to organize under the protection of your troops’ military reserves to the North of the 38th parallel.” Stalin added that Pyongyang was not informed of this request.30 It did not take Mao long to respond to Stalin’s cable. Mao declined to fulfill his own promise under the pretext that Chinese troops were not strong enough and a clash between China and the USA would ruin Beijing’s plans for peaceful reconstruction and could drag the USSR into a war with Washington. Instead, he suggested that the North Koreans accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.31

The Soviets were stunned with this unexpected change in China’s position. Stalin reminded the Chinese of their previous promises and urged them again to move into the conflict. The Soviet dictator tried to convince Beijing that the Americans would not dare to start a big war and would agree on a settlement on Korea favorable to the communist camp. Under such a scenario China would also solve the Taiwan issue. He added that even if the USA provoked a big war, “let it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the United States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the continent in the form of Rhee’s Korea.”32 Stalin informed Kim Il Sung about his attempts to persuade the Chinese and called upon the North Koreans “to hold firm to every piece of their land.” However, on 12 October 1950, the Soviet leader told Kim that the Chinese had refused again and that Korea had to be evacuated. On the next day, however, Stalin had better news: the Chinese, after long deliberations and discussions, had agreed to extend military aid to North Korea. Moscow in exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops and to provide them with air cover.33

According to available sources, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Two members of the Chinese leadership considered sympathetic to Moscow, Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was: if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution. Those who opposed participation, on the other hand, complained about Soviet refusal to participate in the conflict. Some even suggested that China should accept the American advance, even occupation by the USA of Manchuria—because in this case a war between Moscow and Washington would break out and China could stay away from trouble.

9. Chinese “volunteers” enter the Korean War, the communist camp is euphoric

After the entrance of Chinese “volunteers” into the Korean war in late November 1950, the mood of Stalin and Kim Il Sung (as well as that of Mao Zedong, of course) dramatically changed for the better. With every new success of the Chinese on the battlefield the desires and arrogance of Stalin and his allies grew (though they did feel their weak points and exchanged occasional complaints).

On December 1, Stalin cabled Mao: “Your successes make happy not only myself and my comrades in the leadership, but the entire Soviet people. Let me welcome from all my heart you and your friends in the leadership, your army and the entire Chinese people in connection with tremendous suc-
cesses in the struggle against American troops. On December 4, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, talking to the Chinese Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, advised Beijing to continue its successful offensive by crossing the 38th parallel. He stressed that the Chinese had to exploit the emerging opportunities to the full extent. Both sides agreed that Americans were confused and had fallen into a very unfavorable situation, that disagreements had developed between Washington and London. The Chinese ambassador quoted reports from the front that Americans were poor fighters, much worse than the Japanese.

On December 7, Stalin and Mao agreed to go on with the fighting and present at the United Nations tough conditions for a cease-fire. On 8 January 1951, in a cable announcing the further advance of Chinese troops, Stalin wrote: “From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades on the capture of Seoul. This is a great victory of popular patriotic forces over forces of reaction.” On January 16, Mao suggested to Kim Il Sung to reinforce and to restructure joint forces in Korea (in order “not to repeat mistakes committed by the Korean troops from June to September 1950”). After a certain rest, Mao proposed that a spring (April/May) offensive could start “with the purpose of achieving the final solution of the South Korean issue.” Mao did not exclude that the Americans, having learned about serious preparations on the Chinese-North Korean side, would cease resisting and leave the Korean peninsula. But even if Washington continued to resist, it would soon realize that resistance was futile and evacuate its troops from Korea.

On January 19, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao’s plan of a rest and thorough preparation for the final assault (though Pak Hon-Yong tried to hurry things up). It was also agreed that the North Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese participation was needed.

10. Euphoria disappears

By the end of January 1951, as documents testify, the communists’ euphoria started to decline; soon it disappeared, replaced by worries, fear, confusion, and at times panic. Reading the documents, one also senses growing irritation among the ranks of the communist allies. It is also noticeable that Stalin tried to keep the USSR as much as possible out of direct participation in the war—if he agreed to send Soviet advisers, pilots and other military personnel to Korea once in a while, every time he did so only after repeated pleas by Mao and Kim. Stalin did not always satisfy the requests of his allies about supplies of armaments, but for objective reasons: they wanted more than the USSR, still weak after WWII and engaged in a global Cold War, could provide.

On January 28, Mao informed Stalin that the adversary had begun an unexpected offensive and due to this the communist troops lost the opportunity to rest and to undergo a restructuring. Instead they had to launch a counterattack. After achieving an operational success the Chinese side hoped to resume preparation for the final assault on the South. Stalin promptly agreed with the strategy, stressing that “from the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that Inchon and Seoul are not captured by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops give a serious rebuff to the advancing troops of the adversary.”

In late January/early February 1951, Stalin criticized the structure, organization, and quality of the Korean armed forces, suggesting substantial changes. His proposals were immediately accepted by the Koreans and supported by Beijing. By that time the first reports of the falling spirit of the Korean troops reached Beijing and Moscow. That the situation for the communist side continued to deteriorate is quite clear from a cable sent by Mao to Stalin on 1 March 1951, in which the Chinese leader admitted that a general offensive was no longer possible, that the adversary had superiority in weapons and dominated the air, and that Sino-Korean troops were sustaining heavy losses and urgently needed air cover by Soviet air force units. Mao stressed that the communist side must prepare for a long war and admitted that American troops will not be driven out of Korea for at least a number of years.

Stalin satisfied Mao’s requests, immediately noting that large-scale military operations were in the offering for Sino-Korean troops. In the following months Moscow promptly and favorably responded to all other requests of the Chinese, concerning first of all airplanes and air defense.

Meanwhile, further correspondence between the USSR and the PRC reveals that the fighting spirit of the communist side continued to deteriorate as that of the Americans improved. The situation got so bad that Stalin felt it necessary to criticize Mao for wrong tactics employed in the war.

11. Communists seek an armistice

By June 1951 the situation at the front became so hopeless for the communists that they started to seek a way out. The question of an armistice was raised by the North Koreans and Chinese. Stalin had no choice but to agree. Maneuvers around the armistice talks did not, however, prevent the communists from looking for every opportunity to reinforce the army, to gain territory and to strike at the opposite side. At the same time the communists constantly worried about attacks by the opposite side. The conditions presented by the communists for an armistice were inflexible. It is also worth noting that Stalin flatly refused to direct the armistice negotiations and quite rudely told Mao to do the job. Another prominent feature of this period was constant bargaining between Stalin and Mao about Soviet military supplies and military advisers. Mao kept bombarding Stalin with new requests, and the Kremlin chief continued to rebuff Mao, sometimes with visible irritation.

In June 1951, Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow, where they convinced Stalin to agree to the necessity of an armistice-seeking policy. However, at the same time the communists discussed measures to beef up their military capabilities and to prepare for an offensive in August. In ensuing communications, tactics were worked out on who would raise the issue of the armistice first and how it would be done. It was also decided to insist on restoration of the border line along the 38th parallel and on a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao suggested to raise, for the sake of bargaining, the issue of Taiwan and then to drop it. Simultaneously China requested from the USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin gave the OK, though he rebuked the Chinese for trying to get all the weapons during one year, explaining that it was “physically impossible and totally unthinkable.”

Preparing for the negotiations, Mao cabled Stalin: “It is extremely important that you personally take charge of the negotiations in order to prevent us from getting
Stalin rejected the idea, saying: “In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It’s you, comrade Mao Zedong, who’ll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim II Sung. You must have direct communication with him.”

To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be more active on the front, to put additional pressure on the adversary as well as to improve their own defenses in case the other side would try to gain a military advantage.

Measures were also taken to upgrade the overall military potential of North Korea, making it ready for a prolonged war. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as much as he was able, except for the advisers. Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for extravagant requests for weapons and unwillingness to share them with the North Koreans.

My analysis concludes here, leaving for other contributions a reexamination of the strategy and tactics of the communist side at the armistice talks and in the final stage of the war. In conclusion, I would like to stress that further archival research is needed to get definite answers to the following aspects of communist politics in the Korean war:

1. The exact reasons for the reversal of Stalin’s position on “the liberation” of South Korea.
2. The real motives behind China’s initial refusal to enter the Korean War, and the total picture of Soviet-Chinese interactions on Korea in 1949-1950.
3. The detailed process of communist preparations for the war.
4. The events of the first days of the war and reaction to these events in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang.
5. What further strategy Stalin had in mind when he ordered North Korean communists to evacuate the country in the autumn of 1950.

See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambassador Shtykov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1949, APRF.

2. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46.
3. Shtykov report to Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF). See also Marshal Vasilevsky and Ambassador Shpykov’s cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, APRF.
4. See, e.g., Stalin cable to Shpykov, 30 October 1949, APRF.
5. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46.
6. See, e.g., memorandums of conversations of ambassador Shpykov with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong, 12 and 14 August 1949, and Charge d’Affaires Tunkin’s cable to Moscow on 3 September 1949, AVP RF.
7. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 776, pp. 30-32.
8. See Shpykov cable to Stalin, 19 January 1950, AVP RF.
9. Stalin’s cable to Shpykov, 30 January 1950, AVP RF.
10. See Shpykov cable to Stalin, 23 March 1950, AVP RF.
11. See Shpykov cable to Stalin, 15 May 1949, AVP RF; cable to Stalin by General Kovalev about a conversation with Mao Zedong, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61.
12. Shpykov cable to Moscow, 12 May 1950, AVP RF.
15. Coded message N 5500, 14 May 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55.
16. See Ambassador Roshchin’s cable to Moscow, 14 June 1950, AVP RF.
17. APRF, Fond 6, list 9, file 14, p. 57.
18. Shpykov cable to Stalin, 1 January 1950, AVP RF.
19. Shpykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950, AVP RF.
20. Coded message N 34691/osh, 1 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, p. 104.
22. Coded message N 75021, 28 August 1950, ibid., pp. 5-6, 10-11.
27. Stalin cable to Roshchin, 8 July 1950.
28. See, e.g., Mao’s conversations with Soviet acade-
mician on 19 and 28 August 1950, and Zhou’s com-
ments on 14 September 1950 to Roshchin.
29. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 13 July 1950, AVP RF.
30. Coded message N 4581, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 334, pp. 97-98.
32. See Stalin’s cable to Kim Il Sung (quoting Stalin’s earlier message to Mao), 8 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 65-67.
33. Coded message N 4829, 14 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 343, p. 77.
34. Coded message N 9768. APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, p. 5.
35. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 371, pp. 35-37.
36. Ibid., list 1, file 336, pp. 88-90.
37. See coded message N 15603, 16 January 1951, APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, pp. 81-82.
38. Coded message 15994, 21 January 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 335, pp. 37-40.
39. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, p. 44.
40. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 47-48.
41. Ibid., Fond 3, list 65, file 828, p. 123.
42. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 78-82.
43. Ibid., p. 118.
44. See, e.g., the coded message N 20412, June 1951, ibid., file 339, pp. 4-6.
46. Coded message N 3557, 13 June 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 31-32; see also file 339, pp. 61-63.
47. Coded message N 635177, 24 June 1951, ibid., file 339, p. 78.
49. Coded message N 3917, 30 June 1951, ibid., pp. 95-96.

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The Cold War International History Project awards a limited number of fellowship for scholars from countries on “the other side” of the Cold War to conduct up to one year of archival research in the United States. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Applications should include: CV; letter of nomination and three letters of recommendation; research proposal, indicating topic to be investigated and sources to be utilized; writing samples in English welcomed, though not required. Applicants should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States. Applications may be sent or faxed to: Jim Herschberg Cold War International History Project Woodrow Wilson Center 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW Washington, D.C. 20560 USA Fax: (202) 357-4439 E-mail: wwciem123@sivm.si.edu

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SHTYKOV
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In the diaries, of course, Shhtykov wrote much about strictly military affairs. However, the majority of the diaries were devoted to the political and economic situation in Korea after the liberation from Japanese occupation in August 1945. The first volume deals with the September 1946 General Strike, the October 1946 Uprising, and the merger of the three leftist parties in the south; volume two covers the election for the People’s committees of provinces, cities, and counties, and the Assemblies of the Committees in North Korea; the third volume includes the Second Soviet-American Joint Commission, when Shhtykov himself was the head of the Soviet Delegation; and finally volume four covers the cabinet formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).

Most important, the diaries vividly show that the Soviet Stationary/Occupation Army intervened deeply in and exerted an enormous influence on not only North Korean but also South Korean politics.8

The merger of the three leftist parties and the September General Strike/October Uprising in the south are the two most conspicuous examples of the Soviet intervention.9 In the case of the merger of the parties, the Soviet Army played the role of moderator and leader in the process. Interestingly, despite the efforts by Shhtykov and the Soviet Army to make Kim Il Sung the representative of the will of the Soviets, the South Korean leftist leaders preferred to deal with the Soviets directly rather than with Kim Il Sung. This demonstrates that the leftist leaders in the south did not yet approve Kim’s leadership. In the process of the merger, the Soviet Army consistently supported Pak Hon-yong, head of the Korean Communist Party (KCP). The reasons were, first of all, that Pak controlled the biggest leftist party in the south; and second, that Pak’s transition of policy from cooperation to confrontation with the U.S. Occupation Government was consistent with that of the Soviet Army in the north. The Soviet leaders in the north, through Kim Il Sung, tried to persuade or even threaten leftist leaders in the south, who were against the merger, into accepting Pak Hon-yong’s line and the merger. For instance, when Kang Jin, a leftist leader in the south who was against the merger, visited North Korea, Kim Il Sung, apparently under the direction of Shhtykov, met with Kang and reported the details of the meeting to Shhtykov on 22 October 1946.10

I met with Kang Jin. I told him that he had to take full responsibility for the failure of the merger. I also told him, “Although I don’t know whether you are a running-dog of American Imperialism, you are helping Americans enormously.... Comrade Pak Hon-yong’s decision is not only his but also 400,000 North Korean Party members’.... You have to admit that you made a mistake if you truly want to be a real revolutionary which you have not been.”

After the success of the merger, Shhtykov ordered General Romanenko, the Director of the Soviet Military Administration in the north, to telegraph Pak Hon-yong as follows: “Congratulations on the hard-earned but successful merger.”11 Even after the merger, Shhtykov and the Soviet leaders closely worked with Pak and even supported him financially from time to time.12

It has been a widely accepted view that the September General Strike and the October Taegu Riot (or Uprising) in the south had nothing to do with the Soviets. However, the Shhtykov Diaries shed new light on this issue. The strike and the riot broke out to a certain extent spontaneously under KCP leadership. But the incidents themselves provoked the intervention of Soviet leaders in the north. On the other hand, Communist leaders in the south had to consult with the Soviets when the General Strike transformed into an armed riot. In their wholehearted support for the strike, however, Shhtykov and the Soviet leaders did not refrain from giving advice: Shhtykov gave specific instructions to Communist leaders in the south, and these leaders often asked for the instructions of the Soviet leaders in the north.13 For example, Shhtykov wrote in his diary on 28 September 1946:

As regard to the strike, I instructed as follows:

Continue the struggle until the demands of various economic claims, wage increase for workers, the release of the leftist leaders from prison, the cancellation of the warrant of arrests of Communist leaders, and revived publication of banned leftist newspapers are met.

Stop the strike when the demands are met.

Declare that [the strikers] will continue to talk with the American Occupation Government on the issue of transition of power to People’s Committee [in the south].

Demand that the American Occupation Government not oppress the organizers and supporters of the strike.

Probably the most striking evidence of intervention was that Shhtykov funneled 2 million yen to support the General Strike and later 3 million yen for the October Riot.14

There are some problems in analyzing the diaries. First, the information in the diaries is so fragmentary that it is nearly impossible for us to understand completely how certain situations evolved. They also contain many abbreviations which can be understood only by the author himself and grammatical errors which are open to a variety of interpretations. Above all, Shhtykov wrote as if he were giving orders to Korean leftist leaders: according to the diaries, the Korean leaders were simply automatons. Therefore we must interpret historical events very carefully, comparing information from the diaries and that from other sources.

Still, the Shhtykov diaries are undoubtedly among the most important documents to emerge on Soviet policy toward Korea from 1945 to 1951 and the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia. From the diaries, it is evident that Shhtykov and the Soviet Army in North Korea played a major role in the decision-making: Soviet policies in Korea were planned at Shhtykov’s desk and approved by the higher ranking Soviet army leaders and later by Moscow. After he received approval from Moscow, the diaries suggest, Shhtykov and his lieutenants carefully choreographed and directed the political drama of North Korean (and sometimes South Korean) politics. Although not all of
them were puppets of the Soviet Army, it is evident that North Korean Communist leaders like Kim Il Sung were under the tutelage of the Soviet Army. Even though the Soviet Army leaders tried to make their rule look like an indirect one, their intervention was always direct and full-scale. In other words, the Shtykov diaries show that the Soviet Army in North Korea was a de facto Occupation Army, not merely a “Stationary Army.” In addition, we now know from the diaries that the Soviets were more deeply involved in politics and social unrest in the south than we had known previously; leftist parties in the north and south were strongly dependent upon the Soviets in the north and, ultimately, Moscow.

2. Zhdanov was the First Secretary of the party committee of Leningrad. Shykov had absolute loyalty to Zhdanov. When Zhdanov died on 31 August 1948, Shykov expressed his deep grief over his death in his diary. Diaries, 31 August, 1, 3 September 1948.
3. When the Communist regime was established in North Korea, Stalin immediately appointed Shykov to this important post. Interestingly enough, Shytocv refused the offer at first because of his heart problem. However, he could not refuse Molotov’s urgent request along with promise to send Shytov to a center for medical treatment and provide him with competent aides. See Diaries, 2 December 1948.
4. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1980), 544
5. Ibid.
6. His memoirs stopped at the years of his childhood. Interview in 1995 with Viktor Terentevich Shytov, General Shytov’s son, in St.Petersburg.
7. For example, Kravtsov, a special aide to Shytov, recollected that he had burned in the 1950s all of his documents, including reports he had written.
8. For convenience’s sake, I use North Korea and South Korea although there were only the de jure U.S. Occupation Government in the south and de facto Soviet Occupation Government in the north from 1945-1948.
9. The 3 November 1946 election in North Korea was another example.
11. Diaries, 2 December 1946.
12. Diaries, 6, 7, 11. 12, 25, 27 December 1946
13. Diaries, 28 September, 7, 8, 22 December 1946.
14. At that time one seon of rice (a big sack of rice) cost 15 yen in the north and 150 yen in the south).

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DMITRII VOLKOGONOV
(1928-1995)


Having been an orthodox Communist for most of his life, Volkogonov in the 1990s shifted toward a strongly anti-Communist position. As recently as when he wrote his books on Stalin and Trotsky, he had glorified Lenin. But by the time he completed his study of Lenin in 1994, Volkogonov had concluded that the founder of Bolshevism was in fact a “savage, cruel, uncompromising, remorseless, and vengeful” figure. Volkogonov said he had found it “painful” to “shed [his] illusions” about the Soviet regime, but shed them he did. His final books provide overwhelming support for his ideological change of heart.

In late 1991, Volkogonov was appointed head of a special parliamentary commission to oversee the handling of archives from the Soviet period. In that capacity, he helped secure the release of many valuable documents, including items from the Presidential Archive, the collection of highly-sensitive materials kept under the personal control of Soviet and then Russian leaders. Even so, critics of Volkogonov frequently charged that he exploited his privileged access to the archives and held back from circulation the most significant or sensational documents for his own use. After a lengthy article along these lines appeared in the newspaper Izvestiya in July 1994, Volkogonov sent a letter to the editor asserting that he had enjoyed no special access for his Stalin and Trotsky biographies, and that virtually all the documents he used for his Lenin book were “accessible to everyone.” Partly as a result of this controversy, the translator’s preface to the English edition of the Lenin biography was modified to include a pledge that all documents cited in the book, including those from the Presidential Archive, would be made available to all researchers.

Unfortunately, the access envisaged in that pledge has not yet materialized. Russian and foreign scholars who worked in the Russian archives in 1995 (including myself) were summarily turned down when they requested access to documents adduced in the Lenin book. Whether because of bureaucratic inertia or some other motive, most of the senior archival officials in Moscow displayed no interest in gathering and making available the items that Volkogonov cited. One hopes that with Volkogonov’s death, a renewed effort will be made to release for open research the many documents he employed to such good effect. That would be a fitting tribute to a courageous historian.

—Mark Kramer
Russian Research Center
Harvard University
At 5:45 a.m. on 15 September 1950, the 5th Marine Brigade of the X Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond began its unprecedented amphibious landing onto the beaches of Inch’on. There were about 500 North Korean soldiers on Wolmi-do, a tiny island protecting the entry into the Inch’on harbor, another 500 at Kimpo, and about 1,500 within Inch’on. They were confronted with more than 70,000 troops from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Holland, and the UK disembarking from more than 260 ships. The surprise of the UN attack, and the preponderant firepower and manpower of the U.S.-led forces, destroyed pockets of the dazed North Korean resistance within hours. By the next morning the 1st Marines had been able to squeeze the remnants of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) out of Inch’on and had started their rapid advance towards Kimpo and Seoul. Operation Chromite was a complete success and later labeled as “a masterpiece of amphibious ingenuity.” In a little more than a week Seoul was recaptured by the UN forces. On 1 October 1950, they crossed the 38th parallel, and began their rapid, sweeping advance northward. The KPA surrendered Pyongyang on October 19, and soon the first Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. battalions approached the Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean border.

However, U.S./UN Commander Douglas MacArthur’s promise to “Bring the Boys Home by Christmas” never came true. The Thanksgiving offensive proved still-born, for it was a new enemy that the UN troops confronted in Korea from then on: 36 divisions of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) who entered North Korea in late October-early November, supported by almost twelve wings and air defense divisions of the Soviet Air Force operating from nearby airfields in Northeast China. Recognizing new patterns in the enemy’s behavior, in his special communiqué to the UN dated 28 November 1950, MacArthur called it “an entirely new war.” Indeed, it was.

In the Western literature there are many scholarly and eyewitness accounts of the preparation, implementation, and strategic and military significance of Operation Chromite, as well as the subsequent prosecution of the war by the UN forces, including the origins and aftermath of the reversal of fortunes for the UN troops in November 1950. In addition, in his 1960 study *China Crosses the Yalu*, Allen S. Whiting persuasively showed how national security concerns, as well as domestic political and economic considerations, may have led the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government to decide to enter the Korean War. His preliminary conclusions were supported almost three decades later by Russell Spurr, who focused his research on the psychological background of the Chinese leaders’ decision to provide military assistance to a friendly communist regime in Pyongyang.

Then, a wave of memoirs published in the PRC by former high-ranking Chinese officials, military leaders, and other insiders allowed scholars to reconstruct in great detail the relevant decision-making processes in Beijing and Northeast China regarding the merits of Chinese military intervention in Korea, including debates within the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and among PLA senior commanders. These works also brought to light some differences in the individual positions of Chinese leaders, including last-minute doubts, reversals, disagreements, and vacillations on the part of those involved, and analyzed the correspondence between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and their military officials, as well as other political, economic, military, and administrative events related to the war which occurred in China in August-October 1950.

However, what this literature still left to speculation was the Soviet side of the story. Some of the books, especially *Uncertain Partners* (1993), by Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, and William W. Stueck’s recently-published *The Korean War: An International History*, discuss strategic calculations which Stalin might have made at this crucial juncture of the Korean War, the course and outcome of crucial negotiations between Stalin and Zhou Enlai on 10-11 October 1950, as well as the still-enigmatic October 1950 correspondence between Beijing and Moscow. But due to the unavoidable lack of hard top-level archival evidence, these accounts fell far short of being able to reconstruct in detail the attitudes and policy orientations of Stalin or other key Soviet leaders in Moscow and their representatives on the ground in Korea, nor the decision-making processes taking place inside the Kremlin immediately after the U.S. landing at Inch’on and leading up to the final Chinese decision a month later to intervene militarily in Korea. Moreover, this literature suffered from the lack of previously classified Moscow-Pyongyang top-level correspondence, and to rely primarily on the officially authorized, at times propagandistic Chinese sources of the exchanges between the PRC and USSR leaders.

This absence of critical Soviet source materials, consequently, gave birth to a number of academic debates. First, many scholars disagree in their assessments of Soviet and Chinese intentions and motivations in Northeast Asia and the nature and parameters of their respective perceived national interests on the Korean peninsula at this stage of the war. Second, an overarching debate among historians involves a series of interrelated questions about alliance commitments between Moscow and Beijing—what commitments were made, why and how they were reached, whether they were broken or honored, and how they affected the subsequent course of Sino-Soviet relations (a good example of this is the claim advanced in some Chinese accounts that Stalin, in his 10-11 October 1950 meeting with Zhou, reneged on a prior commitment for the USSR to provide air support for the CPVs). This debate includes controversies related to the personal roles of Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung in manipulating one another’s decisions regarding the war, especially the initial decision to initiate a large-scale attack against the south in June 1950 and later over China’s intervention. There is also a cloud of uncertainty over the role of...
Zhou Enlai as an intermediary between Stalin and Mao in managing (mismanaging?) the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the role of the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang in the initial stages of the war, T.F. Shytkov, as an intermediary between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in the ill-fated handling of the USSR-DPRK alliance.

Shortly before the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the Russian government released a new batch of previously classified documents related to the events on the Korean peninsula from 1949 to 1953, including some correspondence between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong, internal correspondence between the Kremlins and various Soviet government ministries involved in the prosecution of the war in Korea, and ciphered telegrams between Soviet representatives in North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and their respective superiors in Moscow. In total, these new primary source materials amount to well over a thousand pages and come from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from the Military Archive at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

This article introduces and analyzes a selection of these newly declassified documents from the Russian Archives related to the period after the U.S.-UN troops’ landing at Inch’on on 16 September 1950, until mid-October 1950, when the PRC decided to send its troops to Korea to save Kim Il Sung’s collapsing regime. The newly released documents primarily from the APRF, offer new information and insights into how Stalin and his political representatives and military advisers in Korea; Kim Il Sung and his close associates; and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and their personal representatives in Korea, viewed and assessed the strategic and military significance of the UN forces’ landing at Inch’on, recapture of Seoul, crossing of the 38th parallel, and drive to the Yalu. These new archival materials provide researchers with a fascinating window into the internal dynamics and politics of alliance relationships among the Soviet Union, PRC, and the DPRK from the aftermath of the Inch’on landing until the Chinese crossing of the Yalu River. They present startling new evidence on the commonalities and differences in the Soviet and Chinese world views, and their respective views on the limits of the U.S. global power and likelihood of a U.S.-led escalation of the Korean conflict, as well as on the varied significances of Korea, divided or unified, for the Soviet versus Chinese national interests. Also, the newly declassified early October 1950 correspondence between Moscow and Beijing sheds dramatic new light on intra-alliance bargaining between Stalin and Mao Zedong regarding the terms of China’s entry into the Korean War, which is at variance with the traditional Chinese and Western interpretations thereof. In particular, these Russian documents raise questions about the reliability and even authenticity of Mao’s telegrams of 2 and 14 October 1950 as they appear in officially authorized Chinese sources, and subsequently in scholarly literature. They also reveal the depth of Stalin’s and Mao’s personal involvement and the complexity of policymaking processes in Moscow and Beijing regarding the prosecution of the Korean War, as well as how domestic political considerations and bureaucratic politics in the USSR and PRC affected their respective policy outcomes concerning military strategy and tactics. Finally, they reveal for the first time a series of decisions by the Soviet leadership to reduce the Soviet presence in Korea at that time, including three CPSU Politburo conferences (on 27 and 30 September 1950 and 5 October 1950) which considered the Chinese leadership’s pronounced reluctance to accommodate Stalin’s prodding of Mao to send troops to rescue the DPRK, leading to Stalin’s 13 October 1950 decision to abandon North Korea and evacuate Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA to Northeast China and the Soviet Far East, as well as his dramatic reversal less than twenty-four hours later upon learning of the Chinese final decision to fight.

The value of the ciphered telegrams lies in the fact that they reveal the atmosphere of mutual finger-pointing which reigned in the offices of the Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese decision-makers after the Inch’on landing. In the internal correspondence between Stalin and the Soviet political and military advisers in Korea, Stalin blamed them for all the KPA failures in the Korean campaign, whereas in his correspondence with Kim Il Sung Stalin blamed the KPA commanders for military defeats, while in his exchange with Mao Zedong, Stalin held Kim II Sung and his Korean generals responsible for failures at the battleground. In turn, Zhou Enlai blamed Kim Il Sung for withholding military intelligence from the Chinese and for ignoring Mao’s warnings, issued as early as mid-August, about the danger of a U.S. landing at Inch’on. Kim Il Sung, in turn, blamed his commanders for insubordination, Stalin for lack of commitment, and his Soviet advisers for professional ineptitude. Reading the newly declassified Russian telegrams, it is hard not to conclude that these mutual recriminations undermined palpably the mutual trust among the leaders of these communist allies.

The ciphered telegrams also reveal the atmosphere of confusion and discord that permeated relations between the Soviet and Chinese leaders and their respective representatives and associates in Korea regarding the military-strategic significance of the Inch’on landing. Stalin considered the Inch’on landing a development of vital strategic significance, fraught with grave implications for the KPA [Document #3]. Therefore, in his ciphered telegram dated 18 September 1950, he directed that Gen. Vasilevich, the Chief Soviet Military Adviser to the KPA, and Ambassador T.F. Shytkov, the Soviet envoy to the DPRK, tell Kim Il Sung to redeploy four KPA divisions from the Naktong River front to the vicinity of Seoul. Also on September 18, he ordered Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky to urgently develop a plan for the Soviet Air Force to provide air cover to Pyongyang, including the transfer of several Soviet Air Force fighter squadrons with maintenance crews, radar posts, and air defense battalions from their bases in the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East (including the strategic port city of Vladivostok) to the airfields around Pyongyang [Document #1].

In contrast with Stalin’s judgment, neither Shytkov nor Vasilevich seemed to grasp, let alone forecast, the strategic importance of the U.S. troops’ amphibious landing at Inch’on—as Stalin harshly admonished them in a withering message on September 27 [Document #3]. They believed it was a bluff aimed at distracting the attention of the KPA Command from the main southeastern front. Shytkov even suggested that an author of an article in the Soviet newspaper Pravda about the Inch’on landing should be brought to
trial for disinformation and panicking. In their correspondence with Stalin, they doubted the need to redeploy KPA troops from the Naktong River front to the defense of Seoul, instead favoring a strategy of exerting additional pressure on the southeastern front in order to throw the U.S. and ROK troops defending the Pusan perimeter off the cliffs into the Sea of Japan in a final great offensive. Consequently, they dragged their feet in executing Stalin's order to withdraw four KPA divisions from the Southeast to the vicinity of Seoul.

As the military situation around Seoul deteriorated due to the rapid advance of the U.S. X Corps toward the ROK capital from the west, and their recapture of Kimp'o on September 18, Stalin urgently dispatched to Korea a special mission headed by Army General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov,11 (known by the pseudonym Matveyev), the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army, carried Stalin's order that Shyt(y)kov and Vasiliev tell Kim II Sung to halt the offensive along the Pusan perimeter, to assume the defensive and pull out all his divisions from the Naktong River front and redeploy them to defend Seoul in the northeast and east. Also, he pressed Vasilievsky to step up his efforts to provide the KPA with air cover and set up an air defense system around Pyongyang (see Document #2). Finally, Stalin directed his representative in Beijing to solicit the Chinese leadership's opinion on the Korean situation and what to do about it.

On the night of September 18, Stalin received a ciphered telegram from his Ambassador to the PRC, N.V. Roshchin.12 Roshchin informed Stalin of his meeting the same day with Zhou Enlai, with the Soviet Military Advisers Gen. Kotov and Konnov present. Zhou said that the Chinese leadership had no other information about the U.S. amphibious landing at Inch'on besides that reported in the Western newspapers and by the Pyongyang Radio. Zhou noted that, in general, the Chinese had very poor contacts with the North Korean government regarding military matters. The Chinese were aware of the North Korean demand for cadres but were absolutely in the dark about the KPA's operational plans. They had attempted to dispatch a team of senior Chinese military officers from the Northeast Frontier Forces Command to Korea to observe the military situation on the battleground, but had not heard anything from them.13 Zhou complained that the DPRK leaders had persistently ignored Mao Zedong’s advice and predictions and, moreover, deprived the Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang, Ni Zhiliang, of operational information about the military situation, thereby preventing him from informing his government properly in a timely fashion. As a result, Mao had only sketchy reports about the execution and consequences of the Inch’on landing.

In response to Roshchin's question about the appropriate course of action for the KPA at this juncture, Zhou recommended with some reservations that, if the KPA had 100,000-men reserves in the vicinity of Seoul and Pyongyang, they could and must eliminate the enemy's landing force at Inch’on. If, however, the KPA lacked such reserves, then they had to withdraw their main forces from the Naktong River front northward, leaving rear-guards behind to defend the frontline. On behalf of the PRC government, Zhou requested that the Soviet government pass to the Chinese leadership more accurate and up-to-date information on the military situation in Korea, if it possessed it itself.

On September 20, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Roshchin in Beijing for delivery to Zhou Enlai, responding to the latter's request for more information on the Korean situation.14 First of all, he stressed that poor communications between the DPRK and PRC and lack of information in Beijing on the military situation in Korea was “abnormal.” In Stalin's opinion, Kim Il Sung failed to provide Mao Zedong with military intelligence because of difficulties in his own communications with his Frontline Command rather than his reluctance to share this kind of information. Stalin complained that he himself received odd and belated reports about the frontline situation from his Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shyt(y)kov). He asked Zhou to bear in mind that the KPA was a very young and ill-experienced army with an underdeveloped command and control system and weak cadres unable to analyze the frontline situation quickly and efficiently. He blamed the U.S. intervention for the unfavorable conditions of the Korean people were ready to fight a protracted war.”15

In the meantime, on September 22, the 5th and 7th regiments of the 1st U.S. Marines Division approached Seoul from the northwest and northeast, while the 32nd and 17th regiments of the ROK 7th Division advanced to Seoul from southeast, preparing for the final stage of Operation Chromite: the recapture of the capital. There was a general feeling that Seoul was about to fall. On September 23, the U.S.-UN-ROK forces launched a frontal assault on Seoul; at the same time the Eighth Army’s general offensive in the South, unleashed on September 16, began to bear fruit, and the KPA fell apart at the Naktong River front.

Upon arrival in Korea, General Zakharov (Matveyev) sent his first ciphered telegram to Stalin on September 26 [Document #4]. He reported that the situation of the People’s Army troops on the western (Seoul) and southeastern (Pusan) fronts was grave; that the KPA’s First and Second Armies faced the certain prospect of being encircled and completely destroyed by the enemy troops; and that the U.S. Air Force dominated the air space without hinderance, wreaking havoc both within the KPA and in the rear areas. He noted that the KPA troops had suffered heavy losses, mainly from the enemy's air force, having lost almost all its tanks and much of its artillery; and that they lacked munitions and fuel, the delivery of
which was virtually halted. He stressed that the KPA’s top-down command and control system was set up poorly, that wire and radio communications worked only intermittently because of the breakdowns inflicted by the enemy’s air raids and due to the lack of qualified radio operators and radio station fuel, and that courier mail was almost nonexistent.

On September 25-26, Seoul became “an inferno,”16 with the U.S. Marines advancing into Seoul from the South, North, and West, and methodically destroying over 20,000 North Korean troops making a last-ditch stand. According to Zakharov’s ciphered telegram [Document #4], on September 25, at 19:00 hours, local time, Kim II Sung was finally persuaded to abandon his dream of pushing the UN troops into the sea in the south. He succumbed to his Soviet advisers’ urging and ordered that the Seoul Group and the Second Army Group operating in the northern part of the southeastern front assume the defensive and hold up the enemy by any means. The troops of the Second Army Group operating in the central and southern parts of the southeastern front were ordered to begin a general retreat northwestward. But the North Korean troops in the South no longer obeyed their commanders; the KPA was rapidly disintegrating. In Zakharov’s judgment, at that time the North’s top political and military leaders already had no idea about the predicament of the KPA troops, in particular on the southeastern front.

On September 26, the ROK 7th Division moving westward from Namsan district, after having crossed the Han River, joined hands with the U.S. 5th and 7th Marines. Although some North Korean resistance, including suicide squads attacking American tanks, continued fiercely until the afternoon of September 27, by and large the battle for Seoul was over as the night fell. According to Zakharov’s ciphered telegram [Document #4], later that night, Kim II Sung received him; DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong and Shhtykov also attended. As a result of the conversation, Kim Il Sung decided to combine the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister in his own hands, to set up a Staff Office for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for command and control over troops, and to pay serious attention to the work of the rear. Zakharov reported that the North Koreans had only just started to form six infantry divisions in the northern part of Korea, and that Kim Il Sung had issued a directive to take immediate steps to withdraw manpower from South Korea in order to use it in the formation of new divisions in North Korea and deny this opportunity to the South.

Stalin was furious. On September 27, he convened an emergency session of the Politburo of the Supreme Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshhevik) [Document #3]. This was the first in a series of CC VKR(b) Politburo meetings which considered Soviet national interests in Korea and eventually decided to minimize Soviet exposure on the peninsula. In its decision P#78/73, the Politburo blamed the KPA’s predicament in the Seoul area and in the southeast on a series of grave mistakes made by the KPA Frontline Command, the Commands of the Army Groups and army groupings in the questions related to command and control over troops, and combat tactics. In particular, Stalin and his associates in Moscow held responsible the Soviet military advisers for these blunders. In their judgment, the Soviet military advisers had failed to implement scrupulously and in a timely fashion Stalin’s order to withdraw four divisions from the central front to the Seoul area, and had displayed, moreover, strategic illiteracy and incompetence in intelligence matters. “They failed to grasp the strategic importance of the enemy’s assault landing in Inch’on, denied the gravity of its implications... This blindness and lack of strategic experience led to the fact that they doubted the necessity of redeploying troops from the South toward Seoul. At the same time, they procrastinated over the redeployment and slowed it down considerably, thereby losing a week to the enemy’s enjoyment.” The Politburo stated that “the assistance provided by our military advisers to the Korean Command in such paramount questions as communications, command and control over troops, organization of intelligence and combat is exceptionally weak.”17 In conclusion, the Politburo decided that after the fall of Seoul the KPA’s main goal should be to withdraw all its troops to North Korea and defend its own homeland by all means. It attached a list of military measures which Chief Soviet Military Adviser Vasiliev was ordered to implement in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the 38th parallel. Despite the gravity of the charges, however, no personnel changes among the Soviet political and military advisers were made in Korea at that time.

Meanwhile, in Korea, on September 28 Kim Il Sung convened an emergency meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee Political Council (WPK CC PC).18 Everyone present agreed that the military situation was critical and warranted extreme measures. First, in order to restore the KPA Command Structure and improve its efficiency and reliability, the Political Council approved Kim’s proposal to combine the positions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (SCINC) and Minister of National Defense in his hands and to set up a General Staff for the SCINC, i.e., the measures recommended to Kim by Zakharov and Shhtykov at their meeting on September 26. This was tantamount to establishing an entirely new command and control system over the KPA centered on Kim Il Sung. This decision was an obvious reflection of the fact that by September 28, Kim had already lost contact with his Defense Minister, Ch’oe Yong-gon, who was in charge of the defense of Seoul.19 Moreover, Kim and other top political leaders in Pyongyang had lost all communication with their Front Line Command and the Auxiliary Command Posts, which had been cut off from each other by Walker’s rapidly advancing Eighth Army.20 That day, the U.S.-led UN forces enveloped both the First and Second Army Groups of the KPA, broke up the KPA’s command structure, and completely destroyed its communications system. The KPA units attempting to retreat to the north from the Naktong River were pursued and destroyed. In Kim Il Sung’s own words, “because of poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders,” the KPA failed to pull out most of their troops stuck in the south.21

The WPK CC PC’s second decision was to take urgent measures aimed to organize defenses along the 38th parallel, approving Kim’s plan to form immediately fifteen new divisions. At that time, six new infantry divisions were already being created in South Pyongan and South Hwanghae, and South and North Hamgyong Provinces. At the same time, Kim hoped to reconstitute nine more infantry divisions from the remnants of the KPA returning from the southeastern front.22

Finally, in the course of a fierce debate, the Political Council concurred that after the
fall of Seoul nothing would stop the UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel; that if they did cross the parallel, the remaining KPA units would not be able to render any serious resistance, and, consequently, the war would be over in a very short period of time, with the North Korean state being eliminated by the aggressive American imperialists. Unanimously, the North Korean leadership agreed to ask both allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, for direct military assistance. The Political Council thus discussed and approved two official letters [Document #6] addressed to Stalin and Mao Zedong, begging them to intervene directly and without delay to save the North Korean regime.

It is noteworthy that the next day, before dispatching the letter to Stalin, Kim solicited Shptykov’s advice regarding its content and advisability. On the evening of September 29, following the mandate of the WPK CC Politburo, Kim for the first time officially raised to his Soviet military advisers the question of the UN forces’ crossing the 38th parallel. At his meeting with Shptykov and Zakharov [Document #5], with Pak Hon-Yong present, he asked Shptykov whether the latter thought the enemy would dare to cross the 38th parallel. Once Shptykov replied that he was not sure, Kim concurred by saying that “it was not clear to me either.” Kim added, however, that “if the enemy did cross the parallel, the People’s Army would not be able to form new troops and, therefore, would not be able to render any serious resistance to the enemy forces.” Kim told Shptykov he wanted his advice as to how they should approach Stalin concerning their letter requesting direct Soviet military assistance. But Shptykov dodged the question, obviously to ensure that the final decision to invite Soviet troops to the defense of North Korea—and subsequent responsibility, should things go wrong—would rest with Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-Yong themselves. 23 Kim and Pak were visibly dissatisfied and upset but at the same time so “confused, lost, hopeless, and desperate,” and had so much at stake at the moment, that they went ahead and asked Stalin for a total commitment, including Soviet ground troops, even without Shptykov’s blessing. 24

It was on October 1, at 2:50 a.m., that Stalin received cabled telegram #1351 from Shftykov, containing an official text of the letter of Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-Yong pleading for help [Document #6]. Actually, the letter was dated September 29. The next day, Pak Hon-Yong personally delivered it to Shftykov with an emotional plea that “at the moment of the enemy’s troops crossing of the 38th parallel, we will desperately need ground troops from the Soviet Union.” The letter arrived at the Eighth Department of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces on September 30, at 23:30 p.m., by wire as “very urgent,” was deciphered on October 1, at 0:35 a.m., typed up at 1:45 a.m., and forwarded to Stalin to his dacha in the South at 2:50 a.m. The timing is important in this case because only after having received Kim II Sung’s plea for help did Stalin dispatch a cable to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on October 1, at 3:00 a.m., requesting China’s direct intervention in the Korean conflict.

In their letter, Kim and Pak informed Stalin about the severe consequences for the KPA of the Inch’on landing. Although still loathe to admit that Seoul had fallen, they indicated that the enemy “had the real possibility of taking over Seoul.” They were certain that “with the complete occupation of Seoul, the enemy would launch a further offensive into North Korea.” Kim and Pak admitted that “if the enemy were to take advantage of the situation and step up its offensive in North Korea, then we would be unable to stop the enemy by our own forces... and the U.S. aggression would succeed in the end.” Nonetheless, they emphasized that they were still determined to fight on, to mobilize new troops and to prepare “for a protracted war.” They argued that it was “in the USSR’s national interest to prevent the U.S. advance into North Korea and the latter’s transformation into a colony and military springboard of U.S. imperialism.”

Finally, they begged Stalin for a “special kind of assistance,” admitting that “at the moment when the enemy troops begin to cross the 38th parallel, we would desperately need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.” Afraid of their plea being rejected outright and fearful that Stalin held them personally responsible for the war’s disastrous turn, Kim and Pak inserted a face-saving proposition for Stalin, i.e., “if for any reason, this [direct military assistance - AM] proves to be impossible, please, assist us in lining up international volunteers’ units in China and other countries of people’s democracies to be used in providing military assistance to our struggle.” Kim and Pak could not be more explicit than that. Recognizing that they could not survive on their own, they were crying out for help to Stalin, their “fatherly leader,” for, preferably, the Soviet cavalry to rescue the day, or, if not, to broker Mao’s consent to enter the war.

In the meantime, on September 29, General MacArthur restored the Government of the Republic of Korea headed by Syngman Rhee in an emotional ceremony in the capital in Seoul. The last hope that the war could be contained at the status quo ante bellum was dashed when later that day the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved MacArthur’s plan for the conquest of North Korea, envisioning the Eighth Army advancing to Pyongyang and the Tenth Corps being withdrawn from the Inch’on-Seoul area for another amphibious landing at Wonsan. The same day, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gen. George C. Marshall sent an encouraging message to MacArthur: “We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel.” 25

On September 30, the Soviet Politburo conferred again on the Korean situation, in particular Zakharov’s latest report on the dire military situation [Document #4]. The discussion focused on the need to avoid a direct military confrontation between the USSR and the United States and the options still available to salvage the situation in Korea, including soliciting Chinese help and opening a last-ditch diplomatic maneuvering at the United Nations. The Politburo directed that the Foreign Ministry draft a new ceasefire resolution to be submitted to the UN. Also, they decided to approve Kim II Sung’s proposals to reorganize the KPA high military command, form six new divisions, and withdraw remaining North Korean troops from the South [Document #8]. At the same time, the Politburo decided that armaments, munition, and other materials for the new divisions would be supplied to the KPA between October 5 and 20. 26 Finally, the Politburo recommended that Kim ask the Chinese to dispatch truck drivers to North Korea.

It is worth noting that Stalin specifically mentioned in his instructions to Shftykov that their last recommendation should be passed to Kim II Sung without any reference to Moscow, as if it were coming from the Soviet military advisers in the field. The probable cause for such reticence may have
been Stalin’s belief that the entire question of the Chinese entry into the war was so profound that: 1) he had to discuss it with Mao directly; and 2) he should not even raise it until it was clear that without Chinese help the North Koreans would not survive, and until the latter asked for it explicitly. Also, Stalin may have wanted to probe Mao’s intentions and promises and put them to a real test, albeit on the minor issue of truck drivers. Perhaps Stalin even hoped to drag Mao into the war incrementally; according to this scenario, the drivers would be the first commitment of manpower by Mao to Korea, which would later lead to a chain of escalating commitments.

The Politburo made these decisions and wired some of them to Pyongyang close to noon on September 30, i.e., before Stalin received another ciphered telegram #1340 from Shtykov [Document #5], later that the same day (after 4:55 p.m.). Only then was Stalin officially informed by him that Seoul had fallen and Syngman Rhee was back in the capital, promising to complete his drive to the North and vanquish Stalin’s North Korean comrades; that Kim II Sung was afraid that the UN forces would not halt their advance northward at the 38th parallel; and that the North Koreans would not be able to resist the enemy’s offensive on their own.

Later in the evening of September 30, in line with the general disposition in Moscow toward limiting the Soviet presence and risks in Korea, Shtykov requested evacuation powers from Moscow [Stalin was informed of this in a note from Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko dated September 30—Document #9]. Shtykov asked for the right to send back to the USSR all Soviet specialists working at the North Korean enterprises, as well as some redundant personnel of the Soviet organizations in the DPRK. As the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK responsible for the lives of his people and anticipating the inevitability of the U.S. occupation of North Korea, Shtykov not unnaturally sought emergence authority to order their evacuation. But Gromyko disagreed and advised a different procedure: In order to show the Soviets’ continuous faith and backing for Kim II Sung’s government, he recommended to Stalin that Shtykov be allowed to repatriate the Soviet specialists only after a specific request of such a nature was made by the DPRK government. Otherwise, all had to stay at their post, whatever it was. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry in Moscow insisted that it, not Shtykov, should have the final say in each case of anticipatory repatriation. Surprisingly, Stalin opted to defer both Shtykov’s request and Gromyko’s recommendation for the time being.

Later that same night, on September 30, Stalin, who was vacationing at one of his dachas on the Black Sea, was informed about the content of Zhou Enlai’s official speech in Beijing earlier that day, in which Zhou stated that “the Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.” Stalin may well have sensed that the Chinese might be ready for action.

On October 1, at 3:00 a.m., upon the receipt of Kim II Sung’s desperate plea for help, Stalin immediately dictated a telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and had it wired to Beijing [Document #10]. In his telegram, first of all he placed all the blame for the KPA’s collapse and disintegration on North Korean military commanders who, in his opinion, had failed to carry out Kim II Sung’s orders for a strategic retreat of the main forces from the South. He specifically mentioned to Mao that Moscow had forewarned the North Korean political leadership about possibly devastating consequences of the U.S. landing at Inch’on as early as September 16, but that the warning was disregarded. However, he was careful to avoid blaming Kim II Sung personally, thereby indicating to Mao that Kim was still the man to deal with in Pyongyang. Second, Stalin informed Mao and Zhou that after their ruinous defeat in Seoul, the North Koreans no longer had any troops capable of resistance, and that the road toward the 38th parallel from the south was wide open. Finally, Stalin requested that Mao, if possible, “immediately dispatch at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel so that the Korean comrades would have an opportunity to regroup and form combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the protection of the Chinese troops.” Stalin suggested, apparently for the first time, that the Chinese troops should be designated as “volunteer” forces. In order to entice Mao further, he indicated that he was ready to share overall command and control over the KPA and the Chinese volunteer forces with the Chinese generals, implying that the role of the Soviet military advisers to Kim II Sung and the KPA would be drastically curtailed, if not abolished altogether.

It is noteworthy that this is one of the first instances in the Stalin-Mao correspondence where Stalin indicated to Mao his willingness to share control over events in Korea. In exchange for shouldering so much of the burden of defending of North Korea, Stalin offered Mao a power-sharing arrangement. Thus, this telegram was a harbinger of the looming end of the unilateral Soviet control over North Korea which had lasted since 1945. It also meant that from then on Kim II Sung would have two masters to serve, as well as to play off against each other—one in Moscow and one in Beijing. At the same time, Stalin felt compelled to show some respect for Chinese sensitivities, in particular, their yearning for national independence and independent decision-making; moreover, he was intent to avoid the possibly very awkward position of being the messenger of bad news, in case Mao turned down his request. Therefore, Stalin “magnanimously” designated Mao to deliver his own response directly to Kim II Sung, stressing that he did not intend to pre-judge the Chinese comrades and tell Kim II Sung about their likely decision, nor would he desire to do so in the future, because all the honors and gratitude should belong to Mao, not Stalin.

On the evening of October 1, Stalin approved the text of a Soviet draft resolution regarding the Korean Question that had been drafted at the Foreign Ministry’s first Far Eastern Department, approved by Gromyko, and submitted for Stalin’s consideration. For Stalin, it was a last pitch to the West to resolve the Korean crisis without major escalation.

At 9:15 p.m. (Moscow time), in Beijing Soviet Ambassador Roshchin delivered the content of the draft resolution to Zhou Enlai. At 10:45 p.m. (Moscow time), Zhou Enlai met Roshchin again and informed him that Mao agreed with its provisions. An hour later, after learning Mao’s view, Stalin immediately ordered it wired to the Soviet Representative to the United Nations at Lake Success.

It is well known that on October 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky presented the Soviet draft resolution to the Political Committee of the General Assembly, which stipulated an immediate ceasefire, with
drawal of all foreign troops, and general elections in all Korea to be held under international supervision. However, at this stage of the war, after a miraculous landing at Inch’on and the recapture of Seoul when the KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of question and totally unacceptable to the West. By now, the decision made in Washington, on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th parallel, after Inch’on had become an official United Nations operation.

While waiting for Mao’s reply, on October 2, Stalin received information that the North Korean frontier defenses had begun to crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee’s revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces had pushed north beyond the parallel on the east coast road heading towards Kosong. He sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating his earlier directive to his chief military representative in Korea to do his utmost to bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the south back into the north, and to hold the frontline along the 38th parallel.

In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou’s warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier; Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military assistance; and, finally, Stalin was personally urging Mao to intervene in Korea. Consequently, that day Mao convened the first of a series of enlarged meetings of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC) Politburo in Beijing to formulate the Chinese response. New documents from the Russian Presidential Archive suggest that at their first meeting the CCP CC Politburo members discussed general reasons why the PRC should or should not enter the war in Korea and decided that the risks outweighed the benefits of China’s direct military intervention at that time. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao’s negative position prevailed, and Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin of the Chinese hesitations and lack of decision.

On October 3, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Roshchin, relayed Mao Zedong’s negative response. [See Document #12.] Replying to Stalin’s October 1 entreaty to enter the war, Mao acknowledged that the Chinese leadership had “originally planned” to send “several volunteer divisions” to assist the “Korean comrades” once the enemy crossed the 38th parallel. However, he explained, after “thoroughly” considering the matter, many of his comrades now advocated a more cautious course of action. Consequently, the PRC would refrain from sending troops to Korea, at least for the time being. Mao attributed this reversal to three principal considerations. First, the Chinese army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and had “no confidence” it could defeat the modern American military, which could “force us into retreat.” Second, Chinese intervention in the conflict would “most likely” lead to an open Sino-American war, which in turn could drag the USSR into the war due to its commitments under the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, “and the question would thus become extremely large.” Finally, after decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the Korean conflict to confront a powerful American adversary would provoke widespread domestic resentment within the PRC toward the newly-established People’s Government, and wreck the leadership’s plan for peaceful reconstruction.

Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded, it was necessary to “show patience now,” focus on building military strength for a possible later conflict, and in the meantime accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the North Koreans “change the form of the struggle to partisan war.” Mao concluded his message by noting that this decision was provisional and awaited a final determination by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; in the meantime, he was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to Stalin’s vacation home for direct consultations. In conveying Mao’s telegram, which was dated October 2, an obviously shocked Roshchin noted that this new position flatly contradicted repeated assurances from Chinese leaders that the People’s Liberation Army was ready, indeed, in high “fighting spirit,” to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Americans. The Soviet envoy could only speculate on the reasons for the turnabout in the Beijing leadership’s stand: the international situation, the “worsening” predicament in Korea, and/or Anglo-American “intrigues” through the intercession of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is important to note that this account of Mao’s October 2 communication to Stalin, informing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war, based on newly-declassified documents in the Russian archives, fundamentally contradicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of October 2 which was published in 1987 in an official Chinese document compilation and has since been relied upon for numerous scholarly accounts; see the attached footnote for further information.)

Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disappointed, did not know whether Mao had given his final word or was simply for bargaining for better terms for China’s participation in the war. During the day of October 5, Stalin conferred with the members of the (VKP(b) CC) Politburo. Although the official agenda was designated as “the Question of Comrade Shlykov,” the real issue under consideration was the nature of the Soviet national security interest in Korea and how to protect it on the ground. All Politburo members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation in Korea should be avoided at all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalls that “When the threat [after Inch’on] emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated, and that the Americans would reach our border. I remember quite well that in connection with the exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said: ‘So what? Let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come there, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready to fight.’” The upshot of the Politburo discussion was a decision to increase pressure on Mao to extract an unequivocal commitment from China to enter the war.

Thus, it appears that as a result of cumulative discussions and a series of incremental decisions dated September 27, September 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided to begin to limit Soviet military and political exposure in Korea, and at the same time permit a greater Chinese role in the alliance decision-making on Korea.

In this light, given the continuous deterioration of the military situation in Korea, as well as the Soviet leaders’ determination to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign Ministry’s objections and decided, as one of the first steps aimed at curtailting the Soviet presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador Shlykov the evacuation powers that he requested with respect to some Soviet specialists employed by the DPRK government and
by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He was notified of this policy change by wire the same day. Ironically, the permission arrived just as Shykov, sensing a policy shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim Il Sung’s ability to defend his regime on his own, and unsure if any help was coming from Moscow or Beijing, requested even more extended evacuation powers, now including the families of the Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, the personnel of the Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea, and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Document #16]. It took less than a day for Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin’s approval and immediately wire the affirmative response.

After the conference with his Politburo associates sometime during the day of October 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao and Zhou [Document #13]. Without mentioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he outlined his reasoning why it was in China’s national interest to dispatch the Chinese “Volunteers” to save the collapsing North Korean regime and why this had to be done immediately. First, he reiterated his conviction that the United States was not ready to fight a major war at present, while Japan, whose militaristic potential had not yet been restored, was not currently capable of militarily assisting the Americans. Therefore, he argued, the U.S. would be compelled to concede in the Korean question to China, which was backed by its ally, the USSR, and to agree to terms of settlement favorable to (North) Korea thus preventing the Americans from transforming the peninsula into their springboard. Following the same hardnosed realpolitik reasoning, Stalin stated that, consequently, not only would Washington have to abandon Taiwan, but also they would have to reject the idea of separate peace with the Japanese “revanchists,” and to jettison their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their bridgehead in the Far East.

Having depicted his vision of an emerging new geopolitical order in the Far East, Stalin blandly told Mao that he proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if she were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy. Without some serious struggle and an imposing display of force, he argued, not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions, but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan, which at that time the United States was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nationalist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), in Stalin’s view, but to use the island as its own strategic base or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singularly unusual propensity for high-stakes gambling which was fraught with the potential for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he had taken into account the possibility that the United States, albeit unready to fight a major war then, could still be drawn into a big war (i.e., with China) on a question of prestige, which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which was bound with China by a Mutual Assistance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao: “Should we be afraid of this possibility? In my opinion, we should not, because, together, we will be stronger than the United States and Great Britain, whereas none of the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany, which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) possess any military power at all. If war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese imperialism will be restored as a U.S. ally and when the U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of all Korea run by Syngman Rhee.” This telegram was a call for action. Stalin forcefully indicated to Mao that all the chips were down, and Mao had to show what hand he was playing after all.

The embattled Mao must have received this telegram amidst a series of tense emergency sessions of the CCP CC Politburo in Beijing sometime on October 6. It was at one of these meetings that Mao reportedly announced his decision to appoint Peng Dehuai as the commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). Later that evening, Mao dined together with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, and Gao Gang. Reportedly, they agreed that “now it seems that we have to fight a war,” and that Zhou Enlai would fly to Moscow to solicit Soviet military aid. The next morning, a supreme military conference presided over by Zhou is said formally to have approved of Mao’s decision to send Zhou and Lin Biao to the USSR to discuss the details of military cooperation.

On October 7, Stalin received Mao’s reply; in Stalin’s own words, “Mao expressed solidarity with the main ideas of my [October 5] letter and stated that he would send nine, not six, divisions to Korea, but that he would not do it right away; instead, he intended to do it some time soon. In the meantime, he asked me to receive his representatives and discuss with them a plan of military assistance to Korea in detail” [see Document #13]. Evidently, Mao’s October 7 telegram contained only his conditional consent to send troops to Korea. He had taken a step toward Stalin’s position but hinted that, once again, the decision was not yet final, and could be rendered final only after Stalin received in person and succeeded in persuading the chief CCP CC Politburo opponents of China’s entry into the Korean War: Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Stalin accepted Mao’s request with understanding, realizing that he had to bolster Mao if he wanted the latter to deliver.

While Moscow and Beijing bickered about why, when, on what terms, and whether troops should be sent to defend Kim Il Sung’s crumbling regime—and whose troops they should be—the Western allies intensified their diplomatic offensive at the United Nations and stepped up their military offensive on the battleground, anticipating a quick mop-up of the entire Korean campaign. On October 4, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet draft resolution of October 2, and, on October 7, the UN General Assembly passed by a 47-5-7 vote a “Go after the DPRK” resolution, proposed by the United Kingdom, which recommended that: “1. a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; b) all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the U.N., for the establishment of a united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea.” In a nutshell, this resolution gave Gen. MacArthur and the Western powers carte blanche to occupy all of North Korea and rearrange its political and economic systems to their liking. On the day this crucial vote was taken, in Korea the advanced units of the 1st Cavalry of Gen. Walton Walker’s Army crossed the 38th Parallel in the Kaesong area.

At 10:15 p.m. on the night of October 7 Stalin asked Bulgarin to forward to Kim Il Sung via Shykov his long-delayed response to Kim’s October 1 plea for help. It had taken almost a week for Stalin to respond, although he was well aware that Kim was...
desperate and hanging over a precipice. Stalin had tarried simply because he did not yet have any good news to deliver. Only after receiving Mao’s conditional commitment did he decide to write to Kim. In his telegram, which Shtykov gave Kim on the afternoon of October 8, Stalin for the first time told Kim II Sung about his ongoing negotiations with Mao, noting that the Chinese comrades still had doubts and hesitated to make a final commitment to fight, but, at the same time, emphasizing that negotiations continued, and therefore Kim II Sung had to battle tenaciously for each inch of his land because help was on its way [Document #13].

Reportedly, Mao also sent a telegram to Kim II Sung via his Ambassador in Pyongyang, who went to Kim’s underground headquarters and handed it to him on the night of October 8. It said: “In view of the current situation, we have decided to send volunteers to Korea to help you fight against the aggressor.” Chinese sources report Kim II Sung to have reacted gleefully.

The next morning, on October 9, at 7:05 a.m., Shtykov wired Kim’s reply to Stalin [Document #16], adding that he concurred with its content. Clearly, this letter reflected Kim’s new, more positive mood and his newly found self-confidence. Although Shtykov did not mention any contacts between Kim and the Chinese representatives the night before, surely Mao’s cable had lifted Kim’s spirit. In his letter, Kim expressed his belief that the U.S. aggressor would not stop until it had occupied Korea entirely and converted it into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East; therefore, the struggle of the Korean people for their independence, freedom, and state sovereignty would be protracted and very hard.

In contrast to his previous letter of September 29, in which he had requested “direct military assistance” from the Soviet Union, Kim now asked Stalin only to aid the KPA by training 2,000 pilots, 1,000 tank drivers, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers in the territory of the USSR. Of course, if one looks at the numbers, the inescapable impression is that Kim basically asked Stalin to help train an entirely new professional officers corps for the KPA, with the exception of the infantry officers. In other words, Kim II Sung’s fortunes were still very much dependent on professional military advice and arms supplies from the USSR. Nonetheless, once informed of Mao’s commitment to send ground troops to fight in Korea, he apparently began to distance himself from Stalin. No longer did he request Soviet ground troops or even air cover, because he knew Mao would probably take care of it by himself.

In the meantime, the Western allies continued to advance. On October 9 in Washington, President Truman and the JCS directed MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel, even if Chinese intervention occurred, so long as “in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success.” At once, MacArthur issued his final unconditional surrender demand, stating that unless North Korea capitulated, he would proceed to “take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations.” The same day, advanced ROK I Corps units moving up the east coast from the perimeter reached Wonsan, over 110 miles north of the parallel. The 1st Cavalry and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade pushed north towards Kumchon, Sariwon, and Pyongyang itself.

On October 9, two F-80 jets raided “by mistake” a Soviet airfield sixty miles inside the USSR border near Vladivostok. The days of Kim II Sung’s state appeared to be numbered. It is plausible to assume that Stalin was aware of these developments in Korea when he first received Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao at a dacha near the Black Sea late that night.

The Stalin-Zhou talks of 9-10 October 1950 are crucial in understanding the evolution of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the terms of the Chinese entry into the Korean War. They reveal how domestic political considerations influenced the foreign policy priorities of these two communist giants, as well as the pivotal role of misperceptions and miscommunications in the mismanagement of the alliance relationship.

The newly declassified Russian documents from the APRF by and large confirm the account of Mao’s interpreter, Shi Zhe, (except dates) of what transpired between Stalin and Zhou at the former’s dacha during these two days. In brief, Zhou told Stalin that the CCP CC Politburo had decided not to send troops to Korea because: 1) China lacked adequate money, arms, or transport; 2) the CCP’s domestic political opposition had not been pacified yet, and reactionary forces could use this opportunity to raise their heads again; and, finally, 3) the U.S. could declare war on China, should the latter intervene in Korea.

Aware of these arguments from his previous correspondence with Mao and bearing in mind that Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao were the chief opponents within the CCP CC Politburo of China’s entry into the war, Stalin went on the offensive. First, he noted that the Great Patriotic War (World War II) had just ended, and therefore it would be very difficult for the USSR to fight another large-scale war right away. Besides, the Soviet-North Korean border was too narrow to allow massive troop transfers. Notwithstanding this, if U.S. actions were to jeopardize the fate of world socialism on a global scale, the Soviet Union would be ready to take up the American challenge. However, he stressed that, at that time, U.S. imperialism was in a weak strategic position because it could not rely for assistance on traditional military powers such as Germany and Japan, as well as Britain, all of which were profoundly weakened by the Second World War. Hence, Washington would not dare to launch a world war. Since any kind of U.S. attack against China would trigger the mutual military assistance provision of the Soviet-Chinese Alliance Treaty and draw the U.S. into a global conflict with the USSR, for which it was not ready, America was unlikely to risk a war with China on the latter’s own territory. Hence, in Stalin’s opinion, at that moment, Beijing could help the North Koreans without fear of U.S. retaliation against Mainland China. Moreover, Stalin emphasized that it was in China’s national interest to ensure the survival of a friendly government in North Korea. For, if the U.S. occupied the North and deployed its forces along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, this would pose an enormous threat to Chinese security, because the Americans could harass China from the air, land, and sea at their discretion and could also endanger the economic development of northeast China.

But, despite these arguments, Zhou did not yield to Stalin’s pressure. Stalin appears to have almost yelled in exasperation, “That you do not want to send troops to Korea is your decision, but socialism in Korea would collapse within a very short period of time.” After regaining his composure, Stalin changed his tactics and laid out a stark alternative for Zhou. He suggested that both the
Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA if they could no longer fight on their own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and some cadres of the KPA would be redeployed to northeast China, while the disabled and wounded men, as well as Koreans of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In their new bases in northeast China they would train new troops, master new weaponry, and prepare themselves for the day of their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated that since the Chinese did not intend to send troops, the Soviet Union and China should work out concrete plans to provide shelter for their Korean comrades and their forces, and make sure that one day they would be able to return to Korea.

Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what he heard. He backed away from his initial tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China could count on Soviet air cover should it decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, Stalin responded positively: “We can send a certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for the CPV in Korea-AM].” Stalin also reassured Zhou that the Soviet Union would take care of weapons and equipment supplies for the CPV, including their replacements, immediately after the Chinese side ascertained its needs in actual combat.

The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two days, and yet no mutually agreed upon decisions were reached at the end. Zhou simply said that he needed to communicate with Beijing in order to ask for new instructions. Stalin replied that he could wait but that time was fast running out. They parted, reportedly, both confused about each other’s true intentions.39

Contrary to Goncharov, Xue, and Lewis’ account in Uncertain Partners40—citing the recollections of Zhou aide Kang Yimin—Stalin and Zhou Enlai did not agree to send a joint telegram to Mao Zedong the next day. Nor did Molotov call Zhou after the latter’s arrival in Moscow with “startling news that the Soviet Union would not offer any military equipment to China.” These are stories, perhaps elaborated by Zhou’s entourage in order to persuade Mao that Stalin, not Zhou’s obduracy, was to blame for the “breakdown of talks;” that Stalin was an unreliable ally; and that, after all, China should not fight a war in Korea alone, which was Zhou’s belief from the very beginning.41 Not only did these fictional events never occur, they could not even have happened the way they were described. Stalin never co-signed his telegrams with anybody, regardless of the status of the other party or the addressee, including Mao and Zhou. In the Stalinist era, Soviet Politburo members never used the telephone to communicate important decisions, no matter how urgent those might be, let alone to talk to foreign leaders. These fictional events contradict the then-prevailing Soviet party bureaucratic practices.42 The present author has never encountered evidence of such unorthodox procedures anywhere in the Russian Archives.

In reality, all along Stalin reiterated his willingness to provide the CPV with air cover if Mao sent his troops to Korea.43 Nonetheless, on October 11, Zhou reportedly sent a telegram to Mao in Beijing, stating that “Comrade Filippov [a pseudonym for Stalin-AM] did not express his objections to the CCP CC Politburo’s decision not to send troops to Korea.” It was Gao Gang who told the Soviet Consul-General in Shenyang, A.M. Ledovsky, and General Vazhnov about Zhou’s cable from Moscow during a conversation on October 25 in Shenyang. He added that it was this telegram from Zhou that reigned a fierce debate in the CCP CC Politburo regarding the merits of China’s intervention in Korea.44 The result was that Mao put on hold all Chinese preparations in the northeast for the dispatch of troops to Korea.45

I would interpret what happened during the Stalin-Zhou talks on October 9-10 as follows. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to see Stalin with a strong belief that China could not and should not intervene in Korea. During the talks, Stalin failed to convince them of the potentially dire consequences of the North’s collapse for Chinese security and its international standing. Therefore, Zhou and Lin decided to stick to their original anti-intervention stand in their debate with Mao, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang. At the same time, they invented a “respectable” excuse for their obduracy, i.e., an alleged refusal by Stalin to provide the CPV with air cover. At that moment, there was a brief rupture in bilateral communications, and both sides were left to make decisions for themselves.

As far as Zhou Enlai’s role is concerned, if this scenario is correct, he rose up between Stalin and Mao, and almost had them at each other’s throat because they both disagreed with his own beliefs. Zhou seems to have viewed his visit to Stalin as a last opportunity to prevent China from entering the Korean war and to shift the entire burden of saving Kim’s regime onto Stalin’s broad shoulders. Once he realized that Stalin did not want to accept this responsibility and preferred to see the Chinese fighting, Zhou opted to bluff and may even have misrepresented the Soviet position in his correspondence with Mao. But, to his regret, he miscalculated Stalin’s high-risk-taking propensity in his gambling on the future of North Korea altogether, as well as Mao’s own determination to fight in Korea, and failed to foresee that Mao would decide to fight even when his back was pushed against the wall and he was left ostensibly alone, allegedly without Soviet air support.

In the meantime, in Korea, on October 12, the Interim Committee of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, created by the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, advised the United Nations Command to take over the civil government of North Korea, which meant in practice that the U.S. military was authorized to rule the “liberated” provinces of North Korea. Kim Il Sung moved his headquarters to Kosangjin, near Kanggye, not far from the Chinese border. The newly-rebuilt KPA Front Line Command was moved to Tokcheon in South P’yongan Province. The KPA forces desperately tried to halt the advancing ROK and U.S. troops that had broken through the 38th parallel and reached as far as Chunghwa, a few miles from Pyongyang.

On the morning of October 13, Stalin received a report from Admirals Golovko and Fokin informing him of a large concentration of U.S. heavy battleships and amphibious assault vessels, manned with troops, apparently ready for an amphibious landing in the harbor of Wonsan [Document #17]. That day, Wonsan was the target of ferocious U.S. air raids and Navy fire. Stalin could easily foresee the strategic implications of the forthcoming U.S. landing in Wonsan: the KPA would be again split in half, this time along the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and, with its rear absolutely unprotected, the ROK I Corps and U.S. X Corps could march unimpeded toward the Yalu-Tumen rivers on the North Korean-Chinese and North Korean-Soviet borders, while Gen.
Walker’s Eighth Army mopped up KPA remnants in the Pyongyang area and then advanced toward the northwest.

This was a decisive moment for Stalin. A week earlier, the Soviet Politburo had decided that the USSR would rather abandon North Korea than risk a direct military confrontation with the U.S., unless the latter deliberately attacked Soviet territory. Therefore, Stalin did not intend to send Soviet ground troops to save Kim Il Sung. As Zhou had told Stalin a couple of days earlier, the Chinese also decided to refrain from sending the CPV to Korea for the time being. Realizing that neither he nor Mao was willing to save Kim Il Sung from total defeat, Stalin evidently resigned himself to viewing the entire Korean situation as a matter of cutting his losses and saving face.

Such a conclusion is supported by the dramatic order Stalin appears to have sent a Kim Il Sung via Ambassador Shtykov on the afternoon of October 13.46 Informing Kim of his talks with Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, Stalin reported with regret that Zhou had stated that the Chinese were not yet ready to enter the war. Consequently, they concluded that it would be better for Kim to withdraw the remnants of his forces from Korea to China and the USSR. Therefore, Stalin ordered that Kim Il Sung “evacuate North Korea and pull out his Korean troops to the north.” He also directed that Shtykov assist Kim in drawing up a plan of measures to implement this evacuation order. In effect, Stalin was fed up with Kim Il Sung and had thrown him into the towel.

Late on the night of October 13, Shtykov, following Stalin’s instructions, met with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong and read the text of Stalin’s telegram to them. In Shtykov’s telegram addressed to Fyn Si (another Stalin pseudonym), which he wired from Pyongyang at 3:15 a.m. on October 14 [Document #18], he described the North Koreans’ reaction as follows: “Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-Yong were very much surprised by the content of the telegram. Kim Il Sung stated that it was extremely hard for them to implement such advice; however, since there was such advice, they would implement it.” Then, Kim asked Shtykov to give him his practical recommendations and directed that Pak Hon-Yong write them down. Also, he asked Shtykov and Matveev to assist him in drafting a plan of measures to be taken regarding the KPA evacuation plan.

After receiving Stalin’s evacuation order on the night of October 13, Kim Il Sung called Major-General Ch’oe Kyong-dok47 to his headquarters in Kosangjin and ordered that Ch’oe leave immediately for the northeastern provinces of China in order to set up guerrilla bases for Kim and the KPA remnants there. Ch’oe is said to have departed with two adjutants the same night. In the next several hours, Kim is said to have repeatedly told his close associates that they would have to wage a guerrilla war from China again. Within a day Ch’oe and his two aides had mysteriously disappeared. Kim Il Sung dispatched a small team of scouts to find them, but in vain.48

Meanwhile, however, even before seeing Kim’s response, Stalin had changed his mind and dramatically reversed himself, thanks to some welcome news from Beijing. Early in the morning of October 14, at 3:20 a.m., he received two extremely urgent telegrams (#2406 and #2408) from the Soviet envoy to the PRC described a late-night meeting with Mao which took place immediately after the CCP CC Politburo finally decided, at an emergency session, to intervene in Korea before the war ended in a U.S. victory. Roshchin cited Mao as saying: “Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us and the Northeast [China] will be faced with constant danger.” Mao confirmed that “past hesitations by our comrades occurred because the questions of the international situation, the questions of the Soviet assistance to us, the question of air cover were not clear to them,” and stressed that “at present, all these questions have been clarified.” Furthermore, Mao pointed out, “now it is advantageous for us to dispatch Chinese troops into Korea. China has the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea” [Document #19]. He mentioned that at this point they were sending a first contingent of nine divisions. Although poorly armed, it would be able to fight the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades would prepare a second echelon. As for air cover, Mao expressed hope that the Soviet air force would arrive in northeast China as soon as possible, but not later than in two months. Mao concluded by saying that the CCP CC believed that the Chinese must assist Korean comrades in their difficult struggle; therefore, he had asked Zhou Enlai to discuss the matter of China’s entry into the Korean War with Comrade Filippov again. He stressed that “Zhou Enlai was being sent new instructions.”

What is important about this telegram is that it contains Mao’s admission that, in essence, Zhou’s position was to stonewall because of the hesitations and reservations displayed by some prominent CCP CC leaders in Beijing. However, once these domestic political disputes were resolved, Mao wanted Stalin back in the game.

Indeed, Stalin rejoiced at Mao’s new decision because he had been so reluctant to abandon North Korea to begin with. At once, he hand-wrote a note to Shtykov for immediate delivery to Kim Il Sung [Document #20], the second telegram within hours, temporarily halting the implementation of his order of October 13.49 It said: “I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CCP Central Committee discussed the situation again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask you to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to you yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and withdrawal of the Korean troops to the north.” This telegram makes perfectly clear that the crucial consideration in Stalin’s position on intervention in Korea was the role of China. When Mao balked, so did Stalin. When Mao decided to make a commitment to Kim Il Sung, Stalin again followed suit. Still unsure whether Mao’s decision was irrevocable, Stalin displayed some caution and ordered that Kim Il Sung “temporarily postpone, not cancel, the implementation of measures advised to him a day earlier.

Only after Stalin received further clarifications and proof from Beijing that this time Mao meant it, did he order that his previous recommendations to Kim be annulled. He reiterated his commitment to supply the CPV with weapons and equipment. Most importantly, he felt compelled to indicate to Kim that he was relinquishing some of his authority on the Korean matter to Mao and his CPV commanders. A few hours later on October 14, he dispatched a
third ciphered telegram to Shlykov for Kim [Document #21] which said: “After hesitations and a series of temporary decisions, the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops. I am glad that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last. In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which you were told about earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades. The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR. I wish you success.”

CONCLUSIONS

The new documentary evidence from the Russian archives led me to the following conclusions. First, all three supreme leaders of the USSR, PRC, and the DPRK—Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il Sung—were personally and intimately involved in the prosecution of the Korean War. Notwithstanding this, their will often failed to prevail, for the war policies of these states were also shaped by the pressures of intra-alliance bargaining, domestic politics, bureaucratic outputs, and personal preferences of people in charge of the implementation of leaders’ decisions, not to mention circumstances created by enemy and external forces.

Second, contrary to the traditional Chinese interpretation, Stalin never reneged on his promise to Mao to provide the CPV with air cover. From early July until late October 1950 he unwaveringly maintained that if the Chinese comrades decided to intervene in Korea he would send the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense units to protect the Chinese ground troops from the air. He even considered dispatching them directly to Pyongyang. An “account of Stalin’s betrayal of Mao” is fictional and should be attributed to Zhou Enlai’s entourage, who wanted to have their boss look good after the latter probably purposefully failed his mission at his talks with Stalin in mid-October, 1950 and perhaps even misled Mao about Stalin’s true intentions.

Third, the only person who had a legitimate reason to feel that Stalin had betrayed him at that time was Kim Il Sung. Stalin reneged on his commitment to back up Kim at the critical juncture of the war after the UN troops had crossed the 38th parallel: he ordered Kim to abandon the defense of North Korea and pull out the remnants of the KPA into guerrilla camps in northeast China and the Soviet Far East. Although within several hours Stalin reversed himself, after learning of Mao’s renewed commitment to fight in Korea, this original decision dramatically revealed the limits of the Soviet national security interest on the Korean peninsula. In Stalin’s own words (as recalled by Khrushchev), he was willing to abandon North Korea and allow the United States to become the USSR’s neighbor, with its troops deployed in Korea, if this was the price to pay for avoiding direct military confrontation with the U.S. at that time. Moreover, I believe that it was as a result of this incident, not Khrushchev’s destabilization campaign, that Kim Il Sung realized the limits of the Soviet support as well as the extent of his personal dependency on Moscow, and made up his mind to begin distancing himself from his Soviet handlers.

Fourth, obviously, there was little political will and much less hope in Moscow, Beijing, and even Pyongyang to defend North Korea to the last man when the military situation collapsed in mid-October 1950. Therefore, had the United States been less ambivalent, more consistent, and more persuasive on the diplomatic front in stating to Moscow and Beijing the goals of its Korean campaign—e.g., that it had no desire to attack Mainland China or threaten the territory of the Soviet Far East—the Soviet and Chinese governments could well have decided to let Kim Il Sung’s regime go under and acquiesce to a UN-proposed Korean settlement. However, Gen. MacArthur’s repeated unconditional surrender demands, coupled with barely veiled direct threats against the PRC and the USSR, coming out of Tokyo headquarters, literally pushed the insecure Chinese to the brink, compelling them almost against their will to intervene in Korea, thereby providing Stalin a legitimate reason to reconsider his own decision to evacuate North Korea.

1. This article is based on the newly-declassified Russian archival materials related to the Korean War. Researchers were allowed access to these primary sources from Russia as a result of a series of agreements on academic cooperation and joint research on the history of the Korean War, signed by the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University, New York, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow. In order to make these materials readily available to researchers in the United States, the Center for Korean Research has agreed to cooperate with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in the procurement, translation, custody, and dissemination of these documents. (CWIHP has provided a copy of the documents to the National Security Archive, located on the seventh floor of the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where they are available for researchers.) The Center for Korean Research acknowledges with gratitude a generous facilitating grant from the Luce Foundation in support of this project.

2. This is according to the field reports filed by several dozen agents sent to the area by the Joint Special Operations Group from the Far East Command’s G-2 on the eve of operation Chromite.


9. [Ed. note: In addition, some high-level declassified Russian documents bearing on the period examined by this article were published in English translation in Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13:3 (Fall 1994), 42-67, esp. 48-57.]

10. Although this document has still not been declassified, it is alluded to in a detailed chronology of events prepared by officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry who had access to still-classified materials. In particular, the chronology entry dated 20 September 1950, describing the content of Stalin’s reply to Zhou Enlai’s inquiry about the military situation in Korea after the Inch’on landing (an inquiry which Zhou had conveyed to Amb. Roshchin and Soviet military advisers Kotov and Konnov on September 18), states: “These Soviet recommendations [regarding what the KPA should do following the Inch’on landing] were transmitted to Kim II Sung on 18 September 1950.” See Chronology of Major Developments on the Eve of and During the Korean War (January 1949-October 1950) [hereafter Chronology]. Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 5, opis 58, delo 266, list 55.

11. At this point, it is worth clarifying a bit of confusion that has emerged over the fact that there were two senior Soviet military officials with the surname Zakharov at this juncture of the Korean War. Army Gen. Matvey Vasilevich Zakharov (1898-1972), the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, was dispatched to Pyongyang in late September 1950 to inspect and report back to Stalin on the military situation. He signed and received messages using the pseudonym, “Matvey.” In October 1950, shortly after M.V. Zakharov was sent to Korea, Corps Commissar Semyon Egorovich Zakharov (1906-1969) was sent to Beijing as Stalin’s personal military envoy to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and remained in the Chinese capital until the end of the war in July 1953, and documents involving him bear his actual name.

12. See Chronology, AVPRF, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, listy 52-53.

13. In Unknown Partners (p. 174), Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue refer to a five-man team which was dispatched from China to Korea on September 17 “to survey local topography.” This must be the same team of senior military officers to which Zhou referred.


15. See Chronology, listy 55-56.

16. Rees, Korea, 91.

17. These charges are not completely fair because the Soviet military advisers were severely restricted in their mobility by Stalin’s early order that under no circumstances they cross the 38th parallel, even when the KPA was on the offensive at the Naktong River front. Hence, their own knowledge of the military situation and ability to influence it were very much limited. 18. See Shakhshin’s testimony with Pak Hon-yong, recorded in Document #5. A.I. Shakhshin had been the Soviet Deputy Consul in Seoul before the end of the Second World War; as Adviser on Political Affairs; in 1946, he was appointed as a Political Adviser to the Soviet 25th Army responsible for the occupation of North Korea; when the Korean War started, he was assigned to Gen. Matveyev’s team. 19. Kim was reported to be very upset that ‘Che’o failed to report to him regularly about the development of the military situation in Seoul, despite his access to radio. 20. Kim II Sung commanded his troops from inside an underground bunker located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. According to Yu Song-ch’ol’s memoirs, during the entire war Kim II Sung made only one visit to the Front Line Command. That was when it was located at the Seoul Capitol Building. Others disagree and insist that he came down as far as Suambo to inspect the front lines and allegedly even bathed in hot springs there. [See Yu Song-ch’ol, “Recollections,” Chongang Ilbo (Seoul), 14 November 1990.] Consequently, the only more or less reliable source of updates on the military situation for Kim II Sung at that time was his Soviet advisers. But as the predicament of the KPA deepened, they seemed to begin to dodge his inquiries, citing insufficient knowledge, and to avoid giving recommendations on strategy and tactics.


22. One should note that two days earlier Zakharov had told Kim that it was wishful thinking on his part to count on manning those nine divisions from among “the southerners” because the UN offensive would most likely cut off and rout them. See Document #4.

23. Such “shyness” was quite unusual for Shtykov, who while he would be busy seeking Chinese support. He signed and received messages using the pseudonym, “Matvey.” In October 1950, shortly after M.V. Zakharov was sent to Korea, Corps Commissar Semyon Egorovich Zakharov (1906-1969) was sent to Beijing as Stalin’s personal military envoy to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and remained in the Chinese capital until the end of the war in July 1953, and documents involving him bear his actual name.

24. The origins of this request were not without controversy, even within the DPRK government. In his conversation with A.I. Shakhshin on September 28 [Document #5], Pak Hon-yong mentioned that originally the WPK CC PC intended to ask only for Soviet air support because some nationalistic North Korean leaders advocated only limited direct Soviet participation in the war. As of September 29, Kim II Sung still insisted, perhaps pro forma, that “we should continue to fight on and eventually unite Korea by our own forces.” However, as the military situation continued to deteriorate, increasing the perception in Pyongyang that only an all-out intervention by the USSR could bail out the North Korean regime, which was on the brink of complete disaster, Kim felt compelled to seek full Soviet military intervention.

25. Quoted in Rees, Korea, 103.

26. This timetable may have reflected Stalin’s hope that the remnants of Kim’s troops would be able to resist the UN troops on their own at least for the few next days while he would be busy seeking Chinese support. His justification for this measure was that most of these enterprises were destroyed by American air raids and out of operation anyhow.

27. I have not located any evidence in the Russian archives as to whether Stalin was informed on October 1 that MacArthur had just made an unconditional surrender demand to the North Koreans “to forthwith lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct.” Nor could I find any records indicating whether Stalin knew of U.S. delegate to the UN Warren Austin’s famous statement to the UN Political Committee made the day before: “Today the forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of military victory... The aggressor’s forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world.” See Chronology, list 61.

28. I have not located any evidence in the Russian archives as to whether Stalin was informed on October 2 that MacArthur had just made an unconditional surrender demand to the North Koreans “to forthwith lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct.” Nor could I find any records indicating whether Stalin knew of U.S. delegate to the UN Warren Austin’s famous statement to the UN Political Committee made the day before: “Today the forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of military victory... The aggressor’s forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world.” See Chronology, list 61.


1. We have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the name of [Chinese People’s] Volunteers to fight the United States and other countries. Second, since Chinese troops are to fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name Volunteers), we must be prepared for a declaration of war by the United States and for the subsequent use of the U.S. air force to bomb many of China’s cities and industrial bases, as well as an attack by the U.S. navy on our coastal areas. 3. Of these two problems, the primary problem is whether or not the Chinese troops can annihilate the American troops in Korea and effectively resolve the Korean issue. Only when it is possible for our troops to annihilate the American troops in Korea, principally the Eighth Army (an old army with combat effectiveness), can the situation become favorable to the revolutionary camp and to China, although the second problem (a declaration of war by the United States) is still a serious one. This means that the Korean issue will be solved in reality along with the defeat of the American troops (in name it will probably remain unsolved because the United States will most likely not admit Korea’s victory for a considerable period of time). Consequently, even if the United States declares war on China, the war will probably not be of great scope or last long. The most unfavorable situation, we hold, would result from the inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate American troops in Korea and the involvement of the two countries’ troops in a stalemate while the United States publicly declares war on China, undermines the plans for China’s economic reconstruction, which has already begun, and sparks the dissatisfaction of [China’s] national
bourgeoisie and other segments of the people (they are very afraid of war).

4. Under the current situation, we have reached a decision to order the 12 divisions stationed in advance in South Manchuria to set off on October 15. They will be deployed in appropriate areas in North Korea (not necessarily reaching to the 38th parallel). On the one hand, they will fight the enemies who dare to cross the 38th parallel. At the initial stage, they will merely engage in defensive warfare to wipe out small detachments of enemy troops and ascertain the enemy’s situation; on the other hand, they will wait for the delivery of Soviet weapons. Once they are [well] equipped, they will cooperate with the Korean comrades in countermoves to annihilate American aggressor troops.

5. According to our intelligence to date, an American corps (composed of two infantry divisions and a mechanized division) has 1,500 guns of 70 mm to 240 mm caliber, including tank cannons and anti-aircraft guns. In comparison, each of our corps (composed of three divisions) has only 36 such guns. The enemy dominates the air. By comparison, we have only just started training pilots. We shall not be able to employ more than 300 aircraft in combat until February 1951. Accordingly, we do not now have any certainty of success in annihilating a single American corps in one blow. Since we have made a decision to fight the Americans, we certainly must be prepared to deal with a situation in which the U.S. headquarters will employ one American corps against our troops in one of the Korean theaters. For the purpose of eliminating completely one enemy corps with a certainty of success, we should in such a situation assemble four times as many troops as the enemy (employing four corps to deal with one enemy corps) and firepower from one-and-a-half times to twice as heavy as the enemy’s (using 2,200 to 3,000 guns of more than 70mm caliber and 1,500 enemy guns of the same caliber).

6. In addition to the above-mentioned 12 divisions, we are moving 24 divisions from south of the Yangtze River and from Shaanxi and Gansu provinces to areas along the Xuzhou-Lanzhou, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Shenyang railroad lines. We plan to employ these divisions as the second and third groups of troops sent to aid Korea in the spring and summer of next year as the future situation requires.

Is the above text—indicating a firm Chinese decision to intervene militarily against the Americans in Korea (albeit with some trepidation and an explicit statement that the “Volunteer” forces would require adequate Soviet weaponry before they could take the offensive)—compatible with the message from Mao to Stalin dated 2 October 1950 which Roschlin cabled to Moscow on 3 October 1950 [Document #12], according to the document recently declassified in the Russian archives? Clearly not. Nor is it compatible with Stalin’s statement to Kim Il Sung on October 8, stating that, in response to his own letter of October 1 seeking Chinese entry into the war, “Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction in China.” [Document #13]. That appears to leave two principal alternatives: 1) that both Russian documents, and others in the Presidential Archives collection that are logically and chronologically consistent with the events they describe, are elaborate fakes (which I find highly unlikely, especially as the collective authors of documents that are highly incriminating regarding the Soviet role in the war); or 2) (what I find more likely) that the published Chinese version of the October 2 telegram is unreliable: inaccurate, unvalid, or perhaps mistranslated; nor can one exclude the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by the Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history. (In contrast to the case with Russian documents, scholars have not been permitted access to the relevant Chinese archives to examine original documents or facsimiles, and have been forced to rely on published versions.) In any case, numerous important accounts of the events leading to the PRC’s entry into the Korean War relying on the Chinese version of the 2 October 1950 Mao to Stalin cable must now be called into question. [Ed. note: Some of the more important of the many examples of recent works using the Chinese version of the cable—some in English translation of which was reprinted under the headline, “Mao’s Cable Explains Drive Into Korea,” in The New York Times on 26 February 1992—include Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” esp. 135-142; Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis,” esp. 460-463; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 97; Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, esp. 176-183; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, esp. 175-180; Stueck, The Korean War, esp. 99-190; and Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, esp. 78-80.)

Clearly, further research is necessary, in both the Moscow and Beijing archives, to establish the precise contents and chronology of the communications between Stalin and Mao during the first two weeks of October 1950. In the meantime, the evidence cited here should induce additional caution in treating the Chinese version of Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War as authoritative. A list of primary evidence [31. N. S. Khrushchev, The Korean War (Moscow: Progress Publishing House), 28, in Russian; for a slightly different English translation, see Khrushchev’s Rememberers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), 147.]

32. I believe that Shytkov referred to the members of the DPRK government and various administrative agencies and organizations who originally came from the USSR as Soviet citizens of Korean nationality. This was an “escape clause” for all the so-called Soviet Korean leaders, including Kim Il Sung himself and his guerrilla comrades.

33. I believe that herein Shytkov referred to the Soviet aircraft maintenance and support teams which were transferred from the Maritime Province to the vicinity of Pyongyang in the last week of September. At that time, the Soviet General Staff had still been considering Stalin’s order to dispatch a Soviet fighter aviation squadron to provide air cover for the North Korean capital. However, once the UN forces moved over the 38th parallel on October 1 and were rapidly and successfully advancing toward Pyongyang, apparently Stalin made a decision not to deploy the Soviet Air Force directly in North Korea, but to redeploy it in northeast China. Therefore, Shytkov requested authority to send home the remaining aircraft maintenance and support teams.

34. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 183.

35. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 185, 279. 36. One can notice also that from then on, Kim Il Sung started to conclude his personal letters to Stalin with the words “respectfully yours,” instead of “faithfully yours.” 37. See Rees, Korea, 108-109. 38. See Shue, “Innocent? 39. The above account of Stalin-Zhou talks in October 1950 is based on the author’s June 1995 interview with Dr. Nikolai T. Fedorenko, one of the Soviet participants at these talks who interpreted them and later composed minutes thereof. In the near future, the Center for Korean Research expects to receive copies of the minutes of the Stalin-Zhou talks as part of its project on academic cooperation with the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

40. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 190.

41. It is noteworthy, however, that Goncharov, Xue, and Lewis’s account is based on the personal recollections of Kang Yimin, a confidential secretary of Zhou Enlai from the CCP Central Committee who accompanied the latter to Moscow. One may speculate that Zhou might have attempted to distort the record of talks in order to manipulate Mao’s opinion, and later used his confidential secretary to leak his preferred version of what allegedly happened in Moscow. 42. This conclusion is based on the author’s June 1995 interview with a former high-ranking official at the International Department of the CPSU CC who asked not to be identified.

43. Intriguingly, the first time Stalin mentioned his willingness to provide Chinese troops with air cover if they engaged in Korea was in his letter to Zhou Enlai dated 5 July 1950(!). In his ciphered telegram #3172 wired to Beijing at 23:45 p.m., he stated that “we consider it correct to concentrate immediately nine Chinese divisions on the Chinese-North Korean border for volunteers’ actions in North Korea in the event of the enemy’s crossing the 38th parallel. We will do our best to provide the air cover for these units.” For the full text, see Document #7.

44. See Chronology, list 61.

45. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 192-195.

46. Although we do not have this ciphered telegram in our physical possession, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to believe that this document actually existed: Stalin cited and referred to this ciphered telegram several times in Documents #20 and #21; also, a reference to it appears in Shytkov’s telegram to Stalin in Document #18.

47. Major-General Ch’oe Kyong-dok was a member of the Front Military Council. Before the war he was the Chairman of the DPRK Federation of Trade Unions. 48. This account is based on the author’s interview with Dr. V. K. Pak (Pak Gil-yon), former Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK (1954-1960) in charge of the DPRK’s relations with socialist countries, who has been in exile in the USSR since his purge in 1960. During the Korean War, Mr. Pak served at Kim Il Sung’s headquarters as his second personal interpreter. The interview took place in Moscow on 10 July 1995. 49. Although this note was written and wired out in the early morning hours of October 14, Stalin seems to have pre-dated it as of October 13. Perhaps he wanted to make everybody in the loop, as well as posterity, forget about his original evacuation order sent to Kim only a few hours earlier.

Alexandre Y. Mansourov is a doctoral candidate at the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University.
Document 1: Soviet Defense Minister
A.M. Vasilevsky to Stalin, 21 September 1950

To Comrade STALIN

Regarding the question of the transfer of fighter aviation regiment of “YAK-9s” to provide air cover to Pyongyang, I herewith report:

1. In order to speed up the regiment transfer, we consider it the most expedient to use the 84th fighter regiment of the 147th aviation division based on 40 metal-made “YAK-9s”, deployed in the Maritime Region in the vicinity of Voroshilov. The regiment shall be dispatched by air via Chinese territory by the route Yanji-Andong-Pyongyang. The regiment’s overflight should take two days. During the preparation for the overflight one has to take into account the inevitability of air combat in the area of Andong-Pyongyang.

2. In a very cautious manner, we made a number of inquiries to Comrade Shlykov concerning the following questions:
   - the suitability for the landing of our aircraft at airdromes in the vicinity of Pyongyang which have been badly damaged by the enemy’s air raids, especially lately;
   - the availability of aircraft maintenance personnel, fuel, and munitions there.

3. If the Koreans do not have aircraft maintenance crews, before the regiment’s transfer we will have to dispatch an aviation maintenance battalion for this regiment, composed of 223 men with air-base equipment, from Korea to Andong by railroad via Andong to their destinations:
   - fuel for 15 refueling cycles and 15 sets of munitions.
   - an air defense artillery battalion consisting of three 85-mm gun batteries and one 37-mm gun battery, in total 16 artillery guns, for providing air cover to the airdrome;

4. Bearing in mind the lack of Korean aerial surveillance and alert system in the vicinity of Pyongyang, in order to create normal conditions in combat for our regiment, we would consider it necessary to dispatch along with the regiment at least several radar units designed to locate the enemy’s aircraft, as well as a team of radio operators who can set up communications between the airbase and these radar posts. Otherwise, our airplanes on the ground will be subject to sudden raids by the enemy’s aviation.

5. We ask You to give us permission to report all our final calculations regarding the regiment’s transfer to Pyongyang as soon as we find out in Pyongyang the details related to the questions of the regiment’s redeployment. At the same time, we will report to You our considerations concerning the organization of the air defense system of the airbase from which the regiment will operate.

[signature]

V A S I L E V S K Y

“21” September 1950

No. 1172cc

Copies: Stalin, Malenkov, Beriya, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 79-80]

Document 2: Vasilevsky to Stalin, 23 September 1950

To Comrade STALIN

I herewith report concerning the undertaken measures relating to the redeployment of the fighter aviation regiment based on the “LA-9” type of aircraft from the Maritime Region to provide air cover for the city of Pyongyang.

1. For the redeployment we assigned the 304th fighter aviation regiment of the 32nd fighter aviation division numbering 40 airplanes “LA-9” currently deployed at the air base Spassk in the Maritime Region.

2. On October 1-2, the regiment will be redeployed by air via Chinese territory by the route Spassk-Dongning-Yanji-Tonghua-Andong-Pyongyang.

3. The regiment’s overflight will be subject to sudden raids by the enemy’s aircraft, as well as a team of radio operators who can set up communications between the airbase and these radar posts. Otherwise, our airplanes on the ground will be subject to sudden raids by the enemy’s aviation.

4. We ask You to give us permission to report all our final calculations regarding the regiment’s transfer to Pyongyang as soon as we find out in Pyongyang the details related to the questions of the regiment’s redeployment. At the same time, we will report to You our considerations concerning the organization of the air defense system of the airbase from which the regiment will operate.

[signature]

V A S I L E V S K Y

“23” September 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 81-82]

Document 3: Telegram from Fyn Si (Stalin) to Matveyev (Army Gen. M.V. Zakharov) and Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK T.F. Shlykov, approved 27 September 1950 Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo
VKP(b) CC
# P78/73
27 September 1950
[To:] Cmrs Malenkov, Bulganin, Vasilyevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC
VKP(b) Decision dated September 27, 1950

#73. - Questions of Korea.

Approve of the attached directive to Comrades Matveev and Shtykov.

Secretary of the C[entral] C[ommittee]

* * * * *

Attachment to #73 (op) of the Politburo Protocol #78

Top Secret

Pyongyang

TO MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]
TO SHTYKOV

The serious predicament in the area of Seoul and in the South-East in which the Korean People’s Army has found itself late has to a great extent been caused by a series of grave mistakes made by the Frontline Command, the Commands of the Army Groups and army groupings in matters related to command and control over troops, as well as to the tactics of their combat use in particular.

It is our military advisers who are even more to blame for these mistakes. Our military advisers failed to implement scrupulously and in a timely fashion the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the withdrawal of four divisions from the central front to the area of Seoul despite the fact that at the moment of adopting this decision such a possibility existed. Consequently, they lost seven days which brought about an enormous tactical advantage in the vicinity of Seoul to the U.S. troops. Had they pulled out these divisions on time, this could have changed the military situation around Seoul considerably. Odd battalions and separate detachments arriving in the vicinity of Seoul, unprepared for combat, could not produce any effect because of lack of coordination and communications with the staff. The division which arrived from the southeast was thrown into combat in a disorganized manner and in odd units, which made it easier for the enemy to decimate and annihilate it. As we directed earlier, you should have deployed this division for combat at the line northeast and east of Seoul, reorganize it there, give its soldiers at least one day of respite, prepare it for battle and only afterwards introduce these troops into combat.

One cannot help taking serious note of erroneous and absolutely inadmissible tactics for tank use in combat. Lately you have used tanks in combat without preliminary artillery strikes aimed at clearing the field for tank maneuvers. As a consequence, the enemy easily destroys your tanks. Our military advisers who have personal experience from the Great Patriotic War must be aware that such ignorant use of tanks leads to their loss.

One cannot help noticing the strategic illiteracy of our advisers and their incompetence in intelligence matters. They failed to grasp the strategic importance of the enemy’s assault landing in Inch’on, denied the gravity of its implications, while Shtykov even suggested that we should bring to trial the author of an article in the “Pravda” about the U.S. assault landing. This blindness and lack of strategic experience led to the fact that they doubted the necessity of redeploying troops from the South toward Seoul, as well as procrastinated over their redeployment and slowed it down considerably, thereby losing a week to the enemy’s enjoyment.

The assistance provided by our military advisers to the Korean Command in such paramount matters as communications, command and control over troops, organization of intelligence and combat is exceptionally weak. As a result of this, the KPA troops, in essence, are beyond control: they are engaged in combat blindly and cannot arrange the coordination between the various armed services in battle. One can tolerate such a situation during a successful offensive, but one cannot allow this to happen when the frontline situation is worsening.

You must elucidate all these points to our military advisers, and first of all to Vasilyev.

In the present military situation, in order to provide assistance to the Korean Com-
advisers will be captured by the enemy, as was directed earlier.

Report on the implementation of this directive.

F Y N SI. [STALIN]

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 90-93]

Document 4: Ciphered telegram from Matveyev (Zakharov) to Fyn Si (Stalin), 26 [27] September 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600262/sh

From Pyongyang Sent on 26.9.50 at 8:10 a.m., by wire
Received in Moscow on 27.9.50 at 20:55 p.m.
Arrived in the 8th MDGS2 on 27.9.50 at 21:10 p.m.
Deciphered by Morozov on 27.9.50 at 23:50 p.m.

Number of copies made - 10
Distribution List:
Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1,
Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1,
Bulganin - 1, Vazilevsky - 1, 8th MDGS file - 1.

TO COMRADE FYN SI [STALIN]

Having familiarized myself with the predicament of the KPA, I report:

The situation of the People’s Army troops on the Western (Seoul) and Southeastern (Pusan) fronts is severe.

Seeking to encircle and destroy the main forces of the People’s Army, it is in the general direction of Ch’ungju that the U.S. troops have concentrated the major efforts of the assault group which had landed in the area of Chemulp’o, as well as of the troops that had launched an offensive from the area to the North and Northwest of Taegu.

Using the support of the air force which has dominated the air space without hindrance and caused aircraft-fright [aviobosan]’ both among the ranks within the People’s Army and in the rear areas, the U.S. troops have managed to move from Suwon eastward and southeastward for 25 to 30 kilometers and some of their troops took over Sangju and Antó to the north and northwest of Taegu.

According to the information which still needs to be verified, some tank units of the enemy’s Seoul group continue to advance toward Ch’ungju, which creates the danger of encirclement of the First Army Group of the KPA.

The People’s Army troops, suffering heavy losses, mainly from the enemy’s airforce, having lost almost all their tanks and much artillery, are engaged in difficult battles to hold their positions. The troops lack ammunition and fuel the delivery of which has been virtually halted. The accounting for the available weapons and ammunition is organized unsatisfactorily. The top-down command and control system is set up poorly. The wire and radio communications work intermittently because of the interruptions inflicted by the enemy’s air raids and due to the lack of qualified radio operators and the lack of fuel for radio station generators correspondingly. Courier mail is almost nonexistent.

The predicament of the KPA troops, in particular on the Southeastern front, remains unclear.

Upon our recommendation, on the night of 26.9.50 [26 September 1950], some Korean communications officers were dispatched to the Front Command and the Seoul group in order to collect information on the troops’ situation.

On 25.9.50, at 19:00 pm, local time, Kim Il Sung’s order was forwarded to the troops, according to which the Seoul grouping and the Second Army Group operating in the northern part of the southeastern front were told to go on the defensive and hold up the enemy by any means.

The troops of the Second Army Group operating in the central and southern parts of the southeastern front were ordered to begin general retreat northwestward with the aim of getting to the area of Chénchang, Taejon, Po’un for further levelling off the front line approximately following the line Seoul, Yëju, Ch’ungju [in Russian translation: Seoul, Reisiu, Tsiusiu, Naidzio, Urutsin].

On 26.9.50, KIM IL SUNG received our group.

The meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister PAK HÓN-YÓNG and Comrade SHTYKOV.

As a result of our conversation, KIM IL SUNG decided to combine the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister in his hands, to set up a Staff Office for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the command and control over troops, and to pay serious attention to the work of the rear.

At present, they have begun to form only six infantry divisions in the northern part of Korea, whereas the current military situation has made impossible the formation of nine infantry divisions manned with the Southerners.

KIM IL SUNG issued a directive to take immediate steps aimed at withdrawing the remaining KPA troops from South Korea so that to use it to form new divisions in North Korea and deny this opportunity to the South.

In connection with the fact that the Chinese railroads are overloaded transporting supplies to Korea, it is desirable that the armaments designated for use by the six divisions which are being newly formed be shipped first, and only then should the ammunition be delivered.

After our conversation with KIM IL SUNG we got down to work in order to assist in:
- organizing good command and control over troops;
- rearranging the system of troop supplies, shipments, and transport services;
- preparing defensive fortifications.

The People’s Army is experiencing a dire shortage of drivers. The 3,400 trucks which are to arrive soon have no drivers at all. It may be expedient to propose to Kim Il Sung that he ask the Chinese friends to dispatch not less than 1,500 drivers to Korea, may it not?

MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]

# 1298/sh
09/27/50
12:35pm, Pyongyang time
Typed by Budanova on 28.9.50 at 0:15 a.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 103-106]

Document 5: Ciphered Telegram, Shytov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantia (Stalin), 29 September 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600301/sh
From: PYONGYANG
Sent on 09/29/50 at 20:23 p.m.
Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 14:45 p.m.
Received at the 8D/GS on 09/30/50 at 14:50 p.m.
Deciphered by Vakushin on 09/30/50 at 15:50 p.m.
Distribution list - 12 copies:
Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1,
Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1,
Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1, 8 MDGS - 1,
MFA - 1, on file - 1.

To: MOSCOW
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
To Comrade GROMYKO
Instantsia [Highest Authority]

On 29 September 29 I met KIM IL SUNG upon his request.

PAK HÓN-YÓNG was present at the meeting. In the beginning of the conversation KIM IL SUNG asked me whether I was aware of the military situation at the front.

I replied that I did not know the latest one.

Then KIM IL SUNG briefly explained to me the predicament of his troops on the basis of the report of the Front Commander and asked my advice as to what one could do in order to improve the situation at the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the wake of the enemy’s having occupied the Syarye mountain range and moving into the rear of the Second Army Group the front situation is becoming particularly troublesome. Earlier they hoped that they would be able to withdraw troops in an organized manner. But because of their poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders, the enemy managed to cut off the First Army Group and is moving to cut off the Second Army Group by its breakthrough toward P’UNGGI and is moving to cut off the Second Army Group the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the wake of the enemy's having occupied the Syarye mountain range and moving into the rear of the Second Army Group the front situation is becoming particularly troublesome.

I replied that I did not know the latest one.

Then KIM IL SUNG briefly explained to me the predicament of his troops on the basis of the report of the Front Commander and asked my advice as to what one could do in order to improve the situation at the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the wake of the enemy’s having occupied the Syarye mountain range and moving into the rear of the Second Army Group the front situation is becoming particularly troublesome. Earlier they hoped that they would be able to withdraw troops in an organized manner. But because of their poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders, the enemy managed to cut off the First Army Group and is moving to cut off the Second Army Group by its breakthrough toward P’UNG/GI [BUNKEI] and JIUYON [TISEN].

The situation in Seoul is also murky. His orders notwithstanding, CH’OE YONGGON does not report anything, despite the fact that a line of communications with him is available.

I replied that it was hard for me to advise anything regarding this matter because I did not know the predicament of the KPA troops and their location, however, I would consider it expedient for KIM IL SUNG to take urgent steps to organize defense along the 38th parallel, including immediate deployment of troops at the already prepared fortifications there.

KIM IL SUNG asked me, how do you consider [the situation], will the adversary cross the 38th parallel northward?

I replied that it was not clear yet, but that they had to undertake urgent measures to set up defenses along the 38th parallel.

KIM IL SUNG reiterated his earlier stated desire to unify the country by his own means, he stated that he wanted to form 15 divisions and to continue the struggle, but it was not clear for him whether the adversary would cross the 38th parallel or not. Should the enemy cross the 38th parallel, they [the North Korean leadership - AM] would be unable to form new troops and they would have no means to render any serious resistance to the enemy.

In this connection, he would like to ask my advice regarding his letter to Comrade STALIN. They discussed this idea and want to send the letter.

I responded that I could give no advice on this matter. At that moment, PAK HÓN-YÓNG joined the conversation and said that they had already drafted a letter, that the WPKs Political Council had discussed it, and they wanted to familiarize me with its content.

I dodged the reading by saying that it was up to the Political Council what its members were going to write in their letter. On 28.9.50, [A.I.] SHABSHIN, a member of MATVEYEV’S group, told MATVEYEV and myself that at a chance meeting with PAK HÓN-YÓNG the latter told him that the Political Council had discussed and adopted a text of the letter addressed to comrade Stalin, containing a request to aid Korea with air support.

PAK informed SHABSHIN that they had dispatched a letter in reply to MAO ZEDONG which contained a hint about aid.

It was obvious that they [Kim and Pak - AM] were not satisfied with my earlier reply and they did not know what to do with their letter to Comrade STALIN.

KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG are nervous. In the present difficult situation one can feel some confusion and hopelessness.

The military situation has worsened dramatically lately. The adversary managed to cut off the entire First Army Group composed of six divisions and two brigades, as well as, by advancing to the vicinity of CH’ÓNGJU, to cut off the Second Army Group composed of 7 divisions. Seoul fell. There are no standby troops ready to render any serious resistance to the enemy advancing to the 38th parallel.

New military units being formed in the North advance to the frontline very slowly because the railroads in fact do not function due to the demolished bridges and ruined railway stations, while automobile transport is scarce.

These new units lack armaments. The newly formed units and groupings designated to defend CHEMULPO, HAJEU, WÓNSAN, and CH’ÓNGJIN have weapons designed for training purposes only.

The political situation is also getting more and more complicated.

The enemy stepped up its activity of dropping paratroopers into the territory of North Korea with the task of gathering intelligence on what deliveries are being shipped from the Soviet Union and to conduct subversive activities. Reactionary forces are raising their heads in North Korea.
Extremely Urgent

MOSCOW
To Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR
Comrade GROMYKO

I herewith relay the text of a letter addressed to Comrade STALIN which I received from KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG (translation from the Korean).

This letter was handed over to me by PAK HÓN-YÓNG in person.

S H T Y K O V
No. 1351
Enclosure: 4-page letter.

This letter was cabled to Comrade Stalin on 10.01.50 at 12:50 p.m.

Typed by Shcherbakova on 10/01/50 at 1:45 a.m.

* * * * *

Moscow, Kremlin.

DEEPLY RESPECTED Iosif Vissarionovich STALIN.

On behalf of the Workers’ Party of Korea, we express to You, the liberator of the Korean people and the leader of the working peoples of the entire world, our profound gratitude for compassion and assistance which You constantly provide to our people struggling for the freedom and independence of its Motherland.

In this letter, we would like to brief You on the current situation at the fronts of the liberation war of our people against the American aggressors.

Prior to the assault landing at Inch’ón (Chemulp’o) one could not judge the situation at the fronts as unfavorable to us. The adversary, suffering one defeat after another, was cornered into a tiny piece of land at the southern-most tip of South Korea and we had a great chance of winning a victory in the last decisive battles.

Such a situation considerably damaged the military authority of the United States. Therefore, in those conditions, in order to restore its prestige and to implement by any means its long-held plans of conquering Korea and transforming it into its military-strategic bridgehead, on 16.9.50, the U.S. performed an assault landing operation and landed a considerable number of troops and armaments in the vicinity of Inch’ón after having mobilized almost all its land, naval, and air troops deployed in the Pacific ocean. The enemy took over Inch’ón and is engaged in street combats in the city of Seoul itself. The military situation became perilous.

The units of our People’s Army heroically fight against advancing assault landing units of the enemy. However, we consider it necessary to report to You about the emergence of very unfavorable conditions for us.

The enemy’s air force numbering about a thousand airplanes of various types, facing no rebuff from our side, totally dominate the air space and perform air raids at the fronts and in the rear day and night. At the fronts, under the air cover of hundreds of airplanes the motorized units of the enemy engage us in combat at their free will and inflict great losses to our manpower and destroy our armaments. Moreover, by freely destroying railroads and highways, telephone communications lines, means of transportation and other facilities, the enemy’s air force impedes the provision of supplies to our combat units and bars maneuvers by our troops, thereby making their timely redeployments impossible. We experience this difficulty on all fronts.

Having cut off all the communications lines of our troops and joined the assault force that landed in Inch’ón with the units of their southern front that broke through our frontline, the adversary has a real opportunity to take over the city of Seoul completely.

As a result, the units of the People’s Army that are still fighting in the southern part of Korea have been cut off from the northern part of Korea, they are torn into pieces and cannot receive munitions, armaments, and food rations. Moreover, some units do not have any communication with each other, while some of them are surrounded by enemy troops.

After taking over Seoul completely, the enemy is likely to launch a further offensive into North Korea. Therefore, we believe that if in future the above-mentioned conditions unfavorable to us continue, then the American aggression ultimately will be successful.

In order to provide troops with all the necessary supplies and to feed the frontline without any interruption, first of all, we need to have an appropriate air force. But we do not possess well-trained pilots.

Dear Comrade STALIN, we are determined to overcome all the difficulties facing us so that Korea will not be a colony and a military springboard of the U.S. imperialists. We will fight for the independence, democracy and happiness of our people to the last drop of blood. Therefore, with all our energy we are taking decisive measures for the formation and training of many new divisions with the aim of using more than 100,000 troops mobilized in South Korea [captured in South Korea - AM] in the most advantageous operational areas, as well as arming the entire people so as to be prepared to fight a protracted war.

This notwithstanding, if the enemy does not give us time to implement the measures which we plan, and, making use of our extremely grave situation, steps up its offensive operations into North Korea, then we will not be able to stop the enemy troops solely with our own forces.

Therefore, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, we cannot help asking You to provide us with special assistance. In other words, at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.

If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people’s democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.

We request Your directive regarding the aforementioned proposal.

Respectfully, The CC of the Workers’ Party of Korea

KIM IL SUNG, PAK HÓN-YÓNG

29 September 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 41-45]

Document 7: Ciphertext Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing (N.V. Roshchin) with message
for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172

Coded, only by wire
Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50
Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1
To BEIJING, [SOVIET] AMBASSADOR

Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 1112-1126

Tell Zhou Enlai the following:
1. We agree with the opinion of Chinese comrades regarding the Indian intermediation in the matter of admitting the People’s [Republic of] China into the UN membership.
2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteers’ actions in North Korea in the event of the enemy’s crossing the 38th parallel. We will do our best to provide the air cover for these units.
3. Your report about the flights of the Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian territory has not been confirmed. But we have issued an order not to permit such overflights.

F I L I P P O V [STALIN]

373/sh
5.7.50 [5 July 1950]
Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 07/06/50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 331, list 79]

Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov), 30 September 1950

VKP(b) CC
# P78/118
09/30/50
To: Cmrs. Malenkov, Bulganin, Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b)

Decision dated 30 September 1950

118. Telegram from Comrade Matveyev # 1298.

The attached draft of the reply to Comrade Matveyev regarding his telegram #1298 has been approved.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

* * * * *

Attachment to the Decision of the Politburo #78 on #118

PYONGYANG
To MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]
RE: # 1298

We consider correct the decisions adopted by Kim Il Sung at his meeting with You, in particular, regarding the combining of the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister in the hands of Kim Il Sung, the establishment of the Staff at the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the formation of six divisions and withdrawal of manpower reserves from South Korea.

The formation of six divisions must be accelerated. Necessary armaments, ammunition, and other materials will be supplied from October 5 to October 20.

As far as the question about the expediency of recommending that Kim Il Sung ask the Chinese friends to dispatch drivers to Korea, You may give such advice but without citing Moscow.

Upon the directive of Instantsia

CHAN F U [STALIN]

30 September 1950
# 182-sh
1 copy

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 100-101]

Document 9: Memorandum Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Comrade STALIN I.V.

The Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade Shtykov has reported that as a result of air bombardments by the U.S. Air Force many enterprises of the DPRK have been ruined and are not in operation. At the present time, Koreans do not intend to rebuild these factories and plants.

In this situation Comrade Shtykov considers it expedient to send some of the Soviet specialists back to the Soviet Union and asks to be given the right to dispatch the Soviet experts back to the USSR regardless of the length of their stay in Korea upon consultations with the government of the DPRK.

Comr. Shtykov also requests that he be permitted, at his judgement and upon consultations with heads of the Soviet organizations in Korea, to evacuate some of their personnel working in Korea without whom they can still continue to do their work.

The M[inistry of] F[oreign] A[ffairs of the] USSR considers it possible to recall some of the Soviet specialists from the DPRK only if the initiative for their return to the Soviet Union were to come from the government of the DPRK.

As far as Comr. Shtykov’s suggestion about the evacuation of the personnel of the Soviet organizations from the DPRK, the MFA [of the] USSR proposes that we maintain the existing procedures according to which the recall of personnel is to be done via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

A draft [cable to Shtykov - AM] is attached.

I request Your consideration.

A. G R O M Y K O
providing for the defense of the 38th parallel fighting in the South northward, thereby later to gradually pull out most of the troops frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and from the South immediately, to set up their rear in the North. Moscow admonished Army Groups of the North Koreans from aimed at cutting off the First and Second [Inchon] had great significance and was landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp’o Moscow warned our Korean friends that the friends is getting desperate.

In the current situation, without delay you must give instructions to the soldiers and officers who are still fighting in the south to retreat by any means, in groups or person by person, to the north. There is no continuous frontline. These troops are fighting on their own territory, so the population feels compassion toward them and will help them out. They must leave heavy weapons behind and try to get to the north by all means, by using the cover of night and the areas unoccupied by the enemy yet. You have the possibility of rescuing thereby the most valuable asset, that is, the cadres.

Take all the necessary measures to implement this directive.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

C H A N F U [STALIN]
2 October 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 64]

Document 12: CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 12:15
3.10.1950

TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]

I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581:

“I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

In the second place, it is necessary to consider the way toward the 38th parallel wide open.

I think that if in the current situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course.

I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it.

I await your reply.

Greetings,

F I L I P P O V [STALIN]
In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [krajne bol’shim].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war.

We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place, to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.

MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50"

1. In our view MAO ZEDONG’s answer is indicative of a change in the original position of the Chinese leadership on the Korean question. It contradicts the earlier appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed
in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank weapons and to some extent in artillery.

The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid catastrophe.

ROSHCHIN

No. 2270 3.10

Deciphered by Araushkin 12.50 3.10
[12.50 p.m. 3 October]
Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10
[1.20 p.m. 3 October]
Typ[ed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to file)

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.]


PYONGYANG, To SHTYKOV for KIM IL SUNG

Comrade Kim Il Sung!

My reply has been delayed because of my consultations with the Chinese comrades, which took several days. On 1 October, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring whether he could dispatch to Korea immediately at least five or six divisions under the cover of which our Korean comrades could form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction [nedoval’stvo] in China. I replied to him by the following letter:

“I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of five-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.

While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an international character:

1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war [k bol’shoi voine];
2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;
3) the USA will be compelled to yield in the Korean question to China behind which stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to agree to such terms of the settlement of the Korean question that would be favorable to Korea and that would not give the enemies a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard;
4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their springboard in the Far East.

In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy, and that without serious struggle and an imposing display of force not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its springboard not for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

Of course, I took into account also [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.

Such were the considerations and prospects of an international nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a minimum of five-six divisions from You.”

In response to this [letter], on October 7, I received letter from Mao on 7 September [sic-October], in which he expresses solidarity with the fundamental positions discussed in my letter and declares that he will dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. But [he said] that he will send them not now, but after some time. He also requested that I receive his representatives and discuss some details of the mission with them. Of course, I agreed to receive his representatives and to discuss with them a detailed plan of military assistance to Korea.

It is obvious from the above mentioned that You must stand firm and fight for every tiny piece of your land, that You have to strengthen resistance to the American occupiers of Korea and prepare reserves, using for this purpose the military cadres of the Korean People’s Army coming out from the encirclement. Also, this shows that You are absolutely right in your proposal that we transfer all Korean comrades studying in the
USSR into the pilot training program.
I will keep you informed about further talks with the Chinese comrades. 8 October 1950.

F Y N S I [STALIN]

Comrade Shtykov, I ask You to read this letter to Kim Il Sung. He may copy it by hand in your presence, but You may not hand over this letter to Kim Il Sung because of its extreme confidentiality.

F Y N S I [STALIN]

[Handwritten: This letter was delivered to Comrade Bulganin on October 7, 1950 at 22:15 pm.]
[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65-67]

Document 14: Telegram from Gromyko to Shtykov
Approved by Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, 5 October 1950

VKP(b) CC
# P78/168
05/10/50
To: Cmrds Bulganin, Gromyko

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b)

Decision dated October 5, 1950
168. The Question of Shtykov.

The attached draft of a telegram addressed to the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Com. Shtykov, regarding the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists and personnel of Soviet organizations from Korea to the USSR, has been approved.

SECRETARY OF THE CC
4ak

[Attachment to the Decision of the Politburo #78 regarding #168]

PYONGYANG
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

1304/sh. We agree with your proposals concerning the temporary evacuation of some Soviet specialists upon consultations with the Korean government, as well as of the personnel of Soviet organizations in Korea.

G R O M Y K O

5-nb

[APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 121-122]

Document 15: Gromyko and Vasilevsky to Stalin, 6 October 1950, attaching draft cable to Shtykov

Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Distribution list:
Stalin - 1, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, Khrushchev - 1.

Comrade STALIN I.V.:

In connection with Comrade Shtykov’s telegram #1405/sh dated 5 October in which he pressed the question of the evacuation from Korea of Soviet specialists working in Korea, personnel of Soviet organizations in Korea, families of Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, staff of the Soviet air commandants’ offices, and, in case of emergency, all Soviet citizens, we consider it necessary to reply in accordance with the attached draft.

We request your consideration thereof.

A. VASILEVSKY A. GROMYKO
6 October 1950
No. 201-gi

[Attachment]

CIPHERED MESSAGE:

To PYONGYANG
SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

RE: 1405/sh

First. Regarding the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists and their families, as well as personnel of Soviet organizations and their families, follow the instructions laid out in our telegram # 18909.
Second. You must decide the question of the evacuation of families of Soviet citizens of Korean nationality from the territory of Korea on the spot, bearing in mind changes in the situation on the ground.
Third. All the Soviet personnel of the air commandants’ offices and families of Soviet military advisers must be evacuated from the territory of Korea.
Fourth. We agree with your proposal that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, be evacuated to the territory of the USSR and China.

(A. Vasilevsky) (A. Gromyko)

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 126-127]

Document 16: Ciphered Telegram, Kim Il Sung to Stalin (via Shtykov), 9 October 1950

Ciphered Telegram # 600382/sh

To Comrade STALIN I.V.
FROM: PYONGYANG

Sent by wire on 10/09/50 at 7:05 a.m.
Received in Moscow on 10/09/50 at 9:38 a.m.
Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/09/50 at 9:45 a.m.
Deciphered by Morozov on 10/09/50 at 10:45 a.m.
Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1.

I herewith transmit a letter of the following content addressed to Your name from comrade KIM IL SUNG:

“Comrade STALIN Iosif Vissarionovich,

Let me ask You, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, for assistance and advice. Now it is evident to everybody that having made significant achievements in recent military operations, the American aggressor will not stop at anything short of...”
the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its conversion into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East.

In my opinion, the struggle of our people for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.

For a successful struggle against a strong enemy armed with the latest achievements of military science and technology we will have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators, and engineering officers urgently.

It is very difficult to train them inside our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following request:

1. To permit the training of 200-300 pilots from among Korean students studying in the Soviet Union.
2. To permit the training of 1,000 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers from among Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union.

I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render us assistance in this regard.

Respectfully, KIM IL SUNG

I support KIM IL SUNG’S request.

SHTYKOV

No. 1447/sh

9 October 1950

Typed by Kravchuk on 10/09/50 at 11:20 a.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 72-73]

Document 17: Memorandum, Golovko and Fokin to Stalin, 13 October 1950

Comrade STALIN

According to electronic intelligence data gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battleships were noticed in the vicinity of Ch’ôngjin: USS “Missouri,” three heavy aircraft carriers (“Valley Forge,” “Leyte,” “The Philippine Sea”), two escort aircraft carriers (“Sicily,” “Bedaun Strait”), three heavy cruisers (“Rochester,” “Toledo,” “Helena”), three cruisers (“Wooster,” “Juno,” “Ceylon”), twelve destroyers, the third squadron of mine-sweepers, the first and the third assault landing groups.

Ch’ôngjin was heavily bombarded from the air and the sea.

[signature] GOLOVKO

[signature] FO KIN

No. 244cc
13 October 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, list 3]

Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, Roschchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 October 1950, re Meeting with Mao Zedong

Ciphered Telegram # 25629

FROM: BEIJING

Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38 a.m.
Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at 02:00 a.m.
Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20 a.m.
Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, 8MDGS - 1.
PRIORITY T

To FILIPPOV [STALIN]

In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say:

Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us [the Chinese - AM] and the Northeast will be faced with constant menace.

Past hesitations by our comrades occurred because questions about the international situation, questions about the Soviet assistance to us, and questions about air cover were not clear to them. At present, all these questions have been clarified.

Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is advantageous for them to dispatch the Chinese troops into Korea. The Chinese have the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea.

At this point, they are sending the first echelon composed of nine divisions. Although it is poorly armed, it will be able to fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades will have to prepare the second echelon.

The main thing that we need, says Mao Zedong, is air power which shall provide us with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as soon as possible, but not later than in two
months.

Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong noted that at present the government of the People’s Republic of China cannot pay in cash for the armaments delivered. They hope to receive arms on credit.

Thus, the 1951 budget will not be affected, and it will be easier for them to explain it to the democrats.

In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believe that the Chinese must come to the assistance of the Korean comrades in their difficult struggle. To discuss this matter, Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrade Filipov again.

Zhou Enlai is being sent new instructions.

R O S H C H I N

13.10 [13 October]

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2]

Document 20: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 13 October 1950

Ciphered Telegram # 75525/4/675 (incoming #3735/shs)
(Stalin’s hand-written note)

PYONGYANG

To SHTYKOV for Comrade Kim Il Sung

I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] discussed the situation [in Korea - AM] again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to You yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of the Korean troops to the north.

13 Oct 1950

typed:] Sent on 13.X.50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 74-75]

Document 21: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829

To PYONGYANG—SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the following message:

“After vacillations [kolebaniy] and a series of temporary [provisional] decisions the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops.

I am glad [rad] that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last.

In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which You were told of earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades.

The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR.

I wish You success.”

F Y N S I [STALIN]

14.10.50

Typed by Doronchenkova #8865
Made 2 copies: Stalin - 1, 8MDGS - 1.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, list 77]

1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September 26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 because at the end of the telegram it says that it was dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 September 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same date Moscow time.

2. 8th MDGS stands for the Eighth Main Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
11 July 1995

To the Editor:

Since Kathryn Weathersby chose once again to stigmatize my work (as “revisionist”) in the spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, perhaps I might be permitted a comment. The documents that she reproduced, selectively culled from a vastly larger archive and handcarried to Seoul by a Boris Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the faltering Russian economy, are quite interesting but in ways that she does not seem to understand.

Document #1, a standard transcript of Kim Il Sung’s meeting with Stalin on 5 March 1949 widely circulated for use inside the Soviet government, is impressive primarily for how bland it is, adding very little to the existing record. If anything it illustrates how distant Stalin was from the Korean situation, probing Kim on what kind of an army he had, what kind South Korea had, and whether he had utilized the “national bourgeoisie” to organize trade (which Kim indeed had done). This transcript adds virtually nothing to what has been known of this meeting, a relatively full record of which can be found in an archive of captured North Korean materials in Washington. But it does appear to show that no secret military alliance or agreement issued forth from this meeting, as the South long claimed.

This document certainly does not provide evidence for Dr. Weathersby’s assertion that the meeting was “revealing in a most intimate way [of] the nature of the relationship” between the USSR and the DPRK or that North Korea was “utterly dependent” on the USSR. The captured archive has large numbers of documents on Korean-Soviet trade, negotiations over various exchanges, and proof that some precious Korean minerals, like gold and monazite (when refined, useful for a thorium atomic bomb) were indeed transferred in large quantities to Russia. (I covered this briefly in my Origins of the Korean War, volume 2 [Princeton University Press, 1990], pp. 151–2, 340–45.) These voluminous materials still do not prove North Korea’s utter dependency on the USSR, especially when contrasted to South Korea, which had half its annual budget and five-sixths of its imports in the 1950s provided virtually gratis by the United States. (Stalin, to the contrary, charged Kim two percent—about what mortgages cost in the U.S. then.)

Document #7, Stalin’s telegram to Russian ambassador to P’yŏngyang Shtykov on 30 January 1950, does not say what Weathersby says it does, namely, it does not “reveal so bluntly” Stalin’s strategic thinking or his “perfect mafioso style.” Instead it shows Stalin appearing to be more interested than at any previous point in Kim II Sung’s plans for South Korea, without a hint of what Stalin’s own strategic thinking might be. Dr. Weathersby thinks the timing of this change is to be explained by Dean Acheson’s famed press club speech on January 12, which is to assume a Stalin so inexperienced as to take Acheson’s public statement of a private policy at face value (and even the public statement is always misread by scholars). Finally, Stalin’s request that Kim send 25,000 tons of lead (whether gratis or for a price is not mentioned) is no more “mafioso” than the U.S. more or less telling South Korea that it would require Korea’s entire annual output of tungsten in the early 1950s, to make up for the lost tungsten supplies of southern China.

Documents number two through six are considerably more interesting, but remain inexplicable unless placed against the back-and-forth logic of the developing civil conflict on the peninsula, with full knowledge of what the South and the U.S. were doing. The critical issue in these documents is not a wholesale invasion of the South, but a military operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula, which juts southward from the 38th parallel on Korea’s west coast, reachable from the South only by sea or by an overland route through North Korean territory. This is where the Korean War conventionally dated from 25 June 1950 began, and where fighting between the South and North began on 4 May 1950—in a battle probably started by the South, according to the most reliable accounts.

According to these Soviet documents, Kim Il Sung first broached the idea of an operation against Ongjin to Shtykov on 12 August 1949. This came on the heels of the biggest Ongjin battle of 1949, initiated on August 4 by the North to dislodge South Korean army units holding Un’p’ a Mountain, a salient above the 38th parallel which the South had aggressed against in a previous battle and the summit of which commanded much of the terrain to the north. The North, sought, in the words of the American commander of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAC) “to recover high ground in North Korea occupied by [the] South Korean Army.” Before dawn it launched strong artillery barrages and then at 5:30 a.m., 4000 to 6000 North Korean border guards attacked the salient. They routed the South Korean defenders, destroying two companies of ROK soldiers and leaving hundreds dead.

Virtual panic ensued at high levels of the South Korean government, leading Syngman Rhee and his favored high officers in the army to argue that the only way to relieve pressure on Ongjin was to drive north to Ch’orwon—which happened to be about 20 miles into North Korean territory. Rhee, who was meeting with Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] in a southern Korean port, returned to Seoul and dressed down his defense minister for not having “attacked the North” after the Ongjin debacle. The American ambassador and the KMAC commander both intervened, since an attack on Ch’orwon would, in the words of the latter, “cause heavy civil war and might spread.” The South did not move against Ch’ orwon, but attacks from both sides across the parallel on the Ongjin peninsula continued through the end of 1949.

All this is based on unimpeachable American archival documentation, some of which was reproduced in the 1949 Korea papers of the Foreign Relations of the U.S. and which I treated at length in my 1990 book. When we now look at both sides of the parallel with the help of Soviet materials, we see how similar the Russians were in seeking to restrain hotheaded Korean leaders, including the two chiefs of state. Indeed, two key Russian Embassy officials seeking to restrain Kim used language almost identical to that which John Foster Dulles used with Rhee in his June 1950 discussions in Seoul (both, upon hearing Kim or Rhee declaim their desire to attack the other side, “tried to switch the discussion to a general theme,” to quote from document #6). We see that Kim II Sung, like southern leaders, wanted to bite off a chunk of exposed territory or grab a small city—all of Kaesong for example, which is bisected by the 38th parallel, or Haeju city just above the parallel on Ongjin, which southern commanders wanted to occupy in 1949-50.

The Soviet documents also demonstrate the hardwon, learned logic of this civil war.
by late 1949, namely, that both sides understood that their big power guarantors would not help them if they launched an unprovoked general attack—or even an assault on Ongjin or Ch’orwon. Document #6, a telegram from the Russian ambassador to Moscow in January 1950, shows Kim II Sung impatient that the South “is still not instigating an attack,” thus to justify his own, and the Russians in P’yôngyang tell him once again that he cannot attack Ongjin without risking general civil war. Meanwhile Rhee and his advisors (some of whom were Americans with cabinet-level portfolios in the ROK government) had gotten the message (especially through OSS and CIA operative Preston Goodfellow) that the US would only back Seoul in the case of an unprovoked and unequivocal attack from the North. Thus the 1950 logic for both sides was to see who would be stupid enough to move first, with Kim itching to invade and hoping for a clear southern provocation, and hotheads in the South hoping to provoke an “unprovoked” assault, thus to get American help—for that was the only way the South could hope to win. What better way for both sides to begin than to do it in isolated, remote Ongjin, with no foreign observers present along the parallel?

Other items in these documents also bear comment. They make clear that well before the war Kim already had begun playing Moscow off against Beijing, for example letting Shtykov overhear him say, at an apparently drunken luncheon on 19 January 1950, that if the Russians wouldn’t help him unify the country, “Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.” In general this document underscores my point that the victory of the Chinese revolution had an enormous refractory effect on North Korea (Origins, 1990, pp. 369-71), and that North Korea’s China connection was a trump card Kim could play to create some breathing room for his regime between the two communist giants. The documents also show that Kim’s timing for an invasion was deeply influenced by his desire to get large numbers of Korean soldiers back from China, where they had been fighting for years with Mao’s forces (Origins, 1990, pp. 451-53).

These documents put to rest forever, in my view, P’yôngyang’s canard that it was Pak Hon-yong, the southern communist leader, who argued for war in 1950 and foolishly thought the southern people would “rise up” to greet northern troops (Origins, 1990, pp. 456-57). Kim II Sung trumped up these charges in show trials in 1953, and then had Pak and his close allies executed. Meanwhile Kim told Shtykov in January 1950 that “partisans will not decide the question. The people of the south know that we have a good army.” South Korean “liberation” was to come courtesy of, and only of, the Korean Peoples Army.

Finally, what is absolutely fascinating about documents two through six is Kim II Sung’s basic conception of a Korean War, originated at least by August 1949: namely, attack the cul de sac of Ongjin (which no sane blitzkrieg commander would do precisely because it is a cul de sac), move eastward and grab Kaesong, and then see what happens. At a minimum this would establish a much more secure defense of P’yôngyang, which was quite vulnerable from Ongjin and Kaesong. At maximum, it might open Seoul to his forces. That is, if the southern army collapses, move on to Seoul and occupy it in a few days. And here we see the significance of the collapse of the ROK 2nd and 7th divisions, 25-27 June 1950, which opened the historic invasion corridor and placed the Korean People’s Army in Seoul on the 27th, and why some people with intimate knowledge of the Korean civil conflict have speculated that these divisions may have harbored a fifth column (Origins, 1990, pp. 572-73, 582-85). Kim did not by any means get what he wanted out of the Korean War, but, rest his soul, he got his minimum demand: Kaesong and Ongjin remain firmly on the other side of the 1953 demilitarized zone....

Readers of this Bulletin may not be as interested in the details of Korean history as I am. But they make the point that Korean history is made first and foremost by Koreans, which is something that much of the Korean War literature (from all sides) still fails to grasp. The Soviet documents also show that they are merely documents, that is, evidence that remains to be interpreted with all the intelligence, hindsight, imagination and care that the historian can muster. Furthermore these documents are highly selective, drawn from one portion of one section of one archive, and preferred to a Seoul still socked into the Korean civil struggle by a mendicant from Moscow. (Can we imagine the reverse? An American president curry favor in P’yôngyang with a handful of half-century-old documents?) And even when we have every document the Soviets ever produced, we will still need the South Korean archives, the North Korean archives, the Chinese archives on both sides of the Taiwan straits, and the American intelligence, signals and cryptography archives, before we will be able to argue on truly solid ground the question we ought all try to forget, namely, “who started the Korean civil war?”

Sincerely yours,

Bruce Cumings

1. The armistice did not end discussions of seizing Ongjin and Kaesông, however. According to American intelligence reports in February 1955, Syngman Rhee had held “meetings in which Rhee told Korean military and civilian leaders to prepare for military actions against north Korea,” and in October came reports saying that he had ordered plans for the retaking of Kaesông and the Ongjin Peninsula. This never happened, probably because the U.S. once again prevented Rhee from doing it. See declassified information cited in Donald S. MacDonald, U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 23-24, 80.

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K. Weathersby responds:

Professor Cumings attempts to downplay the significance of the Russian documents by asserting, first of all, that the documents on the decision-making behind the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 published in the previous issue of the Bulletin were “selectively culled from a vastly larger archive.” In fact, the collection from the Presidential Archive declassified in preparation for Yeltsin’s presentation of a portion of them to South Korea includes the great majority of what that archive contains, as can be ascertained from looking at the “Delo” and page numbers. The important gaps in that collection are from April-June 1950 and October 1950, not from the earlier period.

Cumings also writes that these documents were “handcarried to Seoul by a Boris Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the faltering Russian economy.” Actually, Yeltsin presented them to President Kim Young Sam while the latter was in Moscow. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s government’s economic reasons for wishing to improve relations with South Korea are only relevant to
our discussion if this motivation led the Russian declassification commission to exclude certain documents, presumably ones that would present the Soviet role in the Korean War in an unfavorable light. As is apparent from the documents published in this issue as well as the previous issue of the Bulletin, unflattering documents have not been excluded; these records are, in fact, remarkably frank.

Cumings disparages the usefulness of the transcript of the first meeting between Kim Il Sung and Stalin by describing it as a “standard transcript...widely circulated for use inside the Soviet government” which “adds virtually nothing to what has been known of this meeting.” With regard to this assertion, it must be pointed out that Cumings has no knowledge of the circulation of this transcript within the Soviet government, and neither does any other scholar. Furthermore, nothing was “widely circulated” within the Soviet government; in the Soviet context this claim simply makes no sense. In addition, the account of Kim’s meeting with Stalin provided in the captured documents is limited to a report of the trip Kim Il Sung presented to a party assembly, in which he described the agreements reached, the “friendly atmosphere” of the talks, the sites the delegation visited, etc. Obviously, an actual transcript of the meeting with Stalin provides a much more substantial piece of historical evidence.

As for Cumings’ conclusion that the transcript reveals “how distant Stalin was from the Korean situation,” it would be possible to interpret Stalin’s remarks in this way if one had no knowledge of Soviet/North Korean relations and no knowledge of Stalin’s style with subordinates. Perhaps I should have been more explicit. Stalin was very well informed about events in North Korea. The ranking Soviet official in North Korea was General T.F. Shtykov, one of Stalin’s “own men,” who had direct access to Stalin, reporting to him outside the normal channels of the Foreign Ministry and General Staff. Throughout 1949 and 1950 Shtykov regularly communicated with Stalin about the situation in Korea, particularly about the U.S. military presence in the South, the opposition movement in the South, and the actions of the U.S.-backed government in Seoul. Stalin’s request to Kim to provide him with information on such topics was a familiar style of dealing with subordinates, testing him and reinforcing his vulnerability by making him expose himself through his replies to such questions.

Cumings also argues that this transcript does not provide evidence for my assertion that North Korea was utterly dependent on the Soviet Union. Of course it doesn’t—it would have been ridiculous to claim that it did. What I wrote was that “the thousands of pages of documents on post-war Korea in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive” show “in exhaustive detail” that “in the years prior to and during the Korean War, North Korea was utterly dependent economically on the Soviet Union,” a subject I address further in my essay in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

Cumings adds that the collection of documents captured by UN forces in Pyongyang in the fall of 1950, which is housed in the National Archives in Washington, reveal considerable trade between the DPRK and the USSR, but “still do not prove North Korea’s utter dependency on the USSR.” With regard to this argument, it must be pointed out that the collection of captured documents consists of documents that the North Koreans left behind when they withdrew from Pyongyang in the face of the U.S./UN advance into North Korea. They thus include only those documents that were not considered important enough either to evacuate or destroy. This is why there is nothing in that collection about the planning of the June 1950 attack and no records of high-level correspondence between Pyongyang and Moscow. It is not sound reasoning to argue that something was not the case if it is not documented in this collection.

The captured documents are a very rich source of information on many aspects of the history of North Korea that are little illuminated in the Soviet documents, such as politics at the village level, economic records of individual factories, and party personnel rosters. But to get the big picture we must turn to the Russian documents. And to get a complete picture, we must examine both sets of records, a laborious undertaking which a handful of scholars from South Korea has begun.

With regard to Cumings’ disagreement of my reading of Stalin’s telegram of 30 January 1950, I refer readers to my article in the present issue of the Bulletin. Cumings goes on to discuss documents #2-6, recounting the reasons why he concluded in his 1990 volume that the war of June 1950 began as a limited military operation on the Ongjin peninsula. As the Soviet documents show, he was correct to conclude that something was up on Ongjin. However, he stops his account before the punch line. In 1949 Kim did raise the possibility of a limited operation to seize Ongjin, but the Soviet leadership rejected the plan. In early 1950 Stalin changed his mind, and, as the article in this issue details, in April and May Soviet and North Korean military leaders together worked out a plan for a full-scale offensive against South Korea. Cumings is right that leaders of both sides hoped to gain their patron’s support for a war by provoking an assault by the other side and that “the 1950 logic for both sides was to see who would be stupid enough to move first.” But the end of the story is that the Soviet Union eventually decided to support its client’s plan for military reunification while the United States did not. Thus, though Cumings is right that Korean history is made first and foremost by Koreans, the war of 1950-53 was not a purely Korean product.

Of course it’s true, as Cumings notes, that we must examine the archives from all the major actors in the war before we can fully understand this unusually complex conflict. The Cold War International History Project is facilitating just such a multiarchival investigation, beginning with a close comparison of the Chinese and Russian sources. Nonetheless, certain important questions about the war have been resolved by the Russian archival sources; to pretend otherwise is simply dishonest.
SOVIET INTERROGATION OF U.S. POWS IN THE KOREAN WAR

by Laurence Jolidon

The extensive, covert involvement of Soviet intelligence in the interrogation of American prisoners throughout the Korean War has been laid bare thanks to a trove of long-secret military documents unearthed by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on missing Americans in the former Soviet Union.

Despite accounts in the debriefings of repatriated U.S. POWs—and even brief mentions in the Western press during and immediately following the war—that Russians had questioned U.S. POWs, Soviet officials steadfastly maintained for decades that it never happened.

The Kremlin’s obvious interest in the details of American weapons, strategy and morale in the Far East—as early-Cold War indicators of what to expect once the battle for world supremacy that most assumed would eventually occur in Europe was joined—had never gone that far, Stalin and his successors argued.

Moscow’s leaders hid behind the fiction that the Soviet Union, while lending moral and logistical support to the troops of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and air protection along the Manchurian border for the sanctuary it had recently ceded to the new Chinese ruler, Mao Zedong, had primarily been a neutral, disinterested party in Korea.

But just as Soviet Communist Party archival documents made public in the past few years have drawn a clear, intentional and decision-making connection between Stalin’s hand and the North Korean invasion, documents from Soviet military files have deepened our knowledge of what became in effect an extensive, bold, yet largely covert intelligence war conducted by the Soviets north of the 38th parallel.

One key document, obtained in April 1994 by investigators from the Pentagon’s POW/MIA Affairs Office working under the aegis of the Joint Commission, came from files at the Soviet military archives in Podolsk.

The two-paragraph message, dated 26 November 1952, from S. Ignatyev, the chief Soviet military advisor in North Korea, to G.M. Malenkov, one of Stalin’s principal ministers, stated:

Representatives of the MGB of the USSR and China came from Peking to conduct further prisoner interrogations, in order to gain more precise information on spy centers, landing strips and flights over the territory of the Soviet Union.

The interrogations will continue in Pekton [Pyoktong].

While seemingly cursory and matter-of-fact, this document had several important implications.

First, it contradicted previous Russian assurances that Soviet officials had not been involved in the interrogation of American POWs.

Even after veterans of the Soviet military intelligence service had told the Joint Commission of their personal involvement in numerous interrogations, the Russian side had insisted that the rules under which Soviet forces operated in the Korean War forbade such acts.

As proof, they cited message traffic to Soviet posts in the war theater dating from January 1951, and repeated as a standing order throughout the war, that “our translators are categorically forbidden to interrogate American and British POWs, or prisoners of any other nationality.”

The Ignatyev-Malenkov message, on its face, was either a reversal of that policy or—as some American analysts believed—a clue that the “categorically forbidden” order was only for public consumption.

(In the course of the Russian-American dialog on this subject through the meetings of the Joint Commission, the Russian position shifted several times. Some Russian members of the commission admitted reluctantly that one favored method of interrogating American POWs was to have the Russians’ questions put to the prisoners by Chinese interrogators while the Soviets sat, unseen, in an adjacent room. Testimony taken by the commission also made clear that in some cases the Soviets carefully chose Russian officers of Asiatic cast to do the interrogating.)

While Americans are not specifically mentioned in the Ignatyev-Malenkov message, the reference to “flights over the territory of the Soviet Union” could pertain only to American reconnaissance flights, disguised in public statements by U.S. authorities—who had their own reasons for keeping such activities secret—as “weather” or “training” missions.

These flights, which actually began before the outbreak of the Korean War and continued for years afterward, were themselves responsible for the loss of approximately 140 U.S. pilots and crewmen shot down over or near Soviet territory. Except in rare cases these men were never publicly acknowledged by the U.S. government and the very existence of their missions was routinely disavowed.

Just as routinely, the Soviets denied finding or capturing any survivors of these shootdowns. They were secret casualties in a secret war. So long as the U.S. and the USSR remained superpower enemies, to publicly seek their whereabouts would violate their secret status.

But the interrogations referred to in the 26 November 1952 message were primarily those conducted on Americans taken prisoner in hostile action in the Korean War. In the case of U.S. aviators, they included men shot down over or otherwise forced to ditch or parachute in Manchuria.

By UN Command edict, U.S. planes were forbidden to enter Chinese air space. This stipulation was frequently breached by U.S. pilots, although it was customary for official military records to mask this fact in after-action reports.

Secondly, the 26 November 1952 message to the Soviet advisor in North Korea is an important clue to the dynamics of the covert war the Soviets were then conducting behind the lines in Korea.

Rather than simply sitting back and waiting for the reports of POW interrogations to be sent through channels, from the prison camps that were ostensibly under the control of the Chinese army, the Soviets were taking the initiative to monitor and direct the process more directly.

This speaks to the apparent competition for access to the most valuable POWs—documented in wartime accounts of UN prisoners—among the three Communist allies in the war.

By the fall and winter of 1952, for instance, the Chinese had capitalized on the capture on Manchurian territory of a number of U.S. aviators by charging them with “war crimes,” including the much-disputed allegation of waging “germ warfare” by dropping infected plants and insects while overflying Chinese territory.
The statement that “interrogations will continue in Pekton (Pyoktong),” a city on the North Korean side of the Yalu near the border with China, could be read as a sign that the Soviets wished to make it clear that the prisoners—and the intelligence gained from their interrogations—should be shared.

A later Soviet document, acquired by the American side of the commission in early 1995, also appears to lift any previous prohibition against Soviet involvement with American POWs—if the prohibition ever existed. Sent on 29 January 1953, and addressed to three top Soviet leaders including Lavrenti Beria, then head of the MGB, the message read:

“The minister of public security of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on this decision of the TSK KPK [the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and oversee their work. The MGB advisor was ordered by us to render such help.”

A second document that illustrates the involvement of Soviet military intelligence in the interrogation of American POWs in Korea deals with the 4 December 1950 shootdown of a USAF RB-45 reconnaissance plane.

None of the four men aboard the plane—the pilot, Capt. Charles McDonough, two other crewmen, and Col. John R. Lovell, a top-ranking Air Force intelligence officer believed to be on a mission from the Pentagon—made it back to the U.S.

Thus, like the Cold War spy flights, the RB-45 case was wrapped not only in the difficulties of unraveling any MIA case from the tangles of the Korean War but also in the sensitivity that attaches to intelligence missions and personnel.

The key document discovered so far in the RB-45 case revealed not only that at least one of those aboard was captured alive, but also that Soviet interest and involvement in the case was high.

A cable dated 17 December 1950, stated in part:

An aircraft shot down on 12-450 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km to the east of Andun (Manchuria). The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to the earth burned up completely. The crew bailed out on parachutes. The pilot Captain Charles McDonough was taken prisoner.

Under interrogation he said:

The aircraft was shot down at an altitude of 30,000 feet.

The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out on parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he not seen. The captive himself was burned and is in a critical condition.

A second cable, dated the following day, added this:

I am informing you that the pilot from the shot down B-45 aircraft died en route and the interrogation was not finished.

These two cables—both sent to Marshal Stepan Krasovsky, chief of the Soviet general staff in Moscow—were found in the Soviet military archives in Podolsk by civilian Russian researchers working under the direction of Dr. Paul Cole, then with the Rand Corp. Cole’s project was authorized under a Pentagon contract with Rand to search for information in Soviet archives dealing with Americans missing after World War II, the Korean War and Cold War.

The cables in the McDonough-Lovell RB-45 case were made available to the American side of the Joint Commission within a short time after Cole learned of them in the fall of 1992 and ultimately became a part of the large repository of Joint Commission documents that comprises the results of the commission’s efforts.

After being translated, documents received from the Russian side of the commission, along with transcribed minutes of the Joint Commission’s regular meetings (usually three times a year), are placed on file at the Library of Congress.

Besides filling gaps in the world’s expanding knowledge of Soviet behavior and policies, the still-growing collection of documents, summaries of papers, lists and translations now available to scholars and the general public may ultimately help resolve a significant number of American MIA cases.

To date, the Joint Commission’s record on that score has been modest. Only one actual Cold War MIA case—a U.S. fighter pilot whose remains were retrieved from an uninhabited coastal island in the Russian Far East after a Russian man who took part in the original burial came forward with details of the incident—has been resolved through the Joint Commission’s efforts.

But investigations into other cases, particularly those related to the testimony of live Russian witnesses, are continuing; and together, the Senate committee and the Joint Commission did become a catalyst for bringing to light some of the Soviet Union’s most closely-held secrets regarding the treatment of Americans in Russian hands.

One clear lesson was that the main targets of the Soviet’s intelligence war during Korea were American POWs—and that the most prized among them were the pilots and crews of the innovative units of the U.S. Far East Air Force. Of men flying the F-86, the most advanced U.S. fighter of the Korean War era, a disproportionate several dozen failed to appear among the ranks of the repatriated U.S. POWs when prisoners were exchanged in 1953.

The documents on American POWs from Soviet military archives, taken together with the testimony of Soviet veterans of Korea and now-declassified papers from U.S. archives, clearly point to Soviet complicity in the disappearance and probable death of dozens, if not hundreds, of those POWs who were not repatriated.

Soviet military data dealing with American prisoners in Korea began making its way to U.S. authorities and private researchers in the winter of 1991-92, as the administration of Mikhail Gorbachev was giving way to his rival, Boris Yeltsin.

During what many would later characterize as a brief “window of opportunity,” when a mood of genuine reform and openness about past misdeeds seemed to emanate from Moscow, government and private researchers seeking answers about U.S. POWs and MIAs attempted to turn the moment to their advantage.

A number of interested parties in the U.S. government—the State Department, Pentagon, National Archives, Library of Congress—decided on a unified approach to gaining access to files related to missing Americans, and supported the creation of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. Each agency or department appointed a representative to the commission, whose co-chairmen were former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon for the U.S. and the late Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a historian and military adviser to Yeltsin, for the Russians.

The commission began its work in rela-
tive obscurity. But in a move whose motivation and meaning to this day remains somewhat of a mystery, Yeltsin in June 1992 suddenly announced that a number of American military prisoners had indeed been held on Soviet territory. And he vowed an investigation that would determine whether any remained alive.

His statement revived the hopes not only of thousands of families seeking information about MIAs in Indochina—the most vocal and media-noticed segment of the POW/MIA community—but also of a quieter and more patient community representing the families and friends of nearly 8,200 unaccounted-for men from the Korean War and dozens more from the shootdowns of U.S. spy planes during the 1950s and 1960s.

This community—unaligned with and largely separate from the academic community that had begun to forage in Soviet archives for its own purposes—had two powerful allies in its search for information about American MIAs assumed to be in Russian hands.

Each of these allies—the Senate Select Committee on POWs and MIAs and the U.S.-Russia joint commission—would end up disappointing the Korean War and Cold War MIA community in its own way.

The Senate committee, whose co-chairs were Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts and Sen. Robert Smith of New Hampshire, lasted for one year and drew significant media attention. But, predictably, it spent the vast majority of staff time and investigative effort on Indochina. The life of the committee was marked by private and public quarrels over the value of certain evidence and the integrity of some of the witnesses.

But in every case, the context of the news and controversy was the Vietnam War. In the public hearings phase, only one day was devoted to Korean War and Cold War issues and cases.

The Joint Commission, meanwhile, had begun what can now be seen as an extremely ambitious attempt to investigate the thousands of intelligence tips and live-sightings of Americans held in the former Soviet Union from the end of World War II to the present day.

Thanks to some Russian cooperation—or, to put it another way, despite frequent Russian non-cooperation—the American side of the commission has been able to visit some archives and museums and interview a number of Russian citizens who have come forward as a result of printed and broadcast appeals for information. (Joint Commission staffers operate on the understanding that Russian officials will be notified of and invited to sit in on all interviews of Russians volunteering information to the American side.)

Now in its fifth year, the Joint Commission remains in operation, although the flow of tips and leads has slowed drastically and the frequently stated promise of access to KGB files on foreign POWs remains unfulfilled.

While conducting ground-breaking work that frequently kept the POW/MIA community’s hopes on razor’s edge, the Joint Commission also became caught in post-Cold War gridlock, as the archival “window of opportunity” closed and the Russian side’s hardliners parried with a dwindling and sometimes fractious team of Americans on the other side.

A report released in the summer of 1993 by the Task Force Russia—a team of U.S. experts on Soviet affairs and military intelligence put together by the U.S. Army—concluded that up to 1,000 or more American POWs from the Korean War had been shipped to the former Soviet Union for interrogation.

But the report’s findings were minimized by Pentagon officials who charged they were more supposition than fact. The team of experts who had constructed the case made by the report—Task Force Russia—was effectively disbanded after one year, and its duties subsumed under the Pentagon’s Office of POW/MIA Affairs.

The current U.S. position on this issue is that the strongest available evidence points to the transfer to Soviet territory of a relatively small number of Korean War American POWs—perhaps corresponding to the roughly 25-30 fighter pilot MIAs who are believed to have been among the most prized captives for intelligence purposes.

Laurence Jolidon is an investigative reporter, war correspondent, and the author of Last Seen Alive—The Search for Missing POWs from the Korean War, from which this article was excerpted.

CWIHP On-Line...is coming!

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is developing an internet-accessible system to make publications (including the Bulletin and Working Papers), translated documents, and other features available via computer. The service is being developed in cooperation with the National Security Archive, a non-governmental, nonprofit research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University.

Plans call for the system to go on-line early in 1996, with CWIHP to be part of the Archive’s home-page on the World Wide Web. Once in service, users will be able to gain access to past, present, and in-progress CWIHP publications, to learn other information on CWIHP and related research activities.

One planned feature of the on-line service of special interest to many users will be the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD). RADD, a collaborative effort of CWIHP and the National Security Archive, is intended to help inform researchers of documents relevant to Cold War history that various scholars and scholarly projects have obtained from Russian archives, and to share expenses for translations so that they can be used as widely as possible. An English-language inventory of documents which scholars have already provided is being prepared, and the aim is to put translations on line as soon as feasible. Those scholars who can read Russian may then read the documents in the Archive reading room, while those who cannot can commission translations, which will then be made freely available. RADD is presently being managed at the Archive by Mark H. Doctoroff, who can be reached at (202) 994-7239 (telephone) or (202) 994-7005 (fax).

As the project moves forward, we are open to expanding RADD into READD—Russian and East-bloc Documents Database—if resources permit and source materials justify this expansion.

Further information on CWIHP’s on-line service will appear in the next issue of the Bulletin. In the meantime, we welcome suggestions and (as always) donations of documents and translations for RADD (and READD).