Exploiting and Securing the Open Border in Berlin: the Western Secret Services, the Stasi, and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961

By Paul Maddrell, February 2009
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**Special Working Papers Series**

Exploiting and Securing the Open Border in Berlin: The Western Secret Services, the Stasi, and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961

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On 13 August 1961, the East German Communist regime closed its last remaining open border with the West, sealing the border between the Soviet and Western Sectors in Berlin. The fence it put up quickly turned into the Berlin Wall. Berlin had been at the forefront of international politics since the Soviet government, on 27 November 1958, had sent the United States, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany a diplomatic note demanding that the occupation regime in the city be ended and West Berlin become a “free city.” The Western governments had feared since that time that West Berlin would be blockaded, as had happened between 1948 and 1949. The literature on the East Germans’ and Soviets’ decision to close the border presents it as a means of maintaining the stability of the GDR regime by stopping the flow of refugees to the West.\(^1\) While this was the primary purpose behind the action, it was not the only one. The open border in Berlin exposed the GDR to massive espionage and subversion and, as the two documents in the appendices show, its closure gave the Communist state greater security. Not only was this the official Socialist Unity Party\(^2\) line, it expressed a reality as well. Indeed, state security officers called the border closure “die Sicherung der Staatsgrenze” (the securing of the state border).

The two documents printed in translation below are records of Main Department IX (Hauptabteilung IX) of the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS, better known as Stasi). This was the MfS’ so-called Untersuchungsorgan (investigation branch) which, among other responsibilities, had the job of interrogating arrested spies and preparing assessments of trends in Western espionage. Its job therefore required it to examine evidence of Western spying very carefully and critically.

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\(^2\) *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED).
The documents shed new light on the history of the contest between the Western intelligence agencies and Communist security services. They show that the closure of the sectoral border in Berlin was the key moment in the history of the MfS’ counter-espionage and counter-subversion services. Western intelligence saw when Khrushchev issued his ultimatum of November 1958 on the Berlin and German questions that he meant to put a stop to their successful espionage and subversion, which they had chiefly carried out from bases in West Berlin. The Western secret services had to develop new methods to infiltrate the Communist police state. Their task became even more difficult after August 1961 when the wall went up. Their operations had largely depended on freedom of movement over the border between the Western and Soviet sectors.

The open border in West Berlin had four benefits in particular for the Western secret services. It meant that East Germans could leave the GDR via West Berlin. Some were refugees, leaving it for good; others were only leaving for a day or two, either visiting relatives or friends in the Western sectors or just shopping. All these people were vulnerable to Western influence. Most important were the refugees. Once in West Berlin they were interrogated and asked to name people still in East Germany, usually colleagues at work or friends, who would be willing to cooperate with Western intelligence. Contact could then be made with those named, again exploiting the open border in Berlin, either via a letter, often posted in the GDR itself by a courier who crossed over into it from West Berlin, or by a courier who would visit the target. The target would be invited to visit West Berlin; where he or she would be asked to cooperate in espionage activities. This was the principal way of recruiting spies, yet there were others too. East Germans who were merely visiting West Berlin were also approached, using a variety of means and excuses, and successfully recruited. They would return home and spy for the West.

The second benefit of an open border was that the informant, once recruited, could travel regularly to West Berlin to hand over information to his controller. These personal meetings, which were the primary way of communication between agent and controller in all Western services, allowed for quick, safe, and full method of communication, superior to other forms. The informant could also be trained at these meetings and supplied with spying equipment.3

Third, the open border allowed Western agencies to inspire the defection of people who were of value to the Communist regimes of the Bloc. Such people were identified and contacted in similar ways as informants. Refugees and spies named people who held important jobs and commented on their politics and character. If they were deemed sufficiently skilled and experienced and it seemed as if they would accept a job in the West, such a job would be offered to them. They would then make their way to the West, with their families, over the open border in Berlin. The American secret services played the leading role in these operations, which were meant to reinforce the embargo on the export of strategic goods to the Soviet Bloc. Declassified US Government records on the Truman Administration’s psychological warfare programme confirm that inducing the defection of valuable people was seen as a useful means of reducing Communist control of the Bloc.\(^4\) The policy of economic warfare also influenced the character of espionage, as both documents demonstrate: economic spying concentrated on the key sectors of the East German industry, to determine whether the regime’s economic targets were being achieved. Spies were also tasked to supply intelligence on the GDR’s import and export trade, to discover economic vulnerabilities which could be exploited by extending the trade embargo.\(^5\)

Fourth, members of West German anti-Communist organizations funded in part by the Western secret services could enter the GDR over the sectoral boundary, spread anti-Communist propaganda, and supported anti-Communist politics. The SED feared the effects of these organizations and its State Security Ministry made every effort to crush them. The open border thus enabled mass espionage to be practised and subversion to be conducted on a large scale.\(^6\)

The Western secret services saw that Khrushchev’s ultimatum was, among other things, an effort to frustrate their work and put an end to the GDR’s intense security crisis. The crisis could end in any of three actions, all of which harmed Western interests. First, if the Western governments yielded to the ultimatum, they would be prevented from operating from West Berlin (this was Khrushchev’s goal). If they continued to operate against the GDR from there, they would do so contrary to the treaty and would have to conduct their operations with greater skill and secrecy. Furthermore, Allied troops would be withdrawn from the city and the secret

services would lose the military cover they had long exploited. Second, if Khrushchev carried out his threat to transfer control of the Allies’ access routes to Berlin to the GDR, war might break out, since the East German regime would cut the air routes to prevent the flight of refugees and Allied forces might try to break through the blockade. Lastly, Khrushchev might decide not to provoke the Allies and simply close the Berlin sectoral boundary. If he did this, they would be able to remain in West Berlin but its value would diminish. Spying and subversion against the GDR would have to carried out under harsher conditions. They were aware of the danger of this: the sectoral boundary had been closed before, briefly, in 1953, 1957, and 1960.7

The documents show that Khrushchev’s ultimatum had a considerable impact on the Western secret services. Their agents reporting on the GDR at this time were mostly East Germans actually living there (not West Germans or other outsiders sent to Berlin). The services were afraid they would lose contact with these people. If war came, as a result of the crisis, they might be driven from West Berlin completely. Consequently, personal meetings between spy and controller would cease. Even if the secret services remained, their operations would be very difficult under conditions of extensive surveillance by the KGB and MfS. Personal meetings would be more difficult to arrange and less secure than previously. If West Berlin became a “free city,” as Khrushchev proposed, operations against the GDR from West Berlin on the customary pattern would remain possible, but, being contrary to treaty, could only be conducted on a limited scale: by signing the treaty, the Western governments would be forced to severely limit them. Closure of the sectoral border would also cut their communication link since East Germans, as a rule, would no longer be able to make visits there. Since personal meetings served not only to hand over intelligence but also those to train and supply spies, these activities were also endangered by any likely treaty. As spy recruitment depended heavily on questioning refugees, any of these three ways of resolving the Berlin issue would make it either pointless or impossible for East Germans to make their way to West Berlin and thus threaten its effectiveness. The secret services’ entire work was menaced by the ultimatum. They had to change their methods to suit the conditions likely to appear.

The documents below show the way in which they adjusted. To ensure continued communication, they distributed either radio sets capable of receiving shortwave transmissions or shortwave converters. These would enable spies to receive instructions by radio. The Americans originally set a deadline of 28 May 1959 (when the ultimatum expired) for the distribution of radios. Secret writing equipment (invisible ink, prepared writing paper, and codebooks) was also distributed. The spy would communicate with the West by these means if communication by personal meeting became impossible but communication by post remained possible. This would be the case if the sectoral border in Berlin were closed. Radio transmitters were distributed and “dead letter boxes”8 (DLBs) created to prepare for the eventuality of war. Either the transmitter was a fast one (the BND’s practice) or radio agents were also supplied with tape recorders, on to which they recorded the messages they intended to broadcast (a practice used by the Americans and French). The recorders played the message over the radio at ten times normal speed: this was meant to defeat the MfS’ attempts to locate the transmission. Radiotelephones were distributed to agents who lived right on the state and sectoral borders; secret pathways were also created along these borders. Personal meetings with spies in West Berlin were cut back.

As Document 2 shows, after the border closure the American and West German secret services were successful in re-establishing contact with their agents in East Germany. The Americans also planned to smuggle agents out of the GDR to meet their controllers in the West. Dead letter boxes were henceforth used by the secret service to supply spies with spying equipment and money (rather than by the spy to pass on intelligence, though this happened too). This was above all how the Americans handled the matter of supply. Indeed, as the case of the CIA spy Franz Brehmer, referred to Document 1, shows, the Agency had been preparing to supply some of its spies in this way even before Khrushchev issued his ultimatum. The West Germans were less careful, making much use of parcels sent to East Germany. This was less secure because the parcels could be searched and the money and spying equipment they contained discovered. The major Western secret services were not the only ones active in the GDR. Document 2 states that, eight years after CIA covert action which firmly established his control over the country, the Shah of Iran was still sufficiently alarmed by the Tudeh Party, Iran’s Communist Party, for his secret service to be operating in East Germany against Iranian

8 “Dead drops”, in US intelligence terminology.
Communists who had taken refuge there. These operations were coordinated with those of West Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, or BfV), which also spied on Communist organizations in the GDR.

The documents therefore show that border security was essential to the Communist police state. Put simply, the East German police state did not function properly in the years before 1961 because East Germans could escape it – either for a day or two, or for ever. Espionage and subversion against the GDR could be organized from a safe haven located right next to it and conducted over a border it had not yet managed to close. This was a challenge which the Soviet security service had never faced. Almost immediately after they gained power in Russia, the Bolsheviks had made strenuous efforts to close, guard, and watch all their borders, particularly those with the West. As soon as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which fixed the German-Russian border, was signed in March 1918, the Bolsheviks closed the border and created the Frontier Troops, an armed force of border guards, and frontier units of the political police to stop people from leaving the USSR without permission and prevent people and goods from entering the country illicitly. As soon as the Civil War was over, troops were also deployed along Russia’s other borders. From 1921 the Frontier Troops were under the control of the political police, the Cheka; some 95,000 troops were by then engaged in guarding Russia’s borders. The “bandits” whose illegal crossings of the border most concerned the Bolsheviks were the anti-Communist guerrilla forces directed by Boris Savinkov and the Ukrainian nationalist government-in-exile of Semyon Petliura, which made raids into Byelorussia and Ukraine from Poland and Romania. Savinkov’s organization, the “People’s Union for Defence of Country and Freedom” (Narodnyi Soyuz Zashchity Rodiny I Svobody) ran a network of agents in Russia to collect intelligence and conduct anti-Bolshevik political activity. To help them fight such organizations and control the movements of the Soviet population, the border units of the political police ran informers who watched both the border zone on the Soviet side and the foreign territory just beyond it. Like the East German border, the USSR’s border region was divided into a border zone and, along the border itself, a narrow border strip. The border zone could only be entered by residents of it or

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9 A. Knight, *KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 228. The Frontier Troops claimed to have captured 11,641 people who had tried, in the years from 1922 to 1925, to make an illegal crossing of the western border of the USSR. Of these, more than six hundred were said to be “spies and terrorists.”

people with special permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; only people with special permission from the frontier troops could enter the border strip.11

Securing the border significantly enhanced the GDR’s security, as Document 2 states: The protection measures taken by the government of the GDR on 13.8.1961 on the state border with West Berlin gave rise to a considerable obstruction to the subversive work of the secret services, particularly owing to the substantial elimination of West Berlin as a base for spying on the German Democratic Republic.

From the MfS’ perspective, the security crisis which had lasted since the late 1940s became less intense in August 1961, though it remained grave. The SED still needed furious repression to remain in power. However, the MfS’ superiority in the fields of espionage and counter-espionage over the Western secret services operating against it, and particularly those of the Federal Republic, dates from 1961. From that time, the MfS’ foreign intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), became ever more successful at penetrating its West German targets, while the Stasi’s counter-espionage divisions consistently frustrated the efforts of Western intelligence services to spy successfully in the GDR.12 Western - and particularly West German - subversion of the GDR continued, but its forms changed. Moreover, the sealed border contributed to the GDR developing politically in ways very different from the Federal Republic. Opposition to the Communist regime ceased to be total. Rather than seeking the regime’s overthow and the re-introduction of parliamentary democracy and a free-market economy, it evolved into more subtle forms of resistance.13 Accordingly, Jens Gieseke has called 13 August 1961 “the GDR’s secret foundation day.”14 The Berlin Wall made a greater contribution to the GDR’s security than the sealing of its Western border four decades earlier had made to that of Russia because the Western secret services, at this highpoint of the Cold War, were far more active against the GDR and the rest of the Bloc than they had been against the

11Knight, KGB, pp. 232-42.
13Gieseke, Der Mielke-Konzern, pp. 162-76.
Bolsheviks in the late 1910s. Moreover, the GDR, as part of Germany, was more vulnerable to Western subversion than was the Soviet Union.

Document 1 is a report by Main Department IX, entitled “New methods of operation of Western secret services.” It is unclear when the document was created but it seems to have been after Khrushchev’s ultimatum but before the closure of the sectoral border. It records the reaction of the Western secret services to the ultimatum. It is the only document yet made available which reveals the preparations of all the main Western secret services for Khrushchev’s resolution of the Berlin question. One point needs to be stressed: the MfS had very great confidence in its information, which often came from double agents. These double agents were considered reliable by their Western controllers, who met them in bars, cars, and safehouses in West Berlin. The agents talked to their controllers at length and came to know their mentality. The MfS therefore knew well who were the people operating against it in the Western sectors and obtained a good understanding of them. The repat’s conclusions, the MfS believed, were based on hard evidence. The best indication of this is that the Ministry proposed adjustments to its own operations in response to the Western services’ changes. This was, indeed, the purpose behind the report. The MfS’ operations were driven by evidence of the enemy’s activities, not just Party ideology: it considered evidence of the Western secret services’ activities very carefully.

Document 1 shows that Khrushchev’s ultimatum galvanized the Western secret services into action. This was true of the most important ones, the American secret services (the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC) and the Military Intelligence Service (MIS)) and West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND). The most important point made in the report is the MfS’ claim that Western intelligence officers assessed the political situation more realistically than their governments: they saw that, whatever happened, Khrushchev meant to put a stop to the favourable conditions which they had exploited up to now. In response, they completely re-organized their operations. They prepared for war (including withdrawing agent controllers to West Germany). They made intensive efforts to maintain the communication link with their spies by all other available means (radio, cover addresses meant for letters bearing secret writing, dead letter boxes, and secret pathways). The report thus shows that the closure of the sectoral border in August 1961 did not come as a surprise to the Western secret services – they had prepared extensively for it. Indeed, they had prepared throughout the 1950s for the loss of contact with their spies in the East, whether this
was brought about by war or by the introduction of border controls in Berlin. Without hyperbole, the border closure was one of most prepared-for events in twentieth-century European history. Though an effort to seal the border was not seen as the most likely outcome of the crisis by the CIA, all the main Western secret services saw it as a distinct possibility.

In early 1959, the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence took the view that it would be impossible to close the sectoral border throughout the whole of Berlin completely. It advised the US Government that “police, border guards, and workers’ militiamen could be posted at strategic points, but it would be impossible to seal the dividing line effectively. Instead, the Communists are likely to continue their tactics of intimidation, infiltration, and harassment.”15 By contrast, it considered that a successful blockade of West Berlin was possible because the access routes by air, land, and water could be cut. All the routes were crucial for the population of West Berlin because by the late 1950s the Americans thought that it could no longer be sustained by an airlift alone. The “Three Essentials” of President John F. Kennedy’s Berlin policy, announced on 25 July, did not explicitly preclude the construction of a wall; however, the President did insist that the Allies retain unhindered access to West Berlin. In the period leading up to the border closure, CIA analysts expected Khrushchev to repeat what he had done between November 1958 and January 1959: demand a peace treaty which would end the Allied rights of access to West Berlin and give the GDR control over these routes. The access routes would then be cut and refugees thus prevented from leaving West Berlin. It would therefore make little sense for them to make their way there. The CIA’s reports stress the importance of preparing to break a blockade; they do not mention a wall.16

The report considers the operations of the principal Western services and makes several interesting comments. The MfS recorded that the “American secret service” had a policy of mass recruitment of spies. Since the CIA at the start of the 1960s had only about a hundred spies in the GDR, this must have been chiefly the policy of the USA’s military intelligence agencies, which

were very active in East Germany.\textsuperscript{17} The same claim of mass recruitment is made by the MfS veterans Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert in their book \textit{Headquarters Germany: Die USA-Geheimdienste in Deutschland} (Berlin: edition ost, 1997). It is supported by Main Department IX’s own monthly reports of its investigations into suspected cases of espionage.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, similar claims have been made by American intelligence officers as well. Richard M. Bissell Jr., the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans under Allen Dulles, commented in 1968 that spyng was conducted with “special intensity” in Berlin before the Wall was built.\textsuperscript{19} Harry Rositzke, a CIA officer in West Germany in the 1950s, has stated that American “agents … penetrated high circles of the ruling party, the government’s economic ministries, the railway and postal administrations, the police and the militia. Thousands of reports, from freight car loadings to party policy discussions, were screened, translated, and sent off to the Army commanders and to Washington.”\textsuperscript{20} George Blake, the SIS officer who spied for the KGB from 1953 to 1961, wrote in his memoirs that all the main Western secret services sent “large numbers of agents into East Germany against all sorts of targets and with a variety of tasks”, turning Berlin into a “vast espionage web.”\textsuperscript{21}

Spying was not only an activity for a small number of carefully-selected and well-placed people (though this was indeed the policy of SIS). Western intelligence services recruited spies, depending on circumstances. Anti-Communism among East Germans and the open border in Berlin made the GDR vulnerable to large-scale espionage, an opportunity which was fully exploited. American intelligence policy required running vast networks of informants. As Documents 1 and 2 show, and as the American sources referred to above confirm, the USA’s intelligence agencies were charged with extensive spying on the GDR’s political life and public opinion, on all parts of its industry, and on all bases and installations of the Soviet and East German armies. One method of gathering intelligence favoured by American secret services was to recruit spies who worked in telephone exchanges and tell them to tap important cables. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} CIA Berlin Base to Washington DC, 14 September 1961, in Steury (ed.), \textit{On the Front Lines of the Cold War}, p. 605. The MfS was in the habit of using the singular when referring to hostile secret services, even when a number of services were meant. \textit{Der amerikanische Geheimdienst} (the American secret service) refers to the CIC and MIS as well as the CIA. This may read oddly to an English-speaking reader.
\item \textsuperscript{18} See Maddrell, \textit{Spying on Science}, chs. 5, 6 & 9.
\item \textsuperscript{19} See V. Marchetti & J. Marks, \textit{The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence} (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 384.
\item \textsuperscript{20} H. Rositzke, \textit{The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counter-espionage and Covert Action} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 43.
\item \textsuperscript{21} G. Blake, \textit{No Other Choice} (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), pp. 166-7.
\end{itemize}
large-scale nature of American spying in turn encouraged the MfS to step up its mass surveillance.

The other great force in Western spying in the GDR was the West German BND. The report indicates that the BND was more afraid of war than any other service: the claim is made that it was so concerned about the prospect that it restructured itself, creating a whole new department tasked with making preparations for war. It also withdrew units from West Berlin to West Germany. At the time the report was written, its spying on the GDR from West Germany was increasing. The mention of “severe blows” done to the BND by the MfS in the years 1953-56 is a reference to the arrest of hundreds of its agents, sweeps which the MfS called the “Big Operations” (Grossaktionen). The report also indicates that the BND at this time reconsidered the wisdom, when trying to recruit spies, of stressing that they would be serving the cause of German reunification. This may be because Khrushchev’s ultimatum made reunification seem less likely than ever; it may also have been a response to the passage of time since the two German states were founded, which again made reunification seem unlikely. In another change of approach, it also tended not to reveal past service in the Nazis’ governmental apparatus.

Document 1 makes two interesting claims about the French services. The first is that the Sûreté Nationale used violence in interrogations – this is the only such allegation made in the report and is consistent with similar French actions in Algeria. The second is that the French were making preparations for withdrawal from West Berlin. Of greater interest are the comments made about the British secret service, SIS. In part, this interest stems from the fact that, like the French secret services, SIS has not allowed historians to write a history of its operations in East Germany during this period using its archive. More fundamentally, the MfS’ comments are important because they show that SIS was a highly professional secret service which was nevertheless utterly undone in its work in the GDR by the skill of the KGB. Between 1958 and 1961 terrible damage was done to its agent network in East Germany by George Blake. Blake had likewise provided information to the KGB which had enabled many of SIS’ East German agents to be identified and arrested in the years 1953-55.


23 On the CIA’s operations in Berlin and the GDR, see D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev & G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale UP, 1997).

24 Andrew & Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 520-1; Maddrell, Spying on Science, p. 146.
SIS’s policy was very different from that of the USA’s military intelligence agencies. It was one of highly selective recruitment. It sought to infiltrate the government apparatus, recruiting well-placed agents able to provide high-grade political, economic, and scientific intelligence over a long period. They were therefore very security-minded and careful. Blake’s memoirs make clear that SIS considered itself to be highly professional – more professional than many of its rivals.

Unlike the Americans and West Germans, who met their agents in public spaces in West Berlin, the British only met them in cars and safehouses. By making the spy report orally and recording what he or she said, the British were able to obtain the maximum amount of information from him and cross-check it (one benefit of the personal meeting). They could also carefully examine the spy to gauge whether he might be working for the MfS or KGB. SIS was slower to prepare for a change in the conditions for spying than the Americans or West Germans.25

Document 2 is entitled “Brief assessment of the investigation results achieved in 1961 in work on crimes of espionage” (Kürze Einschätzung der im Jahre 1961 erzielten Untersuchungsergebnisse in der Bearbeitung von Spionageverbrechen) and dated 9 January 1962. In it, Main Department IX reviews its counter-espionage successes of the previous year and draws conclusions as to the policy of the Western secret services. The records of Main Department IX show that it took care to support its conclusions with evidence, such as the one shown in Document 1. However, Document 2 demonstrates that the assessments it prepared also reflected the SED line, even if this meant disregarding a lack of evidence. So, as both documents show, it had obtained plenty of evidence that the Western secret services were preparing for war – that is to say, preparing to fight one rather than start one. Consistent with the Party line, the assessment maintains that the Western secret services were “preparing an attack on the German Democratic Republic.” The claim is also made that, before the border in Berlin was closed, new

25 This was not the first time that British Intelligence had had to overcome a fence in order to obtain intelligence. During the First World War, the Germans had used two electrified fences to seal occupied Belgium off from neutral Holland. The fences extended the whole length of the border between the two countries. Both SIS and the intelligence service of the British Army in France managed to smuggle through the fences intelligence on German troop movements obtained by train-watcher networks in Belgium. Belgian spies also sent their intelligence directly to the army in Northern France by carrier pigeon (the First World War forerunner of radio transmission). The British experimented (unsuccessfully) with radio transmission of military intelligence during the Great War. Radio was also used to send instructions to spies. The British also sent Belgian refugees as spies back into their country via Holland, which anticipated their exploitation of East German refugees thirty to forty years later. On this, see C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp. 139-46 & 156-65.
agents were recruited in the Western part of the city “by means of threats and blackmail.” In actual fact, as the Department knew full well, the principal motive for East Germans to agree to act as spies was anti-Communism. The remark reflects its Party spirit and hostility towards “the class enemy.”

This assessment also confirms that the Western secret services were very successful in recruiting agents in GDR ministries. The report refers to the arrest of “a series of agents of the American and English secret service as well as the BND, who had managed [...] to infiltrate state and social institutions and gather information on the defence preparedness, foreign policy measures of the government of the GDR, and other political tasks, as well as on key political-economic elements of the Seven Year Plan.” At the time the report was written, however, four months after the border closure, much of their espionage was directed towards obtaining military intelligence. The Western governments continued to fear that war might break out over West Berlin, particularly since Khrushchev had not yet succeeded in his aim of incorporating it into the Soviet sphere of influence. Spies were told by their controllers to look for signs of a popular uprising which would overthrow the SED regime. It was the fact that there was no such uprising which was the surprise of 1961.

As MfS records, both documents translated here are held by Central Archive (Zentral-archiv) of the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU). They were therefore made available pursuant to the provisions of the Law on the State Security Records (Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz) of 1991, which requires the names of people who neither worked for the MfS nor fell into other specific categories of exception to be blacked out. Consequently, names have been redacted out of each document. However, their meaning and significance remain clear.

26 See Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 120, 130.
27 In English: Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic.
DOCUMENT APPENDIX

DOCUMENT 1: ASSESSMENT BY MAIN DEPARTMENT IX OF CHANGES TO THEIR OPERATIONS MADE BY THE MAIN WESTERN SECRET SERVICES IN RESPONSE TO KHRUSHCHEV’S ULTIMATUM ON BERLIN

[Source: BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX Nr. 4350, pp. 341-360. Translated by Paul Maddrell.]

Main Department IX/1

New methods of operation of Western secret services

I. The following material is based on experience of investigative work of the last few months as well as information obtained from the exchange of information with other responsible departments.

Applies to all secret services: [they] react to the political situation in each case – party and government.

For example:

- chemistry conference
- proposals USSR and GDR for the resolution of the West Berlin question

Characteristic:

Immediate reaction on the part of all intelligence services to proposals – particularly Americans and Federal Intelligence Service –

Officers worried, confused – however, unlike politicians of the Western Powers they assessed the situation relatively realistically; that is to say: comprehensive re-ordering of their work.

(a) foreigners and officers of the Federal Intelligence Service go to West Germany

(b) general conversion to radio and preparation for war

    important: not only specialist radio operators;
(c) use of the most modern technology;
(d) covert addresses [in] West Germany, dead drop boxes, and smuggling routes on the
Western state border and the sectoral borders.

II. American secret service:

Yank dealt heavy blows in 1956, work completely re-ordered, agents switched off\(^{28}\), German
employees dismissed.

Lie detector – extensive questionnaires stating parents, siblings, home – [two words blacked out]
Recruitment on mass basis.
Work transferred from West Berlin to West Germany. Already various offices transferred to
Frankfurt/Main and Kassel.
[handwritten note: [illegible name] and others – Kassel office with telephone numbers from West
Berlin
New methods in recruitment, cooperation, communication of intelligence –
Equipping for war
Sails under other flags. [handwritten note: Schütz [name]]

Recruitment methods:
Recruitment – refugee GDR-citizens; West German citizens, who come as asylum-seekers to the
GDR; 5\(^{th}\) Column;
Railway-workers, lorry drivers, and sailors on internal waterways, who are employed in
interzonal travel;
Scientists and GDR citizens, who visit West Germany.
Sailors who dock in West German ports;
Refugees ask acquaintances and relatives to visit them in West Berlin, there introduce them to
secret service.
Poles and Czechs who are staying in West Germany are supplied with forged travel visas.

\(^{28}\) This is intelligence jargon for suspending or ending cooperation with agents. [author’s note: Abge-schalten,
meaning “switched off” i.e. agent becomes inactive].
[handwritten note: name blacked out – Visa. Border region - DLB store for documents and technical aids]

**Cooperation:**

Personal meetings are no longer carried out in bars, only in cars and safehouses which are mostly unknown to the agents.

Permanent change (wechsel) of safehouses – personal meetings are limited as much as possible – for example: Brehmer – one year

Meetings in West Berlin with “PM 12”\(^{29}\) or plane from West Berlin to West Germany

**Tasks:** transmitted by radio [handwritten note: no radio traffic [illegible word] Brehmer]

For example: Brehmer

Courier connection via DLB.

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**Communication of intelligence:**

West German covert addresses have been given out to almost all agents.

Addresses do not exist, post office workers take them out, spy reports written with invisible ink (tablets – almost all tablets suited to making invisible ink) are also encoded. [handwritten note: and typewritten]

To a greater degree agents are equipped with radio sets – deadline 28 May 1959\(^{30}\), replacement sets stored in DLBs.

With the radio sets – tape recorders, radio signals are transmitted on to these, tape plays at **ten times normal speed** over the transmitter – therefore hard to locate.

Along the sectoral borders and Western state border smuggling routes for people and DLBs

Resident agents are equipped with radio-telephones – for example: [name of agent blacked out]

[handwritten note: Schneeberg [illegible word] Aue]

Regional radio headquarters: Frankfurt/Main, Fulda, Offenbach.

[Handwritten note: radio with tape and pencil – then illegible]

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\(^{29}\) This was a visa issued by the East German People’s Police (the *Volkspolizei*), permitting East Germans to visit West Germany or West Berlin.

\(^{30}\) This was when Khrushchev’s ultimatum expired.
Technical aids:

Beyond those already stated:

(a) **Cameras:**

built into glasses case, into wristwatch, cigarette lighter, and fountain pen.

Chiefly the Minox is used – automatic camera with telephoto lens for railway junction –
for example: [name of agent blacked out]

(b) **Bugging equipment:** BASA/microphone – e.g. [name of agent blacked out]

Tapping of telephone cables on roads and in telephone exchange, bugging devices are
attached to tape recorders which run for 24 hours. Bugging devices which are equipped
with a transmitter have been installed in chandeliers and pocket torches. For example:
[name of spy blacked out].

(c) Devices which record radioactive emissions fixed to railway tracks so as to detect
uranium transports – for example: [name of spy blacked out]

(d) Transport of technical devices, codes, and instructions takes places in packaging
materials which are in common use in the GDR, e.g. cans of beef, tins of paint, bars of
chocolate, accordions, vacuum cleaners.

III. British secret service:

is divided in West Berlin into:

12 Berlin Intelligence Staff (BIS)\(^{31}\) carries out only military espionage – mostly groups, partly
using army officers without experience of secret service work as members

and

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) – carries out:

(a) military espionage

(b) economic\(^{32}\) and political espionage

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\(^{31}\) The number 12 was a legacy of Occupation days, when each of the various intelligence staffs in cities occupied by
the British had different numbers. The intelligence staff in Berlin had the number 12.
Fundamentally rejects the creation of espionage groups.

Base of both departments of the British secret service on the premises of the Reich sports ground (Olympic Stadium Prohibited Zone).

They are directly responsible to the Prime Minister.33

Recruitment methods:

Utterly rejects mass recruitment, chiefly makes use of refugees who write to their circle of acquaintances and relatives. [handwritten note: compare with [name blacked out] – direct work on the person in the GDR – summoned34 by means of letters.

In making recruitments the officers speak openly of the British secret service and as evidence that cooperation will be secure state that no British agents have yet been sentenced on the territory of the GDR, otherwise there would have been articles in the democratic35 press.


Maintaining the connection:

The agents are mainly given telephone numbers 93 51 40 or 45.

32 For the MfS, economic espionage included scientific espionage, since scientific institutions (the research departments of the big nationalized enterprises and research laboratories and institutes) formed part of the economic complex. Scientific espionage was a key part of the tasking of SIS and the other major Western services.
33 Translator’s note: The Berlin Intelligence Staff, as a military staff, was under the control of the Secretary of State for Defence. The Secret Intelligence Service is responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
34 meaning: to West Berlin.
35 In communist jargon “democratic” means “Communist.”
36 The term used in the text is “P-Quellen.” This means “Penetrierungs-Quellen”: penetration sources.
When calling these numbers from a public telephone in West Berlin the caller’s money is returned after the conversation ends.

[handwritten note: respect when calling – call from [then illegible]]

When the exchange answers, the agent asks for an extension number given to him by the intelligence officer. However, these are agent numbers.

Meeting places: safehouses; cars; car-parks at night; [handwritten note: lorries – with perfectly installed meeting rooms – drive around Berlin – illegible word (cover)]; occasionally also in barracks and in the Olympic Stadium – meetings in bars are ruled out.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the British secret service uses the wives of agents as couriers.

The conduct of espionage:

Infiltrates agents on long-term basis into state apparatus and party organizations and mass organizations; tells them to appear progressive37, to join the SED.

Lets agents report orally using microphones,

Information written on Japanese tissue paper, original documents in briefcases with secret compartments.

Gives agents radio sets, however they are not yet in operation, only in case of war, DLBs also only for case of war.

Cover addresses have not yet appeared. [handwritten note: West Germany]

Camera built into petrol cans and briefcases.

IV. French secret service:


West Berlin, Müllerstraße, uses violence in interrogations.

DR38/Marine – works on Baltic coast – chiefly via Hamburg.

DR/SR39: (a) army (b) air force (c) political and economic espionage

37 The term “progressive,” in the Communist lexicon, meant either Communist or sympathetic to Communism.
38 “DR” probably stands for “Direction de Renseignements” (intelligence directorate).
Strict separation of responsibility.

Main base in Germany: Baden-Baden.

West Berlin Quartier Napoleon – Reinickendorf, Kurt-Schumacher-Damm –

Use German employees for recruitment and introduction

Cooperation chiefly with French officers.

Since [Soviet] Note on Berlin⁴⁰ use of German employees on a greater scale.

French are making preparations for withdrawal.

Equipping agents with radio sets.

Recruitment methods:

Zoo Station⁴¹ - black market dealer in optical goods – [handwritten note: House of the East German Homeland] – refugee camps about refugees (Flüchtlingslager über Republikfluchtige) –

[two words blacked out] – [handwritten note: exploitation of “Heimatverbände” – revanche⁴²].

Aids:

Japanese tissue paper (Seidenpapier)– shoes with hollow sole – radio sets – winder and board which opens out as well as Morse key. [handwritten note: [agent ] does not need to be a radio operator]

Radio sets with tape just like the Americans.

Communication of intelligence:

DLBs, covert addresses in West Germany, couriers – personal meetings in safehouses and bars – radio connections.


⁴¹ This is a reference to the Zoologischer Garten railway and subway station in West Berlin.

⁴² The “Heimatverbände” were the associations of German expellees from lost German territories in Central and Eastern Europe. The French secret service was exploiting their “revanchisme.”
Characteristic features:

French secret service is currently generous with financial resources – pays in advance monthly salary for one year, makes agents buy motorbikes and radio sets.

V. Federal Intelligence Service (BND):

1. Structure:

Change in the structure (1. Intelligence collection, 2. Sabotage – Subversion and 3. Counter-espionage)


[handwritten note: that is a more prominent feature of the BND’s character]

That is to say: concentration now on war and hostile intelligence services.

Structure of offices (organization) remained as known up to now Headquarters (GD – Geheimdienst), general agencies (GV – Generalvertretungen), district agencies (BV – Bezirksvertretungen), sub-agencies (UV – Untervertretungen), local branches (FL – Filialen), and agent controllers (VMF - Vertrauensmannführer).

Cover: as up to now (firms, trade representatives, and suchlike.)

[handwritten note: without (official) guard – only porters]

The BND’s methods of activity:

(a) research\textsuperscript{43} and recruitment: main territory of research: West Germany, returnees, visitors to West Germany

Post and foreign offices – surveillance – collecting addresses

\textsuperscript{43} “Research” here means identifying people who were likely to be good spies and finding out as much as possible about them.
partly West Berlin – exploitation of offices which GDR citizens call at, e.g. Federal Support Offices (131-type pensions\textsuperscript{44}) etc.

Selection of recruitment candidates:

Up to now – chiefly Fascists, Wehrmacht and police officers

Today – still the case – but Federal Intelligence Service seeks so-called “party faithful” – people who outwardly support the policy of the Party and state.

[handwritten note: compare [name blacked out] – exploitation of grievance and compromising material]

Recruitment:

Known up to now – German theme – reunification of Germany among other phrases – activity in Nazi Germany revealed

New line: activity in Nazi Germany not revealed – if it is, then flag\textsuperscript{45} not revealed.

[handwritten note: general testing by means of 08 tasks, then P-sources (Weinderlich [name])]

(b) Working methods with agent networks:

1953-1956 offices (Fl\textsuperscript{46}) in West Berlin – severe blows by MfS
Transfer of all official offices to West Germany “to the secure hinterland.”
Officers of the Federal Intelligence Service only now come to West Berlin for meetings.\textsuperscript{47}
Constant changing of meeting places (hotels), e.g. [name blacked out]
Transfer to city districts located far from one another, only now partly in bars.
[handwritten note: drives in taxis of more [illegible word]]

\textsuperscript{44} This clearly refers to a type of pension.
\textsuperscript{45} “Flag” here means the recruiting secret service.
\textsuperscript{46} “Filialen”. See note 39.
\textsuperscript{47} Meant here are meetings with their agents.
Instruction:
meetings also in West Germany
reduce number of meetings.
That is to say: the work from West Germany of the Federal Intelligence Service will increase in future.

(c) Methods of communicating intelligence:

Secret text [(ST)] process – covert addresses – [handwritten note: ST – Blue]
particularly covert addresses in West Germany/water pressure process, drying process with prepared paper.
The peculiarities of covert addresses in West Germany: addresses of people who do not exist or second address (forwarding job) covert address passes on all messages to a second address – post office boxes and storage card – likewise second address.
- giving of instructions by means of films
13 points – economic spy.
15 points – political spy.
19 points – military spy.
21 points – military/economic spy.
- warning calendar (Warnkalender) handed over on films.
- increased laying of DLBs round Berlin and above all towards West Germany (motorway, railway lines)
[handwritten note: compare [deleted] telephone smuggling, secret service smuggling (channels and [illegible word])]
- dispatch of parcels (parcel of biscuits) with money and intelligence on type-through paper (ST process) to second person.

(d) Particular novelty – supplying all agents with radio sets – that is to say:
transmitter – extremely small – with a winder/figures – duration of a normal transmission 20-30 seconds – “radio operator” does not need to be a radio expert.
reception devices: (shortwave converter) – attachment to radio with headphones – to
receive instructions, whereby each operator receives: key, date, time of day, and time when headquarters will repeat [message].
(speech traffic – not machine)
Types of radio sets: “Eisenach,” “Rema/800,” “Dominante,” “Stradivari/E9” and all sets with 2 loudspeakers.

Transports and hiding places:

Transport concealed in tins of preserved food from HO [Handelsorganisation: a state-owned network of shops and hotels], even unopened, has been maintained up to recent instructions.
Children’s toy – like cars and toy railway sets etc.
Utensils (pocket mirror) and cigarettes etc.
[Handwritten note: petrol cans – paint tins and some use with set parcel with pieces of clothing pieces of clothing in general]

Couriers:

There are specific instructions for selection and collaboration
For example: people who travel a lot (professionally), long-distance drivers, sailors, and suchlike, sales representatives, courier material not to be concealed on body, concealment during transport must offer the chance of abandoning the material easily.

(e) Other technical aids:

MINOX cameras
- Robot Star and Robot Junior with cable release and powerful telephoto lens. Particularly during observation of MfS offices and officers.

3. Particular installations under attack:
Economic espionage against key parts of the people’s economy (for example: chemistry, coal, energy, or big construction sites – Rostock harbour)
[handwritten note: see in connection with returnees]
Military espionage – all installations of the Soviet army and NVA [Nationale Volksarmee: the East German army.]
Stepped-up activity against the MfS and the organs subordinate to it.
Aim: to penetrate, study, spy, “play games,” smash existing IM [Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter: informants] groups.
Also spying on officers of MfS by means of observations, investigations, conversations, bar visits, drinking bouts, and suchlike.
Introduction of compromised MfS employees to secret service.

Conclusions:

1. consistent political instruction of officers; each officer – each department must [form] from this corresponding conclusions for investigative work.

2. increases sharing of experience – give more attention to operational evaluation.

3. evaluation of investigation cases – more attention to presentation of evidence.
   Counter-espionage uses too little operational technology to obtain official evidence.
   for example: photographing meetings by means of an observer.
   Case [name blacked out] – operational combination tank -
   Case [name blacked out] – [handwritten: (photographed handing over spying equipment)]
   therefore important: as the intelligence service now instructs its agents in interrogations to require evidence to be presented [handwritten: e.g. arrest order e.g. [name blacked out]] – no basis for arrest without confession.
   [handwritten: informants’ information: show evidence – otherwise no confession]
   previously: MfS would make use of beatings and other physical means – agents thereby intimidated – the interrogator impressed by correct behaviour – confession.
4. All members of Departments IX, VII, M, XIV to be instructed about opportunities for concealment -
most meticulous inspection of all objects found on spies – more use to be made of
Department K – [handwritten note: quartz lamp, magnets, X-rays]
personal participation of interrogators in house searches.

5. In the future more agent radio operators (every spy can possess a radio set) – question
every agent about knowledge of radio – conversations about this with controllers, training
and technical devices received – if it is suspected that the agents possess a radio, search
with a detection device.

6. Question migrants from West Germany whether they have been recruited.
   Experiences of the last few months – increase in number of people recruited and sent into
   the GDR.
   See also Yank method.

particularly Department IX\textsuperscript{48} to Western state border – acquisition by some officers of English
and French language skills.

\textsuperscript{48} This being the Investigation Branch, which created this document.

[Source: BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, Nr. 4350, pp. 226-235. Translated by Paul Maddrell.]

Berlin, 9.1.1962
Copies: 5/Ho. III. Copy

Brief assessment of the investigation results achieved in 1961 in work on crimes of espionage

The investigation results achieved in 1961 in work on cases of agents of the American, English, and French secret service as well as the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) prove again that until 13.8.1961 West Berlin was the main base for the organization of espionage against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the other Socialist states. New agent connections were, as a rule, created by means of threats and blackmail using people who had left the territory of the GDR illegally, during visits by citizens of the GDR to relatives in West Berlin during trips to West Berlin to take care of personal matters. Controlling, training, giving instructions, and remunerating agents likewise took place at meetings in restaurants, hotels, and safehouses in West Berlin.

While, compared with 1960, an increase in the number of arrests of BND agents has been recorded, the numbers of agents of foreign secret services fell, which obviously resulted from a change in their methods of operation or an improvement in their intelligence connections.

As could be determined by work on spy cases, particularly those of the BND and American secret service, the main focus of the increased subversive activity carried out from West Berlin is directed at putting into effect the aggressive plans of the Bonn Ultras and the most aggressive imperialist circles of the USA and other NATO states to undermine the power of workers and peasants so as to create prerequisites for a military attack on the GDR.
Thus it should be recognized that the agents of the most active imperialist secret services – the American services and the BND – are being prepared to a particularly large degree for their employment in war.

This finds expression in the increased tasking to gather information of a military-strategic nature, such as determining the load-bearing capacity of bridges, the significance of railway junctions, the flow capacity of streets, railways, and waterways, as well as the extent and employment of transport space.

Without exception, the agents of the American, English, and French secret service, as well as the BND, have been employed to inquire thoroughly into the military potential and the defence measures taken by the government of the GDR. The focus of the military spying in the activity of the American secret service and the Federal Intelligence Service lies above all in the collection of intelligence about the units of the Soviet army temporarily stationed on the territory of the GDR. In this their agents predominantly concentrate on spying on missile units and on the construction of air defence bases and storage depots.

For example, the agent of the American secret service [name blacked out] and the BND spy [name blacked out] tried to find out such information in a large number of towns on the territory of the GDR.

The concentration of the secret services, particularly the American services and the BND, on creating agent groups must also be evaluated in connection with the preparations for war against the GDR of the West German militarists, in combination with NATO, were intensified in 1961.

In accordance with the instructions and general orders which were obtained, these groups, predominantly equipped with radio-technical aids, were, among other things, to report on the mood and condition of the population, signs of discontent, starting fires as well as other acts of sabotage and subversion, imbalances in the people’s economy, particularly shortages in the provision of goods, and on the situation in agriculture.
The main task of the agent groups created consists of collecting and transmitting intelligence about troop movements and other military operations to increase the defence preparedness and striking power of the armed forces of the GDR. Closely connected with that are orders to ascertain the situation among the civilian population, the provision of goods, and the readiness of the population to support the armed forces.

Thus it was possible to liquidate a large number of groups, above all of the BND, in whose possession were, altogether, 22 high-performance radio sets and converters suitable for war conditions, which would serve to transmit information in case of war. Most of the radio-technical devices seized in the course of investigative actions were smuggled into the territory of the GDR from West Berlin by couriers like the arrested BND spies [name blacked out] and [name blacked out]. Some were deposited in so-called far and near hiding places. Some of the radio sets meant for use in war were transported into the GDR by the agent radio operators using means of transport made specifically for this purpose. Musical instruments, liquid containers, and tools were chosen as hiding places for transporting the radio sets. Until 13.8.1961 these agent groups transmitted the information they gathered to their controllers almost exclusively at personal meetings as well as using invisible ink and prepared paper via covert addresses in West Germany.

While only a small proportion of the arrested radio agents transmitted the information collected by radio, most, however, regularly received instructions using converters and, in the case of the American secret services\(^{49}\), by means of the shortwave frequency of radio sets.

The fact that it was only possible in one case to find a radio set in the possession of an agent of the American secret service is evidently to be put down to the smashing of the courier department in 1960 and to the not-yet-completed supplying of new sets connected with that. While none of the arrested agents of the French secret service had been equipped with radio-technical aids, it was possible to seize a radio set and two converters of the English secret service.

\(^{49}\) This is, above all, a reference to the main American secret services running spies in East Germany; the CIA and the two services of the US Army, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC).
The fact that people who have left the GDR illegally are recruited for spying in West Berlin and West Germany and sent back to their hometowns to gather information on defence preparedness is also to be evaluated in connection with the concentration of the secret services on preparing an attack on the German Democratic Republic. Since mid-1959 the American secret service has to a greater extent gone over to recruiting people in West Germany for the purpose of conducting espionage against the GDR and other Socialist states, training them thoroughly, equipping them with forged identify papers, and, abusing the air corridor, flying them from West Germany to West Berlin and from there infiltrating them into the territory of the GDR.

More agents were smuggled over the Western state border into the territory of the GDR and likewise told to gather information of a military-strategic character. These conclusions are based on the investigative results reached in the cases against the agents of the American secret service [three names blacked out] among others.

In 1961, though, it was possible to arrest a series of agents of the American and British secret services as well as BND agents, who had managed, owing to negligent cadre work, to infiltrate state and social institutions and gather information on the defence preparedness, foreign policy measures of the government of the GDR, and other political tasks, as well as on key political-economic elements of the Seven Year Plan.

The arrestees [name blacked out] and [name blacked out], exploiting their work, respectively, as Head of Secretariat and member of the Criminal Police in People’s Police district offices, stole secret instructions, analyses, and other material, which, among other things, provided information on the training, equipment, and defence preparedness of the Kampfgruppen\(^\text{50}\), as well as the Order Groups of the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend - Free German Youth movement). These they photographed or copied and passed on to their controller, the American secret service, using their wives. These documents also enabled these secret service headquarters to alter the work of the Military Mission on the territory of the GDR as well as the smuggling of agents and the exploitation of revanchist events in West Berlin to recruit agents.

\(^{50}\) Workers’ militia.
Furthermore, they handed over information about the MfS, of which they had obtained knowledge by reason of their work for the police.

As the results of the investigations into agents of the American secret service prove, the organization of extensive spying in the political sphere is a very important element in the subversive activity of this secret service.

This year, the agents of the American secret service [name blacked out], [name blacked out], and [name blacked out] were arrested, from whose testimony the tasking of the American secret service with regard to inquiring into the political situation in the GDR is clearly identifiable.

Therefore, the American secret service is particularly interested in finding out about the international connections of all GDR state and social organizations and institutions, about the political, economic, and cultural connections of the GDR with other countries, in particular with the independent national-democratic states, about the work of central institutions of the democratic parties and mass organizations in the GDR, about central state offices, and about the mood of the population concerning particular political events.

Similar conclusions were likewise reached in handling cases of spies of the Federal Intelligence Service.

The aim of this work of the American secret service and the BND is to undermine the moral-political unity of the population of our state.

Among the imperialist secret services, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) especially concerns itself with the activity of democratic51 parties and mass organizations on the territory of the GDR so as to obstruct all-German contacts and their all-German work.

51 Meaning Communist.
In the course of last year it was possible to prove that the Iranian secret service, exploiting Iran’s diplomatic representations in West Germany, is engaging in intensive agitation and subversion against the elements of the Tudeh Party which have emigrated to the GDR; this it does in close collaboration with organs of the West German BfV.

For the purpose of organizing measures of ideological subversion, the BfV’s work also focuses on inquiring into the political situation in the border areas and the mood of various strata of the population.

With the same intensity as last year, the secret services are concentrating on finding out about the economic potential of the GDR.

By way of example, as appears from the cases of the agents of the American secret service [name blacked out], of the English secret service [name blacked out], and of the BND spies [two names blacked out], the main focus of the economic spying is inquiring into the key economic sectors of the GDR, like energy, mechanical engineering, and the chemical industry. Both the American secret service and the BND are very interested in these industrial sectors. Substantial attacks of the hostile secret services are also directed at central institutions of the GDR economy. For example, the agent of the English secret service [name blacked out] had the task of handing over or photocopying all the research papers on economically significant projects, in particular on electronic devices and other important instruments, which were available to him in the Institute for Instrument Construction of the German Academy of Sciences and which were in the economic and political interest of the GDR to be kept secret.

Under the cover of academic consultations and interviews to research academic studies, the CIA agent [name blacked out] made a wealth of contacts with leading economic officials in the GDR in order to compromise them through the betrayal of matters to be kept secret and to blackmail them into cooperating with the American secret service.

The spying of [name blacked out] extended to a considerable degree to the entire foreign trade activity of the GDR, particularly to investigating important matters and interrelations concerning
trade relations between the foreign trade organs of the GDR and trading companies of capitalist and socialist countries.

The aim of this extensive spying is the preparation of an economic blockade of the GDR in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The protection measures taken by the government of the GDR on 13.8.1961 on the state border with West Berlin gave rise to a considerable obstruction to the subversive work of the secret services, particularly owing to the substantial elimination of West Berlin as a base for spying on the German Democratic Republic.

The change in the situation brought about after 13.8.1961 caused the imperialist secret services to adapt and reorganize their working methods.

It was not possible to reach any conclusions on the basis of investigative proceedings about the activity of the English and French secret service in this period.

In their spying after 13.8.1961, the American secret service and BND give their main attention – apart from renewing connections which had been broken off and making new contacts – to greater inquiring into any military movements on the territory of the GDR and to the investigation of the opinion of the population about the security measures of the government, about the border incidents and provocations on the state border with West Berlin which have been organized by the Bonn Ultras in conjunction with the West Berlin Senate and USA Occupiers, and about difficulties which have arisen supplying the population with consumer goods. The aim of this work is the creation of prerequisites for the organization of counter-revolutionary activities, as a reason for an aggressive war by Bonn militarists and NATO against the GDR.

Characteristic of the uncertainty and mood of panic which has set in the offices of the secret services in West Berlin in connection with the measures of 13.8.1961 is the fact that – according to the testimony of the CIA spy [name blacked out] – American citizens living in West Berlin
have been sent into Democratic Berlin to observe troop movements, gatherings of people, and unrest expected by the American secret service in Democratic Berlin.

Over and above that, for example, the instruction and training of the arrested agent of the American secret service [name blacked out] was broken off prematurely and precipitately after the security measures came into force. [Name blacked out] was smuggled illegally into the GDR and received instructions to inquire into the military situation on the territory of the GDR.

It is to be concluded that the number of spies of the American secret service smuggled over the state border (West) increased.

According to investigative results of cases of spies of the American and West German secret service, the main method of maintaining the connection is radio activity.

Basically, tasks and spying instructions are transmitted by radio, whereby the American secret service uses the “Ilmenau 210” radio sets which are available for purchase [in the GDR] and the BND uses shortwave converters which are specifically meant for radio reception.

Some of the arrested radio agents of the BND were already reporting by radio the observations they had made to the regional radio headquarters of the Federal Intelligence Service.

A further method of reporting to the secret service is the exploitation of the post using cover addresses and varied means of secret writing.

This method is – as the cases [three names blacked out] and others prove – used both by the BND and the American secret service.

In proceedings against two agents of the American secret service, a married couple, it was possible to obtain facts on additional new methods of cooperation.
Thus the agents are supplied with money and spying aids from West Berlin by couriers via so-called dead letter boxes which are only used once and the location of which is made known to the agents by radio.

With regard to the majority of its agents, the BND planned to supply money and so-called barter goods as well as spying aids by exploiting the parcel traffic between West Germany and the GDR, whereby the goods were to be hidden in foodstuffs and pieces of clothing.

The American secret service in particular is interested in meeting its agents in capitalist and other socialist countries.