THE COLD WAR IN ASIA
The Cold War
International History Project

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Ambassador Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHPP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.
# Table of Contents

**Stalin’s Conversations With Chinese Leaders**
- Talks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1949-53, with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok........................................................................................................3
- Rivals and Allies: Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese Civil War, January 1949, introduction by Odd Arne Westad............7

**New Evidence on the Korean War**
- New Russian Documents on the Korean War, introduction and translations by Kathryn Weathersby.......................30
- China’s Road to the Korean War, by Chen Jian..............................................................................................................41
- Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51, by Evgeni Bajanov. .................................................................54
- The Shykov Diaries, by Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng.........................................................................................69
- Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives, article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov.........................................................94
- Bruce Cumings and Kathryn Weathersby: An Exchange on Korean War Origins..................................................120
- Soviet Interrogation of U.S. POWs in the Korean War, by Laurence Jolidan...........................................................123

**New Chinese Sources**
- CCP Leaders’ Selected Works and the Historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution, by Chen Jian........131
- The Second Historical Archives of China, by Gao Hua with Scott Kennedy..........................................................147

**New Evidence on Sino-Soviet Relations**
- The Emerging Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958, introduction, translations, and annotations by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian.................................................................148
- Mao on Sino-Soviet Relations: Two Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, introduction by Odd Arne Westad...157
- The Soviet Foreign Ministry Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, by Mark Kramer........170
- East German Documents on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969, by Christian F. Ostermann.........................186
- The Cold War in Asia: Khabarovsk Conference Held on Russian Far East, by David L. Wolff...........................191
- Soviet Reactions to the Sino-Soviet Border Rift, introduction and translations by Elizabeth Wishnick............194
- Sino-Soviet Tensions, 1980: Two Russian Documents, introduction and translations by Elizabeth Wishnick........202

**New Evidence on Sino-American Relations**
- Mao Zedong’s Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents, introduction, translations, and annotation by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson......................................................208
- Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise to Beijing during the Crisis, introduction by Vladislav Zubok................................219
- Mao Zedong and Dulles’s “Peaceful Evolution” Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo’s Memoirs, introduction and translation by Qiang Zhai.................................................................228

**New Evidence on the Vietnam/Indochina Wars**
- Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam, by Jerzy Michalowski...............................................................241
- The Cambodian National Archives, by Kenton J. Clymer ......................................................................................260
- Sources on the Khmer Rouge Years: The Cambodian Genocide Program.........................................................260

**Research Notes**
- Documenting the Early Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program, by Mark Kramer......................................................266
- Secret East German Report on Chinese Reactions to the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, by Mark Kramer.....................271

**Book Reviews**
- G.M. Kornienko, *The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant*, review by David R. Stone.....................................272
- Chen Hansheng, *My Life During Four Eras*, review by Maochen Yu.............................................................274

**Response**: Sudoplatov Controversy (cont.), More on 1956 Polish & Hungarian Crises.......................................280

**Update**.................................................................................................................................................................................................286
Stalin’s Conversations
Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950, And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952

with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok

This issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin leads off with translations of five meetings between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) of the newly-created People’s Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of the documents, which constitute some of the most intimate glimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet and Chinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closed archives of the communist world, are kept in the Russian Presidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. They were recently declassified by Russian authorities in connection with efforts to gather materials related to the Korean War for presentation by the Russian Government to South Korea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as well as many other Russian archival records concerning the Korean War which appear later in this issue of the Bulletin, as a consequence of its cooperation with a research project involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained by CWIHP are available to researchers through the National Security Archive, a non-governmental documents repository, library, and research institute located on the seventh floor of The Gelman Library at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and will also be made available through Columbia University.)

The documents that follow begin with transcripts of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950, during the Chinese leader’s two-month visit to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Those conversations came as the two countries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and also constituted the first and only personal encounter between these two communist titans and major figures of 20th-century world history.

Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscow between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952, where issues on the table for discussion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the relationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcripts yield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind of Stalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), one of the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over the USSR.

To assess the significance of these documents, the CWIHP Bulletin has assembled four specialists familiar with Sino-Soviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, from various perspectives: Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), author of China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Prof. Vojtech Mastny (Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, currently at the University of Hokkaido, Japan), author of The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford University Press, 1996), a forthcoming sequel to his Russia’s Road to the Cold War, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Dr. Odd Arne Westad (Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute), author of Cold War and Revolution: Soviet American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Dr. Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), co-author (with Constantine Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).

Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian.

—Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin
I: Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 16 December 1949

[Classification level blacked out: “NOT SECRET” Stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE
I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG
on 16 December 1949

After an exchange of greetings and a discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The most important question at the present time is the question of establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to pre-war levels and to stabilize the country in general. Decisions on the most important questions in China hinge on the prospects for a peaceful future. With this in mind the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] entrusted me to ascertain from you, comrade Stalin, in what way and for how long will international peace be preserved.

Comrade Stalin: In China a war for peace, as it were, is taking place. The question of peace greatly preoccupies the Soviet Union as well, though we have already had peace for the past four years. With regards to China, there is no immediate threat at the present time: Japan has yet to stand up on its feet and is thus not ready for war; America, though it screams war, is actually afraid of war more than anything; Europe is afraid of war; in essence, there is no one to fight with China, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to invade China?

Peace will depend on our efforts. If we continue to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even longer.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Since Liu Shaoqi’s return to China, CC CPC has been discussing the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between China and the USSR.

Comrade Stalin: This question we can discuss and decide. We must ascertain whether to declare the continuation of the current 1945 treaty of alliance and friendship between the USSR and China, to announce impending changes in the future, or to make these changes right now.

As you know, this treaty was concluded between the USSR and China as a result of the Yalta Agreement, which provided for the main points of the treaty (the question of the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England. Keeping in mind this circumstance, we, within our inner circle, have decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now, since a change in even one point could give America and England the legal grounds to raise questions about modifying also the treaty’s provisions concerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, etc. This is why we searched to find a way to modify the current treaty in effect while formally maintaining its provisions, in this case by formally maintaining the Soviet Union’s right to station its troops at Port Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese government, actually withdrawing the Soviet Armed forces currently stationed there. Such an operation could be carried out upon China’s request.

One could do the same with KChZhD [Chinese Changchun Railroad, which traverses Manchuria], that is, to effectively modify the corresponding points of the agreement while formally maintaining its provisions, upon China’s request.

If, on the other hand, the Chinese comrades are not satisfied with this strategy, they can present their own proposals.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The present situation with regard to KChZhD and Port Arthur corresponds well with Chinese interests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate to effectively fight against imperialist aggression. In addition, KChZhD is a training school for the preparation of Chinese cadres in railroad and industry.

Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal of troops does not mean that Soviet Union refuses to assist China, if such assistance is needed. The fact is that we, as communists, are not altogether comfortable with stationing our forces on foreign soil, especially on the soil of a friendly nation. Given this situation anyone could say that if Soviet forces can be stationed on Chinese territory, then why could not the British, for example, station their forces in Hong Kong, or the Americans in Tokyo?

We would gain much in the arena of international relations if, with mutual agreement, the Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur. In addition, the withdrawal of Soviet forces would provide a serious boost to Chinese communists in their relations with the national bourgeoisie. Everyone would see that the communists have managed to achieve what [Nationalist Chinese leader] Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) could not. The Chinese communists must take the national bourgeoisie into consideration.

The treaty ensures the USSR’s right to station its troops in Port Arthur. But the USSR is not obligated to exercise this right and can withdraw its troops upon Chinese request. However, if this is unsuitable, the troops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2, 5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Let them not misunderstand that we want to run away from China. We can stay there for 20 years even.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussing the treaty in China we had not taken into account the American and English positions regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act in a way that is best for the common cause. This question merits further consideration. However, it is already becoming clear that the treaty should not be modified at the present time, nor should one rush to withdraw troops from Port Arthur.

Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow in order to decide the treaty question?

Comrade Stalin: No, this question you must decide for yourselves. Zhou may be needed in regard to other matters.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would like to decide on the question of Soviet credit to China, that is to draw up a credit agreement
for 300,000,000 dollars between the governments of the USSR and China.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. If you would like to formalize this agreement now, we can.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, exactly now, as this would resonate well in China. At the same time it is necessary to resolve the question of trade, especially between the USSR and Xinjiang [Sinkiang], though at present we cannot present a specific trade operations plan for this region.

Comrade Stalin: We must know right now what kind of equipment China will need, especially now, since we do not have equipment in reserve and the request for industrial goods must be submitted ahead of time.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We are having difficulties in putting together a request for equipment, as the industrial picture is as yet unclear.

Comrade Stalin: It is desirable to expedite the preparation of this request, as requests for equipment are submitted to our industry at least a year in advance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would very much like to receive assistance from the USSR in creating air transportation routes.

Comrade Stalin: We are ready to render such assistance. Air routes can be established over Xinjiang and the MPR [Mongolian People’s Republic]. We have specialists. We will give you assistance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would also like to receive your assistance in creating a naval force.

Comrade Stalin: Cadres for Chinese navy could be prepared at Port Arthur. You give us people, and we will give you ships. Trained cadres of the Chinese navy could then return to China on these ships.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Guomindang [Kuomintang] supporters have built a naval and air base on the island of Formosa [Taiwan]. Our lack of naval forces and aviation makes the occupation of the island by the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] more difficult. With regard to this, some of our generals have been voicing opinions that we should request assistance from the Soviet Union, which could send volunteer pilots or secret military detachments to speed up the conquest of Formosa.

Comrade Stalin: Assistance has not been ruled out, though one ought to consider the form of such assistance. What is most important here is not to give Americans a pretext to intervene. With regard to headquarters staff and instructors we can give them to you anytime. The rest we will have to think about.

Do you have any assault landing units? Comrade Mao Zedong: We have one former Guomindang assault landing regiment unit which came over to join our side.

Comrade Stalin: One could select a company of landing forces, train them in propaganda, send them over to Formosa, and through them organize an uprising on the isle.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Our troops have approached the borders of Burma and Indo-China. As a result, the Americans and the British are alarmed, not knowing whether we will cross the border or whether our troops will halt their movement.

Comrade Stalin: One could create a rumor that you are preparing to cross the border and in this way frighten the imperialists a bit.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Several countries, especially Britain, are actively campaigning to recognize the People’s Republic of China. However, we believe that we should not rush to be recognized. We must first bring about order to the country, strengthen our position, and then we can talk to foreign imperialists.

Comrade Stalin: That is a good policy. In addition, there is no need for you to create conflicts with the British and the Americans. If, for example, there will be a need to put pressure on the British, this can be done by resorting to a conflict between the Guangdong province and Hong Kong. And to resolve this conflict, Mao Zedong could come forward as the mediator. The main point is not to rush and to avoid conflicts.

Are there foreign banks operating in Shanghai? Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes.

Comrade Stalin: And whom are they serving?

Comrade Mao Zedong: The Chinese national bourgeoisie and foreign enterprises which so far we have not touched. As for the foreigners’ spheres of influence, the British predominated in investments in the economic and commercial sectors, while the Americans lead in the sector of cultural-educational organizations.

Comrade Stalin: What is the situation regarding Japanese enterprises?
**Rivals and Allies:**
**Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese Civil War,**
**January 1949**

**Introduction by Odd Arne Westad**

In early 1949, as the communist-led People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was winning decisive victories on the battlefield in the Chinese civil war, the Guomindang (GMD) government made a last attempt at a peace settlement through Great Power mediation. Stalin decided not to disregard completely the GMD initiative, but to offer Soviet mediation in case the Chinese government accepted those harsh preconditions spelled out in his January 10 telegram to Mao Zedong. That telegram, in turn, prompted a brief but revealing exchange between the two communist leaders over the merits of diplomatic versus military tactics in the conflict; the exchange, recently declassified in the Russian archives, is printed below.

There are several likely reasons why Stalin did not want to turn the GMD appeal down forthright. He may genuinely have seen the response he outlined to Mao as the best tactic in order to forestall a propaganda victory for the GMD and Washington. Stalin probably also wanted to impress on Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership his status as the master tactician of the world Communist movement—as someone who immediately understood a political situation wherever it came up with more clarity and breadth than “local” leaders. Thirdly, he may have wanted to remind the CCP leaders, in a not too subtle way, of their dependence on Soviet political and diplomatic support notwithstanding the PLA’s victories.

Whatever his motives, Stalin’s scheme could be translated into Russian.

**Comrade Mao Zedong:** I am currently reviewing my works which were published in various local publishing houses and which contain a mass of errors and misrepresentations. I plan to complete this review by spring of 1950. However, I would like to receive help from Soviet comrades: first of all, to work on the texts with Russian translators and, secondly, to receive help in editing the Chinese original.

**Comrade Stalin:** This can be done. However, do you need your works edited?

**Comrade Mao Zedong:** Yes, and I ask you to select a comrade suitable for such a task, say, for example, someone from CC VKP/b/ [All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks].

**Comrade Stalin:** It can be arranged, if indeed there is such a need.

Also present at the meeting: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, [Soviet translator N.T.] Fedorenko and [Chinese translator] Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

**Recorded by comr. Fedorenko.**

[signature illegible 31/XII]

1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9-17; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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**II. Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950**

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG**

22 January 1950

After an exchange of greetings and a short discussion of general topics, the following conversation took place.

**Stalin:** There are two groups of questions which must be discussed: the first group of questions concerns the existing agreements between the USSR and China; the second group of questions concerns the current events in Manchuria, Xinjiang, etc.

I think that it would be better to begin not with the current events, but rather with a discussion of the existing agreements. We believe that these agreements need to be changed, though earlier we had thought that they could be left intact. The existing agreements, including the treaty, should be changed because war against Japan figures at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war is over and Japan has been crushed, the situation has been altered, and now the treaty has become anachronism.

I ask to hear your opinion regarding the treaty of friendship and alliance.

**Mao Zedong:** So far we have not worked out a concrete draft of the treaty, only a few outlines.

**Stalin:** We can exchange opinions, and then prepare an appropriate draft.

**Mao Zedong:** Judging from the current situation, we believe that we should strengthen our existing friendship using the help of treaties and agreements. This would resonate well both in China and in the international arena. Everything that guarantees the future prosperity of our countries must be stated in the treaty of alliance and friendship, including the necessity of avoiding a repetition of Japanese aggression. So long as we show interest in the prosperity of our countries, one cannot rule out the possibility that the imperialist countries will attempt to hinder us.

**Stalin:** True. Japan still has cadres remaining, and it will certainly lift itself up again, especially if Americans continue their current policy.

**Mao Zedong:** Two points that I made...
earlier are cardinal in changing our future treaty from the existing one. Previously, the Guomindang spoke of friendship in words only. Now the situation has changed, with all the conditions for real friendship and cooperation in place.

In addition, whereas before there was talk of cooperation in the war against Japan, now attention must turn to preventing Japanese aggression. The new treaty must include the questions of political, economic, cultural and military cooperation. Of most importance will be the question of economic cooperation.

Stalin: Is it necessary to keep the provision, stated in article 3 of the current Treaty of friendship: “...This article shall remain in force until that time when, by request of both High Participants in the Treaty, the United Nations is given the responsibility of preventing any future aggression on the part of Japan”?

Mao Zedong: I don’t believe it is necessary to keep this provision.

Stalin: We also believe that it is unnecessary. What provisions do we need to specify in the new treaty?

Mao Zedong: We believe that the new treaty should include a paragraph on consultation regarding international concerns. The addition of this paragraph would strengthen our position, since among the Chinese national bourgeoisie there are objections to the policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union on questions of international concern.

Stalin: Good. When signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation, the inclusion of such a paragraph goes without saying.

Mao Zedong: That’s right.

Stalin: To whom shall we entrust the preparation of the draft? I believe that we should entrust it to [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Vyshinskii and [Chinese Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai.

Mao Zedong: Agreed.

Stalin: Let us move over to the agreement on KChZhD. What proposals do you have on this question?

Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should accept as the guiding principle the idea of making practical changes concerning the KChZhD and the Port Arthur agreements, while legally continuing them in their present state?

Stalin: That is, you agree to declare the legal continuation of the current agreement, while, in effect, allowing appropriate changes to take place.

Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take into account the interests of both sides, China and the Soviet Union.

Stalin: True. We believe that the agreement concerning Port Arthur is not equitable.

Mao Zedong: But changing this agreement goes against the decisions of the Yalta Conference?!

Stalin: True, it does—and to hell with it! Once we have taken up the position that the treaties must be changed, we must go all the way. It is true that for us this entails certain inconveniences, and we will have to struggle against the Americans. But we are already reconciled to that.

Mao Zedong: This question worries us only because it may have undesirable consequences for the USSR.

Stalin: As you know, we made the current agreement during the war with Japan. We did not know that Jiang Jieshi would be toppled. We acted under the premise that the presence of our troops in Port Arthur would be in the interests of Soviet Union and democracy in China.

Mao Zedong: The matter is clear.

Stalin: In that case, would you deem the following scenario acceptable: declare that the agreement on Port Arthur shall remain in force until a peace treaty with Japan is signed, after which the Russian troops would be withdrawn from Port Arthur. Or perhaps one could propose another scenario: declare that the current agreement shall remain in place, while in effect withdrawing troops from Port Arthur. We will accept whichever of these scenarios is more suitable. We agree with both scenarios.

Mao Zedong: This question should be thought through. We agree with the opinion of comrades Stalin and believe that the agreement on Port Arthur must remain in force until a peace treaty is signed with Japan, after which the treaty shall become invalid and the Soviet soldiers will leave. However, we would like for Port Arthur to be a place for military collaboration, where we could train our military naval forces.

Stalin: The question of Dalny [Dairen; Dalian]. We have no intention of securing any Soviet rights in Dalny.

Mao Zedong: Will Dalny remain a free port?

Stalin: Since we are giving up our rights there, China must decide on its own the question of Dalny: will it remain a free port or not. During his time Roosevelt insisted that Dairen remain a free port.

Mao Zedong: So the preservation of the free port would be in the interests of America and Britain?

Stalin: Of course. It’s a house with open gates.

Mao Zedong: We believe that Port Arthur could serve as a base for our military collaboration, while Dalny could serve as a base for Sino-Soviet economic collaboration. In Dalny there is a whole array of enterprises that we are in no position to exploit without Soviet assistance. We should develop a closer economic collaboration there.

Stalin: In other words, the agreement on Port Arthur will remain in force until a peace treaty is signed with Japan. After the signing of the peace treaty the existing agreement shall become invalid and the Russians shall withdraw their troops. Did I sum up your thoughts correctly?

Mao Zedong: Yes, basically so, and it is exactly this which we would like to set forth in the new treaty.

Stalin: Let us continue the discussion of the KChZhD question. Tell us, as an honest communist, what doubts do you have here?

Mao Zedong: The principal point is that the new treaty should note that joint exploitation and administration will continue in the future. However, in the case of administration, China should take the lead role here. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the question of shortening the duration of the agreement and to determine the amount of investment by each side.

Molotov: The conditions governing the cooperation and joint administration of an enterprise by two interested countries usually provide for equal participation by both sides, as well as for alternation in the appointment of replacements for management positions. In the old agreement the administration of the railroad belonged to the Soviets; however, in the future we think it necessary to alternate in the creation of management functions. Let’s say that such an alternation could take place every two-three years.

Zhou Enlai: Our comrades believe that the existing management of KChZhD and the office of the director ought to be abolished and a railroad administration commission be set up in their place; and that the
offices of the commission chairman and of the director should be replaced by Chinese cadres. However, given comrade Molotov’s proposals, this question requires more thought.

Stalin: If we are talking about joint administration, then it is important that the replacements for the managing position be alternated. That would be more logical. As for the duration of the agreement, we would not be against shortening it.

Zhou Enlai: Should we not change the ratio of capital investment by each side, by increasing the level of Chinese investment to 51%, instead of the current requirement for parity?

Molotov: This would go against the existing provision for parity.

Stalin: We do indeed have agreements with the Czechs and the Bulgarians which provide for parity and equal-footing for both sides. Since we already have joint administration, then we might as well have equal participation.

Mao Zedong: The question needs to be further examined, keeping in mind the interests of both sides.

Stalin: Let us discuss the credit agreement. We need to officially formalize that which has already been agreed to earlier. Do you have any observations to make?

Mao Zedong: Is the shipment of military arms considered a part of the monetary loan?

Stalin: This you can decide yourself: we can bill that towards the loan, or we can formalize it through trade agreements.

Mao Zedong: If the military shipments are billed towards the loan, then we will have little means left for industry. It appears that part of the military shipments will have to be billed towards the loan, while the other part will have to be paid with Chinese goods. Can’t the period of delivery of industrial equipment and military arms be shortened from 5 to 3-4 years?

Stalin: We must examine our options. The matter rests in the requisition list for our industry. Nevertheless, we can move the date that the credit agreement goes into effect to 1 January 1950, since the shipments should begin just about now. If the agreement specified July 1949 as the time for the commencement of the loan, the international community would not be able to understand how an agreement could have been reached between the Soviet Union and China, which at the time did not even have its own government. It seems that you should hasten somewhat to present the requisition list for industrial equipment. It should be kept in mind that the sooner such a list is presented, the better for the matter at hand.

Mao Zedong: We believe that the conditions of the credit agreement are generally favorable to China. Under its terms we pay only one percent interest.

Stalin: Our credit agreements with people’s democracies provide for two percent interest. We could, says comr. Stalin jokingly, increase this interest for you as well, if you would like. Of course, we acted under the premise that the Chinese economy was practically in ruin.

As is clear from the telegrams that we have received, the Chinese government intends to use its army in the reconstruction of its economy. That is very good. In our time we also made use of the army in our economic development and had very good results.

Mao Zedong: That’s right. We are drawing on the experience of our Soviet comrades.

Stalin: You raised the question of China receiving a certain amount of grain for Xinjiang?

Mao Zedong: Wheat and textile.

Stalin: For this you need to come up with the necessary requests that include numbers.

Mao Zedong: Very well, we shall prepare these.

How shall we proceed with the trade agreement?

Stalin: What is your opinion? Up until now we have only had a trade agreement with Manchuria. We would like to know what sort of a situation we should look forward to in the future: will we be signing separate agreements with Xinjiang, Manchuria and other provinces, or a single agreement with the central government?

Mao Zedong: We would like to have a single, central agreement. But in time Xinjiang may have a separate agreement.

Stalin: Just Xinjiang; what about Manchuria?

Zhou Enlai: A separate agreement with Manchuria can be ruled out, since in the agreement with the central government China’s obligations would in essence be fulfilled by shipments made from Manchuria.

Stalin: We would like the central government to sanction and take the responsibility for the agreements with Xinjiang or Manchuria.

Mao Zedong: The agreement with Xinjiang must be signed in the name of the central government.

Stalin: Right, since [a] provincial government might not take many things into account, whereas things are always clearer to the central government.

What other questions do you have?

Mao Zedong: At the present time the main question is economic cooperation - the reconstruction and development of the Manchurian economy.

Stalin: I think that we will entrust the preparation of this question to comrs. Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Zhou Enlai, and [CCP CC member and Vice Chairman of Finance and Economics Commission] Li Fuchun.

Any other questions?

Mao Zedong: I would like to note that the air regiment that you sent to China was very helpful. They transported 10 thousand people. Let me thank you, comrade Stalin, for the help and ask you to allow it to stay a little longer, so it could help transport provisions to [CCP CC member and commander of the PLA’s Second Field Army] Liu Bocheng’s troops, currently preparing for an attack on Tibet.

Stalin: It’s good that you are preparing to attack. The Tibetans need to be subdued. As for the air regiment, we shall talk this over with the military personnel and give you an answer.

The meeting took two hours.

Present at the meeting were comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan,Vyshinskii, Roshchin, Fedorenko and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, [PRC Ambassador to the USSR] Wang Jiaxiang, [CCP CC member] Chen Boda, and Shi Zhe /Karski/.

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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III. Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952

[Classification level blacked out: “NOT SECRET” stamped]
Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the attention being focused in China on the upcoming [October 1952] XIX Congress of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks].

Stalin notes that there has not been a convention for a long time, that in 1939 there were only 1.5 mln. party members, while now there are about 6 mln.; even though we have been holding down the influx of new party members, the party is still growing.

He asks about the delegation’s trip.

Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the attention and answers that the trip went quite well and that the delegation travelled in full comfort. In the name of Mao Zedong, he thanks comrade Stalin, the party CC [Central Committee] and the Soviet government for the enormous help in both the development of the national Chinese economy and in the struggle with its enemies.

Stalin. There is no need to thank. This is our duty. Wouldn’t the Chinese comrades help us if we were in the same position?

Zhou Enlai agrees that this is true, adding that though assistance should be given, gratitude, obviously, should also be expressed.

Stalin. We must also thank the Chinese people for carrying on the right struggle. China also helps us by delivering us caoutchouc [natural rubber]. Thus, we will have to thank China as well.

Zhou Enlai says that, unfortunately, China’s assistance to Soviet Union is insufficient.

Stalin. You came to power too late. You were late by more than 30 years.

Zhou Enlai asks for permission to set forth the reason for the delegation’s visit. Refers to the telegram from Mao Zedong which contains the Chinese government’s wishes. States three main topics to be discussed. First question - the situation in Korea. Second - the internal situation within PRC over the past three years and the five year plan for economic development. Notes that a written report is under preparation. The Chinese delegation would like to deal with this question after the report has been presented. Third - the extension of the agreement on Port Arthur.

Stalin notes that the initiative to extend the joint use of the military naval base at Port Arthur must come from China. We are guests there, and guests don’t ask such questions.

Zhou Enlai agrees with comrade Stalin and offers to exchange diplomatic notes. The Chinese government shall address the Soviet government with the necessary request.

The next question concerns the construction of the railway from Ulan-Bator to the Sino-Mongol border.

Stalin asks whether China is interested in such a railway.

Zhou Enlai notes that a railway to Xinjiang would be of greater importance. But that would be a complicated and difficult construction project. The Chinese government is intent on first building a railroad to Mongolia which could then connect to Soviet Union. The length of this railroad on Chinese territory would be approximately 350 km. This railroad is projected to be constructed from Lanzhou to Khami. In the first five year plan a railroad will be built from Khami to the USSR border.

Stalin approves of this and reiterates the significance of a Xinjiang railway with respect to prospective oil mining.

Zhou Enlai affirms that there are oil deposits all along this route. Moves on to the agreement on hevea [rubber] trees.

Stalin indicates that the question has been pretty much decided.

Zhou Enlai agrees and shifts to the question of the five year plan for the PRC’s economic development. Says that a written report on the subject is under preparation and that, as soon as the report is completed, he would like to visit comrade Stalin and personally go over the report with him.

Stalin agrees to this.

Zhou Enlai requests assistance for work in geological exploration.

Stalin promises such assistance.

Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of construction projects for various industrial enterprises in China. Says that there are 151 such enterprises planned to be constructed. Points out that China needs the Soviet Union’s help in procuring equipment. Asks that the PRC’s written request be considered and that an answer be given as to whether and in what capacity the Soviet Union would render such assistance, and that time periods be specified, and also that Soviet specialists be sent to China. Emphasizes that Soviet specialists working in China have performed a great deal of work and have been of great help to China, especially in the area of training work cadres and specialists.

Stalin. That is most important. China must have its own cadres in order to stand
Zhou Enlai informs that they would like to receive an additional 800 specialists from Soviet Union.

Stalin says that this request will be examined and that we will try to send as many as we can.

Zhou Enlai asks also for assistance with technical documentation (blueprints, etc.). Stalin answers that this is, indeed, necessary.

Zhou Enlai asks if it will be possible to continue to educate students in the USSR and to send interns to Soviet enterprises.

Stalin expresses agreement.

Zhou Enlai touches on the question of the military five year plan. Informs that materials are under preparation and that a written report will be presented. Also wishes to receive military equipment.

Stalin asks what Zhou Enlai has in mind: shipments of weapons or equipment for military factories.

Zhou Enlai says that he meant shipments of weapons. Noting that since agreement has already been expressed with regard to weapons for 60 divisions, he would like to discuss shipments for naval forces. Asks what sort of assistance could be received in the way of airplanes.

Stalin asks whether the Chinese government is thinking of building aero-manufacturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that this would be very difficult to do in the course of the first five year plan, particularly with regard to jet airplanes. Notes that such construction is not planned to begin until at least 5 years from now, and motor-building - in 3 years.

Stalin points to the example of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which began with assembly plants. Says that the USSR could send China motors and other airplane parts, and China could organize the assembly of these airplanes. Cadres can be trained in this way. We went through the same process. Such a process would be more beneficial for Chinese comrades as well. First you must build 1-2 factories for motor assembly. We will send motors and other airplane parts which would then be assembled in China. That’s how it was done in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. This ought to be organized. Having organized assembly plants, you could then, in another 3 years, build an airplane factory. That is the easiest and the best way.

Zhou Enlai says that they are beginning to understand this and are organizing maintenance and assembly plants. He adds that if comrade Stalin finds it necessary to hasten the process, then they will take all appropriate measures to comply.

Stalin asks whether divisions of some sort have been organized in order to receive the shipment of weapons for 60 divisions which Soviet Union sent to China.

Zhou Enlai explains that out of the 10 divisions’ worth of armaments that China has received, 3 have been given over to Korea and 7 have been earmarked for Chinese detachments in Korea.

Stalin asks if he understands correctly that all of the weapons will go to the Korean front.

Zhou Enlai affirms that it will be so, assuming that the war will continue. Informs that, out of the total of 60 divisions’ armaments, the Chinese government is intent on sending 3 to Korea, preparing 42 divisions [of Chinese soldiers] to serve in Korea .... [ellipsis in original]

Stalin asks whether the Chinese have gotten unused to the new weapons.

Zhou Enlai explains that they are gradually becoming proficient with the new weapons, with 3-4 months of training.

Stalin, Under these circumstances we operate in a way so as to allow soldiers to become familiar with the weapons and the overall organization of the division. This takes time - approximately 6 months. Without it one could lose the weapons. Besides, during this time we inspect the operation of various mechanisms, and only then do we send these units to the front. Of course this preparation could be carried out behind the front, in Korea, for example. Half of the divisions receiving the new weapons should remain in China.

Zhou Enlai notes that the shipment of divisions to Korea results in losses, which must be made up.

Stalin emphasizes that it is imperative to train the divisions, so as to make them stronger.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of assistance with artillery.

Stalin asks whether China can produce ammunition.

Zhou Enlai answers that they have not yet addressed this question.

Stalin notes that, all in all, it is more difficult to transport ammunition than artillery pieces.

Zhou Enlai repeats his request for assistance with artillery. Emphasizes that for every Chinese shell fired, the Americans answer with 9 shells of their own.

Stalin. That’s bad. Adds that if the Americans are firing 9 shells, the Chinese should be firing 20. We smothered the Germans with artillery. We had a gun stationed every 2 meters, while the Germans had a gun every kilometer. Artillery is important stuff. The Chinese government needs to get the munitions production going. We will help you build these factories.

Zhou Enlai points out that they are reorganizing existing factories and are planning new factories.

Stalin. That is necessary. Machine tools are of utmost importance here.

Zhou Enlai says that they have machine tools, but old ones.

Stalin says that machine tools are essential in the production of ammunition for 122mm, three-inch and anti-aircraft guns. We can help in this matter. Adds that it is not necessary to build large factories. We build ammunition in different plants: one plant makes shell casings while another loads them. It’s difficult to do everything in one factory.

Zhou Enlai announces that the Chinese government will act upon the advice of the Soviet government regarding its aviation industry and take all measures to further its development.

Stalin emphasizes the importance of first organizing assembly plants.

Zhou Enlai says that the Chinese government plans to build tank-producing factories: one for light tanks with an output of 1 thousand tanks per year, and another for medium tanks, to be completed in 4-5 years.

Stalin advises to start here with assembly plans as well, pointing out that during the war we converted automobile factories to produce tanks. Says that it would be good for China to have 1-2 auto assembly plants.

Zhou Enlai says that they plan to build a factory in Changchun with an output of 20 thousand cars and are organizing an assembly plant with an output of 3 thousand cars a year. Asks for assistance in the planning of yet another factory.

Stalin emphasizes that cadres must receive training in assembly and maintenance factories. This issue must be addressed.

Zhou Enlai agrees completely with this...
Zhou Enlai raises the question of de-
portation and notes that the Chinese gov-
ernment is addressing this matter. They
have maintenance factories and are cur-
cently working to organize assembly plants;
these plants will open next year.

Stalin inquires whether China has
worker education schools in their factories.

Zhou Enlai admits that this is one of the
weaker spots. They are taking measures to
rectify the situation. There are courses
given in factories. They are trying to attract
students and are selecting party members to
teach.

Stalin points out that we have a special
ministry, the Ministry of Labor Resources.

There are vocational schools. It would be
good for China to establish something of the sort.

Every year these schools graduate around 1 mln. young workers.

Zhou Enlai asks, what sort of institu-
tions does Soviet Union have to train middle
management cadres?[

Stalin explains that there are special
technical schools for this purpose.

Zhou Enlai says that he would like to
discuss the question of radar.

Radio and radar are very important.

Zhou Enlai says that they were thinking of
building assembly plants for this purpose.

Stalin emphasizes that subsequently
they should build radar equipment manu-
facturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that so far they are not
capable of producing radar equipment.

Stalin promises to help.

Zhou Enlai returns to the question of
specialists. Says that the Chinese govern-
ment does not intend merely to ask us for help
with specialists but also plans to pre-
pare its own specialists.

Stalin approves of this, pointing out
that, in time, other countries will ask China
for specialists: India, Burma, Indo-China.

Adds that it would be wiser for the Chinese
government to send engineers and techni-
cians to Soviet factories, where they could
hone their skills.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of de-
fraying the costs that China bears from the
trade imbalance between the two countries.

Says that the Chinese government would
like to ask for a new loan. However, ob-
serves Zhou Enlai, we understand that this
would be a burden for the Soviet Union.

Stalin points out that this is because we
came to power earlier, that we were lucky. If
the Chinese comrades had come to power
before us, then we would have had to ask the
same of them.

To this Zhou Enlai responds that Mos-
cow is the center from which all nations
derive inspiration for their struggle for lib-
eration.

He goes on to give a short account of the
situation in Korea. He points out that up until
May 1951 the war in Korea was not static, but
was a war of movement. Since May 1951, a
front has been established, and the war has
become static. Both sides are about equal in
strength. The enemy is in no position to carry
out an offensive. There is a certain equilib-
rium. But we are not carrying out large
offensives, either. Like the enemy which has
reinforced its position 15-20 km. deep, so
have we created our own fortified zone, and
continue to dig even now. The enemy has not
been able to destroy our fortifications. The
front line extends for about 200 km and is
completely fortified, as are the left and right
flanks.

Mao Zedong has put forth three ques-
tions. First - will we be able to repulse the
enemy? We are convinced that we will. Second - will we be able to hold our present
positions? This year has shown that we will
be able to hold and strengthen our positions.
Third - will we be able to carry out an
offensive, to attack the enemy? Earlier we
thought that we would hardly be able to carry
out an offensive for more than 7 days. Now
we are sufficiently strong to launch stronger
offensives and have entrenched ourselves
well enough to withstand bombing raids.

Stalin asks whether they are capable of
widening the scope of the offensives.

Zhou Enlai explains that they can launch
offensives to capture isolated positions, but a
general offensive would be difficult to carry
out. Since the war acquired its static nature,
the American command has been intent on
drawing out the negotiations and is not inter-

tested in signing a truce.

Stalin says that apparently the Ameri-
cans want to keep more Chinese POWs. That
would explain their refusal to return POWs.

Perhaps they turned them over to Jiang Jieshi.

Zhou Enlai affirms that there are agents
of Jiang Jieshi among the POWs.

Stalin observes that Americans want to
decide the POW question on their own, in
defiance of all international laws. Under
international law the warring sides are obli-
gated to return all POWs, except those con-
victed of crimes. What does Mao Zedong
think regarding this matter: will he give in or
will he hold his own?

Zhou Enlai briefly relates the differ-
ences that separate them and the [North]Korean comrades in this matter. America
has agreed to return 83 thousand POWs, and
[North] Korea was ready to accept the offer.

However, they have not considered the crafty
game that America is playing here - out of the
83 thousand, only 6400 are Chinese, and the
rest Koreans. In truth, they are supposed to
return another 13,600 Chinese volunteers,
but the Americans don’t want to do this,
though they are quite willing to return 76
thousand Koreans. This clearly shows that
they are out to provoke us, by trying to drive
a wedge between China and [North] Korea.

Stalin asks how many Korean POWs
are there.

Zhou Enlai answers - 96,600. Empha-
izes that the question of the number of
Chinese and Korean POWs supposed to be
returned is a matter of principle. Informs
that the Chinese government is firmly com-
mitt ed on having all 116 thous. POWs, in-
cluding 20 thous. Chinese, returned. But if
Americans were to agree on returning a few
less, then we would not strongly object, if
[they] promised that negotiations for the
return of the other POWs will continue.

Stalin affirms that this is the right posi-
tion.

Zhou Enlai informs that Mao Zedong,
having analyzed the current situation re-
garding this matter, believes that one should
stand firmly committed on the return of all
POWs. The [North] Koreans believe that
the continuation of the war is not advanta-
geous because the daily losses are greater
than the number of POWs whose return is
being discussed. But ending the war would
not be advantageous to the USA. Mao
Zedong believes that the continuation of the
war is advantageous to us, since it detracts
USA from preparing for a new world war.

Stalin, Mao Zedong is right. This war
is getting on America’s nerves. The North
Koreans have lost nothing, except for casual-

ties that they suffered during the war.

Americans understand that this war is not
advantageous and they will have to end it,
especially after it becomes clear that our
troops will remain in China. Endurance and
patience is needed here. Of course, one needs to understand Korea - they have suffered many casualties. But they need to be explained that this is an important matter. They need patience and lots of endurance. The war in Korea has shown America's weakness. The armies of 24 countries cannot continue the war in Korea for long, since they have not achieved their goals and cannot count on success in this matter. Koreas need our help and support.

Asks about the bread situation in Korea. Says that we can help them.

Zhou Enlai says that Korea is having difficulties in this regard. The Chinese government knows that USSR has helped Korea. Says that they have also helped Korea and have told Kim II Sung that this is not an obstacle, that they will give them foodstuffs and clothing and everything they ask for, but that they cannot give weapons.

Stalin says that we can give Korea additional weapons. We will begrudge nothing to Korea.

Zhou Enlai repeats that they cannot yield to the Americans during the negotiations.

Stalin observes that if the Americans back down a little, then you can accept, assuming that negotiations will continue on questions still unresolved.

Zhou Enlai agrees, adding that if the Americans don't want peace, then we must be prepared to continue the war, even if it were to take another year.

Stalin affirms that this is correct.

Zhou Enlai emphasizes the truth of comrade Stalin's observations, namely that this war is getting on America's nerves and that the USA is not ready for the world war. Adds that China, by playing the vanguard role in this war, is helping to stave off the war for 15-20 years, assuming that they will succeed in containing the American offensive in Korea. Then the USA will not be able to unleash a third world war at all.

Stalin says that this is true, but with one stipulation: Americans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean war. All of their strength lies in air power and the atom bomb. Britain won't fight for America. America cannot defeat little Korea. One must be firm when dealing with America. The Chinese comrades must know that if America does not lose this war, then China will never recapture Taiwan. Americans are merchants. Every American soldier is a speculator, occupied with buying and selling. Germans conquered France in 20 days. It's been already two years, and USA has still not subdued little Korea. What kind of strength is that? America's primary weapons, says comrade Stalin jokingly, are stockings, cigarettes, and other merchandise. They want to subjugate the world, yet they cannot subdue little Korea. No, Americans don't know how to fight. After the Korean war, in particular, they have lost the capability to wage a large-scale war. They are pinning their hopes on the atom bomb and air power. But one cannot win a war with that. One needs infantry, and they don't have much infantry; the infantry they do have is weak. They are fighting with little Korea, and already people are weeping in the USA. What will happen if they start a large-scale war? Then, perhaps, everyone will weep.

Zhou Enlai states that if America makes some sort of compromises, even if they are small, then they should accept. If America does not agree to return all POWs and proposes a smaller number, then they should accept the offer, under the condition that the question of the remaining POWs will be resolved under mediation by some neutral country, like India, or the remaining POWs transferred to this neutral country until the question is resolved.

Stalin asks how many American POWs there are.

Zhou Enlai explains that the overall number of POWs in North Korean and Chinese hands is 12,000, out of which 7,400 are South Koreans.

Stalin does not exclude such a resolution to the question, as proposed by Zhou Enlai. On his part, [he] proposes that they could announce to the Americans that if they are holding back a certain percentage of Korean and Chinese POWs, then North Korea and China will hold back the same percentage of South Korean and American POWs until a final solution to the POW question is agreed upon. This needs to be tried as a way of pressuring Americans by publicizing it in the press. If America rejects this offer, then it should be declared that they apparently want to send Chinese POWs to Jiang Jieshi. If these proposals are unsuccessful, then you can resort to mediation. The main thing here is to propose a cease-fire.

Zhou Enlai declares that, indeed, an armistice agreement also involves a cease-fire. On the POW question [he] enumerates three positions. First - announce from the beginning that they will hold back the same percentage of South Korean and American POWs as the percentage of North Koreans and Chinese held back by America, and leave it at that. Second - resort to mediation by a neutral country. Third - sign an armistice agreement by putting off the POW question and resuming its discussion afterwards.

Then Zhou Enlai returned to the question of military assistance and put forth the Korean comrades' request for 10 anti-aircraft gun regiments. We told the Koreans that we don't have such capabilities, but that we would bring this up with the Soviet government.

Stalin. Kim II Sung asked as for 5 regiments. We promised to send him these. Perhaps China will also give 5 regiments?

Zhou Enlai repeats that they do not have such capabilities and that this is new to them.

Stalin says that this question needs to be cleared up with Kim II Sung.

As for Zhou Enlai's request to send 10 regiments, irrespective of those promised earlier, comrade Stalin answers that it will have to be examined.

Zhou Enlai brings up the Korean comrades' request for advice on whether they should start bombing South Korea. They are not sure whether it's the right way to go.

Stalin explains that the air force belongs to the state and that Chinese volunteers should not use state planes.

Zhou Enlai informs that the Korean comrades have asked about launching a new offensive, to which the Chinese government replied that they cannot carry out a strategic offensive.

Stalin points out that when armistice negotiations are taking place, they should not be launching either strategic or tactical offensives. They shouldn't be launching any offensives.

Zhou Enlai asks, referring to Mao Zedong's question whether Kim II Sung and [Chinese military commander] Peng Dehuai should be invited to Moscow.

Stalin. I would happily talk to them, but they are far away. Besides, we are not very comfortable with inviting them. If they were to bring up the question, then we would happily welcome them here.

Zhou Enlai informs that Peng Dehuai would very much like to come, though he is...
unsure of what Kim II Sung thinks. Perhaps it would be good to speak to them about this.

Stalin agrees.

Zhou Enlai repeats that the Chinese government believes that it is wise to continue the negotiations in Panmunjom. But China is preparing for the possibility of another 2-3 years of war. Again asks for assistance with aviation, artillery, and ammunition, as China cannot deal with these matters on its own.

Stalin announces that everything we can give you, we will.

Asks how is the Korean morale. Is there confusion?

Zhou Enlai explains that, indeed, there has been much destruction in Korea, especially after the bombing of the electric power station on the Yalu river. This has had an impact on Korean morale and on their efforts to accelerate the struggle to achieve peace.

Stalin says that the American strategy is fright. But they have not frightened China. Could it be said that they have also failed to frighten Korea?

Zhou Enlai affirms that one could essentially say that.

Stalin: If that is true, then it’s not too bad.

Zhou Enlai adds that Korea is wavering somewhat. They are in a slightly unsteady state. Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.

Stalin reminds that he has been already informed of these feelings through Kim II Sung’s telegram to Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai confirms this.

Asks how should the Chinese delegation proceed further.

Stalin proposes to start work immediately. Informs that Soviet Union has assigned a commission under the chairmanship of comrade Molotov and consisting of comrs. Bulganin, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, and Kumykin, and that the Chinese delegation can speak to Molotov about when to start work.

Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the information and asks comrade Stalin to name the time when he can brief comrade Stalin on the internal situation in the PRC.

Stalin agrees to see Zhou Enlai as soon as he receives a finished version of the written report.

Transcribed by

A.Vyshinskii [signature]
N.Fedorenko [signature]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 54-72; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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IV: Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 3 September 1952

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN COMRADES
I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI

3 September 1952

Present:
on the Soviet side
comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Vyshinskii, and Kumykin.
on the Chinese side
comrs. Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian, and Su Yu

translated by
comrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe.

After an exchange of greetings the discussion began with the question of the five year plan of the People’s Republic of China.

Stalin. We have familiarized ourselves with your five year plan for construction. You are setting the yearly growth at 20%. Is not the setting of yearly industrial growth at 20% strained, or does the 20% provide for some reserve margin?

Zhou Enlai draws attention to the fact that they do not yet have sufficient experience in such planning. The experiences of the past three years has shown that the PRC is understimating its capabilities. The feasibility of the plan will depend on the efforts of the Chinese people and on the assistance that China is counting on receiving from the USSR.

Stalin. We draft the five year plan with a reserve margin, as it is impossible to take into account every instance. There are various reasons that may affect the plan in one direction or another. We always include the civil and military industries in the plan. The PRC five year plan does not. In addition, it is necessary to have the complete picture of all expenditures provided by the plan.

We must know how much is required from us on a paragraph by paragraph basis. It is necessary to do the calculations. The given documents do not contain such data. Hence we cannot give our final answer. We need at least two months in order to do the calculations and tell you what we can provide you.

Usually it takes us at least a year to prepare our five year plan. Then we analyze the prepared draft for another 2 months, and still we manage to let mistakes go by.

We would like you to give us some two months to study your plan, so that we could answer your questions.

How do things stand in other matters? It seems that the question of Port Arthur has been examined. In that case we need to make a decision. If there are any sort of objections then they should be discussed right now.

In addition, it seems that there are also no objections to the draft communique on the transfer of KChZhD.

The third question concerns hevea [rubber] trees. We would like to receive from you 15 to 20 thousand tons of caoutchouc [natural rubber] each year. You, it seems, object, citing difficulties. The fact is that we have a tremendous need for caoutchouc, since automobiles and trucks, which are also being sent to you, require large amounts of rubber. We would like to receive at least 10-15 thousand tons of caoutchouc. We have not much opportunity to buy caoutchouc, since Britain keeps it to itself. We ask you to reexamine the question of purchasing for us the necessary amount of caoutchouc.

If all these questions get resolved, then the remaining can be decided with other delegation members, as it seems that Zhou Enlai is hastening to return.

Zhou Enlai says that it’s difficult for him to remain here for two months, that he would like to return to China in mid-September. [Vice chairman of the Northeast (China) People’s Government] Li Fuchun can remain here.

Stalin. Fine.

There still remains the question of constructing the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad. The Mongolian Premier, who was just here in Moscow, has given his approval.

In other words, four questions remain to be decided by Zhou Enlai: Port Arthur,
KChZhD, caoutchouc, and the construction of the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad.

Zhou Enlai referring to the hevea question, says that they will take all measures in order to provide USSR with 15-20 thousand tons a year, but they are apprehensive that the blockade and other measures directed against China by its enemies may prevent it from fulfilling this commitment in full. The delegation is apprehensive that this may be seen as a breach of its commitments to the Soviet Union.

[He] repeats that they will take all measures to fulfill this commitment, but would like to reserve the right to explain the reasons and not be held in breach of its commitments, if in extraordinary cases the shipment falls short of what was promised.

Stalin says that he understands this. We can soften the wording in the agreement, by saying that China will strive in every possible way to realize the shipments of the stated amount. But if it is unable to deliver caoutchouc in the amount stipulated, then we will have to decrease the number of trucks ordered.

Asks jokingly whether President Ho Chi Minh might not be able to help in this matter.

Zhou Enlai informs that China has many options in this regard (mostly through contraband).

[He] returns to the question of the construction of the new railroad. Notes that here are no objections.

Stalin notes that they can make public announcements on Port Arthur and KChZhD, but not on hevea, and only make announcements on the Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad once it has been completed.

Zhou Enlai expresses agreement with this and returns to the question of the five year plan. Again emphasizes that they are underestimating their capabilities. He agrees that it is difficult to perceive the five year plan as a general picture, as it does not include the military, since they are having difficulties with military planning. Overall, they are unsure whether to include the military in the general plan. As for publishing the five year plan, they were not intent on publishing the plan itself, only its general trends.

Stalin explains that our five year plans are published and that we include incognito articles dealing with military technology production, chemical and other industries. The publication of the plans is essential, if the people are to comprehend the scope of development. There must be numbers. It is not advisable to limit oneself by publishing solely its general trends. There are people who want to know and behold the entire scope of development as specified in the five year plan. That’s why it is necessary to provide for military production in this plan, though without naming military enterprises and such. It will be better thus. There must be a single, unitary plan that includes both civil and military development.

As far as the USSR is concerned, we, as the provider, must also know in what capacity and what type of assistance will be required of us. There is but one source - the USSR. But we need a reckoning for both the civil and military sectors. We must know and calculate every portion of the entire sum.

Let’s say that in 1953 we provide weapons for 10-15 divisions. We need to know how much steel and other materials will be needed to fulfill this order. During that same year 1953 we must supply a certain amount of equipment for the civil sector. This must also be calculated. Then both sums, the civilian and the military, must be combined to determine whether we will be able to supply the entire amount. This is how a plan must be drafted for each and every year. Perhaps our Chinese comrades believe that all these weapons are lying around somewhere in a warehouse. No, they must be produced.

Zhou Enlai completely agrees with everything laid out by comrade Stalin, and will ascertain how the matter of the [weapons shipments for] 60 divisions will rest. If they will be billed to credit, then that will also have to be specified.

Comr. Mao Zedong had an idea - if the war in Korea were to continue for another year or two, then it would be possible to extend the duration of shipments for 20 divisions to next year?

Stalin says that right now it’s difficult to say. Perhaps it will have to be shortened, perhaps not. It needs to be calculated. The calculation will tell us. Nothing here can be determined beforehand.

Zhou Enlai turns to the question of naval-military shipments. Asks whether these need to be included in the plan or not. Roughly speaking these shipments need to be delivered over the next six years. Will the previous arrangement remain in force?

Stalin. Everything which we have agreed to - military and naval-military shipments - will remain in force. But this must be taken into account when determining the total number of shipments. We are not repealing any laws nor rescinding any agreements. In general, we find it unconscionable to run from the responsibilities that one has taken upon himself. Once an agreement has been signed, it is imperative to abide by it, and we will abide by it.

Zhou Enlai says that comm. Mao Zedong has entrusted him to present the general outline of the five year plan and to ascertain how much will have to be ordered from the Soviet Union for the civilian and military industries. They project 7,700 mln. rubles for the civilian industry, and 4,500 mln. rubles for the military. Mao Zedong asked to ascertain if this is a suitable ratio, if the military portion is not too great.

Stalin. This is a very unbalanced ratio. Even during wartime we didn’t have such high military expenses.

Zhou Enlai says that the 4,500 mln. rubles earmarked for military orders are composed of the following: weapons for 60 divisions - 985 mln. rbls., military-naval shipments - 2,126 mln. rbls., aviation - 1,200 mln. rbls., and others.

Emphasizes that under normal conditions the ratio between the military and civilian sectors is not so unbalanced. The military portion is smaller.

Stalin. During wartime our military production constituted about 40-45%, but China doesn’t have a real war on its hands. However, shipments for the air and naval forces are necessary. Perhaps Mao Zedong is right about the ratio of 7.7 bln. rbls. to 4.5 bln. rbls.

Zhou Enlai informs that in 1950 expenses for the military constituted 44% of the entire budget (4.2 bln. rbls.), in 1951 - 52% (8 bln. rbls.), in 1952 - 27.9% (6.6 bln. rbls.). Says that, according to the five year plan, investments in the military industry (munitions arsenals, aviation, tank production, military shipbuilding) constitute 12-13% of all industrial investments. If comrade Stalin believes that such a ratio is acceptable, then they will use that as the basis when drafting their general requisitions list.

Stalin. Good. It is acceptable.

Zhou Enlai says that at first they projected constructing 151 industrial enterprises, but now they have dropped this number to
147, excluding military arsenals (aero-manufacturing enterprises, tank enterprises, shipbuilding enterprises). Explains that these 147 enterprises are not military, though they serve military needs.

**Stalin.** We usually build few new enterprises; we try to expand existing ones. It’s more economical. However, China will have to build new ones, since there aren’t enough existing ones. During the war we converted aero-maintenance shops into aero-manufacturing plants, and automobile factories into tank factories. We frequently resorted to inter-enterprise cooperation, producing parts in various enterprises and then assembling them. China ought to try this method. It is simpler than building special factories.

**Zhou Enlai** says that during the civil war years they also made use of cooperation among enterprises in the manufacture of light weapons, but now they are embarking upon the manufacture of heavy weapons, and that requires creating a base.

Shifts to the question of how to cover the cost of the trade imbalance between the Soviet Union and China. Says that there are 3 ways to cover this cost: 1) increase Chinese exports to the USSR; 2) receive payments in foreign currency - dollars, pound sterling, Hong Kong dollars, Swiss francs; 3) credit. Asks which of the three options is most acceptable.

**Stalin.** Perhaps it will be necessary to make use of all three.

**Zhou Enlai** says that they are planning to increase exports to the USSR to 13 bln. rubles. We can supply cattle, leather, fur, wool, silk, mineral resources, and foodstuffs: beans, fats, tea.

Notes that over five years they could collect up to 200 mln. American dollars, as well as 1.6 bln. British pound sterling, Hong Kong dollars, and Swiss francs.

**Stalin.** American dollars are preferable. British pound sterling have limited circulation. As for Hong Kong dollars, you should consult our Ministry of Finance.

The Soviet Union needs lead, wolfram [tungsten], tin, and antimony. We would like you to increase the deliveries of these. Notes that we would also accept lemons, oranges, and pineapples which the Soviet Union buys from other countries.

**Zhou Enlai** says that the loan of 4 billion rubles that they would like to receive from the USSR consists of the following:

- 985 mln. rbls. - weapons shipments for 60 divisions; 2,126 mln. rbls. - military-naval shipments; 100 mln. rbls. - caoutchouc; 800 mln. rbls. - industrial equipment.

**Stalin.** We will have to give something, though the exact amount must be calculated. We cannot give four billion.

**Zhou Enlai** says that this amount does not include aviation. They intend to pay cash for aviation.

**Stalin.** The question here is not in the monetary amount, but in whether we will be able to produce this much equipment. All that will have to be determined, which will take some two months.

**Zhou Enlai** shifts to the question of specialists. Says that beginning with 1953, China will need new specialists in the following fields: financial and economic matters - 190 people, military - 417, medical school instructors and others - 140. In addition, they will also need specialists for the military industry, though this matter is still being studied.

**Stalin.** This will have to be examined: what specialists, in which fields and with what profiles. We will send some, though it’s difficult to say how many.

Have you found the Soviet specialists currently working in China useful?

**Zhou Enlai** responds that they are very useful.

Asks whether comrade Stalin has any remarks to make on the recently submitted report.

**Stalin.** The impression is a positive one. China is growing. China must become the flagship of Asia. It must in its turn supply other countries with specialists.

**Zhou Enlai** notes that the report contains a footnote, specifying that in the event the war ends, we would like to create an army of 3,200 thousand people, with 102 divisions.

**Stalin.** That’s good. But that’s the minimum. China must be well armed, especially with air and naval forces.

**Zhou Enlai.** We project on having 150 air regiments with 13,000 flight personnel.

**Stalin.** That’s too few. You’ll have to add some. You should have 200 air regiments.

**Zhou Enlai.** Then we will have to increase the number of flight personnel.

**Stalin.** That’s right. You will probably have to shift to three-regiment divisions. That’s more economical - less division staff.

**Zhou Enlai** asks whether there needs to be a certain ratio maintained between fighter jets and reciprocating engine planes.

**Stalin** says that reciprocating engine fighter-planes should be gradually retired and replaced by jets. Fighter jets have a speed of 800 kilometers. Pilots should be trained on reciprocating engine planes and then transferred to jet planes. Reciprocating engine planes should be completely retired over the next two years. We will give you new fighters with speeds of 1000-1100 km/h. You must not fall behind in this matter.

**Zhou Enlai** raises the question of providing China with technical documentation for the manufacture of the following weapons: 122mm howitzers, 37mm guns and 67.2mm field guns.

**Stalin** says that the blueprints can be provided.

**Zhou Enlai** asks whether they should immediately begin the construction of tank factories or build automobile and tractor factories first, and then convert them to tank production.

**Stalin** responds that some sort of a tank manufacturing plant should be built. Such a plant could be gradually expanded. As for automobile factories, you definitely need more of them.

**Zhou Enlai** says that they will redraft their five year plan and will seek our advice; the redrafted materials will be submitted to comrade Molotov.

**Stalin** advises to fix the overall growth [rate] at 15%, and at 20% for yearly plans. Notes that that would be a plan with a reserve margin. Points out the importance of giving the workers a slogan for overfulfilling the plan. Such a plan can be overfulfilled. Says that this is exactly how we draft our plans, with a certain reserve margin, since there is a possibility of having unfavorable circumstances. You can’t plan for everything.

**Stalin** expresses interest in the production of naval mines in the PRC.

**Zhou Enlai** responds that plans for a naval mine factory are being drafted.

**Stalin** points out the importance of defending Chinese sea ports.

Inquires about the situation in Macao.

**Zhou Enlai** replies that Macao continues, as before, to be in Portugal’s hands.

**Stalin** says that this scam that has situated itself on the very entrance to China must be driven out.

**Zhou Enlai** says that in their relations with Southeast Asian countries they are...
maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful influence without sending armed forces. He offers the example of Burma, where PRC has been trying to influence its government through peaceful means. The same in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully. Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with America and Britain.

Stalin. Tibet is a part of China. There must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully. Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese government is concealing its true position with regard to China, but is actually maintaining an anti-China policy, orienting itself with America and Britain.

Zhou Enlai. It would be good if there was a pro-China government in Burma. There are quite a few scoundrels in the Burmese government, who make themselves out to be some sort of statesmen.

Zhou Enlai explains that Chinese troops were deployed in Tibet a year ago, and are now at the Indian border. The question of whether there should be Chinese troops in Tibet is moot.

Emphasizes that maintaining communication with Tibet is difficult. In order to communicate with Lhasa one needs 4-motor transport planes, equipped with oxygen tanks and de-icing devices. Could not the Soviet Union provide such planes? 2-motor planes can go 3/5 of the way, but that’s as far as they’ll go.

Stalin replies that Soviet Union can assist with this.

Zhou Enlai. In that case could China request 20 4-motor planes from the USSR? Stalin replies that first we will provide 10, and then another 10.

Points out the importance of building a road to Tibet.

Zhou Enlai says that such a road is being built, but that its construction will take up all of next year and part of 1954.

Stalin notes that without a road it’s difficult to maintain the necessary order in Tibet. Tibetan Lamas are selling themselves to anyone - America, Britain, India - anyone who will pay the higher price.

Zhou Enlai says that, indeed, the Lamas are hostile. This year (February, March, April) they were planning a rebellion, but the Chinese People’s Government was able to suppress the rebels.

Notes that as a result of this, the Dalai Lama’s brother fled abroad.

Stalin says that a road to Tibet must be built, and that it is essential to maintain Chinese troops there.

At the end of the discussion a meeting was arranged for 4 September, at 9 o’clock in the evening.

Recorded by A. Vyshinskii [signature] N. Fedorenko [signature]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 75-87; translation by Danny Rozas.]

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V. Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1952

[Classification level blacked-out: “NOT SECRET” stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI
19 September 1952

Present: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskii.

Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian, Su Yu, Shi Zhe

STALIN, opening the conversation with the Mexican proposal concerning the exchange of POWs, says that we agree with Mao Zedong, that the Mexican proposal is not acceptable, since it conforms with America’s position at the negotiations in Korea. If Mexico comes forward with its proposal at the UN, the USSR delegation will reject this proposal as not conducive to the cessation of the war in Korea and will strive towards the following:

1. Immediate cessation of military activities of the involved parties on land, sea and air.

2. Return of all POWs to their native land in accordance with international standards.

3. Withdrawal of foreign armies, including the Chinese volunteer units, from Korea in the course of 2-3 months; a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue in the spirit of Korean unification, conducted by Koreans themselves under the observation of a committee with participation of the immediately concerned parties and other countries, including those which did not partake in the Korean war.”

He adds that the question of which and how many countries should take part in this committee can be further discussed and decided.

Regarding the proposal of temporary withholding of 20% of POWs from each side, and the return of the remaining POWs, the Soviet delegation will not involve itself with this proposal, which will be left in Mao Zedong’s hands.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, what is your opinion concerning the possibility of the Chinese government entering into a non-aggression pact with India and Burma? Mao Zedong thinks such a pact would be expedient.

STALIN answers that we support comrade Mao Zedong’s opinion. Of course, there are and there will not be any obstacles here.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, is it possible to delay the introduction of the second position, to wait 2-3 weeks?

STALIN answers that this is Mao Zedong’s business. If Mao Zedong wants, we can introduce in the Assembly the discussion of the second position concerning the percentage of withheld POWs.

ZHOU ENLAI introduces a question about the third position - the possibility of transferring POWs to neutral countries so that their subsequent fate can be decided separately. He says that this is talked about in the international community, and asks whether comrade Stalin considers it possible to support this position.

STALIN answers, that we want the return of all POWs. This also concurs with the Chinese position. If an agreement cannot be reached on this basis, we cannot deliver the POWs to the UN [because the UN is a military participant in the war; he asks, in China’s opinion, which country will the captives be sent to?]

ZHOU ENLAI answers: Mao Zedong entrusted me to say, that we had in mind India.

STALIN asks who will be responsible, in this case, for the expense of maintaining POWs. It seems, every involved party?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that if the POWs are transferred to India, then after some time they will be transferred from India to China, and then the Chinese and Korean parties will
STALIN says that this proposal can be acceptable, but we must keep in mind that the Americans will not want to deliver all the POWs, that they will keep some captives, with the intention to recruit them. This was the case with our POWs. Now we are capturing several of our POWs a day, who are being sent over by America. They are withholding POWs not because, as they say, the POWs don't want to return - America often refers to this - but so that they could use them for spying.

ZHOU ENLAI concedes that this is precisely so.

He introduces the following scenario: to cease fire and resolve the issue of POWs later. He reminds that comrade Stalin agreed with this, if no agreement is reached regarding the percentage of POWs withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this can be considered as one of possible scenarios, but America is not likely to agree to it.

ZHOU ENLAI says that perhaps America will suggest this in the Assembly. STALIN. This would be good.

ZHOU ENLAI says that in the last discussion comrade Stalin suggested that China take initiative in creating a continental or regional UN. He asks whether there would be any other instructions regarding this matter.

STALIN answers that he continues to hold his previous point of view. In addition he says that, besides the current UN, it is necessary to create separate organizations for Asia, Europe, etc., not in lieu of the UN, but parallel to the UN. Let America create an American organization, Europe - a European one, Asia - an Asian one, but parallel to the UN, not contrary to the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI says that China has no interest in the UN and obviously it is necessary to take initiative in creating a continental organization.

STALIN emphasizes that UN is an American organization and we should destroy it, while keeping up the appearance that we are not against the UN; we should conduct this with an appearance of respect to the UN, without saying that it should be destroyed, weakened, but in reality weaken it.

He reminds, that during the war Churchill suggested to create a continental UN, but America opposed this. We quietly observed the debate, but then Britain rejected its position and we supported the proposal regarding the creation of the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI asks whether there will be letters concerning this matter from comrade Stalin to Mao Zedong.

STALIN explains that it will be better without a letter. He sees that Zhou Enlai is taking notes and he fully trusts him.

ZHOU ENLAI mentioned the Peace Congress in Peking, scheduled in the end of September, saying that now it will be necessary to move the Congress to the beginning of October. He adds that China is striving for the participation of Japan and India in this Congress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will participate.

ZHOU ENLAI agrees that Pakistan should participate as well and that Pakistan representatives are invited, but the Pakistan government is not issuing them passports. As for India, a part of the Indian delegation has already arrived, and the Japanese delegation will arrive via Hong-Kong.

STALIN says further that we should aim for China to have the principal role [in the Congress], because:
1/ the initiative in assembling the Congress belongs to China;
2/ it will be better this way, because the USSR is only partly located in Asia, and China is entirely in Asia, therefore it should have the principal role.

ZHOU ENLAI asks what specific actions will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers: peace.

ZHOU ENLAI talks about Nehru’s proposal concerning the conference of five countries - the Soviet Union, China, England, France and USA.

MOLOTOV explains that this was a proposal of the Committee of the National Congress Party.

STALIN says, that this proposal should be supported.

ZHOU ENLAI emphasizes that at such a conference India, it goes without saying, will speak [in agreement] with England, but, it would seem, that it would be advisable to utilize this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.

ZHOU ENLAI says, that in connection with the publication of the note about Port Arthur, the position which the PRC should take with regard to Japan is completely clear. The PRC should indicate that Japan does not wish the conclusion of a peace agreement with China and the Soviet Union.

STALIN adds—and is preparing for aggression. He underscores that our position was not directed against the Japanese people.

ZHOU ENLAI raises the question of Formosa. He says that since the Japanese government has concluded an agreement with Jiang Jieshi, it thus has confirmed that it is ignoring the interests of the Chinese people. This excludes the possibility of concluding a peace agreement. So long as a peace agreement exists with Formosa, a peace agreement between the PRC and Japan is not possible.

STALIN emphasizes that the note on Port Arthur was directed against America and not against the Japanese people. America maintains a naval fleet around Taiwan and exploits Taiwan. He affirms the correctness of Zhou Enlai’s point of view on the impossibility of a peace agreement with Jiang Jieshi, and indicates that the fact of the signing of an agreement by Japan with Jiang Jieshi only worsens its [Japan’s] position.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, what will be the further development of events with regard to Germany?[

STALIN says that it is difficult to forecast. It seems, America will not support German unification. They plundered Germany; if the West Germany and East Germany unite, then it will not be possible to plunder Germany any longer. That is why America does not want German unification.

ZHOU ENLAI says: in his opinion, even though America is rebuilding the military forces of West Germany and Japan, hoping to use them, this weapon can turn against them.

STALIN says that it is quite possible, even though the German government will be controlled by nationalists, Hitler’s followers.

ZHOU ENLAI shifts to the situation in Xinjiang. He says that the work in Xinjiang is generally going well and that agricultural reforms are being instituted there. But, there are also some leftist excesses, which manifest themselves in unlawful confiscation of domestic animals, in the domain of religion, and the reduction of interest rates and land lease. To eliminate these excesses the CC Plenum was assembled, which released [PLA commander] Wang Zhen from the office of Secretary of Xinjiang CC CPC sub-bureau,
and a group of CC members was directed to take care of the excesses. In general discontent was eliminated, and cases of defection, including those to USSR territory, have been halted.

STALIN says, that the excesses resulted from the desire to obtain land and domestic animals faster, confiscating both from the rich.

ZHOU ENLAI notes that as soon as the rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile elements began to slaughter domestic animals.

STALIN notes that similar incidents took place at a certain time in our experience as well. It is necessary to hurry up with the reform. If the agricultural reform is not instituted, such looting will continue to occur.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that the agricultural reform is being instituted in crop farming regions, and redistribution and excesses connected with it [are occurring] in the animal farming regions. Since animal herders participated in the redistribution, the Chinese government has decided to improve their condition, which should improve the general condition as well.

STALIN says: of course, it is up to you.

ZHOU ENLAI says that according to the Liu Shaoqi report, two representatives from the Indonesian communist party should arrive at the XIX [Party] Congress, and he asks whether it would be timely to discuss party issues in Moscow with them.

STALIN says that it is difficult to tell yet. It depends on whether they will address the CC. He points out, that when the representatives from the Indian communist party arrived, they asked us to help in determining the party policy, and we had to do it, even though we were busy.

ZHOU ENLAI reports that the Japanese comrades should arrive as well, and it is likely they will also want to discuss party issues.

STALIN answers that older brothers cannot refuse their younger brothers in such a matter. He says that this should be discussed with Liu Shaoqi, who has substantial experience, and clarified how the Chinese comrades perceive it.

ZHOU ENLAI points out that Liu Shaoqi intends to bring with him appropriate material, in order to discuss a number of questions.

STALIN notes that if the Chinese comrades want to discuss these issues, then of course we will have no contradictions, but if they do not want it, then we will not have to discuss anything.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that the Chinese comrades will definitely want to talk.

STALIN answers that, in this case, we shall find the time.

ZHOU ENLAI says that it is possible that the comrades from Vietnam will also arrive.

STALIN notes that the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our welcome guests.

ZHOU ENLAI, ending the conversion, says they would like to receive instructions concerning all these issues.

STALIN asks - instructions or suggestions?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that from comrade Stalin’s perspective perhaps this would be advice, but in their perception these would be instructions.

STALIN notes that we give only advice, convey our opinion, and the Chinese comrades may accept it or not; instructions, on the other hand, are mandatory.

ZHOU ENLAI repeats that from the Chinese perspective these are instructions, most valuable instructions. He notes that they do not accept these instructions blindly, but consider it necessary to understand and accept them deliberately.

STALIN emphasizes that we know China too little, and that is why we are cautious in giving instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that comrades Stalin certainly is well familiar with the particular issues they are addressing, and asks again whether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that our advice is this: we should remember, that England and America will try to place their people into the apparatus of the Chinese government. It does not matter if they are American or French. They will work to undermine, try to cause decay from within, could even commit such crimes as poisonings. That is why we must be alert. He says we should keep this in mind. Here - these are all the instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that these are very valuable instructions. He agrees that not only Americans, English and French can commit such treacheries, but they also push the Chinese into it.

STALIN adds - their agents from the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie.

MOLOTOV, returning to the question of military credit, the payment for weapons for 60 Chinese divisions, asks whether he understood Zhou Enlai correctly the last time, that the cost of deliveries for 60 divisions is not related to the military credit, granted by the Soviet government to China from 1 February 1951, according to the agreement. The deliveries of weaponry for 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in full amount according to the credit, granted in a special agreement between China and the Soviet Union.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that comrade Molotov understood him absolutely correctly, and again asserts, that the weapon supplies for 60 Chinese divisions have to be paid in full, according to the rates established for countries other than China, and not in half.

STALIN says that in this case we should sign a special agreement.

He mentions the gifts presented to Soviet representatives by the Chinese government, and notes that there have been very many gifts.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that they could not present gifts to comrade Stalin for the 70th anniversary [of Stalin’s birth]. They attended the museum of gifts, saw the gifts sent by other countries, and they feel they must make up for what they were not able to do before.

STALIN says that we also would like to present the Chinese delegation automobiles made in USSR. He says that we have automobiles “ZIS”, smaller than “ZIM”, but very beautiful, and we would like to present you with these “ZIMs.”

Then he mentions the question concerning Song Qingling [also Soong Chingling; widow of Chinese nationalist Sun Yat-sen and then Vice Chairperson of the Central People’s Government of the PRC].

ZHOU ENLAI says that he is working on getting her closer to him, that she is gradually shifting from bourgeois ideology to our side, that she comes out with good articles based on our ideology. She says that Song Qingling is very proud of being the winner of the International Stalin Peace Award.

The conversation started at 10:30, ended at 12:30.
COMMENTARIES

Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History

By Chen Jian

These documents from the Russian Presidential Archives provide significant new insights into the making and development of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1949-1950. They usefully complement the account contained in the memoirs of Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong’s Russian language interpreter, who has been one of the main sources of our knowledge about the relationship between Beijing and Moscow during the early Cold War period. (See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [Together with Historical Giants: Shi Zhe’s Memoirs] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992).) As the translator of Shi Zhe’s memoirs, I am deeply impressed by the richness of the information in these documents. I am also surprised, in spite of some discrepancies, by the extent to which Russian and Chinese materials (including Shi Zhe’s memoirs and other sources) are in accord. I will therefore focus my comments on comparing Chinese and Russian sources on the same events as reflected in these documents.

Let me start with the meeting between Mao and Stalin on 16 December 1949. The Russian minutes of the meeting are highly compatible with, but more detailed than, Mao Zedong’s own summary of the meeting in his telegram to Liu Shaoqi on 18 December. Mao’s telegram reads as follows:

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th, and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved include the prospect of peace, the treaty, loans, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works.

(2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid of fighting a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions.

(3) With regard to the question of the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Yalta agreement, it is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy of the old Chinese-Soviet treaty. If we are to abolish the old treaty and to sign a new treaty, the status of the Kurile Islands will be changed, and the United States will have an excuse to take away the Kurile Islands. Therefore, on the question of the Soviet Union’s thirty-year lease of Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not change it in format; however, in reality, the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Lushun and will let Chinese troops occupy it. I expressed [the view] that too early a withdrawal [of the Soviet troops from Lushun] will create unfavorable conditions for us. He replied that the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet Union will stand by with folded arms [in a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways through which China will not become the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is that we may sign a statement, which will solve the Lushun problem in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing so, China will also gain political capital [zhengchi ziben]. I said that it is necessary for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta agreement. However, the public opinion in China believes that as the old treaty was signed by the Guomindang, it has lost its standing with the Guomindang’s downfall. He replied that the old treaty needs to be revised, and that the revision is necessarily substantial, but it will not come until two years from now.

(4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai] to fly here just for signing a statement. I told him that I will consider it. I hope that the commercial, loan and aviation agreements will be signed at the same time, and Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come. It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss how to solve the treaty problem and offer its opinions.


As far as the meeting between Mao Zedong and Stalin on 22 January 1950 is concerned, the Russian minutes are also compatible with the information provided by Shi Zhe’s memoirs. Shi Zhe relates that Mao Zedong and Stalin discussed the principles underlying the new Chinese-Soviet treaty at this meeting. Mao emphasized that the treaty should serve to increase the political, military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation between China and the Soviet Union, while at the same time paying special attention to the prevention of a re-emergence of Japanese militarism. On the China Eastern Railway issue, Shi Zhe recalls that Mao agreed not to change its joint administration structure, but proposed that its administrative head be Chinese and that China’s investment in it should be increased from parity to fifty-one percent. However, the Soviets desired to retain a 50:50 ratio between Chinese and Soviet investments. On the issue of Port Arthur (Luda), Mao and Stalin agreed to establish a deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops to begin after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. On the issue of Dairen (Dalian), Stalin claimed that the Soviets had no intention to retain rights there and that the Chinese should feel free to manage the city. Shi Zhe also mentioned that Mao and Stalin discussed issues concerning Sinkiang (Xinjiang) and Manchuria, but some “unpleasant feelings” emerged on the Chinese side because the Chinese leaders believed that these issues were their internal affairs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, pp. 445-446.) One finds a similar record of the discussion of these issues in the Russian minutes.

Shi Zhe also covers in his memoirs Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Soviet Union in August and September 1952, describing in detail Zhou’s meetings with Stalin on 20 August and 3 September. Shi Zhe recalls that at the first meeting Zhou Enlai explained to Stalin the Chinese leadership’s assessment of the international situation in general and the Korean War situation in
particular. The two leaders also discussed the agenda of Zhou’s visit, which included the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China’s first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological support to China in establishing rubber tree plantations in southern China, and the construction of a railway from Ji’ni, a city on the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. The two leaders then had a long discussion on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai told Stalin that China would be willing to end the war on acceptable conditions but would not yield to unreasonable American terms. In Mao’s view, Zhou informed Stalin, if the Communists could demonstrate a more enduring patience than the Americans, the enemy would sooner or later make additional concessions. Zhou particularly emphasized that it was Mao’s belief that a firm Communist stand in the armistice negotiations might prolong the war in Korea but would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in Mao’s opinion, the conflict in Korea had exposed the weakness of the United States, and delayed the coming of a new world war. Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did have difficulties in continuing war operations under the current conditions, especially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superiority in artillery pieces over the Communist forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement with Mao Zedong’s assessment of the situation, offering to increase Soviet military equipment delivery to China so that the Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery fire power against the Americans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese-North Korean side should take three steps in dealing with the Americans on the prisoner issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding thirty percent of Chinese-North Korean prisoners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggest holding a comparable proportion of the enemy’s prisoners in exchange. The purpose of this suggestion was to force the Americans to change their position. Second, if the first design failed to work, the Chinese-North Korean side could propose a cease fire to be followed by an exchange of prisoners. Third, if the second proposal was unacceptable to the Americans, the Chinese-North Korean side could make the following proposal: if some prisoners did not want to be returned, they might be temporarily maintained by a neutral third country, and then, after their intentions were ascertained, they would either be released or returned. In order to strengthen the Chinese-North Korean position at the negotiating table, Stalin agreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artillery regiments to Korea. However, he warned the Chinese not to send their air force across the 38th parallel. He believed that the Americans were not in a position to continue a prolonged war in Korea. If the Chinese-North Korean side remained patient in negotiations while at the same time maintaining a powerful position on the battlefield, the Americans would sooner or later yield to one of the aforementioned three Communist designs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, pp. 510-511, 520-522.)

Again, if one compares Shi Zhe’s description of the meeting with the Russian minutes, they are compatible even in some small details. For example, in both records, Stalin said that the Soviets would assist the Chinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield. Yet these Russian documents do raise questions about existing Chinese sources in several aspects. While these Russian documents are declassified by the Presidential Archives in their original format, existing Chinese sources are usually released on a selective basis, and published in compilations rather than made available in their original form to scholars working in archives. As a result, serious omissions exist in the Chinese sources. In the Russian minutes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Stalin on 20 August 1952, for example, the two leaders discussed the differences between Chinese and North Korean leaders over the Korean armistice issue. In Shi Zhe’s memoirs, although he implied that problems existed between Beijing and Pyongyang, he does not explain what the problems were and why and how they emerged. Further, the accuracy of the information provided by memoirs is subject to the limits of human memory. In the case of Shi Zhe’s memoirs, even with his marvelous memory of historical events (enhanced by his experience of writing “confessions” several hundred times during the Cultural Revolution and assisted by his privileged access to archival sources), ambiguities exist and mistakes occur. For example, comparing Shi Zhe’s account of Mao Zedong’s meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949 with both the Russian records and Mao’s own telegram summarizing the meeting, one finds it too general and ambiguous in some places. Shi Zhe also confuses some important dates in his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi, the Chinese Communist Party’s second most important person, visited the Soviet Union from 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhe mistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu’s visit started on 8 July 1949. Access to original Russian documents will certainly help scholars to establish a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the historical past.

But even the original Russian documents could also contain important omissions. In describing Mao Zedong’s first meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949, for example, Shi Zhe consistently recalls that when Stalin asked Mao about the goals he hoped to achieve through the visit, Mao replied, according to Shi Zhe, that “For this trip we hope to bring about something that not only looks nice but also tastes delicious.” (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, p.436.) Indeed, this was the single most important message Mao tried to deliver to Stalin at their first meeting. The Russian minutes, however, do not include this statement. Why not? A possible answer could lie in the cultural differences between Chinese and Russian interpreters. In Shi Zhe’s memoirs, he mentioned that Mao made the statement at the beginning of the meeting, and that the Soviets did not quite understand Mao’s meaning. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, a Soviet Politburo member, even laughed at Mao’s expression. Is it possible that N.T. Fedorenko, who took the Russian minutes, missed the importance Mao attached to this statement and treated it only as a part of “greetings” or an insignificant “discussion of general topics”? (See the first paragraph of the Russian minutes.)

This discrepancy or omission reminds scholars that the post-Cold War access to previously unavailable Communist documentary sources do not offer automatic answers to all remaining scholarly questions. They provide us with new research opportunities, but they also require us to be more careful in treating our sources and more creative in establishing our perspectives. In this sense, this is a new point of departure in the study of the Cold War history.

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From Consensus to Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance—
A Palpable Deterioration
by Vojtech Mastny

The two sets of documents about high-level Sino-Soviet conversations, separated in time by less than three years, illustrate the palpable deterioration of relations between the two communist powers under the strain of the Korean war. Yet the nature of the deterioration, as well as its extent—not to mention the personalities of the principles—appear quite different from these contemporary Russian records than they do from the retrospective Chinese accounts which have so far been the main source of information on the subject and which project the later Sino-Soviet rift into a period when a fundamental conflict of interest was neither present nor anticipated.

Even with the allowance made for a tendency of the Russian note taker to embellish the atmosphere prevailing at the meetings, there cannot be a doubt that Mao Zedong on his first visit to Moscow treated Stalin as the supreme authority of world communism, with a reverence that was not merely pretended but rooted in a perception of common interests, to which the Chinese leader repeatedly and cogently alluded. The same perception determined Stalin’s uncharacteristically considerate, even generous, attitude toward his junior partner, so much in contrast with the condescension he usually displayed in dealing with his eastern European lieutenants. The Russian documents hardly bear out the self-serving Chinese descriptions of his stinginess and boorishness, an image that Mao himself—no doubt retrospectively embarrassed by the extent of subordination he had once been willing to accept in regard to Moscow—later tried to disseminate.

Of course not everything was sweet and smooth between the two ruthless and devious dictators; still, their ability to dispose of potentially contentious issues was remarkable. Of these, none was more important than the question of whether the treaty Moscow had concluded with China’s previous government should remain in effect or be replaced by a new one. During the month that elapsed between his two meetings with Mao, Stalin reversed himself, and on both occasions Mao readily followed suit. Whereas in mid-December Stalin considered the treaty an outgrowth of the Yalta agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet territorial acquisitions in the Far East, by January 22 he was ready to send Yalta “to hell” and dispense with the treaty on the ostensible grounds that it had merely been a temporary expedient required by the war against Japan. He proved amenable to Mao’s insistence that the new pact must be stronger, including the obligation for the two signatories to consult with each other on all important international matters.

This proposed provision is one of the few possible hints in the record at the impending communist aggression in Korea, whose preparation also provides the most compelling reason for Stalin’s reversal on the Sino-Soviet treaty. During their December meeting, the two chieftains still gave no inkling of plotting the Korean adventure, despite North Korea’s Kim II Sung’s persistent entreaties to obtain Moscow’s support for his plan for a forcible reunification of the country. If in December they knew of the plan but did not yet consider it topical, the thrust of their January conversation suggests that by then they had begun changing their minds. Their assessment, in view of recent U.S. public statements and behavior implying a diminished likelihood of effective American opposition, offers the most plausible explanation of the change.

Besides the decision to proceed toward a tighter Sino-Soviet alliance, the subject of the January conversation most relevant to the prospective North Korean action was the presence of Soviet forces at the naval base of Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. Unanimous in their view that the forces should remain there as a deterrent to any possible American military move against China, Stalin and Mao anticipate keeping the place under Soviet control until the conclusion of what they look forward to as a satisfactory peace settlement with Japan; in the final agreement signed three weeks later, the transfer to Chinese sovereignty was to be fixed to take place in two years’ time. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the only reason why they could possibly expect to achieve a Japanese peace treaty to their liking was the crushing effect that a successful unification of Korea by the communists, presumably within that particular time span, would have on the United States.

By the time Zhou Enlai came to Moscow in August 1952, the Korean gamble had failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson of Stalin’s reneging on his promise to provide Soviet air cover for the Chinese intervention force, and the botched war had reached a stalemate. Its burden was weighing ever more heavily on the Chinese and North Koreans, though not on Stalin, who could relish the sight of the United States being pinned down on the Far Eastern battlefield—unless, to be sure, Washington would decide to expand hostilities in trying to force a decision.

The kind of underlying consensus permeating Stalin’s conversations with Mao is no longer evident in the record of his talks with Zhou. These are businesslike talks, where bargaining takes place, though within the limits of propriety, and conflict of interest matters, even if it is not allowed to come into the open. Considering Stalin’s rapidly deteriorating physical and mental condition, he still shows an impressive command of economic and military facts; only in the later sessions does his reasoning get muddled when he tackles the larger questions of diplomacy and war. For his part, Zhou lives up to his reputation of a cool and deft negotiator, never losing sight of what he wants to accomplish, his deliberate obfuscations notwithstanding.

Zhou’s dual aim was the achievement of an armistice in Korea as quickly as possible while maximizing Soviet economic and military assistance to his ravaged country. Yet he never states these goals so clearly and sometimes even seems to be contradicting them. He affirms China’s refusal to entertain any concessions to the Americans. Indeed, the two conversation partners outdo each other in their professions of intransigence toward the “imperialists” although not all that they say is to be taken at face value.

Stalin lectures the Chinese visitor—as if both did not know better—about the supposed military flabbiness of the Americans and their inability to subdue even little Korea. He expresses his expectation that eventually the United States would be compelled to end the war on terms agreeable to the communists; accordingly, as a deterrent to any American attempt to expand the war, he compiles with the Chinese request to keep Soviet forces in Port Arthur beyond the previously agreed time limit. It is difficult to tell whether Stalin’s expectation was another example of his frequent wishful think-
ing, rooted in the ideologically motivated belief that sooner or later “objective” forces would compel the capitalist enemies to behave that way he wanted them to behave. It is also possible, and not mutually exclusive, that he was making a disingenuous argument to persuade the Chinese to go on fighting, thus perpetuating their dependence on him while keeping the United States engaged. He is certainly not helpful in advancing any practical proposals to induce an armistice, insisting instead on demands that he knew were unacceptable to the U.S. side.

Playing a weak hand as a *demandeur*, Zhou has the difficult task of convincing the Soviet ruler to provide enough material assistance for both the prosecution of the war and China’s economic development while dissuading him from blocking a compromise that alone could lead to the termination of hostilities. By dwelling on China’s determination to fight on for several more years, if necessary, rather than to make any concessions, Zhou secures Stalin’s promises of huge military and economic assistance. He makes good use of the Soviet leader’s fascination with turning China into the “arsenal of Asia” and his support for the Chinese conquest of Tibet, though he sidetracks Stalin’s unsolicited advice to expel the Portuguese “scum” from the enclave of Macau. At the same time, they both agree not to provoke the Americans by acceding to the North Korean request for the bombing of South Korea—an escalation Stalin refuses to authorize with the priceless explanation that the air force belongs to the state and could therefore not be used by the Chinese “volunteers.”

Zhou Enlai fares less well in trying to break the deadlock in the armistice negotiations caused by the disputes about the disposition of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war unwilling to be repatriated. While professing China’s insistence on the complete repatriation of all prisoners, he nevertheless outlines to Stalin his plan for the transfer of the unwilling ones to a neutral country, such as India; noting the inconsistency, Stalin demurs. Nor does Zhou succeed any better with his alternative proposal that the armistice be concluded first and the question of the captives be settled later. The inconclusive outcome of the discussion about this key issue was a victory for Stalin, which Zhou papers over by gratefully accepting his “instructions,” which the Soviet leader presides are merely “suggestions.”

Not even Zhou’s diplomatic skills sufficed to overcome the disparity of power between China and its Soviet protector. When later in 1952 he publicly signaled Chinese interest in the option of transferring the prisoners to India, the Soviet delegation at the United Nations preventively torpedoed the idea. The Korean War was eventually ended in July 1953 by applying Zhou Enlai’s other formula—but only after Stalin’s death in March removed the major obstacle on the road to an armistice.

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**Unwrapping the Stalin-Mao Talks: Setting the Record Straight**

by Odd Arne Westad

The records of the 1949/50 Stalin-Mao conversations—the only face-to-face meeting between the two dictators—have topped the secret documents wish-list of many a Cold War historian. As often happens in such cases, when the parcel is finally unwrapped the contents prove to be somewhat disappointing. Gone is the high drama of various memoirs, according to which the monologues of the two giants circled each other but never touched, each too preoccupied with his own agenda to address the concerns of the other. On the contrary, these conversations are rather businesslike, not unlike discussions recorded when the head of the new subsidiary is visiting the company president.

But the transcripts help us to set the record straight. They show the Soviet leader in the role of the cautious statesman, whose experience in international relations and the building of socialism enabled him to dispense “advice” to his Chinese friends. On foreign affairs, Stalin told the Chinese not to engage the United States or other imperialists in armed conflict, not on Taiwan nor anywhere else. The reference here goes back to Stalin’s unfortunate remarks to Chinese communist emissary Liu Shaoqi the previous summer on the Chinese taking up “the leading position” in making revolution in the East. When Mao took Stalin on his word, and in October-November 1949 had presented plans for a Chinese intervention in Indochina, he had had his fingers slapped by the *vozhd* (supreme leader). While in Moscow, Mao and Zhou Enlai guarded themselves well against bringing up regional problems unless invited to do so by their hosts.

The most interesting part of the conversations concerns Sino-Soviet relations. Stalin initially turned down Mao’s wish for a new treaty between the two countries, and instead proposed limited changes to the 1945 treaty, using U.S. and British complicity at Yalta in wrestling Soviet concessions from Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] regime as his main reason to leave the main part of that treaty intact. Only after Mao’s long and idle wait in Moscow over the New Year holidays and the Chairman’s increasingly desperate conversations thereafter with various Soviet officials—Molotov, Vyshinski, Mikoyan, and ambassador Roshchin—did Stalin relent.

The January 22 conversation, held just after Zhou Enlai had arrived in Moscow and talks on a new treaty had started, showed Stalin at his magnanimous best. “To hell with” the Yalta treaty, Stalin said. He was willing to restore to China some of the concessions Chiang had given him five years earlier, even if the imperialists undoubtedly would protest such an altruistic act on Stalin’s behalf. (It would have been interesting to know how this absurd line of argument struck the Chinese on that winter’s night 45 years ago.) We can still only guess about Stalin’s real motives. A wish to keep the advantageous provisions of the 1945 treaty? Very likely. An unwillingness to proclaim the Sino-Soviet alliance to the world (and especially to the United States)? Quite possibly, although Stalin’s fears of a confrontation with the Americans seem to have been at an ebb that winter.

The rest of the conversation really formed the start of the detailed negotiations of a new treaty which Zhou Enlai and Andrei Vyshinski continued and which ended in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and other agreements signed on February 14. Throughout these negotiations the Soviets held to a hard bargain, insisting on getting new advantages in return for their economic and military assistance and their relinquishing of old prerogatives. The Soviet negotiating strategy both offended and putted to the Chinese—on the one hand they were treated like “a vassal, not an ally,” on the other hand they just could not make economic sense of many of the Soviet demands. What really hurt Mao and his col-
leagues were Soviet references to Xinjiang, Mongolia, and (to a lesser extent) Manchuria: in Mao’s image six years later these areas were “turned into spheres of influence of the USSR.” (See Mao’s conversation with Yudin, 31 March 1956, reprinted elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin.)

The centerpiece of Stalin’s conversations with Zhou Enlai in Moscow in the summer of 1952 is the search for an armistice in Korea, a solution which at this stage both allies wanted, but which was held up by Stalin’s ceaseless maneuvering on the issue. The Soviet leader most likely wanted the Chinese to go firmly on record in requesting a ceasefire (possibly to be arranged by Moscow) and to back away from their position from the previous summer, when Stalin had wanted an end to the war and Mao had turned him down. In his conversations with Zhou, Stalin paid lip-service to Mao’s previous position, while underlining that the Chinese and the North Koreans should not undertake further offensives and could postpone the contentious POW issues until after an armistice had been signed. But neither Stalin nor Zhou would admit to the other that they were looking for a way out of the war against the United States and its allies.

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“To hell with Yalta!”—Stalin Opt for a New Status Quo

by Vladislav Zubok

The two transcripts of conversations during the Stalin-Mao talks in December 1949-February 1950 provide a unique insight into Stalin’s doubts and second thoughts about the creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although the groundwork for holding the summit meeting had been laid during an exchange of secret high-level missions over the previous year (Anastas Mikoyan’s visit to China in February 1949 and Liu Shaoqi’s trip to Moscow in July-August), there were still unresolved issues and obstacles on the path to the new alliance. One issue was the matter of Soviet interests in Northeast China. Another was the invisible presence of the Americans at the Sino-Soviet negotiating table and the possible consequences of the alliance for vital Soviet broad interests, not only in the Far East. Many other issues involving Chinese and Soviet interests were also on the table.

But the delicate and complicated question of establishing a personal relationship between Stalin and Mao also mattered greatly, and the tacit struggle between the two great revolutionary personalities is as important in understanding the talks between them in Moscow as their substance. At first, Stalin seems to have succeeded in impressing Mao with his posture as world leader and magnanimous emperor. Shi Zhe, Mao’s interpreter, recalls that at the welcoming banquet Stalin seemed strongly interested in developing a new relationship with China. “The victory of the Chinese revolution will change the balance of the whole world,” he quoted Stalin as saying. “More weight will be added to the side of international revolution.”

According to the official Soviet record of the 16 December 1949 conversation, Mao asked what was the likelihood that a peaceful “breathing spell” would last for the next 3-5 years. Stalin seemed to sound even more optimistic than the previous July, when Liu Shaoqi had asked a similar question. There was no immediate threat to China, he said, because “Japan has yet to stand up on its feet and is thus not ready for war; America, though it screams war, is actually afraid of war more than anything; Europe is afraid of war; essentially, there is nobody to fight with China....” In the most significant breach with the framework of Yalta, Stalin suggested that “peace depends” on the alliance between the two communist powers. “If we continue to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even longer.”

Shi Zhe recalls that the conversation became uneasy, because Mao avoided speaking about the terms of a future Sino-Soviet treaty, waiting for Soviet initiative. Mao presented a different version to the USSR ambassador to the PRC, Pavel Yudin, six years later: “During my first meeting with Stalin I submitted a proposal to conclude a [new] state treaty, but Stalin evaded a response. Subsequently, Stalin avoided any meetings with me.” The official Soviet record of the meeting provides a much more vivid picture of this episode.

When Mao asked about the treaty, Stalin immediately presented him with three options: to announce the preservation of the 1945 treaty, to announce “impending changes” to the treaty, or (without announcement) to proceed with changes “right now.” In other words, Stalin had flatly reneged on his commitment—relayed to Mao via Mikoyan the previous February—to discard what the Chinese regarded as an “unequal” treaty. Stalin reminded Mao that the 1945 treaty “was concluded between the USSR and China as a result of the Yalta Agreement which provided for the main points of the treaty (the question of the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England. Keeping in mind this circumstance, we, within our inner circle, have decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now, since a change in even one point could give America and England the legal grounds to put forward a proposal to raise questions about modifying also the treaty’s provisions concerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, etc.”

Why this sudden change of mind? One plausible explanation is that the cautious Soviet leader still wanted to know more about the American reaction to the creation of the People’s Republic of China and to the Sino-Soviet talks. While the Truman Administration and the U.S. Congress coped with the “loss of China” and nervously monitored the news from Moscow, Stalin preferred to wait. However, his last argument shows that there were not only immediate concerns at play. Even in late 1949, after the Cold War had unmistakably broken out, Stalin still found it psychologically difficult to part decisively with the Yalta agreements, which had represented a cornerstone of Soviet diplomacy. He understood that the issue of new Soviet borders in the Far East and the existence of Soviet outposts in Manchuria constituted one facet of an indivisible foreign policy package, linked to the peace treaty with Japan. To destroy this package, which was the crowning achievement of Stalin as a statesman and a foundation of the USSR’s international legitimacy, was not an easy thing to do. For decades after Stalin’s death, Soviet leaders from Molotov and Khrushchev to Brezhnev and Gromyko considered themselves duty-bound to safeguard and confirm “the results of Yalta” which signified international recognition and acceptance of Soviet legitimacy and the boundaries of its “external empire.”

The Soviet leader must have known...
from previous months of contacts and correspondence that it would be hard for the Chinese, and Mao in particular, to retain the old treaty which Stalin had concluded with the Guomindang (GMD). Therefore, he tried to sweeten the bitter pill by telling Mao that it would be possible to preserve the existing treaty only “formally,” while changing it “in effect,” that is, “formally maintaining the Soviet Union’s right to station its troops in Port Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese government, actually withdrawing the Soviet Armed forces currently stationed there.” (He quickly added, however, that if the Chinese desired the Soviet troops to remain, they could do so “by request of the Chinese government” for the next 2, 5, 10, or even 20 years.) Stalin also expressed willingness to alter some points concerning the ownership and exploitation of the Chinese-Changchun railroad.

Stalin’s new position must have struck Mao like a bolt of lightning (the final proof, though, will come only in the Chinese leader’s correspondence surrounding the meeting). But Mao did not explicitly object. Instead, he humbly admitted that during the discussions in Beijing of a future Sino-Soviet treaty the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership had “not taken into account the American and English positions regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act in a way that is best for the common cause.” Mao said, according to the Soviet record. “This question merits further consideration. However, it is already becoming clear that the treaty should not be modified at the present time.” Mao also admitted that Soviet control over Port Arthur (Lushun) and the Chinese-Changchun railroad “corresponds to the interests of China.”

No language, however, could conceal the divergent priorities of the two leaders. When Mao indirectly asked the Soviet leader “to send volunteer pilots or secret military detachments to speed up the conquest of Formosa [Taiwan],” Stalin promised only “to consider” such assistance and advised Mao to “organize an uprising” on the GMD-controlled island as a possible alternative to a military assault. Stalin was careful not to indicate that he wished to curb the nationalist ambitions of the Chinese revolutionaries, yet in essence that was what his words implied. Again and again, Stalin repeated that the “most important” thing was to avoid giving the Americans a “pretext to intervene.” At the same time, Stalin encouraged the Chinese to “frighten the imperialists a bit” by probing the positions of the British and French in Hong Kong, Burma, and Indochina, i.e., in the South and far from the Soviet security perimeter.

Eventually, in their initial conversation, both leaders decided to drop the issue of the treaty, and moved to discuss other issues. When Mao inquired whether Zhou Enlai should travel to Moscow concerning the treaty, Stalin replied benignly and cryptically that this was a question that “you should decide for yourselves. Zhou may be needed in regard to other matters.” The ambiguity of this response, perhaps aggravated by translation, may well have contributed to Mao’s impression that Stalin did not want to discuss a new treaty. The meeting ended without any specific proposals from either side, and in the coming weeks Stalin and Mao engaged in a tacit war of nerves. Some other factors intervened as well, particularly a report from Soviet advisor I.V. Kovalev (who had been a Stalin emissary to Mao) stating that Mao was neither a real “Marxist” nor strong enough to resist pressure from “the right-wing of the [Chinese] national bourgeoisie, which has pro-American inclinations.”

For whatever reason, Stalin decided to let Mao cool down (and cool his heels), and to gain more time himself to gauge the international response to their meeting, and suggested resuming talks only on 2 January 1950, more than two weeks later. Before calling Mao, however, Stalin sent Molotov and Mikoyan for a reconnaissance to his Bliznita dacha where Mao was quartered. Molotov recalled that “Stalin hadn’t received him [Mao] for some days after he arrived. Stalin told me, ‘Go and see what sort of fellow he is.’” Molotov returned and allegedly reported that it would be a good idea to receive Mao for another meeting. “He was a clever man, a peasant leader, a kind of Chinese Pugachev [a Russian peasant revolutionary]. He was far from a Marxist, of course.” The concerns about Mao’s political and ideological face played, however, a secondary role in Stalin’s change of mind—the international situation was far more important. Finally, as Molotov informed Mao on January 2, Stalin decided to jettison the old Sino-Soviet treaty and with it its commitment to the Yalta arrangements in the Far East. Mao jubilantly reported the news to Beijing: “Comrade Stalin has agreed to Comrade Zhou Enlai’s arrival here and to the signing of a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, as well as agreements on credit, trade, civil aviation, and others.”

In Mao’s estimate, the crucial factor was that Great Britain and India recognized the PRC in January. In fact, a more important development was the conclusion of the Truman Administration’s reassessment of its Far Eastern strategy. Washington decided to keep a hands-off policy toward Taiwan and to focus instead on the defense of its essential interests in other Pacific areas it deemed critical, particularly Japan and Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. The new American policy was enshrined secretly on 30 December 1949 in a classified document, NSC-48/2, announced by Truman in a press conference on 5 January 1950, and spelled out publicly a week later by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson in his “defense perimeter” speech at the National Press Club.

One may speculate that Stalin learned about the essence of this new policy before these official pronouncements, from various leaks and intelligence sources in Washington and London. It is even possible that, as with his reversal of the initial Soviet response to the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1947, an intelligence coup might have been a pivotal factor in prompting Stalin to reassess his Far Eastern strategy.

From Stalin’s perspective, all this appeared as a new American doctrine for the Far East, a crucial change in the international situation which seemed to signify a U.S. retreat from the Asian mainland and implicit acceptance of the Sino-Soviet alliance as a new geopolitical fait accompli. Stalin might also have suspected that he no longer had anything to lose if he openly rejected a now-outmoded “spirit of Yalta.” On the other hand, Stalin knew from many sources (Kovalev among them) that other members of the CCP leadership, such as Zhou Enlai, had been enthusiastic about the prospect of balancing Soviet influence in China with an American presence. By sticking to the old treaty, Stalin could only play into the hands of the British and of Acheson, who eagerly sought to discover an opening through which to drive a wedge between Stalin and his most promising and significant potential ally in the Far East.
Interestingly, Stalin did not tell his subordinates about this turnabout in his attitude toward signing a new treaty. On January 6, Mao met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, in the presence of Kovalev, the Chinese ambassador in Moscow, and interpreters Nikolai Fedorenko and Shi Zhe, to discuss joint Sino-Soviet tactics at the United Nations, where the Nationalists continued to occupy China’s seat on the Security Council. When Mao mentioned the necessity of a new treaty, Vyshinsky repeated the official line that any change in the 1945 treaty “could be used by the Americans and the British as a pretext for revision of those parts of the treaty, whose change would hurt the interests of the Soviet Union and China. This is undesirable and must not happen.”

Soviet actions at the United Nations, however, had already begun to reflect Stalin’s new line: the alliance with communist China against the U.S.-led coalition of capitalist states.

At the second official meeting with Mao (now accompanied by Zhou Enlai, who had arrived in Moscow two days before), on 22 January 1950, Stalin sounded like a changed man. “We believe that these agreements [of 1945] need to be changed, although earlier we had thought that they could be left intact,” he said. “The existing agreements, including the treaty, should be changed, because war against Japan figures at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war is over and Japan has been crushed, the situation has been altered, and now the treaty has become anachronistic.”

The most salient feature of the discussion was the omnipresence of the Japanese threat and a virtual absence of discussion of the United States and the new American policy; nor did anybody then raise Acheson’s speech of January 12. Only later, during the discussion of the specific provisions of the new treaty, did the following exchange occur:

Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take into account the interests of both sides, China and the Soviet Union.

Stalin: True. We believe that the agreement concerning Port Arthur is not equitable.

Mao Zedong: But changing this agreement goes against the decisions of the Yalta Conference?!?

Stalin: True, it does—and to hell with it! If we make a decision to revise treaties, we must go all the way. It is true that for us this entails certain inconveniences, and we will have to struggle against the Americans. But we are already reconciled to that.

Mao Zedong: With regard to this matter, we are only concerned by the fact that it could lead to undesirable consequences for the USSR.

Stalin sought to convince Mao that the Soviet Union would risk a conflict with the United States for the sake of its new Asian ally. Yet, he wanted to extract from the Chinese a proper price for this willingness, primarily in the form of recognition of Soviet security interests in Manchuria. This time Stalin did not miscalculate. Mao now accepted Stalin’s proposal, put forth at the first meeting, that the Soviet Union would retain its legal rights in Port Arthur, at least until a peace treaty with Japan was signed. The Chinese leader also agreed to keep the Dairen port closed to the Americans.

The Chinese attempted to bargain when it came to Soviet rights to control the Chinese Changchun railroad, the main strategic artery between the USSR and Liaotung (the Port Arthur peninsula). But Stalin and Molotov defended those rights tooth and nail. During the talks on the ministerial level, the Soviet side succeeded in imposing on the PRC several secret agreements. The Additional Agreement to the treaty stipulated that “on the territory of the Far Eastern region and the Central Asian republics, as well as on the territory of Manchuria and Xinjiang,” both the USSR and the PRC “would not provide to foreigners the rights for concessions, and would not tolerate activities of industrial, financial, trade and other enterprises, communities and organizations, with the participation, directly or indirectly, of the [financial] capital of the third countries or the citizens of those countries.”

The Chinese also signed a “Protocol on the unimpeded transportation of Soviet troops and military property on the Chinese Changchun railroad in case of the threat of war in the Far East.” This secret agreement allowed the Soviets to transport troops and military equipment and supplies quickly, without paying any tariffs to the Chinese and without any Chinese customs control.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on 14 February 1950, satisfied Stalin’s search for the preservation of the status quo (where it benefitted the USSR) in times of upheaval. It also made the CCP leadership feel more secure in its international isolation. At the same time, the treaty created a new revolutionary-imperial synergy in the Far East. The Chinese communists, backed by Moscow, wanted to complete the reunification of the country and to carry the banner of revolution further, to Burma and Indochina. For Stalin the alliance marked the end of the status quo strategy of Yalta and the opening of a second Cold War against the United States in the Far East. Notwithstanding the fact that in both countries hundreds of millions of people yearned for peace and reconstruction, the new alliance in reality signaled military mobilization and confrontation—as events in Korea would soon demonstrate.


3. This difference was previously noted in Sergei N. Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 85-86, as one of the authors, Sergei Goncharov, had seen the minutes of the Stalin-Mao talks, which were then still classified, in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.

4. In an undated cable sent to Stalin during the 31 January-7 February 1949 talks with Mao, apparently near the end of the discussions, Mikoyan reported that he had told the Chinese leader that the Soviet government had decided “to repeal this unequal [nespravedlivii] treaty and withdraw its troops from Port Arthur as soon as the peace [treaty] with Japan will be concluded. But if the Chinese communist party ... would find expedient an immediate withdrawal of [Soviet] troops [from Port Arthur], then the USSR was ready to do so. As to the accord on the Chinese-Changchun railroad, we [the Soviet] do not consider this treaty unequal, since this railroad had been built primarily with Russian means. Perhaps ... in this treaty the principle of equal rights is not fully observed, but we are ready to consider this question and decide it with the Chinese comrades in a fraternal manner.” See Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), f. 39, op. 1, d. 39, ll. 78-79, as quoted in Andrei Ledovskiy, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai” [Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan to China], Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 3 (1995), 94-105, quotation on p. 100; see also Ledovskiy, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai,” Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 2 (1995), 97-111.

5. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, 91, 247-249.

7. See the text of Mao's cable to Beijing of 2 January 1950, as reprinted in Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, 242.


10. See record of meeting in f. 0100, op. 43, d. 8, papka 302, II 4-6, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Moscow, cited in B. Kulik, “Kitaiskaiia Narodnaia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949-1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF)” [“The Chinese People’s Republic in the founding period (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation”), Problemi Danego Vostoka 6 (1994), 77.

11. AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 235, papka 18, I, 134; also in SSSR-KNR (1949-1983): Dokumenti i materialy [Documents and materials on USSR-PRC relations, part one (1949-1983)] (Moscow: Historico-Documen
tary Department and Far Eastern Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1985), 31-32; see also Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, 121.

WESTAD continued from page 7

a divided China. The visit of Soviet Polit
buro member Anastas Mikoyan to the CCP
headquarters later that winter did not do
much to mitigate mutual suspicions; indeed,
Mao on several occasions during the dec
dades to come referred to this episode as
an example of Soviet duplicity.

The documents were translated from
Russian by Maxim Korobochkin; see also
S.L. Tikhvinskii, “Iz Prezidenta RF:
Peripiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v
yanvare 1949 g.”, Novaya i noveisha istoriya
4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.

*     *     *     *     *

Stalin to Mao Zedong, 10 January 1949

Comrade Mao Zedong,

On January 9 we received a note from the
Nanjing government, proposing that the Soviet
government act as a mediator between the Nanjing
government and the Chinese Communist party
[CCP] in the termination of war and the conclu
sion of peace. A similar proposal was sent
simultaneously to the governments of the USA,
Britain and France. The Nanjing government has
not received any answer from these governments
yet. Neither has the Soviet government given its
answer. Obviously, the government's proposal
had been inspired by the Americans. The aim of
this proposal is to present the Nanjing govern
ment as the advocate of the termination of war
and a peaceful settlement, while the Communist
party of China would be presented as the advoca
tes of the continuation of war, if it would direc
tly reject peace negotiations with Nanjing.

We think we will give the following answer:
the Soviet government was and continues to be
in favour of the termination of war and the establis
ishment of peace in China, but before agreeing
to mediation it would like to know whether the other
side—the Chinese Communist party—agrees
to accept Soviet mediation. Therefore the USSR
wishes that the other side—the Chinese Commu
nist party—would be informed of the peace ac
tion by the Chinese government, and that the
other side would be asked for its agreement to the
mediation by the USSR. That is how we are
planning to answer and we ask you to inform us
whether you agree to this. If you do not, give your
advice for a more expedient answer.

We also think that your answer, in case you
will be asked for it, should be something like this:

The Chinese Communist party has al
ways been a supporter of peace in China,
because the civil war in China had not
been started by it, but by the Nanjing
government, which should bear all re
sponsibility for the consequences of the
war. The Chinese Communist party is
in favour of talks with the Guomindang,
but without the participation of those
war criminals who provoked the civil
war in China. The Chinese Communist
party is in favour of the direct negotia
tions with the Guomindang, without any
foreign mediators. The Chinese Com
munist party especially finds it impos
sible to accept the mediation by a for
eign power which takes part in the civil
war against the Chinese Popular Libera
tion forces with its armed forces and
navy, because such a power cannot be
regarded as neutral and impartial in the
liquidation of the war in China.

We think that your answer should be
approximately like this. If you do not agree, let us
know of your opinion.

As for your visit to Moscow, we think that in
the view of the abovementioned circumstances
you should, unfortunately, postpone your trip
again for some time, because your visit to Mos
cow in this situation would be used by the
enemies to discredit the Chinese Communist party
as a force allegedly dependent on Moscow, which,
certainly, could bring no benefit to the Commu
nist party of China or to the USSR.

We are waiting for your answer.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 95-96.]

*     *     *     *     *

Stalin to Mao Zedong, 11 January 1949

As you can see from what you have already
received, our draft of your reply to the Guomindang proposal is aimed at the underm
inig of the peace negotiations. Clearly, the
Guomindang would not agree to peace negotia
tions without foreign powers' mediation, espe
cially that of the USA. It is also clear that the
Guomindang will not agree to negotiate with
out the participation of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai
shek] and other war criminals. We assume there
fore that the Guomindang would reject peace
negotiations on CCP terms. The result will be
that the CCP agrees to the peace negotiations and
it will be impossible to accuse it of being eager to
continue the civil war. The Guomindang, how
ever, will receive the blame for breaking the
peace talks. Thus, the peace maneuver of the
Guomindang and the USA will be frustrated, and
you will be able to continue your victorious war
of liberation.

We are waiting for your answer.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 97-99.]

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Mao Zedong to Stalin, 13 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

I received your telegram of January 10.

1. We think that the government of the
USSR should give the following answer to the
note by the Nanjing government proposing that
the USSR accepts mediation in the termination of
the civil war in China:

The government of the USSR has
always wished, and still wishes, to see
China as a peaceful, democratic and
united country. But it is for the people
of China itself to choose the way to
achieve peace, unity and democracy in
China. The government of the USSR,
relying on the principle of noninterfer
ence in the other countries' internal
affairs, cannot accept mediation be
tween the two sides in the civil war in
China.
2. We think that although the USA, England, and France, and especially the USA, are very willing to take part in mediation to terminate the war in China and thus achieve their goal—to preserve the Guomindang regime—the governments of these countries, especially the US government, have already lost their prestige among the Chinese public, and as the victory of the PLA nationwide and the downfall of the Guomindang regime is already in sight—it seems questionable whether they still wish to continue their assistance to the Nanjing government and thus further offend the PLA.

Only the USSR has a very high prestige among the Chinese people, so if the USSR in its reply to the note by the Nanjing government will take the position outlined in your telegram of January 10, it would make the USA, England and France assume that participating in mediation is an appropriate thing, and give the Guomindang a pretext for scolding us as warlike elements.

And the broad popular masses, which are displeased with the Guomindang and hope for an early victory of the PLA, would find themselves in despair.

If therefore it is possible for the USSR, in view of overall international relations, to make its reply along the lines which we are proposing, we would wish very much that you approve of our proposals. By doing so, you will help us enormously.

3. One should think thoroughly whether it is possible to let people from the Nanjing government, including war criminals, take part in peace negotiations with us. As of now we are inclined toward the following position: the unconditional surrender of the Nanjing government is necessary to give the people of China a real peace as soon as possible.

By starting the war, the Nanjing government committed a great crime—it has lost the confidence of the nation. To reach an early termination of war and a peace settlement the Nanjing government should surrender its powers to the people. It has no reason for procrastinating.

We think that if we now would start peace negotiations with people like Zhang Zhizhong or Shao Lizi and enter into a coalition government among the Chinese people.

We are deeply concerned by the fact that this deception will have a large influence on the people and make us start another political detour, i.e. to refrain from rejecting peace negotiations with the Guomindang. We are delaying the creation of the coalition government. Our principal objective is to make the Americans and the Guomindang put all their aces on the table, while we keep our aces until the last moment.

We have recently published a list of war criminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement by a person of authority). The PLA has not yet issued an order to arrest these war criminals.

On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peace proposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this, too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sum up, we have left some room for a volte face, to see how the Chinese people and international opinion would react to the Guomindang’s deceptive negotiations.

But now we are inclined towards rejecting the peace deception by the Guomindang with full righteousness, because now, as the balance of class forces in China has already changed irreversibly and the international opinion is also unfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLA will be able to cross the Yangzi this summer and start the offensive towards Nanjing.

It looks like we do not have to make one more political detour. In the present situation this maneuver would be damaging rather than beneficial.

4. Thank you for asking for our opinion on such an important issue. If you do not agree with my opinion as expressed here or would introduce corrections, please let me know.

Mao Zedong

* * * * *

Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 January 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We received your long telegram on the Nanjing peace proposal.

1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjing government’s peace proposal did not exist at all, if this whole peace maneuver by the USA was nonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreeable, because it can bring some trouble to our common cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver does exist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes on this fact, we have to accept it.

2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal by Nanjing and the USA is a manifestation of a policy of deception. First, because Nanjing does not really want peace with the Communist party, as the peace with the Communist party would mean the rejection by the Guomindang of its principal policy of liquidation of the Communist party and its troops, and that would lead to the political death of the Guomindang leaders and the total disintegration of the Guomindang army. Second, because they know that the Communist party will not make peace with the Guomindang, as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liquidation of the Guomindang and its troops.

So what does Nanjing want after all? It wants not peace with the Communist party, but an armistice, a temporary termination of hostilities to use the armistice as a respite to restore order among Guomindang troops, to fortify the south bank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from the USA, to reinforce and then to break the truce and deliver a blow on the People’s Liberation forces, blaming the Communist party for the breakdown of negotiations. Their minimal wish is to prevent the total defeat of the Guomindang forces by the Communist party.

This is the basis of the current deception policy of Nanjing and the USA.

3. How can one respond to this maneuver by Nanjing and the USA? Two replies are possible. First reply: to reject the Nanjing peace proposals openly and directly, thus declaring the necessity of the continuation of civil war. But what would that mean? That means, first, that you had put your principal ace on the table and surrendered a very important weapon—the banner of peace—into the hands of the Guomindang. It means, second, that you are helping your enemies in China and outside China to accuse the Communist party as the advocate of continuing the civil war, and to praise the Guomindang as the defender of peace. It means, third, that you are giving the USA an opportunity to brainwash public opinion in Europe and America on the lines that no peace is possible with the Communist party, because it does not want peace, and that the only way to achieve peace in China is to organize an armed intervention by foreign powers like the intervention which had taken place in Russia for four years from 1918 to 1921.

We think that a direct and overt answer is good when you are dealing with honest people, but when you have to deal with political swindlers, like the Nanjing people, a direct and overt answer can become dangerous.

But a different answer is also possible, i.e.: a) to accept the desirability of a peace settlement in China; b) to conduct negotiations without foreign mediators, as China is a sovereign country and has no need for foreign mediators; c) to conduct negotiations between the Communist party and the Guomindang as a party, not with the Nanjing government, which is bearing the blame for starting the civil war and thus has lost the confidence of the people; d) as soon as the parties come to an agreement on the problems of peace and of the government of China, the hostilities would be terminated.

Can the Guomindang accept these conditions? We think it cannot. But if the Guomindang
will not accept these conditions, the people will realize, that the Guomindang and not the Communist party is to blame for the continuation of civil war. The banner of peace in this case rests in the hands of the Communist party. This issue is especially important now, when a lot of people in China are tired of the civil war and are ready to support the advocates of peace.

But let us assume the impossible and imagine that the Guomindang had accepted these terms. What should the Communist Party’s plans of actions be like?

First, it would be necessary to refrain from terminating the hostilities and then to create the central coalition government organs in such a way that approximately three fifths of seats in the Consultative Council and two thirds of the posts in the government would be retained by the Communists, and the other seats and posts would be distributed between other democratic parties and the Guomindang.

Second, it is necessary that the posts of the prime minister, Commander in Chief, and, if possible, that of the president, be occupied by Communists.

Third, the Consultative Council should declare this coalition government the only government of China, and any other government, pretending to be the government of China, should be declared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded.

And, finally, the coalition government should order both your troops and the Guomindang troops to swear allegiance to the coalition government and that hostilities against the troops which had given the oath would be terminated immediately, while they would be continued against the troops which had refused to give the oath.

It seems unlikely that the Guomindang would agree to these measures, but if they would not, it would be also detrimental for them, because they would be totally isolated, and these measures would be carried out without them.

4. This is our understanding of the issue and our advice to you. Maybe we were not able to present our advice clearly enough in our previous telegram.

We ask you to regard our advice as advice only, which does not impose any obligations on you and which you can accept or turn down. You can be sure that your rejection of our advice will not influence our relations and we will remain your friends as we have ever been.

5. As for our answer to the Nanjing mediation proposal, it will be in the spirit of your proposals.

6. We still insist that you postpone temporarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence in China is essential now. If you want we can immediately send an authoritative member of the Politbureau to Harbin or some other place to negotiate on issues of interest to you.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 110-113.]

Mao Zedong to Stalin, 14 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

1. I was glad to receive your supplementary telegram of January 11. On the principal line (the breakdown of large scale negotiations with the Guomindang [GMD], the continuation of the revolutionary war to the end) we agree with you completely.

Today we published eight conditions under which we [would] agree to enter into peace negotiations with the Guomindang. These conditions are put forward against the five reactionary conditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peace proposal of January 1.

Several days ago already the Americans sounded out our opinion—whether we would wish to conduct peace negotiations with the Guomindang without the 43 war criminals. So this sole condition—negotiating without war criminals—is no longer sufficient to undermine the intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotiations.

2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCP radio station.]

Since the publication of the Guomindang’s peace proposals there has been much fuss in the GMD-controlled areas and the population is en masse demanding peace from the Guomindang, reproaching the Guomindang that its peace conditions are too severe.

The agitation and propaganda organs of the Guomindang are hastily explaining why the Guomindang needs to preserve its legal status and its army. We think that this disorder in the Guomindang-controlled regions will be increasing further.

Mao Zedong

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 104-105.]

Stalin to Mao Zedong, 15 January 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We have just received your last short telegram, which shows that we now have unanimous opinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace proposal and that the Communist party of China has already started its “peace” campaign. Thus, the matter is now closed.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, p. 118.]

The Official Statement on the Soviet Government’s Answer to the Note by the Nanjing Government (Izvestia, 18 January 1949)

On January 8 the Chinese Foreign Ministry presented a memorandum to the Soviet embassy in China, containing an appeal by the Chinese government to the Soviet government to act as a mediator in the peace negotiations between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist party. As the Soviet Ambassador was informed, the Chinese government had sent a similar appeal to the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France.

On January 17 the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vshinsky A. Ya. received the Chinese Ambassador in the USSR Mr. Fu Bing Ciang and gave him the answer of the Soviet government, which points out that the Soviet government, always loyal to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, does not regard it expedient to accept the mediation mentioned in the memorandum.

The answer of the Soviet government notes that the restoration of China’s integrity as a democratic peace-loving state is the affair of the Chinese people itself and that this integrity could be probably best achieved by the direct negotiations between the internal forces of China, without foreign interference.

NEW RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON THE KOREAN WAR

Introduction and Translations

by Kathryn Weathersby

In the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the collection of high-level documents on the Korean War that Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also presented translations of six key documents from that collection that illuminate the decision-making behind the outbreak of full-scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the publication of the Spring 1995 Bulletin, the base of documentary evidence on the Korean War has been enriched even more by the release of virtually the entire collection of high-level documents on the war declassified by the Presidential Archive in Moscow, which numbers approximately 1,200 pages. Through a joint project of the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University and the Cold War International History Project, these documents are now available to all interested researchers.1

The Presidential Archive (known officially as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) is the repository to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin leadership sent its most sensitive records for safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings are therefore more selective than those of the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major repositories used by historians of the Cold War. The release of a large portion of the APRF’s documents on the Korean War consequently provides a critical addition to available evidence on the high-level decisions and deliberations of the communist side during this pivotal conflict.

This article presents translations of and commentary on a sizable portion of this recently-released APRF collection on the Korean War. It begins with most of the released documents covering February 1950 through January 1951, providing a close look at the Soviet role in Korea during the significant first months of the conflict. Unfortunately, some key materials from this period, particularly the months immediately preceding the war, have not yet become available; for key documents from mid-September to mid-October 1950, covering events from the Inchon landing to China’s decision to intervene in the war, see the article by Alexandre Y. Mansourov elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) It then offers a more selective sample of documents from spring 1951 through the end of the war, focusing primarily on Stalin’s approach to the armistice negotiations. As the reader will quickly discover, these documents of high-level decision-making within the Soviet government and within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang alliance shed light on many questions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance, Soviet relations with North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), Soviet attitudes toward the United States, and the making of Soviet foreign policy in general in the last years of Stalin’s life. In this brief commentary I will therefore not attempt to provide a close examination of these documents, as I have in two previous Bulletin articles (and a related article in The Journal of American-East Asian Relations).2 Instead, I will point out some of the most important questions these new sources address, provide additional background information drawn from my research in other Soviet archives, and offer some preliminary conclusions.

The documents presented below begin where the records published in the previous Bulletin left off, with Stalin’s telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 30 January 1950 informing Kim Il Sung that he would “assist” him in the matter of reunifying Korea by military means. Document #1 reveals that Kim II Sung and Soviet Ambassador T.F. Shytkov interpreted Stalin’s message as approval to plan an offensive campaign against South Korea. The North Korean leader received Stalin’s telegram with “great satisfaction” and informed Shytkov that he would begin preparations for a meeting with Stalin at which the details of the campaign would be worked out. Shytkov’s telegram to Soviet Defense Minister A.M. Vasilevsky on February 23 (document #4) supports accounts given by former DPRK military officers that Stalin began taking steps to strengthen the North Korean military forces even before Kim II Sung’s secret trip to Moscow in April, by appointing Major-General Vasilyev, a Hero of the Soviet Union and section chief for War Experience Analysis in the Soviet General Staff, to replace Shytkov as principal military adviser to the Korean People’s Army (KPA).3

From Shytkov’s telegram to Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on February 7 (document #2), we see how closely Stalin supervised events in North Korea, deciding whether the DPRK could issue a bond, form an additional three infantry divisions, convene the Supreme People’s Assembly, or send textile workers to the Soviet Union for training. Documents #5-9 indicate the reason why the highly nationalist Korean communists allowed such interference in their country’s affairs. As I discussed in the previous Bulletin, prior to the Korean War, North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for the substantial quantities of goods and the broad range of expertise needed to construct a new socialist state out of an abruptly truncated portion of the former Japanese empire. From 1945-1950, the only place to which the DPRK could turn for this support was the Soviet Union. Though many North Korean communists had close ties to the Chinese communist party, the latter was not in a position to aid its Korean comrades. In early 1950, the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing led by Mao Zedong was itself forced to turn to Moscow for economic and military aid. As documents #11 and #13 indicate, in the spring of 1950 Mao Zedong and Kim II Sung were both interested in the possibility of developing wider trade and closer communications between the PRC and the DPRK. Close economic and military ties between Pyongyang and Beijing developed after the Chinese entered the Korean War; they were not in place prior to October 1950.4

At Stalin’s insistence, after secretly receiving the Soviet leader’s conditional green light for an attack against South Korea during a secret summit in Moscow in April (for
which records still, alas, remain unavailable), Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing in May 1950 in order to secure Mao Zedong’s approval for the planned offensive. Documents #11 and #13 show that in his discussions with Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong was considerably less worried about the possibility of military conflict with the United States than was the Soviet leadership, arguing that “the Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory.” It also appears that in May 1950 Kim Il Sung, perhaps to counter the oppressive Soviet influence in North Korea, took a tentative step toward the strategy he later used so extensively of playing China and the Soviet Union against one another. He reported to Soviet Ambassador Shtykov that he had at first intended to ask Mao for ammunition for the Korean troops that had recently been transferred from China to North Korea (whose weapons were of Japanese and American manufacture rather than Soviet) but he decided not to raise the issue after all, since he was informed that the KPA had sufficient ammunition. Furthermore, he had no other requests to make of Mao “since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there.”

Shtykov’s telegram to Vyshinsky on May 12 (document #13), reveals that before departing Pyongyang the following day for Beijing, Kim Il Sung reported to Shtykov that he had ordered the chief of the general staff to prepare his forces for the military operation against the South and that he wished to begin the operation in June, though he did not know if they would be ready by then. Unfortunately, the documents from the Presidential Archive in Moscow are quite sparse for the crucial period of April–June 1950 and prospects for gaining access to those records in the near future are not encouraging. Many important questions about how the North Korean offensive was planned thus remain obscure. However, a British Broadcasting Corporation documentary team that conducted research on the Korean War in Russia in 1994 has discovered a revealing report on the preparations for the attack and the first day of the operation. Written by Shtykov and addressed to the head of the special Soviet military mission sent to North Korea to oversee the operation, this report (document #14) reveals that troop concentration was carried out from June 12 to June 23, as prescribed in the General Staff’s plan, and that Soviet advisers participated in reconnaissance and in planning the operation at the divisional level. However, Soviet advisers were apparently withdrawn from the front line before the attack began, with negative consequences for the efficiency of the operation. This accords with Khrushchev’s recollection that Stalin pulled back Soviet advisers from the front at the last minute, out of fear that they might be taken prisoner and thus expose Soviet participation in the operation.6

Consistent with his withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the front, Stalin’s queries to Shtykov on July 1 (document #15) indicate that he was agitated and nervous about the situation in Korea following the American entry into the war. Shtykov’s reply (document #16) cautiously raises the question that was at the root of the Soviet leader’s anxiety, namely the possibility that a disaster in Korea might draw Soviet troops into combat against American armed forces. Shtykov reports that Kim Il Sung and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong “understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war” and “are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources,” though some in the DPRK leadership were inquiring about possible Soviet entry into the war.

We see that as early as the first week of July, Stalin began the strategy toward the war in Korea that he was to continue for the remainder of the conflict. In order to avoid committing Soviet troops to fight the Americans in Korea, he encouraged the Chinese leadership to take steps toward entering the war should the tide of battle turn against the DPRK. Chen Jian revealed in his recent book that the Chinese leadership decided on July 7 and 10 to send troops to the Korean border to prepare for possible intervention in Korea; discussion about sending troops to Korea thus began well before the UN advance into North Korea in early October. Stalin’s telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Beijing on July 5 (document #18) reveals that in advance of those mid-July meetings, the Beijing leadership consulted with Stalin about the proposed troop transfer. Stalin informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on July 5 that he approved of the plan and also promised to try to provide air cover for the Chinese troops.

Stalin’s rather rude message to Mao Zedong on July 8 (document #21) appears to have been a further attempt to prod the Chinese to move toward entering the war. Stalin was also quite brusque in his message to Mao on July 13, indicating that he had not been informed whether the Chinese had decided to deploy troops on the Korean border and offering again to provide air cover. He also informed Beijing that he intended to train Chinese pilots in two to three months and to transfer the necessary equipment to them, presumably for use in Korea. On August 27, Stalin informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (document #26) that he would send 38 air force and air defense specialists to China. These advisers and the large amounts of equipment that accompanied them were the first installment of what became massive Soviet support in constructing an air force for the PRC, a process which continued throughout the Korean War.

Stalin’s message to Kim Il Sung on 28 August 1950 (document #27) is particularly revealing of the Soviet leader’s approach to the difficult situation created by American entry into the Korean War. While North Korea was suffering saturation bombing by American planes, Stalin exhorted Kim Il Sung to take courage from the example of the Red Army’s triumph against great odds in the civil war of 1918-20 and the great war against Germany of 1941-45. He offered to send additional aircraft for the small North Korean air force, but did not suggest sending Soviet air force units or ground forces. Avoiding military confrontation with the United States remained the Soviet leader’s foremost concern.

Stalin’s difficult and dramatic negotiations with the Chinese leadership in October 1950 over the entry of Chinese armed forces into the war in Korea is the subject of a separate article in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov. I have therefore omitted those documents from this selection, but will point out that the terms of Chinese entry—that the PRC would provide troops, the USSR material and advisers, and China would pay the Soviet Union for all military supplies—engendered considerable bitterness on the part of the Chinese leadership. Stalin’s approach to the armistice negotiations, which will be discussed below, and his insistence on timely and high payments for military supplies to China during the Korean War, thus constituted an important cause of the eventual
collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Resuming the story in late October 1950, document #31, the Politburo decision of 25 October 1950, suggests that the Soviet leadership worried that the United States might use the war in Korea as a pretext for rearming Japan. Stalin’s continued fear of a resurgent Japan may seem surprising, but in 1947 the U.S. military had considered rearming Japan to buttress the forces available along the Soviet Pacific border, a move vigorously opposed by the Soviet representative to the Far Eastern Commission. Furthermore, two weeks after the North Korean attack on South Korea, U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime minister to create a “National Police Reserve” of 75,000 men, some of whom were, in fact, deployed to Korea. (At the same time, analogous moves toward constituting a West German military contribution to the Western alliance were stepped up.) We have no record of Japanese participation in the battles referred to in the Soviet statement cited here, but forty-six minesweepers with 1,200 Japanese military personnel were dispatched to the eastern coast of North Korea between 2 October and 10 December 1950, to clear the way for an amphibious assault by UN forces. Japanese participation never became a major issue during the Korean War, either militarily or diplomatically, but it does appear that one of Stalin’s reasons for taking the risks associated with a North Korean offensive against South Korea was to eliminate the possibility that a resurgent Japan would be able to use southern Korea as a beachhead for an attack on the Soviet Union. (This argument also animates Stalin’s arguments to Mao in early October 1950 in favor of Chinese entry into the war to save the North Korean regime; see documents accompanying Alexandre Mansourov’s article.)

Despite Stalin’s concern to avoid direct military conflict with the United States, he finally agreed to provide air cover for Chinese ground troops crossing into Korea. Given the intensity of American bombing, Chinese troops could hardly have entered the war without such cover and they did not have the means to provide it for themselves. On 1 November 1950, Soviet air force units first engaged American planes in air battles over the Yalu River bridge that was the route for Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) entering Korea. Stalin’s military envoy to Mao, S.E. Zakharov, reported on 2 November 1950 (document #35) on the results of the first day of combat between Soviet and American pilots. Zakharov’s report also reveals that American planes were still flying in November 1950, from bases in Manchuria, and that American planes were bombarding air bases in Manchuria as well as targets in North Korea.

Soviet air force units in Korea proved to be highly effective against American bombers and fighter planes. On 15 November 1950 (document #38), Mao expressed his appreciation to Stalin for the heroism of the Soviet pilots guarding the Yalu crossings, who had shot down 23 American planes in the previous 12 days. Mao’s message also reveals that Stalin reinforced Soviet air support by sending additional MiG-15’s to China and creating a command apparatus for the air corps. Over the next few months Soviet air force involvement in Korea grew to quite substantial proportions. Nonetheless, Stalin continued to attempt to minimize the damage to Soviet interests that might ensue from the presence of Soviet pilots in Korea by ordering the Soviet Air Force to train Chinese pilots as quickly as possible so that they could be sent to the front to replace Soviet air crews (documents #68, 74, 76).

In addition to providing air cover against American planes along the Korean-Manchurian border, the Soviet Union also played the critical role of providing military supplies and advisers for the Chinese and North Korean war effort. In this selection of documents I have included the requests for supplies and advisers from November 1950 through February 1951 (documents #36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 53, 62, 64), and then have limited the selection to only a few such requests for the remainder of the war (documents #72, 73, 91, 92, 106, 111). I should emphasize, however, that Chinese and North Korean requests for supplies and advisers constituted a large part of Stalin’s correspondence with Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung until his death in March 1953. It is interesting to note that Stalin himself negotiated with Mao and Kim over the amounts of the various supplies that would be delivered, the schedule of delivery, and the terms of payment. Stalin’s personal attention to the supply issue probably reflects the severity of the burden this role placed on Soviet production capacity, which was still rebuilding from the devastation of World War II.

These documents corroborate the impression produced by recently-disclosed Chinese sources that Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai played the central role in operational planning during the Korean War (e.g. documents #50, 54-57). They kept Stalin informed of the military situation and of proposed operations and asked his advice whenever a question of the “international situation” was involved, such as in planning the “fourth operation”—a possible offensive—in late January 1951 (document #56) or in general strategic planning in early June 1951 (documents #66, 67). The documents also reveal that Stalin offered advice on military planning whenever he wished, such as on 5 June 1951 (document #65), and that he intervened more often and more directly with the command of North Korean troops than with the Chinese (documents #19, 58, 59, 61).

While the Chinese leadership had primary responsibility for managing the battlefield, the Soviet leadership played the central role in formulating diplomatic strategy for the communist side during the war. We see that in November and December 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised Zhou Enlai regarding the best approach to take to the question of Chinese participation in the United Nations Security Council (document #37) and to a response to American proposals declaring China an aggressor in Korea (document #46). When UN representatives asked Chinese representatives in New York in December 1950 to inform them under what conditions China would accept a cease-fire in Korea, Zhou Enlai reported to Stalin his proposed terms and asked for the opinion of the Soviet government before responding (document #48).

Stalin’s reply to Zhou and the Politburo directive the same day to UN Ambassador Vyshinsky suggest that the success of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in turning back the American advance in November 1950 sharply altered Stalin’s approach to the war. On December 7 the Politburo informed Vyshinsky (document #47) that his draft proposal for a cease-fire in Korea was “incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans are more and more often advancing a proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops.” With the unexpected and undoubtedly welcome sight of the supposedly fear-
some American armed forces retreating before the troops of his junior ally, Stalin ordered Vyshinsky to propose instead terms that the Americans would surely reject. In the same vein, Stalin replied to Zhou (document #49) that it was not yet time “for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated,” and advised him to adopt the more cunning strategy of requesting US and UN opinions on conditions for an armistice. When the UN group presented its proposal on 11 January 1951, Zhou again turned to Stalin for “advice and consultation” (document #52), and in accordance with Stalin’s recommendation the PRC rejected the UN proposal.

Stalin’s telegram to Mao Zedong on 5 June 1951 (document #65) reveals the new attitude toward the war that Stalin adopted after Chinese successes on the battlefield removed the threat of an American advance toward Chinese and Soviet borders. He informed Mao that he agreed that “the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of Anglo-American troops.” We have no record of Mao’s reaction to Stalin’s enthusiasm for this costly “learning experience” for China and one may imagine that the Chinese leadership may have been less enthusiastic about the massive casualties suffered in Korea, which ran to many hundreds of thousands by the end of the war. At the same time, however, Mao’s correspondence with Stalin indicates that the Chinese leader was in fact willing to continue the war until he obtained from the United States terms he considered acceptable. Russian records of Mao’s correspondence with Stalin thus lend support to Chen Jian’s argument that Mao Zedong intervened in Korea primarily in order to reassert China’s place in the international order and to revive revolutionary momentum within China.12

Despite Stalin’s interest in continuing the war in Korea, the serious losses suffered by Chinese and North Korean troops in their failed offensives of April and May 1951 forced the communist allies to consider opening negotiations with the UN command. On June 5 Soviet Ambassador to the UN Jacob Malik informed the American diplomat George F. Kennan that “the Soviet government wanted peace and wanted a peaceful solution of the Korean question—at the earliest possible moment” and advised the United States “to get in touch with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in this matter.”13 A few days later Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang, a Chinese leader with close ties to the Soviet Union, went to Moscow to discuss the situation with Stalin (documents #67, 69-72). Mao Zedong considered it advisable to open negotiations with the UN command because for the next two months the Chinese and North Koreans would have to occupy a defensive position (documents #73, 74, 76). If the Chinese and North Korean forces could avoid facing an enemy offensive during this period, by August they would be strong enough to launch their own new offensive.

Stalin agreed with Mao that armistice negotiations were desirable at that time (see document #69) and instructed Moscow’s ambassador to the United Nations to take the appropriate initiative.14 This evidence suggests that the “hawks” within the Truman Administration who opposed opening negotiations in Korea on the grounds that the enemy was only trying to buy time to build up its forces were, in fact, correct. From Mao’s assessment of the condition of the Chinese and North Korean troops in the summer of 1951, it appears that if the UN forces had pushed their advantage in June and July 1951, before the Chinese had time to dig fortifications, they may well have advanced the line of the front, and hence the eventual border between the two Koreas. After August 1951 the CPV and PLA were sufficiently well dug in that the war remained a stalemate.

An examination of Chinese and North Korean strategy during the armistice negotiations, which lasted from July 1951 to July 1953, is beyond the scope of this essay, though the Presidential Archive documents provide extensive evidence on this subject. I will note only that it appears that while Mao Zedong opened negotiations in 1951 primarily in order to buy time to reinforce his position on the battlefield, his communications with Stalin in July and August 1951 (documents #84-88) suggest that if he had been able to secure satisfactory terms in the negotiations, he may have been willing to conclude an armistice. However, the documents reveal that Stalin consistently took a “hard line” toward the negotiations, advising Mao that since the Americans had an even greater need to conclude an armistice, the Chinese and North Koreans should “continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations” (document #95).

The evidence presented below suggests that as the fighting dragged on through 1952, the North Koreans became increasingly desirous of ending the war (documents #102, 106). The Chinese approach to the war, however, seems to have been contradictory. On the one hand, Mao Zedong was clearly anxious to avoid undermining the prestige of the PRC by accepting unfavorable armistice terms (document #108). As Zhou Enlai explained to Stalin in a conversation in Moscow on 20 August 1952 (the transcript of which is published elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin), the Chinese leadership felt that as a matter of principle it could not yield to the Americans on the issue of repatriation of POWs. Zhou also reported to Stalin that Mao believed that the war in Korea was advantageous to China because it kept the United States from preparing for a new world war. Specifically, by fighting the Americans in Korea, China was helping to delay the next world war by 15-20 years. On the other hand, however, Zhou stated toward the end of this conversation that if America makes some sort of compromise on the POW issue, the communist side should accept it.

We need additional records from China in order to determine more clearly the Chinese leadership’s thinking regarding the war in Korea during the long months of armistice negotiations. However, from an internal report on the Korean War written by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1966 (published in Issue 3 [Fall 1993] of the Bulletin), it appears that by the time of Stalin’s death in March 1953, Beijing was eager to bring the war to an end. According to this report, during conversations held while Zhou Enlai was in Moscow for Stalin’s funeral, the PRC foreign minister “urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of an armistice.” As the tortuously worded USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 19 March 1953 (document #112) reveals, ending the war in Korea was also a high priority for the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow; in the midst of the great anxiety and confusion following Stalin’s death, the new leadership drafted and approved this major foreign policy decision in only two weeks. The evidence thus suggests that Stalin’s desire to
continue the war in Korea was a major factor in the prolongation of the war; immediately after his death the three communist allies took decisive steps to reach an armistice agreement.

The timing of the Council of Ministers’ resolution also suggests that it was Stalin’s death rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the armistice negotiations. The Eisenhower Administration later asserted that it finally broke the stalemate at Panmunjom by virtue of its “unmistakable warning” to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China if an armistice were not reached—a claim that had great influence on American strategic thinking after 1953. However, Eisenhower’s threats to use nuclear weapons were made in May 1953, two months after the Soviet government resolved to bring the war to an end. The Russian documents thus provide important new evidence for the debate over “nuclear diplomacy.”

The final two documents presented below provide intriguing information about Mao Zedong’s attitude toward the Korean War and the effect the war had on his relations with Moscow. In a discussion with Soviet officials in Beijing on 28 July 1953 (document #114), Mao was remarkably bellicose, speaking of the war as though it had been a great victory for China. He even commented that “from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year.” Mao may have been mainly posturing before the Russians, part of a larger effort to redefine his relations with Moscow following the death of Stalin; the Soviet documents need to be combined with the new Chinese sources before one can draw firm conclusions about Mao’s thinking. It is clear, however, as the excerpt from a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing in April 1956 (document #115) suggests, that the Korean War profoundly affected relations between the PRC and the USSR. Stalin desperately wanted Mao Zedong to pull his chestnuts out of the fire in Korea, but the PRC’s stunning success against the formidable American foe, combined with Moscow’s tightfistedness toward its ally, made the communist government in Beijing much less willing to tolerate subsequent Soviet demands.

As is apparent from the documents pre-
Il Sung further stated that he will prepare himself for the meeting.

Regarding the question of delivering lead from Korea to the USSR, I read the second point of your order. Kim answered that he will take all necessary measures to secure the delivery to the USSR from Korea of the quantity of lead indicated by you. He promised to work out all necessary measures regarding this question in the course of 10-15 days.

31.I.50. [T.F.] SHTYKOV

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF), Listy 123-124, Fond and Opis not given; and Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter AVPRF), Fond 059a, Opis 5а, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 92-93]

2. 7 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram  Strictly secret
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, Copy.
From Pyongyang, No. 4040. 10 hours 10 minutes. 8.II.1950
Special File
To Vyshinsky
On 4 February I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung at his request. During the meeting Kim Il Sung raised the following questions:
1. Can they adopt a central committee decision about issuing a loan, about which he earlier asked my advice[?] They have already calculated the loan at 2 billion won. They have already prepared an example of a bond. He asked agreement to send their representatives to Moscow with draft bonds in order to formulate orders for these bonds. I answered that I had communicated Kim Il Sung’s request to Moscow, but had still not received an answer.
2. Kim Il Sung asked my advice about whether they can proceed toward forming three additional infantry divisions, so that the total number of the army will be brought to ten divisions. I answered that this question is large and serious, that before adopting a decision you must think through whether you have the necessary material resources for this. I also need time to think through this question before I give you advice on this measure.
3. Kim Il Sung asked me if he can appeal to Comrade Stalin with a request to use in 1950 the credit the Soviet government had allocated for 1951. With this credit they would like to buy in the Soviet Union arms for the three infantry divisions they intend to form. I answered that I will report this question to my government.

4. Kim Il Sung further communicated that they intend to call a session of the Supreme People’s Assembly for February 25 with the following agenda:
1. Regarding the budget for 1950. 2. Regarding the criminal code. 3. Regarding the results of the fulfillment of the national economic plan in 1949. They still do not have a firm decision regarding whether to raise the three questions.

Kim Il Sung reported that he had commissioned Pak Hon Yong to write a request to the Soviet government about sending a group of textile workers to the Soviet Union in order to prepare them to work on the Soviet equipment that is arriving. I answered that as soon as I receive his letter I will report it to my government.

I ask your orders about what to answer Kim Il Sung regarding the first three questions raised by him [as reported] in this telegram.

7.I.50 SHTYKOV

In the margins Stalin wrote “it is possible” beside points 1, 2 and 3, “we don’t object” beside point 4 and “let him write it” beside the last paragraph. He wrote a note at the top to Malenkov to “give an answer today.”

[Source: APRF, Listy 125-126, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5а, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 145-146]

3. 10 February 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram  Strictly secret
Copy prohibited
From Pyongyang
To Vyshinsky
Today, February 10, I visited Kim Il Sung and in accordance with your order verbally transmitted to him the answer to his questions of February 4 of this year. Kim Il Sung received my communication enthusiastically and several times asked me to communicate to Comrade Stalin his gratitude for his assistance.

I promised to present a letter to the
government of the USSR within three days concerning all the questions touched upon in your telegram.

10/II-50. SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 129, Fond and Opis not given]


Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

From Pyongyang

To Vasilevsky, Copy to Vyshinsky.

Lieutenant-General Vasilevsky has arrived and has taken over the responsibility of main military adviser of the Korean People’s Army. He has familiarized himself with the position in the staff and units of the army.

In connection with this I understand that the functions of main military adviser are removed from me.

I ask you to confirm.

23.II.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 130, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150]

5. 9 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting note from Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

To Vyshinsky.

I transmit the text of a note received from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK:

“The Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic reports to you about the following:

In 1950 the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, in order to strengthen the people’s army and to fully equip it with arms, ammunition and technical equipment, asked the Soviet government to send to Korea military-technical equipment in the amount of 120-150 million rubles, in accordance with an application made earlier to the Government of the USSR.

The Korean People’s Democratic Republic corresponding will deliver to the Soviet Union this year:

9 tons of gold — 53,662,900 rubles
40 tons of silver — 1,887,600 rubles
15,000 tons of monazite concentrate — 79,500,000 rubles
In all a sum of 133,050,500 rubles.

Korea is interested in the soonest possible receipt of the goods indicated in this application.

I ask you to inform the Soviet government of our request.

Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.”

9.III.50 SHTYKOV

6. 12 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov) transmitting message to Kim Il Sung

[handwritten]

MID USSR Top Secret

Ciphered telegram

To Pyongyang

To Soviet Ambassador

Communicate to Kim Il Sung, in answer to his letter of 10 February, that the Soviet Government will satisfy the request of the government of the DPRK about using in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 that was allocated by the Soviet Union to Korea in accordance with the Agreement of 17 March 1949.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

A. Vyshinsky

[Source: APRF, List 131-132, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150]

7. 16 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting 14 March 1950 message from Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky.

I transmit the note we received on 14 March 1950 from the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung:

“I have the honor to inform you of the following:

In connection with the agreement of the Government of the USSR to allocate to Korea in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 in the amount of 70,700,000 rubles, the Government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic would like to acquire with this sum arms, ammunition and military-technical equipment for the Korean People’s Army in the amounts indicated in the attached [list].

The Government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic hopes that the Government of the USSR, understanding well the needs of the young Korean Republic, will complete the delivery of all the special goods in the shortest period.

Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic

A copy of the note was transmitted by me to the trade representative of the USSR in Korea. I will send the original note by diplomatic post. The arms and military equipment indicated in the attached [list] will go to the formation of 3 divisions.

16.III.50 SHTYKOV

attached is a seven page list, divided into sections for artillery armaments, ammunition, [illegible], engineering equipment, military-medical equipment, and military aviation supplies.

[Source: APRF, List 133-140, fond and opis not given]

8. 18 March 1950, message, Stalin to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)

PYONGYANG

To SHTYKOV

Transmit to Kim Il Sung the following answer from Comrade Stalin:

“First. I received your communication of March 4 about agreement to send the indicated amount of lead to the Soviet Union. I thank you for the assistance. As concerns the equipment and materials you request, and also the specialists in lead industry, the Soviet Government has resolved to fully satisfy your request.

Second. I have also received your proposal of 9 March about the delivery to you of arms, ammunition and technical equipment for the people’s army of Korea. The Soviet government has decided also to satisfy fully this request of yours.

With respect I. STALIN”.

[Source: APRF, page 141, fond and opis not given]
9. 21 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
From Pyongyang

In accordance with your order on March 20 I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung, at which [DPRK Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong was present. During the meeting I transmitted to Kim the text of the telegram of Comrade Stalin.

During this meeting Kim asked me to transmit to Comrade Stalin his request that he, together with Pak Hon Yong, would like to have a meeting with Comrade Stalin at the beginning of April.

They want to make the trip to Moscow and the meeting with Comrade Stalin unofficially, in the manner as [it was done] in 1945.

Kim Il Sung said further that they are completing the preparation of all materials for the trip and intend to raise the following questions at the meeting with Comrade Stalin:

1. About the path and methods of unification of the south and the north of the country.
2. About the prospects for the economic development of the country.
3. Also possibly several party questions.

I ask your order.

21.III.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, List 142, Fond and Opis not given]

10. 24 March 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
From Pyongyang

On March 24 I visited Kim Il Sung and communicated to him that Comrade Stalin has agreed to receive him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong.

Kim Il Sung plans to leave Korea for Moscow on March 30 of this year. I consider it advisable to arrange a special plane for transporting Kim and Pak to Moscow. For this purpose I request a corresponding order to apportion a plane. The designated plane should arrive in Pyongyang on March 29 of this year. In case it is not possible to send a plane, the departure from Korea can be organized by naval transport from Seisin to Vladivostok. From Vladivostok to Moscow [Kim and Pak can travel] by train in a special car.

Kim intends to take with him to Moscow as an interpreter Mun Il, who was interpreter during the negotiations in Moscow, and the personal adjutant of So Chen Diu, who was also with him in Moscow in 1949.

I request an order regarding whether it is necessary for someone from the embassy to accompany Kim to Moscow.

I ask for corresponding orders.

24.III.50 Shtykov

[Source: APRF, List 143-144, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 94-95]

11. 10 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Soviet representative Aleksii Ignatieff in Pyongyang Ignatiev to Vyshinsky

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
From Pyongyang

The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK has reported to me about the following:

1. A report to Kim Il Sung was received from the ambassador of the DPRK in the Chinese People’s Republic Li Zhou-yuan in which he reports about a meeting between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan that took place in Beijing at the end of March 1950.

In the conversation between Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan, at the initiative of the latter, the question of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed.

Mao Zedong responded positively to the question of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and selected the end of April or the beginning of May of this year as the approximate time for this meeting.

Mao Zedong connected the proposed meeting with the question of the unification of Korea, indicating in this regard that if there is a concrete plan for the unification of Korea, then the meeting should be organized secretly [not openly], but if there is not yet such a plan for unification of Korea, then the meeting with Kim Il Sung can be conducted officially.

Li Zhou-yuan has not given a concrete answer to the question of the time and form of the meeting, referring to the fact that Kim Il Sung is presently undergoing medical treatment. [Ed. note: Kim was making a secret visit to Moscow.] Further, Mao said in the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan that if a third world war begins, Korea will not escape participation in it, therefore the Korean People’s Democratic Republic should prepare its armed forces.

In the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan, Mao Zedong expressed the wish to develop wider trade between the Chinese People’s Republic and the DPRK.

2. Kim Ch’aek has reported that Kim Dar Sen, the leader of the partisan detachments in the south of Korea whom the southern press and radio have repeatedly officially reported as killed in battles with punitive units of the South Korean army, arrived in Pyongyang from South Korea on April 3. Kim Dar Sen came to North Korea to report about the position of the partisan movement in South Korea and to receive orders on this question.

Kim Ch’aek asked me to transmit the above indicated questions to Kim Il Sung through Comrade Shtykov.

10.IV.50. [A.] IGNATIEV

[Source: APRF, List 146-147, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 96-97]

12. 25 April 1950, ciphered telegram, Ignatiev to Vyshinsky

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
From Pyongyang

25 April at 16:00 hours local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong arrived in Seisin (North Korean) from Voroshilov by plane. Both feel well.

25.IV.50 IGNATIEV

[Source: APRF, List 148-149, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 98-99]

13. 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung

Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret
From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky.

25 April at 16:00 hours local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong arrived in Seisin (North Korean) from Voroshilov by plane. Both feel well.

12.MAY.50 Shtykov
Ciphered telegram

Strictly secret

Copying prohibited

From Pyongyang

To Vyshinsky

At the request of Kim Il Sung, on May 12 I had a meeting with him and [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong. During the conversation Kim Il Sung reported to me that upon his return from Moscow he received a letter from Li Zhou-yuan (ambassador to China), in which he reported about a meeting that took place with Mao Zedong and [PRC Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai. During this meeting the question of the necessity of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed. Zhou Enlai proposed that the meeting have an official character. Mao, turning toward Li as if asking when you intend to begin the unification of the country, without waiting for an answer stated that if you intend to begin military operations against the south in the near future, then they should not meet officially. In such a case the trip should be unofficial.

Mao Zedong added further that the unification of Korea by peaceful means is not possible, solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory.

Kim Il Sung reported further that since Li Zhou-yuan did not have a commission from the Central Committee to meet with Mao Zedong and to discuss questions about his meeting, i.e. Kim Il Sung’s, with Mao Zedong, they decided to summon Li Zhou-yuan and give him corresponding rebukes and instructions.

Li Zhou-yuan came to Pyongyang and on May 10 left for Beijing with corresponding commissions.

Today, May 12, Li Zhou-yuan reported that he met with Mao Zedong, who agreed to the arrival of Kim Il Sung at the time indicated by him. Kim Il Sung reported that they intend to leave for Beijing in the morning of May 13 and asked me if the plane coming for him will be ready by this time. I answered that the plane is ready.

Kim Il Sung further reported that they decided to go to China with Pak Hon Yong, that they have not discussed the question of a meeting with Mao Zedong in the Central Committee, that he has only spoken about this question with Kim Ch’ae-k (member of the Politburo).

Kim Il Sung reported to me that they intend to discuss roughly the following questions with Mao Zedong:

1. To inform about their intentions about unifying the country by military means and to report about the results of the discussions on this question in Moscow.
2. To exchange opinions on the question of the conclusion of a trade agreement between Korea and China. He intends to propose that they sign a trade agreement in the nearest future, but that they sign an agreement about friendship after the unification of the country.
3. To inform Mao about several questions which were placed under discussion with Comrade Stalin in Moscow and about the establishment of closer communications between the Central Committee of the labor party of Korea and the communist party of China.
4. To exchange opinions on several questions which interest both Korea and China, such as the electrical station at Suiho, Koreans who live in China and so forth.

Kim further asked my advice, about what kind of questions he should raise before Mao Zedong from the point of view of assistance in the intended operation. I declined to answer, stating that it is clearer to him, what he has insufficiencies in and what the Chinese can help him with. Then Kim Il Sung answered that he intended to ask for ammunition for the Japanese and American arms which the divisions that arrived from China have and for some number of horses. However, after a conversation with the chief of staff of the army, who reported that they have more than 3 b.k. [boekomplekt, standard load of ammunition] of ammunition, he decided not to raise these questions. He stated that he doesn’t have more requests for Mao about assistance, since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there.

Kim Il Sung reported to me that with regard to the question of the preparation of the operation he had given all necessary orders to the chief of the general staff, who already has begun to implement them, that his wish is to begin the operation in June, but he is still not convinced that they will manage it in this period.

13 May at 5:20 local time Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong flew to Beijing.

12.V.50 SHTYKOV

[Source: APRF, Listy 151-154, Fond and Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 100-103]

[Ed. note: For the texts of an exchange of messages between the Chinese leadership and Stalin on 13-14 May 1950, during Kim Il Sung’s secret visit to Beijing and concerning his plans to attack South Korea, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 60-61.]

14. 26 June 1950, top secret report on military situation by Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov

Top Secret

To Comrade Zakharov

([transmit] in person only)

I report about the preparation and course of the military operations of the Korean People’s Army.

The concentration of the People’s Army in the region near the 38th parallel began on June 12 and was concluded on June 23, as was prescribed in the plan of the General Staff. The redeployment of troops took place in an orderly fashion, without incident.

The intelligence service of the enemy probably detected the troop redeployment, but we managed to keep the plan and the time of the beginning of troop operations secret.

The planning of the operation at the divisional level and the reconnaissance of the area was carried out with the participation of Soviet advisers.

All preparatory measures for the operation were completed by June 24th. On June 24th divisional commanders were given orders about “D”[day] and “H”[hour].

The political order of the Minister of Defense was read to the troops, which explained that the South Korean army had provoked a military attack by violating the 38th parallel and that the government of the DPRK had given an order to the Korean People’s Army to go over to the counterattack.

The order to counter-attack was met with great enthusiasm by the soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army.

The troops went to their starting positions by 24:00 hours on June 24th. Military operations began at 4 hours 40 minutes local time. Artillery preparation was accompanied in the course of 20-40 minutes by direct fire and a ten-minute artillery barrage. The
infantry rose up and went on the attack in good spirits. In the first three hours individual units and formations advanced from 3 to 5 kilometers.

The attack of the troops of the People’s Army took the enemy completely by surprise.

The enemy put up strong resistance only in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. The enemy began to put up a more organized resistance after 12:00 on the first day.

On the first day of battle the following towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Kaesong, Sinyuri—(map 1:1,000,000 published by the General Staff in 1943).

In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. [People’s Army] advanced 12 kilometers.

On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 kilometers.

On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio area and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 partisans.

The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out successfully.

The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining it.

The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the People’s Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no losses.

On June 26 troops of the People’s Army continued the attack and, with fighting, advanced deep into the territory of South Korea.

During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin peninsula and Kaizin peninsula were completely cleared and units of the 6th division made a forced crossing of the bay and took the populated point in the direction of Kimpo airport.

In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th divisions took the cities of Bunsan and Tongducheb and the 2nd division took the provincial center Siunsen.

On the coast of the Sea of Japan the advance has continued. The port of Tuburi has been taken.

During the course of the day there has been no communication with the 12th Infantry Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the mechanized brigade attacking through Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif.

Conclusions regarding the North.

It is necessary to note the following substantial insufficiencies in the operations of the People’s Army:

1. With the beginning of military actions and the forward advance of units and formations, staff communication was lost from top to bottom. The general staff of the People’s Army already on the first day did not direct the battle, since it did not have firm communication with a single division.

The commanders of units and formations are not trying to establish communications with the senior staff, command posts from combat level and higher change the senior staff without permission, the General Staff still has not established communications with the brigade operating along the eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Division.

2. The command staff of the KPA does not have battle experience, after the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers they organized the battle command poorly, they use artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose communications.

3. However, our military advisers note great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean People’s army and a general aspiration to fulfill their allotted tasks.

4. The political mood among the people of North Korea in relation to the beginning of military operations is characterized by a general enthusiasm, by faith in the government of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the Korean People’s Army.

On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an appeal to the Korean people in the name of the government of the DPRK, in which he described the situation that has been created in the country and laid out the tasks for the defeat of the enemy and the unification of Korea.

5. The Command of the Korean People’s Army is taking measures to put right the troop communications and the organization of the battle command. To this end the Army Command Post has been moved to the Tepuges area. The War Minister, the chief of the General Staff and the main military adviser, along with a group of officers, will go out to the Command Post.

Conclusions regarding the South.

The first two days of military operations have shown the following:

1. The enemy is putting up resistance and while fighting is retreating deep into the territory of South Korea, mass taking of prisoners from the South Korean army has not been noted.

2. The South Korean puppet authorities have begun to throw in troops from deep in the rear and are trying to halt the advance of the People’s Army.

3. In the first day the attack of the People’s Army caused confusion in the South. The South Korean authorities and the ambassador of the USA personally in their radio speeches called on the people of South Korea to stay calm. The staff of the South Korean army is broadcasting false reports about the successes of the South Korean army.

SHTYKOV
No. 358/sh
26.6.50.

[Source: collection of Soviet military documents obtained in 1994 by the British Broadcasting Corporation for a BBC TimeWatch documentary titled “Korea, Russia’s Secret War,” to be broadcast in the UK and the USA in 1996]

15. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

Ciphered Telegram No. 34691/sh.

Pyongyang. Soviet Ambassador.

1. You do not report anything about what kind of plans the Korean command has. Does it intend to push on? Or has it decided to stop the advance. In our opinion the attack absolutely must continue and the sooner South Korea is liberated the less chance there is for intervention.

2. Communicate also how the Korean leaders regard the attacks on North Korean territory by American planes. Are they not frightened or do they continue to hold firm? [sic]

Does the Korean government intend to make an open statement of protest against the attacks and the military intervention? In our opinion, this should be done.

4. [sic] We have decided to fulfill fully by July 10 the Koreans’ requests for delivery of ammunition and other military equipment. Report about this to KIM IL SUNG.
CHINA’S ROAD TO THE KOREAN WAR

by Chen Jian

In October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership sent “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV) to Korea to fight against United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border. Although China’s intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing leadership’s hopes of overwhelming the UN forces. Therefore, when the Korean War ended in July 1953, Korea’s political map remained virtually unchanged, while America’s military intervention in Korea and China’s rushing into a conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a Sino-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States that would last nearly twenty years.

The newly established Chinese Communist regime faced enormous problems during its first year, including achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a war-shattered economy, and finishing reunification of the country. Why then did Mao decide to assist North Korea in fighting a coalition composed of nearly all the Western industrial powers? How was the decision made? What were the immediate and long-range causes leading to Beijing’s decision to enter the Korean War? Finally, was there any opportunity that might have prevented the direct confrontation between the PRC and the United States? More than forty years after the end of the Korean War, scholars answer to these questions are still limited and remarkably inadequate.

In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed China’s entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of worldwide expansion, believing that the entire international Communist movement was under the control of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions. The Korean conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential part of a life-and-death confrontation between the Communists on the one hand and the “free world” on the other.

The North Korean invasion of the South, as viewed by President Harry Truman—and many later students of the Korean War—represented the first step in a general Communist plot to “pass from subversion” to “armed invasion and war” in their scheme of world conquest. Correspondingly, Beijing’s entrance into the Korean War was regarded as an action subordinate to Moscow’s overall Cold War strategy. Scholars in the West widely believed that Beijing’s policy was aggressive, violent, and irrational.

In 1960, Allen S. Whiting published his landmark study, China Crosses the Yalu, which has strongly influenced a whole generation of scholars. Using Western intelligence sources and Chinese journal and newspaper information, Whiting argued that unlike the Soviet Union, Communist China had not directly participated in the planning for the North Korean invasion of the South. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whiting believed, Beijing tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement, and only after the attempts for a political solution failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin necessary military preparations in early September. Whiting emphasized that after the Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing tried through both public and private channels to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only after all warnings had been ignored by Washington and General Douglas MacArthur and therefore, in the Beijing leadership’s view, the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded that Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese Communist perception of America’s threat to China’s national security. Lacking access to Chinese archival materials, though, Whiting’s study had to focus more on the analysis of the environment in which the Beijing leadership made their decision to go to war than on a close examination of the decision-making process.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more critical perspective on the Sino-American confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam, the normalization of Sino-American relations, and the declassification of new archival documentation. Building on Whiting’s thesis, scholars paid more attention to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ concerns for China’s national security as the decisive factor underlying their decision to enter the Korean War. They generally argued that Beijing did not welcome the Korean War because China faced difficult tasks of economic reconstruction and political consolidation at home and gave priority to liberating Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of these scholars stressed that Beijing’s decision to enter the Korean War was simply a reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to the physical security of Chinese territory. And while most scholars believed that the American decision to cross the parallel triggered China’s intervention, some speculated that if UN forces had stopped at the parallel China would not have intervened.

A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to share these assumptions, as can be seen in Chinese publications on the “War to Resist America and Assist Korea” that appeared in the 1980s.

As a lecturer at Shanghai’s East China Normal University in the early 1980s and then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in the United States, I became increasingly interested in the emergence of Sino-American confrontation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In my study I too believed in the standard interpretation of China’s reasons for entering the Korean War. Not until 1988-1990, when the work on my dissertation led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I begin to feel doubts. For example, to my surprise, I found that early in August 1950, more than one month before the Inchon landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership had been inclined to send troops to Korea, and China’s military and political preparations had begun even a month earlier. I also found that the concerns behind the decision to enter the Korean War went far beyond the defense of the safety of the Chinese-Korean border. Mao and his associates aimed to win a glorious victory by driving the Americans off the Korean peninsula. It was no longer possible to accept the well-established view of Chinese and American historians.

continued on page 85
The leadership of the DPRK and the People’s Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) correctly evaluate the complicated military-political situation in Korea, believe in full victory and are directing all efforts toward a subsequent broad attack on the south of Korea.

KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war against the DPRK and in connection with this they are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources for the war.

KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about forming additional infantry, tank, and naval units and formations. They intend to introduce universal military service in the DPRK. However, some portion of the leading figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties of conducting a war against the Americans with the forces of Korea and in a cautious way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG reported to me these facts, about a conversation of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN KHI with KIM IL SUNG.)

The rightist and centrist figures that are entering the government of the DPRK are supporting all measures of the government, but so far are not displaying the necessary direction of activity in the mobilization of their parties in the south of the country.

I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that the government of the USSR has satisfied his request for arms and ammunition.

The general situation in the KNP [Korean People’s Republic, apparently a mis-spelling of DPRK] continues to remain favorable and makes it possible to continue the active offensive of the People’s Army.

No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV.

1.7.50.

Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110]
VASILIEV we proposed the following structure:

1. To create two army groups headed by Military Councils composed of: a commander, a member of the Military Council and a chief of staff.

To place 4-6 units under the command of each army group.

2. To create a front headquarters headed by a commander of the front, a chief of staff and a member of the Military Council of the front.

The front headquarters should be created from [the facilities and personnel of] the General Staff.

3. To preserve the Ministry of National Defense, since it already exists only in a reduced form.

The Ministry’s task should be the supply of combat troops with everything needed (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as well as the training of reserves, the new troop formation and the organization of anti-aircraft defense for the northern part of the republic.

4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme Commander of troops. He agreed with our proposals.

The restructuring will proceed without harm to the military operations on the front.

He then asked our opinion about how best to arrange the disposition of commanding cadres.

From my part I proposed to appoint the following group commanders: Deputy Minister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left flank group, and for the commander of the right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (presently commanding an operational group). To appoint as commander of the front the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Industry, Kim Cha’ek (he knows military affairs, was a partisan and served in the Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man).

To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General Staff.

The Minister of National Defense will remain in his post. He will manage the formation of new units and the organization of anti-landing defense, and also supplying troops with everything needed.

They want this measure to be passed through the military committee on July 4 or 5. I judge that in this complicated situation this measure will yield positive results.

The staff of the front will move to Seoul in the near future.

I ask your permission:

1. To have two advisers in every army group (adviser for the group commander and adviser for the artillery commander).

2. I ask your permission for the main military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go to Seoul with a group of officers, together with the staff of the front, and to be permanently located there with the staff.

3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the questions touched on.

SHTYKOV
No. 439/sh.
4.7.50.
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-114]

18.5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the People’s Republic of China [PRC] N.V. Roshchin)

Ciphered telegram No. 3172
Beijing. Soviet Ambassador.
To your No. 1112-1126.
Transmit to Zhou Enlai:
1. We agree with the opinion of the Chinese comrades regarding the mediation of India on the question of the entry of people’s China into the membership of the UN.
2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units.
3. Your report about flights of Soviet planes over Manchurian territory is not confirmed. An order was given not to allow such flights.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
No. 373/sh
5.7.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115]

19.6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678
Pyongyang. To Comrade Shtykov.
To No. 439/sh
1. The arms will be sent through Manchuria, Andong, Singisiu.
2. Concerning the location of the chief military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it more useful for him to be in Pyongyang.
3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we consider that the main thing is not this but to fill out the existing divisions and to increase their strength approximately to 12,000. It is necessary to have attached to the divisions an apparatus for the formation of troops, which would receive the reinforcements, check and train them and after this, transfer them to reinforce the divisions. This is the main thing.
FYN-SI [Stalin]
No. 374/sh
6.7.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116]

20.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh
From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26
Received 8.7.50 11:15
Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35.
By telegraph.
To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin],
I received the following letter from KIM IL SUNG addressed to us.
“To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo Comrade Stalin, I.V.
I ask that you accept the expression of deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluable assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, continually render to our people in their struggle for independence.
Being confident of your desire to help the Korean people rid themselves of the
American imperialists, I am obliged to appeal to you with a request to allow the use of 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of the 2nd Army Group, since the national military cadres have not yet sufficiently mastered the art of commanding modern troops.

Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK.

Pyongyang. 8 July 1950.

SHTYKOV
No. 481/sh
8.7.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151]

21. 8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin in PRC transmitting message to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231
BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador.

Only by telegraph
Sent 18:40  8.7.50
Delivered 8.7.50

Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that the Koreans are complaining that there is no representative of CHINA in KOREA. A representative should be sent soon, so that it will be possible to have communications and resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to have communications with KOREA.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].
No. 379/sh.
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117]

22. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305
BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph

SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15 13.7.50

Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO ZEDONG the following:

"1. The English have officially appealed to us through their ambassador in Moscow and declared that they, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, cannot now make proposals regarding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, but if the Korean People’s Democratic Republic withdraws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this could hasten a peaceful resolution of the Korean question.

We consider such a demand by the English to be impertinent and unacceptable.

We intend to reply that the Korean question has become too complicated after the armed foreign intervention and that such a complex question can be resolved only by the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea in order to hear their opinion.

Communicate your views.

As regards the statement of the Indian ambassador, we have decided not to answer him, since they made it clear that his statement is his personal opinion, in which the Indian government is not involved.

2. It is not known to us whether you have decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea. If you have made such a decision, then we are ready to send you a division of jet fighter planes—124 pieces for covering these troops.

We intend to train Chinese pilots in two to three months with the help of our pilots and then to transfer all equipment to your pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the aviation divisions in Shanghai.

Communicate your opinion."

Telegraph fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 118]

23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh
Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador.

Advise the Koreans immediately to reply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie that the Korean army is strictly adhering to the Geneva convention with regard to prisoners, and [that they should] let the Koreans make a statement in the press exposing the slander of the American press regarding poor treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It would be good for someone among the prisoners to make a statement on the radio that the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is very good.

FYNI-SI [Stalin]
No. 4.4781
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 148]


To the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Comrade Shtykov, T.F.

I ask you to transmit to the Government of the USSR the following:

In connection with the appeal of the English to the Government of the USSR with a demand about the withdrawal of troops of the Korean People’s Army to the 38th parallel, the Government of the DPRK considers, as does the Soviet Government, that such a demand of the English is impertinent and unacceptable.

We are in full agreement with the opinion of the Soviet Government that the Korean question [should be] discussed in the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea.

The Government of the DPRK [will take measures] quickly to clear the entire territory of Korea of American interventionists.

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK

Kim Il Sung.

14.7.50.
25. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
To Beijing To Soviet Ambassador Roshchin

TOP PRIORITY
25.VII.50

On the authorization of Filippov, transmit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we agree with the proposed procedure and time period for training Chinese pilots on jet planes.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

VYSHINSKY

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 94]

26. 27 August 1950, cipheredtelegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962
Beijing
To Comrade Kotov
To No. 1726.

Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the reply to his telegram about military advisers.

I visited Comrade Zhou Enlai.

The Soviet Government has satisfied your request about sending Soviet military advisers—specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the Eastern and Northeastern military districts. 38 advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in VVS.

As regards the remaining 26 advisers, we consider that there is no special need to send them, since the work of these advisers can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can advise the work of the Chiefs of the operational and intelligence departments of the PVO district; Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the VVS can advise the work also of the Chief of the Operational Department of the Staff of the VVS district.

The 38 advisers will leave for China soon.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 108-109]

27. 28 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75021
Pyongyang Soviet Ambassador.

Verbally transmit the following to Kim Il Sung.

1. The CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] salutes Comrade Kim Il Sung and his friends for the great liberalational struggle of the Korean people which comrade Kim Il Sung is leading with brilliant success. CC VKP(b) has no doubt that in the soonest time the interventionists will be driven out of Korea with ignominy.

2. Comrade Kim Il Sung should not be embarrassed by the fact that he does not have solid successes in the war against the interventionists, that the successes are sometimes interrupted by delays in the advance or even by some local set-backs. In such a war continuous successes do not occur. The Russians also did not have continuous successes during the civil war and even more during the war with Germany. The greatest success of the Korean people is that Korea has now become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the movement in Asia for liberation from the imperialist yoke. The armies of all enslaved peoples will now learn from the Korean People’s Army the art of bringing decisive blows to the Americans and to any imperialists. Moreover, Comrade Kim Il Sung should not forget that Korea is not alone now, that it has allies, who are rendering and will render it aid. The position of the Russians during the Anglo-French-American intervention in 1919 was several times worse than the position of the Korean comrades at the present time.

3. Advise Comrade Kim Il Sung not to scatter the air force, but to concentrate it on the front. It is necessary that each attack by the People’s Army on any portion of the front begin with a number of decisive blows by attack planes on the troops of the enemy, that the fighter planes defend the troops of the Peoples Army from the blows of the enemy planes as much as possible. If it is necessary, we can throw in additional assault aircraft and fighter aircraft for the Korean air force.

FYN-SI [Stalin]

28 August 1950
No. 483/sh
Copy No. 1 To Stalin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 5-6, 10-11 (original copy); and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, Listy 155-156]

28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From Pyongyang, Sent 31.8.50 11:32
Received 31.8. 17:27
Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35
By telegraph
FYN-SI [Stalin]

To No. 483/sh.

In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL SUNG listened to my communication and asked permission to write down its contents, which I dictated to him.

KIM IL SUNG received your letter very well, thanking you several times, underscoring that it is a very good letter.

Afterwards he asked my agreement to summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong and read him your telegram.

After exchanging opinions with Pak Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about whether he can bring it to the notice of the members of the PolitSoviet [Political Council] of the CC, in connection with which he underscored that this is a very important letter and he needs to communicate its contents since some members of the PolitSoviet are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful to them to know the contents of this letter.

I replied that if he considers this neces-
sary then he can do it. KIM IL SUNG replied that he would convene the PolitSoviet tomorrow and read them the contents of this letter.

SHTYKOV
No. 1001
30.8.50
Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162]

30.13September 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III. From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 13.9. 13:15
Sent to the 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.

By telegraph.

Extremely urgent.

Moscow—Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.

In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.

In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.

We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic about the position which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question.

We ask your orders.

SHTYKOV
No. 1154/sh.
13 September of this year
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 163-164]

31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee Politburo decision with approved directives to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Washington

All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P78/332 To Comrades Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.

Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b).

Decision of 25 October 1950 332. - About the use by the United States of Japanese in the war against Korea.

To confirm the draft order of MID USSR to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission (attachment 2).

SECRETARY CC
To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78
Attachment 1

NEW YORK TO VYSHINSKY
353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon-Yong, in one of your next speeches in the
General Assembly at an appropriate moment, according to your discretion.

We are simultaneously giving an order to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far Eastern Commission] to make a corresponding statement on this question and to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the United States of Japanese in military operations in Korea.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].

A. GROMYKO

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78
TOP SECRET
Attachment 2
WASHINGTON
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

It is necessary for you the make the following statement at the next meeting of the Far Eastern Commission:

“As is known, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the chairman of the General Assembly and to the chairman of the Security Council a protest against the use of Japanese servicemen in military actions in Korea. In this protest it is shown that in the fundamental facts found in the decree of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, it is established that Japanese servicemen participated in battles in the area of Seoul together with American troops, that one Japanese company participated in battles in the area of Chkhovol and that a significant number of Japanese are found in the 7th and 8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops.

The use by the United States of Japanese servicemen in military operations in Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam declaration, and also of section III of the resolution of the Far Eastern Commission “Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after Capitulation” of June 19, 1947, and the resolution adopted on the basis of this document “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equipment” of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam declaration and aforementioned resolution of the Far Eastern Commission provide for the full disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, forbid the reestablishment or possession of any kind of Japanese military formations.

The Soviet delegation supports the protest of the government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic against the use by the USA of Japanese servicemen in the war against the Korean people. The Soviet delegation considers that the Far Eastern Commission must not disregard the aforementioned facts, which testify to the direct violation of the agreed-upon decision on the demilitarization of Japan.”

Give the statement to the press.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]

32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From Beijing Received 19 hours 50 minutes 28.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

27 October I received the following telegram from Mao Zedong addressed to you:

“Comrade Filippov!

In connection with the military situation that has developed in China at the present time, we urgently need to acquire from the Soviet Union the following armaments for the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes.

Therefore I intend to send immediately to Moscow by plane the commander of the navy Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Comrade Kuz’min in order to conduct negotiations with the responsible comrades of the Soviet Navy on the question of the request for the above mentioned arms and on the question of the construction of the Chinese navy in the future.

Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, two other comrades from the navy administration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy chief of the rear administration of the navy Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Moscow].

I ask you to review the aforementioned and give me a corresponding reply.

MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950.”

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 62-63]

33. 29 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - to Comrade Zakharov
For MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram about naval matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of XIAO, JINGUANG and the other comrades. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

29.10.50.

Copies: Stalin, Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 64]

34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shlykov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222
TO SHLYKOV

You request that our officers and advisers remain in the disposition of the [North] Koreans for the formation of Korean divisions. Such a point of view of yours is well known to us. But we do not know the points of view of the [North] Korean government, we do not know whether it wishes to have Soviet officers and advisers in the future or prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not communicated the point of view of the Korean government on this subject. We cannot impose our advisers and officers on the Korean government. Let KIM IL SUNG communicate his point of view regarding this.

FYNSI [STALIN]

1 November 1950
Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the General Staff to Shlykov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347,
5. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram, S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military representative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin)

Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Shhtemenko, Lomov

From Beijing 15 hours 30 minutes 2.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY E

FYN SI [Stalin]

To No. 5228 of 2.11.50

I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, adviser to the Korean air force, I have obtained the following specific information:

1. By the first of November a regiment was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are located in An’dun.

2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes of this regiment went into battle for the first time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were downed. Two Yak-9’s did not return from the battle.

The first report from comrade Belov to me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU was thus imprecise.

The losses relate to a battle in the region of ANSIU.

3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in MIG-15’s and two planes were downed by anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes were downed.

We had no losses in the air battle.

4. MIG-15’s of Comrade Belov flew from airbases at MUKDEN and AN’SHAN’. In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport.

5. At present there are 16 battle [as opposed to training] Yak-9’s at the airbase at ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is possible to restore them. In addition, 2 planes were lost while patrolling.

In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not return from the region of ANSIU.

In addition to the Yak-9’s there are:

a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully combat ready and are carrying out night missions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during landings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 planes were lost while on missions.

b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to now there are no planes for them

6. The command of the mixed air division of Koreans in ANDONG has been formed. It is headed by General LI FART.

7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about the possibility of receiving 25 IL-10 planes and 10 PO-2 planes.

[S.E.] ZAKHAROV

No. 2702

2.11.50

Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade Zakharov about the fact that there are discrepancies between his report and Belov’s report about the air battle in the region of Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this discrepancy and report about the participation of Korean planes in battles and about the fact that two of them did not return.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188]

36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shhtemenko

From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 minutes 7.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade Filippov [Stalin]

In view of the fact that the infantry arms of the People’s Liberation Army are mainly trophies captured from the enemy, there is a great variety in the calibers of the rifles.

Such a situation creates great difficulty for the manufacture of ammunition, and in particular for the production of rifle and machine gun cartridges, especially as our factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.

At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divisions of the twelve armies, which are taking part in military operations in KOREA, have only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun cartridges. In the future, in connection with the development of military operations, we will have a very great need to supply the army with ammunition. If there is no change in military production, then the rearmament can be begun in the second half of 1951.

For overcoming the difficulties of the present time I ask you to review the question of the possibility of the delivery of small arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course of January and February 1951, according to the following list (name, quantity in pieces):

1. Soviet rifles 140,000.
2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000.
3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000.
4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns 80,000,000.
5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000.
6. Cartridges for light machine guns 37,000,000.
7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000.
8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns 20,000,000.
9. Pilots’ handguns 1,000.
10. Cartridges for pilots’ handguns 100,000.
11. TNT 1,000 tons.

I ask you to communicate to me the results of your review of my request.

I wish you health.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 2784

7.11.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 80-81]

37. 9 November 1950, VKB(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Roshchin with message for Zhou Enlai

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P78/448 To Bulganin, Molotov, Gromyko.

9 November 1950

Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)]

Decision of 9 November 1950 448.- Question of MID USSR.

To confirm the attached draft of a telegram to Comrade Roshchin on the question
of the participation of China in the Security Council.

SECRETARY CC
To p.448(op) pr.PB No.78

BEIJING

SOVIET AMBASSADOR
For transmission to Zhou Enlai.

I have received your telegram with the request for a consultation on the question of the participation of China in the [UN] Security Council.

In our opinion two variants are possible.

The first variant [is] to refuse to accept the invitation in the manner in which it was formulated in the Security Council. Motives: the invitation deprives the Chinese people’s republic of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most urgent questions of China, in particular the question of the military intervention in Korea and the question of the seizure of Taiwan by the United States of America, its right being limited only to the review of the report of MacArthur.

The second variant [is] to accept the invitation and to commission the Chinese delegation to make a statement in the Security Council on all the above mentioned questions, turning the discussion of the question into an indictment of the USA. If they do not allow the Chinese delegation fully to lay out its position, the Chinese delegation will walk out of the meeting and refuse to discuss even one report of MacArthur.

It seems to us that the first variant is more advisable.

You should not connect yourself to the conduct of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council, where he voted for the resolution of the English delegate [Gladwyn] Jebb, especially since, speaking between us, Soviet delegate [Jacob] Malik did not have an instruction to vote for the English resolution, but had a direct directive to put in a veto if the Soviet resolution was rejected. Malik apparently was carried away by the fact that he had nevertheless forced the Americans to vote in favor of inviting China, but he did not take into account that the form of the invitation adopted by the Security Council would place China in a disadvantageous position.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 371, Listy 4-5]

38. 15 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26901.
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.
From Beijing Received 06 hours 10 minutes 16.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV:
I fully agree with your proposal to reinforce Belov’s aviation force by an additional delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two lots, numbering 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces and to create a command apparatus for the air corps.

As concerns questions regarding the airports in MANCHURIA and the strengthening of all PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] measures, we will resolve them together with comrade [S.E.] ZAKHAROV.

I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes. I think that this is worth reporting to you.

I congratulate you on the successes!
MAO ZEDONG.
Nov 15, 1950.
NEW PARAGRAPH.
To Comrade FILIPPOV.
I report.
Your telegram was communicated at 20 hours 30 minutes local time 15.11.
ZAKHAROV
No. 2910
16.11

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 116 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 189]

39. 16 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26935

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev
From Beijing Received 20 hours 15 minutes 16.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
At present the number of our troops operating in Korea has increased from 18 (eighteen) divisions of 6 (six) armies to 30 (thirty) divisions of 9 (nine) armies. Moreover we have another 9 divisions of 3 armies in reserve. In connection with this, transport is faced with very large tasks. With regard to automobiles, we have already received agreement from the Government of the Soviet Union about delivery of 3,000 automobiles before December 15.

It is necessary that we urgently resolve the question of gasoline and lubricant. I ask you to confirm the delivery of gasoline and lubricant in the quantity indicated below:

1. New request: 10 thousand tons of gasoline, 2720 barrels (capacity of 53 gallons, the same as below) of lubricating oil for diesel engines, transmission oil 220 barrels, brake oil 110 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 144 barrels.

2. I ask you to ship the following oils on the quota agreed upon in the request made by the Ministry of Trade of the Chinese People’s Republic to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR: gasoline 7000 tons, diesel lubricant 2380 barrels, transmission oil 190 barrels, brake oil 95 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 126 barrels.

3. The total quantity of various oils (1 and 2), which we must acquire from the Soviet Union: gasoline 17,000 tons, diesel lubricant 5100 barrels, transmission oil 410 barrels, brake oil 205 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 270 barrels.

I ask you to deliver the first half (50%) of the aforementioned gasoline and oil by the end of December, and the second half (50%) by 20 January 1951.

Will this be subject to regulations?
We await your answer.
With Bolshevik greetings.

ZHOU ENLAI
No. 2917
14/16.11.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 117-118]

40. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram,
Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev
From Beijing Received 20 hours 45 minutes 17.11.1950
EXTREMELY URGENT
To Comrade Filippov [Stalin]
According to a report from Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient number of automobiles engaged in transport to the rear, enemy planes are inflicting losses on autotransport, and also it is not possible to ensure the supply of local human and material resources, food supply and winter clothing cannot be secured in time and the troops are experiencing hunger and cold.

A new operation will begin soon. Railroad bridges across the Yalu are subjected to bombardment by enemy planes every day.
The river is beginning to freeze, and it is not possible to build submerged bridges and pontoons. Therefore until such time as the river is frozen, so that automobiles can cross the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days transport at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and ammunition. If we do not, it will have an influence on the next stage of the fulfillment of the operation.
In view of this, besides the mobilization of all automobiles in Manchuria that could be mobilized on the front, we can mobilize a maximum of 200 automobiles from Northern China and immediately send them to the front to relieve the difficult situation.
I earnestly ask you to give a command to the commander of the Soviet Army on the Liaodong peninsula about the transfer of 500 automobiles for our army. These 500 automobiles will be reimbursed on the account of the portion which you promised to send from 25.11 to 25.12, numbering 3,000 automobiles.
Can you satisfy my request? I await your swift reply.
With bolshevik greetings.
Zhou Enlai
No. 2933
17.11 10:00

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 122-123]
With regard to the preparation of pilots for one bomber regiment, it is more convenient to prepare them in the Korean school we have in the Far East Maritime Region. The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber regiment, will also be given.

3. We agree to accept an additional 120 men in the Korean pilot school that we have in the Far East Maritime Region, to train them as technicians and crew for attack planes.

4. It is better that the Korean pilots receive flight training in the place where they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in our Maritime Region.

If you agree with these proposals, corresponding orders will be given to our military command.

FYNSI [Stalin].

No. 4/7556
20 November 1950
Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin.

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182]

45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR
To transmit to Comrade MAOZEDONG
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!
I received your telegram No. 3153.
I thank you for the information about the state of affairs in China, in connection with the successful offensive of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea.
Your successes gladden not only me and my comrades in the leadership, but also all Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the soul you and your friends in the leadership, the People’s Liberation Army of China and the entire Chinese people in connection with these enormous successes in their struggle against the American troops.
I have no doubt that in the war against the up-to-date and well-armed American army the Chinese army will receive great experience in contemporary warfare and will turn itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in the struggle with the first-class-armed German army received experience in contemporary warfare and turned into an up-to-date well-equipped army.
I wish you further successes.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
1 December 1950

Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 5]

46. 5 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved orders to Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Beijing (with message for Zhou Enlai)

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolshheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P79/167 To Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko
December 1950
Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of Politburo CC
VKP(b)[Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshhevik)]

Decision of 5 December 1950 167.- Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. 802.

To confirm the draft orders to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to Comrade Roshchin (attachment 2):

TOP SECRET
Attachment 1
to p.167(op) pr. PB No. 79

New York
To Vyshinsky
802. We are answering point by point.
Regarding point one. We agree with your proposal. However, you should not make the stipulations you proposed, that the Assembly has the right to review a question of aggression if the Security Council turns out not to be in a condition to fulfill its obligation regarding supporting peace. Such a stipulation would mean that we recognize as having legal force the resolution of November 3, which the Soviet delegation declared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Charter.

Regarding point two. We agree with your proposal. As for the invitation to a representative of the Chinese People’s Republic to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly, do not introduce a proposal about the invitation before you receive from us an additional order, which we will give after the government of the PRC makes it clear whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

Regarding point three. We agree with your proposal.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO
TOP SECRET
Attachment 2
to p.167(op) pr.PB No. 79

Peking
Soviet Ambassador
Urgently visit Zhou Enlai and communicate to him the following.

According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, the Americans will introduce into discussion at the [UN General] Assembly a question under the heading “The Intervention in Korea of the Central People’s Government of the Chinese People’s Republic.”

The Soviet delegation will express opposition to the inclusion of this question on the agenda. If it nonetheless is included, the Soviet Government needs to know the opin-
ion of the government of the Chinese People’s Republic—whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of the question raised by the Americans in the General Assembly. If Zhou Enlai asks what the point of view of the Soviet Government is on this question, you should answer that in this case, as well as in the case of the discussion of MacArthur’s report in the Security Council, the Soviet Government considers it more advisable that the Chinese government not take part in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

Telegraph the results.

A. Gromyko

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6]

47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Copying Prohibited
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Copy. From Beijing No. 35379 6 hours 55 minutes 7/XII 1950

Special Nos. 2522, 2523
TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

On December 7 at 3:00 Beijing time Zhou Enlai invited me to his [office] and transmitted the following in the name of the Chinese government:

At Lake Success representatives from India, England, Sweden and the general secretary of the UN Trygve Lie have recently appealed several times to the representative of the Chinese people’s republic [General] Wu Xiu-quan asking under what conditions it is possible to end the military operations in Korea.

Their aspirations are to hold the position in Korea at the 38th parallel.

Not wishing to put ourselves in a disadvantageous position and having the goal of holding the initiative in our hands and also showing assertiveness on this question, the government of the Chinese people’s republic intends to give the following instruction to Wu Xiu-quan for answering the representatives of India, England, Sweden and Trygve Lie:

“Military operations in Korea will be ended under the following conditions:
1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. The withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan strait and from the territory of Taiwan.
3. The Korean question must be resolved by the Korean people themselves.
4. The participation of a representative of the Chinese people’s republic in the UN and the exclusion from the UN of a representative of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek].
5. Convening a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the four great powers for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.
6. If the five aforementioned conditions for the cessation of military operations are accepted, the five great powers can send their representatives to convene a conference for signing the conditions of an armistice.”

Zhou Enlai transmitted the enumerated conditions in written form.

Further, Zhou stated that before sending the present conditions for cessation of military operations in Korea, the Chinese government wishes that Wu Xiu-quan consult with the government of the USSR and asks the Soviet government to express its opinion on this question.

Zhou Enlai earnestly asked [me] to transmit to the Soviet government that the Chinese government wishes to receive an answer today.

I stated to Zhou Enlai that what was communicated by him: the report, the conditions for ceasefire in Korea and the request for an answer will be immediately brought before the government of the USSR.

7.XII.50 ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 17-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 193-195]

48. 7 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bol’sheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P79/189 Copies to Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko. 7 December 1950.

Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 7 December 1950.

To Vyshinsky

No. 825. Your proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea we consider incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans more and more often are advancing a proposal about a cessation of military operations in Korea, in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops.

The draft of the Soviet delegation should include the following:
1. The immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
2. The resolution of the Korean question must be left to the Korean people themselves.

The text of your preamble does not elicit objections.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].

A. Gromyko

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 23-24 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 7-8]

49. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin transmitting message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

MID USSR No. 23343
Tenth department Received 19 hours 10 minutes 7/XII.1950

Dispatched 20 hours 40 minutes 7/XII.1950

Special No. 1691,1692
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
To BEIJING To SOVIET AMBASSADOR
SPECIAL FILE
TOP PRIORITY

2522. Immediately visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the following:
“We completely agree with your conditions for a ceasefire in Korea. We consider that without the satisfaction of these condi-
tions military activity cannot be ceased. In addition, we consider that you should not be too open and show all your cards too early before the representatives of the three states, who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. We think that the time has not arrived for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could use China’s five conditions to box us on the ear by [making] a UN resolution. It is not necessary to give this advantage to the USA.

We therefore think that it is possible at the present time to limit oneself to the following:

1. The Chinese Central People’s Government along with you, gentlemen delegates of England, Sweden, India would welcome the soonest possible conclusion of the military actions in Korea. China is applying all its strength in order to conclude quickly the military activity forced on Korea and China.

2. Therefore, we would like to know the opinion of the UN and the USA with regard to conditions for an armistice. As far as we know, you have not been commissioned by the UN or the USA to discuss with anyone the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, the delegation from England together with the delegation from the USA, France, Norway, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced into the First Committee [of the General Assembly] of the UN a resolution condemning China, thereby hindering the matter of a settlement of the Korean question.

3. In view of this we will eagerly await the opinion of the UN and USA about the conditions for a cessation of military actions in Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].”

Telegram the fulfillment.

GROMYKO.

7/XII-50
Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197]

50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filipov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak II U to Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 02 hours, 40 minutes 8.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T.
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I send you a copy of the telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak II U, sent 24:00 4.1 [January 4].

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it:

“To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We are simultaneously sending a copy to the commanders of the corps and army Comrades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Chzhou Biao, Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast.

1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry division and a unit of troops from the 117th infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of Siumsen was also taken on 3 January by units of our 66th army.

The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen and to areas further south.

It is supposed that the next attempt by enemy troops will be the defense of the river, which is beginning in the area of Chemul’po [Inchon], Kimpo, lokhei, and is going on along the south bank of the Kanko river, through Genziu, Seikheisio to Korio.

It is possible that the enemy, regrouping behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko river and the mountainous areas, will gather the remnants of its forces, gain time and make preparations for new military operations.

Another possibility is that, in case of further more powerful strikes by our troops, the enemy will withdraw to the south.

2. If we give the enemy the possibility to continue to occupy defensive positions along the south bank of the river Kanko, to control the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at Chemul’po for supply, then although Seoul will be in our hands, it will be under constant threat from enemy air force and artillery, which will be extremely disadvantageous for preparing our troops for a spring offensive.

If, in the presence of success, our troops make one more effort and destroy another unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to retreat from the south bank of the Kanko river, then we not only will be able to take the Kimpo airport and control the port of Chemul’po, but this will create more advantageous conditions for the preparation of our troops for a spring offensive.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals the following plan has been worked out:

a) To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the People’s Army for garrison duty in the city of Seoul.

The main forces of the corps will be deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, Dzinsori, Mokudo.

After rest and regrouping, in three days they must prepare to make a forced crossing of the Kanko river and at the appropriate moment occupy the Kimpo airport, Chemul’po port and consolidate themselves there.

b) Troops of the left column as before are under the unified command of Khan’ Sian’-chu.

The 50th army will continue to advance in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kiriu and the area to the northwest of these points. It will send out immediately a strong detachment to control the bridge across the Kanko river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river). This detachment will find out what the situation is, make active preparations for a forced crossing of the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the south bank and continue to carry out the battle in cooperation with the main forces.

If the enemy continues to withdraw to the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing him, to occupy Suigen and to wait for further orders.

The line of delimitation between the 50th army and the 1st corps of the People’s Army runs through Kokeiseki, Riusan, Kasaiwai. The line itself and the areas to the west of it belong to the 50th army, the areas to the east of this line belong to the 1st corps.

The 38th, 39th and 40th armies will put themselves in order, rest for three days (until 7.1 inclusive) and prepare for a forced crossing of the Khokukan-ko river above and below Seisen. They will first strike the enemy in the area of Uokkei, after which they will develop an offensive along a line from the southeast to the northwest on the enemy positions in the area of Risen, Kosi, Suien, Eitokho.

A detailed plan is being worked out by Comrade Hun Xianchu.
c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Biao, and also the 2nd and 5th corps of the People’s Army under the unified command of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint forces plan established earlier, must destroy the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Odzio, and afterwards await further orders. All the aforementioned troops must send spies and outposts toward the enemy troops located in front of the frontline.

When the troops of the right column begin a new offensive these units must be ready to render assistance. Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, Pak II U. 24:00 4.1.” With bolshevik greetings. MAO ZEDONG. No. 103 7.1.51.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 88-90]

51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Zakharov to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15451

Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING  Received 00 hours 50 minutes 13.1.51

EXTREMELY URGENT

To Comrade Filippov [Stalin]
I report - your ciphered telegram of 11.1 of this year to MAO ZEDONG was handed to ZHOU ENLAI at 23 hours local time 12.1. of this year.

ZAKHAROV
No. 207

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 121]

52. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry

ASSESSING THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN WAR, 1949-51
by Evgueni Bajanov

This article is based on the recently declassified Soviet archives and examines the political line of Moscow as well as of its allies, Pyongyang and Beijing, on the Korean Peninsula in 1949-1951, up to the armistice negotiations, which began in the summer of 1951.

The paper is divided into eleven sections in order to show more clearly the evolution of the policies of the three communist governments in Korea.

1. Stalin fears an attack from the South

Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea. Instead he was worried about an attack from the South, and did everything to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul. In 1947-1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the possibility of a unification of Korea, and refused to sign a separate friendship and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader Kim II Sung.1

In the beginning of 1949 the Soviet embassy began to alert the Kremlin to the growing number of violations of the 38th parallel by South Korean police and armed forces. On 3 February 1949 Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Shtykov bitterly complained that the North Koreans did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient numbers of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South. Receiving Kim II Sung in the Kremlin on 5 March 1949, Stalin showed an open concern about growing pressure from the opponent in the vicinity of the 38th parallel and emphatically told Kim: “The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important.”2

After Kim’s return to Korea, the situation did not improve. On 17 April 1949, Stalin warned his ambassador of an imminent attack from the South. The Soviet ambassador confirmed that a large-scale war was being prepared by Seoul with the help of Americans and raised alarm about the inability of North Korean troops to withstand the aggression.3 In May-August 1949 the Kremlin and Pyongyang continued to exchange data about a possible attack from the South. The USSR was clearly afraid of such an attack, and was nervous not knowing how to prevent the war. Stalin repeatedly castigated Ambassador Shtykov for failing to do everything in his power to maintain peace on the 38th parallel.4

2. Kim insists on war, Stalin disagrees

While Stalin tried to prevent a war in Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, demanding permission to liberate the South. On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow Kim II Sung said: “We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means.” The Soviet leader disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th parallel, and the possibility of American intervention.

Stalin added that only if the adversary attacked Pyongyang could they try military reunification by launching a counterattack. “Then,” the Kremlin chief explained, “your move will be understood and supported by everyone.”5

In August and again in September 1949, North Korean leaders resumed pressure on Moscow, hoping to convince it that: a) peaceful reunification was totally impossible; b) the Korean people wanted liberation and would not understand if the chance for reunification was missed; c) Northern armed forces were superior to the Southern army; d) after

continued on page 87

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Copy.
From BEIJING No. 1309 20 hours 05 minutes, 13.1.1951

Special No. 62
SPECIAL
TOP PRIORITY

Your order No. 48 has been fulfilled. Zhou Enlai asked to give great thanks to comrade Filippov for the advice and consultation. Further he stated that the Korean comrades will be informed. In addition, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai with a request to come to Beijing for a short time to discuss a number of questions. During their time in Beijing Mao Zedong will also talk over with Kim Il Sung the questions touched on in the memorandum.

13.1.51 ROSHCHIN
Spravka: no. 48 (from no. 837) of Jan 13, 1950. Vyshinsky proposed to visit Zhou
Enlai and transmit to him Filippov’s telegram regarding the memorandum of the Chinese government.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 123 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 13]

53. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15607

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Vasilevsky, Men’shikov
From BEIJING Received 14 hours 30 minutes 16.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

1. I received your telegram of 4.1.51. I fully agree with all the arrangements contained in your telegram. I thank you and the Soviet Government for the assistance you are rendering to us.

2. We have studied the draft agreement on military credit.

We fully agree with the draft of this agreement, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd points of the third article, to which were introduced changes on the basis of your telegram of 4.1 of this year, about which we requested Comrade Zakharov to inform you.

With regard to the signing of this agreement, Comrade Zhou Enlai will resolve this question together with Comrade Zakharov.

3. You communicated in your telegram that in the first nine and a half months of 1950 the USSR has agreed, in accordance with the agreement on credit of 14.2.1950, to deliver to China military goods in the amount of 140 million rubles.

Not long ago Comrade Wang Jia-xiang brought the requests of February and May for military goods that he received from the military-engineering administration of MVT to the general sum of 237,548,103.64 rubles, of which the request for February is 114,415,274.67 rubles and for May 123,132,828.97 rubles.

Thus, the total value of the military goods delivered, contained in our telegram, is 97,500,000 rubles less than the value of the military goods in the February and May requests.

Should it be considered that the military goods ordered in the requests have been sent only in part? Will this difference be covered in 1951? I ask you to communicate about this.

4. That you have established the amounts of military credit for 1951 is very good. As soon as we sort out the first two requests we will make an application for military goods for 1951, with a careful calculation of the cost of this military hardware, so that the total sum will not exceed the amount of 400,000,000 rubles established by you, so that the Soviet government will not be burdened by the fulfillment of our military applications.

5. I thank you for your decision about the delivery of railway equipment as a part of the military credit in accordance with the agreement on military credit, with a reduction of 25% of the cost of this equipment.

6. We agree that 5,000 automobiles delivered to us in 1950 and 12,000 automobiles which will be delivered in 1951 should be paid through trade exchange. I hope that you will review my request and communicate an answer about the delivery ahead of time of the remaining 12,000 automobiles for satisfying the needs of the front.

7. I ask you to communicate to us whether gasoline and aviation fuel, for military purposes, included in the application for military equipment sent after 19.10.1950, will be included in the military equipment stipulated by the agreement on military credit. Is the agreement on military equipment applicable to the aforementioned gasoline?

With bolshevik greetings!
MAO ZEDONG

No. 262
14.1.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, delo 337, Listy 4-5]

54. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 14 January 1951 message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15603

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
From BEIJING Received 14 hours 45 minutes 16.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I send you a copy of my telegram of 14 January 1951 to Comrade Peng Dehuai for transmission to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: “To Comrade Peng Dehuai. I ask that the contents of this telegram be transmitted to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The approximately 100,000 Korean recruits being trained in Northeast China must be incorporated into various corps of the People’s Army in the next 2-3 months, in the period of rest and reformation, so that the companies in all divisions of the People’s Army will be fully manned. There must be more than 100 men in each company and 10,000 - 15,000 men in each division.

In the Korean army there are too many units of the division and brigade type. It is necessary that all personnel be consolidated into fifteen divisions (approximately) and Soviet arms be apportioned to them so that these Korean divisions, cooperating with the Chinese volunteers, provide major support to them during the spring offensive (April-May), with the goal of finally resolving the South Korean question.

In the next two to three months the Chinese volunteers and the Korean troops must carry out serious and major work, in particular to replenish the troops with newly trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly trained soldiers imitate the experience of the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop armaments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store food and ammunition, to improve the work of transport and the rear service. Carrying out this work can secure the final victory.

It is possible that the enemy command will have two variants for conducting subsequent military operations:

1. Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. If this happens, it will be the result of our carrying out thorough preparations, because the enemy, having received information about the preparation work being carried out, will be convinced that our military forces have grown even greater, and therefore, fearing difficulty, he will withdraw from Korea.

2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.

If this happens, it is necessary for us to
carry out good preparation so that it will be possible to continue to fight. In the opposite case, we can repeat the mistakes allowed by the Korean troops in the period from June to September 1950.

But it is also possible that objective causes will force us to make a single operation in February, after which again to continue the respite and reformation for the purpose of completing the necessary preparation for the next operation. This also must be taken into account. However, if this does not happen, then conducting the last decisive operation after finishing the necessary preparation in two-three months, which was discussed above, will be necessary and practicable.

Chinese and Korean comrades must be patient and carry out the necessary preparation.

I ask you to communicate your opinion. MAO ZEDONG.”

With Bolshevik greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 260

15.1.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 1-3]

55. 27 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filipпов (Stalin) conveying 19 January 1951 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao re meetings with Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 minutes 27.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you a copy of the telegram from Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January 1951.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it. “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG.

I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL SUNG’s in the evening on 16 January 1951 and returned on the evening of 18 January 1951.

I report about the results of our meeting:

1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his comrades think that it is not possible to pursue the retreating American and puppet [South Korea] troops with the forces of the Korean People’s Army alone. This would also take on an adventurist character.

They stated that the Politburo regards as correct the proposal made from my side about the necessity of conducting rest and reformation for two months in order to make a forward advance cautiously, without hurrying. Although Comrade PAK HON-YONG had his own opinion, after the second elucidation I made on 17 January, about the positive and negative sides of a risky forward advance without carrying out preparation and a cautious forward advance with advance preparation, he was satisfied.

The Soviet adviser also agreed that the next operation is decisive, therefore with the approval of the Politburo of the Korean Workers’ party, it will be conducted better.

2. The question of the defense of the sea coast.

Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade RAZUVAEV put forth the following opinions: 26 brigade will be based in TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24 brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in BUGTKHENG, 69 brigade in KORIO. These brigades will occupy by battalion, portions of the defense along the western and eastern sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 men, and moreover their combat capability is not high.

In addition to this, three newly organized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO.

No decision was made about which units to leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL’PO. They also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volunteers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to leave one army, which will be located in TET-SUGEN.

1000 sea mines and 200,000 anti-tank and other mines have been received from the USSR. So far a decision was made to use 100,000 mines for defense of the sea coast and to place the sea mines in the most important ports. The task of defending the sea coast to the south of the SUIGEN-SANSIOKU line was assigned to the forward units. Defense of the port RIUGANPO, which is located in the area of SINGISIU, they asked to assign to troops V0 of northeast CHINA (one regiment is sufficient for this). In the main I agreed with the aforementioned plan for the defense of the sea coast.

I ask you to review.

3. The question of restaffing five corps.

It was decided that each corps must be composed of three divisions. At present, all five corps, with the exception of 1st corps, have 4-5 divisions. However, these divisions are not fully manned, there are 3,000-4,000-5,000 men. It is proposed that each corps fill out three divisions using the fourth division of the corps. In this way each division can be brought to an average of 7,000 men. I introduced a proposal to apportion 20,000 men per five armies from among the South Korean prisoners, but they did not agree with me.

With regard to my proposal to fill out the existing corps with the newly organized three corps, they did not agree with this. Although such a proposal was advanced by me, I considered it awkward to defend it further. They are planning the participation in the next operations of three of their corps.

4. A sufficient number of cadres were not prepared for carrying out work in the newly liberated regions.

SEOUL earlier had a population of 1,500,000 persons, at the present time it probably still has around 1,000,000 persons. There are great difficulties with food and fuel. No assistance is being given to refugees and the unemployed. There is only just enough food for the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Volunteer troops. In the regions to the west of KAIIDZIO and to the south of SIARIN there are large gangs, which have even seized some locations. We agreed to send one regiment and four battalions from the People’s Army to destroy these gangs. In addition it was decided to send one division from the 39th corps to the region to the west of the RININKO river to assist.

Thus, with the destruction of these gangs we will be able to receive several dozen tons of food.

Agreement in principle was obtained from our side in the discussion of such questions as: fortifying the areas under control; demoralization of the enemy—for example preparation for the spring planting in Northern KOREA; assistance to refugees; partial restoration of production in several factories; developing a political offensive in the areas temporarily occupied by the American and puppet [South Korean] troops; creation of armed detachments which will include
party and administrative workers and leaders of mass organizations which will penetrate the enemy’s rear, where under the cover of armed units of the detachment they will carry out organizational work in the locality; the combination of legal and illegal forms of struggle; striking a blow at the most reactionary elements; assistance to the progressive elements; attracting to their side the intermediate elements; and also all methods of carrying out these measures. However, in the future it will be clearer how to begin the organization of the implementation of these measures resolutely and with the correct placement of cadres.

PENG DEHUAI 12:00 19.1.51.”

With bolshevik greetings!

MAO ZEDONG

No. 449
26.1.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 37-40]

56. 29 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16052
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 18 hours 40 minutes 29.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T
To FILIPPOV [Stalin]

At the present time the American troops are trying to attack the regions of the southern bank of the Kanko river adjacent to Seoul and Chemul’po [Incheon]. Such a situation has developed that our troops are deprived of the possibility of continuing rest and reformation and are forced immediately to begin preparation for the fourth operation. I send you my telegram of 28.1.51, addressed to Comrade PENG DEHUAI.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and communicate your opinion about whether this is advisable from the point of view of the international situation:

“Comrade PENG DEHUAI!

1. I received your telegram of 27.1.51, 24:00, and your order about preparation for conducting military operations sent to all armies.

2. Our troops must immediately conduct preparations for the fourth operation, with the goal of the destruction of 20,000 to 30,000 American and puppet [South Korean] troops and the occupation of the area to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary.

3. In the course of the preparation for this operation it is necessary to hold Chemul’po, the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river and the city of Seoul, and also to draw out the main enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region. After the beginning of the operation the main forces of the North Korean and Chinese troops must break through the enemy’s line of defense in the region of Gensiu and make attacks in the direction toward Eisiu and Anto.

4. The withdrawal of Chinese and North Korean troops for 15-30 km to the north and the publication of a communication about support for the proposal about a temporary ceasefire is disadvantageous for us, since the enemy precisely wishes to cease military operations only at the time when our troops withdraw some distance to the north and in order that he (the enemy) can blockade the Kanko river.

5. After the conclusion of the fourth operation, it is possible that the enemy will conduct peace negotiations with us regarding a resolution of the Korean question. Conducting negotiations will then be advantageous for China and Korea. However, the enemy at present is calculating to return the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river, to the south of the line Seoul-Chemul’po and to blockade the Kanko river, so that Seoul would be under threat of shelling from enemy artillery, so as to thereby force us to cease military operations and begin peace negotiations. In this way the enemy wants to place China and Korea in a disadvantageous position, which we can in no case allow.

6. Our troops have not been able to receive reinforcements. Transporting troops is also inadequate. We have a very great difficulty in this regard. However, we are in a position to concentrate the main forces and with a strike in the direction of Gensiu-Eisiu destroy a unit of American troops and four to five divisions of South Korean troops.

I ask you explain this to a meeting of the high command. This meeting must be completely directed to the preparation of the fourth operation.

7. After the Chinese and Korean troops occupy the region to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary, they must again make a two to three months long preparation, after which to accomplish the last, fifth, operation of decisive significance. This is advantageous in all respects.

8. The ninth army group must in the near future be redeployed to the region of Pyongyang, Seoul, Chemul’po, Suigen for rest and reformation. At the same time they must fulfill the task of defending the given region so as not to give the possibility to enemy troops to land in Chemul’po an Tsinnampo. At the time of the fifth operation the given army group must participate in military operations on the western portions of the front.

9. At the time of implementing the fourth operation I ask you to think over the question of whether it will be better for the main forces of the Chinese and North Korean troops to divide into two echelons. Troops of each echelon must have a five day dry ration. Troops of the first echelon must make the breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the enemy to a determined border, and the troops of the second echelon must continue the pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation will continue for 10-12 days and that in this time it will be possible to destroy as many enemy troops as possible.

I ask you to communicate your opinion.

MAO ZEDONG, 28.1.51 19:00.”

No. 478.
28.1.51. MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 41-43]

57. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 633
BEIJING TO ZAKHAROV
FOR COMRADE MAO ZEDONG

Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I received your telegram to PENG DEHUAI of 28 January. I agree with you. From the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that CHEMUL’PO and SEOUL not be seized by the enemy, so that the Chinese-Korean troops can make a serious rebuff to attacking enemy troops.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 60/sh
leading the corps, but there are already army apparatuses. It would be better to organize the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions in each army, so that the army apparatus itself directly commands its divisions. In this case the Korean armed forces would have in its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the main command for assisting the most needy armies according to the course of the operation. With time, when the commanders mature, when there will be enough of them and when they learn to command joint divisions, then it will be possible to transfer to a corps system.

Of course, this reform should not be carried out now, but during a time of rest after conducting the operation.

Discuss these proposals and communicate your opinion.

30 Jan 1951

FYNSI [Stalin]

Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko

60. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung via Razuvaev

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].

On the 30th January, I reported:

1. To raise the battle readiness of the troops and to improve their quality, it is necessary to lower the number of army administrations and the number of divisions.

2. To produce the decrease in army administrations and divisions by increasing the three army administrations from Manchuria.

We await your answer.

FYNSI [Stalin].

No. 83/sh.

3 February 1951.

61. 4 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Razuvaev to Fyn-Si (Stalin) reporting message from Kim Il Sung

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].

To No. 4/854 and No. 81/sh.

I report:

KIM IL SUNG and the Korean comrades discussed your telegram about the composition of forces of the Korean People’s Army and arrived at the following conclusion:

1. To raise the battle readiness of the troops and to improve their quality, it is necessary to lower the number of army administrations and the number of divisions.

2. To produce the decrease in army administrations and divisions by increasing the three army administrations from Manchuria.

To reduce: two army administrations;

— four pd [infantry divisions]: 2nd army
- 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one pd by increasing 8th army
3. To temporarily keep naval brigades for the defense of bases and coastline.

To strengthen the naval brigades to significantly reduce VMU ["battle friction" that results from being understrength]; the sailor school and apparatus of naval command.

4. To carry out further reductions after the next operation, which will begin February 7-13, 1951.
5. To have the total number of army units and divisions be within the numerical limits that you recommended.

RAZUVAEV.
No. 375/sh
4.2.51
Copies: Stalin (2), Vasilevsky, Shtemenko,
File of 8th Administration

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348,
Listy 25-26 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,
Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 199-200]

62. 16 February 1951, cabled telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1078
Sent 22:03 16.2.51
Transmitted 22:55 16.2.51
BEIJING - To Comrade ZAKHAROV
Your request about advisers for the Chinese Air Army will be satisfied. I consider it more advisable to give you advisers who know China and are familiar with the air war in Korea. As adviser to the command of the Air Army we suggest Major General GOLUNOV, who is attached to General of the Army ZAKHAROV. The list of remaining advisers will be communicated separately.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
No. 635037
16 February 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336,
List 60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,
Delo 5, Papka 11, List 26]

63. 15 March 1951, cabled telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai (via Zakharov)

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1749

65. 5 June 1951, cabled telegram, Filippov to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3410
BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY
FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG
I received your telegram of June 4, and also the two directives of Comrade Peng Dehuai.

I also think, as do you, that the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the Anglo-American troops.

In my telegram I wrote mainly about the fact that it is risky to conduct maneuvers if there are no strong defensive fortifications in the rear, to which the main forces could be quickly withdrawn. Comrade Peng Dehuai writes that he is creating three defensive lines in the rear. If this is done and the defensive lines are truly serious, then the affair will proceed in a better way and the troops will not fall into encirclement.

You complain that you have little artillery, antitank guns and other arms. I communicated to you two months ago that the Poles have retracted their orders and we therefore could make for you additional deliveries of arms in this year, thus increasing the volume of military credit for 1951. Comrade Zhou Enlai welcomed this report of mine and told us that you will soon send new applications. However, there are no new applications from you. Why is this? How is this explained? Again I communicate to you that we could make new deliveries of artillery for you if you want this.

Comrade Peng Dehuai is right that it is necessary to strengthen the operations of partisan detachments in the enemy’s rear. This is absolutely necessary.

Comrade Peng Dehuai writes about the presence of a relatively high fighting spirit among the Anglo-American troops, and about
the fact that “serious rightist moods” have appeared among the Chinese troops. In my opinion this is explained by the fact that your local maneuvers with some forward advance but then a falling back, repeated several times, create among your troops the impression of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, but create among the Anglo-American troops the impression of their might. I fear that this situation can undermine the spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will not be possible to crush these unhealthy moods unless you prepare and carry out a serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of three to four enemy divisions. This would lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Anglo-American troops. This, of course, will not be broad and far from being an offensive, will be only a serious short blow against the enemy, but this will be the kind of blow that will sober up the enemy and raise the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. Moreover this would give you the possibility of undertaking then wider and more successful local maneuvers needed to exhaust the enemy.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 297/sh  
5 June 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 17-18]

66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448
Copies: Stalin (2)
From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

In the course of conducting the war in KOREA we have run into such serious questions as the financial question, the question of the conduct of military operations directly at the front, the question of the danger of a possible enemy landing on the sea coast in our rear.

We intend to send Comrade GAO GANG to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to inform you regarding the aforementioned questions and to ask your directions in the matter of the resolution of these important questions.

At the present time Comrade KIM IL SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of these questions with you.

I ask you to communicate your opinion about the possibility of this trip.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 2787
5.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 23]

67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY
for Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram about the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG and to discuss with them the questions indicated in your telegram.

On 8 June in the morning we will send a plane from Moscow to Peking to transport Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing on 9 June.

We ask you to give an order to your authorities about the unimpeded flight of the plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 303/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30]

68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advisor in Beijing Krasovsky

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559
BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY

According to our information, our pilots are training the Koreans very slowly and in a slipshod manner. You and General Belov apparently intend to make professors rather than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be overcautiousness on the side of our aviation specialists. If Russian pilots were trained during the war in five to six months, then why is it impossible to complete the training of Chinese pilots in seven to eight months? Isn’t it time to throw away this harmful overcautiousness? The Chinese troops will not fight without air cover. Therefore it is necessary to create more quickly a group of eight Chinese air fighter divisions and send them to the front. This is now your main task.

Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divisions can be held in the rear in North Korea, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese fighter divisions closer to the front. This is absolutely necessary. It is necessary to arrange matters so that the Chinese rely only on their own aviation at the front.

Report the fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557
BEIJING, TO ROSHCIN

Deliver immediately to the addressee.

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Today there was a conversation with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea [Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three questions were raised:

First—about an armistice. We recognized that an armistice is now advantageous.

Second—about military advisers. If they are very necessary to you, then we are ready to satisfy you.

Third—about the delivery of arms for sixteen divisions. There will not be objections from our side.

I won’t write about the details, since your representatives will report to you about them.

We consider it absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. We think that besides two or three aviation divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the front from central and southern China five or six divisions of MIG-9’s, which operate very effectively against bombers. Eight fighter
divisions on your front could fully satisfy the needs of the front. According to our information your pilots are already ready to fly. It is necessary to put them into battle more quickly, so that they will be not paper pilots, but battle pilots. We trained our pilots for action at the front in five months. Seven to eight months of training is fully sufficient for the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be the main question now for your front.

After the end of the conversation we received information that the Anglo-Americans intend to appeal soon to you and to the Koreans in the name of the sixteen nations fighting against Korea with a proposal about an armistice. But before making this proposal they want to strike a blow against our troops. It is possible that these are merely rumors, but it is fully possible and probable that these are not merely rumors, but corresponds to reality. We therefore advise you to hold tight the line of defense and not allow the enemy to advance.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

For Roshchin.

We ask you to familiarize Krasovsky with this telegram. We are sending him a special directive.

FILIPPOV

No. 302/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 31-32 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 31-32]

70. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20772

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 19:55 13 June 1951

Series “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

To my [telegram] No. 2967 (vkh. No. 20757).

13.6.51 at 22:00 Beijing time I received the following telegram addressed to you from MAO ZEDONG.

“To Comrade FILIPPOV,

I received your telegram of 13 June. Today I received a telegram from Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. I communicated our opinion on the question of an armistice to Comrade GAO GANG in order for him to relay it to you and receive instructions from you. I won’t write about it in detail here.

Comrade PENG DEHUAI very much needs Soviet advisers on strategy and tactics. It would be desirable if you could send them as soon as possible.

With regard to the participation of eight fighter divisions in battles, in accordance with your advice, I gave an order to the General Staff to draw up a plan. In addition, I gave an order to Comrade PENG DEHUAI that our troops firmly hold the line of defense at the second and third defensive lines and create a new defensive line.

The position at the front in June will be such that our forces will be comparatively weaker than those of the enemy. In July we will be stronger than in June and in August we will be even stronger. We will be ready in August to make a stronger blow to the enemy.

MAO ZEDONG

13.6.51

ROSHCHIN

No. 2974

13.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 55-56; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, List 34]


To Comrade Stalin, I.V.

We have received a reply telegram from Comrade Mao Zedong. We ask you to receive it and if time allows also to receive us today. We very much ask you to show us such a high honor. Then we will have the possibility to depart tomorrow to resolve all the questions in accordance with your instructions.

With communist greetings!

Gao Gang

Kim Il Sung

14 June 1951

[attached handwritten letter].

“To Comrades Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung:

I received your telegram of 13 June.

Concerning how to raise the question of negotiations about an armistice, we consider it inadvisable for Korea and China themselves to advance this question today, since the Korean army and Chinese volunteer troops must occupy a defensive position for the next two months.

It is better to act in this way:

1. To wait for the enemy to make an appeal.

2. It is hoped that, on the basis of the statement of [State Department official on-leave George F.] Kennan, the Soviet government would make an inquiry to the American government about an armistice.

It is possible to bring this about in two ways simultaneously, which are that from one side the Soviet government makes an inquiry, and from the other—if the enemy puts forth the question of an armistice, then Korea and China will express their agreement to this. We ask you to share opinions about which is more advisable and decide with Comrade Filippov.

3. Conditions for the armistice: restoration of the border at the 38th parallel; to apportion from both North Korea and South Korea an insignificant strip [to serve] as a neutral zone. A proposal that the neutral zone come only from the territory of North Korea will by no means be accepted. North and South Korea [should not] interfere with one another.

As concerns the question of the entrance of China into the UN, we consider that it is possible not to raise this question as a condition, since China can refer to the fact that the UN has in fact become an instrument of aggression, and therefore China does not at the present time attach a special significance to the question of entrance into the UN.

You must think about whether it is worth raising the question of Taiwan as a condition. In order to bargain with them, we consider that this question should be raised.

If America firmly insists that the question of Taiwan be resolved separately, then we will make a corresponding concession.

In the interests of the cause of peace we will resolve first of all the question of Korea. I ask you to appeal to Comrade Filippov and to receive orders from him.

4. We have ordered Deng Hua and the commander of the armies of the 13th army group immediately to return to the front and to hold firmly the present line of the front. In June and July preparations will be carried out intensively. In August we will carry out a larger operation. If the enemy does not make a large-scale amphibious landing in our rear, then our goal can be achieved. If the enemy
does not send new reinforcements to Korea and does not make an amphibious landing, then in August we will be significantly stronger than now.

5. Right now we are planning the transfer of our aviation units to the front.

Mao Zedong
13.6.51"

72. 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21039
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING  Received 21:15
21.6.1951
SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!
1. Comrade Gao Gang has returned and transmitted your opinion on various questions.
I consider that they are all correct and we must do precisely thus.
As regards the question of planting rubber trees, we intend immediately to start the planning.
I hope that the Soviet government will send its representatives to assist us in formulating plans.
2. Our troops’ eight months of experience in conducting war in Korea has clearly shown the great difference in the equipment of our troops and the troops of the enemy and the extreme necessity of improving the equipment of our troops. This is why we commissioned Comrade Gao Gang to appeal to you with a request about delivery to us of arms for sixteen divisions, to which you agreed. This is the minimal requirement of our troops in Korea for the present year.
Upon his return Gao Gang said that you consider our requirements in arms for each division insufficient and proposed to strengthen each division with tanks and artillery.
I consider this completely correct. This is necessary in war against imperialists.
I already sent a telegram to Comrade Siu Sian-tsien [with instructions] to conduct the negotiations fully in accordance with your opinion.
3. According a telegram received from Comrade Siu Sian-tsian after his preliminary negotiations with representatives of the Soviet General Staff, of the total quantity of arms for sixty divisions according to the calculation of the Soviet General Staff, arms for only sixteen divisions will be delivered this year (including for three Korean [divisions]), and arms for the remaining forty-four divisions will be delivered in 1952-1953. This is in contradiction to the needs and time frame of the Korean theater of military operations.
4. For the goal of satisfying the urgent needs of the Korean theater of military operations, I ask you to study the applications transmitted by Comrade Gao Gang to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian, and explore the possibility of fulfilling all deliveries of rifles, artillery, tanks, airplanes, automobiles, spare parts for automobiles and GSM, medicines and other military equipment, at 1/6 [of the total] monthly, from July to the end of the year, so that the various military units in the Korean theater of military operations receive replenishment according to the presently existing organizational structure, what is advantageous for the conduct of military operations.
5. With the availability this year of deliveries of arms according to our applications, the missing quantity of arms needed for units in accordance with the new organizational structure proposed by the Soviet General Staff can be delivered in the next year. Simultaneously with this, in accordance with the delivery of arms, we will reorganize the selections for this division and in that way gradually convert the sixteen divisions to the new organization.
6. We have delayed our applications for three months and have thus brought great harm to ourselves. Today we suddenly have appealed to you with such large numbers and want all this to be delivered in six months. This places before you great difficulties, especially in the area of transport. I do not know if this can be done. I ask you to do as much as is possible.

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3107 21.6.51

73. 24 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - Comrade KRASOVSKY
For Comrade MAO ZEDONG
We received your telegram of June 21.
1. You must already know from [Soviet ambassador to the UN Jacob] Malik’s speech that our promise about raising the question of an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. It is possible that the matter of an armistice will move forward.
2. As concerns arms for 60 divisions then I must say to you directly that to fulfill this application in the course of a single year is physically impossible and altogether unthinkable. Our production and military specialists consider it completely impossible to give arms for more than 10 divisions in the course of 1951. The fulfillment of the application for 60 divisions is possible, and at that with great difficulty, only in the course of 1951, ’52, ’53 and the first half of ’54, i.e. in the course of three years. Such is the final opinion of our production and military specialists. I have tried in every way to shorten these periods even if by a half year, but unfortunately upon examination it has turned out that this is impossible.
I will communicate about all this in more detail in a separate telegram and also about the staff-organizational structure of the present Chinese divisions.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
24 June 1951
No. 635177

74. 26 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing

relaying telegram from Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING - TO KRASOVSKY
We have received the following telegram from Mao Zedong:
“The government of the Chinese People’s Republic intends to send fighter divisions armed with MIG-15s to Korea for participation in the military actions, which will be much better than sending divisions armed with MIG-9 planes. It is therefore necessary in the course of one and a half to two months to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th
fight divisions, which are armed with MIG-9s, on MIG-15s, with a calculation of sending them to the front in September 1951.

The government of the Chinese People’s Republic asks you to give an order to the Soviet comrades in China to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter divisions on MIG-15s in the indicated periods.” As is obvious, Mao Zedong does not want to take MIG-9s from the Chinese airports for transfer to the front, but prefers to leave them in place, and to use at the front only MIG-15 divisions. Speak with Mao Zedong, and if our supposition is confirmed, tell him that your people will begin the retraining of Chinese pilots now flying MIG-9s for flights on MIG-15s. It seems to us that this does not require two months, but if the Chinese insist, then train them in the course of two months. Report the fulfillment.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
26 June 1951

Gromyko notes that the text of the letter was transmitted by Soviet ambassador Razuvaev by telegraph, using the telegraph line of the Ministry of War USSR.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 34-36]

76. 28 June 1951, ciphers telegram, Krasovsky to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21266
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 11:12 28.6.1951 SERIES “G”
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
I report:
A meeting took place 27.6.51 at 19 hours 30 minutes Beijing time.

In the conversation Comrade Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter aviation divisions, which have been trained on MIG-9s, must retrain on MIG-15s before being sent to the front. The period of retraining was established as one and a half to two months, so that these divisions could take part in the forthcoming operations in Korea.

To the question I raised about the construction of three additional airbases for the deployment of Chinese divisions, Comrade Mao Zedong answered that Nie Rongzhen in the name of the Prime Minister sent a telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung with a request to select a place to the south of Pyongyang and as soon as possible build three airbases there for jet planes.

The commander of the VVS [Air Force] of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] of China Liu Yalou, who was present at the conversation, stated that they have in mind using the MIG-9s in the future in schools and in the PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] system of the country.

An order was given by me to the commanders of the 17th, 144th and 328th fighter aviation divisions immediately to begin retraining the 6th, 12th and 14th Chinese fighter aviation divisions on MIG-15 planes, according to the confirmed program.

KRASOVSKY
28.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 85-86 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 40-41]

77. 30 June 1951, ciphers telegram, Mao Zedong to Filipppov (Stalin) transmitting 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21336
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 11:30 30.6.1951 SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
A telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung.
“Comrade Mao Zedong!
Malik’s speech on the radio on June 23 of this year aroused interest among the Americans in the question of the cessation of military actions in Korea. In the United Press report from Washington on June 28 it says: “Among American generals and senior officers the hope for a cessation of military actions in Korea grows with every day. [U.S. Commander Matthew] Ridgway constantly maintains contact with the chief of the American General Staff on the question of the possibility of a cessation of military actions.

From the reports being circulated it is known that as soon as Ridgway receives an order from the Ministry of National Defense of the USA, he will enter negotiations with the commander of the North Korean troops. A report about this will be made by the staff of UN troops.

How should we relate to this? How should we answer, if Ridgway wants to conduct negotiations.
I ask you urgently to communicate your concrete opinion on this question.

Kim Il Sung 29.6.51”
Mao Zedong
No. 3261
30.6

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 92 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 11]

78. 30 June 1951, ciphers telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 11:20 30.6.1951

SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
1. I have received your two telegrams (of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with your opinion.

a) As regards the time periods for the delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions, we should act only on the basis of the productive and transport possibilities of the Soviet Union, that is [we should] complete the deliveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the course of three years, and in 1951 complete the deliveries for ten divisions.

b) The staff-organizational structure you have proposed for the present Chinese infantry divisions is very good. We are implementing it. With sixteen divisions armed in accordance with this staff-organizational structure, the Chinese army will be far stronger than at present.

2. Malik’s statement secured us the initiative in the matter of conducting peace negotiations. On 28.6.51 I received through Comrade Roshchin the main positions of the contents of the conversation of Comrade Gromyko with the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, [Alan] Kirk. At the end of the text is stated: “Only two representatives must participate from each side. Moreover these representatives must be from the command of the corresponding military units, and not representatives of the governments.

Thus, from the Chinese side a representative of the volunteer troops must participate and not a representative of China, as a warring state.” I consider this completely correct.

I have received a telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung in which he asks how he should answer if Ridgway calls for negotiations to begin.

I have already communicated to Comrade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai that on the one hand we must carefully watch the military situation so as not to give the enemy the possibility of using this moment to his advantage, and on the other hand Comrade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai must discuss this question and be prepared, in case of a demand by the enemy to begin negotiations, to send corresponding representatives to conduct negotiations.

As regards how to answer Ridgway, after receiving a demand from Ridgway, the contents should be discussed and an answer formulated. What is your opinion on this question?

If negotiations begin, it is extremely necessary that you personally lead them, so that we do not find ourselves in a disadvantageous position.

I send you for familiarization the telegram of Comrade Kim Il Sung.

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3260
30.6

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 90-91]

79. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin); note: no photocopy available—text copied by hand and therefore exact heading not presented

The commander of the troops of the enemy, Ridgway, today made a statement with a proposal that representatives of both warring sides meet on a Danish ship in the port of Genzan for a meeting about the cessation of military activities. Simultaneously with this he stated that a corresponding guarantee is required, and only in this case can military actions be ceased.

I report to you my opinion on the given question.

I ask you to study [it] and give an answer, and I also ask you to communicate it immediately to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

1. Comrade Kim Il Sung presumably must give an answer to Ridgway on the 2nd or 3rd of July. In this answer he must express his agreement to representatives of both sides conducting negotiations about a cessation of military operations, and to propose a time, place and number of participants for the meeting.

2. As concerns the place for holding the negotiations, Ridgway suggests the port of Genzan.

Considering that Genzan is a fortified sea base of North Korea and the enemy intends to make a landing there, it seems to me disadvantageous to agree to hold negotiations in Genzan. Is it impossible to propose for the conduct of negotiations the town of Kaidzio, a point on the 38th parallel?

3. For the goal of securing for our representatives time for full preparation for the meeting it seems to me advantageous to name July 15 as the opening day of the meeting.

4. In light of the compressed period of time and the great importance of the given meeting I ask you to immediately communicate with comrade Kim Il Sung, personally to lead this meeting and simultaneously to inform me.

Mao Zedong.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 93-94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 12-13]

80. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3917
BEIJING—TO KRAZOSVSKY
Your telegrams about an armistice have been received.

In our opinion it is necessary immediately to answer Ridgway over the radio with agreement to meet with his representatives for negotiations about an armistice. This communication must be signed by the Command of the Korean People’s Army and the command of the Chinese volunteer units, consequently by Comrade KIM IL SUNG and Comrade PENG DEHUAI. If there is no signature of the commander of the Chinese volunteer units, then the Americans will not attach any significance to only one Korean signature. It is necessary decisively to refuse the Danish hospital ship in the area of Genzan as a place of meeting. It is necessary to demand that the meeting take place at the 38th parallel in the region of Kaesong. Keep in mind that at the present time you are the bosses of the affair of an armistice and the Americans will be forced to make concessions on the question of a place for the meeting.

Send to Ridgway today an answer roughly like this:

“To the commander of UN troops General RIDGWAY. Your statement of 28 June regarding an armistice has been received. We are authorized to declare to you that we agree to a meeting with your representatives for negotiations about a cessation of military actions and the establishment of an armistice. We propose as a meeting place the 38th...
parallel in the area of the city of Kaesong. If you agree, our representatives will be prepared to meet with your representatives July 10-15.

Commander in Chief of the Korean People’s Army

KIM IL SUNG

Commander in Chief of the Chinese Volunteer Units

PENG DEHUAI

Date:*

In your telegram you propose that we direct the negotiations about an armistice from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceivable and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we can give is advice on various questions. We also cannot maintain direct communication with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain communication [with him].

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

30 June 1951
No. 335/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 95-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 14-15]

81. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Razuvaev to S.M. Shtemenko reporting message from Kim Il Sung to Filippov (Stalin)

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

From Correspondent 20  Sent 1.7.51 5:30

Dispatched to 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 1.7.51 7:25

By telegram

Extremely urgent

To Comrade SHTEMENKO S.M.

I report:

1. The text of an answer of KIM IL SUNG to a meeting on negotiations was given by me according to the line of MID. It is proposed to give an answer 2-3.7.51.

Agreement of MOSCOW is urgently needed.

2. The composition of the delegation from the Korean People’s Democratic Republic is proposed to be three persons—the chief of staff of the Korean People’s Army NAM IL, the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs PAK DENCHO and [one] from the Chinese volunteers.

3. It is proposed that NAM IL declare the following points:

   a) Time of ceasefire and cessation of military operations;
   b) Withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel to the north and south for 5-10 km;
   c) Crossing the 38th parallel by land or air is prohibited from the moment of the ceasefire;
   d) Withdrawal of naval forces from the territorial waters of KOREA and removal of the blockade;
   e) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from KOREA within a two month period;
   f) Carrying out an exchange of prisoners of war and return of civilian population.

   Comrade KIM IL SUNG awaits corresponding advice of Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I ask your orders. RAZUVAEV

No. 1751

1 July 1951

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Department

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 3-4]

82. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung

8TH ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101529

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

We received your telegram of July 1, No. 1751.

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG that the Korean government must come to an agreement on the questions raised in the telegram with the Chinese government and together work out the proposals.

From the telegram received it is not apparent that the proposals of KIM IL SUNG have been agreed to by MAO ZEDONG.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].

No. 4/3208
2 July 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 5]

83. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 30 June 1951 message from Kim Il Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21404

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING  Received 12:10 3.7.1951

SERIES “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Telegram of Comrade KIM IL SUNG. “Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I propose to create our delegation with a composition of three persons: chief of general staff of the People’s Army of Korea NAM IL (head of the delegation), deputy minister of foreign affairs PAK DON CHO and one representative from the volunteer troops.

During the meeting of representatives of both sides we propose to advance the following points:

1. Beginning from a certain day and hour (according to Pyongyang time) both sides must cease fire and all other military operations.

2. Beginning from a certain day the troops of both sides must within three days withdraw from the 38th parallel for a distance of 10 km and create a buffer zone in that region.

3. Both sides must cease the transfer of land, naval and air forces across the 38th parallel.

4. Withdraw all foreign ships from the territorial waters of North Korea and liquidate the blockade of the sea coast north of the 38th parallel.

5. In the course of two months from the day of the ceasefire all foreign land, naval and air forces will withdraw from Korea.

6. In the course of two months from the day of the ceasefire an exchange of prisoners will be conducted.

7. The civilian population forcefully taken by the American and Rhee Syngmann troops from regions north of the 38th parallel must be returned.

I ask you urgently to give an answer after familiarizing yourself with the telegram.

KIM IL SUNG 30.6.1951."

MAO ZEDONG

No. 3304

3.7.51
4. "To create a control committee of neutral states which would supervise the fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this committee there must be an equal number of representatives of neutral states that have not taken part in the Korean war and that have been selected by both sides.”

We think that the enemy also will advance an analogous proposal, therefore we intend to show initiative in this. However, there will be numerous difficulties in the fulfillment of this point.

“Members” of the control committee proposed by the enemy will monitor our military transport on the Chinese-Korean border and at important communications points in Korea. Or should we not take the initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to advance his proposal, after which we will accept it?

I ask you to communicate your opinion about how to proceed expediently. To completely refuse to create a control committee seems also inadvisable.

5. “Both sides must carry out repatriation of prisoners of war. In the course of four months after the cessation of military operations to conduct a full mutual exchange of them, in separate batches.”

The enemy will possibly propose to conduct a one for one exchange. We must demand repatriation of all prisoners of war. However, the enemy has taken prisoner a relatively larger number of North Koreans, who have already been included in the ranks of the South Korean troops, and therefore this situation will possibly elicit an argument.

In our opinion the 5 basic points indicated above must be accepted at the meeting of military representatives of both sides.

In addition there are some other points:

1. "All foreign troops including Chinese volunteer troops must completely leave North and South Korea within a specified period of time (for example within three-four months), in separate batches."

This is also a very important point. However, the representatives of the enemy possibly will think that this question belongs among political questions and should not be resolved at this meeting.

I ask you to study and communicate whether our side should advance this point.

2. "Within a specified period of time (for example in several months) refugees of North and South Korea must be returned to the areas where they lived previously.”

Comrade KIM IL SUNG insists on advancing this point. However, to bring this about is very difficult. It is apparent that with regard to this question many differences of opinion and many arguments will arise between the representatives of North and South Korea, which can have an influence on the resolution of other important questions.

Or is it possible to advance this proposal?

If it leads to arguments and is not resolved, then transfer it for discussion at an international conference of a political character.

I ask you to communicate your opinion on the points indicated above. Furthermore, yesterday we sent Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade Li Kenong and his assistant to Korea. He will arrive approximately on 5.7.1951 and will discuss with Comrade KIM IL SUNG and other comrades various questions concerning the peace negotiations.

After this he will go to the area of Kaesong, whence he will secretly lead the negotiations.

I am also sending you the telegram which lays out the opinion of Comrade KIM IL SUNG on this question.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 3305
3.7.51
agreement of the sides. The fifth point should be proposed and you should insist on it.

As concerns your remaining two points (about the withdrawal of all foreign troops and about refugees), both of these proposals should be advanced and should be insisted on.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].

No. 340/III
3 July."

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 11]

86. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 2 July 1951 telegram from Mao to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21412
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 13:50
3.7.1951
SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade Filippov!
I send you the text of my telegram to Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG.

“Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG!

The period of preparations for and conduct of negotiations with representatives of the enemy will occupy approximately 10-14 days. I ask you with all seriousness to fulfill the following points:

1. In the course of the 10 days that we have, to make every effort to increase the personnel of the front line units and especially to replenish them with arms and ammunition.

I ask Comrade GAO GANG to transfer from the rear to North Korea in no more than 10 days the personnel, arms and ammunition marked for transfer. It is necessary to be prepared for the fact that after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations it will be impossible to transfer the aforementioned personnel and armaments.

2. To heighten vigilance up to the limit. Units of the first line must be prepared to repulse a possible large-scale attack by the enemy and intensive bombing of our rear either before or during the negotiations, which the enemy may undertake in order to force us to sign a disadvantageous agreement.

If the enemy begins a large-scale attack, our troops must go over to the counterattack and defeat the enemy.

3. It is necessary to issue an order to second corps Yang Chengan and to the 50th corps to depart quickly for the indicated regions so that the enemy cannot make use of the opportunity to make a landing in Genzan.

Our 38th, 39th and 42nd corps must be ready to repulse possible landings by the enemy on the western coast.

4. I ask you to think about what could occur after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations and be prepared for everything that needs to be done.

MAO ZEDONG 2.7.51.”

MAO ZEDONG
No. 3308
3.7.51
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 14–15]

87. 13 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 12 August 1951 telegram from Li Kenong to Mao re armistice talks

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 22834
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin
From BEIJING Received 17:20
13.8.1951
SERIES “G” T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!
I send you for familiarization the telegram received from Comrade Li Kenong on 12 August 4:00.

“To Comrade Mao Zedong.

1. I received your telegram of 11 August 7:00.

2. At the evening meeting the mistaken views of the enemy became even more intensified. The enemy considers that it is possible through pressure to force us to abandon discussion of the question of the 38th parallel. He has already four times expressed his wish to discuss a proposal about a military demarcation line and a buffer zone on the basis of the present line of the front and the present military situation.

We consider that the goal of this is to avoid defeat in the area of propaganda but also secretly to show that he can alter his proposal. Taking this into account, in our statement in today’s meeting we pursued the goal of striking a blow against his unfounded theory of refusal to discuss the question of the 38th parallel, and also tried to ascertain if he intended to abandon his unfounded proposal.

At today’s meeting the enemy displayed some interest in the portion of our statement where we tried to ascertain his intention. However, in his statement in the second half of the day the representative of the enemy expressed a strong [sense of] injustice and tried to lay on us the responsibility for the impasse that has been created in the negotiations.

Our statement for tomorrow will be constructed on the basis of your instructions. The goal of the statement will be to smash this [claim of] injustice of the enemy, to unmask his capacity for deception and simultaneously to advance such questions as to force the enemy more clearly to express his position.

The main goal of the statement is once again to underscore that if the enemy does not renounce his unfounded proposal, there will be no progress in the work of the conference. We consider that we can also express our wish to change the proposal about the buffer zone in the area of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line only in such case as the enemy clearly gives us to understand that he abandons his earlier proposal.

3. After the resumption of the work of the conference, the mistaken views of the enemy have become even more intensified and the enemy has become even more convinced that we yearn for peace, and therefore it is possible to get concessions from us. All this was possible to foresee.

However, from the entire course of the conference and the general situation outside the conference it is apparent that it is not possible to force the enemy to accept the proposal about the 38th parallel. In the course of several days the enemy on the one hand will put pressure on us and try to force us to be the first to make a concession, and on the other hand will prepare for a possible breakdown in the conference.

Therefore we consider it necessary to work out a definite resolution with regard to
the 38th parallel.

If our final goal consists of conducting a struggle for the principle of the determination of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line and if in this regard we can admit only certain alterations, then we should have in mind a breakdown in the negotiations and we must prepare for this.

In the opposite case we should have some kind of compromise position determined. Our past proposal, it is true, could not foresee the possible development of the present situation, but it is also not possible to win much time through action in accordance with your orders contained in the telegram of 17.7.51 about a concession to the enemy for the purpose of gaining time.

4. We (Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang and Qiao Guan-hua) suggest that the final goal of the enemy is to cease military operations at the present front line. In relation to this the enemy may allow small alterations.

It is thus necessary for us to decide: to struggle for the 38th parallel and prepare for an end to the negotiations or, avoiding a breakdown in the negotiations, to carry on the struggle for the cessation of military operations and to study the question of the cessation of military operations at the present front line.

Having studied, on the basis of the limited materials we have, the general world situation, the needs of our state and the fact that at present Korea cannot continue the war, we think that it is better to think over the question of cessation of military operations at the present front line and bring the conference to a breakdown.

In connection with this it is necessary to take into consideration that it is possible to gain some concessions from the enemy in the discussion of the proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line.

Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5 years time for preparation of forces.

Of course, if the enemy does not in any way abandon his unfounded proposal, which he is at present insisting on, then we also intend to choose only the path of a schism.

Having limited materials at our disposal, the situation has been studied superficially. We urgently ask your instructions for future actions.

LI KENONG
12.8.51 4:00.”
MAO ZEDONG
No. 4061

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, Listy 56-58]

88. 27 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23256

Copies: Stalin(2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulgannin
From BEIJING 01:30 27.8.1951
SERIES “G”

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade Filippov!

In view of the fact that the enemy was not in a position to withdraw from the impasse created in the course of the negotiations on the question of a military demarcation line, he has undertaken a whole series of provocation actions.

On August 19 enemy troops, dressed in civilian clothes, made a raid on our security forces in the neutral zone in Kaesong, as a result of which one man was killed and one was wounded. After an investigation by representatives of both sides, the enemy in justifying himself stated that this was [committed by] partisans from the South Korean partisan detachment active in our region, and therefore he does not take any responsibility for this.

After this, on the night of August 22, one enemy plane dropped nine bombs on the territory of the neutral zone in Kaesong and fired on the house where our delegation is quartered. Although American officers came to investigate that same night, the enemy impudently refused to acknowledge their actions and contended that the fragments and craters found there are not from air force bombs. After this, the enemy, contradicting the former, said that the raid was made by an unidentified plane.

The enemy dared to make these impudent provocations because he considered that our side would not make a breakdown in the negotiations over this. He therefore wanted to use this measure to put pressure on us.

Of course, it is possible [that it was] a South Korean secret service plan to break up the negotiations, but the possibility is excluded that Syngmann Rhee could send a plane to make an attack on Kaesong in the region of the building where the negotiations are being conducted on his own initiative, without agreement from the Americans. Therefore, the provocation acts of the enemy have caused us to make a decisive counterstroke.

We have declared a temporary cessation of the negotiations until the enemy accepts responsibility for what has happened. The negotiations will not be resumed until we receive a satisfactory answer—we’ll let them cool their heels. However, we do not want to take the initiative in declaring a breakdown in the negotiations.

We suppose that the enemy will not openly acknowledge his provocation acts.

The dragging out of the negotiations can end in two ways.

First, the delay may bring the negotiations to a breakdown.

We are forcefully preparing ourselves to resist a possible attack by enemy troops directly at the front. We are simultaneously strictly defending the ports on the western and eastern coast of North Korea from landings by the enemy. For the last several days enemy planes have passed through the area of the following cities on the China coast: Tsingtao, Shanghai, Hangchow. This was also done for provocation purposes.

Simultaneously with this, the enemy wanted to reconnoiter the air defense of our coastal regions. With regard to this, we want to strengthen our command in Korea and the air defense of the cities located in the coastal region. In a subsequent telegram I will communicate to you a draft [plan] for sending Soviet military advisers to work with the Chinese volunteer troops in Korea.

Simultaneously with this I will ask you about an additional delivery of artillery armaments.

Second, it is possible that as a result of the delay in the negotiations the enemy will find the means to extricate [himself] from the impasse and an agreement will be reached on the question of a military demarcation line.

At the present time we want to use the period of the break in negotiations for conducting a cold war in order to expose the impudent provocation acts of the enemy. However, we suppose that the enemy will not openly acknowledge his provocations.

If after some period of time the situation will develop so that the enemy wishes to renew the negotiations, then we think that at our own initiative we can propose a way
which would lead to a turn in the negotiations and to force the enemy to agree with this.

Comrade Kim II Sung suggests for the purpose of securing the neutral zone at Kaesong to ask representatives of neutral states to participate at the conference as monitors and witnesses for the period of negotiations, as a necessary condition for the resumption of the negotiations. Moreover, these representatives can be used in the future as a control organ for the implementation of the ceasefire.

How do you view this? Do you consider this necessary or do you have a better way? I ask your orders on the above.

With greetings. Mao Zedong.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 86–88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53]

89. 28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P83/280
28 August 1951 Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky
Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]
Decision of 28 August 1951
280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong of 27 August (No. 4279)
To adopt the attached draft answer of Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong.
SECRETARY CC
To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83
TOP SECRET
BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY
For transmission to MAO ZEDONG
“Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram of August 27.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations in Kaesong and with your line on the necessity of getting a satisfactory answer on the question of the incident provoked by the Americans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. As before, with regard to this we will proceed from the fact that the Americans have greater need to continue the negotiations.

We do not see the use in inviting, according to your initiative, representatives of neutral states to participate in the negotiations as monitors and witnesses during the present period of negotiations. The negative side of this proposal is that the Americans will view it as [an indication] that the Chinese-Korean side has more need quickly to reach an agreement about an armistice than do the Americans. If you are of such an opinion on this question, then you must communicate this to Comrade Kim II Sung.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].”

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, continued on page 92]
90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951

 SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I agree that it is not advisable to take the initiative in inviting representatives of neutral states as monitors and witnesses at the present stage of the negotiations.

I have already communicated about this to Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4358
30.8.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89]

91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 16:20 8.9.1951

 SERIES “G” T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

In my telegram to you of 27.8 of this year I communicated to you that we intend to ask the Soviet Government to send its military advisers for work among the troops of the Chinese volunteers in Korea.

After studying this question and consulting with the Main Military Adviser Comrade Krasovsky, we consider that it is necessary to invite 83 advisers:

1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer troops: in all nine persons, including: Main adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser on intelligence - 1, adviser on communications - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on VOSO [voennye soobshchenie, military communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns [samokhodnym ustanovkam] -1, adviser on engineering matters - 1.

2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 persons. Two advisers to each army, specifically: adviser of the command of the army and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the army - 1, adviser on operational questions - 1.

3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all 83 persons. Three persons in each corps, specifically: adviser of the command of the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on artillery - 1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns - 1. It is hoped that the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea through Beijing in September and October 1951.

I ask you to study this question and communicate your decision.

With greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 4492
8.9.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Listy 98-99]

92. 10 September 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

BEIJING

To Comrade KRASOVSKY
for Comrade Mao Zedong

“Comrade Mao Zedong!

We have received your telegram of 8 September.

We agree to send a main military adviser and a group of military specialists as military advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea.

We consider it advisable to resolve the question of sending military advisers to the armies and corps after the main military adviser familiarizes himself with the situation on location and presents his considerations on this question.

As main military adviser for the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send General of the Army Zakharov.

If you agree with this decision of ours, then General of the Army Zakharov can depart soon for Beijing for further movement to the location of the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin].”

3-ae.
10.IX.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 109]

93. 14 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25902

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 13:40 14.11.1951

 SERIES “G” T.
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

After the resumption of negotiations for cessation of military operations in Korea, in view of the large losses at the front over the last two months and the increase in demands within America and outside its borders for cessation of military operations, the possibility of the American side accepting the conditions for an armistice has increased. However, at the same time, taking into account internal and external politics, the American government is still trying to keep the international situation tense, and therefore the Americans, while actively engaged in spying and carrying out a policy of an advance in the course of the negotiations, are trying to drag out the negotiations.

The main question in the negotiations is the determination of the demarcation line. In place of the demand for designation of the demarcation line deep in the rear of our troops, the enemy has proposed to designate it on the basis of the present line of the front, with some alterations and with the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone.

At present the enemy is already demanding the designation of the line in fact contiguous with the line of the troops at the time of the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations as the demarcation line without the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. We are insisting on the cessation of military opera-
tions at the present front line and the designation of the present line contiguous to the troops of both sides as the demarcation line with the introduction of alterations in the line contiguous to troops of both sides in case of alterations of it in the period of the achievement of an agreement on all points of the agenda. At the present time the enemy is fighting with us precisely on this question, but we assume that this fight will not continue for long.

Our proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line and our agreement to set aside the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the convening of a political conference, was made not only because the present negotiations are negotiations about cessation of military operations and [because] the enemy will not in any case want to exchange eastern mountainous regions to the north of the 38th parallel for low-lying regions to the south of the 38th parallel, but also because in case the enemy refuses to leave the eastern mountainous regions we also have mountainous regions there [that are] advantageous for defense; as regards the western coastal plain to the south of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us because it has a much greater population than the eastern regions, and furthermore it is rich in agricultural products, plus the region of Kaesong is an advanced post for taking Seoul.

Comrade Kim Il Sung during the discussion of armistice conditions in Beijing in June of this year had the same opinion on this question. This time it also was done with his agreement.

As regards the discussion of the question of monitoring at the negotiations, we earlier suggested to propose to create an organ for cessation of military operations, in which would be included representatives of both sides, and to assign to it the task of monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the cessation of military operations and monitoring in the buffer zone.

However, the enemy is sure to demand the establishment of monitoring in the rear of both sides, in order to limit the transport by both sides of reinforcements and military goods.

We intend to agree to the establishment of monitoring at 1 or 2 border points of both sides and in accordance with your instructions to propose to transfer the monitoring functions to neutral states, in other words to states that are not participating in the war. We want to invite three states to fulfill these tasks: the Soviet Union, Poland and India.

It is possible that the Americans will oppose this at the beginning. Then we will propose to introduce [as monitors] representatives from Sweden and one state of Latin America.

As regards the exchange of prisoners of war, we will oppose exchange according to the principle of 1 for 1 and will propose exchange according to the principle of return of all prisoners of war by both sides.

I think it will not be difficult to reach agreement on this question.

On the question of the governments of the interested states convening a conference of high level officials, three variants are possible:

1. Convening a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting negotiations. (It is possible that America will propose this variant.)

2. Convening a conference with the participation of four states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England and representatives of North and South Korea.

3. Convening a conference with participation of seven states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England, France, India, Egypt and representatives of North and South Korea.

I ask you, proceeding from the international situation, to give instructions regarding which of the three variants is best or propose a new variant.

At the present time, on the basis of the aforementioned we will achieve cessation of military operations this year. At the same time, we will carry out the necessary preparation in case of a dragging out of the negotiations by the enemy and their breakdown. Expecting that the negotiations will be drawn out for another half year or year, we have moved toward economizing on our human and material forces in the Korean theater of military operations and we are pursuing the tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal of holding the position we presently occupy and inflicting great manpower losses on the enemy, in order to gain victory in the war.

Within the country we are preparing for the reorganization of the army, reduction of the bureaucracy, introduction of a regime of economizing, increasing production and further strengthening of the campaign to aid Korea and struggle against American imperialism, for the purpose of ensuring the further conduct of the war in Korea, securing also by financial means the stabilization of the scene within the country, and also strengthening state construction and mainly construction of defense.

In the present year, in light of rendering aid to Korea and the struggle against American imperialism, the budget of the Chinese state in comparison with 1950 has increased by 60%. 32% of the total budget is directly being used in the Korean theater of military operations. (Military credit extended to us by the Soviet Government is not included in this calculation.)

Thus, if a regime of economizing is not introduced now, in the next year the budget will increase even more, which inevitably will have an influence on finances and lead to a great rise in the prices of goods, which in turn will create difficulties at the front, and also in the area of construction in the rear. It is true that achieving peace as a result of the negotiations is advantageous for us, but we also are not afraid of dragging out the negotiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able to achieve victory. At the same time we will be able successfully to carry out various measures within the country and secure stabilization and further development in the area of politics and the economy.

I ask your instructions on the above.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 5631
14.11.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 16-19]

94. 19 November 1951, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

Ciphered Telegram

Copies: Stalin (2), Copy

From BEIJING 17:1019/XI.1951

Special No. 1821

TOP PRIORITY

SPECIAL

19 November at 18 hours Beijing time I was invited to visit Zhou Enlai, who asked me to transmit to Comrade Filipov the request of Mao Zedong to give an answer to the telegram of Mao Zedong to Comrade Filipov [Stalin] on the question of negotiations in
Korea, which was transmitted to the Center on 14 November through Krasovsky.

Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the telegram and added that while awaiting the reply of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had already twice declined to meet with American representatives in Korea.

19.XI.51 ROSCHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62]

95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov to Mao Zedong

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/421

19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky

Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951

421. Telegram of Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

To adopt the attached draft answer of Comrade Filippov to the telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong on questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

SECRETARY CC

To p.421(op) pr.PB No.84
Top Secret

BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY

For transmission to Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

“Comrade Mao Zedong!
We received your telegram on the questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations.

The entire course of the negotiations for some time past shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly concluding them. This is based on the overall international situation.

We consider it correct that the Chinese/Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.

We consider your position on the definition of the line of demarcation and the establishment of monitoring in one or two border points to be correct. We also agree with you about the composition of the commission for the fulfillment of monitoring functions.

Your position on the question of an exchange of prisoners of war is completely correct and it will be difficult for the opponent to dispute it.

As regards the possible variants of convening a conference for the further resolution of the Korean question after the conclusion of an armistice, it seems to us that it would be more expedient to convene a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting the negotiations, with the obligatory participation of representatives of North and South Korea.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

19 November 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 65, Delo 828 [9], Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy of the telegram sent to Beijing in found in [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23]

96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko

19 November 1951

Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951

422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev to Mao Zedong.

To adopt the attached draft instruction to Comrade Razuvaev.

SECRETARY CC

To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84
Top Secret
Top Priority
NORTH KOREA
To RAZUVAEV

1352. From your telegram it is not clear in connection with what and on whose initia-
tive the question arose about an appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and the Security Council with a demand concerning a speeding up of the resolution of the Korean question. It is also not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, since you do not communicate anything about this in your telegram.

An appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops along the front line and the creation of a two kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean side, which is politically disadvantageous.

Therefore, not having the text of the appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chinese comrades and not knowing the motives which are guiding the Korean friends, we consider it necessary that you advise the Korean friends to set aside resolution of the question of an appeal until the elucidation of the aforementioned questions.

We await a more detailed report from you.

Confirm receipt.

A. GROMYKO

19/XI/51

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 65-66]

97. 20 November 1951, Gromyko to G.M. Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to Razuvaev

To Comrade MALENKOV G.M.

I am sending a draft telegram to Comrade Razuvaev. I ask you to review it.

A. Gromyko
20 November 1951
No. 334/ag
Copies: Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev
TOP PRIORITY
NORTH KOREA
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

We draw your attention to the inadmissibility of your actions in connection with the appeal of the Korean friends to the UN on the question of speeding up a peace settlement in
Korea.

You communicated only on 18 November (your No. [number is illegible]) about the intention of the Korean friends to put forth an appeal to the General Assembly and the Security Council with demands: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops from the front line and creation of a 2-kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea—asking if such an appeal would contradict the statement of Comrade Vyshinsky.

Since we knew nothing about the proposed appeal of the Korean friends with a statement of the indicated demands, or at whose initiative arose the question of putting these demands before the UN, we asked you to elucidate (our No. 1059).

Without waiting for an answer to your telegram, in which were laid out the demands of the Korean friends mentioned above, you informed us (Your No. 1353 of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 November, the text of the statement by Pak Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the radio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry (our No. 1059), on the question of the indicated demands of the Korean friends you limited yourself only to a report that you had raised the question at your own initiative and to a repetition of the question of whether there is a discrepancy between the proposals of Comrade Vyshinsky about withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel and agreement in Kaesong to the point of the agenda about the establishment of a demarcation line. Concerning the appeal, you also only reported that it would be announced 19 November.

Thus, both in telegram No. 1353 of 19 November and in telegram No. 1355 of 19 November, you informed us that the Korean friends will announce their appeal, even though at that time you did not have instructions from us and could not yet have received an answer to your inquiry. As a result the Korean friends made the appeal without agreement with us.

In that way you acted inadmissably thoughtlessly. Your guilt is aggravated also by the fact that you did not even take the trouble to find out from the Korean friends whether they had reached agreement with the Chinese friends about the appeal to the UN with the aforementioned demands, and you elucidated this only when you had received a direct order to do so and after the Koreans had already made their statement. Learn this in the future.

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 46-48 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 27-29]

98. 21 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Razuvaev

MID USSR
Tenth Department Received 18:35 21.XI.1951

Sent 20:50 21.XI.1951
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
To NORTH KOREA
To RAZUVAEV TOP PRIORITY SPECIAL

On 20 November the following directive from Comrade Filippov [Stalin] was sent to Roshchin:

“Explain to Mao Zedong and also to Kim Il Sung through Razuvaev, that there is indeed a difference between Vyshinsky’s demand about the immediate withdrawal of USA troops across the 38th parallel and the present position of the Chinese-Korean comrades about the delineation of the demarcation line at the present front line. Vyshinsky could not speak otherwise in order to demonstrate the injustice of the USA position of refusing to withdraw their troops beyond the 38th parallel. Vyshinsky’s position is advantageous to the Chinese-Korean comrades, since it demonstrates from one side the greediness of the Americans and from the other side the tractability and peaceableness of the Chinese-Korean comrades, who are making serious concessions for the sake of achieving peace.”

In view of the fact that Comrade Roshchin does not have communications with you and therefore cannot fulfill through you the order about transmitting to Kim Il Sung the elucidation given in the directive of Comrade Filippov, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is sending the directive to you.

Confirm receipt.
Immediately telegraph the fulfillment. 21.XI.51 GROMYKO

21.XI.51 Copies: Stalin, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, papka 11, Listy 67-68]

99. 25 December 1951, memorandum, Gromyko to Razuvaev

To Comrade STALIN I.V.

According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, reports have been published lately in French and American newspapers in Paris which underscore the inevitability of a breakdown in the peace negotiations in Korea and the possibility of broadening the Korean conflict and which lay the responsibility for this on the Korean-Chinese side (telegram No. 812).

In connection with this, Comrade Vyshinsky is introducing a proposal that by the time the period for agreement about a demarcation line [expires], i.e. by 27 December, the Korean-Chinese command publish a communiqué about the course of the negotiations with an exposure of the position of the Americans, which is aimed at drawing out and breaking down the negotiations for an armistice in Korea. In the opinion of Vyshinsky, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] DPRK should send such a communiqué to the chairman of the General Assembly of the UN with a request to publish it as a document of the UN and to send it to all the delegations in the Assembly session.

MID USSR considers the above indicated reports of the French and American newspapers as blackmail, done for the purpose of putting pressure on the Korean-Chinese side.

As regards the communiqué proposed by Vyshinsky, in the opinion of MID, it is scarcely necessary to give advice to the Koreans and Chinese on this account, since they systematically publish reports which disclose the line taken by the Americans in the negotiations about an armistice in Korea. From the other side, the distribution of a Korean-Chinese communiqué as a document of the UN will not give any practical results, and a request from the Koreans and Chinese about this can be evaluated as a sign of their weakness.

In view of this, MID considers that to give any kind of advice to the Korean and Chinese governments regarding the communiqué is inadvisable.

A draft resolution is attached.
I ask you to review.

A. Gromyko
25 December 1951
No. 396
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008

From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951

Cables: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77]

100. 31 January 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

We simultaneously will vigilantly follow the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA. They are trying to bring an end to the war in Korea, therefore in recent days the enemy was forced to set aside the discussion of the question of limiting restoration and construction of airports in Korea and moved to discussion of small questions concerning the agreement.

According to the concrete conditions of the text of the agreement on an armistice proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as before, this text is not final, in other words that, as before, the enemy has included conditions about limiting the restoration and construction of airports and about liberation of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after having declared that these conditions can be omitted and it is possible not to discuss them. From this it is obvious that the possibility of reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of course, we never have and are not now counting only on these possibilities.

For the past period of time, in view of the deliberate prolongation of the negotiations by the enemy in the course of the negotiations for an armistice in Korea, up to the present time a final agreement has not been achieved.

However, on the basic questions of the cessation of military operations, for example: on the question “Establishment of a military demarcation line between the two sides for the purpose of establishment of a demilitarized zone” an agreement has already been reached on three points.

On the question “working out practical measures for the implementation of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the personnel, powers and functions of the apparatus for monitoring the implementation of the conditions of the ceasefire and armistice” an agreement has already been reached on six points (the texts are attached).

However, on the questions “Measures about prisoners of war” the enemy in principle cannot oppose the liberation of all prisoners of war. As a consequence of this, the negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to drag out the negotiations under the pretext of a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding and construction of airports after the cessation of military operations and also a demand about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary basis. However, in view of the fact that our side decisively opposes these proposals and also in view of the fact that it is very difficult for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for continuation of the war in Korea, the satellites of the enemy and the USA itself are trying to bring an end to the war in Korea, therefore in recent days the enemy was forced to set aside the discussion of the question of limiting restoration and construction of airports in Korea and moved to discussion of small questions concerning the agreement.

According to the concrete conditions of the text of the agreement on an armistice proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as before, this text is not final, in other words that, as before, the enemy has included conditions about limiting the restoration and construction of airports and about liberation of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after having declared that these conditions can be omitted and it is possible not to discuss them. From this it is obvious that the possibility of reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of course, we never have and are not now counting only on these possibilities.

We simultaneously will vigilantly follow the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA. They are trying to bring an end to the war in Korea, therefore in recent days the enemy was forced to set aside the discussion of the question of limiting restoration and construction of airports in Korea and moved to discussion of small questions concerning the agreement.

According to the concrete conditions of the text of the agreement on an armistice proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as before, this text is not final, in other words that, as before, the enemy has included conditions about limiting the restoration and construction of airports and about liberation of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after having declared that these conditions can be omitted and it is possible not to discuss them. From this it is obvious that the possibility of reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of course, we never have and are not now counting only on these possibilities.

For the purposes of achieving a final agreement on an armistice it is necessary to receive your concrete instructions on the following questions:

1. About the monitoring organ composed of representatives of neutral states.

The American side proposes that both sides each invite three states whose armed forces are not participating in the military operations in Korea, and also that each invited state name one senior officer as a representative (in all 6 persons from the neutral states of both sides) for the creation of a monitoring organ of neutral states.

We intend to agree with this arrangement and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia to send representatives so that they could discuss the matter on an equal basis with representatives of the three states invited by the USA and also have the right to veto.

2. Each of the abovementioned neutral states must name one deputy representative who could participate in the meetings of the monitoring organ in the name of its representative. All representatives can take with them assistants-advisers from among the citizens of their country. All invited neutral states will provide the necessary number of administrative workers for the creation of a secretariat responsible for keeping protocols, transmitting documents and translations.

3. The functions of the monitoring organ of neutral states are:

a) Practical control and monitoring of the observation of the agreement by both sides—not to transport to Korea from abroad, through mutually agreed upon points, shipments to the rear as reinforcements, military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, arms and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and goes into force, and also to carry out an exchange of military personnel of both sides on the scale stipulated by the agreement and in identical numbers;

b) Report about places where an incident occurs, about the guilt of anyone from the [two] sides outside the demilitarization zone who violates the agreement on armistice, and also the carrying out of practical observation.

At the request of both sides or one side of the commission on military armistice, the monitoring organ must immediately send a neutral group for inspection and observation and also for bringing the results of the investigation to the commission on military armistice.

4. Simultaneously with the establishment of the functions indicated in column “A” point 3, the American side also proposes that both sides after cessation of military operations must present information about precise places of deployment of the land, sea and air units which are participating in the military operations in Korea, and also must not change the deployment or carry out a concentration of their troops. We intend not to agree with this, since it was not stipulated in the points on which agreement was reached.

5. As concerns the points of disestablishment in the rear where observation must be established, the American side proposes to establish in South Korea Seoul, Chemulpo [Inchon], Dzoio, Gensiu, Tsusius, Taiden, Anto, Dzensiu, Gunzan, Taiko, Dzenten, Pusan—in all 12 points. In North Korea to establish Singisiu, Manphkodin, Kangge, Khesandun, Khekido, Sengdzii, Kaisiu—
all 15 points.

At each point a region of operation for the neutral state must be established within a radius of 30 miles from the center of the point.

We consider that the enemy has proposed too many points, the area of operation is too broad, and the number of open points is not equal. We intend to agree that both sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea: Singuisu, Seisin, Kanko, Manphkodon and one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We also intend to propose that the radius of operations of the neutral group be established as 5 kilometers from the center of the point.

6. Neutral groups of observers will be attached to the monitoring organ of neutral states. The group must be organized as a minimum from four mid-level officers (lieutenant-major), two officers each from the representatives of neutral states invited by each side. In case of necessity subgroups can be created attached to the monitor groups, composed of two representatives, one person from each side.

The American side proposes to create 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider that this is too many. If an agreement is reached that both sides will each open 5 of their rear points, then it will be sufficient for fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring organ to have 16 neutral groups of observers, of which 10 groups will be permanently located at mutually agreed upon points of disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as reserves to send to the site of incidents.

7. The monitoring organ of neutral groups and the commission on the military armistice must be located in one place. The neutral groups of observation during the fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and observation do not have the right to study the “construction and characteristics” of all types of arms and ammunition.

As concerns the reports about results of the work of the neutral groups of observation, we consider that official reports must be adopted by the majority of the members of the given group, but reports not adopted by the majority of members or reports from individual persons cannot be official documents. They can be used as reference materials.

8. Material supply of the monitoring organ of neutral states and the groups subordinate to it must be provided by both warring sides. Both sides must provide the monitoring organ with transport for trips of its members to points and to places where a violation of the agreement on armistice occurs.

All the 8 points set forth above concern questions of monitoring by neutral states in the rear regions of both sides outside the demilitarized zone.

1. I ask you to review whether our point of view is correct and whether anything needs to be added.

If you agree with our opinions, then do you consider it necessary to communicate about this in advance to the comrades leaders of the parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia?

2. I ask you to give your answer.

Note: The texts of the agreement reached on two agendas was sent to you by separate telegram.

With greetings.
MAO ZEDONG
No. 326
31.1.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 73-77]

101. 3 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 709
TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL
BEIJING
TO KRASOVSKY
Transmit the following answer to MAO ZEDONG:

“Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegrams of January 31 concerning the negotiations on questions of an armistice.

We agree with the plan outlined by you and the evaluation of the course of the negotiations which you give. The firm position taken by you has already given positive results and must force the enemy to make further concessions.

We consider that you must make an agreement with the leading comrades of Poland and Czechoslovakia about including their representatives in the commission of observers, and they, of course, will agree with this. With greetings. FILIPPOV [Stalin].”

Confirm receipt.
Telegraph the fulfillment.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80]
lected agricultural taxes in kind in grain in the amount of 650,000 tons, which constituted too large a percentage of the entire yield. At the present time 10 percent of the population is suffering from hunger. The majority of the peasant population will be able to subsist only until April-May.

If there is no assistance soon, then this will influence not only the carrying out of spring sowing but also the gathering of the harvest.

They say that our government has already resolved to deliver to the Korean government 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, is this true? If it is not true, I consider that it is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of 30,000 tons of grain in March for the purpose of providing assistance so that the peasants can engage in spring planting.

3. I consider that although our budget is also very strained, in 1952 we nevertheless need to plan to apportion 1,600,000 million yuan (which constitutes approximately 237 million rubles) according to the plan of 1951 budget year for rendering aid to Korea. This amount can hardly be reduced. I ask that all this possibly be planned earlier in the general budget.

My answer of 4.2 of this year.

"I received your telegram of 22.1 of this year. As concerns rendering aid to Korea, in our budget for 1952 we have already included expenditures of 1,500,000 million yuan (approximately equal to 222 million rubles), which somewhat exceeds the sum of the trade credit extended by China to Korea in 1951, the sum granted by China for urgent restoration of Korean railroads and also the sum granted by China for maintenance of Korean citizens located in Manchuria.

If military operations in Korea are ended, then it is assumed that expenditures for aid to Korea will be increased.

At the end of January of this year the Minister of Trade of Korea Comrade Chan Si U came to Beijing for negotiations about deliveries of goods in 1952. As a result of these negotiations the total value we established for goods delivered by us comes to 700,000 million yuan (approximately 103 million rubles).

Korea will not deliver anything to us in exchange, and therefore the aforementioned amount was established as the sum of trade credit.

As concerns foodstuffs stipulated in the application, the delivery according to this application will be carried out from February to May. In each month 5,000 tons of rice and 5,000 tons of chumiza [a cereal grain in Northeast Asia] (in all 40,000 tons of rice and chumiza will be delivered), in each month 200 tons of bean oil.

In addition, in February 3,300,000 meters of cotton fabric will be delivered.

Negotiations will be concluded soon. According to your practical observation, if military operations in Korea cease, what is necessary to restore in Korea as first priority?

The army of the Chinese volunteers can render assistance as a work force to restore the highways and agricultural economy. What other kind of aid is needed from us?

I ask you to study these questions and communicate your opinion.”

MAO ZEDONG

No. 431

8.2.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 81–83]

103. 5 March 1952, memorandum, Gromyko to Stalin

To Comrade STALIN I.V.
The Ambassador of the USSR in Korea Comrade Razuvaev proposes to advise Kim Il Sung to publish an interview with a TASS correspondent concerning the negotiations for an armistice in Panmunjom. (telegram No. 188).

In the draft presented by Razuvaev the interview touches on three questions: the dragging out of the negotiations by the American side; inviting representatives of the Soviet Union to a neutral organ for monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the armistice; the position of the Korean side in case of a breakdown in the negotiations by the American side.

In the opinion of MID USSR, the proposal of Comrade Razuvaev is unacceptable. The publication of such an interview could be interpreted as a manifestation of haste and nervousness on the Korean-Chinese side. Moreover, the elements of threat, contained in the answer to the third question, could be used for accusing the Korean-Chinese side of trying to complicate the course of the negotiations for an armistice.

Draft resolution is attached.

I ask you to review.

A. GROMYKO

5 March 1952

[As indicated in the file in AVPRF, the Politburo decision was taken on March 7 to reject Razuvaev’s proposal, 1. 82. Draft resolution to this effect is on l. 83]

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, List 3 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 81–83]

104. 14 April 1952, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Stalin to Kim Il Sung

ALL-UNION COMMunist PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P87/104

Copies: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyshinsky, Shtemenko

14 April 1952

Excerpt from protocol No. 87 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)]

Decision of 14 April 1952

104. Question of Korea.

To confirm the attached text of a telegram.

SECRETARY CC

To p.104(op) pr.PB No. 87

BY CIPHER

PYONGYANG

To Soviet Ambassador RAZUVAEV

Hand Over Immediately

For Comrade KIM IL SUNG

It has become known to me that the Korean people are in need of bread. We have in Siberia 50,000 tons of prepared wheat flour. We can send this flour as a gift to the Korean people. Telegraph your agreement. We can send the flour immediately according to your instruction.

With greetings. I. STALIN

14 April 1952

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 778, Listy 22–23]

105. 16 April 1952, ciphered telegram, Babkin to Shtemenko conveying letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 501587

From CORRESPONDENT 20 Sent 16.4.52 13:00 Received 16.4. 14:44

Dispatched to the 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 16.4 14:50
Extremely urgent.
To Comrade SHTEMENKO
S.M.

I transmit the reply letter of KIM IL SUNG to Comrade I.V. STALIN.
No. 1448 BABKIN
16.4.52
Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, File of 8th Administration (2)

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

The government of the DPRK is moved by your fatherly concern about the urgent needs of the Korean people.

Your proposal to send us 50,000 tons of bread, which we accept with endless gratitude, is one more expression of the selfless fraternal assistance of the great Soviet people to Korea, which has suffered from American aggression but is prepared to defend to the end its freedom and independence.

A grateful Korean people wishes you, dear leader and teacher, many years of life and health for the happiness of mankind.

KIM IL SUNG
16 April 1952

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 60-61]

106. 17 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Kim Il Sung to Stalin via Razuaev

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 502597/sh
From Correspondent 20 Sent 17.7.52
18:45 Received 17.7 20:50
Sent to 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 17.7 21:10
Extremely Urgent
To Comrade A. Vasilevsky
To Comrade A. Ia. Vyshinsky
I report the letter from KIM IL SUNG to Comrade STALIN I.V. of 16.7.52.

RAZUVAEV
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky.
No. 2250
17.7.52

“Respected comrade ambassador, I ask you to bring to the attention of Comrade STALIN I.V. the contents of the following telegram:

“Dear Comrade STALIN I.V.

I consider it necessary to report to you, Josef Visarrionovich, about the following: proceeding from a general analysis of the situation in Korea the possibility is not excluded that the negotiations for an armistice can be drawn out for an indefinite period of time.

Over the past year of negotiations we have virtually curtailed military operations and moved to a passive defense.

Such a position has led to the fact that the enemy almost without suffering any kind of losses constantly inflicts on us huge losses in manpower and material values.

Thus, for example, just recently the enemy put out of operation all the electrical stations of Korea and because of the active operations of VVS [air force] does not allow the possibility to restore them, which has caused and continues to cause huge losses to the entire national economy of the DPRK.

In only one 24 hour period of barbaric bombing, of only one city of Pyongyang (on July 11 and the night of July 12) more than 6,000 peaceful inhabitants were killed and wounded.

The enemy, making use of this situation, makes demands in the negotiations that are unacceptable to us.

Naturally, the Chinese friends refuse to accept these conditions. We share the opinion of Comrade MAO ZEDONG on this question.

However, in order to spare the DPRK and its people suffering and unjustified, needless losses, it is necessary for us hopefully to provide cover for the most important sites and to go over to active operations.

For this it would be desirable:
1. To strengthen antiaircraft defense. By our accounting, for this it is necessary to receive additional arms for ten antiaircraft regiments (including three middle caliber regiments and seven small caliber regiments).

It is desirable in connection with this that the Chinese comrades put out half and that the KPA receive arms for five antiaircraft regiments directly from you.

2. To activate the night operations of the VVS [Air Force] of the KPA [Korean People’s Army] and CPV [Chinese People’s Volunteers]. It is necessary to cover North Korea in the daytime with fighter aviation, if only up to the line of Pyongyang.

VVS of the KPA is prepared at any time to begin active military operations. Along with this, in the near future 40 crews of KPA TU-2 pilots will finish their training in the Soviet Union. We would like for these pilots to come to the DPRK together with TU-2 airplanes so that they could immediately take part in active military operations and bring influence to bear on important enemy sites.

3. To carry out a number of ground operations, appreciable to the enemy, so as to divert the operations of the enemy VVS from our rear and to influence the course of the negotiations in Kaesong.

Aside from all of this, to raise the battle capability of the KPA it is extremely necessary for us to receive from you in the nearest future technical goods and materials according to our note of January 10, 1952 and July 9, 1952 and application for 1952 in the note of October 6, 1951, within the limits of your possibilities.

4. In Kaesong we need simultaneously to move decisively toward the soonest conclusion of an armistice, a ceasefire and transfer of all prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva convention. These demands are supported by all peaceloving peoples and will lead us out of a passive position in Kaesong.

The change in the character of military operations on the ground and in the air will have a corresponding, desirable influence on the enemy.

A telegram of analogous content was sent to comrade MAO ZEDONG.

The Korean people are boundlessly grateful to you for the enormous selfless assistance being rendered to the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.

We await your orders and advice on the aforementioned questions.

We wish you good health and long years of life for the well-being and happiness of progressive humanity.

With deep respect and esteem
Your Kim Il Sung
Pyongyang 16.7.52.”

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 65-68 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 40-43]

107. 17 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 4018
BEIJING -
TO KRASOVSKY
Transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG the following answer:

“Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We consider your position in the negotiations on an armistice to be completely..."
correct.

Today we received a report from Pyongyang that Comrade KIM IL SUNG also agrees with your position.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]
16 July 1952

Telegraph the fulfillment.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 69 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 89]

108. 18 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filipppov (Stalin) conveying 15 July 1952 telegram from Mao to Kim Il Sung and 16 July 1952 reply from Kim to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21646

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Krushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky

From BEIJING Received 12:15 18.7.1952

Series “G” T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send to you for familiarization the text of my telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year to KIM IL SUNG and the text of the reply telegram to me from Comrade KIM IL SUNG of 21:00 16 July of this year:

“To Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

Copy to Comrade LI KENONG.

After we wrote a telegram to comrade LI KENONG we received your telegram of 18:00 14 July of this year.

After a two-day study by us of the given questions our comrades unanimously consider that at present, when the enemy is subjecting us to furious bombardment, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy, which does not signify in fact any kind of concession, is highly disadvantageous for us.

We will look at the positive and negative sides of this question:

Rejecting the proposal of the enemy will bring only one harmful consequence—further losses for the Korean people and Chinese people’s volunteers. However, once the war began, China began to help Korea, the Korean people already honestly stood on the front line of defense of the camp of peace of the whole world.

At the cost of the sacrifices of the Korean people a strengthening of the position at the 38th parallel has been won, North Korea and Northeast China have been defended.

The people of Korea and China, especially their armed forces, have received the possibility of being tempered and acquiring experience in the struggle against American imperialism.

In addition, in the course of the struggle of the Korean and Chinese peoples, their might has been strengthened, which is inspiring the peace-loving peoples of the whole world in the struggle against aggressive war and is facilitating the development of the movement for defense of peace throughout the world. This also limits the mobility of the main forces of American imperialism and makes it suffer constant losses in the east. As the stronghold of peace throughout the world—the Soviet Union can strengthen its reconstruction and can exercise its influence on the development of the revolutionary movement of peoples of all countries. This will mean the delay of a new world war.

The presence of these great movements testifies to the fact that the Korean people are no longer alone.

In the first place, the Chinese people want to apply all their strength to overcome the difficulties of the Korean people. Therefore at the present time we ask you not to be ashamed to appeal to us with questions which demand an urgent resolution of the situation in Korea.

If we are not able to resolve your questions, then we will together with you appeal to FILIPPOV with a request to render assistance for the resolution of these questions.

As concerns the acceptance of the proposal of the enemy, that will bring great harm.

In the first place, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy under the influence of its bombardment will place us in a disadvantageous position in political and military relations.

The enemy will surely use this weakness of ours for further pressure on us, which will lead to new provocations from the side of the enemy. Then, being in a disadvantageous position, upon putting pressure on the enemy we possibly will suffer even greater failures and the aforementioned positive sides will lose their significance. This will signify an unsuccessful course, because of which the whole game will be lost.

Therefore to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our prestige.

If we display resolution not to accept the enemy’s proposal and to prepare ourselves for a breakdown in the negotiations from the side of the enemy, the enemy surely will not cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

In the process of a further delay of the negotiations, upon decisive insistence by our side on our point of view, it is possible that the enemy will make a new concession.

If the enemy will not concede or breaks off the negotiations, then we must continue military operations so as to find in the course of the war, which the enemy cannot resolve, a means for changing the present situation.

We will report to Comrade FILIPPOV about this proposal and the course taken by us and we will ascertain his opinion.

We will report to you the results upon receiving an answer from him.

With greetings! MAO ZEDONG,
3:00, 15.7.52

“To Comrade MAO ZEDONG!
Your telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year was received.

As a result of careful study and discussion of it, we have arrived at a unanimous conclusion. We consider that your analysis concerning the present situation is correct.

At the same time, considering our present position, you have communicated to us to that we henceforth not be ashamed to raise questions about the assistance we need, for which we are sincerely grateful to you.

We consider it necessary to activate military operations in the long struggle against the enemy. If we do not show aggressiveness in military operations and continue a passive defense, the enemy will not take into consideration our forces, and will continue furious bombardment for the purpose of putting military pressure on us.

We therefore propose to implement the following urgent measures:

1. It is necessary to strengthen antiaircraft artillery, by at least 10 regiments. It is necessary to strengthen PVO [Anti-aircraft Defense] of the city of Pyongyang and all important industrial sites, for example: Shuifens-kaya, Chandzinganskaya, and Puchenganskaya electrical stations.

2. It is necessary to make the air battles of our VVS [Air Force] more active:

   a) To improve the command of the VVS
so that it correctly directs the air battles on Korean territory.

b) The diameter of operations of aviation units must not be limited only to the present line along the Yalu river. At the least, it is necessary to extend it to the border of Pyongyang and to strengthen by all measures the PVO of the capital and important industrial sites.

c) It is necessary to send already trained air force bomber units on night actions deep into enemy [territory], to boldly carry out air battles,subjecting to bombardment a number of airports, warehouses, barracks and other military installations of the enemy.

3. In infantry operations it is necessary to make local attacks on several parts of the front in order to put military pressure on the enemy.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and indicate a time of meeting convenient for you for receipt of your personal orders.

With highest respect toward you. KIM IL SUNG. 21:00 16 July 1952.”

MAO ZEDONG
No. 2084
18.7.52"

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 72-75 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 90-93]

[Ed. note: The next two documents coincide with a visit to Moscow by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952; the transcripts of three of Zhou’s conversations with Stalin during this visit are printed elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin.]

109. 16 September 1952, hand-delivered note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin conveying telegram from Mao to Zhou

To Comrade STALIN, I.V.

I send you a Russian translation of a telegram I received from comrade Mao Zedong.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and indicate a time of meeting convenient for you for receipt of your personal orders.

With communist greetings.

Zhou Enlai.

16 September 1952.

Comrade ZHOU ENLAI.

1. According to our information, the Korean question will be discussed at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the UN. Regarding the question of prisoners of war Mexico has advanced a proposal consisting of 3 points, which are: first, both sides immediately conduct an exchange of prisoners who have expressed the wish to return to their homeland; second, the remaining POWs will be transferred to the temporary protection of UN member states and be subject to repatriation according to an agreement which will be concluded; third, after a normal situation is established in Korea, to guarantee that these POWs can return to their homeland and to provide them with the possibility for this. Until the restoration of a normal situation in Korea, if the POWs ask to return to their homeland, then the corresponding government also must take measures and present to them all possibilities for repatriation.

Apparently, the proposal to discuss the Korean question in the General Assembly of the UN was advanced at the initiative of England. The proposal of Mexico arose at the initiative of the USA. The latter have already expressed the wish to discuss this question in the UN General Assembly.

We intend to express opposition to such a variant.

I ask you to consult with comrade FILIPPOV about what our position should be on this question.

2. India and Burma have made indications that they would like to sign a non-aggression pact with us, and also hope that you will visit these countries. The essence is that [Indian leader Jawaharlal] Nehru would like to visit China, with a view, however, that you will go to India on a return visit. We received this information from our ambassador in Burma Iao Chzhun-min.

I suggest that it is highly possible that India and Burma will advance these questions for an exchange of opinion. If India and Burma make these proposals officially, then it would be inconvenient for us to refuse.

I ask also that you consult with Comrade FILIPPOV about whether it is advisable for China to conclude such pacts with India and Burma.

Mao Zedong.

15 September 1952

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 94-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 96-98]

110. 17 September 1952, hand-delivered letter, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG

We agree with you that the proposal of the Mexicans is unacceptable, since it reflects the position of the USA in the negotiations in Korea. As is obvious, the USA, not having achieved successes in negotiations in Korea, intends now to receive approval of their position in the UN and to make those same demands in the name of the UN. The Mexicans are the agents of the USA.

If the Mexicans advance their proposal in the UN, the delegation of the USSR will reject this proposal as not corresponding to the interests of cessation of the war in Korea, and will try to attain the following:

“1. Immediate cessation of military operations of the [warring] sides on land, sea and air.

2. Return of all POWs to their homeland according to international norms.

3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops, including also the Chinese volunteer units, in the course of 2-3 months and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question in the spirit of the unification of Korea, carried out by the Koreans themselves under the observation of a commission with the participation of the sides directly interested as well as other states, including states which have not taken part in the war in Korea.”

As concerns the proposal about temporarily withholding 20% of POWs from both sides and returning all remaining POWs, the proposal of the Soviet delegation will not touch on this and it will be left with you in reserve.

On the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with India and Burma we completely share your point of view.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

17 September 1952

Stalin’s handwritten draft is attached.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 97-103 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 99]

111. 27 December 1952, Semenov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

BEIJING

To the Main Military Adviser
for Comrade MAO ZEDONG

Comrade Mao Zedong!
We have received your telegram of 17 December.

Your observations regarding the probability of an attack by the Americans in the spring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present American command in Korea, who are operating under the leadership of the Truman government. It is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhower government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.

We have reviewed your application for military goods for 1953 and the application for urgently needed military goods.

The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry divisions; this means that we must deliver for each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of various types and other goods.

Taking into account the situation you speak of in your telegram, with great difficulty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions [already] earmarked, with equal shipments until the end of the year, approximately one-fourth of the quantity you stated in your telegram of 17 December, specifically: 600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of artillery of various types, tractor artillery, detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts of the deliveries of each will be determined by our War Ministry.

Thus, with a calculation of the arms and ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 pieces of artillery of various types, as opposed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952.

As regards the applications for materials for military production mentioned in your telegram, transmitted to us by Minister of Foreign Trade Comrade E Tszi Chzhuanom—this application is now being studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade.

SEMENOV [Stalin].

27 December 1952.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 115-116]

112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR

RESOLUTION
Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc.
Moscow, Kremlin

Question of MID

The Council of Ministers of the USSR RESOLVES:
1. To confirm the attached draft letters of the Government of the USSR to Comrades Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

To transmit the present letter to Comrade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will immediately be sent to Pyongyang.

2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

Representative of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov

Business Manager of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly reviewed the question of the war in Korea under present conditions and with regard to the entire course of events of the preceding period. As a result of this, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in a firm peace throughout the world and have always sought an acceptable path toward the soonest possible conclusion of the war in Korea.

It is not necessary to dwell in detail on all that the aggressor has done in the course of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest people of the whole world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea more and more expose that bloc, and especially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an international factor that is pursuing a policy of preparing a new war and is ready to shift to a policy of broadening the war solely in order to dictate to people their aggressive imperialistic will, which expresses an aspiration for world domination, for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic aims.

The Soviet Government considers that we should regard all these important circumstances of the international order in the same way that we have regarded them until now. This does not mean, however, that in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peace-loving peoples.

In connection with all the abovementioned and taking into account the concrete facts of late regarding the war in Korea, we consider it urgently necessary to carry out a number of measures, in particular:

1. It is necessary that Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai give a positive answer to the appeal of General [Mark W.] Clark on February 22 on the question of an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

2. Immediately after the publication of the answer of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, an authoritative representative of the government of the PRC (best of all would be Zhou Enlai) should make a statement in Beijing in which is underscored a positive attitude toward the proposal on an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also to indicate that the time has arrived to resolve the entire question of prisoners and, consequently, to secure the cessation of the war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

3. Simultaneously with the aforementioned statement in Beijing, the head of the government of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, should make a statement in Pyongyang which declares full support for and the justice of the aforementioned statement of the government of the PRC.
4. We consider it also advisable that immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and Pyongyang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR make a statement in Moscow with corresponding full support for the Beijing and Pyongyang statements.

5. In accordance with the four measures enumerated above, the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly of the UN in New York should do everything possible to support and move forward the new political line which is laid out above.

We consider it necessary to give the following elucidation of the abovestated:

First. About the answer to General Clark. We consider that the response letter of Kim II Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark should express full agreement with Clark's proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, with an indication that they have in mind a positive resolution of this question in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

In the answer to Clark indicate that the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners has the greatest significance for a successful resolution of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, for a successful resolution of the question of the cessation of the war and the conclusion of an armistice. In view of this, propose to resume the negotiations in Panmunjom between the main representatives of both sides to negotiations for an armistice.

Propose that the date of the negotiations be established by the officers connected with both sides.

In the course of the negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that “not a single wounded and sick prisoner of war can be repatriated against his wishes during military action,” add the receipt of a guarantee from the American side that in relation to prisoners of war, under no circumstances will forcible measures be applied to prevent their return to their homeland.

Propose also to establish a commission of representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assistance in returning sick and wounded prisoners to their homeland.

In the negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed from the fact that the task consists not only of securing a positive resolution of the indicated question, but also in securing a positive resolution of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, to remove the obstacles to the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of military action and the conclusion of an armistice. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention should be used for this, especially the second paragraph of this article, which stipulates the conclusion of “an agreement on repatriation or internment in a neutral country of healthy prisoners of war who have spent a long time in captivity.”

In the negotiations propose that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be repatriated immediately, but the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country in order to secure a fair resolution of the question of their repatriation.

With regard to these prisoners add that a classification according to nationality and place of residence be made, as was proposed in the letter from Kim II Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark on October 16, 1952 (this is also in accordance with the Indian draft on Korea).

After the classification, prisoners of war immediately receive the right to return to their homeland, which will be facilitated by the assistance of all interested sides.

Second. About the statement in Beijing. In this statement it would be advisable to say that the government of the PRC has discussed the question raised by General Clark with the Command of the Korean People's Army and the Command of the Chinese volunteers (point 19). The Commission must monitor the observance of the armistice agreement, including monitoring the work of the Committee on repatriation of prisoners of war and regulate through negotiations possible violations of the armistice agreement (pp. 24 and 25).

3) About the creation of a Commission of neutral states to supervise the armistice, composed of representatives from Sweden and Switzerland named by the Commander in Chief of the UN Military Forces and representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia named by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese Volunteers. (pp. 36 and 37).

The Commission may create inspection groups composed of representatives of those states. (p. 40).

The Commission of neutral states must supervise the implementation of the agreement on the armistice and fulfill the functions of control (p. 41).

Inspection groups of neutral states will disembark at the ports of Synyidzhu, Chongchin, Khungnam, Manpo and Sinandzhu (North Korea), Inchon, Taegu, Pusan, Kanchung and Kunsan (South Korea).

Moreover, the sides reached agreement that the commanders of both sides must “recommend to the governments of interested countries of both sides that a political conference of all sides at the highest level be...
convened within three months of the signing and implementation of the armistice...for the resolution by means of negotiations of questions regarding the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops, the peaceful resolution of the Korean question etc. (point 60).

A significant portion of the articles of the draft agreement concerning prisoners of war was also agreed to, with the exception of the question of repatriation of prisoners. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK), following its policy of preserving and strengthening peace, striving for a peaceful resolution of the Korean question and applying all its efforts to the immediate cessation of the war, proposes to resolve also the question of prisoners of war as a whole. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK) on its side is prepared to adopt measures to eliminate the disagreements on this question, which is at present the only obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on ceasefire and armistice. Toward this goal, the Government of the PRC (DPRK) proposes that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be immediately repatriated and the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country to secure a just resolution of the question of their repatriation.

The Beijing statement must also say the following:

Our new step, which is directed at the conclusion of the war in Korea, should also serve as an example for a positive resolution of a number of other important and urgent international questions, first of all the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statement in Pyongyang. We suggest that in this statement Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate that the aforementioned statement of the representative of the PRC was worked out jointly by the governments of the PRC and DPRK and that the Government of the DPRK fully shares both the evaluation of the political situation contained in the Beijing statement and the concrete conclusions and proposals contained in it. In connection with this, underscore not only the full support for, but also the justice of, the statement of the representative of the PRC.

Fourth. About the statement in Moscow. We consider expedient a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, which should be made immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow statement to be underscoring before the whole world the full solidarity and concordance of action between the USSR, PRC and DPRK on the question of the war in Korea.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly of the UN in New York. The Soviet delegation in the General Assembly must act in accordance with the entire above-described political plan with regard to the war in Korea. In this connection it is necessary that as soon as the Polish draft resolution “On Averting the Threat of a New World War” comes up for discussion, the Soviet delegation would secure the introduction of the corresponding alterations to this draft in the part concerning Korea and also the necessary statements by the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Sixth. Additional notes. It goes without saying that at the present time we cannot foresee all steps and measures which the governments of the USSR, PRC and DPRK will need to make. However, if there is full agreement between our governments in the conduct of a general line on this question, for which we fully hope, then the remaining points can be agreed upon in the course of the affair.

DIRECTIVES FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN.

1. To commission the delegation of the USSR in the General Assembly (Comrade Vyshinsky), upon the presentation for discussion of the resolution of the Polish delegation, the part concerning Korea, to make a statement with firm support for the last proposals and statements of the PRC and DPRK.

Hanging set forth the position of the Soviet Union in the question of exchange of prisoners of war as a position which fully corresponds to generally acknowledged principles of international law and the positions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which demands repatriation of all prisoners of war, the representative of the USSR must point out the following. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed and is proposing to recommend to the warring sides in Korea that they immediately and fully cease military operations on land, sea and in the air.

At the initiative of the Soviet Union, negotiations between the warring sides were begun in Kaesong in June 1951 for a ceasefire and armistice in Korea. These negotiations led to agreement on all questions except the question of repatriation of prisoners of war. The Soviet Union continues to consider the position taken in this question by the Chinese People’s Republic and the Korean People’s Democratic Republic to be just and fully in accordance with the principles of international law and international practice, and also the positions of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The Soviet Union fully supports this position.

The question of the exchange of prisoners of war is the single unresolved question in the negotiations between the warring sides in Korea. The governments of the PRC and DPRK have declared their readiness to adopt measures from their sides toward the settlement of this question, in order to remove the last obstacle to a ceasefire in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

The Soviet Union welcomes the noble initiative of the Chinese People’s Republic and the Korean People’s Democratic Republic on this question. The Soviet Union fervently supports the proposal on resumption of negotiations in Korea with the goal of achieving an agreement on exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also on settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, also the question of cessation of the war in Korea and conclusion of an armistice.

Commission the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly to reach an agreement with the Polish delegation about introducing into the draft Polish resolution on the question of averting the threat of a new world war the following alterations in the part concerning the Korean question: in place of the old text of p. “b)” (about returning all prisoners of war to their homeland) to include the following text: “b) immediate resumption of negotiations on an armistice between the sides, having in mind that at the same time the sides will apply all efforts to achieve an agreement on the question of exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war as well as on the entire question of prisoners of war and will thus apply all efforts to remove the obstacles that are hindering the conclusion of the war in Korea.”
113. 29 March 1953, ciphered telegram from Kuznetsov and Fedorenko in Pyongyang [from notes taken at AVPRF; photocopy not available]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From PYONGYANG
Top Priority
Special File
In response to your communication No. 359.

During the second meeting on March 29, Kim Il Sung again declared that he fully agrees with the proposal of the Soviet government on the Korean question and considers that this proposal must be implemented as soon as possible.

Kim Il Sung further underscored that the time has come to show initiative from our side on the question of the conclusion of the war in Korea and achievement of peace. It is necessary, Kim said, either actively to carry out military operations or to end the war; a further dragging out of the existing situation is not in the interests of the DPRK and PRC, or of the entire democratic camp. In connection with this, Kim pointed out that the losses on the Korean side at the front and in the rear (daily nearly 300-400 persons) are very significant and it is hardly advisable to conduct further discussion with the Americans regarding repatriation of a disputed number of prisoners of war. In the present conditions, Kim said, the proposal of the Soviet government is the most advisable and correct.

Kim Il Sung is taking measures to prepare for the anticipated negotiations: the number of sick and wounded prisoners in the DPRK is being determined, materials for the negotiations in Panmunjom are being prepared, a statement from Pyongyang is being prepared, etc.

Following your instructions (Your Communication #242) we agreed with Kim Il Sung that the representative at the negotiations (if they resume) will be Nam II, as before. In connection with this, the publication of a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly about naming Nam II Minister of Foreign Affairs will be delayed. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is temporarily being held by Li Don Gen. Kim Il Sung will inform the Chinese friends about this.

29.III.53 Kuznetsov, Fedorenko SPRAVKA [Report]: No. 359 (bkh. #8265) 29.III.53

Comrades Kuznetsov, Razuvaev and Fedorenko have reported that on March 29 they were received by Kim Il Sung in the presence of General Nam II, that Kim Il Sung was given the document which arrived from Moscow and that they agreed to meet again after Kim Il Sung has familiarized himself in detail with the document.

No. 242 (ishk. No. 6277) 24.II.53 Molotov gave an order to transmit to Kim Il Sung that Moscow advises that the decision of the question of naming Nam II as Minister of Foreign Affairs be postponed until Malik’s arrival and that it would be good at the present moment to be limited to the naming of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would meanwhile serve as minister.”

[Source: AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122]

114. 29 July 1953, ciphered telegram, Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From BEIJING From Kuznetsov
To MID USSR URGENT
Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Zorin, Podtserob

[reporting a meeting of July 28]

After listening to the greetings of the CC CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP. Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach an armistice not only by force of military reasons but also by force of political and economic reasons. In military matters the last year has shown that the enemy is not only not in a condition to advance on land but is also not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front. The Chinese troops had begun not only to conduct a positional war but also to break through the front.

Among the political causes that forced the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao noted the military contradictions in the camp of the imperialists and the significant activation of world social opinion, which is speaking out against the war in Korea.

Concerning economic causes, Mao stated that in the first two years of the war the American monopolists amassed colossal profits in military orders and deliveries, but with the end of the negotiations for an armistice, and also as a result of the strengthening of the movement to end the war in Korea, their profits began to fall sharply.

Having returned to the military side of the matter, Mao noted that from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year in order to occupy more favorable borders along the Changan river. Further movement to the south would risk stretching out the flanks in the west and east shore of Korea. In this case the danger of landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean troops would grow significantly.

Touching on further steps after the signing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the government of the PRC has a number of questions about which it would like to consult with the government of the USSR. By approximately 10 August, we will prepare a proposed plan of measures about which it is necessary to consult with the Soviet government.

Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting.

KUZNETSOV

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158]

115. 20 April 1956, ciphered telegram, excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassador to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Strictly Secret
From BEIJING

31 March I visited Comrade Mao Zedong.

...The important moments that apparently somewhat strengthened Stalin’s trust in the CCP were your (my) information about the trip to China and the Korean war—the performance of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, although in this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not sufficiently consulted. On the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow [in December 1949-January 1950] we came to an understanding about everything, the issue was not about the seizure of South Korea, but about the significant strengthening of North Korea. But subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow,
where some kind of agreement was reached, about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us beforehand. It should be noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of South Korea...

P. YUDIN

[Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Delo not given]

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF Archive of the President, Russian Federation
AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation
CC Central Committee (of a communist party)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers (the designation given PLA units sent to fight in Korea)
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
KPA Korean People’s Army (the army of North Korea)
MID Ministerstvo Inostrannyykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Army of the PRC)
PRC People’s Republic of China
VVS Voennye Vozdushnye Sily Air Force

INDEX OF NAMES

Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR
Belov, General M., Chief of Staff for Soviet First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter Air Corps
Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR
Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Army Corps of the People’s Liberation Army, in June 1951 became Acting CPV Commander and Political Commissar
Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at the Soviet embassy in Beijing
Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for ciphered telegrams
Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ciphered telegrams
Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party
Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade-Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist Party who established a rival government in Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland China by the PLA in 1949
Kaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR
Kim Ch’ae-k’ ong, Director of Military Intelligence and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party
Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence
Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR
Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Communist Party
Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade, USSR
Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chairman of Council of Ministers, USSR, until restored to Foreign Minister’s post following Stalin’s death in March 1953
Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff of People’s Liberation Army
Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korea’s Democratic Republic
Pon Iiu, Minister of Internal Affairs, DPRK, named by Mao Zedong as deputy commander and deputy political commissar of Chinese People’s Volunteers
Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese People’s Volunteers
Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
Razuvayev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to DPRK following Shtykov’s dismissal in December 1950
Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 appointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in Korea
Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China
Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Political Adviser in North Korea
Shaporenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
Shtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK until December 1950
Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delegation to United Nations, had served as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Korea 1946-48
Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR
Wu, General Xiou-quan, Head of special delegation to the United Nations from the People’s Republic of China in December 1950
Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of the People’s Republic of China
Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People’s Volunteers
Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special Military Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matvee)
Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Commissar sent to Beijing during Korean War as Stalin’s personal military envoy
Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People’s Republic of China

Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Professor of History, Florida State University (Tallahassee), is working on a book on the Soviet Union and the Korean War. She contributed articles on new Russian archival evidence on the Korean War to CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 (Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP Working Paper No. 8 on “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives.”
The reexamination of the Korean case led me into a broader question concerning the proper understanding not only of Communist China’s foreign policy but also, probably, that of any sovereign country: is it appropriate to comprehend the foreign policy behavior of a country, especially one that had historically viewed itself as the “Middle Kingdom,” as totally reactive and without its own consistent inner logic? The assumptions underlying most of the existing scholarship on China’s entrance into the Korean War, though seemingly critical of Washington’s management of the Korean crisis, emerge ironically as American-centered in a methodological sense. Lacking a real understanding of the logic, dynamics, goals, and means of Communist China’s foreign policy, they treat Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis simply as a passive reaction to the policy of the United States. They thus imply that American policy is the source of all virtues as well as evils in the world—if something went wrong somewhere, it must have been the result of a mistake committed by the United States. It was time to rethink Beijing’s entrance into the Korean War.

My study, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), retraces China’s path to involvement in the Korean War with insight gained from recently released Chinese materials. It argues that China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border. To comprehend China’s decision to enter the war, one must first examine the CCP leaders’ perception of China’s security interests and their judgment of to what extent and in which ways such interests had been challenged during the Korean crisis. This examination requires an extended analysis of a variety of basic factors shaping the CCP leadership’s understanding of China’s external relations. Among these factors, the most important ones include CCP leaders’ perception of the outside world and China’s position in it, the nature and goals of the Chinese Communist revolution and their impact on the CCP’s security strategy and foreign policy, the influence of the CCP’s domestic policies on the party’s foreign behavior, and the leverage of historical-cultural factors (such as the Chinese emphasis of the moral aspect of China’s external relations, Chinese ethnocentrism, and Chinese universalism) upon Mao and the CCP leadership. Only with a better understanding of the logic and dynamics of the CCP’s outlook is it possible to reconstruct the interactions that led China and the United States into a major confrontation in Korea.

My three-part study begins with an analysis of Communist China as an emerging revolutionary power. Focusing on the pre-1949 period, I first discuss the domestic sources of the CCP’s foreign policy, the party leadership’s perception of the outside world and China’s position in it, and Mao’s central role in the CCP’s policy-making structure. The second part explains how the conflict between the CCP and the United States escalated and the strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow developed in 1949 and the first half of 1950: On the eve of the Korean War, Beijing and Washington had perceived each other as a dangerous enemy, and the stage for Sino-American confrontation had been set. The third part examines Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis from late June to mid-October 1950, focusing on how the decision to enter the war was made and how it-withstood both internal and external tests. Emphasizing that Beijing’s decision to enter the war was based on the belief that the outcome of the Korean crisis was closely related to the new China’s vital domestic and international interests, I argue that there was little possibility that China’s entrance into the Korean War could have been averted.

A note on the Chinese sources used in this study is appropriate here. Since the mid-1980s, thanks to China’s reform and opening policies, many fresh and meaningful materials concerning China’s entry into the Korean War have been released, which offer the basis for this study. These new sources include personal memoirs by those who were involved in Beijing’s intervention in Korea, scholarly articles and monographs by Chinese researchers with archival accesses, official academic publications using classified documents, openly or internally published collections of CCP Central Committee’s and regional bureaus’ documents, and the internally and openly published collections of Mao Zedong’s papers. While it is apparent that these sources have created new opportunities for fresh studies, it is also clear that they were released on a selective basis and, sometimes, for purposes other than a desire to have the truth known. Indeed, unless scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese, are offered free and equal access to the original historical documentation, there is always the possibility that a study might be misled by its incomplete databases. Fully aware of this danger, I have made every effort to doublecheck my citations as much as possible (such as checking documents with information from interviews, and vice versa, and comparing Chinese materials with non-Chinese ones). Wherever necessary, I pointed out what I consider to be dubious sources in the notes.

My study was also based on my four research trips to China respectively in 1987, 1991, 1992, and 1993. During these trips I established and updated my research databases, and interviewed those who were involved in Beijing’s policy-making during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and those who have access to classified CCP documents (because of the political sensitivity involved in the issues under discussion, unless authorized by the interviewees, I do not identify their names, but I restrict myself to using unidentified interviews only when absolutely necessary). I have not been able to get close to Beijing’s CCP Central Archives (which, by the way, is located in the city’s remote western suburb). But by a combination of effort and good luck, I gained access to some important classified documents (including correspondences and telegrams of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other CCP leaders, and a few minutes of CCP leaders’ decision-making conferences) for the 1948-1950 period. To balance the need to protect my sources with the general practice of Western scholarship, I cite them in my book by pointing out their forms (telegram, correspondence, or minute), dates, and where their originals are maintained (the Chinese Central Archives or Chinese Military Archives). I believe that this is the best one can do in the current circumstances. It is my hope that China, my motherland, will follow the internationally accepted practice of declassifying historical documents on a legal basis, so that all researchers, including myself, will soon be able to get free access to them.


5. This approach can be found in a wide range of Chinese publications, such as Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., *Zhongguo remin min zhi yuankan kangmei yuanhao zhanshi* (History of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea by the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), chap. 1; Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waixia* (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1987), 37-38; Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, in “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” *The China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990) 94-115, attempt to offer an alternative to Whiting’s thesis but generally follow Whiting’s stress on Beijing’s concerns for the safety of the Chinese-Korean Border.


Chen Juan is Associate Professor of History at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. This article is adapted from the introduction to his China’s Road to the Korean War; The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
the withdrawal of American troops from Korea, the 38th parallel lost its meaning; e) a counterattack was no longer possible since Seoul postponed its plans for an overall offensive against the North.6

Finally Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending, on 11 September 1949, instructions to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political, and international aspects of a possible attack on the South. The embassy gave a negative view on the matter (14 September 1949), and on 24 September 1949, the CPSU CC Politburo rejected the appeal of the North Koreans to start the war, concluding that the North Korean army was not prepared for such an attack militarily, that “little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle,” and that an unprovoked attack by the North “would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs.”7

As can be seen from this Politburo document, Moscow no longer flatly rejected the idea of military reunification of Korea. Instead it called upon Pyongyang to get better prepared for the operation. Evidently, encouraged by this shift in the Kremlin’s mood, the North Korean leadership increased pressure to win Soviet support for the war. On 17 January 1950, Kim II Sung complained to Soviet ambassador Shtykov: “I can’t sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause... is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people.” Kim Il Sung requested permission to make a new visit to the USSR to receive “orders and permission” from Stalin for the offensive.8

3. Stalin blesses the invasion

After ambassador Shtykov informed Moscow of this wave of demands by Pyongyang, Stalin (on 30 January 1950) replied (through diplomatic channels): “I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I’ll always be ready to receive him and talk to him... I am prepared to help him in this matter.”9

So, Stalin finally took the decision to initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the same time that the above mentioned exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was present in the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decision to launch an attack on the South as well as his invitation to Kim II Sung to come to Moscow.

Kim Il Sung and his delegation spent almost the whole of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was: ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means.10 Stalin gave his approval to an invasion of the South and outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR) and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington’s positions and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia.

Stalin was now more confident of the Communist bloc’s strength, less respectful of American capabilities and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves.

2. Stalin did not consult Mao in advance because he wanted to work out the plans for the Korean war himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it. While in Moscow Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was negative to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country.

4. China’s position on “liberating” the South

China was involved in the process of working out communist strategy in Korea in the late 1940s. Basically Mao supported Kim’s desire “to liberate” the South and even promised to help with troops if necessary. Mao, however, recommended not to hurry things up, to wait until the Chinese had completed their revolutionary war.

In the beginning of May 1949, North Korean Politburo member Kim II had meetings with Chinese leaders. Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that a war in Korea could start at any moment. If the war dragged on, the Japanese could interfere, but this was not a reason for worry. Mao pointed out: “If necessary, we can throw in for you Chinese soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will not see the difference.” Mao at the same time warned Kim not to advance to the South in the near future. He cited the unfavorable situation in the world and the preoccupation of Chinese communists with the civil war. Mao Zedong recommended to postpone the war until China was united under the leadership of the Communist party.11

In the end of March 1950, Mao Zedong, talking to the North Korean ambassador, stressed that peaceful unification in Korea was impossible, it was necessary to employ military means. Mao said one should not be afraid of Americans because “they would not start a third world war over such a small territory.”12

After completion of Kim II Sung’s April 1950 visit to the USSR, of which Mao seemed to know nothing, Stalin authorized the Soviet ambassador in China to tell the Chinese leadership the following: “Korean comrades visited us recently. I’ll inform you shortly about the results of our conversations.”13 Simultaneously Kim II Sung requested a visit to Beijing to execute Stalin’s instructions: to continue with the war plans only if Chinese supported the idea. On the eve of the visit Kim II Sung said to the Soviet ambassador that he did not intend to ask anything from the Chinese since “all his requests had been met in Moscow.”14

Upon hearing from Kim II Sung about the decision to attack South Korea, Mao requested additional information from Stalin. On 14 May 1950 Stalin sent the following cable to Mao Zedong: “In the conversations with Korean comrades Filipov [Stalin’s alias] and his friends expressed the opinion
that due to the changed international situation they agreed with the proposals by the Koreans to set upon unification. The final decision of the issue must be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades disagree, the decision must be postponed till a new discussion.15

In talks with North Korean leaders Mao approved their analysis of the situation and stressed that he supported a speedy military solution of the Korean problem. He was sure of its success. Mao did not exclude the possibility of American interference. In such an event, China would help.16

5. Preparations for the war

Even before Kim Il Sung received, in January 1950, the first hints from the Kremlin that Stalin had become more favorably disposed to a war in Korea, Pyongyang had embarked upon a concerted effort to upgrade its military potential. Stalin responded positively. After Kim’s talks in Moscow in April 1950 the war was energetically prepared by the two sides jointly.

On June 1949 a special protocol was signed between the USSR and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) on military-technical assistance. Moscow agreed to supply its ally with large numbers of air force planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, engineering equipment, etc.17

At the end of 1949 Kim Il Sung again addressed himself to Moscow a request for large quantities of armaments and ammunition necessary for the creation of new 5 round units and enlargement of the fleet.18 In March 1950, Kim Il Sung asked to use the Soviet credit allocated for 1951 in 1950 and to acquire additional quantities of military hardware; these requests were met.

In April 1950, leaders of the guerrilla movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang to work out a program of action for before and after the invasion. On 12 May 1950, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador that his General Staff had already started to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to attack in June but was not sure that preparations could be completed by that time.19 By the end of May, the armaments which had been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan of the invasion was ready. Kim Il Sung insisted on an attack in June, not in July as Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that information about the imminent attack could leak to the South; and that in July rain would slow the advancement of troops.

While making final preparations for the war, the North continued a propaganda campaign, proposing initiatives on the peaceful unification of Korea. Initially the communists wanted to strike at the Ongjin peninsula, but at the last moment the strategy was changed. It was believed that Seoul had learned about the attack and beefed up its defenses in the Ongjin direction. The North Koreans now asked Moscow for permission to attack along the whole front.

Unfortunately the final period (May-June 1950) before the attack is not well documented, and additional research in the archives is required to get a clearer and more detailed picture of the final preparations by the communist side for the war.

6. The initial stage of the war

Throughout the initial stage of the Korean War Stalin was clearly in charge: his word was final on the date of the invasion, he told the Koreans how to fight and he kept instructing the Sino-Korean command on its every move. As for the mood of both Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was quickly changing for the worse as the adversary hit back harder and harder.

Already on 1 July 1950, Stalin seemed to be worried about a halt in the advancement of North Korean troops and the impact of American air raids on North Korean territory.20 Soviet Ambassador Shtykov admitted that American air raids had worsened the political mood in the North. Doubts regarding final victory surfaced and some officials began to hint that it was difficult for Pyongyang to rely purely on its own forces in the war with America.21 Meeting with the Soviet ambassador on July 3, Kim Il Sung confirmed the seriousness of the situation on the front due to American bombing. He wanted Soviet advice on how to reorganize the command of the military actions, and also hoped for new supplies of weapons.

On July 8, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet military advisers in order to strengthen his army. Stalin agreed to provide some of these advisers, but his main preoccupation was to give moral support to Pyongyang. In an August 28 cable to Kim, he emphasized the fact that “the great liberation struggle of the Korean people ... was conducted with brilliant success,” that Kim Il Sung “should not feel embarrassed ... because of delays in advancement and because of some local defeats... The biggest success of Korea is that it has become the most popular country in the world and has turned the banner of the liberation movement in Asia against the imperialist yoke.”22 Kim Il Sung expressed deep gratitude to Stalin for this letter, and for “fatherly care and assistance.”23

But the outlook for the North Koreans soured following the successful U.S./UN landing at Inchon in mid-September. On September 27, the Soviet Politburo, frustrated by problems at the front, approved a letter to Ambassador Shtykov which contained devastating criticism of the North Korean military leadership and Soviet military advisers. The letter explained in detail what to do and how to do it in the course of the fighting. With the situation getting more and more complicated for the North Koreans, Stalin, after persistent requests from both Kim Il Sung and Moscow’s representatives in Korea, consented to station air force units in the North. Meanwhile, the situation for the communists was becoming desperate.24

The North Korean leadership forwarded on September 30 a letter to Stalin literally begging for direct military assistance by the Soviet Union or “volunteer units of China and other countries of people’s democracy.”25 Realizing that the situation was desperate, Moscow responded in the following ways: 1) giving constant advice to North Koreans on tactical matters; 2) withdrawing Soviet representatives from Korea; 3) preparing plans for the evacuation of the Pyongyang regime and its troops out of the country; 4) training troops for a comeback to Korea in the future; 5) pressuring the Chinese to enter the conflict.

7. China’s role in the war’s initial stage

As was mentioned earlier in this paper, China supported an attack on the South. However, quite soon Beijing became distressed and offended by the fact that the North Koreans did not consult with them and did not pay heed to their advice. Moscow attempted to calm the emotions of the Chinese.

On 2 July 1950, Zhou Enlai in a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin complained that the North Koreans had un-
derestimated the probability of American military intervention, ignoring Mao Zedong’s warnings back in May 1949 and 1950. Zhou passed on Mao’s advice to the North Koreans to create a strong defense line in the area of Inchon, because American troops could land there. The Chinese leadership feared landing operations by Americans in other parts of the Korean peninsula as well. In this conversation Zhou Enlai confirmed that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops, disguised as Korean, would engage the opponent. Three Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden. Zhou inquired if it would be possible to cover these troops with the Soviet air force.26

By July 8, Stalin was already showing a certain irritation with China. In a cable to Ambassador Roshchin he ordered: “Tell Mao Zedong that Koreans complain that there is no representative of China in Korea. They should quickly send a representative... if, of course, Mao Zedong feels it is necessary to have a communication link with Korea.”27

On July 13, Stalin approved the Chinese decision to deploy troops in the vicinity of the Korean border and promised to train Chinese pilots and to provide China with military planes. In August-September 1950, on a number of occasions, Mao personally expressed concern over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean Peninsula “to mince” American divisions. Simultaneously the Chinese leaders complained that the North Korean military command had committed many mistakes and ignored Beijing’s recommendations. Moreover, Pyongyang did not even inform China of developments on the front.28

On September 20, Stalin in a cable to Mao agreed that it was not normal and correct that the North Korean leadership did not properly inform their Chinese comrades about the development of combat activities in Korea. Stalin, however, defended the Koreans, explaining the aforementioned fact by the lack of proper communications and noting that Moscow too had only received “sporadic and outdated” information from the front. Stalin reminded Mao that the (North) Korean People’s Army was very young and inexperienced and it had to fight against perfectly equipped foreign troops, not simply South Koreans.

In general, Moscow and Beijing held similar views at that time on the strategy and tactics of the war, though with the landing of Americans at Inchon, the mood in China started to change. In a conversation with Roshchin on September 21, Zhou Enlai admitted that there were persons in China who complained that the Korean war would drag on and would require sacrifices on the part of Chinese. It is also significant that China’s authorities leaked to the Soviets intelligence information, showing the Kremlin’s policy in Korea in a bad light. Thus, at one point Moscow was informed by Beijing that the British consul in the Chinese capital had reached the conclusion that the USSR and the USA had colluded in Korea, trying, with the help of the war there, to prevent China from capturing Taiwan, completing the civil war and becoming a strong power.29

8. Stalin pressures a reluctant China to enter the Korean war

On 1 October 1950, Stalin came to the conclusion that China had to come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime. On that day he sent an urgent message to Mao and Zhou asking them “to move to the 38th parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give our Korean comrades a chance to organize under the protection of your troops’ military reserves to the North of the 38th parallel.” Stalin added that Pyongyang was not informed of this request.30 It did not take Mao long to respond to Stalin’s cable. Mao declined to fulfill his own promise under the pretext that Chinese troops were not strong enough and a clash between China and the USA would ruin Beijing’ s plans for peaceful reconstruction and could drag the USSR into a war with Washington. Instead, he suggested that the North Koreans accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.31 The Soviets were stunned with this unexpected change in China’s position. Stalin reminded the Chinese of their previous promises and urged them again to move into the conflict. The Soviet dictator tried to convince Beijing that the Americans would not dare to start a big war and would agree on a settlement on Korea favorable to the communist camp. Under such a scenario China would also solve the Taiwan issue. He added that even if the USA provoked a big war, “let it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the United States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the continent in the form of Rhee’s Korea.”32 Stalin informed Kim Il Sung about his attempts to persuade the Chinese and called upon the North Koreans “to hold firm to every piece of their land.” However, on 12 October 1950, the Soviet leader told Kim that the Chinese had refused again and that Korea had to be evacuated. On the next day, however, Stalin had better news: the Chinese, after long deliberations and discussions, had agreed to extend military aid to North Korea. Moscow in exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops and to provide them with air cover.33

According to available sources, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Two members of the Chinese leadership considered sympathetic to Moscow, Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was: if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution. Those who opposed participation, on the other hand, complained about Soviet refusal to participate in the conflict. Some even suggested that China should accept the American advance, even occupation by the USA of Manchuria—because in this case a war between Moscow and Washington would break out and China could stay away from trouble.34

9. Chinese “volunteers” enter the Korean War, the communist camp is euphoric

After the entrance of Chinese “volunteers” into the Korean war in late November 1950, the mood of Stalin and Kim Il Sung (as well as that of Mao Zedong, of course) dramatically changed for the better. With every new success of the Chinese on the battlefield the desires and arrogance of Stalin and his allies grew (though they did feel their weak points and exchanged occasional complaints).

On December 1, Stalin cabled Mao: “Your successes make happy not only myself and my comrades in the leadership, but the entire Soviet people. Let me welcome from all my heart you and your friends in the leadership, your army and the entire Chinese people in connection with tremendous suc-
cesses in the struggle against American troops. On December 4, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, talking to the Chinese Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, advised Beijing to continue its successful offensive by crossing the 38th parallel. He stressed that the Chinese had to exploit the emerging opportunities to the full extent. Both sides agreed that Americans were confused and had fallen into a very unfavorable situation, that disagreements had developed between Washington and London. The Chinese ambassador quoted reports from the front that Americans were poor fighters, much worse than the Japanese.

On December 7, Stalin and Mao agreed to go on with the fighting and present at the United Nations tough conditions for a cease-fire. On 8 January 1951, in a cable announcing the further advance of Chinese troops, Stalin wrote: “From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades on the capture of Seoul. This is a great victory of popular patriotic forces over forces of reaction.” On January 16, Mao suggested to Kim Il Sung to reinforce and to restructure joint forces in Korea (in order “not to repeat mistakes committed by the Korean troops from June to September 1950”). After a certain rest, Mao proposed that a spring (April/May) offensive could start “with the purpose of achieving the final solution of the South Korean issue.” Mao did not exclude that the Americans, having learned about serious preparations on the Chinese-North Korean side, would cease resisting and leave the Korean peninsula. But even if Washington continued to resist, it would soon realize that resistance was futile and evacuate its troops from Korea.

On January 19, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao’s plan of a rest and thorough preparation for the final assault (though Pak Hon-Yong tried to hurry things up). It was also agreed that the North Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese participation was needed.

10. Euphoria disappears

By the end of January 1951, as documents testify, the communists’ euphoria started to decline; soon it disappeared, replaced by worries, fear, confusion, and at times panic. Reading the documents, one also senses growing irritation among the ranks of the communist allies. It is also noticeable that Stalin tried to keep the USSR as much as possible out of direct participation in the war—if he agreed to send Soviet advisers, pilots and other military personnel to Korea once in a while, every time he did so only after repeated pleas by Mao and Kim. Stalin did not always satisfy the requests of his allies about supplies of armaments, but for objective reasons: they wanted more than the USSR, still weak after WWII and engaged in a global Cold War, could provide.

On January 28, Mao informed Stalin that the adversary had begun an unexpected offensive and due to this the communist troops lost the opportunity to rest and to undergo a restructuring. Instead they had to launch a counterattack. After achieving an operational success the Chinese side hoped to resume preparation for the final assault on the South. Stalin promptly agreed with the strategy, stressing that “from the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that Inchon and Seoul are not captured by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops give a serious rebuff to the advancing troops of the adversary.”

In late January/early February 1951, Stalin criticized the structure, organization, and quality of the Korean armed forces, suggesting substantial changes. His proposals were immediately accepted by the Koreans and supported by Beijing. By that time the first reports of the falling spirit of the Korean troops reached Beijing and Moscow. That the situation for the communist side continued to deteriorate is quite clear from a cable sent by Mao to Stalin on 1 March 1951, in which the Chinese leader admitted that a general offensive was no longer possible, that the adversary had superiority in weapons and dominated the air, and that Sino-Korean troops were sustaining heavy losses and urgently needed air cover by Soviet air force units. Mao stressed that the communist side must prepare for a long war and admitted that American troops will not be driven out of Korea for at least a number of years.

Stalin satisfied Mao’s requests, immediately noting that large-scale military operations were in the offing for Sino-Korean troops. In the following months Moscow promptly and favorably responded to all other requests of the Chinese, concerning first of all airplanes and air defense.

Meanwhile, further correspondence between the USSR and the PRC reveals that the fighting spirit of the communist side continued to deteriorate as that of the Americans improved. The situation got so bad that Stalin felt it necessary to criticize Mao for wrong tactics employed in the war.

11. Communists seek an armistice

By June 1951 the situation at the front became so hopeless for the communists that they started to seek a way out. The question of an armistice was raised by the North Koreans and Chinese. Stalin had no choice but to agree. Maneuvers around the armistice talks did not, however, prevent the communists from looking for every opportunity to reinforce the army, to gain territory and to strike at the opposite side. At the same time the communists constantly worried about attacks by the opposite side. The conditions presented by the communists for an armistice were inflexible. It is also worth noting that Stalin flatly refused to direct the armistice negotiations and quite rudely told Mao to do the job. Another prominent feature of this period was constant bargaining between Stalin and Mao about Soviet military supplies and military advisers. Mao kept bombarding Stalin with new requests, and the Kremlin chief continued to rebuff Mao, sometimes with visible irritation.

In June 1951, Kim II Sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow, where they convinced Stalin to agree to the necessity of an armistice-seeking policy. However, at the same time the communists discussed measures to beef up their military capabilities and to prepare for an offensive in August. In ensuing communications, tactics were worked out on who would raise the issue of the armistice first and how it would be done. It was also decided to insist on restoration of the border line along the 38th parallel and on a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao suggested to raise, for the sake of bargaining, the issue of Taiwan and then to drop it. Simultaneously China requested from the USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin gave the OK, though he rebuked the Chinese for trying to get all the weapons during one year, explaining that it was “physically impossible and totally unthinkable.”

Preparing for the negotiations, Mao cabled Stalin: “It is extremely important that you personally take charge of the negotiations in order to prevent us from getting
January 1949, APRF.

Stalin rejected the idea, saying: "In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It's you, comrade Mao Zedong, who'll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim Il Sung. You must have direct communication with him." 49

To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be more active on the front, to put additional pressure on the adversary as well as to improve their own defenses in case the other side would try to gain a military advantage.

Measures were also taken to upgrade the overall military potential of North Korea, making it ready for a prolonged war. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as much as he was able, except for the advisers. Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for extravagant requests for weapons and unwillingness to share them with the North Koreans.

My analysis concludes here, leaving for other contributions a reexamination of the strategy and tactics of the communist side at the armistice talks and in the final stage of the war. In conclusion, I would stress that further archival research is needed for other contributions a reexamination of aspects of communist politics in the Korean war:

1. The exact reasons for the reversal of Stalin's position on "the liberation" of South Korea.
2. The real motives behind China's initial refusal to enter the Korean War, and the total picture of Soviet-Chinese interactions on Korea in 1949-1950.
3. The detailed process of communist preparations for the war.
4. The events of the first days of the war and reaction to these events in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang.
5. What further strategy Stalin had in mind when he ordered North Korean communists to evacuate the country in the autumn of 1950.

Photo description:

1. See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambassador Shytov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1949, APRF.

2. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46. Stalin's report to Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF). See also Marshal Vasilevsky and Ambassador Shytov's cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, APRF.

4. See, e.g., Stalin cable to Shytov, 30 October 1949, APRF.

5. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46.

6. See, e.g., memorandum of conversations of ambassador Shytov with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong, 12 and 14 August 1949, and Charge d'Affaires Tunkin's cable to Moscow on 3 September 1949, AVP RF.

7. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 776, pp. 30-32.

8. See Shytov cable to Stalin, 19 January 1950, AVP RF.

9. Stalin's cable to Shytov, 30 January 1950, AVP RF.

10. See Shytov cable to Stalin, 23 March 1950, AVP RF.

11. See Shytov cable to Stalin, 15 May 1949, AVP RF; cable to Stalin by General Kovalev about a conversation with Mao Zedong, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61.

12. Shytov cable to Moscow, 12 May 1950, AVP RF.


15. Coded message N 5500, 14 May 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55.

16. See Ambassador Roshchin's cable to Moscow, 14 May 1950, AVP RF.

17. APRF, Fond 6, list 9, file 14, p. 57.

18. Shytov cable to Stalin, 1 January 1950, AVP RF.

19. Shytov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950, AVP RF.


22. Coded message N 75021, 28 August 1950, ibid., pp. 5-6, 10-11.


27. Stalin cable to Roshchin, 8 July 1950.


29. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 13 July 1950, AVP RF.

30. Coded message N 4581, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 334, pp. 97-98.


33. Coded message N 4829, 14 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 343, p. 77.

34. Coded message N 9768, APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, p. 5.

35. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 371, pp. 35-37.

36. Ibid., list 1, file 336, pp. 88-90.

37. See coded message N 15603, 16 January 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 336, pp. 81-82.

38. Coded message 15994, 21 January 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 335, pp. 37-40.

39. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, p. 44.

40. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 47-48.

41. Ibid., Fond 3, list 65, file 828, p. 123.

42. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 78-82.

43. Ibid., p. 118.

44. See, e.g., the coded message N 20412, June 1951, ibid., file 339, pp. 4-6.


46. Coded message N 3557, 13 June 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 31-32; see also file 339, pp. 61-63.

47. Coded message N 635177, 24 June 1951, ibid., file 339, p. 78.


49. Coded message N 3917, 30 June 1951, ibid., pp. 95-96.

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SHTYKOV
continued from page 69

The merger of the three leftist parties and the September General Strike/October Uprising in the south are the two most conspicuous examples of the Soviet intervention. In the case of the merger of the parties, the Soviet Army played the role of moderator and leader in the process. Interestingly, despite the efforts by Shytkov and the Soviet Army to make Kim Il Sung the representative of the will of the Soviets, the South Korean leftist leaders preferred to deal with the Soviets directly rather than with Kim Il Sung. This demonstrates that the leftist leaders in the south did not yet approve Kim’s leadership. In the process of the merger, the Soviet Army consistently supported Pak Hon-yong, head of the Korean Communist Party (KCP). The reasons were, first of all, that Pak controlled the biggest leftist party in the south; and second, that Pak’s transition of policy from cooperation to confrontation with the U.S. Occupation Government was consistent with that of the Soviet Army in the north. The Soviet leaders in the north, through Kim Il Sung, tried to persuade or even threaten leftist leaders in the south, who were against the merger, into accepting Pak Hon-yong’s line and the merger. For instance, when Kang Jin, a leftist leader in the south who was against the merger, visited North Korea, Kim Il Sung, apparently under the direction of Shytkov, met with Kang and reported the details of the meeting to Shytkov on 22 October 1946.10

I met with Kang Jin. I told him that he had to take full responsibility for the failure of the merger. I also told him, “Although I don’t know whether you are a running-dog of American Imperialism, you are helping Americans enormously…. Comrade Pak Hon-yong’s decision is not only his but also 400,000 North Korean Party members’…. You have to admit that you made a mistake if you truly want to be a real revolutionary which you have not been.”

After the success of the merger, Shytkov ordered General Romanenko, the Director of the Soviet Military Administration in the north, to telegaph Pak Hon-yong as follows: “Congratulations on the hard-earned but successful merger.”11 Even after the merger, Shytkov and the Soviet leaders closely worked with Pak and even supported him financially from time to time.12

It has been a widely accepted view that the September General Strike and the October Riot proved by the higher ranking Soviet army commands as follows: “Stop the strike when the demands of various economic claims, wage increase for workers, the release of the leftist leaders from prison, the cancellation of the warrant of arrests of Communist leaders, and revived publication of banned leftist newspapers are met.

As regard to the strike, I instructed as follows:

Continue the struggle until the demands of various economic claims, wage increase for workers, the release of the leftist leaders from prison, the cancellation of the warrant of arrests of Communist leaders, and revived publication of banned leftist newspapers are met.

Stop the strike when the demands are met.

Declare that [the strikers] will continue to talk with the American Occupation Government on the issue of transition of power to People’s Committee [in the south].

Demand that the American Occupation Government not oppress the organizers and supporters of the strike.

Probably the most striking evidence of intervention was that Shytkov funneled 2 million yen to support the General Strike and later 3 million yen for the October Riot.14

There are some problems in analyzing the diaries. First, the information in the diaries is so fragmentary that it is nearly impossible for us to understand completely how certain situations evolved. They also contain many abbreviations which can be understood only by the author himself and grammatical errors which are open to a variety of interpretations. Above all, Shytkov wrote as if he were giving orders to Korean leftist leaders: according to the diaries, the Korean leaders were simply automatons. Therefore we must interpret historical events very carefully, comparing information from the diaries and that from other sources.

Still, the Shytkov diaries are undoubtedly among the most important documents to emerge on Soviet policy toward Korea from 1945 to 1951 and the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia. From the diaries, it is evident that Shytkov and the Soviet Army in North Korea played a major role in the decision-making: Soviet policies in Korea were planned at Shytkov’s desk and approved by the higher ranking Soviet army leaders and later by Moscow. After he received approval from Moscow, the diaries suggest, Shytkov and his lieutenants carefully choreographed and directed the political drama of North Korean (and sometimes South Korean) politics. Although not all of
them were puppets of the Soviet Army, it is evident that North Korean Communist leaders like Kim Il Sung were under the tutelage of the Soviet Army. Even though the Soviet Army leaders tried to make their rule look like an indirect one, their intervention was always direct and full-scale. In other words, the Shhtykov diaries show that the Soviet Army in North Korea was a de facto Occupation Army, not merely a “Stationary Army.” In addition, we now know from the diaries that the Soviets were more deeply involved in politics and social unrest in the south than we had known previously; leftist parties in the north and south were strongly dependent upon the Soviets in the north and, ultimately, Moscow.

2. Zhdanov was the First Secretary of the party committee of Leningrad. Shhtykov had absolute loyalty to Zhdanov. When Zhdanov died on 31 August 1948, Shhtykov expressed his deep grief over his death in his diary. Diaries, 31 August, 1, 3 September 1948.
3. When the Communist regime was established in North Korea, Stalin immediately appointed Shhtykov to this important post. Interestingly enough, Shhtykov refused the offer at first because of his heart problem. However, he could not refuse Molotov’s urgent request along with promise to send Shhtykov to a center for medical treatment and provide him with competent aides. See Diaries, 2 December 1948.
5. Ibid.
6. His memoirs stopped at the years of his childhood. Interview in 1995 with Viktor Terentevich Shhtykov, General Shhtykov’s son, in St. Petersburg.
7. For example, Kravtsov, a special aide to Shhtykov, recollected that he had burned in the 1950s all of his documents, including reports he had written.
8. For convenience’s sake, I use North Korea and South Korea although there were only the de jure U.S. Occupation Government in the south and de facto Soviet Occupation Government in the north from 1945-1948.
9. The 3 November 1946 election in North Korea was another example.
11. Diaries, 2 December 1946.
12. Diaries, 6, 7, 11, 12, 25, 27 December 1946.
13. Diaries, 28 September, 7, 8, 22 December 1946.
14. At that time one seom of rice (a big sack of rice) cost 15 yen in the north and 150 yen in the south.

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Dmitrii Volkogonov
(1928-1995)


Shortly before his death, he completed a survey of the whole Soviet period (Sem’ Portretov [Seven Portraits] [Moscow: Novosti, 1995]), which only recently appeared in Russia.

Having been an orthodox Communist for most of his life, Volkogonov in the 1990s shifted toward a strongly anti-Communist position. As recently as when he wrote his books on Stalin and Trotsky, he had glorified Lenin. But by the time he completed his study of Lenin in 1994, Volkogonov had concluded that the founder of Bolshevism was in fact a “savage, cruel, uncompromising, remorseless, and vengeful” figure. Volkogonov said he had found it “painful” to “shed [his] illusions” about the Soviet regime, but shed them he did. His final books provide overwhelming support for his ideological change of heart.

In late 1991, Volkogonov was appointed head of a special parliamentary commission to oversee the handling of archives from the Soviet period. In that capacity, he helped secure the release of many valuable documents, including items from the Presidential Archive, the collection of highly-sensitive materials kept under the personal control of Soviet and then Russian leaders. Even so, critics of Volkogonov frequently charged that he exploited his privileged access to the archives and held back from circulation the most significant or sensational documents for his own use. After a lengthy article along these lines appeared in the newspaper Izvestiya in July 1994, Volkogonov sent a letter to the editor asserting that he had enjoyed no special access for his Stalin and Trotsky biographies, and that virtually all the documents he used for his Lenin book were “accessible to everyone.” Partly as a result of this controversy, the translator’s preface to the English edition of the Lenin biography was modified to include a pledge that all documents cited in the book, including those from the Presidential Archive, would be made available to all researchers.

Unfortunately, the access envisaged in that pledge has not yet materialized. Russian and foreign scholars who worked in the Russian archives in 1995 (including myself) were summarily turned down when they requested access to documents adduced in the Lenin book. Whether because of bureaucratic inertia or some other motive, most of the senior archival officials in Moscow displayed no interest in gathering and making available the items that Volkogonov cited. One hopes that with Volkogonov’s death, a renewed effort will be made to release for open research the many documents he employed to such good effect. That would be a fitting tribute to a courageous historian.

—Mark Kramer
Russian Research Center
Harvard University
STALIN, MAO, KIM, AND CHINA’S DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR, SEPTEMBER 16-OCTOBER 15, 1950: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov

At 5:45 a.m. on 15 September 1950, the 5th Marine Brigade of the X Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond began its unprecedented amphibious landing onto the beaches of Inch’on. There were about 500 North Korean soldiers on Wolmi-do, a tiny island protecting the entrance into the Inch’on harbor, another 500 at Kimpo, and about 1,500 within Inch’on. They were confronted with more than 70,000 troops from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Holland, and the UK disembarking from more than 260 ships. The surprise of the UN attack, and the preponderant firepower and manpower of the U.S.-led forces, destroyed pockets of the dazed North Korean resistance within hours. By the next morning the 1st Marines had been able to squeeze the remnants of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) out of Inch’on and had started their rapid advance towards Kimp’o and Seoul. Operation Chromite was a complete success and later labeled as “a masterpiece of amphibious ingenuity.” In a little more than a week Seoul was recaptured by the UN forces. On 1 October 1950, they crossed the 38th parallel, and began their rapid, sweeping advance northward. The KPA surrendered Pyongyang on October 19, and soon the first Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. battalions approached the Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean border.

However, U.S./UN Commander Douglas MacArthur’s promise to “Bring the Boys Home by Christmas” never came true. The Thanksgiving offensive proved still-born, for it was a new enemy that the UN troops confronted in Korea from then on: 36 divisions of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) who entered North Korea in late October-early November, supported by almost twelve wings and air defense divisions of the Soviet Air Force operating from nearby airfields in Northeast China. Recognizing new patterns in the enemy’s behavior, in his special communiqué to the UN dated 28 November 1950, MacArthur called it “an entirely new war.” Indeed, it was.

In the Western literature there are many scholarly and eyewitness accounts of the preparation, implementation, and strategic and military significance of Operation Chromite, as well as the subsequent prosecution of the war by the UN forces, including the origins and aftermath of the reversal of fortunes for the UN troops in November 1950. In addition, in his 1960 study China Crosses the Yalu, Allen S. Whiting persuasively showed how national security concerns, as well as domestic political and economic considerations, may have led the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government to decide to enter the Korean War. His preliminary conclusions were supported almost three decades later by Russell Spurr, who focused his research on the psychological background of the Chinese leaders’ decision to provide military assistance to a friendly communist regime in Pyongyang.

Then, a wave of memoirs published in the PRC by former high-ranking Chinese officials, military leaders, and other insiders allowed scholars to reconstruct in great detail the relevant decision-making processes in Beijing and Northeast China regarding the merits of Chinese military intervention in Korea, including debates within the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and among PLA senior commanders. These works also brought to light some differences in the individual positions of Chinese leaders, including last-minute doubts, reversals, disagreements, and vacillations on the part of those involved, and analyzed the correspondence between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and their military officials, as well as other political, economic, military, and administrative events related to the war which occurred in China in August-October 1950.

However, what this literature still left to speculation was the Soviet side of the story. Some of the books, especially Uncertain Partners (1993), by Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, and William W. Stueck’s recently-published The Korean War: An International History, discuss strategic calculations which Stalin might have made at this crucial juncture of the Korean War, the course and outcome of crucial negotiations between Stalin and Zhou Enlai on 10-11 October 1950, as well as the still-enigmatic October 1950 correspondence between Beijing and Moscow.

But due to the unavoidable lack of hard top-level archival evidence, these accounts fell far short of being able to reconstruct in detail the attitudes and policy orientations of Stalin or other key Soviet leaders in Moscow and their representatives on the ground in Korea, nor the decision-making processes taking place inside the Kremlin immediately after the U.S. landing at Inch’on and leading up to the final Chinese decision a month later to intervene militarily in Korea. Moreover, this literature suffered from the lack of previously classified Moscow-Pyongyang top-level correspondence, and to rely primarily on the officially authorized, at times propagandistic Chinese sources of the exchanges between the PRC and USSR leaders.

This absence of critical Soviet source materials, consequently, gave birth to a number of academic debates. First, many scholars disagree in their assessments of Soviet and Chinese intentions and motivations in Northeast Asia and the nature and parameters of their respective perceived national interests on the Korean peninsula at this stage of the war. Second, an overarching debate among historians involves a series of interrelated questions about alliance commitments between Moscow and Beijing—what commitments were made, why and how they were reached, whether they were broken or honored, and how they affected the subsequent course of Sino-Soviet relations (a good example of this is the claim advanced in some Chinese accounts that Stalin, in his 10-11 October 1950 meeting with Zhou, reneged on a prior commitment for the USSR to provide air support for the CPVs). This debate includes controversies related to the personal roles of Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung in manipulating one another’s decisions regarding the war, especially the initial decision to initiate a large-scale attack against the south in June 1950 and later over China’s intervention. There is also a cloud of uncertainty over the role of
Zhou Enlai as an intermediary between Stalin and Mao in managing (mismanaging?) the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the role of the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang in the initial stages of the war, T.F. Shvytkov, as an intermediary between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in the ill-fated handling of the USSR-DPRK alliance.

Shortly before the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the Russian government released a new batch of previously classified documents related to the events on the Korean peninsula from 1949 to 1953, including some correspondence between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong, internal correspondence between the Kremlin and various Soviet government ministries involved in the prosecution of the war in Korea, and ciphered telegrams between Soviet representatives in North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and their respective superiors in Moscow. In total, these new primary source materials amount to well over a thousand pages and come from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from the Military Archive at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

This article introduces and analyzes a selection of these newly declassified documents from the Russian Archives related to the period after the U.S.-UN troops’ landing at Inch’on on 16 September 1950, until mid-October 1950, when the PRC decided to send its troops to Korea to save Kim Il Sung’s collapsing regime. The newly released documents primarily from the APRF, offer new information and insights into how Stalin and his political representatives and military advisers in Korea; Kim Il Sung and his close associates; and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and their personal representatives in Korea, viewed and assessed the strategic and military significance of the UN forces’ landing at Inch’on, recapture of Seoul, crossing of the 38th parallel, and drive to the Yalu. These new archival materials provide researchers with a fascinating window into the internal dynamics and politics of alliance relationships among the Soviet Union, PRC, and the DPRK from the aftermath of the Inch’on landing until the Chinese crossing of the Yalu River. They present startling new evidence on the commonalities and differences in the Soviet and Chinese worldviews, and their respective views on the limits of the U.S. global power and likelihood of a U.S.-led escalation of the Korean conflict, as well as on the varied significances of Korea, divided or unified, for the Soviet versus Chinese national interests. Also, the newly declassified early October 1950 correspondence between Moscow and Beijing sheds dramatic new light on intra-alliance bargaining between Stalin and Mao Zedong regarding the terms of China’s entry into the Korean War, which is at variance with the traditional Chinese and Western interpretations thereof. In particular, these Russian documents raise questions about the reliability and even authenticity of Mao’s telegrams of 2 and 14 October 1950 as they appear in officially authorized Chinese sources, and subsequently in scholarly literature. They also reveal the depth of Stalin’s and Mao’s personal involvement and the complexity of policymaking processes in Moscow and Beijing regarding the prosecution of the Korean War, as well as how domestic political considerations and bureaucratic politics in the USSR and PRC affected their respective policy outcomes concerning military strategy and tactics. Finally, they reveal for the first time a series of decisions by the Soviet leadership to reduce the Soviet presence in Korea at that time, including three CPSU Politburo conferences (on 27 and 30 September 1950 and 5 October 1950) which considered the Chinese leadership’s pronounced reluctance to accommodate Stalin’s prodding of Mao to send troops to rescue the DPRK, leading to Stalin’s 13 October 1950 decision to abandon North Korea and evacuate Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA to Northeast China and the Soviet Far East, as well as his dramatic reversal less than twenty-four hours later upon learning of the Chinese final decision to fight.

The value of the ciphered telegrams lies in the fact that they reveal the atmosphere of mutual finger-pointing which reigned in the offices of the Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese decision-makers after the Inch’on landing. In the internal correspondence between Stalin and the Soviet political and military advisers in Korea, Stalin blamed them for all the KPA failures in the Korean campaign, whereas in his correspondence with Kim Il Sung Stalin blamed the KPA commanders for military defeats, while in his exchange with Mao Zedong, Stalin held Kim Il Sung and his Korean generals responsible for failures at the battleground. In turn, Zhou Enlai blamed Kim Il Sung for withholding military intelligence from the Chinese and for ignoring Mao’s warnings, issued as early as mid-August, about the danger of a U.S. landing at Inch’on. Kim Il Sung, in turn, blamed his commanders for insubordination, Stalin for lack of commitment, and his Soviet advisers for professional ineptitude. Reading the newly declassified Russian telegrams, it is hard not to conclude that these mutual recriminations undermined palpably the mutual trust among the leaders of these communist allies.

The ciphered telegrams also reveal the atmosphere of confusion and discord that permeated relations between the Soviet and Chinese leaders and their respective representatives and associates in Korea regarding the military-strategic significance of the Inch’on landing. Stalin considered the Inch’on landing a development of vital strategic significance, fraught with grave implications for the KPA [Document #3]. Therefore, in his ciphered telegram dated 18 September 1950, he directed that Gen. Vasilyev, the Chief Soviet Military Adviser to the KPA, and Ambassador T.F. Shvytkov, the Soviet envoy to the DPRK, tell Kim Il Sung to redeploy four KPA divisions from the Naktong River front to the vicinity of Seoul.10 Also on September 18, he ordered Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky urgently to develop a plan for the Soviet Air Force to provide air cover to Pyongyang, including the transfer of several Soviet Air Force fighter squadrons with maintenance crews, radar posts, and air defense battalions from their bases in the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East (including the strategic port city of Vladivostok) to the airfields around Pyongyang [Document #1].

In contrast with Stalin’s judgment, neither Shvytkov nor Vasilyev seemed to grasp, let alone forecast, the strategic importance of the U.S. troops’ amphibious landing at Inch’on—as Stalin harshly admonished them in a withering message on September 27 [Document #3]. They believed it was a bluff aimed at distracting the attention of the KPA Command from the main southeastern front. Shvytkov even suggested that an author of an article in the Soviet newspaper Pravda about the Inch’on landing should be brought to
trial for disinformation and panicking. In their correspondence with Stalin, they doubted the need to redeploy KPA troops from the Naktong River front to the defense of Seoul, instead favoring a strategy of exerting additional pressure on the southeastern front in order to throw the U.S. and ROK troops defending the Pusan perimeter off the cliffs into the Sea of Japan in a final great offensive. Consequently, they dragged their feet in executing Stalin’s order to withdraw four KPA divisions from the Southeast to the vicinity of Seoul.

As the military situation around Seoul deteriorated due to the rapid advance of the U.S. X Corps toward the ROK capital from the west, and their recapture of Kimpo on September 18, Stalin urgently dispatched to Korea a special mission headed by Army General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov,11 (known by the pseudonym Matveyev), the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet army, carried Stalin’s order that Shvykov and Vasiliev tell Kim Il Sung to halt the offensive along the Pusan perimeter, to assume the defensive and pull out all his divisions from the Naktong River front and redeploy them to defend Seoul in the northeast and east. Also, he pressed Vasilievsky to step up his efforts to provide the KPA with air cover and set up an air defense system around Pyongyang (see Document #2). Finally, Stalin directed his representative in Beijing to solicit the Chinese leadership’s opinion on the Korean situation and what to do about it.

On the night of September 18, Stalin received a ciphered telegram from his ambassador to the PRC, N.V. Roshchin.12 Roshchin informed Stalin of his meeting the same day with Zhou Enlai, with the Soviet Military Advisers Gen. Kotov and Konnov present. Zhou said that the Chinese leadership had no other information about the U.S. amphibious landing at Inch’on besides that reported in the Western newspapers and by the Pyongyang Radio. Zhou noted that, in general, the Chinese had very poor contacts with the North Korean government regarding military matters. The Chinese were aware of the North Korean demand for cadres but were absolutely in the dark about the KPA’s operational plans. They had attempted to dispatch a team of senior Chinese military officers from the Northeast Frontier Forces Command to Korea to observe the military situation on the battleground, but had not heard anything from them.13 Zhou complained that the DPRK leaders had persistently ignored Mao Zedong’s advice and predictions and, moreover, deprived the Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang, Ni Zhiliang, of operational information about the military situation, thereby preventing him from informing his government properly in a timely fashion. As a result, Mao had only sketchy reports about the execution and consequences of the Inch’on landing.

In response to Roshchin’s question about the appropriate course of action for the KPA at this juncture, Zhou recommended with some reservations that, if the KPA had 100,000-men reserves in the vicinity of Seoul and Pyongyang, they could and must eliminate the enemy’s landing force at Inch’on. If, however, the KPA lacked such reserves, then they had to withdraw their main forces from the Naktong River front northward, leaving rear-guards behind to defend the frontline. On behalf of the PRC government, Zhou requested that the Soviet government pass to the Chinese leadership more accurate and up-to-date information on the military situation in Korea, if it possessed it itself.

On September 20, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Roshchin in Beijing for delivery to Zhou Enlai, responding to the latter’s request for more information on the Korean situation.14 First of all, he stressed that poor communications between the DPRK and PRC and lack of information in Beijing on the military situation in Korea was “abnormal.” In Stalin’s opinion, Kim II Sung failed to provide Mao Zedong with military intelligence because of difficulties in his own communications with his Frontline Command rather than his reluctance to share this kind of information. Stalin complained that he himself received odd and belated reports about the frontline situation from his Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shvykov). He asked Zhou to bear in mind that the KPA was a very young and ill-experienced army with an underdeveloped command and control system and weak cadres unable to analyze the frontline situation quickly and efficiently. He blamed the U.S. intervention for the KPA’s debacle at Inch’on, emphasizing that had the KPA fought only against Syngman Rhee’s troops, “it would have cleaned up Korea from the reactionary forces long time ago.” Stalin argued that the tactics used by the KPA at that time—dispatching odd bat-

talions and regiments to the vicinity of Inch’on and Seoul—were flawed and fraught with the possible annihilation of these units without providing any solution to the problem as a whole. He stressed that only a pullout of main forces from the southeastern front and creation of formidable lines of defense east and north of Seoul could halt the unfolding UN offensive around Seoul.

Upon receiving Stalin’s message from Roshchin on September 21, Zhou expressed satisfaction that the Soviet assessment of the military situation in Korea after Inch’on matched the Chinese one. He mentioned to Roshchin that two days earlier, he had sent a cable to Chinese Ambassador Ni Zhiliang in Pyongyang with recommendations similar to those which he had given Roshchin and Soviet military advisers earlier that day. According to Zhou, the same day, Ni had a long talk with Kim II Sung, with Pak Il’u and Pak Hon-Yong present, and, afterwards, cabled to Beijing Kim’s words that “the Korean people were ready to fight a protracted war.”15

In the meantime, on September 22, the 5th and 7th regiments of the 1st U.S. Marines Division approached Seoul from the northwest and northeast, while the 32nd and 17th regiments of the ROK 7th Division advanced to Seoul from southeast, preparing for the final stage of Operation Chromite: the recapture of the capital. There was a general feeling that Seoul was about to fall. On September 23, the U.S.-UN-ROK forces launched a frontal assault on Seoul; at the same time the Eighth Army’s general offensive in the South, unleashed on September 16, began to bear fruit, and the KPA fell apart at the Naktong River front.

Upon arrival in Korea, General Zakharov (Matveyev) sent his first ciphered telegram to Stalin on September 26 [Document #4]. He reported that the situation of the People’s Army troops on the western (Seoul) and southeastern (Pusan) fronts was grave; that the KPA’s First and Second Armies faced the certain prospect of being encircled and completely destroyed by the enemy troops; and that the U.S. Air Force dominated the air space without hindrance, wreaking havoc both within the KPA and in the rear areas. He noted that the KPA troops had suffered heavy losses, mainly from the enemy’s air force, having lost almost all its tanks and much of its artillery; and that they lacked munitions and fuel, the delivery of
which was virtually halted. He stressed that the KPA’s top-down command and control system was set up poorly, that wire and radio communications worked only intermittently because of the breakdowns inflicted by the enemy’s air raids and due to the lack of qualified radio operators and radio station fuel, and that courier mail was almost nonexistent.

On September 25-26, Seoul became “an inferno,” with the U.S. Marines advancing into Seoul from the South, North, and West, and methodically destroying over 20,000 North Korean troops making a last-ditch stand. According to Zakharov’s ciphered telegram [Document #4], on September 25, at 19:00 hours, local time, Kim Il Sung was finally persuaded to abandon his dream of pushing the UN troops into the sea in the south. He succumbed to his Soviet advisers’ urging and ordered that the Seoul Group and the Second Army Group operating in the northern part of the southeastern front assume the defensive and hold up the enemy by any means. The troops of the Second Army Group operating in the central and southern parts of the southeastern front were ordered to begin a general retreat northwestward. But the North Korean troops in the South no longer obeyed their commanders; the KPA was rapidly disintegrating. In Zakharov’s judgment, at that time the North’s top political and military leaders already had no idea about the predicament of the KPA troops, in particular on the southeastern front.

On September 26, the ROK 7th Division moving westward from Namsan district, after having crossed the Han River, joined hands with the U.S. 5th and 7th Marines. Although some North Korean resistance, including suicide squads attacking American tanks, continued fiercely until the afternoon of September 27, by and large the battle for Seoul was over as the night fell. According to Zakharov’s ciphered telegram [Document #4], later that night, Kim Il Sung received him; DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong and Shthykov also attended. As a result of the conversation, Kim Il Sung decided to combine the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister in his own hands, to set up a Staff Office for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for command and control over troops, and to pay serious attention to the work of the rear. Zakharov reported that the North Koreans had only just started to form six infantry divisions in the northern part of Korea, and that Kim Il Sung had issued a directive to take immediate steps to withdraw manpower from South Korea in order to use it in the formation of new divisions in North Korea and deny this opportunity to the South.

Stalin was furious. On September 27, he convened an emergency session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) [Document #3]. This was the first in a series of CC VKR(b) Politburo meetings which considered Soviet national interests in Korea and eventually decided to minimize Soviet exposure on the peninsula. In its decision P#78/73, the Politburo blamed the KPA’s predicament in the Seoul area and in the southeast on a series of grave mistakes made by the KPA Frontline Command, the Commands of the Army Groups and army groupings in the questions related to command and control over troops, and combat tactics. In particular, Stalin and his associates in Moscow held responsible the Soviet military advisers for these blunders. In their judgment, the Soviet military advisers had failed to implement scrupulously and in a timely fashion Stalin’s order to withdraw four divisions from the central front to the Seoul area, and had displayed, moreover, strategic illiteracy and incompetence in intelligence matters. “They failed to grasp the strategic importance of the enemy’s assault landing in Inch’on, denied the gravity of its implications... This blindness and lack of strategic experience led to the fact that they doubted the necessity of redeploying troops from the South toward Seoul. At the same time, they procrastinated over the redeployment and slowed it down considerably, thereby losing a week to the enemy’s enjoyment.” The Politburo stated that “the assistance provided by our military advisers to the Korean Command in such paramount questions as communications, command and control over troops, organization of intelligence and combat is exceptionally weak.”

In conclusion, the Politburo decided that after the fall of Seoul the KPA’s main goal should be to withdraw all its troops to North Korea and defend its own homeland by all means. It attached a list of military measures which Chief Soviet Military Adviser Vasiliev was ordered to implement in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the 38th parallel. Despite the gravity of the charges, however, no personnel changes among the Soviet political and military advisers were made in Korea at that time.

Meanwhile, in Korea, on September 28 Kim Il Sung convened an emergency meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee Political Council (WPK CC PC). Everyone present agreed that the military situation was critical and warranted extreme measures. First, in order to restore the KPA Command Structure and improve its efficiency and reliability, the Political Council approved Kim’s proposal to combine the positions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (SCINC) and Minister of National Defense in his hands and to set up a General Staff for the SCINC, i.e., the measures recommended to Kim by Zakharov and Shthykov at their meeting on September 26. This was tantamount to establishing an entirely new command and control system over the KPA centered on Kim Il Sung. This decision was an obvious reflection of the fact that by September 28, Kim had already lost contact with his Defense Minister, Che’oe Yong-gon, who was in charge of the defense of Seoul. Moreover, Kim and other top political leaders in Pyongyang had lost all communication with their Front Line Command and the Auxiliary Command Posts, which had been cut off from each other by Walker’s rapidly advancing Eighth Army. That day, the U.S.-led UN forces enveloped both the First and Second Army Groups of the KPA, broke up the KPA’s command structure, and completely destroyed its communications system. The KPA units attempting to retreat to the north from the Naktong River were pursued and destroyed. In Kim Il Sung’s own words, “because of poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders,” the KPA failed to pull out most of their troops stuck in the south.

The WPK CC PC’s second decision was to take urgent measures aimed to organize defenses along the 38th parallel, approving Kim’s plan to form immediately fifteen new divisions. At that time, six new infantry divisions were already being created in South Pyongan and South Hwanghae, and South and North Hamgyong Provinces. At the same time, Kim hoped to reconstitute nine more infantry divisions from the remnants of the KPA returning from the southeastern front.
fall of Seoul nothing would stop the UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel; that if they did cross the parallel, the remaining KPA units would not be able to render any serious resistance, and, consequently, the war would be over in a very short period of time, with the North Korean state being eliminated by the aggressive American imperialists. Unanimously, the North Korean leadership agreed to ask both allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, for direct military assistance. The Political Council thus discussed and approved two official letters [Document #6] addressed to Stalin and Mao Zedong, begging them to intervene directly and without delay to save the North Korean regime.

It is noteworthy that the next day, before dispatching the letter to Stalin, Kim solicited Shytkov’s advice regarding its content and advisability. On the evening of September 29, following the mandate of the WPK CC Politburo, Kim for the first time officially raised to his Soviet military advisers the question of the UN forces’ crossing the 38th parallel. At his meeting with Shytkov and Zakharov [Document #5], with Pak Hon-Yong present, he asked Shytkov whether the latter thought the enemy would dare to cross the 38th parallel. Once Shytkov replied that he was not sure, Kim concurred by saying that “it was not clear to me either.” Kim added, however, that “if the enemy did cross the parallel, the People’s Army would not be able to form new troops and, therefore, would not be able to render any serious resistance to the enemy forces.” Kim told Shytkov he wanted his advice as to how they should approach Stalin concerning their letter requesting direct Soviet military assistance. But Shytkov dodged the question, obviously to ensure that the final decision to invite Soviet troops to the defense of North Korea—and subsequent responsibility, should things go wrong—would rest with Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-Yong themselves.23 Kim and Pak were visibly dissatisfied and upset but at the same time so “confused, lost, hopeless, and desperate,” and had so much at stake at the moment, that they went ahead and asked Stalin for a total commitment, including Soviet ground troops, even without Shytkov’s blessing.24

It was on October 1, at 2:50 a.m., that Stalin received ciphered telegram #1351 from Shytkov, containing an official text of the letter of Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-Yong pleading for help [Document #6]. Actually, the letter was dated September 29. The next day, Pak Hon-Yong personally delivered it to Shytkov with an emotional plea that “at the moment of the enemy’s troops crossing of the 38th parallel, we will desperately need ground troops from the Soviet Union.” The letter arrived at the Eighth Department of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces on September 30, at 23:30 p.m., by wire as “very urgent,” was deciphered on October 1, at 0:35 a.m., typed up at 1:45 a.m., and forwarded to Stalin to his dacha in the South at 2:50 a.m. The timing is important in this case because only after having received Kim II Sung’s plea for help did Stalin dispatch a cable to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on October 1, at 3:00 a.m., requesting China’s direct intervention in the Korean conflict.

In their letter, Kim and Pak informed Stalin about the severe consequences for the KPA of the Inch’on landing. Although still loathe to admit that Seoul had fallen, they indicated that the enemy “had the real possibility of taking over Seoul.” They were certain that “with the complete occupation of Seoul, the enemy would launch a further offensive into North Korea.” Kim and Pak admitted that “if the enemy were to take advantage of the situation and step up its offensive in North Korea, then we would be unable to stop the enemy by our own forces... and the U.S. aggression would succeed in the end.” Nonetheless, they emphasized that they were still determined to fight on, to mobilize new troops and to prepare “for a protracted war.” They argued that it was “in the USSR’s national interest to prevent the U.S. advance into North Korea and the latter’s transformation into a colony and military springboard of U.S. imperialism.”

Finally, they begged Stalin for a “special kind of assistance,” admitting that “at the moment when the enemy troops begin to cross the 38th parallel, we would desperately need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.” Afraid of their plea being rejected outright and fearful that Stalin held them personally responsible for the war’s disastrous turn, Kim and Pak inserted a face-saving proposition for Stalin, i.e., “if for any reason, this [direct military assistance - AM] proves to be impossible, please, assist us in lining up international volunteers’ units in China and other countries of people’s democracies to be used in providing military assistance to our struggle.” Kim and Pak could not be more explicit than that. Recognizing that they could not survive on their own, they were crying out for help to Stalin, their “fatherly leader,” for, preferably, the Soviet cavalry to rescue the day, or, if not, to broker Mao’s consent to enter the war.

In the meantime, on September 29, General MacArthur restored the Government of the Republic of Korea headed by Syngman Rhee in an emotional ceremony in the capital in Seoul. The last hope that the war could be contained at the status quo ante belli was dashed when later that day the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved MacArthur’s plan for the conquest of North Korea, envisioning the Eighth Army advancing to Pyongyang and the Tenth Corps being withdrawn from the Inch’on-Seoul area for another amphibious landing at Wonsan. The same day, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gen. George C. Marshall sent an encouraging message to MacArthur: “We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel.”25

On September 30, the Soviet Politburo conferred again on the Korean situation, in particular Zakharov’s latest report on the dire military situation [Document #4]. The discussion focused on the need to avoid a direct military confrontation between the USSR and the United States and the options still available to salvage the situation in Korea, including soliciting Chinese help and opening a last-ditch diplomatic maneuvering at the United Nations. The Politburo directed that the Foreign Ministry draft a new ceasefire resolution to be submitted to the UN. Also, they decided to approve Kim II Sung’s proposals to reorganize the KPA high military command, form new divisions, and withdraw remaining North Korean troops from the South [Document #8]. At the same time, the Politburo decided that armaments, munition, and other materials for the new divisions would be supplied to the KPA between October 5 and 20.26 Finally, the Politburo recommended that Kim ask the Chinese to dispatch truck drivers to North Korea.

It is worth noting that Stalin specifically mentioned in his instructions to Shytkov that their last recommendation should be passed to Kim II Sung without any reference to Moscow, as if it were coming from the Soviet military advisers in the field. The probable cause for such reticence may have
been Stalin’s belief that the entire question of the Chinese entry into the war was so profound that: 1) he had to discuss it with Mao directly; and 2) he should not even raise it until it was clear that without Chinese help the North Koreans would not survive, and until the latter asked for it explicitly. Also, Stalin may have wanted to probe Mao’s intentions and promises and put them to a real test, albeit on the minor issue of truck drivers. Perhaps Stalin even hoped to drag Mao into the war incrementally; according to this scenario, the drivers would be the first commitment of manpower by Mao to Korea, which would later lead to a chain of escalating commitments.

The Politburo made these decisions and wired some of them to Pyongyang close to noon on September 30, i.e., before Stalin received another ciphered telegram #1340 from Shtykov [Document #5], later that the same day (after 4:55 p.m.). Only then was Stalin officially informed by him that Seoul had fallen and Syngman Rhee was back in the capital, promising to complete his drive to the North and vanquish Stalin’s North Korean comrades; that Kim Il Sung was afraid that the UN forces would not halt their advance northward at the 38th parallel; and that the North Koreans would not be able to resist the enemy’s offensive on their own.

Later in the evening of September 30, in line with the general disposition in Moscow toward limiting the Soviet presence and risks in Korea, Shtykov requested evacuation powers from Moscow [Stalin was informed of this in a note from Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko dated September 30—Document #9]. Shtykov asked for the right to send back to the USSR all Soviet specialists working at the North Korean enterprises, as well as some redundant personnel of the Soviet organizations in the DPRK. As the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK responsible for the lives of his people and anticipating the inevitability of the U.S. occupation of North Korea, Shtykov not unnaturally sought emergence authority to order their evacuation. But Gromyko disagreed and advised a different procedure: In order to show the Soviets’ continuous faith and backing for Kim II Sung’s government, he recommended to Stalin that Shtykov be allowed to repatriate the Soviet specialists only after a specific request of such a nature was made by the DPRK government. Otherwise, all had to stay at their post, whatever it was. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry in Moscow insisted that it, not Shtykov, should have the final say in each case of anticipatory repatriation. Surprisingly, Stalin opted to defer both Shtykov’s request and Gromyko’s recommendation for the time being.

Later that same night, on September 30, Stalin, who was vacationing on the Black Sea, was informed about the content of Zhou Enlai’s official speech in Beijing earlier that day, in which Zhou stated that “the Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.” Stalin may well have sensed that the Chinese might be ready for action.

On October 1, at 3:00 a.m., upon the receipt of Kim II Sung’s desperate plea for help, Stalin immediately dictated a telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and had it wired to Beijing [Document #10]. In his telegram, first of all he placed all the blame for the KPA’s collapse and disintegration on North Korean military commanders who, in his opinion, had failed to carry out Kim II Sung’s orders for a strategic retreat of the main forces from the South. He specifically mentioned to Mao that Moscow had forewarned the North Korean political leadership about possibly devastating consequences of the U.S. landing at Inch’on as early as September 16, but that the warning was disregarded. However, he was careful to avoid blaming Kim II Sung personally, thereby indicating to Mao that Kim was still the man to deal with in Pyongyang. Second, Stalin informed Mao and Zhou that after their Ranger defeat in Seoul, the North Koreans no longer had any troops capable of resistance, and that the road toward the 38th parallel from the south was wide open. Finally, Stalin requested that Mao, if possible, “immediately dispatch at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel so that the Korean comrades would have an opportunity to regroup and form combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the protection of the Chinese troops.” Stalin suggested, apparently for the first time, that the Chinese troops should be designated as “volunteer” forces. In order to entice Mao further, he indicated that he was ready to share overall command and control over the KPA and the Chinese volunteer forces with the Chinese generals, implying that the role of the Soviet military advisers to Kim II Sung and the KPA would be drastically curtailed, if not abolished altogether.

It is noteworthy that this is one of the first instances in the Stalin-Mao correspondence where Stalin indicated to Mao his willingness to share control over events in Korea. In exchange for shouldering so much of the burden of defending of North Korea, Stalin offered Mao a power-sharing arrangement. Thus, this telegram was a harbinger of the looming end of the unilateral Soviet control over North Korea which had lasted since 1945. It also meant that from then on Kim II Sung would have two masters to serve, as well as to play off against each other—one in Moscow and one in Beijing. At the same time, Stalin felt compelled to show some respect for Chinese sensitivities, in particular, their yearning for national independence and independent decision-making; moreover, he was intent to avoid the possibly very awkward position of being the messenger of bad news, in case Mao turned down his request. Therefore, Stalin “magnanimously” designated Mao to deliver his own response directly to Kim II Sung, stressing that he did not intend to pre-judge the Chinese comrades and tell Kim II Sung about their likely decision, nor would he desire to do so in the future, because all the honors and gratitude should belong to Mao, not Stalin.

On the evening of October 1, Stalin approved the text of a Soviet draft resolution regarding the Korean Question that had been drafted at the Foreign Ministry’s first Far Eastern Department, approved by Gromyko, and submitted for Stalin’s consideration. For Stalin, it was a last pitch to the West to resolve the Korean crisis without major escalation. At 9:15 p.m. (Moscow time), in Beijing Soviet Ambassador Roshchin delivered the content of the draft resolution to Zhou Enlai. At 10:45 p.m. (Moscow time), Zhou Enlai met Roshchin again and informed him that Mao agreed with its provisions. An hour later, after learning Mao’s view, Stalin immediately ordered it wired to the Soviet Representative to the United Nations at Lake Success. It is well known that on October 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky presented the Soviet draft resolution to the Political Committee of the General Assembly, which stipulated an immediate ceasefire, with
drawal of all foreign troops, and general elections in all Korea to be held under international supervision. However, at this stage of the war, after a miraculous landing at Inch’on and the recapture of Seoul when the KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of question and totally unacceptable to the West. By now, the decision made in Washington, on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th parallel, after Inch’on had become an official United Nations operation.

While waiting for Mao’s reply, on October 2, Stalin received information that the North Korean frontier defenses had begun to crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee’s revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces had pushed north beyond the parallel on the east coast road heading towards Kosong. He sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating his earlier directive to his chief military representative in Korea to do his utmost to bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the south back into the north, and to hold the frontline along the 38th parallel.

In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou’s warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier; Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military intervention at that time. Zhou Enlai was ready, indeed, in high “fighting spirit,” to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Chinese army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and had “no confidence” it could defeat the modern American military, which could “force us into retreat.”

Finally, after decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the Korean conflict to confront a powerful American adversary would provoke widespread domestic resentment within the PRC toward the newly-established People’s Government, and wreck the leadership’s plan for peaceful reconstruction.

Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded, it was necessary to “show patience now,” focus on building military strength for a possible later conflict, and in the meantime accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the North Koreans “change the form of the struggle to partisan war.” Mao concluded his message by noting that this decision was provisional and awaited a final determination by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; in the meantime, he was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to Stalin’s vacation home for direct consultations. In conveying Mao’s telegram, which was dated October 2, an obviously shocked Roshchin noted that this new position flatly contradicted repeated assurances from Chinese leaders that the People’s Liberation Army was ready, indeed, in high “fighting spirit,” to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Americans. The Soviet envoy could only speculate on the reasons for the turnabout in the Beijing leadership’s stand: the international situation, the “worsening” predicament in Korea, and/or Anglo-American “intrigues” through the intercession of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is important to note that this account of Mao’s October 2 communication to Stalin, informing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war, based on newly-declassified documents in the Russian archives, fundamentally contradicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of October 2 which was published in 1987 in an official Chinese document compilation and has since been relied upon for numerous scholarly accounts; see the attached footnotes for further information.)

Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disappointed, did not know whether Mao had given his final word or was simply for bargaining for better terms for China’s participation in the war. During the day of October 5, Stalin conferred with the members of the (VKP(b)) Politburo. Although the official agenda was designated as “the Question of Comrade Shlykov,” the real issue under consideration was the nature of the Soviet national security interest in Korea and how to protect it on the ground. All Politburo members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation in Korea should be avoided at all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalls that “When the threat [after Inch’on] emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated, and that the Americans would reach our border. I remember quite well that in connection with the exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said: ‘So what? Let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come there, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready to fight...’” The upshot of the Politburo discussion was a decision to increase pressure on Mao to extract an unequivocal commitment from China to enter the war.

Thus, it appears that as a result of cumulative discussions and a series of incremental decisions dated September 27, September 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided to begin to limit Soviet military and political exposure in Korea, and at the same time permit a greater Chinese role in the alliance decision-making on Korea.

In this light, given the continuous deterioration of the military situation in Korea, as well as the Soviet leaders’ determination to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign Ministry’s objections and decided, as one of the first steps aimed at curtailing the Soviet presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador Shlykov the evacuation powers that he requested with respect to some Soviet specialists employed by the DPRK government and
by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He was notified of this policy change by wire the same day. Ironically, the permission arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim Il Sung’s ability to defend his regime on his own, and unsure if any help was coming from Moscow or Beijing, requested even more extended evacuation powers, now including the families of the Soviet citizens of Korean nationality,32 the personnel of the Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,33 and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Document #16]. It took less than a day for Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin’s approval and immediately wire the affirmative response. After the conference with his Politburo associates sometime during the day of October 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao and Zhou [Document #13]. Without mentioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he outlined his reasoning why it was in China’s national interest to dispatch the Chinese “Volunteers” to save the collapsing North Korean regime and why this had to be done immediately. First, he reiterated his conviction that the United States was not ready to fight a major war at present, while Japan, whose militaristic potential had not yet been restored, was not currently capable of militarily assisting the Americans. Therefore, he argued, the U.S. would be compelled to concede in the Korean question to China, which was backed by its ally, the USSR, and to agree to terms of settlement favorable to (North) Korea thus preventing the Americans from transforming the peninsula into their springboard. Following the same hard-nosed realpolitik reasoning, Stalin stated that, consequently, not only would Washington have to abandon Taiwan, but also they would have to reject the idea of separate peace with the Japanese “revanchists,” and to jettison their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their bridgehead in the Far East. Having depicted his vision of an emerging new geopolitical order in the Far East, Stalin blandly told Mao that he proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if she were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy. Without some serious struggle and an imposing display of force, he argued, not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions, but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan, which at that time the United States was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nationalist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), in Stalin’s view, but to use the island as its own strategic base or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow. In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singularly unusual propensity for high-stakes gambling which was fraught with the potential for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he had taken into account the possibility that the United States, albeit unready to fight a major war then, could still be drawn into a big war (i.e., with China) on a question of prestige, which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which was bound with China by a Mutual Assistance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao: “Should we be afraid of this possibility? In my opinion, we should not, because, together, we will be stronger than the United States and Great Britain, whereas none of the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany, which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) possess any military power at all. If war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese imperialism will be restored as a U.S. ally and when the U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of all Korea run by Syngman Rhee.” This telegram was a call for action. Stalin forcefully indicated to Mao that all the chips were down, and Mao had to show what hand he was playing after all.

The embattled Mao must have received this telegram amidst a series of tense emergency sessions of the CCP CC Politburo in Beijing sometime on October 6. It was at one of these meetings that Mao reportedly announced his decision to appoint Peng Dehuai as the commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). Later that evening, Mao dined together with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, and Gao Gang. Reportedly, they agreed that “now it seems that we have to fight a war,” and that Zhou Enlai would fly to Moscow to solicit Soviet military aid. The next morning, a supreme military conference presided over by Zhou is said formally to have approved of Mao’s decision to send Zhou and Lin Biao to the USSR to discuss the details of military cooperation.34

On October 7, Stalin received Mao’s reply; in Stalin’s own words, “Mao expressed solidarity with the main ideas of my [October 5] letter and stated that he would send nine, not six, divisions to Korea, but that he would not do it right away; instead, he intended to do it some time soon. In the meantime, he asked me to receive his representatives and discuss with them a plan of military assistance to Korea in detail” [see Document #13]. Evidently, Mao’s October 7 telegram contained only his conditional consent to send troops to Korea. He had taken a step toward Stalin’s position but hinted that, once again, the decision was not yet final, and could be rendered final only after Stalin received in person and succeeded in persuading the chief CCP CC Politburo opponents of China’s entry into the Korean War: Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Stalin accepted Mao’s request with understanding, realizing that he had to bolster Mao if he wanted the latter to deliver.

While Moscow and Beijing bickered about why, when, on what terms, and whether troops should be sent to defend Kim Il Sung’s crumbling regime—and whose troops they should be—the Western allies intensified their diplomatic offensive at the United Nations and stepped up their military offensive on the battleground, anticipating a quick mop-up of the entire Korean campaign. On October 4, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet draft resolution of October 2, and, on October 7, the UN General Assembly passed by a 47–5–7 vote a “Go after the DPRK” resolution, proposed by the United Kingdom, which recommended that: “1. a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; b) all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the U.N., for the establishing of a united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea.” In a nutshell, this resolution gave Gen. MacArthur and the Western powers carte blanche to occupy all of North Korea and rearrange its political and economic systems to their liking. On the day this crucial vote was taken, in Korea the advanced units of the 1st Cavalry of Gen. Walton Walker’s Army crossed the 38th Parallel in the Kaesong area.

At 10:15 p.m. on the night of October 7 Stalin asked Bulgarin to forward to Kim Il Sung via Shtykov his long-delayed response to Kim’s October 1 plea for help. It had taken almost a week for Stalin to respond, although he was well aware that Kim was
desperate and hanging over a precipice. Stalin had tarried simply because he did not yet have any good news to deliver. Only after receiving Mao’s conditional commitment did he decide to write to Kim. In his telegram, which Shtykov gave Kim on the afternoon of October 8, Stalin for the first time told Kim II Sung about his ongoing negotiations with Mao, noting that the Chinese comrades still had doubts and hesitated to make a final commitment to fight, but, at the same time, emphasizing that negotiations continued, and therefore Kim II Sung had to battle tenaciously for each inch of his land because help was on its way [Document #13].

Reportedly, Mao also sent a telegram to Kim II Sung via his Ambassador in Pyongyang, who went to Kim’s underground headquarters and handed it to him on the night of October 8. It said: “In view of the current situation, we have decided to send volunteers to Korea to help you fight against the aggressor.” Chinese sources report Kim II Sung to have reacted gleefully.35

The next morning, on October 9, at 7:05 a.m., Shtykov wired Kim’s reply to Stalin [Document #16], adding that he concurred with its content. Clearly, this letter reflected Kim’s new, more positive mood and his newly found self-confidence. Although Shtykov did not mention any contacts between Kim and the Chinese representatives the night before, surely Mao’s cable had lifted Kim’s spirit. In his letter, Kim expressed his belief that the U.S. aggressor would not stop until it had occupied Korea entirely and converted it into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East; therefore, the struggle of the Chinese people for their independence, freedom, and state sovereignty would be protracted and very hard.

In contrast to his previous letter of September 29, in which he had requested “direct military assistance” from the Soviet Union, Kim now asked Stalin only to aid the KPA by training 2,000 pilots, 1,000 tank drivers, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers in the territory of the USSR. Of course, if one looks at the numbers, the inescapable impression is that Kim basically asked Stalin to help train an entirely new professional officers corps for the KPA, with the exception of the infantry officers. In other words, Kim II Sung’s fortunes were still very much dependent on professional military advice and arms supplies from the USSR. Nonetheless, once informed of Mao’s commitment to send ground troops to fight in Korea, he apparently began to distance himself from Stalin. No longer did he request Soviet ground troops or even air cover, because he knew Mao would probably take care of it by himself.36

In the meantime, the Western allies continued to advance. On October 9 in Washington, President Truman and the JCS directed MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel, even if Chinese intervention occurred, so long as “in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success.” At once, MacArthur issued his final unconditional surrender demand, stating that unless North Korea capitulated, he would proceed to “take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations.” The same day, advanced ROK I Corps units moving up the east coast from the perimeter reached Wonsan, over 110 miles north of the parallel. The 1st Cavalry and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade pushed north towards Kumchon, Sariwon, and Pyongyang itself.37 On October 9, two F-80 jets raided “by mistake” a Soviet airfield sixty miles inside the USSR border near Vladivostok. The days of Kim II Sung’s state appeared to be numbered. It is plausible to assume that Stalin was aware of these developments in Korea when he first received Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao at a dacha near the Black Sea late that night.

The Stalin-Zhou talks of 9-10 October 1950 are crucial in understanding the evolution of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the terms of the Chinese entry into the Korean War. They reveal how domestic political considerations influenced the foreign policy priorities of these two communist giants, as well as the pivotal role of misperceptions and misconstructions in the mismanagement of the alliance relationship.

The newly declassified Russian documents from the APRF by and large confirm the account of Mao’s interpreter, Shi Zhe,38 (except dates) of what transpired between Stalin and Zhou at the former’s dacha during these two days. In brief, Zhou told Stalin that the CCP CC Politburo had decided not to send troops to Korea because: 1) China lacked adequate money, arms, or transport; 2) the CCP’s domestic political opposition had not been pacified yet, and reactionary forces could use this opportunity to raise their heads again; and, finally, 3) the U.S. could declare war on China, should the latter intervene in Korea.

Aware of these arguments from his previous correspondence with Mao and bearing in mind that Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao were the chief opponents within the CCP CC Politburo of China’s entry into the war, Stalin went on the offensive. First, he noted that the Great Patriotic War (World War II) had just ended, and therefore it would be very difficult for the USSR to fight another large-scale war right away. Besides, the Soviet-North Korean border was too narrow to allow massive troop transfers. Notwithstanding this, if U.S. actions were to jeopardize the fate of world socialism on a global scale, the Soviet Union would be ready to take up the American challenge. However, he stressed that, at that time, U.S. imperialism was in a weak strategic position because it could not rely for assistance on traditional military powers such as Germany and Japan, as well as Britain, all of which were profoundly weakened by the Second World War. Hence, Washington would not dare to launch a world war. Since any kind of U.S. attack against China would trigger the mutual military assistance provision of the Soviet-Chinese Alliance Treaty and draw the U.S. into a global conflict with the USSR, for which it was not ready, America was unlikely to risk a war with China on the latter’s own territory. Hence, in Stalin’s opinion, at that moment, Beijing could help the North Koreans without fear of U.S. retaliation against Mainland China. Moreover, Stalin emphasized that it was in China’s national interest to ensure the survival of a friendly government in North Korea. For, if the U.S. occupied the North and deployed its forces along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, this would pose an enormous threat to Chinese security, because the Americans could harass China from the air, land, and sea at their discretion and could also endanger the economic development of northeast China.

But, despite these arguments, Zhou did not yield to Stalin’s pressure. Stalin appears to have almost yelled in exasperation, “That you do not want to send troops to Korea is your decision, but socialism in Korea would collapse within a very short period of time.” After regaining his composure, Stalin changed his tactics and laid out a stark alternative for Zhou. He suggested that both the
Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA if they could no longer fight on their own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and some cadres of the KPA would be deployed to northeast China, while the disabled and wounded men, as well as Koreans of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In their new bases in northeast China they would train new troops, master new weaponry, and prepare themselves for the day of their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated that since the Chinese did not intend to send troops, the Soviet Union and China should work out concrete plans to provide shelter for their Korean comrades and their forces, and make sure that one day they would be able to return to Korea.

Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what he heard. He backed away from his initial tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China could count on Soviet air cover should it decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, Stalin responded positively: “We can send a certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for the CPV in Korea-AM].” Stalin also reassured Zhou that the Soviet Union would take care of weapons and equipment supplies for the CPV, including their replacements, immediately after the Chinese side ascertained its needs in actual combat.

The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two days, and yet no mutually agreed upon decisions were reached at the end. Zhou simply said that he needed to communicate with Beijing in order to ask for new instructions. Stalin replied that he could wait but that time was fast running out. They parted, reportedly, both confused about each other’s true intentions.

Contrary to Goncharov, Xue, and Lewis’ account in Uncertain Partners—citing the recollections of Zhou aide Kang Yimin—Stalin and Zhou Enlai did not agree to send a joint telegram to Mao Zedong the next day. Nor did Molotov call Zhou after the latter’s arrival in Moscow with “startling news that the Soviet Union would not offer any military equipment to China.” These are stories, perhaps elaborated by Zhou’s entourage in order to persuade Stalin that Stalin, not Zhou’s obduracy, was to blame for the “breakdown of talks;” that Stalin was an unreliable ally; and that, after all, China should not fight a war in Korea alone, which was Zhou’s belief from the very beginning. Not only did these fictional events never occur, they could not even have happened the way they were described. Stalin never co-signed his telegrams with anybody, regardless of the status of the other party or the addressee, including Mao and Zhou. In the Stalinist era, Soviet Politburo members never used the telephone to communicate important decisions, no matter how urgent those might be, let alone to talk to foreign leaders. These fictional events contradict the then-prevailing Soviet party bureaucratic practices. The present author has never encountered evidence of such unorthodox procedures anywhere in the Russian Archives.

In reality, all along Stalin reiterated his willingness to provide the CPV with air cover if Mao sent his troops to Korea. Nonetheless, on October 11, Zhou reportedly sent a telegram to Mao in Beijing, stating that “Comrade Filippov [a pseudonym for Stalin-AM] did not express his objections to the CCP CC Politburo’s decision not to send troops to Korea.” It was Gao Gang who told the Soviet Consul-General in Shenyang, A.M. Ledovsky, and General Vazhnov about Zhou’s cable from Moscow during a conversation on October 25 in Shenyang. He added that it was this telegram from Zhou that reigned a fierce debate in the CCP CC Politburo regarding the merits of China’s intervention in Korea. The result was that Mao put on hold all Chinese preparations in the northeast for the dispatch of troops to Korea. I would interpret what happened during the Stalin-Zhou talks on October 9-10 as follows. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to see Stalin with a strong belief that China could not and should not intervene in Korea. During the talks, Stalin failed to convince them of the potentially dire consequences of the North’s collapse for Chinese security and its international standing. Therefore, Zhou and Lin decided to stick to their original anti-intervention stand in their debate with Mao, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang. At the same time, they invented a “respectable” excuse for their obduracy, i.e., an alleged refusal by Stalin to provide the CPV with air cover. At that moment, there was a brief rupture in bilateral communications, and both sides were left to make decisions for themselves.

As far as Zhou Enlai’s role is concerned, if this scenario is correct, he rose up between Stalin and Mao, and almost had them at each other’s throat because they both disagreed with his own beliefs. Zhou seems to have viewed his visit to Stalin as a last opportunity to prevent China from entering the Korean war and to shift the entire burden of saving Kim’s regime onto Stalin’s broad shoulders. Once he realized that Stalin did not want to accept this responsibility and preferred to see the Chinese fighting, Zhou opted to bluff and may even have misrepresented the Soviet position in his correspondence with Mao. But, to his regret, he miscalculated Stalin’s high risk-taking propensity in his gambling on the future of North Korea altogether, as well as Mao’s own determination to fight in Korea, and failed to foresee that Mao would decide to fight even when his back was pushed against the wall and he was left ostensibly alone, allegedly without Soviet air support.

In the meantime, in Korea, on October 12, the Interim Committee of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, created by the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, advised the United Nations Command to take over the civil government of North Korea, which meant in practice that the U.S. military was authorized to rule the “liberated” provinces of North Korea. Kim Il Sung moved his headquarters to Kosanjin, near Kanggye, not far from the Chinese border. The newly-rebuilt KPA Front Line Command was moved to Tokch’ on in South P’yongan Province. The KPA forces desperately tried to halt the advancing ROK and U.S. troops that had broken through the 38th parallel and reached as far as Chunghwa, a few miles from Pyongyang.

On the morning of October 13, Stalin received a report from Admirals Golovko and Fokin informing him of a large concentration of U.S. heavy battle ships and amphibious assault vessels, manned with troops, apparently ready for an amphibious landing in the harbor of Wonsan [Document #17]. That day, Wonsan was the target of furious U.S. air raids and Navy fire. Stalin could easily foresee the strategic implications of the forthcoming U.S. landing in Wonsan: the KPA would be again split along the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and, with its rear absolutely unprotected, the ROK I Corps and U.S. X Corps could march unimpeded toward the Yalu-Tumen rivers on the North Korean-Chinese and North Korean-Soviet borders, while Gen.
Walker’s Eighth Army mopped up KPA remnants in the Pyongyang area and then advanced toward the northwest.

This was a decisive moment for Stalin. A week earlier, the Soviet Politburo had decided that the USSR would rather abandon North Korea than risk a direct military confrontation with the U.S., unless the latter deliberately attacked Soviet territory. Therefore, Stalin did not intend to send Soviet ground troops to save Kim Il Sung. As Zhou had told Stalin a couple of days earlier, the Chinese also decided to refrain from sending the CPV to Korea for the time being. Realizing that neither he nor Mao was willing to save Kim Il Sung from total defeat, Stalin evidently resigned himself to viewing the entire Korean situation as a matter of cutting his losses and saving face.

Such a conclusion is supported by the dramatic order Stalin appears to have sent a Kim Il Sung via Ambassador Shtykov on the afternoon of October 13.46 Informing Kim of his talks with Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, Stalin reported with regret that Zhou had stated that the Chinese were not yet ready to enter the war. Consequently, they concluded that it would be better for Kim to withdraw the remnants of his forces from Korea to China and the USSR. Therefore, Stalin ordered that Kim Il Sung “evacuate North Korea and pull out his Korean troops to the north.” He also directed that Shtykov assist Kim in drawing up a plan of measures to implement this evacuation order. In effect, Stalin was fed up with Kim Il Sung and had thrown in the towel.

Late on the night of October 13, Shtykov, following Stalin’s instructions, met with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong and read the text of Stalin’s telegram to them. In Shtykov’s telegram addressed to Fyn Si (another Stalin pseudonym), which he wired from Pyongyang at 3:15 a.m. on October 14 [Document #18], he described the North Koreans’ reaction as follows: “Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong were very much surprised by the content of the telegram. Kim Il Sung stated that it was extremely hard for them to implement such advice; however, since there was such advice, they would implement it.” Then, Kim asked Shtykov to give him his practical recommendations and directed that Pak Hon-Yong write them down. Also, he asked Shtykov and Matveyev to assist him in drafting a plan of measures to be taken regarding the KPA evacuation plan.

After receiving Stalin’s evacuation order on the night of October 13, Kim Il Sung called Major-General Ch’oe Kyong-dok47 to his headquarters in Kosangjin and ordered that Ch’oe leave immediately for the northeastern provinces of China in order to set up guerrilla bases for Kim and the KPA remnants there. Ch’oe is said to have departed with two adjutants the same night. In the next several hours, Kim is said to have repeatedly told his close associates that they would have to wage a guerrilla war from China again. Within a day Ch’oe and his two aides had mysteriously disappeared. Kim Il Sung dispatched a small team of scouts to find them, but in vain.48

Meanwhile, however, even before seeing Kim’s response, Stalin had changed his mind and dramatically reversed himself, thanks to some welcome news from Beijing. Early in the morning of October 14, at 3:20 a.m., he received two extremely urgent telegrams (#2406 and #2408) from the Soviet envoy to the PRC described a late-night meeting with Mao which took place immediately after the CCP CC Politburo finally decided, at a emergency session, to intervene in Korea before the war ended in a U.S. victory. Roshchin cited Mao as saying: “Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us and the Northeast [China] will be faced with constant danger.” Mao confirmed that “past hesitations by our comrades occurred because the questions of the international situation, the questions of the Soviet assistance to us, the question of air cover were not clear to them,” and stressed that “at present, all these questions have been clarified.” Furthermore, Mao pointed out, “now it is advantageous for us to dispatch Chinese troops into Korea. China has the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea” [Document #19]. He mentioned that at this point they were sending a first contingent of nine divisions. Although poorly armed, it would be able to fight the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades would prepare a second echelon. As for air cover, Mao expressed hope that the Soviet air force would arrive in northeast China as soon as possible, but not later than in two months. Mao concluded by saying that the CCP CC believed that the Chinese must assist Korean comrades in their difficult struggle; therefore, he had asked Zhou Enlai to discuss the matter of China’s entry into the Korean War with Comrade Filippov again. He stressed that “Zhou Enlai was being sent new instructions.”

What is important about this telegram is that it contains Mao’s admission that, in essence, Zhou’s position was to stonewall because of the hesitations and reservations displayed by some prominent CCP CC leaders in Beijing. However, once these domestic political disputes were resolved, Mao wanted Stalin back in the game.

Indeed, Stalin rejoiced at Mao’s new decision because he had been so reluctant to abandon North Korea to begin with. At once, he hand-wrote a note to Shtykov for immediate delivery to Kim Il Sung [Document #20], the second telegram within hours, temporarily halting the implementation of his order of October 13.49 It said: “I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CCP Central Committee discussed the situation again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask you to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to you yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and withdrawal of the Korean troops to the north.” This telegram makes perfectly clear that the crucial consideration in Stalin’s position on intervention in Korea was the role of China. When Mao balked, so did Stalin. When Mao decided to make a commitment to Kim Il Sung, Stalin again followed suit. Still unsure whether Mao’s decision was irrevocable, Stalin displayed some caution and ordered that Kim Il Sung “temporarily” postpone, not cancel, the implementation of measures advised to him a day earlier.

Only after Stalin received further clarifications and proof from Beijing that this time Mao meant it, did he order that his previous recommendations to Kim be annulled. He reiterated his commitment to supply the CPV with weapons and equipment. Most importantly, he felt compelled to indicate to Kim that he was relinquishing some of his authority on the Korean matter to Mao and his CPV commanders. A few hours later on October 14, he dispatched a
third ciphered telegram to Shptykov for Kim [Document #21] which said: “After hesitations and a series of temporary decisions, the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops. I am glad that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last. In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which you were told about earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades. The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR. I wish you success.”

CONCLUSIONS

The new documentary evidence from the Russian archives led me to the following conclusions. First, all three supreme leaders of the USSR, PRC, and the DPRK—Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il Sung—were personally and intimately involved in the prosecution of the Korean War. Notwithstanding this, their will often failed to prevail, for the war policies of these states were also shaped by the pressures of intra-alliance bargaining, domestic politics, bureaucratic outputs, and personal preferences of people in charge of the implementation of leaders’ decisions, not to mention circumstances created by enemy and external forces.

Second, contrary to the traditional Chinese interpretation, Stalin never reneged on his promise to Mao to provide the CPV with Soviet air cover. From early July until late October 1950 he unwaveringly maintained that if the Chinese comrades decided to intervene in Korea he would send the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense units to protect the Chinese ground troops from the air. He even considered dispatching them directly to Pyongyang. An “account of Stalin’s betrayal of Mao” is fictional and should be attributed to Zhou Enlai’s entourage, who wanted to have their boss look good after the latter probably purposefully failed his mission at his talks with Stalin in mid-October, 1950 and perhaps even misled Mao about Stalin’s true intentions.

Third, the only person who had a legitimate reason to feel that Stalin had betrayed him at that time was Kim Il Sung. Stalin reneged on his commitment to back up Kim at the critical juncture of the war after the UN troops had crossed the 38th parallel: he ordered Kim to abandon the defense of North Korea and pull out the remnants of the KPA into guerrilla camps in northeast China and the Soviet Far East. Although within several hours Stalin reversed himself, after learning of Mao’s renewed commitment to fight in Korea, this original decision dramatically revealed the limits of the Soviet national security interest on the Korean peninsula. In Stalin’s own words (as recalled by Khrushchev), he was willing to abandon North Korea and allow the United States to become the USSR’s neighbor, with its troops deployed in Korea, if this was the price to pay for avoiding direct military confrontation with the U.S. at that time. Moreover, I believe that it was as a result of this incident, not Khrushchev’s destalinization campaign, that Kim Il Sung realized the limits of the Soviet support as well as the extent of his personal dependency on Moscow, and made up his mind to begin distancing himself from his Soviet handlers.

Fourth, obviously, there was little political will and much less hope in Moscow, Beijing, and even Pyongyang to defend North Korea to the last man when the military situation collapsed in mid-October 1950. Therefore, had the United States been less ambivalent, more consistent, and more persuasive on the diplomatic front in staying to Moscow and Beijing the goals of its Korean campaign—e.g., that it had no desire to attack Mainland China or threaten the territory of the Soviet Far East—the Soviet and Chinese governments could well have decided to let Kim Il Sung’s regime go under and acquiesced to a UN-proposed Korean settlement. However, Gen. MacArthur’s repeated unconditional surrender demands, coupled with barely veiled direct threats against the PRC and the USSR, coming out of Tokyo headquarters, literally pushed the insecure Chinese to the brink, compelling them almost against their will to intervene in Korea, thereby providing Stalin a legitimate reason to reconsider his own decision to evacuate North Korea.

1. This article is based on the newly-declassified Russian archival materials related to the Korean War. Researchers were allowed access to these primary sources from Russia as a result of a series of agreements on academic cooperation and joint research on the history of the Korean War, signed by the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University, New York, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow. In order to make these materials readily available to researchers in the United States, the Center for Korean Research has agreed to cooperate with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. in the procurement, translation, custody, and dissemination of these documents. (CWIHP has provided a copy of the documents to the National Security Archive, located on the seventh floor of the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where they are available for researchers.) The Center for Korean Research acknowledges with gratitude a generous facilitating grant from the Luce Foundation in support of this project.

2. This is according to the field reports filed by several dozen agents sent to the area by the Joint Special Operations Group from the Far East Command’s G-2 on the eve of operation Chromite.


10. Although this document has still not been declassified, it is alluded to in a detailed chronology of events prepared by ofﬁcials of the Russian Foreign Ministry who had access to still-classiﬁed materials. In particular, the chronology entered date 20 September 1950, describing the content of Stalin’s reply to Zhou Enlai’s inquiry about the military situation in Korea after the Inch’ŏn landing (an inquiry which Zhou had conveyed to Amb. Roschin and Soviet military advisers Kotov and Konnov on September 18), states: “These Soviet recommendations [regarding what the KPA should do following the Inch’ŏn landing] were transmitted to Kim II Sung on 18 September 1950.” See Chronology of Major Developments on the Eve of and During the Korean War (January 1949-October 1950) [hereafter Chronology]. Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federa
tion (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 5, opis 58, delo 266, list 55.

11. At this point, it is worth clarifying a bit of confusion that has emerged over the fact that there were two senior Soviet military ofﬁcials with the surname Zakharov at this juncture of the Korean War. Army Gen. Matvey Vasilevich Zakharov (1898-1972), the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, was dispatched to Pyongyang in late September 1950 to inspect and report back to Stalin on the military situation. He signed and received messages using the pseudonym, “Matvey.” In October 1950, shortly after M.V. Zakharov was sent to Korea, Corps Commissar Semyon Egorovich Zakharov (1906-1969) was sent to Beijing as Stalin’s personal military envoy to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and remained in the Chinese capital until the end of the war in July 1953, and documents involving him bear his actual name.

12. See Chronology, AVPRF, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, listing 52-53.

13. In Uncertain Partners (p. 174), Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue refer to a ﬁve-man team which was dispatched from China to Korea on September 17 “to survey local topography.” This must be the same team of senior military ofﬁcers to which Zhou referred.


15. See Chronology, listing 55-56.

16. Rees, Korea, 91.

17. These charges are not completely fair because the Soviet military advisers were severely restricted in their mobility by Stalin’s early order that under no circum-
stances they cross the 38th parallel, even when the KPA was on the offensive at the Naktong River front. Hence, their own knowledge of the military situation and ability to inﬂuence it were very much limited.

18. See Shabshin’s conversation with Pak Hyeong Yong, recorded in Document #5. A.I. Shabshin had been the Soviet Deputy Consul in Seoul before the end of the Second World War; as Adviser on Political Affairs; in 1946, he was appointed as a Political Adviser to the Soviet 25th Army responsible for the occupation of North Korea; when the Korean War started, he was assigned to Gen. Matveev’s team.

19. Kim was reported to be very upset that Ch’ŏn failed to report to him regularly about the development of the military situation in Seoul, despite his access to radio.

20. Kim II Sung commanded his troops from inside an underground bunker located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. According to Yu Song-ch’ol’s memoirs, during the entire war Kim II Sung made only one visit to the Front Line Command. That was when it was located at the Seoul Capitol Building. Others disagree and insist that he came down as far as Suanbo to inspect the front lines and allegedly even bathed in hot springs there. [See Yu Song-ch’ol, “Recollections,” Chongang Ilbo (Seoul), 14 November 1990.] Consequently, the only more or less reliable source of updates on the military situation for Kim II Sung at that time was his Soviet advisers. But as the predicament of the KPA deepened, they seemed to begin to dodge his inquiries, citing insufﬁcient knowledge, and to avoid giving rec-
ommendations on strategy and tactics.


22. One should note that two days earlier Zakharov had told Kim that it was wishful thinking on his part to count on manning those nine divisions from among “the southerners” because the UN offensive would most likely cut off and rout them. See Document #4.

23. Such “shyness” was quite unusual for Shtykov, who as a southern commander, could reasonably expect to encounter “southerners” because the UN offensive would most likely cut off and rout them. See Document #4.

24. The origins of this request were not without controversy even within the DPRK government. In his con-
versation with A.I. Shabshin on September 28 [Docu-
ment #5], Pak Honyong mentioned that originally the WPK CC PC intended to ask only for Soviet air support because some nationalistic North Korean leaders advo-
cated only limited direct Soviet participation in the war. As of September 29, Kim II Sung still insisted, perhaps pro forma, that “we should continue to ﬁght on and eventually unite Korea by our own forces.” However, as the military situation continued to deteriorate, in-
creasing the perception in Pyongyang that only an all-out intervention by the USSR could bail out the North Korean regime, which was on the brink of complete disaster, Kim felt compelled to seek full Soviet military intervention.

25. Quoted in Rees, Korea, 103.

26. This timetable may have reﬂected Stalin’s hope that the remnants of Kim’s troops would be able to resist the UN troops on their own at least for the next few days while he was busy seeking Chinese support.

27. His justification for this measure was that most of these enterprises were destroyed by American air raids and out of operation anyhow.

28. I have not located any evidence in the Russian archives as to whether Stalin was informed on October 1 that MacArthur had just made an unconditional sur-
render demand to the North Koreans to “forthwith lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such mili-
tary supervision as I may direct.” Nor could I ﬁnd any

records indicating whether Stalin knew of U.S. delegate to the UN Warren Austin’s famous statement to the UN Political Committee made the day before: “Today the forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of military victory... The aggressor’s forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world.”

29. See Chronology, list 61.


1. We have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the name of [Chinese People’ s] Volunteers to ﬁght the United States and its lackey Syngman Rhee and to aid our Korean Comrades. From the following consider-
ations, we think it necessary to do so: the Korean revolutionary force will meet with a fundamental defeat, and the American aggres-
sors will rampage unchecked once they occupy the whole of Korea. This will be unfavorable to the entire East.

2. Since we have decided to send Chinese troops to ﬁght the Americans in Korea, we hold that, ﬁrst, we should be able to solve the prob-
lem; that is, [we are] ready to annihilate and drive out the invading armies of the United States and other countries. Second, since Chi-
nese troops are to ﬁght American troops in Korea (although we will use the name Volun-
teurs), we must be prepared for a declaration of war by the United States and for the subsequent use of the U.S. air force to bomb many of China’s cities and industrial bases, as well as an attack by the U.S. navy on our coastal areas.

3. Of these two problems, the primary prob-
lem is whether or not the Chinese troops can annihilate the American troops in Korea and effectively resolve the Korean issue. Only when it is possible for our troops to annihilate the American troops in Korea, principally the Eighth Army (an old army with combat ef-
citiveness), can the situation become favorable to the revolutionary camp and to China, although the second problem (a declaration of war by the United States) is still a serious one. This means that the Korean issue will be solved in reality along with the defeat of the American troops (in name it will probably remain unsolved because the United States will most likely not admit Korea’s victory for a considerable period of time). Consequently, even if the United States declares war on China, the war will probably not be of great scope or last long. The most unfavor-
able situation, we hold, would result from the inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate American troops in Korea and the involvement of the two countries’ troops in a stalemate while the United States publicly declares war on China, undermines the plans for China’s economic reconstruction, which has already begun, and sparks the dissatisfaction of [China’s] national
bourgeoisie and other segments of the people (they are very afraid of war).

4. Under the current situation, we have reached a decision to order the 12 divisions stationed in advance in South Manchuria to set off on October 15. They will be deployed in appropriate areas in North Korea (not necessarily reaching to the 38th parallel). On the one hand, they will fight the enemies who dare to cross the 38th parallel. At the initial stage, they will merely engage in defensive warfare to wipe out small detachments of enemy troops and ascertain the enemy’s situation; on the other hand, they will wait for the delivery of Soviet weapons. Once they are [well] equipped, they will cooperate with the Korean comrades in counterattacks to annihilate American aggressor troops.

5. According to our intelligence to date, an American corps (composed of two infantry divisions and a mechanized division) has 1,500 guns of 70 mm to 240 mm caliber, including tank cannons and anti-aircraft guns. In comparison, each of our corps (composed of three divisions) has only 36 such guns. The enemy dominates the air. By comparison, we have only just started training pilots. We shall not be able to employ more than 300 aircraft in combat until February 1951. Accordingly, we do not now have any certainty of success in annihilating a single American corps in one blow. Since we have made a decision to fight the Americans, we certainly must be prepared to deal with a situation in which the U.S. headquarters will employ one American corps against our troops in one of [the Korean] theaters. For the purpose of eliminating completely one enemy corps with a certainty of success, we should in such a situation assemble four times as many troops as the enemy (employing four corps to deal with one enemy corps) and firepower from one-and-a-half to twice as heavy as the enemy’s (using 2,200 to 3,000 guns of more than 70mm caliber to deal with 1,500 enemy guns of the same caliber).

6. In addition to the above-mentioned 12 divisions, we are moving 24 divisions from south of the Yangtze River and from Shaanxi and Gansu provinces to areas along the Xuzhou-Lanzhou, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Shenyang rail lines. We plan to employ these divisions as the second and third groups of troops sent to aid Korea in the spring and summer of next year as the future situation requires.

Is the above text—indicating a firm Chinese decision to intervene militarily against the Americans in Korea (albeit with some trepidation and an explicit statement that the “Volunteer” forces would require adequate Soviet weaponry before they could take the offensive)—compatible with the message from Mao to Stalin dated 2 October 1950 which Rosshchin cabled to Moscow on 3 October 1950 [Document #12], according to the document recently declassified in the Russian archives? Clearly not. Nor is it compatible with Stalin’s statement to Kim Il Sung on October 8, stating that, in response to his own letter of October 1 seeking Chinese entry into the war, “Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction in China.” [Document #13.] That appears to leave two principal alternatives: 1) that both Russian documents, and others in the Presidential Archives collection that are logically and chronologically consistent with the events they describe, are elaborate fakes (which I find highly unlikely, especially as the collective of documents that are highly incriminating regarding the Soviet role in the war); or 2) (what I find more likely) that the published Chinese version of the October 2 telegram is unreliable: inaccurate, absent, or perhaps misdated; nor can one exclude the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history. (In contrast to the case with Russian documents, scholars have not been permitted access to the relevant Chinese archives to examine original documents or facsimiles, and have been forced to rely on published versions.) In any case, numerous important accounts of the events leading to the PRC’s entry into the Korean War relying on the Chinese version of the 2 October 1950 Mao to Stalin cable must now be called into question. [Ed. note: Some of the more important of the many examples of recent works using the Chinese version of the cable—an English translation of which was reprinted under the headline, “Mao’s Cable Explains Drive Into Korea,” in The New York Times on 26 February 1992—include Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” esp. 135-142; Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis,” esp. 460-463; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 97; Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, esp. 176-183; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, esp. 175-180; Stueck, The Korean War, esp. 99-100; and Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, esp. 78-80.)

Clearly, further research is necessary, in both the Moscow and Beijing archives, to establish the precise contents and chronology of the communications between Stalin and Mao during the first two weeks of October 1950. In the meantime, the evidence cited here should induce additional caution in treating the Chinese version of Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War. [31] N. S. Khrushchev, The Korean War (Moscow: Progress Publishing House), 28, in Russian; for a slightly different English translation, see Khrushchev’s Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold R. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), 147.

32. I believe that Shytkov referred to the members of the DPRK government and various administrative agencies and organizations who originally came from the USSR as Soviet citizens of Korean nationality. This was an “escape clause” for all the so-called Soviet Korean leaders, including Kim Il Sung himself and his guerrilla comrades.

33. I believe that here Shytkov referred to the Soviet aircraft maintenance and support teams which were transferred from the Maritime Province to the vicinity of Pyongyang in the last week of September. At that time, the Soviet General Staff had still been considering Stalin’s order to dispatch a Soviet fighter aviation squadron to provide air cover for the North Korean capital. However, once the UN forces moved over the 38th parallel on October 1 and were rapidly and successfully advancing toward Pyongyang, apparently Stalin made a decision not to deploy the Soviet Air Force directly in North Korea, but to redeploy it in northeast China. Therefore, Shytkov requested authority to send home the remaining aircraft maintenance and support teams.

34. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 183.
Document 1: Soviet Defense Minister A.M. Vasilevsky to Stalin, 21 September 1950

To Comrade STALIN

Regarding the question of the transfer of fighter aviation regiment of “YAK-9s” to provide air cover to Pyongyang, I herewith report:

1. In order to speed up the regiment transfer, we consider it the most expedient to use the 84th fighter regiment of the 147th aviation division based on 40 metal-made “YAK-9s”, deployed in the Maritime Region in the vicinity of Voroshilov. The regiment shall be dispatched by air via Chinese territory by the route Yanji-Andong-Pyongyang. The regiment’s overflight should take two days. During the preparation for the overflight one has to take into account the inevitability of air combat in the area of Andong-Pyongyang.

2. In a very cautious manner, we made a number of inquiries to Comrade Shhtykov concerning the following questions:
   - the suitability for the landing of our aircraft at airbases in the vicinity of Pyongyang which have been badly damaged by the enemy’s air raids, especially lately;
   - the availability of aircraft maintenance personnel, fuel, and munitions thereat.

3. If the Koreans do not have aircraft maintenance crews, before the regiment’s transfer we will have to dispatch an aviation maintenance battalion for this regiment, composed of 223 men with air-base equipment, to Pyongyang by the railroad via Andong. It is likely to take us five-six days to transfer this battalion, given the transport overload across the Yalu River in the vicinity of Andong.

If the Koreans do not have fuel and munitions, we will have to ship them to Pyongyang simultaneously with the battalion transport.

In this case, accounting for the transfer of the personnel, it is likely to take up to eight-ten days for the final readiness of the regiment for combat in the vicinity of Pyongyang.

4. Bearing in mind the lack of Korean aerial surveillance and alert system in the vicinity of Pyongyang, in order to create normal conditions in combat for our regiment, we would consider it necessary to dispatch along with the regiment at least several radar units designed to locate the enemy’s aircraft, as well as a team of radio operators who can set up communications between the airbase and these radar posts. Otherwise, our airplanes on the ground will be subject to sudden raids by the enemy’s aviation.

5. We ask You to give us permission to report all our final calculations regarding the regiment’s transfer to Pyongyang as soon as we find out in Pyongyang the details related to the questions of the regiment’s redeployment. At the same time, we will report to You our considerations concerning the organization of the air defense system of the airbase from which the regiment will operate.

   [signature]

V A S I L E V S K Y

“21” September 1950

No. 1172cc

Copies: Stalin, Malenkov, Beriya, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khruschev.

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 79-80]

Document 2: Vasilevsky to Stalin, 23 September 1950

To Comrade STALIN

I herewith report concerning the undertaken measures relating to the redeployment of the fighter aviation regiment based on the “LA-9” type of aircraft from the Maritime Region to provide air cover for the city of Pyongyang.

1. For the redeployment we assigned the 304th fighter aviation regiment of the 32nd fighter aviation division numbering 40 airplanes “LA-9” currently deployed at the airbase Spassk in the Maritime Region.

   On October 1-2, the regiment will be redeployed by air via Chinese territory by the route Spassk-Dongning-Yanji-Tonghua-Andong-Pyongyang.

   We will carefully elaborate the flight plan, especially regarding its segment from Andong to Pyongyang, and the regiment’s pilot crews will study it thoroughly.

   2. The information which we received from Korea indicates that airdromes in the vicinity of Pyongyang are still suitable for operation.

At present, there are no maintenance personnel at these airdromes because they had all been redeployed to airfields south of Seoul. Neither are there fuel and munitions for combat aircraft in the vicinity of Pyongyang.

Therefore, first, from September 25 to September 30, we will transport the following by railroad from the Maritime Region via Andong to their destinations:

- a team for the technical maintenance of the regiment with the minimum required airbase equipment;
- a team of radio technicians with four radar units for locating the enemy’s planes and guiding our planes thereto;
- an air defense artillery battalion consisting of three 85-mm gun batteries and one 37-mm gun battery, in total 16 artillery guns, for providing air cover to the airdrome;
- fuel for 15 refueling cycles and 15 sets of munitions.

   3. On September 24, in order to organize the reception of the regiment and its combat operation, we are sending by car from the Maritime Region to Pyongyang the commander of the aviation corps Colonel Noga who is supposed to meet the regiment in Andong, assign combat tasks thereto, and be in charge of its flight over to Pyongyang.

   4. The regiment is expected to commence fulfilling its combat mission aimed at covering Pyongyang from the air on October 3.

   5. At the same time, we consider it necessary to report that our pilots’ work in the skies over Pyongyang will inevitably be discovered by the U.S. troops right after the first air combat, because all the control and command over the combat in the air will be conducted by our pilots in the Russian language.

   [signature]

V A S I L E V S K Y

“23” September 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 81-82]

Document 3: Telegram from Fyn Si (Stalin) to Matveyev (Army Gen. M.V. Zakharov) and Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK T.F. Shhtykov, approved 27 September 1950 Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo
VKP(b) CC
# P78/73
27 September 1950
[To:] Cmrs Malenkov, Bulganin, Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC
VKP(b) Decision dated September 27, 1950

#73. - Questions of Korea.

Approve of the attached directive to Comrades Matveyev and Shlykov.

Secretary of the C[entral] C[ommitee]

* * * *

Attachment to #73 (op) of the Politburo Protocol #78

Pyongyang

TO MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]
TO SHTYKOV

The serious predicament in the area of Seoul and in the South-East in which the Korean People’s Army has found itself lately has to a great extent been caused by a series of grave mistakes made by the Frontline Command, the Commands of the Army Groups and army groupings in matters related to command and control over troops, as well as to the tactics of their combat use in particular.

It is our military advisers who are even more to blame for these mistakes. Our military advisers failed to implement scrupulously and in a timely fashion the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the withdrawal of four divisions from the central front to the area of Seoul despite the fact that at the moment of adopting this decision such a possibility existed. Consequently, they lost seven days which brought about an enormous tactical advantage in the vicinity of Seoul to the U.S. troops. Had they pulled out these divisions on time, this could have changed the military situation around Seoul considerably. Odd battalions and separate detachments arriving in the vicinity of Seoul, unprepared for combat, could not produce any effect because of lack of coordination and communications with the staff. The division which arrived from the southeast was thrown into combat in a disorganized manner and in odd units, which made it easier for the enemy to decimate and annihilate it. As we directed earlier, you should have deployed this division for combat at the line northeast and east of Seoul, reorganize it there, give its soldiers at least one day of respite, prepare it for battle and only afterwards introduce these troops into combat.

One cannot help taking serious note of erroneous and absolutely inadmissible tactics for tank use in combat. Lately you have used tanks in combat without preliminary artillery strikes aimed at clearing the field for tank maneuvers. As a consequence, the enemy easily destroys your tanks. Our military advisers who have personal experience from the Great Patriotic War must be aware that such ignorant use of tanks leads to their loss.

One cannot help noticing the strategic illiteracy of our advisers and their incompetence in intelligence matters. They failed to grasp the strategic importance of the enemy’s assault landing in Inch’on, denied the gravity of its implications, while Shlykov even suggested that we should bring to trial the author of an article in the “Pravda” about the U.S. assault landing. This blindness and lack of strategic experience led to the fact that they doubted the necessity of redeploying troops from the South toward Seoul, as well as procrastinated over their redeployment and slowed it down considerably, thereby losing a week to the enemy’s enjoyment.

The assistance provided by our military advisers to the Korean Command in such paramount matters as communications, command and control over troops, organization of intelligence and combat is exceptionally weak. As a result of this, the KPA troops, in essence, are beyond control: they are engaged in combat blindly and cannot arrange the coordination between the various armed services in battle. One can tolerate such a situation during a successful offensive, but one cannot allow this to happen when the frontline situation is worsening.

You must elucidate all these points to our military advisers, and first of all to Vasilyev.

In the present military situation, in order to provide assistance to the Korean Command, especially in the questions of an organized pullout of the KPA troops from the southeast and the prompt organization of a new defense front to the east, south, and north of Seoul, our military advisers must arrange the following:

1. The pullout of the main forces must be conducted under the protection of strong rear guards dispatched from the divisions and capable of rendering serious resistance to the enemy. This can be achieved if the command over the rear guards is assigned to commanders with considerable military experience, if the rear guards are strengthened with standing and antitank artillery, field engineering units, and, if possible, with tanks.

2. The rear guards must engage in combat from defensive line to defensive line, making broad use of engineering fortifications, including mines and materials at hand.

The rear guards must act decisively and actively in order to gain the time required for the pullout of the main forces.

3. The bulk of the troops of the divisions, to the extent possible, must be withdrawn in a compact manner, ready to force their way forward, but not in separate and odd units. The major force must dispatch strong forward guards armed with artillery and, if possible, with tanks.

4. Tanks must be used only in joint action with infantry and only after preliminary artillery fire.

5. One must dispatch forward detachments to occupy and hold ravines, bridges, ferries, passes and important road junctions located along the way of the movement of the major forces until the latter pass through them.

6. Special attention must be paid to the questions of the organization of field intelligence, as well as flank protection and maintenance of communications between marching troops’ columns.

7. When preparing for defense, one should avoid stretching out the troops along the entire front line but tightly cover the main directions and set up strong reserve units for active actions.

8. When setting up communications with troops via the line of the Korean Command, one must utilize radio with the use of codes.

In the future, while organizing the work of our military advisers in accordance with this directive, you must undertake all necessary measures so that none of our military
advisers will be captured by the enemy, as was directed earlier.

Report on the implementation of this directive.

F Y N SI. [STALIN]

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 90-93]

Document 4: Ciphered telegram from Matveyev (Zakharov) to Fyn Si (Stalin), 26 [27] September 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600262/sh

From Pyongyang Sent on 26.9.50 at 8:10 a.m., by wire
Received in Moscow on 27.9.50 at 20:55 p.m.
Arrived in the 8th MDGS\(^2\) on 27.9.50 at 21:10 p.m.
Deciphered by Morozov on 27.9.50 at 23:50 p.m.

Number of copies made - 10
Distribution List: Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, Vasilevsky - 1, 8th MDGS file - 1.

TO COMRADE FYN SI [STALIN]

Having familiarized myself with the predicament of the KPA, I report:

The situation of the People’s Army troops on the Western (Seoul) and Southeastern (Pusan) fronts is severe.

Seeking to encircle and destroy the main forces of the People’s Army, it is in the general direction of Ch’ungju that the U.S. troops have concentrated the major efforts of the assault group which had landed in the area of Chemulp’o, as well as of the troops that had launched an offensive from the area to the North and Northwest of Taegu.

Using the support of the air force which has dominated the air space without hindrance and caused aircraft-fright [aviabooian] both among the ranks within the People’s Army and in the rear areas, the U.S. troops have managed to move from Suwon eastward and southeastward for 25 to 30 kilometers and some of their troops took over Sangju and Antó to the north and northwest of Taegu.

According to the information which still needs to be verified, some tank units of the enemy’s Seoul group continue to advance toward Ch’ungju, which creates the danger of encirclement of the First Army Group of the KPA.

The People’s Army troops, suffering heavy losses, mainly from the enemy’s airforce, having lost almost all their tanks and much artillery, are engaged in difficult battles to hold their positions. The troops lack ammunition and fuel the delivery of which has been virtually halted. The accounting for the available weapons and ammunition is organized unsatisfactorily. The top-down command and control system is set up poorly. The wire and radio communications work intermittently because of the interruptions inflicted by the enemy’s air raids and due to the lack of qualified radio operators and the lack of fuel for radio station generators correspondingly. Courier mail is almost nonexistent.

The predicament of the KPA troops, in particular on the Southeastern front, remains unclear.

Upon our recommendation, on the night of 26.9.50 [26 September 1950], some Korean communications officers were dispatched to the Front Command and the Seoul group in order to collect information on the troops’ situation.

On 25.9.50, at 19:00 pm, local time, Kim Il Sung’s order was forwarded to the troops, according to which the Seoul grouping and the Second Army Group operating in the northern part of the southeastern front were told to go on the defensive and hold up the enemy by any means.

The troops of the Second Army Group operating in the central and southern parts of the southeastern front were ordered to begin operating in the central and southern parts of the enemy by any means.

The predicament of the KPA troops, in particular on the Southeastern front, remains unclear.

After our conversation with Kim Il Sung we got down to work in order to assist in:

- organizing good command and control over troops;
- rearranging the system of troop supplies, shipments, and transport services;
- preparing defensive fortifications.

The People’s Army is experiencing a dire shortage of drivers. The 3,400 trucks which are to arrive soon have no drivers at all. It may be expedient to propose to Kim Il Sung that he ask the Chinese friends to dispatch not less than 1,500 drivers to Korea, may it not?

MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 1298/sh

09/27/50
12:35pm, Pyongyang time
Typed by Budanova on 28.9.50 at 0:15 a.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 103-106]

Document 5: Ciphered Telegram, Shytkov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia (Stalin), 29 September 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600301/sh
From: PYONGYANG
Sent on 09/29/50 at 20:23 p.m.
Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 14:45 p.m.
Received at the 8D/GS on 09/30/50 at 14:50 p.m.
Deciphered by Vakushin on 09/30/50 at 15:50 p.m
Distribution list - 12 copies:
Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1, 8 MDGS - 1, MFA - 1, on file - 1.

To: MOSCOW
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
To Comrade GROMYKO
Instantia [Highest Authority]

On 29 September 29 I met KIM IL SUNG upon his request.

PAK HÓN-YÓNG was present at the meeting. In the beginning of the conversation KIM IL SUNG asked me whether I was aware of the military situation at the front.

I replied that I did not know the latest one.

Then KIM IL SUNG briefly explained to me the predicament of his troops on the basis of the report of the Front Commander and asked my advice as to what one could do in order to improve the situation at the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the wake of the enemy’s having occupied the Syarye mountain range and moving into the rear of the Second Army Group the front situation is becoming particularly troublesome. Earlier they hoped that they would be able to withdraw troops in an organized manner. But because of their poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders, the enemy managed to cut off the First Army Group and is moving to cut off the Second Army Group as its breakthrough toward P’UNGGI CH’ÔNGJU to cut off the Second Army Group composed of 7 divisions. Seoul fell. There are no standby troops ready to render any serious resistance to the enemy advancing to the 38th parallel.

New military units being formed in the North advance to the frontline very slowly because the railroads in fact do not function due to the demolished bridges and ruined railway stations, while automobile transport is scarce. These new units lack armaments. The newly formed units and groupings designated to defend CHEMULP’O, HAEJU, WÔNSAN, and CH’ÔNGJIN have weapons designed for training purposes only.

The political situation is also getting more and more complicated. The enemy stepped up its activity of dropping paratroopers into the territory of North Korea with the task of gathering intelligence on what deliveries are being shipped from the Soviet Union and to conduct subversive activities. Reactionary forces are raising their heads in North Korea.

30.IX.50
No. 1340
Typed by Lobyseva on 09/30/50 at 16:55 p.m.

Document 6: Ciphered Telegram, DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist leader Pak Hong-Yong to Stalin (via Shtykov), 29 September 1950

Ciphered Telegram # 600308/sh

Sent from Pyongyang by wire on 09/30/50 at 20:35 p.m.
Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 23:32 p.m.
Arrived in the 8 MDGS on 09/30/50 at 23:30 p.m.
Deciphered by Mikhaylenko on 10/01/50 at 0:35 a.m.
Distribution list - 12 copies:
Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria -1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1.
Extremely Urgent

MOSCOW
To Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Comrade GROMYKO

I herewith relay the text of a letter addressed to Comrade STALIN which I received from KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG (translation from the Korean).

This letter was handed over to me by PAK HÓN-YÓNG in person.

S H T Y K O V
No. 1351

Enclosure: 4-page letter.

This letter was cabled to Comrade Stalin on 10.01.50 at 12:50 p.m.

Typed by Shcherbakova on 10/01/50 at 1:45 a.m.

* * * * *

Moscow, Kremlin.

DEEPLY RESPECTED Iosif Vissarionovich STALIN.

On behalf of the Workers’ Party of Korea, we express to You, the liberator of the Korean people and the leader of the working peoples of the entire world, our profound gratitude for compassion and assistance which You constantly provide to the people struggling for the freedom and independence of its Motherland.

In this letter, we would like to brief You on the current situation at the fronts of the liberation war of our people against the American aggressors.

Prior to the assault landing at Inch’ón (Chemulp’o) one could not judge the situation at the fronts as unfavorable to us. The adversary, suffering one defeat after another, was cornered into a tiny piece of land at the southern-most tip of South Korea and we had a great chance of winning a victory in the last decisive battles.

Such a situation considerably damaged the military authority of the United States. Therefore, in those conditions, in order to restore its prestige and to implement by any means its long-held plans of conquering Korea and transforming it into its military-strategic bridgehead, on 16.9.50, the U.S. performed an assault landing operation and landed a considerable number of troops and armaments in the vicinity of Inch’ón after having mobilized almost all its land, naval, and air troops deployed in the Pacific ocean. The enemy took over Inch’ón and is engaged in street combats in the city of Seoul itself. The military situation became perilous.

The units of our People’s Army heroically fight against advancing assault landing units of the enemy. However, we consider it necessary to report to You about the emergence of very unfavorable conditions for us.

The enemy’s air force numbering about a thousand airplanes of various types, facing no rebuttal from our side, totally dominate the air space and perform air raids at the fronts and in the rear day and night. At the fronts, under the air cover of hundreds of airplanes the motorized units of the enemy engage us in combat at their free will and inflict great losses to our manpower and destroy our armaments. Moreover, by freely destroying railroads and highways, telephone communications lines, means of transportation and other facilities, the enemy’s air force impedes the provision of supplies to our combat units and bars maneuvers by our troops, thereby making their timely redeployments impossible. We experience this difficulty on all fronts.

Having cut off all the communications lines of our troops and joined the assault force that landed in Inch’ón with the units of their southern front that broke through our frontline, the adversary has a real opportunity to take over the city of Seoul completely.

As a result, the units of the People’s Army that are still fighting in the southern part of Korea have been cut off from the northern part of Korea, they are torn into pieces and cannot receive munitions, armaments, and food rations. Moreover, some units do not have any communication with each other, while some of them are surrounded by enemy troops.

After taking over Seoul completely, the enemy is likely to launch a further offensive into North Korea. Therefore, we believe that if in future the above-mentioned conditions unfavorable to us continue, then the American aggression ultimately will be successful.

In order to provide troops with all the necessary supplies and to feed the frontline without any interruption, first of all, we need to have an appropriate air force. But we do not possess well-trained pilots.

Dear Comrade STALIN, we are determined to overcome all the difficulties facing us so that Korea will not be a colony and a military springboard of the U.S. imperialists. We will fight for the independence, democracy and happiness of our people to the last drop of blood. Therefore, with all our energy we are taking decisive measures for the formation and training of many new divisions with the aim of using more than 100,000 troops mobilized in South Korea [captured in South Korea - AM] in the most advantageous operational areas, as well as arming the entire people so as to be prepared to fight a protracted war.

This notwithstanding, if the enemy does not give us time to implement the measures which we plan, and, making use of our extremely grave situation, steps up its offensive operations into North Korea, then we will not be able to stop the enemy troops solely with our own forces.

Therefore, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, we cannot help asking You to provide us with special assistance. In other words, at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.

If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people’s democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.

We request Your directive regarding the aforementioned proposal.

Respectfully, The CC of the Workers’ Party of Korea

KIM IL SUNG, PAK HÓN-YÓNG

29 September 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 41-45]

Document 7: Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing (N.V. Roshchin) with message
for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172

Coded, only by wire
Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50
Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1
To BEIJING, [SOVIET] AMBASSADOR

Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 1112-1126

Tell Zhou Enlai the following:
1. We agree with the opinion of Chinese comrades regarding the Indian mediation in the matter of admitting the People’s [Republic of] China into the UN membership.
2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteers’ actions in North Korea in the event of the enemy’s crossing the 38th parallel. We will do our best to provide the air cover for these units.
3. Your report about the flights of the Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian territory has not been confirmed. But we have issued an order not to permit such overflights.

F I L I P P O V [STALIN]

5.7.50
Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 07/06/50

Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov), 30 September 1950

VKP(b) CC
# P78/118
09/30/50
To: Cmrds. Malenkov, Bulganin, Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC

Decision dated 30 September 1950

118. Telegram from Comrade Matveyev # 1298.

The attached draft of the reply to Comrade Matveyev regarding his telegram #1298 has been approved.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

* * * * *

Attachment to the Decision of the Politburo #78 on #118
PYONGYANG
To MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV]
RE: # 1298

We consider correct the decisions adopted by Kim II Sung at his meeting with You, in particular, regarding the combining of the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister in the hands of Kim II Sung, the establishment of the Staff at the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the formation of six divisions and withdrawal of manpower reserves from South Korea.

The formation of six divisions must be accelerated. Necessary armaments, ammunition, and other materials will be supplied from October 5 to October 20.

As far as the question about the expediency of recommending that Kim II Sung ask the Chinese friends to dispatch drivers to Korea, You may give such advice but without citing Moscow.

Upon the directive of Instantsia

C H A N   F U [STALIN]

30 September 1950
# 182-sh
1 copy

Attachment

TOP PRIORITY

Document 9: Memorandum Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Comrade STALIN I.V.

The Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade Shtykov has reported that as a result of air bombardments by the U.S. Air Force many enterprises of the DPRK have been ruined and are not in operation. At the present time, Koreans do not intend to rebuild these factories and plants.

In this situation Comrade Shytov considers it expedient to send some of the Soviet specialists back to the Soviet Union and asks to be given the right to dispatch the Soviet experts back to the USSR regardless of the length of their stay in Korea upon consultations with the government of the DPRK.

Comr. Shytov also requests that he be permitted, at his judgement and upon consultations with heads of the Soviet organizations in Korea, to evacuate some of their personnel working in Korea without whom they can still continue to do their work.

The M[inistry of] F[oreign] A[ffairs of the] USSR considers it possible to recall some of the Soviet specialists from the DPRK only if the initiative for their return to the Soviet Union were to come from the government of the DPRK.

As far as Comr. Shytov’s suggestion about the evacuation of the personnel of the Soviet organizations from the DPRK, the MFA of the USSR proposes that we maintain the existing procedures according to which the recall of personnel is to be done via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

A draft [cable to Shtykov - AM] is attached.

I request Your consideration.

A.  G R O M Y K O
Korea may take place only when the initiative for the return of any such specialists comes from the government of the DPRK. You should not display any initiative of your own in raising the issue of the evacuation of Soviet specialist before the Koreans do.

The return of the personnel of the Soviet organizations working in the DPRK to the Soviet Union should be done in the previously-established order, that is, via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

You should inform the MFA of the USSR about each case of pending return of the Soviet specialists from Korea well in advance.

A. Gromyko

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 827, listy 123, 125]

Document 10: Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950

Transmitted to Bulganin

On 1.X.50 [1 October 1950] at 3:00 a.m.

Ciphered Telegram

To BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR

(For immediate transmission to MAO ZEDONG and ZHOU ENLAI.)

I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea. However, judging by the information that I have received from Moscow today, I see that the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate.

It was on 16 September already that Moscow warned our Korean friends that the landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp’o [Inchon] had great significance and was aimed at cutting off the First and Second Army Groups of the North Koreans from their rear in the North. Moscow admonished them to withdraw at least four divisions from the South immediately, to set up a frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and later to gradually pull out most of the troops fighting in the South northward, thereby providing for the defense of the 38th parallel.

However, the 1 [First] and 2 [Second] Army Groups’ Commands failed to implement Kim Il Sung’s order for the withdrawal of troops northward, which allowed the U.S. troops to cut them off and surround them. Our Korean friends have no troops capable of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence, one needs to consider the way toward the 38th parallel wide open.

I think that if in the current situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course.

I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it.

I await your reply.

Greetings,

F I L I P P O V [STALIN]

1 October 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 97-98]

Document 11: Ciphered Telegram, Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveev (Zakharov), 2 October 1950

Ciphered Note (by wire)

To PYONGYANG

MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV] (transmitted by ciphered telegram)

We constantly point out to You the exceptional importance of the withdrawal of troops out of the encirclement. In this matter, the crucial point is to bring the manpower and commanding officers back to the north.

In the current situation, without delay you must give instructions to the soldiers and officers who are still fighting in the south to retreat by any means, in groups or person by person, to the north. There is no continuous frontline. These troops are fighting on their own territory, so the population feels compassion toward them and will help them out. They must leave heavy weapons behind and try to get to the north by all means, by using the cover of night and the areas unoccupied by the enemy yet. You have the possibility of rescuing thereby the most valuable asset, that is, the cadres.

Take all the necessary measures to implement this directive.

Telegraph the fulfillment.

C H A N F U [STALIN]

2 October 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 64]

Document 12: Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 12:15

3.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]

I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581:

“I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

...”
In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [krainé bol’šim].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war.

We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place, to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.

MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50”

1. In our view MAO ZEDONG’s answer is indicative of a change in the original position of the Chinese leadership on the Korean question. It contradicts the earlier appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed
No. 2270 3.10

Deciphered by Araushkin 12.50 3.10
Typed by Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10
Typed by Doronchenkova 12.50 3.10
[1.20 p.m. 3 October]
[1.20 p.m. 3 October]
Typed 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 - (to file)

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.]


PYONGYANG, To SHTYKOV for KIM IL SUNG

Comrade Kim Il Sung!

My reply has been delayed because of my consultations with the Chinese comrades, which took several days. On 1 October, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring whether he could dispatch to Korea immediately at least five or six divisions under the cover of which our Korean comrades could form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction [nedoval' stvo] in China. I replied to him by the following letter:

“I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of five-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.

While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an international character:

1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war [k bol'shoi voin e];

2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;

3) the USA will be compelled to yield in the Korean question to China behind which stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to agree to such terms of the settlement of the Korean question that would be favorable to Korea and that would not give the enemies a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard;

4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their springboard in the Far East.

In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy, and that without serious struggle and an imposing display of force not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its springboard not for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

Of course, I took into account also [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.

Such were the considerations and prospects of an international nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a minimum of five-six divisions from You.”

In response to this letter, on October 7, I received letter from Mao on 7 September [sic-October], in which he expresses solidarity with the fundamental positions discussed in my letter and declares that he will dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. But [he said] that he will send them not now, but after some time. He also requested that I receive his representatives and discuss some details of the mission with them. Of course, I agreed to receive his representatives and to discuss with them a detailed plan of military assistance to Korea.

It is obvious from the above mentioned that You must stand firm and fight for every tiny piece of your land, that You have to strengthen resistance to the American occupiers of Korea and prepare reserves, using for this purpose the military cadres of the Korean People’s Army coming out from the encirclement. Also, this shows that You are absolutely right in your proposal that we transfer all Korean comrades studying in the
USSR into the pilot training program. I will keep you informed about further talks with the Chinese comrades. 8 October 1950.

FYNS I [STALIN]

Comrade Shtykov, I ask You to read this letter to Kim Il Sung. He may copy it by hand in your presence, but You may not hand over this letter to Kim Il Sung because of its extreme confidentiality.

FYNS I [STALIN]

[Handwritten: This letter was delivered to Comrade Bulganin on October 7, 1950 at 22:15 pm.]

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65-67]

Document 14: Telegram from Gromyko to Shtykov Approved by Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, 5 October 1950

VKP(b) CC

# P78/168

05/10/50

To: Cmrs Bulganin, Gromyko

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b)

Decision dated October 5, 1950

168. The Question of Shtykov.

The attached draft of a telegram addressed to the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Com. Shtykov, regarding the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists and personnel of Soviet organizations from Korea to the USSR, has been approved.

SECRETARY OF THE CC 4ak

[Attachment to the Decision of the Politburo #78 regarding #168]

PYONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

1304/sh. We agree with your proposals concerning the temporary evacuation of some Soviet specialists upon consultations with the Korean government, as well as of the personnel of Soviet organizations in Korea.

GROMYKO

5-nb

[APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 121-122]

Document 15: Gromyko and Vasilevsky to Stalin, 6 October 1950, attaching draft cable to Shtykov

Ministry of Defense of the USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Distribution list:

Stalin - 1, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, Khrushchev - 1.

Comrade STALIN I.V.:

In connection with Comrade Shtykov’s telegram #1405/sh dated 5 October in which he pressed the question of the evacuation from Korea of Soviet specialists working in Korea, personnel of Soviet organizations in Korea, families of Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, staff of the Soviet air commanders’ offices, and, in case of emergency, all Soviet citizens, we consider it necessary to reply in accordance with the attached draft.

We request your consideration thereof.

A. VASILEVSKY A. GROMYKO

[Signature]

6 October 1950

No. 201-gi

[Attachment]

PRIORITY CABLE

To PYONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

RE: 1405/sh

Coded Telegram # 600382/sh

To Comrade STALIN I.V.

FROM: PYONGYANG

Sent by wire on 10/09/50 at 7:05 a.m.

Received in Moscow on 10/09/50 at 9:38 a.m.

Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/09/50 at 9:45 a.m.

Deciphered by Morozov on 10/09/50 at 10:45 a.m.

Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1.

I herewith transmit a letter of the following content addressed to Your name from comrade KIM IL SUNG:

“Comrade STALIN Iosif Vissarionovich,

Let me ask You, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, for assistance and advice. Now it is evident to everybody that having made significant achievements in recent military operations, the American aggressor will not stop at anything short of
the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its conversion into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East.

In my opinion, the struggle of our people for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.

For a successful struggle against a strong enemy armed with the latest achievements of military science and technology we will have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators, and engineering officers urgently.

It is very difficult to train them inside our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following request:

1. To permit the training of 200-300 pilots from among Korean students studying in the Soviet Union.
2. To permit the training of 1,000 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers from among Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union.

I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render us assistance in this regard.

Respectfully, KIM IL SUNG

I support KIM IL SUNG’S request.

S H T Y K O V

No. 1447/sh

9 October 1950

Typed by Kravchuk on 10/09/50 at 11:20 a.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 72-73]

Document 17: Memorandum, Golovko and Fokin to Stalin, 13 October 1950

Comrade STALIN

According to electronic intelligence data gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battleships were noticed in the vicinity of Ch’όngjin: USS “Missouri,” three heavy aircraft carriers (“Valley Forge,” “Leyte,” “The Philippine Sea”), two escort aircraft carriers (“Sicily,” “Beduin Strait”), three heavy cruisers (“Rochester,” “Toledo,” “Helena”), three cruisers (“Wooster,” “Juno,” “Ceylon”), twelve destroyers, the third squadron of mine-sweepers, the first and the third assault landing groups.

Ch’όngjin was heavily bombardied from the air and the sea.

[signature] G O L O V K O

[signature] F O K I N

No. 244cc
13 October 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 827, list 139]

Document 18: CIPHERED TELEGRAM, Shytkov to Fyn Si (Stalin), 14 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600428/sh
FROM: PYONGYANG

Sent by wire on 10/14/50 at 03:15 a.m. Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 6:36 a.m. Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/14/50 at 7:10 a.m. Deciphered by Morozov on 10/14/50 at 7:45 a.m. Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1.

FYN SI [STALIN]

In accordance with your directive dated 13.10.50 I had a meeting with KIM IL SUNG. PAK HΟΝ-YΟNG was present at the meeting. I read the text of your telegram to them. The content of the telegram caught KIM IL SUNG and PAK HΟΝ-YΟNG by surprise.

KIM IL SUNG stated that it was very hard for them [to accept Stalin’s recommendation - AM], but since there is such advice they will fulfill it.

KIM IL SUNG asked me to read practical recommendations and ordered PAK HΟΝ-YΟNG to write them down. He also asked us to help him develop a plan for measures related to this question.

S H T Y K O V

No. 1476/sh
14 October 1950
Typed by Bantseleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20 a.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, list 3]

Document 19: CIPHERED TELEGRAM, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 October 1950, re Meeting with Mao Zedong

FROM: BEIJING

Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38 a.m. Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at 02:00 a.m. Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20 a.m. Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - 1, SMDGS - 1.

PRIORITY T

To FILIPPOV [STALIN]

In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say:

Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us [the Chinese - AM] and the Northeast will be faced with constant menace.

Past hesitations by our comrades occurred because questions about the international situation, questions about the Soviet assistance to us, and questions about air cover were not clear to them. At present, all these questions have been clarified.

Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is advantageous for them to dispatch the Chinese troops into Korea. The Chinese have the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea.

At this point, they are sending the first echelon composed of nine divisions. Although it is poorly armed, it will be able to fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades will have to prepare the second echelon.

The main thing that we need, says Mao Zedong, is air power which will provide us with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as soon as possible, but not later than in two
months.

Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong noted that at present the government of the People’s Republic of China cannot pay in cash for the armaments delivered. They hope to receive arms on credit.

Thus, the 1951 budget will not be affected, and it will be easier for them to explain it to the democrats.

In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believe that the Chinese must come to the assistance of the Korean comrades in their difficult struggle. To discuss this matter, Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrades Filippov again.

Zhou Enlai is being sent new instructions.

ROSCHCHIN

No. 2408
13.10 [13 October]

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2]

Document 20: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 13 October 1950

Ciphered Telegram # 75525/4/6759
(incoming #3735/shs)
(Stalin’s hand-written note)

PYONGYANG

To SHTYKOV for Comrade Kim Il Sung

I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] discussed the situation [in Korea - AM] again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to You yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of the Korean troops to the north.

FYNSI [STALIN]

13 Oct 1950
[typed:] Sent on 13.X.50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 74-75]

Document 21: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829

To PYONGYANG—SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the following message:

“After vacillations [kolebaniyi] and a series of temporary [provisional] decisions the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops.

I am glad [rad] that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last.

In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which You were told of earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades.

The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR.

I wish You success.”

FYNSI [STALIN]

14.10.50
Typed by Doronchenkova #8865
Made 2 copies: Stalin - 1, 8MDGS - 1.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, list 77]

1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September 26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 because at the end of the telegram it says that it was dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 September 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same date Moscow time.

2. 8th MDGS stands for the Eighth Main Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
To the Editor:

Since Kathryn Weathersby chose once again to stigmatize my work (as “revisionist”) in the spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, perhaps I might be permitted a comment. The documents that she reproduced, selectively culled from a vastly larger archive and handcarried to Seoul by a Boris Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the faltering Russian economy, are quite interesting but in ways that she does not seem to understand.

Document #1, a standard transcript of Kim Il Sung’s meeting with Stalin on 5 March 1949 widely circulated for use inside the Soviet government, is impressive primarily for how bland it is, adding very little to the existing record. If anything it illustrates how distant Stalin was from the Korean situation, probing Kim on what kind of an army he had, what kind South Korea had, and whether he had utilized the “national bourgeoisie” to organize trade (which Kim indeed had done). This transcript adds virtually nothing to what has been known of this meeting, a relatively full record of which can be found in an archive of captured North Korean materials in Washington. But it does appear to show that no secret military alliance or agreement issued forth from this meeting, as the South long claimed.

This document certainly does not provide evidence for Dr. Weathersby’s assertion that the meeting was “revealing in a most intimate way [of] the nature of the relationship” between the USSR and the DPRK or that North Korea was “utterly dependent” on the USSR. The captured archive has large numbers of documents on Korean-Soviet trade, negotiations over various exchanges, and proof that some precious Korean minerals, like gold and monazite (when refined, useful for a thorium atomic bomb) were indeed transferred in large quantities to Russia. (I covered this briefly in my Origins of the Korean War, volume 2[Princeton University Press, 1990], pp. 151-2, 340-45.) These voluminous materials still do not prove North Korea’s utter dependency on the USSR, especially when contrasted to South Korea, which had half its annual budget and five-sixths of its imports in the 1950s provided virtually gratis by the United States. (Stalin, to the contrary, charged Kim two percent—about what mortgages cost in the U.S. then.)

Document #7, Stalin’s telegram to Russian ambassador to P’yŏngyang Shytkov on 30 January 1950, does not say what Weathersby says it does, namely, it does not “reveal so bluntly” Stalin’s strategic thinking or his “perfect mafioso style.” Instead it shows Stalin appearing to be more interested than at any previous point in Kim Il Sung’s plans for South Korea, without a hint of what Stalin’s own strategic thinking might be. Dr. Weathersby thinks the timing of this change is to be explained by Dean Acheson’s famed press club speech on January 12, which is to assume a Stalin so inexperienced as to take Acheson’s public statement of a private policy at face value (and even the public statement is always misread by scholars). Finally, Stalin’s request that Kim send 25,000 tons of lead (whether gratis or for a price is not mentioned) is no more “mafioso” than the U.S. more or less telling South Korea that it would require Korea’s entire annual output of tungsten in the early 1950s, to make up for the lost tungsten supplies of southern China.

Documents number two through six are considerably more interesting, but remain inexplicable unless placed against the back-and-forth logic of the developing civil conflict on the peninsula, with full knowledge of what the South and the U.S. were doing. The critical issue in these documents is not a wholesale invasion of the South, but a military operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula, which juts southward from the 38th parallel on Korea’s west coast, reachable from the South only by sea or by an overland route through North Korean territory. This is where the Korean War conventionally dated from 25 June 1950 began, and where fighting between the South and North began on 4 May 1949—in a battle probably started by the South, according to the most reliable accounts.

According to these Soviet documents, Kim Il Sung first broached the idea of an operation against Ongjin to Shytkov on 12 August 1949. This came on the heels of the biggest Ongjin battle of 1949, initiated on August 4 by the North to dislodge South Korean army units holding Un’a Mountain, a salient above the 38th parallel which the South had aggressed against in a previous battle and the summit of which commanded much of the terrain to the north. The North sought, in the words of the American commander of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAC) “to recover high ground in North Korea occupied by [the] South Korean Army.” Before dawn it launched strong artillery barrages and then at 5:30 a.m., 4000 to 6000 North Korean border guards attacked the salient. They routed the South Korean defenders, destroying two companies of ROK soldiers and leaving hundreds dead.

Virtual panic ensued at high levels of the South Korean government, leading Syngman Rhee and his favored high officers in the army to argue that the only way to relieve pressure on Ongjin was to drive north to Ch’ŏrwon—which happened to be about 20 miles into North Korean territory. Rhee, who was meeting with Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] in a southern Korean port, returned to Seoul and dressed down his defense minister for not having “attacked the North” after the Ongjin debacle. The American ambassador and the KMAC commander both intervened, since an attack on Ch’ŏrwon would, in the words of the latter, “cause heavy civil war and might spread.” The South did not move against Ch’ŏrwon, but attacks from both sides across the parallel on the Ongjin peninsula continued through the end of 1949.

All this is based on unimpeachable American archival documentation, some of which was reproduced in the 1949 Korea papers of the Foreign Relations of the U.S. and which I treated at length in my 1990 book. When we now look at both sides of the parallel with the help of Soviet materials, we see how similar the Russians were in seeking to restrain hotheaded Korean leaders, including the two chiefs of state. Indeed, two key Russian Embassy officials seeking to restrain Kim used language almost identical to that which John Foster Dulles used with Rhee in his June 1950 discussions in Seoul (both, upon hearing Kim or Rhee declare their desire to attack the other side, “tried to switch the discussion to a general theme,” to quote from document #6). We see that Kim Il Sung, like southern leaders, wanted to bite off a chunk of exposed territory or grab a small city—all of Kaesong for example, which is bisected by the 38th parallel, or Haeju city just above the parallel on Ongjin, which southern commanders wanted to occupy in 1949-50.

The Soviet documents also demonstrate the hardwon, learned logic of this civil war...
by late 1949, namely, that both sides understood that their big power guarantors would not help them if they launched an unprovoked general attack—or even an assault on Ongjin or Ch’orwon. Document #6, a telegram from the Russian ambassador to Moscow in January 1950, shows Kim II Sung impatient that the South “is still not instigating an attack,” thus to justify his own, and the Russians in P’yôngyang tell him once again that he cannot attack Ongjin without risking general civil war. Meanwhile Rhee and his advisors (some of whom were Americans with cabinet-level portfolios in the ROK government) had gotten the message (especially through OSS and CIA operative Preston Goodfellow) that the US would only back Seoul in the case of an unprovoked and unequivocal attack from the North. Thus the 1950 logic for both sides was to see who would be stupid enough to move first, with Kim itching to invade and hoping for a clear southern provocation, and hotheads in the South hoping to provoke an “unprovoked” assault, thus to get American help—for that was the only way the South could hope to win. What better way for both sides to begin than to do it in isolated, remote Ongjin, with no foreign observers present along the parallel?

Other items in these documents also bear comment. They make clear that well before the war Kim already had begun playing Moscow off against Beijing, for example letting Shptykov overhear him say, at an apparently drunken luncheon on 19 January 1950, that if the Russians wouldn’t help him unify the country, “Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.” In general this document underscores my point that the victory of the Chinese revolution had an enormous refractory effect on North Korea (Origins, 1990, pp. 369-71), and that North Korea’s China connection was a trump card Kim could play to create some breathing room for his regime between the two communist giants. The documents also show that Kim’s timing for an invasion was deeply influenced by his desire to get large numbers of Korean soldiers back from China, where they had been fighting for years with Mao’s forces (Origins, 1990, pp. 451-53).

These documents put to rest forever, in my view, P’yôngyang’s canard that it was Pak Hon-yong, the southern communist leader, who argued for war in 1950 and foolishly thought the southern people would “rise up” to greet northern troops (Origins, 1990, pp. 456-57). Kim II Sung trumped up these charges in show trials in 1953, and then had Pak and his close allies executed. Meanwhile Kim told Shptykov in January 1950 that “partisans will not decide the question. The people of the south know that we have a good army.” South Korean “liberation” was to come courtesy of, and only of, the Korean Peoples Army.

Finally, what is absolutely fascinating about documents two through six is Kim II Sung’s basic conception of a Korean War, originated at least by August 1949: namely, attack the cul de sac of Ongjin (which no sane blitzkrieg commander would do precisely because it is a cul de sac), move eastward and grab Kaesong, and then see what happens. At a minimum this would establish a much more secure defense of P’yôngyang, which was quite vulnerable from Ongjin and Kaesong. At maximum, it might open Seoul to his forces. That is, if the southern army collapses, move on to Seoul and occupy it in a few days. And here we see the significance of the collapse of the ROK 2nd and 7th divisions, 25-27 June 1950, which opened the historic invasion corridor and placed the Korean People’s Army in Seoul on the 27th, and why some people with intimate knowledge of the Korean civil conflict have speculated that these divisions may have harbored a fifth column (Origins, 1990, pp. 572-73, 582-85). Kim did not by any means get what he wanted out of the Korean War, but, rest his soul, he got his minimum demand: Kaesong and Ongjin remain firmly on the other side of the 1953 demilitarized zone....

Readers of this Bulletin may not be as interested in the details of Korean history as I am. But they make the point that Korean history is made first and foremost by Koreans, which is something that much of the Korean War literature (from all sides) still fails to grasp. The Soviet documents also show that they are merely documents, that is, evidence that remains to be interpreted with all the intelligence, hindsight, imagination and care that the historian can muster. Furthermore these documents are highly selective, drawn from one portion of one section of one archive, and proffered to a Seoul still socked into the Korean civil struggle by a mendicant from Moscow. (Can we imagine the reverse? An American president currying favor in P’yôngyang with a handful of half-century-old documents?) And even when we have every document the Soviets ever produced, we will still need the South Korean archives, the North Korean archives, the Chinese archives on both sides of the Taiwan straits, and the American intelligence, signals and cryptography archives, before we will be able to argue on truly solid ground the question we ought all try to forget, namely, “who started the Korean civil war?”

Sincerely yours,

Bruce Cumings

1. The armistice did not end discussions of seizing Ongjin and Kaesong, however. According to American intelligence reports in February 1955, Syngman Rhee had held “meetings in which Rhee told Korean military and civilian leaders to prepare for military actions against North Korea,” and in October came reports saying that he had ordered plans for the retaking of Kaesong and the Ongjin Peninsula. This never happened, probably because the U.S. once again prevented Rhee from doing it. See declassified information cited in Donald S. MacDonald, U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 23-24, 80.

* * * * *

K. Weathersby responds:

Professor Cumings attempts to downplay the significance of the Russian documents by asserting, first of all, that the documents on the decision-making behind the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 published in the previous issue of the Bulletin were “selectively culled from a vastly larger archive.” In fact, the collection from the Presidential Archive declassified in preparation for Yeltsin’s presentation of a portion of them to South Korea includes the great majority of what that archive contains, as can be ascertained from looking at the “Delo” and page numbers. The important gaps in that collection are from April-June 1950 and October 1950, not from the earlier period.

Cumings also writes that these documents were “handcarried to Seoul by a Boris Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the faltering Russian economy.” Actually, Yeltsin presented them to President Kim Young Sam while the latter was in Moscow. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s government’s economic reasons for wishing to improve relations with South Korea are only relevant to
our discussion if this motivation led the Russian declassification commission to exclude certain documents, presumably ones that would present the Soviet role in the Korean War in an unfavorable light. As is apparent from the documents published in this issue as well as the previous issue of the Bulletin, unflattering documents have not been excluded; these records are, in fact, remarkably frank.

Cummings disparages the usefulness of the transcript of the first meeting between Kim Il Sung and Stalin by describing it as a “standard transcript...widely circulated for use inside the Soviet government” which “adds virtually nothing to what has been known of this meeting.” With regard to this assertion, it must be pointed out that Cummings has no knowledge of the circulation of this transcript within the Soviet government, and neither does any other scholar. Furthermore, nothing was “widely circulated” within the Soviet government; in the Soviet context this claim simply makes no sense. In addition, the account of Kim’s meeting with Stalin provided in the captured documents is limited to a report of the trip Kim Il Sung presented to a party assembly, in which he described the agreements reached, the “friendly atmosphere” of the talks, the sites the delegation visited, etc. Obviously, an actual transcript of the meeting with Stalin provides a much more substantial piece of historical evidence.

As for Cummings’ conclusion that the transcript reveals “how distant Stalin was from the Korean situation,” it would be possible to interpret Stalin’s remarks in this way if one had no knowledge of Soviet/North Korean relations and no knowledge of Stalin’s style with subordinates. Perhaps I should have been more explicit. Stalin was very well informed about events in North Korea. The ranking Soviet official in North Korea was General T.F. Shtykov, one of Stalin’s “own men,” who had direct access to Stalin, reporting to him outside the normal channels of the Foreign Ministry and General Staff. Throughout 1949 and 1950 Shtykov regularly communicated with Stalin about the situation in Korea, particularly about the U.S. military presence in the South, the opposition movement in the South, and the actions of the U.S.-backed government in Seoul. Stalin’s request to Kim to provide him with information on such topics was a familiar style of dealing with subordinates, testing him and reinforcing his vulnerability by making him expose himself through his replies to such questions.

Cummings also argues that this transcript does not provide evidence for my assertion that North Korea was utterly dependent on the Soviet Union. Of course it doesn’t—it would have been ridiculous to claim that it did. What I wrote was that “the thousands of pages of documents on post-war Korea in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive” show “in exhaustive detail” that “in the years prior to and during the Korean War, North Korea was utterly dependent economically on the Soviet Union,” a subject I address further in my essay in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

Cummings adds that the collection of documents captured by UN forces in Pyongyang in the fall of 1950, which is housed in the National Archives in Washington, reveal considerable trade between the DPRK and the USSR, but “still do not prove North Korea’s utter dependency on the USSR.” With regard to this argument, it must be pointed out that the collection of captured documents consists of documents that the North Koreans left behind when they withdrew from Pyongyang in the face of the U.S./UN advance into North Korea. They thus include only those documents that were not considered important enough either to evacuate or destroy. This is why there is nothing in that collection about the planning of the June 1950 attack and no records of high-level correspondence between Pyongyang and Moscow. It is not sound reasoning to argue that something was not the case if it is not documented in this collection.

The captured documents are a very rich source of information on many aspects of the history of North Korea that are little illuminated in the Soviet documents, such as politics at the village level, economic records of individual factories, and party personnel rosters. But to get the big picture we must turn to the Russian documents. And to get a complete picture, we must examine both sets of records, a laborious undertaking which a handful of scholars from South Korea has begun.

With regard to Cummings’ disagreement of my reading of Stalin’s telegram of 30 January 1950, I refer readers to my article in the present issue of the Bulletin. Cummings goes on to discuss documents #2-6, recounting the reasons why he concluded in his 1990 volume that the war of June 1950 began as a limited military operation on the Ongjin peninsula. As the Soviet documents show, he was correct to conclude that something was up on Ongjin. However, he stops his account before the punch line. In 1949 Kim did raise the possibility of a limited operation to seize Ongjin, but the Soviet leadership rejected the plan. In early 1950 Stalin changed his mind, and, as the article in this issue details, in April and May Soviet and North Korean military leaders together worked out a plan for a full-scale offensive against South Korea. Cummings is right that leaders of both sides hoped to gain their patron’s support for a war by provoking an assault by the other side and that “the 1950 logic for both sides was to see who would be stupid enough to move first.” But the end of the story is that the Soviet Union eventually decided to support its client’s plan for military reunification while the United States did not. Thus, though Cummings is right that Korean history is made first and foremost by Koreans, the war of 1950-53 was not a purely Korean product.

Of course it’s true, as Cummings notes, that we must examine the archives from all the major actors in the war before we can fully understand this unusually complex conflict. The Cold War International History Project is facilitating just such a multiarchival investigation, beginning with a close comparison of the Chinese and Russian sources. Nonetheless, certain important questions about the war have been resolved by the Russian archival sources; to pretend otherwise is simply dishonest.
SOVIET INTERROGATION OF U.S. POWS IN THE KOREAN WAR

by Laurence Jolidon

The extensive, covert involvement of Soviet intelligence in the interrogation of American prisoners throughout the Korean War has been laid bare thanks to a trove of long-secret military documents unearthed by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on missing Americans in the former Soviet Union.

Despite accounts in the debriefings of repatriated U.S. POWs—and even brief mentions in the Western press during and immediately following the war—that Russians had questioned U.S. POWs, Soviet officials steadfastly maintained for decades that it never happened.

The Kremlin’s obvious interest in the details of American weapons, strategy and morale in the Far East—as early-Cold War indicators of what to expect once the battle for world supremacy that most assumed would eventually occur in Europe was joined—had never gone that far, Stalin and his successors argued.

Moscow’s leaders hid behind the fiction that the Soviet Union, while lending moral and logistical support to the troops of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and air protection along the Manchurian border for the sanctuary it had recently ceded to the new Chinese ruler, Mao Zedong, had primarily been a neutral, disinterested party in Korea.

But just as Soviet Communist Party archival documents made public in the past few years have drawn a clear, intentional and decision-making connection between Stalin’s hand and the North Korean invasion, documents from Soviet military files have deepened our knowledge of what became in effect an extensive, bold, yet largely covert intelligence war conducted by the Soviets north of the 38th parallel.

One key document, obtained in April 1994 by investigators from the Pentagon’s POW/MIA Affairs Office working under the aegis of the Joint Commission, came from files at the Soviet military archives in Podolsk.

The two-paragraph message, dated 26 November 1952, from S. Ignatyev, the chief Soviet military advisor in North Korea, to G.M. Malenkov, one of Stalin’s principal ministers, stated:

Representatives of the MGB of the USSR and China came from Peking to conduct further prisoner interrogations, in order to gain more precise information on spy centers, landing strips and flights over the territory of the Soviet Union.

The interrogations will continue in Pekton [Pyoktong].

While seemingly cursory and matter-of-fact, this document had several important implications.

First, it contradicted previous Russian assurances that Soviet officials had not been involved in the interrogation of American POWs.

Even after veterans of the Soviet military intelligence service had told the Joint Commission of their personal involvement in numerous interrogations, the Russian side had insisted that the rules under which Soviet forces operated in the Korean theater forbade such acts.

As proof, they cited message traffic to Soviet posts in the war theater dating from January 1951, and repeated as a standing order throughout the war, that “our translators are categorically forbidden to interrogate American and British POWs, or prisoners of any other nationality.”

The Ignatyev-Malenkov message, on its face, was either a reversal of that policy or—as some American analysts believed—a clue that the “categorically forbidden” order was only for public consumption.

(In the course of the Russian-American dialogue on this subject through the meetings of the Joint Commission, the Russian position shifted several times. Some Russian members of the commission admitted reluctantly that one favored method of interrogating American POWs was to have the Russians’ questions put to the prisoners by Chinese interrogators while the Soviets sat, unseen, in an adjacent room. Testimony taken by the commission also made clear that in some cases the Soviets carefully chose Russian officers of Asiatic cast to do the interrogating.)

While Americans are not specifically mentioned in the Ignatyev-Malenkov message, the reference to “flights over the territory of the Soviet Union” could pertain only to American reconnaissance flights, disguised in public statements by U.S. authorities—who had their own reasons for keeping such activities secret—as “weather” or “training” missions.

These flights, which actually began before the outbreak of the Korean War and continued for years afterward, were themselves responsible for the loss of approximately 140 U.S. pilots and crewmen shot down over or near Soviet territory. Except in rare cases these men were never publicly acknowledged by the U.S. government and the very existence of their missions was routinely disavowed.

Just as routinely, the Soviets denied finding or capturing any survivors of these shootdowns. They were secret casualties in a secret war. So long as the U.S. and the USSR remained superpower enemies, to publicly seek their whereabouts would violate their secret status.

But the interrogations referred to in the 26 November 1952 message were primarily those conducted on Americans taken prisoner in hostile action in the Korean War. In the case of U.S. aviators, they included men shot down over or otherwise forced to ditch or parachute in Manchuria.

By UN Command edict, U.S. planes were forbidden to enter Chinese air space. This stipulation was frequently breached by U.S. pilots, although it was customary for official military records to mask this fact in after-action reports.

Secondly, the 26 November 1952 message to the Soviet advisor in North Korea is an important clue to the dynamics of the covert war the Soviets were then conducting behind the lines in Korea.

Rather than simply sitting back and waiting for the reports of POW interrogations to be sent through channels, from the prison camps that were ostensibly under the control of the Chinese army, the Soviets were taking the initiative to monitor and direct the process more directly.

This speaks to the apparent competition for access to the most valuable POWs—documented in wartime accounts of UN prisoners—among the three Communist allies in the war.

By the fall and winter of 1952, for instance, the Chinese had capitalized on the capture on Manchurian territory of a number of U.S. aviators by charging them with “war crimes,” including the much-disputed allegation of waging “germ warfare” by dropping infected plants and insects while overflying Chinese territory.
The statement that “interrogations will continue in Pekton (Pyoktong),” a city on the North Korean side of the Yalu near the border with China, could be read as a sign that the Soviets wished to make it clear that the prisoners—and the intelligence gained from their interrogations—should be shared.

A later Soviet document, acquired by the American side of the commission in early 1995, also appears to lift any previous prohibition against Soviet involvement with American POWs—if the prohibition ever existed. Sent on 29 January 1953, and addressed to three top Soviet leaders including Lavrenti Beria, then head of the MGB, the message read:

“The minister of public security of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on this decision of the TSK KPK [the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and oversee their work. The MGB advisor was ordered by us to render such help.”

A second document that illustrates the involvement of Soviet military intelligence in the interrogation of American POWs in Korea deals with the 4 December 1950 shootdown of a USAF RB-45 reconnaissance plane.

None of the four men aboard the plane—the pilot, Capt. Charles McDonough, two other crewmen, and Col. John R. Lovell, a top-ranking Air Force intelligence officer believed to be on a mission from the Pentagon—made it back to the U.S.

Thus, like the Cold War spy flights, the RB-45 case was wrapped not only in the difficulties of unraveling any MIA case from the tangles of the Korean War but also in the sensitivity that attaches to intelligence missions and personnel.

The key document discovered so far in the RB-45 case revealed not only that at least one of those aboard was captured alive, but also that Soviet interest and involvement in the case was high.

A cable dated 17 December 1950, stated in part:

An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km to the east of Andun (Manchuria). The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to the earth burned up completely. The crew bailed out on parachutes. The pilot Captain Charles McDonough was taken prisoner.

Under interrogation he said:

The aircraft was shot down at an altitude of 30,000 feet.

The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out on parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in a critical condition.

A second cable, dated the following day, added this:

I am informing you that the pilot from the shot down B-45 aircraft died en route and the interrogation was not finished.

These two cables—both sent to Marshal Stepan Krasovsky, chief of the Soviet general staff in Moscow—were found in the Soviet military archives in Podolsk by civilian Russian researchers working under the direction of Dr. Paul Cole, then with the Rand Corp. Cole’s project was authorized under a Pentagon contract with Rand to search for information in Soviet archives dealing with Americans missing after World War II, the Korean War and Cold War.

The cables in the McDonough-Lovell RB-45 case were made available to the American side of the Joint Commission within a short time after Cole learned of them in the fall of 1992 and ultimately became a part of the large repository of Joint Commission documents that comprises the results of the commission’s efforts.

After being translated, documents received from the Russian side of the commission, along with transcribed minutes of the Joint Commission’s regular meetings (usually three times a year), are placed on file at the Library of Congress.

Besides filling gaps in the world’s expanding knowledge of Soviet behavior and policies, the still-growing collection of documents, summaries of papers, lists and translations now available to scholars and the general public may ultimately help resolve a significant number of American MIA cases.

To date, the Joint Commission’s record on that score has been modest. Only one actual Cold War MIA case—a U.S. fighter pilot whose remains were retrieved from an uninhabited coastal island in the Russian Far East after a Russian man who took part in the original burial came forward with details of the incident—has been resolved through the Joint Commission’s efforts.

But investigations into other cases, particularly those related to the testimony of live Russian witnesses, are continuing; and together, the Senate committee and the Joint Commission did become a catalyst for bringing to light some of the Soviet Union’s most closely-held secrets regarding the treatment of Americans in Russian hands.

One clear lesson was that the main targets of the Soviet’s intelligence war during Korea were American POWs—and that the most prized among them were the pilots and crews of the innovative units of the U.S. Far East Air Force. Of men flying the F-86, the most advanced U.S. fighter of the Korean War era, a disproportionate several dozen failed to appear among the ranks of the repatriated U.S. POWs when prisoners were exchanged in 1953.

The documents on American POWs from Soviet military archives, taken together with the testimony of Soviet veterans of Korea and now-declassified papers from U.S. archives, clearly point to Soviet complicity in the disappearance and probable death of dozens, if not hundreds, of those POWs who were not repatriated.

Soviet military data dealing with American prisoners in Korea began making its way to U.S. authorities and private researchers in the winter of 1991-92, as the administration of Mikhail Gorbachev was giving way to his rival, Boris Yeltsin.

During what many would later characterize as a brief “window of opportunity,” when a mood of genuine reform and openness about past misdeeds seemed to emanate from Moscow, government and private researchers seeking answers about U.S. POWs and MIAs attempted to turn the moment to their advantage.

A number of interested parties in the U.S. government—the State Department, Pentagon, National Archives, Library of Congress—decided on a unified approach to gaining access to files related to missing Americans, and supported the creation of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. Each agency or department appointed a representative to the commission, whose co-chairmen were former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon for the U.S. and the late Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a historian and military adviser to Yeltsin, for the Russians.

The commission began its work in relat-
tive obscurity. But in a move whose motivation and meaning to this day remains something of a mystery, Yeltsin in June 1992 suddenly announced that a number of American military prisoners had indeed been held on Soviet territory. And he vowed an investigation that would determine whether any remained alive.

His statement revived the hopes not only of thousands of families seeking information about MIAs in Indochina—the most vocal and media-noticed segment of the POW/MIA community—but also of a quicker and more patient community representing the families and friends of nearly 8,200 unaccounted-for men from the Korean War and dozens more from the shootdowns of U.S. spy planes during the 1950s and 1960s.

This community—unaligned with and largely separate from the academic community that had begun to forage in Soviet archives for its own purposes—had two powerful allies in its search for information about American MIAs assumed to be in Russian hands.

Each of these allies—the Senate Select Committee on POWs and MIAs and the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission—would end up disappointing the Korean War and Cold War MIA community in its own way.

The Senate committee, whose co-chairs were Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts and Sen. Robert Smith of New Hampshire, lasted for one year and drew significant media attention. But, predictably, it spent the vast majority of staff time and investigative effort on Indochina. The life of the committee was marked by private and public quarrels over the value of certain evidence and the integrity of some of the witnesses.

But in every case, the context of the news and controversy was the Vietnam War. In the public hearings phase, only one day was devoted to Korean War and Cold War issues and cases.

The Joint Commission, meanwhile, had begun what can now be seen as an extremely ambitious attempt to investigate the thousands of intelligence tips and live-sightings of Americans held in the former Soviet Union from the end of World War II to the present day.

Thanks to some Russian cooperation—or, to put it another way, despite frequent Russian non-cooperation—the American side of the commission has been able to visit some archives and museums and interview a number of Russian citizens who have come forward as a result of printed and broadcast appeals for information. (Joint Commission staffers operate on the understanding that Russian officials will be notified of and invited to sit in on all interviews of Russians volunteering information to the American side.)

Now in its fifth year, the Joint Commission remains in operation, although the flow of tips and leads has slowed drastically and the frequently stated promise of access to KGB files on foreign POWs remains unfulfilled.

While conducting ground-breaking work that frequently kept the POW/MIA community’s hopes on razor’s edge, the Joint Commission also became caught in post-Cold War gridlock, as the archival “window of opportunity” closed and the Russian side’s hardliners parried with a dwindling and sometimes fractious team of Americans on the other side.

A report released in the summer of 1993 by the Task Force Russia—a team of U.S. experts on Soviet affairs and military intelligence put together by the U.S. Army—concluded that up to 1,000 or more American POWs from the Korean War had been shipped to the former Soviet Union for interrogation.

But the report’s findings were minimized by Pentagon officials who charged they were more supposition than fact. The team of experts who had constructed the case made by the report—Task Force Russia—was effectively disbanded after one year, and its duties subsumed under the Pentagon’s Office of POW/MIA Affairs.

The current U.S. position on this issue is that the strongest available evidence points to the transfer to Soviet territory of a relatively small number of Korean War American POWs—perhaps corresponding to the roughly 25-30 fighter pilot MIAs who are believed to have been among the most prized captives for intelligence purposes.

Laurence Jolidon is an investigative reporter, war correspondent, and the author of Last Seen Alive—The Search for Missing POWs from the Korean War, from which this article was excerpted.

CWIHP On-Line ...is coming!

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is developing an internet-accessible system to make publications (including the Bulletin and Working Papers), translated documents, and other features available via computer. The service is being developed in cooperation with the National Security Archive, a non-governmental, non-profit research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University.

Plans call for the system to go on-line early in 1996, with CWIHP to be part of the Archive’s home-page on the World Wide Web. Once in service, users will be able to gain access to past, present, and in-progress CWIHP publications, to learn other information on CWIHP and related research activities.

One planned feature of the on-line service of special interest to many users will be the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD). RADD, a collaborative effort of CWIHP and the National Security Archive, is intended to help inform researchers of documents relevant to Cold War history that various scholars and scholarly projects have obtained from Russian archives, and to share expenses for translations so that they can be used as widely as possible. An English-language inventory of documents which scholars have already provided is being prepared, and the aim is to put translations on line as soon as feasible. Those scholars who can read Russian may then read the documents in the Archive reading room, while those who cannot can commission translations, which will then be made freely available. RADD is presently being managed at the Archive by Mark H. Doctoroff, who can be reached at (202) 994-7239 (telephone) or (202) 994-7005 (fax).

As the project moves forward, we are open to expanding RADD into READD—Russian and East-bloc Documents Database—if resources permit and source materials justify this expansion.

Further information on CWIHP’s on-line service will appear in the next issue of the Bulletin. In the meantime, we welcome suggestions and (as always) donations of documents and translations for RADD (and READD).
CONSTRUCTING A HISTORY
OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
FOREIGN RELATIONS

by Michael H. Hunt

The study of the foreign relations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is undergoing dramatic changes that are taking it in a distinctly more historical direction. This development has essentially been driven by the appearance of an abundance of new material (for details see the accompanying essay on sources). This material is largely the product of the party’s own history establishment and its mandate to transcend a simple and largely discredited party mythology in favor of a better documented and hence more credible past. The publication of documents, memoirs, chronologies, and standard historical accounts has at last made it possible for specialists outside of China to move beyond broad, heavily speculative treatments based on fragmentary evidence and to construct a party foreign-policy history marked by engaging human detail and structural complexity.

My book, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), is itself a good gauge of that already well advanced if uneven reorientation. As is evident in the volume, the historical ground becomes more treacherous to traverse the closer we get to the present. The prehistory of the CCP (located in the opening chapters of my study in the late Qing and the early Republic) is firmly in place. From the point of the CCP’s formal founding in 1921 down to its consolidation of state power in 1949-1950 (the subject of the middle chapters), the evidence constitutes uneven footing that requires some caution. The most recent phase—the foreign relations of the party-state—is just beginning to pass into the historical realm (as the tentativeness of the relevant chapter suggests). It will prove the most interpretively volatile as historical patterns begin to emerge for the first time from the accumulation of reliable evidence.

This trend toward a more historical treatment of the CCP’s external relations has occurred at an uneven pace and taken different forms in a field effectively fragmented into two distinct parts. The work done in China is already decidedly historically though still politically constrained. Outside of China (largely but by no means exclusively in the United States), scholarship bears the imprint of the political science discipline and the closely related international relations field, which has long dominated CCP foreign-policy studies. Historical questions and historical methods are thus, at least outside of China, only beginning to move from the margins to a more central position.

The purpose of this article is to offer a guide to this emergent historical approach. It begins with an extended look at the field’s two chief geographic divisions, China and the United States. It closes with some thoughts on ways to encourage the already promising prospects for a solidly grounded and conceptually sophisticated history of party foreign relations.

Scholarship in China

Scholars in the People’s Republic of China, now in many ways at the leading edge of CCP foreign-policy history, have only recently come into their own. They long labored under the gaze of party representatives whose main task was to ensure that history served the party’s political agenda and contributed to nationalist myths and popular morale during the international crises that marked Mao Zedong’s years of power. Under these difficult conditions specialists on Chinese foreign relations did their best work by putting together politically inoffensive collections of historical materials, many of notable quality and lasting value. But in their own writing they had to serve up a thin historical gruel heavily spiced but hardly made more palatable by quotes from Chairman Mao and other sources of the official orthodoxy. This revolutionary historiography, following tenets laid down by Mao, stressed the wave of imperialism that had overpowered China. Commercial and later industrial capitalism, its diplomatic agents, and those Chinese drawn into the unsavory role of collaborator, had left the Chinese people impoverished, economically subordinate, and politically in thrall. The predatory character of imperialism locked China in fundamental conflict with the powers until a popular revolution transformed China and altered China’s relationship to the capitalist world.

Since the late 1970s established scholars have worked free of many of the old interpretative constraints, and joined by a younger, adventuresome generation have begun to exploit their inherent advantages in studying China’s complex behavior in an often threatening and generally intrusive world. They have had immediate access to publications (some of limited circulation), and enjoyed the first glimpses into the archives. They have profited from their personal contacts with former policymakers, and brought to new sources an unmatched sensitivity to the political culture in which China’s policy was made. They have enjoyed the stimulus of a large and interested audience for their writing and easy opportunity to discuss with colleagues work in progress and news of the field. As a result of these developments, the center for the study of foreign relations and the CCP has shifted back to China. A glance at the number of specialists and special research offices, the frequency of conferences, and the long list of publications would all confirm this impression.

But Chinese specialists still face some notable difficulties. One of these is a patriotism that the CCP did not create but did powerfully reinforce in scholarship as in other realms of Chinese life. The mantra is familiar: China was divided and oppressed; China pulled itself together under CCP leadership; China stood up. This satisfying if somewhat simple story to which specialists on party history and foreign relations still give at least lip service constrains their examination of foreign relations, not least with the capitalist powers and inner-Asian peoples. These sensitive topics must be addressed correctly and carefully or not at all.

While the fate of non-Han people under China’s imperial ambitions are simply written out of the category of foreign relations (to be treated instead as an “internal” matter), dealings with foreign powers are featured in terms of the comfortable and safe tale of struggle and triumph. For example, PRC scholars enjoying unparalleled access to source materials on the Korean conflict waged against a U.S.-led coalition have been in a position to offer the fullest account of its conduct, warts and all. Their accounts are indeed fuller but the warts are hard to spot, thus keeping alive the old heroic narrative. Patriotism, reinforced by party orthodoxy, has inspired repeated claims that the Korean intervention was a “brilliant decision” (yingming juece) unblemished by confu-
tion, division, or opportunism. That very phrase appears in the title of one of the earliest of the documented accounts to appear in the PRC, and the theme persists in virtually all of the secondary studies of the Korean War published in the last decade. 2

A second impulse, as constraining as patriotism and no less intrusive, has been the pressure to fit research findings within a linear, progressive conception of the CCP’s development. Highly self-conscious of the importance of its own past to legitimizing the current leadership and maintaining party prestige, the CCP has consistently sought to explain its evolution in terms of the forces of history and the wisdom of its leaders. The result is a picture of a party that adjusted to changing social and international conditions and that consistently and correctly reassessed its own performance, distinguishing correct from mistaken policy lines. The party, thus at least in theory, developed according to a logic which left scant room for recurrent miscalculation or fundamental misdirection.

This notion of history in which all events are mere tributaries feeding the main stream itself flowing toward some predestined point is extraordinarily constraining, as a look at PRC writings relating the 1919 May Fourth movement to the CCP reveals. Chinese leaders interested in the origins of the party have tried to force a rich set of contemporary views into an orthodox framework wherein the raison d’être of May Fourth is to serve as intellectual midwife to the CCP’s birth. Their studies make the Bolshevik revolution the central and transformative event in the intellectual life of future party leaders; they underestimate that era’s ideological exploration and fluidity; they minimize attachment to such heterodox beliefs as anarchism; and they downplay the influence of earlier personal concerns and indigenous political ideas. 3

The third obstacle standing in the way of party historians is the sensitivity with which the party center continues to regard past relations with “fraternal” parties. This reticence is perhaps understandable in the case of North Korea and Vietnam. A candid look at the past can complicate dealings with parties still in power. But the reticence applies even to the now defunct Soviet party. By thus consigning interparty relations to historical limbo, the CCP has effectively set out of bounds large and important slices of its own foreign-relations record and experience.

How the CCP privately assessed the USSR as a supporter and model—surely the single most important issue for understanding the CCP’s position within the socialist camp—will remain a matter of speculation if not controversy so long as the historical sources needed to arbitrate it are kept locked in Chinese archives and excluded even from restricted-circulation materials. The opening of Soviet archives may provide the first revealing, detailed picture of broad aspects of the relationship, and may perhaps even help overcome some of the squeamishness party leaders apparently feel about a candid look at this important part of their own past. Or it may take the passing of the last of party elders whose memories of dealing with the Soviets go back to the 1920s. However they get there, scholars badly need freer rein to research and publish on this long sensitive topic vital to understanding the CCP after 1949 no less than before that date. [Ed. note: A sampling of recently released Chinese materials on Sino-Soviet relations, 1956-58, appears on pages 148-163 of this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.]

The last and easily the most practical problem handed down from earlier CCP historical work is the matter of the layers of tendentious documentation and personal reminiscences that have come to surround Mao Zedong. Those layers have unfortunately not only served to obscure him as a personality and policymaker but also covered over the contributions of his colleagues. Repeatedly over the last half century party officials have remade Mao, re-creating his persona to suit the politics of the times. These multiple layers baffle and distract foreign scholars no less than Chinese.

The process began in the late 1930s when the task was to reinforce Mao’s claims to leadership of the party. Mao himself made a signal contribution by relating his autobiography to Edgar Snow in mid-1936. Putting aside the reticence usually so marked a feature of Chinese autobiography, Mao offered a self-portrait that highlighted his own moment of Marxist illumination and his strong revolutionary commitment. The resulting account bears an uncanny resemblance to the genre of spiritual autobiography penned by Buddhist and Confucian writers intent on making their own journeys of spiritual self-transformation and spiritual discovery available for the edification of others. 4

But Mao’s account also arose from the more practical political concern with launching a publicity campaign that would win support for the party among Chinese and foreigners and bring in much needed contributions from the outside. Inviting Snow, a reliably progressive American, to Bao’an was part of that strategy. Mao set aside roughly two hours a night over ten evenings to tell his story. While Wu Liping translated, Snow took notes. Huang Hua then translated those notes back into Chinese for Mao to review. Snow then returned to Beijing to prepare the final account, to appear in 1938 in Red Star Over China. The first Chinese version of Mao’s story appeared the year before. That Chinese edition and others would circulate within Nationalist as well as CCP controlled areas. 5

The second layer is associated with the “new democracy” Mao began to form in the wake of Wang Ming’s defeat and in the context of the rectification movement of 1942-1943. 6 Party theoreticians had in 1941 begun to promote the importance of “Mao thought” to party orthodoxy, and a Political Bureau meeting in September and October of that year produced statements of support from Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, and Ye Jianying. (Neither Zhou Enlai nor Lin Biao was present.) For the next two years the visibility of “Mao thought” continued to rise. Zhang Ruxin, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai offered praise, and Mao’s writings figured prominently in the study material used in the rectification campaign. The Seventh Party Congress brought the apotheosis. A Liu Shaoqi report and a resolution passed at the congress established a Maoist historiography and proclaimed the guiding role of “Mao thought.”

As early as mid-1944 the first genuine collection of Mao’s writings had appeared to help consolidate his claim to ideological dominance within the CCP. This early five-volume Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] was edited under Wang Jiaxiang’s supervision and published in the Jin-Cha-Ji base area by the New China News Agency. New editions of his selected works (perhaps as many as eight, some with restricted circulation) continued to appear in the base areas down to 1948. That same year Xiao San published his account of the young Mao; he had conceived the project nearly a
The third layer of Mao publications began to appear soon after the conquest of power in 1949. Stalin is supposed to have suggested to Mao during their Moscow summit the formal designation of an official body of Mao’s writings. [Ed. note: The Soviet transcript of the first Stalin-Mao meeting, on 16 December 1949, published on pages 5-7 of this issue of the Bulletin, indicates that Mao, not Stalin, made this suggestion.] The Political Bureau gave its approval in spring 1950, and a compilation committee was formed at once. The resulting four volumes of this new xuanji, published between 1952 and 1960, burnedished the image of the statesman traveling the Chinese road to socialism. This new collection, carefully revised by Mao with the help of his staff, was flanked by yet another treatment of the young revolutionary, this one by Li Rui.8

The next layer in the official Mao was laid down during the Cultural Revolution. Alarmked by what he saw as ideological backsliding in the USSR and the persistent bourgeois grip on China’s intellectual and cultural life, Mao put forward his own ideas as the antidote. His acolytes took up the struggle, beginning with compilation of the “Little Red Book” on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. That slim but ever-present volume was but the herald to twenty-plus collections intended to define the most imposing Mao ever—“the greatest genius in the world,” unsurpassed “in several hundred years in the world and in several thousand years in China.” One enthusiast declared, “Chairman Mao stands much higher than Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin.” His thought serves as the lighthouse for mankind,” its “universal truth applicable everywhere.”9

The latest layer took form soon after Mao’s death and was shaped by the political struggle to claim his legacy and appraise his achievements. Hua Guofeng sought to strengthen his claim to leadership through the editing of volume five of the official xuanji, published in 1977. The other, ultimately victorious side in the succession struggle dismissed the tendentious quality of that volume and went off in search of its own Mao. The new image, intended to serve the political program of Deng Xiaoping and his allies, was defined after two years and considerable Political Bureau discussion. The resulting 1981 resolution, prepared by a small drafting group headed by Hu Qiaomu and supervised by Deng himself along with Hu Yaobang, made Mao bear the burden of mistakes committed in his last years, forced him to share credit for the successes with his colleagues, but let him retain full credit for his earlier revolutionary leadership. Finally, in 1986 a two-volume reader appeared defining the essence of this latest, emphatically scientific version of “Mao thought.”10

In the new atmosphere of greater openness the party history establishment has made available a wide range of works that constitute the point of departure for anyone interested in Mao’s outlook and political role. But cutting through the successive layers of Mao documentation and sorting through the mountain of writing that he left behind is a task that Chinese scholars have sidestepped. Without comment, they have let new scholarly collections pile up on top of the older ones compiled with a marked political agenda, leaving specialists outside China such as Takeuchi Minoru, Stuart R. Schram, Michael Y. M. Kau, and John K. Leung struggling to produce a full and accurate collection essential to recovering the historical figure beneath all the political mythmaking.

A variety of other difficulties stand in the way of the development of party history in its homeland. The publications process lacks quality controls, in part because there are so many party history journals with pages to fill and so many party elders with reputations to burnish, causes to advance, and scores to even. Access to archives for the entire history of the Communist Party and for the era of the PRC is tightly restricted. Some favored Chinese specialists get in; foreigners are uniformly excluded. Even the best libraries are weak on international studies generally and on the foreign relations of particular countries whose histories impinged on that of China. Opportunities are limited for research in libraries and archives outside China and for exposure to conceptual approaches prevailing abroad.

As a result, party historians in China operate in an atmosphere of caution and insularity. There is little if any interest in methodological or theoretical issues so prominent outside of China. Scholarly debates do not publicly at least go beyond brief exchanges in party history journals over such factual questions as the date of a particular document or the contents of a particular conversation. Engrossed in a clearly defined body of party history materials, researchers pay scant attention to either Chinese society or the international environment in which the CCP operated. The failure to read, not to mention engage, foreign scholarship has helped preserve the narrowness, discourage international dialogue, and close off CCP history from comparative insights.

Behind at least some of these difficulties is something that is likely to be in short supply for the foreseeable future—material resources for research and the assurance that researchers have political support or at least tolerance from a ruling party concerned to keep its historical reputation free of blemish. An attempt to circumvent these two problems by sending Chinese abroad for graduate study in history and international relations has proven somewhat disappointing. It is my impression that those studying overseas in one or another of the broad foreign-relations fields have not found training and research on China-related topics notably attractive, and disarmingly few of those who have completed their studies abroad have gone home to share their skills, knowledge, and contacts. Long-time expatriates are likely to find settling into home institutions trying and particularly frustrating after having paid a substantial personal price in making the earlier adjustment to foreign academic life.

Despite all these problems, good work on CCP foreign relations is being done in China that bears considerable relevance to historical scholarship in the United States and elsewhere abroad. Indeed, it has already had an impact here, thanks above all to the PRC scholars who have helped foreigners researching in China, who have published in English, or who have begun careers in the American university system. It seems certain that foreign historians bent on studying the CCP will ride on the coat-tails and in many cases work in close cooperation with the larger and more active group of Chinese scholars.

Scholarship in the United States

On this side of the Pacific, historical work on CCP foreign relations has suffered from neglect. In the most direct sense this state of affairs is the result of indifference to
the subject by historians of modern China. The paucity at least until recently of adequate sources provides the most obvious explanation for this indifference. But perhaps even more important is the fall of foreign relations from historical grace—from the position of prominence and respect it once enjoyed. As historians embraced a “China-centered” approach, they became increasingly absorbed in intellectual, social, economic, and local history. They looked back with a critical eye on the earlier historical literature with its strong emphasis on China’s external relations, and they saw scant reason for interest in more recent treatments of CCP foreign policy produced in the main by political scientists.11

As a result, an emergent CCP foreign-policy history, like other aspects of China’s foreign relations, stands somewhat apart from today’s governing historical concerns. Why should specialists in early twentieth-century anarchism, urban women, or rural society care about the party’s dealings with the outside world? Even specialists in party history drawn from a new generation of American historians are inclined to set foreign relations beyond their purview or banish it at best to the margins of their concerns.

But arguably to set foreign relations somewhere on edge of Chinese history is to impoverish both. Politics and the state do matter, a point that social and cultural historians in a variety of fields have come to accept.12 And foreign policy, the regulation of relations with the outside world, may be one of the most powerful and consequential aspects of the state’s activity. Understanding the decisions, institutions, and culture associated with that activity can be of signal importance in filling out such diverse topics as the role of ideas, life in the city, or changes in the countryside. Party historians in particular run the risk of losing track of the global dimensions of the revolutionary and state-building enterprise and thereby forfeiting a chance to move toward a fully rounded understanding of the CCP. At the same time, CCP foreign relations needs the methodological leavening and interpretive breadth afforded by the history of China as it is now practiced. Foreign relations also needs the well honed language tools that historians of China could bring to mining the documentary ore now so abundantly in view.

While there is no reason to mourn the passing of the age of foreign-relations hegemony in the study of the Chinese past, the effect has been to leave the stewardship of China’s foreign relations to political scien-

### CCP FOREIGN RELATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE

**by Michael H. Hunt**

This article offers a general overview of the literature on the origins and evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)’s external relations. This opportunity to share with interested readers my understanding of that literature also permits me to acknowledge the scholarly contributions of others who made my synthesis in *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* possible.

**Background and General Treatments**

Anyone in search of major themes in Chinese foreign relations or a ready overview should start with Jonathan Spence’s elegant *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), and *The Cambridge History of China*, general editors Dennis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge University Press, 1978–). *The Cambridge History* provides good coverage not only of the period treated in this study—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—but also earlier times. Both Spence and *The Cambridge History* volumes offer help on the relevant literature.

Of all the broad-gauge surveys of CCP external relations, John Gittings’s *The World and China, 1922-1972* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974) stands out for the vigor of its argument and for the breadth of its concep-

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**continued on page 136**
tists with their own understandably distinct agenda and style. The consequence of their dominance is a literature tending in two directions, each bearing features that are worrisome because of the effect they may have in slowing and skewing the use of new materials on the CCP.\(^\text{13}\)

One tendency, marked but by no means dominant, is a preoccupation with theoretical abstractions. What may most strike historians is how this theory-building enterprise tends to thrive under conditions that are euphemistically described by those who attempt it as “data poor” (if imagination rich). We can all call to mind efforts to construct and test high-flying theoretical formulations that get off the ground only after the perilous potholes along the evidentiary runway are carefully smoothed over. Once airborne, those formulations stay aloft only so long as no dangerous mountains of data intrude in the flight path. The virtuosity of the performance can be impressive, but it usually comes at the price of obscuring the fascinating complexity of political life with sometimes mind-numbing abstractions.\(^\text{14}\)

The second, perhaps more pronounced tendency among political scientists is to approach Chinese policy with a stronger commitment to description and a more developed historical sensibility. Political scientists working along these lines bring to their work an awareness of the way that skimpy documentation hobbles their interpretative effort. This group also follows an old-fashioned faith in the importance of individual leaders’ values, style, and personality—especially Mao’s.\(^\text{15}\) But the paucity of good documentation long locked CCP decisionmaking in a black box and forced these China-watchers to find modes of analysis that would help them make sense of limited evidence and communicate their findings promptly and clearly to the broad policy community. Determined to make some sense of what was going on inside the black box, these analysts developed a variety of tools to penetrate its mysteries. However, the problematic nature of some of those tools is becoming apparent as the new CCP sources open up that box for the first time and permit comparison of past interpretations with the newer, more richly documented understanding.

The reading of public pronouncements, long a mainstay of China-watchers, is rendered particularly tricky by all the ways those pronouncements can deceive. Usually couched in explicit and correct ideological terms, they may not reflect the more direct, less jargon-ridden inner-party discussions and directives. They are, moreover, sometimes intended to manipulate foreigners, and thus are couched in terms that the party thinks will be effective on its target audience, not in terms that are revealing of inner-party calculations. Finally, they may be directed at an audience altogether different from the one the contemporary foreign reader may have assumed was the target.\(^\text{16}\)

American observers’ misreading of the CCP’s propaganda line from mid-1945 to mid-1946 offers a good example of these interpretive difficulties. Inner-party documents now capture Mao Zedong as a backstage operator, carefully orchestrating an attempt to manipulate Washington into an engagement in Chinese politics beneficial to the CCP. He was not intend, as most students of the period have naturally concluded on the basis of the public record, on dismissing American contacts or rejecting American involvement.\(^\text{17}\)

An even more complicated example of the perils of reading public signals is Zhou Enlai’s interview on 3 October 1950 with the Indian ambassador. Often cited retrospectively as one of a string of crystal-clear warnings issued by Beijing following the outbreak of the Korean War, Zhou’s own language in the formal Chinese record is in fact strikingly muffled and vague and does not accurately convey the depth of Mao’s commitment to intervention at that moment. Zhou was apparently aware that he might be misconstrued and worked with his translator to get his point across. But U.S. China-watchers in Hong Kong had difficulty extracting a clear message from that October interview, and the puzzle still remains for historians today looking back. While we may puzzle over whether Zhou’s lack of clarity was inadvertent or by design, the point remains that this critical public pronouncement is still hard to interpret.\(^\text{18}\)

An emphasis on factions, the relatively stable groups united by some sort of overarching interest or ideology,\(^\text{19}\) is another of the questionable short-cuts employed by China-watchers struggling to make sense of Beijing politics. The reduction of complicated political choices to stark factional alternatives reflected the analysts’ need for clarity and the absence of restraints that rich documentation might impose. At first based largely on circumstantial evidence, the factional interpretation enjoyed a major boost during the Cultural Revolution when material on elite conflict became public. As a result, a variety of factional cleavages have gained prominence in the writing of China-watchers, and soon found their way back into the work on party history produced by political scientists. Perhaps the best known of the factional interpretations has arrayed “Maoists” against Moscow-oriented “internationalists.”\(^\text{20}\)

The new materials have raised two sets of doubts about the factional model. On the one hand, they offer little to support even a circumstantial argument for the existence of factions, and on the other they have set in question the Cultural Revolution evidence used to beat down former party leaders. Some of this evidence is of doubtful authenticity, and much seems torn from context to score political points.

It would prove ironic indeed if the factional model turns out to offer a no more subtle treatment of Chinese politics than does the former dependence of the CCP’s own analysts on struggles within monopoly capitalism to explain U.S. politics. Undeniably, informal networks and shifting coalitions have played a part in PRC politics, but a compelling, carefully documented case has not yet been made that those networks have supported stable and identifiable as opposed to complex and cross-cutting political attachments. Scholars pressing factional claims bear the responsibility for being explicit about their definition of the term, marshalling reliable evidence, and setting whatever factional activity may exist within the broad political context so as to clarify the relative importance of such activity.

A final shortcut rendered doubtful by the new CCP history is the China-watchers’ reliance on China’s own international affairs “experts” as a prime source of information.\(^\text{21}\) These experts, often accessible and able to speak the language (both literally and figuratively) of Western analysts, have become over the past decade understandably attractive contacts, constituting along with their foreign counterparts a transnational community of policy specialists and commentators on current international affairs. But the new history underlines the limited insights of these experts by revealing
the degree to which decisionmaking on critical issues has been closely held, the monopoly of a handful of leaders. Moreover, the new history reveals that major decisions have often been tightly guarded, not something to share with a foreigner—except where it suits the purposes of the party center to make available partial and sometimes tendentious information.

The shift toward a more historical rendering of the CCP past should have a notable impact on political science research. Those of a more descriptive bent should welcome and benefit from the accumulation of fresh evidence that makes possible greater analytic rigor and sharper interpretive insight. The more theoretically inclined may be the more threatened, but some will accommodate to the new data, using it as ballast that will keep them closer to the safety of the ground. Indeed, it is possible that taking a longer view and looking at the implications of better documented cases may induce them to dispense with all but the most modest, commonsensical “theory” and perhaps even to enter the fray over what the evidence actually means. The theoretically enthralled may thereby rediscover in Chinese policy some of the classic and “soft” issues of international politics—the importance of personality, the contingent nature of politics, the complexity of thought behind action, and the persistence and power of political culture.

While this new CCP history should give political scientists pause, they also have important contributions to make to a more historically oriented field. Their concern with understanding the state and explaining its exercise of power has generated a repertoire of theories that may prove helpful to anyone trying to make sense of considerable new data and still uncertain of the most fruitful way to frame the issues. Moreover, the political scientists’ preoccupation with contemporary questions stands as a salutary reminder to the more historically oriented of the complex relationship of past to present—of how the present may subtly influence the agenda for historical research and how historical findings may illuminate current problems.

Defining a Historical Agenda

CCP foreign policy is, as the above discussion suggests, a field distinctly in flux. Specialists have put a good deal of time and energy into coping with the recent flood of valuable documentary and other materials. The flood may be cresting, and those who have escaped drowning and reached the safety of high ground are now in a position to reflect on their future tasks.

The most obvious is to link a better documented version of CCP external relations chronologically and thematically to Chinese foreign relations in general. Qing sources, printed and archival, have long been available, and have been recently reinforced by the opening of collections located in the PRC. Materials from the Republican era get

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CCP LEADERS’ SELECTED WORKS AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

By Chen Jian

The study of 20th-century Chinese history, especially the history of the Chinese Communist revolution, has experienced a boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s largely for two reasons. First, the introduction of the “reform and opening to the outside world” policy in the People’s Republic of China in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in a more flexible political and academic environment, which enabled Chinese scholars, historians in particular, to conduct their studies in more creative and critical ways. Second, the release of many previously unavailable documentary sources about the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) makes it possible for scholars, both in China and in the West, to base their studies on a more comprehensive documentary foundation. This paper reviews the works of CCP leaders that have been compiled and published (both internally and openly) since the early 1980s, examining their influence on the historiography of the Chinese Communist revolution.

I

For the purpose of mobilizing the party’s rank and file as well as the masses, the CCP has long carried out a practice of compiling and publishing the works of Party leaders. The most important example in this regard is the publication of the four-volume Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) in the 1950s and 1960s. Altogether, over 100,000,000 sets of xuanji had been printed and sold by 1966-1967, making them, together with the famous “little red book” (Quotations of Chairman Mao), the “Red Bible” during the years of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” (As a by-product, Chairman Mao became the richest person in China from royalty income, although, according to the memoirs of his nurses and bodyguards, he disliked money and was unwilling to touch it himself.) The publication of works of the CCP leaders was not designed to provide scholars with reliable source materials to study the party’s past; rather, it was aimed to guide the revolutionary mass movement into the orbit set up by the party.

Thus, the criteria for selecting the works of Party leaders followed the Party’s needs. Indeed, only those documents which served to promote the Party’s current policy, or to enhance the Party’s and its leaders’ image of being “eternally correct,” were made public.

Consequently, the selection process often resulted in a substantive revision of the texts of historical documents. For example, it is well known among China scholars that the texts of many pieces in Mao Zedong xuanji were substantially altered from the original versions.

Yet scholars of the Chinese revolution, including historians, have widely used such publications as Mao Zedong xuanji as their primary sources. Indeed, at a time that Western scholars had to travel to Hong Kong, Taipei, and Tokyo to collect materials on the Chinese Communist revolution, how could they exclude Mao Zedong xuanji from their data base? The openly published selected works by CCP leaders, together with official CCP statements, contemporaneous newspaper and journal literature, and, in some cases, Guomindang (Nationalist Party) and Western intelligence reports, formed the documentary basis of Western studies on the Chinese Communist revolution before the early 1980s. Sometimes China scholars had no choice but to rely on obviously flawed documentary sources. As a result, in those years, the ability to make good “educated guesses” was a necessary quality for every Western scholar writing about China.

II

In a brief sketch, it is hard to describe

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continued on page 144
steadily better as fresh publications appear and archives open on Taiwan and within the PRC. The new CCP material helps round out an already rich documentary base and makes all the more urgent an integrated treatment of China’s external relations. Drawing on this range of sources, historians can begin to offer in-depth treatment of all the kinds of topics associated with a well developed foreign-relations literature—from important personalities to the relation of policy to the “public.” It should also convey a more complex sense of policy with features—economic opportunism, political flexibility, cultural ambivalence, strategic opportunism, and policy confusion—long associated with the better studied policies of other countries. To bring these themes into better focus specialists will want to place the CCP’s historical experience in a comparative framework and look for insight on the CCP that might emerge from juxtaposition with other foreign-relations histories.22

This broad agenda, good as far as it goes, neglects a fundamental and necessarily unsettling interpretive collision about to play out within the CCP foreign-relations field. Its resolution bears directly on the kind of agenda the field will follow. As historians turn to CCP foreign relations, they will bring with them an anthropological concern with culture and a post-modern sensitivity to language, both currently strong preoccupations within their discipline.23 Those interpretive proclivities are distinctly at odds with at least three fundamental features of the established literature and discourse defined by political science. Finding ways to make fresh, thoughtful use of the new historical evidence is here as perhaps in general inextricably tied to a critical examination of older, well worn, and often narrow channels of interpretation.

One point of conflict arises from the long-established tendency to cast policy in terms of antinomies that in effect impose an interpretive strait-jacket. The literature is peppered with reference to policies that are supposed to fit in one of several either/or categories. Policies were either “idealist” or “realist.” They were either “ideologically driven” or responsive to “situational factors.” They were shaped either by the “international system” or by “domestic determinants.” These alternatives confront scholars with an interpretive dilemma that they often resolve by impaling themselves on one or the other of its horns.

Of all the dualisms, none is more pervasive and troubling than the idea of the “international system” and its conceptual twin, “domestic determinants.” A moment of critical reflection reminds us that the make-up of the international system is not self-evident, and those who champion its power to shape national policy differ widely on what the system is and how it works. Claims for the primacy of “domestic determinants” suffer from an equally serious problem: “domestic” is understood so narrowly and “determinants” is taken so literally that the phrase is almost drained of its significance.

The impulse to distinguish domestic and international influences may not be particularly useful in understanding the foreign policy of any country, and in the case of China draws a distinction that party leaders from Chen Duxiu to Deng Xiaoping would have found baffling, even wrong-headed. The growing availability of documentation makes it possible to argue what common sense already suggests—that discussions of Chinese policy need to transcend this and the other stark categories that narrow and impoverish our discourse.

Some scholars (including political scientists) have already begun to escape these stark alternatives.24 They have shown not just that Mao and his colleagues operated within an international arena of Cold War rivalry and in a China of revolutionary aspirations and conflict but also that those worlds overlapped and interacted. Conclusions drawn from the behavior of the American imperialists, upheavals observed in Eastern Europe, and Nikita Khrushchev’s theses on peaceful coexistence played off against internal discussions and debates about the best road for China’s socialist development, treatment of peasants and intellectuals, the nature of party leadership, and China’s appropriate place in a world revolutionary movement. Together the foreign and the domestic strands were interwoven into a single web, and neither strand can be removed without doing fundamental harm to our understanding of the whole.

A second point of likely conflict is an interpretive vocabulary whose unexamined assumptions exercise a quiet but nonetheless dangerous linguistic tyranny. Any reader of international relations would recognize the widely used lexicon, including prominently such terms as “national interest,” “strategic interests,” “geostrategic imperatives,” and “geopolitical realities.” Thus we get accounts that confidently proclaim China’s foreign relations is “propelled by national interests” (not its evil twin, “ideology”). Other accounts seek to differentiate “pragmatic” policies (usually linked with Zhou Enlai’s or Deng Xiaoping’s name) from “radical” or “provocative” policies (here Mao or the “Gang of Four” is likely to appear), and hold up as an ideal a “balance-of-power” approach that secures “strategic interests,” “national security,” and “foreign-policy interests” in a changing “international system.”

While this language most commonly appears in American writing on contemporary China, Chinese scholars writing about their country’s foreign policy have been showing signs of appropriating this vocabulary. Influenced by American international relations literature as well by their own search for a usable foreign-policy past, they have emphasized the neatly formulated and smoothly executed nature of Chinese policy and held up Zhou Enlai as a model of “realism” and “expertise,” while wrestling over whether to make Mao’s contributions to foreign-policy “realistic” or “ideological.”25

Behind this vocabulary lurks a strongly judgmental impulse antipathetic to less universal, more culture-specific insights. Understanding policy, whatever its complexities, takes a back seat to handing down a clear-cut verdict based on what a “rational” or “realistic” actor would have done in a particular set of circumstances.

The Korean War literature starkly illustrates this point about the powerful impulse to evaluate the rationality or realism of policy. Chinese scholars have joined Americans in reporting approvingly on Beijing’s reassuringly clear, unitary, and above all carefully calculated response to U.S. intervention on the peninsula. In the American literature on deterrence China’s handling of the Korean War has even been enshrined as a positive model in striking contrast to the bumblings of U.S. policymakers at the time.26 Subjected now to a closer look thanks to the new evidence, this positive characterization seems wide of the mark. Mao and his associates, it now turns out, were themselves engulfed in the kind of messy and confused decisionmaking that also afflicted American leaders. Viewed in this new light, Beijing’s reaction to the Korean crisis be-
comes interesting not so much for the evaluative question of who did the better job but rather for the interpretive question of how do we understand the limits of cultural understanding and human control in a story strongly marked by chaos and contingency. These observations are not meant to deny rationality on the part of Chinese policymakers or for that matter on the part of Americans but to highlight the difficulty of evaluating policy rationality, especially with the help of simple, dichotomous notions of policy as either realistic or idealistic, driven by either careful calculations of national interest or by ungovernable ideological impulses.27

Though the critique of the rational actor model is widely made and apparently widely accepted,28 much of the CCP literature still seems unusually preoccupied with distinguishing sound from misguided policy. This siren call to make judgments about international behavior finds a response in all of us, but answering the call carries dangers. The most apparent is the tendency for simple judgments and a polemical style to appeal most strongly when limited evidence affords the weakest supporting grounds for them. For example, it was easy to offer up an idealized Mao when his own party decided what we should know, and it was natural to move toward a negative appraisal when new revelations thrust at us serious, previously unsuspected personal flaws. As the evidence becomes fuller and more reliable for Mao as for the CCP in general, older judgments must confront previously unimagined moral and political dimensions, and what previously seemed self-evident evaluations dissolve into complexity.

But beyond the simple problem of judgments handed down on scant or skewed evidence there is a broader and more complex problem. The claim to understand and judge “national interest,” “national security,” and so forth rests on a fundamentally metaphysical faith that value preferences serve to settle otherwise eminently debatable issues. That claim becomes often unthinkingly universalistic when scholars discover in countries and cultures other than their own roughly comparable notions of national interest and national security—at least among policymakers deemed sufficiently skilled in the realist calculus of power. The inadvertent results of this rational actor framework are judgments that are fundamentally culture-bound or at least that employ a definition of culture so narrow as to close off potentially interesting lines of investigation. Historians more interested in understanding the past than judging it will find limited appeal in hauling CCP leaders into court and formulating a verdict on the basis of their realism.

The third interpretive impulse likely to create conflict is a notion of ideology that is ahistorical and anemic. This unfortunate approach to the role of ideas in policymaking is in part a reflection of the rigid dualisms and fixation with rationality discussed above. It is also a reflection of a broader tendency during the Cold War to denigrate ideology as a peculiar deformation of the socialist bloc, a tendency that carried over into the China field as international relations specialists, schooled in comparative communism, applied a Soviet model to Chinese politics. In their accounts a pervasive, powerful Marxist-Leninist ideology came to offer an important key to understanding Chinese policy.

The resulting notions of CCP ideology are, it would now appear, ahistorical. The use of the Soviet Union as a starting point for understanding Chinese thinking may be unwise and is certainly premature because the Soviet model is itself drawn in narrow political terms and lacks firm historical grounding.29 Moreover, the Chinese party, which itself only recently began to come into sharper historical focus, is unlikely to offer an easy fit with any Soviet template.30 Indeed, we may look back on this Sino-Soviet ideological model and realize that the conclusions drawn from one set of highly circumstantial studies became the foundation for another set of equally circumstantial studies.

The prevalent thin, abstract conception of ideology should not divert our attention from more subtle and perhaps powerful informal ideologies that may be of considerably greater analytic value.31 Examining the intellectual predispositions and fundamental assumptions that constitute informal ideology may render us more sensitive to the cultural and social influences over policy. Such an approach may thus help us better understand how calculations of “interest” are rooted in social structure and filtered through a screen of culturally conditioned assumptions and how individual responses to “objective” circumstances in the international environment are profoundly conditioned by personal background, beliefs, and surroundings.

Analysts using imposed, culture-bound categories find themselves in much the same impossible situation an outsider would face in trying to understand the Australian aborigines who spoke Dyirbal. To ignore their language is to close the door to understanding their world with its unfamiliar classification: bayi (human males, animals); balan (human females, water, fire, fighting); balam (nonflesh food); and bala (a residual category).32 This breakdown may not make much sense to an outsider, but if getting into the head of the “other” is important, then uncovering the particular categories used to constitute their world is essential. By contrast, the conceptual baggage the observer brings from home must be counted a serious impediment. Employing outside frames of reference may obscure more China-centered and China-sensitive perspectives and thereby divert us from our ultimate destination—the understanding of China’s beliefs and behavior in international affairs.33

One promising way to get beyond simple and mutually exclusive notions of CCP ideology—for example, either making it “Marxism-Leninism” or “nationalism”—is to think of it as a fabric that we can better understand by following the strand of keywords. A close look at those keywords and the relationship among them might prove helpful in defining policy discourse over time and unlocking contending visions of China’s place in the world.34

“Patriotism” (qiao zhuyi) is one of those neglected keywords examined earlier in these pages. Another is “small and weak nationalities” (ruoxiao minzu). It too would repay close examination, revealing complexities not easily spotted in a straightforward reading of formal party statements. Like patriotism, this term had its roots in the late Qing, and persisted in CCP discourse from the party founding through the Maoist era and even beyond, injecting into it tensions as well as unintended ironies. China at times offered flamboyant rhetorical support for its revolutionary neighbors, but it has also collided with India and Vietnam, both important members of that community to which China claimed to belong. How has the concept of “small and weak nationalities” evolved, and what has China’s regional ambitions and limited resources done to reconstitute the meaning of that term?

This discussion of keywords suggests
that we need a more subtle and expansive notion of ideology—one that includes more than the formal ideology that the party utilized as an organizational glue and mobilization guide—if we are to move toward a richer understanding of CCP external relations. The network of ideas that make up an informal ideology is a complex, unstable amalgam drawn from a wide variety of sources and varying significantly from individual to individual. Some party leaders had experienced formative brushes with anarchism. Others had reacted strongly against disturbing urban conditions that made capitalism the main foe. Yet others constructed from their rural roots a populist outlook. Each borrowed from a rich, complex intellectual tradition, drew from distinct regional roots, and learned from diverse political experience as youths. A more penetrating grasp of Chinese policy depends ultimately on exploring the enormous diversity of thinking that shaped its course.

The negotiation of these and other points of difference between historians and political scientists will redefine the agenda for CCP foreign-policy studies and in the process help recast a field already in the midst of important change as a result of the revival of CCP studies in China. Historians taking a more prominent place in the field will be advancing a new constellation of questions and methods. The response by political scientists will doubtless vary with those of a descriptive bent finding it easy, while those devoted to theory may well find the transition awkward. How much this interaction across disciplinary lines will lead to a new mix of concerns and approaches and how much historians and political scientists will turn their back on each other, effectively creating a schism in the field, remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome outside of China, party historians within China are for their part likely to maintain a largely autonomous community interacting selectively with foreigner counterparts. Thus this trend toward a more historical picture of CCP external relations, at work in both the United States and China, is not likely to lead to a new monolithic field. And perhaps this outcome, marked by national and disciplinary diversity, is to be welcomed if it proves conducive to the wide-ranging inquiry and lively discussions associated with a field in renaissance.


5. The earliest Chinese version appears to be Waiqiu jiebin xibei xuexiang [A foreign reporter’s impression of the northwest] (Shanghai: Dingchoubianyi, 1937). A partial copy is in the Wang Fu Shih collection, University Archives, University of Missouri, Kansas City. Hu Yuzhi translated one of the early versions, perhaps this one. Snow’s account was also published under the title Xingsheng manji [Notes on a journey to the west] and Mao Zedong zhidong [Mao Zedong’s autobiography]. For details on the production of the autobiograpy, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yuanjushu and Xinhua tongxunshe, comps., Mao Zedong xunwen gongzuo xuanwujuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works on journalism] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1983), 37-38; Wu Liping, comp., Mao Zedong zhidong dengzilian xiaozu de tongshu (Mao Zedong’s 1936-1976 story with Snow) (Beijing: Renmin, 1979), 1, 6-9; and Qiu Ke’an, Sinow sui Zhipeng [Snow in China] (Beijing: Sanlian, 1982).

Appearing in 1937 along with the Snow account was the first, perhaps rudimentary collection of Mao’s essays. For evidence on the existence of such a collection, see Mao Zedong ji [Collected writings of Mao Zedong], ed. Takeuchi Minoru (10 vols.; Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1971-72; Hong Kong reprint, 1975), 5: 232.

6. This and the paragraph that follows draw on Xu Quanxing and Wei Shihe, chief authors, Yunnan shiqu de Mao Zedong xueshi xishuang yanjiu [Studies on Mao Zedong’s philosophical thought during the Yannan period] (Xian: Shaanxi renmin jiaoyu, 1988), chap. 11 (written by Xu); and Thomas Kampen, “Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong and the ‘Triumph of Mao Zedong-Thought’ (1935-1945),” Modern Asian Studies 23 (October 1989), 716-22.


10. Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], vol. 5 (Beijing: Renmin, 1977); Mao Zedong zhuxu xuanju [A reader of works by Mao Zedong], comp. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yuanjushu, ed. (2 vols.; Beijing: Renmin, 1986). More revealing than the public “resolution on certain historical issues concerning the party since the founding of the PRC” (“Guanyu jiangou yila de dange ruoqin lixi de jieju”), is the limited circulation treatment of sensitive issues raised by this reappraisal, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiuju, “Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbian bianxiezuo, Zhonggong dangshihzdishiniandianbianshouming” [Elucidation of “a chronology of major events in CCP history”] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiang, 1983; “internal circulation”).


12. See e.g., Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), which begins by stressing the importance of relating the actions of the state to "the lives of even ordinary citizens" (xi).


have had their major writings published. The Mao collection (discussed below) is the best known, but the list extends to those who played a prominent role briefly in the mid- and late 1920s (such as Qu Qiubai and Peng Shuzhi), the group that accompanied Mao to the top (such as Liu Shaoqi, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and Chen Yun), party intellectuals (such as Chen Hsingsheng and Ai Siqi), notable public supporters (such as Song Qingling), and even that party black sheep, Wang Ming. These volumes appear variously as wenji (collected works), wexuan (selected works), xuanji (selections), and in several cases junsu (selected works on military affairs). Generally these collections, especially the ones published in the early decades of the PRC, are less revealing on foreign affairs than the more recent materials. The collected works for a few of the best known party figures can be found in translation.


Party history journals are a treasure trove, offering fresh documentation, revealing articles, and news of conferences and pending publications. A number of the chief journals underwent a confusing set of title changes in the late 1980s, and most are restricted in their circulation. They are as a result difficult for researchers outside of China to keep straight and use systematically. Of these journals Dangde wenxian [Literature on the party] (published by Zhongyang wenxian yanjushi and Zhongyang dang’an guan, 1988-; “internal circulation”) and its earlier incarnation, Wenxian he yanjiu [Documents and research] (published by Zhongyang wenxian yanjushi, 1982-87; “internal circulation”), deserve singling out for their fresh documentation as well as helpful articles.

Rise of an International Affairs Orthodoxy (1921-1934)


Writings from the People’s Republic of China offer such a constricted treatment of the CCP’s May Fourth background that they are of only limited use. Broader perspectives are available in documentary collections such as Wusi aiguo yundong [The May fourth patriotic movement], comp. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jindai ziliao bianjizu (2 vols.; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1979); and Shehui zhuyi sixiang zai Zhongguo de chuango [The propagation of socialist thought in China] (3 vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao keyan bangongshi, 1985). The latter is but one of a number of documentary collections that have been compiled in China over the last decade on ideological transmission and formation around the time of May Fourth.


To form a more precise impression of CCP views on imperialism, turn to contemporary materials, notably prominent party journals such as Xiangdao zhoubao [The guide weekly] (1922-27) and the collections of Central Committee documents (noted above). Evidence on the general attractiveness of anti-imperialism as a tool of political mobilization can be found in Wusa yundong shiliao [Historical materials on the May 30 (1925) movement], comp. Shanghai shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1981); San yibia yundong ziliao [Materials on the March 18 (1926) movement], comp. Sun Dunheng and Wen Hai (Beijing: Renmin, 1984); and San yibia can’anziliao shuibusian [Materials on the March 18 (1926) massacre], comp. Jiang Changren (Beijing: Beijing, 1985).


Among a substantial collection of general surveys in Chinese on the CCP and the Comintern, the standouts are Xiang Qing, Gongchuan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi shigao [Draft history of the relations between the Comintern and the Chinese revolution] (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1988); Yang Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongchuan guoji he Zhongguo geming [The Comintern and the Chinese revolution] (Shanghai: Shangh hai renmin, 1988); and Yang Kuisong, Zhongjian didai de geming: Zhongguo geming de celüe zai guoji beijing xia de yanbian [Revolution in the intermediate zone: The development of China’s revolutionary strategy against an international background] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1992), the freshest and most detailed treatment. All three accounts carry the story into the 1940s—down to the dissolution of the Comintern and beyond.


The Emergence of a Foreign Policy (1935-1949)

The CCP’s handling of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Pacific War and into the early Cold War period has been the subject of roughly three decades of serious scholarship. The appearance of new documentation has rendered much of that literature obsolete and compromised interpretations advanced as recently as the late 1980s. Several major works drawing on the fresh source materials have already appeared. John W. Garver’s Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) stresses the CCP’s policy of maneuver and places Mao alongside Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] as a nationalist whose outlook drove him into “rebellion” (274) against Moscow. Odd Arne Westad’s Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), sets Mao’s policy in an impressively international context and pictures as largely abortive his efforts to make the great powers serve his party’s cause in the immediate aftermath of World War II.


A number of studies prepared without benefit of the recently released documentation are still worth attention. James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), stirred up debate by minimizing ideological constraints on CCP policy and by arguing for a “lost chance” at the end of the Pacific War when the CCP was frustrated in its attempt to avert Sino-American hostility and to minimize dependence on the Soviet Union.


Levine’s own major statement, Anvil of


PRC historians have led the way in filling out the picture of CCP policy from the late 1930s down to 1949. The most ambitious account to date is Niu Jun’s Cong Yanan zouxiang shijie: Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai guanxi de qiyuan [Moving from Yenan toward the world: the origins of Chinese Communist foreign relations] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1992). Niu locates the origins of the CCP’s independent foreign policy in the Yenan years, and perhaps better than any other account—in English or Chinese—provides the supporting evidence. He builds here on his earlier work on the CCP’s handling of the Hurley and Marshall missions, Cong He’erli dao Maxie’er: Meiguotiaochu guogong maodun shimo [From Hurley to Marshall: a full account of the U.S. mediation of the contradictions between the Nationalists and the Communists] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1988).


Key sources for this period, aside from the central party documents mentioned above, are Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dang’anguan, comps., Zhongguo zhongyang kangRi minzu tongyi zhixian wenjian xuanbian [A selection of documents on the CCP Central Committee’s national anti-Japanese united front] (3 vols.; Beijing: Dang’an, 1984-86); and Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dang’anguan, comps., Zhongguo zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng zhixian wenjian xuanbian [A selection of documents on the CCP Central Committee’s united front during the period of liberation struggle] (Beijing: Dang’an, 1988; “internal circulation”).

Personal accounts are useful in supplementing the primary collections. See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Zhi Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history: Shi Zhe’s memoir] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991); Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] (3 vols.; Beijing: Janshi, 1983, and Jiefangjun, 1984); Wu Xiuxuan, Wode licheng [My course] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1984); Peter Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diary, Yenan, China: 1942-1945 (Garden City, N.Y., 1975), a translation that is not as complete as the Russian original, and in any case betrays a tendentious quality that invites some suspicion; and Ivan V. Kovalev and Sergei N. Goncharov, “Stalin’s Dialogue with Mao Zedong,” trans. Craig Seibert, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 10 (Winter 1991-92), 45-76. Chen Jian has translated the portions of the Shi Zhe memoir dealing with the 1949 missions by Mikoyan and Liu Shaoqi in Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992), 35-46; and 6 (Spring 1993), 67-90. 

Mao Zedong

Anyone interested in tracing Mao’s evolving outlook on international affairs and his central policy role from the mid-1930s has an embarrassment of documentary riches to contend with. Indeed, a wide variety of materials have accumulated layer upon layer so that systematic research requires considerable patience. Those who press on will find as their reward Mao emerging from these materials a more complex and more interesting figure than previously guessed.


Collections compiled by the party history establishment in China over the last decade have added significant, fresh light on Mao’s general outlook and his emergence as a maker of foreign policy. These collections include Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* [A selection of Mao Zedong correspondence] (Beijing: Renmin, 1983); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* [A selection of Mao Zedong works on journalism] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1983); and Zhonggong zhongyang tongyi xianwen gongzuobu yanjiushi et al., comps., *Mao Zedong lun tongyi zhanxian* [Mao Zedong on the united front] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxian, 1988).


For the post-1949 Mao turn to the classified series compiled by Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, *Jianqiu yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong manuscripts for the period following the establishment of the country] (8 vols. to date; Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987-; “internal circulation”). This series sheds new light on Mao and world affairs down to the late 1950s, and taken together with the outpouring of Mao material during the Cultural Revolution, gives us the basis for beginning to understand Mao’s PRC years. The formidable task of collecting, collating, and verifying these materials has only begun. For a good recent guide, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar et al. (Cambridge:

To make the post-1949 Mao materials available in English, Michael Y. M. Kau and John K. Leung launched a translation series in 1986. Two volumes of their *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986) have appeared to date covering the period down to December 1957. Their formidable task has been complicated by the continuing flow of new materials out of China. Translated fragments are available elsewhere—in a variety of publications by U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (better known as JPRS); in Stuart Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971* (New York: Pantheon, 1975); and in MacFarquhar et al., *The Secret Speeches* (cited above).

**Zhou Enlai**

Zhou deserves special attention as Mao’s chief lieutenant in foreign affairs. For the moment the place to start is the archivally based biography, *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (under the direction of Jin Chongji), *Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1898-1949* [Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949] (Beijing: Renmin and Zhongyang wenxian, 1989). This biography should be used in conjunction with *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* [A selection of Zhou Enlai letters] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1988); *Zhonggong zhongyang tongyi zhanxian gongzuo and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi*, comps., *Zhou Enlai tongyi zhanxian wenxuan* [A selection of Zhou Enlai writings on the united front] (Beijing: Renmin, 1984); and *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu* and *Zhonghua zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi*, comps., *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990). These materials go well beyond the limited documentation in *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji* weiyuandui, comps., *Zhou Enlai xuanji* [Selected works of Zhou Enlai] (2 vols.; Beijing: Renmin, 1980, 1984), which is available in translation as *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* (2 vols.; Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981-89).

For an introduction to recent work in China on Zhou’s diplomatic career and thinking, see *Zhou Enlai yanju xuexhua taolunhui luwenji* [Collected academic conference research papers on Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1988); *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu* [diplomatic thought and practice] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1989); *Zhongguo gemiai bowuguan et al., comps., Zhou Enlai he tade shiye: yanjiu xuancu* [Zhou Enlai and his enterprises: a sampling of studies] (Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi, 1991); and *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu* wanxiang* yanjiushi* [Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activities, 1949-1975] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1993).

**The Foreign Policy of the PRC**

The new sources and studies that have refashioned our understanding of early CCP attitudes and policies are just beginning to have an impact on the post-1949 period. Until more documentary publications appear and are digested, it is likely that our understanding of PRC foreign policy will remain thin and fragmentary, and the writings in English on the topic will for the most part hold to the well-established political science approaches.


The general secondary accounts in Chinese on post-1949 policy increasingly reflect the new openness in the PRC but still stick close to the official line. Han Nianlong, chief comp., *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao* [Chinese foreign affairs in recent times] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1987) is the best known of these. That volume has been translated as *Diplomacy of Contemporary China* (Hong Kong: New Horizon, 1990) by Qiu Ke’an. It appears as a part of the series “Dangdai Zhongguo” (Contemporary China), which includes studies on the armed forces also germane to foreign policy. *Zhongguo waijiaoshi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqu* [A diplomatic history of China: The PRC period, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1988) is the best known of these. That volume has been translated as *Diplomacy of Contemporary China* (Hong Kong: New Horizon, 1990) by Qiu Ke’an. It appears as a part of the series “Dangdai Zhongguo” (Contemporary China), which includes studies on the armed forces also germane to foreign policy.


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The most detailed and up-to-date accounts of the war’s origins are to be found in Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), notable for its stress on the strong revolutionary streak in Mao’s foreign

Within the Chinese historical establishment, Yao Xu, *Cong Yalijiang dao Banmendian: Weida de kangMei yuanChao zhanzheng* [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom: the great war to resist America and aid Korea] (Beijing: Renmin, 1985; “internal circulation”); and Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, *KangMei yuanChao jishi* [A record of resisting America and aiding Korea] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1987; “internal circulation”), were the first to deal in detail with the war. Their work was in turn improved on by Junshi jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiu suo, *Junshi jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiu suosuan jian* [Documents on domestic mobilization. For a selection of Korean War materials translated from Chinese sources to theoretical information from Chinese sources to theoretical concerns with deterrence, calculated decision-making, and “learning” by policymakers. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), reveals how Mao’s public dismissal of the American nuclear threat was belied by a high-priority program to create a Chinese bomb.


Our understanding of the PRC’s Taiwan and Vietnam policies is, much like insights on Korea, in debt to the Chinese military. Xu Yan, *Jinmen zhi zhan* (1949-1959 nian) [The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing: Zhonggong guangbo dianshi, 1992), and Zhonggou junshi guwenlu lishi bianxue zu, *Zhonggou junshi guwenlu lishi bianxue ziliao* (1989), 111-59, is available in a translation by Chen Jian, “Peng Dehuai and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” *Chinese Historians* 6 (Spring 1993), 1-29.


CCP LEADERS continued from page 131

how the situation has changed in the age of “reform and opening to the outside world.” Insofar as the original works of CCP leaders are concerned, the archives storing them, especially Beijing’s Central Archives, remain inaccessible to most scholars (both Chinese and Western). If one carefully examines the contents of the selected works of CCP leaders that have been compiled and published since the early 1980s (especially the editions “for internal circulation only”), however, it is easy to find that the policy of “reform and opening to the outside world” has made its stamp on them. Put simply, the “selected works” compiled and published in the 1980s and 1990s are more substantial, and, so far as their texts are concerned, more reliable than previous collections. To make this point clear, I will introduce and examine several major “selected works” compiled and published during this period.

1. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee). This documentary collection covers the period from 1921 to 1949 in two different editions: A fourteen volume internal edition published in the mid-1980s, and an eighteen volume open edition published in the early 1990s. Both editions contain many previously unpublished materials. The open edition contains almost fifteen percent more documents than the earlier internal one (however, a few “sensitive documents” that were included in the internal edition disappeared from the open edition). The “quality” of some of the documents is impressive. For example, the Central Committee’s “Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs,” dated 18 August 1944, clearly reveals the CCP leadership’s perception of international affairs as well as its calculation on how the Party should best deal with the perceived situation. These documents provide scholars with valuable information for understanding important decisions by the CCP leadership.

2. Jian guo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China). The publication of this series began in late 1987, with eight volumes published by 1995, covering the period from October 1949 to December 1959. Although these volumes are marked “for internal circulation only,” it is not difficult for scholars outside of China to gain access to them. For example, the Yenchen Library and the library of John K. Fairbank Center at Harvard University, the East Asian Library at Columbia University, the East Asian Library at Stanford University, the East Asian Library at Toronto University, the Asian Section of Library of Congress, and many other East Asian libraries in North America have collected various volumes of this set.

The documents published in this collection are of high historical value. They cover, among other things, such important events as Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1949-1950; China’s participation in the Korean War in 1950-1953; Mao Zedong’s direction of the “Three-Antis” and “Five-Antis” Movements in 1951-1952; Mao’s and the CCP leadership’s management of relations with the Soviet Union in the mid- and late 1950s; Mao’s management of the Taiwan Crisis and the potential confrontation with the United States in 1958; Mao’s handling of the “Anti-Rightist Movement” and the “Great Leap Forward” in 1957-1958; and Mao’s presentations at the Lushan Conference in 1959. In many places, the documents published in this collection confirm the inner-Party statements and instructions by Mao divulged during the “Cultural Revolution” years. But the majority of the documents contained in this collection have never been released in the past. Most of the documents are published in their entirety; some, however, are published only in part. The quality of the eight published volumes is uneven. The first volume, which covers the period from October 1949 to December 1950, is one of the best. It offers, among other things, a quite detailed coverage of Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union, as well as how the CCP leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War. Volume Four, covering the 1953-1954 period, is, compared with other volumes, extremely thin. As a whole, this collection provides scholars with much fresh information (compared with what we knew in the past) and, therefore, must be regarded as a basic reference for the study of Mao Zedong, the Chinese revolution, and the history of the People’s Republic of China.

3. Mao Zedong junshi wexuan (Selected Military Papers of Mao Zedong) and Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers, 6 volumes). Mao Zedong junshi wexuan, published in the early 1980s, contains many previously unknown inner-Party instructions and telegrams by Mao, especially the telegraphic communications between Mao and Chinese field commanders during the early stage of China’s military intervention in Korea (October-December 1950). Its circulation was highly restricted at first; after the mid-1980s, however, it became available to scholars outside of China through several channels, especially after it had been reprinted by a publisher in Hong Kong. The six-volume Mao Zedong junshi wenji was published in December 1993, on the 100th anniversary of Mao’s birthday. Its coverage is extraordinarily uneven. The first five volumes, which cover the period from the late 1920s to 1949, include many documents released only for the first time. The sixth volume, which covers the period from 1949 to 1976, contains almost nothing new compared with the previously published Mao Zedong junshi wenji and Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. In actuality, many documents concerning Mao’s military activities during this post-revolution period published in the other two collections are deleted from this volume. This is a great disappointment for scholars who are interested in Mao’s activities during the PRC period.

4. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong). This collection focuses on Mao’s diplomatic and strategic activities, emphasizing the post-1949 period. Some of the documents published in this volume are of high historical value. For example, it has long been known to scholars that in the summer of 1958, a major dispute emerged between Beijing and Moscow in the wake of Moscow’s proposal to establish a joint Chinese-Soviet submarine flotilla. However, it has been unclear to scholars how this dispute developed. The minutes of a talk between Mao Zedong and P. F. Yudin, the Soviet ambassador to China, on July 22, 1958, published in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, reveal the Chinese attitude, including Mao’s reasoning underlying it, toward this question.

5. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Papers). This collection publishes Mao’s speeches, instructions, and telegrams not included in Mao Zedong xuanji. Among the quite impressive documents released are those about the CCP leadership’s handling of the Xian Incident of 1936.

6. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of
Mao Zedong, 3 volumes). Published in December 1993, the 100th anniversary of Mao’s birth, it offers a quite detailed day-to-day account of Mao’s activities up to 1949. It releases many previously unknown important documents, going beyond the coverage of other Mao collections. For example, it publishes for the first time Mao Zedong’s telegram to the CCP’s Nanjing Municipal Committee dated 10 May 1949, in which Mao established the principles for Huang Hua to meet with John Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador to China who remained after the Communist takeover of Nanjing.12

7. **Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan** (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai).13 This is a collection of minutes of internal talks, instructions, statements, and speeches related to Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activities. This collection includes some interesting documents, such as the Chinese minutes of Zhou Enlai’s talk with K.M. Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, early in the morning of 3 October 1950. During this meeting Zhou Enlai issued the warning that if the American forces crossed the 38th parallel in Korea, China would “intervene” in the conflict.14

8. **Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949** (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai).15 This chronicle, like Mao Zedong nianpu, covers the period up to 1949. It offers a day-to-day account of Zhou Enlai’s activities, from his early years to the time of the nationwide victory of the Chinese revolution. The Collection includes complete texts of several important documents relating to Zhou Enlai.

9. **Deng Xiaoping wenxuan** (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3 volumes).16 As China’s most important leader after Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping played a central role in China’s “reform and opening to the outside world” period. This collection offers researchers, as well as the general public, a window through which to study Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts. The most important volume of this collection is the third volume, which covers the period from 1982 to 1992, when Deng was indisputably China’s paramount leader (although he never assumed that title). Among the documents published in the volume is the talk Deng gave after the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, in which Deng explained his reasoning for opening fire on the demonstrators on Beijing’s streets.

10. **Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan** (Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai).17 As the PRC’s defense minister in the 1950s and the commander of the Chinese Volunteers in Korea, Peng Dehuai played an important role in developing China’s military and security strategies. This volume publishes some of Peng’s most important military papers, including his correspondences with Mao during the early stages of the Korean War.

In addition to the above listed collections, other “selected works” that have been published since the 1980s include ones by Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Shaoqi, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and Zhu De.18

III

Compared with the “selected works” published earlier, the above list of “selected works” published in the 1980s and 1990s have several distinctive features. First, contrary to the earlier practice of making extensive excisions from, or even revisions in, the original documents for the sake of publication, the compilation and editing of most of the volumes published in the past decade are more faithful to the original text of the documents. For example, **Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji** (Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China) and **Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wenxiao** (Writings of Mao Zedong since 1949) clearly indicate at the end of most documents that they are printed according to the original texts of the documents. In some cases, photocopies of original documents are provided. This practice significantly increases the reliability and historical value of these publications.

Second, in the pre-1980 period, the editing and publication of “selected works” were generally controlled and conducted by party cadres who always put the party’s interests over everything else and who had had, at best, only inadequate knowledge of China’s modern history. In the past decade, increasing numbers of professional historians, many of whom have Ph.D degrees in modern history, the history of the Chinese revolution, and modern Chinese politics, have joined the editorial teams responsible for compiling and editing the “selected works.” Although these scholars still must follow the general directions of the Party in conducting their work, their professional training makes them less willing than their predecessors to alter the documents. As a result, the documents selected are of better “quality” and the annotations are more useful to researchers. Indeed, the footnotes of several important collections, such as **Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wenxiao**, **Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan**, and **Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan**, contain much important documentary information.

Third, some of the collections, especially those for “internal circulation only,” have broken many “forbidden zones” in the writing of the CCP history. For example, scholars who are interested in the CCP’s management of the Xian Incident will find that the information offered by the documents in **Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji**, **Mao Zedong nianpu**, **Zhou Enlai nianpu**, and **Mao Zedong wenji** differ from the Party’s propaganda in the past, indicating that the CCP leadership’s attitude toward Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) had been strongly influenced, or even defined, by the Comintern. Also, the documents offered by **Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wenxiao** reveal that, different from the description of the official Party history, one of the considerations behind Mao Zedong’s decision to shell the Nationalist-controlled Jinnan Islands in August 1958 was to assist the people in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, in their struggles against the U.S. imperialists.19

However, one should not exaggerate the utility and significance of the historical documents released in “selected works.” The documents that have been included in the “selected works” of the 1980s and 1990s are only a small portion of the entire body of original documents, and the criteria used in their selection remain highly dubious. In reality, through other sources, we know for certain that many documents, which in the eyes of the editors have the potential of harming the image of the CCP and its leaders being “generally correct,” have been intentionally excluded from the selections.

An example of this practice is a telegram Mao Zedong sent to Peng Dehuai on 28 January 1951. Let me first give some background introduction. After Chinese troops entered the Korean War in October 1950, they waged three offensive campaigns from late October 1950 to early January 1951, driving the American/UN troops from areas close to the Chinese-Korean border to areas south of the 38th parallel. However, the Chinese forces exhausted their offensive potential because of heavy casualties, lack of air support, and the overextension of
supply lines. Therefore, when the American troops started a counteroffensive on 25 January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese commander, proposed a temporary retreat in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, however, overestimated China’s strength. In a telegram to Peng the next day, he ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Korean offensive to counter the American offensive. He even argued that the Chinese troops possessed the capacity to advance to the 36th parallel.

Mao’s instructions contributed to the military defeat of the Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield in spring 1951. This telegram is certainly important because it revealed Mao’s strategic thinking at a crucial point of the Korean War, and reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in Korea—driving the Americans out of the Korean peninsula, thus promoting China’s reputation and influence in East Asia while at the same time enhancing the Chinese revolution at home. However, this telegram also makes it clear that sometimes Mao’s judgment of the situation could be very poor. Although a few Chinese authors with access to classified documents have cited the telegram in its entirety, this important telegram is excluded from *Jianguo yilai MaoZedong wengao* and *Mao Zedong jushi wenji*.

This, of course, is only one of many, many such cases.

The end of the Cold War makes it possible for scholars to gain access to documents from the former Soviet Union. Many of the Russian documents that have recently become available display discrepancies compared to what has been revealed by Chinese documents. In some cases these discrepancies expose the limit to which truth is revealed in the documents published in “selected works” in China. Here is another example. All the Chinese documents about the Korean War published in the first volume of *Jianguo yilai MaoZedong wengao* and *Mao Zedong jushi wenji* indicate that the Beijing leadership made the decision to enter Korean War in early October 1950. In a telegram dated October 2, Mao formally informed Stalin that the CCP leadership had made the decision to send troops to Korea. However, Russian documents on the Korean War (which Russian President Yeltsin gave to South Korean President Kim Young-sam in June 1994) tell a different story. According to these documents, Mao Zedong informed Stalin on 3 October 1950 that China would not send troops to Korea, and it would take great efforts from Stalin to persuade the Chinese that it was in China’s basic interest to prevent the war from reaching China’s northeast border. (See the article by Alexandre Mansourov in this issue of the *Bulletin.*

Why does this discrepancy exist? What really happened between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950?

To answer these questions (and many other similar questions) scholars need full access to Beijing’s archives. “Selected works” are useful, but only in a highly limited sense. This is particularly true because even in the age of “reform and opening to the outside world,” the writing of Party history in China remains a business primarily designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Party’s reign in China. This means that materials released through “selected works” are often driven by intentions other than having the truth known, and, as a result, can be misleading.

Therefore, while it is wrong for China scholars to refuse to recognize the historical value of materials contained in “selected works,” it is dangerous and unwise for them to rely completely or uncritically on “selected work” sources. While using them, scholars must double check “selected works” materials against other sources, including information obtained from interviews. In the long run, scholars must be given full and equal access to Chinese archives to tell the story of the Chinese Communist revolution and China’s relationship with the outside world.

1. An earlier draft of this article was presented to an international symposium on “Local Chinese Archives and the Historiography of Modern China” at the University of Maryland, College Park, 5-7 October 1995.


5. For English translations of these documents, see *Zhang Shu Guan and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1995), Part II.


9. Ibid., 322-333.


21. My interviews with researchers at Beijing’s Academy of Military Science, who were responsible for editing *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, in summer 1991 confirmed that this telegram would not be included because of its “improper” content.

THE SECOND HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF CHINA: 
A Treasure House for Republican China Research
by Gao Hua
translated by Scott Kennedy

After arriving at Nanjing’s 309 Zhongshan East Road, passing the police stationed at their post and going through a routine check-in, researchers face a classical Chinese edifice—the famous Second Historical Archives of China (SHAC).1

Established in February 1951, SHAC has one of the largest historical collections in China. The former tenant at the archive’s address was the “Committee for Compiling GMT [Guomindang] Party Historical Records.” After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over management of the Committee as well as the archives from the original “National History House.” Soon after, large quantities of documents concerning the GMT regime housed in Guangzhou (Canton), Chongqing (Chungking), Chengdu, Kunming, Shanghai and Beijing, as well as the archival records stored in Beijing on the Northern Warlords Government, were all moved to Nanjing, and together make up the foundation of SHAC’s collection.

At the heart of SHAC’s collection are the original records of the central organs of the various regimes in existence during the Republican era (1912-1949), namely: 1) the Nanjing Provisional Government (January-April 1912); 2) the Northern Warlords Government (April 1912 - June 1928); 3) the various GMT regimes, first centered in Guangzhou and Wuhan, and then as a national government in Nanjing (1927-1949); and 4) the various puppet regimes of the Japanese (e.g., Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing regime). The archives provide a detailed account of policy and actual conditions—at the central and local levels—on foreign policy, military matters, commerce and finance, culture and education, and even social customs. However, the materials of greatest number and value collected at SHAC are those archives concerning the GMT rule in Nanjing from 1927-1949.

From 1951 to 1979, SHAC’s doors remained closed to the public. During those years, the only significant work done was the compiling of a collection of archival documents, Zhongguo xian dai zhengzhishi ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Materials on Chinese Modern Political History]. The project, launched in 1956 with a directive from the CCP Central Committee Political Research Office, consumed SHAC’s entire energies for three years. Only 100 sets of the 244 volume, 21 million character collection were printed. They were then distributed to central party and political organs as well as some universities to be used as a research reference. At present, this important collection is the largest and richest set of materials concerning China’s domestic situation during the Republican era.

Since 1979, SHAC has made public a large number of documents one after another and published three major archival document sets: Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Republican China History Archival Records], Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao conkan [A Series of Republican China History Archives], and Zhonghua minguoshishi dang’an ziliao congshu [A Collection of Republican China History Archives]. Finally, in 1985, SHAC launched the quarterly, Minguo dang’an [Republican Archives].

SHAC has been a resource on issues where historical questions influence current policy questions. Since 1986, Minguo dang’an has published a large number of documents concerning relations between Tibet and central government authorities. SHAC has also cooperated with Beijing’s “China Tibetan Studies Research Center” to publish three volumes of historical materials on Tibet. The journal has also published materials concerning China’s claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. SHAC provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with materials concerning China’s Republican-era relationship with Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. They recently allowed Taiwanese scholars to view documents concerning the 2-28 Incident (a massacre of Taiwanese by the GMT on 28 February 1947). Finally, geologists and policymakers involved in the planning of the controversial proposed Three Gorges dam have relied on SHAC for materials on relevant Republican-era research.

SHAC has formally been open to scholars for the past 14 years. Apart from the dossiers of various individuals, some judicial archives, and those which “involve national interest,” scholars are free to utilize all of SHAC’s files. Procedures for foreign scholars have also been dramatically simplified. However, due to the effects of economic reform, SHAC has also increased its fees for those scholars who have yet to use its services. SHAC is also planning to install an air-conditioned reading room as another service to foreigners, but, of course, you’ll have to pay.

A Chinese-language reference book which is helpful to users of the Second Archives is Zhongguo dier lishi dang’an guan jianming zhinan [A Brief Guide to the Second Historical Archives of China], (Archives Publishing House, 1987), a well-organized introduction to each of the categories under which all of SHAC’s documents are stored. Also useful are Dangdai zhongguo dang’an shiye [China Today: Archival Undertakings] (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 1988); and Minguoshi yu minguo dang’an luwenji [Republican History and Collected Essays on Republican Archives] (Archives Publishing House, 1991).

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RUSSIAN HISTORIANS TO PUBLISH STUDY

Two Russian historians who have conducted extensive research in Russian and U.S. sources have completed a study of Soviet leaders and the early Cold War: Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders From Stalin to Khrushchev, is scheduled for publication by Harvard University Press in March 1996.
THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW:
TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958

Translated and Annotated by
Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian

Translators’ Notes: In February 1950, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two “brotherly” Communist countries, would last forever. However, serious problems soon emerged between the Chinese and Soviet parties and governments. Starting in 1960, the two parties became engaged in an increasingly heated polemical debate over the nature of true communism and which party represented it. By the late 1960s, the relationship between the two countries had deteriorated to such an extent that a major border war erupted between them in March 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union change from allies to enemies? What problems caused the decline and final collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to answer these questions, scholars need access to contemporary documentary sources, and these translations of the newly available Chinese documents provide a basis for beginning to answer these questions.

The documents are divided into three groups. The first group includes two speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the Chinese Communist view on such important questions as Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin, the general principles underlying the relations among “brotherly parties and states,” and their perception of the Soviet Union’s attitude toward the Chinese revolution. Particularly interesting is Mao Zedong’s repeated reference to the “unequal” relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union during Stalin’s era. Through these documents one is able to sense some of the deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group includes three documents reflecting the CCP leadership’s response to the Soviet proposals in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long conversation with the Soviet Ambassador P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to a series of more general questions concerning the overall relationship between the two countries, revealing comprehensively (often in cynical tones) his understanding of the historical, philosophical, and political origins of the problems existing between Beijing and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again emphasized the issue of “equality,” emphasizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow’s treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. The third group includes four Chinese documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives, which demonstrate the extent to which China had been dependent upon the military and other material support of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. These documents make it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet relations from another perspective.

Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences

1. Minutes, Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [undated] September 1956
Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993), 251-262

We welcome you to China. We are very pleased at your visit. We have been supported by you, as well as by other brotherly [Communist] parties. We are invariably supporting you as much as all the other brotherly parties. In today’s world, the Marxist and Communist front remains united, whether in places where success [of Communist revolution] is achieved or not yet achieved. However, there were times when we were not so united; there were times when we let you down. We listened to the opinions of the Information Bureau in the past. Although we did not take part in the Bureau’s [business], we found it difficult not to support it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we kept silent on the resolution [condemning you], although we published articles to criticize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should not have done that; we should have discussed [this issue] with you: if some of your viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have let] you conduct self-criticism, and there was no need to hurry [into the controversy] as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: should you disagree with us, you should do the same thing, that is, the adoption of a method of persuasion and consultation. There have not been that many successful cases in which one criticizes foreign parties in newspapers. [Your] case offers a profound historical lesson for the international communist movement. Although you have suffered from it, the international communist movement has learned a lesson from this mistake. [The international communist movement] must fully understand [the seriousness of] this mistake.

When you offered to recognize new China, we did not respond, nor did we decline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have rejected it, because there was no reason for us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we did not say no to it. How could we find any excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist country?

There was, however, another factor which prevented us from responding to you: the Soviet friends did not want us to form diplomatic relations with you. If so, was China an independent state? Of course, yes. If an independent state, why, then, did we follow their instructions? [My] comrades, when the Soviet Union requested us to follow their suit at that time, it was difficult for us to oppose it. It was because at that time some people claimed that there were two Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the other in China, even if no one passed a resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito
from my head? The tag was removed after [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] and came to [North Korea’s] aid and when [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow.

The Wang Ming line was in fact Stalin’s line. It ended up destroying ninety percent of our strength in our bases, and one hundred percent of our strength in the white areas. Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi pointed this out in his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.

Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the losses] to the [impact of] Stalin’s line? There is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself could criticize Stalin; but it would be inappropriate for us to criticize him. We should maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Maybe [we] could make our criticism public sometime in the future. It has to be that way in today’s world, because facts are facts. The Comintern made numerous mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages were not so bad, but its middle stage was not so good: it was all right when Lenin was alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in charge. The first Wang Ming line dominated [our party] for four years, and the Chinese revolution suffered the biggest losses. Wang Ming is now in Moscow taking a sick leave, but still we are going to elect him to be a member of the party’s Central Committee. He indeed is an instructor for our party; he is a professor, an invaluable one who could not be purchased by money. He has taught the whole party, so that it would not follow his line.

That was the first time when we got the worst of Stalin.

The second time was during the anti-Japanese war. Speaking Russian and good at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could directly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to China by Stalin, he tried to set [us] toward right deviation this time, instead of following the leftist line he had previously advocated. Advocating [CCP] collaboration with the Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or GMD], he can be described as “decking himself out and fawning on [Stalin].” He wanted [us] to obey the GMD wholeheartedly. The Six-Principle Program he put forward was to overturn our Party’s Ten-Principle Policy. [His program] opposed establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated giving up our Party’s own armed force, and preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] was in power, there would be peace [in China]. We redressed this deviation.

[Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us correct this mistake: while Wang Ming “decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang],” Jiang Jieshi “slapped his face and kicked him out.” Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China’s best instructor: he had educated the people of the whole nation as well as all of our Party members. Jiang lectured with his machine guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with his own words.

The third time was after Japan’s surrender and the end of the Second World War. Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us, the Communist Party, but supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in his autobiography.

Only after the dissolution of the Comintern did we start to enjoy more freedom. We had already begun to criticize opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and unfolded the rectification movement. The rectification, in fact, was aimed at denouncing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern had committed in directing the Chinese revolution; however, we did not openly mention a word about Stalin and the Comintern. Sometime in the near future, [we] may openly do so. There are two explanations of why we did not openly criticize [Stalin and the Comintern]: first, as we followed their instructions, we have to take some responsibility. Second, we do not want to disrupt our relations with the Soviet Union. We had already begun to criticize Stalin and the Comintern; first, as we followed their instructions, we have to take some responsibility. Nobody compelled us to follow their instructions! Nobody forced us to be wrongfully deviated to right and left directions! There are two kinds of Chinese: one kind is a dogmatist who completely accepts Stalin’s line; the other opposes dogmatism, thus refusing to obey Stalin’s instructions. Second, we do not want to disrupt the Soviet and our relations with the Soviet Union. The Comintern has never made self-criticism on these mistakes; nor has the Soviet Union ever mentioned these mistakes. We would have fallen out with them had we raised our criticism.

The fourth time was when [Moscow] regarded me as a half-hearted Tito or semi-Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist countries and some non-socialist countries were there some people who had suspected whether China’s was a real revolution.

You might wonder why [we] still pay a tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his portrait on the wall. Comrades from Moscow have informed us that they no longer hang Stalin’s portraits and only display Lenin’s and current leaders’ portraits in public parade. They, however, did not ask us to follow their suit. We find it very difficult to cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin are yet to be made known to the Chinese people as well as to our whole party. Our situation is quite different from yours: your [suffering inflicted by Stalin] is known to the people and to the whole world. Within our party, the mistakes of the two Wang Ming lines are well known; but our people do not know that these mistakes originated in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and regarded me as a half-hearted Tito.

We had no objection that the Soviet Union functions as a center [of the world revolution] because it benefits the socialist movement. You may disagree [with us] on this point. You wholeheartedly support Khrushchev’s campaign to criticize Stalin, but we cannot do the same because our people would dislike it. In the previous parades [in China], we held up portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as those of a few Chinese [leaders]—Mao, Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], and Zhu [De]—and other brotherly parties’ leaders. Now we adopt a measure of “overthrowing all”: no one’s portrait is handed out. For this year’s “First of May” celebration, Ambassador Bobkoveshi already saw in Beijing that no one’s portrait was held in parade. However, the portraits of five dead persons—Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin and Sun [Yat-sen]—and not yet dead person—Mao Zedong—are still hanging [on the wall]. Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavians may comment that the Soviet Union no longer hangs Stalin’s portrait, but the Chinese still do.

As of this date some people remain suspicious of whether our socialism can be successfully constructed and stick to the assertion that our Communist Party is a phony one. What can we do? These people eat and sleep every day and then propagate that the Chinese Communist Party is not really a communist party, and that China’s socialist construction is bound to fail. To
them, it would be a bewildering thing if socialism could be built in China! Look out, [they warn]. China might become an imperialist country—to follow America, Britain, and France to become the fourth imperialist country! At present China has little industry, thus is in no position [to be an imperialist country]; but [China] will become formidable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan11 might be brought to life; consequently Europe would suffer again, and Yugoslavia might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” must be prevented!

There is absolutely no ground for this to happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist Party. The Chinese people are peace-loving people. We believe that aggression is a crime, therefore, we will never seize an inch of territory or a piece of grass from others. We love peace and we are Marxists.

We oppose great power politics in international relations. Although our industry is small, all things considered, we can be regarded as a big power. Hence some people [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn them: “Lower your heads and act with your tails tucked between your legs.” When I was little, my mother often taught me to behave “with tails tucked between legs.” This is a correct teaching and now I often mention it to my comrades.

Domestically, we oppose Pan-Hanism,12 because this tendency is harmful to the unity of all ethnic groups. Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sectarianism. Those who have hegemonic tendencies only care about their own interests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan-Hanists only care about the Han people and regard the Han people as superior to others, thus damaging [the interests of] all the minorities.

Some people have asserted in the past that China has no intention to be friends with other countries, but wants to split with the Soviet Union, thus becoming a troublemaker. Now, however, this kind of people shrinks to only a handful in the socialist countries; their number has been reduced since the War to Resist America and Assist Korea.13 It is, however, a totally different thing for the imperialists: the stronger China becomes, the more scared they will be. They also understand that China is not that terrifying as long as China has no advanced industry, and as long as China continues to rely on human power. The Soviet Union remains the most fearsome [for the imperialists] whereas China is merely the second. What they are afraid of is our politics and that we may have an enormous impact in Asia. That is why they keep spreading the words that China will be out of control and will invade others, so on and so forth.

We have been very cautious and modest, trying to overcome arrogance but adhering to the “Five Principles.”14 We know we have been bullied in the past; we understand how it feels to be bullied. You would have had the same feeling, wouldn’t you?

China’s future hinges upon socialism. It will take fifty or even one hundred years to turn China into a wealthy and powerful country. Now no [formidable] blocking force stands in China’s way. China is a huge country with a population of one fourth of that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribution to the world is yet to be compatible with her population size, and this situation will have to change, although my generation and even my son’s generation may not see the change taking place. How it will change in the future depends on how [China] develops. China may make mistakes or become corrupt; the current good situation may take a bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, that even if [China’s] situation takes a bad turn, it may not become as decadent a society as that of Jiang Jieshi’s. This anticipation is based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, and, then, negation of negation. The path in the future is bound to be tortuous. Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, and arrogance all may take effect in China. However, the Chinese people are inclined to be modest and willing to learn from others. One explanation is that we have little “capital” at our disposal: first, we did not invent Marxism which we learned from others; second, we did not experience the October Revolution and our revolution did not achieve victory until 1949, some thirty-two years after the October Revolution; third, we were only a branch army, not a main force, during the Second World War; fourth, with little modern industry, we merely have agriculture and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Although there are some people among us who appear to be cocky, they are in no position to be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] their tails one or two meters high. But we must prevent this from happening in the future: it may become dangerous [for us] in ten to twenty years and even more dangerous in forty to fifty years.

My comrades, let me advise you that you should also watch out for this potential. Your industry is much modernized and has experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin made you suffer and hence, justice is on your side. All of this, though, may become your [mental] burden.

The above-mentioned four mistakes Stalin committed [concerning China] may also become our burden. When China becomes industrialized in later years, it will be more likely that we get cocky. Upon your return to your country, please tell your youngsters that, should China stick her tail up in the future, even if the tail becomes ten thousand meters high, still they must criticize China. [You] must keep an eye on China, and the entire world must keep an eye on China. At that time, I definitely will not be here: I will already be attending a conference together with Marx.

We are sorry that we hurt you before, thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be compensated by life and debts must be paid in cash. We have criticized you before, but why do we still keep quiet? Before [Khrushchev’s] criticism of Stalin, we were not in a position to be as explicit about some issues as we are now. In my previous conversations with [Ambassador] Bobkoveshi, I could only say that as long as the Soviet Union did not criticize Stalin, we would be in no position to do so; as long as the Soviet Union did not restore [diplomatic] relations with Yugoslavia, we could not establish relations with you.15 Now these issues can be openly discussed. I have already talked to the Soviet comrades about the four mistakes that Stalin had committed [to China]; I talked to [Soviet Ambassador Pavel] Yudin16 about it, and I shall talk to Khrushchev about it next time when we meet. I talk to you about it because you are our comrades. However, we still cannot publish this in the newspapers, because the imperialists should not be allowed to know about it. We may openly talk about one or two mistakes of Stalin’s in the future. Our situation is quite different from yours: Tito’s autobiography mentions Stalin because you have already broken up with the Soviet Union.

Stalin advocated dialectical materialism, but sometimes he lacked materialism and, instead, practiced metaphysics; he wrote about historical materialism, but very often
suffered from historical idealism. Some of his behavior, such as going to extremes, fostering personal myth, and embarrassing others, are by no means [forms] of materialism.

Before I met with Stalin, I did not have much good feeling about him. I disliked reading his works, and I have read only “On the Basis of Leninism,” a long article criticizing Trotsky, and “Be Carried Away by Success,” etc. I disliked even more his articles on the Chinese revolution. He was very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his heart with others and treated others as equals whereas Stalin liked to stand above every one else and order others around. This style can be detected from his works. After I met with him, I became even more disgusted: I quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin was excitable by temperament. When he became agitated, he would spell out nasty things.

I have written altogether three pieces praising Stalin. The first was written in Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 December 1939—ed.], the second was the congratulatory speech [I delivered] in Moscow [in December 1949—ed.], and the third was an article requested by Pravda after his death [March 1953—ed.]. I always dislike congratulating others as well as being congratulated by others. When I was in Moscow to celebrate his birthday, what else could I have done if I had chosen not to congratulate him? Could I have cursed him instead? After his death the Soviet Union needed our support and we also wanted to support the Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal feelings and treat him as the leader of a socialist country. Therefore, that piece was rather vigorous whereas the other two came out of [political] need, not my heart, nor at my will. Human life is just as contradictory as this: your emotion tells you not to write these pieces, but your rationality compels you to do so.

Now that Moscow has criticized Stalin, we are free to talk about these issues. Today I tell you about the four mistakes committed by Stalin, but, in order to maintain relations with the Soviet Union, [we] cannot publish them in our newspapers. Since Khrushchev’s report only mentioned the conflict over the sugar plant while discussing Stalin’s mistakes concerning us, we feel it inappropriate to make them public. There are other issues involving conflicts and controversies.

Generally speaking, the Soviet Union is good. It is good because of four factors: Marxism-Leninism, the October Revolution, the main force [of the socialist camp], and industrialization. They have their negative side, and have made some mistakes. However, their achievements constitute the major part [of their past] while their shortcomings are of secondary significance. Now that the enemy is taking advantage of the criticism of Stalin to take the offensive on a world-wide scale, we ought to support the Soviet Union. They will certainly correct their mistakes. Khrushchev already corrected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. They are already aware of Wang Ming’s mistakes, although in the past they were unhappy with our criticism of Wang Ming. They have also removed the “half-hearted Tito” [label from me], thus, eliminating altogether [the labels on] one and a half Titos. We are pleased to see that Tito’s tag was removed.

Some of our people are still unhappy with the criticism of Stalin. However, such criticism has positive effects because it destroys mythologies, and opens [black] boxes. This entails liberation, indeed, a “war of liberation.” With it, people are becoming so courageous that they will speak their minds, as well as be able to think about issues.

Liberty, equality, and fraternity are slogans of the bourgeoisie, but now we have to fight for them. Is [our relationship with Moscow] a father-and-son relationship or one between brothers? It was between father and son in the past; now it more or less resembles a brotherly relationship, but the shadow of the father-and-son relationship is not completely removed. This is understandable, because changes can never be completed in one day. With certain openness, people are now able to think freely and independently. Now there is, in a sense, the atmosphere of anti-feudalism: a father-and-son relationship is giving way to a brotherly relationship, and a patriarchal system is being toppled. During Stalin’s time people’s minds were so tightly controlled that even the feudalist control had been surpassed. While some enlightened feudal lords or emperors would accept criticism, Stalin would tolerate none. Yugoslavia might also have such a ruler [in your history] who might take it well even when people cursed him right in his face. The capitalist society has taken a step ahead of the feudalist society. The Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States are allowed to quarrel with each other.

We socialist countries must find better solutions. Certainly, we need concentration and unification; otherwise, uniformity cannot be maintained. The uniformity of people’s minds is in our favor, enabling us to achieve industrialization in a short period and to deal with the imperialists. It, however, embodies some shortcomings, that is, people are made afraid of speaking out. Therefore, we must find some ways to encourage people to speak out. Our Politburo’s comrades have recently been considering these issues.

Few people in China have ever openly criticized me. The [Chinese] people are tolerant of my shortcomings and mistakes. It is because we always want to serve the people and do good things for the people. Although we sometimes also suffer from bossism and bureaucracy, the people believe that we have done more good things than bad ones and, as a result, they praise us more than criticize us. Consequently, an idol is created: when some people criticize me, others would oppose them and accuse them of disrespecting the leader. Everyday I and other comrades of the central leadership receive some three hundred letters, some of which are critical of us. These letters, however, are either not signed or signed with a false name. The authors are not afraid that we would suppress them, but they are afraid that others around them would make them suffer.

You mentioned “On Ten Relationships.” This resulted from one-and-a-half months of discussions between me and thirty-four ministers [of the government]. What opinions could I myself have put forward without them? All I did was to put together their suggestions, and I did not create anything. Any creation requires materials and factories. However, I am no longer a good factory. All my equipment is out-of-date, I need to be improved and re-equipped as much as do the factories in Britain. I am getting old and can no longer play the major role but had to assume a minor part. As you can see, I merely played a minor role during this Party’s National Congress whereas Liu
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others assumed the primary functions.

Source: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenzuan, 280-283

[Let me] talk about U.S.-China relations. At this conference we have circulated a copy of the letter from [Dwight D.] Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in my view, aims largely at dampening the enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheering him up a bit. The letter urges [Jiang] to keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to resolve the problems through the United Nations, but not through a war. This is to pour cold water [on Jiang]. It is easy for Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer [Jiang] up is to continue the hard, uncompromising policy toward the [Chinese] Communist Party, and to hope that internal unrest would disable us. In his [Eisenhower’s] calculation, internal unrest has already occurred and it is hard for the Communist Party to suppress it. Well, different people observe things differently!

I still believe that it is much better to establish diplomatic relations with the United States several years later than sooner. This is in our favor. The Soviet Union did not form diplomatic relations with the United States until seventeen years after the October Revolution. The global economic crisis erupted in 1929 and lasted until 1933. In that year Hitler came to power in Germany whereas Roosevelt took office in the United States. Only then was the Soviet-American diplomatic relationship established. [As far as I can anticipate], it will probably wait until when we have completed the Third Five-Year Plan that we should consider forming diplomatic relations with the United States. In other words, it will take eighteen or even more years [before we do so]. We are not anxious to enter the United Nations either. This is based on exactly the same reasoning as why we are not anxious to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The objective of this policy is to deprive the U.S. of its political assets as much as possible, so that the U.S. will be placed in an unreasonable and isolated position. It is therefore all right if [the U.S.] blocks us from the United Nations and refuses to establish diplomatic relation with us. The longer you drag on [these issues], the more debts you will owe us. The longer the issues linger there, the more unreasonable you will appear, and the more isolated you will become both domestically and in face of international public opinion. I once told an American in Yanan that even if you United States refused to recognize us for one hundred years, I simply did not believe that you United States could refuse to recognize us in the one hundred and first year. Sooner or later the U.S. will establish diplomatic relations with us. When the United States does so and when Americans finally come to visit China, they will feel deep regret. It is because by then, China will become completely different [from what it is now]: the house has been thoroughly swept and cleaned, “the four pests” have altogether been eliminated; and they can hardly find any of their “friends.” Even if they spread some germs [in China], it will have no use at all.

Since the end of the Second World War, every capitalist country has suffered from instability which has led to disturbance and disorder. Every country in the world is disturbed, and China is no exception. However, we are much less disturbed than they are. I want you to think about this issue: between the socialist countries and the imperialist countries, especially the United States, which side is more afraid of the other after all? In my opinion, both are afraid [of the other], but the issue is who is afraid more. I am inclined to accept such an assessment: the imperialists are more afraid of us. However, such an assessment entails a danger, that is, it could put us into a three-day-long sleep. Therefore, [we] always have to stress two possibilities. Putting the positive possibility aside, the negative potential is that the imperialists may become crazy. Imperialists always harbor malicious intentions and constantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless, it will not be that easy for the imperialists to start a world war; they have to consider the consequences once war starts.

[Let me] also talk about Sino-Soviet relations. In my view, wrangling [between us] will continue. [We shall] never pretend that the Communist parties will not wrangle. Is there a place in the world where wrangling does not exist? Marxism itself is a wrangling-ism, and is about contradiction and struggle. Contradictions are everywhere, and contradictions invariably lead to struggle. At present there exist some controversies between China and the Soviet Union. Their ways of thinking, behavior, and historical traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we must try to persuade them. Persuasion is what I have always advocated as a way to deal with our own comrades. Some may argue that since we are comrades, we must be of the same good quality, and why in the world is persuasion needed among comrades? Moreover, persuasion is often employed for building a common front and always targeted at the democratic figures and, why is it employed toward communist party members? This reasoning is wrong. Different opinions and views do exist even within a communist party. Some have joined the party, but have not changed their mindset. Some old cadres do not share the same language with us. Therefore, [we] have to engage in heart-to-heart talks with them: sometimes individually, sometimes in groups. In one meeting after another we will be able to persuade them.

As far as I can see, circumstances are beyond what persons, even those occupying high positions, can control. Under the pressure of circumstance, those in the Soviet Union who still want to practice big-power chauvinism will invariably encounter difficulties. To persuade them remains our current policy and requires us to engage in direct dialogue with them. The last time our delegation visited the Soviet Union, [we] openly talked about some [controversial] issues. I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the phone that, as those people are blinded by lust for gain, the best way to deal with them is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is [their] asset? It involves nothing more than 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much does this count? It does not count for a thing. With this asset, however, their heads have gotten really big. How can they be communists [by being so cocky]? How can they be Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a hundred times bigger, these things do not count for a thing. They have achieved nothing but digging a few things out of the earth, turning them into steel, thereby manufacturing some airplanes and automobiles. This is nothing to be proud of! They, however, turn these [achievements] into huge burdens on their back and hardly care about revolutionary principles. If this cannot be described as being blinded by lust for gain, what else...
could this be? Taking the office of the first secretary can also become a source for being blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for one to be out of one’s mind. Whenever one is out of his mind, there must be a way to bring him back to his senses. This time Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained a modest attitude but quarreled with them and, of course, they argued back. This is a correct attitude, because it is always better to make every [controversial] issue clear face to face. As much as they intend to influence us, we want to influence them too. However, we did not unveil everything this time, because we must save some magic weapons [in reserve]. Conflict will always exist. All we hope for at present is to avoid major clashes so as to seek common ground while reserving differences. Let these differences be dealt with in the future. Should they stick to the current path, one day, we will have to expose everything.

As for us, our external propaganda must not contain any exaggeration. In the future, we shall always remain cautious and modest, and shall tightly tuck our tails between our legs. We still need to learn from the Soviet Union. However, we shall learn from them rather selectively: only accept the good stuff, while at the same avoiding picking up the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. As long as we are aware of their mistakes, [we] can avoid committing the same mistake. We, however, must learn from anything that is useful to us and, at the same time, we must grasp useful things all over the world. One ought to seek knowledge in all parts of the world. It would be monotonous if one only sticks to one place to receive education.


Having already spoken considerably about the achievements of the Soviet Communist leadership in public, now let [me] illustrate again the major mistakes it has made:

(1) In my view, the mistakes of the Soviet Communist leadership arise from erroneous thinking. They often set the interests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of their brotherly parties; they often set their own interests as the leaders ahead of those of the party. As a result, they often fail to overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, and emotion when they think about and resolve problems; they often fail to link together the interests of the above-stated sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm fashion. Although they may correct one mistake, they are not free of making others. Sometimes they admit that they made mistakes; but it does not mean that they fully come to grips with their mistakes for they merely take a perfunctory attitude toward these mistakes.

For instance, the dispatch of their troops to Warsaw was clearly interference with the internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed forces, but not an action to suppress counter-revolutionaries. They admitted that they had committed a serious mistake, and they even stated in our meetings this time that no one should be allowed to interfere with other brotherly parties’ internal affairs; but in the meantime, they denied that [their intervention in Poland] was a mistake.

When we had a general assessment of Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social roots of his [mistakes], they kept avoiding any real discussion. Although they seemingly have changed [their view] in measuring Stalin’s achievements and mistakes, to me, such an alteration was to meet their temporary needs, not the result of profound contemplation.

We immediately sensed this shortly after our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner party hosted by Liu Xiao\(^25\) on the 17th [of January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappropriate words, however, he made no self-criticism. We then pushed him by pointing out that, given the development of Stalin’s authoritarianism, ossified way of thinking, and arrogant and conceited attitude over twenty years, how can those comrades, especially those [Soviet] Politburo members, who had worked with Stalin, decline to assume any responsibility? They then admitted that Stalin’s errors came about gradually; had they not been afraid of getting killed, they could have at least done more to restrict the growth of Stalin’s mistakes than to encourage him. However, in open talks, they refused to admit this.

Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that as members of the third generation [of Soviet] leadership, they could not do anything to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. During [my visit] this time, however, I stressed the ideological and social roots of Stalin’s mistakes, pointing out that the other leaders had to assume some responsibility for the gradual development of Stalin’s mistakes. I also expressed our Chinese Party’s conviction that open self-criticism will do no harm to, but will enhance, the Party’s credibility and prestige. Before getting out of the car at the [Moscow] airport, Khrushchev explained to me that they could not conduct the same kind of self-criticism as we do; should they do so, their current leadership would be in trouble.

About the Poland question.\(^26\) It is crystal-clear that the Poland incident was a result of the historical antagonism between the Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of [the Second World] War, many [outstanding and potential] conflicts have yet to be appropriately resolved. The recent [Soviet] dispatch of troops to Warsaw caused an even worse impact [in Poland]. Under these circumstances the Polish comrades have good reason not to accept the policy of “following the Soviet leadership.” The Polish comrades, however, admitted that they had yet to build a whole-hearted trusting relationship with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, [Wladyslaw] Gomulka\(^27\) is trying his best to retrieve the losses and reorient the Polish-Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland]. Regardless, however, the Soviet comrades remain unwilling to accept the criticism that [they] practiced big-power politics [in resolving the Polish crisis]. This kind of attitude does not help at all to convince the Polish comrades.

It is safe to say that although every public communiqué [between the Soviet Union and] other brotherly states has repeatedly mentioned what the 30 October [1956] declaration\(^28\) has announced as the principles to guide the relationship among brotherly parties and governments, [the Soviets] seem to recoil in fear when dealing with specific issues and tend to be inured to patronizing others and interfering with other brotherly parties’ and governments’ internal affairs.
(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Facing a [common] grave enemy, the Soviet comrades have ardent expectations about Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opinion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly convinced by our argument; nor have the differences between us disappeared completely. For instance, many leaders of the Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised our article “Another Comment on the Historical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictatorship.” Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, when we discussed with them the part of the article concerning criticism of Stalin, they said that this was what made them pleased (or put them in a difficult position, I can’t remember the exact words). . . . Therefore, I believe that some of the Soviet leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, at the last day’s meeting, I decided not to raise our requests concerning the abolition of the long-term supply and purchase contracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] collaboration on nuclear energy and missile development. About these issues I didn’t say a word. It was not because there wasn’t enough time to do so, but because [I wanted to] avoid impressing upon them that we were taking advantage of their precarious position by raising these issues. These issues can be raised later or simply dropped.

(3) In assessing the international situation, I am convinced that they spend more time and effort on coping with specific and isolated events than on evaluating and anticipating the situations thoroughly from different angles. They explicitly demonstrate weakness in considering and discussing strategic and long-term issues. As far as tactics are concerned, on the other hand, lacking clearly defined principles, they tend to be on such a loose ground in handling specific affairs that they will fail to reach satisfactorily the strategic goals through resolving each specific conflict. As a result, it is very likely that some worrisome events may occur in international affairs. For instance, this time they conceded to our conviction that in today’s world there existed two camps and three forces (socialist, imperialist, and nationalist) and agreed to our analysis. But the communiqué drafted by them included only vague statements about the union among the Soviet Union, China and India, as well as [about] possible Sino-Soviet collaboration on the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs. We regarded these statements as swashbuckling, which is not good, and they were finally deleted from the communiqué. As a result, we did not use the Soviet draft. The published communiqué was largely based on our draft.

(4) In spite of all of the above, however, Sino-Soviet relations are far better now than during Stalin’s era. First of all, facing the [common] grave enemy, both sides have realized and accepted the necessity of promoting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual support, which had been taken as the most important principle. Second, now the Soviet Union and China can sit down to discuss issues equally. Even if they have different ideas on certain issues, they must consult with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are having some impact on the cadres and people in the Soviet Union, and even on some [Soviet] leaders. Third, the previous dull situation in which the brotherly parties and states could hardly discuss or argue with one another no longer exists. Now, different opinions can be freely exchanged so that unity and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, the majority of the Soviet people love China and feel happy for the Chinese people’s achievements and growth in strength. Their admiration and friendship with the Chinese people are being enhanced on a daily basis. However, while [Russian] arrogance and self-importance have not been completely eliminated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet leadership] gave us a splendid and grand reception which indicated its intention to build a good image in front of its own people and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and knowing little the ways of the world, some of their leaders have hardly improved themselves even with the several rebuffs they have met in the past year. On the other hand, however, they appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs or relations with other brotherly parties. Although they did sometimes speak from the bottom of their hearts while talking with us, they nevertheless could not get down from their high horse. In short, it is absolutely inadvisable for us not to persuade them [to make changes]; it is, however, equally inadvisable for us to be impatient in changing them. Therefore, changes on their part can only be achieved through a well-planned, step-by-step, persistent, patient, long-term persuasion.

Part II. Disputes over Long-wave Radio Stations and the Joint Submarine Flotilla


With regard to Soviet Union’s request for establishing long-wave radio stations in our country, the Soviet side insists on the original idea that the construction should be jointly invested by the two sides. They also propose to dispatch experts to China in early June to conduct such activities as selecting the proper location, making investigations and preparing for the design work, and drafting an agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In order not to hinder the investigation and design work, we may permit the Soviet experts to come to China to conduct some technical work, leaving the question concerning investment and operation to be solved as the next step.

5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the Soviet Request on Establishing a Special Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June 1958 Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 316-317

For the eyes of Liu [Shaoqi], Lin Biao, [Deng] Xiaoping, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Chen [Yun], Peng Zhen, and Chen Yi only: return to Comrade Peng Dehuai for file.

This can be implemented as [you have] planned. China must come up with the money to pay for [the financial cost] which cannot be covered by the Soviet side.

Mao Zedong
7 June

If they try to put heavy pressure on us, we shall not respond and shall let it drag on for a while, or we may respond after the
central leadership discusses it. This issue must be settled through an agreement between the two governments.

Peng [Dehuai] ought to pay attention to the section about the conversation where Mao has added some comments.

II

China must shoulder the responsibility of capital investment for this radio station; China is duty-bound in this case. [We] may have to ask for Soviet comrades’ help with regard to construction and equipment, but all the costs must be priced and paid in cash by us. [We] may share its use after it is constructed, which ought to be determined by an agreement between the two governments.33 This is China’s position, not purely the position of mine.34

6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July 195835
Source: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 322-333

After you left yesterday I could not fall asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite you over to talk a bit more so that you can be [my] doctor: [after talking with you], I might be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating and sleeping.

Let us return to the main subject and chat about the issues we discussed yesterday. We will only talk about these issues here in this room! There exists no crisis situation between you and me. Our relationship can be described as: nine out of ten fingers of yours and ours are quite the same with only one finger differing. I have repeated this point two or three times. You haven’t forgotten, have you?

I’ve thought over and again of the issues that were discussed yesterday. It is likely that I might have misunderstood you, but it is also possible that I was right. We may work out a solution after discussion or debate. It appears that [we] will have to withdraw [our] navy’s request for [obtaining] nuclear-powered submarines [from the Soviet Union]. Barely remembering this matter, I have acquired some information about it only after asking others.36 There are some warmhearted people at our navy’s headquarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They asserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear submarines have been developed, we can obtain [them] simply by sending a cable [to Moscow].

Well, your navy’s nuclear submarines are of a [top] secret advanced technology. The Chinese people are careless in handling things. If we are provided with them, we might put you to trouble.

The Soviet comrades have won victory for forty years, and are thus rich in experience. It has only been eight years since our victory and we have little experience. You therefore raised the question of joint ownership and operation. The issue of ownership has long before been dealt with: Lenin proposed the system of rent and lease which, however, was targeted at the capitalists.

China has some remnant capitalists, but the state is under the leadership of the Communist Party. You never trust the Chinese! You only trust the Russians! [To you] the Russians are the first-class [people] whereas the Chinese are among the inferior who are dumb and careless. Therefore [you] came up with the joint ownership and operation proposition. Well, if [you] want joint ownership and operation, how about have them all—let us turn into joint ownership and operation our army, navy, air force, industry, agriculture, culture, education. Can we do this? Or, [you] may have all of China’s more than ten thousand kilometers of coastline and let us only maintain a guerrilla force. With a few atomic bombs, you think you are in a position to control us through asking for the right of rent and lease. Other than this, what else [do you have] to justify [your request]?

Lushun [Port Arthur] and Dalian [Darinse] were under your control before. You departed from these places later. Why were these places under your control? It is because then China was under the Guomindang’s rule. Why did you volunteer to leave? It is because the Communist Party had taken control of China.

Because of Stalin’s pressure, the Northeast and Xinjiang became a [Soviet] sphere of influence, and four jointly owned and operated enterprises were established.37 Comrade Khrushchev later proposed to have these [settlements] eliminated, and we were grateful for that.

You [Russians] have never had faith in the Chinese people, and Stalin was among the worst. The Chinese [Communists] were regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese people] were considered as a backward nation. You [Russians] have often stated that the Europeans looked down upon the Russians. I believe that some Russians look down upon the Chinese people.

At the most critical juncture [of the Chinese revolution], Stalin did not allow us to carry out our revolution and opposed our carrying out the revolution. He made a huge mistake on this issue. So did [Grigory Y.] Zinoviev.

Neither were we pleased with [Anastas] Mikoyan. He flaunted his seniority and treated us as if [we were] his sons. He put on airs and looked very arrogant. He assumed the greatest airs when he first visited Xibaipo in 194938 and has been like that every time he came to China. Every time he came, he would urge me to visit Moscow. I asked him what for. He would then say that there was always something for you to do there. Nevertheless, only until later when Comrade Khrushchev proposed to hold a conference to work out a resolution [concerning the relationship among all the communist parties and socialist states] did [I go to Moscow].39

It was our common duty to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Up to that time, as I often pointed out, there had existed no such thing as brotherly relations among all the parties because, [your leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it; as a result, the relations between [the brotherly] parties can be described as between father and son or between cats and mice. I have raised this issue in my private meetings with Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades. They all admitted that such a father-son relationship was not of European but Asian style. Present were Bulganin, Mikoyan, and [M. A.] Suslov. Were you also at the meeting? From the Chinese side, I and Deng Xiaoping were present.

I was unhappy with Mikoyan’s congratulation speech which he delivered at our Eighth National Congress and I deliberately refused to attend that day’s meeting as a protest. You did not know that many of our deputies were not happy with [Mikoyan’s speech]. Acting as if he was the father, he regarded China as Russia’s son.

China has her own revolutionary traditions, although China’s revolution could not have succeeded without the October Revolution, nor without Marxism-Leninism.

We must learn from the Soviet experi-
We ought to learn from all the experiences whether they are correct or erroneous. The erroneous lessons included Stalin’s metaphysics and dogmatism. He was not totally metaphysical because he had acquired some dialectics in thinking; but a large part of his [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What you termed as the cult of personality was one [example of his metaphysics]. Stalin loved to assume the greatest airs.

Although we support the Soviet Union, we won’t endorse its mistakes. As for [the differences over] the issue of peaceful evolution, we have never openly discussed [these differences], nor have we published [them] in the newspapers. Cautious as we have been, we choose to exchange different opinions internally. I had discussed them with you before I went to Moscow. While in Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] issues. We won’t openly talk about them even in the future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade Khruzhchev’s [political position]. In order to help consolidate his [Khruzhchev’s] leadership, we decided not to talk about these [controversies], although it does not mean that the justice is not on our side.

With regard to inter-governmental relations, we remain united and unified up to this date which even our adversaries have conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have objected to all the major criticism that the revisionists and imperialists have massed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has so far done the same thing [for us].

When did the Soviets begin to trust us Chinese? At the time when [we] entered the Korean War. From then on, the two countries got closer to one another [than before] and as a result, the 156 aid projects came about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade Khruzhchev later added a few more.

We have held no secrets from you. Because more than one thousand of your experts are working in our country, you are fully aware of the state of our military, political, economic, and cultural affairs. We trust your people, because you are from a socialist country, and you are sons and daughters of Lenin.

Problems have existed in our relations, but it was mainly Stalin’s responsibility. [We] have had three grievances [against Stalin]. The first concerns the two Wang Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin’s follower. The second was [Stalin’s] discouragement of and opposition to our revolution. Even after the dissolution of the Third International, he still issued orders claiming that, if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of national elimination. Well, for whatever reason, we are not eliminated. The third was during my first visit to Moscow during which Stalin, [V.M.] Molotov, and [Lavrenti] Beria personally attacked me.

Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar [to China] to read my works? Was it because I so lacked confidence that I would even have to have you read my works? Or was it because I had nothing to do myself? Not a chance! [My real intention] was to get you over to China to see with your own eyes whether China was truly practicing Marxism or only half-hearted toward Marxism.

Upon your return [to Moscow] you spoke highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin was “the Chinese [comrades] are truly Marxists.” Nevertheless Stalin remained doubtful. Only when [we entered] the Korean War did he change his view [about us], and so did East European and other brotherly parties drop their doubts [about us].

It appears that there are reasons for us to be suspect: “First, you opposed Wang Ming; second, you simply insisted on carrying out your revolution regardless of [our] opposition; third, you looked so smart when you went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin to sign an agreement so that [China] would regain authority over the [Manchurian] railroad.” In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who took care of me with [N. T.] Fedorenko as my interpreter. I got so angry that I once pounded on the table. I only had three tasks here [in Moscow], I said to them, the first was to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third was to shit.

There was a [Soviet] adviser in [our military] academy who, in discussing war cases, would only allow [the Chinese trainees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, not China’s, would only allow them to talk about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, not [ours] in the Korean War.

Please allow us to talk about these cases! [Can you imagine] he wouldn’t even allow us to talk about [our own war experiences]! For God’s sake, we fought wars for twenty-two years; we fought in Korea for three years! Let [me ask] the Central Military Commission to prepare some materials concerning [our war experiences] and give them to Comrade Yunid, of course, if he is interested.

We did not speak out on some [controversial] issues because we did not want to cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. This was particularly true when the Polish Incident broke out. When Poland demanded that all of your specialists go home, Comrade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu’s] suggestion which made the Polish people happy because they then tasted some freedom. At that time we did not raise our problems with your specialists [in China] because, we believe, it would have caused you to be suspicious that we took the advantage [of your crisis situation] to send all the specialists home. We will not send your specialists home; we will not do so even if Poland does so ten more times. We need Soviet aid.

Once I have persuaded the Polish people that [we all] should learn from the Soviet Union, and that after putting the anti-dogmatism campaign at rest, [they] ought to advocate a “learn from the Soviet Union” slogan. Who will benefit in learning from the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland more.

Although we shall learn from the Soviet Union, we must first of all take into account our own experiences and mainly rely on our own experiences.

There should be some agreed limits on the terms of [Soviet] specialists. For instance, there have never been restrictions on your chief advisers in [our military] and public security branches, who can come and go without even notifying or consulting with us in advance. Presumably, if you leave your post, is it all right that another ambassador be sent [to China] without discussing it with us? No, absolutely not! How much information could your advisers to our ministry of public security obtain if they merely sit there totally uniformed by their Chinese colleagues?

Let me advise you [and your specialists] to pay more visits to each of our provinces so as to get in touch with the people and obtain first-hand information. This have I
MAO ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador

Introduction by Odd Arne Westad

Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China Pavel Yudin’s two conversations with Mao on 31 March (printed below) and 2 May 19561, form some of the best evidence we have on the Chairman’s reaction to Khrushchev’s secret speech at the February 1956 CPSU 20th Congress. The conversations provide a fascinating insight into how Mao Zedong manipulated history and the myth of his own role in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They also show that Mao’s concrete views on the “Stalin issue” in the spring of 1956 were much different from those to which the Chinese party later subscribed.

In his long monologues to Yudin—with whom he was on personally friendly terms—Mao gave vent to three decades of frustrations with Stalin’s China policy—frustrations which up to 1956 he could neither present fully to the Soviets nor share openly with his Chinese colleagues. In terms of CCP history, Mao’s spring 1956 version was not radically different from what had been dogmatically accepted in the party since 1945, with the major exception that Stalin’s role had been filled in. In this version, the major “mistakes” which almost destroyed the party before Mao took the helm were ascribed not only to the CCP leaders who implemented the policies (Li Lisan, Wang Ming and others), but to Stalin, who had inspired and abetted “the mistakes.” Likewise, the resistance to Mao’s “correct” leadership since the late 1930s could again be traced back to Stalin’s errors, which even influenced the negotiating of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950—the very text on which the relationship between the two Communist states was built.

To Mao, more than to most CCP leaders, Khrushchev’s speech was a golden opportunity not only to restate China’s past and present relationship with the Soviet Union, but also to sanction his and the party’s turn to more radical policies since the start of 1955. These policies, including the sweeping collectivization of agriculture which had just been completed (of which the Soviets had been rather critical) and the further steps in speeding up the revolutionary process which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by a nascent concern about the lack of revolutionary fervor within the CCP), could now be advanced without too much interference from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in effect, repudiated much of its own past, it could no longer insist on having a monopoly on theoretical guidance. Mao could—in a dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin’s ghost.

It was not until, first, half a year later, after the Polish and Hungarian events in October-November 1956, that Mao’s concern with the political effects of de-Stalinization came to the fore. The disintegration of Communist authority in Eastern Europe frightened the Chinese leaders and compelled them to adopt a much more cautious attitude to the “Stalin issue,” including an indirect criticism of the Soviets for having gone too far in their revision of the Communist past. (For revealing insights into the causes of Mao’s change of heart, see Bo Yibo’s and Wu Lengxi’s recent memoirs.)

Mao’s conversation with the somewhat startled Soviet ambassador S.V. Chervonenko on 26 December 1960 (also printed below) is as difficult to interpret for historians today as it must have been for Moscow Center 35 years ago. 1960 was the year when the Sino-Soviet split broke into the open, first with newspaper polemics in the spring, and then the recall of all Soviet advisory personnel from China in July. Meetings between the two sides had been increasingly frosty, even if the compromises reached on some issues during the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in the fall momentarily reduced the intensity of the confrontation.

Mao had not met Chervonenko earlier in the year, but in this meeting he seemed to be eager to depreciate his own role in Chinese policymaking, and thereby in the responsibility for the split. Granted, Mao’s description of his political status is not totally inaccurate; in the wake of his disastrous economic experiments in the late 1950s, he had—not of his own free will—taken less part in day-to-day governance than before. But here he overstated his case and he did so to the Soviet ambassador. In addition, when it came to the Sino-Soviet conflict, we know that Mao had been fully in charge, even during this period.

So what was Mao’s purpose? To behave civilly to a well-wisher bringing birthday greetings? To give away as little as possible about how he really felt about Sino-Soviet relations? Or to position himself so that in case his game with real or perceived enemies within his own party went against him, he could still play the “Soviet card” to strengthen his hand? As of yet, we still do not know.

Translations of the two documents follow below:

continued on page 164
It was Comrade Khrushchev who had eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before his death, Stalin demanded the right to build a plant to manufacture canned food in our country. My response was that [we] would accept [the demand] as long as you provide us equipment, help us build it, and import all the products [from us]. Comrade Khrushchev praised me for giving [Stalin] a good answer. But why in the world do [you Russians] want to build a naval “cooperative” now? How would you explain to the rest of the world that you propose to build a naval “cooperative” now? How would you explain to the Chinese people? For the sake of struggling against the imperialists, you may, as advisers, train the Chinese people. Otherwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and other [ports] for ninety-nine years; but your “cooperative” proposal involves the question of ownership, as you propose that each side will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday you made me so enraged that I could not sleep at all last night. They (pointing at other CCP leaders present) are not angry. Only me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my sole responsibility.

(Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unanimously agreed upon these points.)

If we fail to get our messages through this time, we may have to arrange another meeting; if not, we may have to meet every day. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Comrade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to clarify every issue.

(Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky cabled me requesting to build a long-wave radio station along China’s coast to direct the [Soviet] submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As the project will cost a total of 110 million rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 million and China will pay 40 million.)

This request is of the same nature as the naval “cooperative” proposal which [we] cannot explain to the people. [We] will be put in a politically disadvantageous position if [we] reveal these requests to the world.

(Peng Dehuai: Petrovshviki [a Soviet military adviser] also has a rude attitude and rough style. He is not very pleased because some of our principles for army building do not completely follow the Soviet military codes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, when Comrade Ye Fei from the Fujian Military District pointed out that, as the Soviet military codes were basically to guide operations on flatlands, and as Fujian [province] had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes were not entirely applicable [to Fujian’s reality]. Very upset at hearing this, Petrovshviki immediately responded: “You have insulted the great military science invented by the great Stalin!” His remarks made everyone at the meeting very nervous.)

Some of the above-mentioned [controversial] issues have been raised [by us] before, some have not. You have greatly aided us but now we are downplaying your [role]; you may feel very bad about it. Our relationship, however, resembles that between professor and student: the professor may make mistakes, do not you agree that the student has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes does not mean that the [student] will drive the professor out. After all the professor is a good one.

You are assisting us to build a navy! Your [people] can serve as advisers. Why would you have to have fifty percent of the ownership? This is a political issue. We plan to build two or three hundred submarines of this kind.

If you insist on attaching political conditions [to our submarine request], we will not satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny [piece of our] finger. You may inform Comrade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] these conditions, there is no point for us to talk about this issue. If he accepts our requirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if not, he does not have to come, because there is nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny condition is unacceptable [for us]!

When this issue is involved, we will refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand years. However, it is still possible for us to cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely that we would break up. We will, from beginning to the end, support the Soviet Union, although we may quarrel with each other inside the house.

While I was in Moscow, I once made it clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did not have to satisfy every one of our requests. Because if you hold back your aid from us, [you] in effect would compel us to work harder [to be self-reliant]; should we get everything from you, we will end up in an disadvantageous position.

It is, however, extremely important for us to cooperate politically. Because, if we undermine your political positions, you will encounter considerable problems; the same is true with us: if you undermine our [political] positions, we will be in trouble.

In wartime, you can utilize all our naval ports, military bases, and other [facilities]. [In return] our [military] can operate in your places including your port or bases at Vladivostok and shall return home when war is over. We may sign an agreement on wartime cooperation in advance which does not have to wait until war breaks out. Such an agreement must contain a stipulation that our [forces] can operate on your territory; even if we might not do so, such a stipulation is required, because it involves the issue of equality. In peacetime, however, such an arrangement cannot be accepted. In peacetime, you are only to help us construct [military] bases and build armed forces.

We would not have accepted [your] proposition for building a naval “cooperative” even it had been during Stalin’s time. I quarreled with him in Moscow!

Comrade Khrushchev has established his credibility by having the [previous] “cooperative” projects eliminated. Now that such an issue involving ownership is raised again, we are reminded of Stalin’s positions. I might be mistaken, but I must express my opinion.

You explained [to me] yesterday that [your proposition] was based on the consideration that [Russia’s coastal] conditions were not as good for nuclear submarines to function fully as China’s, thus hamstringing future development of nuclear submarines. You can reach [the Pacific] Ocean from Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The condition is very good!

What you said [yesterday] made me very uneasy and displeased. Please report all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: you must tell him exactly what I have said without any polishing so as to make him uneasy. He has criticized Stalin’s [policy] lines but now adopts the same policies as Stalin did.

We will still have controversies. You do not endorse some of our policies; we cannot accept some of your policies. For instance, your [leadership] is not pleased at our policy regarding “internal contradictions among the people,” and the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend.”

Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, causing the losses of our revolutionary
strength up to more than ninety percent. At the critical junctures [of our revolution], he wanted to hold us back and opposed our revolution. Even after [we] achieved victory, he remained doubtful about us. At the same time, he boasted that it was because of the direction of his theories that China’s [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away with any superstition about him. Before I die, I am prepared to write an article on what Stalin had done to China, which is to be published in one thousand years.

(Yudin: The Soviet central leadership’s attitude toward the policies of the Chinese central leadership is: it is completely up to the Chinese comrades how to resolve the Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese comrades who understand the situation best. Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and arrogant to judge and assess whether or not the CCP’s policies are correct, for the CCP is a great party.)

Well, [we] can only say that we have been basically correct. I myself have committed errors before. Because of my mistakes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and two other campaigns. I will be very content if I am refuted as being basically correct, because such an assessment is close to reality.

Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will be built is a policy issue: only China is in a position to decide whether we should build it with your assistance or it should be “jointly owned.” Comrade Khrushchev ought to come to China [to discuss this issue] because I have already visited him in [Moscow].

[We] should by no means have blind faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of your specialists asserted on the basis of a book written by one of your academy scholars that our coal from Shanxi [province] cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an assertion has despaired us: we therefore would have no coal which can be turned into coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit!

Comrade Xining [transliteration], a Soviet specialist who helped us build the Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very good comrade. His bridge-building method has never been utilized in your country: you never allowed him to try his method, either to build a big or medium or even small sized bridge. When he came here, however, his explanation of his method sounded all right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let him try his method! As a result, his trial achieved a remarkable success which has become a first-rate, world-class scientific invention.

I have never met with Comrade Xining, but I have talked to many cadres who participated in the construction of the Yangtze Bridge. They all told me that Comrade Xining was a very good comrade because he took part in every part of the work, adopted a very pleasant working style, and worked very closely with the Chinese comrades. When the bridge was built, the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from him]. Any of you who knows him personally please convey my regards to him.

Please do not create any tensions among the specialists regarding the relations between our two parties and two countries. I never advocate that. Our cooperation has covered a large ground and is by far very satisfactory. You ought to make this point clear to your embassy staff members and your experts so that they will not panic when they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criticized [Soviet leaders].

I have long before wanted to talk about some of these issues. However, it has not been appropriate to talk about them because the incidents in Poland and Hungary put your [leadership] in political trouble. For instance, we then did not feel it right to talk about the problem concerning the experts [in China].

Even Stalin did improve himself: he let China and the Soviet Union sign the [alliance] treaty, supported [us] during the Korean War, and provided [us] with a total of 141 aid projects. Certainly these achievements did not belong to him but to the entire Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we do not want to exaggerate Stalin’s mistakes.

**Part III. China’s Request for Soviet Military and Material Support**

7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. Bulganin, 12 December 1956

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

On 30 April 1956, our government proposed to the USSR that [China] would order a total of 890 million rubles worth of military supplies [from the USSR] for the year of 1957. As large areas [of China] have suffered severe flood this year thus encountering a shortage of material supplies, however, [we] have to reallocate materials that have originally been designated for export so as to meet the needs of our domestic supply and, therefore, to reduce our export for next year. In order to maintain the balance between our import and export for the year of 1957, we have no other alternatives but to reduce purchases of foreign goods. As we have calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut down such items as complete sets of equipment and general trade items so as to avoid casting an adverse effect on the ongoing capital construction. Therefore, we have decided that our original order worth 890 million rubles of materials from the USSR for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million rubles.

We understand that our reduction of purchase orders of Soviet military materials will cause the Soviet Government some problems. But [our request for the change] is an act against our will. [We] wish that the Soviet Government will accept our request. Provided that you accept our request, we will dispatch Tang Tianji, our representative with full authority in military material orders, to Moscow for the purpose of conducting negotiations with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a detailed list of orders which are reduced and verified to the Soviet Economic Office to China soon. We look forward to hearing from you.

8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

The Chinese Government asserts that, although generally acceptable, the draft paper on a review of Far Eastern economic development, compiled by the [Soviet] Far East Economic Committee has made several errors on China’s economic development.

1) The sentence that “[China’s] agrarian collectivization has encountered peasants’ opposition,” under the section of “Speedy Advance toward Socialism” (page 1), does not correspond with reality. The speed of our country’s agricultural collectivization, which has been fully explained by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the [National]
People’s Congress, completely refutes such an assertion. In discussing [China’s] price problem, the draft paper deliberately distorts and obliterates our basic achievements which are clearly presented in Li Xiannian’s\(^\text{50}\) report [to the People’s Congress], and instead, exaggerates our isolated weakness and mistakes. Given this fact, therefore, the paper could not help but draw erroneous conclusions (page 20).

(2) The draft paper has also made errors merely by comparing our published statistics which are, indeed, to serve different purposes. There are several such errors:

1. The section titled “Speedy Advance toward Socialism” mentions “[China] plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts [as an industry] in the nation’s GNP up to 15.3% in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year Plan has originally planned to have [the handicrafts] reach 9.4% in 1957” (page 4). In actuality, the former [figure] refers to a combined output of “handicrafts factories” and “handicrafts individuals” while the latter [figure] only reflects the percentage of “handicrafts individuals’ outputs” in GNP.

2. The section on “National Income and Capital Accumulation” asserts that “[China] in one way or another exaggerates its [per capita] increase, given the [Chinese] statistics which are, indeed, to serve different purposes. There are several such errors:

3. The section on “National Income and Capital Accumulation” also points out that the total of [China’s] capital construction during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year budget’s 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State Planning Commission Chairman Li Fuchun’s\(^\text{52}\) report [to the People’s Congress] only states that [China] will by 1956 complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of capital construction as designed by the five-year plan only includes the main part of economic and cultural [entertaining and educational] construction, whereas the total of [China’s] capital construction during 1953-1956 covers much wider grounds.

4. The session on “Development Plans” notes that the Second Five-Year Plan originally set 98.3% as the [overall] increase objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is indeed no reduction of the original increase objective. Because the former [figure] excludes the outputs of individual production whereas the latter includes the outputs of individual production, thus becoming 90.3%.

Since there are detailed explanations and illustrations as to exactly what the above mentioned figures cover when these reports are publicized, there exists no excuse why such errors have been committed. Other than the above listed mistakes, the draft paper still contains minor errors which are of no significant concern [of ours].

9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 December 1957

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 3, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet cooperation and close links regarding national defense industry, the Chinese Government proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commission in charge of national defense industry be established which, consisting of several delegates from each side, is to meet once or twice annually.

The joint commission’s major responsibilities include:

1. exchange published and unpublished books, journals, handbooks, directories, technical criteria, or other materials both sides deem appropriate;
2. discuss such issues as standardization of weaponry, technical conditions, specifications, and national criteria, and commonly acceptable differences of weaponry production;
3. discuss standardization of [technical] specifications, and provide [each other] with standard products and measuring apparatus;
4. discuss invitation and engagement—including procedures, terms limits, and amount—of technical experts and aides;
5. invite and dispatch on a reciprocal basis experts and delegations for the purpose of on-site inspection, participation in conferences, delivery of research reports, and short-term internships;
6. establish frequent contacts on scientific research and production conditions in [each side’s] national defense industry;
7. discuss the exchange and provision of teaching guides, textbooks, or other materials on national defense industry training, or materials necessary to enhance national defense industry personnel’s techniques and skills;
8. exchange lessons and experiences of employing new machinery, new facilities, and new technology as well as new applications of research results to weaponry production;
9. study the issue of warranties for technical material [one side] provides [the other side] for production;
10. discuss other issues concerning national defense industry that both sides deem necessary.

During the period when the joint commission adjourns, the Chinese Government will authorize the Second Machinery Ministry and the Commercial Office of the PRC embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of communications and contacts regarding routine affairs and issues of national defense industry. Whichever agency [of the Soviet side] will be in charge [during this period] is left to the Soviet Government to decide.

Before every meeting of the joint commission, each side is to provide the other side with a memorandum containing the agenda [and] schedule as well as supplementary materials.

All minutes and records of the joint commission’s meetings are to be prepared respectively in Chinese and Russian languages and co-signed by the representatives of each side’s delegation to the joint commission.

All results of the joint commission’s discussions are to be references for each Government which, if deemed necessary, will authorize certain agencies for their implementation.

All costs of organizing the joint commission’s meetings will be charged to the Government where the meeting is held, whereas each Government will be responsible for expenditures of its own delegation.
during the meeting.

Please consider our above-stated propositions. The Chinese side wishes to know the Soviet Government’s response.


Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

(1) As China’s influence in the international community rises day by day, the US imperialists’ policy of disregarding the Chinese people and not recognizing but shutting out the Chinese [Government] from international life is getting increasingly difficult and losing support of the peoples [all over the world]. In order to extricate itself from such a difficult position as well as to assure continuous control of Taiwan, [the US Government] has stepped up the realization of its “two-China” conspiracy.

(2) The following is the Chinese Government’s counter-measure against the [US] “two-China” plot:

1. With regard to the situation in which China’s delegation and Jiang [Jieshi] Clique’s “delegation” join the same international organization or attend the same international conference. Facing this situation, the Chinese side will resolutely demand to have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If [our request is] rejected, China will not cooperate with such an organization or conference and, thus, will have to withdraw with no hesitation. In the past year China has already done this many times, including withdrawing from the Nineteenth World Convention of the Red Cross. [China] has recently decided not to recognize the International Olympic Committee. From now on, China will resolutely refuse to participate in any international organizations or conferences which invite or tolerate the participation of the Jiang Clique’s representatives.

2. With regard to the situation in which China’s delegation or individual and Jiang Clique’s individuals participate in the same international organization or international conference. Such a situation, although in formality constituting no “two-China,” will in effect impress upon the [international] community that “two Chinas” co-exist, and is very likely to be used by [our] adversaries to their advantage. Therefore, China will from now on refuse to participate in any international organizations or conferences involving such a situation. China will also consider withdrawing from those international organizations, such as the International Law Association, at an appropriate moment.

For those overseas Chinese individuals who participate in the international organizations or conferences which have already invited Chinese delegates, [we] will decide by looking at these [overseas Chinese individuals’] attitude toward politics. If they do not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but represent their [residential] countries, [we] will not treat them as complicating the “two-China” issue. However, [we] must not relax our vigilance because they might disguise their appearance but in effect carry out conspiratorial activities [related to the creation of “two Chinas”].

3. With regard to the situation in which an international organization which has already had the Jiang representatives, or its branch organization, invites us to attend conferences even if Jiang Clique’s delegates are not invited. Such a situation definitely constitutes a “two-China” reality. Moreover, it will leave others with a wrong impression that China is anxious to participate in the activities of those international organizations. Therefore, China will not be part of these organizations or conferences.

(3) Controlled by the United States, the United Nations and its Special Organizations have generally retained Jiang’s representatives and kept rejecting the restoration of China’s legitimate positions [in these international organizations]. The following are our counter-measures.

1. China will not dispatch any representatives (either of the Chinese Government or of other organizations) to participate in any conferences organized by the United Nations and its Special Organizations. No individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a representative or a staff member of other international organizations, is permitted to contact or conduct negotiations with the United Nations and its special organizations.

2. China will not provide the United Nations or its special organizations with any materials or statistics, nor will China endorse that [our] brother countries publish any materials concerning China in the journals of the United Nations and its special organizations.

3. With regard to those international conferences already having certain relations with the United Nations or its special organizations which China considers participating, our policy is as follows:

a. China will support any resolutions of the conferences which only generally mention the United Nations Charter. China will not comply with any resolutions of the conferences which have a good deal to do with the United Nations or its special organizations. However, if these resolutions are favorable to world peace and friendly cooperation [among all the nations], China will not oppose.

b. China will not attend any sessions of the [conferences] which are designated to discuss the United Nations or its special organizations.

c. China will refuse to attend any sessions where United Nations representatives speak in the name of conference advisers or as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese [delegates] listen to United Nations representatives' report or presentation. However, Chinese delegates will be allowed to participate in sessions where United Nations representatives participate in or give speeches as ordinary participants. If UN representatives deliver speeches or remarks to insult or slander China, Chinese delegates will have to refute them right on the spot and then leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are included in the UN delegation, Chinese delegates must point out that this ignored China’s interests and then, protest and refuse to participate.

d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to express any opinion on whether China will establish, in some fashion, a consultative relationship with the United Nations or its special organizations. If any international conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese delegates cannot but abstain from the voting.

(4) China asserts that [its] participation in international conferences and organizations is only one way to establish contacts and relations in the international community, which may bring about some results in terms of enhancing China’s visibility and obtaining some information on how certain specific [international] projects progress. However, no or minimum participation in the international conferences or organiza-
tions will not keep China from developing vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese people from getting acquainted or making friends with other nations; no or minimum participation in some international conferences or organizations does not mean that China adopts a negative or protective attitude toward [international] cultural exchange activities. [In regard to these activities], China may take part in other fashions. On the other hand, China’s non-participation may put so much pressure on these conferences or organizations that they will have difficulties in organizing activities thus making them discontented with the United States. As a result, more and more criticism and condemnation of the “two-China” policy may be aroused. In short, China remains willing to cooperate with those international conferences and organizations which are in China’s interests [and] have no intention to impair China’s sovereignty.

[We are certain] that, as long as we have the Soviet-led socialist countries’ support, our just cause of smashing America’s “two-China” conspiracy will achieve a complete success.

1. The content of this conversation suggests that it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the CCP’s Eighth National Congress was in session.
2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’ Parties (Cominform), which was established in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau announced that it was ending its activities in April 1956.
3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union, a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that Wang Ming committed “ultra-leftist” mistakes in the early 1930s and “ultra-rightist” mistakes in the late 1930s.
4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas.
5. Liu Shaqoi was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the People’s National Congress. He was China’s second most important leader.
6. The Chinese Communist party’s eighth national congress was held in Beijing on 15-29 September 1956.
7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian communist, was the Comintern’s secretary general from 1935 to 1943.
8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935, during which the “international section,” of which Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and vice chairman of the PRC.
10. Bobkoveski was Yugoslavia’s first ambassador to the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time on 30 June 1955.
11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes still lived in the steppes of Central Asia. He became a great organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressive- ness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was certainly present in Chinggis.
12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese population.
13. The “War to Resist America and Assist Korea” describes China’s participation in the Korean War from October 1950 to July 1953.
14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 December 1953. These principles—(1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the Chinese government as the foundation of the PRC’s foreign policy.
15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugoslavian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 October 1949, four days after the PRC’s establishment.
16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet ambassador to China from 1953 to 1959.
17. “On Ten Relationships” was one of Mao’s major works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship between industry and agriculture and heavy industry and light industry, between coastal industry and industry in the interior, between economic construction and national defense, between the state, the unit of production, and individual producers, between the center and the regions, between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities, between party and non-party, between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right and wrong, and between China and other countries. For an English translation of one version of the article, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83.
18. Liu Shaoqizi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At the Party’s Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and Zhou were elected the Party’s vice chairmen, and Deng the Party’s general secretary.
19. This was part of Mao Zedong’s speech to a conference attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal secretaries.
20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, the year of completing the third five-year plan would be 1968.
21. The elimination of the “four pests” (rats, bedbugs, flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a national hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and late 1950s.
22. “Democratic figures” is a term used by Mao and the Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or communist sympathizers in China.
23. This refers to Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou Enlai’s report on the visit, see the next document.
24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai Bulganin, Nikita Krushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership, summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese and Soviet parties.
25. Liu Xia was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union from February 1955 to October 1962.
26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved Zhou’s Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a formal state visit in India): “The Polish ambassador visited us, mentioning that their congress election is scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. There exists the danger that the United Workers’ Party might lose the majority support. He hoped that China would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Comrade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one between the United Workers’ Party and other parties (with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon. But if the United Workers’ Party loses control, it would be disadvantageous [to the socialist camp]. Therefore, we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will allow you to have four to five days to have the Sino-Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.” (Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhongguo fenyuan, 299-300).
27. Władysław Gomułka was the leader of the Polish Communist regime.
28. This refers to the “Declaration on Developing and Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries” issued by the Soviet government on the evening of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its relations with other communist countries and promised that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges with them in the future.
29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP Politburo and published in the name of the editorial board of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) on 29 December 1956.
30. Peng Dehuai, China’s minister of defense, submitted this report in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of establishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union’s defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai. In order to command the Soviet Union’s submarines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high command urgently hoped that between 1958 and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will...
jointly construct a high-power long-wave radio transmission center and a long-wave radio receiving station specially designed for long-distance communication. In terms of the fund that is needed for the construction of the two stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller portion (30%).

The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a matter related to China’s sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 112-113.)

31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai’s report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document.

32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China’s vice premier; Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and China’s vice premier in charge of financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a member of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi was a member of the CCP Politburo, China’s vice premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting in February 1958).

33. Words in italics were added by Mao.

34. Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, Peng Dehuai sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June 1958: “The Chinese government agrees to the construction of high-power long-wave radio stations, and welcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union after the completion of their construction. Therefore, it is necessary for the governments of the two countries to sign an agreement on the project.” On 11 July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did not understand the nature of Beijing’s concern over having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft provided that the station should be constructed and jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese responded with several suggestions for revision: China would take the responsibility for constructing the station and its ownership belongs to China; China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to help construct the station; after the station’s completion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union.

35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for China’s naval buildup, especially the designs for new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev’s name, Yudin told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type submarines. Because China had a long coastline and good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, we should make clear the guiding principle: [Do you mean that] we should create [the flotilla], otherwise you will not offer any assistance?” Mao emphasized that he was not interested in creating a Sino-Soviet “military cooperative.” (Source: Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal with Yudin at length.

36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who were present during this discussion.

37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and Soviet government signed four agreements, establishing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a non-ferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding company jointly owned by the two countries.

38. Xiaibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin, Mikoyan secretly visited Xiaibaipo from 31 January to 7 February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account of Mikoyan’s visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), “With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese Interpreter,” *Chinese Historians* 5:1 (Spring 1992), 45-56. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei Ledovskii, “Mikoyan’s Secret Mission to China in January and February 1949,” *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit are in accord.

39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers’ parties from socialist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. The “Moscow Manifesto” was adopted by the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers’ parties from socialist countries in November 1957. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for China’s first five-year plan, focusing on energy development, heavy industry, and defense industry.

40. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin’s telegrams to the CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause “the danger of national elimination.”

41. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao’s works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Zedong’s works.

42. I. V. Koval’s representative to China from 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950. N. T. Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.

43. See note 30.

44. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District.

45. Mao commanded these military operations during the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934.

46. Documents in this group are found in Russian Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chinese.

47. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Logistics Department.

48. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and China’s vice premier and finance minister.

50. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and China’s vice premier, chairman of National Economic Commission.
MAO’S CONVERSATIONS
continued from page 157

Document 1:
Mao’s Conversation with Yudin,
31 March 1956

From the Journal of P.F. Yudin
“5” April 1956
No. 289

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
with Comrade Mao Zedong
31 March 1956

Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave him Comrade Khrushchev’s letter about the assistance which the Soviet Union will provide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises and 3 scientific research institutes for military industry, 2) in the construction of a railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet-Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to send his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and the Soviet government.

Further I said that I had wanted to visit him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days following my return to Beijing and to tell about the work of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade Khrushchev’s speech at the closed session regarding the cult of personality. Mao Zedong responded that because of his illness he had found it necessary to put off the meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the members of the CPC delegation who had attended the 20th Congress had told him something about the work of the Congress and had brought one copy of Comrade Khrushchev’s speech regarding the cult of personality. That speech has already been translated into Chinese and he had managed to become acquainted with it.

During a conversation about I.V. Stalin’s mistakes Mao Zedong noted that Stalin’s line on the China question, though it had basically been correct, in certain periods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes. In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exaggerated the revolutionary capabilities of the Guomintang, had spoken about the Guomintang as the main revolutionary force in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the Chinese Communists an instruction about the orientation to the Guomintang, having viewed it as a united front of the revolutionary forces of China. Stalin said that it is necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly about the subordination of the Communist Party of China to the Guomintang. This was a great mistake which had held back the independent work of the Communist Party of China on the mobilization of the masses and on attracting them to the side of the Communist Party.

Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong continued, Stalin, having become after the death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great number of incorrect directives. These mistaken and incorrect directives resulted from the fact that Stalin did not take into account the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van Minh, being a Comintern worker, met frequently with Stalin and tendentiously had informed him about the situation in the CPC. Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the single exponent of the opinion of the CC CPC.

Van Minh and Li Lisan, who represented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC in their own hands. They tried to present all the Communists who criticized the mistakes of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists. Mao Zedong said, they called me a right opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an example of how the Comintern acted incorrectly in relation to the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong introduced the following.

Under the pretext that the Third Plenum of the CC CPC, while considering the coup-plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the successive criticism of these mistakes to its conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CC CPC, the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif and Van Minh - charged with the task of conducting the Fourth Plenum of the CPC. Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CC CPC made under the pressure of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more ultra-leftist that Li Lisan’s line. In them it was stated that it is necessary to move into the large cities, to take control of them, and not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CC CPC there was permitted such, for example, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions of China which were blockaded by the Guomintang even the petty trading bourgeoisie was liquidated and all kinds of internal trade was stopped. As a result of this policy the Chinese Red Army, which in 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the territory which made up the Soviet regions of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organizations in the cities were routed by the Guomintang and the number of Communists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 people. The Soviet regions were totally isolated from the remaining part of the country and remained without any products, even without salt. All this caused serious discontent among the population of the Soviet regions.

As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of Van Minh, the more or less large regions which remained under CPC leadership were mostly in North China (the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia), to which Van Minh’s power did not extend. Van Minh, backed by the Comintern, essentially managed it so that the 8th and 4th armies removed themselves from subordination to the CC CPC.

Van Minh and his successors saw the Guomintang as the “young power,” which absorbs all the best and will be able to gain a victory over Japan. They spoke against the independent and autonomous policy of the Communist Party in the united front, and against the strengthening of the armed forces of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against the unification of all strata of the population around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh’s supporters tried to replace the genuinely revolutionary program of the CPC, which consisted of 10 points, with their own six-point program, the author of which was Van Minh, although this was, in the essence of the matter, a capitulationist program. In conducting this whole program Van Minh, backed by the Comintern and in Stalin’s name, spoke as the main authority.

Van Minh’s supporters, taking advantage of the fact that they had captured a majority in the Southern bureau of the CC CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to the army and to the local authorities. So, for example, once, to our surprise, said Mao Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the houses were replaced, on Van Minh’s order,
with slogans “about a stable union with the Guomintang,” etc.

As a result of the serious ideological struggle and the great explanatory work following the 7th Congress of the Communist Party, especially in the last four years, the majority of Communists who made left or right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van Minh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter with acknowledgment of his mistakes, however he then once again returned to his old positions. All of the former activity of Van Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried out under the direct leadership of the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious loss to the Chinese revolution.

Characterizing the Comintern’s activity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Lenin was alive he had played the most prominent role in bringing together the forces of the Communist movement, in the creation and consolidation of the Communist parties in various countries, in the fight with the opportunists from the Second International. But that had been a short period in the activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh more than the CC CPC. In the last period of the Comintern’s work, especially when Dimitrov worked there, certain movements were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van Minh. However, in this period as well, not just a few mistakes were made by the Comintern, for example, the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and others. In this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to discern three periods in the activity of the Comintern, of which the second, longest period, brought the biggest loss to the Chinese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, precisely in this period the Comintern dealt most of all with the East. We can say directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the defeat of the Chinese revolution at that time was, right along with other reasons, also the result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when we found out about the dissolution of the Comintern.

In the last period, continued Mao Zedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated the situation in China and the possibilities for the development of the revolution. He continued to believe more in the power of the Guomintang than of the Communist Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] supporters, on a united front with the Guomintang and the creation in China of a “democratic republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CC CPC received a secret telegram, for some reason in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against this journey, since a provocation from Jiang Jieshi’s side was expected. However, said Mao Zedong, I was required to go since Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the armed struggle against the forces of Jiang Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he doubted the forces of the Chinese revolution. This lack of belief remained in Stalin even during the first stages of the formation of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of the revolution. It is possible that Stalin’s lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain disappointment, many conversations took place to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party was going along the Yugoslav path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” I told Mao Zedong that there were no such moods and conversations in our Party.

The bourgeois press around the world, continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right socialists, had taken up the version of “China’s third way,” and extolled it. At that time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, did not believe us, while the bourgeoisie and laborites sustained the illusion of the “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shirking that the capitalist powers should not in any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that “he will not turn from his path,” etc. This behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, since he knows us too well, he more than once had to stand in confrontation to us and to fight with us.

The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao Zedong continued further, was apparent also during the time of Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The Chinese people asked us whether a treaty of the USSR with the new China will be signed, why until now legally there continues to exist a treaty with the supporters of the Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was an extremely important matter for us, which determined the possibilities for the further development of the PRC. At the first conversation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along government lines, but Stalin declined to answer. During the second conversation I returned once again to that issue, showing Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the same type of proposal about a treaty. I proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion as a pretext for refusal and said that “it is inconvenient to act in this way, since the bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chinese government is located in Moscow.” The undeclared state of war between the USSR and the PRC had come into effect. Then an unpleasant conversation took place with I.V. Mikoyan. Mikoyan and Kaganovich were not against the treaty, but I, N.T. Fedorenko, who was in charge of the negotiations, were not in favor of it. We decided to undertake nothing further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then an unpleasant conversation took place with I.V. Kovalev and N.T. Fedorenko, who proposed that I go on an excursion around the country. I sharply rejected this proposal and responded that I prefer “to sleep through it at the dacha.”

Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, they handed me a draft of my interview for publication which had been signed by Stalin. In it, the Soviet-Chinese treaty was being held in Moscow on concluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This already was a significant step forward. It is possible that in Stalin’s change of position, said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the Indians and the English, who had recognized the PRC in January 1950. Negotiations began right after this, in which Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the negotiations, at Stalin’s initiative there was undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union to assume sole ownership of the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. Subsequently, however, a decision was made about the joint exploitation of the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides
which the PRC gave the USSR the naval base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock companies were opened in China. At Stalin’s initiative, said Mao Zedong, Manchuria and Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres of influence of the USSR. Stalin insisted on the fact that in these regions only Chinese people and Soviet citizens be permitted to live. Representatives of other foreign states, including Czechs, Polish people, and Englishmen who were living permanently in those regions should be evicted from there. The only ones whom Stalin skipped over through his silence were Koreans, of whom there are counted one and a half million in Manchuria. These types of pretensions from Stalin’s side, said Mao Zedong, were incomprehensible to us. All this also was fodder for the bourgeois press and representatives of capitalist states. In fact, continued Mao Zedong, in the course of the negotiations around this treaty, there was the most genuine trading going on. It was an unattractive way to pose the issue, in which Stalin’s distrust and suspicion of the CPC was brightly expressed.

We are glad to note, said Mao Zedong, that the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway and Port Arthur have been returned to China, and the joint stock companies have ceased to exist. In this part of the conversation Mao Zedong stressed that Khrushchev did not attend these negotiations, and that Bulganin’s participation in them was minimal. Stalin’s distrust of the CPC was apparent in a number of other issues, including Kovallev’s notorious document about anti-Soviet moods in the leadership of the CPC. Stalin, in passing this document to the CC CPC, wanted, evidently, to stress his mistrust and suspicions.

Over the course of the time I spent in Moscow, said Mao Zedong, I felt that distrust of us even more strongly and there I asked that a Marxist-representative of the CC CPSU be sent to China in order to become acquainted with the true situation in China and to get to know the works of the Chinese theoreticians, and simultaneously to examine the works of Mao Zedong, since these works in the Chinese edition were not reviewed by the author in advance, while the Soviet comrades, counter to the wish of the author, insisted on their publication.

Mao Zedong reminded me that upon my (Yudin’s) arrival in China he had persistently and specially recommended to me to complete a trip around the whole country. In relation to this I told Mao Zedong about a conversation which I had with Stalin, in the presence of several members of the Politburo, upon my return from the trip to China. Stalin at that time asked me whether the ruling Chinese comrades are Marxists. Having heard my affirming response, Stalin said, “That’s good! We can be calm. They’ve grown up themselves, without our help.”

Mao Zedong noted that in the very posing of this question Stalin’s distrust of the Chinese Communists was also made apparent.

Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin’s belief in the CPC, were your (Yudin’s) report about the journey to China and the Korean War-performance of the Chinese people’s volunteers.

In such a way, said Mao Zedong, if we look historically at the development of the Chinese revolution and at Stalin’s attitude to it, then it is is possible to see that serious mistakes were made, which were especially widespread during the time of the Comintern’s work. After 1945, during the period of the struggle with Jiang Jieshi, because of the overestimation of the forces of the Guomintang and the underestimation of the forces of the Chinese revolution, Stalin undertook attempts at pacification, at restraining the development of the revolutionary events. And even after the victory of the revolution Stalin continued to express mistrust of the Chinese Communists. Despite that, said Mao Zedong, we have stood firmly behind the revolutionary positions, for if we had permitted vassalizations and indecisiveness, then, no doubt, long ago we would not have been among the living.

Then Mao Zedong moved on to a general evaluation of Stalin’s role. He noted that Stalin, without a doubt, is a great Marxist, a good and honest revolutionary. However, in his great work in the course of a long period of time he made a number of great and serious mistakes, the primary ones of which were listed in Khrushchev’s speech. These fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, could be summed up in seven points:

1. Unlawful repressions;
2. Mistakes made in the course of the war, moreover, in particular in the beginning, rather than in the concluding period of the war;
3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow to the union of the working class and the peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this group of mistakes, in particular, the incorrect policy in relation to the peasantry, was discussed during Comrade Khrushchev’s conversation with [PRC military leader] Zhu De in Moscow;
4. Mistakes in the nationality question connected to the unlawful resettlement of certain nationalities and others. However, overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy was implemented correctly;
5. Rejection of the principle of collective leadership, conceit and surrounding himself with toadies;
6. Dictatorial methods and leadership style;
7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy (Yugoslavia, etc.).

Mao Zedong further stressed a thought to the effect that overall in the Communist movement great victories were won. The single fact of the growth of the Socialist camp from 200 million people to 900 million people speaks for itself. However, in the course of successful forward advance in some certain countries, in some certain parties these or other mistakes arose. Mistakes similar to these and others, he said, can arise in the future too. I observed that it would be better not to repeat mistakes like Stalin’s. To this, Mao Zedong answered that, evidently, there will be these types of mistakes again. The appearance of these mistakes are entirely explicable from the point of view of dialectical materialism, since it is well known that society develops through a struggle of contradictions, the fight of the old with the new, the new-born with the obsolete. In our consciousness, said Mao Zedong, there are still too many vestiges of the past. It lags behind the constantly developing material world, behind everyday life.

In our countries, continued Mao Zedong, much has come from the former, capitalist society. Take, for example, the issue of the application of corporal punishments to the accused. For China too, this is not a new issue. Even in 1930 in the Red Army during interrogations beatings were broadly applied. I, said Mao Zedong, at that time personally was a witness to how they beat up the accused. Already at that time a corresponding decision was made regarding a ban on corporal punishment. However, this decision was violated, and in Yanan, it is true, we tried not to allow unlawful executions. With
the creation of the PRC we undertook a further struggle with this ugly manifestation. It is entirely evident, continued Mao Zedong, that according to the logic of things during a beating the one who is being beaten begins to give false testimony, while the one who is conducting the interrogation accepts that testimony as truth. This and other vestiges which have come to us from the bourgeois past, will still for a long time be preserved in the consciousness of people. A striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, for broad anniversary celebrations, this is also a vestige of the psychology of bourgeois man, since such customs and such psychology objectively could not arise among the poorest peasantry and the working class. The presence of these and other circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates the conditions for the arising of those or other mistakes with which the Communist parties will have to deal.

I observed that the main reason for Stalin’s mistakes was the cult of personality, bordering on deification.

Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, noted that Stalin’s mistakes accumulated gradually, from small ones growing to huge ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowledge his own mistakes, although it is well known that it is characteristic of a person to make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, reviewing Lenin’s manuscripts, he had become convinced of the fact that even Lenin crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or other in his own works. In conclusion to his characterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once again stressed that Stalin had made mistakes not in everything, but on some certain issues.

Overall, he stressed that the materials from the Congress made a strong impression on him. The spirit of criticism and self-criticism and the atmosphere which was created after the Congress will help us, he said, to express our thoughts more freely on a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao Zedong, it would be difficult to take the initiative on this matter.

Mao Zedong declared that he proposes to continue in the future the exchange of opinions on these issues during Comrade Mikoyan’s visit, and also at a convenient time with Comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Then Mao Zedong got distracted from this topic and getting greatly carried away briefly touched on a few philosophical questions (about the struggle of materialism with idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Communist society as a society which is free from any sort of contradictions, from ideological struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the past. In a Communist society too, said Mao Zedong, there will be good and bad people. Further he said that the ideological work of China still to a significant extent suffers from a spirit of puffery [nachetniches'tva] and cliches. The Chinese press, in particular, still cannot answer to the demands which are presented to it. On the pages of the newspapers the struggle of opinions is lacking, there are no serious theoretical discussions. Because of insufficient time Mao Zedong expressed a wish to meet with me again to talk a little specifically about issues of philosophy.

At the end of the discussion I inquired of Mao Zedong whether he had become acquainted with the Pravda editorial about the harm of the cult of personality, a translation of which was placed in [Renmin Ribao] on 30 March. He responded that he still had not managed to read through that article, but they had told him that it is a very good article. Now, said Mao Zedong, we are preparing for publication in Renmin Ribao a lead article which is dedicated to this issue, which should appear in the newspapers in the coming week. Beginning on 16 March, he noted jokingly, all the newspapers in the world raised a ruckus about this issue—China alone for the time being is silent.

Then I briefly told Mao Zedong about the arrival in the PRC of 16 prominent Soviet scholars and about the beginning of the work of a theoretical conference dedicated to the 20th Congress, which is opening today in the Club of Soviet specialists. Soviet and Chinese scholars will deliver speeches at the conference.

Mao Zedong listened to these thoughts with great interest.

The conversation continued for three hours. Mao Zedong was in a good mood, and joked often.

The Deputy Head of the Administration of Affairs of the CPC Yang Shankun, the Chief of the CC CPC Translation Bureau Shi Zhe and Counselor of the USSR Embassy in the PRC Skvortsov, T.F. attended the conversation.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE PRC  P. YUDIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, delo 9, listy 87-98; also Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 163, listy 88-99; see also Problemi Dalnego Vostok 5 (1994), 101-110. Translation for CWHP by Mark Doctoroff, National Security Archive]

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Document II:
Mao’s Conversation with Chervonenko,
26 December 1960

From the diary of
S. V. CHERVONENKO
Copy No. 3

“6” January 1961
Outgoing No. 2

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
with comrade Mao Zedong

26 December 1960

According to the instructions of the Center I visited Mao Zedong today.

In the name of the CPSU CC and comrade N.S. Khrushchev personally, I congratulated Mao Zedong with his 67th birthday and wished him good health, long life and fruitful work.

Mao Zedong was very impressed by this warm attention from the CPSU CC and comrade N.S. Khrushchev. He was deeply moved, and, without concealing his emotions, he most warmly expressed his thanks for the friendly congratulations and wishes. Mao Zedong stated that it is a great honor for him to receive these high congratulations on his birthday. He asked to give his warmest thanks to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and wished him, personally, as well as all the members of the CPSU CC Presidium, good health and big fruitful successes in their work.

Then, on Mao Zedong’s initiative, we had a conversation. He told me that the Chinese leaders have to work a lot now. “As for myself - he mentioned - I am now work-
ing much less than before. Though - Mao Zedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a day (sometimes more), the productivity is not the same as it used to be. His comprehension of the material studied is less effective, and the necessity arose [for him] to read documents printed in large characters.” He mentioned in this connection that “this must be a general rule that people of advanced age are in an unequal position to the young as regards the efficiency of their work.”

Mao Zedong then emphasized that his resignation from the post of the Chairman of the PRC had lessened the load of state activities on him. Speaking about this he mentioned that at the time when he had submitted this proposal he had been supported only by the Politbureau members, while many members of the CPC CC had objected. “There was even more disagreement among the rank and file communists.” By now, he said, everybody was supporting this decision.

As he continued talking about his work and the activities of the leadership of the CPC CC, Mao Zedong said that for several years, practically from 1953-54 he was not chairing the Politbureau meetings any more. He said that from 1956 Liu Shaoqi is in charge of all the routine activities of the Politbureau, while he is taking part in some of the meetings from time to time. Mao Zedong mentioned that he personally is usually working and consulting mostly with the members of the Permanent Committee of the CPC CC Politbureau. Sometimes specially invited persons also take part in the meetings of the Permanent Committee.

Then Mao Zedong told that on some occasions he takes part in the enlarged Politbureau meetings. Leading party executives from the periphery are usually invited to these meetings, for instance the secretaries and deputy secretaries of the CPC CC bureaus from certain regions, the secretaries of the CPC Provincial Committees. Mao Zedong said that now he practically never speaks at the CPC CC Plenums, and even at the CPC Congress he just delivers a short introductory speech. His resignation from the post of the Chairman of the Republic gave him also an opportunity to refrain from participating in the work of the Supreme State Conference. However, he mentioned in this connection, I systematically study the documents and materials (before they are adopted) of the most important party and state conferences and meetings.

Mao Zedong agreed with my statement, that in spite of a certain redistribution of authority between the CPC CC leaders he (Mao Zedong) still has great responsibilities in the leadership of the party and the country. He said that he still often has to work at night. “The principal workload is connected with the reading of numerous documents and materials.” Twice a day, for instance, he said, “they bring me two big volumes of routine information on international affairs, which of course it is necessary to look through to keep updated, not to lose contact with life.”

In the course of the conversation I mentioned that the rapidly developing international affairs demand constant attention and timely analysis. I stressed the outstanding significance of the Moscow Conference where the recent international developments were submitted to deep Marxist-Leninist analysis.

Mao Zedong agreed with this statement and quickly responded to the topic, saying: “The Moscow Conference was a success, it was thoroughly prepared, and the editing commission, which included the representatives of 26 parties, worked fruitfully.” Foreign representatives, he went on, are often puzzled and ask why was the conference so long. Mao Zedong said that they apparently do not have a full understanding of the real situation when it took more than 10 days for each of the representatives of 81 parties to deliver his speech. Then there were repeated speeches, not to mention the work on the documents themselves. He stated: “It is very good that there were arguments and discussions at the conference. This is not bad.”

Then, agreeing with my statement on the deep theoretical character of the documents of the Moscow Conference, Mao Zedong added that these documents caused a great confusion in the Western imperialist circles, among our common enemies.

During the conversation I gave a brief review of the work to popularize the results of the Moscow Conference in the Soviet Union, to study the Conference’s documents within the political education network.

In his turn Mao Zedong told me that the study of the Moscow Conference documents is also being organized by the CPC. As for the summarizing of the Conference’s results, the CPC CC has not yet sent any precise instructions on this question to the provinces.

Then he told me that the CPC CC Plenum will take place in January 1961 (the last Plenum was in April 1960), where the CPC CC delegation at the Moscow Conference will present its report. It is planned to adopt a short Plenum resolution on this question, expressing support of the Moscow Conference’s decisions. Apart from the results of the Conference the January Plenum of the CPC CC will also discuss the economic plan of the PRC for 1961.

After that Mao Zedong told me that there are certain difficulties in the PRC which make it impossible to elaborate a perspective plan, “and we also lack the experience for this.” At first, he went on, the CPC CC wanted to work out a plan for the three remaining years of the second five year plan. However, 1960 is already over. So it was decided to make separate plans for the two remaining years of the five year plan. He said that the current plan of economic development for the first quarter of 1961 exists and is practically put into implementation.

For my part I told him about the favorable conditions for planning achieved in the Soviet Union, of the adoption of the economic plan and budget for 1961 by the Supreme Council of the USSR.

Expressing a critical opinion of the lag with the adoption of economic plans in the PRC, Mao Zedong said that the plan for 1960, for instance, was adopted only in April 1960, and on some occasions plans were adopted by the sessions of CAPR [Chinese Assembly of People’s Representatives] only in June-July. He explained it by the lack of sufficient experience in the PRC.

I told Mao Zedong of the forthcoming Plenum of the CPSU CC, of the serious attention paid by the party and government to the problems of agricultural development in the Soviet Union, including some special features of the forthcoming Plenum, where the most important questions of further increase of agricultural production will be discussed and resolved.

Mao Zedong said that the CPC CC is now also “specializing” on agriculture. Increasing the attention to this question, he continued, “we are even thinking about narrowing the industrial front to some extent.” Explaining this idea he said that it is about a certain lowering of the scale of capital investments into the industrial production, in-
cluding some branches of heavy industry; capital investments into the construction of public buildings will also be cut.

In the course of the conversation he briefly mentioned the bottlenecks of the PRC’s industry, pointing, for instance, at the mining and coal industry, and the transport as well, talked about the interconnection of these industries, their influence on the development of many other branches (steel production etc.).

Returning to the problem of agriculture, he emphasized that the lack of appropriate attention to this most important field of the PRC’s economy, as well as to the development of the light industry, would make it impossible to satisfy the requirements of the population for foodstuffs, clothing and consumer goods. Our own experience, Mao Zedong went on, persuaded us that “organizing the production of living plants and animals is much more difficult than the production of lifeless items – metals, ore, coal etc.” He stated jokingly that “the dead will not run away from us and can wait.”

In the course of the conversation Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed that after the revolution in the PRC the material requirements of the Chinese population have been steadily growing. So the CPC must seriously contemplate these problems, and the way to overcome the arising difficulties. Of course, it is not the difficulties only that matter. Even when we have successes, new problems and tasks are appearing all the same. He stated in this connection, that even in 300-400 years new problems will be still arising, demanding to be solved, “no development will be possible without them.”

I shared with Mao Zedong some of the impressions from my trip around the Soviet Union together with the Chinese delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi, stressing the significance of the trip for the strengthening of friendship and solidarity between the USSR and the PRC.

Mao Zedong actively supported this part of the conversation. He said that in China they are very happy with this visit, “it is very good that it took place.” Both our peoples, he said with emphasis, demanded such an action to be taken. “By making this decision, the Central Committees of both parties satisfied the demands of both peoples.”

I told him as if jokingly, that many republics of the USSR, Ukraine for instance, were however “displeased” that the Chinese delegation was not able to visit them. He said, laughing, that this protest should be addressed to the members of the delegation, for instance to Yang Shankun, who is present here at the conversation, as the Politburo had no objections against prolonging the visit. I noted in the same tone that the Chinese friends had disarmed the “displeased” Soviet comrades, saying that it was not their last visit to the Soviet Union. So, Mao Zedong said, one can maintain that they owe you.

When he broadened the topic of the usefulness of these meetings and visits I told him that during the trip of the Chinese delegation Soviet citizens had repeatedly asked to give him (Mao Zedong) their best wishes and expressed their hope that he will also come to the Soviet Union when he finds it convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, collective farms, especially that he had had no chance to get better acquainted with the country during his previous visits. He reacted warmly and stated that he “must certainly find the time for such a visit.”

Then Mao Zedong told that in China he is criticized by the functionaries from the periphery, who are displeased that he has not been able yet to visit a number of cities and regions - Xinjiang, Yanan, Guizhou, Tibet, Taiyuan, Baotou, Xian, Lanzhou etc. These workers, he said, used to call me “the Chairman for half of the Republic,” and when I resigned from this post in favor of Liu Shaoqi, they started to call me “the Chairman of the CPC for half of the country.”

In the final part of the conversation Mao Zedong returned to the notion of his alleged retirement from active state and party work, saying half jokingly that now “he will wait for the moment when he will become an ordinary member of the Politburo.” I have not consulted anybody in the party on this matter, he mentioned, even him, Mao Zedong said, pointing at Yang Shankun, you are the first whom I am telling about my “conspiracy.”

I expressed assurance that the members of the CPC will apparently not agree to such a proposal from Mao Zedong. Then, he said jokingly, I will have to wait until everybody realizes its necessity; “in several years they will have mercy for me.”

The conversation lasted more than an hour in an exceptionally cordial, friendly atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong came to see us to our car. Bidding us a warm farewell, he once again asked to give his warm greetings to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and the members of the CPC CC Presidium and most sincere thanks for their congratulations and warm wishes.

Candidate member of the CPC CC Secretariat Yang Shangkun, the functionaries of the CPC CC apparatus Yan Min Fu and Zhu Jueren, Counsellor Minister of the USSR Embassy in the PRC Sudarikov N.G. and the counsellor of the embassy Rakhmanin O.B. were present at the conversation.

The Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

[signature]

S. CHERVONENKO

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 55, papka 454, delo 9, listy 98-105; translation for CWIHP by Maxim Korobochkin.]

1. Memorandum of conversation, Yudin-Mao Zedong, 2 May 1956, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, delo 9, listy 124-130.
In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The Soviet leader’s trip, as Gromyko was well aware, was also intended to alleviate a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a rift that had not yet flared up in public. Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to travel to China because he had numerous other commitments at around the same time; but after discussing the matter with his colleagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided that face-to-face negotiations with Mao Zedong and other top Chinese officials would be the only way to “clear the atmosphere” and restore a “sense of friendship between our peoples.”

Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30-page survey of “The Political, Economic, and International Standing of the PRC” (Report No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the same day that Khrushchev began a highly publicized visit to the United States. The Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 September, just a day before he was due to leave for China. On his way back from the United States, he was given a copy of Zimyanin’s report. That copy is now housed in the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD). The final section of Zimyanin’s report, which focuses on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the most interesting portion of the document, is translated here in full except for a few extraneous passages at the beginning and end.

Zimyanin’s appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations is intriguing not only because of its substance, but also because of the light it sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. Both points will be briefly taken up in this introduction, which is divided into two main parts. The first part will discuss the content of the Foreign Ministry’s report, highlighting items of particular interest as well as several important lacunae. The second part will consider how Zimyanin’s assessment contributed to, and was affected by, changes under way in Soviet policy-making toward China. Those changes, as explained below, temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Ministry and therefore gave increased prominence to Zimyanin’s report.

**Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations**

In both substance and tone, Zimyanin’s analysis of Soviet relations with China reflected the burgeoning unease among Soviet officials. Although his view of the relationship was still distinctly favorable overall, he was quick to point out many areas of incipient conflict between the two countries. His report suggested that a full-fledged rift could be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent difficulties were bound to cause growing acrimony and recriminations unless appropriate steps were taken. In citing a litany of disagreements about key ideological and practical questions, the report drew a causal link between internal political conditions in China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, a theme emphasized by many Western analysts as well. Although Zimyanin concluded the document on an upbeat note—claiming that “relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year”—his analysis left little doubt that existing tensions between Moscow and Beijing could eventually take a sharp turn for the worse.

Four specific points about the document are worth highlighting.

**First**, the report acknowledged that friction between the two Communist states had been present, to some degree, since the very start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin did not imply that China had been merely a “reluctant and suspicious ally” of Moscow in the early 1950s, he emphasized that the Soviet Union under Stalin had “violated the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People’s Republic” and had “kept the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR.”

**No doubt**, these criticisms were motivated in part by the then-prevailing line of de-Stalinization, but Zimyanin provided concrete examples of “negative” actions on Moscow’s part between 1950 and 1953 that had “impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.”

His views on this matter, interestingly enough, were very similar to conclusions reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and Beijing to project an image of monolithic unity (an image, incidentally, that was not far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time could sense that negotiations leading to the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will between the two countries. According to a secret background report, Mao was “highly dissatisfied with [Moscow’s] attempted exactions on China,” and Zhou Enlai said he “would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] demands as presented.” Although Soviet and Chinese officials did their best to conceal any further hints of bilateral discord over the next few years, word continued to filter into Washington about “strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia”—the same strain and difficulties that Zimyanin noted.

By tracing the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict back to the Stalin period, Zimyanin’s report was quite different from the public statements made later on by officials in both Moscow and Beijing, who averred that the split had begun when the two sides disagreed about Khrushchev’s secret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956. Until recently, the large majority of Western (and Russian) scholars had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in which to pinpoint the origins of the dispute. It is now clear, both from Zimyanin’s report and from other new evidence (see below), that tensions actually had begun emerging much earlier.

This is not to say that the whole Sino-Soviet rift, especially the bitter confrontation of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, but the reality is usually more complex. Far from being a “reluctant and suspicious ally” of the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet experience and to forge close, comprehensive ties with Moscow in the name of socialist internationalism. Even so, the latest memoirs and archival revelations, including Zimyanin’s report, leave little doubt that the seeds of a conflict between Moscow and
Beijing were present, at least in some fashion, as early as 1950-53.

Second, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of Stalin was considerably “different from our own” and that the Congress had prompted “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical comments about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations.” Even more damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He cited a wide range of “hostile statements” and “denunciations of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship” that had surfaced in China. “The airing of these types of statements,” he wrote, “can in no way be justified.” The report expressed particular concern about a number of territorial demands that had been raised against the Soviet Union.11

Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin devoted considerable attention to the Sino-Soviet ideological quarrels that began to surface during the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the form of disagreements about the establishment of “people’s communes,” the role of material versus ideological incentives, the nature of the transition to socialism and Communism, and other aspects of Marxism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter disputes erupted over territorial demands and questions of global strategy (not to mention a clash of personalities between Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had not yet come to dominate the relationship in September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideological differences that were particularly salient at the time. His report provides further evidence that ideological aspects of the conflict must be taken seriously on their own merits, rather than being seen as a mere smokescreen for geopolitical or other concerns.

Finally, there are a few conspicuous omissions in Zimyanin’s assessment, which are worth briefly explicating here because they provide a better context for understanding the document:

- Stalin’s relationship with Mao. Although Zimyanin discussed problems in Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half months beginning in December 1949. This omission is unfortunate because even a few brief comments might have helped clarify what has been a matter of great confusion. First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao relationship by former Soviet and Chinese officials offer sharply conflicting interpretations. One of the most jaundiced descriptions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be found in Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs:

> Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes on [the Chinese leader] for days at a time—and since Stalin neither saw Mao nor ordered anyone else to entertain him, no one dared to go see him. We began hearing rumors that Mao was very unhappy because he was being kept under lock and key and everyone was ignoring him. Mao let it be known that if the situation continued, he would leave. . . . In this way, Stalin sowed the seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet, anti-Russian sentiment in China.12

A similar appraisal of Stalin’s demeanor was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin hosted a special dinner for Mao in February 1950, the atmosphere was “oppressive” and the two leaders "seemed personally to have nothing in common that would enable them to establish the necessary rapport.”13 Because Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s observations fit so well with everything that is known about Stalin’s general behavior, their accounts have been widely accepted in the West.

More recently, though, a very different picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has emerged from testimony by Nikolai Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet embassy in China who served as an interpreter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former official in the Chinese foreign ministry who interpreted for Mao. Both men were present during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meetings in 1949-1950.14 Although Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that several points of contention had surfaced between Stalin and Mao, they both emphasized that the relationship overall was amicable. Fedorenko specifically took issue with Khrushchev’s account:

> Later on it was claimed that Stalin had not received Mao Zedong for nearly a month, and in general had not displayed appropriate courtesy toward the Chinese leader. These reports created a false impression of the host and his guest. In actual fact, everything happened quite differently. Judging from what I saw first-hand, the behavior of the two leaders and the overall atmosphere were totally different from subsequent depictions. . . . From the very first meeting, Stalin invariably displayed the utmost courtesy toward his Chinese counterpart. . . . Throughout the talks with Mao Zedong, Stalin was equable, restrained, and attentive to his guest. His thoughts never wandered and were always completely focused on the conversation.

Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that “Stalin was visibly moved [when he met the Chinese leader] and continuously dispensed compliments to Chairman Mao.” Shi dismissed rumors in the West that “Stalin had put Chairman Mao under house arrest” during a particularly tense stage in the negotiations leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance.

Even with the benefit of new evidence, it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies between these accounts. So far, transcripts of only the first two private meetings between Mao and Stalin—on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950—are available.15 Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by confirming how long the interval was between meetings), but they do not, and indeed cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin’s behavior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expressions, and even some unflattering comments are apt to be omitted from these stenographic reports either deliberately or inadvertently, just as there are crucial gaps in numerous
other East-bloc documents. The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev’s recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko’s, Fedorenko’s, and Shi’s accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory.

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko’s version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than to Khrushchev’s. First, Fedorenko and Shi participated in all the private talks between Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and Gromyko were present at only the public meetings. Second, it is conceivable that Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin’s behavior in an unduly negative light. (Khrushchev may have done this subconsciously, or he may have been seeking to lay the “blame” on Stalin for the subsequent rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Stalin. One could therefore make a prima facie case on behalf of Fedorenko’s account.

On the other hand, most of the latest evidence tends to support Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s versions, rather than Fedorenko’s. One of the most trusted aides to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who remained a staunch defender of the Soviet dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had to wait many days or even weeks after his initial luncheon meeting with Stalin until the Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him again. This corresponds precisely to what Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. Khrushchev’s account is further strengthened by the recollections of General Ivan Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military officer who served as Stalin’s personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev recounted the tribulations and rudeness that Mao had experienced during his visit:

Mao was met [on 16 December] by Bulganin and Molotov, who brusquely turned down his invitation to join him for a meal, saying that it would be contrary to protocol. For the same reason, they declined Mao’s invitation to ride with him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao was clearly upset by the cool reception. That same day, Stalin received Mao Zedong, but they held no confidential talks of the sort that Mao had wanted. After that, Mao spent numerous boring days at the dacha. Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan stopped by to see him, but had only very brief official conversations. I was in touch with Mao and saw him every day, and I was aware that he was upset and apprehensive.

Kovalev also noted that in late December, Mao asked him to convey a formal request to Stalin for another private meeting, indicating that “the resolution of all matters, including the question of [Mao’s] spare time and medical treatment, [would] be left entirely to your [i.e., Stalin’s] discretion.” According to Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and “as before, Mao remained practically in isolation.” Even when Mao “retaliated by refusing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador to China,” it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev emphasized that it was “not until Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow at the end of January 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more successfully.” All this amply corroborates what Khrushchev wrote.

Khrushchev’s depiction of the Stalin-Mao relationship is also borne out by newly declassified testimony from another key Soviet official who served as Stalin’s personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a private meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about the “ugly atmosphere” he had confronted in Moscow in 1950 and about the “profound distrust and suspicion” that Stalin had shown toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Mao also recalled the “insulting” treatment he had suffered after his preliminary discussions with Stalin:

From then on, Stalin sought to avoid me. I tried, for my part, to phone Stalin’s apartment, but was told that he was not home and that I should meet with Mikoyan instead. I was offended by all this, and so I decided that I would not do anything more and would simply spend my time resting at the dacha. Then I had an unpleasant conversation with Kovalev and Fedorenko, who suggested that I go for a trip around the country. I flatly rejected this proposal and said that I might as well just “go on sleeping at my dacha.”

Mao revealed these “problems and difficulties” to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech at the CCP’s Chengdu conference in March 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight years earlier:

In 1950, Stalin and I argued with each other in Moscow for two months about our mutual defense treaty, about the Chungchung railroad, about joint economic ventures, and about our boundary lines. Our attitudes were such that when he offered a proposal which was unacceptable to me, I would resist it; but when he insisted on it, I would give in. I did so for the sake of socialism.

Mao noted with particular distaste that he had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere “colonies” of the Soviet Union—a point mentioned by Zimyanin as well. At Chengdu and in numerous other speeches before closed CCP gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Stalin’s “serious mistakes” and “shortcomings,” a practice that suggests long pent-up feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet dictator.

Furthermore, even some of the comments in Fedorenko’s and Shi’s own articles imply—if only inadvertently—that the relationship between Stalin and Mao was not really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that a residue of tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in
the early 1950s because of Stalin’s refusal during the Chinese civil war to provide greater support for the Communist rebels.26 This tension inevitably caused personal strains between the two leaders, as Mao himself observed during his March 1956 meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in one of his secret speeches two years later at the Chengdu conference:

The victory of the Chinese revolution was against Stalin’s wishes.... When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We made no protest.27

Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into a “sullen” mood during the 1949-50 meetings whenever Mao was being deliberately “evasive.” This was particularly evident, according to Shi, when negotiations on the treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to “gauge Chairman Mao’s intentions.” Shi added that the testy exchanges between the two leaders prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcastically that Stalin was wont to “blame the Chinese for all the mistakes” in bilateral relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Stalin’s extreme suspiciousness during the talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator’s incessant complaints about “conspiracies,” “plots,” and “illegal murmurs.” This behavior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko initially implied.

Despite the wealth of new evidence, there are still many unresolved questions about the nature of Stalin’s relationship with Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging documentation and first-hand accounts will be essential to set the record straight. Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s recollections seem to be corroborated by the latest disclosures, but Fedorenko’s and Shi’s accounts must be taken seriously, at least for now. Zimyabin’s analysis, with its strong criticism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, is more compatible with Khrushchev’s version than with Fedorenko’s, but the report provides no conclusive evidence one way or the other.

* The crises in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. During the standoff between the Soviet Union and Poland in October 1956, Chinese officials generally supported the defiant Polish leader, Władysław Gomułka, and urged the Soviet Union to forgo military intervention in Poland. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a peaceful settlement with Gomułka. Senior Chinese officials also initially counseled against an invasion of Hungary when they traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emergency consultations. By that point, Khrushchev and his colleagues were no longer confident that “the Hungarian working class” could “regain control of the situation and suppress the uprising on its own,” but they agreed for the time being to desist from further intervention in Hungary.28 Less than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet authorities reversed their decision and voted in favor of a large-scale invasion.29 When Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute change, he immediately and strongly endorsed the Soviet decision, not least because Imre Nagy had announced on November 1 (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a neutral state.

China subsequently became the most vocal supporter of the invasion and even publicly welcomed the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jarring effect in Beijing. Zimyabin prominently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956 in his report, but he made no mention of the turmoil that had given rise to the declaration or of the actions that followed.

* Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World.
In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began vigorously championing—and, where possible, actively promoting—“wars of national liberation” and “anti-imperialist struggles” in the developing world.30 This strategy mirrored the growing radicalization of China’s domestic politics at the time. It also flowed naturally from Mao’s view, first enunciated in November 1957, that “the East Wind is now stronger than the West Wind.” Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would deter Western countries from responding to Communist-backed guerrilla movements. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious—at least rhetorically—than their Chinese counterparts, not least because they were aware that the East-West military balance had not improved as much as most Chinese officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodically warned that local Third World conflicts could escalate to a highly destructive global war if the superpowers directly intervened on opposing sides.

In terms of actual policy, however, the difference between Soviet and Chinese approaches was relatively small.31 If only for logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, not China, that had been the primary arms supplier to Communist insurgents in numerous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Cuba).32 Moreover, Chinese leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, were often hesitant about translating rhetoric into concrete policy. In private discussions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese representatives argued that “reasonable caution” was needed even when “conditions were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas in certain [Third World] countries.33

Despite the underlying similarities between Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Communist states were bound to disagree at times. This was evident in July 1958 when a leftist coup against Iraq’s pro-Western government sparked a brief but intense crisis in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and British troop landings in Lebanon and Jordan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials urged the Soviet Union to take a firm stand against “American imperialist aggression” in the Middle East, a task that China itself could not perform because of its lack of power-projection capabilities. Contrary to Beijing’s wishes, however, Soviet leaders quickly decided there was little to be gained by risking a direct East-West confrontation.34 Rather than sending “volunteers” to the Middle East or extending an overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called for a special UN-sponsored meeting to resolve the situation. Although the peak of the crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differences on this score had seemingly waned) by the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the Middle East were a prominent topic of discussion during his visit.35 The resulting exchanges may have been partly responsible for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few weeks later (see below).

Judging from numerous documents prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far
Against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts, Chinese patrol boats engaged in an artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Islands on August 23. Chinese officials, however, were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu lands on August 23 and Chinese naval forces engaged in naval warfare against Taiwan.40 The strongest effect of this crisis came on September 4, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resupply missions to Quemoy. U.S. naval aircraft also were called into action to support the Taiwanese air force as it established control of the region's airspace. In a rapid series of air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.-made MiG-17s forced their Chinese opponents to retreat.41 These humiliating defeats forced Mao and several of his top military commanders onto the defensive during subsequent intra-party debates.42

The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet leaders.43 On September 5, Mao privately acknowledged to the PRC’s Supreme State Conference that he “simply had not anticipated how roiled and turbulent the world would become” if China “fired a few rounds of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu.”44 Confronted by the threat of U.S. military retaliation, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have had at the time of seizing the offshore islands or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.45 Although Chinese artillery units continued in September and early October to shell U.S.-escorted convoys as they landed with resupplies in Quemoy, these actions were coupled with efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 the Chinese government announced a provisional cease-fire, effectively bringing the crisis to an end. The continued bombardment of Quemoy had posed some risk that wider hostilities would break out, but Chinese leaders were careful throughout the crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Mao’s retreat came as a disappointment to some of his colleagues because of his earlier claim that the United States would become “a paper tiger.”46

Souled by the “many people both inside and outside the Party who do not understand the paper tiger problem.”46 Soviet leaders, for their part, were convinced until late September that the PRC’s effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly after the crisis began, he found that Mao was still expressing hope of “responding with force against force.”47 After hearing back from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on his earlier pledge to support the Chinese operation. On September 7, while U.S. ships were embarking on their first escort missions, the Soviet leader issued a public warning that any attack against mainland China would be deemed an attack against the Soviet Union as well.48 This warning was followed two weeks later by a declaration that any use of nuclear weapons against China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. Many Western analysts have claimed that these two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric only when he believed there was no longer any danger of war. New evidence does not bear out this long-standing view. A week after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, he met secretly with the Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he still expected and hoped that China would proceed with its “decisive” military action against Taiwan.49 Although Khrushchev clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to attack mainland China after Chinese artillery units resumed their bombardment of Quemoy gave the Soviet leader reason to believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces would not follow through on their commitment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt betrayed when he finally realized in late September/early October that Mao had decided to bail out of the operation.50

To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended up sparking discord between Soviet and Chinese officials, but for a much different reason from what has usually been suggested. Most Western analysts have argued that Chinese leaders were dismayed when the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lukewarm military backing for the probe against Taiwan.51 New evidence suggests that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did
everything it had promised to do in support of the Chinese operation, and that it was China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to follow through.\textsuperscript{52} This outcome explains why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned once, was determined not to let it happen again. From then on he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These different views became a sore point in Sino-Soviet relations, as was evident during Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in the autumn of 1959.\textsuperscript{53} Zimyanin’s brief discussion of Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does not mention the frustration that Soviet leaders felt and the lasting impact this had on Khrushchev’s approach to the Taiwan issue.

- **Soviet assistance to China’s nuclear weapons program.** When Chinese leaders formally decided in January 1955 to pursue an independent nuclear weapons program, they did so in the expectation that they would receive elaborate advice and backing from Moscow. Between January 1955 and December 1956 the Soviet Union and China concluded four preliminary agreements on bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, nuclear research, and uranium enrichment, and these were followed in October 1957 by the signing of a New Defense Technology Agreement (NDTA), which provided for broad Soviet assistance to China in the development of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.\textsuperscript{54} Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear weapons scientists and engineers were dispatched to China, sensitive information was transferred, equipment was sold for uranium processing and enrichment, and preparations were made to ship a prototype nuclear bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute for training and instruction purposes. In addition, a group of high-ranking Soviet military specialists were sent to help the Chinese establish new regiments for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 (8Zh38) tactical missiles.\textsuperscript{55} The Soviet officers not only gave detailed advice on the technology and operational uses of the missiles, but also helped find suitable locations for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment fields. Similar cooperative arrangements were established for naval delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union provided China with technical data, designs, components, and production equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the naval version of the SS-1B.\textsuperscript{56} Although the R-11FM had a maximum range of just 162 kilometers and could be fired only from the surface, it was the most advanced Soviet SLBM at the time.

Despite the initial success of these efforts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 that it would be inadvisable, in light of Beijing’s territorial claims against the Soviet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to the PRC.\textsuperscript{57} Chinese officials were not informed of this decision until nearly a year and a half later, and in the meantime mutual recriminations occurred behind the scenes when the promised shipment repeatedly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, but his trip proved of little avail in this respect and tensions continued to increase. Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, Soviet leaders formally notified their Chinese counterparts that no prototype bombs or detailed technical blueprints would be provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, but Khrushchev and his colleagues were willing to pay that price at a time when, in their view, Sino-Soviet “relations were steadily deteriorating” and the NDTA was “already coming unraveled.”\textsuperscript{58} Curiously, the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing to give up all hope of obtaining further assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. At the summit in October 1959, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested Soviet aid in the development and production of nuclear-powered strategic submarines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. Khrushchev immediately turned down both proposals, thus dashing any lingering expectations that Mao and Zhou still had of pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons cooperation or of at least reviving the NDTA.\textsuperscript{59}

The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not been involved in the implementation of the NDTA, but senior ministry officials most likely were aware that nuclear assistance was being provided to China. (After all, the Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when they sought to open negotiations for the agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, apart from two oblique references to “questions of defense cooperation.”

- **Differences about Soviet efforts to seek improved ties with the United States.** Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union pursued a line of “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. Chinese leaders, by contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation between the Communist world and the capitalist world and to avoid any hint of compromise. Chinese leaders even claimed that they were willing, \textit{in extremis}, to risk a global nuclear war in the “struggle against imperialism.” To be sure, the connection between rhetoric and concrete policy was often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed down when confronted by a massive U.S. naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Nevertheless, even after that humiliating retreat, officials in Beijing continued to insist that “if the imperialists launch an all-out war,” it inevitably would result in “victory” for the Communist states and “inspire hundreds of millions of people to turn to socialism.” Mao’s seeming indifference to the potential consequences of nuclear war chasened Soviet leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet Union might be drawn into a large-scale conflict against its will.\textsuperscript{60} Soviet officials like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these divergent outlooks (and the high-level concern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is odd that he made no more than an oblique reference to the matter.

Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing about the value of East-West arms control. Chinese officials were deeply suspicious of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their country, too, would come under pressure to sign a test ban treaty (even though they had taken no part in the negotiations), and that this would effectively end China’s hopes of becoming a nuclear power.\textsuperscript{61} The inception of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensified Beijing’s concerns that arms control talks were antithetical to China’s nuclear ambitions.\textsuperscript{62} Zimyanin was well aware of these differences, but chose not to bring them up.

- **China’s deepening confrontation with India.** Sino-Indian relations had been harmonious for several years after the Commu-
nists took power in Beijing, but the relationship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as a result of differences over Tibet and the disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and deployed many thousands of extra troops on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with great apprehension in neighboring India. Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian border dispute heated up, leading to a serious incident in late August 1959, when Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a contested border post at Longju. Although each side blamed the other for the incident, the clash apparently was motivated in part by the Chinese authorities’ desire to take a firm stand against India before Khrushchev arrived in Beijing.

As recriminations between India and China escalated, Chinese officials secretly urged “the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries to exploit all possible opportunities” to “conduct propaganda measures against India” and “expose the subversive role of imperialist and reactionary Tibetan forces” armed and supported by India.64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead of rallying to China’s defense, the Soviet Union scrupulously avoided taking sides during the skirmishes, and released a statement on 9 September 1959 expressing hope that China and India would soon resolve the matter “in the spirit of their traditional friendship.”65 Chinese officials were shown the TASS statement before it went out, and they did their best to persuade Moscow not to release it; but far from helping matters, Beijing’s latest remonstrations merely induced Soviet leaders to issue the statement a day earlier than planned, without any amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues were so dismayed by the Soviet Union’s refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a dispute with a non-Communist state that they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow on September 13 claiming that “the TASS statement has revealed to the whole world the divergence of views between China and the Soviet Union regarding the incident on the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that has literally brought joy and jubilation to the Indian bourgeoisie and to American and British imperialism.”67 The irritation and sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two days later when Soviet and Indian leaders signed a much-publicized agreement that provided for subsidized credits to India of some $385 million over five years.

These events were still under way—and tensions along the Sino-Indian border were still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his report, so it was probably too early for him to gauge the significance of Moscow’s decision to remain neutral.68 Even so, it is odd that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up having such a deleterious effect on Khrushchev’s visit.69

Zimyanin’s Report and Soviet Policy-Making

The submission of Zimyanin’s report to Khrushchev was one of several indicators of a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy-making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union’s dealings with the PRC, as with other Communist states, had been handled mainly along party-to-party lines. A special CPSU Central Committee department, known after February 1957 as the Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, was responsible for keeping track of developments in East-bloc countries and for managing relations with those countries on a day-to-day basis.70 (Matters requiring high-level decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded from Soviet policy-making toward China. On some issues, such as the effort to gain a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, the MFA was the only important actor involved. Also, the foreign minister himself at times played a key role, notably in the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold secret negotiations with Mao about “issues of war and peace, the international situation, and the policy of American imperialism.”71 Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign Ministry’s input was limited. Apart from standard diplomatic support, the MFA had contributed relatively little during Khrushchev’s two previous visits to China (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as well as his visits to most other Communist states. The bulk of the preparations had been handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Central Committee departments and by Khrushchev’s own staff.

In that respect, the September 1959 trip to China was quite different. The MFA ended up with a dominant role in the preparations for the trip, thanks in part to a deliberate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater say for the Foreign Ministry in policy toward China.72 When Gromyko first asked Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on China, the foreign minister knew that he would soon be accompanying Khrushchev on a two-week visit to the United States, a task that would enable him to bolster the Foreign Ministry’s standing (as well as his own influence) on other issues, especially Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in between Khrushchev’s two visits in late September was so limited, briefings for the China trip had to occur almost entirely on the plane. Gromyko was aware that the other senior members of the Soviet “party-government delegation,” led by Mikhail Suslov, were scheduled to depart for China on September 26-27, while Khrushchev and Gromyko were still in the United States. Hence, the foreign minister knew he would be the only top official accompanying Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also intended to make good use of his privileged access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and flight back from, the United States.74)

Under those circumstances, the Foreign Ministry’s report on China, prepared by Zimyanin, became the main briefing material for Khrushchev, along with a short update (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent personnel changes in the Chinese military High Command.75 What is more, Zimyanin (who was a member of the MFA Collegium as well as head of the ministry’s Far Eastern department) and a number of other senior MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing to provide on-site advice and support, something that had not happened during Khrushchev’s earlier visits to China.76 Although the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and a few other CC department heads also traveled to China as advisers, the Foreign Ministry’s role during the visit was far more salient than in the past. (This was reflected in Gromyko’s own role as well; among other things, he was the only Soviet official besides Suslov who took part in all of Khrushchev’s talks with Mao and Zhou Enlai.)77 Hence, Zimyanin’s report proved highly influential.

As things worked out, however, the
MFA’s expanded role had little effect one way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. The trip in September-October 1959 left crucial differences unresolved, and the two sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet Union quietly began pulling some of its key military technicians out of China.78 Tensions increased rapidly over the next several months, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birthday.79 The statement, entitled “Long Live Leninism!” removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.80 Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting and to retaliate for China’s decision to provide other delegates with copies of a confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.81

Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet Union withdrew all its remaining military technicians and advisers from China in July and August 1960, and simultaneously began recalling its thousands of non-military personnel, causing disarray in many of China’s largest economic and technical projects and scientific research programs.82 Although Soviet diplomats in China still had important liaison and information-gathering roles, the expertise of the MFA’s Far Eastern department was largely eclipsed during the 1960s. Zimyanin left the department as early as February 1960, having been appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Subsequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin served briefly as a deputy foreign minister and then gained prominence within the CPSU in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full Central Committee member (from 1966 on), and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC Secretary, beginning in 1976.

Like Zimyanin, the new head of the Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appointment, but aside from that one distinction, Tugarinov was an obscure official whose tenure at the department lasted only until August 1963. His successor, N. G. Sudarkinov, was not yet even a member of the MFA Collegium when he became head of the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of the department’s waning influence. (Sudarkinov was not appointed to the Collegium until November 1964, some 15 months after he took over the Far Eastern department and a month after Khrushchev’s ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the Foreign Ministry’s role in policy-making toward China remained well short of what it had been in September 1959.

The MFA’s diminished impact on Sino-Soviet relations was largely unchanged until mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department was bifurcated, and the ministry’s senior expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed in charge of the new “First Far Eastern” department.84 That department, under Kapitsa’s highly visible direction for well over a decade (until he was promoted to be a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), was responsible for China, Korea, and Mongolia, while the “Second Far Eastern” department handled Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines.85 Even after separate departments were established, however, the continued hostility between China and the Soviet Union left the MFA’s First Far Eastern department with a relatively modest role in policy-making, in part because the department overlapped so much with the sections on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries. Not until the 1980s, when relations between Moscow and Beijing finally began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry regain extensive influence over policy toward China. That trend was under way as early as 1982, but it gathered much greater momentum after 1986, as Eduard Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, the MFA had acquired a dominant role in policy-making toward China.

The status of the Foreign Ministry on this issue was never quite as prominent during Andrei Gromyko’s long tenure as foreign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA’s influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin’s report thus symbolized a high point for the ministry vis-a-vis China in the pre-Gorbachev era.

The translation of Zimyanin’s report follows below:

* * * * *
Soviet-Chinese Relations

The victory of the people’s revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People’s Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries.

When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People’s Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.

Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust. Over time, the above-mentioned agreements were annulled or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan. In addition, a communiqué and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPC CC, a Communist Party of China Central Committee, fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences.

It is worth noting, however, that the CPC CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin. A bit later the Chinese comrades reexamined their evaluation of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in Mao Zedong’s pronouncements when he was visiting Moscow. For example, he said: “... Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now have the same view as the CPSU.” In a number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. Stalin.

Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a campaign was launched in China to combat dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to “let a hundred flowers bloom.” In connection with this the Chinese press began, with increasing frequency, to express criticism of specific conditions and of works by Soviet authors in the fields of philosophy, natural history, literature, and art. This inevitably gave strong impetus to hostile statements by rightist forces who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers. In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR. The airing of these types of statements during the struggle against rightists can in no way be justified, even if one takes account of the tactical aims of our friends, who were seeking to unmask the rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against them for all their statements. It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush-
of revisionists and the surge of imperialist propaganda, which tried to use several ideological campaigns in China in 1957—and, in particular, the campaign to “let a hundred flowers bloom” as well as the publication of a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among the People”—to provoke a schism in relations between the Soviet Union and PRC, the leadership of the CPC CC and the government of the PRC emphasized the close unity of the socialist camp and the leading role of the CPSU among Communist and workers’ parties. Mao Zedong stated this very definitively in his speech to Chinese students attending Moscow State University (November 1957), and he spoke about it at length with officials from Yugoslavia and also during meetings that PRC government delegations had with delegations from Poland and other countries of the socialist camp.99 In 1959 the CPC CC, having reexamined the proposal of the CPSU CC to clarify its formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again affirmed that this formula must be preserved in the future.

The durability of Soviet-Chinese relations and the role of Soviet-Chinese friendship gained new strength as the international situation deteriorated in the Middle East and also in connection with the provocations by the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the summer of 1958. The most important political event that year in Soviet-Chinese relations, which had an enormously positive influence on the development of the whole international situation, was the July-August meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.100 During an exchange of views they considered a number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chinese relations and, in particular, questions of military cooperation.101 The speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his statement that an attack on the PRC would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union itself, was fervently greeted with expressions of gratitude and approval in China.102 The government of the PRC displayed great satisfaction at our assurance about our readiness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation for a nuclear strike against China.103 In turn, the Chinese government declared that the PRC will come to the assistance of the USSR in any part of the globe if an attack is carried out against it.

The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, and a variety of reports from the CPSU CC—about the provision of assistance to the PRC to continue strengthening its defense capability, about a reduction in the number of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the elimination of the network of Soviet “adviser-consultants,” about the CPSU CC’s views of the Yugoslav Communist League’s draft program, and about other matters—had important political benefits.

The results of the CPSU’s 21st Congress provided a great boost to the practical activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist construction in the country.104 It is worth noting that after the publication of the theses of the report by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the CPSU’s 21st Congress and during the proceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, while giving a generally positive evaluation of the achievements of socialist construction in the USSR, made almost no mention of the theoretical portions of the report by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev and said that those portions related only to the practice of socialist and Communist construction in the USSR.105

In a similar vein, the provisions adopted at the Second Session of the CPC’s 8th Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle against “blind faith” and regarding the need to foster sentiments of national pride among the people, as well as some preliminary success in implementing the “Great Leap Forward,” caused a number of cadre workers in the PRC to take on airs.106 They began excessively emphasizing China’s uniqueness and displaying a guarded attitude toward Soviet experience and the recommendations of Soviet specialists.107 Some began declaring that the Soviet Union had stayed too long at the socialist stage of development, while China was moving valiantly ahead toward Communism. The Chinese press quite actively featured criticism of the socialists principles implemented in the USSR for the distribution of material goods in accordance with one’s labor, for the compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, and so forth. Some authors essentially argued that communes were incompatible with kolkhozes.108

Later on, after studying materials from the Congress and after numerous mistakes arose during the establishment of the peasant communes and during the implementation of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC began to display a more proper understanding of matters considered by the 21st Congress, such as the question of the significance of creating a material-technical base and increasing the productivity of labor for the construction of socialism, the question of the role of the principle of material incentives and labor distribution under socialism, and other questions.

The CPSU’s position in offering a principled explanation of a number of Marxist-Leninist precepts and laws of the building of socialism and Communism, which were ignored in China during the implementation of the “Great Leap Forward” and the establishment of communes (see the report and speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Congress and the speeches that followed), helped the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situation correctly and to begin rectifying the mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev about the permanent foundations of Soviet-Chinese friendship swept the rug out from under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist propaganda, which was intended to sow mistrust between our countries and provoke a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations.

An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations over the past decade confirms that relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year. These relations are a decisive factor in the further growth of the might and cohesion of the world socialist camp and in the consolidation of world peace and the security of nations.

3. The section, entitled “Sovetsko-kiitaiskie otnosheniya,” is on LL 71-79.
Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in [Mao’s own] domestic political priorities,” which elevated “national” over “internationalist” concerns. Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone and the agenda for his own Government,” and China’s relations with the Soviet Union were therefore “decisively altered” when “Mao’s thought about China’s domestic condition underwent a sea change in the years 1956-9” (emphasis added). For an opposing view, see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts in Chinese domestic policies, rather than the other way around. For a similar, though more qualified, assessment, see Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), esp. 110-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars have attempted to connect shifts in Soviet domestic policies with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or vice versa). Alexander Dallin outlined a general framework in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific application to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership politics on Khrushchev’s stance vis-a-vis China in Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief research note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev,” Studies in Comparative Communism 8:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras’s and Linden’s observations are speculative and (particularly in Linden’s case) not wholly convincing. Even the illuminating book by James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations, barely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet relations, to the extent they existed for either China or the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that remains a fitting topic for study. 5. The phrase “reluctant and suspicious ally” comes from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which debunk the notion that China was “forced” into an Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in [Mao’s own] domestic political priorities,” which elevated “national” over “internationalist” concerns. Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone and the agenda for his own Government,” and China’s relations with the Soviet Union were therefore “decisively altered” when “Mao’s thought about China’s domestic condition underwent a sea change in the years 1956-9” (emphasis added). For an opposing view, see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts in Chinese domestic policies, rather than the other way around. For a similar, though more qualified, assessment, see Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), esp. 110-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars have attempted to connect shifts in Soviet domestic policies with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or vice versa). Alexander Dallin outlined a general framework in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific application to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership politics on Khrushchev’s stance vis-a-vis China in Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief research note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev,” Studies in Comparative Communism 8:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras’s and Linden’s observations are speculative and (particularly in Linden’s case) not wholly convincing. Even the illuminating book by James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations, barely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet relations, to the extent they existed for either China or the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that remains a fitting topic for study. 5. The phrase “reluctant and suspicious ally” comes from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which debunk the notion that China was “forced” into an
Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influence.” See “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tse-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.”, L. 93.

26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin’s policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTSKhIDN): Kommunisticheskaia partiiya (Bol’shevik), Kommintern, i Narodno-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal Problemy Dal’nego vostoka. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in January-February 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan’s report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tkhivinskiis and published as “Iz Archivka Presidenta RF: Perepiska I. V. Stalin’a s Mao Tsedunom v yanvare 1949 g.” (Novaya i noveisha istoriya (Moscow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 95-118.

27. “Address on March 10.” 98. For Mao’s extended comment on the point during his March 1956 meeting, see “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tse-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.”, Ll. 88-92.

28. Khrushchev, Vospominniya, Vol. 5, Part C (“O Voenigr”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary only November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht über die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 220, No. 212/20. Other evidence, including the meeting by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev’s account. (Veliko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev’s version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 supra), despite the way that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev’s account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts Khrushchev’s account. The September 1963 statement goes on to claim that Chinese leaders “insisted on the adoption of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev’s claim that Mao strongly supported the invasion after the Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any chronology, it creates the impression that Mao’s backing for an invasion preceded the Soviet decision, but the statement would hold up equally well if, as appears likely, Mao’s support for an invasion followed rather than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev’s account.


30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in particular Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the supposed conflict between Soviet and Chinese approaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking rhetorical flourishes for actual policy.


35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tse-duana,” Pravda (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October 1959 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassador in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev during the 1958 trip.

36. In Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern crisis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis began). Mehnert’s comments have no bearing on the initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here shows, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely differed in their views about how to respond.


51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations.
52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” 499-500.


55. The information here was first revealed by the former head of the Soviet “missile group” in China, Major-General Aleksandr Savel’ev, in Aleksandr Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1995, 6.

56. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 131-132. For more on the R-11FM, see Mikhail Turetsky, The Introduction of Missile Systems into the Soviet Navy (1945-1962), Monograph Series on Soviet Union No. 8 (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Associates, February 1983), 65-72.


58. Ibid., p. 98. Details of the NDTA and the June 1959 talks focused almost exclusively on recent developments in the Taiwan Straits, and were largely unproductive. He said he was “astounded” when Mao nonchalantly proposed that American troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike (p. 133). Khrushchev’s retrospective assertions about this particular matter have been controversial from the time they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, has discounted Khrushchev’s report (see Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 16 and 258), but has added no specific evidence to contradict it. What is known about China’s cautious policy during the Quemoy crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Khrushchev’s claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something reasonably close, and that Khrushchev may have somewhat misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC’s Supreme State Conference that China should be ready, if necessary, for a “war in which hydrogen bombs” would be used: “If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people die, there is still nothing to fear.” (See Mao Zedong sizheng wansui, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said roughly the same thing to Khrushchev, it is plausible that the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what Khrushchev alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks before Khrushchev’s visit. In an interview in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, “I recall hearing something about this at the time, after the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked us.”


60. A very useful account of Khrushchev’s interactions with Gorbachev during the trip is in Khrushchev’s Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part E (1980s) (SAH), pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he “greatly respected Gorbachev as foreign minister both during this time and afterwards” (p. 8).

61. A cover note on Zimyinian’s report alludes to a one-page update, but the text has not yet been located. No doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 September 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao. Numerous other top military officials also were re-
moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General Staff, General Huang Kecheng (who was replaced by the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); two other deputy defense ministers, General Xiao Ke and General Li Du; and a half dozen lower-ranking generals. These and other top officials were all removed because of their purported links with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of “rightist opportunism” and forming an “anti-Party clique.” These charges, approved by the CCP Central Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of August, stemmed from a secret “letter of opinion” that Peng Dehuai wrote in response to interrogations during the Cultural Revolution. An English version is now available: Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1988-1974), trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986). The book includes a whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1969 (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe that Peng’s challenge to Mao revolved around military issues per se or had anything to do with the Soviet Union. Peng undoubtedly was troubled by the growing frictions with Moscow because he knew how dependent China was still on the USSR for military technology, but he never raised this issue in his confrontation with Mao. Nor is there any evidence to substantiate claims about a “Soviet connection” made in David A. Charles (psued.), “The Dismissal of Marshal P’teng Teh-Huai,” The China Quarterly 8 (October-December 1961), 63-76. Charles’s article alleges that Peng’s letter to Mao was prepared with Moscow’s knowledge, and that “Khrushchev’s refusal to apologize for this intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps precipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute.” These assertions are no more than dubious speculation. 76. On the role of senior MFA officials during the trip, see, inter alia, “Uzhan u Mao Tsze-dun” and “Prebyvanie v Pekine sovetskogo partiinopravitel’svennoi delegatsii,” both in Pravda (Moscow), 3 October 1959, 1; and “Kita i teplo provozhata sovetskikh gostei: Ot’ezd iz Pekina partiipo-pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 5 October 1959, 1. The MFA Collegium was a group of 12-15 of the most senior officials in the ministry, including the minister, all the first deputy and deputy ministers, and about a half dozen others, among them Zimyanin. 77. See “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khruzhcheva 2 oktyabrja 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, L. 1; and “Beseda N. S. Khruzhcheva i Mao Tsze-tse,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1. 78. This is documented in Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, trans. by (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572-573. Nie Rongzhen was the long-time head of China’s strategic weapons program; his memoirs were first published in Chinese (Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu) in 1984. 79. “Long Live Leninism!” was first published in Hongyi 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in translation in Peking Review 3:17 (April 1960), 14-22. This statement and many others from 1959 and 1960 are available in well-annotated translation in Hudson, China’s Relations with the West: Diplomatic Documents, 1959-1972 (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110. 80. See, e.g., Dolinin, “Kak nashe raketchiki kitaevsev obchali,” 6. 81. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War. Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110. 82. For a useful account of this process by a participant, see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, 1964), esp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, “Kak nashe raketchiki kitaevsev obchali,” 6. 83. For a good indication of Rakhmanin’s views at the time, see his pseudonymously written book, O. B. Rakhmanin, “Rasskazy sovetskoi-kitsiiskoi otnoshenii v khod godakh” (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). Although the book was written much later, his views were remarkably constant over the years. Rakhmanin wrote numerous other books about China (also under the pseudonym of O. B. Borisov), which are also worth consulting. See in particular O. B. Borisov and B. T. Kolooskov, Sovetskoi-kitaiskie otnoshenia 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk (Moscow: Mysl’, 1972). 84. For background on Kapitsa and his dealings with Rakhmanin, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 51-53. 85. All other Southeast Asian countries came within the purview of the MFA’s Southeast Asian Department, which remained a unified entity. 86. The provisions excluding foreigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang to the status of “colonies.” For other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see “Soglashenie mezhdu Soveyzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Kitaikoi Narodnoi Respublikoi o obuchrenenii dushv Sovetskoi-kitaiskikh aksionernikh obschestv,” 29 March 1930; and “Soobschhenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaikoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii dvukh Sovetskoi-kitaiskikh aksionernikh observstv,” 29 March 1930; and “Soobschhenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaikoi Narodnoi Respublikoi o ob uchrezhdenii Sovetskoi-kitaiskogo aksionernogo obschestva grazhdanskoi aviantii,” 2 April 1950, all in L. 1: F. K. Kudrykov, V. N. Nikiforov, and A. S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetskoi-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 1917-1957 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoi literatury, 1959), 221-222, 227-228 and 228-229, respectively. For further commentary on these agreements, see Chang, China’s Boundary Trea-
attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Department of People’s Daily and Red Flag,” 13 September 1963, in Peking Review 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8-15.

91. The reference here is to Mao’s trip in November 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip outside China) since early 1950. On the point discussed in the next sentence, see Khurshchev, Vospominiyaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105.

92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend”; and in the spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee published a directive inviting public criticism, many Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportunity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter-revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this event, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., Tragedy in China: The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals, 50. See also Minoe Nakajima, “Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., The People’s Republic, Part I, 270, 277.

93. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal’neishem ukrepleniya druzyby i sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi socialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vyipiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhении в Vengrrii,” No. P49/ 1 (STRICLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Li. 25-30. Zimyanin’s description of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly praised the October 30 statement as evidence of Moscow’s “determination to eliminate certain abnormal features of its relations with other socialist states.” 95. “Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 January 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 330–335. Zimyanin’s characterization of this declaration (see next sentence) is accurate.

96. The reference here is to the 1964 meeting in Moscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first session on 14-16 November, but at the outset Yugoslavia declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin accurately observes below, China joined the other participants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the CPSU’s preeminent role in the world Communist movement. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh ik rabochikh parti” sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshikh svesnya v Moskve 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to participate in the second phase of the conference, which was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world took part in that session, which culminated in the adoption of a so-called Peace Manifesto. 97. “Rech’ rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoj Narodnoj Republiki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoj sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR.” Pravda (Moscow), 7 November 1957, 2. See also Khurshchev, Vospominiyaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46. 98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only time he is known to have offered direct support for Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts from the speech were later published in Remnin Ribao, but all references to Khurshchev and the “Molotov clique” were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 the full text of Mao’s 18 November 1957 speech was published, along with the texts of two other unpublished speeches he gave during the November 1957 conference, in a collection entitled Mao Zedong si sixiang wansu (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same title used for eight earlier compilations of secret speeches by Mao). All three speeches were translated into English, introduced, and annotated by Michael Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 Moscow Conference,” The Journal of Communist Studies 2:2 (June 1996). Mao’s comments about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse the CPSU Central Committee’s resolution of the Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade Khurshchev was abroad and unprepared. However, even though they launched a surprise attack, our Comrade Khurshchev is no fool; he is a smart man who immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victorious counterattack. That struggle was one between two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This shows that the line represented by Comrade Khurshchev is more correct and that opposition to this line is incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake. The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides could not accommodate each other and each side excluded the other. This is the case, there need not be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is the danger of trouble if things are not handled well.” 99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-duna s kitaiskimi studentami i praktikantami v Moskve,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 November 1957, 3. 100. “Kommyunyike o vstreche N. S. Khurshcheva i Mao Tsze-duna.” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 403–406. 101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed at this meeting were essentially fivefold. First, China sought new weapons and broader military backing from Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see above). Second, Khurshchev sought, once again, to persuade China to permit a long-range communications center to be established on Chinese territory by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific. This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky in April 1958, and over the next few months the two sides haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the summit, Khurshchev and Mao concurred that China would build and operate the station with Soviet funding and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from China in mid-1960 left the communications center only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually completed it on their own.) Third, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that Khurshchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the past. Fourth, Khurshchev renewed an earlier proposal for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at Soviet Arctic ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea, just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before Khurshchev’s visit. Fifth, the question of nuclear weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing...
information needed to build nuclear weapons. But unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a non-committal response. Information here is derived from: (1) an interview with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to China, in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 6 October 1955; (2) Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 14-15; and (3) Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 76-78.

102. Khrushchev declared that “an attack against the Chinese People’s Republic, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do everything necessary, in conjunction with People’s China, to defend the security of both states.” This statement was repeated, in more or less identical phrasing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, e.g., “Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khruscheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkauерu po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivany,” 7 September 1958, in Kurydkov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya*, 411. According to Khrushchev’s memoirs, as soon as this statement was issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had any intention of fulfilling it; see *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part F (“Mao Tsze-dun”), pp. 4-5. This assertion is problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) any direct evidence to contravene it.

103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the Quemoy crisis, warning that “those who are conceiving plans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack is carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be dealt a swift and automatic rebuff and ink.” See “Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khruscheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkaurovu po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivany,” 19 September 1958, in Kurydkov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya*, 417. At the time, the Chinese authorities warmly praised Khrushchev’s statement, describing it as “a lofty expression of our fraternal relations.” See “Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi mezhdunarodnoi obstansove,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 10 November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was “deeply touched by [the Soviet Union’s] boundless devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism” and wanted to “convey heartfelt gratitude” to Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders shifted their view (in accordance with the polities of the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev’s pledge, arguing that “Soviet leaders declared their support for China only when they were certain there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union to support China with nuclear weapons.” See “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government’s Statement of 21 August,” 1 September 1963, in *Peking Review* 6:36 (6 September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev’s pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, *China’s Strategic Seapower*, 15-17 and Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” 499-500. For an earlier study reaching the same conclusion, see Halperin and Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,” 265-303.


105. Zimyanin’s characterization of the Chinese response to Khrushchev’s report (especially the section on “The New Stage in Communist Construction and Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory”) is accurate. Beijing’s tepid initial response appeared in the main daily *Renmin Ribao* on 5 February 1959, and a much more extended commentary was published in the theoretical journal *Hongqi* on 16 February, 106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous Second Session of the CPC’s 8th Congress, which adopted a “General Line” of drastically accelerated economic development and ideological fervor. The hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash program of industrialization relying primarily on China’s own resources; (2) the establishment of huge “people’s communes” (the “basic social units of a Communist society”), which were intended to replace collective farms and to combine agriculture with industry (including “backyard” steel furnaces) all around the country; (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes and systematic depredation of expertise; (5) the abandonment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the conversion of the army into a full-fledged people’s militia (via the communes) and the establishment of an “Every one a Soldier” campaign requiring Chinese military officers to spend at least one month a year performing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders’ hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a debilitating failure. The communes (which became smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed forces also suffered immense damage from both the demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray within the military-industrial complex. Of the many Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, *The Great Leap Forward*, 36-40, passim. For a good example of Mao’s own thoughts on the topic, see his secret “Address on March 10” at the Chengdu Conference, published in Issues & Studies 10:2 (November 1973), 95-98.

108. For Soviet officials’ views of these ideological disputes, see the voluminous files in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, Dd. 247, 301, 398, and 399.

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New Evidence on
The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71

EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS
ON THE BORDER CONFLICT, 1969

by Christian F. Ostermann

The Sino-Soviet border crisis of March-September 1969 is one of the most intriguing crises of the Cold War. For several months, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stood on the brink of war—which, on the Soviet side—involved the threat of nuclear strikes. It resulted in a sharp increase in Soviet military strength in Central Asia and a fierce Soviet-Chinese arms race. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1969 border conflict also reinforced the trend toward a fundamental realignment in the Cold War international system: polycentrism within world communism, Sino-Soviet tensions, U.S.-Chinese rapprochement and “triangular diplomacy.”

Unlike in the case of Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, however, the documentary evidence on the crisis is extremely sparse. Both Moscow and Beijing have published their mutual recriminations, but beyond official notes and journalistic accounts, few sources have become available on either side, nor, for that matter, in the United States.

Numerous questions remain unanswered: What was the motivation on both sides behind the 1969 border incidents? How likely was the outbreak of a major war? How serious was the Soviet nuclear threat? Were there divisions within the Chinese leadership over the Zhen Bao/Damansky Island Incident? What was the debate in Moscow? How much did the United States know about the conflict? What was the U.S. role in the dispute? How was the crisis resolved? Even with the opening of the former Soviet archives, little new evidence on the crisis has emerged. The following three documents, obtained by the author in the “Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv” (SAPMO), the archives which house the records of the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Berlin, are among the first authentic, previously secret documents on the crisis that have become available.

Border disputes between Russia and China had a long historical tradition. Competing territorial claims and differences over borderlines reached back to the seventeenth century. In 1860, the conclusion of the Treaty of Beijing provided for a temporary settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, Chinese and Russian cultures and territorial ambitions continued to clash in the border areas. Following the Communists’ victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and Mao Zedong’s option for an alliance with Moscow (1950), the Chinese Communists apparently accepted the territorial status quo along the 4,150 mile-long border with Russia. Largely dependent on the Soviet protection and support, the Chinese signed the 1951 Border Rivers Navigation Agreement which implied their consent to the existing border regime. This included acceptance of armed Soviet control of the Amur and Ussuri border rivers and of more than 600 of the 700 islands located in these strategically important waterways in the extreme northeastern border region. The agreement also required the Chinese to obtain Soviet permission before using the rivers and the islands. Similar procedures had been established for the use of Soviet-claimed pastures by Chinese herders in the northwestern Xinjiang border province. Disagreements over the border never ceased to exist but local authorities kept them at a low level.

With the emerging Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and the open collision of Soviet and Chinese leaders at the International Conference of Communist Parties in Bucharest in 1960, the dormant border issue resurfaced again. It now seems evident that the border issue was a symptom rather than a cause of heightening tensions between both countries. Both sides, however, found the issue extremely useful as an instrument in their ideological and power-political rivalry. For the Chinese, the border incidents were a way to underline their ideological challenge by quasi-military means and to put the Soviets on the defensive. Claiming that the borderline had been “dictated” by the Russian Empire in “unequal treaties” with a weak and divided China, the Chinese leadership used the conflict over the border to draw attention to Czarist imperial legacies in Soviet foreign policy and serve as proof for what was later labeled Soviet “social imperialism.” Moreover, Beijing hoped that the incidents would serve notice to the USSR that the PRC would no longer put up with Soviet subversion in the volatile border regions. Chinese border violations had occurred in Xinjiang in 1959, and continued in the early 1960s.

Moscow had initially refused to accept the Chinese notion of “unequal treaties” and enter into negotiations which Beijing had demanded possibly as early as 1957 and again in 1960. Negotiations, Moscow must have felt, would call into question the legitimacy of the border arrangement and open a Pandora’s box of questions. As Soviet-Chinese polemics and Chinese border intrusions mounted in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and as Beijing demonstrated its readiness to employ its growing military power in several military campaigns against India in 1962, Moscow finally agreed to consultations on the border. Following a letter by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to CCP Chairman Mao Zedong in November 1963, secret negotiations began in February 1964 but soon stalled over Chinese claims to large territories in Siberia and demands for recognition of the “unequal” nature of the historical border arrangement. Disagreement also existed regarding the exact borderline. While Moscow was ready to concede that the thalway—a line following the deepest point of a valley or river—constituted the borderline in the northeastern border rivers, the Soviets were unwilling to relinquish control over most of the 700 islands in the frontier rivers. When Mao publicized the controversy and accused the Soviets of “imperialism,” Khrushchev decided to suspend the talks (October 1964).

The onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution led to a further decline in Sino-Soviet relations. Following an abortive meeting with Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin in February 1965, Mao broke party relations with the CPSU in 1966 and reduced communications with Moscow to low-
level contacts. Concurrently, the situation on the borders worsened. In the spring, Beijing unilaterally announced stricter navigation regulations governing “foreign” (thus Soviet) vessels on the border rivers. Later that year small-scale skirmishes occurred along the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-Mongolian borders. Ever more aggressively, the Chinese asserted their claims to the islands within their half of the border rivers along the Chinese Northeast. Groups of Chinese soldiers and fishermen were now sent on the border islands instructed to fight if their normal patrol routes were blocked by Soviet guards. Later, Beijing claimed that a total of 4,189 border incidents had occurred between 1964 and 1969 alone.10

The new Soviet leadership under Leonid I. Brezhnev (which overthrew Khrushchev in October 1964) had responded to Beijing’s confrontational posture by increased economic and military pressure. Early on in the confrontation, the Soviets had withdrawn vital economic support and advisers from the PRC. Moscow had also initiated a major long-term build-up of its military power in the Soviet Far East. Soviet conventional force levels rose dramatically after 1965, from approximately 17 divisions to 27 divisions by 1969 (and about 48 divisions in the mid-1970s).11 Moscow also decided to deploy SS-4 MRBMs as well as short-range rockets (SCUD and FROG). Other initiatives aimed at strengthening border controls along the frontier with the PRC. Increasing the geostrategic pressure on Beijing, Moscow also concluded a twenty-year treaty of friendship with Mongolia. The treaty provided for joint Soviet-Mongolian defense efforts and led to the stationing of two or three Soviet divisions in the Mongolian People’s Republic.12

Most importantly, Moscow did not shy away from thinly veiled nuclear threats. As early as September 1964, Khrushchev had announced that the Soviet Union would use all necessary measures including “up-to-date weapons of annihilation” to defend its borders.13 Repeatedly throughout the border crisis, Moscow secretly and publicly aired the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear installations. Faced with the PRC’s growing military capabilities and Mao’s apparent “mad” “opportunism”, Moscow increased its nuclear strength in Asia and, by 1969, had installed an anti-ballistic missile system directed against China.

Despite heightened Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet nuclear sabre-rattling, the border conflict did not immediately or inevitably develop into shooting engagements. Chinese fishermen and soldiers continued to enter border islands on the Ussuri and Amur which they claimed as their own, thus encroaching on territory controlled by Soviets border guards. In each case, the Soviets dispatched border guard units which expelled the Chinese from the islands. Fighting was usually avoided. Over the years, Soviets and Chinese came to adopt a pattern of almost ritualistic practices and unwritten rules to resolve border violations in a non-shooting fashion. Even after Mao turned toward a more aggressive policy of “forceful forward patrolling” (which implied fighting if necessary) during the Cultural Revolution, shooting engagements were avoided by both sides. Neither Beijing nor Moscow was apparently interested in starting major fighting.14

The Sino-Soviet “cold war” on the border turned hot in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) and the Soviet enunciation of the “Brezhnev doctrine.” It is likely that the Chinese leadership perceived the Soviet claim to intervene in any socialist state where socialism was considered “in danger”—and the potential application of the Brezhnev doctrine to Asia—as a threat and challenge to Chinese security interests. PRC Defense Minister Lin Biao, Mao’s heir apparent, allegedly warned the CCP Politburo and the Military Affairs Commission that China would be attacked by the the Soviet Union. In October 1968, he issued Directive No. 1 which put the People’s Republic on war footing. Others within the Politburo—including Premier Zhou Enlai and probably Mao Zedong—apparently doubted Moscow’s readiness for war with China.15 These differences notwithstanding, the Chinese leadership opted for a more forceful attitude towards Russia. Chinese border guards were now instructed to carry uniforms and weapons and to confront the Soviets and shoot if necessary. Incidents of growing violence (though still non-shooting) occurred in late 1968 and in January and February of 1969. But it was not until 2 March 1969 that the transition from non-shooting confrontations to firefighting was made. On this day, Chinese soldiers ambushed and opened fire on a Soviet border patrol unit on the Zhen Bao/Damansky Island in the Ussuri, killing the Soviet officer and 30 soldiers. Document No. 1 (printed below), an informational note given to the East German leadership and circulated in the SED Politburo, provides the first internal Soviet account of this crucial incident.

The document accords with the publicized Soviet version of the incident, considered by scholars as closer to the truth than the opposing Chinese account which claimed that the Soviets started the gunfire and thus broke the most significant tacit principle of confrontation.16 According to the document, Soviet observations posts noted the presence of thirty armed Chinese soldiers on the island around 9 a.m. on March 2, causing the Soviets to send a unit of border guards to the island to expel the Chinese intruders. When, according to the long-established practice, the Soviet post commander and a small advance contingent of border guards confronted the Chinese and protested the border violation, demanding that the Chinese leave the island, the Chinese opened fire. In the ensuing fight, the Soviet commander and thirty Soviet soldiers were killed. Artillery fire was also opened on the unit from larger and well-equipped Chinese forces hidden on the island and from the Chinese shore. Only after Soviet reinforcements arrived were the Chinese expelled from the island.

Despite the assertion that the incident was the “logical consequence” of previous border provocations, the memorandum to the East German leadership, communicated a few days after the event took place, reflects Soviet anxiety over the new level of preparation, violence and weaponry exhibited by the Chinese in carrying out the ambush. The document reveals that the Soviet were nothing less than stunned over the fact that the Chinese had departed from the long-established practice of resolving border violations short of fireworks. Was this a prelude to a full-fledged war? To some extent, the document thus corroborates evidence by high-level Soviet defector Arkady N. Shevchenko who has argued that “the events on Damansky had the effect of an electric shock in Moscow. The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory. ... A nightmare vision of invasion by millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost fran-
tic. Despite our overwhelming superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy for the USSR to cope with an assault of such magnitude.”

Soviet concerns that the border conflict would spin out of control were central to the Soviet response to the Chinese challenge. Yet so was the specter of an even more radical shift in Chinese foreign policy evident in the offensive posture displayed in the ambush and atrocities. For Moscow, the March 2 incident also carried geostategic meaning: it revealed “Beijing’s intention to activate its opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries—above all with the United States and West Germany.”

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in response to the crisis: First, Moscow sought to isolate Beijing further and increase military pressure on the PRC. The March 2 clash had initially provoked a heated debate within the Soviet leadership. Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated a “nuclear blockbuster” against China’s industrial centers, while others called for surgical strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities. Brezhnev eventually decided to opt for a more vigorous build-up of Soviet conventional forces in the East (including relocation of Soviet bomber fleets from the West), not necessarily precluding, however, the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Demonstrating their determination to retaliate with superior force, the Soviets, after a 12-day stand-off, attacked Chinese positions on the island with heavy artillery and overwhelming force, foregiving, however, the use of air or nuclear strikes.

To some extent, the Kremlin’s forceful but limited military response was influenced by heightened concern over the militarization of the crisis among Moscow’s European and Asian allies. Moscow, however, had no interest in escalating the crisis beyond control for other reasons as well. Added pressure on the PRC would not induce Mao to forego his “political flirtation” with the West—in fact, it might reinforce such a move, which would run counter to Soviet geostategic interests. Thus, Brezhnev also sought to defuse the crisis by resuming negotiations with the Chinese. Within a week of the March 15 incident, Moscow sought to re-establish contact with Beijing.

Document No. 2, a telegram from the East German Embassy in Beijing in early April 1969, documents one of the early Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports information provided by the Soviet chargé d’affairs in Beijing according to which Kosygin, acting on behalf of the CPSU Politburo, tried to contact Mao on March 21 through the existing hotline between Moscow and Beijing. The Chinese, however, refused to put Kosygin through. Reflecting Moscow’s concern over the crisis, Kosygin reportedly indicated that, “if necessary,” he would agree to meet even with Zhou Enlai. When the Soviet Embassy communicated the Soviet desire for talks to the Chinese Foreign Ministry the following day, the Soviets were informed that a direct line between the CPSU Politburo and the CCP was no longer “advantageous.” Mao’s insensitivity may well have stemmed from the realization that Moscow had only limited military leverage. Moreover, by publicly degrading Moscow, Mao probably sought to strengthen his position at the Chinese Communist Party conference in April 1969.

Soviet overtures for border discussions continued, however. On March 29, Moscow publicly called for negotiations on the border issue. Two weeks later, on April 11, a Soviet Foreign Ministry note to the PRC again proposed the immediate resumption of the border talks, to no avail. Major Chinese intrusions occurred, according to these informational notes given by the Soviets to the East Germans, throughout May, climaxing in incursions on May 2, 9, 13, and 14 in the western border regions as well as along the controversial border rivers in the east.

Facing Chinese intransigence, Moscow continued its “coercive diplomacy” throughout the summer of 1969, launching a further military build-up to ensure complete superiority in strategic and conventional weapons. Indeed there is every reason to believe that following the March 2 engagement, the Soviets were largely responsible for incidents along the Sino-Soviet border, the most important of which occurred on August 13 along the Central Asian border in Xinjiang, six miles east of Zhalanashkol. Taking advantage of their superiority in armor and weaponry, the Soviets sought to demonstrate to the Chinese their determination through repeated border infringements. Apparently more anxious about Soviet policy, the Chinese, by September, were charging the Russians with 488 “deliberate” border violations between June and August alone. Considering the concurrent hints of potential nuclear attack, the summer of 1969 can be seen, as the Thomas Robinson has put it, “as a textbook case of the use by Moscow of combined political, military, and propaganda means to force Peking to take an action—renew the talks—it otherwise resisted....”

Soviet strategy in the border conflict proved successful with regard to the resumption of border talks. In May, the Chinese Government signaled its readiness for talks through an official government note. Contrary to their refusal in previous year, the Chinese, in June, agreed to hold a meeting of the Commission on Border Rivers Navigation which had been created by the 1951 Agreement. After an abortive Chinese walk-out, negotiations resulted in the signing of a new protocol in August. More significantly, the Chinese finally agreed to a high-level meeting: on 11 September 1969, a meeting between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai took place in Beijing which laid the foundations for the eventual resolution of the border crisis.

Document No. 3, an informational memorandum handed by the Soviets to the East German leadership, is a record of the meeting which took place between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Few details of this crucial meeting have become known. According to the memorandum, the meeting was the result of “one more initiative” on the part of the CPSU Central Committee to effect a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Chinese responded “pretty quickly” to the Soviet proposal to take advantage of Kosygin’s presence in Hanoi on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh’s funeral. The Soviet delegation under Kosygin, however, learned of Chinese readiness to talk only one hour after its departure from Hanoi. Indicative of Moscow’s strong interest in de-escalation, Kosygin, who had already reached Soviet Central Asia, turned around and flew to Beijing, there he was met by Chinese leaders Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi.

The four-hour talk apparently centered on the border issue. According to the Soviet account, Zhou Enlai declared that “China has no territorial pretensions toward the Soviet Union” and—despite his assertions about the unequal nature of the treaties—“recognizes that border which exists in accord with these treaties.” While Zhou stated that China had no intentions of attacking the Soviet Union, Kosygin denied assertions of
“contrived imperialist propaganda” that Moscow was “preparing a preventive strike” against the PRC. Preparatory to further negotiations on border issues in Beijing, both sides were reported to have agreed to three principles: (1) the observance of the existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of armed confrontations; and (3) military disengagement from disputed border areas. Kosygin also proposed the expansion of trade relations and economic cooperation as well as the normalizing of railroad and aviation connections. Significantly, the Soviet premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared that Beijing would not curtail its political and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin conceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements “played into the hands of world imperialism,” Moscow considered polemics on controversial issues as “permissible” if conducted in a “fitting tone.”

Moscow was successful in forcing the Chinese to accept the status quo along the Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at a price in ideological and geostrategic terms. Not only did the Soviets concede the validity of a direct challenge to its leadership within the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a development long evident but rarely formulated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. In the long run, Moscow’s coercive diplomacy worsened relations with the United States and helped drive China into a rapprochement with the West, thus altering the balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvantage.26

**Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR Leadership on 2 March 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Clashes**

5 Copies
3/8/69

On March 2, 1969, at 11 o’clock local time, the Chinese organized a provocation on the Island Damansky which is located on the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsky, between the points Bikin and Iman (Primorsky Region).

The ascertained facts are that this action had been prepared by the Chinese government for a long time. In December 1968 and in January/February 1969, groups of armed Chinese soldiers violated the border at the Damansky Island several times, operating from Hunzy. After protests by the Soviet border guards, the Chinese military returned to their border posts or marched along the line which constitutes the border between China and the USSR.

In the events of March 2, 1969, the border control forces at Hunzy played only a secondary role. An especially trained unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with a force of more than 200 men was used for the staging of this provocation. Secretly, this unit was brought on the Island Damansky during the night of March 2. The men in this unit had special gear and wore camouflage clothes. A telephone line to the unit was installed from the Chinese shore. Prior to this, reserves and munitions, among others PAC batteries, mines and armored artillery and heavy fire guns, had been pulled together near the Chinese shore. The stabilizers, shelling, mines and grenade splinters, and the kind of crates left in the tanks that were hit, found later provided the proof that these weapons had indeed been used.

Around 2 o’clock Moscow time (9 o’clock local time), our observation posts noted the advance of 30 armed Chinese military men on the Island of Damansky. Consequently, a group of Soviet border guards was dispatched to the location where the Chinese had violated the border. The officer in charge of the unit and a small contingent approached the border violators with the intention of registering protests and demanding (without using force) that they leave Soviet territory, as had been done repeatedly in the past. But within the first minutes of the exchange, our border guards came under crossfire and were insidiously shot without any warning. At the same time, fire on the remaining parts of our force was opened from an ambush on the island and from the Chinese shore. The guards then assumed combat order, and, reinforced by the approaching reserve from the nearby border post, threw back the Chinese surprise attack, and expelled them through decisive action from Soviet territory.

There were casualties and wounded men on both sides.

When the location on the island where the incident had happened was inspected, military equipment, telephones, and phone lines connecting to the Chinese mainland, as well as large numbers of scattered empty liquor bottles (which had obviously been used by the Chinese provocateurs and the participants in this adventure beforehand to gain courage) were found.

There are no settlements on the Island of Damansky and it is of no economic importance at all; there are no villages in the vicinity for dozens of miles. One can obviously draw the conclusion that it [the island] was chosen as the site for the provocation because such an endeavor could be prepared there secretly and then presented to the world in a version advantageous to the organizers.

During the provocation, the Chinese military committed incredibly brutal and cruel acts against the wounded Soviet border guards. Based on the on-site inspection and the expert knowledge of the medical commission which examined the bodies of the dead Soviet border guards, it can be stated that the wounded were shot by the Chinese from close range [and/or] stabbed with bayonets and knives. The faces of some of the casualties were distorted beyond recognition, others had their uniforms and boots taken off by the Chinese. The cruelties committed by the Chinese toward the Soviet border guards can only be compared with the worst brutalities of the Chinese militarists and Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi’s] men during the ’20s and ’30s.

The crime by the Mao Zedong group which caused loss of lives has far-reaching objectives.

The Maoists exacerbate the anti-Soviet hysteria and produce a chauvinist frenzy in the country, creating an atmosphere which enables them to establish Mao Zedong’s anti-Soviet and chauvinist-great power course as the general line of Chinese policy at the IX Party Convention of the CPC.

It is also obvious that the Mao group has the intention of using the anti-Soviet psychosis it created for its subversive and divisive policy in the international Communist movement. The Maoists apparently strive to make an all-out effort to complicate and prevent the convention of the International Consultation of Communist and Workers’ Parties in order to create distrust in the Soviet Union and the CCP among the fraternal parties.

The new dangerous provocations of the Maoists reveal Beijing’s intention to activate the opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries - above all with the United States and West Germany. It is no
accident that the ambush on the Soviet border unit was staged by the Chinese agencies at a time when Bonn started its provocation of holding the election of the Federal President in West Berlin.

The provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is part of the Maoists’ policy which aims at forcing a radical reversal in the foreign and domestic policies of the PR [People’s Republic] of China and at transforming the country de facto into a power hostile toward the socialist countries.

The Mao Zedong group has prepared the organization of armed provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. The Chinese authorities have been creating artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese border since 1960. Since this time the Chinese have undertaken several thousand border violations with provocative goals.

At the beginning of 1967, the number of border violations by Chinese authorities increased sharply. In some districts they tried to install demonstratively border patrols on the islands and those parts of the rivers belonging to the USSR. In December 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese undertook large provocative actions on the island of Kursk on the Yalu and in the area of the Kasachev Canal. On January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an armed attack on the Island of Damansky.

The border in the area of the Island of Damansky was established according to the Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed map which the representatives of Russia and China signed in June 1863. According to the then-drawn-up demarcation line the Island of Damansky is located on the territory of the USSR. This line has always been protected by Soviet border guards.

Confronted with the Chinese provocations at the border, the Soviet side, for years, has taken active steps towards a regulation of the situation.

The question of the borderline was discussed in the bilateral Soviet-China Consultations on the Determination of the Borderline in Certain Controversial Areas of 1964. The Soviet side made a number proposals regarding the examination of the controversial border question. The Chinese leadership, however, was determined to let these consultations fail. The Chinese delegation put up the completely untenable demand to recognize the unequal character of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chinese border and raised territorial claims against the Soviet Union about an area of altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a conversation with Japanese members of parliament with regard to the Chinese territorial demands against the Soviet Union that “we have not yet presented the bill for this territory.”

On August 22, 1964, the consultations were interrupted. Despite our repeated proposals the Chinese did not resume the conversations and did not react even when the question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ministry note of August 31, 1967.

Meanwhile the Chinese authorities continued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and 1968 they blew up the consultations of the mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commission which had been established on the basis of the agreement of 1951.

In the Chinese border areas large military preparations set in (construction of airports, access routes, barracks and depots, training of militia, etc.).

The Chinese authorities consciously conjure up situations of conflict along the border and stage provocations there. On our part, all measures have been taken to avoid an escalation of the situation and to prevent incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border troops have been instructed not to use their arms and, if possible, to avoid armed collisions. The instruction on the non-use of arms was strictly enforced, although the Chinese acted extremely provocatively in many cases, employed the most deceitful tricks, picked fights, and attacked our border guards with stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other such things.

The armed provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is a logical consequence of this course of the Chinese authorities and is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing aiming at increasing the Maoists’ anti-Soviet campaign.

Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Embassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an organized siege by specially trained groups of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike excesses against the representatives of Soviet institutions are occurring throughout China every day. All over the country, an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been kindled. It is characteristic that this whole campaign assumed a military coloration, that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy has been created throughout the country. Faced with this situation the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government are undertaking the necessary steps to prevent further border violations. They will do everything necessary in order to frustrate the criminal intentions of the Mao Zedong group which are to create hostility between the Soviet people and the Chinese people.

The Soviet Government is led in its relations with the Chinese people by feelings of friendship and is intent on pursuing this policy in the future. Ill-considered provocative actions of the Chinese authorities will, however, be decisively repudiated on our part and brought to an end with determination.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

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Document No. 2: Telegram to East German Foreign Ministry from GDR Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969

Berlin, April 2, 1969

Comrade Walter Ulbricht
Willi Stoph
Erich Honecker
Hermann Axen
Berlin

Dear Comrades!

The following is the text of a telegram from Comrade Hertzfeld, Peking, for your information:

“Soviet Chargé stated that there is talk in Hanoi that Ho Chi Minh wants to go to Beijing soon to negotiate at the highest level with the Chinese side since the Vietnamese side is very concerned about the aggravation of Chinese-Soviet relations.

The Ambassador of the Hungarian People’s Republic reported that the PR China
and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] [earlier] this year signed an agreement on Chinese aid for Vietnam in the sum of 800 million Yen. [...] 

The Chargé was called on the evening of March 21 by Kosygin on direct line from Moscow. Com. Kosygin informed him that he had attempted to contact Mao Zedong through the existing direct telephone line. He was not put through by the Chinese side. If need be the conversation could also be held with Zhou Enlai. (Com. Kosygin was acting at the request of the politburo of the CPSU.)

After various attempts by the Soviet Embassy to contact the Foreign Ministry in this matter, a conversation between Kosygin and Mao Zedong was refused [by the Chinese] under rude abuse of the CPSU. Desire for talks with Zhou was to be communicated [to the Chinese].

3/22 Aide-mémoire by the deputy head of department in the foreign ministry; it stated that, because of the currently existing relations between the Soviet Union and the PR China, a direct telephone line was no longer advantageous.

If the Soviet government had to communicate anything to the PR China, it is asked to do so via diplomatic channels.

Allegedly conference in Hongkong on questions of China policy organized by the US State Department. Dutch Chargé and Finnish Ambassador here are to attend.”

With Socialist Greetings
Oskar Fischer

[Source: SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

* * * * *


Secret
Information
Only Copy

About A.N. Kosygin’s Conversation With Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969

The Cold War in Asia: Khabarovsk Conference Highlights Role of Russian Far East

by David L. Wolff

On 26-29 August 1995 an international, interdisciplinary conference focusing on the borderland nature of the Russian Far East took place in Khabarovsk, Russia. Brought together by funds from the Center for Global Partnership (Abe kikin), the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), 40 scholars made 38 presentations about their papers and responded to questions from the other participants.

A number of papers focused directly on Cold War issues, as can be seen in the full schedule printed below. There was an approximately equal number of papers covering events prior to the Cold War and those more contemporary. General themes touched on in discussions included:

1) the special nature of the Russian Far East as a borderland, historically much more in contact with neighbors than most of Russia;

2) Russo-Chinese, Russo-Japanese, Russo-Korean and Russo-American diplomatic, economic and cultural relations in Northeast Asia;

3) the special role of the military as a social and economic force in the borderland;

4) the great importance of migration in this region, whether as colonization, intra-regional mobility or expulsion, and

5) diaspora communities of the Russian Far East: Chinese, Germans, Japanese, Jews, Koreans and Russians;

The working language of the conference was Russian, although several talks were delivered in English with interpretation into Russian. There were a surprising number of people at the table (actually a big square of tables) fluent in three or more languages and I think everyone met and talked with just about everyone else.

Representatives from local archives presented papers on specific areas of strength and exhibited lists of holdings, covering such themes as Russo-Chinese relations, Chinese and Koreans in the Russian Far East, Russians in China and Birobidzhan. Additionally, aside from myself, six other scholars worked in the Khabarovsk Provincial Archive and Russian State Archive of the Far East in Vladivostok. These sites hold materials on such Cold War related topics as border disputes and clashes, mobilizations, the draft, voluntary organizations to aid the Army, civil defense, military education, the military-industrial complex and cross-border contacts (trade, tourism, intergovernmental negotiations, etc.). Two interesting documents from the Khabarovsk archive concerning Sino-Soviet border-tensions appear in translation by Elizabeth Wishnick in this issue of the Bulletin. Russian participants have also made declassification requests in the course of preparing conference papers.

Significantly, a large group of the region’s archivally active scholars, Americans, Chinese, Japanese and Russians became aware of the Cold War International History Project’s past accomplishments, present activities and future plans. Several are now undertaking research on the Cold War and plan to attend the January 1996 CWIHP conference at the University of Hong Kong on the Cold War in Asia to present findings.

The CC CPSU considers it necessary to inform You about A.N. Kosygin’s conversation with Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai which took place on September 11 of this year in Beijing.

As is well known, relations between the USSR and China, and the leadership of the PRC is to blame for this, are extremely aggravated. The Chinese authorities are exacerbating tension on the border with the Soviet Union. In the PRC, appeals to prepare for war against the USSR are openly made. Trade relations have been reduced to a minimum, scientific-technological and cultural exchanges have ceased, contacts along diplomatic lines are limited. For more than three years ambassadors have been absent from Moscow and Beijing. The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership is being used by the imperialist powers in the struggle against world socialism and the Communist movement.

In the report of CC CPSU General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev to the Moscow meeting continued on page 206
of Communist and Workers’ Parties the course of our policy in relation to China was clearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet government, proceeding from its unchanging policy oriented towards an improvement in relations between the USSR and the PRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chinese leadership with concrete proposals about ways to normalize relations. The pronouncements of the government of the USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year are very well known. The message of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the State Council of the PRC sent in July of this year, in which concrete proposals regarding the improvement of contacts between the Soviet Union and China along government lines were put forth, including the organization of a bilateral summit meeting, also served the aims of putting to rights Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations.

Undertaking these actions, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded from and proceeds from a principled course in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to our deep conviction, a softening of tensions in relations between the USSR and the PRC would correspond to the interests of our two countries, and also of the whole Socialist commonwealth overall, would facilitate the activation of the struggle against imperialism, would be an essential support to heroic Vietnam and to the peoples of other countries which are leading the struggle for social and national liberation.

Guided by these considerations, the CC CPSU decided to undertake one more initiative aimed at a softening of the situation in relations between the USSR and the PRC. The Chinese side responded pretty quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at Ho Chi Minh’s funeral, with Zhou Enlai. However, the Chinese response arrived in Hanoi an hour after the departure of the Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin set off for Beijing already from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The meeting of the Soviet delegation headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi continued for about four hours. From the Soviet side efforts were applied to assure that the conversation took place in the spirit of a concrete consideration of the knotty issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chinese relations. In this regard, Zhou Enlai’s various attempts to introduce into the conversation polemics on issues of ideological disagreements were decisively deflected. The Soviet side firmly declared the immutability of our principled positions and political course in the area of domestic and foreign policy.

A consideration of the situation on the border issues. Zhou Enlai declared that “China has no territorial pretensions toward the Soviet Union.” At the same time he repeated his previous assertions about the unfair nature of the agreements which define the border, although he said that the Chinese side does not demand that they be annulled and “recognizes the border which exists in accord with these treaties.” From the Soviet side a proposal was introduced to move toward the practical preparation for negotiations on border issues. Vis-a-vis these goals, we proposed to organize over the next week or two a meeting between delegations headed by the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries. In this regard it was noted by us that the place where these negotiations will be held has no particular significance for us. Zhou Enlai responded to our proposal about negotiations and expressed a wish that the negotiations would be held in Beijing.

As the bases for normalization of the situation on the border during the period before a final settlement which could be achieved as the result of negotiations between the delegations of the USSR and the PRC, the following principles were put forth: observance of the existing border, the inadmissibility of armed confrontations, the withdrawal of troops of both sides from direct contact in controversial sectors. It was agreed that issues which arise in relation to the economic activity of citizens of both countries in the controversial sectors will be decided according to the agreement between representatives of the border authorities. Both sides agreed to give an instruction to the appropriate border organizations to resolve misunderstandings which arise in the spirit of benevolence via the path of consultation.

Guided by the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Soviet side put forth concrete proposals on the establishment and development of economic contacts between the USSR and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by us regarding an expansion of trade, the fulfillment of contracts which had been concluded, the signing of trade protocols for the current and next year, the working out of measures on trade and economic cooperation during the present five-year plan. Zhou Enlai promised to present these proposals to the Politburo of the CC CPC, and expressed his agreement to exchange supplemental lists of products for 1969.

We proposed to the Chinese side to normalize railroad and aviation connections between the two countries, and to reestablish the high-frequency link which had been interrupted by the Chinese authorities in March of this year.

From the Soviet side there also was raised the issue of mutually sending Ambassadors and the creation of conditions for the normal activity of diplomatic representatives.

Zhou Enlai stated that these proposals will be submitted to Mao Zedong.

During the consideration of issues of Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations Zhou Enlai stressed that the leadership of the CPC does not intend to curtail its political and ideological speeches against the CPSU and the other fraternal parties. He justified the current forms of “polemics” which are being used by the Beijing leaders as having nothing in common with theoretical discussions, and referred to the statement of Mao Zedong to the effect that “polemics will continue for 10 thousand more years.”

The Soviet side stressed that the CPSU believes that polemics on controversial issues are permissible; however, it is important that they be conducted in an appropriate tone, and argued on a scientific basis. Lies and curses do not add persuasiveness and authority to a polemic, and only humidify the feelings of the other people and aggrivate the relations.

From our side it was also underlined that disagreements between the USSR and the PRC play into the hands of the world imperialism, weaken the Socialist system and the ranks of fighters for national and social liberation. It was noted that over the whole history of the struggle with Communism, imperialism has never received a greater gain than that which it has as a result of the deepening, which is not our fault, of the PRC’s differences with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.
We declared the provocative nature of the contrived imperialist propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is preparing a preventive strike on China. It was stressed that in the Soviet Union neither the Party nor the government has ever spoken about the unavoidability of war and has not summoned the people to war. All of our documents, party decisions summon the people to peace. We never have said to the people that it is necessary to “pull the belt tighter,” that war is unavoidable. Zhou Enlai, in his turn, said that “China has no intentions to attack the Soviet Union.” He stressed that from the Chinese side measures will be undertaken not to allow armed confrontations with the USSR.

The conversation took place overall in a constructive, calm atmosphere, despite the sharp posing of a range of issues.

We evaluate the meeting which has taken place with representatives of the Chinese leadership as useful. The CC CPSU and the Soviet government made a decision about the members of the delegation and time frames for their meetings with the Chinese representatives for the realization of the concrete proposals which were put forth in the course of the conversation.

It goes without saying that for the time being it is still early to make conclusions about the results which this meeting will bring. The anti-Soviet campaign which is continuing in the PRC and also the fact that the agreed text of the communiqué about the meeting was changed, put us on our guard. Upon its publication in the Chinese press it has found itself as a result of the consistent or if this is only a tactical move dictated by the circumstances of the aggravated domestic struggle in the PRC and also of that isolation in which the Chinese leadership has found itself as a result of the consistent and firm policy of the Socialist countries, Communist parties, and all forces who have condemned the peculiar positions of the Chinese leadership. We believe it necessary to follow attentively and vigilantly the further development of the situation in China itself, the activity of the Beijing leadership in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations, and also the international arena overall.

The CC CPSU and the Soviet government believe that if the Chinese leaders demonstrate a sober and serious approach to the proposals which were put forth by us, that this will frustrate the designs of the imperialist circles to intensify the Soviet-Chinese disagreements, to provoke a conflict between our countries and in this way to weaken the common front of the anti-imperialist struggle.

The normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC, if they will demonstrate a desire to do this in Beijing, undoubtedly will facilitate the growth of the power of the camp of Socialism and peace, will correspond to the interests of a strengthening of unit of the anti-imperialist forces and to the successful resolution of the tasks which were posed by the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from Russian by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

1. I would like to thank Malcolm Byrne and Jim Hershberg for their support and advice. Translations of documents nos. 1 and 2 are mine; translation of document No.3 from Russian was provided by Mark Doctoroff (The National Security Archive).


13. Cited in Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68.


18. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 73.


21. According to Han Suyin, Eldest Son: 369-70, Kossygin was “more alert to the changing situation than Brezhnev,” and tried to reach Zhou Enlai but failed “because the young telephone operator in Beijing, full of Cultural Revolution spirit, told Kossygin, ‘We do not speak to revisionists.’” See also Dick Wilson, The Story of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976 (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 270.


Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candidate at the University of Hamburg based at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., contributes frequently to the Bulletin and authored CWIHP Working Paper 11, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback.” This article was adapted from a longer analysis of SED archival documents on the Sino-Soviet border conflict to be presented at the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia at the University of Hong Kong in January 1996.
IN THE REGION AND IN THE CENTER:
SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE BORDER RIFT
by Elizabeth Wishnick

How did Soviet Communist Party officials and activists in the regions bordering the People’s Republic of China respond to the news of Aleksei Kosygin’s 11 September 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing? The two documents below, from the State Archive of Khabarovskyi Kray (territory) in the Russian Far East,1 show the reactions of several leading party members in the frontier region to Central Committee and Soviet government efforts to defuse the rupture with China.

One document is the stenographic record of a 22 September 1969 meeting of the regional and city party aktiv convened to discuss the Central Committee’s account of Kosygin’s discussion of the border conflict with Zhou. The second document is the Khabarovskyi Kray party committee’s report of the same meeting to the CPSU CC in Moscow.

In comparing the two documents, it is particularly interesting to note their differences in emphasis. The Khabarovskyi Kray report to the CPSU CC accentuates the positive, stressing that Kosygin’s meeting with Zhou represented a step toward resolving Soviet-Chinese differences through peaceful means. According to the stenographic record, however, many of the speakers described the problems in the border region in much greater detail than was reported to Moscow. Although they all applauded Kosygin’s meeting with Zhou, some speakers noted that little change in the border situation had been observed since their encounter eleven days before. Comrade I.K. Bakan’, for example, the head of the political department of a military district in the region, noting that there had been over 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory in his district in 1969 alone, commented that no substantive changes were observed following the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. The Secretary of the Khabarovsky City committee of the CPSU, comrade V.S. Pasternak, made a similar remark, describing Sino-Soviet relations as “increasingly tense” and observing that the anti-Soviet hysteria and propaganda in Beijing had not been abated. Bakan’ urged his comrades to be prepared for any provocation on the border, while his colleague in the military district, comrade Popov, noted that Chinese ideological positions were dangerous for the international communist movement “and cannot but evoke alarm” among the Soviet people. Comrade N.V. Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsky Pedagogical Institute, called attention to the fact that Zhou had told Kosygin that China’s ideological struggle with the CPSU would continue for another 10,000 years.

In its report, the Khabarovskyi Kray committee expressed the region’s support for the Center’s policy toward China. In so doing, the regional committee at times inserted comments which were not in the stenographic record, for example, praising the Kosygin-Zhou meeting for being mutually beneficial.

Because the region’s reporting function had the result of legitimating the Center’s policies, comments by the regional aktiv which raised uncomfortable questions for the party leadership were omitted. For example, the secretary of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure city committee of the CPSU, Comrade Shul’ga, restated the standard line that Soviet efforts to improve relations with China would resonate with the healthy forces in Chinese society (i.e., among communists) and then noted that in Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union had correctly intervened in support of communists when the revolution’s gains were endangered. Comrade Kadochnikov, a Khabarovsky worker, commented that he had trouble reconciling Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda with the PRC’s claim to be a socialist state. Comrade Sverdlov stated that in the past polemics had some value for the international communist movement, and then cited the polemics with Palmiro Togliatti, the long-time leader of the Italian Communist Party, as an example. Still, he concluded that Chinese policies were so unrestrained that they went beyond the definition of useful polemics.

These two documents are valuable for showing the reluctance of the Khabarovskyi Kray committee to address substantive problems in their reports to the Central Committee in Moscow: the Center only found out what it wanted to hear. However, the documents also demonstrate that as far back as 1969 regional views on China policy did not always run exactly in step with Moscow’s.

The new opportunities to examine the holdings of regional party archives will further expand our knowledge of regional concerns and center-regional relations in the Soviet period.

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Document 1: Stenographic Record of Meeting of Khabarovsky regional and city party officials, 22 September 1969

STENOGRAPHIC RECORD

of the meeting of the Khabarovsky regional and city party aktiv

22 September 1969

First Secretary of the Khabarovsky regional committee of the CPSU, comr. A.P. Shitikov, opened the meeting:

Comrades, we brought you together to familiarize you with the information of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union about the question of the visit by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and the discussion between comr. A.N Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Today I will acquaint you with the information. (Reads the information aloud).

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Pasternak, secretary of the Khabarovsky city committee of the CPSU.

Comr. PASTERNAK

Comrades, the communists of the Khabarovsky city party organization and all the workers of the city of Khabarovsky directed particular attention to the report of the meeting in Beijing between the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai. It explains the increasingly tense situation between the PRC and the Soviet Union, which is the fault of the Chinese leaders.

Khabarovsky residents are well aware of the bandit-like character of the armed provocations, and therefore the mendacity of the Maoists’ propaganda, the malicious attacks on the policy of our party and government, the kindling of hatred towards the Soviet Union, and the direct call for war with the Soviet Union, were particularly clear to us.

All this requires our government to pur-
SVERDLOV  
KADOCHNIKOV  
SHUL’GA

other sides expresses the desire to facilitate timely, reasonable, and fair, and are capable which result from the situation at hand, are Soviet-Chinese relations. These proposals, Soviet Union’s proposals for stabilizing Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with the slightest positive shift in the development of temporary revolutionary movement.  Impermanent, of surmounting of problems and disagreements, temporarily arising in the contemporary revolutionary movement.

It is natural and understandable that the slightest positive shift in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with satisfaction by the Soviet people, and all the more by us, China’s immediate neighbors.

The information clearly outlined the Soviet Union’s proposals for stabilizing Soviet-Chinese relations. These proposals, which result from the situation at hand, are timely, reasonable, and fair, and are capable of fostering the correct resolution of intergovernmental disputes, certainly, once the other sides expresses the desire to facilitate an improvement in relations. It is unlikely we will be able to say that about the Chinese leadership.

From the information we learned that Zhou Enlai, arbitrarily promised, just as Mao himself would have, to continue the ideological struggle against our party, and consequently, against the policy of all communist parties of the socialist countries, for another 10 thousand years.

This is not accidental and is evoked as a reserve option for the long-term anti-Soviet campaign, and it is impossible to overlook this. Our party, proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, from the richest practice of its own and the international communist movement, considers a polemic about disputed issues to be fully achievable, but this polemic must lead to the interests of the peoples, the interests of the cohesion of the ranks of the communist parties, on the basis of deep scientific argumentation, without insults and abuse vis-a-vis another people and party.

We saw that on a number of occasions polemics were useful in the revolutionary movement. In its time the CC of our party honestly, openly noted a series of erroneous views by the late respected Palmiro Togliatti. There were polemics with other parties. But such polemics do not have anything in common with the unreserved policy of the Chinese leaders.

Therefore it is necessary for us to all the more steadfastly and firmly turn the ideological struggle against the Chinese revisionists. Permit me to state in the name of the workers in higher education that we unanimously support the proposals and efforts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations formulated by our party, and will not spare any effort to contribute to the consolidation of the strength and might of our great Motherland.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute.

Comrade SVERDLOV

Comrades, the information we have been listening to clearly and convincingly demonstrates that our party and its decision-making nucleus, in the form of the Leninist Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties, pursues a policy of consolidating the international communist movement, of surmounting of problems and disagreements, temporarily arising in the contemporary revolutionary movement.

It is natural and understandable that the slightest positive shift in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with satisfaction by the Soviet people, and the Chinese leaders went so far as to stage military provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border. It is strange for us workers and all the Soviet people to hear such gibberish from people calling themselves communists.

It is fully understandable that we cannot passively watch the train of events in China. We approve the steadfast and principled line of our government for the settlement of disputed issues through negotiations and consider that our party and government will exert every effort so that normal relations with China can be achieved.

As far as we are concerned, we consider that it is necessary to strengthen the might of our Motherland through work. Our workers work calmly, confident in their strength and in the durability of the Soviet borders. I assure the regional committee of the party that the party can count on us workers, can be sure of our unreserved support for all its efforts to strengthen the international communist movement.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Shul’ga, secretary of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure city committee of the CPSU.

Comr. SHUL’GA

Comrades, the workers of the city of Komsomolsk were satisfied with the contents of the report about the meeting between the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR comr. Kosygin and the President of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, and hope that the initiative will be understood by the healthy forces among the Chinese people.

We know that the strengthening of friendly relations between the peoples of our countries is the basis for Soviet policy. We provide assistance to many countries in the socialist camp. Now, when the intrigues of imperialism are intensifying, it is especially incumbent upon us to stand on the forefront of those forces who are restraining the onslaught of the forces of reaction. We could not do otherwise than go to the assistance of real communists, when a threat hung over the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

It is pleasant for us Soviet communists to realize that we are the members of the party, which stands in the avant-garde of the international communist movement. Evaluating the contemporary policy of the CPC from a principled position, we seek paths to normalize relations between our two states. And it is not our fault that at a certain point
the leaders of China broke off relations between the Soviet Union and China. The results of this turned out to be deplorable. It began with [China’s] isolation from absolutely the majority of the communist parties. The people of China, who were only just liberated from feudalism, again found themselves in a difficult economic situation.

We approve the policy of the CC of our party to decide all disputed issues by peaceful means, not by armed provocations. We fully understand that today a very difficult situation has been developing on the Far Eastern borders given the unleashing of anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Soviet hysteria. And we support the policy of our party to begin negotiations with China, to resolve all questions through peaceful means, particularly with a country which considers itself to be socialist.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Bokan’, the head of the political department of the Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern border district.

Comr. BOKAN’

Comrades, the soldiers of the Krasnoznamennyi border district reacted to the report of the meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai concerning the stabilization of relations on the Soviet-Chinese border with a feeling of deep understanding, satisfaction, and approval.

In the report it is apparent that the improvement of relations along the Soviet-Chinese border was the central question at this meeting. The border events attracted the attention not just of Soviet people but of people all over the world. Incursions by Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory became a daily occurrence.

In this year alone in the area guarded by the forces of our district there were about 300 incidents of invasions by Chinese citizens onto our territory. Ideological diversions on the Chinese border increased noticeably.

The personnel in the district thoroughly understand the situation and show courage and the ability to counter the provocations. We feel the constant support of the people of Khabarovskii Kray, the party, state, and youth organizations.

In the period since the meeting in Beijing, no substantive changes have occurred, with the exception of a certain degree of restraint. We support the initiative which took place and the steps taken by our government, directed at the stabilization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Fully assessing the danger of the situation, we must be prepared for the outbreak of any type of provocation along the border. The personnel in the district is firmly resolved in these days of preparation for the 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin to further improve the level of political and military knowledge, increase the military preparedness of the forces, to merit with honor the great trust of the party and the people, to defend the inviolability of the borders of our Motherland.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Plotkin, the head of the “Energomash” construction bureau.

Comr. PLOTKIN

Comrades, today we heard the report in which we were informed about the humanitarian mission fulfilled by our delegation headed by comr. Kosygin. The entire Soviet people and we, Far Easterners, in particular, follow with great interest and undivided attention the development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The report about the meeting in Peking between Kosygin and the Chinese leaders was very brief, but we understood the whole value of this step by our government. The trip to Peking, the organization of the meeting - all this expressed confidence in the correctness of our cause.

As a member of the plant collective many times I have heard the workers express their concerns about the criminal actions of the Chinese leaders. Therefore we are glad to hear that our government is searching for paths to stabilize relations. I totally and fully approve of the policy of our party.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Popov, deputy director of the political directorate of the KDVO [Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern Military District].

Comr. POPOV

Comrades, communists and all the soldiers of our Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern military district are completely satisfied by the wise domestic and foreign policy of our party and the Soviet government.

Along with entire Soviet people the soldiers of the army and fleet unanimously support the general line of our party, directed at the creation of all the necessary preconditions for the successful building of communism in our country.

V.I. Lenin’s precepts about the necessity of a consistent struggle for the unity of the international communist movement against the forces of imperialist reaction, against all forms of opportunism are eternally dear to us. These Leninist ideas are the basis for all the documents passed by the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ parties.

The only correct policy - is a policy which is principled and consistent as is our policy towards China. We are building our policy on the basis of a long-term perspective.

The meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking is evidence of the readiness of our party to establish normal relations between our countries. If the Chinese leaders exhibit prudence and undertake to respond with steps to stabilize relations, this would be received with approval by the Soviet people.

However the position of the Chinese leaders cannot but evoke alarm among our people. Now, in the period of preparation for the 20th anniversary [1 October 1969] of the founding of the PRC, Peking’s propaganda continues to fuel an anti-Soviet campaign. The Peking radio programs talk about this daily.

All this conceals a serious danger for the international communist movement and the world socialism system. We, members of the military, know well that Maoism engendered the military provocations and this requires of us continuous vigilance and readiness to give a worthy rebuff to the provocations by the Maoists at any moment.

Permit me in the name of the soldiers of our district to assure the Central Committee of our party, that in the future the communists and Komsomol members of our district will guard our party’s well-equipped weapons and will always be ready to fulfill any tasks of our party and people.

Comr. Shitikov - Who else would like to speak? There are no more speakers. The following two proposals are put forth for your consideration.

I. To approve completely and fully the initiative of the CC of our party and the Soviet government concerning the meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai,
designated to ease the situation on the border and to consider this meeting to have been very useful.

II. The regional party aktiv completely and fully approves the policy of the party and government, aimed at normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and China.

What other proposals are there? There are proposals to accept such a resolution. No one is opposed? No.

After this the meeting of the aktiv was considered closed.

9/23/69
Stenographer Taran

[Source: State Archive of Khabarovskyi Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, ll. 1-12; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

* * * * *


Proletariat of all countries, unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

KHABAROVSKYI KRAY COMMITTEE

City of Khabarovsk

(Sent 9/22/69)

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU

DEPARTMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK

INFORMATION

regarding the familiarization of the electoral aktiv of the Khabarovskyi Kray party organization with the Information from the CC CPSU about the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin’s discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969

On 22 September 1969 a regional meeting of the party electoral aktiv was held to acquaint them with the Information from the CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin’s discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969.

The First Secretary of the regional party committee read the Information from the CC CPSU.

7 people spoke at the meeting. The participants noted with great satisfaction that our party, its Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ parties [in June 1969 - translator’s note], take a hard line on strengthening of the peace and security of peoples, consolidating the ranks of the international communist movement, and overcoming the difficulties and disagreements within it. They [the members of the aktiv] unanimously approved the initiative of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, directed at taking concrete measures to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, settle disputed issues through negotiations and the organization of the meeting in Peking.

The Secretary of the Khabarovsk city committee of the CPSU V.S. Pasternak said in his remarks:

“The communists and all the workers of the city were particularly attentive to the news of the meeting in Beijing between the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A.N. Kosygin, and the president of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. Khabarovsk residents always steadfastly follow the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, [and] angrily judge the great power, adventurous course of the PRC leaders. The armed raids by the Maoists on the Soviet-Chinese border, the malicious slander against our Soviet people, our state, the Communist party, deeply trouble the workers of our city.

The initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet government to stabilize Soviet-Chinese relations and organize a meeting in Beijing in such a difficult current situation once again vividly affirms the wise policy of our party to resolve disputed issues by peaceful means.

The city party organization aims to improve the ideological work among the workers in every possible way, to mobilize the collectives of firms, construction compa-
report of the meeting between the president of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, with feelings of deep understanding and satisfaction and consider that this discussion was useful for both sides. One of the central questions at this meeting was the question of the mitigation of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border.

Relations along the border exemplify the relations between the states. The Maoists’ provocative violations of the Soviet-Chinese border and their intervention in Soviet territory attest to the adventurist policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim to decide disputed questions through force.

The border forces in the district have at their disposal all that is necessary to fulfill their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an exemplary way. In these days of preparation for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. Lenin’s birth, we will demonstrate our level of decisiveness by increasing the military preparedness of the troops in order to honorably merit the great trust of the party, government, and people, as well as of the military forces in the Army and Navy, to guarantee the inviolability of the Far Eastern border of our beloved Motherland.”

The following resolution was approved by the participants in the meeting:

1. Completely and fully approve the initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet government about the meeting between the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin and the premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, aimed at ameliorating the state of relations between the USSR and China, and consider that this meeting was useful.

2. Unanimously support the actions of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, directed at normalizing relations with China, and rebuffing any encroachments by the Chinese leadership on the interests of our state, on the interests of our people.

Secretary of the Khabarovsk
(A. Shitikov)
regional committee of the CPSU

How did the Central Committee of the CPSU view Soviet-Chinese relations in the aftermath of the violent 1969 border clashes between the two communist powers? The following document, a February 1971 secret background report prepared for and approved by the CC CPSU, sheds some light on Soviet diplomatic initiatives aimed at ameliorating the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. Although the Central Committee analysis is relatively optimistic about the long-term prospects for normalizing of Soviet-Chinese relations, in the short term Chinese territorial claims on Soviet territory and anti-Sovietism among Chinese leaders were viewed as major obstacles to any improvement in relations. Written not long before the March 1971 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Central Committee analysis represented an attempt to explain to the Party leadership and aktiv why there was only limited progress in Soviet-Chinese relations [particularly at a time when Sino-American relations were improving]. The document outlines a series of diplomatic overtures made by the Soviet Union in 1969-1971 and attributes the minimal response by the Chinese leadership to their need to perpetuate anti-Sovietism for domestic reasons.

One of the most interesting points in the document pertains to the consequences of the 11 September 1969 discussions between Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the border clashes. According to the document, the People’s Republic of China rejected a later Soviet proposal to sign a draft agreement on maintaining the status quo on the border, based on the oral agreement reportedly reached by Kosygin and Zhou during their meeting. The document notes that the Chinese side insisted on signing an agreement on “temporary measures” as a precondition, both at the 1969 meeting and subsequently. By “temporary measures” the Chinese meant the withdrawal of forces from what they viewed as disputed territories in the border regions. Such a precondition was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, fearing that a withdrawal of troops would pave the way for a Chinese attempt to occupy the 1.5 million square kilometers they claimed were wrested from China by Tsarist Russia.

The Central Committee document goes on to criticize the Chinese leadership for their lukewarm if not outright negative responses to Soviet diplomatic overtures for normalizing relations. What the document fails to mention is that Soviet negotiating efforts were backed up by threats. Five days after the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist reportedly employed by the KGB, published an article in the London Evening News arguing that an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities could not be excluded.

The document also neglects to address the discrepancy between the Soviet and Chinese understanding of the results of the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. Contrary to the Soviet position outlined here, China claimed that Kosygin had recognized the existence of “disputed territories” and agreed to discuss a withdrawal of forces from the border regions. The Central Committee document would seem to support the Soviet case, but in the absence of reliable verbatim contemporaneous documentation from the meeting itself it is difficult to evaluate the relative veracity of the Soviet and Chinese accounts. One recently published memoir supports the Soviet position, however. A.I. Elizavetin, a Soviet diplomat in Beijing who took notes during the Kosygin-Zhou meeting, reported in his own account of their encounter that Kosygin suggested the two sides should respect the status quo ante on the border and open talks on border demarcation as well as on confidence-building measures.

The issue of a withdrawal of forces from the border regions was to remain a stumbling block in bilateral negotiations through the 1980s. By the early 1980s, the Chinese no longer spoke of disputed territories, but they contended that the stationing of Soviet military forces in the border regions represented an obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. A recently declassified transcript of a May 1983 CPSU CC Politburo meeting indicates that the Soviet military continued to oppose any withdrawal of forces, on the grounds that the Soviet Union had spent considerable time and effort to develop forward bases in the border region. Although Moscow and Beijing finally normalized relations in 1989 and have reduced their overall military presence due to cuts in their respective armed forces, the creation of a demilitarized zone in the border region continues to present difficulties even today. At present the main stumbling-block is geostrategic: Russia is unwilling to withdraw beyond 100km from the
than a year ago. This is the main reason why, despite all the constructive efforts made by our delegation, the negotiations on border issues in essence haven’t made any progress.

To move things forward, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government came out with an important initiative, and sent a letter from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we proposed in this letter to begin negotiations in Moscow, at the same time as the negotiations in Beijing, between special governmental delegations on a draft agreement between the USSR and the PRC on mutual non-use of force, including nuclear weapons, and the cessation of war propaganda and of preparations for war against the other side.

At the same time, to eliminate many controversial issues from the negotiations, a proposal was made to formulate an intergovernmental agreement on the demarcation of the eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of more than half of its length, where most of the border incidents took place (from the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and further to the south along the Amur and Ussuri rivers).

The letter expressed the view that, in the interests of the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, it would be expedient to hold another meeting of the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, this time on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also restated a range of other constructive proposals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to speculate in the international arena and in domestic propaganda on the alleged existence of a “threat of force” from the USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet insinuations.

To deprive the Chinese government of a basis for such inventions and facilitate the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, the subject of the negotiations, on January 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet another step - it made a proposal to the leadership of the PRC to conclude an agreement between the USSR and the PRC on the non-use of force in any form whatsoever, including missiles and nuclear weapons, and forward a draft of such an agreement to Beijing through the ambassador of the USSR.

In sending this draft agreement for consideration by the government of the PRC, the Soviet side expressed its belief that the fulfillment of our proposal - the most rapid conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force — would create a more favorable atmosphere for the normalization of relations between our two states and, in particular, would facilitate the restoration of neighborly relations and friendship between the USSR and the PRC.

A positive answer from the Chinese side to the Soviet initiative could lead to a decisive shift forward in the negotiations. However there is still no answer whatsoever from the Chinese side. There is a growing impression that Beijing, as before, is interested in maintaining the “border territorial issue” in relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic goals.

Why have the Soviet steps towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations encountered such significant difficulties? The main reason, as was mentioned previously in our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism was and continues to be the main ingredient in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the present Chinese leadership. This is confirmed, in particular, by the materials of the 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-September 1970), the nature of the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC [in October 1970], the continuing slanderous campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside world and especially through domestic Chinese channels. The strengthening of the anti-Soviet campaign is taking place in the pages of the Chinese press. In the last half a year alone the Chinese central newspapers published hundreds of materials containing rude assaults against our party and our country. The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are covered with appeals to struggle against “Soviet revisionism.” In China anti-Soviet brochures and posters are being published in huge numbers and widely distributed. For example, not long ago a series of brochures with clearly anti-Soviet content was recommended for children as study aids as well as for the repertoire of clubs and circles engaged in amateur artistic performances. Anti-Soviet films are always playing in movie theaters. The Chinese population also is exposed to anti-Soviet messages in radio and television programs and through verbal propaganda.

Feigning a threat of attack by the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership actively uses anti-Sovietism to continue their propaganda about war and war preparations against the Soviet Union and to strengthen their control over the domestic situation in the country. The Chinese leadership fears that constructive steps by the USSR and progress in stabilizing relations between our countries would undermine the basic ideological premise: to convince the Chinese people that the difficult situation facing them is, as it were, the result of the policy of the Soviet Union, and not of the anti-Leninist adventuristic policy of the Chinese leaders themselves.

Chinese provocations were met with a decisive rebuff and furthermore our initiative about carrying out negotiations for a border settlement created serious obstacles to the organizations of new adventures.

The PRC leadership is making efforts to emerge from the international isolation in which China found itself as a result of the Red Guard diplomacy in the years of the “Cultural Revolution.” China activated its diplomatic contacts in a number of countries, achieved diplomatic recognition by a series of bourgeois states. Today even seven NATO countries have diplomatic relations with Beijing. However, the Chinese leadership is making concessions on major issues, on which they previously held implacable positions. It is not surprising that the capitalist states actively use this flirtation in their own interests.

The imperialist powers, the USA in particular, are playing a complex and sly game in their approach to China. On the one hand they would like to use the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists in the struggle against the USSR, but on the other hand, they would like to strengthen their own position in the PRC, in the vast Chinese market. As a side interest these states all the more loudly urge the PRC “to get actively involved in the international community.”

Recently the Chinese leadership has been rather pointedly making outwardly friendly gestures towards some socialist states, promising them to open broad pros-
pects in the area of trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation. The Chinese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the effective political, economic, and other forms of cooperation among socialist states, as well as by their interaction, which facilitates the strengthening of the international positions of socialism, and their [socialist states’] ability to move forward with the resolution of major issues in world politics. The Beijing leadership aims to use any opportunity to break the unity and cohesion of the socialist states, to weaken their existing social structure. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases its provocative statements on the Czechoslovak question. Beijing has acted similarly with respect to the recent events in Poland.

The communist and workers parties of the fellow socialist countries, which firmly stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, understand and respond appropriately to this tactical step of Beijing’s, which is directed at splitting the socialist community and isolating the Soviet Union.

The Moscow conference of communist and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to split them. Convinced by the futility of their efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in individual countries into influential political parties, and to cobble them together into an international anti-Leninist movement, the Chinese leadership once again is counting on its ability to either attract individual communist parties to its side, or at least to achieve their refusal to publicly criticize the ideology and policy of the CPC leadership. To this end, Beijing’s propaganda and CPC officials are concentrating their main efforts on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of foreign communists the foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the USSR, and in the socialist community. At the same time Chinese representatives are aiming to exacerbate disputes in the communist movement. They use any means to heat up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet dispositions in the ranks of the communist and national-liberation movement.

Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned movement and the developing countries under its own influence. For this purpose, and in order to alienate the states of the “third world” from their dependable support in the struggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union and other fellow socialist countries, the Chinese leadership is tactically using the PRC’s opposition to both “superpowers” (USSR and USA), which allegedly “came to terms” to “divide the world amongst them.” All this attests to the fact that the leaders of China have not changed their previous chauvinistic course in the international arena.

Domestically, the Chinese leadership, having suppressed the enemies of their policies during the so-called “Cultural Revolution”, is now trying to overcome the disorder in economic and political life, brought about by the actions of the very same ruling groups over the course of recent years. The well-known stabilization of socio-political and economic life is occurring through all-encompassing militarization, leading to an atmosphere of “a besieged fortress.” The army is continuing to occupy key positions in the country and serves as the main instrument of power. As before a cult of Mao is expanding, the regime of personal power is being strengthened in the constitution of the PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed in the country. This, of course, cannot but have a pernicious influence on the social life of the entire Chinese people.

In an oral statement made directly to Soviet officials about the desirability and possibility in the near future of the normalization of intergovernmental relations, the Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideological, and to a certain degree, the political struggle between the USSR and China, will continue for a lengthy period of time.

As long as the Chinese leadership sticks to ideological and political positions which are hostile to us, the stabilization and normalization of intergovernmental relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC would have to be achieved under conditions of sharp ideological and political struggle.

In informing the party aktiv about the current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Central Committee of the CPSU attributes great importance to this work, since positive shifts in Chinese politics can be facilitated in the near future only by struggling relentlessly against the theory and practice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism figures prominently, by further strengthening the cohesion and unity of communist ranks, and by combining the efforts of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

45-mz
sa/ka

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed.
2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., communist, forces within society, and the Maoist leadership.
5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist movement and Moscow’s subsequent imposition of orthodox “normalization” there.
6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk in December 1970, and a subsequent government shake-up.

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SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS

by Elizabeth Wishnick

The two Central Committee documents from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet foreign policy concerns at a time when the Soviet Union was particularly isolated in the international arena as a result of its December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In these documents, Soviet policymakers express their fears that their principal adversaries, the United States and China, were drawing closer together due to their shared hostility toward the USSR. The documents contend that the Sino-American rapprochement had two particularly unfortunate consequences: the development of Sino-American military cooperation and increased efforts by China to undermine the socialist community.

The October 1980 document about Sino-American military cooperation was written for two audiences. On the one hand, Soviet representatives were given the task of convincing Western public opinion that military cooperation with China could backfire and engulf their countries in conflict. On the other hand, the document showed Soviet concern that some non-aligned and socialist states were choosing to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude towards them. Since China had invaded Vietnam soon after the Sino-American normalization of relations in February 1979, Soviet policymakers feared that the improved U.S.-China relationship had emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist states and that U.S. military assistance would provide the Chinese with the means to act on their ambitions.

Which states were neutral on the China question and why? The March 1980 document clarifies this in an analysis of China’s policy of distinguishing among the socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a policy referred to here and in other Soviet analyses as China’s “differentiated” approach to the socialist community. The document, a series of instructions about the China question to Soviet ambassadors to socialist states, notes China’s hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea. China’s efforts to foster economic and even political ties with the “fraternal countries”—Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—are portrayed here as being of utmost concern to the Central Committee. The document shows Soviet displeasure at China’s interest in improving relations with these states at a time when it refused to continue negotiations with the USSR.1

In the Soviet view, relations between the socialist community and China had to be coordinated with Soviet policy, and the “fraternal countries” were expected to wait for and then follow the Soviet Union’s lead. To this end, representatives from the International Departments of these countries had been meeting regularly with the CPSU International Department for over a decade.2 Despite all these efforts to coordinate China policy, the March 1980 document evokes Soviet fears that China had been making inroads into the socialist community and was achieving a certain measure of success in using economic cooperation to tempt individual states to stray from the fold. As a result, the document outlines a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would foster skepticism about China’s intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states.

1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly scheduled political talks in 1980.
2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this aim. See, e.g., TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 19, d. 525, ll. 29, 107-110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19, d. 605, ll. 3, 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077, ll. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, ll. 4, 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; ll. 4, 20 April 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, ll. 5, 19 May 1980.

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Document I: CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassadors in Communist Countries, 4 March 1980

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOP SECRET

Proletariat of all countries, unite!
ist states], the Chinese leadership is trying to stratify the socialist countries into various groups. With such states as Romania, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK, China is developing extensive relations, supporting the nationalistic tendencies in their policies in every possible way with the aim of creating its own group on this basis, and using it to counter the socialist community. In relations with other socialist countries the hostile character of China’s policy is strengthening even more, as the unceasing attacks and pressure on the SRV [Vietnam], Cuba, DPRL [Laos], and MPR [Mongolia], attest. China uses a double-dealing tactic including pressure and promises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria], HPR [Hungary], GDR, PNR [Poland], and ChSSR [Czechoslovakia] on the one hand China is continuing its gross interference in their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring their interests; on the other hand, it is giving assurances about its readiness to develop relations with them on a mutually advantageous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing is counting on at least forcing these countries into positions of “neutrality” regarding China’s course, if not to achieve more.

Within the Chinese leadership demagogic and deceptive practices are widely used. It is affirmed, as if China’s struggle against the USSR need not worry the other socialist countries, that the development of relations between them and China could even facilitate the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, that the expansion of ties between these states and China meets their national interests, and, in particular, could bring them major advantages in the trade-economic sphere.

Beijing has noticeably strengthened its efforts to penetrate into various spheres of life and activities in the countries of the socialist community. Chinese representatives are trying to become more active in developing relations with official institutions and government agencies, social organizations, educational institutions, and the mass media; they are establishing contacts with various strata of the population, particularly with the intelligentsia and youth, and widely distributing invitations to various events at the PRC embassies. Information is being collected about the domestic life of their post country, the decisions of party and state organs, the economic situation and the military potential, the military forces and weapons. Under the guise of “study tours,” attempts are being made to send Chinese delegations to some socialist countries and receive their delegations in the PRC.

There are signs that the Chinese may reevaluate their relations with the ruling parties of some socialist countries, and establish party-to-party ties with them. Party-to-party ties are already developing with Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese party delegation in recent years went to participate in the RKP [Romanian Communist Party] congress.

Denying in essence the general regularities of development of the revolutionary processes and socialist economic construction in various countries, the Chinese leadership has once again returned to the use of the conception of the “national model” of socialism, and especially rises to the defense of the Yugoslav “model”. Beijing’s divisive activity shows its limited, but nevertheless negative, influence in certain socialist states. Some of the workers do not always grasp the meaning of the Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not provide their own effective rebuff to Beijing’s hegemonic policy. Moreover, the facts show that responsible leaders of certain fraternal countries, counter to the official positions of their parties, are expressing an interest in excluding some important directions in their ties with China from the sphere of multilateral coordination, that in certain situations they are taking steps to expand ties with the PRC without considering the level of relations between China and other states.

Judging from all of this, China’s tactical use of a differentiated approach [to socialist states], which plays on various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation in certain socialist states, on any type of temporary difficulties, will not only continue, but may even be more widely used in the near future. It can be inferred that attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into various areas of the domestic life of the socialist countries will be further intensified.

Under these conditions an important question in the work of ambassadors is the effective and systematic opposition of Beijing’s splitting activities in socialist countries, the neutralization of its plans to shake the unity of the socialist states, to influence their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders to penetrate into various spheres of the domestic life of the socialist countries. With the participation of the leaders and representatives of the political and social circles of your post countries, direct the following:

1. Pay attention to the noticeable activation of Chinese policy towards socialist states. Using the example of Beijing’s recent maneuvers, continuously carry out measures to clarify the danger of the Chinese differentiated approach tactic and efforts to penetrate the socialist states. This danger is growing in connection with the fact that the splitting activity of the Chinese representatives is being coordinated all the more closely with imperialist circles, above all with the USA, and their intelligence services. Expose the false character of Chinese assertions, which allege that China is “concerned” about the improvement of relations with socialist states, and cares about their interests and security. In fact, Chinese policy, particularly its constant appeals to the USA, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe to unite with China in a “broad international front” and its pressure on the NATO countries to increase their armaments, including nuclear missiles, is totally and fully directed against the socialist states, their security. Calling for the economic integration and military-political consolidation of the West, Beijing is all the more intensively seeking to undermine the positions of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

One must also keep in mind that the changes in domestic policy taking place in China, among them the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi at the Vth Plenum of the CCCP and the promotion to leading posts of experienced political representatives who were victims of the “Cultural Revolution”, do not mean, as the facts show, that Beijing has renounced its hostile policy towards socialist countries. On the contrary, one can expect that this policy will be pursued even more tenaciously.

2. Show the dangerous character of the Chinese leadership’s aim to undermine the unity of the socialist states, its hypocritical efforts to separate the questions of bilateral relations between the socialist countries and China from Soviet-Chinese relations, to sow illusions concerning its goals in this area, for example by using for its own purposes the fact that Soviet-Chinese negotiations are
being held. As the leadership of the fraternal countries was informed, the results of the Moscow round of Soviet-Chinese negotiations showed that the Chinese side does not aim, in the near future in any case, to come to any agreements about the normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC; that China knowingly proposes unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the Soviet side’s constructive proposals, directed at the elaboration of principles of relations between the two countries and the building of a political-juridical basis for them.

As far as the second round is concerned, now it is generally difficult to say anything about it, insofar as the Chinese press announced that it would be “inappropriate” to hold them at present. Recent events attest to the escalation of Beijing’s hostility towards the Soviet Union.

3. Taking into account the hostile character of China’s policy towards socialist states and the strengthening of its aggressiveness, note the necessity of a careful and deliberate approach to the development of economic ties and scientific-technical cooperation with the PRC, particularly in those areas which would facilitate the growth of its military-industrial potential. Beijing’s efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspectives of trade and economic cooperation with some socialist countries don’t have any real basis and are only a tactical means of influencing these countries. Beijing now considers it advantageous to orient itself towards the West, and not to the development of trade-economic ties with the countries of the socialist community. The Chinese side is prepared to give any promises, however, as experience shows, among them the heralded experience of relations with Romania and Yugoslavia, China does not have sufficient foreign currency and trade resources to fulfill these promises. In 1979, for example, the planned trade balance with the FSRY [Yugoslavia] was fulfilled only to one fourth. China not only is an undesirable partner, but also often uses trade-economic relations as a means of pressure on socialist states (SRV, MNR, Albania), which refuse to undertake obligations for purely political motives.

4. Pay attention to the importance of continuing a consistent and broad coordination of actions towards China and its attempts to use a differentiated approach to undermine the cohesion of the socialist countries. Under present conditions, when the Chinese leadership is strengthening its subversive activities among countries of the socialist community, it is all the more important to meticulously observe the criteria elaborated at the meetings of the international departments of the CCs of the fraternal countries for approaching questions of bilateral relations between socialist countries and the PRC. These mandate that the rapprochement between Beijing and the USA (as their actions in Indochina and Afghanistan attest) is taking a more and more dangerous form and is directed against the interests of peace and the process of detente. Given the way the situation is progressing, keep in mind that the task of decisively repelling the strengthening attacks on the socialist community on the part of imperialism, reaction, and Chinese hegemonism, is all the more important.

5. Note the necessity of a vigilant approach to the activities of Beijing and its representatives in socialist countries, its attempts to penetrate various spheres of the domestic life of these countries, to spread its influence in various strata of the population, particularly among young people, some of whom are a part of the technical, scientific, and creative intelligentsia. It is important not to weaken control over their contacts with Chinese representatives, to monitor their visits to various organizations, including government agencies, scientific-research and educational institutions, and also to limit the attendance by citizens in the post countries of events at Chinese embassies.

It would be inadvisable to consider the explanatory work on this question to be an episodic campaign. It is necessary to conduct it consistently, taking into account the specifics of the post country, and, as much as possible, involve a wide range of leading party and government cadres, as well as the creative intelligentsia. As necessary, contribute any suitable proposals for effective opposition to Beijing’s subversive activities and the neutralization of undesirable tendencies in the policies of specific socialist states.

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Document II. CPSU CC Politburo Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and Representatives, 2 October 1980

Subject to return within 7 days to the CC CPSU (General department, 1st sector)

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P217/57

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin, Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol No. 217 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of October 2, 1980

___________________________________________________________

Re: Carrying out additional measures to counter American-Chinese military cooperation

Approve the draft indicated for Soviet ambassadors and Soviet representatives (enclosed).

CC SECRETARY

For point 57 prot. No. 217

Secret

FOR ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES

At the present time the partnership between American imperialism and Beijing’s hegemonism, which is spreading to the military sphere, is a new negative phenomenon in world politics and dangerous for all of humanity. Counting on using “strong and stable” China in its strategic interests, Washington is expanding the parameters for cooperation with Beijing in the military-technical sphere. In particular, the USA administration has affirmed its readiness to deliver modern American weapons and technology to China, which could be widely used for military purposes.

As American-Chinese military cooperation develops further, destructive elements
will grow in international relations.

In accordance with the instructions you received previously and taking into account the specifics of your post country, continue your work to reveal the dangerous character of the developing rapprochement between aggressive circles in the West, above all the USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling attention to the following aspects.

1. In developing military cooperation with China, the ruling circles in the USA count on the possibility of influencing China to act in a “desirable” way, of channeling its policies in an acceptable direction. Frequently the foreign policy activity of the PRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in the international arena. The Chinese leaders themselves are not adverse to playing up to such a discussion and, to this end, without withdrawing the thesis of the “inevitability of war,” have begun to use a more flexible terminology. However, with the help of a sham “peaceful nature,” invoked to add greater “respectability” to the PRC’s foreign policy, Beijing is simply counting on gaining time to accomplish the forced arming of the country. Actually, more and more, the Chinese leadership is resorting to a policy of diktat and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and assumes on itself the improper functions of “teaching lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with the force of arms.

2. As before, the PRC government declines to make any international legal commitments to disarmament, tries to diminish the importance of results achieved in this area, and refuses to take part in measures to limit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set about to manufacture and experiment with intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and is working on the creation of neutron weapons. All this drives the global arms race forward and directly contradicts the interests of detente. This policy of Beijing’s seriously threatens everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not just the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

3. There is absolutely no basis for concluding, as some do, that Beijing’s alleged adoption of a “modernization program” represents a new political course to overcome China’s economic backwardness. In fact this course was taken above all to contribute to the realization of pre-existing plans to speed up the process of transform-

ing China into a military “superpower,” and the resolution of the most serious problems, such as increasing the extremely low material and cultural level of the Chinese people, has been relegated to an indefinite future. In China they don’t hide the fact that “modernization” is the best means of preparing for war. In practice, unrestrained militarization accelerates economic collapse and increased instability in China. Thus, those countries who actively take part in the Chinese program of “modernization,” actually contribute to the growth of its military potential and render a disservice to the Chinese people.

On the other hand, the policy of militari-
zing the country will inevitably engender unpredictable turns and zigzags and future evidence of foreign policy adventurism, leading to the dangerous destabilization of the international situation and the inflation of international tension. Any injection of aid, particularly by the USA, either directly or indirectly contributing to China’s militarization and to the development of the Chinese military potential, would enable China to find the striking power necessary for the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Under conditions when Beijing not only opposes all constructive proposals to strengthen peace and detente, but also directly provokes international conflict, this [aid] would mean an increased danger of war breaking out and the growth of threats to all humanity, including the Chinese and American peoples.

The fact that what is proposed for delivery to China is “non-lethal” equipment and technology, “defensive,” and “dual-use,” etc., does not change the situation. The issue is not that such distinctions are extremely relative, but that cooperation with military modernization will free up the forces within China and the means necessary for building up its principal strike force - its nuclear capability.

4. The plans Beijing has been developing for a long time to change the global correlation of forces and the entire structure of contemporary international relations elicit serious alarm. The transfer to China of any technology or equipment whatsoever - this would be a step in the direction of the erosion of the established military-balance in the world and of a new cycle in the arms race. The destruction of the balance of military forces would erode the basis for the arms limitation negotiations insofar as equal security is the main principle which the USSR and USA have agreed to follow.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has every opportunity to defend its interests and repel the presumptions of other countries, including the PRC. The calculations of those who try to direct American-Chinese relations in such as way as to use China as a means of pressure and as a military counterweight to the Soviet Union are short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect Chinese expansion to the north risk major miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion of China’s military potential increases the danger that certain countries would be inveigled into Beijing’s orbit, and in the long-term, could lead to a situation in which these very countries could become the victims of Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking realistically, it would follow to recognize that a “strong” China would chose a different direction for its expansionist plans: in all likelihood it would swallow up neighboring countries, grab hold of all the vitally important regions of the world, and would certainly not serve as an instrument in the hands of the USA or any other country.

5. The development of military-politi-
cal cooperation between China and the USA, which elicits concern among many states, has led already to a noticeable worsening of the international situation and complicated the search for real paths to strengthening peace and security in various regions of the world. In an effort to create favorable condi-
tions for the realization of its hegemonic aims, the Beijing leadership counts on aggravating relations between countries, setting some states against others, and provoking military conflicts. Beijing does not hide the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA, and, from its ashes, assume world domina-
tion.

Those who insist on the necessity of “strengthening” China base their calculations on the assumption that Beijing would coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore would not be dangerous for the West. But taking into account the continuing domestic political struggle in China, no one can guaran-
tee that in 5-10 years China would not bring into play an anti-American card or anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force against those countries which irresponsibly connived and assisted with the PRC’s re-
armament.
The experience of history attests to the fact that the extent of China’s expansion will be proportional to the military might of the Chinese army. Even today China’s neighbors, above all the countries of Southeast Asia which the Chinese leaders consider to be their traditional sphere of influence, experience an immediate threat. It would be easy to imagine how China will behave in relation to its neighbors once the USA and its neighbors assist China to acquire more modern weapons. Above all, China is trying to institute its control over Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Malacca and the straits of Singapore.

Under these conditions, attempts to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policy and to remain neutral will only encourage Beijing to undertake new adventures and to extend its expansion. Collective efforts by Asian states could, on the contrary, impede China’s path to increased military might, which is directed above all against countries of this region.

(For New Delhi only, the connivance and outright support of the USA for military preparations in China can only contradict India’s interests. Although the Chinese leadership is holding talks about normalizing relations with India, there is an entire array of means of pressure against it in China’s arsenal of strategies. In American-Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India and as a base of support for the aggressive actions of the USA and China in Southeast Asia is expanding more and more. In cooperation with the USA, Beijing is flooding India’s neighbors with arms and, by creating an atmosphere of war psychosis, is attempting to maintain in powerful unpopular regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. Beijing is speeding up its military preparations along the Chinese-Indian border, constructing missile bases and strategic roads in Tibet, and activating its support for separatist movements in northeast India, where it is practically waging an “undeclared war” against this country.)

There is no doubt that as China strengthens its military-industrial potential, it will advance further along the path to the realization of Chinese leadership’s openly declared territorial pretensions against neighboring countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia. This will not only lead to a serious destabilization of the situation in Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present a direct threat to other regions.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not only do we carefully monitor the direction of American-Chinese cooperation in the military sphere, but also we must take the necessary steps to strengthen the security of our borders. We cannot tolerate change in the military-strategic balance in favor of forces hostile to the cause of peace.

(Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul.)

The post countries should inform MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet ambassadors were sent instructions about carrying out work to counter the negative consequences for the causes of socialism, peace, and detente, of the establishment of an American-Chinese military alliance. Familiarize the recipient with the content of the aforementioned instructions.

Carry out your work in coordination with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Hungarian People’s Republic (HPR), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDPR), the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR), the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), and the Czechoslovak People’s Republic (CPR).

It is necessary to attentively follow all foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans for the expansion of American-Chinese military cooperation, to regularly and effectively inform the Center about them, and to take the measures required to neutralize the tendencies that are undesirable for our interests.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]
27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Borderland: Options and Tensions

Morning: Regional Political-Economy


Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San Diego): “Politics and the Reform of the Primorsky Fuel and Energy Complex”

Afternoon: The RFE as “Outpost”

Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): “The Cossack Revival in the Far East: From Borderguards to Emigrés to Interest Group”

Vladimir Sokolov (Primor’e Provincial Museum): “Russian Nationalism and the Cossacks of the Far East”


Evgeniia Gudkova (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Military Conversion in the Russian Far East”

James Hershberg (Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, DC): “Northeast Asia and the Cold War”

Tanya Troyakova (Institute of History, Vladivostok): “The Maritime Province on the Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok”

Late Afternoon: International Economic Considerations (I)

Natal’ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): “The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia and China”

Mikhail Koval’chuk (Institute of Transport, Khabarovsk): “Foreign Trade and Transport in the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s”


Lidia Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial Archive): “Foreign Concessions in the Russian Far East, 1920s-1930s”

Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): “Foreign Capital in the Far East in the 1920s”

Takeshi Hamashita (Tokyo U.): “Japanese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia”


Morning: International Economic Considerations (II)

Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar): “Current Issues in Russo-Chinese Border Trade”

Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and Central Asia, CASS): “Sino-Russian Border Trade”

Natal’ia Bezljudnaia (Far Eastern State U.): “Geopolitical Projects in the Southern Part of the Maritime Province”

Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin): “Sino-Russian Border Trade”


Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies


Thomas Lahusen (Duke University): “Azhaev’s Far East”

Tatsuo NAKAMI (Tokyo Foreign Languages U.): “Japanese Conceptions of Northeast Asia in the 20th century”
MAO ZEDONG’S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958: CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Translated and Annotated by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson

Translators’ Note: On 23 August 1958, Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian area along the People’s Republic of China’s Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Island. In the following two months, several hundred thousand artillery shells exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around it. At one point, a Chinese Communist invasion of the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In response to the rapidly escalating Communist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the Eisenhowen Administration, in accordance with its obligations under the 1954 American-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. naval vessels to help the Nationalists protect Jinmen’s supply lines. Even the leaders of the Soviet Union, then Beijing’s close ally, feared the possible consequences of Beijing’s actions, and sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to inquire about China’s reasons for shelling Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed on October 6, when Beijing issued a “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it was speculated by many at that time, and later confirmed, that this message was drafted by Mao Zedong). The message called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem, arguing that all Chinese should unite to confront the “American plot” to divide China permanently. From this day on, the Communist forces dramatically relaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war between China and the United States.

In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in Cold War history, it is particularly important to understand Beijing’s motives. Why did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the shelling relate to China’s overall domestic and international policies? Why did the Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, scholars have been forced to resort to “educated guesses” to answer these questions.

The materials in the following pages, translated from Chinese, provide new insights for understanding Beijing’s handling of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu Lengxi, then the director of the New China News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily). Wu was personally involved in the decision-making process in Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and attended several Politburo Standing Committee meetings discussing the events. His memoir provides both a chronology and an insider’s narrative of how Beijing’s leaders, Mao Zedong in particular, handled the crisis. The second part comprises 18 documents, including two internal speeches delivered by Mao explaining the Party’s external policies in general and its Taiwan policy in particular. The two parts together provide a foundation to build a scholarly understanding of some of the key calculations underlying the Beijing leadership’s management of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly interesting is the revelation that Mao decided to shell Jinmen to distract American attention from, and counter American moves in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his extensive explanation of how China should use a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S. imperialists.” Equally important is his emphasis on the connection between the tense situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass mobilization in China leading to the Great Leap Forward. It should also be noted that despite the aggressive appearance of Beijing’s Taiwan policy, Mao paid special attention to avoiding a direct military confrontation with American forces present in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. Although these materials are not directly from Chinese archives, they create a new basis for scholars to deepen their understanding of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using newly available Chinese sources, see Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by Thomas Christensen to be published by Princeton University Press.]

Rendering Chinese- or English-language materials into the other language is difficult because the two languages have no common linguistic roots. Thus, the materials provided below are sometimes free rather than literal translations from Chinese to English. Great care has been taken to avoid altering the substantive meaning intended by the author of the documents. Material appearing in the text in brackets has been supplied to clarify meaning or to provide missing words or information not in the original text. Additional problems with individual documents are discussed in the notes. The notes also include explanatory information to place key individual and events in context or to provide further information on the material being discussed.

Part I. Memoir, “Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen”

By Wu Lengxi

[Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]

In August 1958, the members of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Politburo met at Beidaihe² for a regular top leaders’ working conference. The meeting originally planned to focus on the nation’s industrial problems, and later the issue of the people’s commune was added to the discussion.

The Politburo convened its summit meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend the meeting several days later. On the 20th,
however, the General Office of the Central Committee called, urging me to go to Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 August on a scheduled flight arranged by the Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed with Hu Qiaomu³ in a villa in Beidaihe’s central district. This seaside resort area was used only for the leading members of the Central Committee during summers. All of the villas in the resort area were built before the liberation⁴ for high officials, noble lords, and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman Mao’s large, one-story house was newly constructed.

At noon on 23 August, the third day after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People’s Liberation Army’s artillery forces in Fujian employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist army.

In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the Politburo’s Standing Committee meeting chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I learned the reason [for the bombardment]. In mid-July, American troops invaded Lebanon and British troops invaded Jordan in order to put down the Iraqi people’s armed rebellion. Thereafter, the Central Committee decided to conduct certain military operations in the Taiwan Straits to support the Arabs’ anti-imperialist struggle as well as to crack down on the Nationalist army’s frequent and reckless harassment along the Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores], Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emergency alert.” It showed that Jiang’s army was going to make some moves soon. We therefore deployed our air force in Fujian Province at the end of July.⁵ Our fighters had been fighting the Nationalist air force and had already taken over control of the air space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, our artillery reinforcement units arrived at the front one after another. And mass rallies and parades were organized all over the country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples and to protest against the American and British imperialists’ invasions of the Middle East.

Chairman Mao talked first at the meeting of August 23. He said that the day’s bombardment was perfectly scheduled. Three days earlier, the UN General Assem-
lounge hall of the swimming area at Beidaihe’s beach. Mao chaired the meeting in his bathrobe right after swimming in the ocean. Among the participants were Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Dehuai. Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meeting. Chairman Mao started the meeting by saying that while we had had a good time at this summer resort, the Americans had extremely hectic and nervous days. According to their responses during the past days, Mao said that Americans were worried not only by our possible landing at Jinmen and Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We did not say if we were or were not going to land. We were acting as circumstances dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was not a small matter because it had a bearing on much more important international issues. The problem was not the 95,000 Nationalist troops stationed there—this was easy to handle. The problem was how to assess the attitude of the American government. Washington had signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, however, did not clearly indicate whether the U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the Americans wanted to carry these two burdens on their backs. The main purpose of our bombardment was not to reconnoiter Jiang’s defenses on these islands, but to probe the attitude of the Americans in Washington, testing their determination. The Chinese people had never been afraid of provoking someone far superior in power and strength, and they certainly had the courage to challenge [the Americans] on such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and Mazu, which had always been China’s territories. Mao said that we needed to grasp an opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen was an opportunity we seized when American armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 July 1958]. Our action therefore not only allowed us to test the Americans, but also to support the Arab people. On the horns of a dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to cope with both the East and the West at the same time. For our propaganda, however, we should not directly connect the bombardment of Jinmen [to the America’s landing in Lebanon]. Our major propaganda target was America’s aggressions all over the world, condemning its invasion of the Middle East and its occupation of our territory, Taiwan, Mao said. The People’s Daily could begin our propaganda campaign by criticizing an anti-China memorandum recently published by the U.S. State Department, enumerating the crimes of America’s invasion of China in the past and refuting the memorandum’s calumny and slander against us. We could also organize articles and commentaries on the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly, requesting American and British troops to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request the withdrawal of American armed forces from their military bases in many countries across the world, including Taiwan. Our media should now conduct an outer-ring propaganda campaign. After we learned the responses and moves of America, of Jiang Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then issue announcements and publish commentaries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. Mao said that at the present our media should build up strength and store up energy—draw the bow but not discharge the arrow. Peng Dehuai suggested that the media should write some reports and articles about the heroic fighting of our commanders and soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The participants at the meeting agreed that our reporters on the front could prepare articles, and we would decide later when they could publish their reports.

That evening I informed the editors of the People’s Daily in Beijing, through a secured telephone line, of the Politburo’s instructions on how to organize our propaganda campaign. But I did not say anything about the Politburo’s decisions, intentions, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, which were a top military secret at that time. For the next two days, the Politburo’s Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe focused its discussions upon how to double steel and iron production and upon issues of establishing the people’s commune. Chairman Mao, however, still paid close attention to the responses from all directions to our bombardment of Jinmen, especially to America’s response. Mao’s secretary called me several times checking on follow-up information after the NCNA’s Cangao ziliao [Restricted Reference Material] printed America’s responses. During these days, I asked NCNA to report to me every morning by telephone about headline news from foreign news agencies. I reported the important news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou.

The Central Committee’s working conference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 September, one day before the conference, Mao called for another Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which mainly discussed the international situation after the bombardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed the American responses. Both [Dwight] Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made public speeches. They ordered half of their warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the American government also suggested resuming Chinese-American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw. Seemingly, the American leaders believed that we were going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to have made up their mind whether or not to defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower and Dulles slurred over this matter without giving a straight answer. The participants at the meeting agreed that the Americans feared a war with us. They might not dare to fight us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accomplished our goal. We made the Americans very nervous and mobilized the people of the world to join our struggle.

At the Politburo’s Standing Committee meeting, however, the participants decided that our next plan was not an immediate landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose [around America’s neck] tighter and tighter—putting more pressure on America—and then looking for an opportunity to act. All participants agreed with Premier Zhou’s suggestion of announcing a twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so as to prevent America’s warships from reaching Jinmen and Mazu. Chairman Mao considered it rightous for us to defend our territory if American ships entered our territorial water. Our batteries, however, might not fire on them immediately. Our troops could send a warning signal first, and then act accordingly.

Chairman Mao also said that we were preparing another approach as well. Through the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, which would be resumed soon in Warsaw,
we would employ diplomatic means to coordinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We now had both an action arena and a talk arena. There was yet another useful means—the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said that at present our media should give wide publicity to a condemnation of America for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We should request America to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Our propaganda should emphasize that Taiwan and the offshore islands were Chinese territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang’s army and was purely China’s internal affair, and that no foreign country would be allowed to interfere with what happened there. Our propaganda organs, the People’s Daily, NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery rhetorical tone in their articles and commentaries. Their wording, however, must be measured, and should not go beyond a certain limit, Mao emphasized.

From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao chaired the Supreme State Conference. He made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th. Besides domestic issues, his speeches focused on international issues similar to the eight issues which he had explained at the Beidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao talked about pulling the noose, he said that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made the Americans very nervous. Dulles seemingly intended to put his neck into the noose of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for us to get the Americans there. Whenever we wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus we had the initiative, and the Americans did not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It was indeed troublesome to let Jiang’s army occupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? We, however, did not intend to launch an immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. Our bombardment was merely aimed at testing and scaring the Americans, but we would land if circumstances allowed. Why should we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came an opportunity? The Americans in fact were afraid of having a war with us at the bottom of their hearts so that Eisenhower never talked publicly about an absolutely “mutual defense” of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans seemingly intended to shy away [from Jinmen-Mazu]. Although their policy of escape was acceptable, the Americans also needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang’s troops from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans continued to stay and kept Jiang’s troops there, the situation would not be affected as a whole but they would put the noose around their necks.

During Chairman Mao’s speech on the 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi was attending the meeting. I answered. Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed to be included in that day’s news, and asked me to prepare it immediately. I discussed this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found it difficult to decide which part of Mao’s speech should be published, we agreed eventually to write the part about the noose first. I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. When the conference adjourned, Chairman Mao and other members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee gathered in the lobby of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over the news draft to Mao for his checking and approval. While talking to the others, he went over the draft and made some changes. Mao told me that only publishing the noose issue was all right. It was not appropriate at that moment to publish all the issues discussed because it was merely an exchange of opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, Mao did not want to relate the noose issue directly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was different from writing articles or editorials for newspapers. In our articles, Mao continued, we should not write about our policy toward Jinmen-Mazu, which was a top military secret. Our writing, however, could clarify our position toward the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks which would resume soon, expressing that whatever the outcome would be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were now shelling on the one hand and talking on the other—military operations combined with diplomatic efforts. Our bombardment was a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000 shells that day in coordination with the mass rally at Tiananmen Square to make a great show of strength and impetus. Our talks were a test through diplomacy in order to get to the bottom of American reaction. Two approaches were better than a single one. It was necessary to keep the negotiation channel open, Mao emphasized. After checking and polishing my manuscripts, Chairman Mao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmit the news that evening and to publish it in the People’s Daily the next day (9 September).

There was another interesting episode. Khrushchev did not have any idea about our intentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid of being involved in a world war, he sent Gromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on 6 September. During the Supreme State Conference, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou met with Gromyko, informing him of our decisions and explaining that we did not intend to have a major war. In case a major war broke out between China and America, China did not intend to involve the Soviet Union in the war. After receiving our message, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, asking the American government to be very cautious in the Taiwan Straits and warning that the Soviet Union was ready to assist China anytime if China was invaded.

Right after the Supreme State Conference, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an inspection trip of the southern provinces. From 10 to 28 September, he visited Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, and other places. On 30 September, one day after Mao returned to Beijing, his secretary called to tell me that Chairman Mao wanted to see me. I immediately went to Fengzeyuan in Zhongnanhai.

When I walked into the eastern wing of the Juixiang Study, Chairman Mao was reading a book. He asked me to sit down and said that during his trip he was impressed by the boundless energy of the people across the country, especially in their great efforts to develop a steel and iron industry and to mobilize massive militias. Mao had drafted a news story for NCNA, which was being typed and would be ready soon. Chairman Mao also told me that he particularly invited General Zhang Zhizhong to join in the trip. Besides his interests in a rapid growth of industry and agriculture, Zhang showed special concerns during the trip about the situation in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did not understand why we took so long to land on Jinmen. His advice was that even though we were unable to liberate Taiwan at that time, we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by all possible means. Zhang suggested not letting slip an opportunity which might never come again.

Chairman Mao told me that in fact we were not unwilling to take over Jinmen and Mazu. Our decision [on the landing], however, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, but also had to give special consideration to America’s position. The Americans feared...
a war with us. After we announced a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters, American warships at first refused to accept it. They invaded the boundary line of our territorial waters many times, though they did not sail into the eight-mile territorial waters which they recognized. Later, after our warnings, American ships did not dare to invade our twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some American gunships escorted a Nationalist transportation flotilla shipping munitions and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint flotilla reached Jinmen’s harbor, I ordered heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries opened fire, the American ships turned around and quickly escaped. The Nationalist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, America was a paper tiger.

America, however, was also a real tiger, Mao continued. At present, America concentrated a large force in the Taiwan Straits, including six out of its twelve aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its strength was so strong that one could not underestimate it, but must consider it seriously. Thus, our current policy [toward Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and cutting-off without killing (meaning that without a landing, we would continue bomb-jinmen to blockade its communication and transportation and to cut off its rear support and supplies, but not to bottle up the enemy [on the island]).

Chairman Mao also told me that the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of talks, we could tell that the Americans were certain about defending Taiwan but not sure about Jinmen. Some indications suggested that the Americans intended to exchange their abstaining from defending Jinmen-Mazu for our recognition of their forcible occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed to work out a policy concerning this situation. It was not adequate for us to accept General Zhang Zhizhong’s advice at that point. Mao asked the People’s Daily and NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda campaign and wait for the Central Committee’s further decision.

Chairman Mao asked for my comments on his news draft after it was typed out. I noted that the article particularly mentioned at its end that General Zhang had joined Mao’s inspection trip. I agreed with Mao’s manuscript except the last paragraph about Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead public thinking about relations with the Nationalists. According to Chairman Mao’s instruction, the article was published as the headline news on the front page of the People’s Daily on that National Day (1 October 1958).

After the National Day, Chairman Mao held continuous meetings of the Politburo’s Standing Committee to discuss the situation in the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October, the committee members met almost every day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focused on an analysis of Dulles’s speech on 30 September. In his speech, Dulles bluntly proposed a “two Chinas” policy, requesting that the Chinese Communists and the Taiwan government “both should renounce the employment of force” in the straits. Meanwhile, he criticized Taiwan’s deployment of large numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazu as unnecessary, “unwise and not cautious” actions. A reporter asked him if America’s Taiwan policy would change if the Chinese Communists made some compromises. Dulles said that “our policy in these respects is flexible…. If the situation we have to meet changes, our policies change with it.”

Premier Zhou pointed out at the meeting that Dulles’s speech indicated America’s intention to seize this opportunity to create two Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to commit to non-military unification of Taiwan. Using this as a condition, America might ask Taiwan to give up its so-called “returning to the mainland” plan and withdraw its troops from Jinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles’s policy was designed to exchange Jinmen and Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was the same hand of cards we had recently discovered during the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasized that the American delegates even spoke more undisguisedly at the talks than had been suggested in Dulles’s speech.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping believed that both China and America were trying to find out the other’s real intention. The two sides did the same thing at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By now both had some ideas about the other’s bottom line, they said. Americans knew that we neither intended to liberate Taiwan in the near future nor wanted to have a head-to-head clash with America. Fairly speaking, both sides adopted a similar cautious policy toward their confrontation in the Taiwan Straits. Our test by artillery fire in August and September was appropriate because the Americans were forced to reconsider what they could do in the area. At the same time, we restricted our shelling to Jiang’s ships, not American ships. Our naval and air forces all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships and airplanes. We acted with caution and exercised proper restraint. Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping also said that we put up quite a pageant in our propaganda campaign to condemn America’s occupation of our Taiwan territory and to protest American ships and aircraft invading our territorial waters and air space. Our propaganda had mobilized not only the Chinese masses but also the international community to support the Arab peoples and put very heavy pressure on the American government.

They both emphasized that this was the right thing to do.

Chairman Mao said at the meeting that our task of probing [the American response] had been accomplished. The question now was what we were going to do next. He pointed out that regarding Dulles’s policy we shared some common viewpoints with Jiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-China policy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he should be the only legal government, and we the bandits. Both, therefore, could not renounce the use of force. Jiang was always preoccupied with recovering the mainland; and we could never agree to abandon Taiwan. The current situation, however, was that we were unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain period; Jiang’s “returning to the mainland” also included “a very large measure of illusion” as even Dulles recognized. The remaining question now was how to handle Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we did not need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Mao asked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmen and Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. The advantage of this policy was that we could maintain contact with the Nationalists through this channel since these islands were very close to the mainland. Whenever necessary, we could shell the Nationalists. Whenever we needed tension, we could pull the noose tighter. Whenever we wanted a relaxation, we could give the noose more slack. [The policy of] leaving these islands hanging there neither dead nor alive could be employed as one means to deal with the Americans. Every time we bombed, Jiang...
Jieshi would ask for American help; it would make Americans anxious, worrying that Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little impact on our construction of a socialist country. Jiang’s troops on Jinmen-Mazu alone could not cause too much damage. On the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would lose a reliable means by which we can deal with the Americans and Jiang.

All the participants at the meeting agreed with Chairman Mao’s proposal to allow Jiang’s troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and force the American government to continue with this burden. The latter would be always on tenterhooks since we could kick it from time to time.

Premier Zhou expected the Americans to propose three resolutions during the Chinese-American talks. Their first proposition might ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu and America would announce that Jinmen-Mazu was included in the American-Jiang mutual defense perimeter. The second proposal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while America would declare that their mutual defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang’s withdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a commitment by both sides not to use force against each other. All three propositions were unacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because they were essentially aimed at creating two Chinas and legalizing America’s forcible occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, considered it favorable for us to continue the Chinese-American talks, which could occupy the Americans and prevent America and the European countries from bringing the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN.

We also needed to explain clearly the situation to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to give them the truth and prevent [the crisis] from doing us a disservice. All the participants agreed with Premier Zhou’s suggestions.

Chairman Mao concluded at the meeting that our decision had been made—continuation of shelling but not landing, blockading without bottling up and allowing Jiang’s forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our shelling would no longer be daily, with no more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time. Later on, our shelling could be at some intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, sometimes light; and several hundred shells fired randomly in one day. However, Mao said that we should continue to give wide publicity to our propaganda campaign. We insisted in our propaganda that the question of Taiwan was China’s internal affair, that bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign country or international organization should be allowed to interfere in China’s affairs. America’s stationing of its land and air forces on Taiwan was an invasion of China’s territory and sovereignty; concentrating a large number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits revealed American attempts to cause tensions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn from that area. We must oppose America’s attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chairman Mao emphasized that our media propaganda should explicitly address the above principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw talks should also follow these principles while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All these points would not be publicly propagated until we had issued a formal government statement. At the present, the People’s Daily could have a “cease-fire” for a couple of days to prepare and replenish munitions. Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons would boom after our orders.

After the meeting of the 4th, Chairman Mao issued an order to the frontal forces on 5 September to suspend their bombardment for two days. The same day Mao himself drafted the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” which was published on the 6th in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. The message began with “We are all Chinese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, the best is making peace.” It pointed out that both sides considered Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories, and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas. The message then suggested that Taiwan leaders should abolish the mutual defense treaty signed with Americans. The Americans would abandon the Taiwanese sooner or later; and one could discern certain clues about this in Dulles’s speech of 30 September. After all, the American imperialists were our common enemy. The message formally suggested that both sides hold negotiations to search for peaceful resolutions to the Chinese civil war which had been fought for the past 30 years. It also announced that our forces on the Fujian front would suspend their shelling for seven days in order to allow the [Nationalist] troops and residents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Our suspension of bombardment, however, would be with the precondition of no American ships providing escort.

This statement drafted by Chairman Mao was a very important turning point in our policy toward Jinmen. That is, our focus shifted from military operations to political (including diplomatic) efforts.

After watching the situation for two days, Chairman Mao called for another Politburo Standing Committee meeting at his quarters in the afternoon of 8 September. All the committee members noticed that the world had made magnificent and strong responses to the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan.” Some Western newspapers and magazines even saw the message as a straw in the wind that augured dramatic change in the relations between both Chinese sides and between China and America. Meanwhile, American ships stopped their escorts and no longer invaded our territorial waters around Jinmen. Only Jiang’s Defense Department believed the message to be a Chinese Communist “plot.”

Chairman Mao then asked me about how the People’s Daily prepared its editorial. I answered that the paper had already finished one article to attack Americans in particular. Mao told me to work on the Guomindang (GMD) first by writing an article which focused on a dialogue with Jiang Jieshi, while at the same time posing some difficult questions for the Americans. This article should explain that our message was not a crafty plot, but part of our consistent policy toward Taiwan. The message showed our stretching out both our arms once again, Mao said. The article might try to alienate Jiang from America, saying that Taiwan suffered from depending on other people for a living, and that getting a lift on an American ship was unreliable. Then the article could criticize Dulles’s so-called cease-fire and ask the Americans to meet five requirements for a cease-fire (stopping naval escorts, stopping the invasion of China’s territorial waters and air space, ending military provocation and war threats, ending inter-
vention in China’s internal affairs, and withdrawing all American armed forces from Taiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao asked me to finish my writing that evening. He was going to wait to read and check the article that night. Mao told me that I could leave right now to write the article without waiting for the end of the meeting.

Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back to the People’s Daily’s building. After ordering a dish of fried noodles as my dinner from a restaurant across the street, I began to draft the editorial hurriedly in my office. With Chairman Mao’s instruction, my writing was very smooth and fast. A little bit after the midnight, I finished my draft. It was two or three o’clock in the early morning of the 9th when the final proof of the article was sent to Chairman Mao for checking and approval. Mao read the editorial early the same morning and made important changes in its last paragraph. He re-wrote the paragraph as follows: “Seemingly, the problem still needs to have more tests and observations. We are still very far away from the time of solving the problem. After all, the imperialists are the imperialists, and the reactionaries are the reactionaries. Let us wait and see how they will make their moves!” Chairman Mao noted his approval on the final proof: “Not very good, barely publishable.” The time written down below his signature was six o’clock of 9 October.

I received my manuscript sent back by Chairman Mao on the morning of 9 October. Meanwhile, I received a telephone call from Mao’s secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told me that Chairman Mao wanted to include Dulles’s 8 October announcement of American ships stopping their escorts in the editorial. Mao also suggested postponing its publication for one day. After reading Mao’s revision and corrections, I felt that the editorial’s title was not a very bold headline. So, according to the changes he made in the last paragraph, I changed the title to “Let’s See How They Make Their Moves.” After the editorial was published on 11 October, it was thought to be Chairman Mao’s writing because of its striking title and special style close to that of the “Message to the Com patriots in Taiwan.”

Two days later, the People’s Daily published another editorial, “Stop Talking about Cease-fire; To Leave Is the Best,” on 13 October. This editorial was based upon Premier Zhou’s opinion at the Politburo Standing Committee meeting on 4 October. Zhou gave the editorial his final check and approval. Its main content was our critiques and refusal of an American request for a cease-fire on the Jinnem-Mazu front. The editorial clearly stated that there was no war between China and America, so where did the cease-fire come from? It asked America to withdraw all of its naval and air forces from Taiwan and surrounding areas around the Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing for this editorial, corresponding to the “Defense Ministry’s Order,” which was issued on 13 October and drafted by Chairman Mao. In that order, the Defense Ministry announced a continuation of the suspension of our bombardment for two more weeks. The suspension, however, still contained the precondition that no American ships could be escorts. We would resume shelling immediately if there were any American escort vessels.

Two days later, Eisenhower ordered all the warships from the Sixth Fleet which had been sent as reinforcements to the Pacific to return to the Mediterranean. He also sent Dulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi. The Editorial Department of the People’s Daily, without really knowing what was going on, wrote an editorial entitled “Having Only Themselves to Blame,” saying that Dulles and Jiang played a “two-man show.” After the editorial was published on 21 October, Premier Zhou called us during the same morning and gave a pungent criticism that we were neither consistent with the facts nor with the policy made by the Central Committee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that afternoon, he also criticized our editorial as bookish and naive, reeling and swaggering, which had a one-sided understanding of the Central Committee’s policy and gave an inappropriate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidarity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles’ mission to Taiwan was to persuade Jiang Jieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinnemen-Mazu in exchange for our commitment not to liberate Taiwan so that America could gain a total control of Taiwan’s future. Disagreeing with Dulles, however, Jiang demanded that America commit to a “mutual defense” of Jinnemen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a big argument in which nobody gave in to the other. As a result, the meeting ended in discord and was not a “two-men show” of solidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chairman Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me one more time about this particular matter. Then we wrote another editorial to re-critcize the Dulles-Jiang meeting.

Chairman Mao also said at the Politburo Standing Committee meeting that there were many problems in the relationship between America and Jiang. The Americans wanted to make Jiang’s “Republic of China” one of their dependencies or even a mandated territory. But Jiang desperately sought to maintain his semi-independence. Thus came conflicts between Jiang and America. Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-American initiative. They would resist America if it drove them too hard. Among such cases in the past were Jiang’s condemnation of Hu Shi [Hu Shih]17 and his dismissal of General Sun Liren18—actions taken because Jiang believed that the troublemakers against him were supported by the Americans. Another good example of Jiang’s independence was the recent smashing and looting of the American Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanese masses.19 Jiang permitted American armed forces stationed in Taiwan only at the regimental level, while rejecting larger units at the divisional level which America had planned to send to Taiwan. After our shelling of Jinnem began, Jiang allowed only 3,000 more American marines to reinforce Taiwan and they were stationed in Tainan [a city in southern Taiwan]. As Chairman Mao had pointed out two days earlier, we and Jiang Jieshi had some common points. The conflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting suggested that we might be able to ally with Jiang to resist America in a certain way. Our policy of not liberating Taiwan in the near future might help Jiang relax and concentrate on his fight against America’s control. We neither landed on Jinnem nor agreed with the American proposal for a “cease-fire.” This clearly caused problems between Americans and Jiang. In the past months, our policy had been one of shelling without landing and blockading without driving Jiang’s troops to the wall. While continuing the same policy, we should from now on implement it more flexibly in favor of supporting Jiang Jieshi to resist America’s control.

All the participants at the meeting agreed with Chairman Mao’s ideas. Premier Zhou added that “shelling” was coordinated with “blockading.” Since we relaxed our “blockading,” we might also need to relax our
“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by suggesting that we should announce an odd-numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on even-numbered days. For the odd-numbered-day shelling, our targets might be limited only to the harbors and airport, not the defense works and residential buildings on the island. From now on, our shelling would be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light shelling might not be on a regular basis. Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such policy was unknown in the history of Chinese or world warfare. However, we were engaged in a political battle, which was supposed to be fought this way. Chairman Mao said that we only had “hand grenades” right now, but no atomic bombs. “Hand grenades” could be successful for us to use in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, when everybody had nuclear weapons, very likely nobody would use them.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meeting whether we should issue a formal statement announcing future shelling on odd days only but not on even days. Chairman Mao believed it necessary. He also required me to understand that the editorial mentioned early in the meeting should not be published until our formal statement was issued.

On 25 October, the “Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chairman Mao was issued in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analysis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S. State Department on 23 October, the message pointed out that on the one hand Dulles finally saw a “Communist China” and was willing to make contact with it. On the other hand, however, this American bureaucrat still considered the so-called “Republic of China” in Taiwan as a “political unit which was factually existing.” The American plan was first to separate Taiwan from the mainland, and second to mandate Taiwan’s special status. The message read, “China’s affairs must be handled by the Chinese themselves. For any problem unable to be solved at once, we can give it further thought and discuss it later between us. . . . We are not advising you to break up with Americans right now. These sort of ideas are not practical. We simply hope that you should not yield to the pressure from Americans. If you live under somebody’s thumb and lose your sovereignty, you will eventually have no place to call your home and be thrown out into the sea.” The message announced that we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Fujian front not to fire on the airport, harbors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even days. On odd days, we might not bomb either, as long as there were no ships or airplanes coming to Jinmen.

The same day the statement was issued, Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying and me for a conversation. Besides asking us to make a survey of the current condition of people’s communes in Henan Province, Mao talked about the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu. He said that during this event both we and the Americans adopted a brinkmanship policy. America concentrated many warships which invaded our territorial waters and escorted Jiang’s transportation fleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000 or 20,000 shells a day, or even more whenever there were American escort ships. Our shells, however, fell only on Jiang’s ships not on American ships. Some shells fell near American ships, which frightened them and caused them to turn around. While confronting each other in the Taiwan Straits, both sides continued talks in Warsaw. Americans were on one side of the brink, and we on the other. Even though both were at the brink of war, no one ever crossed the line. We used our brinkmanship policy to deal with American brinkmanship. Mao continued that there were many stories written in Liazhai Zhiyi (The Chinese Ghost Stories) about people without fear of ghosts. One of the stories was titled “Qing Feng,” which talked about a bohemian scholar named Geng Qubing. One night, Geng was reading late in a remote village house. “A ghost walks into his house with long hair and black face, and stares at the scholar. Laughing, dipping his fingers into the black ink, and painting his face black himself, Geng looked directly at the ghost with keen, sparkling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed and ran away.” Chairman Mao told us that if we were not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would be unable to do anything to us. He said that our experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the case in point.

I can say that what Chairman Mao told us here is his summary of our management of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958.

Part II. Documents

1. Notation, Mao Zedong on Chen Geng’s Report, 18 December 1957


Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai:

[What has been suggested in the report] is absolutely necessary. You should supervise and push the air force to go all out [to fulfill the task], so that we are sure that the invading enemy will be annihilated. Please consider the question regarding our air force’s moving into Fujian in 1958.

2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng, 27 July 1958

Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong weniao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Formation of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992), 7:326

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

[I] could not sleep [last night], but thought about it again. It seems more appropriate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for several days. While holding our operations, [we will] observe the situational development there. We will not attack whether or not the other side relieves a garrison. Until they launch a provocative attack, [we will] then respond with a counterattack. The solution of the problem in the Middle East takes time. Since we have time, why should we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack plans now, but one day we will put it into implementation. If the other side invades Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, and Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take action] would emerge. How do you think about this idea? Could you have a discussion about this with other comrades? It is extremely beneficial [for our decision-making] with politics in command and going through repeated deliberations. To make a plan too quickly usually results in an unthoughtful consideration. I did such things quite often and sometimes had unavoidable miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even if the other side attacks us, [we still] can wait for a couple of days for a clear calculation, and then start our counterattack. Can all of
the above points be accounted as working out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy in battles a thousand miles away, and having some certainty of success that we will be ever-victorious? We must persist in the principle of fighting no battle we are not sure of winning. If you agree [with the above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and ask him to think about it very carefully. Let me know his opinion.

Have a peacefull morning!

Mao Zedong
10 A.M., 27 July

3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.
Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:348

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

[We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong and Shengzhen, so that the British would not be scared.

Mao Zedong
1 A.M., 18 August

P.S.: Please call air force headquarters attention to the possibility that the Taiwan side might counterattack us by dispatching large groups of air force (such as dozens, or even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to take back air control over Jin[men] and Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare to use large groups of air force to defeat them immediately. However, in chasing them, [our planes] should not cross the space line over Jinmen and Mazu.

4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng, 3 September 1958
Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:376

Part I
Comrade [Huang] Kecheng:

Both the instruction and the appendix are well written. Please send them to Comrade Peng Dehuai immediately for his reading. Then, they should be approved by the Central Military Commission’s meeting and issued thereafter. Please give a detailed explanation of the reasons [for these docu-

ments] at the Military Commission’s meeting.

Part II
Distribute them to the Fujian Military District and all other military districts; the party committees of all provinces, metropolises, and regions; all departments of the Central Military Commission and all special forces headquarters; all members of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lu Dingyi,29 and Wu Lengxi.

5. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 5 September 1958 (Excerpt)

As far as the international situation is concerned, our view has always been optimistic, which can be summarized as “the East Wind prevails over the West Wind.” At present, America commits itself to an “all-round contract” policy along our coast. It seems to me that the Americans will only feel comfortable if they take complete responsibility for Jinmen and Mazu, or even for such small islands as Dadan, Erdan, and Dongding. America gets into our noose. Thereby, America’s neck is hanging in China’s iron noose. Although Taiwan is [for the Americans] another noose, it is a bit farther from [the mainland]. America now moves its head closer to us, since it wants to take responsibility for Jinmen and other islands. Someday we will kick America, and it cannot run away, because it is tied up by our noose.

I would like to present some viewpoints, offering some ideas for the participants at this meeting. Do not treat them as a decision, or some kind of law. As law, they might not be changed; as opinions, they are alive and flexible. Let us use these points to review and analyze the current international situation.

The first question is who fears whom a bit more. I believe that the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. So are we. But the question is which side actually fears the other a bit more. This is my point, as well as my observation. I would like to invite everybody here to apply this point to your observation from now on. You can observe the situation for one, two, three, or four years by using this point. You will eventually find out whether the West fears the East a bit more, or the East fears the West a bit more. According to my opinion, it is Dulles who fears us more. Britain, America, Germany, France, and other western countries fear us a lot more. Why do they have more fears? This is an issue of strength, and an issue of popularity. Public attitude is indeed strength. There are more people on our side, and fewer on their side. Among the three doctrines [in today’s world]—communism, nationalism, and imperialism, communism and nationalism are relatively closer. Nationalism dominates a large part of the world, including the three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even though the ruling groups of some countries in these continents are pro-West, such as those in Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Iran, among the people in these countries many, probably quite a few, are pro-East. Only the monopoly-capitalists and a few people who have been totally poisoned by the monopoly-capitalists want a war. Except for them, the rest of the people, or the majority of the people (not all of them) do not want a war. In northern European countries, for example, the ruling classes, though belonging to the capitalists, do not want a war. The balance of strength is like this. The truth is in the hands of the majority of the people, not in the hands of Dulles. As a result, while they feel rather diffident, we are solid and dependable inside. We depend on the people, while they support those reactionary rulers. This is what Dulles is doing right now. He specializes in such people as “Generalissimo Jiang,” [South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee, and [South Vietnam leader] Ngo Dinh Diem. My viewpoint is that both sides are afraid [of each other], but they fear us a bit more. Thus, it is impossible for a war to break out.

The second question is what is the nature of the international military alliances organized by the Americans and the other imperialists, such as the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization], the Baghdad [Treaty Organization], and the Manila [Treaty Organization].30 We say that they are of an aggressive nature. It is absolutely true that these military organizations are of an aggressive nature. However, against which side do these organizations direct their spearhead? Are they attacking socialism, or na-
tionalism? It seems to me that they are currently attacking the nationalist countries, such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weak countries in the Middle East. But they will attack the socialist countries until, say, when Hungary completely has failed, Poland has collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany have fallen down, and even the Soviet Union and us have encountered troubles. They will attack us when we are shaking and crumbling. Why should they fail to attack you when you are falling down? Stable and strong, we are not falling down now, and they are unable to bite the hard bone. So they turn to those more bitable countries, gnawing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon. They have attempted to overthrow [Gamal Abdul] Nasser, undermine Iraq, and subjugate Algeria. By now Latin America has made a significant progress. As [U.S.] vice president, [Richard] Nixon was not welcomed in eight countries, where people spat and stoned him. When the political representative of America was treated with saliva and rocks there, it means contempt for America’s “dignity,” and an unwillingness to treat it “politely.” Because you are our enemy, we therefore treat you with saliva and rocks. Thus, we should not take the three military organizations too seriously. [We] need to analyze them. Even though aggressive, they are not steady.

The third point is about the tension in the international situation. We are calling every day for relaxing international tensions because it will benefit the people of the world. So, can we say that it must be harmful for us whenever there is a tense situation? I do not think it necessarily so. A tense situation is not necessarily harmful for us in every circumstance; it has an advantageous side. Why do I think this way? It is because besides its disadvantageous side, a tense situation can mobilize the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize the people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction. Afraid of fighting a nuclear war? You have to think it over. Look, we have fired a few shells on Jinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect that the entire world would be so deeply shocked, and the smoke and mist is shading the sky. This is because people are afraid of war. They are afraid that the Americans will make trouble everywhere in the world. Except for Syngman Rhee, no second country supports America among so many countries in the world. Probably the Philippines can be added to the list, but it offers only “conditional support.” It is a tense situation, for example, that caused the Iraqi revolution, is it not? The current tense situation is caused by the imperialists themselves, not by us. In the final analysis, however, the tense situation is more harmful for the imperialists. Lenin once introduced this point in his discussions about war. Lenin said that a war could motivate people’s spiritual condition, making it tense. Although there is no war right now, a tense situation caused by the current military confrontation can also bring every positive factor into play, while at the same time stimulating groups of backward people to think.

The fourth point is about the issue of withdrawing armed forces from the Middle East. American and British troops of aggression must withdraw. The imperialists now refuse to withdraw and intend to stay there. This is disadvantageous for the people, but it will at the same time educate the people. In order to fight against aggressors, you need to have a target; without a target, it is difficult for you to fight against the aggressors. The imperialists now come up there themselves to become the target, and refuse to leave. This arouses the people of the entire world to fight against the American aggressors. After all, it seems to me that it is not so harmful for the people when the aggressors put off their withdrawal. Thereby the people will yell at the aggressors every day: why do you not leave [our country]?

The fifth question is whether it is a good thing or bad thing to have [Charles] de Gaulle in power. At present, the French Communist Party and the French people should firmly oppose de Gaulle coming to power, and veto his constitution. Meanwhile, they should also be prepared for the struggle after he takes office in case they cannot stop him. Once in power, de Gaulle will oppress the French Communist Party and the French people. His taking office, however, may also have advantageous effects in both domestic and foreign affairs. Internationally, this person likes to make trouble for Britain and America. He likes to argue. He had some miserable experiences in the past. In his memoirs, de Gaulle blamed Britain and America all the time, but said some nice words about the Soviet Union. It seems to me that he will make trouble again. It is advantageous when France has trouble with Britain and America. Domestically, he would become a necessary teacher who can educate the French proletarians, just like “Generalissimo Jiang” in China. Without “Generalissimo Jiang,” it would not be enough for the Chinese Communist Party’s positive education alone to educate [China’s] 600 million people. Currently, de Gaulle is still enjoying his reputation. If you defeat him now, people are still missing him as he is still alive. Let him come to power, he will run no more than five, six, seven, eight, or ten years. He will be finished sooner or later. After he is finished, no second de Gaulle will be there and his poison will be completely released. You must allow his poison to be released, just like that we did to our Rightists. You have to let him release the poison. If not, he always has the poison. You can eliminate the poison only after he releases it.

The sixth point is the embargo, that is, no trade with us. Is this advantageous or disadvantageous to us? I believe that the embargo benefits us a lot. We do not feel it [to be] disadvantageous at all. It will have tremendous beneficial impact on our [handling of] clothing, food, housing, and transportation, as well as on our reconstruction (including the production of steel and iron). The embargo forces us to work out all the solutions ourselves. My appreciation goes to He Yingqin all the time. In 1937 when our Red Army was re-organized into the Eighth Route Army under the Nationalist Revolution Army, we received 400,000 yuan of fabi every month. After we were paid the money, we became dependent on it. In 1940, however, the anti-Communist movement reached its peak, and the payment stopped. No more money was paid to us. We had to find out our own means [to support ourselves] from then on. What did we find out? We issued an order that as there was no more fabi, each regiment had to find out its own way of self-support. Thereafter, all [of] our base areas launched a production movement. The value yielded from the production reached not 400,000, not 4 million, even not 40 million yuan, but about 100 or possibly 200 million yuan, if we combined the production of all the base areas together. We have since relied on our own efforts. Who is today’s He Yingqin? It is Dulles, a different name. Currently, they are carrying out an embargo. We are going own way. We have
initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing away dependence and breaking down blind faith. The result is good.

The seventh is the non-recognition issue. Is [imperialist countries'] recognition of the PRC or non-recognition relatively more advantageous to us? Same as on the embargo issue, imperialist countries' non-recognition of us is more advantageous to us than their recognition of us. So far there are about forty some countries which refuse to recognize us. The main reason lies in America. For instance, France intends to recognize China, but it does not dare to do it because of America's opposition. Many other countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and Canada, dare not to recognize us because of America. There are only nineteen capitalist countries which recognize us now, plus another eleven countries in the socialist camp, plus Yugoslavia, totaling thirty-one countries. It seems to me that we can live with this small number. Non-recognition of us, in my opinion, is not a bad thing. Rather, it is relatively good. Let us produce more steel. When we can produce 600 or 700 million tons of steel, they will recognize us at last. They may still refuse to recognize us by then, but who cares?

The last issue is about preparations for an anti-aggression war. I said in my first point that as both sides are afraid of war, war should not break out. Everything in the world, however, needs a safety factor. Since there exists a monopoly-capitalist class in the world, I am afraid that it will make trouble recklessly and abruptly. We must therefore be prepared to fight a war. This point needs to be explained clearly to our cadres. First, we do not want a war, and we oppose any war. So does the Soviet Union. If war comes, it will be started by the other side and we will be forced to enter the fighting. Second, however, we do not fear fighting a war. We must fight it if we have to. We have only grenades and potatoes in our hands right now. A war of atomic and hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since many people will die. That is why we oppose a war. Unfortunately, the decision will not be made by us. If the imperialists decide to fight a war, we have to be prepared for everything. We must fight a war if we have to. I am saying that it is not so terrifying even if half of our population perishes. This is certainly talk in extreme terms. Thinking about the history of the entire universe, I do not see any reason to be pessimistic about the future. I had a debate with Premier [Jawaharlal] Nehru\(^34\) over this issue. He said that [as the result of a nuclear war] no government could remain and everything would be destroyed. Even though someone might want to seek peace, no government would be there. I told him that it would never be like that. If your government would be eliminated by atomic bombs, the people would form another one which could work out a peace. If you fail to think about things in such extreme terms, how can you ever sleep? This is no more than a matter of people being killed, and [what is reflected here] is the fear of fighting a war. But if the imperialists definitely want to fight a war and attack us first, using atomic bombs, it does not matter whether you fear fighting a war or not; in any case they will attack you. If that were the case, what should be our attitude? Is it better to fear or not to fear? It is extremely dangerous for us to fear this and fear that every day, which will make our cadres and people feel discouraged. So I believe that [we] should be case-hardened toward fighting a war. We will fight it if we have to. We will rebuild our country after the war. Therefore, we are now mobilizing the militias. All people's communes should organize their militias. Everyone in our country is a soldier. We should arm the people. We can distribute several million guns at the beginning. Later on we will distribute several dozen million guns among the people. All provinces should be able to construct light weapons, including rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, and light mortars. Each people's commune should have a military office to supervise [combat] training. Some of our participants here today are intellectuals. You need to make a call for holding a pen in one hand and gripping a gun in the other. You cannot only have pens in your hands. You should be culturalized as well as militarized.

These eight points are my opinions. I offer them to you for your observation of the international situation.

6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 8 September 1958 (Excerpt) Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 348-352

I am going to discuss something we have talked about before. About the noose issue we discussed at the last meeting, did we not? Now I want to say that we need to place nooses on Dulles, Eisenhower, and other warmongers. There are many places where the nooses can be used on the Americans. In my opinion, wherever an [American] military base is located, [America] is tied up by a noose. [This happens], for example, in the East, in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan; in the West, in West Germany, France, Italy, and Britain; in the Middle East, in Turkey and Iran; and in Africa, in Morocco and other places. In each of these countries, America has many military bases. For instance, in Turkey there are more than twenty American military bases, and it is said that in Japan there are about 800. In some other countries, although there is no [American] military base, they are occupied by the troops of the imperialists. For example, American troops in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan.

Here I am focusing on two of these nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. Taiwan is an old noose since America has occupied it for several years. Who ties America there? The People's Republic of China ties it there. 600 million Chinese have a noose in their hands. This is a steel noose and it ties America's neck. Who tied America? The noose was made by America itself and tied by itself, and it throws the other end of the noose to mainland China, letting us grasp it. [America] was tied in Lebanon only recently, but the noose was also made by America itself, tied by itself, and the other end of the noose was thrown into the hands of Arab nations. Not only so, America also throws [the other end of the] noose into the hands of the majority of the people in the world. Everyone condemns America, and no one gives it any sympathy. The noose is held by the people and governments in many countries. In the Middle East, for example, the UN held meetings [on the Lebanon issue], but [America's] main problem is that it has been tied by the Arab people and cannot escape. At present, America is caught in a dilemma—is it better to withdraw earlier or later? If an early withdrawal, why did it come in the first place? If a late withdrawal, [the noose] will be getting tighter and tighter, and will become an encased knot. How can this be handled? Lebanon is different from Taiwan.
with which America has signed a treaty. The situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no treaty is involved there. It is said that one issued the invitation, and the other came, and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot since a treaty was signed. There is no difference between the Democrats and Republicans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh Fleet there. Truman could come and go at will since there was no treaty during his time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the Guomindang’s panic and request, and also because America was willing [to be tied up there].

Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did not the Americans say that they had not made any decision yet, and that they would make the decision in accordance with the situation after the Communists landed there? The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindang troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu. America has to pay attention to them as long as these two large garrisons are on the islands. This concerns the interest and feelings of their class. Why do the British and Americans treat the governments in some countries so nicely? They cannot fold their hands and see these governments collapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are having a joint military exercise under the command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet. Also is there is [Roland] Smoot, the person who ordered the firing, which made the [U.S.] State Department and Defense Department unhappy. He is there, together with Beakley, to take the command.

To make a long story short, you [Americans] are nosed here. You may be able to get away if you take the initiative to leave slowly and quietly. Is there not a policy for getting away? In my view, you had a policy for getting away from Korea, and now a policy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazu is being shaped. As a matter of fact, those in your group really want to get away, and the public opinion also asks you to do so. To get away is to extricate yourself from the noose. How can this be done? That is, the 110,000 troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs. The dealing between us and you [the Americans] is an international issue. These are two different issues. Although you Americans have been associated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible to dissolve this chemical combination. This is just like electrolytic aluminum or electro-

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Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise To Beijing During the 1958 Crisis

introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok

The history of the “second” Taiwan Straits crisis (August-October 1958) has gotten a second wind lately, due to the emergence of new Chinese evidence. While this research has greatly illuminated Chinese decision-making, scholars still have been unable to ascertain precisely what transpired between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships after the outbreak of the crisis. The document printed below, a previously secret 27 September 1958 communication from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CPC), an internally circulated version of which is now declassified and available to researchers at the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds one more piece of evidence to this puzzling story. Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chinese interactions during the 1958 crisis have attracted particular attention: the secret visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaders on September 6-7; and the letter of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warning that an attack on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclear retaliation. Researchers have assumed for some time that Soviet leaders were unhappy with the new Sino-American confrontation and considered the Chinese brinkmanship as a dangerous development that interfered with Kremlin plans for “detente” with the West. In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, more recently, Gromyko both described how puzzled and alarmed they were by Mao’s seemingly reckless attitude toward nuclear war as not only possible, but actually desirable for the communist camp. However, Khrushchev’s September 7 public declaration to Eisenhower—stating that “An attack on the Chinese People’s Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union”—seems to contradict this general thesis.

The secret letter from the CC CPSU to the CC CPC printed below links the two puzzling events noted above, and helps point toward possible answers to the questions they raise. It attests to the fact that, in spite of the genuine tension between the two communist giants, the Khrushchev leadership at that time still was determined to stand with Beijing at a moment of crisis, and took additional steps to prove that it remained loyal to the spirit and letter of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950.

The first article of that treaty, concluded at the end of Mao Zedong’s summit meetings in Moscow with Stalin after the establishment of the PRC the previous fall, stated that, “in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”

(The United States was not mentioned by name in the text, but the implication was clear enough.)

What emerged from the Gromyko-Chinese talks in early September 1958 and what appeared to have worried the Kremlin leadership was not that the Chinese might provoke a general war with the United States. Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter below implies, it was the general assumption of the Chinese Politburo that if the United States “should start a war against the People’s Republic of China” and used tactical nuclear weapons against the PRC (in response to Chinese attacks against the offshore islands or Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remain passively on the sidelines, as a strategic reserve in case the Americans decided to broaden the war by using high-yield (e.g., thermonuclear) weapons. This interpretation of the Soviet commitments diverged significantly from Article I of the Treaty signed in Moscow eight years earlier.

In a forthcoming book, Constantine Pleshakov and I argue that many in the Soviet leadership were unhappy to see the

continued on page 226
lytic copper, the combination will be dissolved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshi is [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Americans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [The two] cannot be mixed up.

America now attempts to dominate four out of the five continents, except for Australia. First of all, in North America, this is mainly America’s own place, and its armed forces are there. The next is Central and South America where it intends to provide “protection,” although it does not have garrisons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa, and Asia, to which [America] has given its main attention, and deployed its main force in Europe and Asia. I do not know how it [America] can fight a war with a few soldiers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believe that it focuses on occupying the intermediate zone. As far as the territories of our [socialist countries] are concerned, I believe that the Americans do not dare to come, unless the socialist camp encounters big trouble and they are convinced that the Soviet Union and China will totally collapse as soon as they come. Except for [the countries belonging to] our camp, America is seeking hegemony everywhere in the world, including Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australia has linked itself with America through a military alliance and follows its orders. Is it better for America to try to control these places by utilizing the banner of “anti-communism” or by fighting a real war against communism? To fight [a real war] against communism means to dispatch its troops to fight us and fight the Soviet Union. I would say that the Americans are not so stupid. They only have a few soldiers to be transferred here and there. After the incident in Lebanon, American troops were transferred there from the Pacific. After they arrived in the Red Sea area, the situation changed unfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turned around quickly and landed at Malaya. They announced that [the troops] were taking a vacation there, and kept quiet for seventeen days. Later, after one of their reporters claimed that [America] was taking charge of the Indian Ocean, everyone in the India Ocean [area] expressed opposition. When we began our artillery bombardment, America came here since there were not enough of its troops here. It will probably better serve America’s interests if it leaves such places like Taiwan in an earlier time. If it continues to stay, let it be noosed here. This will not affect the overall situation, and we can continue the Great Leap Forward.

We should strive to produce eleven million tons of steel, doubling last year’s output. Next year another twenty million tons, striving to reach thirty million tons. The year after next, another twenty million tons. Is it not fifty million tons by then? Three years of hard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. At that time, we will occupy third place in the world, next only to the Soviet Union and the United States. The [steel output] of the Soviet Union reached fifty million [tons] last year. In three years, they can make it sixty million [tons]. If we make hard efforts in the next three years, it is possible that [our steel output] may surpass fifty million tons. In another two years, by 1962, it is possible [for us to produce] eighty to a hundred million tons of steel, approaching the level of the United States (because of the impact of economic recessions, America’s [steel output] will probably only reach a hundred million tons at that time). [At the end of] the second five-year plan, we will approach or even surpass America. In another two years, in seven years, [we may] produce a hundred fifty million tons of steel, and surpass America to become the number one in the world. It is not good for us to name ourselves as the most superior in the world, but it is not bad to become the number one steel producer. [We should also] make hard efforts in the next three years to [increase] grain production. The output of this year is between three hundred fifty to four hundred million tons. [The output] will double next year, reaching, probably, seven hundred fifty million tons. We should slow down a little bit the year after next, for we have to find outlets for [extra] grain. Food will be grain’s main outlet; but we also need to find other outlets in industry. For example, [using grain] to produce ethyl alcohol, and, through ethyl alcohol, to produce rubber, artificial fiber, plastic, and other things.

Let me talk a little bit more about the tense situation. You [Americans] cause the tense situation, and you think it advantageous to you, do you not? You may be wrong. The tense situation can mobilize the people in the world, making everyone blame you Americans. When a tense situation emerges in the Middle East, everyone blames the Americans. When tension comes to Taiwan everyone again blames the Americans. Only a few people blame us. The Americans blame us, Jiang Jieshi blames us, and Syngman Rhee blames us. Maybe there are some others [who blame us], but mainly these three. Britain is a vacillating element. While it will not be militarily involved, it is said that it has strong sympathy politically. This is because Britain faces problems in Jordan. How can it handle the situation in Jordan if the Americans withdraw from Lebanon because [the British] failed to show sympathy [to the Americans]? Nehru issued a statement, which basically echoed us, suggesting that Taiwan and other [offshore] islands should be returned to us, but hoping that a peaceful solution can be reached. The countries in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Iraq, warmly welcomed [our artillery bombardment] this time. They praise us every day, saying that we have done the right thing. This is because our [artillery bombardment] here has reduced the pressure the Americans put on them.

I think that we can tell the people of the world publicly that, in comparison, a tense situation is more disadvantageous to the western countries, as well as more disadvantageous to America [than to them]. Why is it advantageous to them [the people of the world]? Does the tense situation in the Middle East do any good for America? Does it do any good for Britain? Or is it more advantageous to the Arab countries and to the peace-loving people in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other continents. To which side is the tense situation in the Taiwan [Strait] more advantageous? Let us take our country as an example. Our country is now experiencing a nationwide mobilization. If during the Middle East crisis about thirty to forty million people participated in the rallies and protest parades, this time [during the Taiwan crisis] we will probably mobilize 300 million people [to participate in rallies and parades], educating them and toughening them. This event will also benefit our unity with all democratic parties in China because all the parties now share a common goal. As a result, those who in the past had knots in their hearts, who were unhappy, and who were criticized will now feel a little bit more comfortable. If we can continue to handle the situation in this way, doing it again and again, we will all belong to the working class one day. Therefore, in my view, the tense situation caused by the imperialists eventually becomes advanta-
geous to hundreds of millions of Chinese people who oppose imperialism, to peace-loving peoples all over the world, and to all social classes, all social ranks, and the governments [in various countries]. They now have to believe that America, always arrogant and aggressive, is no good after all. [The U.S. government] moved six of its thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan Straits]. Among these carriers, there are some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms the strongest fleet in the world. It does not matter if you want to make it even stronger. It does not matter if you want to concentrate all of your four fleets here. I welcome you all. After all, what you have is useless here. Even though you move every ship you have here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the water, and cannot come to the land. You can do nothing but make some threatening gesture here. The more you play, the more the people in the world will understand how unreasonable you are.

7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh, 10 September 1958
Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:413

Comrade President:

Your letter of 8 September has been received. Thank you.

I believe that (1) the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely that a big war will break out; and (2) it seems to me that the business in your country should go on as usual.

8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and Huang Kecheng, 13 September 1958
Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:416-417

Part One

Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng:

[I] have received [the documents] you sent to me, including two intelligence reports on Jinmen’s situation and the order of our military. In addition to carrying out [the operations] in accordance with the lines set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire some scattered shells day and night around the clock, especially at night, shelling especially the area within the three-mile radius of Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to 300 shells a day) will make the enemy panic[ky] and restless day and night. It seems to me that [doing this] is a big, or at least moderate, advantage [to us]. What is your opinion about it? On the days of heavy shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On the days of light shelling we will use this method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan at night, we should accurately calibrate battery placements during daytime, which will make the shelling at night more accurate. Please seek opinions from [the people at] the front, to see if this method is workable or not.

As far as the Warsaw talks are concerned, in the next three to four days, or one week, [we] should not lay all of our cards on the table, but should test [the Americans]. It seems that it is unlikely for the other side to lay all of their cards out, and that they will also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian], and Qiao [Guanhua]?

Congratulations for the success from the very start.

9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1958
Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 353

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

Your letter dated the night of the 18th has been received. It is indeed very good. I am very happy after reading it since [we] have gained the initiative. Please take due actions immediately. Please also pass your letter and my reply here at once to Comrades Wang Bingnan and Ye Fei. Make sure that they understand [the key to] our new policy and new tactics is holding the initiative, keeping the offensive, and remaining reasonable. We must conduct our diplomatic struggle from a far-sighted perspective so that it will develop without any difficulty.

Mao Zedong
4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei

10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Conversation with S.F. Antonov on the Taiwan Issue, 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)
Source: Zhou Enlai wajiao wenxuan, 262-267

The entire situation has already changed at this point. Dulles’s press conference published on 30 September reveals some changes in America’s position. Although Dulles’s talks with reporters do not clearly indicate [America’s new position], he expressed ambiguously that if China commits to a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw from the offshore islands [under his control]. Apparently America intends to carry out basically a policy to help Jiang slip away from Jinmen.

After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the content of Dulles’s talks in advance. Thus, he gave a speech on 29 September, and another on 1 October, stating that the Americans had done a disservice to him. Two days later, when he talked to British reporters from The Times [of London], Jiang asked Britain to advise America not to be fooled [by the communists]. This is really funny.

Last night the Indian ambassador [to Beijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K. Krishna Menon’s plan [at the United Nations]. Menon believes that current changes in the situation have already become a tendency. Thus, he is planning to make a general speech at the UN meeting, including a suggestion that Jiang’s troops withdraw from the offshore islands and a request to us to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain attempted to mediate this affair in the past, but we refused it. Dag Hammarskjold of the UN intended to talk to us through Norway, [but] we also turned it down. Even though America was not willing to invite India [to mediate] before, it had no choice but to invite Menon this time. Menon was unwilling to come himself, if America did not send an invitation to him, or if he was unsure about the situation. At the present, since Menon feels certain about the situation because America has asked for his help, he is planning to deliver this proposition. Our assumption is as follows: after Menon makes his proposition, it will be accepted by UN members, and then by most countries in the world. Through this approach, the UN can put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile ask us to make compromises. Thereby, America can maneuver between Jiang and us to make a bargain.

We calculate that America has three cards to play:

First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zhu]. America’s proposition on 18 September requested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we rejected it immediately. We have been ever since condemning America’s occupation of
Taiwan. America now attempts to expand its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must oppose it firmly. America dares not engage in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, because the American people and its allied countries oppose it. Moreover, if America wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to fight against it. In addition, the Soviet Union supports us. After our rejection, America took back its first card, that is, defending Jinmen and Mazu.

Its second card is about “two Chinas.” America’s proposition on 30 September had a central point of lining up China with the Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang Jieshi with the United States on the other side. It puts forth a “two Chinas” scheme and pushes us to accept the status quo. We firmly oppose it now, and will continue to oppose it.

The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. America intends to persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw from the offshore islands as an exchange to freeze the situation in the Taiwan Straits, requesting our renouncing the use of force on Taiwan, or our accepting America’s occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and “two Chinas” as “an existing fact.” America may not play its third card at once. As soon as Dulles’s meeting with press caused Jiang Jieshi’s big complaints, Dulles wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America could not yield to force. He, however, also said that if Communist China ceased fire, [America] could reconsider [the situation there]. It shows that America is still wavering, though it wants to get away from Jinmen-Mazu.

According to the above calculations, I told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we did not want Menon to deliver his proposition to the UN. We cannot trade a settlement of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of America’s occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and acceptance of the existence of so-called “two Chinas.”

Meanwhile, some Asian and African countries are suggesting that the Eight-nation Committee can draft a statement about the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we believed that the Asian and African countries could hardly issue such a joint statement since there existed two different positions among themselves. I said to him it was better not to have this kind of joint statement. If the statement mentioned a cease-fire, it would benefit America; we had to oppose it. If the statement criticized both America and China, it would be unable to tell right from wrong, we had to disagree as well. A just statement should include the following major points: to recognize firmly that Taiwan is China’s territory, and that no foreign countries are allowed to intervene; America should withdraw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of “two Chinas”; China and America should continue their talks. Obviously, some countries that follow America will not agree to these points. Thus, if the Asian and African countries cannot issue a just statement, it is better for them not to issue any joint statement.

Moreover, this morning Comrade Chen Yi met diplomatic envoys from eight concerned Asian and African countries that have diplomatic relations with China. Regarding these countries’ discussion about issuing a joint statement, he clarified the above position of the Chinese government and made further explanations.

I talked to you on 30 September [about our policy toward Taiwan]. Originally, our plan had two steps: the first was to recover the offshore islands; the second to liberate Taiwan. Later, after we began shelling Jinmen, our bombardment played a role to mobilize the people of the world, especially the Chinese people. Thereafter, many countries launched and joined a new anti-American movement on a much larger scale than that after the Lebanon event. The situation already becomes clear. America knows that we do not want to fight a war against it. When it escorted Jiang Jieshi’s ships, we did not fire [on them]. We have no intention to liberate Taiwan immediately. We know that America does not want to fight a war against us over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained its air and naval forces from entering our territorial waters between three and twelve miles from our coast. Currently America works on how to persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces from being pinned down in this region.

As I said to you on 30 September, we realized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshi on Jinmen-Mazu. After the Central Committee’s discussions, we still believe that it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi on Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiang stays at Jinmen and Mazu, and America continues to intervene. It will educate the people of the world, especially the Chinese people. We will not let America go, when it wants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu. We demand that America withdraws its armed forces form Taiwan. Under this circumstance, if we need tension, we can shell Jinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, we can stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi said to you, [we can] have small-, or medium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen. We can have shelling while negotiating, and we can stop shelling anytime we like. This is advantageous for us. So we are not going to recover these offshore islands in the near future. We will take back them together with the Penghus and Taiwan later.

Thus, we decided to issue a “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the name of our defense minister. [It indicates that] we will suspend our shelling for seven days from 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allow Jiang’s troops to transport their logistic supplies easily. Our suspension of bombardment, however, has a precondition that no American ships provide escort. Moreover, [it] suggests a direct negotiation with Jiang Jieshi searching for peaceful solutions to the conflicts between both sides. Since our shelling is actually a punitive operation against Jiang’s troops, we can slow it down as long as Jiang is willing to cooperate [with us]. If he is not, we will continue to punish him. Therefore, we will always be in a positive position.

Our purpose in publishing this “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” is to deepen the conflicts between America and Jiang. Jiang’s current garrison on Jinmen, about 80,000 men under the command of Chen Cheng, is the main strength of Jiang’s forces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmen to the last and drag America down to the water. Chen Cheng, however, wants to save these troops. If we bottle up the troops on Jinmen, it is easier for America to encourage Chen to persuade Jiang to withdraw his troops from the offshore islands. If we let these troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chen can use them to drive a hard bargain with America. In our message to the compatriots in Taiwan, we warn them that America will abandon them sooner or later. There is no need to fight for America’s interests between the two Chinese sides. Although
we can possibly fight for thirty more years, it is better [for both sides] to talk for solutions.

To be sure, [on the one hand,] Jiang Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as soon as we publish our message], accusing us of attempting to cast a bone between him and America, saying that he will never sit down with the Chinese Communists for negotiations, and so forth. In his mind, however, Jiang can figure out himself that there is a lot behind this, and that he can make a further bargain with America. This is his old trick. On the other hand, Americans will also criticize the Chinese Communist attempt to drive a wedge between them and Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in their minds that we suddenly let up pressure on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, because there might be a tacit agreement between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang yells, the more suspicious the Americans will become.

Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for America, and it does not know how to cope with it. America is facing a very difficult situation right now. It originally planned to persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw [from Jinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal, Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons him. If America stops persuading Jiang to withdraw, we will achieve our goal.

11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958
Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:437

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

Our batteries should not fire a single shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are American airplanes and ships escorts. If the enemy bombs us, our forces should still not return fire. [We should] cease our activities, lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, we will know what to do. Although the air force must carry on our defense, the airplanes should not fly off the coast. One more thing: do not issue any public statement during these two days because we need to wait and see how the situation will develop. Please carry out the above order immediately. Or [you can] pass this letter [as an order] to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.51

Mao Zedong
8:00 A.M., 5 October

P.S.: After you have handled this letter, please convey it to the Premier.52

12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958
Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:437

Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]:

Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye [Fei]:

Yesterday I said not to issue any public statement, and to wait and see for two days. Later [I] thought about this again, and considered it more appropriate to issue a statement first. This is the reason for [me to write] the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan.”53 This statement is about to be issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio station to broadcast it repeatedly.

Mao Zedong
2:00 A.M., 6 October

Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handling immediately.54

13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 11 October 1958
Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:449-450

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

No hurry to reply to the letters from the Soviets.55 Need to discuss them first.

Cao Juren56 has arrived. Ignore him for a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I] will think about whether I need to meet him or not.

Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-check accurate numbers of how many enemy airplanes we shot down, and how many of our planes were shot down in more than fifty days of air engagements since the Shantou air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics for the Soviets’ information. They believed the enemy’s false information and do not know the true story. [The Soviets] should sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us control the employment of them. The Soviets may send a few people to teach us how to use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We can] discuss and decide whether it is appropriate tonight or tomorrow night.

Mao Zedong
10:00 A.M., 11 October

Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466

Part I
The report is approved.

Part II
It is more appropriate to start shelling one hour after, or half hour after, the reading [of the order] is finished.58

15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October 1958
Source: Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:479

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and [Huang] Kecheng:

[We] should extend the areas where no shelling is allowed on even-numbered days. That means shelling will be prohibited on even days on all fronts. Allow Jiang’s troops to come outdoors and get some sunshine so that they can continue to stay there. Only fire a few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian [front] by internal channels to carry it out. Do not issue public statement at this point. If there is a need later, [we] will consider making an announcement then. Please discuss and decide on this matter.

I am leaving for a southern trip this afternoon.

Mao Zedong
2:00 A.M., 31 October

16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November 1958
Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:490

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and [Huang] Kecheng:

Suggest having a heavy all day shelling tomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least 10,000 shells and bomb all the military targets [on Jinmen] in order to affect America’s election, promoting the Democrats’ victory and the Republicans’ defeat. Meanwhile, give Jiang’s troops an excuse for refusing to withdraw [from Jinmen]. Please consider and decide if this is proper.
Mao Zedong
5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou

17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 November 1958

Part One
Attention, Military and Civilian Compatriots on the Jinmen Islands:

Tomorrow, 3 November, is an odd-numbered day. You must make sure not to come outside. Do be careful!

Part Two
Deliver to Premier Zhou.
The Xiamen Front must broadcast [the message] this afternoon (2 November) for three times.

18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on “Huan Xiang on the Division within the Western World,”25 November 1958
Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wen gao, 7:581-582

Part I
Huan Xiang’s viewpoint is right. The situation in the Western world is indeed disintegrating. Even though currently it is in the middle of a gradual disunification and not yet breaking into pieces, the West is moving toward its inevitable final disintegration. It will probably take a long time, not overnight nor a single day, for this process. The so-called united West is purely empty talk. There may be a kind of unity that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants [the West] to “unite” under the control of America, and asks all his partners and puppets to get close to America in front of its atomic bombs, paying their tributes and pets to get close to America in front of its America, and asks all his partners and puppets to “unite” under the control of [the West].

Part Two
The so-called united West is purely not overnight nor a single day, for this process. It will probably take a long time, not overnight nor a single day, for this process. The so-called united West is purely empty talk. There may be a kind of unity that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants [the West] to “unite” under the control of America, and asks all his partners and puppets to get close to America in front of its atomic bombs, paying their tributes and pets to get close to America in front of its America, and asks all his partners and puppets to “unite” under the control of [the West].

Mao Zedong
Part II
Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping:
Please print and distribute this report.

Mao Zedong
10:00 A.M., 25 November
for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attack mainland China] while at the same time it would play the role in checking American actions in the Middle East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting and ordered the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “prepare for an operational order at any moment.” At this juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter.  

24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the bombardment and focus on making further preparations for the shelling.  

25. After three weeks of “waiting and seeing,” Mao Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Matsu) to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen and Matsu. If this happened, it would be decided at that time if the shelling should be followed by landing operations in accordance with the actual situation. On August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particularly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the enemy’s headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also made clear that the initial shelling would last for three days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next action could be taken in accordance with the responses of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizheng et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.)  

26. The italics are Mao’s.  

27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese military planners believed that they had succeeded in cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities repeatedly requested American assistance to support their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to observe the responses of the other side.  

28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s “Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan and the Offshore Islands under Jiang’s Occupation.” The instruction emphasized that “because the struggle against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang’s occupation is a complicated international struggle, which has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and propaganda should follow the principles of concentration and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on his own.” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:376-377)  

29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, headed the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department.  

30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), established in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The United States was related to the organization as an “observer.” The Manila Treaty Organization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).  


32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectual leaders who had been criticized and purged during the “Anti-Rightist” campaign in 1957.  

33. He Qing (November 1890-1987) was a high ranking Nationalist officer. During China’s War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as chief of the general staff and headed the Military-Political Department of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government.  

34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1898-1964) was India’s premier from 1947 to 1964.  

35. Admiral Roland Smeat was head of the Taiwan Defense Command.  

36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to follow the CCP’s leadership.  

37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tense situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible for a war to break out between China and the United States? (B) What preparations should we make here in Vietnam?” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:413-414.)  

38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships began escorting Guomindang transport vessels delivering supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This becomes the background of this letter and the CMC’s order cited in the next note.  

39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s order, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” issued at 11:15 a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: “(1) If the American ships continue their escort today and anchor three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should shell Jiang’s transport ships entering the Liaoluowan harbor to unload and the people working there. The ships not entering the harbor, be they America’s or Jiang’s, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level needed to sink or to expel Jiang’s transport ships, while at the same time damaging the enemy positions on ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and anti-aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with the air raids by Jiang’s planes. The air force and anti-aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above principles, you may make your own decisions on specific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the situation changes, you must report immediately so that we can report it to the Central Committee to make new decisions.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshe wenji, 6:380.)  

40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, was China’s first vice foreign minister.  

41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign minister; he later served as China’s foreign minister in the mid-1970s.  

42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in this letter, concluding that China had gained the initiative at the meeting.  

43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Americans in Warsaw.  

44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet charged d’affaires to China.  

45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to 3 August 1958, Nikita Khurshchev visited Beijing, holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however, did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing’s leaders told the Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct confrontation between China and the United States, let alone one between the Soviet Union and the United States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis.  

46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962.  

47. Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplomat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to 1961.  

48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group established by Asian and African countries at the UN to draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, and the Philippines.  

49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Politburo, was China’s vice premier and foreign minister.  

50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice president and prime minister in Taiwan.  

51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the PLA’s Fuzhou Military District.  

52. The italics are Mao’s.  

53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” was broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in all major newspapers in mainland China the same day. The message announced that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist troops to receive supplies.  

54. The italics are Mao’s.  

55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita Khurshchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing’s intentions on handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the reliability of Beijing’s statistics on the results of air battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide China with ground-to-air missiles.  

56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had extensive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him, mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring about Taiwan’s “peaceful liberation.” After returning to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao mentioned Cao’s name on the eve of the second “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” announcing that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for another two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12.  

57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the following report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts to warn America against using its escort vessels in the waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft of the Defense Ministry’s order has been completed. It is also enclosed here for your consideration.” Please
return it to me right after you have read and approved it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang [Kecheng] for their reading and checking. Everything is ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already been issued [to the front] separately by telephone and in writing which was signed by [Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifications, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Jinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garrison camps, and command headquarters is allowed, particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our air and naval forces will make no movement at this time. The Defense Ministry’s order will be broadcast at 3:00 [p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the same time. As soon as the reading of the order is finished, [our batteries] will open fire.” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466-467.)

58. The italics are Mao’s.

59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast.

60. Huai Xiang was Chinese chargé d’affaires in Britain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the Chinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the report “Huang Xiang on the Division within the Western World.” The main points of the report were as follows: The two-year-long British-French negotiation to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist countries had started. The British plans to divide West Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. In an economic sense, this was not a big failure for Britain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplomacy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two important choices: it could take retaliatory measures and thus destroy the political and economic cooperation between European countries, or it could return to negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary compromise. It seemed that only one choice was feasible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to find ways to compromise with France and Germany, and to seek the support of the United States. This failure on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain’s position as the “second power” in the capitalist world had been weakened further, and that the postwar British hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly shaken. The balance of power in continental Western Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take advantage of French-West German contradictions in order to divide the two countries, making them check each other. This balance of power policy would certainly last a long time. The balance of power among imperialist countries in West Europe was changing, and the contradictions between the imperialists over West European problems had never been so sharp. (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582-5823.)

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KRUSHCHEV’S NUCLEAR PROMISE continued from page 219

Chinese leadership developing their own school of brinkmanship that threatened to draw the USSR into a conflict with the United States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that Khrushchev, the real authority behind the Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese position (though he may well have been miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during his summit in Beijing only a few weeks before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling the offshore islands on August 23). Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achieving China’s reunification, provided that the policy was fully coordinated with the Kremlin. 5 He therefore took the Chinese position, reported to him in an urgent cable from Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese leaders had begun to put their national interests above the common interests of the “entire Socialist camp.” This effective unilateral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified an implicit challenge to the unity of the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership— and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders on both political and ideological grounds. Hence the letter decrees the peril of disunity in the strongest terms possible: “…a crime before the world working class…a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communists—from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.”

Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter to Eisenhower immediately after he received the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20 more days to address the Chinese leadership through party channels. It is still unclear what happened inside the Kremlin in the interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the same time to respond to the CC CPSU’s letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he thanked him “heartily” for his stand and wrote that the Chinese leadership had been “deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism.”

In sum, this episode testifies to the ambiguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese relationship: for the majority of the leadership on both sides, it continued the grim comedy of misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began to suspect what was occurring in faraway Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening and would erupt in earnest only a year later, in the autumn of 1959.

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From the CC CPSU’s letter to the Central Committee of the CPC About the USSR’s Readiness to Provide Assistance to the PRC in the Event of an Attack on It From the Side of the USA or Japan, 27 September 1958

...Comrade Gromyko informed us about his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking on 7 September. Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the consideration of the situation in the Taiwan region the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proceeded from the fact that should the USA start a war against the People’s Republic of China and in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, then the Soviet Union will make a stern warning to the USA but will not take part in the war. Only in the event that the United States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and in this way risks widening the war, will the Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapons.

We carefully considered this issue and decided to express to you our opinion...We cannot allow the illusion to be created among our enemies that if an attack will be launched against the PRC by the USA or Japan—and these are the most likely adversaries,—or by any other state, that the Soviet Union will stand on the sidelines as a passive observer. Should the adversary even presume this, a very dangerous situation would be created. It would be a great calamity for the entire Socialist camp, for the Communist working class movement, if, when atomic bombs have begun to fall on the Chinese People’s Republic and China has begun to pay with the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet Union, possessing terrible weapons which could not only stop but could also devastate our common enemy, would allow itself not to come to your assistance. This would be a crime before the world working class, it would be a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communists—from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.

Thank you for your nobility, that you are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are convinced, that you also agree that the main thing now consists of the fact that everyone
has seen—both our friends and, especially, our enemies—that we are firm and united in our understanding of the tasks, which flow from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all brother Communist parties is unshakeable, that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to the aggressor in the event of an attack on any Socialist state. This is necessary so that no hopes will arise in our enemies that they will be able to separate us, so that no cracks will be created which the enemy could be able to use to break the connection between the Socialist countries.

...It is necessary that neither our friends nor our enemies have any doubts that an attack on the Chinese People’s Republic is a war with the entire Socialist camp. For ourselves we can say that an attack on China is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also convinced that in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union the Chinese People’s Republic would fulfill its brotherly revolutionary duty. If we in this way will build our policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, depending on the unity of our goals, on the might of our states, on our joint efforts, the unifying of which is favored by the geographical disposition of our countries, then this will be an invincible shield against our enemies.

[Source: Information and Documentation Administration, First Far Eastern Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. The letter appears in a formerly classified Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary collection on the history of Sino-Soviet relations, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the National Security Archive, contributes frequently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev, co-authored with Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in March 1996 by Harvard University Press.


3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle, 198.


6. “We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the Communist Party of China, I express to you my heartfelt gratitude.” Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33.
MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES’S “PEACEFUL EVOLUTION” STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM BO YIBO’S MEMOIRS

Introduction, translation, and annotation by Qiang Zhai

Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a leading member of the CCP-led resistance force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee at the Party’s Seventh Congress. During the Chinese Civil War in 1946-1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP North China Bureau and Vice Chairman of the CCP-led North China People’s Government. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, he became Finance Minister. As a revolutionary veteran who survived the Cultural Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of the most powerful figures in China today.

Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published two volumes of his memoirs, Ruogan zhongda juce yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of Certain Major Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first volume covers the period 1949-1956 and the second volume 1957-1966. In the preface and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes that in preparing his memoirs he has consulted documents in the CCP Central Archives and received the cooperation of Party history researchers. Bo’s reminiscences represent the most important memoirs of a high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966 period.

As a still active senior leader, Bo is not a disinterested writer. His arguments and conclusions are completely in line with the 1981 Resolution on Party History.1 Memoirs in China usually have a didactic purpose that encourages the creation of edifying stereotypes. Bo’s memoirs conform to a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo’s memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little description of the character and personalities of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo’s volumes follow another memoirs-writing tradition in the PRC, which tends to emphasize the role of groups and societal forces at the expense of individuals. Despite these drawbacks, Bo’s memoirs contain many valuable new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Especially notable are Bo’s references to Mao’s statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo played a major role in Chinese economic decision-making during the period, his memoirs are especially strong on this topic. He sheds new light on such domestic events as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposition to Rush Advance, the Great Leap Forward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, economic rectification in 1961-1962, and the Socialist Education Campaign. Although international relations in general does not receive much attention, the volumes do include illuminating chapters on some key foreign policy decisions.2

The translation below is taken from Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138-1146). This section is very revealing about Mao’s perception of and reaction to John Foster Dulles’s policy toward China in 1958-1959. The CCP leader took seriously statements by the U.S. Secretary of State about encouraging a peaceful change of the Communist system. In November 1959, according to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao’s secretary, prepared for Mao translations of three speeches by Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful evolution within the Communist world. After reading the documents, Mao commented on them before having them circulated among a small group of Party leaders for discussion. Thus Bo’s memoirs not only provide fresh texts of what Mao said, but also an important window into what he read. As a result, the interactive nature of Mao’s activities—with his top colleagues and his secretary—is open to examination. A sense of the policy-making process, as well as Mao’s opinions, emerges from Bo’s memoirs.

The years 1958-1959 were a crucial period in Mao’s psychological evolution. He began to show increasing concern with the problem of succession and worried about his impending death. He feared that the political system that he had spent his life creating would betray his beliefs and values and slip out of his control. His apprehension about the future development of China was closely related to his analysis of the degeneration of the Soviet system. Mao believed that Dulles’s idea of inducing peaceful evolution within the socialist world was already taking effect in the Soviet Union, given Khrushchev’s fascination with peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Mao wanted to prevent that from happening in China. Here lie the roots of China’s subsequent exchange of polemics with the Soviet Union and Mao’s decision to restructure the Chinese state and society in order to prevent a revisionist “change of color” of China, culminating in the launching of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao’s frantic response to Dulles’s speeches constitutes a clear case of how international events contributed to China’s domestic developments. It also demonstrates the effects of Dulles’s strategy of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.

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To Prevent “Peaceful Evolution” and Train Successors to the Revolutionary Cause

by Bo Yibo

According to the general law of socialist revolution, only through the leadership of a proletarian political party directed by Marxism, reliance on the working class and other laboring masses, and waging of an armed struggle in this or that form can a revolution obtain state power. International hostile forces to the newly born people’s government would always attempt to strangle it in the cradle through armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade. After the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union experienced an armed intervention by fourteen countries. In the wake of World War II, imperialism launched a protracted “Cold War” and economic containment of socialist countries. Immediately after the triumph of the revolution in China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and implemented an all-out embargo against China. All of this shows that it will take a sharp struggle with external hostile forces through an armed conflict or other forms of contest before a newly born socialist country can consolidate its power.

History suggests that although the armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade launched by Western imperialists against socialist countries can create enor-
mous problems for socialist countries, they have great difficulty in realizing their goal of overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a “soft” method in addition to employing “hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Secretary of States Dulles emphasized the strategy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed out that “the enslaved people” of socialist countries should be “liberated,” and become “free people,” and that “liberation can be achieved through means other than war,” and “the means ought to be and can be peaceful.” He displayed satisfaction with the “liberalization-demanding forces” which had emerged in some socialist countries and placed his hope on the third and fourth generations within socialist countries, contending that if the leader of a socialist regime “continues wanting to have children and these children will produce their children, then the leader’s offsprings will obtain freedom.” He also claimed that “Chinese communism is in fatal danger,” and “represents a fading phenomena,” and that the obligation of the United States and its allies was “to make every effort to facilitate the disappearance of that phenomena,” and “to bring about freedom in all of China by all peaceful means.”

Chairman Mao paid full attention to these statements by Dulles and watched carefully the changes in strategies and tactics used by imperialists against socialist countries. That was the time when the War to Aid Korea and Resist America had just achieved victory, when the United States was continuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straits and its embargo, and when our domestic situation was stable, “the First Five-Year Plan” was fully under way, economic construction was developing rapidly, and everywhere was the picture of prosperity and vitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao did not immediately bring up the issue of preventing a “peaceful evolution.” The reason for his later raising the question has to do with developments in international and domestic situations.

In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev attacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communist and anti-Socialist wave in the world and triggering incidents in Poland and Hungary. In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Rightsists seized the opportunity of Party reform to attack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev proposed to create a long-wave radio station and a joint fleet with China in order to control China militarily; he also openly opposed our Party’s “Three Red Flags” and objected to our just action of “shelling Jinmen.” (Chairman Mao once said that whether we bombarded Jinmen or suspended our bombardment, our main purpose was to support the Taiwan people and the Taiwan regime to keep Taiwan [from being] invaded and annexed by foreign countries.—Bo’s note). The above events alerted Chairman Mao.

In the meantime, the United States actively practiced its strategy of promoting a “peaceful evolution” of socialist countries. In 1957, the Eisenhower administration introduced the “strategy of peaceful conquest,” aiming to facilitate “changes inside the Soviet world,” through a “peaceful evolution.” On October 24, 1958, in an interview with a BBC correspondent, Dulles asserted that communism “will gradually give way to a system that pays more attention to the welfare of the state and people,” and that at the moment, “Russian and Chinese Communists are not working for the welfare of their people,” and “this kind of communism will change.”

Considering the situation in both the Soviet Union and at home, Chairman Mao took very seriously Dulles’s remarks. In a speech to the directors of the cooperation regions on November 30, 1958, Chairman Mao noted that Dulles was a man of schemes and that he controlled the helm in the United States. Dulles was very thoughtful. One had to read his speeches word by word with the help of an English dictionary. Dulles was really taking the helm. Provincial Party Committees should assign special cadres to read Cankao ziliao. Chairman Mao has always insisted that Party leaders at all levels, especially high-ranking cadres, should closely follow international events and the development of social contradictions on the world scene in order to be well informed and prepared for sudden incidents. It is very necessary for Mao to make that demand. Chairman Mao read Cankao ziliao every day. For us leading cadres, we should consider not only the whole picture of domestic politics but also the whole situation of international politics. Thus we can keep clear-headed, deal with any challenges confidently, and “sit tight in the fishing boat despite the rising winds and waves.” This is a very important political lesson and a leadership style.

In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were even more strained and Sino-Soviet differences even greater. In January, the Soviet Union officially notified China that it would scrap unilaterally the agreement to help China build nuclear industry and produce nuclear bombs. In September when the Sino-Indian Border Incident occurred, the Soviet Union announced neutrality, but in actuality it supported India. It openly criticized China after the incident. At the Soviet-American Camp David Talks during the same month, Khrushchev sought to improve relations with the United States on the one hand and vehemently attacked China’s domestic and foreign policies on the other. All these events convinced Chairman Mao that the Soviet leadership had degenerated and that Khrushchev had betrayed Marxism and the proletarian revolutionary cause and had turned revisionist. At the Lushan Conference held during July-August that year, when Peng Dehuai criticized the “Three Red Flags,” Chairman Mao erroneously believed that this reflected the combined attack on the Party by internal and external enemies. Facing such a complex situation, Chairman Mao felt deeply the danger of a “peaceful evolution.” Accordingly, he unequivocally raised the issue at the end of that year.

In November 1959, Chairman Mao convened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhou attended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Hu Qiaomu, among others, to discuss and examine the international situation at the time. Before the opening of the meeting, Chairman Mao asked his secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles’s speeches concerning “peaceful evolution” for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selected three such speeches: Dulles’s address titled “Policy for the Far East” delivered before the California Chamber of Commerce on December 4, 1958, Dulles’s testimony made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles’s speech titled “The Role of Law in Peace” made before the New York State Bar Association on January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao had read these three speeches before. After re-reading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of his opinions about them and asked him to write commentaries based on his views and insert them at the beginning of each of Dulles’s statements. After Comrade Lin Ke had completed the commentaries, Mao instructed him to distribute Dulles’s speeches, along
with the commentaries, to the members attending the meeting.

The three speeches by Dulles all contained the theme of promoting a “peaceful evolution” inside socialist countries. The three commentaries based on Chairman Mao’s talks highlighted the key points in Dulles’s remarks and warned of the danger of the American “peaceful evolution” strategy. The first commentary pointed out: “The United States not only has no intention to give up its policy of force, but also wants, as an addition to its policy of force, to pursue a ‘peaceful conquest strategy’ of infiltration and subversion in order to avoid the prospect of its ‘being surrounded.’” The U.S. desires to achieve the ambition of preserving itself (capitalism) and gradually defeating the enemy (socialism).” After noting the main theme of Dulles’s testimony, the second commentary contended: Dulles’s words “demonstrate that U.S. imperialists are attempting to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union by the method of corrupting it so as to realize their aggressive goal, which they have failed to achieve through war.”

The third commentary first took note of Dulles’s insistence on “the substitution of justice and law for force” and his contention that the abandonment of force did not mean the “maintenance of the status quo,” but meant a peaceful “change.” Then it went on to argue that “Dulles’s words showed that because of the growing strength of the socialist force throughout the world and because of the increasing isolation and difficulties of the international imperialist force, the United States does not dare to start a world war at the moment. Therefore, the United States has adopted a more deceptive tactic to pursue its aggression and expansion. While advocating peace, the United States is at the same time speeding up the implementation of its plots of infiltration, corruption, and subversion in order to reverse the decline of imperialism and to fulfill its objective of aggression.”

At the meeting on November 12, Chairman Mao further analyzed and elaborated on Dulles’s speeches and the commentaries. He said:

Comrade Lin Ke has prepared for me three documents—three speeches by Dulles during 1958-1959. All three documents have to do with Dulles’s talks about encouraging a “peaceful evolution” inside socialist countries. For example, at his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28 Dulles remarked that basically the U.S. hoped to encourage changes within the Soviet world. By the Soviet world, Dulles did not mean just the Soviet Union. He was referring to the whole socialist camp. He was hoping to see changes in our camp so that the Soviet world would no longer be a threat to freedom on the globe and would mind its own business instead of thinking about realizing the goal and ambition of communizing the world....

In commenting on Dulles’s statement of January 31, 1959, Chairman Mao asserted:

Dulles said that justice and law should replace violence and that war should be abandoned, and law and justice should be emphasized. Dulles also argued that the abandonment of force under the circumstances did not mean the “maintenance of the status quo,” but meant a peaceful “change.” (laughter) Change whom peacefully? Dulles wants to change countries like ours. He wants to subvert and change us to follow his ideas.... Therefore, the United States is attempting to carry out its aggression and expansion with a much more deceptive tactic.... In other words, it wants to keep its order and change our system. It wants to corrupt us by a peaceful evolution.

Chairman Mao believed that Khrushchev’s speeches reflected the “peaceful evolution” advocated by Dulles and that our principle should be:

Under the existing complex international conditions, our policy is to resist the pressures head-on—pressures from two directions, Khrushchev and Eisenhower. We will resist for five to ten years. Toward the United States, we should do our best to expose it with facts and we should do so persuasively. We will not criticize Khrushchev, nor will we attack him through implication. We will only expose the American deception and lay bare the nature of the so-called “peace” by the United States.

This is the first time that Chairman Mao clearly raised and insightfully elaborated on the issue of preventing a “peaceful evolution.” From that time on, he would pay more and more attention to the matter. In a series of meetings that followed, he would repeatedly alert the whole party on the issue and gradually unfold the struggle against the so-called revisionism both at home and abroad.

From 1960 forward, differences between the Chinese and Soviet Parties increased. On April 22, an editorial titled “Long Live Leninism” published by the journal Hongqi denounced Comrade Tito of Yugoslavia by name and criticized Khrushchev of the Soviet Union without mentioning his name. On internal occasions, we unequivocally pointed out that the Soviet Union had become revisionist and that we should learn the Soviet lesson. We also felt that “revisionists” already existed in China and that Peng Dehuai and some other comrades were examples. We warned against the emergence of revisionism in order to prevent a “peaceful evolution.” In his meeting with Jespersen, Chairman of the Danish Communist Party, on May 28, 1960, Chairman Mao said: “There are also revisionists in our country. Led by Peng Dehuai, a Politburo member, they launched an attack on the Party last summer. We condemned and defeated him. Seven full and alternate members of our Central Committee followed Peng. Including Peng, there are eight revisionists. The total number of full and alternate members in our Central Committee is 192. Eight people are merely a minority.”

At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” held in January 1962, Comrade [Liu] Shaogqi delivered a “written report” on behalf of the Party Central Committee. He made a special reference to the question of opposing contemporary revisionism. In his remarks concerning the issue of practicing democratic centralism, Chairman Mao stated: “Without a highly developed democracy, there cannot be a high level of centralism. Without a high level of centralism, we cannot establish a socialist economy. What will happen then to our country if we cannot create a socialist economy? China will become a revisionist country, a bourgeois coun-
try in fact. The proletarian dictatorship will become not only a bourgeois dictatorship but also a reactionary and fascist dictatorship. This is an issue that deserves full attention. I hope our comrades will consider it carefully.” (Selected Readings of Chairman Mao’s Works, Vol. II, pp. 822-823.) Here Chairman Mao officially sounded an alarm bell for the whole party. In his meeting with Kapo16 and Balluku17 of Albania on February 3, 1967, Mao contended: At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in 1962, “I made a speech. I said that revisionism wanted to overthrow us. If we paid no attention and conducted no struggle, China would become a fascist dictatorship in either a few or a dozen years at the earliest or in several decades at the latest. This address was not published openly. It was circulated internally. We wanted to watch subsequent developments to see whether any words in the speech required revision. But at that time we already detected the problem.”

At the Beidaihe Meeting and the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee during August and September, 1962, Chairman Mao reemphasized class struggle in order to prevent the emergence of revisionism. On August 9, he clearly pointed out the necessity of educating cadres and training them in rotation. Otherwise, he feared that he had devoted his whole life to revolution, only to produce capitalism and revisionism. On September 24, he again urged the party to heighten vigilance to prevent the country from going “the opposite direction.” The communiqué of the Tenth Plenum published on September 27 reiterated the gist of Chairman Mao’s remarks and stressed that “whether at present or in the future, our Party must always heighten its vigilance and correctly carry out the struggle on two fronts: against both revisionism and dogmatism.”

From the end of 1962 to the spring of 1963, our Party published seven articles in succession, condemning such so-called “contemporary revisionists” as Togliatti of Italy,18 Thorez of France,19 and the American Communist Party. On June 14, 1963, the CCP Central Committee issued “A Proposal for a General Line of the International Communist Movement.” On July 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) published “An Open Letter to Party Units at All Levels and to All Members of the CPSU,” bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to the open. From September last to July 1964, our Party used the name of the editorial boards of the Renmin ribao and Hongqi to issue nine articles, refuting the Soviet open letter and condemning “Khrushchev Revisionism” by name. Thus the Sino-Soviet polemics reached a high point. In the meantime, the struggle to oppose “revisionism” and to prevent a “peaceful evolution” was accelerated at home.

1. The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. While affirming the historical role of Mao Zedong, the resolution also blames him for the Cultural Revolution. After an analysis of all the crimes and errors in the Cultural Revolution the resolution describes it as, after all, “the error of a proletarian revolutionary.” It concludes that although Mao has made “gross mistakes” during the Cultural Revolution, “if we judge his activities as a whole, his contribution to the Chinese revolution far outweighs his mistakes.” For the text of the resolution, see Resolution on CPC History (1949-1981) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981).
3. Bo does not mention precisely when and where Dulles made those remarks about Chinese communism. I have not been able to identify Dulles’ s speech to which Bo is referring.
4. The “Three Red Flags” refer to the General Line of Socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’s Commune.
5. Jinman (Quemoy).
6. These refer to the economic cooperation regions established during the Great Leap Forward. China was divided into seven such regions.
7. Cankao ziliao (Reference Material) is an internally circulated reading material, which provided Party leaders with translations and summaries of international news from foreign news agencies and press.
10. Peng Zhen, Party Secretary of Beijing and a Politburo member.
11. Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP International Liaison Department and a Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat.
12. Hu Qiaomu, Mao’s political secretary and an Alternate Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat.
13. Hongqi (Red Flag) is the official journal of the CCP Central Committee.
15. The conference was held between January and February, 1962 to review methods of Party leadership and examine problems caused by the Great Leap Forward.
17. Bequir Balluku, Defense Minister and a Politburo member of the Albanian Communist Party.
18. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party.

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by Ilya V. Gaiduk

The Vietnam War stands out among Cold War crises for its scale, length, intensity, and global repercussions. The literature on the war and the American role in it encompasses thousands of volumes, from political memoirs to soldiers’ eyewitness accounts to historical and journalistic studies, to novels and political science treatises.1 With the passage of time, ever more documents have been declassified, enabling more thorough and comprehensive analyses. Now that there is substantial access to archives in the former USSR, researchers have at their disposal a whole set of previously unavailable materials which shed new light on unresolved issues as well as on problems which have either escaped the attention of Western scholars or have not yet been analyzed in detail.

One of those problems relates to the Soviet Union’s participation in the Vietnam conflict, particularly the nature of Soviet-American relations during the war and Moscow’s role as a potential mediator. Although many U.S. researchers have studied these problems and, on the basis of the documents analyzed, drawn certain conclusions, their analyses of the subject were far from exhaustive and quite often insufficiently corroborated by the necessary archival sources. The present article assesses Soviet policy toward Vietnam and the war’s impact on U.S.-Soviet relations from 1964 to the early 1970s on the basis of materials bearing on this subject in the archive of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC)—a repository now known as the Storage Center for Contemporary Documents (SCCD, or TsKhSD, in its Russian acronym)—located in the CC’s former headquarters in Staraya Ploschad’ (Old Square) in Moscow. This report was originally prepared for presentation at the January 1993 Moscow Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, organized by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and SCCD. Subsequently, the author expanded his research into a far broader study of Soviet involvement in the Vietnam conflict, utilizing sources in both Russian and American archives (the latter during a CWIHP fellowship for research in the United States); that study, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, is scheduled for publication by Ivan R. Dee (Chicago) in Spring 1996.

The SCCD archives contain materials related to a broad range of the former CPSU CC’s work, primarily correspondence with a wide range of Soviet organizations and establishments dealing with various socio-economic, domestic, and foreign policy issues. The archive collections (fondy) include a considerable number of documents on the subject of the Vietnam War and Soviet-American relations which were sent to the CPSU CC—mostly to the CC International Department and the CC Socialist Countries’ Communist and Workers’ Parties Department—by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Ministry, and Committee of State Security (KGB). Considerably less frequently encountered, alas, is documentation illuminating recommendations, draft decisions, and top-level decision-making. Thus, the top leadership’s decisions and the mechanism of decision-making on this level are only indirectly reflected in the SCCD materials. This unfortunate gap, naturally, creates problems for historians trying to determine how policy was actually made by the top Soviet leadership on important foreign policy questions, and necessitates continued efforts to increase access to materials in Russian archives that remain off-limits, particularly the so-called Kremlin or Presidential Archives, known officially as the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF).

At the same time, the SCCD materials enable historians not only to reconstruct many events related to the Vietnam War during the period in question, and to present matters which were previously interpreted only inferentially, but also to assess the development of U.S.-Soviet relations in close interconnection with the conflict in Southeast Asia. This last factor is of obvious importance, for one can hardly study U.S.-Soviet relations during the Vietnam War in isolation from an understanding of relations between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV), between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and between the DRV and PRC. All those interconnected relations crucially influenced the relevant Soviet policies.

The escalation of the conflict in Vietnam after the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and the February 1965 attack by armed units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV, also known as the NLF) on the base of American military advisers in Pleiku (triggering U.S. aerial bombardment of North Vietnam in retaliation), coincided with a certain cooling in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations. This chill between Moscow and Hanoi, in turn, was partly attributable to the growing differences between the USSR and the PRC, the two chief patrons and supporters of the Vietnamese struggle against the Saigon regime.2 Besides the impact of the Sino-Soviet split, the tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations during this stretch was also tied to the relatively moderate stand adopted by the then Soviet government, under the leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev prior to his downfall in October 1964. Owing to the

continued on page 250
BEIJING AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, 1964-1965:
NEW CHINESE EVIDENCE
by Qiang Zhai

The years 1964-1965 marked a crucial period in the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and subsequent U.S. escalation of war against North Vietnam represented a major turning point in the American approach to Indochina, as the Johnson Administration shifted its focus from Saigon to Hanoi as the best way to reverse the deteriorating trend in South Vietnam and to persuade the North Vietnamese leadership to desist from their increasing involvement in the South. How did Beijing react to Washington’s escalation of the conflict in Vietnam? How did Mao Zedong perceive U.S. intentions? Was there a “strategic debate” within the Chinese leadership over the American threat and over strategies that China should adopt in dealing with the United States? What was in Mao’s mind when he decided to commit China’s resources to Hanoi? How and why did a close relationship between Beijing and Hanoi turn sour during the fight against a common foe? Drawing upon recently available Chinese materials, this paper will address these questions.¹ The first half of the article is primarily narrative, while the second half provides an analysis of the factors that contributed to China’s decision to commit itself to Hanoi, placing Chinese actions in their domestic and international context.

China’s Role in Vietnam, 1954-1963

China played an important role in helping Ho Chi Minh win the Anti-French War and in concluding the Geneva Accords in 1954.² In the decade after the Geneva Conference, Beijing continued to exert influence over developments in Vietnam. At the time of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese Communists asked the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to help them consolidate peace in the North, build the army, conduct land reform, rectify the Party, strengthen diplomatic work, administer cities, and restore the economy.³ Accordingly, Beijing sent Fang Yi to head a team of Chinese economic experts to North Vietnam.⁴

According to the official history of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG), on 27 June 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap headed a Vietnamese military delegation on a secret visit to Beijing accompanied by Wei Guoqing, head of the CMAG in Vietnam. The Vietnamese visitors held discussions with Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, and General Petrovshkii, a senior Soviet military advisor in China, regarding the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s reconstruction of the army and the war plan for the future. The DRV delegation visited the Chinese North Sea Fleet before returning to Hanoi in mid-July. That fall, on 15 October 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap led another secret military delegation to China, where he talked with Peng Dehuai and Soviet General Gushev again about the DRV’s military development and war planning. The Vietnamese inspected Chinese military facilities and academies and watched a Chinese military exercise before traveling back to North Vietnam on December 11.⁵

The official CMAG history states that during both of Giap’s journeys to Beijing, he “reached agreement” with the Chinese and the Russians “on principal issues.” But it does not explain why Giap had to make a second visit to China shortly after his first tour and why the Soviet participants at the talks changed. Perhaps disagreement emerged during the discussions of Giap’s first trip, leaving some issues unresolved. In fact, according to the study by the researchers at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, the Chinese and the Russians differed over strategies to reunify Vietnam. The Soviet advisors favored peaceful coexistence between North and South Vietnam, urging Hanoi to “reunify the country through peaceful means on the basis of independence and democracy.” The Chinese Communists, conversely, contended that because of imperialist sabotage it was impossible to reunify Vietnam through a general election in accordance with the Geneva Accords, and that consequently North Vietnam should prepare for a protracted struggle.⁶

On 24 December 1955, the Chinese government decided to withdraw the CMAG from Vietnam; Peng Dehuai notified Vo Nguyen Giap of this decision. By mid-March 1956, the last members of the CMAG had left the DRV. To replace the formal CMAG, Beijing appointed a smaller team of military experts headed by Wang Yanquan to assist the Vietnamese.⁷

These developments coincided with a major debate within the Vietnamese Communist leadership in 1956 over who should bear responsibility for mistakes committed during a land reform campaign which had been instituted since 1953 in an imitation of the Chinese model. Truong Chinh, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP), who was in charge of the land reform program, was removed from his position at a Central Committee Plenum held in September. Le Duan, who became General Secretary later in the year, accused Truong Chinh of applying China’s land reform experience in Vietnam without considering the Vietnamese reality.⁸

The failure of the land-reform program in the DRV dovetailed with a growing realization that the reunification of the whole of Vietnam, as promised by the Geneva Accords, would not materialize, primarily as a result of U.S. support for the anti-Communist South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, who refused to hold elections in 1956. As hopes for an early reunification dimmed, the DRV had to face its own economic difficulties. The rice supply became a major...
problem as Hanoi, no longer able to count on incorporating the rice-producing South into its economy, was forced to seek alternative food sources for the North and to prepare the groundwork for a self-supporting economy. In this regard, leaders in Hanoi continued to seek Chinese advice despite the memory of the poorly-implemented land-reform program. There are indications that the Chinese themselves had drawn lessons from the debacle of the Vietnamese land reform and had become more sensitive to Vietnamese realities when offering suggestions. In April 1956, Deputy Premier Chen Yun, an economic specialist within the CCP, paid an unpublicized visit to Hanoi. At the request of Ho Chi Minh, Chen proposed the principle of “agriculture preceding industry and light industry ahead of heavy industry” in developing the Vietnamese economy. The Vietnamese leadership adopted Chen’s advice. Given the fact that the CCP was putting a high premium on the development of heavy industry at home during its First Five-Year Plan at this time, Chen’s emphasis on agriculture and light industry was very unusual, and demonstrated that the Chinese were paying more attention to Vietnamese conditions in their assistance to the DRV. Zhou Enlai echoed Chen’s counsel of caution in economic planning during his tour of Hanoi on 18-22 November 1956, when he told Ho Chi Minh to refrain from haste in collectivizing agriculture: “Such changes must come step by step.”

Donald S. Zagoria argues in his book *Vietnam Triangle* that between 1957 and 1960, the DRV shifted its loyalties from Beijing to Moscow in order to obtain Soviet assistance for its economic development. In reality, the Hanoi leadership continued to consult the CCP closely on such major issues as economic consolidation in the North and the revolutionary struggle in the South. With the completion of its economic recovery in 1958, the VWP began to pay more attention to strengthening the revolutionary movement in the South. It sought Chinese advice. In the summer of 1958, the VWP presented to the CCP for comment two documents entitled “Our View on the Basic Tasks for Vietnam during the New Stage” and “Certain Opinions Concerning the Unification Line and the Revolutionary Line in the South.” After a careful study, the Chinese leadership responded with a written reply, which pointed out that “the most fundamental, the most crucial, and the most urgent task” for the Vietnamese revolution was to carry out socialist revolution and socialist construction in the North. As to the South, the Chinese reply continued, Hanoi’s task should be to promote “a national and democratic revolution.” But since it was impossible to realize such a revolution at the moment, the Chinese concluded, the VWP should “conduct a long-term underground work, accumulate strength, establish contact with the masses, and wait for opportunities.” Clearly, Beijing did not wish to see the situation in Vietnam escalate into a major confrontation with the United States. Judging by subsequent developments, the VWP did not ignore the Chinese advice, for between 1958 and 1960 Hanoi concentrated on economic construction in the North, implementing the “Three-Year Plan” of a socialist transformation of the economy and society.

The policy of returning to revolutionary war adopted by the VWP Central Committee in May 1959 did not outline any specific strategy to follow. The resolution had merely mentioned that a blend of political and military struggle would be required. During the next two years, debates over strategy and tactics continued within the Hanoi leadership. Ho Chi Minh continued to consult the Chinese. In May 1960, North Vietnamese and Chinese leaders held discussions in both Hanoi and Beijing over strategies to pursue in South Vietnam. Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping argued that in general political struggle should be combined with armed conflict and that since specific conditions varied between the city and the countryside in South Vietnam, a flexible strategy of struggle should be adopted. In the city, the Chinese advised, political struggle would generally be recommended, but to deliver a final blow on the Diem regime, armed force would be necessary. Since there was an extensive mass base in the countryside, military struggle should be conducted there, but military struggle should include political struggle. The Chinese policymakers, preoccupied with recovery from the economic disasters caused by the Great Leap Forward, clearly did not encourage a major commitment of resources from the North in support of a general offensive in the South at this juncture.

In September 1960, the VWP convened its Third National Congress, which made no major recommendations affecting existing strategy but simply stated that disintegration was replacing stability in the South. To take advantage of this new situation, the Congress urged the party to carry out both political and military struggle in the South and called for an increase of support from the North. This emphasis on a combination of political and military struggle in the South reflected to some degree the Chinese suggestion of caution.

In the spring of 1961, U.S President John F. Kennedy approved an increase in the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) of 100 advisers and sent to Vietnam 400 Special Forces troops to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency techniques. This escalation of U.S. involvement in Indochina aroused Chinese leaders’ concern. During DRV Premier Pham Van Dong’s visit to Beijing in June 1961, Mao expressed a general support for the waging of an armed struggle by the South Vietnamese people while Zhou Enlai continued to stress flexibility in tactics and the importance of “blending legal and illegal struggle and combining political and military approaches.”

1962 saw a major turning point in both U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in Chinese attitudes toward the conflict. In February, Washington established in Saigon the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to replace the MAAG. The Kennedy Administration coupled this move with a drastic increase in the number of American “advisers” and the amount of military hardware it was sending to the Diem regime, marking a new level of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

That spring, an important debate broke out within the Chinese leadership over the estimation of a world war, the possibility of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, and the degree of China’s support for national liberation movements. On February 27, Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP Foreign Liaison Department, sent a letter to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi (the three PRC officials directly in charge of foreign policy), in which he criticized the tendency to overrate the danger of world war and to underestimate the possibility of peaceful coexistence with imperialism. In terms of support for national liberation movements, Wang emphasized restraint, calling attention to China’s own economic problems and limitations in resources. On the issue of
Vietnam, he asked the party to "guard against a Korea-style war created by American imperialists," and warned of the danger of "Khrushchev and his associates dragging us into the trap of war." Wang proposed that in order to adjust and restore the economy and win time to tide over difficulties, China should adopt a policy of peace and conciliation in foreign affairs, and that in the area of foreign aid China should not do what it cannot afford. But Mao rejected Wang's proposal, condemning Wang as promoting a "revisionist" foreign policy of "three appeasements and one reduction" (appeasement of imperialism, revisionism, and international reactionaries, and reduction of assistance to national liberation movements).  

The outcome of the debate had major implications for China's policy toward Vietnam. If Wang's moderate suggestions had been adopted, it would have meant a limited Chinese role in Indochina. But Mao had switched to a militant line, choosing confrontation with the United States. This turn to the left in foreign policy accorded with Mao's reemphasis on class struggle and radical politics in Chinese domestic affairs in 1962. It also anticipated an active Chinese role in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. With the rejection of Wang's proposal, an opportunity to avert the later Sino-American hostility over Indochina was missed.

In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing to discuss with Chinese leaders the serious situation created by the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the possibility of an American attack against North Vietnam. Ho asked the Chinese to provide support for the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. Beijing satisfied Ho's demand by agreeing to provide the DRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and guns that could equip 230 infantry battalions. These weapons would be used to support guerrilla warfare in the South. In March 1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), visited the DRV and discussed with his hosts how China might support Hanoi if the United States attacked North Vietnam. Two months later, Liu Shaqiqi, Chairman of the PRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told Ho Chi Minh: "We are standing by your side, and if war broke out, you can regard China as your rear." Clearly Beijing was making a major commitment to Hanoi in early 1963. Toward the end of the year, Chinese and North Vietnamese officials discussed Beijing's assistance in constructing defense works and naval bases in the northeastern part of the DRV. According to a Chinese source, in 1963 China and the DRV made an agreement under which Beijing would send combat troops into North Vietnam if American soldiers crossed the Seventeenth Parallel to attack the North. The Chinese soldiers would stay and fight in the North to free the North Vietnamese troops to march to the South. But the precise date and details of this agreement remain unclear.

In sum, between 1954 and 1963 China was closely involved in the development of Hanoi's policy. The CCP urged Ho Chi Minh to concentrate on consolidating the DRV and to combine political and military struggles in the South. Although before 1962 Beijing policy makers were not eager to see a rapid intensification of the revolutionary war in South Vietnam, neither did they discourage their comrades in Hanoi from increasing military operations there. Between 1956 and 1963, China provided the DRV with 270,000 guns, over 10,000 pieces of artillery, nearly 200 million bullets, 2.02 million artillery shells, 15,000 wire transmitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000 trucks, 15 aircraft, 28 war ships, and 1.18 million sets of uniforms. The total value of China's assistance to Hanoi during this period amounted to 320 million yuan. 1962 was a crucial year in the evolution of China's attitudes toward Vietnam. Abandoning the cautious approach, Mao opted for confrontation with the United States and decided to commit China's resources to Hanoi. Beijing's massive supply of weapons to the DRV in 1962 helped Ho Chi Minh to intensify guerrilla warfare in the South, triggering greater U.S. intervention. By the end of 1963, Chinese leaders had become very nervous about American intentions in Vietnam but were ready to provide full support for the DRV in confronting the United States.

China's Reaction to U.S. Escalation

In the first half of 1964, the attention of U.S. officials was shifting increasingly from South Vietnam toward Hanoi. This trend reflected mounting concern over the infiltration of men and supplies from the North and a growing dissatisfaction with a policy that allowed Hanoi to encourage the insurgency without punishment. In addition to expanding covert operations in North Vietnam, including intelligence overflights, the dropping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN 34A commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast, the Johnson Administration also conveyed to Pham Van Dong through a Canadian diplomat on June 17 the message that the United States was ready to exert increasingly heavy military pressure on the DRV to force it to reduce or terminate its encouragement of guerrilla activities in South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese leader refused to yield to the American pressure, declaring that Hanoi would not stop its support for the struggle of liberation in the South.

Mao watched these developments closely. Anticipating new trouble, the chairman told General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff of the (North) Vietnamese People's Army, in June: "Our two parties and two countries must cooperate and fight the enemy together. Your business is my business and my business is your business. In other words, our two sides must deal with the enemy together without conditions." Between July 5 and 8, Zhou Enlai led a CCP delegation to Hanoi, where he discussed with leaders from the DRV and Pathet Lao the situations in South Vietnam and Laos. Although the details of these talks are unknown, clearly the three Communist parties were stepping up their coordination to confront the increasing threat from the United States.

Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing sent a cable on August 5 to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung, asking them to "investigate the situation, work out countermeasures, and be prepared to fight." In the meantime, Beijing instructed the Kunming and Guangzhou Military Regions and the air force and naval units stationed in south and south-west China to assume a state of combat-readiness. Four air divisions and one anti-aircraft division were dispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam and put on a heightened alert status. In August, China also sent approximately 15 MiG-15 and MiG-17 jets to Hanoi, agreed to train North Vietnamese pilots, and started to construct new airfields in areas adjacent to the Vietnamese border which would serve as sanctuary and repair and maintenance facilities for Hanoi's jet fighters. By moving new air force units to the border area and
building new airfields there, Beijing intended to deter further U.S. expansion of war in South Vietnam and bombardment against the DRV. Between August and September 1964, the PLA also sent an inspection team to the DRV to investigate the situation in case China later needed to dispatch support troops to Vietnam.31

The first months of 1965 witnessed a significant escalation of the American war in Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. aircraft struck North Vietnamese military installations just across the 17th Parallel, ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American barracks near Pleiku and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson Administration stopped claiming that its air attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for the DRV’s incursions into South Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. aircraft struck North Vietnamese military installations just across the 17th Parallel, ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American barracks near Pleiku and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson Administration stopped claiming that its air attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for specific Communist assaults in South Vietnam and began a continuous air bombing campaign against the DRV. On March 8, two battalions of Marines armed with tanks and 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.32

Worried about the increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April 2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan to convey to President Johnson a four-point message:

(1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States. (2) The Chinese mean what they say. In other words, if any country in Asia, Africa, or elsewhere meets with aggression by the imperialists headed by the United States, the Chinese government and people will definitely give it support and assistance. Should such just action bring on American aggression against China, we will毫不犹豫地 rise in resistance and fight to the end. (3) China is prepared. Should the United States impose a war on China, it can be said with certainty that, once in China, the United States will not be able to pull out, however many men it may send over and whatever weapons it may use, nuclear weapons included. (4) Once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries. If the American madmen bombard China without constraints, China will not sit there waiting to die. If they come from the sky, we will fight back on the ground. Bombing means war. The war can not have boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to finish the war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.33

This was the most serious warning issued by the Chinese government to the United States, and given the caution exercised by President Johnson in carrying out the “Rolling Thunder” operations against the DRV, it was one that Washington did not overlook. Clearly, U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from the Korean War, when the Truman Administration’s failure to heed Beijing warning against crossing the 38th parallel led to a bloody confrontation between the United States and China.34

The U.S. escalation in early 1965 made the DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early April to ask China to increase its aid and send troops to Vietnam. Le Duan told Chinese leaders that Hanoi needed “volunteer pilots, volunteer soldiers as well as other necessary personnel, including road and bridge engineers.” The Vietnamese envoys expected Chinese volunteer pilots to perform four functions: to limit U.S. bombing to the south of the 20th or 19th parallel, to defend Hanoi, to protect several major transportation lines, and to boost morale.35 On behalf of the Chinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi replied to the Vietnamese visitors on April 8 that “it is the obligation of the Chinese people and party” to support the Vietnamese struggle against the United States. “Our principle is,” Liu continued, “that we will do our best to provide you with whatever you need and whatever we have. If you do not invite us, we will not go to your place. We will send whatever part of our troops that you request. You have the complete initiative.”36

In April, China signed several agreements with the DRV concerning the dispatch of Chinese support troops to North Vietnam.36 Between April 21 and 22, Giap discussed with Luo Ruiqing and First Deputy Chief of Staff Yang Chengwu the arrangements for sending Chinese troops. In May, Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao in Changsha, the chairman’s home province, where he asked Mao to help the DRV repair and build twelve roads in the area north of Hanoi. The Chinese leader accepted Ho’s request and instructed Zhou Enlai to see to the matter.37

In discussions with Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu, Zhou said: “According to Pham Van Dong, U.S. blockade and bombing has reduced supplies to South Vietnam through sea shipment and road transportation. While trying to resume sea transportation, the DRV is also expanding the corridor in Lower Laois and roads in the South. Their troops would go to the South to build roads. Therefore they need our support to construct roads in the North.” Zhou decided that the Chinese military should be responsible for road repair and construction in North Vietnam. Yang suggested that since assistance to the DRV involved many military and government departments, a special leadership group should be created to coordinate the work of various agencies. Approving the proposal, Zhou immediately announced the establishment of the “Central Committee and State Council Aid Vietnam Group” with Yang and Li Tianyou (Deputy Chief of Staff) as Director and Vice Director. This episode demonstrates Zhou’s characteristic effectiveness in organization and efficiency in administration.

In early June, Van Tien Dung held discussions with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing to flesh out the general Chinese plan to assist Vietnam. According to their agreement, if the war remained in the current conditions, the DRV would fight the war by itself and China would provide various kinds of support as the Vietnamese needed. If the United States used its navy and air force to support a South Vietnamese attack on the North, China would also provide naval and air force support to the DRV. If U.S. ground forces were directly used to attack the North, China would use its land forces as strategic reserves for the DRV and conduct military operations whenever necessary. As to the forms of Sino-Vietnamese air force cooperation, Dung and Luo agreed that China could send volunteer pilots to Vietnam to operate Vietnamese aircraft, station both pilots and aircraft in Vietnam airfields, or fly aircraft from bases in China to join combat in Vietnam and only land on Vietnamese bases temporarily for refueling. The third option was known as the “Andong model” (a reference to the pattern of Chinese air force operations during the Korean War). In terms of the methods of employing PRC ground troops, the two military leaders agreed that the Chinese forces would either help to strengthen the defensive position of the DRV...
troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese counter offensive or launch an offensive themselves to disrupt the enemy’s deployment and win the strategic initiative.40

But despite Liu Shaoqi’s April promise to Le Duan and Luo Ruqiang’s agreement with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the Vietnamese “White Paper” of 1979, the Chinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 notified its Vietnamese counterpart that “the time was not appropriate” to send Chinese pilots to Vietnam.41 The PRC’s limited air force capacity may have caused Beijing to have second thoughts, perhaps reinforcing Beijing’s desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Whatever the reasons for China’s decision, the failure to satisfy Hanoi’s demand must have greatly disappointed the Vietnamese since the control of the air was so crucial for the DRV’s effort to protect itself from the ferocious U.S. bombing, and undoubtedly contributed to North Vietnam’s decision in 1965 to rely more on the Soviet Union for air defense.

Beginning in June 1965, China sent ground-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and logistical units into North Vietnam to help Hanoi. The total number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam between June 1965 and March 1973 amounted to over 320,000.42 To facilitate supplies into South Vietnam, China created a secret coastal transportation line to ship goods to several islands off Central Vietnam for transit to the South. A secret harbor on China’s Hainan Island was constructed to serve this transportation route. Beijing also operated a costly transportation line through Cambodia to send weapons, munitions, food, and medical supplies into South Vietnam.43 When the last Chinese troops withdrew from Vietnam in August 1973, 1,100 soldiers had lost their lives and 4,200 had been wounded.44

The new materials from China indicate that Beijing provided extensive support (short of volunteer pilots) for Hanoi during the Vietnam War and risked war with the United States in helping the Vietnamese. As Allen S. Whiting has perceptively observed, the deployment of Chinese troops in Vietnam was not carried out under maximum security against detection by Washington. The Chinese presence was intentionally communicated to U.S. intelligence through aerial photography and electronic intercepts. This evidence, along with the large base complex that China built at Yen Bai in northwest Vietnam, provided credible and successful deterrence against an American invasion of North Vietnam.45

The specter of a Chinese intervention in a manner similar to the Korean War was a major factor in shaping President Johnson’s gradual approach to the Vietnam War. Johnson wanted to forestall Chinese intervention by keeping the level of military actions against North Vietnam controlled, exact, and below the threshold that would provoke direct Chinese entry. This China-induced U.S. strategy of gradual escalation was a great help for Hanoi, for it gave the Vietnamese communists time to adjust to U.S. bombing and to develop strategies to frustrate American moves. As John Garver has aptly put it, “By helping to induce Washington to adopt this particular strategy, Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi’s eventual victory over the United States.”46

Explaining PRC Support for the DRV

Mao’s decision to aid Hanoi was closely linked to his perception of U.S. threats to China’s security, his commitment to national liberation movements, his criticism of Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and his domestic need to transform the Chinese state and society. These four factors were mutually related and reinforcing.

Sense of Insecurity:

Between 1964 and 1965, Mao worried about the increasing American involvement in Vietnam and perceived the United States as posing a serious threat to China’s security. For him, support for North Vietnam was a way of countering the U.S. strategy of containment of China. The Communist success in South Vietnam would prevent the United States from moving closer to the Chinese southern border.

On several occasions in 1964, Mao talked about U.S. threats to China and the need for China to prepare for war. During a Central Committee conference held between May 15 and June 17, the chairman contended that “so long as imperialism exists, the danger of war is there. We are not the chief of staff for imperialism and have no idea when it will launch a war. It is the conventional weapon, not the atomic bomb, that will determine the final victory of the war.”47 At first Mao did not expect that the United States would attack North Vietnam directly.48 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident came as a surprise to him. In the wake of the incident, Mao pointed out on October 22 that China must base its plans on war and make active preparations for an early, large-scale, and nuclear war.49

To deal with what he perceived as U.S. military threats, Mao took several domestic measures in 1964, the most important of which was the launching of the massive Third Front project. This program called for heavy investment in the remote provinces of southwestern and western China and envisioned the creation of a huge self-sustaining industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event China became involved in war. The project had a strong military orientation and was directly triggered by the U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam.50

On 25 April 1964, the War Department of the PLA General Staff drafted a report for Yang Chengwu on how to prevent an enemy surprise attack on China’s economic construction. The report listed four areas vulnerable to such an attack: (1) China’s industry was over-concentrated. About 60 percent of the civil machinery industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry, and 52 percent of the national defense industry were concentrated in 14 major cities with over one million people. (2) Too many people lived in cities. According to the 1962 census, in addition to 14 cities of above one million, 20 cities had a population between 500,000 and one million. Most of these cities were located in the coastal areas and very vulnerable to air strikes. No effective mechanisms existed at the moment to organize anti-air works, evacuate urban populations, continue production, and eliminate the damages of an air strike, especially a nuclear strike. (3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and harbors were situated near big and medium-size cities and could easily be destroyed when the enemy attacked the cities. No measures had been taken to protect these transportation points against an enemy attack. In the early stage of war, they could become paralyzed. (4) All of China’s reservoirs had a limited capacity to release water in an emergency. Among the country’s 232 large reservoirs, 52 were located near major transportation lines and 17 close to important cities. In conclusion, the report made it...
clear that “the problems mentioned above are directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war.” It asked the State Council “to organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and effective measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack.”

Yang Chengwu presented the report to Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruqing and Yang on August 12 with the following comment: “It is an excellent report. It should be carefully studied and gradually implemented.” Mao urged the newly established State Council Special Committee in charge of the Third Front to begin its work immediately.52 Mao’s approval of the report marked the beginning of the Third Front project to relocate China’s industrial resources to the interior. It is important to note the timing of Mao’s reaction to the report—right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam had confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions about American intentions.

Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun became Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo Yibo and Luo Ruqing became Vice Directors of the Special Committee. On August 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed proposal on how to implement the Third Front ideas.3 In the meantime, the CCP Secretariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made two speeches at the meetings on August 17 and 20. He asserted that China should be on guard against an aggressive war launched by imperialism. At present, factories were concentrated around big cities and coastal regions, a situation deleterious to war preparation. Factories should be broken into two parts. One part should be relocated to interior areas as early as possible. Every province should establish its own strategic rear base. Departments of industry and transportation should move, so should schools, science academies, and Beijing University. The three railroad lines between Chengdu and Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed as quickly as possible. If there were a shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails on other lines could be dismantled. To implement Mao’s instructions, the meetings decided to concentrate China’s financial, material, and human resources on the construction of the Third Front.54

While emphasizing the “big Third Front” plan on the national level, Mao also ordered provinces to proceed with their “small Third Front” projects. The chairman wanted each province to develop its own light armament industry capable of producing rifles, machine guns, canons, and munitions.55 The Third Five-Year Plan was revised to meet the strategic contingency of war preparation. In the modified plan, a total of three billion yuan was appropriated for small Third Front projects. This was a substantial figure, but less than 5 percent of the amount set aside for the big Third Front in this period.56 In sum, the Third Front was a major strategic action designed to provide an alternative industrial base that would enable China to continue production in the event of an attack on its large urban centers.

In addition to his apprehension about a strike on China’s urban and coastal areas, Mao also feared that the enemy might deploy paratroop assault forces deep inside China. In a meeting with He Long, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Luo Ruqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28 April 1965, Mao called their attention to such a danger. He ordered them to prepare for the landing of enemy paratroopers in every interior region. The enemy might use paratroops, Mao contended, “to disrupt our rear areas, and to coordinate with a frontal assault. The number of paratroops may not be many. It may involve one or two divisions in each region, or it may involve a smaller unit. In all interior regions, we should build caves in mountains. If no mountain is around, hills should be created to construct defense works. We should be on guard against enemy paratroops deep inside our country and prevent the enemy from marching unstopped into China.”57

It appears that Mao’s attitudes toward the United States hardened between January and April 1965. In an interview with Edgar Snow on January 9, Mao had expressed confidence that Washington would not expand the war to North Vietnam because Secretary of State Dean Rusk had said so. He told Snow that there would be no war between China and the United States if Washington did not send troops to attack China.58 Two days later, the CCP Central Military Commission issued a “Six-Point Directive on the Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in the South China Sea,” in which it instructed the military not to attack American airplanes that intruded into Chinese airspace in order to avoid a direct military clash with the United States.59

In April, however, Mao rescinded the “Six Point Directive.” Between April 8 and 9, U.S. aircraft flew into China’s airspace over Hainan Island. On April 9, Yang Chengwu reported the incidents to Mao, suggesting that the order not to attack invading U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the air force command take control of the naval air units stationed on Hainan Island. Approving both of Yang’s requests, Mao said that China “should resolutely strike American aircraft that overfly Hainan Island.”60 It is quite possible that the further U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam in the intervening months caused Mao to abandon his earlier restrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft.

It is important to point out that the entire Chinese leadership, not just Mao, took the strategic threat from the United States very seriously during this period. Zhou Enlai told Spiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May 1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizing its population for war. Although it seemed that the United States had not made up its mind to expand the war to China, the Chinese premier continued, war had its own law of development, usually in a way contrary to the wishes of people. Therefore China had to be prepared.61 Zhou’s remarks indicated that he was familiar with a common pattern in warfare: accidents and miscalculations rather than deliberate planning often lead to war between reluctant opponents.

In an address to a Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965, Liu Shaoqi stated:

If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed.... If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade.... We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and it is easy for us to strike them. We should develop as early as possible new tech-
nology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. The enemy’s strength is in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On the other, we should realize that the enemy lacks justification in sending troops. This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.62

Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that “so long as we have made good preparations on every front, the enemy may not dare to come. We must defend our offshore islands. With these islands in our hands, the enemy will find it difficult to land. If the enemy should launch an attack, we will lure them inside China and then wipe them out completely.”63

Scholars have argued over Beijing’s reaction to the threat posed by U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Much of this argument focuses on the hypothesis of a “strategic debate” in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao. Various interpretations of this “debate” exist, but most contend that Luo was more sensitive to American actions in Indochina than either Lin or Mao, and that Luo demanded greater military preparations to deal with the threat, including accepting the Soviet proposal of a “united front.”64 However, there is nothing in the recently available Chinese materials to confirm the existence of the “strategic debate” in 1965.65 The often cited evidence to support the hypothesis of a strategic debate is the two articles supposedly written by Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao on the occasion of the commemoration of V-J day in September 1965.66 In fact, the same writing group organized by Luo Ruiqing in the General Staff was responsible for the preparation of both articles. The final version of the “People’s War” article also incorporated opinions from the writing team led by Kang Sheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai National Guest House, Kang’s team was famous for writing the nine polemics against Soviet revisionism). Although the article included some of Lin Biao’s previous statements, Lin himself was not involved in its writing. When Luo Ruiqing asked Lin for his instructions about the composition of the article, the Defense Minister said nothing. Zhou Enlai and other standing Politburo members read the piece before its publication.67 The article was approved by the Chinese leadership as a whole and was merely published in Lin Biao’s name. Luo Ruiqing was purged in December 1965 primarily because of his dispute with Lin Biao over domestic military organization rather than over foreign policy issues.68 Luo did not oppose Mao on Vietnam policy. In fact he carried out loyally every Vietnam-related order issued by the chairman. Mao completely dominated the decision making. The origins of the “People’s War” article point to the danger of relying on public pronouncements to gauge inner-party calculations and cast doubts on the utility of the faction model in explaining Chinese foreign policy making.69

**Commitment to National Liberation Movements:**

The second factor that shaped Mao’s decision to support the DRV was his desire to form a broad international united front against both the United States and the Soviet Union. To Mao, national liberation movements in the Third World were the most important potential allies in the coalition that he wanted to establish. In the early 1960s, the chairman developed the concept of “Two Intermediate Zones.” The first zone referred to developed countries, including capitalist states in Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The second zone referred to underdeveloped nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These two zones existed between the two superpowers. Mao believed that countries in these two zones had contradictions with the United States and the Soviet Union and that China should make friends with them to create an international united front against Washington and Moscow.70

Mao initially developed the idea of the “intermediate zone” during the early years of the Cold War. In a discussion with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, the CCP leader first broached the idea. He claimed that the United States and the Soviet Union were “separated by a vast zone including many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” and that it was difficult for “the U.S. reactionaries to attack the Soviet Union before they could subjugate these countries.”71 In the late 1940s and throughout the greater part of the 1950s, Mao leaned to the side of the Soviet Union to balance against the perceived American threat. But beginning in the late 1950s, with the emergence of Sino-Soviet differences, Mao came to revise his characterization of the international situation. He saw China confronting two opponents: the United States and the Soviet Union. To oppose these two foes and break China’s international isolation, Mao proposed the formation of an international united front.

Operating from the principle of making friends with countries in the “Two Intermediate Zones,” Mao promoted such anti-American tendencies as French President De Gaulle’s break with the United States in the first zone and championed national liberation movements in the second zone. For Mao, the Vietnam conflict constituted a part of a broader movement across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which together represented a challenge to imperialism as a whole. China reached out to anti-colonial guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique, to the “progressive” Sihanouk in Cambodia, to the leftist regime under Sukarno in Indonesia, and to the anti-U.S. Castro in Cuba.72 Toward the former socialist camp dominated by the Soviet Union, Mao encouraged Albania to persuade other East European countries to separate from Moscow.73

During this increasingly radical period of Chinese foreign policy, Mao singled out three anti-imperialist heroes for emulation by Third World liberation movements: Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella, the Algerian nationalist leader. In a speech to a delegation of Chilean journalists on 23 June 1964, Mao remarked: “We oppose war, but we support the anti-imperialist war waged by oppressed peoples. We support the revolutionary war in Cuba and Algeria. We also support the anti-U.S.-imperialist war conducted by the South Vietnamese people.”74 In another address to a group of visitors from Asia, Africa, and Oceania on July 9, Mao again mentioned the names of Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella as models of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.75

Envisioning China as a spokesman for the Third World independence cause, Mao believed that the Chinese revolutionary ex-
perience was relevant to the struggle of liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By firmly backing the Vietnamese struggle against the United States, he wanted to demonstrate to Third World countries and movements that China was their true friend. Victory for North Vietnam’s war of national unification with China’s support would show the political correctness of Mao’s more militant strategy for coping with U.S. imperialism and the incorrectness of Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence.

A number of Chinese anti-imperialist initiatives, however, ended in a debacle in 1965. First Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria in June, leading the Afro-Asian movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet direction due to the influence of Nehru in India and Tito in Yugoslavia. The fall of Ben Bella frustrated Mao’s bid for leadership in the Third World through the holding of a “second Bandung” conference of Afro-Asian leaders. Then in September, Sukarno was toppled in a right-wing counter-coup, derailing Beijing’s plan to promote a militant “united front” between Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The Chinese behavior, nevertheless, did convince leaders in Washington that Beijing was a dangerous gambler in international politics and that American intervention in Vietnam was necessary to undermine a Chinese plot of global subversion by proxy.76

Criticism of Soviet Revisionism:

Mao’s firm commitment to North Vietnam also needs to be considered in the context of the unfolding Sino-Soviet split. By 1963, Beijing and Moscow had completely broken apart after three years of increasingly abusive polemics. The conclusion of the Soviet-American partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 was a major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. Thereafter the Beijing leadership publicly denounced any suggestion that China was subject to any degree of Soviet protection and directly criticized Moscow for collaborating with Washington against China. The effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Vietnam soon manifested itself as Beijing and Moscow wooed Hanoi to take sides in their ideological dispute.

After the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, the new leadership in the Kremlin invited the CCP to send a delegation to the October Revolution celebrations. Beijing dispatched Zhou Enlai and He Long to Moscow for the primary purpose of sounding out Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin on the many issues in dispute: Khrushchev’s long-postponed plan to convene an international Communist meeting, support for revolutionary movements, peaceful coexistence with the United States, attitudes toward Tito, and “revisionist” domestic policies within the Soviet Union. The Chinese discovered during their tour on November 5-13 that nothing basic had changed in the Soviet position: the new leaders in Moscow desired an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations on the condition that Beijing stopped its criticisms and limited competition in foreign policy, probably in return for the resumption of Soviet economic aid.77

Instead of finding an opportunity to improve mutual understanding, the Chinese visitors found their stay in Moscow unpleasant and the relationship with the Soviet Union even worse. During a Soviet reception, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky suggested to Zhou Enlai and He Long that just like the Russians had ousted Khrushchev, the Chinese should overthrow Mao. The Chinese indignantly rejected this proposal: Zhou even registered a strong protest with the Soviet leadership, calling Malinovsky’s remarks “a serious political incident.”78 Zhou Enlai told the Cuban Communist delegation during a breakfast meeting in the Chinese Embassy on November 9 that Malinovsky “insulted Comrade Mao Zedong, the Chinese people, the Chinese party, and myself,” and that the current leadership in the Kremlin inherited “Khrushchev’s working and thought style.”79

Before Zhou’s journey to Moscow, the Chinese leadership had suggested to the Vietnamese Communists that they also send people to travel with Zhou to Moscow to see whether there were changes in the new Soviet leaders’ policy. Zhou told Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan later in Hanoi, on 1 March 1965, that he was “disappointed” with what he had seen in Moscow, and that “the new Soviet leaders are following nothing but Khrushchevism.”80 Clearly Zhou wanted the Hanoi leadership to side with the PRC in the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, and Beijing’s extensive aid to the DRV was designed to draw Hanoi to China’s orbit.

The collective leadership which succeeded Khrushchev was more forthcoming in support of the DRV. During his visit to Hanoi on 7-10 February 1965, Kosygin called for a total U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and promised Soviet material aid for Ho Chi Minh’s struggle. The fact that a group of missile experts accompanied Kosygin indicated that the Kremlin was providing support in that crucial area. The two sides concluded formal military and economic agreements on February 10.81 Clearly the Soviets were competing with the Vietnamese to win the allegiance of the Vietnamese Communists. Through its new gestures to Hanoi, Moscow wanted to offset Chinese influence and demonstrate its ideological rectitude on issues of national liberation. The new solidarity with Hanoi, however, complicated Soviet relations with the United States, and after 1965, the Soviet Union found itself at loggerheads with Washington. While Moscow gained greater influence in Hanoi because of the North Vietnamese need for Soviet material assistance against U.S. bombing, it at the same time lost flexibility because of the impossibility of retreat from the commitment to a brother Communist state under attack by imperialism.

Before 1964, Hanoi was virtually on China’s side in the bifurcated international communist movement. After the fall of Khrushchev and the appearance of a more interventionist position under Kosygin and Brezhnev, however, Hanoi adopted a more balanced stand. Leaders in Beijing were nervous about the increase of Soviet influence in Vietnam. According to a Vietnamese source, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary General of the CCP, paid a secret visit to Hanoi shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in an attempt to wean the Vietnamese away from Moscow with the promise of US$1 billion aid per year.82 China’s strategy to discredit the Soviet Union was to emphasize the “plot” of Soviet-American collaboration at the expense of Vietnam. During his visit to Beijing on 11 February 1965, Kosygin asked the Chinese to help the United States to “find a way out of Vietnam.” Chinese leaders warned the Russians not to use the Vietnam issue to bargain with the Americans.83 Immediately after his return to Moscow, Kosygin proposed an international conference on Indochina. The Chinese condemned the Soviet move, asserting that the Russians wanted negotiation rather than continued struggle in Vietnam and were conspiring with the Americans to sell out Viet-
nom. But as R.B. Smith has observed, the Chinese “may have oversimplified a Soviet strategy which was... more subtle.... Moscow’s diplomatic initiative of mid-February may in fact have been timed to coincide with—rather than to constrain—the Communist offensive in South Vietnam.”84

The Chinese criticism of the Soviet peace initiative must have confirmed the American image of China as a warmonger.

The Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnam certainly provided leaders in Hanoi an opportunity to obtain maximum support from their two Communist allies, but we should not overstate the case. Sometimes the benefits of the Sino-Soviet split for the DRV could be limited. For example, the Hanoi leadership sought a communist international united front to assist their war effort. They wanted Moscow and Beijing to agree on common support actions, particularly on a single integrated logistical system. They failed to achieve this objective primarily because of China’s objection.85

**Domestic Need to Transform the Chinese State and Society:**

Beginning in the late 1950s, Mao became increasingly apprehensive about the potential development of the Chinese revolution. He feared that his life work had created a political structure that would eventually betray his principles and values and become as exploitative as the one it had replaced. His worry about the future of China’s development was closely related to his diagnosis of the degeneration of the Soviet political system and to his fear about the effects of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ strategy of “peaceful evolution.”86 Mao believed that Dulles’ approach to induce a peaceful evolution within the socialist world was taking effect in the Soviet Union, given Khrushchev’s fascination with peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Mao wanted to prevent that from happening in China.

The problem of succession preoccupied Mao throughout the first half of the 1960s. His acute awareness of impending death contributed to his sense of urgency. The U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam made him all the more eager to put his own house in order. He was afraid that if he did not nip in the bud what he perceived to be revisionist tendencies and if he did not choose a proper successor, after his death China would fall into the hands of Soviet-like revisionists, who would “change the color” of China, abandon support for national liberation struggles, and appease U.S. imperialism. Mao was a man who believed in dialectics. Negative things could be turned into positive matters. The American presence in Indochina was a threat to the Chinese revolution. But on the other hand, Mao found that he could turn the U.S. threat into an advantage, namely, he could use it to intensify domestic anti-imperialist feelings and

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**POLISH SECRET PEACE INITIATIVES IN VIETNAM**

by Jerzy Michalowski

*This summary was prepared by the author’s son, Stefan Michalowski.*

This is the story of peace initiatives undertaken by Polish diplomats during the height of the Vietnam war. It was written by one of the main participants, Jerzy Michalowski, who was, at the time, a senior official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, and a close friend and colleague of Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. The events took place during the years 1963-1966, when Poland was in a unique position to act as broker between the U.S. and North Vietnam. While formally allied with the latter, and subject to Soviet domination in numerous ways, Poland was able to steer a course of limited independence in its internal and international affairs. Polish diplomats were liked and respected in the West, where they maintained many useful contacts. Jerzy Michalowski, for instance, had been a member of the UN Control and Monitoring Commission that was set up under the 1954 Geneva Accords following the French defeat in Indochina.

In the late 1970s, after a distinguished career as ambassador to Great Britain, the United Nations and the United States, Michalowski found himself out of favor with the government of Communist Party boss Edward Gierek. Removed from positions of responsibility, he was nonetheless given access to secret Ministry archives, and was able to prepare this 120-page report. Eventually, after being expelled from the Party, he retired from the foreign service. The manuscript was brought to the United States shortly before his death in March of 1993.

*Polish Secret Police Initiatives in Vietnam* is terse, honest, and highly readable. The author describes events that he actually took part in. Whenever possible, he supplies references from the Foreign Ministry archives or from published material. He provides accounts of personal meetings with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Leonid Brezhnev, Ho Chi Minh, Phan Van Dong, Lyndon Johnson, Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk and others. Whenever he feels that the historical record has been distorted, he does not hesitate to put forth his own version. He takes strong issue, for example, with the published memoirs of Henry Cabot Lodge.

Michalowski’s perspective, both as peace-maker and author, is that of a professional diplomat, rather than an official representative of a Soviet Bloc nation. His goal was simply to end the bloodshed in Indochina by moving the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Poland’s peace proposals did not attempt to specify the terms of any final settlement. The focus was on defining the principles and conditions that would allow the two sides to talk. Both sides were committed to the military struggle. The Vietnamese had an almost absolute belief in final victory. They were convinced of the similarity of their situation to the previous conflict with the French, and were willing to absorb even the most horrendous blows that the United States could inflict. Michalowski reserves his most critical comments, however, for the Johnson Administration. America’s “carrot and stick” policy of cautious peace feelers combined with a campaign of savage bombing raids was disastrous, for it served only to strengthen the enemy’s resolve, and deepened suspicions about America’s true motives and intentions. Time and again, during the most critical and sensitive diplomatic maneuvers, the bombing raids turned the diplomats’ carefully crafted arrangements into rubble.

*continued on page 258*
mobilize the population against revisionists. Mao had successfully employed that strategy during the Civil War against Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. Now he could apply it again to prepare the masses for the Great Cultural Revolution that he was going to launch. Accordingly, in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Mao unleashed a massive “Aid Vietnam and Resist America” campaign across China.87

Sino-Vietnamese Discord

In its heyday the Sino-Vietnamese friendship was described as “comrades plus brothers,” but shortly after the conclusion of the Vietnam War the two communist states went to war with each other in 1979. How did it happen? In fact signs of differences had already emerged in the early days of China’s intervention in the Vietnam conflict. Two major factors complicated Sino-Vietnamese relations. One was the historical pride and cultural sensitivity that the Vietnamese carried with them in dealing with the Chinese. The other was the effect of the Sino-Soviet split.

Throughout their history, the Vietnamese have had a love-hate attitude toward their big northern neighbor. On the one hand, they were eager to borrow advanced institutions and technologies from China; on the other hand, they wanted to preserve their independence and cultural heritage. When they were internally weak and facing external aggression, they sought China’s help and intervention. When they were unified and free from foreign threats, they tended to resent China’s influence. A pattern seems to characterize Sino-Vietnamese relations: the Vietnamese would downplay their inherent differences with the Chinese when they needed China’s assistance to balance against a foreign menace; they would pay more attention to problems in the bilateral relations with China when they were strong and no longer facing an external threat.

This pattern certainly applies to the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The Vietnamese Communists during this period confronted formidable enemies, the French and the Americans, in their quest for national unification. When the Soviet Union was reluctant to help, China was the only source of support that Hanoi could count upon against the West. Thus Ho Chi Minh avidly sought advice and weapons from China. But sentiments of distrust were never far below the surface. Friction emerged between Chinese military advisers and Vietnamese commanders during the war against the French in the early 1950s.88 Vietnamese distrust of the Chinese also manifested itself when Chinese support troops entered Vietnam in the mid 1960s.

When Chinese troops went to Vietnam in 1965, they found themselves in an awkward position. On the one hand, the Vietnamese leadership wanted their service in fighting U.S. aircraft and in building and repairing roads, bridges, and rail lines. On the other hand, the Vietnamese authorities tried to minimize their influence by restricting their contact with the local population. When a Chinese medical team offered medical service to save the life of a Vietnamese woman, Vietnamese officials blocked the effort.89 Informed of incidents like this, Mao urged the Chinese troops in Vietnam to “refrain from being too eager” to help the Vietnamese.90 While the Chinese soldiers were in Vietnam, the Vietnamese media reminded the public that in the past China had invaded Vietnam: the journal Historical Studies published articles in 1965 describing Vietnamese resistance against Chinese imperial dynasties.91

The increasing animosity between Beijing and Moscow and their efforts to win Hanoi’s allegiance put the Vietnamese in a dilemma. On the one hand, the change of Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam from reluctant to active assistance in late 1964 and early 1965 made the Vietnamese more unwilling to echo China’s criticisms of revisionism. On the other hand, they still needed China’s assistance and deterrence. Mao’s rejection of the Soviet proposal of a “united action” to support Vietnam alienated leaders in Hanoi. During Kosygin’s visit to Beijing in February 1965, he proposed to Mao and Zhou that Beijing and Moscow end their mutual criticisms and cooperate on the Vietnam issue. But Mao dismissed Kosygin’s suggestion, asserting that China’s argument with the Soviet Union would continue for another 9,000 years.92

During February and March, 1966, a Japanese Communist Party delegation led by Secretary General Miyamoto Kenji, visited China and the DRV, with the purpose of encouraging “joint action” by China and the Soviet Union to support Vietnam. Miyamoto first discussed the idea with a CCP delegation led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen in Beijing. The two sides worked out a communiqué that went part of the way toward the “united action” proposal. But when Miyamoto, accompanied by Deng, came to see Mao in Conghua, Guangdong, the chairman burst into a rage, insisting that the communiqué must stress a united front against both the United States and the Soviet Union. Miyamoto disagreed, so the Beijing communiqué was torn up.93 Clearly, Mao by this time had connected the criticism of Soviet revisionism with the domestic struggle against top party leaders headed by Liu, Deng, and Peng. It was no wonder that these officials soon became leading targets for attack when the Cultural Revolution swept across China a few months later.

In the meantime the Vietnamese made their different attitude toward Moscow clear by deciding to send a delegation to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was to be held between March 29 and April 8 and which the Chinese had already decided to boycott. The Vietnamese were walking a tightrope at this time. On the one hand they relied on the vital support of Soviet weapons; on the other hand, they did not want to damage their ties with China. Thus Le Duan and Nguyen Duy Trinh traveled from Hanoi to Beijing on March 22, on their way to Moscow. Although no sign of differences appeared in public during Duan’s talks with Zhou Enlai, China’s unhappiness about the Vietnamese participation in the 23rd Congress can be imagined.94

In sum, the Beijing-Hanoi relationship included both converging and diverging interests. The two countries shared a common ideological outlook and a common concern over American intervention in Indochina, but leaders in Hanoi wanted to avoid the danger of submitting to a dependent relationship with China. So long as policymakers in Hanoi and Beijing shared the common goal of ending the U.S. presence in the region, such divergent interests could be subordinated to their points of agreement. But the turning point came in 1968, when Sino-Soviet relations took a decisive turn for the worse just as Washington made its first tentative moves toward disengagement from South Vietnam. In the new situation, Beijing’s strategic interests began to differ
fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereas the Chinese now regarded the United States as a potential counterbalance against the Soviet Union, their Vietnamese comrades continued to see Washington as the most dangerous enemy. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and the unification of the country, Hanoi’s bilateral disputes with Beijing over Cambodia, a territorial disagreement in the South China Sea, and the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam came to the fore, culminating in a direct clash in 1979.

Was China Bluffing During the War?

The fact that Beijing did not openly acknowledge its sizable presence in North Vietnam raised questions about the justification for Washington’s restraint in U.S. conduct of war, both at the time and in later years. Harry G. Summers, the most prominent of revisionist critics of President Johnson’s Vietnam policy, asserts that the United States drew a wrong lesson from the Korean War: “Instead of seeing that it was possible to fight and win a limited war in Asia regardless of Chinese intervention, we...took counsel of our fears and accepted as an article of faith the proposition that we should never again become involved in a land war in Asia. In so doing we allowed our fears to become a kind of self-imposed deterrent and surrendered the initiative to our enemies.” Summers contends that “whether the Soviets or the Chinese ever intended intervention is a matter of conjecture,” and that the United States allowed itself “to be bluffe by China throughout most of the war.” He cites Mao’s rejection of the Soviet 1965 proposal for a joint action to support Vietnam and Mao’s suspicions of Moscow’s plot to draw China into a war with the United States as evidence for the conclusion that Mao was more fearful of Moscow than Washington and, by implication, he was not serious about China’s threats to intervene to help Hanoi.95

Was China not serious in its threats to go to war with the United States in Indochina? As the preceding discussion has shown, Beijing perceived substantial security and ideological interests in Vietnam. From the security perspective, Mao and his associates were genuinely concerned about the American threat from Vietnam (although they did not realize that their own actions, such as the supply of weapons to Hanoi in 1962, had helped precipitate the U.S. escalation of the war) and adopted significant measures at home to prepare for war. China’s assistance to the DRV, to use John Garver’s words, “was Mao’s way of rolling back U.S. containment in Asia.”96 From the viewpoint of ideology, China’s support for North Vietnam served Mao’s purposes of demonstrating to the Third World that Beijing was a spokesman for national liberation struggles and of competing with Moscow for leadership in the international communist movement.

If the actions recommended by Summers had been taken by Washington in Vietnam, there would have been a real danger of a Sino-American war with dire consequences for the world. In retrospect, it appears that Johnson had drawn the correct lesson from the Korean War and had been prudent in his approach to the Vietnam conflict.

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**NEW CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON THE VIETNAM WAR**

**Translated by Qiang Zhai**

**Document 1: Report by the War Department of the General Staff, 25 April 1964.**

Deputy Chief of Staff Yang97:

According to your instruction, we have made a special investigation on the question of how our country’s economic construction should prepare itself for a surprise attack by the enemy. From the several areas that we have looked at, many problems emerge, and some of them are very serious.

1) The industry is over concentrated. About 60 percent of the chemical industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry, and 52 percent of the national defense industry (including 72.7 percent of the aircraft industry, 77.8 percent of the warship industry, 59 percent of the radio industry, and 44 percent of the weapons industry) are concentrated in 14 major cities with over one million population.

2) Too many people live in cities. According to the census conducted at the end of 1962, 14 cities in the country have a population over one million, and 20 cities a population between 500,000 and one million. Most of these cities are located in the coastal areas and are very vulnerable to air strikes. No effective mechanisms exist at the moment to organize anti-air works, evacuate urban population, guarantee the continuation of production, and eliminate the damages of an air strike, especially the fallout of a nuclear strike.

(3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and harbors are situated near big and medium-size cities and can easily be destroyed when the enemy attacks cities. No measures have been taken to protect these transportation points against an enemy attack. In the early stage of war, they can become paralyzed.

(4) All reservoirs have a limited capacity to release water in an emergency. Among the country’s 232 large reservoirs with a water holding capacity between 100 million and 350 billion cubic meter, 52 are located near major transportation lines and 17 close to important cities. There are also many small and medium-size reservoirs located near important political, economic, and military areas and key transportation lines.

We believe that the problems mentioned above are important ones directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war. We propose that the State Council organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and feasible measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack.

Please tell us whether our report is appropriate.

The War Department of the General Staff, April 25, 1964.

[Source: *Dangde wenxian*98 (Party Documents) 3 (1995), 34-35.]

**Document 2: Mao Zedong’s Comments on the War Department’s April 25 Report, 12 August 1964.**

To Comrades Luo Ruiqing99 and Yang Chengwu:

This report is excellent. We must carefully study and gradually implement it. The State Council has established a special com-
mittee on this question. Has it started its work?

Mao Zedong
August 12.

[Source: Ibid., 33.]


Chairman103 and the Central Committee:

In accordance with Chairman’s comments on the General Staff War Department’s report of how our country’s economic construction should prepare itself for a surprise attack by the enemy, we have gathered comrades with responsibility in these areas for a meeting. All of us agree that Chairman’s comments and the War Department’s report are extremely important. We must pay serious attention to and do our best on such an important issue concerning our country’s strategic defense. The meeting has decided:

(1) To establish a special committee on this case within the State Council. We suggest that the committee consist of thirteen people including Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Luo Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu, Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing Deputy Directors.

(2) In addition to the four areas mentioned by the War Department, our preparation measures also need to include universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutions, warehouses, government departments and institutions as well as civil shelters in cities and mines. We must follow Chairman’s principle of “careful study and gradual implementation” in conducting our investigation into various areas as early as possible and pay attention to the following issues.

(a) All new construction projects will not be placed in the First Front, especially not in the fifteen big cities with over a million population.

(b) For those currently on-going construction projects in the First Front and particularly in the fifteen big cities, except those that can be completed and put into effective operation next year or the year after, all the rest must be reduced in size, undergo no expansion, and be concluded as soon as possible.

(c) For existing old enterprises, especially those in cities with high industrial concentration, we must remove them or some of their workshops. Particularly for military and machinery enterprises, we must break them in two parts if possible, and shift one part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we can remove them as a whole, we must do that with careful planning and in steps.

(d) Beginning in next year, no new large and medium-size reservoirs will be built.

(e) For key national universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes in the First Front, if they can be removed, we must relocate them to the Third and Second Fronts with careful planning. If they can not be removed, we must break them into two parts.

(f) From now on, all new projects, in whatever Front they will be located, must comply with the principle of dispersion, closeness to mountains, and concealment. They must not be concentrated in certain cities or areas.

We have divided labor to deal with the above work:

(a) The State Economic Commission and the State Planning Commission will be responsible for the arrangement of the industrial and transportation systems.

(b) The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for preparation measures concerning railroad junctions.

(c) The Office of National Defense Industry will be responsible for the arrangement of national defense industry.

(d) The General Staff will be responsible for the division of the First, Second, and Third Fronts on the national level and for the arrangement of national defense fortifications and war preparation mobilizations.

(e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be responsible for preparation measures concerning reservoirs.

(f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han Guang will be responsible for the arrangement of universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes.

(g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be responsible for the protection of city buildings and government departments and institutions.

We will spend the months of September and October investigating the various aspects and produce detailed plans that can be implemented gradually. The special committee will synthesize the plans before submitting them to the Central Committee for inclusion in the general plan for the next year and in the Third Five-Year Plan.

(3) We propose to revive the People’s Anti-Air Committee. Premier104 should still serve as Director and Comrade Xie Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). The Ministry of Public Safety will be responsible for the daily work of the committee.

We should restore the Planning Office for the Construction of Underground Railway in Beijing and carry out an active preparation for the building of underground railway in Beijing. In the meantime, we should consider the construction of underground railway in Shanghai and Shenyang. The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for this task.

(4) If the central leadership approves the above suggestions, we propose to distribute our report along with the General Staff War Department report as well as Chairman’s comments as guidelines to all Party Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal, and district Party committees, and to all Party committees within government ministries.

Please inform us whether our report is correct.

Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Luo Ruiqing
August 19, 1964.

[Source: Ibid., 33-34.]

Document 4: Zhou Enlai’s Conversation with Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 2 April 1965.

(1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war (with the United States). (2) China means what it says and will honor the international obligations it has undertaken. (3) China is prepared. China’s policies are
both prudent and prepared....(4) If the American madmen carry out an extensive bombing, China will not sit still and wait to be killed. If they come from the sky, we will take action on the ground. Bombing means war, and war will have no boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to resolve the issue of war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.


Document 5: Liu Shaoqi’s Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965.

The enemy has many contradictions, weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problems are no less than ours. If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed. The enemy will find it difficult to invade. If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade. If it does not invade, we will not fight out. Such a prospect is not impossible. But we must work hard to achieve this goal. We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and are easy for us to strike. We should develop as early as possible new technology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag 1 and Red Flag 2105 can shoot down the enemy’s high-altitude airplanes. If we have assurance to shoot down high-altitude airplanes, we can have more assurance to knock down low-altitude ones. The enemy’s strength lies in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should realize that the enemy lacks reasons and justifications in sending troops. If the enemy invades us without our attacking it first, the enemy’s morale cannot be high. This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.

In addition, there is the issue of increasing the size of troops. In order to build fortifications, we can organize some engineer units. After working for a period and completing fortifications, they can be dismissed. Troops engaged in agricultural production and divisions on semi war alert should also construct fortifications. Production troops are busy with agricultural work, but during slack seasons they should spend most of their time building fortifications. This means that they can work on fortifications for half a year in North China and for four to five months in the Yangtze valley. If war begins and we have to expand troops, we just need a mobilization. This matter will be easy. At the moment, we need to do a good job in organizing militia forces.

What we cannot have time to prepare when war begins includes fortification construction, third fronts, bases as well as communications, a reconnaissance network, and new technology. We must pay attention to these issues. We should start work on the big Third Front, the small Third Front, material storage, state-of-the-art technology, scientific investigation, and research on new weapons. If we delay work on these matters, we will find ourselves unprepared later. To do these things needs time.

As to the issues of the size of troops, the number of military regions, and a unified leadership between the local civilian government and the military, we can have time to deal with them when war begins. Some of the issues will be dealt with only after the enemy has invaded our country. In case that the enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad,106 or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Railroad,107, or the Jinpu Railroad,108, our country will then be divided into sections. If that happens, we have to practice a unified leadership of the party, the government and the army. But this will be decided at that time, not now. With trains and airplanes at its disposal, the enemy will not do things according to our methods. Only when that time comes will our leadership go to mountains. At present, the leadership must live in the city because it will be inconvenient if it does not live in the city. Only when a large number of enemy troops invades China and cuts us into parts will the leadership go to the mountains. It will not do that when China is not cut into parts. For instance, if the enemy does not occupy cities like Xian and Tongguan, Shaanxi109 will not create a Shaanana Military region and a Shaanbei military region. The leadership will decide on this matter after the enemy has invaded, and there is time to do that. There is also time to mobilize troops. At present, we can begin the organization of the militia....(the rest of the speech is about how to organize the militia).

[Source: Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.]


You are fighting an excellent war. Both the South and the North are fighting well. The people of the whole world, including those who have already awakened and those who have not awakened, are supporting you. The current world is not a peaceful one. It is not you Vietnamese who are invading the United States, neither are the Chinese who are waging an aggressive war against the United States.

Not long ago the Japanese Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun published several reports filed by Japanese correspondents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspapers described these reports as unfair, thus provoking a debate. I am not referring to the Japanese Communist newspaper, Akahata. I am talking about Japanese bourgeois newspapers. This shows that the direction of the media is not favorable to the United States. Recently the demonstration by the American people against the American government’s Vietnam policy has developed. At the moment it is primarily American intellectuals who are making trouble.

But all this are external conditions. In fact what will solve the problem is the war you are fighting. Of course you can conduct negotiations. In the past you held negotiations in Geneva. But the American did not honor their promise after the negotiations. We have had negotiations with both Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. Rusk said that the United States has had most negotia-
tions with China. But we stick to one point: the United States must withdraw from Taiwan, and after that all other problems can be easily resolved. The United States does not accept this point. China and the United States have been negotiating for ten years and we are still repeating the same old words. We will not give up that point. The United States once wanted to exchange press delegations with us. They argued that when we began with minor issues, we could better settle major problems later. We contended that only by starting from major issues could minor problems be easily resolved.

You withdrew your armed forces from the South in accordance with the Geneva Accords. As a result, the enemy began to kill people in the South, and you revived armed struggle. At first you adopted political struggle as a priority supplemented by armed struggle. We supported you. In the second stage when you were carrying out political and armed struggles simultaneously, we again supported you. In the third stage when you are pursuing armed struggle as a priority supplemented by political struggle, we still support you. In my view, the enemy is gradually escalating the war; so are you. In the next two and three years you may encounter difficulties. But it is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need to take this possibility into consideration. So long as you have made all kinds of preparations, even if the most difficult situation emerges, you will not find it too far from your initial considerations. Isn’t this a good argument? Therefore there are two essential points; the first is to strive for the most favorable situation, and the second to prepare for the worst.

The Algerian experience can serve as a reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or fifth year of their war, some Algerian leaders became worried. At that time, their Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. They said that Algeria had a very small population of ten million. A million had already died. While the enemy had an army of 800,000, their own regular forces possessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. To add the guerrillas, their total forces were less than 100,000. I told them at the time that the enemy was bound to defeat and that their population would increase. Later, after negotiations France began to withdraw its troops. Now it has completed the withdrawal, only leaving behind a few small naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a national democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Communist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and carrying out people’s war, our two parties are different from Algeria.

I talked about people’s war in my article. Some of the statements refer to specific problems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you have encountered some new conditions. Many of your methods are different from our methods in the past. We should have differences. We also learn about war gradually. At the beginning we lost battles. We have not done as smoothly as you have.

I have not noticed what issues you have negotiated with the United States. I only pay attention to how you fight the Americans and how you drive the Americans out. You can have negotiations at certain time[s], but you should not lower your tones. You should raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared that the enemy may deceive you.

We will support you until your final victory. The confidence in victory comes from the fighting you have done and from the struggle you have made. For instance, one experience we have is that the Americans can be fought. We obtained this experience only after fighting the Americans. The Americans can be fought and can be defeated. We should demolish the myth that the Americans cannot be fought and cannot be defeated. Both of our two parties have many experiences. Both of us have fought the Japanese. You have also fought the French. At the moment you are fighting the Americans.

The Americans have trained and educated the Vietnamese people. They have educated us and the people of the whole world. In my opinion it is not good without the Americans. Such an educator is indispensable. In order to defeat the Americans, we must learn from the Americans. Marx’s works do not teach us how to fight the Americans. Nor do Lenin’s books write about how to fight the Americans. We primarily learn from the Americans.

The Chinese people and the people of the whole world support you. The more friends you have, the better you are.


Document 7: Mao’s Conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968.

Because there has been no battle to fight recently, you want to negotiate with the United States. It is all right to negotiate, but it is difficult to get the United States to withdraw through negotiations. The United States also wants to negotiate with you because it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with problems of three regions: the first is the Americas—the United States, the second is Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few years the United States has stationed its major forces in Asia and has created an imbalance. In this regard American capitalists who have investments in Europe are dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the United States has always let other countries fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is only after World War Two that the United States has begun to take the lead in fighting, first in the Korean War and then in the Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States is taking the lead, but it is followed by only a small number of other countries. Whether the war is a special war or a limited war, the United States is totally devoted to it. Now it cannot afford to pay attention to other countries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are complaining, saying that there is a shortage of manpower and that experienced soldiers and commanders have been removed and better equipment has been relocated. The United States has also redeployed its troops from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. Did not the United States claim that it has a population of two hundred million? But it cannot endure the war. It has dispatched only several hundred thousand troops. There is a limit to its troops.

After fighting for over a dozen years you should not think about only your own difficulties. You should look at the enemy’s difficulties. It has been twenty-three years since Japan’s surrender in 1945, but your country still exists. Three imperialist countries have committed aggression against you: Japan, France, and the United States. But your country has not only survived but also developed.

Of course imperialism wants to fight.
One purpose for its war is to put out fire. A fire has started in your country, and imperialism wants to put out that fire. The second purpose is to make money through producing munitions. To put out fire they must produce fire-extinguishing machines, which will bring about profits. Every year the United States spends over 30 billion dollars in your country.

It has been an American custom not to fight a long war. The wars they have fought average about four to five years. The fire in your country cannot be put out. On the contrary, it has spreaded. Capitalists in the United States are divided into factions. When this faction makes more profit and that faction make less profit, an imbalance in booty-sharing will occur and trouble will begin domestically. These contradictions should be exploited. Those monopolized capitalists who have made less money are unwilling to continue the war. This contradiction can be detected in election speeches made by the two factions. Especially the American journalist Walter Lippmann has published an article recently, warning not to fall into another trap. He says that the United States has already fallen into a trap in Vietnam and that the current problem is how to find ways to climb out of that trap. He is afraid that the United States may fall into other traps. Therefore your cause is promising.

In 1966, I had a conversation with Chairman Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At that time, the United States had already resumed attack on North Vietnam, but had not renewed bombing. I said that the United States might end the war that year because it was an American election year. No matter which president came to power, he would encounter the problem of whether the United States should continue the war or withdraw now. I believed that the difficulties that the United States faced would increase if it continued the war. Countries in all of Europe did not participate in the war. This situation was different from that of the Korean War. Japan probably would not enter the war. It might lend some help economically because it could make money by producing ammunition. I think the Americans overestimated their strength in the past. Now the United States is repeating its past practice by overstretching its forces. It is not just us who make this argument. Nixon has also said so. The United States has stretched its forces not only in the Americas and Europe but also in Asia. At first I did not believe that the United States would attack North Vietnam. Later the United States bombed North Vietnam, proving my words wrong. Now the United States has stopped bombing. My words are correct again. Maybe the United States will resume bombing, proving my words wrong a second time. But eventually my words will prove correct: the United States has to stop bombing. Therefore I believe that it is all right for you to make several contingency plans.

In sum, in the past years the American army has not invaded North Vietnam. The United States has neither blockaded Haiphong nor bombed the Hanoi city itself. The United States has reserved a method. At one point it claimed that it would practice a “hot pursuit.” But when your aircraft flew over our country, the United States did not carry out a “hot pursuit.” Therefore, the United States has bluffed. It has never mentioned the fact that your aircraft have used our airfields. Take another example, China had so many people working in your country. The United States knew that, but had never mentioned it, as if such a thing did not exist. As to the remaining people sent by China to your country who are no longer needed, we can withdraw them. Have you discussed this issue? If the United States comes again, we will send people to you as well. Please discuss this issue to see which Chinese units you want to keep and which units you do not want to keep. Keep the units that are useful to you. We will withdraw the units that are of no use to you. We will send them to you if they are needed in the future. This is like the way your airplanes have used Chinese airfields: use them if you need and not use them if you do not need. This is the way to do things.

I am in favor of your policy of fighting while negotiating. We have some comrades who are afraid that you may be taken in by the Americans. I think you will not. Isn’t this negotiation the same as fighting? We can learn experience and know patterns through fighting. Sometimes one cannot avoid being taken in. Just as you have said, the Americans do not keep their words. Johnson once said publicly that even agreements sometimes could not be honored. But things must have their laws. Take your negotiations as an example, are you going to negotiate for a hundred years? Our Premier has said that if Nixon continues the negotiations for another two years and fails to solve the problem, he will have difficulties in winning another term of presidency.

One more point. It is the puppet regime in South Vietnam who is afraid of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Some people in the United States have pointed out that the really effective government popular among the South Vietnamese people is not the Saigon government but the Liberation Front. This is not a statement attributed to someone in the U.S. Congress. It is reported by journalists, but the name of the speaker was not identified. The statement was attributed to a so-called U.S. government individual. The statement raises a question: Who represents the government with real prestige in South Vietnam? Nguyen Van Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Therefore although the United States publicly praises Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will not go to Paris to attend the negotiations, it in fact realizes that problems can not be solved if the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam does not participate in the negotiations.

[Source: Ibid., 580-583.]

1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian’s “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an informative and insightful analysis of China’s decision to assist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does not address the historiographical controversy of whether there was a “strategic debate” in Beijing in 1965. Fresh materials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed new light on this issue.


5. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi guowentu yanjiuyuan zhi [Historical Facts about the Role of the Chinese Military Advi-
sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist France [Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990], 126-127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqiang as members of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming discussion during Giap’s second visit. See Mao to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Jianguoyiila Mao Zendong wengao [Mao Zendong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served as China’s chief military advisor to the Vietnam in 1950, was not mentioned during Giap’s first visit; evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese team to talk with Giap during his second trip.


7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed., Zhongguo junshe guwenhuo yuan yue kangmei shilu [From the China’s Historical Documents of the War], 142-143.

8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessive persecution of so-called landlords and rich peasants occurred, creating serious resentment among the peasant population against the party. Hoang, Canghai yisu, 279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by Western observers as a member of the “pro-Chinese” wing of the VWP.


11. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. According to a recent study by William J. Duiker, Le Duan as General Secretary was “a powerful advocate of an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunification with the South.” At the Fifteenth Plenum of the VWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committee adopted a new policy which advocated a return to revolutionary war to unify the South. But the new line contributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi’s policy.

12. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina, 265.


14. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina, 266.

15. For Pham Van Dong’s visit to China, see the PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are taken from Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67.


17. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al., Zhonggao gongchundang zhengzhi zhong de renmin jiefangju n [A Factual Record of Assistance to Vietnam against the United States] (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25. Wang Xiangen was a secretary at the headquarters of the PLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is currently working with the PLA General Staff. His book contains much useful data on the role of Chinese army engineer troops in Vietnam.

18. For Pham Van Dong’s visit to China, see the PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 65.


20. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159.

21. Ibid.


26. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; and Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, and Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP.

27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; and Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, and Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP.

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30. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangju n, 408.


34. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 71.

50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, development and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” The China Quarterly 115 (September 1988), 351-386.
51. For the complete text of the report, see Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 34-35.
52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in ibid, 33.
53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 August 1964, see ibid, 33-34.
56. Naughton, “The Third Front,” 368.
59. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 341.
60. Ibid., 341-342; Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:403.
68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, see Huang, Sanci danan bisi de Luo Ruiqing Dajiang, chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish a causal relationship between Luo’s purge and China’s foreign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the Vietnamese claim that China decided in June 1965 to provide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting argues that this timing dovetails with a personal shift in the Chinese leadership: “At some point between May and September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, after which Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrilla war implicitly rejecting Luo’s forward strategy and with it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground support apparently came as a substitute form of help for Hanoi,” Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy,” 516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December 1965.
72. For a recent study of China’s policy toward Angola and Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93,” The China Quarterly 143 (June 1995), 387-422.
75. Mao’s talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, and Oceania on 9 July 1964, in ibid, 534-539. These delegations came to China after participating in Pyongyang in the Second Asian Economic Forum.
77. Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, 161.
80. Zhou’s conversation with Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan, 1 March 1965, in ibid, 438.
83. For Mao’s reaction to Dullies’ policy, see Bo Yibo, Roguan zhongguo juece yu shijian de huiju [Recolle-
87. For more discussions of Mao’s attempt to use the escalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China’s political and social life, see Chen, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War,” 361-365.
88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model,” 712-713.
89. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shi, 60-68.
90. Ibid., 74-75.
92. Cong, Quze fazhan de suiyue, 607.
97. Yang Chengwu.
98. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal published by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and the Central Archives. It often contains important party documents.
99. Chief of Staff.
100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.
101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.
102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.
103. Mao Zedong.
104. Zhou Enlai.
105. These are the names of Chinese missiles.
106. A major railway trunk running east and west between Liaoyang and Lanzhou.
107. A major railway trunk running north and south between Beijing and Wuhan.
108. A major railway trunk running north and south between Tianjin and Nanjing.
110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham Van Dong.

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continued from page 232
palpable improvement in Soviet-American relations following the shared fright of the 1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, the Kremlin sought to minimize Soviet involvement in the Vietnam conflict, which was not only problematic from the viewpoint of possible foreign-policy advantages but was also fraught with possible new clashes between the USSR and the USA. Moreover, the Soviet leaders were apprehensive of real military views held by North Vietnam’s leaders, who had a clearly pro-Chinese orientation.

The extent of the difference in the positions held by the two countries became clear after a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 by a delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam (WPV), led by Le Duan, the party’s First Secretary. The DRV Communists came out in support of their Chinese colleagues with such zeal and expressed such radical ideas about the role of the national liberation movement in Third World countries that their Moscow interlocutors were obliged to switch from “the patient explanation of the CPSU stand and the general line of the world communist movement” to direct warnings about the possible consequences such views could have for “the Vietnamese friends’” relations with the Soviet Union.3

Further evidence that the two sides were slowly but surely drifting apart surfaced during a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLF delegation at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The representatives of the patriarchic forces of South Vietnam presented to the Soviet leaders a number of requests and proposals, including requests for increased supplies of arms and ammunition. They also expressed a desire that a permanent mission of the NLF be opened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewed skeptical about all those requests. In his report to the CC about that delegation’s visit, D. Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC International Department, advised that no definite answer about the opening of such a mission be given and that all talks be held exclusively via the North Vietnamese state agencies. In view of this, it was decided not to receive the delegation at the CPSU CC, for that would have raised the awkward necessity for the Kremlin leaders to state in clear terms their stand on the above-mentioned issues. CC Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the curator of relations between the CPSU and other parties, accepted that advice.4

Meanwhile, faced with the Soviet leadership’s unwillingness to plunge into the Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi redoubled its efforts to improve relations with China. According to the information of the Soviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRV officials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateral treaty of military cooperation. North Vietnam hosted a delegation of PRC military leaders, led by the Defense Minister, and in December 1964 a bilateral treaty was signed which provided for the introduction of PRC troops to the DRV.5 Prior to that, the DRV General Staff had informed the Soviet military attaché in Hanoi that there was no longer any need for Soviet military experts to stay in the country and they should leave the DRV without replacement by other Soviet advisors as soon as they completed their current business.6 The rapprochement between Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated by common views on the need to fight against “U.S. imperialism.” Although the North Vietnamese leaders never fully trusted China (as later conflicts demonstrated), coolness in relations with the Soviet Union predetermined their official position.7

Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 marked a turning point in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations.8 For reasons that remain unclear, the Soviet Union made an about-face and again oriented itself toward closer cooperation with North Vietnam. Probably Leonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feared a loss of Soviet influence in the region, particularly in the context of the mounting differences between Beijing and Moscow which threatened to develop into an open conflict. In that context, the consolidation of China’s position in Southeast Asia at the USSR’s expense posed a potential threat to the Soviet authority in the world communist movement.9 Furthermore, the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in November 1963 and advent to power of Lyndon B. Johnson (whose election as president in 1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indicator of greater right-wing influence in American politics) dimmed the hopes of improvement in Soviet-American relations that had arisen in the last year of Kennedy’s life. This development offered a certain freedom of action to Moscow’s new leadership, which had reverted to the policy of confrontation—a policy which was, in turn,

From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. First and foremost, the USSR emphasized moral and political support to what it described as the Vietnamese people’s war against American aggression. The Soviet mass media now promptly and frequently carried official statements by Soviet leaders denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, no longer delaying as it had with TASS’s statement on the Tonkin Gulf incident. Steps were taken to expand contacts both with Hanoi and representatives of the South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, accordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 December 1964, of a permanent mission of the NLF SV.

Second, Soviet material assistance (economic and, primarily, military) to the DRV and NLF expanded. Soviet military supplies in the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularly after 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi. Prior to 1965, German models of arms were sent to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union, but from then on the Kremlin provided only Soviet-made arms to the “Vietnamese friends,” including the latest designs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes, rockets, and field artillery, as well as a large array of especially sophisticated arms and combat hardware for the DRV air defense system. And Soviet economic and military assistance to Vietnam kept on increasing. According to estimates of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet material assistance accounted for 50 percent of all aid to the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 the total value of Soviet assistance over that period was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles, with military supplies accounting for 60 percent.

Such a turnabout in Soviet policy with respect to cooperation with Vietnam was received with satisfaction by the Hanoi leaders, who increasingly stressed the importance of Soviet moral, political, and material assistance in their conversations with the officials of the Soviet Embassy and those of other socialist countries. However, the North Vietnamese leaders’ appreciation for this largesse by no means signified that they would now take the USSR’s side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusively on only one communist patron. Rather, after Moscow changed its attitude to the DRV, Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profit by exploiting its friendship with both of its mighty allies—the PRC and the USSR—as they competed for influence in Southeast Asia. Precisely this policy was pursued by the WPV Central Committee grouping which was formed in late 1964–early 1965 and included Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap. This group sought to rid North Vietnam of China’s excessive wardship, on the one hand, and, on the other, to avoid any kind of dependence on the Soviet Union. As a result, in that period reports by Soviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the KGB regarding reduced Chinese influence in the DRV were accompanied by complaints of insincerity, egoism and unmanageability on the part of “the Vietnamese friends.”

For instance, back in 1966, in his analysis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Ilya Shcherbakov pointed out: “Just as before, the Embassy believes that the process of promotion of our relations with the WPV and the DRV will hardly be steady or rapid in view of the policy pursued by the Vietnamese comrades. This was, regrettably, confirmed in the past few years. Even the manifestation of a more serious discord between the WPV and the Communist Party of China will not probably mean automatic or proportionate Soviet-Vietnamese approaches. The year 1966 showed once more that we are obliged constantly to display initiative and unilaterally, as it were, drag the Vietnamese comrades to greater friendship and independence.” The ambassador then stressed the “general positive nature” of the WPV’s tendency for independence but pointed to its negative aspects, primarily to indications that the Vietnamese conducted its foreign policy, including its relations with Moscow, from a narrow, nationalistic viewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoi exclusively from the standpoint of their benefit to Vietnam, rather than for the good of the international socialist cause.

This undercurrent of tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations, produced by what Moscow viewed as Hanoi’s parochial perspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966, for example, the North Vietnamese expressed indignation at the partial reduction of Soviet and U.S. military contingents in Germany. Why? Because, they explained, the Soviet troops had allegedly been transferred to the Soviet-Chinese border, which provoked tensions there and diverted Beijing from North Vietnamese military requirements, and the U.S. troops were immediately transferred to South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese side’s egoism and its desire (in the words of a Soviet Embassy political letter) “to have a monopoly on the correct assessment and methods of solution to the Vietnam conflict,” often verged on cynicism. Indicative in this respect was a complaint by the Soviet Ministry of Commercial Shipping, dated 18 July 1966, sent to the CPSU CC, in connection with the actions by the Vietnamese in Haiphong, the DRV’s chief port. The port authorities, the ministry complained, had artificially delayed the unloading of Soviet vessels, evidently believing that the longer they held the large-tonnage vessels flying the Soviet flag in the port and its vicinity, the less risk of damage they would run of U.S. bombing raids. Moreover, they usually placed those Soviet vessels in close proximity to the most dangerous areas (e.g., near anti-aircraft guns), in hopes of ensuring their safety during air raids. Moreover, during air raids Vietnamese military boats lurking behind Soviet vessels fired at the enemy, thus making the Soviet “shields” the targets of U.S. bombers (and those vessels contained loads of cargoes meant as assistance to “the embattled Vietnamese people”). The clearly outraged ministry officials demanded that Soviet commercial vessels be kept out of danger while discharging their noble mission.

No less complicated was the situation concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese military cooperation. The USSR Defense Ministry and embassy in Hanoi repeatedly informed Moscow about the “Vietnamese friends’ insincere attitude” toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, and the Soviet Defense Ministry. They pointed out that they received slanted reports from the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam regarding the situation in South Vietnam, belittling the role and importance of Soviet military assistance to the DRV and discrediting the performance of Soviet arms and military hardware. They also reported that the North Vietnamese had raised obstacles in the way of Soviet military experts who wished to inspect U.S. military hardware, and displayed
other signs of distrust and suspiciousness toward Soviet Defense Ministry representatives. The Soviet leadership was informed about violations of storage rules for Soviet military hardware, wasteful use of missiles and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet experts’ advice on the rules of exploitation of military hardware, which led to its spoilage. All this coincided with Hanoi’s requests for more assistance, but the DRV leaders evidently saw no contradiction in this: It was pointed out in the 1970 political report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while “attaching great importance to the Soviet military assistance, the command of the People’s Army of Vietnam at the same time regarded it exclusively as the obligatory discharge of its internationalist duty by the Soviet Union.”17

All the above-mentioned facts suggest how complicated and contradictory Sino-Vietnamese relations were, and demonstrate the great discrepancy between the scale of Soviet assistance to Vietnam and the degree of Soviet influence on Hanoi’s policy. As a Vietnamese journalist in his conversation with M. Ilyinsky, an Izvestia correspondent, put it: “Do you know,” the Vietnamese journalist asked, “what is the Soviet Union’s share in total assistance, received by Vietnam, and what is the share of Soviet political influence there (if the latter can be measured in percent)? The respective figures are: 75-80 percent and 4-8 percent.” The Soviet journalist noted: “If the Vietnamese journalist has exaggerated the former figures (by 15-20 percent), the share of Soviet influence is probably correct.”18

Sino-Vietnamese contradictions tended to sharpen as the DRV leadership came to realize the need for a diplomatic settlement with the USA. The DRV’s consent to hold talks with Washington in 1968 profoundly irritated Beijing, which was dead-set against any compromise settlement leading to a cessation of hostilities. To advance its more militant policy, the Chinese leaders began to expand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi) with the NLF, urging it to carry on protracted warfare. Moreover, the PRC started to obstruct carriages of Soviet arms and ammunition delivered by rail through Chinese territory, with the express aim of undermining Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Although the PRC leadership’s approach to the talks issue later softened, Sino-Vietnamese relations remained strained.

Although discord between the Beijing and Hanoi leaderships affected Sino-Vietnamese relations, no major conflict between the two countries threatened a complete rupture during the course of the war. Vietnam still needed Chinese assistance and support, so it took steps to reduce or contain the level of tensions. The DRV’s party and government leaders, as before, regularly visited Beijing to discuss with “the Chinese friends” important foreign policy issues. No matter how riled, Hanoi carefully avoided giving categorical assessments of Chinese policy—either regarding the world communist movement or Soviet-Chinese relations. “The WPV leaders realize full well,” the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi explained to Moscow, “that China is situated quite close to Vietnam, whereas the Soviet Union is far away. Vietnam would be hard put to do without Chinese assistance in its struggle and in future peaceful construction. So it would be premature to ask the Vietnamese now to state their clear-cut position with respect to the USSR and China.”21 And the following fact is quite indicative: Hanoi named Xuan Thuy, well-known for his pro-Chinese views and a past president of the Vietnamese-Chinese Friendship Association, as the head of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks.

The details of relations among the USSR, DRV, and PRC also throw light on the Soviet Union’s relations with the USA. Soviet leaders could hardly react indifferently or simplistically to the Vietnam conflict and the dramatic escalation of American military activity in Southeast Asia. From a purely propaganda viewpoint, the conflict played into Soviet hands. While U.S. support for an unpopular neo-colonial regime in Saigon offered a ripe target for condemnation and undermined Washington’s international stature, the USSR could simultaneously pose as a consistent fighter for the triumph of a just cause, acting in the spirit of proletarian internationalism—as evidenced by its moral-political, economic, and military assistance to North Vietnam—and also as a potential mediator in the forging of a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, the likely protracted nature of the conflict promised to sap the strength of the Soviet Union’s principal rivals, distracting the United States and China and thereby enhancing Soviet security interests in other regions (especially Europe and the Soviet Far East).

Yet the Vietnam War also presented long-term difficulties and dangers for Moscow, especially to the extent that there was a real threat of its escalating from a local into a world war, if (as was sometimes speculated) the USA were driven to desperation and resorted to the use of nuclear weapons. In that case, the USSR could hardly have kept neutral—and yet retaliating against the United States might have led to disastrous consequences. All the same, even if no nuclear conflict broke out, the risk of a direct clash between the two superpowers arising from the Southeast Asian crisis was too great and this was precisely what the Soviet leadership wished to avoid at all costs. Plus, to the extent Kremlin leaders genuinely desired an improvement in relations with Washington, the war would inevitably serve as a distraction and potential sticking point.
There were naturally other “pros” and “cons” which Moscow must have taken into account in determining its policy toward the struggle: Military factors constituted one major positive incentive favoring a more active Soviet involvement, according to archival documents. There were two principal, interconnected perceived opportunities: Vietnam offered a live battlefield testing ground for Soviet military hardware, including the latest models, and also a chance to obtain a windfall of hard information about up-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting the war booty captured or obtained by the DRV forces. The North Vietnamese air defense was fully equipped with modern Soviet hardware, whose effectiveness was shown by the fact that even the Vietnamese personnel managed to operate it successfully, despite a frequent lack of training or competence. Those systems were being constantly improved, taking into account the capabilities of U.S. warplanes. Apart from the anti-aircraft defense system, the archival documents note, the North Vietnamese used the Soviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems, which were highly effective in attacks on U.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots, etc., as well as MiG-21 jets.

The Soviet military also relished the opportunity to pore over the latest U.S. military hardware. In accordance with a Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement signed in the spring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook to transfer to the USSR models of captured U.S. military hardware for inspection. All difficulties notwithstanding, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, a total of 700 models were delivered to the USSR between May 1965 and January 1967. The embassy pointed out that the work done was very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted a decision to apply in Soviet industry of a number of selected and studied models.24 However, apart from obvious assets the USSR gained in the course of the Vietnam War, its expenditures were likewise enormous, primarily in the sphere of ever-increasing material assistance to Vietnam. (See the figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 the Soviet Union undertook to render to the DRV economic assistance to the tune of 121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assistance was far greater in view of Hanoi’s incessant requests for additional supplies. In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled 524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in 1969 was planned to remain on the same level (525 million rubles), but with the opening of peace talks and reduction of the scale of hostilities in Vietnam, part of the funds originally assigned for military deliveries was reallocated for other purposes, so Soviet assistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370 million rubles and in 1970, 316 million rubles.25

One negative factor, from the Soviet leaders’ viewpoint, in decision-making on aid to the DRV was what they saw as the Vietnamese allies’ unmanageability and unpredictability. Hanoi’s independent course in relations with the USSR hardly inspired Moscow to greater enthusiasm in its support for the war, and as time went on, those Vietnamese properties might have led to undesirable consequences—perhaps an open break. So from that standpoint, at least, Moscow had every reason to favor an early cease-fire and political solution.

In fact, the hope for a peaceful settlement was shared by both Soviet and American leaders, and their tactics on this issue, paradoxically enough, were surprisingly similar. However, the Soviet government backed a settlement on Hanoi’s terms, whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maximum consideration of the Saigon government’s interests. Moreover, of course, as a direct participant in the conflict, the United States could not possibly play the part of an arbiter, which remained a privilege of the Soviet Union. For this reason, with U.S. armed forces directly involved in hostilities, the Johnson Administration was obliged to rely on intermediaries in its attempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at the negotiating table rather than pursue a purely military outcome. And in this respect Washington pinned much of its hopes on the Soviet Union.26

U.S. leaders had every reason for such hopes, for they believed that since the USSR rendered massive and ever-growing military and economic assistance to Vietnam (of which Washington was well aware),27 so the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after January 1969, his successor Richard M. Nixon were convinced that Moscow would press Hanoi to agree to open negotiations, once Washington: 1) demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the Vietnam War was hardly in its interests; 2) seduced it by the promise of cooperation with the United States; or, better still, 3) warned it that if Soviet cooperation were not forthcoming the United States might resort to rapprochement with China—or some optimal combination of all those approaches. When in retirement, Johnson disclosed his calculations as president in a conversation at his Texas ranch with Soviet citizens that was reported to the Kremlin leadership by the KGB in December 1969. The USSR could be instrumental in helping the United States to bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion, Johnson argued, for “if we take Soviet strategic, not tactical, interests, the end of the Vietnam War fully accords with the Soviet Union’s interests,” considering that, “after all, it is the United States, not Vietnam, which is the main partner of the USSR.” And Johnson rejected the argument that the Soviet Union was not in a position to exert pressure on the DRV as groundless from the viewpoint of realpolitik. “It’s highly doubtful for a country supplying Vietnam with 75 percent of [its] arms not to have real levers of influence on it,” the ex-president was quoted as saying.28

Thus, the problem, from the U.S. perspective, consisted only in discovering how best to approach Moscow. The United States might have acted through official channels, since although Soviet-American relations were rather cool at that time, they were maintained. And the United States certainly probed what could be done in that direction. For instance, at an August 1966 meeting between Colonel C.C. Fitzgerald, a military attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, with officers of the Department of External Relations of the Soviet Defense Ministry, the American stressed the important role the USSR could play in the settlement of the Vietnam conflict as the initiator of and active mediator in peace negotiations. Col. Fitzgerald drew the attention of his interlocutors to the Johnson Administration’s constant efforts to open talks, stating that the visit to Moscow of Senator Mike Mansfield and Averell Harriman’s appointment as a special presidential advisor aimed at precisely this purpose. However, worried that a formal, top-level overture to Moscow might result in a rebuff or even denunciation by the Kremlin leaders, the White House opted not to run the risk, but to first sound out Soviet officials in order to ascertain their attitudes and try to reach agreement unoffi-
cially.

Regrettably, we do not yet have access to all the documents, including the still-classified "special dossiers" (osobaya papki) at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign and Defense Ministry, and Presidential Archive materials, that are necessary to reconstruct fully from Soviet sources all of the many conversations and probes connected to various diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Vietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, perhaps most importantly, the so-called MARI-GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (to use the secret U.S. government code names), in both of which the Soviet Union played an important role. An initial survey of the SCCD archives disclosed only cryptic traces of Soviet contacts with potential intermediaries. For instance, documents failed to clarify what was discussed in conversations with L. Mulkern (vice-president for international relations of the Bank of America), who asked for assistance in establishing unofficial contacts between U.S. President Johnson and the Soviet government, or with Marshall D. Shulman (then an associate of Harvard University's Russian Research Center), both of which were recorded by the KGB (the latter with the recommendation that Shulman be advised that his information had to be confirmed by the U.S. President). While the documents encountered during this early stage of research left these and many other questions unresolved, they certainly pointed at the high intensity of unofficial Soviet-U.S. contacts apparently related to the war (either directly or through mediators, as, for instance, through the services of Austrian Ambassador in the USSR Vodak) in the summer-autumn of 1965.

Moscow’s seeming reluctance to meet Washington half-way in its diplomatic efforts was probably at least partly attributable to the fact that the Kremlin was acutely aware of its limited ability to exert influence on Hanoi’s policy—an awareness due in large measure to the complete and objective information sent to Moscow by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi—not by the Politburo, the CC Secretariat, nor the Foreign Ministry—and only later were those recommendations and draft decisions rubber-stamped by the top Soviet leaders. This conclusion, albeit preliminary, is based on ample documentary evidence, when, for instance, the Soviet Ambassador sets out a number of ideas in his political letter to Moscow about what should be done, and later the same considerations were put forward as the official views of the CPSU and Soviet government in conversations with Pham Van Dong or Nguyen Duy Trinh. So Moscow obviously deemed it advisable to consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi before adopting decisions.

Take the following two examples. The political letter32 of the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, entitled “Soviet-Vietnamese Relations After the Talks Held in April 1968,” prepared for Moscow Center on 1 September 1968, assessed the results and significance of the opening of the Paris peace talks. Regarding the situation as favorable for achieving a settlement in the best interests of the Vietnamese people, the Ambassador, who signed the letter, believed that the prime task at the moment was “to help the Vietnamese comrades to put an end to the hostilities this year and switch over to a political settlement of the Vietnamese issue.” With this aim in view, Shcherbakov believed, it would be advisable to invite a higher-level DRV government delegation to Moscow in October and “try once more to analyze jointly the situation and convince the DRV government to express its opinion on the whole package of the Vietnamese settlement.”

Soon afterward, V. Chivilev, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in the DRV, presented Pham Van Dong with a letter of invitation from Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin for a DRV party and government delegation to visit the Soviet Union. The date of the visit was later settled and a decision was adopted on a visit to the USSR by a Vietnamese government delegation led by Le Duan in November 1968. Though the materials on the visit remain inaccessible, it seems highly likely that Soviet leaders followed the recommendations of their man in Hanoi.34

Another example of the importance of the Soviet ambassador’s advice in decision-making dates to early 1974. CC Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was in charge of the Party’s international relations, submitted to the CPSU CC Secretariat a memorandum, entitled “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends,” in which he raised the issue of establishing and promoting relations between the CPSU and the communist parties of several Southeast Asian countries by making use of the authority wielded by the WPV in the communist movement in the region. In other words, he suggested possible Soviet penetration of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. After inconclusive discussion of the proposal, Ponomarev, along with CC secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko, Demichev, Katushev, and Rakhmanin, decided to consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi on the matter.35

The new importance attached to the role of ambassadors and embassies in the process of decision-making on foreign-policy issues reflected a general trend, typical of the Brezhnev era: the growing influence of the bureaucratic apparatus, especially medium-level officials, on policy-making. Since top Soviet leaders had little idea of the reality in Vietnam, they willingly entrusted decision-making in the sphere of current policy to experts, signing ready-made decisions or intervening only in extraordinary situations.36

Thus, indirect evidence suggests that in defining its stand on the Vietnam War, Moscow largely drew on the opinion of its diplomatic representatives in the DRV. And in 1965-1966 the Soviet Embassy was far from optimistic about the prospects for a peaceful settlement. Meetings and conversations between the Soviet Embassy officials and members of the diplomatic corps and journalists accredited in Hanoi revealed that North Vietnam’s leaders were fully committed to continuing the hostilities against the USA. Indicative in this respect was a conversation at the WPV CC on 23 August 1966 between Soviet chargé d’affaires P. Privalov and Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman of the Committee for the Unification of the Country. Gen. Vinh firmly believed that the situation was hardly favorable for opening North Vietnamese-U.S. talks. “Had we been defeated by the Americans,” Vinh said, “we would have had no other choice than to agree to hold talks, but we are confidently dealing blows at the enemy and winning decisive victories. What would it mean for us to hold talks now? That would mean losing every-
thing....”37 This viewpoint was shared by the entire WPV top leadership.

That is why the Soviet Embassy’s report for 1966 included very cautious forecasts about possible changes in the DRV stand. The embassy, in the belief that it was necessary to “exert and broaden, with the support of all peace-loving forces and the socialist countries, strong political and diplomatic efforts in order to bring the matter to the settlement of the conflict in the current year,” suggested that the USSR might eventually have to elaborate and present its own peace plan to the Vietnamese comrades. That supposition was made on the basis of what the embassy viewed as a certain coincidence of the CPSU and WPV “assessment of the situation and active promotion of politico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam.”38

In that contest, the USSR sought to evade the issue of acting as a formal mediator at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was what the USA sought). The only role the Soviet Union was then prepared to play was that of a “postman,” who would carry both sides’ messages, and that of “a night watchman” by offering an opportunity for unofficial meetings between U.S. and North Vietnamese embassy officials in Moscow.39 At the same time, Moscow spared no effort to convince its “Vietnamese friends” of the need to switch from military to political-diplomatic methods to attain a settlement.

The USSR undertook the mission of “a postman” and “a night watchman” very reluctantly, probably for fear of being turned into an official mediator. At least it did not wish to perform those functions on a permanent basis. So the United States had to use the services of other countries, in particular, Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, early in 1967 a new flurry of activity was observed in Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received Shcherbakov and familiarized him with the gist of President Johnson’s letter to Ho Chi Minh, handed over at a regular meeting in Moscow of representatives of the DRV and the US embassies. And Ho Chi Minh’s reply, according to Trinh, was to be sent along the same channels.40 Those facts make it possible for us to suppose that by 1967, meetings of diplomats of the two warring parties were held in Moscow on a regular basis.

As to its function of “a postman,” in 1967 Moscow regularly supplied Hanoi with information regarding the requests and offers of U.S. representatives, conveyed during meetings with Soviet diplomats, and delivered messages between the two sides. For instance, on 24 April 1967, “Vietnamese comrades” were informed about a request of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet government take the necessary steps for the DRV government to give access to representatives of the international commission of the Red Cross to American POWs then held in North Vietnam. And on 28 April, the DRV leaders learned that Johnson envoy Averell Harriman had handed over a U.S. statement on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the demilitarized zone to the Soviet charge d’affaires in the United States.41 There is no doubt that Hanoi also received exhaustive information about the June 1967 Glassboro summit between Kosygin and Johnson.

In 1967, too, the Soviet Union failed to convince the Vietnamese leaders to hold talks with the USA on a peaceful settlement. The Soviet Embassy in Hanoi believed that the DRV leadership would accept the idea of such a settlements only under the following conditions: a worsening of the military situation; U.S. acceptance of North Vietnam’s main demands; a change in China’s attitude to the Vietnam War; and finally, the socialist countries’ clear declaration to the North Vietnamese that they could not afford to bear the ever growing burden of that war for reasons of an international nature or for fear of its protracted nature. So in assessing the results of the Soviet-Vietnamese talks in April 1967 and the subsequent DRV policy, the Soviet Embassy drew the conclusion that at that juncture, “not a single [one] of the above-mentioned situations makes the Vietnamese comrades take the road of active searching for ways to a peaceful settlement.”42

Nevertheless, summing up the results of 1967, Soviet diplomats in Hanoi reached the optimistic conclusion that the year 1968 would be the most favorable for starting the process of settlement. They strongly denounced Hanoi’s rejection of Johnson’s San Antonio formula—so-named after a speech in the Texas city on 29 September 1967 in which LBJ declared that Washington would stop bombing North Vietnam when assured that this would “lead promptly to productive discussions”—pointing out that that formula could not be regarded as “insurmountable” and advising that the DRV leadership take steps to snatch the diplomatic initiative. In order to convince Hanoi to change its intractable stand on talks with Washington, the Soviet Embassy advised Moscow to inform the North Vietnamese at their next summit with Soviet leaders that the USSR could not afford to pursue a policy of brinkmanship with respect to the United States by getting more deeply involved in the Vietnam conflict, and that therefore the best plan for both the Soviet Union and Vietnam would be if the hostilities drew to a close in 1968.43 The fact that talks on the settlement of the Vietnam issue in fact finally started in 1968 may be regarded as a matter of pure coincidence. At the same time, the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi was farsighted in its assessments—what mattered was not that its forecasts had proved correct but rather the factors on which those forecasts were based. And in this respect, the Soviet Embassy had every reason to hope that the pressure exerted by Moscow on the Vietnamese leaders to accept a political rather than military solution, would finally bear fruit.

Preliminary U.S.-North Vietnamese talks opened on 13 May 1968, followed on 18 January 1969 by the official quadrupartite (U.S.-South Vietnam-North Vietnam-NLF) Paris negotiations. Soviet diplomats justifiably regarded the event as their own success, at least in part. “Without acting as an official mediator,” the Soviet Embassy in the DRV pointed out, “the Soviet Union rendered an important service for the two sides to sit down at the negotiating table and open official talks. The USSR spared no effort to convince world opinion and national governments to support an end to bombing raids on the DRV, and exerted pressure on the USA. At the same time it emphasized to the Vietnamese comrades that the year 1968 was most favorable for a number of reasons for launching the process of the political settlement of the Vietnam issue.”44

The USSR did much to organize the Paris meeting, including influencing the choice of venue. The record of a conversation between V. Chivilev, Soviet acting charge d’affaires, and Le Duan, First Secretary of the WPV CC, held on 2 May 1968, suggests that on the eve of the opening of U.S.-DRV peace talks, the Vietnamese side offered Paris as the venue with due regard for the Soviet opinion. By that time Soviet diplomacy had already performed “a certain
amount of work with the French.” The main factor behind Hanoi’s choice of the French capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the opportunity to maintain contacts with Moscow from it.”

The same factor was taken into account by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping the sides at the negotiating table. With this aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC and Soviet government sent a letter to the WPV CC and DRV government stressing that the Paris talks were vitally important for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized that they were living through an important period from the viewpoint of opportunities for diplomatic struggle, offering to put the entire weight of Soviet authority in the world in order to triumph in the political and diplomatic contest.

In an effort to influence the North Vietnamese side and as a hedge against the DRV’s sometimes unpredictable behavior, the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi offered to send experts on Vietnamese affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Paris. Moreover, Moscow reached an agreement with the DRV leadership for the Vietnamese regularly to inform Moscow on the situation at the talks and their future strategy, tactics, and plans. In turn, the USSR gave the Vietnamese exhaustive information about U.S. intentions.

Nevertheless, despite its promises, Hanoi on several occasions confronted Moscow with a fait accompli. Yet, having “forgotten” to inform its ally about a planned action, the Vietnamese leadership nevertheless insisted on Moscow’s immediate support. This happened, for instance, when the NLF published its program of ten points and established the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (RVSPRG). Although Le Duc Tho met with Kosygin on the eve of the program’s publication (during a stopover in Moscow on his way to Paris), the leading DRV negotiator never mentioned the planned steps.

However, in attempting to convince Soviet leaders to exert greater pressure on Vietnam to achieve progress in the talks, U.S. officials often forced an open door. Assessing the steps taken by Moscow for the settlement of the Vietnam conflict alongside the difficulties it encountered in dealing with Hanoi’s foreign policy, one may reasonably conclude that the USSR did its utmost to ensure a favorable outcome of the talks, naturally with due account of its own interests.

Moscow continued to play an important role at the Paris talks after Nixon came to power in 1969. The Soviet leaders kept abreast of the latest developments and did their best to influence the Vietnamese position through the services of the USSR embassies in Hanoi and Paris. At his regular meetings with the leaders of the DRV and NLF delegations, the Soviet Ambassador in France, V. Zorin, asked the Vietnamese what questions they considered it necessary for him to raise in his conversations with the U.S. delegation. At the same time, Zorin expressed his “desire” for the Vietnamese side to put forward some specific proposals on military issues and for the NLF to elaborate a specific diplomatic program. Simultaneously, the Soviet ambassador in the DRV, Shcherbakov, warned “the Vietnamese friends” against following an extremist path, such as the temptation to pursue a purely propagandist policy or to resort exclusively to military methods in relations with the USA.

Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 elections marked a turning point in U.S. policy toward the USSR, as the incoming administration made every effort to obtain greater Soviet involvement and cooperation in the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The newly elected U.S. president and his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, decided that all problems in Soviet-American relations were linked to the Soviet stand on the Vietnam issue. And if efforts in Moscow did not quickly or sufficiently pay dividends, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared not to miss an opportunity to play “the Chinese card” to make the Soviet leaders more tractable.

Like his predecessors, Nixon was convinced that the USSR had unlimited control over Hanoi’s policy and that as soon as it issued the appropriate orders, the Vietnamese leaders would be ready, willing, and obliged to conclude the talks. As a result, each time the Paris talks reached a blind alley, the White House turned to Moscow to help find an acceptable escape route. After a meeting with Kissinger on 12 June 1969, when the American openly asked the USSR for assistance to overcome the latest crisis in the talks, Soviet Ambassador in the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin reported to Moscow: “All indications are that his [Nixon’s] attempts to convince the USSR to help the USA in the settlement of the [Vietnam] conflict, will be repeated in the future, and this will probably be felt in the course of our talks with this administration on other international issues, if not directly, then at least in the form of procrastination in the course of such talks or in decision-making on other issues.”

In this respect, however, former CIA chief William Colby was probably right when he wrote in his memoirs about his deep skepticism with respect to the Soviet Union’s ability to exert pressure on its friends, who were “stubborn and full of determination.” Nevertheless, in spite of its limited opportunities, the USSR managed to make a considerable contribution to the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. So the signing of the bilateral agreement by the DRV and USA, on 27 January 1973, on the end of the conflict, will be repeated in the future, and this will probably be felt in the course of our talks with this administration on other international issues, if not directly, then at least in the form of procrastination in the course of such talks or in decision-making on other issues.”

In conclusion, in assessing Soviet policy toward the Vietnam War in the 1964-1973 period, including in the sphere of Soviet-American ties, it may be asserted that in spite of all the difficulties, complications, and human costs associated with the conflict in Southeast Asia, the superpowers avoided grave crises, upheavals, or direct confrontations in their bilateral relations—thus preserving a degree of general international stability and paving the way toward the U.S.-Soviet detente of the early-mid-1970s.
22. A memo by Defense Minister Grechko to Brezhnev serves as a testimony to this fact. Grechko wrote that on 30 October 1965, U.S. F-111A aircraft had been shot down by an anti-aircraft Divina complex in the area of Hanoi. He also mentioned measures, adopted by Soviet experts to improve the anti-aircraft complexes after they had obtained information about the use of high-speed aircraft (up to 3700 km per hour) by the US air forces (SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 232, ll. 9-10).
23. Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Southeast Asia Department S. Nemchina and Head of the NLFSLV Permanent Mission in Moscow Dang Cuong Minh, 2 September 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 416, l. 139.
24. Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, 14 March 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 329, l. 43.
26. Washington’s first attempts to reach agreement with the DRV leaders were made back in 1962, under President Kennedy’s administration, so we can only suppose what could be the results of those contacts, had President Kennedy been alive. A. Goodman, for instance, believes that as a result of President Kennedy’s assassination, the USA lost an opportunity to reach agreement with Hanoi. (A.E. Goodman, The Last Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), 14.)
27. To this testifies the KGB information of President Johnson’s talks with Italian Foreign Minister A. Fanfani (SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 690, l. 93).
28. KGB Memorandum, 11 December 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 539, l. 276.
29. Main Intelligence Administration (GRI), USSR Ministry of Defense, to CPSU CC, 23 August 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 262, ll. 237-238. (For an English translation of this document, see CWHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993) 61-62.)
31. KGB Memoranda, 5 and 21 July 1965 and 7 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 379, 393.
32. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
33. Political letters from Soviet embassies were in fact political testaments, were reported to Brezhnev, so the top Soviet leadership had been informed about Washington’s intentions.
34. Political Letter, “Soviet-North Vietnamese Relations before the April 1968 Talks,” 1 September 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 114; see also SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, ll. 129, 131-132, 133.
36. Sometimes the situation looked simply ridiculous. Mentioned in the list of materials, included in “special dossiers,” is the draft decision on the reply to Le Duan’s personal message to Brezhnev, presented by the CC Department and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 December 1974. There is the following note on the card of that document, written by Brezhnev’s aide, Alexandrov: “to Cde K.U. Chernenko. Leonid Ilyich asked to hold a vote on this proposal (he has not read the text).” It turns out that top Soviet leaders signed documents either having learned the gist of the document at best, or having read only its title.
38. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 259.
40. KGB Memorandum, 28 January 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 680; Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador Shcherbakov and DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 15 February 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 145.
41. USSR Foreign Ministry, list of questions on which the Vietnamese comrades were informed, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 15.
44. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 30-31.
45. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Charge d’Affaires in the DRV V. Chivilev and Le Duan, 2 May 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 376, l. 47.
47. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 31.
48. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, l. 177.
49. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador V. Zorin and Xuan Thuy and Tranh Byu Khien, 21 February 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 460, ll. 56-60, 131-134. (For an English translation, see CWHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993) 62-63.)
50. Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobrynin and H. Kissing, 12 June 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 558, l. 103. (For an English translation of this document, see CWHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993) 63-67.) The contents of this conversation, as the note on the document testifies, were reported to Brezhnev, so the top Soviet leadership had been informed about Washington’s intentions.
Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnamese would eventually express a willingness to negotiate.

After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to persuade the Vietnamese that a positive signal of some kind was in their best interests. Working through U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, they made it clear that a resumption of bombing raids in the North would eliminate any chance for peace. Norman Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon Johnson, tried to play the role of intermediary in this process, but to no avail. To the dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United States resumed bombing raids on January 31, and Operation Lumbago came to an unsuccessful end.

Operation Marigold

This was another attempt to bring the United States and North Vietnam together in secrecy and with a minimum of preconditions. This time, Polish diplomats worked closely with their colleagues from Italy. Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of the operation. Poland’s representative to the International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, Italy’s ambassador to South Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main protagonists in Saigon.

Phase I of Marigold developed from a discussion between Lewandowski and Premier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended the bombing campaign. He relayed this information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side was anxious to know whether Hanoi would make any overt sign of accommodation (such as refraining from offensive military operations in the South, or reducing traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bombing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish diplomats could obtain no assurances from Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries.

Phase II was a lengthier and more complex operation that began when ambassador Lodge requested that Lewandowski present a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnamese. This time, an unconditional bombing halt would precede the substantive negotiations. Rapacki and Michalowski under-
stood the importance of this new development, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid Brezhnev, who encouraged them to proceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to Beijing at about the same time, where he received contradictory advice from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

Phan Van Dong’s sly proposal to Lewandowski generated considerable excitement since it contained a request to arrange an unprecedented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a series of consultations with John Gronouski, to set the stage for these critical talks. From the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. First, the American side began to express doubts about certain unspecified details of the 10-point plan as it had been recorded by Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese government, opposed to any talks, increased its pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, the tempo and brutality of American bombing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. On December 13 and 14, the center of the city was hit for the first time. Stunned by these attacks, the North Vietnamese withdrew their offer to meet. In a dramatic confrontation on December 19, when Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad faith, Rapacki’s frustration overflowed: he smashed his glasses down on the table, and they flew into the American ambassador’s face. Operation Marigold appeared to be dead.

The Poles continued to hope that a basis for face-to-face talks still existed, however. They briefed UN General Secretary U’Thant, who promised to do whatever he could. They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary). The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to Beijing at about the same time, where he received a private. Following the toasts and sentimental speeches I was preparing to leave, when Dean Rusk’s secretary informed me that he would like to have a few words with me in private.

Rusk was subdued as he spoke at length about his upcoming academic work, and his retirement plans. Then he said: “During my long tenure as Secretary of State, I’m sure I made many erroneous judgments and bad decisions. But my intentions were always pure, and I acted according to the dictates of my conscience. Thus, I have no regrets. Except for one thing—that in 1966 we did not take advantage of the opportunities and your role as go-between. We should have begun a negotiating process that, with your help, could have ended a conflict that has cost us so much blood and treasure, and that now has cost us the election. I wanted to say this to you today, to thank you for your efforts, and to ask that you convey my words to Minister Rapacki.”

CAMBODIA AND THE COLD WAR

THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES

by Kenton J. Clymer

On a graceful boulevard radiating out from Wat Phnom in Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly reno-
vated National Library of Cambodia. Built by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24
December 1924), the library also housed the country’s archives. A separate archives
building, located directly behind the Na-
tional Library (and thus not visible from the
street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library,
it still awaits renovation. Designed with
high ceilings, large windows, and electric
ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated
the best available technology for preserving
books and manuscripts in tropical climates.

During the French colonial period and
after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in
1975, the library and archives were admin-
istered jointly. In 1986, however, following
the Vietnamese model, they were separated.
The library is controlled by the Ministry of
Information and Culture, while the archives
reports to the Council of Ministries.1

During the terrible period of the Khmer
Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives
were home to pig keepers, who served the
Chinese advisers living in the hotel next
door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gar-
dens. All of the staff from the library and
archives, about forty people, fled. Only a
handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime,
and only two or three returned to work in the
library once the Khmer Rouge were driven
out in 1979.

The library’s holdings today are only a
fraction of what they were in 1975. But
contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge
may not have systematically destroyed books
and documents.2 To be sure many books
were ruined, some simply pushed off the
shelves to make room for cooking pots,
others used for cooking fires or for cigarette
papers.3 Subsequent neglect and misman-
agement made matters worse, arguably much
worse. Many books that did survive the
Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored
and soon succumbed to insects and the ele-
ments. Two Australians archivists, Helen

continued on page 265

SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS:
THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

[Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the
Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies,
Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for
International Human Rights, Yale University.]

Executive Summary

The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the
documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of
Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement
“The policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer
Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975
and January 7, 1979.” [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year
mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit:

1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress

Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to
organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime’s crimes. The
Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the
genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian
Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference,
chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21
and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by
the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal
violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in
Cambodia. Cambodia’s two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both
praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others,
including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of
Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers.

2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide

Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators
of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in
assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian
genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the
Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites
across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom
comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer
Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal
acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot’s
1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer
Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare
documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the
first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages
on the Pol Pot regime. Yale’s CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of
Yale’s singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal
resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute
this complex research undertaking.

3. Recreating Lost Histories

Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge
The Cambodian Genocide Program has nine new histories already underway, comprising detailed and original research on the fates of various regions and population groups into which Pol Pot’s regime divided Cambodia. In the process, Cambodian scholars are being trained in both social science methods and computer documentation. In addition to these nine separate studies in preparation, others are in the planning stage. The first volume of these studies is to be published in 1997.

4. Training Cambodian Lawyers

Until now, the legal expertise did not exist in Cambodia to support a trial of Khmer Rouge leaders utilizing due process guarantees and unimpeachable evidentiary standards. The Cambodian Genocide Program has just graduated the first class of seventeen Cambodian legal professionals, government officials, and human rights workers from CGP’s nine-week intensive summer school on international criminal law and international human rights law. The school was held in Phnom Penh from June to August 1995, with the participation of the Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights at the Yale Law School. A second summer school will be held in Cambodia in mid-1996. The individuals trained in the CGP program will be able to staff a domestic or international tribunal.

5. Creating a Permanent Cambodian Documentation Center

Until now, no “center of gravity” existed in Cambodia to provide a spark for the serious study of what happened to Cambodian society during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Cambodian Genocide Program has established an international, non-governmental organization in Phnom Penh, known as the Documentation Center of Cambodia. The Documentation Center is facilitating the field operations of the CGP, training Cambodians in research and investigative techniques, and will enable an indigenous organization to continue the work of the program after the conclusion of the CGP mandate in January 1997.

Introduction

In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the world witnessed one of the worst cases of genocide and crimes against humanity ever perpetrated. While those responsible for the Nazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20th century were punished, there has been little effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for the atrocities they committed. In 1994, the U.S. Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. A team of world-class Cambodia scholars based at Yale was chosen to receive funding from the U.S. Department of State, and subsequently, by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. That team has now, in three quarters of a year, made tremendous progress in remedying this omission of justice and accountability. Four major problems face any effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice:

1) a paucity of specific documentary evidence linking high-level policymakers and military personnel to acts of genocide and crimes against humanity;
2) insufficient training of Cambodian officials and lawyers with the political will and legal skills to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice;
3) insufficient awareness among Cambodian policymakers of the options available for legal redress of genocide and crimes against humanity; and
4) the lack of a permanent, indigenous Cambodian NGO tasked to carry out independent research and documentation on the Cambodian genocide.

Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program is making excellent progress toward solution of these four problems. That progress is described in this First Interim Progress Report of the Cambodian Genocide Program.

Identifying Legal Options for Redress.

Until now, no conference of Cambodian and international observers has examined specific legal options for redress of Cambodia’s genocide. On 21 and 22 August 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program hosted an international conference under the banner, “Striving for Justice: International Criminal Law in the Cambodian Context.” The Striving for Justice Conference brought together a wide range of interested observers and decisionmakers for discussions with two international criminal law experts. Under a contract with the U.S. Department of State, Mr. Jason Abrams of the Open Society Institute and Professor Steven Ratner of the University of Texas are now completing a study of options for legal redress of criminal human rights violations during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979. When it is completed, the study will offer an analysis of the most probable cases of violations of criminal human rights laws under the DK regime, and the most likely avenues for redress. Abrams and Ratner have tentatively concluded that the Khmer Rouge are culpable on several counts of violating international criminal laws concerning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They further have concluded that there are several possible avenues for legal redress of these criminal violations, including an ad hoc international tribunal, a domestic Cambodian tribunal, and/or some form of an international commission of inquiry.

At the Striving for Justice Conference, Abrams and Ratner presented their draft conclusions to an invitation-only audience of nearly 100 distinguished guests. The audience consisted of representatives from the Offices of the Co-Prime Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, several key ministries including Interior and Justice, numerous Cambodian and international human rights organizations, members of the Cambodian National Assembly, a representative of the United Nations Secretary General, a member of the U.S. Congress, and others. The conference was also addressed by the First Prime Minister, His Royal Highness Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, and the Second Prime Minister, His Excellency Samdech Hun Sen. The conference offered extensive opportunities for discussion and exchange of ideas among the participants. Conference participants reached a clear consensus on the need for accountability, and outlined important specific next steps to be taken to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice.

Documentation Databases. The Cambodian Genocide Program is assembling an elaborate family of databases collectively known as the Cambodian Genocide Data Base (CGDB). Using the Computerized Documentation System (CDS/ISIS) designed by UNESCO and modified to suit CGP’s particular needs by our programmers, CGP is making rapid progress in the
compilation of all known primary and secondary material relating to the Khmer Rouge regime. The Program has already obtained access to several little-known caches of documents, including a DK Foreign Ministry archive, archives of the DK Trade Ministry, the only known surviving archive from a DK regional prison, original maps of Khmer Rouge killing fields, and several collections of rare photographs taken by the DK regime itself. Another collection made available to the CGP includes a set of internal minutes of key meetings of the DK “Party Center” held in 1975 and 1976. CGP currently has two missions at work in Vietnam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, searching for relevant documentation in state and private archives.

These databases will bridge a huge gap in the case against the Khmer Rouge. Because these databases did not previously exist, policymakers could not precisely identify victims and perpetrators, nor could they establish empirical links between the two on a national scale. Yale’s CGDB resolves this problem. When the databases are complete, an investigator using them could, for example, identify individual victims and perpetrators of a particular atrocity, perhaps with photographs and biographies of the individuals in question. Yale’s CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale’s singular combination of Cambodian area and archival studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking.

The Bibliographic Databases. The bibliographic database will contain records on this new material and on all other known primary and secondary sources of information pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime, including books, articles, monographs, documents, reports, interviews, tapes, films and videos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted, CGP research efforts have already led to a dramatic increase in existing documentary evidence through discovery of previously unknown archival sources. Rapid progress has been made with the design and establishment of this database. The initial program timelines projected the creation of some three hundred records in a bibliographic database by the end of December 1995. That milestone was achieved in February 1995. As of August 1995, approximately 1000 records representing some 50,000 pages of documentation had been entered into the bibliographical database.

The Victim Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made arrangements to obtain and make electronically accessible to an international audience Dr. Justin Corfield’s biographical database containing more than 40,000 entries on the Cambodian elite. We express our thanks to Dr. Corfield. We have plans to expand this database with additional information obtained as a result of our original research. Given the patterns of violence in Democratic Kampuchea, it is likely that a large number of the individuals listed in this database became victims of the Khmer Rouge. Thus, this database may become useful for identifying and cross-referencing victims of genocide and crimes against humanity.

The Photographic Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is preparing to scan several large collections of photographs into the CGDB. These collections contain a significant number of items which are likely to have a high degree of evidentiary value for the prosecution. Examples include a large number of photos of DK leaders, of forced labor brigades, and the entire collection of prisoner photographs from the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Most of the 4,000 prisoner mugshots are currently not accompanied by any identification of the prisoners. By making these photographs available on the internet, and adding to the database a special field for readers to key in suggested names for each photograph, we hope to obtain identities for many of the victims of the Khmer Rouge. The names could be used to prosecute perpetrators on charges of killing specific persons.

The Khmer Rouge Biographical Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is assembling a second biographical database containing data on members of the Khmer Rouge organization between 1975 and 1979. This database will include both political and military leadership, down to the srok (district) level. Thus this database will be useful for identifying the chain of command in various regions at various times, and in establishing command responsibility for particular atrocities.

The Imaging Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is in the process of scanning images of original DK documents into the database. We have already accomplished the scanning of several hundred relevant documents, including a near-complete set of the records in Khmer from the 1979 in absentia genocide tribunal of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Using custom software already designed specifically for CGP, CGDB users will be able to browse through the bibliographic database and, upon finding a record of particular interest, “jump” to a full digital image of that specific document with the “click” of a mouse. This capability can considerably expedite the search for incriminating evidence of genocide intent.

The Geographic Database. The Cambodian Genocide Program is also in the process of constructing an elaborate computer-based map showing the physical locations of facilities of the Khmer Rouge “internal security” apparatus, including prison and “killing field” sites. The Cambodian Mine Action Center established by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia has designed standardized software for mapping work in Cambodia, and CGP has obtained access to this system for our purposes. Utilizing the Global Positioning System to pinpoint the precise coordinates of locations identified by our researchers, CGP will accurately map the Khmer Rouge terror system and the resting places of its victims. The resulting display is likely to constitute an incriminating indictment of the scope of Khmer Rouge terror, providing strong evidence of widespread crimes against humanity.

Disseminating the Databases. In addition to publishing analytical indexes of the databases, user access to the computer databases themselves will be enabled in several ways. First, physical copies of the database will be deposited at several locations in the United States and Cambodia. Second, we hope to make the entire database available on CD-ROM. Finally, through the Internet, the database will be made accessible to all interested parties worldwide. The projected implementation date for the online genocide database is early 1997.
more compelling and accurate picture of the past. It will allow policymakers to fashion a case for the necessity of accountability for the Cambodian genocide. And it will provide prosecutors with critical information on crimes committed by specific individuals.

Research. Cambodian Genocide Program Director Ben Kiernan’s new book, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*, will soon be available from Yale University Press. A comprehensive survey of the Cambodian genocide, it provides a baseline of existing information from which more specific research can be initiated. The CGP has already begun implementing a wide range of new social science research on the Cambodian genocide.

For instance, six professional Cambodian researchers and an American have been at work for several months on new histories of the seven geographic zones and regions of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime: the Southwest Zone, the Western Zone, the Northwest Zone, the Siem reap-oddar Meanchey Region, the Northern Zone, the Northeast Zone (including Kratie) and the Eastern Zone. One of these 70-page monographs is already well on the way to completion, and the others are expected to be completed in 1996, for publication in 1997.

The Cambodian Genocide Program has also commissioned several additional studies, including one of the DK “Party Center” (whose members included Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Thirith, Yun Yat, Mok, Ke Pauk and Vorn Vet). This monograph will examine the Khmer Rouge chain of command and the degree of central authority over events in the zones and regions. This study will commence in September 1995, and is expected to be completed in 1996. The CGP has commissioned a further study of the genocide against the Cham Muslim minority under the Pol Pot regime, and work on this monograph will also commence in September 1995. In addition, the CGP plans new monographs on the Buddhist monkhood, on women, and on the Vietnamese, Chinese and tribal minorities, focussing on the fate of these population cohorts under the Pol Pot regime. We expect at least one and possibly two collected volumes of these monographs to be published in 1997 and 1998.

These studies will be of crucial importance in synthesizing the general and the particular in Cambodia’s genocide. Few detailed studies exist of particular regions under the Khmer Rouge, and so up to now it has been impossible to assemble a complete picture of what happened on a national scale. By breaking down the research task into particular regions, and simultaneously selecting several integrating themes such as the Party Center, Cham Muslims, Buddhists and women, the CGP studies will reconstruct the nexus between the local situation and national policy. This will provide crucial analytical evidence of the extent of national control by the Khmer Rouge, and the impact of this control on all the people of Cambodia.

Legal Training Project. On 18 August 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program produced its first graduates in international criminal law and international human rights law. Seventeen Cambodian legal professionals successfully completed the nine-week training program, including officials from the Ministries of Justice and Interior, the Council of Ministers, and three Cambodian non-governmental human rights organizations. The training covered principles of international criminal law pertaining to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; the structure of national and international legal enforcement mechanisms, including national courts, ad hoc international tribunals, the International Court of Justice, and truth commissions; and the requirements of due process and evidentiary standards.

The Cambodian Genocide Program will build on this foundation next year to further enhance the capacity of the Cambodian legal system to cope with the anticipated political decision to move forward with legal redress for crimes committed during the Pol Pot regime. After consulting with the Royal Cambodian Government and other interested observers as to the preferred fora for seeking redress, the CGP will fashion a second training project designed to inculcate the skills necessary to implement those means of redress selected by the appropriate political authorities.

Several additional varieties of training under CGP auspices are in progress. Training of Khmer researchers in Cambodia on social science methods, historiography and database management has been proceeding since June 1995 on a weekly basis. Two Cambodian scholars are currently enrolled for MA’s at Yale, in History and International Relations. Training of Khmer staff and researchers in Cambodia on all aspects of operating the Documentation Center of Cambodia is also occurring on a weekly basis.

Until now, no one in Cambodia had the range of legal skills required to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice in fair and procedurally sound trials. The CGP’s training programs have directly addressed this shortcoming. This is consistent with the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, which states that it is “the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979.” [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.]

The Documentation Center of Cambodia. The Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-Cam”) is a non-profit international non-governmental organization (NGO) established in January 1995 by the CGP to facilitate training and field research in Cambodia related to the CGP’s mission. With offices in Phnom Penh, the DC-Cam serves as a base of operations for the documentation, research and training activities carried out under the auspices of the CGP. The staff of DC-Cam is entirely Cambodian in composition, and weekly staff development training is already in progress to prepare indigenous personnel to assume full responsibility for all aspects of operations in 1997.

In January 1997, at the conclusion of the CGP’s mandate, DC-Cam will be transformed into a Cambodian NGO to serve as a permanent institute for the study of topics related to the Khmer Rouge regime, and as a resource for Cambodians and others who may wish to pursue legal redress for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated under that regime. The documentation and research products of the CGP will be deposited with the Documentation Center of Cambodia for access by the Cambodian people.

[For those who have access to the internet, DC-Cam has a World Wide Web HomePage containing more information about that organization, located at http://www.pactok.net.au. The Documentation Center e-mail address is dccam@pactok.peg.apc.org.]

Research Collaboration. The Cambodian Genocide Program has won strong sup-
port from the worldwide Cambodian studies community (see “Scholars Speak out on Cambodia Holocaust,” letter to the Wall Street Journal, signed by 29 Cambodian scholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). These scholars represent virtually the entire field of Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodian scholars David P. Chandler, Milton E. Osborne, and Michael Vickery have already provided help in various ways. Others who have responded positively to requests for information on their personal archival holdings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd, Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and Judy Ledgerwood. Additional Cambodian scholars like David Ashley and Jason Roberts have generously offered to work with the CGP on a volunteer basis.

An Australian professional working with the CGP has also initiated a project to begin the computer mapping of Khmer Rouge prison and mass grave sites. This project has now been funded by the Australian government at the level of A$24,300. Additional funding is being sought. This is the first time anyone has attempted to construct a comprehensive inventory of the terror apparatus used by the Khmer Rouge regime to murder up to two million people.

In June, July, and August 1995, CGP Director Ben Kiernan presented the Program’s work-in-progress at the U.S. Forum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (in New York), at Monash University and the University of New South Wales (in Australia), and at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions all produced new collaboration from foreign scholars and specialists, ranging from an offer of a large biographic database to a promise of rare photographs of the Pol Pot leadership. The ability of the CGP to attract the cooperation of Cambodian scholars, along with legal and technical experts worldwide, is a key factor in explaining the success of the Program to date.

**Cambodian Reception of the CGP.** Cambodian leaders have complained for years that the outside world had not recognized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the tragedy of the Cambodian people. The initiation of the Cambodian Genocide Program helped answer this complaint on an international scale. This measure of recognition sparked a new willingness among the Cambodian political elite to squarely face the darkest chapter of Cambodian history.

Cambodians have become full partners in the CGP’s work. His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson on 21 July 1995, “I infinitely thank the distinguished promoters of this research program, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan and yourself, for the care that you have manifested, thanks to the ‘Cambodian Genocide Program,’ in nourishing truth and promoting and assuring respect for human rights in my country.”

Since the earliest days of the CGP in January 1995, the Royal Cambodian Government has been unreservedly supportive of the mandate given to Yale University by the U.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministers of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co-Ministers of Defense, and the President of the National Assembly have all pledged their personal and institutional cooperation with the CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of the program transcends political affiliation, with support coming from the leadership of all three parties represented in the government. But the cooperation of the Royal Government has gone far beyond pledges. The Royal Government is providing the CGP with a wide range of resources to facilitate our work in Cambodia and in the region at large.

At the Striving for Justice Conference in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, First Prime Minister Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committed the Royal Cambodian Government to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice for their crimes against humanity. In his opening address to the conference, the First Prime Minister complimented the CGP, saying, “On behalf of the Royal Government, on behalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister, and on my own behalf, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and warmest congratulations to the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigation and Yale University for embarking on the two years programme of documentation, research and training on the Cambodian genocide. I would also like to express my sincere thanks equally to the United States to create the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act and its appointment of Yale University to carry out the two year programme.”

Substantively, the First Prime Minister argued, “The international crimes of the Khmer Rouge violated the most central norms of international law and this clearly affected the interests of all states in general and Cambodia in particular.” His Royal Highness the First Prime Minister added, “The Royal Government is determined to bring those responsible for the perpetration of these heinous crimes against the Cambodian people to face justice.” In his closing address to the conference, His Excellency Samdech Hun Sen summed up the view of many participants by saying of the conference, “This is not about politics, it is about justice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for killing millions of people, then there is no point in speaking about human rights in Cambodia.”

Large numbers of ordinary Cambodian citizens seem to concur with the Co-Prime Ministers. Many Cambodians in Cambodia, the U.S., and other countries have volunteered their assistance. Since June 1995, a team of Cambodian volunteers in New Haven, CT, has been preparing a biographical index of Khmer Rouge political leaders and military commanders. As of September 1995, Cambodian-American citizens’ groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, and Texas have offered to compile witness testimony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst for justice is powerful among the survivors of Pol Pot’s genocide.

Consistent with these feelings of ordinary Cambodians and the policy of the government, the CGP has received from the Royal Cambodian Government significant assistance to our research program. One of the most useful forms of this aid is the unprecedented assistance from the Royal Government in retrieving documentation from Vietnam unavailable to researchers up until now. In combination with previously unexamined archives from the Cambodian People’s Party, Royal Government ministries, and private archives now being opened to the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of new data pertaining to criminal culpability during the Khmer Rouge regime seems destined to come to light. It is the expressed policy of the Royal Government to assist the CGP in uncovering such important information.

**Evaluation.** To ensure objectivity and quality control, the CGP has instituted a rigorous two-tier system of program evaluation. In the first tier, the Steering Group of the Department of State’s Office of Cambo-
Cambodian Archives continued from page 260

Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited the archives at the end of 1992 were “dismayed at what we saw. . . . Valuable records from the French colonial days are on the floors and shelves rotting away. About 50% of the records—and there are about 2000 linear metres of records all up—are either wrapped in brown paper or still in their original boxes. The boxes have been constructed from acidic pasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and protein adhesive which has promoted insect infestation, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Other records are sitting unwrapped gathering dust, mould and also being attacked by insects.”

By the end of 1994, conditions were still far from good. During my two visits to the archives that year, stacks of books, most beyond repair, still stood on the floor of the library’s storage areas and in the archives. Wrapped and unwrapped documents remained on dusty shelves in the archives, and insect damage was evident everywhere. Nevertheless, thanks to the dedication of some Cambodians and some foreign (mainly Australian) assistance, there have been improvements, and the archives can in any event be used. There are now typescript guides to some of the more important documentary collections, and proper archival storage boxes, a gift from Australia, are increasingly being used.

The archives contain numerous, if eclectic, works including official journals, the United States Civil Code, Russian encyclopedias, and works from the French period. More significant are the collections of published and unpublished documents that have survived. The bulk of the collection consists of those colonial records which the French did not take with them when they left, particularly records of the Résidence Supérieure du Cambodge. Some of the manuscripts date to the late nineteenth century and concern a wide range of mostly domestic matters. These, along with some printed Foreign Affairs records from the 1950s and 1960s, were the documents most useful to me. However, other records concern the Buddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge period.

Permission is required to use the archives, and prospective researchers need to apply at the Council of Ministers. There is no fee. Writing ahead might be useful (it is very unlikely that a reply will be sent even if the letter is received), but I was able to obtain permission in Phnom Penh without great difficulty. It may, however, take a few days. (The first time I applied on the Friday before a holiday week. Nevertheless, permission to use the archives was received the Monday following the holidays.)

The archives is open only about four or five hours per day. Many documents remain wrapped in paper. The documents themselves are often in very fragile condition, and insects sometimes scurry out from among the pages. There is no working electricity in the building, and plumbing is rudimentary. Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as are other members of the staff. Kim Ly understands French and some English.

In May 1994, there were few researchers (often I was alone in the building), and the rainy season added to a sense of gloom and foreboding resulting from reports of rebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside. But by December the Khmer Rouge threat seemed to have receded. Now government officials and private citizens did come by to consult the archive’s records. School children also visited. The library was heavily used, especially in December when there was a very well attended celebration of the library’s seventieth anniversary. Perhaps this is a hopeful sign of Cambodia’s returning health.

2. Ibid., 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by the state of Alaska, made the same point in a paper delivered at the “Seminar on the Khmer Culture’s Revival,” Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994.
5. For a more complete description of the archive’s holdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambodia.”

Kenton J. Clymer, professor of history and department chair at the University of Texas at El Paso, is researching a history of U.S.-Cambodian relations. His most recent book is Quest for Freedom: The United States and India’s Independence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
RESEARCH NOTE: DOCUMENTING THE EARLY SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

by Mark Kramer

Two recent developments pertaining to the early Soviet nuclear weapons program—the declassification of an edict promulgated by Josif Stalin in August 1945, and the issuance of a directive by the Russian government in mid-1995—are worth noting. Each development is covered here briefly, and the relevant documentation is provided at the end.

The Establishment of Beria’s Special Committee

Exploration of the basic processes involved in nuclear fission began in the Soviet Union well before World War II, and serious work aimed at building nuclear weapons was initiated at a top-secret research facility in Moscow, known simply as Laboratory No. 2, in early 1943. Over the next two years the Soviet nuclear bomb program was spurred on by intelligence disclosures about the Manhattan Project in the United States, but it was not until after the fighting ended—and the technical feasibility of nuclear weaponry had been vividly demonstrated by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—that an all-out program was launched in the USSR. On 20 August 1945, the supreme leader of the Soviet Union and chairman of the wartime State Defense Committee (GKO), Josif Stalin, formed a nine-member “Special Committee” under the GKO’s auspices to oversee the whole Soviet bomb effort. The Special Committee was placed under the direction of Stalin’s top aide, Lavrentii Beria, the notorious secret police chief. The edict that Stalin issued (No. GKO-9887ss/op) to establish the Special Committee and its two main subordinate organizations was declassified and published in the July-August 1995 issue of Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (“Military-Historical Journal”), pp. 65-67. The full text is provided below in translation.

Several points about the document are worth noting:

First, Stalin’s edict placed the Special Committee under the control of the GKO, the supreme organ in the Soviet Union during World War II. When the GKO was disbanded on 4 September 1945, the Special Committee was recast as a “Special Committee of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars.” (The Council of People’s Commissars was itself renamed the USSR Council of Ministers in March 1946.) Shortly after Beria’s arrest on 26 June 1953, the Special Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers (as it was then known) was dissolved, and the staff and organizations under its control were transferred to the newly formed Ministry of Medium Machine-Building.

Second, the edict provided for the creation of a Technical Council, which was to report directly to the GKO’s Special Committee. Until now, Western experts such as David Holloway had thought that the Technical Council was set up as an integral part of the newly-created First Main Directorate of the Council of People’s Commissars (an entity that is discussed below). A close look at Stalin’s edict shows that on this point Holloway was incorrect. The Technical Council was established as a separate body under the Special Committee, not under the First Main Directorate (which itself was subordinated to the Special Committee).

Third, of the nine members of the GKO’s Special Committee, five were also members of the 11-man Technical Council. The exceptions were Beria, Georgii Malenkov, Nikolai Voznesenskii, and Mikhail Pervukhin. (N.B.: Nikolai Voznesenskii, the director of the State Planning Committee—known as Gosplan for short—should not be confused with the distinguished physicist Ivan Voznesenskii, who was a member of the Technical Council). It stands to reason that the three senior political officials on the Special Committee—Beria, Malenkov, and Nikolai Voznesenskii—would not have been included on the Technical Council, but Pervukhin’s absence is somewhat more puzzling, since he was in charge of the USSR’s chemical industry at the time. The Technical Council consisted predominantly of renowned physicists: Igor Kurchatov, Pyotr Kapitsa, Abram Ioffe, Abram Alikhanov, Yuliia Khariton, Isaak Kikoin, and Ivan Voznesenskii. The other four members included a radiochemist, Vitalii Khlopin, and three highly capable industrial managers and engineers: Boris Vannikov, Avraamii Zavenyagin, and Vasiliy Makhnev. Zavenyagin, among other things, had been a deputy to Beria at the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) since 1941, serving with the rank of general.

Fourth, Vannikov was appointed chairman of the Technical Council, and Alikhanov was appointed the scientific secretary of the Council. The text of Stalin’s edict does not bear out David Holloway’s assertion (in Stalin and the Bomb, p. 135) that Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, and Kurchatov were appointed deputies to Vannikov on the Council. In fact, Pervukhin, as noted above, was not on the Technical Council at all. Zavenyagin and Kurchatov were members of the Council, but were not listed as deputy chairmen.

Fifth, the other new subordinate organ created by Stalin’s edict—a First Main Directorate of the Council of People’s Commissars—also was placed under Vannikov’s supervision, and Zavenyagin was appointed a first deputy. Vannikov and Zavenyagin thus enjoyed the distinction of serving on all three of the main bodies created by Stalin’s edict. Four officials who were not on either the GKO’s Special Committee or the Technical Council were appointed deputy heads of the First Main Directorate: Nikolai Borisov, the deputy chairman of Gosplan; Pyotr Meshik, the head of the NKVD’s economic directorate and deputy head of the “Smersh” Main Counterintelligence Directorate; Andrei Kasatkin, the First Deputy People’s Commissar for the Chemical Industry (which Pervukhin headed); and Pyotr Antropov, a geologist and deputy member of the GKO. Antropov was placed in charge of a commission responsible for the exploration and mining of uranium.

Sixth, the document was forthright about the need for the Soviet Union to ensure access to foreign sources of uranium, including deposits “in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries.” Although it did not specifically mention eastern Germany as a source of uranium, the Soviet zone in Germany (which was transformed into the German Democratic Republic in 1949) became the largest supplier by far for the Soviet bomb program. The importance of uranium in Soviet policy toward Germany in the late 1940s should not be underestimated, as Norman Naimark points out in his recent book, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 235-250.

Seventh, the GKO’s Special Committee was given almost unlimited discretion over
its own funding and operations, a sign of the overriding priority that Stalin attached to the development of nuclear weapons. An entire directorate was set up within Gosplan to ensure that all necessary resources were available. Despite the ravages of the war and the need for mass reconstruction, no expense was spared in the drive to build a nuclear bomb. Although the extravagance of Beria’s efforts proved troubling to some of the participants, their objections were on practical, not moral, grounds. Pyotr Kapitsa cited this matter (as well as his sharp personal differences with Beria) when he wrote a letter to Stalin in November 1945 asking to be removed from the program. Kapitsa argued that the path chosen by Beria was “beyond our means and will take a long time,” and he insisted that a “methodical and well-planned” program would enable the Soviet Union to build nuclear weapons “quickly and cheaply.”

*Eighth*, Stalin’s edict specified the need for increased espionage vis-a-vis the U.S. nuclear program. Until this time, responsibility for Soviet foreign intelligence had been spread among several agencies (and the NKVD’s role in the process was very limited), but the edict gave Beria direct control over all nuclear espionage carried out by Soviet intelligence organs, including the People’s Commissariat on State Security (NKGB, later renamed the Committee on State Security, or KGB), the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (RUKA, later renamed the Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, of the Soviet General Staff), and other unspecified intelligence bodies. Copies of this part of the edict (Point 13) were distributed to Vsevolod Merkulov, the People’s Commissar for State Security, and Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, the chief of the RUKA. (Incidentally, the mention of Kuznetsov’s surname on the distribution list confirms, for the first time, that he was head of Soviet military intelligence in the 1940s. Kuznetsov is described in Soviet military reference works as having been the deputy chief of the General Staff from 1943 to 1949, but he was never explicitly identified as head of the RUKA.)

Both Merkulov and Kuznetsov had been overseeing a massive operation to gain intelligence about nuclear weapons technology, as the newly released “Venona” documents amply show (for more about these documents, partially decrypted Soviet intelligence cables recently declassified by the U.S. National Security Agency, see below). Merkulov had been giving periodic reports to Beria before August 1945 about the technical progress of the Manhattan Project and about the prospects of locating adequate stores of fissible material. In mid-October 1945, shortly after the GKO’s Special Committee was formed, Merkulov sent a follow-up report to Beria, which drew on elaborate information supplied by the spy Klaus Fuchs in June and September. The report provided a detailed technical overview of the design, dimensions, and components of a plutonium bomb (the type of bomb dropped on Nagasaki). In subsequent months, Merkulov and Kuznetsov continued to furnish invaluable data about bomb technology and uranium supplies. The inclusion of Point 13 in Stalin’s edict is one further indication of the crucial role of intelligence in the Soviet nuclear bomb program.

**The Russian Government’s May 1995 Directive**

On 17 February 1995 Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree “On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Compilation of Archival Documents Pertaining to the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR.” This decree (No. 180) was published in the 1 March 1995 issue of Rossiiskaya gazeta, and an English translation was provided in the Spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (p. 57). The decree stipulated that certain archival materials were to be released for an official compilation (sbornik) of documents (presumably a single volume) on the Soviet Union’s pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1945 and 1954. It did not, however, provide for any broader declassification of materials related to the early Soviet nuclear program.

The February 1995 decree indicated that a Working Group was to be established within one month (i.e., by mid-March 1995) to begin considering which documents might be released for an official compilation. This Working Group, formed under the auspices of the Russian government’s Commission for the Comprehensive Solution of the Problem of Nuclear Weapons, was not actually set up until 24 May 1995, some two months behind schedule. Directive No. 728-R, signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and published in Rossiiskaya gazeta on 7 June 1995 (p. 5), listed 20 individuals who were given responsibility for “studying archival documents and developing proposals concerning their declassification” for an official anthology. The full text of that directive, including the 20 members of the Working Group, is featured below.

The combination of Yeltsin’s decree and Chernomyrdin’s directive provides some cause for concern. The announcement of plans for an official anthology is a welcome step, but unless it is followed by a more systematic declassification of archival materials, the proposed anthology will give only a very limited—and perhaps misleading—depiction of the early Soviet nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, judging from the instructions approved by Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, it appears that, at least for now, no broader release of documents is under consideration.

The composition of the Working Group also does not bode well. The affiliations and backgrounds of most of the 20 members imply that archival openness will not be their paramount concern:

*** The panel is chaired by Lev Dmitrievich Ryabev, a first deputy Minister of Atomic Energy. Ryabev has decades of experience in the Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons program, including several years (beginning in 1986) when he served as head of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, the body now known as the Ministry of Atomic Energy. (Although Ryabev currently is only a first deputy minister rather than a minister, his retention of a senior post in the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex is a sign of his trustworthiness and political acumen.) As an institution, the Ministry of Atomic Energy has been extremely wary of releasing documents that would shed any light on Soviet nuclear weapons developments. Ryabev has been among those who have expressed the need for “great caution.”

*** One of the two deputy chairmen of the Working Group, G. A. Tsyrkov, is also a senior official in the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Like Ryabev, Tsyrkov has been leery of divulging any information about Soviet nuclear technology and design practices.

*** Of the other 18 members of the Working Group, five are senior officials from the Atomic Energy Ministry and five
are high-ranking military officers from the Ministry of Defense, including the General Staff. The Defense Ministry, like the Atomic Energy Ministry, has been highly skeptical as an institution about the merits of releasing documents for scholarly purposes. Russian military archivists have been especially disinclined to release items pertaining to nuclear weapons, ostensibly because of concerns about nuclear proliferation. (This policy can be taken to ludicrous extremes. When I worked in the Russian General Staff archive in the summer of 1994, I was told that all documents pertaining to nuclear operations—just operations, not technology—would be sealed off until the year 2046. I asked why that particular year was chosen, but no one seemed to know.)

*** Other members of the Working Group include senior officials from the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Security Service, the Department for the Defense Industry, and the State Technical Commission. (The first two bodies are the main successors to the Soviet KGB, and the last two bodies are under the jurisdiction of the Russian President’s apparatus. The State Technical Commission is housed in the same building as the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.) These four agencies have hardly been noted as champions of archival openness. Documents held by the Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service, in particular, have been kept tightly sealed away. The role of these two agencies is bound to be critical in the release of documentation, whether for an official anthology or for other purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Service archive houses the most sensitive documents on the role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear weapons program, and the Federal Security Service archive contains documents generated by the Special Committee headed by Lavrentii Beria from August 1945 until his arrest in late June 1953 (see above). So far, there is little indication that access to either agency’s document holdings will be expanded.

However, two factors may induce the Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service to be more willing to release documents about nuclear espionage: First, the U.S. National Security Agency has begun declassifying some of its huge collection of “Venona” transcripts of intercepted Soviet communications from 1939 through 1945. The initial batch, released in July 1995, contained numerous documents that shed light on the activities of Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project. The disclosure of these materials may erode the traditional secrecy about such matters in Moscow. Second, some officials in the Russian security and intelligence organs may want to release sensitive documents to spotlight the role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb projects. A fierce debate emerged in Russia in the early 1990s about the relative importance of espionage versus indigenous scientific achievements in the Soviet nuclear/hermonuclear programs. Most observers in both Russia and the West now agree that information provided by Soviet spies was vital in accelerating the construction of the first Soviet fission bomb, but that espionage was of much less importance for the Soviet thermonuclear program. If the release of documents could show that the extent of Soviet nuclear spying was even greater than previously thought, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service might be somewhat less averse to the prospects of declassification.

*** Two heads of research institutes specializing in the history of science and technology—V. V. Alekseev and V. M. Orel—are included on the Working Group, but even if they are inclined to press for greater openness (which is by no means certain), they will be far outweighed by officials from the nuclear weapons complex and military establishment.

*** Rudolf Pikhoya, the director of the Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), is the only panel member from Roskhiv. Even if Pikhoya seeks the release of as many documents as possible—and it is far from clear that he will—his influence on the Working Group is inherently limited, despite his position as a deputy chairman. The most valuable documents on the early Soviet nuclear weapons program are stored in archives outside Rosarkhiv’s jurisdiction.

*** The presence of Yulii Khariton on the Working Group is encouraging, but it may be largely symbolic. Khariton, who was born in 1904, was one of the key physicists in the early Soviet nuclear program, and is the only living member of the Technical Council that was established in August 1945 to advise Beria’s Special Committee (see above). Khariton has given lengthy written and oral testimony over the past few years about the early Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb programs, and he provided useful information to David Holloway for the book Stalin and the Bomb. No doubt, Khariton is more inclined than the other panel members to urge the release of extensive documentation, especially materials that would shed light on the role of espionage versus indigenous scientific achievements. But because he is in his early 90s, it is unlikely that he will be able to play a central role on the Working Group.

Quite apart from obstacles posed by the composition of the Working Group, it is possible that the Russian government’s directive (and Yeltsin’s decree) will go largely unimplemented. Several impressive-looking decrees and directives about the declassification of archival materials have been issued by Yeltsin and the Russian government over the past two years, but very little has come of them. Now that the political outlook in Russia is so uncertain, there is little chance that the archival situation will improve anytime soon. If anything, the increased strength of Communist delegates in the Russian parliament could lead to further restrictions on access to major repositories.

If an official anthology of documents about the early Soviet nuclear weapons program is eventually published, it undoubtedly will contain many interesting and valuable materials. Even the release of individual documents can add a good deal to the historical record (see above). But in the absence of a wider declassification of relevant items, the one-time compilation of an official anthology will not reveal as much about early Soviet nuclear developments as one might hope.

2. See also Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 174-180.
3. P.L. Kapitsa, Pis’ma roshchii (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989), 237-247. On Kapitsa’s withdrawal from the program, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 138-144.
5. In Russian: “O podgotovke i izdani ofitsial’nogo sbornika arkhivnykh dokumentov po istorii sozdanni v yadernogo oruzhii v SSSR.”
6. The directive was published under the rubric “Sbornik...
DOCUMENT 1:  

TOP SECRET  

SPECIAL DOSSIER  

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE  

EDICT No. GKO-9887ss/op  

20 August 1945  

Moscow, the Kremlin.  

On a Special Committee Under the GKO’s Auspices  

The State Defense Committee orders:  

1. That a Special Committee be formed under the GKO’s auspices consisting of:  

   1. Beria, L. P. (chairman)  
   2. Malenkov, G. M.  
   3. Voznesenskii, N. A.  
   4. Vannikov, B. L.  
   5. Zavenyagin, A. P.  
   6. Kurchatov, I. V.  
   7. Kapitsa, P. L.  
   8. Makhnev, V. A.  
   9. Pervukhin, M. G.  

2. That the GKO’s Special Committee be empowered to supervise all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:  

   — the development of scientific research in this sphere;  
   — the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium, as well as the exploitation of uranium deposits outside the USSR (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries);  
   — the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and  
   — the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb.  

3. That a Technical Council be created under the GKO’s Special Committee to conduct a preliminary examination of scientific and technical matters submitted for review by the Special Committee, as well as an examination of plans for scientific research and accounts for it, plus technical designs of installations, structures, and facilities for the use of atomic energy of uranium. The Council will consist of the following:  

   1. Vannikov, B. L. (chairman)  
   2. Alikhanov, A. I. — academician (scientific secretary)  
   3. Voznesenskii, I. N. — corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences  
   4. Zavenyagin, A. P.  
   5. Ioffe, A. F. — academician  
   6. Kapitsa, P. L. — academician  
   7. Kikoin, I. K. — corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences  
   8. Kurchatov, I. V. — academician  
   9. Makhnev, V. A.  
   10. Kharton, Yu. B. — professor  
   11. Khlopin V. G. — academician  

4. That a special directorate be organized under the USSR Council of People’s Commissars—the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, subordinated to the GKO’s Special Committee—to exercise direct supervision over scientific research, development, and design organizations and industrial enterprises for the use of atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs.  

5. That the GKO’s Special Committee be obligated to devise a work plan for the Committee and the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC and measures to carry out this plan, and to present it to the Chairman of the GKO for approval.  

6. That the GKO’s Special Committee take operative measures to ensure the fulfillment of tasks assigned to it under the present edict; that it promulgate directives requiring fulfillment by agencies and departments; and that when a government decision is needed, the GKO’s Special Committee should present its recommendations directly for the approval of the Chairman of the GKO.  

The GKO’s Special Committee will have its own staff and funding estimates and an expense account at the USSR State Bank.  

7. That the GKO’s Special Committee define and approve for the First Main Direc-  

torate of the USSR CPC the level of funding, the size of the workforce, and the volume of material-technical resources that it requires, so that USSR Gosplan can include these resources in the spending category listed as “Special Expenditures of the GKO.”  

8. That the chairman of USSR Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Voznesenskii, organize within Gosplan a directorate to help carry out the assignments of the GKO’s Special Committee.  

That the dep. chairman of USSR Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Borisov, be placed in charge of the aforementioned directorate, and that he be relieved of other work for Gosplan and the GKO.  

9. That the financial expenditures and upkeep of the GKO’s Special Committee, of the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, of the First Main Directorate’s scientific research, design, and engineering organizations and industrial enterprises, as well as the work carried out by other agencies and departments at the behest of the Directorate, are to be included in the union budget through the category “Special Expenditures of the GKO.”  

That financing of capital construction for the First Main Directorate be carried out through the State Bank.  

That the First Main Directorate and the institutes and enterprises under its auspices be freed from the registration of staffs in financial organs.  

10. That Cde. B. L. Vannikov be confirmed as the deputy chairman of the GKO’s Special Committee and director of the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and that he be discharged from his duties as People’s Commissar of Munitions.  

That the following be approved as deputy directors of the Main Directorate:  

   — A. P. Zavenyagin — first deputy  
   — N. A. Borisov — deputy  
   — P. Ya. Meshik — deputy  
   — P. Ya. Antropov — deputy  
   — A. G. Kasatkin — deputy.  

11. That the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC and its enterprises and institutes, as well as work carried out by other agencies and departments for it, are to be controlled by the GKO’s Special Committee.  

Without special permission from the GKO, no organizations, institutes, or individuals have any right whatsoever to interfere in the administrative or operational ac-
tivities of the First Main Directorate and its enterprises and institutes, or to demand information about its work or work carried out at the behest of the First Main Directorate. All records of such work are to be directed only to the GKO’s Special Committee.

12. That within 10 days the Special Committee be instructed to provide recommendations for approval by the Chairman of the GKO concerning the transfer of all necessary scientific, design, engineering, and production organizations and industrial enterprises to the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and to affirm the structure, organization, and number of workers on the staffs of the Committee and the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC.

13. That Cde. Beria be instructed to take measures aimed at organizing foreign intelligence work to gain more complete technical and economic information about the uranium industry and about atomic bombs. He is empowered to supervise all intelligence work in this sphere carried out by intelligence organs (NKGB, RUKA, etc.).

Chairman of the State Defense Committee

J. STALIN

Distributed to Cdes.:

Beria, Molotov, Voznesenskii, Malenkov, Mikoyan: all points; Borisov: 8, 10; Zverev, Golev: 9; Meshik, Abakumov, Antropov, Kasatklin: 10; Pervukhin: 1, 10; Merkulov, Kuznetsov (RUKA): 13; Chadaev: 4, 9, 10, 11.

* * * * *

DOCUMENT 2

No. 728-r, Issued on 24 May 1995 in Moscow

To implement the decree “On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Compilation of Archival Documents Pertaining to the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR,” issued on 17 February 1995 by the President of the Russian Federation:

1. A Working Group of the Government Commission on the Comprehensive Solution of the Problem of Nuclear Weapons (referred to hereinafter as the Working Group) is to be set up to study archival documents connected with the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR and to devise recommendations for their declassification. The Working Group is to consist of the following:

- L. D. RYABEV — first deputy Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (director of the Working Group);
- R. G. PIKOYAY — director of Rosarkhiv (deputy director of the Working Group);
- A. G. TSYRKOV — head of a main directorate in the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia (deputy director of the Working Group);
- V. V. ALEKSEEV — director of the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Urals Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
- V. I. ANIREEV — deputy head of a directorate in the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia
- V. V. BOGDAN — chief of affairs at the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- A. A. BRISH — senior designer at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- V. N. VERKHOTSEV — head of a command sector in a main directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- G. A. GONCHAROV — department head at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- Yu. V. GRAFOV — deputy head of a directorate of the Navy;
- S. A. ZELENTSOV — consultant for a main directorate of the Defense Ministry of Russia;
- A. P. KALANDIN — deputy chairman of the State Technology Commission of Russia;
- N. I. KOMOV — senior specialist in a main directorate of the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- V. N. KOSORUKOV — senior engineer in a main directorate of the Defense Ministry of Russia;
- B. V. LITVINOV — senior designer at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- V. M. OREL — director of the S. I. Vavilov Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences;
- V. A. PIDZHAKOV — deputy head of the Central Physics and Technical Institute at the Defense Ministry of Russia;
- Yu. B. KHRITON — honorary research director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia.

2. Within three months, the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia, the Defense Ministry of Russia, the State Committee on the Defense Industry of Russia, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Rosarkhiv, and the Russian Academy of Sciences will prepare, and present to the Working Group, lists of archival documents proposed for declassification and for inclusion in an official compilation of archival documents pertaining to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period through 1954.

3. In the third quarter of 1995, the Working Group will determine a thematic way of dividing archival documents proposed for declassification in accordance with established procedures and for inclusion in an official compilation of archival documents pertaining to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period through 1954, and will prepare a general list of these documents.

4. In the fourth quarter of 1995, the State Technology Commission of Russia, in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia, the Defense of Russia, the State Committee on the Defense Industry of Russia, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Rosarkhiv, and the Russian Academy of Sciences will, on the basis of established procedures, arrange for the declassification of archival documents pertaining to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period through 1954, drawing on the list.
RESEARCH NOTE:
SECRET EAST GERMAN REPORT ON CHINESE REACTIONS
TO THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLT

Introduced and Translated
by Mark Kramer

Following are excerpts from a document prepared by a senior East German diplomat, H. Liebermann, a few weeks after Soviet troops crushed the revolution in Hungary in 1956. The full report, entitled, “Bericht über die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” is now stored in File No. 120, Section IV 2/20, of the former East German Communist party archives, known as Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB, or SAPMO), in Berlin. (A copy of the document was recently located at the Berlin archive by Christian F. Ostermann, a researcher currently based at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., and provided to the author by CWIHP.)

Liebermann’s six-page report, compiled at the request of the East German Foreign Ministry, traces Chinese press coverage of events in Hungary from late October to mid-November 1956. The portions translated here pertain to coverage through November.

1. After that date, Chinese press reports were virtually identical to the coverage in other Communist countries, all of which condemned the Hungarian revolution and strongly supported the Soviet invasion. Until November 2, however, the Chinese press was bolder and more evenhanded in its treatment of the Hungarian crisis than the other East-bloc newspapers were, as Liebermann’s report makes clear. The East German diplomat even expressed anxiety about the detail of Chinese coverage, saying that “they would have been better off leaving out” some of the most vivid descriptions of the revolutionary ferment. Liebermann left no doubt that the kind of reports featured in the Chinese press would have been unacceptable in East Germany.

The concluding paragraph of Liebermann’s report is intriguing insofar as it reveals high-level East German concerns about China’s efforts to establish a “special position” within the socialist camp and about Beijing’s general commitment to the Communist bloc. Although Liebermann assured his superiors that China “stands solidly behind” the socialist camp and “is not taking up any sort of ‘special position,’” the very fact that he had to rebut these accusations implies that some officials in Eastern Europe already sensed that the “steadfast alliance” between the Soviet Union and China might one day be called into question.

Thus, the document is valuable in showing how even a seemingly arcane item from the East-Central European archives can shed light on the dynamics of Sino-Soviet relations.

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Report on the Stance of the People’s Republic of China toward the Crisis in Hungary

The first report in the Chinese press about the crisis in Hungary was published on 27.10.56. It should be noted that up through 2 Nov., this information was published without commentary, for example in the foreign policy section of “People’s Daily” on pages 5/6. Nevertheless, through daily published reports (except on 30 Oct., when nothing about Hungary was published in “People’s Daily”) the PRC informed the Chinese people in detail about the crisis in Hungary. This information, however, was not enough to provide a clear picture of the crisis. This situation remained essentially unchanged until the formation of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government.

The form of reporting in the Chinese press was obviously geared toward the Chinese reader. Even though the Chinese people were following the crisis in Hungary very closely, it is quite natural that for the Chinese people the crisis seemed more distant than it did for, say, the peoples of the European People’s Democracies. In addition, the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt at that time was given priority coverage in the Chinese press. This explains why until the formation of the Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, much more information about Hungary appeared in the Chinese press than in the GDR press. Under the special conditions of the PRC, they can pursue this type of reporting without fear that it will cause agitation and disquiet among the Chinese people of the sort one can detect among some of the GDR citizens currently here in Peking.

Although the Chinese press during the early days was factual and objective in its reports on the crisis in Hungary, there were some things reported in the press that would have been better off left out, even if one takes account of the special conditions of the PRC. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this point.

1) The “People’s Daily” on 1 Nov. quoted the following passage from a speech by Nagy: “The continual growth of the revolution in our country has brought the movement of democratic forces to a crossroads.”

2) The “People’s Daily” on 1 Nov. also reported that Nagy on 30 Oct. had commenced negotiations with representatives of the armed forces committee of the freedom fighters and the revolutionary committee of the revolutionary intelligentsia and students. A clear statement about the crisis in Hungary was published in a lead article in the “People’s Daily” on 3 Nov. In this lead article, which covers the Soviet Union’s declaration on ties with socialist countries, a portion concerns the crisis in Hungary: “The Chinese people are wholeheartedly on the side of the honest Hungarian workers and on the side of the true Hungarian patriots and resolute socialist fighters for Hungary. We are dismayed to see that a small group of counterrevolutionary conspirators are exploiting the situation with the aim of restoring capitalism and fascist terror and of using Hungary to disrupt the unity of the socialist countries and undermine the Warsaw Pact.”

Judging by the stance of the PRC toward the crisis in Hungary, one again can confidently emphasize that the PRC stands solidly behind the camp of socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union. It is also clear that the PRC is not taking up any sort of “special position” within the socialist camp, as certain Western circles would have preferred. The stance of the People’s Republic of China toward the crisis in Hungary was no different from the stance of the other socialist countries.

(H. Liebermann)
“A VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS”: THE PROFESSIONAL’S REVENGE

by David R. Stone


After a Soviet fighter plane shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September 1983, Georgii Kornienko was assigned by his superior Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to prepare TASS’s official press release on the incident. In particular, Gromyko instructed Kornienko to claim that the Soviet Union had absolutely no knowledge of the fate of the airliner, though the Soviet leadership was quite certain that it had indeed shot down the plane. Kornienko vehemently protested that the truth of the matter would inevitably come out and that the best course was to reveal just that: the Soviet Union had shot down an unidentified intruder in the full conviction that it was an American spy plane. Gromyko was indecisive, but invited Kornienko to call KGB head Yuri Andropov to state his case. In Kornienko’s opinion, Andropov was prepared to accept an honest account of the event, but was swayed by Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, long-time master of Soviet defense industry, and the Soviet military leadership. At the meeting to make the final decision, Ustinov won this internal battle and Kornienko was only “a voice crying in the wilderness.” The consequences proved Kornienko right; a human tragedy was turned by the Soviet leadership’s short-sightedness and the Reagan Administration’s intense criticism into a public-relations disaster for the USSR.

Moments like these, in which political leaders ignore at their peril the advice of their professional advisors, recur frequently in Kornienko’s memoirs. Covering his over forty years of serving the Soviet state from junior translator in intelligence work to Deputy Foreign Minister, Kornienko’s observations are those of a Soviet patriot intent on settling scores both with the West and with his Soviet comrades. It is perhaps a universal failing of memoirs that they emphasize those times when the hero-author is right and all about are mistaken; Kornienko’s are a sterling example, concentrating particularly on moments when diplomats’ prerogatives were violated, whether by party functionaries, military officers, or the highest leadership of the Soviet state. After Henry Kissinger’s April 1972 visit to Moscow, in which he worked closely with Kornienko, the innocuously bland final statement noted that talks had been “open and productive.” N. V. Podgorny, Chair of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus nominally Soviet head of state, objected to this positive spin on Soviet-American relations despite his complete ignorance of diplomacy. Only Kissinger’s acquiescence avoided more serious diplomatic consequences. Still later, as political instability in Afghanistan grew at the end of the 1970s, the universal opinion within the Soviet Foreign Ministry against military intervention was disregarded—Andropov and Ustinov eventually browbeat Gromyko into agreeing to an invasion, Kornienko informs us, producing a bloody and ultimately frustrating war with disastrous consequences at home and abroad.

Despite these tales of underappreciated diplomats, Kornienko’s book is surprisingly unrevealing about the inner workings of Soviet foreign policy; while discussing Ustinov and Andropov’s pressure on Gromyko for intervention in Afghanistan, he never satisfactorily explains why they themselves had abandoned the general conviction that military intervention in Afghanistan was a terrible idea. Extraordinarily cagery, he never draws upon personal experience or Soviet documentary evidence when a Western secondary source will do. Personal observations in his work serve either to prove his own acuity and point up the mistakes of others or to disparage the talents and character of those Kornienko worked with. His memoirs produce the impression that Kornienko had no friends, was particularly unimpressed by Brezhnev, Ford, and Reagan, and of all those he dealt with admired only Gromyko and Andropov. This does not mean that Kornienko’s book is without value, but it must be used to understand the mindset and mental world of a member of the Soviet foreign policy elite, not to find new facts and revealed secrets.

Kornienko’s first three chapters, on the sources of the Cold War, on the Eisenhower presidency, and on Kennedy and Khrushchev, offer very little that is new or especially interesting to students of the Cold War. Though he claims to have based his accounts on his own experiences and on his conversations with other Soviet diplomats, in particular Gromyko, the reader finds little from an insider’s point of view. As a low-ranking diplomat, Kornienko may indeed have seen and done little worthy of reporting. Even so, an occasional personal glimpse of life in Soviet intelligence and the diplomatic corps slips through. Kornienko relates, for example, that hawkish officials in the KGB, hoping to present Stalin with a translation of George Kennan’s seminal 1947 Foreign Affairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in which “containment” was translated as “suffocation,” pressured Kornienko to spice his translation. The cooler heads of Kornienko and his fellow translators succeeded in standing up for the integrity of the translator’s art.

These earlier chapters are most noteworthy for the general theory Kornienko offers of the Cold War and its origins, which has a direct bearing on his interpretation of how the Cold War ended. For Kornienko, there were no vast impersonal forces or inevitable class contradictions dictating the growth of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Neither class struggle nor geopolitical necessity mandated confrontation. Soviet policy in Eastern Europe was also no obstacle to normal relations, as Kornienko argues that American methods in Japan did not differ from Stalin’s methods in Eastern Europe. (Poles and Czechoslovaks might be puzzled here at their implicit inclusion in the camp of defeated Axis powers.) Instead, the Cold War stemmed from the pragmatic Roosevelt’s untimely death and his replacement by the ideologue Truman. Kornienko notes Truman’s notorious suggestion that the Nazis and Soviets be left to kill each other off; he likes it so much he repeats it twice. Kornienko asks rhetorically, “Was another path possible? It seems to me yes. But Truman consciously rejected it.” That is, confrontation was a specific political choice, and one for which the Soviets bore at least some measure of responsibility, for “if the American side said ‘A’ in the Cold War, then Stalin didn’t hold himself back from saying ‘B’.” Since the West never seriously undertook an end to the Cold War, when the end finally did come under Gorbachev, the only possible explanation was unilateral Soviet surrender.

Chapter 4 on the Cuban missile crisis is
nearly as frustrating as the first three in terms of lacking new revelations. Kornienko approves the document collections that have been published since the advent of glasnost, but does not enrich the story they tell with any significant new information of his own. Despite serving as a counselor in the Soviet Union’s Washington embassy during the crisis, Kornienko tells us little of his own experiences. He does relate (as does then-Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in his recently published memoirs) that the Soviet embassy was kept in complete ignorance of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to pass along disinformation.

The meat of Kornienko’s story is his role in one of the key moments of the crisis: Khrushchev’s two letters to Kennedy, the first of 26 October 1962 promising withdrawal of Soviet missiles in return for an American pledge of non-intervention in Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to pass along disinformation. Khrushchev accordingly acted to calm the situation by sending his first letter. Soviet intelligence sources reported a conversation with an American journalist on his immediate departure for Florida to cover the imminent invasion of American armed forces, Khrushchev accordingly acted to calm the situation by sending his first letter. Kornienko himself knew the journalist, scheduled lunch with him (itself proving the document collections that have been published since the advent of glasnost, but does not enrich the story they tell with any significant new information of his own. Despite serving as a counselor in the Soviet Union’s Washington embassy during the crisis, Kornienko tells us little of his own experiences. He does relate (as does then-Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in his recently published memoirs) that the Soviet embassy was kept in complete ignorance of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to pass along disinformation.

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high-placed leaders ignore the competent judgment of specialists and as a result sacrifice the very interests of the state trying for one thing—to that much quickly finish the preparation of this or that treaty and light off fireworks in celebration.”

The conclusion of Kornienko’s book, a shortened version of a case set forth earlier at greater length and in greater detail in Nezavisimaia Gazeta (16 August 1994), is what his argument has been leading to all along: the Gorbachev era as the epitome of unprofessionalism in foreign policy. It is a full-fledged condemnation of almost every action undertaken by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze from 1985 through the final collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, Kornienko strives to discredit the idea that Gorbachev offered something truly new and revolutionary in international politics. As Kornienko reminds us, it was Lenin who first enunciated the principle of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist world (as another form of class struggle), and Stalin actively endorsed the idea of coexistence with the West as late as 1951. Ever since a rough nuclear parity had been achieved in the 1960s, reasonable people on each side had seen the need for an end to the arms race and confrontation. Gorbachev’s innovation was not living in peace with the West, but the unilateral “betrayal of the Soviet Union’s vital interests.”

Kornienko enunciates a number of specific examples of Gorbachev’s craven behavior—submission to the United States over the Krasnoyarsk radar station and Soviet acquiescence in the use of force against Iraq—but his most substantial comments are reserved for the reunification of Germany. Kornienko, having passed over in silence the Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, takes pains to emphasize the right of the German people to self-determination, free from outside influence. His objection is to the manner in which this unification took place and the status of the resulting German state. Why, he asks, should Germany remain in NATO and why should NATO troops remain in Germany with Soviet troops completely evacuated from Eastern Europe? The fact that Germany has stayed in NATO he attributes to the absolutely incompetent way in which Gorbachev handled the German question, avoiding the enunciation of any clear policy until too late, insisting on the unacceptability of German NATO membership to George Bush in Washington only in February 1990 and then conceding Germany’s right to remain in NATO without receiving guarantees and concessions in return.

Here Kholodnaia voina particularly suffers by comparison to Kornienko’s 1992 collaboration with Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, former Chief of the General Staff and one-time personal aide to Mikhail Gorbachev. This earlier book, Glazami marshala i diplomata [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat] (Moscow, 1992), covers in book-length form the Gorbachev years which Kornienko discusses in a chapter. The lion’s share is Akhromeev’s work, and he was a much more sensitive and forthcoming observer, on occasion even revealing the details of Soviet tactics in arms control negotiations. While nearly as condemnatory of Gorbachev as Kornienko, Akhromeev as Chief of the General Staff was in a position to truly appreciate the steady decline of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev and the need for radical reform, though he parted company with Gorbachev on how precisely reform needed to be implemented. (Akhromeev killed himself in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991.) What Kornienko misses in his evaluation of the Gorbachev years is precisely how desperate Gorbachev’s position was by the end of the 1980s. With opposition to Gorbachev growing on all sides, an economy spiraling into free fall, Soviet troops on hostile ground in Eastern Europe, and the specter of nationalism haunting the Soviet Union, Gorbachev simply had no ground to stand on. It is this last factor—nationalism—that Kornienko (and for that matter Akhromeev) consistently ignores. It seems he imagines that a stable end to the Cold War could have occurred with Eastern Europe still occupied by Soviet troops, and he never noticed that half the Soviet Union’s population was non-Russian. Kornienko, then, continues to be a devoted patriot of the collapsed empire he served for four decades. While there is likely some truth to his assertions that Gorbachev might have driven marginally harder bargains with the West than he in fact did, the real significance of any diplomatic triumphs Gorbachev might have achieved is questionable. What can any diplomat achieve when the state he or she represents crumbles away? Kornienko can complain that his voice was never heard, but the rejection of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet state itself are what truly demolished Soviet foreign policy. It is just these events that Kornienko cannot bring himself to look at, and to ask whether he and his fellow professionals bear any responsibility for them.

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CHEN HANSHENG’S MEMOIRS AND CHINESE COMMunist ESPIONAGE

by Maochen Yu

Chen Hansheng, My Life During Four Eras [Sige shidai de wo] (Beijing: China Culture and History Press [zhongguo wenshi chupanshe], 1988).

Post-Mao China has been marked by a transition from a combination of totalitarianism and socialism to one of authoritarianism and a “socialist market economy.” Along with this transition is the gradual “withering away of the state,” which in turn has resulted in a looser government control over publication on some historical issues previously considered taboo during the Mao era. One of the most fascinating new academic interests in China is the sudden surge of materials on Chinese Communist intelligence, triggered by a massive “political rehabilitation” of those Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence veterans who were vanquished in Mao’s ruthless campaigns. ¹ The publication of Chen Hanzheng’s memoirs, My Life During Four Eras, is just one of the telling examples.

Chen Hansheng became an agent for the Comintern in 1926 while a young professor at Beijing University (p.35). His life as a communist intelligence official spans many decades of the 20th century and involves some of the most important espionage cases. Chen Hanzheng’s memoirs add some new and revealing dimensions to the present understanding of the much debated history of Chinese and international communism. In an authoritative manner, this publication helps answer many nagging questions long in the minds of historians, chief among which...
are the following:

To What Extent Were the Chinese Communists Involved in Soviet-Dominated Communist International Espionage in China in the 20th Century? Recent memoirs in Chinese, notably by Chen Hansheng and Shi Zhe, suggest that the Chinese Communists were deeply involved. In the 1930s and 1940s, for example, as the Shi Zhe memoirs reveal, both the NKVD and GRU of the USSR and the Department of International Res. (OMS) of the Comintern ran a large spy training school in Yanan; Chinese Communist spies penetrated deep into the Nationalists’ (GMD) wartime intelligence organizations for Moscow. Chen Hansheng’s story further illustrates this Moscow-Yanan tie. Chen was recruited by the Russians as a Comintern intelligence agent in 1926. One year later, the warlord Zhang Zuolin raided the Soviet Embassy in Beijing which was being used as an intelligence base. This raid exposed a large international espionage scheme controlled by Moscow. Chen Hansheng then fled to Moscow and returned to China in 1928 to become a member of the well-known Richard Sorge Spy Ring, then based in Shanghai. When Sorge was reassigned to Moscow to Tokyo, Chen went along and worked closely with Ozaki Hozumi and others of the ring until 1935, when the unexpected arrest of a messenger from Moscow almost exposed Chen’s real identity. Chen sensed the danger and fled to Moscow again (pp.61-62). For much of his early life, he was directly controlled by Moscow, and highly active in international intelligence. Chen’s identity as a Comintern agent was so important and secret that Richard Sorge, during his marathon interrogation in Tokyo by the Japanese police, never gave out Chen’s real name to the Japanese.

What Was the True Relationship Between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists during WWII? Some historians have minimized the extent and importance of the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union during World War II. Chen Hansheng’s memoirs and other recently available documents from various sources fundamentally challenge this interpretation.

Instead, these new publications show that from the very beginning the CCP was intrinsically connected with the international communist movement centered in Moscow. Every major step of the CCP followed orders from Moscow. In 1935, when the Soviet Union was threatened by rising fascism in Europe and Asia, the CCP followed Moscow’s order to adopt a policy of a “United Front” (Popular Front) with the Nationalists in a joint effort to fight Japanese expansion in Asia. Yet, when Stalin stunned the world by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late August 1939, the United Front policy collapsed in China. Mao Zedong followed Stalin most closely among all the Comintern party chiefs, hailing the Hitler-Stalin deal as a major victory against the West and the partition of Poland as necessary for the communist cause. In January 1940, Mao Zedong proclaimed that “the center of the Anti-Soviet movement is no longer Nazi Germany, but among the so-called democratic countries.” The modus vivendi of communism and fascism in late 1939 created such intense friction between the Chinese Nationalists, who had been engaged in an all-out and bitter war with the Japanese imperial army in China, and the Chinese Communists, who were following Stalin’s rapprochement with Germany, whose ally was Japan, that in early 1940, an army of communist troops was ambushed by the Nationalists in Southern Anhui, an event which essentially ended the superficial United Front. Yet when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin reversed his policy on the Popular Front: all member parties of the Comintern, both in Europe and in Asia, were now ordered to fight fascism. Unfortunately, in China this did not mean the re-establishment of the former United Front against the Japanese, because the Soviet Union had already signed the notorious Neutrality Pact with Japan. The Chinese Nationalists, not the Japanese, remained the CCP’s main enemy.

In fact, a stunning recent discovery at the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives of a secret Soviet-Japanese treaty at the outset of WWII reveals a deeply conspiratorial scheme worked out between Moscow and Tokyo. On 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese diplomats reached a secret deal that stipulated, “The USSR will abandon its active support for Chiang [Kai-shek; Jiang Jieshi] and will repress the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist Party will retain as a base the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia).”

Chen Hansheng’s memoirs have made a significant contribution to reconnecting this CCP-Moscow tie.

Was Agnes Smedley A Comintern Agent? Despite vigorous denials by Smedley herself, Chen Hansheng discloses unequivocally that Smedley was no less than an agent of the Comintern (p.52). (Historian Stephen MacKinnon has only established that Smedley was Sorge’s mistress in Shanghai.) Further, we also know from Chen’s memoirs that Smedley was involved in every major step of the Sorge group’s espionage activities. In fact, it was Smedley herself who recruited Chen into Sorge’s Tokyo operations (p.58). Recent Comintern archives also confirm Smedley’s identity as a Comintern agent.

Was Owen Lattimore A Communist Spy? Lattimore topped Senator Joseph McCarthy’s list of alleged communist spies in the early 1950s. McCarthy accused Lattimore of not only having manufactured a Far East policy leading to the loss of China to the communists, but also of being a “top Soviet agent.”

Chen’s memoirs provide surprising insights on this matter from the perspective of a communist intelligence agent. After Chen fled from Tokyo to Moscow in 1935 to prevent the Sorge Ring’s operations from exposure, Owen Lattimore, then the editor of the New York-based journal Pacific Affairs, the mouthpiece of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), asked the Soviet Union, a member nation of IPR, for an assistant (p.63). In 1936, Moscow recommended Chen Hansheng to Lattimore, who readily accepted the nomination. Chen then went to New York, this time under the direct control of Kang Sheng, who was also in Moscow, to work with Lattimore from 1936 until 1939, when Chen was reassigned by Kang Sheng to a Hong Kong-based operation.

However, Chen states in his memoirs that Lattimore was kept in the dark as to his true identity as a Communist agent directly dispatched from Moscow (p.64). Lattimore’s scholarly activities were only to be used as a cover for Chen. Further, Kang Sheng specifically instructed Chen that while in New York, his position at the IPR should only be used as a means of getting a salary; and that Chen’s real task was to help Rao Shushi, a Comintern and CCP chief also in New York, organize underground activities (p.65). Therefore, Chen’s memoirs seem to clear Lattimore from any complicity associated with Chen Hansheng’s secret operations in
New York.

Was Solomon Adler A Communist?
Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for the U.S. Treasury Department in China during WWII, was also prominent on McCarthy’s communist list. In the 1950s, Elizabeth Bentley, a courier of a Soviet apparatus in Washington, further identified Adler as a member of Soviet intelligence. Adler at the time denied Bentley’s accusation. Surprisingly, in Chen’s memoirs, as well as in some other recent Chinese documents, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a bona fide communist intelligence official. According to these sources, Adler moved to Beijing permanently in the late 1950s and has since worked in various capacities in CCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in Chinese documents as an “Advisor” to the External Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, the department that handles such well-known figures as Larry Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested by the FBI in 1983 for espionage, and committed suicide in jail in 1986.

Were the Chinese Communists Part of the International Communist Movement or Merely “Agrarian Reformers” in the 1930s and 1940s? Chen Hansheng’s memoirs provides much new information about the Chinese Communist Party’s extensive international connections. Besides the Sorge and Lattimore cases, Chen served as a chief communist intelligence officer in Hong Kong in the late 1930s and early 1940s, running a cover organization funneling huge amounts of funds—$20 million in two and a half years—from outside China to Yanan, mostly for the purpose of purchasing Japanese-made weapons from the “Puppet” troops in North China, with considerable Japanese acquiescence. When wanted in 1944 by the Nationalist secret police for pro-Soviet activities in Guilin (China), Chen was rescued by the British and airlifted to India where he was miraculously put on the payroll of British intelligence in New Delhi. Between 1946 and 1950, while undercover as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University in Maryland, Chen became Beijing’s secret liaison with the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (CPUSA) (p.81). After the CCP took over mainland China, Chen was summoned back from America to Beijing by Zhou Enlai in 1950 and has remained a major figure in his own business for much of the rest of his life.

When Intellect And Intelligence Join, What Happens? Chen is a seasoned intelligence officer with high academic accomplishment as an economic historian. While his erudition has provided him with excellent covers for intelligence operations, it was also to become a source of his own demise. Chinese intellectuals are frequently willing to serve the state, to be its ears and eyes, yet in the end the state often turns against the intellectuals without mercy. Chen Hansheng’s life thus becomes a classic example of this supreme irony. While in Moscow in 1935 and 1936, Chen witnessed the bloody purge of the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet Union by Stalin. Many of his Soviet comrades, some of them highly respected scholars, including the former Soviet Ambassador to Beijing who originally recruited Chen in China in 1926, were shot by Stalin as traitors and foreign spies. Chen wrote in raw pessimism about the Soviet purge, “I could not understand what was going on then. Yet it was beyond my imagination that some thirty years later, this horrible drama would be replayed in China and I myself would be a target of the persecution” (p.64). During the Cultural Revolution, Chen did not escape the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. From 1966 to 1968, Chen was put under house arrest. His wife was tortured to death in late 1968. By 1971 when Chen was allowed to leave the “thought reform” Cadre School in remote Hunan province, he had become almost completely blind.

1. The most revealing case was the rehabilitation of Pan Hanmian in 1982, after which a large amount of materials on Pan’s role as a Comintern intelligence chief in China and CCP spymaster during WWII became available for scholars. For more details, see the article by this author, “OSS in China: New Information About An Old Role,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Spring 1994, pp.94-95
2. Shi Zhe, Alongside the Great Men in History: Memoirs of Shi Zhe [zai lishi juren shengbian: shizhe huiyi hu] (Beijing: Central Documents Press [zhongyang wenxian chupan she], 1991. Shi Zhe served as an OGPU (NKVD since 1934) agent for nine years in the Soviet Union until he was dispatched from Moscow to Yenan in 1940. He subsequently worked as Mao’s intelligence aide in charge of encoding and decoding the heavy secret communications between Mao and Stalin during WWII, and as a Chinese-Russian interpreter. Shi Zhe also was Kang Sheng’s deputy at the Social Affairs Department (SAD) and the chief liaison in Yenan between the NKVD team and the SAD.
3. Yan Baohang and others’ aggressive intelligence penetration into the GMD, see the doctoral dissertation by this author entitled American Intelligence: OSS in China (Berkeley, California, 1994).
4. For an example of one Western country’s exploitation of this raid in uncovering communist spy rings in England, see Anthony Cave Brown’s biography of Stewart Menzies, “C,” published in Britain as Secret Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of British Intelligence, 1939-52.
11. Text of testimony by Bentley, in Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats, 132-133.
12. See Adler’s photo in Chen’s memoirs, and Selected Shanghai Culture and History Materials [Shanghai wenxian ziliao xuji] 43 (April 1983), Shanghai People’s Press.
13. For more details on this, see Maochen Yu, American Intelligence: OSS in China.
14. Many top leaders of the CPUSA, including Earl Browder and Eugene Dennis, had served as Comintern agents in China. See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret World of American Communism 8, 12.

Maochen Yu, who teaches history at the U.S. Naval Academy, is completing for publication a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation on the OSS in China during World War II.

Mark Kramer


Many books about the rise of Solidarity in Poland and the subsequent martial-law crackdown have been published in the West, but nearly all of them appeared in the early to mid-1980s. In recent years, particularly since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, scholarly interest in the 1980-81 Polish crisis has largely subsided. Although a few laudable books about the origins of Solidarity, notably those by Roman Laba (*The Roots of Solidarity*), Lawrence C. Goodwyn (*Breaking the Barrier*), and Michael H. Bernhard (*The Origins of Democratization in Poland*), were published in the early 1990s, the large majority of Western scholars no longer seem interested in reexamining the dramatic events of 1980-81. Even in Poland only a handful of experts, mainly those connected with the parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Oversight, are still devoting much effort to a reassessment of the 18-month confrontation that followed the emergence of Solidarity in the summer of 1980. The dearth of academic interest in the Polish crisis is ironic, for it is only now, when the archives in Poland, Russia, and other former Communist countries have become accessible and when a large number of valuable first-hand accounts of the crisis have appeared, that a fuller and more nuanced analysis of the events of 1980-81 is finally possible.

For that reason alone, the two books under review could have made a far-reaching contribution. Both were completed after several of the former East-bloc archives had been opened and after the initial spate of memoirs and other first-hand accounts of the Polish crisis had appeared. But unfortunately, neither author has made any use of archival sources. Although both draw on at least a few of the new first-hand accounts, the use of this new evidence, especially in Yakov Grishin’s narrative, is often problematic. Robert Zuzowski’s volume provides cogent insights into the origins and functions of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) and Grishin’s monograph has a few bright moments, but neither book offers as much as one might hope.

Zuzowski’s study of the origins, activities, and consequences of KOR is enriched by citations from a wide range of open and underground publications. Of necessity, his book relies extensively on (and overlaps with) Jan Jozef Lipski’s acclaimed two-volume history of the Workers’ Defense Committee, which was first published in 1983. Zuzowski’s analysis, however, has three advantages over Lipski’s book. First, as one would expect, Zuzowski is more detached and critical than Lipski, whose perspective as one of the co-founders and leading members of KOR was unavoidably reflected in his lengthy account. Second, Zuzowski’s book extends chronologically well beyond Lipski’s, which ended with KOR’s formal dissolution in September 1981. Third, Zuzowski uses his case study of KOR to derive broader conclusions about the nature and methods of political dissent in highly authoritarian societies. His discussion of the term “intelligentsia” and his overall analytical framework are not always persuasive, but his assessment provides a useful basis for historical and cross-country comparisons.

Hence, the overlap with Lipski’s book does not really detract from *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland*. A more serious problem arises, however, from the overlap with a recent book by Michael Bernhard (cited above), which was published at almost the same time as Zuzowski’s monograph. Bernhard’s volume, like Zuzowski’s, focuses on the origins and political significance of KOR. Both books depict the Workers’ Defense Committee as a crucial factor in the rise of Solidarity and a leading influence on the opposition movement in 1980-81. This view of KOR’s importance has been accepted by many scholars, but it has been challenged in recent years by Roman Laba, who has claimed that Polish workers, rather than Polish intellectuals, provided the overwhelming impetus for Solidarity and were themselves responsible for shaping the union’s agenda. Laba’s publications (including the book cited above) have prompted spirited replies from Bernhard, and the debate is likely to continue for many years to come.

Zuzowski devotes less attention than Bernhard to Laba’s thesis, and as a result his book leaves some key questions unresolved. For example, Zuzowski acknowledges that when the decisive moment came in mid-1980, top KOR members were skeptical about the prospects for achieving a genuinely independent trade union. (Some KOR officials even hoped that striking workers would not press too hard for this goal, lest it become a pretext for a harsh crackdown.) This is difficult to square with the author’s contention that “KOR significantly contributed to the formation of Solidarity and to its performance, shaping the union’s program, structure, and strategy” (p. 169). Nor does Zuzowski explain why so many workers who had probably never heard of KOR and never seen its publications were nevertheless ready to demand a wide array of fundamental political changes. It may well be, as both Zuzowski and Bernhard argue, that KOR decisively changed the broader milieu in which the strikes of 1980 occurred and that this helped Polish workers eschew violence and sustain an organized protest movement. But it is not clear that the evidence produced by Zuzowski is enough to contravene Laba’s basic point.

This reservation notwithstanding, the surveys of KOR that Zuzowski and Bernhard provide, combined with Laba’s earlier book, are about as far as one can go with non-archival sources. Both authors have done an admirable job of poring over KOR’s publications and other dissident works as well as relevant secondary sources. Both have brought new analytical perspectives to bear on their topic. Now that Zuzowski’s and Bernhard’s books have appeared, other scholars who wish to write about KOR will have to draw on recently declassified materials in the Archiwum Akt Nowych and other archives in Poland (materials not consulted by Zuzowski or Bernhard) if they are going to add anything of significance to the historical record.

Zuzowski’s failure to make use of newly released documentation is regrettable, but by no means wholly unreasonable. Several features of his book (e.g., his frequent use of the present tense to describe things that ceased to exist after 1989) suggest that he wrote most of the text in the 1980s before the
I read with great interest “The Sudoplatov Controversy” in the CWIHP Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155-158). In its own time I also read Special Tasks with no less interest.

I believed earlier and now presume that the appearance of the recollections of such a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist NKVD is an outstanding event, no matter what they are like in terms of quality. In any case, such recollections better than anything else characterize the era, and the storyteller. We can only be sorry that the recollections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, do not exist.

Of course, I cannot read without a smile Pavel Sudoplatov’s “assertion” that in the development of my career I am obliged “through KGB connections.” This is a desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, a relic of the past, at a time when it is already impossible, as was done in the Stalinist time, to register innocent people as German, English, and other “spies,” and to make short work of them. Now this lapse of the past is nothing more than an expressive coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov himself. And it is evidence of the fact that my activity offended him very much.

In Special Tasks the episode connected with Yaakov Terletskii’s mission to Niels Bohr. My critical article, published in the Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only on that episode. Since I am not a specialist in Sudoplatov’s professional element, but do have a definite conception of the Soviet atomic project and its history, in this letter, expressing myself, I will limit myself only to the mission to Niels Bohr.

I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov’s version regarding this mission stands up to a comparison with the facts (reason for the trip, significance for the Soviet physicists of the information which was brought; the shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the naked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really did take place remains certain. But even here Sudoplatov is not the one who discovered it: several years ago already Professor Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of Beria’s department in the Soviet press.

I do not believe it possible here to dwell particularly on Sudoplatov’s new fantasies, contained in his letter to the Bulletin and which repeat his Appendix Eight of the paperback edition of Special Tasks (p. 491).

In such a way as was already, for example, analyzed by me, it was shown that the reader should very, very critically regard Sudoplatov’s “improvisations”: the principal defect of the “recollections” was evident even in a “limited space.” Here the assistance and co-authorship in the drafting of Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, and the fact that the flattering foreward to this book belongs to the pen of the famous historian Robert Conquest, are powerless.

Of course, the point of view of the Schecters is interesting, when they assert that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov’s memoirs continues. On one side are Russian scientists who fear the downgrading of their prestige and a threat to the medals they received for building the atomic bomb” (Special Tasks, Addendum, Paperback Edition). And in “The Sudoplatov Controversy,” they even introduce a list of former intelligence operatives and historians who, evidently, do not know atomic technology professionally, but who applaud Sudoplatov. The truth, however, is that in the fact of the matter, the “battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov” ended long ago. People understood that only specialists, physicists-atomic scientists, are in a position to resolve whether or not Niels Bohr gave atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.

Then why did the Schecters, while ignoring the opinion of Russian physicists, not wish to listen, for example, to one of the leading U.S. authorities, the prominent participant in the American atomic project, Prof. Hans A. Bethe? In a recent article in Scientific American together with his co-authors observed: “Thus, the allegation that Bohr shared nuclear secrets with the Soviets is refuted by Beria’s own account of the encounter between his agent and Bohr.” (Scientific American, May 1995, p. 90.) Or does he too fear for his awards and prestige?

It will be useful to pose still one question. Was the U.S. government decision to publish in the summer of 1945 Henry Smyth’s well-known treatise “Atomic Energy for Military Purposes” really dictated by a wish to share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union? Especially since from the point of view of informativeness it exceeded by many times Bohr’s responses to Terletskii’s questions. Responding to this principal issue, it is easier to understand why the attempts to find nonexistent “flaws,” from the point of view of demands of secrecy, in Niels Bohr’s responses, are continuing. And in precisely the same way, it will become clear why the efforts to defend the indefensible fantasies of Sudoplatov are continuing.

Finally, let’s turn to the eloquent acknowledgment of the former Soviet intelligence officer Col. Mikhail Liubimov (Top Secret 3 (1994), 27): “Reading Sudoplatov, one ought to remember that in intelligence activity (possibly like science) there is an inclination to twist facts, particularly because under the conditions of the totalitarian regime it was easy to do without fear of consequences. An intelligence officer or agent could meet and talk with Oppenheimer or with Fermi, who would not have had any idea to whom they were talking, and then later they could give them a code name and with dispatch submit the information to his superiors and cast their deed in bronze.”

A trusting man in the street could be misled by the report on the meeting between Terletskii and Bohr. But for Liubimov, who saw that “in every line (of the report) the traditional, old-fashioned character of the operation is revealed,” it was as clear as two times two equals four that “Sudoplatov would portray the whole trip to Bohr as a colossal success, Beria would be pleased, and he will report everything to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin). And Kurchatov would not dare not to articulate any doubts about the success of the operation, [for] like other scientists, he is subordinate to the system. And just try to squeal about the organs.”

Sincerely,

Yuri N. Smirnov (Moscow)
To the Editor:

In the letter from the well-known KGB functionary Pavel A. Sudoplatov, published in the American journal Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Fall 1995, pp. 156-158), a suggestion or, rather, direct charge, is made against my colleague of many years, Yuri Smirnov, all of whose scientific and literary efforts I have witnessed, that these efforts were in some way connected with the KGB. As is usual in such cases, in place of evidence the letter provides only murky references to a conversation between Sudoplatov and his former colleagues on this matter.

Fairly or unfairly, the reputation of the KGB, as well as that of similar agencies in other countries has always been very low. There has never been a better way to ruin a person in the eyes of public opinion and his close friends than to suggest that he has connections with these services.

An unparalleled expert in the life of Russian bureaucrats and behind the scenes dealings, the author Nikolai Leskov, described a similar intrigue in his story Administrative Grace. In this story, a police official wishing to compromise a provincial public figure organizes what we would now call a “leak” at the suggestion of a highly-placed church official. Simply put, having invited an opponent of the victim to visit him on some pretext, the police official slips him, as if by accident, a specially-prepared letter which refers to payments received from the police department by the individual to be compromised.

In this and similar situations, the “patriotic” attitude of these employees towards their agencies is touching. They of all people understand that the discovery of an individual’s links to their services lead to compromising him in the public’s eyes, and that this works. It is not clear whether they consider that such actions strengthen the negative image of their agencies. Perhaps, considering its own reputation to be beyond salvage, this is of no concern to them.

Knowing Yuri N. Smirnov to be a historian of science, who has objectively evaluated the contribution of our agents in obtaining “atomic secrets,” who neither diminishes nor exaggerates this contribution, Sudoplatov and his colleagues, apparently, decided to “smear” Smirnov as a protective measure.

As a colleague of Yuri Nikolaevich, who began to work with me 35 years ago and to this day is in constant professional and social contact with me, I am in a better position than anyone else to say that Yuri Smirnov is a professional atomic scientist who received his training at Arzamas-16, who took part in the design and testing of the 50-megaton nuclear bomb, who completed his doctoral work under the direction of the well-known scientist D.A. Frank-Kamenetsky. During the period in which he worked at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, he was responsible for a major line of research into the peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

Such a list of accomplishments does not require any embellishments, and any professional would be pleased to call it his own. It was entirely natural that Yuri Nikolaevich, as a possessor of such a rich and varied set of experiences, would turn his sights to the history of science, and particularly the history of nuclear explosive technology. These efforts have borne fruit, as is witnessed by his string of publications. He is recognized among historians of modern science, and no attempts by Sudoplatov and his colleagues to blacken his reputation will stick.

Sincerely,

Victor Adamsky
Arzamas-16

THE KOREAN WAR: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD

On 24-25 July 1995, The Korea Society, Georgetown University, and the Korea-America Society sponsored a conference at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. on “The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record.” Papers were presented by leading scholars from Korea, China, Russia, and the United States.

To obtain further information or to order the conference report or participant papers, contact:

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There is a fee of $5.00 for the conference report and $2.50 per paper; checks can be made payable to the Korea Society.
MORE ON THE 1956 POLISH CRISIS

9 October 1995

To the Editor:

I read the essay “Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka and the Polish October,” by L.W. Gluchowski, and the accompanying documents in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49, with enormous interest, the reason for which will be evident in a moment.

Upon completion of the reading, however, I was thoroughly puzzled by what I saw as a major omission from the author’s introductory essay. Though the material appears in the documents and in footnotes to them, there is no mention at all in the body of the essay concerning one of the most crucial aspects that determined the ultimate outcome of the confrontation between the Soviet and Polish communist party leaders in Warsaw. It concerns the movement of Soviet military forces toward Warsaw, the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements, and the threatened response of Polish military units. It appears as a single line in Document 3 (p. 43), is amplified in Gomulka’s rendition of the events to the Chinese in Document 4 (p. 44), and in footnote 61, quoting Mikoyan’s notes. The threatened response of Polish military units is not mentioned in the documents at all, or by the author.

Gluchowski also quotes two of the comments in Khrushchev’s memoirs; the first—“...the people of Warsaw had been prepared to defend themselves and resist Soviet troops entering the city...”—without asking what “Soviet troops,” from where; and the second—“...our own armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn’t want to resort to the use of our own troops”—without pointing out that it is belied by Khrushchev’s outburst at the October 19 meeting (quoted on page 40): “That number won’t pass here. We are ready for active intervention...I would like the comrades to voice their views on this matter: intervention or...”

It seems very likely, even obvious, that Khrushchev gave the order for the movement of Soviet forces based in Poland in his meeting with Marshals Konev and Rokossovski in the Soviet embassy on October 19, also referred to in his memoirs (p. 41). The troop movements, which the Soviets then claimed were a long-planned army “exercise” (p. 44), were certainly very much larger than the “one military battalion” (p. 40) that Rokossovski admitted to putting “on alert” (p. 44). Gomulka’s phrase is “the Soviet Army stationed in Poland” (p. 44).

In 1980 or thereabouts, I was given a description of the same climactic meeting between the Soviet and Polish leaderships by a former Polish party and government official who had before 1956 been close to the Polish First Secretary, Central Committee Chairman and Prime Minister, Boleslaw Bierut. That rendition adds information beyond that which appears in Gomulka’s description to the Chinese party in Document 4. I recorded the comments at the time. The note which a Polish official handed to Gomulka during the meeting with the Soviets and which informed him of the Soviet troop movements resulted from information reported to Warsaw by Polish military officers (“colonels”). In addition, Polish Air Force General Frey-Bielecki requested permission to bomb the Soviet columns as they converged on Warsaw. Some Polish Air Force units apparently threatened such action whether they received authority to do so or not. (As I recall, Frey-Bielecki agreed to make the request when some of his officers informed him of those threats, telling him what they intended to do. With that, he decided to approach the political leadership.) The Polish internal security forces were also preparing some sort of resistance. Gomulka was the source of Khrushchev’s assessment that “the people of Warsaw had been prepared to defend themselves.” Gomulka apparently told him, in effect, “Leave us alone and everything will be OK; if not, there will be a popular uprising.” And the Russians thought that the Poles would fight; in the words of the Polish official, “All the Czech traditions are different.”

One might add one more point. Gluchowski never comments on the proposals for union, although Khrushchev refers to “...a number of comrades who are supporters of a Polish-Soviet union...” (p. 40).

Sincerely yours,

Milton Leitenberg
Senior Fellow
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
University of Maryland (College Park)

L.W. Gluchowski responds:

I would like to thank Mr. Leitenberg for his thoughtful comments on my documentary essay, “Poland 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the Polish October,” in the Spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. With regard to Mr. Leitenberg’s comment that he was “thoroughly puzzled” by “a major omission from” my “introductory essay” concerning “one of the most crucial aspects that determined the ultimate outcome of the confrontation,” notably “the movement of Soviet military forces towards Warsaw...and the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements,” I shall be brief. Any discussion about the military aspects of the Soviet-Polish confrontation of October 1956 is bound to be controversial at this early stage of archival research in Poland. In any case, I decided to let this set of documents speak for themselves, and no less than six endnotes include extensive discussions of military matters during the crisis. Even Mr. Leitenberg acknowledges that the “material appears in the documents and in the footnotes to them.” Furthermore, in the body of my essay, I noted: “Three days in October [18 to 20] 1956 resolved four outstanding and interrelated conflicts of the de-Stalinization period in Poland.” The second conflict I outlined reads as follows: “the Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the affairs of the Polish Party ended with a compromise agreement on the part of the CPSU leadership and the PUWP leadership.” It is clear that I agree with Mr. Leitenberg: “one of the most crucial aspects” of the confrontation in Warsaw had to
do with the threat of Soviet military intervention.

My first departure with Mr. Leitenberg comes when he elevates “the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements” to some kind of special moment in the negotiations. We still don’t have enough Soviet evidence to draw Mr. Leitenberg’s conclusions. This is particularly true when we consider his comment: “It seems very likely, even obvious, that Khrushchev gave the order for the movement of Soviet forces based in Poland in his meeting with Marshals Konev and Rokossowski in the Soviet embassy on October 19, also referred to in his memoirs.” In this case, an omission on my part may have resulted in the confusion, and I am grateful to Mr. Leitenberg for bringing it to my attention.

In my attempt to edit out a number of long historiographical comments about the documents from the essay I submitted to the Bulletin, I deleted a remark about the reliability of Khrushchev’s memoirs on the Polish crisis, which was originally included with Molotov’s characterization of Rokossowski in the Felix Chuev interview (contained in One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov) cited in endnote 28. I should have left in place the following observation:

This is another example of how Khrushchev’s memoirs are accurate in so far as the general atmosphere of the discussions are concerned, and at the same time confusing because he again tends to take what were obviously a series of discussions and compress them into one important conversation. Surely, as Document 1 clearly shows, Rokossowski could not have gone with Khrushchev to the Soviet embassy on 19 October [1956], although Khrushchev’s emphasis on Rokossowski as a main source of information for what was happening in Poland at the time tells us a lot about what everyone in Poland took for public knowledge: Rokossowski was Moscow’s man in Warsaw. The Polish Minister of Defense was at the Politburo meeting, held immediately after First Secretary Ochab put the 8th Plenum on hold, to further discuss the Polish position towards Khrushchev, while the Soviets went to their own embassy. Rokossowski attended all the meetings of the Polish Politburo during this tense period. The Stenographic report of the 8th Plenum also notes that Rokossowski attended allings of the 8th Plenum from 19-21 October 1956. It would be difficult to imagine Rokossowski not attending meetings of the only legal bodies that could force him from the leadership. Khrushchev probably decided to let the Poles begin the 8th Plenum for a number of reasons, including the necessity of providing Gomulka with the legal status he needed to negotiate on behalf of the Polish side at the Belvedere talks. More important, Rokossowski was a full member of the PUWP Politburo and Central Committee. Gomulka had to treat Rokossowski as part of the Polish negotiation team, at least officially, and no one on either side would have suggested, at least in public, otherwise.

Military aspects of the 1956 crisis, with which I have been grappling since 1986, have been among the most difficult issues to date to discuss with any degree of confidence. Documentary evidence, until recently, has been limited, while humanist sociology, brushed with rumors, hearsay, and unsubstantiated gossip, grows with every memoir. With some exceptions, the latter part of the little story from the long Belvedere meeting recited to Mr. Leitenberg by his Polish source has a ring of truth. I can imagine, during the most heated moments, Khrushchev and Gomulka exchanging veiled threats, using language that spawned images of heroic Polish resistance and Soviet military glory. Khrushchev and Gomulka were not the quiet diplomatic types. But it would be a leap to suggest that “one of the most crucial aspects” determining the “ultimate outcome of the confrontation” was the “circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the [Soviet military] movements,” at least with the limited selection of documents I included in my essay.

However, I will let Mr. Leitenberg and the readers of the Bulletin decide for themselves the merits of my case when I present it in full, in a second documentary essay I have begun to put together, this time with Edward Nalepa of the Military Historical Institute in Warsaw, before I was made aware of Mr. Leitenberg’s letter, for an upcoming issue of the Bulletin. Our documents include a series of reports prepared by Polish military counter-espionage (Informacja) officers throughout the period of the crisis.

In my first essay I wanted to focus on the political aspects of the crisis, particularly the bottom line positions staked out by the two key personalities in this struggle: Khrushchev and Gomulka. Reflecting the tendency at these high level meetings to focus on personalities, both sides argued over the symbolic significance of Marshal Rokossowski’s continued presence in People’s Poland. Almost all other outstanding issues that divided the Soviets and the Poles were left for further negotiations. I am currently preparing a list of the documents that cover this vast subject. The documents I selected for translation or cited in the footnotes of my first Bulletin essay make up the most up to date collection on the Polish version of what happened at the Belvedere Palace on 19-20 October 1956. The Czech document recording a 24 October 1956 meeting at the Belvedere in Warsaw, which outlines the Soviet version of events—a document introduced and translated by Mark Kramer and published in the same issue of the Bulletin (pp. 1, 50-56)—helps to complete the documentary part of the whole puzzle, but more Soviet documents are still required to draw less tentative conclusions.

My thesis, not in dispute insofar as Mr. Leitenberg’s letter is concerned, is that the Polish crisis of October 1956 ended in a political settlement. Khrushchev made the final compromise which ended the standoff: Rokossowski’s future was left to the PUWP CC; and they later voted to oust him from the Politburo. Both sides compromised and claimed victory, although Gomulka came out of the stormy negotiations especially in a strong position. Khrushchev, on the other hand, managed, as I argue, “to put the Polish question to rest for almost 25 years.” The Soviet compromise should not go unnoticed.

Indeed, all this was accomplished at a time of great international tension, ideologi-
cal confusion, social unrest in the country where the negotiations were taking place, and led by two leaders who still had to operate within some kind of collective leadership framework. Other than “active intervention,” as Khrushchev called it, could the Soviet leader (or Gomulka for that matter) have guaranteed anything other than the threat of military intervention during the talks at the Belvedere Palace, without a prolonged and exhaustive period of face-to-face negotiation? We already know, for example, that Khrushchev only knew what others had told him about Gomulka or the situation in Poland, and that he was already suspicious of half the Polish Politburo, whom he met in March 1956. In fact, Khrushchev positively despised Roman Zambrowski, the leading Gomulka supporter in the PUWP Politburo at the time. Mikoyan’s warning to Gomulka that he would “be pulled to the top by the Jews and then again they will drop him” was directed at Zambrowski, who again became the target of Soviet scorn during informal Soviet-Polish meetings over the future of Soviet-Polish relations after October 1956.

With regard to the second assertion by Mr. Leitenberg; namely my refusal to discuss “the threatened response of Polish military units” to the Soviet troop movements, which “is not mentioned in the documents at all, or by the author,” I will add this for the moment. The Soviet control of the Polish Army, acknowledged in the body of my essay, extensively discussed in my footnotes, and covered by Document 5 (Khrushchev’s letter to Gomulka on 22 October 1956), as well as the Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the affairs of the Polish party, cannot be separated. If any communist in Poland at the time can make a claim to have threatened to go to battle against Soviet tanks and troops, who also marched with some Polish military units towards Warsaw, it was the commanders of the security troops under the command of the Polish interior ministry, and perhaps some individual Polish Army officers who turned to them. But all these matters need further clarification. Edward Nalepa and I will try to sort through the myth and draw some more appropriate conclusions in the essay we will present in a future Bulletin.

We will also try to put into context Mr. Leitenberg’s presentation of the observations shared to him during a talk in 1980 with “a former Polish party and government official who had before 1956 been close to the Polish First Secretary...Bierut.” At this stage, I will only emphasize that this too is a problem. How Polish communists, sharply divided before October 1956, immediately after the crisis, appropriated and transformed the October events and then continued to reinvent the “Polish October” after each successive period of conflict during the Cold War, is worthy of note.

I take full responsibility for a number of misprints that appear in the published text. Mr. Leitenberg’s final critical remark to me, “Gluchowski never comments on the [Soviet] proposal for union,” is one of the most serious errors. Three separate letters with corrections were sent to the Bulletin, but it appears the last one did not make it into the final text. The sentence from which Mr. Leitenberg cites (p. 40), where Gomulka is outlining to the Polish Politburo Khrushchev’s comments, should read as follows: “They are upset with us because the Politburo Commission proposed a new list of members to the Politburo without a number of comrades who are supporters of a Polish-Soviet alliance [not union—sojusz polskoradziecki], namely, comrades Rokossowski, [Zenon] Nowak, Mazur, Joziwak.” The next two sentences should read: “I explained to them that we don’t have such tendencies. We do not want to break the friendly relations [not alliance—zrywacz przyjazni związań Radzieckim] with the Soviet Union.”

Incidentally, Khrushchev’s comment to Gomulka about Poland’s leading supporters of a Soviet-Polish alliance is closely related to Khrushchev’s previous comment, cited by Gomulka in Russian: “The treacherous activity of Comrade Ochab has become evident, this number won’t pass here.” It was not obvious to me when I prepared the first essay, although I now hope to make my case shortly elsewhere, but it appears that Khrushchev’s anger, directed as it was towards Ochab, probably stemmed from Ochab’s September 1956 meeting with the Chinese, as mentioned in Document 5, and subsequent negotiations between Warsaw and Beijing. Soviet-Chinese talks over Poland appear to have led Beijing to demand from Moscow a more collective approach to the way the Kremlin dealt with the Warsaw Treaty Organization states. In a telegram to Gomulka from the Polish ambassador to China, dated 27 October 1956, Stanislaw Kiryluk wrote:

...at two in the morning I was invited to meet with the CPCh [Communist Party of China] leadership. Talks with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun lasted for three hours ... [The Chinese leaders stated:] ‘Between 19-23 October a CPCh delegation ... in Moscow convinced Khrushchev about the rightness of the political changes in Poland ... Matters of independent Polish activities cannot be questioned despite the reservations of the CPSU Politburo, which has become accustomed to methods and forms of behavior that must be eliminated from relations within the socialist camp.” Mao used, in this context, the phrase “great power chauvinism.” [See Archive of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collection of telegrams from Beijing in 1956, Telegram no. 17599, 27 October 1956]

It appears the Chinese may also need to be given some credit for the success of the “Polish October.”

Centre for Russian and East European Studies. University of Toronto
25 November 1995
23 October 1995

To the Editor:

The Spring 1995 issue of the Bulletin, as rich and as informative as ever, contains two stimulating articles by Professor Johanna Granville. Permit me to make a few comments on both.

In the first article—"Imre Nagy, Hesitant Revolutionary"—Professor Granville correctly argues that Prime Minister Nagy, a lifelong Communist, hesitated to side with the revolutionaries during the early days of the 1956 Hungarian uprising (October 23-27); that he created a new, reform-minded party leadership that was more congenial to his way of thinking only on October 28th; and that, finally, he embraced the revolution's main demands of neutrality and political pluralism on November 1st, after he realized that Moscow had deceived him.

Alas, this is not a new interpretation, nor do the documents that follow Professor Granville’s article provide important new evidence to confirm it. Hence your claim, Granville's article provide important new evidence to confirm the paragraph that the Kremlin was no longer interested in finding a political solution to the crisis under his leadership. He felt betrayed. In vain had he consulted with the Kremlin; in vain had he gained Soviet approval for every major measure he had adopted between October 23 and 31. The party was over. From the loyal Muscovite he had been all his life, this is when Nagy became a Hungarian revolutionary. On November 1, acting for the first time without Soviet concurrence, his government declared Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the country’s neutrality. On November 4, when its troops reached the Hungarian capital, the Soviet Union overthrew the Nagy government and crushed the revolution.

To the extent this was a “reassessment” ten years ago, Professor Granville’s article must be regarded as a “restatement” of that interpretation, albeit a useful one. I am not aware of a single scholarly book or article published anywhere in recent years that has claimed that Nagy was anything but “hesitant.”

In her second article and in the documents from the archives of the KGB that are attached to it—"Imre Nagy, aka ‘Volodya’—A Dent in the Martyr’s Halo?”—Professor Granville does offer a reassessment of Nagy’s life in Moscow in the 1930s. While the documents make wild claims, Professor Granville prudently and correctly indicates some of the circumstances under which they were released in mid-1989. She puts it well: “The story of how these materials came to light is a story that has more to do with Soviet, Hungarian, and communist party politics amidst the revolutionary upheaval of the late 1980s and early 1990s than with historical or scholarly investigation” (p. 34). My purpose here is to add a few comments, including some new information on the role of a key player, about how and why the KGB released parts of its file on “Volodya.”

On the basic issue at hand: Having read the four KGB documents published by Professor Granville (pp. 36-37), and having read fragments of others in 1991-92, I share Professor Granville’s suspicion that Imre Nagy was almost certainly an informer for the NKVD, the KGB’s predecessor, in the 1930s. Like most other Communist exiles, Nagy was also a Soviet citizen and a member of the Soviet Communist Party. He was attached to the Soviet-dominated Communist International.

However, the claims about the consequences of Nagy’s reporting made by KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov in his letter of transmittal to the Soviet Central Committee on 16 June 1989 (p. 36) are almost certainly not true. His suggestion that Nagy alone was responsible for the arrest, exile, or execution of dozens of high-ranking Communist exiles defies common sense. Nagy, after all, was hardly an important figure at that time; he did not even belong to the inner circle of Hungarian activists. He was a lonely man, writing on Hungarian agriculture in an obscure émigré journal no one read and com-
menting on the Hungarian-language broadcasts of Radio Moscow no one heard, let alone listened to. As one of his Muscovite colleagues would observe many years later, even the leading émigrés “had nothing of consequence to do but they behaved as if they had. They practiced assiduously something they referred to as politics, plotted one another’s downfall, and generally pranced and cantered like superannuated parade horses at the knacker’s gates.” (Julius Hay, *Born 1900: Memoirs* [LaSalle, Ill.: Library Press, 1975], pp. 218-19.)

Given the atmosphere of suspicion prevailing in Moscow at the time, the Russian commissars did not trust information conveyed by foreign Communists.

Could Nagy, a nonentity among the nonentities, have been a petty mole, then? Yes. Could his reporting have contributed to the bloody purge of foreign, especially Hungarian, Communists in the 1930s? Yes. Could he have been directly responsible for the arrest of 25 Hungarian Communist émigrés, of whom 12 were executed and the rest sent to prison or exile? No. One: The Soviet authorities were always both suspicious of and contemptuous toward all foreign Communists; the NKVD surely did not rely on one such informant’s reports. Two: As Kryuchkov put it, the 1989 release of the “Volodya File” to Károly Grósz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP), was meant to be “expedient” and Grósz was to be advised “about their possible use” (p. 36). Three: Given the KGB’s aptitude for falsifying documents, the authenticity of anything emerging from its archives must be carefully scrutinized.

A few hitherto unknown details will amplify the skepticism implicit in these reservations and supplement Professor Granville’s able account of the political circumstances of 1989.

In 1988, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov flew to Budapest on a secret fact-finding mission. Long familiar with, and reportedly very fond of, Hungary, he stayed for several days. He met a few party leaders, the head of the political police, and at least one mole the police had planted in the country’s increasingly vocal democratic opposition movement. Judging by the questions he asked and the people he met, he wanted to gain a first-hand impression of the bitter struggle that engulfed the HSWP leadership after the forced resignation of János Kádár earlier that year and of the character, composition, and objectives of the democratic opposition. His visit confirmed what he must have known: that the critics both inside and outside the party were gaining new adherents by using Imre Nagy’s execution in 1958 to discredit not only Kádár and his associates but to undermine the whole post-1956 Hungarian political order. As in 1955-56, Nagy—a man Kryuchkov knew while he was the Soviet Embassy’s press attaché in Budapest—had once again become the flag for the gathering storm.

I do not know if it was Kryuchkov who then initiated the KGB’s search for information on Nagy’s past. Nor does it much matter. Both he and Grósz were anxious to discredit Nagy in order to deprive the Hungarian people—and the anti-Kádár, anti-Grósz reformers in the HSWP—of a symbol of courage and sacrifice, of a reformer who broke ranks with Moscow. An astute Kremlinologist may also interpret their effort as an attempt to disparage Nagy in order to undermine Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s reputation.

I do know, however, who went over to the headquarters of the KGB to authenticate Nagy’s handwriting and pick up the newly found “Volodya File.” Accompanied by Gyula Thürmer—Grósz’s special assistant for Soviet affairs who, married to a Russian woman, spoke excellent Russian—and possibly by a “Third Man,” also from Budapest, the Hungarian in charge of the transaction was Sándor Rajnai, the Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow. Unlike the young Thürmer and the “Third Man,” Rajnai had long known Nagy and his handwriting very well indeed. For, in 1957-58, Lieutenant-Colonel Rajnai of the Hungarian political police was responsible for Nagy’s arrest in and forced return from his involuntary exile in Romania; for Nagy’s year-long interrogation in a Budapest jail where even his presence was top secret; and for the preparation of Nagy’s equally secret trial whose scenario Rajnai had drafted. (Loyal, competent, sophisticated, and admired by his superiors and subordinates alike, this creative author of the last bloody Communist purge was subsequently richly rewarded for a job well done. After a long tenure as head of Hungarian foreign intelligence, he served as Ambassador to Romania and then—the top prize—to the Soviet Union. In the 1980s he became a member of the HSWP Central Committee as well.)

By the time Rajnai “authenticated” Nagy’s handwriting in July or early August of 1989, Nagy had received—on 16 June 1989—congratulatory tributes to Budapest’s Heroes Square in front of hundreds of thousands of people while millions watched the event live on Hungarian TV all day. Still, Rajnai clung to the hope that he could save the regime in which he believed and his own skin, too, by publicizing damaging information about Nagy—by portraying him as a false pretender, a deceiver who sold out his friends and comrades, a Stalinist stooge. Only in this way could Rajnai help the hardliners in the HSWP, notably Károly Grósz, to defeat such critics as Imre Pozsgay who used Nagy’s name to gain political ground. Not incidentally, only in this way could Rajnai justify his own past and clarify the meaning of his life. He told me as much during the course of some 40 hours of conversation over several months in 1991 and ‘92.

As it happened, Rajnai forwarded the “Volodya File” to Grósz; it was translated from Russian into Hungarian by Mrs. Thürmer. Grósz presented a verbal summary, similar to Kryuchkov’s, to the HSWP Central Committee on 1 September 1989. In his speech Grósz told the Central Committee of Nagy’s direct responsibility for the arrest and sentencing of 25 leading Hungarian cadres in Moscow and the execution of 12 of them. But then Grósz declined to open the floor for discussion or answer any questions. The Central Committee resolved to send the “Volodya File” to the archives where it was shelved. Oddly enough, even Grósz seemed doubtful of Volodya’s political value at this late date. “It is my conviction,” he declared, “that what you have just heard will not be decisive when it comes to making the ultimate judgment about Imre Nagy’s whole life.” (The text of Grósz’s speech was published on 15 June 1990—ten long months later—in the hardline Szabadság, a small-circulation Communist weekly edited by Gyula Thürmer.)

In the end, Rajnai’s hope of saving the one-party Communist regime by publicizing the “Volodya File” was dashed, and his fear of being held accountable for the phony charges he had concocted against Nagy in 1957-58 turned out to be unwarranted. For, while the Hungarian Supreme Court in 1989 declared the trial of Imre Nagy and his associates null and void, it declined to charge
those responsible for it. (Several Politburo members deeply involved in the case, including Kádár’s Minister of Internal Affairs, were then—and are still—alive and well. However, the chief prosecutor committed suicide in the 1970s; János Kádár, the main culprit, died minutes before the Court “retried” and rehabilitated his nemesis; and the head of the kangaroo court that had sent Nagy to the gallows in 1958, who remained unrepentant to the end, died in 1991.)

As for Rajnai, by the time we got acquainted in 1991 he had resigned his ambassadorship and retired. He was in semihiding, worried about retribution. A few months after our last conversation in 1992, I received a letter from him in which he asked for my help in getting an American visa. I have since heard that he died abroad, not in the United States, of natural causes. Perhaps so. But in his last years, the memory of Imre Nagy appeared to consume his mind and cripple his will to live.

Sincerely,

Charles Gati

* * * * *

22 November 1995

To the Editor:

The articles by Janos Rainer and Johanna Granville in Issue 5 of the Bulletin make a major contribution to our understanding of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Soviet decisions relating to it. Both articles tend to conclude that the Soviet decision to intervene decisively to suppress the Nagy government was probably made in the period October 26-30. The documents available to date do not answer the question, but I read them as consistent with a conclusion that the Soviet decision was not made until October 30-31—after the Hungarians had disclosed their intention to declare neutrality and leave the Warsaw Pact. Mikoyan and Suslov, in their telegram of October 30, may have been reporting on their assurances to Nagy as implementation of a deception plan, but why then would they say to their Politburo colleagues “If the situation deteriorates further, then, of course, it will be necessary to reexamine the whole issue in its entirety.”

If a decision to intervene had been taken earlier, what was there to “reexamine in its entirety”? Moreover, the Soviet public declaration of October 30 advanced a liberal interpretation of Warsaw Pact relationships, and included an explicit promise to negotiate a possible complete Soviet military withdrawal from Hungary. That may, of course, have been intended only to deceive Hungarian, Western and world opinion. But if so, it was a costly device—its brutal repudiation in practice a few days later was a serious blow to the Soviet Union in the Western socialist world as well as in Eastern Europe.

I continue to believe what I first wrote in a RAND paper (P-984) on November 28, 1956 (first published in Problems of Communism in January 1957, and later in my book Soviet Military Policy): while Soviet contingent preparations for possible intervention were no doubt underway, it was only on October 30-31 that the final decision to intervene was made.

On October 31, when Mikoyan and Suslov met with Imre Nagy and Zoltan Tildy, the latter rejected an offer to withdraw immediately all Soviet troops that had not earlier been present in the country. Moreover, Tildy told Mikoyan that Hungary would definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact in any case—that is, even if the Soviet leaders accepted their demand to withdraw all Soviet forces immediately. (This was disclosed in a monitored broadcast by [Hungarian Defense Minister] General Pal Maleter on November 1 or 2.) I believe that that was the final straw that tipped the decision to intervene. The new documents, while not conclusive, are consistent with that interpretation. We can hope that other documents not yet discovered or published will clarify this matter.

I do not argue that the thesis I have outlined briefly above has been confirmed, but it has not been disconfirmed by the new evidence available, and in my view the new material tends to substantiate it. I believe we should continue to regard the question as an open one.

Other important developments were also occurring, including the Anglo-French intervention in Suez on October 30 (which, as Vladislav Zubok has pointed out, the Soviet leaders initially interpreted as blessed by the United States). Further attention should also be given to the intriguing comment in KGB Chief Serov’s report of October 28, cited in the Bulletin on pp. 30-31. In para. 5 (on p. 31) he cites an alleged conversation by a KGB Hungarian source with some Americans (named but not identified) who were reported to have said that “if the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest possible time, the UN troops will move in at the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take place.” Nagy had told Andropov on November 1 that Hungary was not only withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact immediately, but would seek UN and Big Four guarantees of its neutrality. Did the Soviet leaders on October 30-November 1 fear a U.S. intervention, possible under UN auspices circumventing their veto, if they withdrew? Perhaps new documents will clarify that issue.

In closing, I would like also to correct one small error in the translation of one of the documents. A report by Deputy MVD Minister Perevertkin on 24 October 1956, is cited (on p. 22 of the Bulletin) as saying that the Soviet intervention force at that time numbered in all “128 rifle divisions and 39 mechanized divisions”—which would have meant almost the entire Soviet Army! The figures evidently refer to 128 rifle and 39 mechanized companies, not divisions. As correctly noted in the text of Mark Kramer’s commentary (on p. 51), the Soviet force in Hungary on October 24 totaled some 31,500 men drawn from five divisions in and near Hungary.

Sincerely,

Raymond L. Garthoff
The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist realm. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP to relevant citations. Readers should consult references in Bulletin articles for additional sources.

Abbreviations:

DA = Deutschland Archiv
FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service
NYT = New York Times
RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
VfZ = Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte
WP = Washington Post
ZhG = Zeitschrift fuer Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Russischen Imperialismus

Russia/Former Soviet Union

Interview with Stalin granddaughter Galina Iakovkevna Dzughashvili. (Yuri Dmitriev and Samarii Gurarii, “Syn Stalina” [Stalin’s Son], Trud, 31 May 1994, 3.)


December 1945 documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives illuminate Moscow’s refusal to join International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Harold James and Marzenna James, “The Origins of the Cold War: Some New Documents,” The Historical Journal 37, 3 (1994), 615-622.)

Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov announces (2 December 1994) plans to revise estimate of total Soviet deaths during World War II; says 44 Soviet soldiers and officers remain MIA from the 1956 invasion of Hungary, 300 were still missing from the war in Afghanistan, and a Col. Udanov, missing in Ethiopia in 1978, was reported to be alive and working in a Somali stone quarry as late as 1989. (RFE/RL Daily Report 229 (6 December 1994).) Dispute over number of Soviet deaths in World War II reviewed. (Boris Sokolov, “New Estimates of World War II Losses," Moscow News [English] 16 (28 April-4 May 1995), 7.)

Stalin’s handling of Nuremberg trials assessed by historian Natalya Lebedeva. (“Stalin and the Nuremberg Trial," Moscow News [English] 11 (24-30 March 1995), 12.)


Report on persecution and isolation of Russians who returned from WWII German POW camps includes April 1956 recommendation from commission headed by Defense Minister Zhukov to relax measures. (Vladimir Naumov and Alexander Korotkov, “WWII POWs Condemned as Traitors,” Moscow News [English] 17 (5-11 May 1995), 11.)


Stalin’s postwar policy in Eastern Europe assessed. (Vadim Tarlinskii, “Sud’ba federatsii” [Fate of the Federation], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 December 1993, 4.)


Beria’s letters from prison, 1953. (Istochnik 4 (1994), 3-14.)


Archival evidence yields new view on Beria’s role in post-Stalin power struggle. (Boris Starkov, “Koe-chto noven’koe o Berii” [Something New About Beria], Argumenty i Fakty 46 (November 1993), 6.)

Nina Vasil’evna Alekseeva on her relationship with L.P. Beria. (Irina Mastykina, “Ya Byla Ne Liubovnitsie Berii, a Ego Zhertvoi” [I Was Not Beria’s Lover, I Was His Victim], Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 25-28 March 1994, 8-9; 8-11 April 1994, 6-7.)

Ex-CPSU official L.N. Efremov discusses memories of Nikita Sergeevich. (Valery Alekseev, “Taki Raznoi Khrushchev” [The Varied Khrushchev], Pravda, 16 April 1994, 4.)


Disident perspective on 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. (Viktor Trofimov, “Neordinarnye otnosheniia” [Unusual relations], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 June 1994, 4.)

Conversations recalled with Prime Minister


Previously unpublished 1963 interview with Khrushchev from CPSU CC archives. (“Vesloe ozhivlenie” [A Happy Revival], Komsomolskaia Pravda, 27 November 1993, 3.)

Account of Soviet officials’ reaction to assassination of John F. Kennedy. (Melor Strura, “22 Noiabria 1963 goda” [22 November 1963], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 November 1993, 8.)

Documents on Khrushchev’s 1964 meetings with Danish leaders. (“About a 1964 Visit to Denmark on the Highest Level,” Diplomaticeskii Vestnik 7-8 (April 1994), 70-5.)


Eyewitness account of 1969 assassination attempt against Brezhnev. (Mikhail Rudenko, “‘I broneboinaia pulia dala rikoshet...’” [And the Armor-Piercing Bullet Ricocheted...], Moskovskiaia Pravda, 5 October 1994, 4.)

Khrushchev’s interrogation upon Western publication of his memoirs in 1970. (Istochnik 4 (1994), 64-75.)


Story of search for rare German stamps to give Brezhnev on 1979 trip to GDR. (Mikhail Pogorelyi, “‘Tseppelin’ dla Brezhneva” [Zeppelin for Brezhnev], Krasniaia Zvezda, 7 May 1994, 6.)

Memoir of more than three decades in Soloviev Psychiatric Hospital. (Maiia Mikhailovna Korol’, “Sudby zhen sovetskoi elity” [The Fate of the Wives of the Soviet Elites], Rosskiiskie Vesti, 20 May 1994, 5.)


Excerpts from personal papers of late Foreign Ministry official, focusing on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. (Anatoly Adamoishin, “Evreiskii Anekdot” [Jewish Anecdote], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 September 1994, 5.)

Memories of Chernenko from his niece. (Aleksandr Khinshtein, “Ne uspel nichego delat’ [I Did Not Have Time to Do Anything], Moskovskiaia Komsomol’ets, 25 December 1993, 8.)

Police officer “S” recalls Soviet policy toward Sakharov. (German Orekhov, “Vospominания Sakharova” [Memories of Sakharov], Smena [Change], 24 August 1994, 4; Medvedev, “Bomba c kleimom LON” [Bomb with the Mark of LON (Camp of Special Significance)], Rabochaia Tribuna, 30 September 1994, 5; 1 October 1994, 3; Medvedev, “The KGB and the Atomic Bomb,” Rossia, 31 January 1995, 6.)


Evidence from the archives of D.V. Skobel’tsyn. (Mikhail Rebrow, “Mog li Sovetskii Soiuiz peryvno sdelat’ atomniuiu bombu?” [Could the Soviet Union Have Been the First to Make an Atomic Bomb?] Krasniaia Zvezda, 30 April 1994, 5.)

Historian Zhores Medvedev on various aspects of the Soviet atomic program, including the roles of prison labor and the KGB. (Zhores Medvedev, “KGB i Sovetskaia Atomnaia Bomba” [The KGB and the Soviet Atomic Bomb], Smena [Change], 24 August 1994, 4; Medvedev, “Bomba c kleimom LON” [Bomb with the Mark of LON (Camp of Special Significance)], Rabochaia Tribuna, 30 September 1994, 5; 1 October 1994, 3; Medvedev, “The KGB and the Atomic Bomb,” Rossia, 31 January 1995, 6.)


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Interview with Arkadii Brishch on his work on Soviet atom bomb. (Oleg Moroz, "Skropnovya byla ne bomba, a skhema zariada" [It wasn’t the Bomb that Was Copied, It Was the Storage System], Literaturnaiia Gazeta 36 (7 September 1995), 10.)


Interview with I. Zavashin, director of “Avangard” factory at Arzamas-16, formerly secret Soviet nuclear center. (Vladimir Gubarev, “Yuri Zavashin: Pontiatie ‘nado’ my vpitali s molokom materi” [Yuri Zavashin: The Concept of “Must” We Imbibed with our Mother’s Milk], Segodnia, 28 September 1994, 9.)

Description of Soviet Air Force 1956 training maneuver for nuclear war, in which 272 troops were ordered to land at ground zero. (Aleksandr Kyrov, “Dernyi Desant” [Turf Landing], Rossiskaia Gazeta, 26 May 1994, 7.)


Environmental impact of nuclear tests on Totskii proving grounds, and increased cancer rates in city of Orenburzh, assessed by Duma representative. (Tamara Zlotnikova, “Zabytiy genotsid” [Forgotten Genocide], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 14 September 1994, 2.)

Soviet KGB head Kryuchkov noted disappearance of several tons of uranium in 1989, according to German report. (Berlin DD/P ADN, 21 August 1994, in “Secret Nuclear Depots Reported in FRG, East Europe, in FBIS-WU-94-162 (22 August 1994), 12.)


Military Issues:

Dmitrii Volkogonov interviewed on search for missing U.S. military from World War II. (Valerii Rudnev, “Rossiia prodolzhaet iskat’ ‘Otriad osobnogo naznacheniia: Khronika minnykh poliakh’” [6,000 Hours on the Minefields], Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 September 1994, 6.)

New data on disaster aboard nuclear submarine PL-574 which claimed 89 lives. (“Taina gibeli PL-574” [The Secret of the Disaster of PL-574], Kosmosol’skaia Pravda, 30 December 1993, 7.)

Former vice-admiral recalls 1974 mine-sweeping operation in Gulf of Suez. (Aleksandr Apollonov, “6,000 chasov na minnykh poliakh” [6,000 Hours on the Minefields], Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 September 1994, 6.)

Series on Pacific Ocean battles covered up by Soviet regimes. (Nikolai Burbyga, “Zhvertvi heob iavlennykh voin” [Victims of Unannounced Wars], Izvestia, 5 January 1994, 6; 9 February 1994, 8.)


New data on Soviet ballistic missile development. (Krasnaia Zvezda, 18 June 1994, 6.)

Sino-Soviet Relations:

Correspondence printed between Stalin and Mao from January 1949 reveals disagreement on tactics regarding potential media-
tion of Chinese Civil War. (Sergei L. Tikhvinskii, “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tsetsunom v yanvare 1949 g.” [From the Presidential Archives of the RF (Russian Federation): Correspondence of I.V. Stalin with Mao in January 1949], Novaya i noveisha istoriya 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.)


Interview with Li Iuzhan, Mao’s interpreter for meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. (Andrei Kabannikov, “Mao v okruzenii vragov i tantsovshchits” [Mao, Surrounded by Enemies and Dancers], Komosenolskaia Pravda, 6 January 1994, 14.)

Intelligence/Espionage Issues:

Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona decrypts of KGB messages seem genuine and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran Communist spy ring, though some key evidence of atomic espionage still lacking. (Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, “Cryptic Answers,” The Nation, 14/21 August 1995, 152-53.)

Christine Keeler, call-girl who was key figure in 1963 Profumo spy scandal in England, reportedly admitted for first time to having been a Soviet spy. (British magazine OK, 4 November 1994, quoted in RFE/RL Daily Report 211 (7 November 1994).)

Recollections of Andropov from ex-KGB colleagues. (Alekandr Chersniak, “Andropov—Izvestnyi i neizvestnyi” [Andropov—The Known and Unknown], Pravda, 15 June 1994; 3; Alesksei Grishin, “V ego stikakh bylo mnogo ostrokh slovochek” [In His Poems There Were Many Sharp Words], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 June 1994, 6.)

Interview of Vladimir Barkovskii, who worked with Soviet spies in London, on role of espionage in development of Soviet atomic bombs. (Andrei Vaganov, “Sorok piat' let nazad, 29 avgusta, byla ispytana pervala v CCCR atomnaia bomba” [Forty-Five Years Ago, On August 29, the USSR’s First Atom Bomb Was Tested], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 30 August 1993, 1.)


Interview with ex-KGB official Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Nikolay Leonov, author of Seditious Times (1994); comments on Ames case, KGB deflectors, etc. (“KGB Lieutenant General Nikolay Leonov: Failure by Ames in the United States was Impossible: He Was Betrayed in Moscow,” Komosomolskaya Pravda, 22 December 1994, 6, in FBIS-SOV-94-248 (27 December 1994), 17-19.)

Interview with Vladimir Stanchenko about Soviet and Russian espionage. (“The Spy Who Returned to the Cold,” Izvestiia, 2 September 1994, 9.)


KGB watched Russian National Unity Movement leader Aleksy Vedenkin for “keeness on fascist ideas” since 1981, authorities say; other report says Vedenkin probably belonged to KGB. (Moscow RIA, 1 March 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-046-A (9 March 1995), 3-4; also Moskovskiy Komsomolet, 1 March 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-055 (22 March 1995), 20.)

Interview with ex-KGB double agent-defector Oleg Gordievsky on publication of his memoirs; Sunday Times (London) publishes excerpt with names of KGB sources. (“Ex-Spy Causes Uproar in Britain” and “Times Publishes Names of British KGB Informers,” Moscow News [English] 8 (24 February-2 March 1995), 11; see also “KGB: Michael Foot was our agent,” The Sunday Times (London), 19 February 1995.)

New official publication, White Paper on Russian Secret Services (Moscow:

...


Archival/Research Developments:

Complaints persist on difficulties of archival access. (Anna Repina, “Komu oni nuzhny, eti tainy” [They are Secrets to those Who Need Them], Smena, 12 October 1993, 4.)

Archive official’s report, based on a December 1993 speech at RTsKhIDNI. (V.P. Kozlov, “Zarubezhnaia arkhivnaiia Rossiki: Problemy i Napravleniia Raboty” [Foreign Archives Relating to Russia: Problems and the Direction of Work], Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 3 (1994), 13-23.)

Russia and France complete first of series of planned archival exchanges. (“Archival Files Are Returned to Russia from France,” Diplomaticeskii Vestnik 3-4 (February 1994), 79.)

Archival regulations. (“Polozhenie ob arkhivom fonde Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [The State of the Archives in the Russian Federation], Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 1 April 1994, 4.)


Interview with Rosarkhiv head R.G. Pikhoya. (Sergei Barshavchik, “Tseny na gosudarstvennye tainy v Rossii po-prezhndey vyse mirovykh” [As Before, the Prices on State Secrets in Russia are Higher than the World Standard], Novaia Ezhedvnevaia Gazeta, 1 September 1994.)

Russian presidential decree (no. 489-rp, dated 22 September 1994) is supposed to lead to massive declassification of materials more than 30 years old. (“Decree to Reveal Secrets,” Moscow News [English] 40 (7-13 October 1994), 14.)

State Duma passes legislation on Freedom of Information giving citizens rights to state information resources, reports Rossiiskie vesti on 23 November 1994. (RFERL Daily Report 223 (28 November 1994).)


Interagency regional conference in Novosibirsk discusses need to protect secret information. (Vechernii Novosibirsk, 19 June 1995, 2, in FBIS-SOV-95-121 (23 June 1995), 34.)


Interview with head of the Russian Presidential Archives (APRF) Aleksandr Korotkov. (“Dla chevo otkrivaiem’ osobuyu papkii” [Why Open the “Special Files”], Krasnaia Zvezda, 9 August 1995, 2.)

Armenia

Document published purporting to confirm secret collaboration between Dashnak party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)) and KGB during Soviet era. (Aragil Electronic News Bulletin (Yerevan), 4 March 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-043 (6 March 1995), 93.)


Belarus


Estonia

Estonian government concerned by reports of KGB documents being sold on black market; Estonia’s Archives Department acknowledges loss of “thousands of files on the activity of the KGB and other intelligence agencies.” (Interfax report of 20 November 1994, in RFERL Daily Report 221 (21 November 1994).)

Parliamentary committee reports results of two-year investigation of KGB activities in Estonia, including review of archives.
Ukrainian archives yield new data on 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. (N.V. Makovs’ka, “Politichnaia Retrospektiva Chornobyli s’koi Katastrofi v Dokumentakh” [A Political Retrospective of the Chernobyl Catastrophe in Documents], Archiv Ukrainy 1-3 (1993), 99-105.)

Detailed recounting of how glasnost in late 1980s permitted freer airing of true dimensions of 1933 famine in Ukraine. (James E. Mace, “How Ukraine Was Permitted to Remember,” The Ukrainian Quarterly 49:2 (Summer 1993), 121-151.)

Czech parliamentary commission investigating late 1980 Warsaw Pact maneuvers may have had political overtones, but link to possible invasion of Poland still unclear. (Prague CTK, 8 February 1995, in “‘No Direct Proof’ of 1980 Poland Invasion Found,” FBIS-EEU-94-027-A (9 February 1995), 6-7.)

Government approves principle of opening StB (secret police files), Interior Minister Runmi denies it will lead to wave of lawsuits. (Prague CTK, 30 March 1995, in “Runmi Outlines Provisions of Bill on StB Files,” FBIS-EEU-94-062-A (31 March 1995), 5.)


Interview with Markus Wolf, former head of GDR external intelligence service. (“East Germany’s Old Spymaster Talks: So Many Regrets, but Uncontrite,” NYT, 6 June 1995, A11.)

Publications: R.C. Raack, Stalin’s Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); Norman Naimark, The...

Hungary

Recounting of case of school-teacher arrested in connection with show trials in Hungary under Matyas Rakosi in Stalin’s last years. (Eva V. Deak, “A Show Trial Case History: The Story of Gyorgyi Tarisznyas,” The Hungarian Quarterly 35:134 (Summer 1994), 75-91.)

Budapest Military Prosecutor’s Office on 28 October 1994 presses charges against three army officers accused of killing unarmed demonstrators during 1956 events, according to MTI. (RFE/RL Daily Report 207 (31 October 1994).)


Poland

Sejm considering State Secrets Bill barring release of information on intelligence activities for 80 years, national security or defense information for 40 years, and economic secrets for 30 years; media, liberals, oppose bill, which is returned to committee. (RFE/RL Daily Report 163 (29 August 1994).) Government and media agree new constitution will guarantee freedom of information, press; parliament rejects restrictive secrecy law. (Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza reports, 25 October 1994, quoted in RFE/RL Daily Report 203 (25 October 1994).)

Ex-Soviet base near Szczecin seen as econological hazard. (Glos Szczecinski, 1 February 1995, 1, in JPRS-TEN-95-004 (28 February 1995), 21-22.)


Romania

Report on Soviet policy toward December 1989 Romanian events, including letter from Shevardnadze to Gorbatchev and minutes of meetings. (“On the Events of 1989 in Romania,” Diplomaticheskii Vestnik (Moscow) 21-22 (November 1994), 74-80.)


Biographical interview with Akos Engelmayr, Hungarian ambassador to Poland, recounting influence of 1956, 1968, 1970, etc. (“Ambassador with a Rucksack,” The Hungarian Quarterly 35:133 (Spring 1994), 123-128.)
Controversy erupts over documents claiming past collaboration by Bishop Laszlo Tokes, ethnic Hungarian priest whose arrest sparked 1989 revolt, with Romanian Securitate secret police [Romanian Intelligence Service, or SRI]. (Gyorgy Jakab, “UDMR Will Ask to See the SRI Files of All Political Leaders,” Adevarul (Bucharest), 29 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-001 (3 January 1995), 24.) Paper publishes purported documents showing Tokes was paid Securitate informer. (“According to Renasterea Banateana, Laszlo Tokes Informed the Securitate Under the Name of Laszlo Kolozsvar,” Curierul National (Bucharest), 31 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-003 (5 January 1995), 19.)

Mongolia


People’s Republic of China

[Ed. note: For detailed lists of recent sources, see the essays by Michael Hunt and Chen Jian elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin.]

Evidence on early wrangling between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Moscow over Soviet seizure of Chinese industrial equipment in Manchuria at close of World War II. (Liu Guowu, “Zhanhou zhongsuo liangguo chuli dongbei rewei chanyede jiufen” [The Argument Between China and the USSR After the War Over How to Deal with the Japanese Puppet’s Industry], Modern Chinese History (Chinese People’s University Publications Reprint Series) 1 (1995), 100-104.]


Article based on CCP sources explores Zhou Enlai’s handling of the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, including data on secret communications between PRC and Taiwan. (Liao Xinwen, “Zhou Enlai yu heping jiejue taiwan wentide fangzhen” [Zhou Enlai and the Initiative to Peacefully Solve the Taiwan Problem], Dangde Wenzian [Party Documents] 5 (1994), 32-38.)


Korean War


Soviet documents on the Korean War, including military reports to Stalin. (“The Participation of the USSR in the Korean War (New Documents),” Voprosi istorii 11 (1994), 30-46.)


A conference on “The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record,” was held at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, on 24-25 July 1995, sponsored by The Korea Society, Korea-America Society, and Georgetown University. Please consult the sponsors for copies of papers delivered.


Vietnam/Vietnam War

USSR sent 3,000 troops to Vietnam during U.S. involvement there, and 13 were killed, writes former Tass correspondent, citing interviews with ex-Soviet ambassador I. Shcherbakov and other former officials. (AP dispatch citing article Aleksandr Minaev in Ekho Planety [Echo of the Planet], November 1995.)


Former Chinese People’s Liberation Army official Zhi Kaiyin writes that Mao scaled back military aid to North Vietnam in late
1960s because he believed weapons were being wasted. (Reported in Xinwen ziyou daobao [Press Freedom Guardian], 29 September 1995, 3.)


Cuba/Cuban Missile Crisis


POLISH CRISIS

continued from page 277

collapse of Communism. Although he added some observations about events through the end of 1991, he decided to proceed with the publication of his book before he had consulted any newly opened archives. This decision was unfortunate, but it was not inexcusable for a scholar who had already completed a manuscript and who would have had to travel many thousands of miles to work in the former East-bloc archives, perhaps delaying the appearance of his book for a considerable time. The delay would have been worthwhile, but it was a judgment call for Zuzowski in 1992, and he obviously believed he should press ahead.

In Grishin’s case, the decision to forgo archival research is far less explicable. His overview of the Polish crisis covers very familiar ground, and thus he should have done his best to adduce new documentary evidence. Grishin did not complete his monograph until early 1993, well after secret materials in both Warsaw and Moscow had been released and at the very time when sensitive files on the 1980-81 events were still freely available at the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow. (Severe restrictions were reimposed at the former Central Committee archive in April 1983, but that was after Grishin’s book was finished.) Although Grishin is based at Kazan University in Tatarstan, rather than in Moscow, he could have traveled to the Russian capital (and ideally to Warsaw, too) at relatively little expense to consult the archives. His decision to rely exclusively on contemporaneous newspaper articles and on a few recent first-hand accounts largely negates whatever contribution his book might have made.

Perhaps if Grishin had pursued archival research, he would have been able to come up with a more sophisticated presentation. To be sure, his book is a vast improvement over the lurid Soviet-era publications on the Polish crisis (e.g., Georgii Korchadze’s Zagovor protiv Pol’shi), and Grishin’s discussion of Soviet policy toward Poland in 1980-81 is often insightful. But his book is a far cry from the scholarly standards that most Western (and, increasingly, many Russian) analysts would accept. Grishin is primarily interested in showing why the Polish leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, was justified in crushing Solidarity in December 1981. Grishin draws extensively and uncritically on Jaruzelski’s own account, Stan wojenny: dlaczego (published in Poland in 1992), and his book often seems little more than a reprise of the memoir. Aside from reiterating Jaruzelski’s arguments, Grishin’s other main goal (as he declares without any subtlety in his introduction) is to depict Solidarity in as negative a light as possible. For polemical purposes his book may have some value, but from a scholarly standpoint it is sorely deficient.

It is a pity that neither of the books under review takes advantages of opportunities afforded by the post-Communist era. Zuzowski’s analysis has much to recommend it, and even Grishin occasionally has interesting things to say, but an authoritative reassessment of the Polish crisis will require detailed and critical archival research.

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Amb. Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.

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