SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE COLD WAR, POST-1974

Edited by Sue Onslow and Anna-Mart van Wyk
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Gathering together former antagonists to compare perspectives and reflect on decisions, backed by primary documents from a variety of international sources, is a well-established exercise in ‘Critical History’—a methodology pioneered by historians Jim Blight and Janet Lang, and used extensively to good effect by the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program, and its partners around the world.

Employing Critical Oral History as a research tool in the Southern African context was both an innovation, and a daunting challenge, as the region’s past is very much alive and kicking. That is one reason why the planning of this first-ever Critical Oral History Conference on Southern Africa in the Cold War took over five years.

The conference itself could not have taken place without the financial support of the Aluka Project, the Nordic Afrika Institute, the Journal of Southern African Studies, and the generous backing and provision of excellent facilities by Monash South Africa.

In addition to the kind contribution from the speakers at this two day meeting, and the input from our fellow academics Professor Vladimir Shubin, Professor Chris Saunders, Professor Brian Raftopoulos, Professor Tilman Dedering, Professor Iain Edwards, and Dr. Thula Simpson, we would also like to thank the following academics and administrators for their steadfast support: Professor Arne Westad, Co-Director of LSE IDEAS, Associate Professor Dina Burger, Deputy Pro-Vice Chancellor for Research at Monash South Africa, Dr. Proscovia Svard, Dr. Graham Dominy and Neels Muller of the South African National Archives, and Dr. Christian Ostermann (Director) and Tim McDonnell, at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. We are also deeply grateful for the continued interest and advice from Professor Mervyn Frost and Professor Jack Spence of the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. But our most profound thanks and appreciation go to the ‘witnesses’ themselves.

Dr. Sue Onslow and Associate Professor Anna-Mart van Wyk
Iain Edwards and Sue Onslow

EDWARDS: The terms “the Cold War” and “the Iron Curtain” are certainly amongst the most well-known terms in the post-World War II political lexicon. The Cold War was an epic period in world history, probably the first period in history that we can speak of as global history. South Africa was a cause celebre in the “life and times of the Cold War” and southern Africa was a significant geographical area within this global contestation. This would serve as a period of around thirty years. Within this period in southern Africa we can identify five broad historical processes: first, decolonization; second, the rise of the apartheid state; third, the growing power of anti-colonial national liberation movements and the ideological and organizational forms of “Third World-ism;” fourth, the increasing importance and complexity of superpower and other foreign interventions in the area; and finally, war. From small-scale sabotage to the articulation and operational conduct of various forms of armed struggle, from conventional to asymmetrical warfare, the Cold War in southern Africa was very often a hot war.

Historical analysis is always under continual revision. Ever since the outbreak of the Cold War, academic debates on the origins and characteristics of the Cold War have dominated the field of contemporary history. As the Cold War proceeded, the historiography of the Cold War developed its own dynamics. In the early phases of the Cold War academic discourse was ideologically partisan, fiercely divergent and even combative. Indeed historians and their works were part of the Cold War. Later historical work became far more nuanced. However, historians were still very much shackled by the realities of this continuing global conflict happening around them as they researched and wrote. The situation has now changed. Four features of this contemporary scholarly debate are salient and will provide much of the intellectual direction for this conference.

First, since the end of the Cold War, the historical context is much more open-ended, providing sources of both opportunity and confusion. Historians seek to review earlier approaches and assertions and, probably more excitingly, explore new areas of research.
Historians are reviewing their concepts and methods and are posing new questions. Historians seek new and relevant knowledge.

Second, during the Cold War secrecy and openness interrelated in complexly important ways. For the most part, the Cold War was a conflict conducted within shrouds of secrecy but carried out within the gaze of enormous publicity and propaganda, and with effects which could not be hidden. Historians need to understand how this wider process manifested itself in various situations, regions and periods. For historians, this is a critical issue of both evidence and analysis. State secrecy, when combined with all governments’ legitimate archival restrictions, has served to decisively limit historians’ access to crucially important primary sources. Inevitably, this limited historians’ analytic abilities. This is now changing across the world as more and more primary source material is becoming publicly accessible. However, the processes of archival opening have by no means been universal, continuous or uncomplicated. Historians still need to seek out further primary source material.

Third, throughout the world very many key Cold War figures live on. Historians have a responsibility to engage with these people. The Cold War was not a huge moment in history leaving only a documentary trail. It was a period of dramatic human agency. These actors have places in history. In a time of massive popular fascination with autobiography and memoir, many of these figures have written memoirs. Many more such works will doubtless follow. However, Cold War historians must seek a dialogue with these figures. Cold War historians must listen and learn. It is here that the contemporary historian, in the case of the Cold War, must embrace oral history. As with all contemporary historians, historians of the Cold War must be oral historians too. This must be a conference of listening and learning.

Finally, despite its ending, the legacy of the Cold War lives on, and is pervasive. The Cold War will cast a long shadow. Good historical work on the Cold War will remain of enormous contemporary importance. It is only now that a wider informed and decision-making leadership and public are recognizing this. This is so for southern Africa as it is for the rest of the world. It is the responsibility of us all, historians and actors, to join together and to develop different forms of understanding and knowledge. It is for exactly this reason that across the world scholars and actors are meeting in conferences such as this one. The importance of this conference is that it is the first time such an initiative has taken place to discuss the history of the Cold War in southern Africa.

In order to ensure that the discussions which are to commence can develop effectively, it is important to accept certain basic assumptions and understandings. Five are important.
First, historians of the Cold War are fully acquainted with power politics: *realpolitik*. Let us face these issues of power directly. Second, the Cold War was a bipolar creation of complex contestation. Let’s acknowledge that this will be central to our discussions. Third, secrecy was a key component in the Cold War. Let us accept that we understand that all is never as it seems. Fourth, the Cold War was a period of a dramatic worldwide engagement and also of minor detail. Let us not, as humans, seek only the dramatic large scale, dismissing the personal and the human as mere anecdote of minor, trivial import. Finally, as humans, we have partial, but nevertheless always legitimate forms of historical understanding and knowledge. Let’s express ourselves openly in this human way. This is the essence of listening and learning.

**ONSLOW:** Thank you very much, Iain. I would just like to begin by saying that we will be having time for questions in this opening session so that we all understand exactly what the brief of this meeting is and its purpose. I would like to welcome everyone. I would again like to thank Monash South Africa (MSA) for hosting this conference. I’d also like to set out, in broad terms, the origin of this meeting, because I genuinely believe it is a historic occasion in itself—the gathering together of former enemies in a meeting to discuss past wars. It is a unique occasion, I believe, for the southern African region, and I thank you all very much indeed for your participation here.

The aim of the overall project with which I’m involved is to explore the complexities of the impact of the Cold War on the southern African region. It recognizes that there are many historical narratives, as Iain pointed out to you. There is the narrative of decolonization. There’s the narrative of nation building, and this is taking place, of course, in an era of a global battle of systems and ideas. So, these narratives are equally legitimate—they could be parallel, they could overlap, and they can also be complex: separate as well as connected. Part of my particular research approach as a historian is therefore to explore these complexities, and also to recognize the fragility of the written record. And this is where I believe oral history is a particularly rich source which needs to be explored and used to supplement written record. Oral history also brings understanding to the documents which are available, because documents can lie just as much as people. We need to understand the past, through both oral and written history, to show its importance and to point to the enduring legacies of the Cold War for contemporary southern Africa. Because this is not the past: its legacies continue to roll out into the present day and to affect the future. So then, this meeting is part of a journey...
to understand the past. I recognize that it may be partial, it may be imperfect, but it is still very necessary.

Now, this meeting itself will take the form of effectively a series of group interviews. In London we call them “witness seminars.” It is a gathering of contemporary actors. It will take the form of a chair and a scholar who has prepared a paper. In your document pack you will find a detailed briefing paper supported by original documents which draw upon our own research and other sources which were kindly contributed. Key questions will be posed and the framework of discussion will then be guided by the chair. But it is for you, the participants, to reflect and to interact. In each session there will be time for the wider gathering to pose questions but also to comment. So, that is the general form.

Now, these interviews, or this series of interviews, are being recorded. In your pack there is a very necessary consent form, because with the recording comes, of course, the transcription that will be returned to each of you to be verified. If there should be anything in the transcript which is an error, or if there is anything in there that you wish to redact, to remove, this will be done. Any additions will be added as addendums to the back of the transcript. So, in other words, people can speak with honesty, they can speak with dignity in the knowledge that their words will be respected. You will have a chance, of course, to read through the entire transcript, to check it. This transcript will then be published and the recording amended as necessary and will be made available for historians.

As Iain has pointed out, there are key concepts and themes that we will be exploring in the discussion here. It raises the key question of what was the Cold War in southern Africa? Of course different actors here, different participants, have different understandings of the Cold War and these are all very relevant. I was discussing with Lord Owen, former British Foreign Secretary, about the Rhodesian conflict and he heartily denied it had anything to do with the Cold War! I explained that perhaps there was another way of looking at it, that the Cold War was an integral part of that struggle and Ian Smith’s government’s resistance. So, what was the Cold War in southern Africa? We will be looking at key themes and concepts, the role of ideas, the role of perceptions, the role of violence—violence at many different levels; violence as conceived by powerful institutions, violence conceived as serving a political purpose, being used as a political language; the violence used at a much lower level, the violence experienced by people. We will be looking at the role of key actors and institutions but also overall, of course, the immensely personal experience of the struggle. And so, here you are in your professional capacities but also in your personal capacities as your own witnesses to history.
In all of this, we are not trying to give an all-embracing history of the region. That is impossible. We are trying to explore avenues; we are trying to open up new areas of research; we are trying to refine our own understanding. So, I look forward to your discussions in opening up these new areas to be explored. I want to underline with Iain our role as scholars: we are here to listen and we fully recognize two days is not enough. But, as General Geldenhuys has instructed me to say, “We look forward to this discussion and we will have a wonderful time.” In all seriousness, it will be an excellent occasion and I’m looking forward to it very much indeed.

There is also the question of ethics which I, as an oral historian, need to address absolutely upfront. I emphasize that this meeting is being recorded, but that you will have the right to check the record. That right will be respected, your words will be verified by you and everything you wish will be removed from the record. We’ll also be dealing with the events of thirty years ago. I also fully recognize that for many of you, this is yesterday. This is very real, very alive in your memories. There is of course the question of how much scholars can expect human beings to be able to recall events from so long ago. But in my experience, for key emotional moments, key points which may vary from individual to individual, people can have excellent recall in a way that in fact really enhances, perhaps rather drives, our understanding of these past events.

There is also the question of language. This is something I am very interested in as a British historian, teaching international history to foreign students. I’m working in a very different area of the world and this is where I very much appreciated my discussion yesterday with Iain because, if you like, I am a Northern Hemisphere Cold War historian, he is a Southern Hemisphere Cold War historian. That brings with it different perceptions, and this cross fertilization of ideas, I think, is very, very valuable. Language, and the use of language, is key. We coming afterwards can look at language and not understand exactly what was meant by the use of certain words. Certain words can have weight and value in the cultural context. When that context is removed, we can fail to understand exactly what was meant. I was reflecting on this talking to Professor Shubin about “military training.” Now I, as a woman, coming from Britain, might not necessarily understand exactly what this encapsulated, and this is what I try to explore here. Use of language—what exactly is meant? Certain words can assume significance to some people which is not intended; others have a great significance, which is not appreciated. But what we are trying to do here is not to touch any moral equivalents to suffering, any moral equivalents of right. We are
trying to explore in a neutral way exactly why what happened, happened. I’d just like to conclude my remarks by saying whilst you are here, you are going to be talking about the past. I believe that what you will be saying is of immense value for the future.

**EDWARDS:** Let us use this discussion to become familiar with our environment, the equipment and establish ways of conversing with each other. Could I ask that when speaking you could please introduce yourself, in the first case giving the gathering a brief resume of your status and career. We can open discussion: issues of a housekeeping nature, general observations, issues of ethics, really anything can flow for the rest of this session. Ambassador?

**URNOV:** My name is Andrey Urnov, and I’m from Russia. I’m now a scholar at the Institute of African Studies. I used to be a Party functionary for quite a long time in the International Department of the Central Committee. Then I was ambassador to Namibia. Later I was ambassador to some other places, but that is when I parted with Africa—when I left Namibia in 1994. And now I’m back to Africa.

But since the matter of the Cold War was raised, I would like to express my opinion. What we are interested in now is: what was the correlation between the national liberation movement and the Cold War? I would like to stress, first of all, that in my opinion, the national liberation movement was a phenomenon of its own, a natural revolt against national and economic oppression. It was rooted in the realities of colonialism, but it happened so that it developed at the time of the Cold War and the Cold War was a global confrontation between the two socio-economic systems. So the Third World could not but become one of the Cold War fronts, and on this front the West was at a disadvantage. Its positions were vulnerable; it was on the defensive. For the USSR, naturally, that opened prospects to expand its sphere of influence and to strengthen its global positions. So, who will miss such a chance? And the same was done by the West, which tried to keep its sphere of influence under control.

In one of the papers which I read here, a question is raised: had there not [been] the Cold War, what would have happened to Namibian independence in the ‘70s and ‘80s? Well, I venture to say that the Cold War did not delay but rather sped up the process of decolonization. The defeat of fascism in the World War had great importance for the national liberation struggle. That was the downfall of racism and its idea of God-chosen nations. And the rise of the Soviet Union as a winner in the war meant a serious change in the world power balance, on the one hand, and the emergence of the source of large-scale
assistance to the freedom fighters. As long as colonial powers were strong enough, they felt comfortable and did not see any reason to end their rule. But the situation changed and then they had to adapt to it. So, without the World War and the Cold War, colonialism could have lasted much longer. That is my opinion.

In our case, for example, when the “Unholy Alliance” existed, the South African and Rhodesian rulers were only prepared to go as far as an internal settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. And the West was quite happy. Of course, it couldn’t recognize the legitimacy of Smith’s regime or of Namibia’s occupation, but it did practically nothing to correct the injustice. Only after the alliance collapsed, the West began to pursue a more active and flexible policy. I mean the plans for Rhodesian settlement and the formation of the Contact Group which is sometimes referred to as “the Gang of Five.”

So, to finish, I would like to once again stress that we should put first things first. And first was the liberation struggle, but the liberation struggle which developed in the situation of the Cold War. And of course there was an interconnection between the two. Thank you.

**GELDENHUYS:** Mr. Chairperson, I feel quite stupid about raising my voice at this early stage—by the way, I am Jannie Geldenhuys. I am not a lapsed consequence; I am what you would say a ‘has-been,’ and decrepit, as you can see. But I have had some experience of the Cold War throughout my whole career.

I think if we start here on this note, what we have right now, we’re going to spoil this conference. We are not going to achieve what we wanted to achieve. We haven’t properly identified the Cold War, we haven’t characterized the Cold War, and if we come up with things like “the Cold War in southern Africa was not a cold war but a hot war,” and things like that. Now what was it? Was it hot or was it cold? What do we mean by “cold” and what do we mean by “hot”? That is a fact. The Cold War was hot and cold war mixed.

I would like to pick up a few points and I have eight but will stick to four characteristics of the Cold War. I said it before, but I think the most important one to start off with, is that other than other wars, the Cold War was not a declared war. It’s simple, but you don’t know how deep that concept goes. Up to 1949, a number of 45 wars were declared officially by governments. After that, not a single state declared war ever again. Governments did commit their defensive forces to war, but they never declared it. And we talk about secrets and all those things—that is where the secrecy comes in. You know, even in the Anglo-Boer War, the two little Boer Republics, the Free State and Transvaal, the Republic of the Orange Free
State, declared war against Great Britain formally. But not after 1945—never again. Now, if you go and ponder this—I do not want to stretch it out here now—but if you ponder that, you find it solves many other questions or give[s] answers to many other questions that come up. Just because people don’t realize that they did not declare wars, they don’t find the answers and, worse still, people sometimes ask wrong questions and it’s no good giving the right answers to the wrong questions. It serves no purpose.

The second point is—and this is now from a military point of view—one could say that before the Cold War era, the government gave a sort of an—and this is my own terminology—absolute order or assignment to achieve military command. Okay, it’s my own terminology, so let me explain. Now, if my dates are not always correct, my names are not always correct, please forgive me. I can’t remember them all, but look at the content of what I’m saying. I think it was Allenby who was the Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa during the Second World War, and I think it was Churchill who gave him his orders. Now, it is amazing, it’s on paper. You know what those orders were? Those orders—two words—only two words: “Conquer Egypt!” What a pleasure for a military commander to get an order “conquer so and so!” You know exactly where you stand and you know what to do. After the Second World War, the commander gets a directive [like] that inside of government. You have to page through it every now and again to try to get the specifics and the real meaning, etc., etc., etc. It is very confusing.

Then, after that, I’d like to say that another characteristic of the Cold War is a very big difference that cuts very deep, and if we don’t grasp that we can forget about the rest of this conference. And that is, up to the Second World War, wars were declared between states. The last time that a war was declared against a state was during the Second World War. Never again. But, there were still wars. Now, you ponder that. Now, you have war between the state and a political movement, and both state and movement assisted and supported by other governments. And most of them, secretly. So, you can see that one thing that already came up here is that secrecy is part and parcel of the Cold War per se. It caused war but there is no declaration of war, so of course everything is secret. So let me give you an illustration in practice. When we went into Angola in 1975/1976, we went there with our soldiers in different uniforms and civilian clothing. We went there in civilian vehicles. Because we haven’t declared war, so you keep it a secret that you do, so you mustn’t be identified because it so developed that the country or movement that is first identified as making war, he is the bad guy. And the other one is the good guy. So, nobody wants to be the bad guy, so you keep it secret. And if you go now and you go on the Internet on Soviet blogs or websites and talk facilities, you’ll find that the Soviets
did the same thing. They also removed the soldier’s identification books and all that. So it all, the nature of this war that we are going to discuss, depends on its characteristics.

The last one I want to mention is that never, ever post-1945 has war been so mixed with politics. It was politics playing the dominant role, but it is completely mixed. And you see, once you start pondering these things, things that come to mind, for example, is how you look at the general Western system. Military is one thing, politics quite another. If the military commander—let’s say in the field, a battalion commander runs into a political problem, he has to go to the Brigade Commander, the Divisional Commander, the Area Commander, to the Chief of the Army, to the Chief of the Defense Force, to the Minister to get an answer on these political problems. And there are many such queries simply because they must know definite, absolute orders, whereas in most of the many Eastern countries, because of their system, they geared themselves to this Cold War idea as a mixed military and political war. And I spoke to many of them, the likes of what we’d like to call perhaps a political commissar, the commander in the field of the freedom movement. If he strikes a political problem he goes to the commissar and he gets an answer just like that [snapping of fingers].

So, all these things that I have told you about have also [given] rise to dirty tricks, propaganda, manipulation with words and what not. So, I think that if we embark on the previous ideas of is it a Cold War or isn’t it? It is a Cold War and the Cold War is mixed: hot and cold. It’s part and parcel of the idea and these basic concepts go much deeper than perhaps the 5 minutes that I’ve spoken about. But if you consider them, you’ll find that [they] really touch deep.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EDWARDS: Thank you.

RAFTOPOULOS: Thank you. I’m Brian Raftopoulos. I was formerly a professor of Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and I’m now based in Cape Town since 2006 as the director of an NGO dealing with Zimbabwe. I’m also research associate at the University of Cape Town.

Okay, I think I want to make three points. First of all, it is clear that any discussion that takes place here is almost an extension of the battle of the Cold War. Invariably there is going to be some extension of that debate and we need to recognize that at the beginning. But one hopes that one can almost unpack it without re-erecting those barriers and I think that it is going to be the first challenge of the discussion here. The second point
is the ferocity of the liberation movements. The Cold War had a number of impacts, one of which was the level of responses to its politics. The level in which struggles were constructed there became almost a disparity between the public representation of those struggles and what was happening on the ground. And that was very much the effect of the kind of global discourses which were taking place. And that, I think, has an important effect on the way we also came to understand liberation struggles.

The third is that the continued impact of the Cold War in our region is felt in terms of the development challenges that we face. That in many ways the continued structures and debates and challenges we face relate to many of the debates that emerged within the Cold War period around alternatives, especially for newly developing countries. So, it has an immediacy still that is very important to the region. I just want to make those three points.

STEWARD: I am Dave Steward of the FW de Klerk Foundation. I think it’s going to be very important—if we’re going to have a good and meaningful discussion—for the white South Africans on this side to say exactly what they think. There is a tendency for white South Africans now to act with political correctness and to adapt their communication to the dominant historical interpretation. If we do that, you will not know what our thinking was at that time. So, for me, it is going to be very important that what we say should be honest; and I think what we say might be honest, even though it might be deeply unacceptable to many of the people in this chamber. But I think that unless we do that, unless we say exactly where we came from—unless we can explain the paradigms from which we operated, we will not succeed in the objectives of the meeting. So, I hope my colleagues will be very frank, in a like-minded manner.

BOTHA: Yes, good morning to everyone. My name is Botha, Pik Botha, and I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for South Africa from 1977 to 1994. And before that I was a member of the Department of Foreign Affairs for 18 years. I was also a member of the South African legal team in the South-West Africa cases in the World Court in The Hague for six years. I wish to refer to General Geldenhuys and Dave Steward’s remarks, but I wish to add something at this junction already. What, then, was the Non-Aligned Movement? Henry Kissinger once told me there is not a single group that is more aligned than those non-aligned. Where do we fit them in? It’s my first point.
Second point. Let me take you back to those days when Kennedy said he was going to stop those Soviet ships on their way to Cuba. We were on the brink of what the world expected to be a devastating global war. I was then a young diplomat in Germany and the Germans bought everything that had a shelf life—all canned foods, meat, whatever. All the shops were empty in a few hours, expecting the Soviet troops to march over the Rhine River. In 48 hours a war could break out. What I’m trying to say is that it might not have been a hot war, but the fact of the matter is, what was Reagan’s Star Wars system? What was the purpose? Was it to frighten the Soviet Union? Crocker¹ once told me—when I said to him, “But Chet, the Soviet Union has so many more planes, submarines, atom bombs, troops than you have in America,” but then he said, “Yes, but we are sharper!” He said to me, “Pik, don’t worry. We will outspend the bastards.” And then they did outspend them. They did outspend them.

What I’m trying to say here is it is going to be extremely difficult to take the Cold War concept, to try and find out exactly what effect that situation, let’s call it animosity, between the West and the East, had on southern Africa. It is more complicated. The Americans told me how many times, “Mr. Minister, your problem is your policy of apartheid is attracting the Soviet Union. You are drawing the wasp.” So, we had to get rid of apartheid to stop the Soviet Union. They were using apartheid to make friends with the blacks. It’s a complicated issue. I wasn’t pro-NATO or pro-Europe. They issued sanctions against us. But the Eastern Europeans have helped us. I circumvented sanctions with the assistance of the Eastern European states, communist states. So let us just take it a little bit by bit each here, before we come to conclusions. It was relatively easy for my department to circumvent sanctions after America dropped us with an anti-apartheid law. We lost trade of over a billion and in six months we made it up with a number of Soviet eastern satellite states. I need not mention them because some of the blokes may still be alive.

Now, a situation in southern Africa, in my opinion, must be viewed against the historical context of Harold Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” speech in 1960,² when he addressed the

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¹ Chester A. Crocker served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989. Currently the James R. Schlesinger professor of strategic studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Crocker led diplomatic efforts in southern Africa throughout the 1980s, brokering peace agreements between Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and the Soviet Union.

² Harold Macmillan was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1957 to 1963. Addressing the South African Parliament on 3 February 1960, Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” speech acknowledged the plight of black African nationalists and emphasized that their demands for self-determination be met by the ruling white minority. Above, Botha paraphrases.
white Parliament—he warned us and said, “The winds of change are blowing throughout Africa. There is a new nationalist awareness and you better adapt.” Verwoerd’s response was, “I agree with you, I recognize it, but the whites also have rights.”³ All I’m saying here is, with the Portuguese removal from Mozambique and Angola after they have been there for centuries, with Mr. Ian Smith getting into trouble eventually, we were the one—Mr. Vorster was Prime Minister—who told Mr. Ian Smith in his face, “You’ve got no alternative, you’ve got to hand over power and you’ve got to sign the Lancaster House agreement.” We were not asked to do so. We were not forced to do so. That was a South African decision. The same with FRELIMO,⁴ which we recognized immediately. The Portuguese handed over power in a regular manner from the international law point of view and we recognized them. In Angola it was different. The MPLA⁵ broke an agreement. They came to power in an illegal manner and we didn’t recognize them. But we saw in UNITA⁶ an ally to prevent the Cubans from marching across the border and creating a communist state, as we saw at that time. Now, whether there was a Cold War or not a Cold War; what I’m trying to say here is I believe that we must judge the events and the effect of events against Harold Macmillan’s speech. Maybe it was a question of South Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies settling once and for all to an irreversible situation, which started after the Second World War with the coming independence of African states on the basis of majority rule. Thank you.

³. Hendrik Verwoerd served as Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966. Considered the architect of the policy of apartheid in South Africa, Verwoerd defended his position on the grounds that black majority rule would inevitably threaten the rights of white Africans. Again, Botha paraphrases.

⁴. Established in 1962, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Portuguese: Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) was the guerrilla and political movement for Mozambican independence from Portuguese colonial rule. After Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, FRELIMO leader Samora Machel became the first President of the independent Republic of Mozambique.

⁵. The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA) was, alongside the FNLA and UNITA (see below), one of three major Angolan independence movements that emerged in the 1950s. Led by Antonio Agostinho Neto, the MPLA exercised influence in the city of Luanda and enjoyed support from Cuba and the Eastern bloc. Although ideological differences sparked conflict between the leftist MPLA and the Western-backed FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA managed to maintain power. Neto became the first President of the independent Republic of Angola in 1975.

⁶. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA) was a prominent anti-colonial independence movement in Angola that received support from South Africa and the United States during the Angolan civil war. Led by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, UNITA fought against the Cuban-backed MPLA until 1989, when the United States facilitated a peace agreement and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Peace between UNITA and MPLA was finally signed in April 2002.
EDWARDS: Thank you, Minister. Anyone wanting to make other comments?

AMATHILA: My name is Ben Amathila and I’m from Namibia. I would be advised to take part in this conference or workshop, or whatever it is. My past life: I’ve been a member of the parliament until almost three years ago in Namibia and I’ve been Minister of Trade and Industries since independence and I’ve been a Minister of Information and Broadcasting for almost eight years and the chief whip of my party for almost eight years.

I’ve been asking myself the question—but before I say that, let me first say how I was amazed to see General Geldenhuys in Namibia with some of his SWAPO7 adversaries and people he fought against having a very, very good chat and discussion in Namibia. In 1990, I, with a delegation from Namibia, met Mr. Botha—in 1990 or 1991—in Cape Town. We were exploring new relations; we were talking about future relations on Walvis Bay and 13 islands, the border on the Orange River and many other items. We accepted the past for what it was, and we decided to take on the new challenges.

The question I wanted to raise was already raised by Mr. Botha: the “Wind of Change” speech by Harold Macmillan. I have been asking myself the question of why do we start with the Cold War in 1974? Because we’ve come a long way and some of the ideas that we’ve carried through to 1974 started a long time ago. Mr. Botha raised the question of why it must be taken into consideration what Mr. Macmillan said in 1960. Now, I’m trying to say why don’t we become a little more flexible in allowing us to dwell a little bit backward in order maybe by the end of the day to make the point that would benefit the conference? It will not ask a lot just to go a little bit backward in order to go forward. Now we are tying ourselves to 1974 and leaving a poor understanding [of] the past, which brought us to the brink of 1974. That is the only request I want to make. Thank you.

EDWARDS: If people feel the need to discuss issues from other time periods in order to back up their views on Cold War issues, they should not feel in any way restricted. We will now move on to the discussion on Angola.

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7. The South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) emerged in the 1960s as the primary movement for Namibian independence from South Africa, which had occupied Namibia—then known as South-West Africa—since 1920. In 1962, SWAPO began waging guerrilla warfare against the South African presence.
BRIEFING PAPER

Vladimir Shubin

Angola (1974-1990): The Torturous Road to Independence

By the time of the April 1974 Portuguese Revolution, which opened the prospects for Angola’s rapid transition to independence, the liberation struggle in Angola was in a difficult stage. The FNLA had been “dormant” for several years, and even the (unfortunate, in the author’s opinion) December 1972 agreement with MPLA, which put Holden Roberto at the helm of the “Supreme Revolutionary Council,” did not manage to “resurrect” it. The MPLA, in its turn, suffered a serious crisis, caused, at least partly, by this agreement. “Revolta do Leste” (“Eastern Rebellion”) headed by Daniel Chipenda against its leadership in Zambia was followed by “Revolta Activa” (“Active Rebellion”) in Congo-Brazzaville. Meanwhile the presence of UNITA was felt in some areas in South-Eastern Angola but its role in the anticolonial struggle was extremely limited.

Due to the crisis in MPLA by the time of the April 1974 Portuguese revolution, which opened the prospects for Angola’s rapid transition to independence, Moscow’s relations with

1. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA) was another of the three major Angolan independence movements. After Angola achieved independence in 1975, the FNLA—like UNITA—clashed with the ruling MPLA party on ideological grounds. However, due to its military misteps and internal rifts, the FNLA was increasingly marginalized.
2. Holden Roberto was the founder and leader of the FNLA.
3. Daniel Chipenda served as the MPLA field commander on the Eastern Front of the Angolan War of Independence.
this organization were at the lowest ebb ever and it took the USSR leadership some months to make a final choice and to resume supporting Agostinho Neto and his followers.

The most critical moment was a so-called “Congress of MPLA” convened in Zambia in August 1974. The quotation marks are relevant here, because this gathering was organized not so much by the Angolans as by their “host countries”—Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Zaire and Tanzania. In fact, the ratio of Neto’s supporters and opponents had been determined by the foreign presidents and it was not in favor of the MPLA president.

The Congress was a fiasco. After rather futile discussions Neto and his supporters left the venue on 22 August and a month later convened their own inter-regional conference of MPLA militants in Moxico province inside Angola. There Neto was confirmed as the top leader and the MPLA Politburo was formed. This happened against the background of broad support for the MPLA after the April 1974 Portuguese revolution inside Angola, especially in Luanda, and for most Angolans this organization was symbolized by Neto.

By the end of 1974 the Soviet attitude became much more positive. In December Moscow received an MPLA delegation headed by Henrique (Iko) Carreira (after the proclamation of independence he became the first Angolan Minister of Defense). Pedro van Dunem “Loy,” responsible for logistics in FAPLA, came as well.

Carreira called the situation “controversial” and spoke about political hegemony by the MPLA in Angola but admitted its “weakness from the military point of view.” In his opinion, the confrontation “between various groupings in Angola” was inevitable, but it could find its expression “in political as well as in military ways.” Under these circumstances the

4. Antonio Agostinho Neto founded and led the MPLA independence movement and political party in Angola. In 1975, Neto became the first President of the independent Republic of Angola. Neto’s communist leanings earned him the support of Fidel Castro’s Cuba and, later, the Eastern bloc.
7. Henrique (Iko) Carreira fought as a member of the MPLA in the Angolan War of Independence. After Angola won independence in 1975, Carreira served as Minister of Defense under the Neto administration.
8. Pedro de Castro van Dunem “Loy” was a close associate of Neto. Throughout his career, van Dunem served in a number of government posts, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Relations.
9. The People’s Armed Forces for Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola, FAPLA) was the military branch of the MPLA.
10. The author’s notes of the discussion with the MPLA delegation headed by H. Carreira, Moscow, 30 December 1974.
MPLA leadership decided to conclude an agreement with UNITA on joint military and political action with the aim “to make UNITA neutral and to prevent it from making an alliance with FNLA, which is a pro-imperialist organization.”

Several “fact-finding” and (later) solidarity visits by the Soviets to Angola helped them to understand the developments there better as well. The first Soviet citizen who visited Luanda in mid-September was Oleg Ignatyev, a veteran Pravda correspondent. Then, at the beginning of January 1975, on the eve of the formation of the transitional government, a Soviet journalist (and an officer of the General Staff), Igor Uvarov, was sent to Angola as the TASS correspondent and stayed there for about two months. He had a chance to be present at the ceremony of the launch of the transitional government, consisting of representatives of Portugal, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA on 31 January 1975. Moscow officially supported its formation. However, the government was problematic from the very beginning, not only because it consisted of forces that had been rivals for many years, but because of foreign interference as well. John Stockwell quotes in his book the words of a CIA desk officer: “The Soviets did not make the first move in Angola. Other people did. The Chinese and the United States.” Indeed, nine days before the formation of that government, on 22 January, the 40 Committee of the U.S. National Security Council approved providing Holden Roberto with $300 000 to enable him “to compete” with other movements in the transitional government. Soon after, in February, Roberto’s well-armed forces moved from Zaire into Angola and began attacking the MPLA in Luanda and Northern Angola.

11. GARF, collection 9540, inventory 1, file 703, p.12. Record of the discussion with the delegation of the MPLA, 30 December 1974.
12. The author met Igor Uvarov for the first time as a fellow student of the Institute of International Relations. He was three years older but both of them were specializing in Afghanistan and studied Pashto and Farsi. They could not imagine that later both of them would come to Northern Yemen, though in different periods of a civil war there, and finally meet again as Africanists. The farewell to Colonel Uvarov took place in Moscow with all military honors on 8 December 2006.
15. Such a government was envisaged in the agreement signed in Alvor on 15 January 1975 between the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and Portugal.
17. Ibid., 67. In fact, according to Stockwell, the CIA began funding Roberto in July 1974 without the 40 Committee’s approval, through “small amounts at first.”
18. Ibid.
As for the USSR, in Uvarov’s words, “Moscow by that time knew nothing properly about the situation in Angola.” Anyhow, he began sending telex messages to TASS describing and analyzing the situation. Soon he managed to connect with the MPLA leaders and was given the opportunity, once a week or so, to transmit more confidential messages (in addition to ordinary telexes) to the Soviet embassy in Brazzaville (and so to Moscow) via MPLA radio stations there and in Luanda. Then, in late February 1975 he managed to charter a small plane and come to Brazzaville, and after listening to his story Ambassador Afanasenko suggested recalling him to Moscow for debriefing.

Meanwhile Agostinho Neto was met by a triumphal reception in Luanda, where he returned on 4 February, on the 14th anniversary of the beginning of the uprising in Luanda. His return coincided with the visit of the delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, headed by Alexander Dzassokhov, who had been invited by the MPLA.

In their discussions with the delegation Neto, Lopo do Nascimento, future first Prime Minister of independent Angola, Iko Carreira and other leaders of the MPLA analyzed the balance of forces. They proudly said that support for the MPLA proved to be even higher than they expected. However, they feared that Zaire would launch an attack against Angola (and their fears were justified).

The next quite important Soviet visitor was Navy Captain Alexey Dubenko who came to Luanda in March under cover and stayed there for some months.

Moscow supported the Alvor Agreement but against the background of growing assistance to the MPLA’s rivals from Zaire, a number of Western countries, South Africa, and, for a certain period, from China, supplies to the MPLA had to continue. Urgent assistance in training was needed, and in March a large number of MPLA members left again for

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19. Discussion with I. Uvarov, Moscow, 23 October 2003. Rather consonant is Stockwell’s revelation that the CIA had “disappointing” information about its allies—UNITA and FNLA and its “knowledge of MPLA was nil.” Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 181.
20. Evgeni Afanasenko was the Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Angola.
22. The author’s notes at the meeting of the African Commission of the SAASC, Moscow, 14 February 1975.
23. The author asked Dubenko, whom he had known since 1960, in the days when he was assistant military attaché in Egypt, how he could get a visa. He said that he went to Angola ostensibly “to study the local educational system.” Dubenko soon received the rank of rear admiral and became the first Soviet military attaché in Angola.
24. The Alvor Agreement, signed on 15 January 1975 by Portugal, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, granted independence to Angola and established a coalition government consisting of the three national factions.
the USSR. They constituted a core of the future 9th Brigade (although 9th in number, it was practically the first regular unit of FAPLA); they completed their course in late June. In the last days of April 1975 Luanda was visited by another delegation, headed by Gennady Yanayev, then chairman of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations. When they arrived they found that between MPLA and FNLA units “war really was waged in town; short bursts of sub-machine-gun fire were heard from all directions.”

After the return to Moscow the delegation presented a comprehensive report, which contained an analysis of the situation, conclusions and recommendations. In particular, Neto underlined to them the readiness of the MPLA leadership to cooperate with other nationalist organizations, especially with UNITA, and to participate actively in the work of the coalition government and preparation for elections. The delegation made a very interesting forecast: “…representatives of various U.S. information services in Luanda are keeping UNITA as a reserve, sizing Jonas Savimbi up, and a situation cannot be excluded when the USA will give up their support of the FNLA in favor of UNITA.”

That is exactly what happened later. By that time the CIA re-opened its station in Luanda in March and according to Neto, it “mobilized armed whites” to act as provocation.

The report, which was not classified, did not mention arms supply; however, Neto was apparently satisfied with the Soviet assistance; no new requests had been made to the delegation. Moreover, the movement did not even use the whole “quota” for military training in the USSR; it was organized mostly inside Angola. The supplies for the whole brigade had been brought to the Soviet ports by mid-May but they could not go further

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26. Gennady Yanayev was elected Vice President of the USSR in December 1990. In August 1991, Yanayev played a role in the “coup” against Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow, after which he served as Acting President of the Soviet Union for three days.
29. Ibid., 9.
30. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was the leader of UNITA at the time of the Angolan War of Independence and civil war.
31. Ibid., 14.
32. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 52.
33. The author’s notes at the meeting in the CPSU International Department, 13 May 1975.
than Pointe-Noir in Congo-Brazzaville and from there the hardware was expected to be brought by small ships to the Angolan ports or to be transported by small planes.34

In August Iko Carreira was back in Moscow, and by that time the situation had become much better for the MPLA.35 General Roberto Leal Monteiro “Ngongo”36 recalls that massive amounts of military supplies began coming into Pointe-Noir around August–September 1975.37

Meanwhile, in Washington, mid-summer was a time of decision-taking on Angola. After the discussion at the National Security Council [Ang.1] the Africa Division of the CIA prepared on 16 July a covert action plan for the Angolan operation. The matter was apparently regarded as quite urgent, as President Gerald Ford approved it the same day. On 27 July $8 million was added to the original sum of $6 million.38 [Ang.3]

However, the decision to interfere in Angola on the side of the MPLA’s rivals was not universally supported in the U.S. establishment. For example, Tom Killoran, American Consul General in Luanda, regarded the MPLA as the best qualified to govern Angola and thought that its leaders sincerely wanted peaceful relations with Washington. It is hardly accidental that he was not even informed when the decision to fund the FNLA was taken in January 1975.39

Moreover, the CIA station chief in Luanda, Robert W. Hultslander, came to share his assessment: “…the MPLA was the best qualified movement to govern Angola…. 

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34. The author’s notes at the meeting in the CPSU International Department with the delegation that came back from Angola, 13 May 1975.
35. The author’s notes on the discussion with the MPLA delegation headed by E. Carreira, Moscow, 19 August 1975. F.A. Guimaraes in his The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, referring to the book by W.R. Duncan, writes about “the decidedly ‘chilly reception’ of Neto on his visit to Moscow in June,” which was aimed at “securing deeper Soviet involvement” (145). This author has never heard about such a visit. Besides, John Marcum, referring to a newspaper article, writes that the MPLA sent Carreira to Moscow in July 1975 to ask for help, “only to have the Soviets suggest that he try the Cubans” (Marcum, 443). The author’s notes say the opposite.
36. General Roberto Leal Monteiro “Ngongo” was trained as a BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher system operator in Simferopol in 1972–1973 and then as an artillery commander in Solnechnogorsk near Moscow in March–July 1975. He served for five years as Angolan ambassador to Russia, and in 2006 was appointed Minister of the Interior.
38. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 55.
39. Ibid., 63–64. Much earlier a similar assessment was made by the British Consulate in Luanda: “Of the three Angolan nationalist organizations opposing the Portuguese in Angola, the MPLA would seem to be the most effective both in the present terms and in future potential.” (National Archives, FCO 25/266. Portuguese colonies. 1968. MPLA. Brit. C-te—Gen. Luanda, 9 July 1968).
Unfortunately, the CIA’s association with the FNLA and UNITA tainted its analysis…. No one wanted to believe the Consulate’s reporting, and Killoran’s courageous and accurate analysis was ignored.”40 [Ang.4]

In that period the MPLA’s leadership was mostly worried by the FNLA advance from the North and Zairian intervention there. The attitude to UNITA was different. Talks between the MPLA and UNITA took place in Portugal but failed. Nevertheless, even after the beginning of hostilities, the MPLA did not want to “cut off all ties” with UNITA. They thought that areas controlled by UNITA did not “constitute a military threat”—the underestimation of the menace from South Africa, just a month before its massive intervention, was obvious, even if they spoke about the “South African Army’s provocations” as well.41

The most crucial moment in Soviet-Angolan relations, the moment of crucial decision-taking, was the eve of independence. As in many other cases, Cold War historians are still arguing on who made the “first move” in Angola: Washington or Moscow? Georgy Kornienko, former Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, writes in his memoirs: “In the Angolan episode of the ‘Cold War,’ as in most of its episodes…, Washington said ‘A,’ but in this case as well, Moscow did not refrain for a long time from saying ‘B.’”42 He believes that with the worsening of Soviet-American relations, related to Angola in particular, the progress in the talks on strategic arms stopped and correspondingly Brezhnev’s visit to the USA was postponed and then did not take place at all.43

However, I share the opinion of Ambassador Vladillen Vasev, former deputy head of the USSR mission in Washington and later head of the Southern African Department at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who believes that if it had not been Angola, the USA would have found another excuse for “cooling off” relations with Moscow.44

Furthermore, it would be a gross (and harmful) simplification to look at the developments in and around Angola just through the spectacles of the USA-USSR

41. Discussion with the MPLA delegation (G. Bires and M. Neto), Moscow, 25 September 1975.
42. Georgii M. Kornienko, Kholodnaya voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika [The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otношение, 1995), 166.
43. Ibid.
confrontation. The complexity of the situation concerning Angola can be seen from the fact that in July 1975 “pro-imperialist” Mobutu expelled the U.S. ambassador from Zaire, arrested and even sentenced to death several alleged CIA agents, having accused Washington of preparing a coup against him, while Kaunda, a “progressive” president of Zambia, soon practically sided with Pretoria in common support for UNITA.

Moscow had to take into account that FNLA could fully rely on a neighboring country, Zaire, which was its secure rear base for almost 15 years. Moreover, it was Zaire to which Beijing managed to send not only arms for the FNLA but instructors as well. Besides, UNITA was receiving support from China from its inception. As for Zambia, it continued supporting Chipenda but gradually switched to UNITA. Finally, South Africa, which occupied and ruled Namibia, was becoming an active player in the game against the MPLA as well.

Kornienko writes about the “sad consequences of the two approaches in the Soviet foreign policy—state and ideological—and the related institutional confusion.” According to him, when after the independence of Angola (rather, on the eve of it) “the civil war, provoked by the USA, began to flare up,” the Soviet MFA, together with the Ministry of Defense and the KGB, prepared a proposal, approved “by and large” by the CPSU Politburo, to provide the MPLA with all kinds of political support and “certain material support,” but not to get involved in the civil war in Angola “in the military sphere.” However, just a few days later the CPSU International Department, headed by Ponomarev, having secured initially the signatures of Marshal Grechko (the Defense Minister) and the KGB chairman Yury Andropov, managed to get the support of Gromyko as well to meet the MPLA’s requests for (still limited) arms supplies.

45. Mobutu Sese Seko served as President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire) from 1965 to 1997. An anti-colonialist, Mobutu’s relations with the United States deteriorated in the mid-1970s when he accused the CIA of aiming to topple his regime.
46. Andrey Tokarev, *FNLA v antikolonialnoi borbe i grazhdanskoi voine v Angola* [FNLA in anticolonial struggle and civil war in Angola] (Moscow: Institut Afriki, 2006), 110.
47. Kenneth David Kaunda was the first President of the independent Republic of Zambia from 1964–1991. Kaunda played a decisive role in the Zambian independence movement.
48. In fact, it closely watched the developments in Angola from the beginning of the armed liberation struggle there; the fact that the future Chief of the SADF, General Geldenhuys, was Pretoria’s Vice-Consul in Luanda from 1965 to 1970 speaks for itself.
50. Ibid.
Anatoly Dobrynin, who was the Soviet ambassador to the USA for almost 25 years, writes that the International Department played “a leading if not decisive role in the Soviet involvement in the Angolan ‘adventure’… the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had nothing to do with our initial involvement and looked at it with some skepticism.”51 The first sentence is perfectly correct, but all important political decisions on international affairs, even if pressed for by the International Department, had to be supported by the MFA, and, depending on their nature, often by the KGB and Ministry of Defense as well.

Kornienko did not specify when exactly these different decisions were taken. However, from the reminiscences of Oleg Nazhestkin, a KGB officer, it becomes clear that they were taken before the designated date of independence. He recollects how Vladimir Kryuchkov, then the head of the First Main Directorate (PGU—Soviet political intelligence) and a close associate of the KGB chairman Yury Andropov, “one day in October” [1975] instructed him to go to Luanda urgently.52

According to Nazhestkin, before his departure from Moscow the MFA and International Department’s officials advised him to “exert influence on Neto and encourage him to reconcile with Roberto and Savimbi and to restore a tripartite coalition.”53 But when he came to Brazzaville, more flexible instructions waited for him and finally, just some hours later, he received another instruction signed “on a higher level.” Nazhestkin’s new task was to tell Neto about “the readiness of the Soviet government to recognize Angola as a sovereign state as soon as the MPLA leadership proclaims it [and] to establish diplomatic relations…”54 This narrative confirms Kornienko’s words about the changes in the attitude of the top Soviet leadership. However, the reasons did not lie in “two approaches in the Soviet foreign policy,” these changes reflected rapid changes in the situation in Angola, in particular when foreign intervention, especially that by South Africa, became evident.

52. *Azia i Africa segodnya*, no. 2, 1996, 33–34. Nazhestkin writes: “Then [before November 1975] the Soviet external [political] intelligence had no intelligence capacities directly in Angola itself” (*Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, no. 4, 2005, 38). This is correct, but he forgot other Soviets who were present there.
53. Ibid., 34.
54. Ibid.
Nazhestkin came to Luanda on 2 November via Brazzaville and met Neto that night. According to him, Neto was moved by the news from Moscow, saying, “At last your people understood us. So, we shall co-operate and fight together.”

What is indisputable, however, is the fallacy of the idea, so popular among Western leaders, academics and the mass media for many years that Cubans acted in Angola as Soviet “proxies.” Even many years later, when an interviewer asked Gerald Ford whether he saw “as a patron in the 1970s that there was war by proxy in Africa,” the former U.S. president replied: “Well certainly in this case, the Angolan case, you could say that the Soviet Union was taking advantage, and letting proxy forces carry out its military desires and objectives in the African continent.”

Nevertheless, the archival documents and oral sources prove that Havana’s decision was its own. For example, Kornienko and his “boss,” Andrey Gromyko, as Grechko and Andropov found out about the movement of Cuban combat troops to Angola from a message by the Soviet ambassador to Guinea, who informed Moscow about the forthcoming technical landings of Cuban planes in Conakry.

However, Moscow did know earlier about the first stage of their involvement. I recall that Petr Manchkha, then the head of the African Section at the CPSU headquarters, informed SWAPO President Sam Nujoma about the imminent arrival of 500 Cuban instructors in Angola.

**SECOND WAR OF LIBERATION**

Odd Arne Westad writes: “In 1975, Fidel Castro initiated Cuban armed support for the MPLA without Moscow’s agreement or knowledge, and thereby reduced the Soviet leaders’ role for several crucial months to that of spectators to a war in which the Cubans and their Angolan

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55. Ibid. *Azia i Africa segodnya*, no. 2, 1996, p. 35
58. The author’s notes at the meeting with S. Nujoma (end of October 1976). By that time a considerable part of the contingent had already arrived in Angola.
allies gambled on prospective Soviet support to win.” He is right on the first point, but wrong on the second: instead of being "spectators," the Soviets were supplying the MPLA with arms and training its cadres during “several critical months” even before the Cuban involvement, and sent advisors and instructors to Luanda a few days after independence.

Soviet-trained personnel with Soviet-supplied arms took part, together with Cubans, in a decisive battle on the Northern Front on 10 November 1975 at Quifangondo, just 30 km from Luanda city center. Stockwell writes in his book that 122 mm Cuban rocket launchers fired on Zairean and FNLA troops in salvos of 20 missiles simultaneously and that CIA “observers,” who were on a ridge to the north of the battlefield, estimated that 2,000 rockets poured like rain on the advancing “small army.”

“Fear has big eyes,” says a Russian proverb. Apparently this is true of the CIA “observers” as well, because General “Ngongo,” who commanded the artillery of the FAPLA 9th Brigade, told me a quite different story right in Quifangondo, on the hill where his rocket launchers had been positioned. The bridge over the Bengo River was blown up by the defenders, and when the Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) approached it, they were hit by the fire of 76 mm Soviet-made anti-tank guns; Soviet-made recoilless B-10 guns were also used. Then the palm grove was covered by rockets from “Ngongo’s six man-portable Grad-P. As for the BM-21 truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers, manned by Cubans, they were used later, near Caxito.”

One detail. Among the forces which confronted FAPLA and Cubans north of Luanda there was a South African artillery battery, and this fact proves that the aim of the South African Defense Force (SADF) invasion into Angola was far beyond “destroying SWAPO bases.”

As for the Soviets, there were only four USSR citizens in Luanda on the eve of Angola’s independence. Igor Uvarov returned to Luanda in August, then on 25 October Oleg

60. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 215. He mistakenly mentioned 11 November as the date of this combat.
Ignatyev followed him, and before long two others with Soviet diplomatic passports: Alexey Dubenko, who earlier left Luanda but came back, and Oleg Nazhestkin.

Against the background of stories about “Soviet proxies,” Uvarov’s narrative about the first contact between Soviets and Cubans in Angola is really fascinating. At the request of Neto, Uvarov went in an old Dakota (DC 3) plane to Henrique de Carvalho (now Saurimo) in the east of Angola. The Portuguese army had already left this region and it came under the MPLA’s control. He was asked to see whether an airport there could be used for bringing in supplies. There Uvarov met two persons who asked the MPLA commander who the white man with him was. “A France-Press correspondent,” the Angolan replied. But when Uvarov in his turn asked the commander who these two people were, he told the truth: “Cubans,” and at Uvarov’s request introduced him to them.

Thus, contacts were established and before long Cubans, in uniform and with Kalashnikovs in hands, called Uvarov at the hotel in Luanda. Their commander was Raoul (Díaz Argüelles) who was later killed in action. Soon Uvarov met “Polo” (Leopoldo Cintra Frias), who had replaced Raoul as the head of the Cuban military mission.

The People’s Republic of Angola was proclaimed at mid-night of 11 November and five days later the first Soviet military instructors arrived in Luanda. The initial group, headed by Captain Evgeny Lyashenko, left Moscow on 31 October by a regular Aeroflot flight and arrived in Brazzaville the next day. It had a specific technical and purely defensive mission—to train Angolans in the use of “Strelas,” anti-aircraft missiles. In a week’s time the group was transferred to Pointe-Noir and on 16 November it was joined there by a larger group of instructors headed by Colonel Vassily Trofimenko. On the same day, all these 40 Soviet military specialists arrived at Luanda by an An-12 military transport plane (of course, with Aeroflot markings).

This group included specialists in combat use of a variety of Soviet-made equipment and interpreters. Apart from training Angolan personnel in the remote part of the Luanda Airport, they often had to go to the front line, especially “Comrade Yury,”

64. Discussion with I. Uvarov, Moscow, 23 October 2003. Apparently Nazhestkin left Luanda before 11 November to report back to his superiors.
65. Ibid.
66. The detailed story of this mission was described in [Colonel] Andrey Tokarev, “Komandirovka v Angoli” [Mission to Angola], *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, no. 2, 2001, 36–41.
Colonel Yury Mitin, who was adviser to “Ngongo.” As a rule Cubans accompanied them on these missions.57

In comparison, U.S. personnel came to Angola much earlier, well before independence. A team of infantry instructors was sent to Zaire, allegedly to train UNITA selected cadres, but the CIA station in Kinshasa hurried to redirect them to Ambriz and Silva Porto. CIA “paramilitary officers” were also training UNITA forces in Silva Porto, and the FNLA in Ambriz.68

The complexity of the situation in and around Angola at the end of 1975 is clear from the discussions between American and Chinese top leaders. President Gerald Ford, who was accompanied in particular by the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and George Bush, then chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, met Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping during his trip to China in early December 1975 and the notes on their discussion are rather revealing. [Ang.5]

There was something like a “division of labor” in the American and Chinese efforts to defeat the Angolan government. The U.S. president asked the Chinese: “Will you move in the north if we move in the south?” “But you should give greater help in the north too,” replied Deng, encouraging Ford: “It is worth spending more money on that problem. Because it is a key position of strategic importance.”69

On 1 February 1976 “Pravda,” the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party, wrote: “The whole world knows that the Soviet Union looks in Angola neither for economic, military nor other advantage. Not a single Soviet man is fighting with arms in hand on Angolan soil.”70 By and large this statement was correct, though later Moscow did acquire facilities for its aircraft and naval ships in Angola. Neither was the Soviet military supposed to take part in actual fighting, but in reality, later it did happen sometimes. [Ang.6; Ang.7]

At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) emergency summit in Addis Ababa from 10 to 13 January 1976, in spite of the facts of South African and Zairean aggression,

67. Aziya i Afrika segodnya, no. 2, 2001, 38–39. Klinghoffer, referring to American journalists, wrongly alleges that “Soviet advisors were present in Angola as early as August.” He claims Igor Uvarov “was actually a member of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and the director of the Soviet arms program in Angola.” See Arthur Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 23. It was not difficult to link up Uvarov with the Soviet military because earlier he had served at the Soviet military attaché office in Morocco, but the second allegation is incorrect.
68. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 177.
70. Pravda, 1 February 1976.
22 delegations voted for recognition of the People’s Republic of Angola, 22 against and two abstained. But at least the USA had not managed to impose the idea of so-called “national unity” in Angola, although the pressure from Washington was really severe. Murtala Muhammed, head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, said in his speech at the summit: “In the days before opening of this Session, we witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activities on the part of the United States. Not content with its clandestine support and outpouring of arms into Angola to create confusion and bloodshed, the United States President took it upon himself to instruct African Heads of State and Government, by a circular letter, to insist on the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban advisors from Angola as a precondition for the withdrawal of South African and other military adventurers. This constitutes a most intolerable presumption and a flagrant insult on the intelligence of African rulers.”

The Nigerian leader contrasted the policy of the USSR with that of the USA: “We are all aware of the heroic role which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have played in the struggle of the African people for liberation. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers of arms to resist oppression, and to fight for national liberation and human dignity. On the other hand the United States which now sheds crocodile tears over Angola has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive United States administrations branded as terrorists, she even openly supported morally and materially the fascist Portuguese Government. And we have no cause to doubt that the same successive American administrations continue to support the apartheid regime of South Africa which they see as the defender of Western interests on the African continent.”

In January the Angolan and Cuban troops launched a counter-offensive in the central and southern areas of the country, while in the north of the country the situation was good; almost all the areas had been liberated. Soon Angola was admitted to the OAU membership and by the end of March the SADF had to withdraw into Namibia.

Then, in May 1976 Lopo da Nascimento, the first Angolan Prime Minister and MPLA Politburo member, visited Moscow as head of a governmental delegation and signed a number of bilateral agreements. He was followed by the “party and government delegation”

72. Ibid., 183–184. Murtala Muhammed paid the ultimate price for his bold stand; he was killed a month later in an attempted coup d’état.
headed by Agostinho Neto who on 8 October 1976 signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and People’s Republic of Angola (PRA), as well as the agreement on cooperation between the MPLA and Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, some months later the relations between Luanda and Moscow faced a new test. On 27 May 1977 some forces within the MPLA, headed by Nito Alves, who had already been removed from high party and governmental posts, arranged an abortive coup d’état under leftist slogans. Unfortunately many in Angola and beyond believed that Nito Alves in his conduct enjoyed the support of Moscow. Why did they think so? Perhaps there were several reasons for it. Alves positioned himself as a genuine socialist, a left-winger, defender of “poder popular” — “people’s power.” The fact that units of the 9th Brigade, mentioned above, were used by Alves as a strike force could also have contributed to such claims. Another reason was Alves’ visit to Moscow where he represented MPLA at the CPSU Congress in February 1976.

However, I believe that the rumors of Soviet involvement in “Alves’s coup” were deliberately spread by Western circles, as well as some forces within Angola, which questioned its “too close” links with Moscow and exploited earlier differences between Agostinho Neto and Moscow to convince the MPLA leader of its hostile intentions. I have never seen any reference to substantiate them. The only “hard proof” was the appearance of Nito Alves in a Soviet documentary film seen by Angolan and other African officers who studied in Moscow in the early 1980s. Some of them regarded this fact as a demonstration of Soviet support to Alves, but the reality was much simpler: filmmakers just knew nothing about the tragedy of 27 May!

Anyhow, when Neto came to Moscow on an official visit in August 1977, according to Karen Brutents, former deputy head of the International Department, at the beginning of the meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, “Neto suddenly turned to the theme of recent military mutiny in Luanda and, ignoring diplomatic nuances, said: ‘Here I came, because such a thing — mutiny — happened, and I wanted to find out from you personally, has Moscow taken part in a conspiracy against me or not? Because, as I have been

73. Nito Alves was a member of the MPLA and served as Interior Minister under President Neto. However, after attempting to stage a coup against Neto in 1977, he was expelled from the party. Alves claimed that the Soviet Union supported his attempted takeover, thereby triggering tensions between Neto and the Soviets.
informed, many of your people were involved.” The situation was aggravated by the fact that Brezhnev—who had already been partly incapacitated by his poor health and advanced age—instead of (rightfully) rejecting such an accusation, just began to read a text, prepared for him earlier about “the good situation” in the USSR and “the expected excellent harvest.” Only later that day one of the Soviets pronounced an “addendum,” rejecting such a supposition and confirming that Moscow had not moved aside from its support to Neto.

In any case, Moscow’s relations with Luanda survived this tragic episode in the history of the MPLA and independent Angola, but one more fact has been exploited by the enemies of Angolan-Soviet cooperation: the death of Agostinho Neto in Moscow on 10 September 1979. Fred Bridgland, a well-known British journalist, whose familiarity with Western (and South African) intelligence sources is quite impressive (as distinct from his knowledge of Soviet policy and personae), writes, referring to the *Daily Telegraph*: “Western intelligence officials leaked their skepticism about the circumstances of Neto’s death. They suggested that Neto was assassinated by a deliberate bungling of the operation so that a more pliable man, less likely to flirt with the West, could be installed in Luanda…”

The truth, however, is that Neto’s arrival in Moscow was a surprise even for those who were dealing with Africa in the International Department. In any case, it would have been worse if the Soviets refused to receive the severely ill Angolan president; surely they would have been accused of causing his death by withholding medical treatment.

**“GENERAL KONSTANTIN”**

Soviet-Angolan cooperation was becoming increasingly all-inclusive, but in view of the situation in the country and in the region its military aspect was the most important. The withdrawal of the South African troops from Angolan territory in March 1976 was not the end of the war. [Ang.8]

The situation deteriorated after the election of President Ronald Reagan. In the 1980s Washington’s assistance to UNITA, initially mostly covert, through “common friends,”

74. Karen Brutents, *Tridtsat let na Staroi Ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on the Old Square] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1998), 494. *Staraya Ploshchad*—the Old Square—was site of the CPSU headquarters in Moscow.
75. Ibid.
such as Morocco and other Arab monarchies and later direct, grew and its cooperation with Pretoria intensified. In July 1985 the U.S. Congress repealed the Clark Amendment, which had banned aid to UNITA.\(^{77}\) If Savimbi’s earlier visits to the USA were informal, in January 1986 Ronald Reagan received UNITA’s leader in the White House, saying: “We want to be very helpful to Dr. Savimbi and what he is trying to do.”\(^{78}\)

The heroic actions of well-trained and well-equipped Cuban forces in Angola are comprehensively discussed, especially in Piero Gleijeses’s excellent book.\(^{79}\) Much less is said about the Soviet role; moreover, too often it has been grossly distorted.\(^{[Ang.9]}\) If initially many politicians and authors tried to portray Cubans as “Soviet proxies,” a new tendency appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union: downplaying the role of the Soviets and emphasizing the differences between Havana and Moscow, which, when they occurred, were differences between comrades-in-arms, and not between rivals.

The Soviet assessors [advisors] in Angola carried out what used to be called “international duty,” often in remote camps, in an unhealthy climate and under persistent threat from the Pretoria-led UNITA bands or the South African Army and Air Force. Initially they stayed in Angola on their own and only later were their families sometimes allowed to join them, depending on the venue where they stayed.

Many Western and South African authors who dared to describe the role of the Soviet military in Angola fell “victim” to their own ignorance or, possibly, too much reliance on faulty intelligence sources. They regularly mention “General Konstantin Shaganovitch” as a top Soviet commander in Angola. Fred Bridgland even took “General Shaganovitch’s offensive” as the title for a whole section of his book describing military action in Angola. The same author also invented “Shaganovitch’s subordinate ‘Mikhail Petrov,’ first deputy in the Soviet Politburo in charge of counter-insurgency policy.”\(^{80}\) Perhaps Bridgland meant Army General (and future marshal) Vassily Petrov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground


\(^{78}\) Quoted in ibid., 170.


Forces and later the First Deputy Minister of Defense. If so, Petrov was first and foremost “in charge of” regular warfare, and could by no means be described as junior to “Shaganovitch.”

“Mikhail Petrov” and “Konstantin Shaganovitch” are mentioned in one publication after another. “Shaganovitch” appears not only in a rather silly book by Riaan Labuschagne, who claims to be a successful spy for the racist Pretoria government, and in a “masterpiece” of propaganda by Willem Steenkamp, but even in an official presentation to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission by a group of former top commanders of the SADF—Magnus Malan, Constand Viljoen, Jannie Geldenhuys and Kat Liebenberg.

The reality, however, is very far from these statements. With the growth in the number of instructors and advisors from the USSR, Major General Ilya Ponomarenko was appointed as the head of the newly created Soviet military mission in early 1976. His (and his successors’) official title was Chief Military Advisor—Advisor of the Minister of Defense. The next people to occupy this position were Lieutenant General Vassily Shakhnovich (1978–1980) and then Lieutenant General Georgy Petrovsky (1980–1982). Then in May 1982 came Lieutenant General (later Colonel General) Konstantin Kurochkin, former First Deputy Commander of the famous Soviet VDV (Vozdushno-Desantnye Voiska—Paratroopers).

So it seems that Bridgland, Ellis, ‘Sechaba’ and their followers performed a miracle: they managed to merge Vassily Shakhnovich, who was dead by that time, with the living Konstantin Kurochkin! All these “creators” of “Konstantin Shaganovitch” have one thing

81. Mikhail Petrov did exist, and he did serve in southern Africa, but as first Soviet resident ambassador to Botswana.
82. Riaan Labuschagne, On South Africa’s Secret Service: An Undercover Agent’s Story (Alberton: Galago, 2002), 112–113. The book is not reliable: Labuschagne claims that he recruited the Soviet military attaché in Botswana (13), but such a post has never existed; he writes about ten Su-23 aircraft being supplied to Angola (111), but such a plane has never been sent there; Sverdlovsk is not a family name, as he claims (158), but a Soviet city. These are but a few of numerous examples of factual errors.
85. In his outstanding Prologue, Post-Prologue, and Continuation of the Book by Professor Gleijeses (Havana, unpublished), 16, Jorge Risquet calls Ponomarenko “Soviet Marshal,” while Odd Arne Westad in his Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974–1976: A New Pattern of Intervention (Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8–9) calls him “Vice-minister.” Both are mistaken: before coming to Angola, Major-General Ponomarenko was Chief of Staff of the 8th Guards Army, a formation consisting of several divisions.
in common: none of them indicate a source of that “wonder.” Yet it cannot be anything else but faulty intelligence supplied by Pretoria and/or its Western partners.

At the same time Bridgland (and his friends) grossly miscalculated the number of Soviet military personnel in Angola87: “Intelligence agencies estimated that Shaganovitch had about 950 fellow Soviets in command and training posts in Angola,” while the man in charge of them, General Kurochkin, said that the strength of “the Soviet advisory apparatus” he had headed was “about 2,000 persons.”88

“General Konstantin,” no doubt, was the most outstanding Soviet officer in Angola. Kurochkin headed the Soviet military mission in Angola at a very crucial period. A high level of cooperation and mutual understanding between the Soviets and Cubans is evident from the fact that in February 1983, at the request of dos Santos,89 joint recommendations on the struggle against UNITA were worked out and presented to the Angolan president.90 Then Soviets and Cubans jointly participated in drafting the plan of a major operation, approved by dos Santos as Commander-in-Chief.91

However, differences between Soviet and Cuban generals did occur from time to time. Thus, when the SADF launched Operation “Protea” in December 1983/January 1984, the Cuban commander, “Polo,” suggested withdrawing three Angolan brigades to the north, where air cover could be provided. However, “General Konstantin” thought that it would be wrong to leave well-equipped positions and that these brigades were powerful enough to rebuff even a numerically stronger enemy.92 Angolan Defense Minister, Pedro Maria Tonha (“Pedale”) supported Kurochkin’s approach; however, “Polo’s” stand was confirmed in Fidel Castro’s message to dos Santos, divulged by “Polo” to Kurochkin on 7 January 1984.93

89. Following Neto’s death in 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos, a member of the MPLA, became the second President of independent Angola.
90. Konstantin Kurochkin’s notebook 2, p. 15.
91. Ibid., 29.
92. Ibid., 27.
93. Ibid., 28.
Castro’s message was a response to dos Santos’s request for the opinion of Havana and Moscow on the situation. The Soviet reply was quite different: “By no means should the brigades of the 5th Military District be withdrawn…. By no means should the territories up to the Mocademes-Lubango-Menoge line be given up to the South Africans, because it is fraught with political consequences.” On the contrary, Moscow recommended strengthening these brigades.94

Kurochkin recalled in his discussions with the author: “My relations with Cubans were complicated initially and through their seniors in Havana they even expressed [to Moscow] their displeasure with my activities. Then a serious commission headed by Army General Valentin Varennikov, First Deputy Chief of the [Soviet] General Staff arrived… and spent several weeks in Angola, visited all military districts, got acquainted with the work of our specialists and came to the conclusion that I was right.”95

Varennikov’s mission to Angola is described in detail in his memoirs.96 According to him initially, when the CPSU Politburo discussed Castro’s proposal on withdrawal of troops to the north, it was suggested that the proposal be accepted but Varennikov nevertheless had to go and make a study of the situation on the spot. Having visited the forward areas, he found that the local Angolan command, just like “General Konstantin,” opposed this idea of withdrawal. So he had to look for a way out—not to aggravate relations with the Cuban top leadership but at the same time not to make wrong decisions. He did find it: at the meeting with the Angolan and Cuban command, to the surprise of those present, he spoke in support of “Fidel’s wise idea”97 but transformed it into a proposal to create several echelons of defense between the front line and the area of deployment of Cuban forces. Such a “face-saving” suggestion satisfied everybody, including the Cubans. According to Varennikov, Jorge Risquet98 told him: “I knew that everything, as always, would end happily. The Soviet comrades can find a way out even where there is no

94. Ibid., 29.
95. Discussion with Konstantin Kurochkin, Moscow, 18 September 2001; Kurochkin’s notebook 3, 34. Varennikov again visited Angola in August 1984. See Kurochkin’s notebook 3, 66.)
97. Ibid., 286–287.
98. A Cuban national and member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, Jorge Risquet Valdés led Cuban military support of the MPLA during the Angolan civil war. Risquet later served as head of the Cuban delegation that negotiated the terms of peace in the Tripartite Accord.
one.” After that Fidel Castro himself invited Kurochkin to Cuba, and after his meetings with Fidel and Raul Castro the situation was made clear and Fidel himself told “General Konstantin” that he had received wrong information.

“General Konstantin” left Angola in June 1985. At the farewell ceremony “Pedale” strongly expressed the attitude of Angolan comrades-in-arms to him: “Words are not enough to describe all the qualities which our friend and comrade General Konstantin possesses…. His assistance was invaluable to us…. “

Kurochkin himself recommended his successor, Lieutenant General Leonid Kuzmenko, who was his colleague: before coming to Angola, Kuzmenko was Deputy Commander of the VDV for combat training. But to match “General Konstantin” was not easy for anybody. Two years later, in 1987, a new Chief Military Adviser (Russian: Glavnyi voennyyi sovetnik, or GVS) came: Lieutenant General Petr Gusev, Deputy Commander of the Carpathian Military District in Western Ukraine. However, the paratroopers were there as well, and the most prominent of them was Lieutenant General Valery Belyaev, who from 1988 to 1991 was the advisor of the Chief of General Staff and for some time Acting GVS.

CUITO-CUANAVALE AND AFTER

Of the 15 years of the Soviet military involvement in Angola the most crucial (and the most controversial) was their participation in preparation and conduct of the offensive against UNITA’s stronghold in 1987, which culminated in the “Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.”

Though much has been written about FAPLA’s advance, South African interference and counteroffensive, Cuban reinforcements and fierce fighting near this town, this battle and its

99. Ibid., 288. As valuable as Varennikov’s eyewitness report is, he made a number of mistakes when he wrote about what was not his personal experience. For example, he claims that “UNITA split from the Neto-led MPLA,” that Savimbi “at one time” was Neto’s “companion in the party,” that the “FNLA also split” from the MPLA (226), and that Savimbi leaned for support on “troops of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia” (227).
100. Konstantin Kurochkin’s notebook 3, 36.
102. Discussion with Konstantin Kurochkin, Moscow, 19 September 2001. One of the Soviet specialists recalls: “They [Soviet military authorities] understood thus and began inviting GVSs from the VDV, because the tactics of the airborne troops are more suitable for guerrilla warfare, while officers from ground troops were adopting linear tactics. Interview with V. Mityaev, Moscow, 11 April 2005, taken by G. Shubin.
effect on further developments in Angola remain points of controversy.103 [Ang.12; Ang.13; Ang.14; Ang.15] In the opinion of Chester Crocker, the decisive positive shift in the process of negotiation on a political settlement took place before the major battle started. For his part General Geldenhuys claimed in his memoirs that his forces had no intention whatsoever of taking Cuito Cuanavale.104 Fidel Castro, on the other hand, declared that it was a turning point: “From now on the history of Africa will have to be written before and after Cuito Cuanavale.”105

Further research is needed, and to begin extracts are offered from the diaries of the Soviets, including veterans, who had been serving at Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 and 1988. [Ang.10; Ang.11; Ang.16; Ang.17]

The failure of FAPLA’s offensive and further developments proved once more the existence of differences between Soviet and Cuban command towards the military strategy in Angola. However, I believe they are exaggerated nowadays, after the political changes in our part of the world.

Let us try to evaluate these developments. Indeed, when the Soviets advised the top Angolan command to carry out an offensive operation in the southeast, towards Mavinga and Jamba, they probably underestimated the threat of massive involvement of the SADF. But this very overt intervention by Pretoria, overt, as distinct from 1975, gave the Cubans the “moral right” to cross for the first time in many years the Mocamedes-Lubango-Menonge line and to begin advancing south to the Namibian border.

Ten years later, in 1998, Fidel Castro criticized the conduct of the Soviets: “The advisors…thought they were waging the Battle of Berlin, with Marshal Zhukov in command, thousands of tanks and 40,000 cannons. They did not understand, nor could

103. There are many mistakes in academic publications on this issue. Thus, in his Kaunda and Southern Africa: Image and Reality in Foreign Policy (London and New York: British Academic Press, 1992), Stephen Chan claims, “As 1987 closed and 1988 began, the Soviet-equipped MPLA and its Cuban allies prepared for their annual offensive” (58), though it began a half a year earlier. Besides, his claim that “the Soviets had dispatched a squadron of latest generation MiG fighters—almost certainly piloted by Soviet officers” (59) is wrong on two points: MiG-23 arrived in Angola almost four years earlier, and Soviet pilots did not take part in combat action there.


105. Quoted in Steenkamp, South Africa’s Border War, 163. Cuito Cuanavale probably had symbolic value for Pretoria; from the 1960s, its airport was used by the South African Air Force, and a Portuguese-South African command center was established there for operations against Angolan and Namibian fighters. See Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 82.
they understand the problems of the Third World, the setting of the struggle and the type of war that must be waged in that setting.”

With all due respect I have to say, that this assessment is not fair. The Soviet advisors could and did understand “the problems of the Third World,” the Soviet military were involved in one way or another in dozens of conflicts there, and in particular they had to acquire very rich experience in counter-guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan. In fact a decision was taken in 1985 that at least 30 percent of officers dispatched to Angola should have had experience of fighting in Afghanistan.

As for tanks and cannons, finally the Cubans, according to another statement by Castro, themselves concentrated under his overall command 1,000 tanks, 1,600 anti-aircraft weapons and artillery pieces, and 1,000 armored vehicles in southern Angola; and on 10 March, while the South Africans remained bogged down in Cuito Cuanavale, with the support of aviation they began advancing towards the Namibian border. This offensive carried out by many thousands of Cuban, Angolan and SWAPO troops was exactly a regular warfare operation!

However, more important is the fact that these actions were not received negatively in Moscow, at least among those who were directly dealing with southern Africa. Anatoly Adamishin, then the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was traditionally more “cautious” than the CPSU International Department, notes that at his meeting with Chester Crocker in Lisbon in May 1988 the U.S. representative was worried by the Cubans’ advance towards the Namibian border, calling it a “dangerous game.” However, Moscow’s interests were different: “not to hamper it, even help it in every possible way, but to see to it that it does not get out of control.”

Risquet further writes: “It was more obvious than ever [by May 1988] that the military situation has compelled the South Africans to accept a solution that would prevent the liberation of Namibia from being achieved through war…” Adamishin confirms this view: “We had a secret understanding with the Cubans that they would not cross the border with

Namibia. But—it was also agreed upon—there was no reason to declare it publicly.”

The debacle of South Africa and UNITA at Cuito Cuanavale and the advance of Cuban, Angolan and SWAPO forces towards the Namibian border created a favorable atmosphere for the completion of talks on the so-called Angolan-Namibian settlement on conditions acceptable to Luanda and Havana and for the signing in December 1988 of the New York agreements. The Soviet contribution to their success was made mostly by Ambassador Vladillen Vasev and, at a later stage, by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoly Adamishin, whose memoir, *The White Sun of Angola*, was published in Moscow in 2001. [Ang. 18]

In February 1986, at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized the need for regional conflicts to be settled politically. Later many academics and politicians presented that step as something entirely new in Soviet policy. However, the Soviet Union had been involved in a search for political solutions in many military conflicts during the previous decades, *inter alia* in Korea, Vietnam, South Asia and the Middle East. In fact the talks about ending the war in Korea began in “Stalin’s days,” in 1951!

In fact the Angolan-Cuban Joint Declaration issued in Luanda and Havana on 4 February 1982, some years before “Gorbachev’s era,” envisaged a political solution: “If the selfless struggle of SWAPO, the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community managed to achieve the true solution of the problem of Namibia, based on strict fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 435/78, and led to a truly independent government and the total withdrawal of the South African occupation troops to the other side of the Orange River, which would considerably diminish the threat of aggression against Angola, the Angolan and Cuban governments would study reinitiating the implementation of the plan for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban forces, in a time period agreed upon by the two governments.”

Many people, especially in Africa, expected that the New York agreements and impending independence of Namibia would facilitate a political settlement in Angola as well. In June 1989 Mobutu managed to convene a meeting in Gbadolite, his native place, which

110. Adamishin, *The White Sun of Angola*, 110. Anatoly Adamishin in his memoirs, describing his meeting with Fidel in Havana on 28 March 1988, quotes Fidel’s words: “[South Africans are] Such fools, they attacked us [at Cuito Cuanavale] on 23 March, while from 18 March we were advancing south, getting into their rear.” See ibid., 98.

became the de facto capital of Zaire. There in the presence of 18 African heads of state, dos Santos and Savimbi shook hands; however, Savimbi quickly changed his mind and withdrew his concessions, so hostilities continued until the peace agreement signed in Bicesse, Portugal on 31 May 1991.

Let us try to sum up. Did the Cold War affect the developments in Angola? No doubt. Yet, I would support a statement Iko Carreira made in May 1976: “We have to understand that our opting for socialism has brought us into confrontation with imperialism, and imperialism is going to use every possible means of fighting us, from sabotage to the supplying of small armed groups [later big ones] to try to create instability amongst our people.”112

A discussion of the developments after the failure of the Bicesse agreement is beyond the scope of this work. However, one point should be emphasized: efforts to stop the war in Angola in the 1990s were made by various sides: the UN, the African states, and the troika of Russia, the USA and Portugal, formed after the agreement in Bicesse. Nevertheless the solution was found by Angolans themselves and I share the opinion of General “Ngongo,” that a political agreement between the government in Luanda and the armed opposition was reached because UNITA had lost the war and its leader was no more.113

A FEW WORDS ON MOZAMBIQUE

As distinct from the situation in Angola, by the time of the Portuguese revolution FRELIMO’s leading role in the liberation struggle was undisputed. Soviet supplies of sophisticated weapons played a role in bringing the Portuguese armed forces to the brink of collapse. In particular Strelas, which from 1973 had been used effectively in Guinea-Bissau, played an important role in Mozambique as well, as they put an end to the enemy’s air supremacy.

The FRELIMO succeeded in their demands for a leading role for their organization in the Transitional Government, headed by Joachim Chissano, formed according to the agreement signed on 7 September 1974. That government was soon in control of the whole country, and we could see it when, as members of a delegation of the Soviet Solidarity

112. Quoted in Wright, The Destruction of a Nation, 90.
Committee, we visited five provinces and 11 towns in early May 1975. We could see that most of the country was intact, because the guerrilla war took place mostly in the remote Northern provinces. Could anybody imagine that after a decade Mozambique would be in disarray due to the actions of RENAMO,114 organized by the Rhodesian intelligence in 1976 and then “adopted” by Pretoria?

The deterioration of the situation in the country affected badly joint Soviet-Mozambican projects. Indeed, some activities of RENAMO, guided, or rather, commanded by Pretoria, were specifically directed against them.

In the first years of its independent existence Mozambique was relying on strengthening economic relations with the socialist countries. In particular, it wanted to join the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA; in the West it was known as COMECON), initially with observer status, and then as a full member.

Perhaps the FRELIMO leadership’s expectations were too high, especially after signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1977. Yury Andropov, having been elected CPSU General Secretary, in 1983 made a sober assessment of the situation in the “Third World,” which was relevant to Mozambique: “It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one’s aim and quite another thing to build it. For this, a certain level of productive forces, culture and social consciousness is needed. Socialist countries express solidarity with these progressive states, render assistance to them in the sphere of politics and culture, and promote the strengthening of their defense. We assist also, to the extent of our ability, in their economic development. But on the whole, their economic development, just like the entire social progress of these countries, can, of course, only be the result of the work of their people and of correct policy adopted by their leadership.”115

Many Western academics and former diplomats write that after his failure to join CMEA Samora Machel116 was eager to leave “the Soviet camp” and shift his allegiance to the West, and this break was marked by Machel’s visit to the USA in September 1983.

114. The Mozambican National Resistance (Portuguese: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) is the anti-communist political party that emerged in Mozambique following national independence. Receiving support from South Africa and Rhodesia, RENAMO violently resisted the leftist FRELIMO until 1992 in what became the Mozambican Civil War.
116. Samora Machel was a Mozambican revolutionary who joined the ranks of FRELIMO, the leftist national liberation movement, in 1962. Upon gaining national independence in 1975, Machel served as the first president of Mozambique until his death in 1986.
However, in the USSR Mozambique was not regarded as a member of “the Soviet camp.” In fact this militaristic terminology had not been in use in Moscow since the 1960s. Neither did Machel “shift his allegiance to the West”; he was a patriot of Mozambique and his “allegiance” was to his own motherland.

The Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighborliness, signed by Machel and Botha in Nkomati on the Mozambican-South African border on 16 March 1984, remains a controversial issue even now, almost a quarter of a century later. The ANC and its foreign supporters were critical of it. On the other hand, the Nkomati Accord provided a powerful counter to the view that decisive assistance to the liberation struggle would come from beyond South Africa’s borders.

However, the view of those in Mozambique who were involved in reaching this agreement must be acknowledged as well. In the opinion of Sergio Vieira, the Nkomati Accord allowed the actions of Mozambique and the liberation movement in South Africa to be put “beyond the East-West confrontation.” Soon after, both in the West and in South Africa, the first signs of readiness for a political settlement in the region and in South Africa in particular appeared.

In Vieira’s opinion, the accord ensured that in spite of several attacks, the confrontation between Mozambique and South Africa never became a full-scale war. However, Pretoria did not honor its obligations and continued supporting RENAMO and the destruction of the country continued.

Another issue that is still raising controversy is the tragic death of Samora Machel, who was killed when his Tu-134, piloted by a Soviet crew, crashed on 19 October 1986 in South Africa at Mbuzini, very close to the Mozambican border. Many, including Soviet and Mozambican authorities, believed that the plane was lured off its course by a false beacon, installed in South Africa. The full story of this tragedy has not yet been told. Let us hope that all the potential witnesses (and culprits?) will be found, as well as all relevant data.

117. Sergio Vieira is a prominent Mozambican intellectual and member of FRELIMO.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. On a Soviet version of these events, see Vladimir Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (Bellville: Mayibuye, 1999), 304.
Other than that, stories appear from time to time that could be called hilarious, were they not so dirty. One recent and most unfortunate example is the memoirs of Jacinto Soares Veloso, former member of the FRELIMO Politburo, who headed the Mozambican security apparatus between 1975 and 1983. He is practically trying to put the blame not even on the Soviet crew, as the regime in Pretoria had done, but on the Soviet leadership. Veloso is of the view that since Machel “betrayed the Soviet camp” in a bipolar confrontation, having made a choice in favor of “liberalization of the economy and society” he was “doomed.”\textsuperscript{122} He even suggests that “ultra-radicals” from the apartheid regime and from “the East” had common interests and were involved “in the operation to eliminate Samora Machel.”\textsuperscript{123}

This is nonsense, and a very treacherous form of it. True, Moscow was sometimes critical of Machel’s actions (though this criticism was never public), but mostly of his overly radical internal policy. However, whatever differences existed, they were differences between friends and comrades and nobody regarded Machel as a “traitor.” In fact the Soviet leadership was shocked by the news of his tragic death.

The changes in the USSR during the period of Perestroika affected Moscow’s role in Mozambique just as in other parts of southern Africa. The crisis in the Soviet Union on the threshold of the 1990s made Moscow lose its position in the area, and unlike in South-West Africa just some years earlier, it virtually had no role to play in the talks between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO that culminated in the signing of the Complete Peace Agreement in October 1992 in Rome.

\textsuperscript{122} Jacinto Soares Veloso, \textit{Memórias em Voo Rasante} (Maputo: Papa Letras, 2006), 205.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 206.
DISCUSSION

EDWARDS: Professor Shubin will begin by speaking to his paper. I will then discuss the specific questions that we would like to use as the focus of discussion. Professor Vladimir Shubin.

SHUBIN: Thank you, sir.

With all due respect, I hope that this session will not be an extension of the Cold War! Of course we are different people, with different political views, different backgrounds, but maybe after so many years, we can try to get rid of the old clichés and, should we say, to destroy some myths and to see the reality. It is important not only for us as historians, but I think it is also important for the new leaders not to repeat the mistakes of old leaders and not to come up with major strategies based upon the wrong views of the situation. This is the main point.

Now, you see, my paper is too long and of course I’m not going to read it. I will try to concentrate mostly on the Soviet involvement in Angola and say a couple of words about Mozambique, and to leave more time for questions and answers.

The 1974 Portuguese revolution or coup or whatever you want to call it: at that time the Angolan liberation movement was in a very difficult situation, it was dormant, it was not even saved by the agreement (in my opinion, a very unfortunate one) between Holden Roberto and Neto, which made Neto deputy to Roberto. UNITA was somewhere inside the country but was hardly visible from outside. And of course these circumstances affected the transition to independence. Anyhow, as we all know, in January 1975, the transitional interim government was created with much less power and in a much more complicated situation than the transition government of Mozambique. Effectively, this government did not work from the very beginning. I remember three or four months after its creation the MPLA representatives said that the three organizations were still on chapter 1, or clause 1, of the constitution.

Soviet position: unfortunately it’s a paradox of history, but by April 1974, our relations with the MPLA led by Neto were at their lowest ebb, partly because of the agreement with Holden Roberto, which we were not happy about; partly for personal reasons. This is talked about in my paper and more in my book, which is supposed to
Finally, just before his departure from Brazzaville to Luanda, he got a new instruction, to say that the Soviet Union would recognize the government that was proclaimed by the MPLA.

be launched today and I am not going into detail now. Thus, it took quite a while for Moscow to get adjusted to the new situation and I think that real restoration of relations between us and the MPLA took place only in December 1974, when Iko Carreira, future first Minister of Defense of Angola, came to Moscow. Then several of our people—journalists, there were a couple of military—came there. The man who played a very important role (and I dedicated my book to him) is the late Igor Uvarov who was TASS correspondent there. We studied together at university, then he was conscripted, commissioned and served in the General Staff. His contribution was very important and he, in a discussion with me about five or six years ago, said Moscow knew nothing about Angola’s situation at the time he arrived there in the beginning of 1975. Then, sometime in March 1975, we received a big group of MPLA cadres for military training. It was the core of the Ninth Brigade. The commanders were trained near Moscow, while other specialists were trained in Perevalnoye, in the Crimea. Then, in July and August, big supplies of arms to the MPLA reached Pointe-Noir.

I want to underline one point. There is a very good book by Professor Piero Gleijeses on the Cuban involvement, based on their archives. However, our [Russian] archives are still sealed. We have to rely on the verbal history and sometimes on our own memories and our own notes; therefore my information may not be always correct. I apologize for this in advance. I hope future historians, when they have access to the archives, will correct us, but I don’t think we should wait for the future. We must at least write whatever we can write or say whatever we can say. So, I know from my notes and discussions, that by mid-May 1975, some supplies, quite a big number of supplies, were already at Soviet ports, but it all depended on Brazzaville, and if you remember, the relations of Brazzaville and the MPLA were not always rosy—there was the problem of Cabinda. Once again the main attention was Zaire, and in fact the very first group of our military was sent that way; not yet to Angola, but to Brazzaville. But the idea was that they will go to Angola after independence. It was a small group of specialists in Sirelas, anti-aircraft missiles. They came there because there were rumors that Zaire would use their Mirages, and Luanda would need some assistance, and it should be provided. That was the first Soviet military mission to the best of my knowledge.

I want to underline that there was no Soviet military presence, except one or two information officers, in Angola before 16 November 1975. The first group of Soviet advisors and instructors came there in November. As we all know, the Cuban comrades appeared there in August as advisors; the first combat unit arrived on the 9th November of 1975.
Meanwhile, according to the Stockwell book, our American counterparts were there several months earlier training UNITA and FNLA troops.

Now, one more point. Definitely there were certain differences, or different views, within the Soviet leadership, to what extent we should interfere in Angolan affairs. To what extent, so to speak, should we help the MPLA. Those people who dealt mostly with the problem of disarmament, the relations with the United States, etcetera—I don't think they were very happy. If you take memoirs of a very good man, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who was Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. for many years (fortunately it's published in English)—he speaks somewhat negatively about these developments. And there are very good memoirs by former First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgy Kornienko. Unfortunately he is no more and unfortunately his memoirs were not translated into English. He mentioned that our involvement in Angola created problems for so-called détente; the problems with Brezhnev's visit to the United States. But I rather share the opinion of another very good man, Ambassador Vasev, who was involved in the talks on a political settlement in 1988. He was former Deputy Head of the Mission in Washington. He said that if not Angola, Washington would have found another excuse, because there was definitely a general trend in cooling down of the relations.

At that stage it is also important to know that almost until early November, the official Soviet line was to try to restore the transitional government; a government which included three different organizations. There are also memoirs of a late KGB Colonel, Oleg Nazhestkin. He dealt with the MPLA from the early sixties, from his days in Kinshasa.

The memoirs were published in a couple of articles, unfortunately only in Russian, but he says there that when he got an order to go and meet Neto in Luanda in October, first, he received the instruction to call for the restoration of this government. However when he arrived in Brazzaville, there was a new, milder instruction waiting for him. Finally, just before his departure from Brazzaville to Luanda, he got a new instruction, to say that the Soviet Union would recognize the government that was proclaimed by the MPLA, etcetera. And this was not just confrontation or a conflict between two policy lines. People often say there were differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Party International Department (and we do not have time to explain the differences); but this was not the main point. The main point, in my opinion, was that the situation was changing. Personally, I’m sure that the reason they reached a decision of recognition of the MPLA government, was South Africa’s deep intervention in Angola. The physical intervention of the South African
Army changed the situation, especially vis-à-vis African countries, because after this, those African countries which were critical of our role in Angola, like Nigeria, for example, changed their position very quickly. This is the first part of my exposé today.

For the second part, I will just say a few words about myths; many people here have heard this story of mine, but I will say it again. The third part is what they call Cuito Cuanavale, or as some people prefer to say, Lomba, but Professor Saunders will cover it tomorrow in his exposé on Namibia although we have the right to add the view of Moscow on those developments.

About the myths: there are some of us here, who were elected politicians, but most of us are historians and we must do our best to destroy the myths. One of the myths is “General Konstantin Shaganovitch.” This man never existed. But there are at least dozen books where they speak about “General Shaganovitch”; “General Shaganovitch’s offensive,” this and that. There was one Chief Advisor of Soviets in Angola, General Vassily Shakhnovich, who left the country in 1980 and died I think in ‘82 or ‘83. There was another man who was there from ‘82 to ‘85—“General Konstantin,” that is General Konstantin Kurochkin, a very good man who is on the front cover of my book by the way. Somebody, somewhere, either the Western intelligence, or the South African intelligence, merged this dead man and a living man and this way “Konstantin Shaganovitch” was created. You see, I’m not an intelligence or counter intelligence officer but I believe I know the origin of it, because the name was spelled in a French way, with ‘vitch’ at the end, and French was used in the Soviet passports. So it looks like somebody saw somewhere the French spelling, perhaps in Angolan Immigration and reported it to his handlers. The only man who avoided this mistake is General Geldenhuys, because in his book the name is correct—it is General Kurochkin.

So, in short, it is very dangerous to create myths. Bridgland, Steenkamp, all these people who write about “Konstantin Shaganovitch,” are supposed to be good experts, but they claim that “he is an expert in chemical warfare.” In fact, the real “General Konstantin” before his assignment in Angola was Deputy Commander of our [Soviet] paratroopers. On the other side, they claimed that he had 950 Soviet officers over there; meanwhile, Kurochkin publicly said he had about two thousand. It looks like intelligence was weak if they had such an under-estimation of our military in Angola.

I will leave the rest for questions and answers. I would just like to clear some myths over Mozambique since I was asked to by the organizers. Two points worry me. One of
course is Samora Machel’s death. There are too many stories and I don’t think we are now in the position to discuss them. As you know, two years ago Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, announced there would be a new investigation but never again did we hear about this investigation. This is none of my business, but I am mentioning it because recently, people started speculating again about Soviet involvement in two ways. There was an article in Zambeze (shall I say a pro-RENAMO paper, sorry for the branding) in Mozambique, with a big headline: “Pilots had false licenses.” Can you imagine the Soviet Union sending Soviet pilots to carry a friendly President with fraudulent licenses? Of course, no sources. And then it was in the book by Mr. Veloso, former Minister, former member of the FRELIMO Politburo—he was the Security Minister at some stage—who practically accused us of killing Machel. He said (I’m quoting from memory, but I’m sure it’s right) that Machel was doomed when he had betrayed the Eastern camp and came to the Western camp. This is all nonsense; nobody regarded him as a traitor. And he said that the ultra-right wing, the ultra-radicals in South Africa, joined forces with ultra conservatives in Russia to organize a conspiracy against Machel. This is a shame. I can’t find another word for it.

Sorry if I took too much time. Now time for questions and answers. Thank you.

**EDWARDS:** Thank you very much. I would now like to read into the record the six questions that we would like to focus the discussion around.

The first question is a two-part question: why did the SADF go into Angola in 1975 and what was their real goal?

The second question: to what extent were these actions prompted by Washington?

Thirdly, what did Pretoria know about Moscow’s involvement in Angola before and after the 11th November 1975?

Fourthly, is it fair to say that for several crucial months in late 1975, the Soviet’s role was reduced to that of a spectator?

**SHUBIN:** Maybe I should comment on that. That was a very good book by Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*.

**EDWARDS:** The fifth question is: did Murtala Muhammed’s speech at the OAU summit provoke his assassination?
And the sixth question is: where and when did General Konstantin Shaganovitch appear for the first time and who were his “parents”?

We have specific participants who can now enter into a discussion. There will be time later on for people who are not specifically designated participants to engage in the debate. Could I now open discussion in the order as listed? Mr. Pik Botha, please.

PIK BOTHA: Thanks, Mr. Chairperson. In the old days we used to say “Chairman” but nowadays it’s “Chairperson.”

At the outset I would like to say that, if he agrees, I would like General Geldenhuyys to deal in greater detail, with the military aspects involved. Let me just speak broadly from the political side of the matter. I was at that stage the South African Ambassador at the United Nations and in the United States, and my impression was, and still is, that Cuban troops came into Angola, and they were plotting a southward thrust towards the Namibian border and we genuinely believed that the Soviet Union was mainly behind this, and no less a person than Dr. Kaunda referred to the Cubans as the “cubs of the leopard.” There were other African leaders, Mobutu, arap Moi,124 the government of Botswana—who also shared this view; it was again as was perceived to be at that stage a Soviet intrusion as they have done in Afghanistan; and they’ve done in other parts of the world. This was our impression. To what extent the information was correct, I want to make use of this opportunity to thank Professor Shubin. I read his document and I must honestly admit for the first time, I realize the dissent and the problems that you [Russians] encountered yourselves, inter alia, with the Cubans. I know now that you did encounter a lot of problems with the Cubans.

But be it as it may, I’m just giving you my impression. I was the Ambassador there and I personally was extremely concerned about Angola, our going into Angola. I phoned the then-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Brand Fourie—he asked me to phone the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller. Dr. Muller asked me to phone Prime Minister Vorster. The Prime Minister said to me: “I think you have to go and do some homework on Capitol Hill because I was assured at the highest level on the American side, that they

124. Daniel Toroitich arap Moi was Vice President of Kenya from 1967 to 1978 and went on to serve as President from 1978 to 2002.
will support us and that they would wish us to do it.” I then spent two days at Capitol Hill. They had this train downstairs where you got to wait hours for a Senator and jump on the seat of the subterranean train next to him, and try and convince him. I saw Barry Goldwater who was an American presidential candidate and he was conservative. I saw Senator Helms and others, and they all said to me: “Look, we will not vote against this proposal to cut all funds, American funds to the non-communist parties in Angola, but we will not vote for it, we will be absent in the Senate.” And it happened exactly that way. The day it happened, I phoned Mr. Vorster and told him, “Look, no more American funds.” And then he invited me to his holiday home in the Cape at the end of 1975. I arrived and I was extremely concerned that the Americans would drop us and that our troops might get caught and captured. When I arrived at the Prime Minister’s home in the Eastern Cape, at a place called Oubos, there was the Minister of Defense, Mr. PW Botha, Head of the Defense Force, General Malan, and much to my joy, after my presentation they told Mr. Vorster that they were willing to withdraw the Defense Force. That made my task much easier. I returned to Washington where the American government then asked me to ask my government not to withdraw, but to hang on at least until the Addis Ababa Conference of the OAU, which was towards the middle of January. I was again very concerned and warned my government that we could not rely on the Americans, and they said, “Well, we could hardly refuse this request.” What then happened was, there was this split. I see you mentioned here the man from Nigeria. While I was at Oubos, I was informed by the Prime Minister that a special delegate from Nigeria secretly visited the South African government and that Nigeria indicated that we should not withdraw. At the Addis Ababa meeting of the OAU two resolutions were drafted. The one asked for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the other one asked for the withdrawal of only the South African troops. So we were pushing for withdrawal of all foreign troops, while of course our Soviet friends were pushing for the withdrawal of only South African troops, and that was the split vote of 22/22. And who tipped the scales? Idi Amin,125 with the President of Nigeria. Our information later was that the Soviet Union bribed Nigeria with $50 million, my American friends told me. It just shows you how dangerous intelligence services are—what they did to Bush and what they did to the Soviet government, and what they even

125. Idi Amin Dada was the President of Uganda from 1972 to 1979. He received immense support from the Soviet Union.
did is they tapped my phone, our own intelligence services in the apartheid days, and that is why I warned Mr. Mandela when he became president. I said to him, “Don’t prolong the life of the intelligence services. They are dangerous. They are very dangerous to all of us.” But that is a different matter, not for this congress to decide.

To return here: as far as I’m concerned, two weeks later, [at the] end of January, I think, the Security Council passed a resolution demanding South Africa’s withdrawal virtually immediately. I knew we couldn’t do it. I phoned Mr. PW Botha and he was willing to do it, but he said those troops must move hundreds of kilometers virtually without roads and so on. So, I sought a connection with the Soviet Union’s Ambassador. That was very difficult, and I’m telling my Russians friends today, it was not the easiest thing to do. I eventually met with one in a very dark, typical New York third class little pub. He was very suspicious, quite rightly so. I merely said to him, “Look, don’t push this thing. We are going to leave Angola. If you push this now and put us under pressure, we are going to fight it out, and then you are going to get a greater clash than you envisaged.” And that happened. We were given the time eventually to get out without further, more severe resolutions being passed. But to sum it up, as far as South Africans are concerned, more or less the white South Africans, they were the voters. They were extremely concerned about what was seen and experienced as a thrust of Cuban troops assisted by the Soviet Union, funded by the Soviet Union, to go south to destroy UNITA and open the way for a severe situation on the northern border of Ovambo. And that was a danger.

Is it fair to say that for several crucial months, the Soviet role was reduced to that of spectators? Well, whether it’s fair to say, that is not for me to judge. In the light of what I heard from Professor Shubin—he is putting different facts now before us for the first time; I’m not in the position to judge it.

As far as Mohammed126 is concerned, I don’t believe that. Nigeria, as I said, was the country which originally wanted us to vote the right way and not withdraw. And what happened behind the scenes there and why he made that specific speech, I am not in a position to respond to that.

As far as this General Konstantin Shaganovitch is concerned, I know nothing about it at all. I just want to ask Professor Shubin, is it really that important? Maybe, what shall we

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126. Murtala Ramat Mohammed was the military ruler of Nigeria from 1975 to 1976. Mohammed indicated support for the MPLA in Angola at the 1976 OAU conference in Addis Ababa.
say, a slight mistake was made here, but is it really important who was this specific general? Because, one case to me that is of extreme importance is the Cuban General Ochoa Sanchez\textsuperscript{127}—that name I’m sure of and General Geldenhuys will confirm that. He was of course executed. He was sent to Angola and he was quoted to say that he was sent to a war that was lost, so that he could be blamed. He was blamed and he was shot a year later in Cuba and that remains despicable. But I will stop here now with the remark that we should give General Geldenhuys, who is our expert in this field, a chance.

\textbf{GELDENHUYS}: Mr. Chairperson, I have a few points that I would like to make. I am not a historian, also not an academic, but what I can tell you is more personal experience, personal view and so on. And I have quite a number of points, but I will confine myself to the four points that the Chairman indicated to us. And you see how it links up with my concept of what the Cold War entailed; the characteristics of the Cold War.

The first question was: why did we go into Angola? Now I must tell you, that was 1975 and it is a hell of a long time ago, and I wasn't a general then. I just came from the beautiful country of Namibia, to Pretoria, and I was at Army headquarters, the Director Staff Officer, the Director of Operations. Above me was the Chief of Staff of Operations and then above him was the Defense Force headquarters that also had a Director of Operations and the Chief of Staff, and then the Chief of the Defense Force, and only then do you get to the Minister. And why [did we go] into Angola—it's a political matter. You get your orders from the Minister, from the politician. And I now outline, as I did before, what that long path is to the politician. Quite frankly, even today as I sit here, I don't quite know why [we went] into Angola. I think Mr. Botha gave us the answer, but I will tell you what my impression was at that stage, which I got from the Director, the Chief, whatever his name was—Viljoen, he was a staffing officer at Defense Force Headquarters. He talked about something like Kissinger, and he also mentioned another name which I think had been mentioned by Mr. Botha, who was a person who was at that stage the Chief of National Intelligence, Hendrik van den Bergh, who apparently had made a visit at some stage or another to Luanda, and I was convinced at that stage that it was initiated

\textsuperscript{127} Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez was a Cuban general who led Cuban forces in Angola against the FNLA in 1975. Despite his impressive military record and apparent commitment to communist internationalism, Ochoa was arrested and later executed on charges of corruption, drug trafficking, abuse of power, and treason.
or requested by the United States. That was my impression. Right or wrong. You get orders and you don't ask any questions.

What also then happened—I talked to you about how secrecy came to the fore in the Cold War era, much more so than in previous wars. What they did was, in the Defense Force, they didn’t use the normal command and control structure of the Defense Force to control that operation. They formed a committee consisting of the Director of Operations of the Army, that was me; a staff officer, the one of the Air Force, and some other guy. That committee, on my level at that stage, controlled that operation until I came one day and I said, “But listen, this is nonsense!”—well, I used stronger language than that. “This is BS, this is nonsense.” And it is only at a much later stage that they used the normal command and control structure for the rest of the war. So I didn’t really know at that stage how it came about why we went there, but there was one thing that I could mention and that was that I was told by my superior staff officer, not even a commander, that I was to compile a list—that was now before the incursion—a list of the armaments that would be required by a South African task force to move into Angola, which we did. And I can’t remember if it was on paper; it wasn’t in very wide detail, but I submitted that list under the firm impression that the United States was going to give us some assistance, to give us the capability to do that operation. Now, this may sound a bit strange to you, but I would like to remind you that the last war before this that we fought was in 1945, many years before and like all wars after that war, the Defense war budget-wise gets zero, almost zero. So, the Defense Force was staggering from 1945 onwards, and you can’t just overnight put a force into the field. So it makes sense that somebody higher up, who [was] involved in the discussions, would say, “Listen, if you want us to do this, then you must give us some assistance.” And that’s how I thought it came about that I was asked to draw up such a list, which I did. So, those were my personal impressions and I must tell you that with time going by, a man can make mistakes and that is how I remembered it as I sit here now.

EDWARDS: General, one factual query. When you were in this position, what was your military rank?

GELDENHUYS: I was just then promoted to Brigadier.

EDWARDS: Thank you. Ambassador Villa?
VILLA: My name is Angel Villa. I’m the Ambassador of Cuba to South Africa. Probably, as some of you realized I was not a personal witness of this conflict, but I read about this and so on and consult the Cuban position in this particular regard.

I would like to highlight some of the perspectives from the Cuban side about our participation in this war. First of all, I believe there is a very important question that was responded to by the South African representative who was exactly a participant on these issues from your side.

First of all, I think it is really important to say that Cuba—a non-African country, a very small one and very far away from this state—was one of the main actors in the war. The question precisely responds to our perspective of “why?” If South Africa didn’t go into Angola, Cubans [would have] never arrived [to participate] in a military operation. History has mentioned the fact that Cuba sent some instructors to Angola before the 11th of November. They were just instructors, even if they went with very large weaponry after they received a request from the MPLA; it was just to train them. The initial request was to train them in Cuba or to do it in Angola. It has been arranged for the decision to do it on both sides.

On the particular case of Cuba: Cuba belonged at the time to the socialist bloc. And one of the main principles for the socialist countries was internationalism, proletarian internationalism. That means to help other countries, including the approach from the political, ideological and economical point of view. Particularly in the case of the socialist bloc, for the survival of the system and for the continuation and the expansion of the system in the world, we needed to make alliances. Those alliances were not only among the very same socialist countries, but we also counted on the participation of some other progressive forces, [such] as the liberation movements from Africa. That’s why in the particular case of Cuba, it was the only socialist country in the Western hemisphere, particularly in the case of Latin America. But Cuba had some other particular interests (in Africa), if I may say so. First of all, Cuba has a very strong African heritage in their population, particularly very related to Angola, because as part of our history of slavery, people that were taken to Cuba came from Angola. Almost half of our population is black or colored. The liberation of Cuba through the revolution coincided with the main wave of independence in Africa, and that allowed us the possibility also to help some other liberation movements in the area as well, as you remember the cases of Cape Verde, Congo and some other experiences. That’s why I would like us to reaffirm that Cuba came to Angola after the request of the MPLA, used to preserve their sovereignty and independence already conquered.
I listen to what was said about the case of how the MPLA arrived to power, [which] is not exactly our perspective. We believe that the MPLA was a legal government in that country; it was very ideologically close to Cuba because it was a movement that embraced Marxism-Leninism. It was not this way during the whole period of the Angolan process. It was not a socialist country, neither a communist country. This is very important because sometimes, you see, propaganda can divert exactly some terms. There were some countries in Africa with a socialist orientation. That means countries with some approaches to the ideological background or ideological feelings, or links to particular ideas. But they were not run as a socialist system.

On the issue of the United States—although they are not present [represented] at this conference—they were critical actors in this particular process. They were not suspecting in 1975 that Cuba would get involved in Angola. Even I remember a meeting of the National Security Council of the U.S. in the month of June, I believe, when they disclosed the Angolan case and they considered that Angola should not continue being united as the [country was]. You know, all wars have a political objective. Sometimes these political objectives have a very big background in economic interests. We are talking about a country, a very rich country in Africa, with oil, diamonds, a lot of raw materials, and that’s very important also for the approach among some big powers. In the case of the U.S., the U.S. definitely did not believe that Angola should be a country as it was, united, etc. Probably, as some of the speakers said, they tried to use South Africa just as the front line, because it was a country from the area. There were some other approaches from the Eastern background of some leaders of South Africa for expansion on the continent and [its] arrival in Angola was the critical point just to turn the reality of this country.

I would like also to mention that this topic is very related to Namibia. In the afternoon, or tomorrow I believe, we will discuss the case of Namibia. But we cannot definitely separate Angola from the case of Namibia, because at the end, this resolution and the presence of the Cuban troops is very linked to the Namibian case. Cuba could not withdraw [from] Angola without assuring the independence of Namibia. It was part of the game. [There] was a request for the withdrawal of all the troops. We were in agreement to withdraw and in fact, we started the withdrawal from Angola at a certain stage, but it was after the second part [of] the South African aggression that we decided to just increase our troops.
Somebody mentioned that we had very big disagreements with the former Soviet Union and so on. You know, they were our big brother and we had a very, very good relationship along the years. And it doesn’t matter if the Soviet Union was sometimes critical and so on. We cannot deny history. That was our main ally. And, in this loving relationship, sometimes, as it happens in human relations, there were some disagreements. Cuba was accused of being a satellite of the Soviet Union. The case of Angola was a proof that it doesn’t matter that we had a very nice relationship; there were some disagreements from the tactical point of view in the case of Angola. They supported us and supported the MPLA from the material point of view and with military equipment and so on, but at a certain stage, we were first on the approach on what to do in the next step. Sometimes even, it was particularly at the end of the war, when we decided to increase our troops, we did it without first arranging it with the Soviet Union. And that was a demonstration of our own agenda regarding the case of Angola.

Cuba was also in the middle of a very critical situation of the Cold War. Cuba belonged to the socialist bloc, but it was the contradiction amongst the two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and it was the pivot also of détente among those two countries. And basically it was also our approach what was advanced in this process among those two countries. Both of them were trying to preserve, at a certain stage, the former Soviet Union. That’s why, at certain moments, what was happening in Angola could affect the final approach or final balance among those two. We were in the middle, and we were already in Angola. Even Cuba put at risk its own defense, just trying to safeguard Angola. We moved a very large number of troops to Angola, a very large amount of military equipment. Reagan was already in power and he was very aggressive, in speaking terms, but they were also preparing aggression in military terms. It was even at the time when Cuba decided to develop a new military agenda internally—what we call the “Wall of the Whole People”—the whole population participating in the defense of the country, and that was fine with our participation network. That’s why we believe that this, the participation of Cuba in this war, had very critical links to so many other points: the United States that was the main focal point in our foreign policy; the Soviet Union, but also our relations with the other countries in the southern hemisphere, because also we had very good relations with Mozambique and some other movements in
the area, like ZANU in Zimbabwe, well at that time it was the issue of ZAPU/ZANU.128 But, definitely, we have to look at so many things.

Finally, the victory was the reason that we had to increase our troops in Angola. We had to increase our equipment just to finish with the victory there, because if Cuba was defeated in Angola, it would be a very, very big danger for our own national security in Cuba, not only because [much of] our equipment and our soldiers were out of Cuba, but also because the perspective, the image of Cuba would be very frail at the end of the day. And it would be easier for the Americans just to go invade Cuba, or to try to do something particularly [to] us. That’s why the victory [was so important]; it was our main inspiration in the case of Angola because we already started the process and we had to finish it. Thank you.

EDWARDS: Would any of the other listed participants like to make any comments? General Geldenhuys.

GELDENHUYS: I just want to link the discussion that we had, Mr. Chairman, with my original characterization of the Cold War. After what you have heard from me now, you may ask: how can it be in such a shambles? How can there be such a deurmekaarspul (confusion) that you don’t know? Now, remember I said, before the Cold War era, you got orders such as “Conquer Egypt!” We didn’t get an order, a political order, to conquer Luanda. It was something totally different. You see how that simple thing of not getting a definite clear-cut order can cause what it in fact did. And historians should also take note of it, because even today, possibly tomorrow’s newspaper, you may find that especially from your far right, people will say that the South Africans made a fantastic, risky takeover into Angola and they were seeing the lights of Luanda and then the politicians stopped us. And it is very difficult to explain [this] to the Soviets, because when we reached that stage, we really could see the lights of Luanda. We already had lost lives and there was lots of fighting, but we never had a command “Conquer Luanda!” So, you can see, if you

128. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was a national liberation organization led by Joshua Nkomo that resisted white minority rule in Rhodesia. ZAPU fought against the white minority Rhodesian government alongside the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which had split from ZAPU in 1963, led by Robert Mugabe. ZAPU and ZANU united as the “Patriotic Front” in 1974. Upon gaining independence in 1980, Mugabe was elected the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. However, tensions later developed between Mugabe and Nkomo, and the new government of Zimbabwe experienced instability throughout the 1980s.
consider the characteristics of the Cold War in depth, then all of these things become all of a sudden more understandable.

I listened with attention to Ambassador Villa and I believe everything he says, but I want to tell him too that I also believe everything that I say, and I found later on that I made mistakes. For example, as it pertains to the point, the subject under discussion, when we withdrew from Angola in later years, I ordered at one stage all troops must come out, and I ascertained that they were all out, and I published statements that they all were out and I will put my hand on the Bible that we were all out, and you know what? Only a few days ago, I found out that there were a few individuals who stayed on longer. It is very right—and you should take to heart what Mr. Botha said—when you get involved with intelligence people all over the world, be careful.

**SHUBIN**: Was that ‘88?

**GELDENHUYS**: It was ‘88.

I think what possibly happened, but that’s only my own thinking, was that Mr. PW Botha was on a very intimate level with Dr. Savimbi. They were friends. Mr. Pik Botha will tell you that. And then to make an issue, an order, to say “All of you get out,” you are making very firm intimate relations all of a sudden. It’s a terrible thing. It’s almost dishonorable. And I can imagine that Mr. Botha might have said, “Listen, those one or two liaison officers who were personally close to the system. Let them stay on a little bit longer.” But that’s only what I think could possibly have happened. But, the fact is, I have lied, and I don’t say it happened in Cuba’s case, but there are people with opposite views to what I said. I believe you, but there may be other explanations too. Because one of the things of the Cold War that was more active than any other wars before the time, are dirty tricks, lies, propaganda and all that. More than ever before in warfare, you have that. Thank you.

**ZAZERAJ**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Victor Zazeraj. I am just retiring now after 35 years in Foreign Affairs and I just returned from a period in South America where I was Ambassador. I don’t want to address any of these specific questions listed here, because at that particular time, I was not in South Africa. I was stationed abroad. But I would like to say—just a general comment—that if, like me at that time, you were a humble Foreign Service Officer, you were a foreign policy analyst in South Africa, it was extraordinarily
difficult to understand Soviet intentions, to analyze Soviet actions and to determine what our response might be. At that time, bear in mind that the Soviet Union was not a democracy in the sense of what the kind of free media did. There were obviously official Soviet publications and commentaries, but it was not as if there was an opposition press there that was analyzing and giving commentary on what was going on. There were Soviet dissident writers whose reliability was questionable. We spoke a lot to our colleagues, diplomats from the United States, Britain, Germany, others, trying to get a deeper understanding of what was happening here in our part of the world. So, if you were an analyst, you were trying to analyze what was going on, it was not an easy question, unlike trying to analyze Britain’s intentions or Germany’s intentions. We saw the Soviet Union as something of a monolith and that’s why it’s particularly interesting, and I want to thank Ambassador Urnov for what for us is rather refreshing information, to spell out that the Soviet Union, on the contrary, was not a monolith. It was far more complicated than that. Let’s say the operational concept that was perhaps little more than a conventional wisdom at the time, was that the Soviet Union was this monolith; it was an aggressive, expansionist, opportunistic state that was spreading its influence throughout southern Africa and posed an extraordinary danger to us. Now, with a bit of hindsight you may regard this as a bit simplistic, but that was the operational concept. And it might be interesting to know that in our conversations with diplomats from the United States, from Germany, from Britain and others, they did nothing to disabuse us of that concept. In fact, they reinforced it.

The time under review here, specifically the late ’70s was a time where I, in fact, served in Finland, and Finland had a very specific history with relation to the Soviet Union—you will remember it. In fact, at the time a word crept into our vocabulary—the word “Finlandization,” a gratuitous insult to suggest that Finland had no independent foreign policy, which was not true. But, given Finland’s history with respect to the Soviet Union, you can understand the psychology of it. Finland was a neutral country and they had very specific interests also in Namibia—you will remember that. But Finland, also as a neutral country, did nothing to disabuse us from that operational concept that I mentioned earlier—this generalized view we had of the Soviet Union and what threat they posed to us in South Africa. And I remember very well, towards the end of the ’70s, the day that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and I received a very urgent message from Pretoria, from Mr. [Pik] Botha who was then the Foreign Minister, wanting a very urgent read-out of the Finnish response to this. I went into the Foreign Ministry that night and it was as if the
Finnish Foreign Ministry was on a war footing. They were scared witless, being a neighboring country and with its long history that they had with the Soviet Union.

This is just by the way; I’m trying to give some background on the psychology that dominated our thinking at the time. And it was very real. There was a widespread view that the Soviet intrusion into southern Africa at the time had the potential of visiting upon us the political and economic system that would be unacceptable to South Africans at that time. So, without dealing specifically with some of these questions on Angola, I thought it important perhaps just to give the context of how difficult it was for us to try and deal with, and understand so many tensions at the time. And perhaps that’s part of the secrecy that General Geldenhuys and Mr. Botha were mentioning. It was difficult to get an objective read-out and I think without understanding that, perhaps it is difficult to know, to follow, why we sometimes did what we did.

**EDWARDS:** Ambassador Urnov?

**URNOV:** Well, in general, I would agree with Mr. Zazeraj that the Soviet Union was a threat to South Africa. There is no doubt about that, because we condemned the whole idea of the apartheid state, and we supported the liberation movement and there was also the Communist Party with which we had long cordial links. But it doesn’t mean that we planned to invade South Africa.

I would like to corroborate the words of my neighbor to the left, his Excellency the Ambassador of Cuba, that Cuba was not a Soviet satellite. Our South African colleagues said that the United States didn’t suspect that Cuba would move into Angola, and I must confess that the Soviet Union didn’t suspect either that Cuba would move into Angola in such a way. It was a surprise when we received a report from our Ambassador in Guinea that planes were coming from Cuba for technical landing with troops aboard destined for Angola. This was in a situation when the enemy forces were approaching Luanda from both North and South. We could not just wash our hands and leave our friends, our Cuban friends and Angolan friends, alone. But, the initiative did come from Cuba.

Another thing, Professor Shubin mentioned Mozambique, and he was making a point, a very correct point, that we never considered Machel a traitor or deserter. Well, Nkomati was a surprise to us, but there was a feeling of understanding; after all, the country did need peace and if peace would come out of this Accord, it would be very good. Another
thing is that we never believed that South Africa will observe this Accord and that’s what actually happened. But, far from being a deserter, President Machel was a frontrunner. He wanted to be a communist. He knocked at our door asking: “Why don’t you recognize FRELIMO as a Communist Party? We are communists and Mozambique is a socialist state.” Our Ambassador there was P. Yevsyukov, the former functionary of the International Department of the Central Committee. He was responsible for the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, so he was nominated Ambassador. And through him, we tried to explain to President Machel that, well, you know, we appreciate your feelings, but we are not sure that the conditions are ripe for communism in your country or for FRELIMO to be a communist party. Socialist oriented party yes, non-capitalist party yes. But this is enough for the time being.

Since Afghanistan was mentioned, I would like to make one point. It happened in December 1979, four long years after the things started to develop in Angola. It was an invasion, and there is now a national consensus in Russia that this was an unfortunate, tragic mistake to send troops into Afghanistan. But that happened in December 1979. As far as the April Revolution of 1978 is concerned, I can assure you that this revolution was carried out by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan on its own, while we tried to persuade them that the revolutionary situation is not there. But after it happened, we had to bear in mind the situation in Iran, and the danger of the establishment of an anti-Soviet government in Kabul—in case the new government fell. That forced us to do something. But it took a year and a half before the decision was taken to send the troops. So the roots of the Afghan problem must be sought in Afghanistan, not in the Soviet Union. We did not encourage this April Revolution. Thank you.

EDWARDS: Mr. Pik Botha.

BOTHA: I would like to ask our Russian friend, Andrey Urnov, whether he could not ask the Russian government to give proper advice to President Obama before it is too late, as regards Afghanistan, because it seems to me you have very good experience from which the Americans could learn a lot.

URNOV: When I became the Deputy Head of Department in 1986…
**SHUBIN:** Just for your information, for four years he was responsible for that.

**URNOV:** …our main problem was how to withdraw, rather than how to carry on. But it was not Mr. Obama’s decision; it was Bush Junior’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan. Right?

**BOTHA:** But what I have in mind is, I don’t want them to repeat mistakes they made in Iraq. That’s all I’m trying to say.

**URNOV:** But you know the funny thing [was], our troops were just in and Margaret Thatcher invited our Ambassador for a talk. He expected that she would be very angry and she would criticize him, and then she was very sympathetic and she’s asking, “What do you think you are doing? Don’t you know what happened to us in the Falklands?”

**BOTHA:** Good, good. Just to round it off, mention was made of President Machel. I think for the record, and for Dr. Sue Onslow and for those who have an interest in this, there appeared very recently (General Geldenhuys got a copy) of a letter of a pilot, a Mozambique pilot, who confirmed that there was no foul play on that air crash, that aircraft, and its route that day. It was a pilot who claims that he’s been flying for Mozambican Airways all his life, very senior and he knows what he is talking about. It was published in a Mozambican paper in Portuguese, but I received a copy in English. I think for record purposes, you would certainly be interested in this.

Lastly, may I just emphasize, because you asked us to go back to that time. There was the Alvor Agreement. In terms of that Agreement, there should have been a government of national unity until elections had been held in Angola towards the end of 1975. The MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, the three of them, would have shared in this interim government of national unity or whatever you want to call it, until elections [had taken] place. The elections never took place. Never. That’s where the trouble started. I just want us to please keep this in mind.

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129. Margaret Thatcher served as the British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990. The Falklands War (1982) was a brief military confrontation between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the sovereignty of the long-disputed Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands.
In the case of Mozambique, we were against FRELIMO at the time, but the Portuguese handed power over properly in terms of international law. We recognized that. In the case of Rhodesia, we told Smith,130 “You’ve got to hand over. Sign the Lancaster House agreement.” In the case of Angola, UNITA had a right to be part of that government until elections took place. We saw in that a grave danger for democracy, a government coming into being through violence and military conquest. Thank you.

EDWARDS: Professor Shubin.

SHUBIN: A couple of small comments to put the record straight. We mentioned now that the events in Afghanistan happened in 1979, which is four years after Angola. Now, about the Cubans. Of course the Cuban colleagues can correct me, but when somebody speaks about South Africa’s intervention in Angola as a response to the Cubans’ actions, we should not forget that those centers, I think they were called ‘centers of revolutionary training’ that were created by Cubans for MPLA, were in the center of the country, in the north, and the southern center was near Lobito and Benguela. So they were very far away, hundred miles away from the Namibian border, and there was no intention of course, by any means, to use those centers for training to arrange an offensive into Namibia.

As far as the pilot’s letter is concerned, it’s really an unconvincing story because it is the same pilot who, as I said, claims that Soviet pilots had false licenses. How could he know? He was a Portuguese pilot for Mozambican Airlines who is now working somewhere in the Far East. I wish I knew how much he got paid for this story, and by whom, but that is another point.

Alvor Agreement and interim government: of course this is a very complicated point. But I’m sorry, I’m not going to advertise my book at all; there are mistakes in it, I’m afraid. But one point is important. I write there that in August, even September 1975, the MPLA representatives, when we met them in Moscow, said, “Look, we still hope to have a deal

130. Ian Smith was the Prime Minister of the white minority government of Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979. Smith’s government unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom in 1965, but Britain had agreed to Rhodesian independence only after the white minority had ceded power to majority rule. At the behest of the United Nations, almost all countries refused to recognize the independence of the new state of Rhodesia. Thus, in 1979, Smith’s government and the ZAPU/ ZANU Patriotic Front signed the Lancaster House Agreement, providing for majority rule and the establishment of an internationally-recognized independent Zimbabwe.
with UNITA. Some talks were going on. It would be difficult for us to proclaim independence alone.” They dismissed the FNLA mostly because of Zaire’s intervention, but with UNITA they hoped for a settlement. And to the best of my knowledge, the United States influenced UNITA to drop those preliminary talks with the MPLA around August or September. I’m speaking from memory. Thank you.

EDWARDS: I can now open discussion to the floor.

MAGUBANE: My name is Ben Magubane, former Professor of Sociology and, in retirement since 1997, I’ve been working in South Africa at the Democracy Education Trust trying to record the history of our liberation from 1960 to 2000.

I got the paper that Sue Onslow sent to us on Wednesday and she specifically said [that] participants should read the paper. So, yesterday I spent the whole day reading the paper. One thing that struck me was an analysis of periodization of when the Cold War started and why it started. So I decided to look at a few points. Now, you know, after the trial of the Soviet Revolution, the rise of Hitler and Nazism and the rise of the Soviet Union, and its defeat of Hitler, it seemed inevitable that [between] the United States and the Soviet Union, the two major powers to remain standing after World War II, there would be conflict. The example of the Soviet Union had inspired countries that were suffering from the yoke of colonialism, imperialism and racism, etc. In fact, during the interwar years, you find that a delegation from South Africa led by LaGuma, who was the Head of the Communist Party, and Gumende, who was the President of the ANC, visited the Soviet Union, and Gumende was extremely impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union.

Now, early in 1946, in a famous telegraph from Moscow, George Kennan, the U.S. diplomat, advised the Truman administration that no *modus vivendi* was possible because the Soviet Union was determined to expand its power throughout the globe. Two weeks later in a speech in Fulton, Missouri, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Britain’s wartime hero, declared that an iron curtain had descended across Europe, partitioning “a free West” from a communist East. And then in March 1947, a speech announcing what became known as the Truman Doctrine officially inaugurated the Cold War in the foundation of American foreign policy. From that day onwards, and I think this is very, very important, it would become the crusade of the United States to identify any struggle, whether it is against colonialism, imperialism, oppression and racism as, *ipso facto*, a struggle against the free world.
We know that the National Party in South Africa is elected in 1948 and one of the key plans of the National Party of course is anti-communism. And it defines anti-communism in such a way that any struggle by the oppressed people of South Africa who have been denied the franchise by the Act of Union, is also defined as communism. Now, I think this becomes important, because the National Party understood the context of the immorality of the Cold War. In the meantime, of course, South Africa during the war had developed and became a major industrial power in southern Africa, guarding the whole of southern Africa, which, at that time of course, included the Portuguese colonies, included Rhodesia and it already had incorporated Namibia as its fifth province. In the meantime, the ANC struggle in South Africa and indeed the struggle of other people under foreign domination in the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia and so forth are going to intensify. In South Africa, that is going to lead to Sharpeville, and Sharpeville in fact becomes a turning point in South Africa. Now, why I mention this is because when we begin southern Africa and the Cold War in 1974, it seems as if we ignore that part of the history of the Cold War and the role that South Africa also itself played in this contest between communism and capitalism. And to say that South Africa for instance had not fought since 1945 also ignores the fact that South Africa participated in the Korean War.

Now, the question is, why did South Africa go into Angola in 1975? I think a great deal has been written on that. Indeed PW Botha discussed it with Chester Crocker and he mentioned the fact that what “pissed” South Africa off—sorry for using that word—was the fact of the betrayal by the United States, by Kissinger, in particular. Now, the question is asked by Stockwell: why did the United States decide to intervene in Angola? South Africa wanted to adhere itself to the American administration, wanted to be the confidant of the American administration. So, it intervened hoping that the United States was not going to let it down. So, when South Africa found itself in the ledge, it is, as Foreign Minister Botha stated, going to play it with the Soviet Union, that yes, we are going to withdraw. But in the meantime, it’s not going to forget the betrayal by Kissinger. Kissinger shuttled the diplomacy between 1975 and 1976—it’s well known. The election of Carter

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131. I.e., the Sharpeville Massacre. On 21 March 1960, police opened fire on black South African demonstrators in the township of Sharpeville, killing 69 people and injuring many more. The Sharpeville Massacre sparked further domestic protests against white minority rule, contributed to international anti-apartheid sentiment, and catalyzed South Africa’s isolation in the international community.
is also well known, and why in order to recoup American prestige, he is going to say that American foreign policy from now on is going to be guarded by the principles of human rights. In the meantime, the right wing in the United States felt humiliated in Vietnam. It was going to try to recoup its losses in southern Africa, so that when the issue of Rhodesia was discussed between 1978 and 1979, it is quite obvious that the right wing pressure on Carter was such that it was going to be ambivalent. He didn’t know what he was going to do, and then ultimately he was defeated by Reagan. Now, Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979; [Helmut] Kohl132 was also elected at that time. [PW] Botha became the new Prime Minister of South Africa, and it was at a critical time. That was when Botha was going to adopt the “total strategy,” which entered South African policy from now on at the center of the Cold War. The Reagan administration was going to walk away. So, when we ask the question, “why did the SADF go into Angola,” the answer is quite simple, because the American administration had promised that, and encouraged it to PW [Botha], and had said that it was not going to be elected to betray.

Now, I taught in Zambia between 1967 and 1970, and it was quite obvious that there were several liberation movements that were accommodated in Zambia, but that the most serious liberation movements were those that intended to be supported by the Soviet Union. At least it was as far as I understood when I was there. The MPLA already, the ANC because of its alliance with the South African Communist Party, FRELIMO—these were the movements that everybody looked to. I can remember when Mondlane,133 for instance, was assassinated, there was a meeting of the MPLA, ANC, ZAPU and so forth at our house. And that’s when for the first time I met Machel. So, it was quite obvious that there was this sort of relationship between these movements that everybody accepted to be quite serious; that the United States was very, very suspicious of, because they were said to be the client or supported by the Soviet Union. So, these are, to me, very, very important points if you are trying to answer the question of why South Africa went into Angola in 1975. What was its real goal then? Its real goal was in fact to reach Luanda with the help of the United States...

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132. Helmut Kohl, a member of the Christian Democratic Union political party, was the chancellor of West Germany from 1982 to 1990 and of reunified East and West Germany from 1990 to 1998.
133. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane was president of FRELIMO from 1962 until his assassination by bombing in 1969.
American people were in 1975—I was teaching in the United States then—anti any foreign involvement, and South Africa therefore was going to become a surrogate of the United States. Thank you very much.

**EDWARDS**: Further comments? Mr. Botha.

**BOTHAA**: Our friend mentioned that we incorporated Namibia as a fifth province. I can assure you it never took place and the four provinces of the Republic of South Africa were known, and Namibia was never a part of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. There were voters, there were National Party people who wanted it, yes, very much so. But it retained its international status—nobody could tell you what it was. Some said it had to be brought under a United Nations Trusteeship. We said no, the mandate of the League of Nations expired but we will administer the territory in the spirit of the mandate. The World Court found against Ethiopia and Liberia in 1966, but we'll discuss that later. I just want for the record to make it clear, from the international legal point of view, Namibia was never part of the old Union of South Africa or of the Republic of South Africa.

**STEWARD**: I think in the discussion we actually identified the main reasons involved. South Africa, the SADF, went into Angola, *inter alia* because the United States approved of the action and to a certain degree asked South Africa to do so, because half of the countries of the OAU wanted South Africa to do so; because South Africa was genuinely concerned about the strategic threat posed by the Soviet-Cuban influence in Angola; because it was the South African perception that the Alvor Agreement had been breached. Those are the reasons why South Africa went into Angola. South Africa didn’t go into Angola to capture Luanda; it was not prepared for a major military offensive; it didn’t have artillery; it didn’t have the kind of logistic preparation that such a major initiative would have required normally, but these were the reasons.

But another point I’d like to make clear at this stage is that we are operating from different paradigms of what the South African government of that time was about. The paradigm that most of you have is [that] this was the racist minority regime, “colonialism of a special type,” etc. etc. This was the apartheid, what have you… Our view was quite different. We did not regard ourselves as being a minority as the Rhodesians did in Rhodesia. And they always accepted they were the minority. We believed that we were
a nation coalescing around the Afrikaners, with a right to self-determination. That was
our point of departure. The central theme in Afrikaner history since 1652 was the wish
to rule themselves and to maintain their right to self-determination. Twice during the
19th century, the Afrikaners took on the greatest imperial power of the time, Britain, in
defense of that goal. The whole of the history of the 20th century for the Afrikaners was
the reestablishment of this right to self-determination. So, for the great majority of white
South Africans at that time, it wasn’t a question of defending “Whites Only” signs and
lifts, as Mr. Botha pointed out. It was a question of whether this national group would
survive as an entity in South Africa. That was the core of our underlying strategic concern.
And also, this nation was broadly Western; it was broadly democratic too at that time. We
didn’t see any future in a society that would come under the rule of a communist party in
South Africa. So, these factors were our main motivating elements. And I think everybody
should realize that at the beginning of the discussion.

EDWARDS: Thank you. Ambassador Urnov.

URNOV: Professor Magubane spoke about the Cold War and how it actually developed
and started. I would agree that when these two superpowers arose after World War II, there
had to be some form of a clash. There had to be competition and rivalry, but the Cold War
was something more than that. And in my opinion, the essence of the Cold War was the
arms race, and I’m pretty sure that the Cold War started when the Americans dropped the
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That was a sort of declaration of war, while we
were still allies. And before Churchill spoke in Fulton, I think several months before that,
the decision was taken by the U.S. National Security Council to launch the production of
atomic armaments on a large scale. And here I would refer to Mr. Pik Botha’s quotation
on the United States wanting to outspend us. But that only proves that the United States,
being superior in [the] economic sphere, indeed made its stake on the arms race as a way
to weaken and undermine the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States’ major task
was to bleed us by means of the armaments race, is something which doesn't have to be
proved; it is obvious. Thank you.

GELDENHUYS: Mr. Chairman, I think we had some very good contributions here and I
would very much like to have Professor Magubane’s small talk on paper, because it is one of
the best summaries of the situation that I’ve heard for a very, very long time. I feel small to talk after him, but perhaps on a lighter note, you may think that I’m anti-historian, anti-archivists, anti-intelligence operators, and you are not entirely wrong. I can give you many examples of things that you would pick up in the archives that are useless, and well, not useless, dangerous.

This doesn’t really fall exactly in the same category, but we heard now that Luanda was attacked from the north and the south. Now that is over-exaggeration. I happened to have been in Ambriz a few days before that operation from the north started, and it was a shambles. It was a farce. When you read certain things, you must always ask—well, I know sometimes people read things and then when it suits their arguments, they like to quote then—but if you are seeking the truth, you must always ask, is it practical; can it be done? Now, I can tell you that that operation from the north, on Luanda, could never have happened. I was there. All they had in the form of armaments, and this is why I mention it, were two 305 mm guns. Old, very old guns. As a matter of fact, I think I was on the aircraft that conveyed a third one to them and we had a handful of people there, mostly advisors to Holden Roberto and for the training of the people, with the little that they had. There was one CIA representative too. Our representative, being Mr. Ben de Wet Roos, that time told me that only a few days before he had a conversation with Holden Roberto, and he said to him: “Please, Mr. President don’t tackle this attack on Luanda. You are not in a position to do it. You haven’t got the capability to do it, you haven’t got the weaponry, you haven’t got the people. They are not trained. Forget it.” And he said, “You must also decentralize more. You can’t give all the orders yourself. If you wanted a Land Rover over there to be moved from one place to another place, Holden Roberto had to sign the authority.” So, Holden Roberto listened to him [Mr. Botha—just like Mugabe] and he said, “Yes, but you know, war is such a serious thing; you can’t leave it to the devils [generals?]” Now, that thing then took off, and that’s about it. It never got anywhere. It never really posed any threat whatsoever and if you had known the whole situation, you would have known that that thing was doomed long before it started and it never had any chance. And it did fail completely. And that was the last hoorah of Holden Roberto.

EDWARDS: Thank you. Professor Shubin.

SHUBIN: Just a couple of things, maybe we can continue later. But you see, General Ngongo, who is now Interior Minister, he was Commander of Artillery at that stage of
the 9th Brigade and for many years Ambassador to Moscow, he invited me to give a talk about four years ago. Of course there are many stories on this battle of Quifangondo, but really, there was a chance for that column of Zaire and FNLA, the shamble as [General Geldenhuys] called it, to reach because we should not forget that before our Cuban friends came and before some kind of 9th Brigades, artillery and other units were established. MPLA troops there were also very weak, extremely weak. But one interesting point, if you read Stockwell and others, they say that there were two thousand rockets, shells, missiles showered on their positions, twenty missiles at the same time. In fact, General Ngongo showed me this ridge, where he had just six Grad-P portable launchers. The overall number was fifty or sixty missiles only, but the CIA observers\textsuperscript{134} were so terrified behind the ridge on the hill [that] they multiplied it about twenty or thirty times. But we shall discuss it maybe a little bit later.

\textbf{MOORE}: Hi, sorry I was late. My name is David Moore from the University of Johannesburg.

A couple of questions. Generally, many times there is a historical template which overlays the perceptions and factors in situations like this. So, I’m just wondering if there was a Congolese template, a Lumumba template that was flowing above the heads of South Africans and Soviets as these other dynamics were playing themselves out, and of course the United Nations, and what did people think of the United Nations in these situations too. Was it a consideration?

Secondly, I don’t know if there are British people here, other than Sue, and you weren’t in the diplomatic service back then. The chats that I’ve had with retired diplomats who’ve been in Zambia and Mozambique, especially Mozambique, suggested the Brits were very, very close to Samora Machel and I’m just wondering if the South Africans and the other side of the Cold War, over here, had much of a perception of what was going on with Machel and the Brits at that time, vis-à-vis Mozambique itself, but I guess more later with Zimbabwe. But for now, just Mozambique. Thank you.

\textsuperscript{134}. Shubin referenced CIA observers in the plural. This does not comport with Geldenhuys’ assertion that there was one CIA observer.
EDWARDS: We can take one further question and then ask any of the participants for concluding remarks.

COWLEY: I am Glen Cowley, publisher at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. We’ve done Vladimir’s book, *The Hot Cold War*, which will be seen later, and a few others. I listened with great interest to General Geldenhuys’ comment about the confusion of war and the indirect orders and, you know, military commanders not being very specific, and then he was saying what he thought was his impression at the time. Just, when you had to compile that weapons list that someone asked you to do, you as a military person would have had a sense if this is for invasion—this is for an invasion and occupation, or this is for a hit and run? I mean, your sense from that list of weaponry must have been towards a capacity to do something more specific than just going and floundering around. So, it may be striking to know what your impression was about that.

The second one, similar to this, you mentioned that the South African Army was not to spend money on arms and it was in very bad shape, but was your impression there were enough armaments, for that kind of incursion into Angola?

GELDENHUYS: The armaments were not, or the shape and size of the force was not indicated in any detail at all, and if we had a definite order like, conquer something, or defend something, or contain something, then that would be enough for me. Then you will know what you need to do, but we didn’t even have that, so we worked on the principle that it must be a balance force and it must have at least some form of ability. So, we did some thumb sucking.

COWLEY: So when you were asked to compile that weapons list, they didn’t say, “Tell us the list of weapons you need, whether the Americans are going to sponsor or not.” For what purpose then would you have said, as a military person, “Why do I need the weapons,” or ask, “What do you need the weapons for?”

GELDENHUYS: The message that I had was that we were to launch an invasion and we said, “Well then, if you want us to do that, then you must supply us with the armaments to do that.” But it was in no specific terms. As I said, because there was no definite order, it was a thumb sucking thing. That’s typical of that war to some extent. Later on it
improved. But as I said, we were at that stage never even thinking in our wildest dreams that we would engage in a war. It came just like that.

**EDWARDS**: Colleagues, thank you very much.

**NDLOVU**: For me it is just a comment, and it is directed to Mr. Dave Steward.

**SHUBIN**: So, Sifiso, please identify yourself.

**NDLOVU**: I’m Sifiso Ndlovu and I’m from the South African Democracy Education Trust and I work with Professor Magubane. My comment is towards Dave Steward. The issue that a flock of foreign states in Africa wanted South Africa to invade Angola doesn’t matter to me, as an indigenous African in South Africa. I certainly think that we need another forum to discuss the issues that he raised, really because as far as I am concerned, the then government was racist and we continue to call it an apartheid regime. It is really an insult to our intellectual capabilities to tell us about the mind and the needs of the Afrikaner nation, and it is totally unacceptable. I hope that we are going to have another session to discuss those issues.

**EDWARDS**: Can I remind people of the discussion that we had right at the beginning. We are here to listen and learn. Mr. Steward.

**STEWARD**: Yes, this is exactly the point I made. I said that either we are going to have a frank discussion and explain where we came from and what our perceptions were, or we can have a discussion based on political correctness. If we have the latter, then we are not going to get to the crux of the any historical issues involved. It is important for you to know where we came from, just as it is important for us to know where you came from. I think that is an important element.

**EDWARDS**: Colleagues, thank you very much. Would any of the listed participants like to make final comments?

**SHUBIN**: What about the questions? Just a couple of words. The template of Lumumba—I don’t think it played any role. You see that’s why we will discuss it lunchtime. And the
second point about British and Mozambican relations. Yes, in broad terms, we knew that Brits were training Mozambicans in Zimbabwe. I don’t think we were happy about it, but it was not a major issue.

EDWARDS: Are there any other concluding comments?

GELDENHUYS: About that question, I’m sorry; I should have added it is really immaterial, because in the end, we didn’t get anything. As I told you before, we even took private cars and lorries to convey troops and we just used what we had.

MAGUBANE: I would just like to make one point with reference to what you say about the state of mind of the Afrikaner. You know the National Party for instance, during the war, was pro-Nazi, and some of its leaders who were going to be in the government of Malan had been interned during that war for their pro-Nazi activities, but with the outbreak of the Cold War, these are now going to be the champ members of the free world. The United States were going to forget about this particular history of the Nationalist Party, so when you say what was the state of mind of the Afrikaner, there is not one state of mind of the Afrikaner. Smuts, General Smuts,135 was an Afrikaner, but his state of mind was different from that of Hertzog,136 and Malan broke away from Hertzog because his state of mind was different from that of Hertzog. So there was not this general state of mind of the Afrikaners.

EDWARDS: One last comment from Mr. Botha.

BOTHAA: Yes, this is certainly an interesting subject and I believe it is going to take up quite a bit of time if we enter properly into history, and we start with when the whole country

135. Jan Christiaan Smuts was a South African military leader and statesman. Smuts served as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa from 1919 to 1924 and from 1939 to 1948; was a proponent of the concept of the British Empire as a British Commonwealth of Nations; played an integral role in the formation of the League of Nations, and, following World War II, the establishment of the United Nations.

136. James Barry Munnik (JBM) Hertzog was a Boer general during the Second Boer War and served as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa from 1924 to 1939. Hertzog advocated Afrikaner culture and was particularly suspicious of the infiltration of British influence.
belonged to the San, not to the Xhosas, Zulus, Afrikaners, British—to the San. It was their country. We could even go back there if we want to, and start from there, but the fact of the matter is, I think I must put that for the record, when we had our first meeting with the ANC, with Mr. Mandela and de Klerk, the two leaders of the two delegations in May 1990, Mr. Mandela gave a survey of the country's history which was first class. You could see he knew it. He studied it, perhaps while in prison, and then eventually, after dealing with the Anglo-Boer War (he even knew that 28,000 woman and children were killed in concentration camps and how the white Boers suffered returning to their destroyed farms, and then he said to us, there's one thing that he could not understand and that is, that when the Afrikaner who suffered so much, who was oppressed, humiliated, almost one tenth of their people killed in the war, how come the Afrikaner never reached out to the black people, who were equally poor, humiliated and oppressed? He didn't say that in an arrogant way or in an accusing way, or in a vindictive way; you could see it was genuinely a riddle for him; it was a question which exercised his mind, and I think that, with all respect, is a key approach. It is a key approach because the Afrikaner lost its independence. I don't say that this explanation is acceptable, morally it isn't, but because of the hardship, it never wanted to be going through that humiliation again and then eventually it committed the same sin by making laws to preserve its power and its privileged position out of fear that it would again go through that trauma and humiliation etc. I do not say that this is an excuse. I merely say that because we, quite frankly, couldn't answer Mr. Mandela that day. That question haunts me to the present day. We couldn't give him a proper answer. I just wanted to make this point. I thought Sue might wish to have it for the record.

EDWARDS: Colleagues, thank you very much.

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137. Formerly known as “Bushmen,” the San people are a diverse group of hunter-gatherers in southern Africa, located particularly in South Africa and Botswana.

138. Frederik Willem (FW) de Klerk served as the final president of apartheid-era South Africa from 1989 to 1994. By engaging in negotiations with Nelson Mandela and the ANC, de Klerk saw through the end of apartheid. He was succeeded by Mandela, the first president of post-apartheid South Africa.
DOCUMENTS ON ANGOLA

Ang 1 27 June 1975, Minutes of Conversation, “Angola”, National Security Archive, contributed by Piero Gleijeses

Ang 2 11 August 1975, Memorandum, On Arguelles visit to Angola, contributed by Piero Gleijeses

Ang 3 27 November 1975, Request, SAG requests U.S.G to provide FNLA-UNITA with military equipment, DNSA-SA00545

Ang 4 Undated Interview, Robert W. Hultslander, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 67, available online at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/transcript.html, contributed by Piero Gleijeses

Ang 5 03 December 1975, Memorandum, White House Convention with Chinese Officials, National Security Archive, contributed by Piero Gleijeses


Ang 12  2 December 1987, Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz in which Cuba describes geo position and mil role in Angola, DNSA-SA02461

Ang 13  29 January 1988, Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Schultz describing the Mil situation in Angola—Cubans deny UNITA seizure of strategic town, DNSA-SA02488

Ang 14  18 March 1988, Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz regarding Cuban Armed Forces Ministry Communique on Cuban-Angola Defense of Cuito Cuanavale, DNSA-SA02509


Date: Friday, June 27, 1975
Time: 2:30 pm–3:20 pm
Place: Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject: Angola

Principals: The President
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Other Attendees:
State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert S Ingersoll
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
White House: Mr Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
NSC: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Harold E. Horan

The President: Bill (to Colby), will you brief us on Angola and related problems.
Mr. Colby: Yes sir [Briefed, as attached]

The President: Cabinda was part of the Portuguese territories? [This was in reference to a point in Mr. Colby’s brief as he described Cabinda].

Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

The President: What are the white areas within the borders of Angola?
Mr. Colby: These are essentially tribal, not military areas. These are additional tribes and I just chose [pointing on the chart] to mention these three. They have different languages and are different socially.
The President: Did the Portuguese do much in combating illiteracy? Are there many educated blacks?

Mr. Colby: The Portuguese were not forceful in this area. The literacy rate is between 10–15 percent.

Sec. Kissinger: Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn’t organize them for independence.

Sec. Schlesinger: Most of the educated classes are in Luanda and support the MPLA.

The President: What is the white population?

Mr. Colby: Three to four thousand.

The President: Out of a total population of how many?

Mr. Colby: About 5.7 million.

The President: Are these mostly white Portuguese?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

The President: Now, Henry, can you give us the options?

Sec. Kissinger: Mr. President, I will be reasonably brief. This is an area where no one can be sure of the judgments. I do question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance. The history of Africa has shown that a nation’s only focal point is the capital, and whoever has the capital has a claim on international support. In the Congo civil war, the reason we came out on top is because we never lost Leopoldville. If Neto can get Luanda, and drive the others out, he will have a power base, and gradually gain support of other Africans.

Mr. Colby: I agree, except to note the importance of the (Benguella) railway and Zaire and Zambia’s need for it.

The President: What is the name of the city at the end of the railway?

Mr. Colby: Lobito. There is, of course, always the possibility for fragmentation.
Sec. Kissinger: Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. Sheldon Vance has just come back from talking with Mobutu, who has stressed the change in the balance of power. Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto’s hands.

Our understanding from Vance is that this is one reason Mobutu is moving away from Roberto and wants a coalition.

An interagency effort has developed options, none of which I am in wild agreement with. The first is neutrality—stay out and let nature take its course. This would enable us to avoid a costly involvement in a situation that may be beyond our control; protect us from some international criticism; avoid tying us to any group; and avoid further antagonizing the MPLA. The probable outcome would be that Neto would establish a dominant position. Mobutu might try to go with Savimbi, or adjust to reality; Angola would go in a leftward direction; and Zaire would conclude we have disinterested ourselves in that part of the world and move towards anti-Americanism.

As for the second course, my Department agrees, but I don’t. It is recommended that we launch a diplomatic offensive to get the Soviets, the Yugoslavs, and others, to lessen arms shipments to the MPLA, get Portugal to exert its authority, and encourage cooperation among the groups. We could have direct dealings with the Soviets or get African states to do it. If we appeal to the Soviets not to be active, it will be a sign of weakness; for us to police it is next to impossible, and we would be bound to do nothing.

[Excised].

The President: Is there a specific proposal from the group of grants in the arms area? I don’t want to make a decision now, but I didn’t see any proposals in the briefing papers.

Sec. Kissinger: The Forty Committee has met twice to discuss the situation. The first meeting involved only money, but the second included some arms pack-
age. I recommend a working group make a more systematic study of this option and return to you.

Original excised.

The President: At dinner he was very forceful on this. He said that it was important to get his man in first, and then he will win the election. I asked him if there were not going to be elections, and he said yes, and that was why it was important to put Savimbi in first and then he would win.

Sec. Kissinger: Kaunda was giving the President a lesson in political science. [Laughter].

[Excised].

Sec. Kissinger: But the reverse of that is that if we don’t do something they would be suppressed.

The President: Once the Popular Movement takes over you can write it off.

Sec. Schlesinger: We might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources.

Mr. President, may I follow up—if we do something, we must have some confidence that we can win, or we should stay neutral. Roberto is not a strong horse. The fact that he stays in the Congo suggests he doesn’t have the tenacity to win.

The President: It seems to me that doing nothing is unacceptable. As for diplomatic efforts, it is naïve to think that’s going to happen, and the proposals on Portugal sound amateurish.

[Excised].

Mr. Clements: I agree with this. Doing something now and keeping the two parties afloat may well be encouraging Mobutu. Whatever happens in November is not final, and it’s important to keep Roberto and Savimbi viable and keep the options open. Give Mobutu some help and let him channel it.
Sec. Kissinger: In the first instance we could activate Mobutu and inform Kaunda.

The President: He [Kaunda] was talking at dinner about getting together with someone. Who was that?

Sec. Kissinger: With Savimbi and Mobutu.

The President: Let’s get some options prepared. Bill [to Colby], when can you have them?

Mr. Colby: By mid-week.

Sec. Schlesinger: [Excised].

The FNLA has a weak capacity to enforce discipline and we should look to see whether the Congolese (Zairians) can be used for instilling discipline. And then there’s the question of the degree to which we can bring Roberto and Savimbi together.

The President: Those are some of the things that have to be in the study. I think we need something for a week from Monday, so let’s set something up.

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**ANG 2 — 11 AUGUST 1975, MEMORANDUM, ON ARGUELLES VISIT TO ANGOLA, CONTRIBUTED BY PIERO GLEIJESES**

We arrived in Luanda, Angola on Sunday August 3rd, and made contact with the MPLA who promptly took us to a hotel. When President Neto heard we arrived, he sent to look for us, placing some of us in his home, and the others at the residence of another comrade.

During the first conversation with Neto we sent greetings in the name of the Commander in Chief and the Minister of the Armed Forces, and gave him the present from the Commander in Chief along with the card and an explanation as to the motives of our visit.

We based our explanation on the following points:
a. The petition formulated by the MPLA when they were visited by a delegation from our party and our government in the month of January and thereafter in Mozambique the one raised by Cheito, Head E.M. of the FALPA.

b. In these petitions there existed a certain contradiction, in the January visit they asked for material aid and preparation of troops in Cuba and in Angola, and later in Mozambique they asked for troop preparation to occur only in Cuba.

c. That we came to visit the actual situation in order to properly assess what our aid should consist of, taking into account the aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November. That we knew that the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power, since this would mean having a progressive government in Angola, and based on this situation we brought militant solidarity from the Commander in Chief, our party and government. We also gave them the one hundred thousand dollars.

In this conversation they also complained of the little amount of aid from the Campo Socialista, and if the Campo Socialista wouldn’t help them, it wouldn’t help anyone, since they represent the most progressive forces, while the Imperialists, Mobutu [excised] help the FNLA with resources. They also complained that the USSR detained aid to them in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it’s very little compared with their vast needs. In general, he wants to make the situation in Angola a vital issue between the systems of Imperialism and Socialism in order to obtain aid from the whole Socialist Camp. We consider that he is right on this issue since at this point in Angola the sides are clearly defined, the FNLA and UNITA represent the international Imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represents the progressive and nationalist forces.

We agreed to see each other again the next day since we needed to get more precise facts, numbers, etc. from the petitions they had already formulated.

[Excised]

We consider that he has the strong support of the people, who find themselves organized and ready to fight even though they lack arms, provisions, or camping equipment. We believe that we must help them directly or indirectly to solve this
situation which definitely entails having the people resist against the reactionaries and
the international imperialists.

Revolutionarily,
Raúl Díaz Arguelles
Leader of the Tenth Direction

**ANG 3 — 27 NOVEMBER 1975, REQUEST, SAG REQUESTS U.S.G TO PROVIDE FNLA-UNITA WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT, DNSA-SA00545**

1. In responding to SADF Chief of Staff’s request of November 18 for U.S. support for UNITA/FNLA, Defense Attaché should adhere closely to language of following paragraph.

2. USG appreciates and shares South Africa’s concern over dangerous and provocative role Soviets and Cubans are playing in Angola. We deplore their support of the MPLA in its rejection of a political settlement and its pursuit of military conquest. We would regard the imposition by force of a Soviet/Cuban-backed MPLA regime in Angola with particular concern. We understand, however that the FNLA and UNITA are continuing to receive arms adequate to their defense, including some air defense capacity. We believe that the only acceptable solution to the problem of Angola is a political settlement in which no one group dominates the others. We have made our deep concern with the present situation known to a number of governments, including the Soviet government, and are continuing our efforts to help bring about a peaceful solution. Kissinger.
Background: I had had no experience in Africa prior to my selection as Chief in Luanda, in July 1975. I was serving in [another] country, and had very little time to “read in” prior to assuming the Angola command in August. I had less than one week with the Angola Task Force in Washington, and spent two days on my way into Luanda with officers involved in the Angolan program. My mind was not clouded by many facts, and I had few preconceptions prior to hitting the ground. Since I would not be directly involved, I also had only rudimentary knowledge of our covert action program. I volunteered to remain in Luanda after Angolan independence (November 11, 1975), although the Consulate was ordered to close. Initially approved at the highest levels of State and CIA, Kissinger, afraid of a potential hostage situation, decided on the day of the last refugee flight, November 3, 1975, that every American diplomat had to leave Luanda immediately. I strongly disagreed, and pointed out that the MPLA desperately wanted to keep an official U.S. presence, and would protect anyone who stayed behind. I lost the argument. The Consulate’s convoy to the airport departed without me; I arrived by motorcycle only minutes before the flight left for Lisbon. I was only in Angola a few days over three months, but continued to follow events from Lisbon for over three years.

QUESTION: What kind of knowledge did the CIA have of the Angolan liberation movements prior to the outbreak of the civil war?
An Agency office was established in Luanda in 1964, chiefly to report on various African Liberation movements. (Since Angola was a Portuguese colony, Lisbon had provided coverage, routinely.) This office was closed in 1967, mainly as you suggest, “to humor the Portuguese” and the Agency was forced to rely on “off-shore” coverage, mainly from Kinshasa, Lusaka, and Lisbon. Responding to the worsening crisis following the Portuguese Revolution, the Agency decided to send a few officers to Luanda on temporary duty in March 1975. I followed as quickly as possible, arriving in early August. To the best of my knowledge, the bulk of the CIA’s reporting in 1974 and 1975 did in fact come from Kinshasa. Holden Roberto was well known to the US Government which enjoyed good access to Roberto and his chief lieutenants, facilitated by his father-in-law, Zairian strongman Mobuto. On the other hand, we had little contact with UNITA (or Savimbi) until UNITA emerged as the third major power player. Also, as you mention in your study, Savimbi was not trusted because of his Chinese communist contacts and his flirtation with Maoist philosophy. The Luanda Consulate reported in June 1974 that Savimbi was ideologically sympathetic to Maoism. The Lusaka Embassy also reported Savimbi was pro-Chinese and a racist. The CIA took issue with these reports, and argued that Savimbi was a nationalist exploring various means to gain assistance for his own liberation movement. The Luanda Consulate subsequently modified its critical reporting on Savimbi, but continued to believe that he was paranoid and self-pitying.

**QUESTION: What was your own assessment of Agostinho Neto and the MPLA? UNITA and the FNLA?**

I came to share [U.S. embassy Consul General Tom] Killoran’s assessment that the MPLA was the best qualified movement to govern Angola. Many of its leaders were educated at the University of Coimbra and, a few at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. Although many outwardly embraced Marxism, they were much closer to European radical socialism than to Soviet Marxist-Leninism. Lucio Lara, a mulatto intellectual, was probably a convinced communist (in the old, Cold War sense). Agostinho Neto, the undisputed leader of the MPLA, however, was more moderate. A protestant minister, he was married to a Portuguese, and had many close Portuguese friends. His trusted doctor, and unofficial advisor, Armenio Ferreira, was Portuguese and lived in Lisbon. Other senior MPLA leaders were impressive: Lopo do Nacimiento, Paula Jorge, Nito Alves, Carlos Rocha, and
Iko Carreira were smart political operatives. Chieto and Dangereux were good military commanders, etc. In addition, the MPLA was the least tribal of the three movements. Neto and most of the top cadre were Mbundu, but the MPLA welcomed many different tribes, unlike the FMLN (Bakongo) and UNITA (Ovimbundu). Despite the uncontested communist background of many of the MPLA's leaders, they were more effective, better educated, better trained and better motivated. The rank and file also were better motivated (particularly the armed combatants, who fought harder and with more determination). Portuguese Angolans overwhelmingly supported the MPLA. Unfortunately, the CIA’s association with the FNLA and UNITA tainted its analysis. As is frequently the case when intelligence collection and analysis are wedded to covert action programs, objectivity and truth become victims of political expediency. I believe this was the case in Angola. No one wanted to believe the Consulate’s reporting, and Killoran’s courageous and accurate analysis was ignored. He sacrificed his career in the State Department when he refused to bend his reporting to Kissinger’s policy.

In the interest of candor, I must admit that Killoran and I were frequently at loggerheads over what I initially perceived as his MPLA bias. The briefings and orientation I received prior to arriving in Luanda emphasized the communist orientation of the MPLA, and convinced me of the urgent need to stop the MPLA from taking power. I fully agreed with the U.S. policy objectives as articulated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 1995. Since the MPLA was receiving Soviet assistance, I believed that we had no choice but to counter with our own assistance to its opponents. It was only after three months in Luanda, that I realized what was really happening….

I had little direct contact with UNITA. My knowledge of this movement is rudimentary, and thus not worth your consideration. As you are aware, UNITA had little presence in Luanda, either politically or militarily, during the time I was there. I was deeply concerned, nevertheless, about UNITA's purported ties with South Africa, and the resulting political liability such carried. I was unaware at the time, of course, that the U.S. would eventually beg South Africa to directly intervene to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.

I admit that I developed a bias against the FNLA and its leaders, which I never tried to hide. Its ties with Mobuto merely added to my assessment that this organization was lead by corrupt, unprincipled men who represented the very worst of radical black African racism. My personal experience only served to reinforce my opinions. I was disgusted by the briefings I received in Kinshasa, and my meetings with FNLA leaders and contacts.
As an aside, which underlines my assessment: our senior FNLA contact in Luanda tried (unsuccessfully) to use our sensitive facilities to transport stolen goods.

**QUESTION: What was your opinion about the CIA covert action program codenamed IAFEATURE?**

Simply put, I was opposed to the covert action program in Angola because I was convinced it would not succeed, and would badly damage our ability to work in the future with moderate elements throughout Africa. We were not prepared to spend the necessary resources to assure victory. Or more fairly put, we should have realized that our adversaries (Moscow and Havana) were more determined and much better positioned than we. And, they did not have a hostile Congress controlling the purse strings. Nat Davis said it succinctly in his notes to Sisco on July 12, 1995: Kissinger was determined to challenge the Soviet Union, although no vital US interests were at stake. We held bad cards, as Davis argued. I like your conclusion, “To ‘pass’ when no vital interests were at stake and the cards in one’s hands were bad could be been, therefore, a sign of maturity, not of weakness. But it was not Kissinger’s style: his United States must play, and win,” How sad! […]

Instead of working with the moderate elements in Angola, which I believe we could have found within the MPLA, we supported the radical, tribal, “anti-Soviet right.” You write that, “Kissinger feared that an MPLA victory would have destabilizing effects throughout southern Africa.” Of course the opposite proved true; it was our policies which caused the “destabilization:” […]

(Comment: I did my best to argue the U.S. Policy position and defend the covert action program during my all night session with [Senator] Clark at Killoran’s Luanda residence. My heart was not in it, however, and I finally admitted that I personally thought our support of Roberto and Savimbi would prove disastrous. This position, as you can imagine, caused me problems with my own superiors, and infuriated Kissinger.)

**QUESTION: What evidence did the CIA station have of a Cuban presence in Angola?**

I agree with the history as you present it, and with your conclusions regarding the assistance provided by Cuban forces, which I believe did not arrive in any numbers until after we departed. […] Although we desperately wanted to find Cubans under every bush,
during my tenure their presence was invisible, and undoubtedly limited to a few advisors. We knew they were on the way, however, and I believe we knew about the Britannia flights through Brazzaville in early November. […] You may be interested to know that [after we evacuated] a senior Cuban officer, believed to be the DGI Station Chief, took over my beach apartment and confiscated all my possessions, including several month’s supply of food and my African art collection. …Since I probably was known to MPLA intelligence, I assume this ironic twist of fate was not coincidental.

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ANG 5 — 03 DECEMBER 1975, MEMORANDUM, WHITE HOUSE CONVENTION WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, CONTRIBUTED BY PIERO GLEIJESES

PARTICIPANTS:
Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, PRC Foreign Minister
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister
Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington
Lin P’ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T’ang Wen-sheng, Deputy-Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Tsfen Ta-yung, Political Counselor, PRC Liaison Office in Washington.
Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)
Lien Chen-pao (Notetaker)

Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States of America
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Vice Premier Teng: Finally, we may discuss the issue of Angola. Actually this issue was already discussed in Mr. President’s conversation with Chairman Mao. We hope that through the work of the two sides we can both bring about a better situation there. The relatively complex problem is the involvement of South Africa. And I believe you are aware of the feelings of the black Africans toward South Africa.

Sec. Kissinger: We are prepared to push South Africa out as soon as an alternative military force can be created.

The President: We hope your Ambassador in Zaire can keep us fully informed. It would be helpful.

Vice Premier Teng: We have a good relationship with Zaire, but what we can help them with is only some light weapons.

Sec. Kissinger: We can give them weapons. What they need is training in guerrilla warfare. If you can give them light weapons it would help, but the major thing is training. Our specialty is not guerrilla warfare. [Laughter].

Vice Premier Teng: In the past we trained the three organizations—including Neto.

Sec. Kissinger: Like NATO! [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: And we helped to train the soldiers of FNLA for some time.

Sec. Kissinger: They needed it most.
Vice Premier Teng: And in the past, we assisted all three organizations and more so to Neto. And the organization we helped earliest was MPLA. With respect to UNITA—Savimbi—we supplied them with weapons by way of Tanzania, but they were not delivered.

The President: Both UNITA and FNLA need help particularly.

Vice Premier Teng: We have no way of transferring weapons into their hands.

Sec. Kissinger: Zambia or Zaire?

Vice Premier Teng: Zambia does not support Neto and the MPLA. If we asked them to allow our weapons to pass through their territory they wouldn’t allow it.

Sec. Kissinger: Really?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes. As I mentioned to you just now, the primary problem is the involvement of South Africa.

[Excised]

...countries have begun to support Neto. I think through Zaire. If you can get South Africa out of Angola as soon as possible, or find some other means to replace South Africa on the southern front, this would be good. We are in no position to help except in the north through Zaire.

The President: We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in. In addition, if you would like, we can talk to Zambia with regard to transshipment.

Vice Premier Teng: I am afraid it is very difficult. Yesterday I said we could try with Mozambique, but we don’t expect great results.

Sec. Kissinger: I talked with their Foreign Minister in New York. They feel very close to China.
Vice Premier Teng: Yes, we have good relations with Mozambique but on this particular issue it is another matter, because Mozambique takes a very strong position on Zimbabwe—Rhodesia—and South Africa. I believe the better way is for you to help through the southern front, and I believe you will find the way.

There is one point which is evident. Since Nyerere would not permit transshipment through Tanzania, how could Zambia account to Tanzania if it accepted transshipment of weapons?

Sec. Kissinger: Can we talk to Kaunda and see what he thinks? We have some influence with him.

Vice Premier Teng: Please understand this with regard to African countries—even the small ones: they are extremely sensitive on matters involving national pride. Because of this, we have not raised the suggestion with them, despite all our assistance to them—as in Tanzania and Zambia in railway construction.

The President: You have been effective. Will you move in the north if we move in the south?

Vice Premier Teng: But you should give greater help in the north too. As far as I know, you have many ways to help. Also through third countries.

The President: We have and will.

Vice Premier Teng: Good.

Sec. Kissinger: We are working with France. They will send some equipment and training.

The President: I just approved before I left Washington $35 million more above what we have done before; and that amount is on its way as I understand it.

Vice Premier Teng: It is worth spending more money on that problem. Because that is the key position of strategic importance.
The President: Yes. They have an important port, and their natural resources are vital.

Vice Premier Teng: So should we call it a morning and continue our talks tomorrow? We spent two and a half hours making a round-the-world trip.

The President: It has been very beneficial and encouraging to work with you, Mr. Vice Premier, to be very frank, and to see how our interests are similar in many, many areas of the world.

Vice Premier Teng: We have said we have many things in common.

Sec. Kissinger: What should we say to the press?

Vice Premier Teng: We may say that we have continued significant discussions on a wide range of international issues.

Sec. Kissinger: All right.

Vice Premier Teng: We will see you tomorrow.

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**Angola**

Brezhnev: Dr Kissinger, you know what’s here? A map of our attack on the United States. (He shows the map on the wall behind the curtain.

Kissinger: Of course. From Angola! [Laughter].

Brezhnev: Don’t mention that word to me. We have nothing to do with that country. I cannot talk about that country.
[Brezhnev then moved away and Gromyko and Amb. Stoessel came up to talk with the Secretary].

Kissinger: The Cubans were in Angola before the South Africans entered. We asked you a question: if the South Africans withdrew, would the Cubans withdraw?

Gromyko: We have nothing to do with that, We have given some equipment to the legitimate government—that’s all.

Kissinger: You transport the Cubans in your planes. They are chartered Soviet planes.

Gromyko: What planes are you talking about? The ones which transported equipment? We have sent no troops.

Amb. Stoessel: No, the Soviet planes used to transport Cuban troops to Angola.

Gromyko: (avoiding a direct answer) The South Africans are still there. They make no move to leave.

Kissinger: The South Africans are in the process of withdrawing.

Gromyko: If this is announced, we will react to it.

Kissinger: I wish to tell you in all seriousness that we can never accept 8,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

[As the meeting closes, Kissinger makes one last effort to put Angola on the table; he even makes threats, but Brezhnev does not take the bait].
Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Angola E.I. Afanasenko, Memorandum of Conversation with President of the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola Agostinho Neto, 4 July 1975

From the diary of E.I. Afanasenko, Copy No. 2, Ser. No. 181, 21 July 1975

We received a visit from President of the MPLA Agostinho Neto. I informed him that the Central Committee of the CPSU was closely following the development of circumstances in Angola. The Soviet people are interested in the victory of democratic forces in Angola. In 1975, significant aid has been provided to the MPLA. Pursuant to instructions from the Central Committee of the CPSU, we had a conference with the President of the PRC [People’s Republic of the Congo] M. Nguabi, in which the issue of rendering aid to the MPLA was discussed.

Neto thanked the Central Committee of the CPSU for the rendering of assistance. He stated that the leadership of the MPLA had recently expanded its contacts with governments of the African countries. In the course of these discussions, the MPLA is attempting to increase the number of its supporters in Africa. One of the immediate objectives of the MPLA is to prevent the discussion of the issue of Cabinda at the upcoming assembly concerned about the fact that this year [Ugandan leader] Idi Amin, who collaborates closely with [Zairian leader] Mobutu [Sese Seko], will become the Chairman of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. We anticipate, said Neto, that the president of Uganda will come forward at the OAU assembly with a proposal to discuss the issue of Cabinda. Our meetings in Nigeria and our ongoing negotiations in the Congo with President M. Nguabi, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPT [the Russian acronym for the Congolese Workers’ Party] A. Lopez, member of the Central Committee of the KPT Obami-Itu, and Foreign Minister [Charles-David] Ganao, said Neto, are directed to this very question.
Negotiations between the MPLA and the KPT are proceeding successfully. An agreement has been reached to maintain ongoing consultations between the MPLA and KPT with the aim of developing a common policy and the conduct of joint efforts in Africa and Angola. In order to enhance propaganda efforts prior to the establishment of radio broadcasting facilities in the country, broadcast of the radio program “Struggle of Angola” will be resumed in Brazzaville.

The president of the MPLA stated that one of the main points in the negotiations with the KPT was the issue of Cabinda. The PRC made the decision not to support the demand of autonomy for Cabinda at the OAU assembly which had been advanced by the Congo and Zaire last February. As to the change of their position on the Cabinda question, the Congolese assured the MPLA delegation that they would terminate assistance to the nationalist Cabindi organization FLEC. Inasmuch as the parties had reached an agreement on the Cabinda issue, the PRC allowed the MPLA to use its territory for the transport of arms, military equipment and other cargo supplied to the Movement by the Soviet Union and other friendly countries. In addition, the Congolese confirmed their decision to close their land border with Cabinda for the MPLA. In order to export supplies to Angola, they allotted the port and airfield at Pointe-Noire. Transportation of cargo is to be carried out by the land and sea forces of the MPLA. Neto was outspoken in his appraisal of the results of the negotiations with the Congolese. He emphasized that the refusal of the Congo to support the Cabindi demand for autonomy represented an important step forward in the normalization of relations between the MPLA and the KPT.

The president of the MPLA proceeded to characterize the domestic situation in Angola. He pointed out that the existence of three national liberation movements in the country was creating a favorable opportunity for reactionary forces in the country, which in turn was leading to a further intensification of political, social, and economic conflicts. Neto pointed to two groups of reactionary forces acting against Angola. The first group he attributed to domestic Portuguese reactionaries. This group is fomenting tensions in the country and provoking a mass emigration of the white population from Angola. The departure of large numbers of technical specialists has resulted in serious damage to the country's economy. The white reactionaries are capitalizing on the support of the present Supreme Commissar of Angola and a large portion of the Portuguese officers. The second group of reactionary forces consists of foreign reactionaries. Neto also included the FNLA in that group.
The president of the MPLA said that the military conflict which took place last June demonstrated the strength of the MPLA's military detachments. Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the FNLA's forces, the MPLA is no weaker than the FNLA in military terms. Neto declared that the MPLA commands great political influence in the country which is continuing to grow. At the same time, he acknowledged that two north-west provinces of Angola have been controlled by the FNLA since last June. In addition, UNITA commands major influence in Bie and the surrounding regions, where a large portion of the country's population lives.

Neto characterized UNITA as an organization representing the interests of white farmers with reactionary leanings. However, UNITA does not command significant military forces and is attempting to play a role as an intermediary between the MPLA and the FNLA. The president of the MPLA spoke in favor of a tactical alliance with UNITA. The desirability of such an alliance was advocated to the leadership of the MPLA by numerous heads of African governments, first and foremost, by the PRC.

The president of the MPLA expressed doubts about fulfillment of all the agreements signed in Nakuru (Kenya). One of the reasons for the likely breakdown of those agreements is the aggression of the FNLA, which is unlikely to give up its armed provocations. All of this, Neto emphasized, requires the MPLA to continue the development of its armed forces. In this connection it is counting on aid from the Soviet Union. The MPLA has decided to address the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request to furnish additional military and financial aid. At the end of this July, an MPLA delegation will be dispatched to the USSR, headed by member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPLA Iko Kareira (commander in chief of the MPLA).

Neto reported that last June, a delegation of the MPLA visited the PRC [People’s Republic of China] at the invitation of the Chinese government. Zambia, Tanzania, and the PRC [People’s Republic of the Congo] also took part in the organization of that trip. In the course of negotiations in the PRC, the Chinese assured their delegation that they would terminate all forms of military aid to all three Angolan national liberation movements until the granting of independence to Angola.

I thanked the president of the MPLA for the interesting information. I promised to communicate to the Central Committee of the CPSU the request of the MPLA to furnish additional military and financial aid.
The conference was attended by members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPLA Lucio Lara and Jose Eduardo, member of the governing council of the MPLA Pedro Van-Dunen, as well as the first Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in the PRC Comrade B. G. Putilin.

Ambassador of the USSR to the People’s Republic of the Congo, /s/ E. Afanasenko
[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 157–159.]

Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Angola B.S. Vorobiev, Memorandum of Conversation with President A. Neto, 4 September 1976

From the diary of B.S. VOROBIEV, Copy No. 1, Ser. No. 286

On 4 September 1976, I visited President A. Neto at his invitation. Neto inquired as to whether any information had been received from Moscow regarding the Soviet position on issues relating to the national liberation movement in southern Africa, and whether that information could be imparted to him, if possible, in connection with the upcoming meeting of the presidents from five countries (Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana), scheduled for September 15.

I said to him in general that no information had yet been received. Based on materials received from the center [Moscow], I told him about the ongoing conference in Moscow of delegations from three national liberation movements from southern Africa.

For my part, I asked the president to share his thoughts in connection with the upcoming meeting and requested his assessment of conditions in the national liberation movement and of the position of other African countries. Neto reported that it had been determined to hold the meeting of the five presidents ahead of schedule (that is, not on September 15 as referenced above), and that in just two hours he was flying to Dar-es-Salaam. The principal theme of the meeting would be the meeting between [U.S. Secretary of State Henry A.] Kissinger and [South African Prime Minister John] Vorster and its implications for Africa. He, Neto, still did not know exactly what position to propose at the meeting, what policy to adopt. This being his first opportunity for participation in this sort of a conference (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana
have already met repeatedly on these issues), it is apparent that Neto needs to hear the opinions of his colleagues at the meeting, and only after that will he be in a position to formulate his position. For example, it is not entirely clear to Neto why the participation and assistance of Kissinger is necessary. He also does not understand the inconsistency of [Zambian] President [Kenneth] Kaunda on the issue of the intermediating role of Kissinger in contacts with Vorster.

Neto indicated further that, lacking a full understanding of the positions held by Tanzania and the other participants in the conference, he is presently having difficulty articulating any concepts on these issues, although after his return from the meeting, these issues will be clearer to him, and he expects to be able to inform us about them, so they can be communicated to Moscow.

In the course of our discussion I informed the president about the response received from Moscow regarding the attitude of the Angolan side toward the issue of the situation in the South Atlantic, conveyed through the Soviet Ambassador by Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento.

President Neto expressed his appreciation for the speedy response. He declared his full agreement with all of the positions held by the Soviet side and emphasized that, in the recent past, new facts had emerged indicating an increased interest by the USA in the ROZM [Republic of Cape Verde] and by France in the DRSTP [Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe].

The president further stated that the Politburo of the MPLA, by special dispensation, had empowered Politburo member and Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento, with responsibility for all important issues of foreign policy, to prepare additional proposals on the issue over further development of contacts by the PRA with Sao-Tome and Principe. He requested the Soviet Ambassador to provide him with detailed positions of the Soviet side on the issue over the situation in the South Atlantic and relations of Lopo do Nascimento with the ROZM and the DRSTP.

Neto stated his desire for a continual exchange of information between the PRA and the USSR on international questions, in particular those concerning the situation in Africa and the South Atlantic. He stated that he intended to address these questions in his conferences in Moscow.
27 June 1978

[I] visited candidate-member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Partido Trabajo] for international issues, P. Luvualu at his invitation.

P. Luvualu informed me that at the current time the leadership of the People’s Republic of Angola has sent several delegations to various African countries in order to explain the Angolan position with regard to Zaire and to gather information on the real nature of the events in the Zairian province of Shaba. The delegations should once again underscore that neither Angola, nor the Soviet Union, nor Cuba bear any relation to the events in the province of Shaba, and that these events are an internal Zairian problem.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that there are objective factors which facilitate the continual occurrence of conflicts and tension in this region. The colonizers, when they drew the borders between states, did not take into account the ethnic make-up of the population. As a result, the significant nationality of the Lunda was broken up and in the current time lives in three countries—Zaire, Angola and Zambia. Moreover, at the current time there are over 250,000 Zairian refugees in Angola, who are mainly of the Lunda nationality and among them from 20,000 to 30,000 are former soldiers, the so-called Katanga gendarmes. After the war of independence, the central authorities in Zaire began to persecute members of the Lunda nationality who lived in the province of Shaba. Unlawful arrests took place as well as the execution of Zairian soldiers of the Lunda nationality.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that the province of Shaba is the richest of all Zairian provinces and provides a significant part of the hard-currency goods which enter
the country, and that some of the largest foreign monopolies have invested capital in the exploitation of the natural resources of the province.

The catastrophic condition of the Zairian economy, the dizzying rise of prices, the corruption which has enveloped the whole machinery of state, including the army, the unbearably serious condition of the population, particularly of national minorities and the greater part of the military, aggravates the conflict between the Kinshasa government and the Lunda nationality, and lead to the revolts which occur from time to time among the soldiers of Lunda nationality in the Zairian army. During moments of acute conflict the Lunda refugees in Angola seek to assist their fellow-tribesmen in the province of Shaba. Moreover, all of the refugees in Angola, it goes without saying, would like to return to their homeland in Zaire. It is practically impossible to control the movement of groups of Lunda nationality from Angola into Zaire and back, since the border between Angola and Zaire stretches out for approximately two thousand kilometers.

P. Luvualu underscored that Mobutu, in every instance when an internal conflict arises, strives by using false pretexts, to internationalize it. The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT [referred to] the interference of Western powers—the members of NATO in the previous conflict in the province of Shaba and their proposal to create an inter-African armed force which would be used not only to resolve the current tasks of putting down the revolt of the Lunda nationality, [but also for] the preservation of the Mobutu regime, and the possibility for foreign monopolies to continue to exploit the resources of the province of Shaba.

The fact, declared P. Luvualu, that the Republic of South Africa has expressed a desire to take part in the inter-African forces confirms our evaluation of the neo-colonial nature of these forces. This evaluation is also confirmed by the fact that China has sent military instructors to Zaire and has offered equipment for arming the inter-African forces.

In the estimation of P. Luvualu, this issue concerns armed forces of international imperialism which are being created by NATO with the aim of supporting reactionary, unpopular regimes in Africa as well as supporting the struggle against progressive African countries and national liberation movements.

The long term goals of the Western countries consist of strengthening the position of NATO in the central part of Africa in order to break through to the Indian Ocean, i.e. for the neo-colonial conquest of Africa.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that the evaluation by the Angolan leadership of the events in Zaire is confirmed likewise by the resolution of the Western countries
to offer Kinshasa economic assistance. The Western countries, as is well known, as a condition for granting such assistance demanded, first, a reform of the management of the Zairian economy and finances according to which representatives of the USA, France, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany would have full control over the economy, finances, and the actions of the administrative apparatus from top to bottom. Secondly, they put forward a demand for the reconciliation of the central Kinshasa authorities with the Lunda nationality in order that foreign monopolies might without resistance exploit the wealth of the province of Shaba. And, finally, the Western countries persist in seeking the reconciliation of Zaire with Angola in order to renew the transport of natural resources from the province of Shaba along the Benguela railroad.

P. Luvualu remarked in this connection that the president of the People’s Republic of Angola, A. Neto, in his declaration of July 9, announced that the Zairian refugees will be led from the Zairian borders into the interior of Angola, that Angola will disarm the detachments of the FNLC [Front for the National Liberation of the Congo] which retreat from the province of Shaba into Angola, and that the Angolan government proposes that Zaire, in turn, draw off the UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC bases away from the Angolan border. The President of the People’s Republic of Angola in this announcement also underscored that the refugees may live in any country according to their choice. This position, said P. Luvualu, is in complete accordance with the charter of the Organization of African Unity and international law.

Then the Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT raised the problem of Namibia. He informed us that, in appraising the aggression of the Republic of South Africa toward Angola at Cassinga, immediately following the important victory of SWAPO [Southwest African People’s Organization] in the UN, the Angolan leadership came to the conclusion that the aggressive actions of the Republic of South Africa were made in pursuit of the following goals: to weaken SWAPO and force it to accept the plan of the 5 Western powers for Namibia; to gain time, in order to create in Namibia a puppet political force which would be able to counter SWAPO; to scare the People’s Republic of Angola and weaken Angolan support for SWAPO.

P. Luvualu remarked that events had fully confirmed the correctness of this appraisal of the Angolan leadership. For example, in the present time in Namibia, the Republic of South Africa has created the so-called democratic party with the help of the renegade [Andrea] Chipanga and the so-called National Front of Namibia. Vorster feverishly
attempts to prepare elections, which are falsified from the very beginning, and to achieve an internal settlement on the model of the internal settlement of Rhodesia with the aid of puppets like Chipanga.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that the People’s Republic of Angola will continue to support SWAPO. The Angolan leadership, he said, considers that for the peaceful resolution of the Namibian problem the Republic of South Africa should: officially define a deadline for the transfer of Walvis Bay to the authorities of Namibia, after declaring the independence of that country; for a period of transition draw off its troops, which are now concentrated on the border with Angola, to bases in the South of Namibia; immediately liberate all political prisoners in Namibia. P. Luvualu likewise remarked that Angola concurs with the proposed role of the UN in the transitional period in Namibia.

In conclusion P. Luvualu underscored that the maneuvers of Western countries around Angola will not succeed in forcing the MPLA-PT to turn from the path it has chosen. We, he declared, have made a firm and final choice of friends. This is the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries. With the assistance and support of socialist states, and first and foremost of the Soviet Union and Cuba, Angola will follow its chosen path.

I thanked the Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT for this information. From my side I handed him the text of the Declaration of the Soviet Government on Africa (in Portuguese). I underscored that this is an important political action in defense of the independence of African governments, in the solidarity of the USSR in the struggle of the peoples of the continent against the imperialist interference in their affairs. I noted that the appraisal contained in it of the situation in Africa coincides with the position of the People’s Republic of Angola. Then I gave him a translation into Portuguese of the Pravda article regarding the external policies of the USA.


P. Luvualu expressed his gratitude to the Soviet government for its unflagging support of progressive forces in Africa. He said that he would immediately bring the text of the Declaration to the attention of the leadership of the People’s Republic of Angola. He likewise expressed his gratitude for the gift of the CC CPSU.

In the course of our exchange of opinions on international problems P. Luvualu asked that I give information about the situation in South Yemen after the unsuccessful government coup.

Embassy advisor S. S. Romanov was present during this discussion.
USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, /s/ V. LOGINOV [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1148, ll. 71–75: translated by Sally Kux; copy on file at National Security Archive.]

Memorandum of Conversation between Minister-counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Havana M. Manasov and Cuban Communist Party CC member Raul Valdes Vivo, 7 May 1979

From the journal of M.A. Manasov, Copy no. 3 re: no 265, “24” May 1979

7 May 1979

I met with R.V. Vivo in the CC of the Party and, referring to the instructions of the Soviet ambassador, informed him of the discussion in the International Section of the CC CPSU with the members of the Executive Committee of the Jamaican People's National Party (PNP).

R.V. Vivo, having thanked me for the information, noted the significance of this meeting, which will enable the development of the connection between the CPSU and the PNP and, first and foremost, opens the possibility for the preparation of PNP cadres in the Soviet Union.

Then, in the course of the discussion, R.V. Vivo spoke about his recent trip to several African countries, which was carried out on the orders of F. Castro. This trip was undertaken, continued my interlocutor, because of the fact that the information which we had received from our embassies in a number of African countries is of a subjective nature. In this connection I [Valdes Vivo] was given the task of becoming acquainted with the situation on location, to have discussions with the leaders of Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nigeria, and likewise with the Soviet ambassadors in these countries, in order to receive more complete and more objective information about the state of affairs in southern Africa.

I was tasked, he said, to convey to J[oshua]. Nkomo [leader of the Zimbabwe African Political Union, ZAPU] and R. Mugabe [leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU], that Cuba is unable to satisfy their request to send pilots for the repulsion of air attacks on the training camps for the Patriotic Front armed forces; to clarify the possibility...
of unified action between ZAPU and ZANU; to lay out before their leaders and the leadership of the front-line governments the Cuban plan for the creation of a provisional government in Zimbabwe.

R.V. Vivo meanwhile remarked that in Angola at first there had not been clear cooperation between Cuba and the USSR, whereas in Ethiopia our countries have achieved the full coordination of our joint actions. The policy of Cuba and the Soviet Union with regard to southern Africa should likewise be coordinated, he underscored.

My interlocutor laid out the essence of the Cuban plan, which is summarized as follows. The declaration of a provisional government in Zimbabwe is realized not in exile, but in a part of the liberated territory of the country; J. Nkomo is proposed for the post of president of the country, R. Mugabe for prime minister; the program platform of the provisional government provides for the realization of a series of social-economic transformations, secures the interests of those countries which recognize its government; the rights of the white part of the population are guaranteed, elections are planned for the legislative organs of the country; constitutional guarantees are proclaimed, etc.

According to the words of R.V. Vivo, J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe have agreed with this plan, as have the leaders of the front-line states. The provisional government, in the estimation of the Cuban side, would possibly be recognized at first by 30 countries.

The active interference of England in the affairs of Zambia may ensure the victory of the puppet government, which would possibly lead to a conflict between ZANU and ZAPU if the unity of their actions are not achieved, noted my interlocutor. He reported that the armed forces of the ZANU and the ZAPU include in total 24 thousand people (12 thousand in each organization), but unfortunately, these forces are as yet inactive. In the ranks of mercenaries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2 thousand whites.

R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the content of his discussion with the Soviet ambassador in Mozambique. According to his words, during the discussion of the situation in southern Africa, our ambassador noted that according to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerate events in a country where there is not a revolutionary situation and where there is not civilization. “To that I responded in jest to the Soviet ambassador,” said R.V. Vivo, “that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F. Castro decide that our countries will take part in the operations in Rhodesia, then we will participate in them.”

By my request R.V. Vivo briefly informed me about the work of the last plenum of the CC Comparty of Cuba. He reported that the plenum summed up the fulfillment of the
resolutions of the First Party Congress, revealed the deficiencies in the development of the national economy of the country, and set its course to overcome them. In view of the fact that the project for the resolution of the plenum on the given question did not reflect all aspects of the economic situation, the corresponding section of the CC of the Party was tasked with its reworking and with its publication.

With regard to the resolution of the plenum of the CC concerning the appointment of Lionel Soto [Prieto] as a member of the Secretariat of the CC of the Party, R.V. Vivo spoke very highly of him (“He is no Garcia Pelaes,” he said) and reported, that L. Soto will be occupied with the issues of the party leadership of the country’s economy; along the party line he is tasked with responsibility for Khuseplan, the National Bank, GKES [State Committee for Economic Cooperation], and other central organs of the national economy.

COUNSELLOR-MINISTER OF THE EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA /s/ M. MANASOV [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 834, ll. 82–84.]

Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, 18 October 1979 (excerpt)

9. Telegram from Havana Spec[jal]. #741 and 744

SUSLOV. Comrades, you have read these telegrams. In one of them a question is raised that in a conversation with our ambassador, Raul Castro told about difficulties that had emerged with regard to replacement of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia. In the second conversation Raul Castro said the Angolans in all probability would appeal [probably to us] with a request to take over the maintenance [i.e., costs—trans.] of the Cuban troops in Angola. Secondly, he said that the Angolans treat the Cuban representatives rather tactlessly.

The next question concerned the assistance with arms to SWAPO. He remarked, that Soviet comrades assist SWAPO with arms but the SWAPO men absolutely do not fight and do not want to fight. Then one wonders, why we should help them with weapons [?] In one word, there are a number of very important principled questions which we should consider. I think that we should order the Defense Ministry and the International Department of the CC to consider these questions advanced in these telegrams, taking into account the exchange of opinions that took place at the meeting of the Politburo,
[and] the proposals will be introduced to the CC.

ALL Agreed.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 6, ll. 1–1; copy obtained by David Wolff; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

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**ANG 8 — 03 APRIL 1977, REPORT, FIDEL CASTRO’S 1977 SOUTHERN AFRICA TOUR: A REPORT TO HONECKER, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT DIGITAL ARCHIVE, WWW.CWIHP.ORG.**

Editor’s Note: In early 1977, Cuban President Fidel Castro took an extensive tour of Africa and then continued on to Europe and the USSR. During a stop in East Berlin, Castro recounted his experiences to East German Communist leader Erich Honecker. The record of those discussions was located in the archives of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) by Christian F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive).

The following excerpt—from a discussion on 3 April 1977 at the House of the SED Central Committee in East Berlin—contains Castro’s impressions of the situations in several southern African countries, (e.g., Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, People’s Republic of the Congo), and several guerrilla or liberation groups in the region, such as the African National Congress (ANC), then struggling for power in South Africa, and two groups fighting to rule Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU). Also included are Castro’s assessments of individual political leaders, remarks about coordination with Moscow, and an over-all conclusion that Africa was the place to inflict a major blow against world imperialism. (For Castro’s remarks at this meeting on the situation in the Horn of Africa, see the excerpts printed later in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.)

**Transcript of Honecker-Castro, Meeting, 3 April 1977 (excerpts)**

Minutes of the conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel
Castro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of the Central Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen, Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cienfuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes [Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him to take the floor—ed.]

Fidel Castro: [sections omitted—ed.]

We visited Tanzania because of an old commitment. We have built three schools there, sent a medical brigade, and given help in other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talk about economic matters above all. The rise in oil prices had affected Tanzania tremendously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oil a year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal and cotton crops has to be used for the purchase of oil. The Chinese are still present in Tanzania. They have built a few things there, in particular the railroad. The armed units of the ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tanzania also carries some responsibility for the split of the liberation movement of Zimbabwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Africa armed fighting has begun.

**ANG 9 — APRIL 1984, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT, “SOVIET MILITARY AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA,” DNSA-SA01629**

**Summary**

The USSR is the most important Communist power active in the spectrum of military, political, and to a lesser extent, economic affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Moscow’s attention is primarily focused on Southern Africa and the Horn, where its clients are involved in protracted military conflicts, the Soviets continue their efforts in other areas to create and exploit instability.

[Excised]
Moscow made great gains in Africa in the mid-1970s as a result of the decline of the Portuguese empire and the Ethiopian revolution. Although Moscow continues to seek gains, its momentum of the mid-1970s is gone and a major amount of Soviet effort is now devoted to protecting Moscow’s positions in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

[Excised]

It is primarily through the military assistance programs that Moscow generates influence and gains access to military facilities in Sub-Saharan countries. The volume of Soviet military assistance outstrips that of any other supplier. Moscow’s acquisition of military access rights in the region both enhance Soviet military capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis SLOC monitoring, and enable the Soviets to demonstrate their presence and support for regional socialist states.

Overt political ties, though low-key in recent years, also continue to play an important role in Soviet foreign policy execution. These are conducted through routine state-to-state relations as well as party-to-party relations with ruling Socialist and Marxist political parties. Overt ties also include a variety of cultural activities.

Covert activities are also important. These include support for subversive organizations, use of front organizations like the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, and disinformation campaigns.

Angola and Ethiopia are the two countries in which Moscow is most heavily involved. [Excised]. In return for its military support, Moscow reaps the considerable benefits of continued use of naval and air facilities at Luanda. Also of great importance to Moscow is the fact that Angola provides a base of operations for the leftist South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) which seeks to end South African rule in Namibia. Moscow’s position is increasingly threatened by the growing strength of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which seeks to oust the pro-Soviet Angolan Government. UNITA strength and the apparent ineptitude of the Angolan Government will require Moscow to provide increasingly expensive military assistance if its client is to survive.

[Excised]

An important shortcoming of Soviet policy in this region is its unwillingness or general inability to furnish sizable amounts of economic aid. Soviet preferences for such assistance still lie with high visibility and heavy industry-related projects, which both provide tangible evidence of Soviet assistance and insure prolonged Soviet involvement during lengthy construction and shakedown phases. Commercial relations are unlikely to expand
significantly in the near future, but Soviet use of African waters for fishing will continue to provide an impetus for such ties.

Soviet influence in Sub-Saharan Africa varies widely from state to state; however, it is in southern Africa and the Horn where Soviet efforts will be concentrated through the mid-1980s. The Soviets are gradually being forced to commit a significant amount of resources to the consolidation and defense of their substantial gains in these key regions.

1. Introduction

The Soviet Union is the major external Communist participant in the military, political, and to a lesser extent, economic affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow’s primary targets remain in Southern Africa and the Horn, where pro-Soviet and pro-Western countries engage in protracted military conflicts. In other areas, however, Moscow also employs its instruments of influence to both create and exploit instability.

In the mid-1970s, the decline of the Portuguese empire, in addition to the Ethiopian revolution enabled Moscow to gain a great deal of momentum in spreading its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. That momentum has since been lost. Furthermore, Moscow’s efforts in West and Central Africa continue to be challenged by a Socialist French government which, while less enthusiastic than its predecessors, remains committed to its role in these regions. Moscow must also account for the efforts of the People’s Republic of China, which is reinvigorating its role in parts of Africa. A major amount of Soviet effort is now devoted to protecting Moscow’s gains in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

2. Soviet Perspective on Africa

Modern Soviet policy toward the region was refined in 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The most important facet of this policy was the acceptance of the principle of “many roads to socialism”. In other words, Marxist principles could be adapted to local conditions. This flexibility permits, from an ideological standpoint, much closer ties with a variety of socialist countries which would have been shunned during the earlier period of more dogmatic Stalinist policies.
Soviet activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are motivated by a blend of ideological and pragmatic considerations. The subcontinent is important to Moscow, however, for two major reasons. First, Western countries are heavily dependent upon Africa and sea routes around the continent for access to many strategic raw materials. Second, the Soviet Union strives to gain and exploit the political and ideological support of the Third World, of which Sub-Saharan Africa is a major part.

Economic considerations, specifically the West’s need for African minerals, form the link between Moscow’s ideological and pragmatic motivations, especially in Southern Africa. For example, Western Europe gets about 50 percent of its cobalt from the area; the US gets about 60 percent; and Japan, 68 percent. Cobalt is vital to the production of jet engines and other military material. Similar dependencies exist for chromium, platinum group metals, manganese, and industrial diamonds. The end of the colonial era contributed to an increase in the cost of raw materials, but producing countries must, of economic necessity, sell these materials. Therefore, Moscow cannot merely be content to have witnessed the decolonization process. It must actively seek to create the conditions whereby Western access to Africa’s raw materials could not only be interrupted for short periods, but made more expensive overall. This probably would generate price increases in Western and Japanese economies. It would also increase Soviet income from mineral sales.

The primary Soviet means of affecting Western supplies of raw materials is by fomenting and sustaining instability in and around producing regions. The two invasions of Zaire’s copper and cobalt producing Shaba province by ex-Katangan gendarmes in 1977 and 1978 are key examples of this technique. The rebels, known as the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), are believed to have launched both attacks with Soviet support and with at least the indirect assistance of East German and Cuban advisors. Such instability can shut down production during periods of warfare and have the longer term effect of driving away skilled technicians who are vital for mining operations. In addition, insurgent activity can close major land routes from ports to mines. South African-backed insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique, a consequence of Soviet support for the Marxist regimes there, have closed major railroads through those countries, thus channeling most surface shipping from mineral producing countries of Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe through South Africa. Should the Soviet-supported Marxist-Leninist African National Congress (ANC), which seeks to establish a multiracial socialist regime in South Africa, become more aggressive, operation of railroads and some mines in South Africa could be periodically disrupted.
To foster instability, Moscow must maintain good relations with regional states which have their own motivation for sheltering and funneling support to various insurgencies. In southern Africa, Angola serves such a purpose and represents Moscow’s most significant regional inroad. Decisive Soviet and Cuban intervention in support of one of several competing Angolan political factions led to the establishment of a Marxist, pro-Soviet state upon achieving independence in 1975. Angola provides training for the ANC, and is a base of operations for the FLNC and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO has challenged South Africa’s occupation of Namibia in a low-level guerilla war along the Namibia/Angolan border since the mid-1960s.

Mozambique is another country which went directly from being a Portuguese colony to being an independent Marxist state. Although Mozambique has resisted Soviet efforts to expand their influence with some degree of success, it remains heavily dependent on Moscow for military assistance. It also serves as a base for ANC operations against South Africa, thus furthering Moscow’s goal of supplanting the current pro-Western government in Pretoria with a nonaligned or pro-Soviet one. However, continued South African support for Mozambican insurgents may reduce Maputo’s ability to resist Soviet domination in the long run.

The ultimate means of manipulating access to Southern Africa’s raw materials will be by having all ports of access controlled by anti-Western or pro-Soviet countries. Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa control these ports. Should a Marxist government ultimately come to power in South Africa, the potential would exist for a coalition of socialist states which conceivably could control access to raw materials either physically or financially. As such, the lack of reliability of the sources of supply could have a profound effect on the West. Any threat to Western supplies of these raw materials might have the effect of revealing cracks in the Western alliance in much the same manner as did the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74. At that time some West European countries were willing to break with the US on political issues for the same of insuring continued access to oil. The Soviets would be likely to encourage a similar effort by strategic mineral and metal producing nations to split the US from its Western allies.

The USSR maintains and seeks military access to air and naval facilities in and around the continent to enhance its military capabilities, and, as a result, to be in a position to challenge the West and protect Soviet power in remote areas. In the South Atlantic Ocean, port facilities in Conakry, Guinea and at Luanda and Namibe, Angola support Moscow’s
West Africa patrol (Table excised). This small naval force shows the Soviet flag and protects Soviet fishing vessels along the Atlantic coast. It numbers between five and seven units and is normally augmented 8 to 9 months of the year by a landing ship (LST) carrying a reinforced naval infantry company. Maintenance support for this force was enhanced in the summer of 1982 when Moscow moved an 8,500-metric-ton capacity floating dry dock to Luanda. To the east, the much larger Indian Ocean Squadron has its primary support base in the Dehalak Archipelago, off the coast of Ethiopia (Table excised). In recent years, the squadron strength has varied between 19 and 32 units. In the first half of 1983, its strength level averaged 20–25 units.

These military forces serve as tangible evidence of Soviet intent to support socialist states throughout Africa. On five occasions, starting in 1979, combatants of the Indian Ocean Squadron have visited the Seychelles during local crises as a show of support for the socialist government. Most recently, a lone LST carrying naval infantry visited the port of Victoria in March 1983, probably in response to a rumor of a coup attempt. Soviet ships visited Maputo, Mozambique, following South African raids on ANC safehouses in Maputo in early 1981, although the visit is believed to have been scheduled months in advance.

Another related practical consideration which draws Soviet attention to the African continent is its proximity to the sea lines of communication (SLOC) from the oil producing nations of the Persian Gulf to the West. The desire to monitor traffic in the SLOCs and to develop a capability to interdict them provides additional motivation for Moscow to gain access to military facilities.

[Excised]

3. Trends

a. General

Moscow continues its policy of taking an active and aggressive role in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa, but it has lost much of the political and psychological momentum it gained in the mid-to-late 1970s. This momentum developed as a result of the dissolution of the Portuguese empire, the Ethiopian revolution, and increased Soviet, Cuban, and East German military, political and subversive activities. In the 1970s, Moscow was heavily involved in eroding Western influence in the region. Although Moscow itself suffered significant setbacks...
in the Sudan and Somalia, what it gained in Ethiopia has compensated for these losses in continuing influence in the Horn of Africa. In the late 1980s, however, Moscow finds itself heavily involved in defending its gains of the 1970s at the same time as it targets the South African Government. Two successful insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, both backed by South Africa, are targeted at pro-Soviet Marxist regimes. These are the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). In addition, the Marxist regime in Ethiopia faces serious challenges from several insurgent groups, particularly in the north where unsuccessful government counterguerrilla campaigns have been conducted with tens of thousands of troops.

Moscow is encountering problems in Sub-Saharan Africa because, in general terms, the goals of the Soviets and their clients are diverging. In Southern Africa, for example, the ruling Marxist parties in Angola and Mozambique prefer to negotiate peace arrangements or at least a modus vivendi with South Africa in order to concentrate their efforts domestically to consolidate their power and engage in nation building. The Angolans have repeatedly spoken out in favor of a negotiated settlement of Namibian independence and have conducted bilateral talks with South Africa. Mozambique has also conducted talks with South Africa on border issues and RENAMO. More recently, Mozambique’s President Machel proposed a meeting of US and Soviet officials, with Mozambique mediating, to discuss the problems of southern Africa and demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. Moscow on the other hand, wants to use these countries as bases for insurgency targeted against South Africa and Namibia, with the result that military pressure from South Africa prevents consolidation of power by the regional Marxists.

[Excised]

In most cases, countries with which Moscow has established close ties seek to rejuvenate their economies, having bolstered themselves militarily with Soviet assistance. Moscow has not provided the needed economic assistance. [Excised]. Soviet models of agricultural development have not succeeded. In Mozambique, President Machel himself has criticized his own party for promoting large and inefficient Soviet style farms at the cost of small-scale, private agriculture.

As a result of this situation, socialist and Marxist nations in sub-Saharan Africa are seeking Western development assistance. Western aid to foundering nations, however, can lead to International Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement. Should an IMF bailout be required, it probably would require economic reforms which are likely to be detrimental to socialist
economic institutions. This is a particularly tricky problem for Moscow. On the one hand, the Soviets claim it is the West’s responsibility to finance development because Western colonialism is responsible for Africa’s poverty. This absolves them from the responsibility for and the expense of providing economic aid. On the other hand, the Soviets have stated that in order for these socialist nations to achieve independence in foreign policy, they must free themselves from economic dependence on the Western powers.

As a result of this divergence, and the growing perception of African leaders that Moscow’s interest in the region centers primarily on East-West issues and not on the needs of the African states, the Soviets can expect little overall gain in Sub-Saharan Africa in the foreseeable future. If Soviet gains in Sub-Saharan Africa were to be categorized by decade, the late 1950s and early 1960s could be characterized as a time of modest Soviet gains based on the ideological naivete of some leftist African leaders who rushed to embrace Moscow. The 1970s were a time of major Soviet gains based on military support for local wars, insurgencies, and revolutionaries. In this context, the 1980s will probably be a time of mixed results—limited Soviet gains based on exploitation of regional instability, individuals, and government factions but potentially greater losses in Southern Africa at the hand of anti-Soviet insurgents and South Africa.

b. Military presence and aid

Military sales and assistance programs remain the most visible and the most important means by which Moscow seeks to penetrate Sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow is the dominant arms supplier; trainer of indigenous military personnel abroad; and the with exception of Cuba, supplier of military advisors to the region. [Excised].

The Soviets have entered into military sales or aid programs with nearly half of the states in this region. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are the USSR’s most important clients in this regard, with Ethiopia accounting for over 60 percent of all Soviet military sales to Sub-Saharan Africa since 1977. The likelihood of continuing military conflict in the Horn and Southern Africa, as well as the general instability endemic to many African states, insures for Moscow opportunities for sales, primarily to old customers. In addition to providing a vehicle of influence, this aid provides a minor source of hard currency. Table 4 provides the figures for Soviet military aid as of late 1983 [Excised, showing only Southern African countries].

Another means used by Moscow to enhance its military capabilities, as well as its overall presence, is through the extension of AEROFLOT civil aviation service throughout
Table 4: Estimated values of Soviet military agreements (A) and Deliveries (D) to Sub-Saharan Africa (Million US Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Aid, 1954–mid-1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1969.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>340.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>251.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL [including other African countries]</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,904.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Visits of African leaders to the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yasouf Dadoo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party</td>
<td>October 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola</td>
<td>October 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People’s Organization</td>
<td>December 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African National Congress</td>
<td>May 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola</td>
<td>November 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samora Moises Machel, President of Mozambique</td>
<td>November 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samora Moises Machel, President of Mozambique</td>
<td>March 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister of Lesotho</td>
<td>May 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola</td>
<td>May 83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Africa. AEROFLOT provides visibility and legitimate service, as well as a vehicle for covert logistical support and bases for espionage in the guise of AEROFLOT offices.

c. Political and Subversive Activity

[Excised]

Since mid-1981 there have been 16 visits by African heads of state and leaders of insurgent movements to the USSR, and 12 to other Warsaw Pact countries (see table 5; excised to show Southern Africa only). Nearly all of these leaders are from countries with which Moscow has or seeks military access rights.

Other overt activities designed to promote Soviet policies include media broadcasts to the region, the placing of news articles in local papers, trade fairs and exhibits, and cultural activities. Sub-Saharan Africa received 274 hours per week of Soviet international broadcasting in 1982, having increased less than 3 percent since 1979. Throughout 1981, Moscow also regularly placed radio and TV programs in the media programming of Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar. Soviet press reports regularly appeared in these countries as well as in Angola, the Congo, Ghana, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Throughout the region in 1981 the Soviets held 18 film festivals, 4 trade exhibits, and 25 cultural exhibits.

Disinformation campaigns also remain a staple of Soviet covert operation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Probably the most frequently employed technique is that of the forged document which is designed to damage US interests. Although the forgeries are often easily recognized as such, it is frequently difficult to tell whether the Soviets or one of their proxies actually prepared them. Nevertheless, the KGB coordinates and monitors all such operations.

[Excised]

d. Economic Aid and Trade Relations

Economic aid remains the most selectively and parsimoniously employed implement of Soviet regional policy. [Excised]. Moscow still prefers to commit its economic aid to high visibility projects, especially those related to the development of heavy industry. A planned hydro-electric dam project in Angola [excised] epitomizes this preference. Such projects serve the dual purpose of providing tangible evidence of Soviet commitment to aid developing nations and insure prolonged ties with Moscow during the construction and shakedown phases of projects.

[Excised]
The provision of Soviet economic technicians and advisors remains an important element of Moscow’s assistance program. During 1982, approximately [excised] such Soviet personnel were in Sub-Saharan Africa. They assist in the daily operation of some nations’ national infrastructure as well as in various development projects.

Similarly, academic training for large numbers of African students continues to be provided in the Soviet Union. The USSR views its academic assistance program as highly visible and one with a potentially high-yield at low-cost. Students are generally awarded full scholarships, which cover subsistence, living quarters, tuition, and transportation. For many African countries, the Soviet scholarship program is Moscow’s only aid effort. During 1982, there were approximately 18,000 students receiving academic training in the Soviet Union, up from 8,000 in 1975. Moscow hopes that some of these students will become indoctrinated in Marxism or will be recruited by Soviet intelligence personnel to serve as Soviet intelligence agents. However, African students in the USSR frequently complain of racial discrimination and write home about inadequate food, supplies, and money, as well as excessive political indoctrination.

4. **Introduction to country studies**

   [Excised]

**Angola**
Farther to the south, in Angola, the Soviets remain in a much stronger position. In 1975, during the months preceding independence from Portugal, the Soviet and Cuban supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) seized control of the transitional government from rival nationalist groups. International pressures and the weight of Soviet and Cuban assistance forced the eventual collapse of the regular forces of the non-Marxist insurgent groups and the pullback of the South African forces that were supporting them. Currently, under the Soviet-educated President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Angola remains plagued with political instability, insurgencies, and economic stagnation. In order to remain in control of the situation, Dos Santos needs continued technical assistance and substantial military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

**Namibia**
The unresolved Namibian independence problem remains the most contentious issue in
southern Africa. The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) under the leadership of Sam Nujoma, continues its protracted guerrilla war against South African control of Namibia, and the Soviet position in Angola provides Moscow a means of channeling support to SWAPO. The USSR continues to oppose any Western-sponsored settlement, particularly one which leaves any doubts about SWAPO’s chances of gaining power. Moscow insists that a UN-sponsored settlement based on UN resolution 435, which recognizes SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, is the only legal basis for Namibian independence. At the same time, the US and Western countries also recognize SWAPO as a legitimate party to the conflict, but do not grant it the exclusive status Moscow does.

The Soviet Union considers SWAPO a legitimate national liberation organization as does the United Nations’ General Assembly. Through its close ties with the Angolan government since 1975, the USSR has supplied SWAPO with most of its military equipment, including small arms, mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, SA-7/GRAIL antiaircraft missiles, mines, and communications equipment. While the majority of SWAPO guerrillas received their training in Angola, some have undertaken specialized training in Cuba and the USSR. In addition, some wounded SWAPO personnel are treated in East Bloc hospitals. [Excised].

Much of the financing provided to SWAPO comes from international organizations, not directly from the Soviet Union. These donors include the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the World Council of Churches, and individual nations, such as Sweden.

SWAPO currently espouses socialist economic principles and leaders publicly have spoke of equalizing ownership of the nation’s resources as well as of forming a “popular democratic people’s government” based on “scientific socialist ideas and principles”. The SWAPO leadership is vague, however, when questioned about future political and economic goals, emphasizing instead that the liberation struggle must be won first. [Excised].

During much of 1982 and 1983, Western-sponsored multilateral and bilateral negotiations have been taking place. Nevertheless, Soviet and Angolan rejection of the “linkage” of the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with independence for Namibia as well as continuing Soviet support for SWAPO makes it unlikely that Angola, SWAPO and South Africa will come to terms in the near future. Failure to settle this conflict will lead to gradual escalation and more Soviet involvement. [Excised].
**Zambia**

In April 1982, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev visited President Kaunda in Lusaka. Although the trip received very favorable Zambia press coverage and generated criticism of US policies, there is no evidence of any substantive results of the talks. In March 1983, the first CPSU delegation to visit Zambia in 2 years signed a 2-year protocol on cooperation with Zambia’s ruling United National Independence Party. Finally, in April 1983, Moscow apparently reluctantly agreed to reschedule Zambia’s debts, a move which won the Soviets a public refutation by Kaunda in the Zambian press of “Western charges that the socialist bloc does not help the Third World countries economically”.

The Soviets have frequently targeted Kaunda with disinformation campaigns designed to damage Zambian relations with Western nations. The most recent was intended to poison the air prior to the Zambian Head of State’s visit to the US in late March 1983.

Zambia, along with other black states in Southern Africa, faces acute economic problems. The ability of the USSR to provide meaningful aid to the key mineral and agricultural sectors of the economy is limited by several factors. First, Western Europe and Japan already have extensive interests in Zambian mining and agriculture. Second, the markets for Zambian products are tied to the West. [Excised]… have been slow in providing the necessary economic aid.

[Excised]… is facing increased political and even military discontent, fomented by a deteriorating economy. Many government officials argue that it is through Western economic development and cooperation that Zambia may be able to solve its domestic ills, not through the purchase of Soviet military equipment. Past Soviet inability to provide substantial economic assistance has tempered Soviet influence in Zambia. [Excised].

**Zimbabwe**

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe gained power in 1980, following a 7-year guerrilla war in which his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its military wing played the preponderant role in bringing an end to white rule in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Since that time, he has exercised consummate skill in overcoming the bitterness of the war and reassuring the West through moderate policies. Despite this, however, festering problems worsened during 1982, and today threaten to divert Zimbabwe from its constructive course, and possibly even to plunge the country into civil war. Zimbabwe’s stability in the near future could be seriously jeopardized if Mugabe cannot successfully reconcile with his
long-term rival Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the increasingly disaffected Ndebele ethnic group.

[Excised]

Nevertheless, for the near term it appears that Mugabe will remain cool toward the Soviets. Despite his advocation toward a socialist course and movement toward establishing a one-party socialist state under the ZANU banner, he has accepted the need for a private sector in the national economy and has secured an immense amount of economic aid from the West. In international fora, he has guided Zimbabwe on a genuine nonaligned course as evidenced by trips to Eastern Europe and the United States in 1983.

The future of Moscow-Harare relations appears to rest mainly on the principal issue of Zimbabwe’s security. If the level of violence between ZANU and ZAPU continues to rise, as is likely, it will create a Zimbabwean need for foreign military supplies—needs which the Soviets can rapidly and relatively inexpensively meet. If neighboring South Africa supports ZAPU, massive amounts of military aid will be needed to counteract this threat.

South Africa

The downfall of the current South African Government and its replacement with a socialist regime remains Moscow’s ultimate goal in Southern Africa. The Soviets continue to support the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which cooperate closely, as the primary means of destabilizing the pro-Western apartheid government. Active for 70 years, the ANC, since the late 1950s, has followed a Marxist-Leninist ideology and seeks to establish a multiracial, socialist society in South Africa. In pursuit of the goal, the ANC has maintained close ties with the South African Communist Party and other groups directly connected to the Soviet Union. SACP members dominate the ANC’s highest decision-making bodies, including the military wing.

The ANC, led by Acting President Oliver Tambo, remains the prime insurgency group. It has enjoyed some success in directly attacking South African installations and property and has escalated its terrorist attacks to include sites in urban areas, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. The ANC can be expected to continue these attacks, maintain its training and weaponry connections with the USSR in order to escalate its activities, and seek the overthrow of the minority South African regime. The USSR is in an excellent position to improve its influence with the ANC and demonstrate its firm support for what it considers a legitimate national liberation organization.
Moscow misses no opportunity to launch diplomatic attacks against Pretoria and to link the US with South Africa’s widely condemned apartheid system. Recent themes of such attacks cite US political and economic ties as proof that the US supports apartheid. Moscow goes beyond mere interpretation of known facts, however, frequently publishing disinformation alleging US efforts to provide South Africa with nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons. The Soviets hope to ultimately replace the current government with one dominated by the SACP or at least a socialist-oriented, black-dominated government which will be indebted to Moscow for past assistance and future military security.

**Mozambique**

Soviet influence in Mozambique can be traced to Soviet support for the war against Portugal and the Marxist orientation of President Samora Machel and other top officials. When independence was achieved in 1975, the need developed to transform a guerrilla army into a conventional military force. The Soviets were considered a natural source of assistance. Although Machel did not limit his aid requests to the Soviet Union, it was the Kremlin which was willing and able to provide the necessary equipment and training. Consequently, since 1976, the Soviet Union has delivered over $200 million in military equipment and provided for the training of the Mozambican military. This training has been conducted in Soviet Bloc states as well as in Mozambique. At present, there are some 600 Soviet military advisers in-country. These advisers are active in the counterinsurgency effort against the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), a South African-supported antigovernment organization operating throughout Mozambique.

RENAMO has been conducting a successful insurgency since mid-1980 and operates throughout most of the country. As a result of the current insurgency, Mozambique’s active support for anti-Rhodesian guerrillas in the late 1970s, and socialist economic shortsightedness, the country’s economy has become a shambles. Although Moscow and Maputo has signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in March 1977, the Soviets were slow in shoring up Machel’s increasingly beleaguered regime. Following a series of visits, beginning in late 1981, by high-level military delegations of both sides, it became apparent that Moscow had agreed to provide additional military equipment. These visits and additional aid were probably the result of a reassessment by Machel of the serious threat posed by RENAMO. Machel’s
subsequent decentralization of the military and, to a lesser extent, the new equipment, improved the ability of Machel's army to counter RENAMO.

In an effort to acquire additional and more useful aid, President Machel has personally met with Soviet leaders on two recent occasions in the Soviet Union; in November 1982 following Brezhnev's funeral and, in March 1983, prior to attending the NAM summit in India. By some accounts, Machel was apparently unhappy with the results of these visits. Other than for a cultural-scientific protocol and some minor economic aid projects, no tangible results of either meeting in the form of agreements or treaties are known. Moscow pledged continued support for Mozambique and probably pressed Mozambique to promote a favorable image of the USSR at the NAM summit.

The exclusiveness of past Soviet-Mozambican political ties has been reduced because of Moscow's reluctance to provide the amounts of economic aid needed by Machel. Although Soviet-Mozambican trade has increased dramatically over the past 5 years, Mozambique's economic ties remain primarily with the West and South Africa. In September 1982, the Soviet Union and Mozambique initiated the implementation of a long-term economic and trade cooperation program which extends until 1990. Since then the two countries have signed a 3-year and 2-year trade agreement. However, the Soviets are still dragging their feet on the implementation of Mozambique's large-scale economic aid requests, and twice refused Mozambique's applications to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

Machel has expressed his disappointment with this rejection, emphasizing that Mozambique is a socialist state. As such, developed socialist countries were obliged to assist an underdeveloped ally. The USSR leadership has countered that Mozambique was merely on the path toward socialism and is not yet a fully developed socialist state. Consequently, Moscow does not feel obliged to grant Mozambique's large-scale economic aid requests.

[Rest of document excised by editors]
October 10, 1987

It is already the second month during which I find myself in the 6th district and ten days of this period—in Cuito Cuanavale. Conditions here are very tense. On 20 August, a diversionary group from South Africa, consisting of eight people, blew up a bridge across the river Cuito. In September, [we] succeeded in neutralizing a group which had been bombarding Cuito Cuanavale itself with mortar fire. On October 1, advisors of the 21st and 25th brigades returned from an operation on the river Lomba. There, on the Lomba, misfortune had befallen them. They had been «covered» with shells from the rapid firing guns of the South Africans. As a result, their interpreter, Oleg Snitko had his leg broken and his hand torn off. He died within a day and a half. The others also had bad luck. Four of them were wounded and shell shocked.

On October 8, they were flown off to a hospital in Luanda. Then on October 9, having replaced them, we departed on a military operation. There are six people in our group—our team leader, Anatoly Mikhailovich Artiomenko; the advisor to the chief of the brigade artillery, Yuri Pavlovich Sushchenko; the technician, Sasha Fatyanov; two specialists from “Osa-AK” (the anti-aircraft missile system), Slava and Kostya, and myself.

The day before, we covered approximately 11 km and at 10:30 we reached the command post of the 25th brigade. We sat there the whole day, and waited uncertainly for something to turn up. We were in fact forced to spend the night there. At around seven o’clock in the evening, I turned on the radio receiver. A concert of Soviet popular songs was being transmitted. The songs were, on the whole, both old and long known, yet all of us at once grew silent and pensive. But today, on October 10, at five thirty in the morning, we hurriedly pushed off from our location and moved forward.

A military column, in general, moves very slowly. The point is that it is advisable not to travel on old, used roads, because they are constantly mined by UNITA. Therefore, our men cut a new road through the forest. The tanks move forward, and behind them, the entire column goes. For some five hours, we moved all in all only 8 km. During one of our usual stops, a group of UNITA soldiers bombarded us. It occurred at 11.10, nineteen miles from Cuito Cuanavale. Our column was bombarded by mortars and submachine guns. It was our first bombardment in this operation and it happened quite close to Cuito-Cuanavale.
Thus we moved forward: we moved at most 100 m before we had to stop and endure a tedious wait during which the tanks continued to push the road forward. At 14:30, we achieved at last crossings over the river Shambinga. But before this, at 13:30, we had stumbled upon a mined field, set up by UNITA. We waited a long time until [our engineers] found a safe passage or detour.

At 16:10, we stopped in a little wood on the other bank of the Shambinga River. Here we will spend the night. The crossing of the Shambinga River is quite uncomfortable. Sufficient to say that it is completely open on both its banks and moreover swampy. The Angolans call such a surface area, “shana”, the same as “flood lands” in Russian. Only one single road, mined on each side, leads to the river through this “shana”, so that nowhere can one turn around. If the enemy is able successfully get this road within his gun sights, and then it can become one of the seven circles of biblical hell.

In fact, here on the September 25 of last year, the leader of our group, Anatoly Mikhailovich was seriously wounded. They had been until then, for all of five days, not able to get across. A [shell] fragment had hit him in the head. But we, this one time, were able to cross without mishap.

**October 11, 1987**

The day today was rich with events. At six in the morning, the column gathered in military formation for the day’s march. We stood for half an hour, waiting for news from the head of our column as to where they were to pave the way. By six thirty, UNITA began to fire its mortars. This time, the majority of mortars were being discharged to release incendiary bombs with the exclusive aim to set our cars on fire. Although the firing continued for thirty minutes, UNITA did not achieve its objectives. Thereupon, we pushed forward. During the course of the day, South African planes appeared twice. The first time was at 11:10 and then at 14:30. Our anti-aircraft missile system, “Osa-AK”, tracked them but the two aircrafts were actually shot down in the region of the 21st brigade.

At 15:35, our column was once more attacked by UNITA forces. A ferocious battle broke out and continued almost 40 minutes. The men covering the flanks of the column performed well by discovering the bandits in time. The attack was successfully repulsed. Five UNITA soldiers were killed, and much booty was taken. On that day, we had to have our dinner in the dark, inasmuch as we stopped at our night lodge quite late and it gets dark here around six in the evening.
October 12, 1987

Today, from 6:45 in the morning, our column once again ran into attacking UNITA forces. The shooting continued for twenty minutes. The column was again fired upon with incendiary mortar shells. But the return fire of our combat means (B-10 anti-tank recoilless guns; 120-mm mortars; BM-21 forty-barrel 122 mm caliber volley fire fired from “Ural” trucks; Grad-P portable guns delivering 122 mm caliber volley fire) did not permit the UNITA forces to aim their guns accurately at us. Only one single mortar shell ever landed on one of the cars in our column while the rest were released without any impact.

At 10:40, the South African air force again appeared, bombing the location of the 21st brigade. For the rest of the day, nothing of any particular importance happened except that now, on the R-123 radio station, we hear, quite clearly and precisely, South Africans discussing among themselves. Thank God that I still remember a little English. And today, they suddenly began talking Polish on the air. I could make out clearly a few phrases in Polish: “What do you want?” “Very good.” And then, “I am listening attentively.” “Thank you.” The answer of the second speaker was not audible. For a long time we speculated as to what this signified, until we realized that in fact maybe these were Polish émigrés in the South African army.

October 13, 1987

Today at 5:10, four South African planes appeared in the area of the 21st and 59th brigades. The brigades opened up furious fire from all types of weaponry. The entire sky looked like a rainbow or a salute. As a result, one plane was put out of action, while a second was hit on the nozzle by a “Strela-3” type rocket, and although hit, managed to escape. The rest dropped their bombs in disorder and made off. Our “Osa-AK” anti-aircraft missile system had begun work already at 04:30. On that day, there were three more South African air raids—at noon, at 15:00 and at 17:00, as if it was according to schedule.

This day, we stayed at the night lodging near the old UNITA base. There we could see the huts which were still intact, communication trenches and so forth? A real fortress I would say. I completely forgot that on this same day, at 14:30, we had discovered a large store house belonging to UNITA at the source of the Kunzumbia river. There, ammunition dumps of Chinese origin were found:

- for 60-mm mortars—120 mortar shells;
- for 81-mm mortars—111 mortar shells;
October 14, 1987

Today, at 07:30 AM, we finally reached the Command Post of the 21st brigade and Operational Group. We met here advisors and specialists of the 47th brigade and of the “Osa-AK” anti-aircraft missile system (nine people in all). So many “horrors” they recounted to us. Much hope had been placed, during the offensive action, on the 2nd Tactical Group to which the 47th airborne-assault brigade belonged. The 47th brigade was reinforced with a tank battalion, artillery and with the “Osa-AK” anti-aircraft missile system.

The Group’s mission was to secure the right flank of the general offensive. It was commanded by Major Tobias, Chief of Staff of the 6th Military District. But the Group was not up to task. According to what was said, the commanding officers drank too much during the operation. The offensive was conducted sluggishly, without enthusiasm, although there was practically no serious resistance in its path. In the end, to be sure, “there appeared to be a so-called clap of thunder in a clear sky”.

The offensive of other brigades was conducted more or less successfully, and UNITA suffered defeat after defeat. It appeared as if victory was already close. But, as it usually had happened many times before, the South Africans, seeing this process, did not permit UNITA to be completely destroyed. Skillfully exploiting the mistakes and miscalculations of FAPLA, they openly penetrated the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola. Now they publicly declared that the South African army was in Angola with the aim of preventing the complete destruction of UNITA.

This was the beginning of the operation’s downfall, the beginning of a tragedy. First of all, we received news of the wounding of Soviet advisors of the 21st brigade and then about the death of the interpreter, Oleg Snitko. Afterwards, when we encountered our comrades from the 47th brigade, we heard from them details about their brigade’s rout. The brigade suffered three attacks from the South African regular forces. The flight which began after the second attack, turned into panic with the launching of the third.

There were many reasons for this: the running out of ammunition, as well as the cowardliness of the officers, the absence of precise instructions to the troops engaged, their terror of facing the South Africans, and, finally, the fact that on the bank where the brigade
stood, across the river Lomba, there was a passage (bridge for crossing). Everybody quickly found out about it, and, if it had not existed, perhaps no one would have tried to flee.

Many Soviet specialists serving here in the district combat brigades earlier had been in Afghanistan. According to their opinion, “in Afghanistan, we never experienced such horrors as Here”. One said that “when the South African artillery began to fire, I felt particularly terrified. However, then came the South African air force and we had very little room on the ground. But the most horrible was when the Angolans turned to flight and began to throw away their equipment…”

This was just what happened with the 47th brigade. As long as the brigade commander maintained radio contact with the commander of the tank battalion, everything to be sure remained relatively normal. But then the tank battalion commander was hit and being wounded, he moved to another tank which too was hit and from which he then could not crawl out. Meanwhile the tank platoon commander who was next to him fled. The tank battalion commander (his name is Silva) thereupon was taken prisoner by the South Africans.

At the time of its flight during the crossing of the river Lomba, the 47th brigade lost 18 tanks, 20 armored troop carriers, 4 D-30 (122 mm) guns, 3 BM-21s valley fire, 4 Osa-AK anti-aircraft [mobile] rocket launchers, 2 Osa-AKs transport cars, one P-19 radar station, heavy automobiles, radio stations, mortars, grenade throwers, approximately 200 pieces of small arms, etc., etc.

...only three Strela-10 anti-aircraft system, two armored troop carriers, two EE-25 vehicles and one Land Rover got across to the other side of the Lomba. Nothing more they were able to save. And if the South Africans had sent over only one company to the other bank and opened fire against the Angolans on the river bank, the entire 47th brigade would have landed at the bottom of the Lomba.

The Soviet “advisors” had to set on fire and abandon their armored troop carrier and then crawl, hugging the ground for 1.5 km along the “shana” to the other bank of the Lomba. They crawled under fire, throwing away everything except for their weapons, while the South Africans struck direct laying fire against them. Then the swamps began. Our men overcame this too and there remained only a short distance to the bank. Completely exhausted, they decided to pause for breath. The South Africans, estimating, by the length of time, that they had already gotten across, began to shoot along the shore. Shells were exploding 10 to 20 m from them while three fell into the swamp 5 m from them. What saved them was that the shells and mines fell into the swamp and on the “shana” (which
was also sticky and swampy), sank and only then exploded. Only for this reason, no one was wounded, not taking small fragments into account.

The crushing defeat of the 47th brigade seriously affected the 16th, 21st, and 59th brigades as well as the military situation as a whole. Now the brigades were positioned on the line formed by the Cunzumbia River. Such was the state of affairs when we arrived.

**October 15, 1987**

Yesterday and today we settled down in our new positions, making the acquaintance with the Commander of our 21st brigade and Major Batista, the Group Commander, and, at brigade headquarters, we familiarized ourselves with the situation. The day passed quietly. South African planes flew by and from the direction of the 16th and 59th brigades, the rumble of cannon fire was heard. There was shelling there and our brigade gave them support with artillery fire.

**October 16, 1987**

In the morning, Major Batista drove off to the command post of the First Tactical Group, took leave of us, thanked us for everything, and asked us to provide help to the brigade commander.

The order came from the District Command: brigades must take defensive positions in those places where they already find themselves, and assume responsibility for each allotted zone where it is necessary constantly to provide thorough searches in order not to permit enemy infiltration and to hinder any enemy activities. This was so to speak a series of local operations which were conducted with the forces of up to two battalions led by brigade commanders.

This afternoon, we moved our mission to a new position, closer to the Brigade Command Post.

**October 29, 1987**

Last night, the enemy hit the 59th brigade with 148 shells. In the morning, we found out that as a result one officer, one sergeant and four soldiers from our brigade had been killed. There were many wounded and one officer and one soldier were missing.

At 6 o’clock, the enemy decided to bid us «good morning» and «good appetite». We were having breakfast when suddenly, not far off as usual, there was a shot. Through
habit, we cocked our ears to hear in which direction the shot was flying. And then our Air Defense specialist Slava shouted, «Lie down!» Right after, a powerful explosion reverberated and I fell from my chair, hitting the ground. I immediately felt a sharp pain in my left shoulder, maybe I had either bruised or dislocated it. But then, in the next second, I leaped up under our armored troop carrier. Everybody ran off in every direction too.

As it then turned out, the enemy had bombarded us from a 120-mm. mortar and one shell exploded 20 m from us during breakfast. My shoulder now hurts very much and I am unable to raise my arm.

But at 14:00, we received frightening news. At 13:10, the enemy had bombarded the 59th brigade, situated in our vicinity, with chemical weapons containing poison gas. As a result, many people had been poisoned. Four had lost consciousness and the brigade commander was coughing blood. The Soviet advisors in the brigade were also affected. The wind was blowing nearby and everyone was complaining of violent headaches and nausea. This news greatly disturbed us since, you see, we didn’t have any gas masks whatsoever. And so ended today’s events.

November 9, 1987

All night, we heard the rumble of engines and nearby explosions. It was the 59th brigade approaching us but the South Africans were «escorting» them with their artillery. In the morning, we went down to meet them. We saw our Soviet advisors. They felt that everything for them was under control. After the South Africans had attacked them with poison gas on the 29 of October, they had more or less regained consciousness. Their faces were happy—after all, they were returning «home», to Cuito.

They had been in the forest for almost 4 months. It is difficult to imagine such a life—one must have personally have lived through it. We, for example, have been in the forest exactly one month, today, yet I have the feeling that already half my life has slipped by, and that all the days have merged into one, that each day is one and the same. If it is suddenly quiet, then you begin to go crazy, they say, wondering why they do not shoot, and what they still have in mind to do there. When the shooting starts, you wait for when it will finally end. And so on and so forth every day.

Around 8 o’clock, we got information that the 16th brigade (which is located in the area of the Shambinga River, 20 km away from us) had been subject since 3 o’clock in the morning to heavy fire and attacks from the regular South African battalions. The
Shambinga area lies right next to Cuito-Cuanavale, and already the South Africans had arrived there, but after all, they were anyway on the river Lomba not long ago. During the afternoon, the advisors attached to the 25th brigade, located on our old positions, informed us that at around one in the morning, the enemy had attempted to penetrate their defense line. When that failed, he began to «throw» everything he had and then another several times tried to break through and has been continuing all this commotion up till now. The position of the 25th brigade is precarious. After all, it remains practically alone there, if we do not take our battalion staying with them into account.

**November 10, 1987**

Yesterday night passed more or less peacefully. However, the next morning, the Brigade Commander came and he said he had received a telegram from District Headquarters with the following order: stay on constant alert inasmuch as the enemy can always attack, employing the strategy of sudden surprise. And that was exactly what happened. At 7 o’clock, artillery and mortar fire suddenly broke out. At that moment I was exactly in radio contact with our Military District. For more than an hour and a half, South Africans keep on bombarding us from 106-mm guns and 120-mm mortars.

Shells fly past our heads. What saves us is that we are standing on a hill and therefore they either fell short of or else fly over us. And yet a number of pieces got within 50 m of us and immediately the fragments began to scream in a horrible way. The advisors of the 16th brigade now gave us their coordinates. We glanced at the map and sighed: saving themselves from yesterday’s South African attack, they had covered not less than 20 km and are now located 4–5 km from the ford across the river Shambinga (15 km from Cuito-Cuanavale).

They let us know that the number of their technique and equipment had dropped to less than half. During the afternoon, I intercepted a telegram stating that two tanks of the 16th brigade had reached by tugboat the area where the 66th brigade was located, together with 100 men from two battalions of the 16th brigade. Thereupon, they had set off for Cuito-Cuanavale. In such a way, the South Africans did «wear out» the 16th brigade…

**November 11, 1987**

This morning a prisoner was captured in the area of the 3rd battalion. He turned out to be an artillery reconnaissance scout from the artillery battery attached to UNITA’s 4th regular battalion. He himself was an African, named Eugene Kayumba, who had served UNITA
for 3 years, born in the province of Huambo. In his battery they had 2 106.7-mm guns and 2 120 mm mortars set up on “Land Rovers.”… Their batteries are constantly changing firing positions, they are supplied with ammunition at night, and they move around on “Unimog” vehicles. A battery consists of 20 men…. According to him, the South Africans are constantly moving in the second echelon, while the UNITA troops are moving in front of them. If UNITA gets into a tight spot, the regular South African forces move there, open artillery fire and send out the air force. In important military sectors, the South Africans themselves enter the battle, as this in fact occurred with the 16th brigade on the 9th of November.

At the source of the river Lomba some bases are situated from where ammunition would be brought up. That place is settled by South Africans.

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When I arrived in Luanda from Moscow, the chief military adviser General Kuzmenko told me: “Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, you are assigned to Huambo. I am not going to insist but I would like you to be sent to the south, to the 6th military district. I would like to have my own representative there. I have one lieutenant-colonel but he’s not really what I’m looking for…”

And I served (instead of Huambo) in the 6th district in Menonge, in Cuito-Cuanavale. From Menonge a road went to Longo and then went to Cuito-Cuanavale. I drove down this road many times…

Near Cuito-Cuanavale stood the Pechora, Kvadrat and Osa-AK air defence missile systems, and there was an untarred airstrip there. A radio-radar reconnaissance company was deployed in the area surrounding the airfield [36]. The town itself is located on the junction of the Cuito and Cuanavale rivers…

And as for events around Cuito-Cuanavale… the main event happened in 1987. When arrived in 6th district in 1986, the first district Commander was “Vietnam”, a member of the Central Committee MPLA, and then when he left it was “Batista” who became the district Commander. These are their alias, they like them, for them they are like a second name. They don’t even use their real names…
The moment I flew into Megonge, the adviser to district Commander, the lieutenant-colonel I mentioned, was leaving. I introduced myself to him, then looked around Megonge, a small place—kind of like a provincial town, more of a village really. I with him drove to the staff office, I introduced myself to “Vietnam”, the district Commander then and to the head of reconnaissance. Next I went to have a look at the Angolan reconnaissance battalion. It was formed out of military reconnaissance companies, armed with AKs and Kalashnikov machine guns (AK-47, AKM and RPK).

The reconnaissance men lived in a “refugè”, a large dug-out, 2m deep. It had concrete walls, a light sloping roof on top and about a metre gap between the walls and the roof so it’s always windy. There’s no glass in the windows for the light, air… and mosquitos to get in. There are no beds, everyone sleeps on the floor laying cardboard from broken-up under themselves (like the homeless) and covering themselves with a light duvet. They would put the assault rifle underneath their heads.

They carry around grenades with them too. The grenades mainly weren’t ours but there were some Soviet F-1s.

The UNITA soldiers had our assault rifles and the hand grenades were small, round, American-made I think.

I began to work with the reconnaissance battalion, helped them to organise training. Taught them how to set up ambushes, carry out raids, how to move about, how to sneak up on somebody, take out the watchmen, transport the prisoners.

*Was there any hand-held night vision equipment?*

Only night sights for the assault rifles and machine guns. One sight per squad. All the instruments would break down quickly because of the severe climate and negligent treatment.

The only things that held together well were Kalashnikov assault rifles and Kalashnikov machine guns…

Once I went and asked the fighters: “Show me you weapon. When did you last clean it?” “We never cleaned them. They shoot fine as they are! (Laughter)” they never cleaned their guns, never greased them with oil…

*When did the “Salute October” offensive begin?*
We always advanced during the dry season, which begins in May. We began the offensive around July. Three Angolan brigades took part in the advance. We went on foot with BTR-60PB APCs and small Engesa[41] trucks with supplies of food, ammunition and fuel. The tanks remained in their positions in front of Cuito-Cuanavale. Then the brigades went each in a separate direction.

We didn't reach Jamba. We went up to the Lomba River… For three months we gradually moved forwards, with skirmishes, checking for fields as well. As soon as the Angolan troops reached the river, straight away the South African army would come into action, especially the Buffalo battalion. The SAAF would begin its attacks—the Mirage F1 fighter-bombers and the Impala attack aircraft. Pilotless reconnaissance planes were used as well. One such reconnaissance plane, which was reconnoitering the brigades’ positions, was found in the area around the bridge in Cuito-Cuanavale.

They wouldn’t allow beyond the Lomba River. The South Africans would counter-attack using AML-60 and AML-90 APCs, Elephant tanks.

…I didn’t go in the leading groups. Substantial firefights took place there. One of our translators, Oleg Snitko, lost an arm. The Cubans evacuated him on a helicopter with a doctor but sadly he died.

The Cubans didn’t take part in this offensive. They remained in the positions near Cuito-Cuanavale.

…Sometime in October 1987 the Angolans crossed the Lomba River but the South Africans launched a powerful counteroffensive and our forces were forced to retreat. The South Africans didn’t chase the Angolans for long. They didn’t cross the Lomba River. I was there during all of that period from around May 1986 till 1989. The Command post of our “advisees” (the Angolans) was in Cuito-Cuanavale. We had a small site there: canopy, sauna with eucalyptus branches, a small hiding-place—a trench covered with the metal floor from an Engesa truck on top.

South African artillery fired on us with 155 mm shells (G-5 gun and the G-6 SP gun, with a range of 39–47km), whereas our artillery BM-21 (20km range) couldn’t reach them.

…While the brigades made their advance we were in Command post in Cuito-Cuanavale. And the South Africans fired using 155m shells, of course mainly on the airfield which was their primary target. The whole of Cuito-Cuanavale was blitzed. All the houses were battered because of the minus and plus rounds.
When the South Africans started to find the targets, the Angolans were the first to get out the way of the artillery bombardment and relocated the Command post to a forest near Cuito-Cuanavale. They fitted out some dugouts there. Then the Cubans also left for the forest, whereas we continued to stay in Cuito-Cuanavale. No one organized anything for us. All we had was our little hiding-place.

I remember that once a shell hit the Angolan staff office, next to it was our hut. And shrapnel from the remains of the shell pierced the wall of our hut. It was made out of light wooden structures like all the houses in Cuito-Cuanavale. The shrapnel pierced the wall of the dining room where all of us were resting and the troop service adviser Colonel Gorb was sitting at the table writing a report. The fragment hit the fridge, don’t how it managed to miss him.

Colonel Gorb was killed a month later. An artillery strike began; all of us go into the hide-out, start playing dominoes. We took it in turns to keep watch but the guards were Angolan. Andrey Ivancovich Gorb was meant to go out on watch to instruct the guards. He was sitting next to our sauna under the canopy, where we carried out political lessons, did sport—the sports’ equipment stood there. All of this was in a confined space, no fence around it though. The guards came on duty at night; they weren’t there during the day. We all went into the hide-out, tell him: “Let’s go”. He said: “I’ll must instruct the guards and come in then”. Then suddenly a Valkiri shell exploded nearby! It flew in through the roof of the canopy. We get out of the hide-out straight away, a GAZ-66 stood just outside it. I look under the truck and see a man lying there. I run up to him. Colonel Gorb looked perfectly fine but one of the balls[43] hit him in the throat, in the carotid artery. We carried him into the hut, the doctor immediately began to help but he died in front of my very eyes. Then I closed his eyes.

Shells landed around our hut so many times. Once a shell landed when I was running into the hide-out and a small, spent piece of shrapnel hit me on the leg. And nothing—just a small scratch.

I remember the bombardment like they were today. Once we were driving from the area where dugouts were to the Command post, still in Cuito-Cuanavale. We are driving in on the BMP-1 into the zone of the Command post and then a shell hits all of a sudden. The Command platoon was to the right of me, 22 people were killed. But in my BMP-1 I just heard bits of shrapnel rattling against the armour.

I parked the BMP-1 and went to the Command post; the artillery bombardment continued. In the car park an Engesa truck with an Angolan soldier inside stood next to the
BMP-1. One shell hit the corner of the Command post dugout, but didn’t really damage anything. I finished my work, come outside but the BMP-1 isn’t there—the Angolan driver drove off somewhere. And where I had left the BMP-1 I see a destroyed Engesa with the dead Angolan driver inside; his stomach mangled by the shrapnel. Had the driver-mechanic of the BMP-1 not driven off the shell could’ve hit it and nothing would’ve saved it.

This was how everyday day work, frequent shelling. The South Africans watched when we drove out to the Command post; they had a visual and acoustic surveillance.

We noted that when we left for the Command post the shelling would begin. Our “zampolit” [Deputy Commander for political affairs] was wounded in his leg. And my reconnaissance battalion was frequently shelled. Once a shell hit us and two men were killed.

The South Africans pounded us using G-5 and G-6s for days on end! You had the double shell bursts. When there was a minus or a plus round as the shell flies over your head you hear the first rumble and then the second as the shell hits the ground. When the two coincide, then it’s “your” hit; it must’ve exploded over your head or somewhere nearby. Awful noise! So many shells and every day.

…When the Command post moved to the forest they constantly bombarded the three remaining installations: the airfield, the radar reconnaissance company and the anti-aircraft defence systems.

…Then we left for the forest and built some dugouts there, but the South Africans pounded us there as well.

…Initially they [Cubans] stayed on the other Western side of Cuito-Cuanavale, on the other side of the Cuito River relative to us. They had defensive positions fitted there. And since Cuito-Cuanavale lies on a hill we could see very well how they were being shelled.

Moreover the Angolans occupied the front positions whereas the Cuban T-55 stood, buried turret-deep in the ground deep in the defensive positions.

…I have a film somewhere, which shows that column of [Cuban] T-62s arriving. They were brought on trailers from the nearest port…There was a tank battalion there. The Cubans didn’t have any reserves in the rear and all the Cuban troops stood in defence in front of Cuito-Cuanavale…

…When I was there they [SADF and UNITA] didn’t occupy Cuito-Cuanavale, in my time, 1986–1989, there wasn’t any occupation of the town. They advanced but they couldn’t get through the Angolan-Cuban defence.
...When the South African tanks were put out of action by the mines, the Cubans took one of them and afterwards everyone was taking photographs of themselves against it in the background. It’s a massive thing that tank, very tall.

...The South Africans kept firing on us. The shelling only began to stop sometime in the end of 1988. Actions of small enemy groups and armed engagements continued. Fire fights and bombardments using mortars still arose. UNITA later used the Valkiris. As well as the South Africans shelled us from far away, the artillery bombardments form 155 mm G-6 howitzers continued...

Constantly, every day, I went to exchange information with the Cubans. They had much better information than the Angolans. They sent out own reconnaissance units.

**ANG 12 — 2 DECEMBER 1987, CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM FROM USINT HAVANA TO SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ IN WHICH CUBA DESCRIBES GEO POSITION AND MIL ROLE IN ANGOLA, DNSA-SA02461.**

Summary: In a possibly significant statement, Cuba has said that its forces are North of the 16th parallel, far removed from UNITA’s main area, and act as a strategic defense against a South African invasion in depth. End summary.

In reporting recent events in Angola, the Cuban press has been careful to emphasize that Cuban troops have not been involved in combat. The insistence on the point by the recently downed Cuban pilot, for example, received special attention here.

Even more interesting was the report in a Prensa Latina November 27 piece... Luanda that referred to the statement of Angolan Vice Minister Venancio de Moura in New York, which affirmed the right of Angola under the UN Charter to ask military help from other countries.

Prensa Latina, however, went on to say that reports underscored that “…the Cuban internationalist forces in Angola have not participated in the fighting. The South African incursions have taken place in the extreme South of Angola near the frontier of Namibia and in the Southeast, a considerable distance from the internationalist Cuban line Namibe-
Menongue, deployed north of the 16th parallel as a strategic force that would impede a massive racist invasion in depth”.

**ANG 13 — 29 JANUARY 1988, CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM FROM USINT HAVANA TO SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ DESCRIBING THE MIL SITUATION IN ANGOLA—CUBANS DENY UNITA SEIZURE OF STRATEGIC TOWN, DNSA-SA02488**

In response to widely circulating reports that UNITA forces have seized the strategic Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale, the Cuban Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) has released a statement that appears on the front page of the January 28 edition of the Communist Party daily Granma. USINT’s informal translation of the statement, entitled “MINFAR gives the lie (to assertions) that the South African racists and the bandits of UNITA have taken Cuito Cuanavale”, follows:

Begin text:

In the last few days, Western media, including the anti-Cuban station that is financed and controlled by the government of the United States, have echoed and beaten on the drum of the supposed seizure by the bandits of UNITA and the South African racists of Cuito Cuanavale, capital city of the Province of Cuando Cubango. In the People’s Republic of Angola on the 22nd of January, the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba state that, as the Angolan authorities have already expressed, such assertions are absolutely false and that the positions of the People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) are being solidly maintained in the cited place after repulsing the unsuccessful attempts of the mixed force of UNITA and South African racists to occupy Cuito Cuanavale.

Also absolutely false is the information that the alluded to sources have published about the supposed casualties of Cuban military personnel in such actions.

End text.
ANG 14 — 18 MARCH 1988, CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM FROM USINT HAVANA TO SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SCHULTZ REGARDING CUBAN ARMED FORCES MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE ON CUBAN-ANGOLA DEFENSE OF CUITO CUANAVALE, DNSA-SA02509

The March 18th edition of the Cuban Communist Party Daily Granma front-pages a defense ministry communiqué detailing the “heroic defense” by Cuban and Angolan troops of Cuito Cuanavale against a South African onslaught. The communiqué refers to 39 Cuban casualties. USINT’s informal translation follows.

Begin text

Communique of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

There has been a substantial change in the situation in Angola. For about three and a half months, South Africa, employing infantry from the counter-revolutionary organization UNITA, troops from the so-called territorial forces of Namibia and regular units from its own army, has tried in vain to occupy the town of Cuito Cuanavale, situated to the west of the river of the same name in the Southeast region of Angola. Cuito Cuanavale is two hundred kilometers to the Southeast of the city of Menongue, which is located on the extreme left flank of the lines defended by Cuban troops in the south of Angola. It was to Cuito Cuanavale, which possesses an airport, that a group of Angolan brigades retreated in November in the face of the large scale South African escalation that took place in October. The retreat helped to avoid defeat at the hands of UNITA in the Mavinga region, approximately 150 kilometers Southeast of Cuito Cuanavale.

The South Africans attacked Cuito Cuanavale with ample employment of infantry, tanks, long range heavy artillery and aircraft. Their final objective was to annihilate the Angolan troops that had grouped there following retreat from UNITA in the Southeast.

In Cuito Cuanavale there were no Cuban military personnel whatsoever, neither advisers nor combat units.

At the request of the Angolan government, Cuban advisers were flown in the first days of December to Cuito Cuanavale, for the FAPLA infantry brigades, the artillery and tank crews. At the same time, some personnel specializing in artillery and tanks were flown in.
Almost simultaneously, the Cuban Air Force in Angola was reinforced with a group of our most experienced pilots, in the middle of January, to counter the persistent South African attack against Cuito Cuanavale. Cuban mechanized infantry units, tanks and artillery were sent to this front, to reinforce the heroic combatants of the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). With the collaboration of a limited number of Cuban advisers and specialists, these forces defended their position.

From the start of December until today, March 17, all enemy attacks against the unyielding Angolan-Cuban resistance have been smashed to bits.

The heavy artillery and long range attacks launched by the South Africans in this period against the Cuito Cuanavale area—more than 20,000 projectiles of 150 millimeter caliber—could not reduce in the least the tenacious resistance of its defenders.

Every effort by the troops of South Africa and its allies to occupy Cuito Cuanavale has been met by a hail of artillery fire and air strikes. The Cuban-Angolan air squadrons have played a brilliant and heroic role in the course of combat. The pilots have shown true prowess attacking ceaselessly and fearlessly the enemy columns and camps. Their actions have been decisive.

Simply put, South Africa, which announced the capture of this town on January 23, almost two months ago, has shattered its teeth against the ferocious resistance of Cuito Cuanavale.

The Angolan soldiers have performed with admirable valor. Because they constitute the bulk of the defensive forces, the Angolans were involved in the heaviest fighting. Their units have suffered several hundred dead and wounded. The Cuban forces, from the arrival on December 5 of the first personnel until March 17, have suffered 39 dead and wounded, whose families have all been duly notified. Most of these losses took place over the last two months.

The enemy has suffered abundant losses. Based on data compiled from their own communications and estimates made by Cuban and Angolan leaders; among their dead and wounded are hundreds of soldiers from the so-called Territorial Forces of Namibia and hundreds more from the white regulars of South Africa itself. In the last 16 days, there has been no new South African attempt to occupy Cuito Cuanavale.

The racists of South Africa have been taught an unforgettable lesson. By stopping cold the forces of racism and apartheid, the heroic Angolan and Cuban combatants of Cuito Cuanavale have become an extraordinary symbol of the dignity of the people of Africa, and of the world.

End text.
Southern Africa has been a troubled region for almost three decades. Conflicts of national liberation have evolved into bitter civil wars, provoking extensive foreign involvement.

This has certainly been true of Angola, which has been wracked by insurgency and invasion since the early 1980s.

Angola’s recent history affords a variety of lessons which are useful to students of contemporary 3rd world conflict. Here, you see a brief chronology of key events in independent Angola.

12 years after Soviet arms and Cuban troops helped install the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), in power, the Marxist regime suffered a near catastrophic military defeat at the hands of the insurgent and South African forces. This briefing will provide a succinct analysis of how a Soviet-designed offensive against Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in Southeastern Angola ended in disaster, and led to a fundamental change in the regional military balance. Special emphasis will be given to the weapons and tactics that affected the outcome.

Here is our agenda:

Following his defeat at the end of the first phase of civil war in 1976, Savimbi rallied his forces in remote, Southeastern Angola. Reorganizing and rebuilding his force, with significant South African assistance, he gradually increased the tempo of insurgent operations.

By the early 1980s, the UNITA challenge was growing rapidly. In 1983, Savimbi’s forces compelled the Angolan and Cuban garrison to abandon the key town of Cangamba, signifying UNITA’s consolidation of its control over the Southeast, and marking entry into a new phase of the insurgency. As UNITA activity spread through the country, the regime tried to move against Savimbi’s stronghold in the Southeast, attempting to cut the insurgency off at its root.

At the same time, the Angolan government sought to transform its military—FAPLA—into a conventional force along Soviet lines. As a result, a more conventional war developed within the broader context of a nation-wide guerilla conflict.

The Angolan government has launched annual dry season offensives against the UNITA base area in recent years. The early offensives were not particularly successful. But the 1985 offensive made unexpected gains, and government troops penetrated to within
12 miles of Mavinga—a key UNITA logistics hub—before being thrown back. The 1986 offensive was preempted by dramatic UNITA attacks on government forces in Central and Southeastern Angola.

Luanda launched another major, Soviet planned offensive in August 1987 to capture Mavinga. This offensive was larger and more complex than previous operations. The objective was to challenge Savimbi’s territorial control by capturing this key town, and to threaten South African logistic support to UNITA guerrillas operation in Northern and Central Angola.

The offensive seriously challenged UNITA’s base region, and achieved some success before bogging down against intense UNITA resistance. UNITA, with some South African support, counterattacked seizing the initiative and pushing government forces back to their starting position at Cuito-Cuanavale.

As the magnitude of the Angolan defeat became apparent, Cuba increased its commitment of combat troops to Angola, by deploying an additional 15,000 troops to Angola, an unmistakable measure to deflect South African attention from the Cuito front. This was not unlike Cuba’s initial rapid military build-up in Angola in 1975, when Havana sent an expeditionary force to Luanda to secure MPLA victory over competing liberation movements.

Our interest, however, is in the 1987 offensive itself, and in its military and political implications. The 1987 offensive can be broken down into four phases, as shown here.

The preparation phase started at the end of the rainy season in March 1987, and consisted of an extensive logistical buildup and improvements to military facilities, particularly airfield runways. FAPLA transported materiel and supplies to forward staging areas, and increased munitions and fuel storage capabilities.

The second phase comprised an Angolan diversionary attack from the North designed to pin down UNITA forces, as well as to force UNITA to redeploy elements from Mavinga. Elements of three FAPLA brigades moved South along two axes of advance with the objective of occupying the towns of Cassambra and Luvuei, both UNITA garrisons and key towns on the North-South supply route leading into South-Eastern Angola. UNITA effectively countered this advance by ambushing lead elements, harassing the main body and interdicting supply lines, which complicated existing logistical deficiencies and geographic constraints. UNITA attacked these units while they awaited resupply and forced them to withdraw northward. UNITA received no direct support from South African combat forces up to this point.
During phase three, FAPLA forces conducted the main attack south from Cuito Cuanavale in an effort to seize Mavinga. Angolan maneuver elements consisted of 4 brigades and 2 operations groups reinforced with additional tank and artillery assets. These battle groups advanced cross-country along two primary axes paralleling the Cunzumbia and Cuzizi rivers. FAPLA forces along each axis consisted of roughly three maneuver brigades with attached fire support. FAPLA’s advance was slow-moving and sporadic, averaging approximately 4 miles per day. There were several reasons for this: first, FAPLA forces moved primarily cross-country, hoping to mitigate the effects of anti-armor weapons and harassing ambushes. Second, FAPLA grouped its forces tightly together both to enhance combat power and to stay within the air-defense umbrella. The Angolans were concerned with the South African air threat. Advancing Angolan forces were supported by SA-8’s and 9’s. These Soviet-made air defense assets succeeded in forcing South African pilots to take protective measures and reduced their effectiveness. FAPLA maneuver forces tended to halt by late afternoon each day in order to dig in and prepare defensive positions.

Another factor impeding the Angolan advance was the difficulty in providing logistic support to the advancing columns. This lack of adequate transport and ongoing UNITA activity in rear areas hampered this support. Also, the need to heavily defended supply convoys diverted combat forces from the main effort. At any one time, FAPLA committed as much as 1/3rd of the combat forces available for the main attack to convoy security. Additional forces, not part of the attacking force, were used to secure LOC’s in the rear.

Numerous water obstacles also hampered FAPLA’s advance. This was compounded by serious shortages of portable bridging equipment.

UNITA’s response to FAPLA’s advance was multi-faceted beginning during FAPLA’s build-up. Initially, it consisted of raids and ambushes in FAPLA’s rear areas as well as small-unit operations throughout Angola destined to tie down FAPLA forces to prevent them from being deployed to the front. Once FAPLA’s advance began, UNITA conducted retrograde operations, harassing FAPLA forces with artillery, mortar and rocket fire, attacking aircraft with shoulder fired missiles and engaging armor from ambush positions with anti-tank weapons. Savimbi hoped to attrite the attacking forces and force FAPLA battle groups to over-exit their supply lines while he withdrew his forces to more desirable positions.

During this phase, UNITA demonstrated its flexibility. As FAPLA advanced, Savimbi redeployed battalions to the Southeast and reorganized smaller guerrilla forces into battalion size units, permitting them to conduct conventional operations. Furthermore,
UNITA’s orderly withdrawal, its systematic destruction of bridges and effective use of obstacles and mines indicated a sophisticated level of command and control.

Then, South African ground elements [excised] drawn from bases in northern Namibia, deployed to Angola and participated with UNITA in operations near Mavinga. In mid-September UNITA and South Africa counterattacked east of Mavinga, effectively destroying one FAPLA BDE. South Africa employed its mechanized forces primarily to block FAPLA’s advance south.

While South African long range artillery fires interdicted FAPLA logistic support, South African air strikes isolated the battlefield, denying access to FAPLA reinforcements. The South African G5 and G6 155-mm artillery and Valkiri 127-mm multiple rocket launchers played a significant role in this effort. The range, flexibility and power of these systems complemented South African close air support. More important, the G5 and G6 enabled the South Africans to engage FAPLA at standoff range, with the result that FAPLA suffered significant casualties long before they were able to engage South Africa and UNITA ground elements. These extended range 155mm guns were perhaps the single most effective weapon used by either side.

During October and November, FAPLA withdrew under pressure in an orderly manner towards Cuito Cuanavale. They reoccupied positions just east of the Cuito River, which they had prepared in July, just prior to the commencement of maneuver operations. The 1987 offensive had failed.

Before continuing, let’s briefly consider some implications of these events.

An assessment of the losses during the 1987 offensive indicates that UNITA inflicted five times as many casualties as it sustained. Some FAPLA combat units may have suffered losses of 12–25 percent of the entire army—the single greatest defeat suffered by Luanda in the 12-year war. In some units the FAPLA attrition may have been higher, especially during the decisive clashes in September-October. UNITA also captured large quantities of combat equipment.

FAPLA’s offensive failed for a variety of reasons: Soviet planning and Angolan strategy, by concentrating on large-scale conventional offensives, may have been unwise. A more fundamental failure, however, was FAPLA’s failure to exploit the advantages of its numbers and more sophisticated equipment. Equally important was UNITA’s superior tactical skill; as was the fact that FAPLA seriously underestimated UNITA’s anti-armor capability.
Another critical event was UNITA's destruction of the key Cuito bridge along the only supply route between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga. Also, the necessity for FAPLA to conduct assault crossings of a number of rivers along both fronts permitted UNITA to attrite FAPLA during crossing attempts. Finally, FAPLA's poor morale and discipline was an important factor in the failure of the operation. This was illustrated by the commander of a brigade-sized battle group. During the decisive battle, he fled, abandoning his troops.

Returning to the military situation, from November-March, FAPLA-held Cuito Cuanavale was under intermittent attack and virtual siege. FAPLA reinforced by the Cuban troops stubbornly held on to its positions on the east bank of the Cuito River. Due to the continued air and ground threat, FAPLA redeployed aircraft from Cuito to the more secure base at Menongue. The tactical command post was also relocated some 12 miles Northwest of Cuito.

UNITA and South African forces could probably have captured Cuito in the November to March period. However, neither was willing to take the heavy casualties that would have resulted from a full-scale effort. South African probes of defensive positions were firmly rebuffed. Thus Pretoria was unable to do more than eliminate the possibility that FAPLA could use Cuito as a forward staging base for a 1988 government offensive.

UNITA exploited its tactical victory at the operational level, continuing conventional and unconventional operations during the subsequent rainy season with numerous attacks on towns, government forces, and lines of communication throughout Angola. In December, UNITA routed a FAPLA brigade at Munhango and destroyed the key bridge over the Cuanza River. These successes isolated the FAPLA garrison at Cuemba, enabling UNITA to tie down six FAPLA brigades attempting to resupply and defend the garrison. UNITA's area of control temporarily expanded to a nearly 200-km section of the Benguela railroad from Luena to Cuemba, facilitating UNITA's transport of personnel and supplies to the north.

Following FAPLA's 1987 defeat, Angolan President Dos Santos reportedly met with President Castro and requested a qualitative as well as quantitative increase in Cuban military assistance. Starting in late 1987, the Cubans deployed approximately 15,000 additional combat troops to Angola. [Excised]. Most of these personnel deployed southward toward the Namibian border in March 1988. By June, Cuban forces in South Western Angola consisted of 5 tank brigades with 10 to 12,000 troops and some 500 tanks.

While UNITA and South Africa had won the battle in the southeast, the Cuban deployment to the southwest ended Pretoria's military dominance of southern Angola.
Castro’s move was a strategic coup because he challenged the South Africans militarily without actual combat. [Excised]. Despite routing the Cubans in a 27 June clash, Pretoria was not able to reassert its military ascendancy in southern Angola.

Although we cannot be certain as to what the various parties may have learned from the 1987 offensive, we have identified several areas in which FAPLA could improve its performance on the battlefield. Based on our analysis, FAPLA success would require significant improvement in the ability to synchronize the employment of various combat arms. The Angolan Army’s slow advance during the ‘87 offensive not only permitted UNITA to control the tempo of the battle, but also necessitated significant increases in logistic support. Improving the discipline and morale of FAPLA soldiers would also improve FAPLA’s capability. FAPLA’s inability to withstand the combined UNITA/South African counter-attack at the Lomba River may have been due to FAPLA’s poor morale and discipline, as it was superior to UNITA/South African combat power. FAPLA’s past reliance on tanks to spearhead attacks proved ineffective. The use of heavily armored forces complicated logistic operations and degraded mobility. Fairly heavy brush in southern Angola limits the ability of tanks to engage at standoff range, making them vulnerable to attack by more mobile and lightly armored vehicles.

There are no indications that FAPLA has learned from its 1987 failure. There have been no comprehensive changes in command, nor has there been reorganization at the tactical level. Furthermore, we have seen no evidence that FAPLA morale and discipline have improved significantly since the offensive. Soldiers are still inadequately fed, clothed and equipped, and desertions continue at a high rate.

[Excised]

UNITA, on the other hand, has adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faces in Angola. By 1987, UNITA had clearly recognized its limitations to counter the initial stages of a full-scale conventional FAPLA offensive. FAPLA’s greater firepower makes this extremely hazardous. Instead, by conducting orderly retrograde and delaying operations, UNITA allowed FAPLA’s inherent logistic and command and control deficiencies to take their toll. Ultimately, UNITA could establish viable defensive positions and assemble a counter attack force, while attriting the advance with guerilla attacks.

During the initial stages of the 1987 offensive, UNITA’s combined retrograde and unconventional warfare operations cut FAPLA logistic support and effectively retarded the movement of FAPLA maneuver units along main avenues of approach. When
FAPLA was in a tactically vulnerable position, UNITA effectively counterattacked and seized the initiative.

Cuba apparently realized that deploying Cuban combat units to the areas of most likely conflict would ensure FAPLA’s survival as a combat force. Realizing that it was not sufficient to merely secure bases and provide advisers, Cuba had to demonstrate its willingness to deploy its forces on the front line. Cuba’s reinforcement and redeployment of its forces in Angola close to the Namibian border, effectively demonstrated this.

South Africa, concerned with the deployment of Cuban troops to the southwest in early 1988, now proved interested in Cuba’s willingness to consider withdrawing its forces in exchange for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435. South Africa reassessed its position in Angola to determine whether or not active involvement in Southern Africa was a vital national interest. Apparently, in the near term, South Africa has decided it is not.

In conclusion, Angola suffered a strategic defeat during its 1987 offensive. Although FAPLA was able to retain Cuito Cuanavale, the number of casualties suffered—as much as 15 percent of its army—as well as UNITA’s ability to maintain the integrity of its territory in southeastern Angola, threatened to significantly alter the balance of power in the region. It was this development that led to the Cuban build-up in southern Angola, which redressed this military balance, challenging South African military dominance along the Namibian border. This, in turn, provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.
The aim of the operation was destruction of UNITA main forces, capture of Savimbi’s headquarters in the area of Mavinga and installation of the lawful government’s authority in the South-East of the country. In case of the interference of the South African troops we in co-operation with Cuban troops had to do away with intruders. The Angolan president gave his approval and the preparation of this operation began. I and all my advisors got fully involved in planning and preparation.

The plan of the operation:

- by aggressive actions of a tank battalion, a motorized infantry brigade on infantry combat vehicles, and an anti-aircraft missile battery with reserves of ammunition and food to make during the 30 days a maneuver through the rear of the enemy main grouping, destroy rear bases and depots, do away with its reserves, capture the UNITA HQ in Mavinga and reach the Angolan-Namibian border;
- to form an offensive grouping on the southern bank of the Cuito river, which in co-operation with the maneuver grouping will deliver a dashing blow and confirm the overthrow of the whole South-Eastern grouping of UNITA.

The operation began in the last days of September by actions of the mobile maneuver group (MMG) in the enemy’s rear. Initially it almost was not meeting an active enemy resistance and was successfully advancing along the Lomba river valley. On the seventh day, having advanced 80–90 km, it was suddenly attacked by the SAAF, however this attack was rebuffed without any losses due to the anti-aircraft missile battery which shot down several South African aircraft. Then the situation became more complicated: the SAAF delivered blows against the MMG several times a day, then the shelling by missile artillery and under this cover UNITA units delivered several attacks, but they were rebuffed by the MMG. Finally, the South African Army tank units went into action.

The MMG passed on to a stiff defence, but suffered heavy losses. Some of Angolan crews, having seen “white” South African crews, left their tanks and run away. Getting use of their panic South African units delivered a counter-attack into the flank of the Angolan troops and the MMG, including five Soviet advisors and specialists, turned to be half-encircled. The situation towards Cuito-Cuanavale also became more complicated; South African tank units went into action there as well.
Having taken a decision to come out of the semi-encirclement, the MMG command did not make a proper reconnaissance of the Lomba floodplain and did not organize the control at the river-crossing. The MMG columns came under the aiming bomb attack of the SAAF. The group suffered a complete defeat, just several tanks, infantry combat vehicles and five anti-aircraft missile systems with our specialists came out of the semi-encirclement.

After the South African tank units went into action in the Mavinga-Cuito-Cuanavale direction, one Angolan brigade got encircled, our interpreter [Lieutenant Oleg Snitko] was heavily wounded. His urgent evacuation from the battlefield was needed and this was skillfully done by our [Cuban] helicopter pilots. Very unfortunately, the interpreter died due to heavy bleeding.

The situation was getting aggravated daily; the Angolan troops could really lose an important strategic region. After the Angolan President’s appeal to Fidel Castro the Cuban troops went into action on the Angolan side. After mighty firepower preparation, Cuban units pressed a counter-attack against South African tank units, which suffered heavy losses and were obliged to retreat, having dropped several damaged tanks and dead soldiers on the battlefield. The Cubans captured them as a “material evidence” of South Africa’s participation in actions. The situation at Cuito-Cuanavale got stabilized. However, the South African long-range artillery continued firing at the locality where the Front HQ and over 30 our advisors and specialists were stationed. As a result of exhausting three-month shelling one of our advisors [Colonel Andrey Gorb] was killed and several officers were shell-shocked.

The operation did not reach its aim and the stated tasks were not fulfilled. The Angolan troops suffered big losses in armament and equipment. The enemy captured anti-aircraft missile installations, tanks and a big number of automobile vehicles, which with relevant comments were demonstrated by Savimbi to foreign journalists from the USA, South Africa and other countries.

The results of the operation did not satisfy Moscow, nor Luanda. The main responsibility for a failed operation was naturally put on the GVS [Chief Military Advisor]. A commission from “Desyatka” [Chief Tenth Department of the General Staff] headed by Colonel-General Kurochkin flew in from Moscow. It worked for ten days and did not find criminal deficiencies, while nobody of us can work ideally, without slightest deficiencies. I personally reported the results of the operation to Akhromeev [Chief of the General Staff]. But the most difficult in moral respect was my report to President of Angola, whom in the
beginning of the operation I, as a military specialist, was convincing, that the operation would be successful and that Savimbi would be routed.

And here I am in the office of the President, reporting the situation with a map in my hands. By that time the situation, taking into account the defeat of South African troops, which tried to capture Cuito-Cuanavale, was stable. But we both understood that the main role in the victory was played by the Cuban troops, which more than once rescued FAPLA in its fighting with UNITA band formations, and he asks me the main question: why have not we fulfilled the stated mission? I answer him, as I can. I do not know, whether he was satisfied with my answer. For myself, it seems to me, I found the answer why such thoroughly prepared operation failed. I think the Angolan students had no sufficient force of spirit, apparently at the genetic level they fear a white man. And, if it so, equipment will help! Indeed, at the Lomba River, having met the white tank crews, Angolan crews were abandoned their intact tanks with ammunition!... Of course, I could not say this to President. This was the most difficult operation during three and a half years I sent in Angola.

Comments by Vitaly Mozolev, who served at Cuito-Cuanavale from September 1986 to December 1988:

I have not read more accurate account of the events. But I do not agree with the assessments. The cause of encirclement (not of the defeat) at Cuito-Cuanavale was not a “genetic fear of the whites”. FAPLA was not ready to confront South African regular troops. These are the stages of formation of any army. Indeed, the initial stage of the operation was correct and successful, but the forces were not sufficient for South African troops... The defence of Cuito-Cuanavale is the VICTORY of the young Angolan army, and not the defeat.

Comments by Danial Gukov, who served as a battalion commander’s advisor at Cuito-Cuanavale for two years:

I agree with Valentin Mozolev. General Gusev underestimated the role of an Angolan soldier at that time.
In the first days of October 1987, a week after the arrival of new ambassador to Angola the government troops suffered a defeat at the Lomba River from the UNITA rebels, actively supported by the South African armed forces. President Reagan extolled “the heroes of Lomba”. The acquaintance with war-torn Angola and its President Eduardo dos Santos took place against a background of this defeat. Gradually encounters with him it became regular (almost twice per month), thorough, they found trust. In one of them arose the possibility to probe the attitude of the President toward the peaceful decision of the long-standing armed conflict with UNITA. Scale and bitterness of military actions made up intransigence toward UNITA in the government of Angola. I had an impression that even inside the Politbureau Dos Santos could not then discuss the idea of negotiations with UNITA. I wrote to Moscow, that the President was ready to examine the peaceful way of settling the conflict as well, but no instructions came to continue conversations with Dos Santos in this direction.

Later Shevardnadze met me in a dual way, supporting a general direction of these encounters, he criticised me for my actions without permission from the Centre [Moscow]. In a sly way. He instructed me to draft his paper to M.S. Gorbachev, where the theme of peace negotiations would be wholly put in the mouth of Dos Santos. Thus our work in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Angola was “legalized”. It facilitated first the New York agreements between Angola, RSA and Cuba (December 1988) and then the signing of a peace accord near Lisbon in June 1991, when Dos Santos and Savimbi shook hands for the first time.

After the meeting [in December 1990] between Shevardnadze and Savimbi vacillations nearly appeared in Moscow—whom to orient ourselves to? Our embassy defended orientation towards dos Santos in defiance of the fashion of those days and to spite various “democrats”. Shevardnadze’s assistants and even our press began showering praise on Savimbi, pointing to his intellect, sense of humour, etc. It reminded how Americans praised him to me, underlining in our discussions that he was quoting Rousseau in French, Mao Zedong in Chinese, etc. However the champions of democracy could not but see that, in addition
to Savimbi’s cult, witchcraft, corporal punishments and other “democratic” pearls of the Middle Ages were flourishing in UNITA.

The end of Jonas Savimbi is well-known now, but somehow we do not hear from the other side of the ocean repentances towards the people of Angola that for a quarter of a century had been bearing the full brunt of a destructive war due to fanaticism of the UNITA leader, for so long obliged by the USA and on their advice by other governments.

The war and other Angolan matters required meetings with Jorge Risquet and Carlos Aldana, members of the Cuban leadership who visited Luanda, with General Ochoa, the commander of the Cuban troops in Angola, who was later sentenced and shot in Havana. Cubans sometimes lamented Dos Santos, they considered him irresolute. I replied to them that for a ruined country, Angola a leader who takes a measure seven times before cutting is better. As in the years of a protracted war, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, a rare political veteran and once a student in Baku, remains at the helm of the country almost unnoticeably for an outside world.

Working in Angola and then heading the Department of African Countries of the USSR MFA I took part in establishing contacts and later diplomatic with then still racist South Africa. The first South African official, whom I met at the talks in Luanda, was Niel Barnard, head of intelligence. In summer 1991 he was secretly in Moscow as a guest of KGB and requested to invite his first Soviet interlocutor for a launch.

A colourful figure was the then South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha. Meetings with him sometimes were rather harsh. Initially at the talks in Johannesburg and Vienna it was agreed to exchange the missions of interests attached to the embassies of Austria in Pretoria and Moscow. Then, having organised a dinner for us in Pretoria, Botha used blackmail: he accused us in “cowardice” and said that he will not go for a halved decision, only for the establishment of full diplomatic relations. By the end of the dinner I pretended that I had already informed Moscow about his position (albeit, we have no mobile phones then). The roles were changed, and Botha had not just to agree, but to strive for the exchange of missions. All this was made official in Vienna with the participation of Kleistel, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry and future President of Austria.

Botha was rather extravagant later as well. He managed to impose his personal visit to Moscow, moreover precisely on 7 November 1991. (We have to agree to it, because the mayors of Petersburg and Moscow Sobchak and Popov to spite of the Centre agreed to meet him in that day. Talks with him were conducted by Pankin, a short-lived USSR Foreign Minister.)
In February 1992, I was present at the officialisation of the diplomatic relations between Russia and the RSA by [Foreign Minister] A. Kozyrev and R. Botha. In the transitional period Pik Botha was Minister of Mines, and some years ago even jointed the ANC.

…their [the US] ‘programme-maximum’ at the talks included not only the settlement of the main core of the problem (withdrawal of both South Africans and Cubans from Angola, and the independence of Namibia), but ‘an additional prize’ as well, that is “bringing Savimbi to power or at least power-sharing. Finally Americans lowered their stakes. To us it was easier in this sense. We always proceeded from the point that what is advantageous for our friends will be suitable for us as well. We said, we would not ask for anything above it. And we did not ask, having kept this line to the end. And, what is important, having preserved in Angola a government friendly to us and having not spoiled relations with Cubans (this happened later, but fortunately not for a long time).

…If we hadn’t come to the assistance to the MPLA, seven thousand kilometres from our borders [in 1975], who would have benefited from it? Little doubt, it would be South Africa. Has not it interfered in Angolan internal affairs? South African columns were stopped in a near proximity to Luanda. What were they doing there? They were bringing to power their protégé Savimbi. On what basis? What would be further developments in the region, if the racist South Africa had grabbed Angola in addition to Namibia? How many more years would its domination by force over the region continue? For how many more years would apartheid survive?

And 13 years later, in 1988, South Africa, still fundamentally racist would hardly have left Angola of its own will, had it not faced the dilemma: to wage a large-scale war against the Cubans, to declare total mobilisation, to risk a lot of whites’ blood or to settle for a compromise…

Cubans drastically raised the price South Africa would have to pay for a military option, forced it more attentively to look to advantages of a peaceful solution and finally to
lean towards it. It is clear that the Cuban factor was not the only one; the RSA govern-
ment had all the time to look back at the situation in the country [South Africa]. But the
Cuban military pressure brought about equilibrium on the battlefield, which was a certain
forerunner of the talks to follow.

However, the Cuban role became efficient only owing to our support, including first
of all, supplies of arms.
## TIMELINE ON ANGOLA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Peasant protest against forced cotton cultivation in Malange violently suppressed. Subsequent events: an attack on a Luanda prison and an armed revolt in the north by the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA) mark the beginnings of the armed struggle for independence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>The UPA merges with the Angolan Democratic Party (PDA) to become the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) under the leadership of Holden Roberto, who quickly established a revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Jonas Savimbi, having left the FNLA and its government in exile, establishes the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td><strong>April</strong> In Portugal, units of the Portuguese armed forces seize power. General António de Spínola is appointed leader of the Movement of Armed Forces (MFA) regime. <strong>June</strong> Portugal suspends military activities against Angolan nationalists. <strong>July</strong> Portugal acknowledges Angola's right to self-determination and all its consequences. <strong>September</strong> Without the High Commissioner in Angola, Admiral Rosa Coutinho’s knowledge, Spínola hosts a secret meeting in Cape Verde reportedly with President Mobutu of Zaire, Roberto, Savimbi and MPLA dissident Daniel Chipenda in an attempt to establish a provisional government that excludes Agostinho Neto’s MPLA. Two weeks later Spínola resigns with the radicals in the ascendancy within the MFA.</td>
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1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Portugal invites the MPLA, UNITA and FNLA to participate in a transitional government, the details of which are worked out in the Alvor Accords, signed on 15 January. The transitional government is inaugurated on 31 January. It includes a ‘troika’ presidency of the three independence movements, and ministerial posts divided between the movements and Portugal. The arrangement fails and fighting soon breaks out between the MPLA and FNLA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>The US launches covert operations in Angola to prevent a Communist takeover.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>The FNLA is expelled from Luanda by the MPLA in July after heavy street battles. Fighting in other parts of the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>The first Cuban military advisers to the MPLA arrive. Zairian units enter northern Angola in support of the FNLA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>MPLA control in Luanda is secured when the last remaining UNITA officials leave for central Angolan towns with some 10,000 supporters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>South Africa secretly launches Operation Savannah, when the first of several SADF columns (Task Force Zulu) cross into Angola from Namibia. SADF troops fan out northwards from Cunene towards Luanda. First clash between Cuban training personnel and South African troops.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**November**

On 9 November first contingent of Cuban combat troops arrive.

On 10 November MPLA and Cuban troops ward off the last big attack of the FPLA, Zairean troops and mercenaries. On 11 November Portugal formally transfers sovereignty to all Angolans. The MPLA, in control of Luanda while conflict rages across the country, proclaims the People’s Republic of Angola. South African and UNITA forces are poised 180 miles south of Luanda. The FNLA and UNITA set up their own government in Huambo, which quickly falls apart.

On 16 November the first group of Soviet military instructors arrived.

**December**

The US Senate terminates covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. This is later extended by the ‘Clark Amendment’.

**1976**

**January**

After earlier large-scale Soviet airlifts of materials to the MPLA, UNITA-SADF positions are under massive attack. By February, the MPLA/Cubans have recaptured Huambo, Benguela, São Salvador (M’banza-Kongo, a FNLA stronghold) and the last FNLA outpost at San António do Zaire (Soyo). The OAU recognizes Angola as a member state.

**March**

South Africa withdraws most of its forces.

**November**

UN recognizes Angola as a full member.

**1977**

Rebel forces from Angola sweep into Zaire and capture much of Shaba province.

**May**

An MPLA faction led by Nita Alves attempts a coup which is bloodily put down, leading to greater centralization and control by the Neto government and political repression.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>December</strong></td>
<td>MPLA's first Congress. The party is renamed the MPLA-Partido do Trabalho (MPLA-Party of Labour), and formally adopts a Marxist-Leninist ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1978</strong></td>
<td>The SADF attacks Cassinga, Hufla, alleging the presence of a South West Africa People's organization (SWAPO) training camp. Hundreds die in what becomes known as the ‘Cassinga Massacre’.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1979</strong></td>
<td>President Neto dies of cancer, and is succeeded by Jose Eduardo Dos Santos.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1981</strong></td>
<td>South Africa invades southern Angola again, with the declared aim to pursue the insurgents of SWAPO, though most fighting is between the SADF and Angolan forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1982</strong></td>
<td>Secret negotiations between South Africa and Angola are held in Cape Verde.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1983</strong></td>
<td>SADF major operation in Angola</td>
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<td><strong>1984</strong></td>
<td>Angola and South Africa sign an accord in Lusaka, providing for a ceasefire, South African withdrawal, and relocation of SWAPO away from the border region. Implementation takes over a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1985</strong></td>
<td>SADF major operation in Angola</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1987

South Africa openly admits its support for UNITA and engages Angolan and Cuban in direct confrontations. The Angolan government sends the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) into a full scale offensive against UNITA-SADF to recapture Mavinga and its airfield, but after initial progress is forced back to Cuito Cuanavale.

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>South Africa is castigated by the United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>South African forces heavily bombard Cuito Cuanavale (until late March 1988).</td>
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1988

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Cuito Cuanavale comes close to being taken.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>The SADF and UNITA stop their offensive Cuban, Angolan and SWAPO troops began their advance towards the Namibian border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Negotiations are initiated in London between Angola, Cuba and South Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Cuban MiGs bomb attack the Calueque dam, previously held by SA forces. South African troops withdraw across the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>SA government agrees to implementation of the ‘UN Plan’ (in exchange for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, SADF full withdrawal from Angola).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Following tentative agreements in July and August, the New York Accords are signed. The Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December commits the Cuban, Angolan and South African governments to sign an agreement under the auspices of the UN. The signing ceremony of the Tripartite Agreement - “The People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola,” - (plus the Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba) takes place on 22 December. The UN Security Council creates the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to supervise the Cuban withdrawal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Cuba begins withdrawing its troops from Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>President Dos Santos and Savimbi sign a ceasefire in Gbadolite, Zaire hosted by President Mobutu. The agreement collapses amid differing interpretations of what was agreed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>The MPLA drops Marxism-Leninism.</td>
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</table>
The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Conflict 1974–1980

As Professor Terry Ranger has pointed out, there are overlapping and contradictory black narratives and overlapping and contradictory white narratives in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe story. “It is too simplistic to interpret [Rhodesian] history in binary terms—white versus black; or colonialism versus anti-colonialism.”¹ In understanding the course and dynamic of the struggle in Rhodesia, it is crucial to appreciate the impact of the Cold War upon the perceptions of Rhodesian elites and their consequent response; the outlook and strategy of the regional hegemon, South Africa, vis-à-vis Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the 1970s, and the response of the various nationalist and liberation movements themselves, who looked for external assistance and support in the increasingly violent struggle for accelerated black enfranchisement.

This paper seeks to point to the complex ways in which the struggle in Rhodesia interacted with the Cold War environment. Much of its analysis focuses upon the role of South

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Africa. In part this is a function of the availability—and survival—of primary documents. I welcome this opportunity to explore other key aspects and areas, particularly the role of the Soviet Union and Cuba and the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean nationalist struggle.

The epoch and outcome of the Rhodesian white settler rebellion against London, its own constructed identity and patriotism, and attempt to build a particular version of a multi-racial society (albeit one founded on racial “habits of mind” in economic and social terms, even if not racial hierarchies and attitudes according to biological criteria) cannot be separated from the Cold War. Indeed, the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) era serves to underline the extent to which the Cold War was indeed also a propaganda battle fought on the home front. The Rhodesia Front’s perception was of a global ideological menace—a combination of anti-communism, anti-liberalism, anti-socialism and anti-internationalism—which situated the country as the “front line” of the war against communism. In one sense, the RF could be seen as a quasi-fascist organization, with its emphasis on these “-isms,” as well as world conspiracy, the cult of personal leadership that developed around Ian Smith, who presented himself as the embodiment of the Rhodesian spirit and identity. This perception of Rhodesia at “the cutting edge of the struggle against communism, with its stalwarts trying to uphold Western civilized standards,” went far beyond the Rhodesian Front politicians. Furthermore, anti-communist rhetoric and propaganda was used by RF politicians to undercut the democratic space of the liberal element of the white community. It was a means to maintain solidarity of the European population, and was used as a tool to transcend race—thus vital glue to hold the Rhodesia Front together, for the RF as a mass movement was not as solid as it looked.

In large part thanks to the Cold War, the Smith government’s propaganda machine helped create an embattled, besieged laager mentality, and enforce a sense of Rhodesian patriotism. By stressing the universal communist menace, the government sought to

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3. Author’s interview with Brian Oliver, Assistant Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office, Rhodesia, 1972–1978, 15 March 2005.
4. Ibid. Winston Churchill was the Rhodesian model of a successful “war leader.”
construct political and social alliances across the white community, to marginalize white liberalism, and to try to co-opt black traditional elites and moderate opinion. The RF leadership regarded domestic African opposition and guerrilla warfare as the product of an external, communist threat—rather than seeing it as home-grown resistance to white minority rule.7 (As Ian Hancock has pointed out, the motley grouping of white liberals did themselves no favors by failing to produce a coherent, consistent alternative.) Anti-communist ideology also played an important role in helping to suborn the Rhodesian business community, many of the members of which had been very dubious indeed about the Smith government’s course of confrontation with Westminster. The government and supporting civil service, and wider societal opinion within the country, believed that they were building a stable, prosperous multi-racial society, founded on sustained economic growth and gradual transference of skills. Of course, this approach proved a political disaster, because failure to reform sufficiently swiftly alienated and radicalized African nationalism, and encouraged the search for external financial and military support.

This paper seeks to emphasize the insidious, as well as the direct role of the Cold War—in terms of threat perception and response—upon the outlook and behavior of the Rhodesia Front and the South African governments. These white minority elites’ policies towards black African nationalism began to diverge in the 1970s. In Rhodesia from 1966, and especially from 1972, the ‘white nationalists’ adopted an overwhelmingly military response to the growing insurgency, rather than a political strategy of parallel accelerated political reform. This was initially a police action, with the white officered, but African dominated, British South Africa Police (BSAP) at the front line of the conflict. This produced a spasmodic, but inexorable slide towards war. The emphasis on police action, and treatment of the guerrillas through the civil courts, underlined the prevailing conception that the nationalists were criminal, deviant elements, manipulated and directed by external sinister communist forces. The promise was the defeat of the “terrs”9 and the survival of

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9. Slang for “terrorists.”

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It was only towards the end of the 1970s that there was a growing realization among more “liberal” elements of the Rhodesian Front movement and bureaucratic administration of the growing indigenous force and validity of African nationalist sentiment.
the white-directed Rhodesian state. The security services elaborated techniques and practices learned in other British colonial wars of Malaya and Kenya: this included emergency security legislation, the incarceration of black nationalist leaders between 1964–1974, the creation of “protected villages” (PVs), and the increasingly violent military response to the growing insurgency. The overwhelming emphasis remained on the military sphere, as the state became fixated upon “body counts” as the measurement of supposed success. (Nothing was learned from America’s experience in Vietnam, which was assiduously covered on Rhodesian television and in the press.) Detailed notebooks taken from political officers attached to insurgent groups, as well as uniforms and weaponry from the Eastern bloc were seen as overwhelming confirmation of the sinister agenda of Russian- and Chinese-directed communism. Rhodesian military intelligence drew up a detailed manual of Soviet and Maoist military organizational and engagement techniques, indoctrination strategies, and approaches to peasant mobilization; the document was handed over to the South Africans in early 1980. The avowedly apolitical stance of the Rhodesian armed services—a widely believed, but in itself a false construct, given its service to the particular agenda of the Rhodesian state—militated against reassessment of the political desirability and effectiveness of counter-insurgency. It was only towards the end of the 1970s that there was a growing realization among more “liberal” elements of the Rhodesian Front movement and bureaucratic administration of the growing indigenous force and validity of African nationalist sentiment.

**Question:** To what extent did the white Rhodesian government’s resistance to accelerated black political and economic rights create “the communist threat”—the collaboration of African nationalist and liberation movements and Soviet bloc and Cuban support?

13. According to Peter Stiff, the Rhodesian security chiefs told Ian Smith on 20 July 1977 the war could not be won by purely military means. Stiff in Parker, *Assignment Selous Scouts*, 15.
In contrast, the Pretoria government—and in particular, the Prime Minister, John Vorster—had come to the conclusion of the necessity of accommodation with black nationalism much earlier in the decade. In the conviction that it was now imperative to support the transition to moderate (i.e. non-communist) black majority rule in the region to ensure the survival of white directed rule inside South Africa itself, Vorster initiated a policy of détente with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1974. (This paralleled the establishment of supposed black majority rule in the “Bantustans” within South African territory: nominally independent, but in reality economically dependent black African entities. These were “constructed” by the National Party government as South African internal decolonization.) The intention was to demonstrate that “separate development” within South Africa was not intended for export, and did not threaten regional stability. South African policy towards Rhodesia was also conditioned by intense personal dislike and distrust of Ian Smith (and PK van der Byl) among South African officials. In the view of the Nationalists, the RF Government had already accepted the principle of ultimate majority rule under its 1961 Constitution. In this way, the South African Cabinet rationalized its pressure upon Smith to reach a swift settlement. In the RSA’s view, this did not contradict South Africa’s constant dictum of non-interference in a country’s internal affairs. Rhodesians “had (already) made their choice and must live with the implications.”

The Cold War also crucially framed South Africa’s view of which African regional liberation movement was preferable to achieve black majority rule for, as Pretoria appreciated, African nationalist movements were varied. There emerged a direct correlation between South Africa’s policy on the Rhodesia issue in the 1970s and the South-West Africa/Namibia independence question—where Pretoria was determined to secure a peaceful transition to moderate black majority rule through the Turnhalle Conference.

14. A South African-born Rhodesian politician, Pieter Kenyon (PK) van der Byl was a member of the Rhodesian Front and served under Prime Minister Ian Smith as Minister of Defense from 1974 to 1976 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1974 to 1979.
16. The 1969 constitution envisaged eventual racial equality of representation, not black majority rule.
process, and the exclusion of the more radical SWAPO movement. Pretoria repeatedly sought to impress upon Ian Smith, firstly, the need to come to terms with Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU), and then to emulate South Africa’s approach on the SWA/Namibia issue of identifying a more moderate indigenous faction to whom power could be incrementally transferred. For its part, the Rhodesian Front government harbored a growing resentment towards the National Party Government in Pretoria, stimulated by Rhodesia’s increasing economic, financial and military dependence upon her southern neighbor. Vorster’s pursuit of détente was viewed as profoundly flawed, and certain to end in disaster for not only Rhodesia, but for the apartheid regime itself.

There seems to have been a fundamental lack of appreciation in the Rhodesian government’s understanding of the extent to which the failure to implement change had radicalized the Rhodesian nationalist and liberation movements, and encouraged the turn to armed struggle in the 1960s.

**Question: Why is this?**

Here the Cold War also helped to frame the political and military choices of the Rhodesian African nationalist movements. Although the four main trends of Zimbabwean nationalism drew their impulses from a variety of sources within Rhodesian society, external support from the Front Line States and the Soviet bloc was of growing importance in determining the outcome of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean conflict.

**Question: How far was Marxist rhetoric a deliberate ploy to gain external support? To what extent was the choice of external support shaped by the political leadership? The military leadership?**

ZAPU’s ability to solicit OAU and Soviet funding and support—leading to an ANC/ZAPU

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alliance in the Wankie campaign\textsuperscript{19} of 1966–67—continued into the 1970s. Yet pressure was exerted by the OAU and the host countries, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia on both ZAPU and ZANU forces operating from their territories, to cooperate in the political sphere. This led to first the ANC unity pact of December 1974, the façade of the Patriotic Front in 1976, a nominal political alliance between the two, brokered for the Geneva Conference. However, the military rupture between ZIPRA and ZANLA persisted.\textsuperscript{20}

**Question:** Why were external backers unable to encourage unity of Zimbabwean radical nationalist movements? How far was the effectiveness of the nationalist cause also compromised by external factors and support?

While ZAPU’s strategy shifted to plans for conventional warfare in 1977–79, backed by Soviet logistical guidance (a Soviet military delegation was attached to the Zambian Defense Ministry in Lusaka, specifically for this purpose)\textsuperscript{21} and Cuban training of 600 ZIPRA fighters per year from 1977 onwards at Boma in Angola, the predominantly peasant army of ZANU/ZANLA, based principally in Mozambique, relied increasingly upon the People’s Republic of China, and Maoist strategies of mobilization and revolutionary warfare. By 1976, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Rumania were also offering more training facilities to ZANU.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} In 1967, an ANC guerrilla unit known as the Luthuli Detachment established an alliance with the military wing of the Zimbabwean liberation organization ZAPU. The ANC forces intended to enter Southern Rhodesia via Zambia, march across the Wankie (Hwange) Game Reserve, and return home to South Africa to mobilize resistance from within. Meanwhile, other ANC guerrillas were to assist ZAPU in establishing a military base in Lupane in northeast Rhodesia. However, beginning 13 August and lasting until September, the ANC-ZAPU group clashed with Rhodesian and South African forces.


\textsuperscript{22} Josiah Tungamirai, “Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a War Machine,” in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, edited by Ranger and Bhebe, Heinemann, 1995, 42.
Questions: To what extent were the Soviets and Cubans coordinating their support for Rhodesian/Zimbabwean nationalist movements? Did this produce friction between Havana and Moscow? Why was there a shift to a conventional military strategy for ZAPU/ZIPRA? Was there any residual coordination between ZANLA and ZIPRA command structures (below the level of leadership)? How much of the focus of the struggle for power was deliberately directed at defeating rival African nationalist armies/movements, as opposed to the Rhodesian security forces? Did winning the war take priority over political negotiations and compromise? How important was Chinese support and what form did it take?

DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

The Kissinger Initiative

Behind contemporary popular European perceptions of cooperation and racial solidarity between white minority regimes, the inveterate animosity that in reality existed between the South African government and Ian Smith’s regime hardened as the 1970s progressed. The strategic landscape altered dramatically following the Portuguese coup of April 1974 and independence of Mozambique in June 1975. The Vorster government attempted to nudge the obdurate Ian Smith regime towards accommodation with moderate black Rhodesian/Zimbabwean nationalism, first in collaboration with Zambia in 1974–5. This coordinated policy between South Africa and Zambia, paralleled a particularly intense period of factional infighting within the ANC. This prompted a determined crackdown by the Zambian security forces, resulting in the detention of the old guard, and this incarceration was used by a group of young Marxist-oriented commanders as the opportunity to try to forge a union of ZANU and ZAPU and their relevant guerrilla armies. However, these “green shoots” of compromise and nationalist collaboration rapidly withered, and 1975 proved “a bad year” for the nationalist cause.

The course of the war in neighboring Angola directly influenced subsequent developments in Rhodesia. The Ford administration was determined to ensure that there would not be a repetition of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Rhodesia. Kissinger’s concern
prompted a strategic review of American’s southern African policy in the spring of 1976, and the launching of his Africa initiative which placed greatest emphasis on achieving a settlement in Rhodesia. Both the British and the Americans had identified the South African government as the key element. The South African government itself, isolated and embattled by the international outcry following its intervention in Angola in late 1975 and facing censure under Chapter 7 in the United Nations, had reached its own conclusions on the necessity of breaking out of its international pariah status. Rhodesia appeared to offer the key for the road back to diplomatic acceptability.

The year 1976 therefore marked a vital watershed for both Rhodesia and South Africa. In essence, it represented an imperial crisis for South Africa: a combination of violence and defeat on the periphery in the Angolan theater, which threatened South Africa’s domination of its “near abroad,” stimulated domestic disequilibrium and disturbances. Driven by the perceived paramount need to restore South African international legitimacy and regional authority following the intervention in Angola, Pretoria embarked upon a coordinated “squeeze play” with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger which led directly to Smith’s historic acceptance of the principle of majority rule within two years. However, this foundered in the abortive Geneva Conference. As Senator Dick Clark reported after the completion of his southern Africa tour in November 1976, the Geneva Conference had little chance of leading to a successful transition to majority rule. “The two sides are simply too far apart, and neither has shown any inclination to moderate its position.” Clark also blamed Kissinger for failing to appreciate the significance of Rhodesian insistence on the appointment of white Ministers of Defense and of Law and Order, and a white chairman of the Council of Ministers.23

Question: How far was the failure of the Geneva Conference the product of African nationalist divisions? The unwillingness of the Rhodesian Front government to consider key compromises? How far was it the product of a lack of political support from the Ford administration in an election year? Why was South Africa not more actively engaged in seeing a successful outcome?

23. 27 November 1976, Memorandum for the Record, from Dick Clark, U.S. Senate, NARA.
The Owen-Vance Proposals

The advent of the Carter administration in Washington in January 1977 ushered in a new phase of the Rhodesian conflict. The new President saw racial justice in the form of black majority rule in southern Africa in both moral and political/ideological terms—as a vital weapon to forestall communist influence and control in a key geostrategic region. This led to a remarkable era of American multilateral diplomacy to achieve peaceful change in the region. This American determination combined with the new energy and commitment of the youthful British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, to produce a sustained diplomatic initiative to achieve an inclusive political settlement and the end of violence in the escalating Rhodesian civil war. It was matched by a perceptible shift by Pretoria towards the Rhodesian Front government’s recipe for the transition to majority rule through an internal settlement that marginalized the Patriotic Front.24

As the international climate deteriorated and its own domestic security situation darkened following the 1976 Soweto uprising, South Africa’s previous willingness to lean on Salisbury declined.25 The renewed burst of diplomatic activity surrounding the Owen-Vance Plan was matched by a period of frenetic diplomatic contact between Pretoria and Salisbury.26 By late September 1977, Vorster informed Smith that Pretoria accepted the Rhodesian government’s insistence of the portfolios of defense and law and order remaining in white hands; and supported the RF government in its insistence that the existing Rhodesian security forces should form the foundation of the Rhodesian Army in the interim period. In the view of both Salisbury and Pretoria, the Owen-Vance plan and behavior exhibited a decided Patriotic Front bias. Therefore attempts to put pressure on South Africa proved counterproductive, as it merely served to strengthen the alliance between Pretoria and Salisbury.27 The Republic itself was under increasing international pressure with the introduction of a mandatory UN arms embargo in November 1977, and growing calls for sanctions against South Africa over Namibia.

Therefore from September 1977, South African policy on the Rhodesian question was fundamentally defensive, focused on securing a smooth and relatively swift transition to moderate black majority rule, via an internal settlement with more moderate elements of the various Rhodesian/Zimbabwean nationalist movements, and an end to the war. In response to the South African government’s “brutal crackdown on political dissidents during the autumn of 1977,” the UN Security Council unanimously approved a mandatory arms embargo resolution in November. In the same month, the Salisbury government announced its intention to pursue an internal settlement, and negotiations were begun in December between Smith and Sithole and Muzorewa.

For the British and Americans, the period from September 1977 to April 1979 was a “reactive phase of diplomacy.” As he confided to the Americans, Owen was faced with a particular quandary: failure to convene an all-party conference meant contending with a transitional agreement to black majority rule, which guaranteed the minority position of Rhodesia’s white community that was anathema to the Patriotic Front, but which could well prove electorally popular in Britain. Maintaining sanctions could well prove politically difficult for the Labor Government. While the British were meeting the Patriotic Front leaders in Malta, the Smith regime was pressing ahead with negotiations with other nationalist parties. Owen was very concerned that unless an all-party conference was convened swiftly, the British and Americans would be faced with either Smith/Muzorewa settlement, or one that also included other Zimbabwean nationalist leaders—but excluded the PF—which guaranteed continued white political influence.

Throughout this protracted process, the South African government remained in touch with both Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his rival, the veteran nationalist leader Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. South Africa was assured by Sithole (of UANC) that “his party had

29. Ndabaningi Sithole founded and led the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a resistance movement against white minority rule in Rhodesia.
30. Abel Muzorewa was Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, the interim coalition government that was in place from 1 June to 12 December 1979.
31. Owen, Time to Declare, 312.
32. Vance, Hard Choices, 284.
34. Vance, Hard Choices, 284.
been in touch with the terrorists in Rhodesia who had indicated they supported the internal settlement and would like to lay down their arms once the interim government was established. In the meantime they would continue their activities in order to keep up the pressure on Smith.” South Africans were similarly assured by Sithole that once the internal settlement was reached, the support for Mugabe and Nkomo “would erode.”35 Encouraged by these reports that political settlement would see the end of the vicious and debilitating war in Rhodesia, South Africa welcomed the signing of the internal agreement of March 1978, between Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau.36 While they had to pay lip service to the international option (of widening the political agreement to include the PF) in order to pre-empt international pressure, the South Africans had a keen interest in the success of the internal settlement.37 However, despite Rhodesian/Zimbabwean hopes, this internal settlement did not lead to formal international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. In the House of Commons the British Foreign Secretary welcomed “those sections which were compatible with the Anglo-American plan, but also pointed out it was seriously defective.”38 By refusing to reject it out of hand, Owen was attempting to pressure the PF into being more reasonable. However, the internal settlement seriously compromised Owen and Vance’s attempts to persevere with their initiative.39 Consequently, over the next year, the British and Americans adapted their strategy towards combining elements of the internal settlement with their own approach. Owen engaged in a number of secret attempts either to separate Nkomo from Mugabe, or using the ZAPU leader to persuade his ZANU counterpart into being more reasonable.40 This produced serious misgivings in Washington.

Questions: What was Pretoria’s view of Owen’s secret diplomacy? How did South Africa contribute?

36. Jeremiah Chirau led the Zimbabwe United People’s Organization (ZUPO), which represented the interests of Rhodesian tribal chiefs.
38. Owen, Time to Declare, 313.
40. Owen, Time to Declare, 314; Vance, ibid., 287.
There was growing unease within the Rhodesian military, led by General Walls; there was a British concern the Rhodesian security forces “might suddenly take control and end illegal independence, demanding that Britain should assume responsibility for Southern Rhodesia.” What was the South African view of this?

How far was the internal settlement debated within ZAPU/ZANU? Were the Soviet Union and Cubans aware of the secret diplomacy?

Did these political developments 1977–1979 influence the armed struggle in any way? To what extent was Cuban support for the armed struggle to pre-empt a compromise political settlement? Why did the nationalist forces never form a government in exile? Why did the Zimbabwean guerrilla strategies not aim at securing liberated areas and the establishment of rival political structures/government to Salisbury?

With the resignation of Vorster in October 1978 and his replacement by PW Botha, the Cold War international environment acquired a new importance with the formulation of South African foreign policy, and particularly towards the Rhodesia question. The new Prime Minister placed renewed emphasis upon safeguarding the Republic’s embattled position, through a Total National Strategy (TNS). Botha’s stated aim was to secure “a peaceful constellation of southern African states, with respect for each other’s cultures, traditions and ideals.” This was founded on the premise that a bloc of peaceful countries could be constructed around South Africa’s perimeter, including the Bantustans inside South Africa itself. As former Defense Minister, with a clear concept of the need for structure and hierarchy in decision making, Botha’s political outlook was profoundly

41. Owen, ibid., 316.
influenced by the Cold War environment and mentality. And his anti-Western theme became increasingly pronounced under his premiership. He was profoundly scornful of the “timorous Western world which is so captivated by the soft music of détente from Moscow.” Under Botha’s leadership South African policy was less susceptible to Western persuasion. “He had developed, more than any previous leader, a clear-cut, almost dogmatic, view of the world in military-strategic and geo-political terms, in which the contest between the ‘free world’ and communism was dominant, and South Africa a target of communist expansionism.”

Therefore under Botha, it seems the principal direction of South African foreign policy generally, and on the Rhodesian question in particular, was based on security. This formed part of the TNS, a concept that pre-dated September 1978, but which was fundamentally shaped by the sense of a “total onslaught” on the Republic. This was soon apparent in Pretoria’s dealings with Salisbury. By December 1978, South Africa believed that its policies of encouraging regional developments, in support of its pursuit of a strong regional bloc with South Africa at its apex, looked decidedly promising. (In December, in addition to events in Rhodesia, elections in South-West Africa/Namibia gave the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [DTA] an outright victory [SWAPO boycotted the poll].)

The Zimbabwe/Rhodesia question therefore encapsulated the South African government’s view of the Cold War struggle in the region, and its views on the most appropriate response. Whereas South African officials realized that their government’s ability to achieve regime change in Mozambique and Angola was strictly limited, the situation in Rhodesia appeared both more fluid and promising. Continued international non-recognition of the internal settlement posed an acute problem for Pretoria’s ambition to create an anti-communist bloc in southern Africa. However, due to the country’s dependence on South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe appeared to offer the chance to manipulate the democratic process to secure an “acceptable” (i.e. non-communist) black nationalist government, and

45. Ibid., 254.
to set a vital precedent for doing the same in South-West Africa/Namibia—although it was recognized that the UN limited Pretoria’s room for maneuver on the Namibia question. At this point, the South African Government was not prepared to see its preferred successor government in either Namibia or Rhodesia compete against its arch-opponents through the ballot box.46

In March 1979 the Botha government secured, as it believed, a remarkable coup. On 23 March 1979, the transitional government of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia (Z/R) signed the Total National Strategy Document (TNSD) 1/79 with South Africa. This confirmed the readiness of the government of Z/R “to undertake jointly with the RSA the execution of the Southern Africa Strategy.” The TNSD 1/79 ensured that South Africa’s security perimeter was on the Zambezi, and the promise of determined exclusion of ANC forward bases. To South Africa, it also legitimized its military involvement with the Rhodesian security forces. This triumph for South Africa’s Total National Strategy was underlined when Bishop Muzorewa’s new Government of National Unity again endorsed the TNSD1/79 after the Rhodesian elections in April 1979.47 The principal thrust of South African regional policy was now to work for a neutral, anti-communist bloc of states in southern Africa.48

South Africa’s policy towards Rhodesia/Zimbabwe for the remainder of 1979 was aimed at ending the Rhodesian civil war and international recognition without changing the moderate nature of the regime. Given the escalating violence in Rhodesia between the Rhodesian security forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA,49 it is hardly surprising the new Rhodesian black nationalist government was delighted.50 The South African security services immediately set about the bureaucratic process of coordinating Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

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46. 19 January 1979, GUIDE-LINES TO FORMULATE A TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR RHODESIA (SHORT TERM) AND FOR ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, RHODESIA (LONGER TERM) AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA, BTS 1/156/3 Volume 4, P. Killern, Political Action Committee, Pretoria SADFAA (South African Department of Foreign Affairs Archives, Pretoria).

47. Approximately 64.7% of the electorate participated. The victorious Bishop Muzorewa was installed as Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU) on 1 June 1979.


49. ZANLA (the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army) was the military wing of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); ZIPRA (the Zimbabwe Independent People’s Revolutionary Army) comprised the armed element of ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African People’s Union), led by Joshua Nkomo.

50. Smith even went so far as to suggest the release of Nelson Mandela and negotiations with the ANC. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 300.
within its Total National Strategy and increasing its military involvement and assistance to Z/R. Intent on “maintaining and expanding [the] political initiative that was gained by the election,” a South African National Security Force Base representative in Salisbury (ZRGBS) was appointed with responsibility for the management of national security in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{51}

By 1979 all sides in the civil war—Robert Mugabe and radical elements in ZANU(PF) and its military wing, ZANLA, Nkomo’s ZAPU/ZIPRA and the Rhodesian Security Forces—now the official army of Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s UANC, through the Government of National Unity (GNU)—honestly believed that military victory was possible. But their external patrons were weary—particularly Zambia and Mozambique. Bishop Muzorewa’s attempt at indigenous nationalist rule through collaboration with Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front regime manifestly failed either to secure domestic tranquility, or international acceptance.\textsuperscript{52} This was despite concerted efforts by the GNU to solicit support from American private and Congressional opinion, and associated British Conservative backbench pressure for the lifting of international economic sanctions. President Carter’s resolute refusal to give in to Congressional opinion (spearheaded by Senator Jesse Helms) that sanctions should be lifted was an important consideration for the incoming Thatcher government in May 1979. The new Foreign Secretary, Peter Carrington, also recognized the need to broaden the base of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe peace settlement—otherwise the civil war would simply continue, with disastrous consequences for regional stability. Furthermore, despite increasing financial, military logistical and material support from the South Africans,\textsuperscript{53} the GNU had failed to resolve the deepening security crisis in the country—although the Rhodesian security forces were convinced they could still win. With ZIPRA forces being trained in Angola, Botswana and Zambia (using Cuban training, and sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union), ZANLA fighters infiltrating the eastern districts from neighboring Mozambique (using Maoist three tier strategy techniques), by August 1979 the Rhodesian Security forces had

\textsuperscript{51} May 1979, Telegram from ZRGBS, Salisbury, to Secretary of Central Security Council, Pretoria, SADFAA BTS 1/156/3.
\textsuperscript{52} David Owen had tried while Foreign Secretary to broaden the Internal Settlement to include Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU party, using the good offices of Nigeria; but this clandestine diplomacy had failed because of rivalries within the African nationalist movement. See David Owen, \textit{Time to Declare}.
\textsuperscript{53} The country was increasingly dependent upon South African economic support, military personnel (especially in the RRAF and helicopter fleet), and weaponry. There was also a unit of the French Foreign Legion in the country.
lost control of most of the rural districts. Although the Conservatives’ election manifesto had raised hopes that a Conservative government would extend crucial recognition to the GNU as it had been based on the election process (even if the Patriotic Front had not participated in the Rhodesian May elections), Carrington came to see the Rhodesia situation as a fundamentally negative drain on British foreign policy and political standing; and crucially, marshaling all his charm and political and foreign policy experience, managed to persuade his Prime Minister of the logic of his reasoning.

The final transition to negotiated armistice, then renewed elections had been achieved in stages: first at the Lusaka Conference in August 1979. This Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was an extraordinary and unlikely triumph: thanks to a key caucus of Commonwealth leaders, principally Commonwealth Secretary-General “Sonny” Ramphal, Kenneth Kaunda, Malcolm Fraser of Australia, and Michael Manley of Jamaica, supporting Britain’s willingness to hold a constitutional conference and secure a negotiated transfer to recognized independence. Mrs. Thatcher’s acceptance of this approach, which went against her emotional judgment and sustained political support for Carrington’s subsequent negotiations, was a key element in containing vociferous Conservative backbench criticism back in London. Then pressure behind the scenes from President Machel of Mozambique and his extremely able spokesperson, Fernando Honwara, and the Cuban government, persuaded the Patriotic Front to attend the London discussions.

**Question:** How was the Patriotic Front persuaded at the Havana Non-Aligned meeting to attend the Lancaster House discussions? What was the role of the Soviet Union and Cuba? What role did the Soviet Union play behind the scenes at Lancaster House?

The process of hard fought negotiations at Lancaster House, between the various delegations and Peter Carrington’s small and dedicated negotiating team, survived the three great crises of the conference: the constitution; the transitional arrangements; finally, the ceasefire itself. The crucial land question was deliberately excluded from the Lancaster House deliberations; here again the good offices of “Sonny” Ramphal (much to Carrington’s irritation) were of vital importance in reaching agreement on the phrasing of the relevant clauses, which allowed for the degree of necessary ambiguity. Key financial backing for land restitution (although the exact sum could not be
specified for fear of antagonizing Congress) was promised by the Carter administration. Final acceptance of the ceasefire arrangements were only finally resolved when Peter Carrington and Thatcher were en route to the United States, and Christopher Soames, the newly appointed Governor of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, was in the air on his way to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.

Over the summer South Africa had watched the evolution of British policy on the Rhodesia question with increasing foreboding. South Africa had no wish to see the reopening of the issue of the transfer of power. Pik Botha bluntly informed the British Ambassador that London was making a mistake, and there would be a heavy price to pay.\(^54\) However, the South African Foreign Minister was guided by a keen appreciation of the realities of the situation.\(^55\) Pretoria remained convinced a settlement on the basis of new elections in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe would not guarantee an end to the insurgency. South Africa’s acute concern was that the continued violence in Rhodesia “would spill over into the region—that is to say our region.” Yet, once Britain had agreed to resume responsibility, a conflict with London was something that Pretoria could not afford.\(^56\) Not only did Pretoria wish for a peaceful transition to internationally accepted black majority government—and there was a firm expectation that Muzorewa would win again—but the South African government also wanted to reduce its defense costs. In 1979, supporting the Rhodesian security forces cost Pretoria £1m a day.

Thus it was the deteriorating security situation in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia which encouraged the “securocrats” in Pretoria to support—with deep suspicion—the Thatcher government’s policy. As a precautionary measure, the State Security Council also decided that South African troops would operate up to 100km into Rhodesian territory.\(^57\) Officially South Africa stood aloof from the Lancaster House discussions on Rhodesian/Zimbabwean independence which took place between October and December 1979. However, the South African Embassy in London was privy to all aspects of the Muzorewa delegation’s negotiations, and Rhodesian and South African intelligence continued to

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56. RF Botha, quoted in Charlton, *The Last Colony in Africa*, 87.
57. SANA (South African National Archives, Pretoria) CAB 1/1/10 Cabinet Meeting 14.8.79.
exchange information.\textsuperscript{58} The Secretariat of the SSC prepared detailed guidelines and contingency plans for South African policy towards Zimbabwe/Rhodesia throughout the London conference. These were regularly updated, depending on the state of the negotiations in London. South Africa was also hedging its bets—giving the Muzorewa camp substantial financial, logistical and military support—whilst also trying to keep other Zimbabwean nationalist leaders “on-side.” Careful not to put “all its eggs in one basket,” Pretoria was also providing financial support for Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and monitoring closely other Zimbabwean political parties.

The South African agenda behind the scenes at Lancaster House was consistently to support the Muzorewa team, achieve the lifting of international sanctions, and to secure new elections as soon as possible before December 1979. This approach was designed to give the Patriotic Front (PF) as little time as possible to organize domestically, and to undercut the PF’s supposed united front. The calculation was that, should Muzorewa be re-elected, this “would lead to at least partial international recognition and it could be expected that Z/R would campaign for affiliation with bodies such as the OAU and the UN. It might lead to the present close relations with the RSA ‘cooling’ to a degree…[but] it is…doubtful whether, at least in the short to medium term, it would crystallize into an openly hostile attitude towards the RSA.” Significantly, the South African calculation was “given the ethnic reality it is unlikely that NKOMO will come into power after an election. Should Mugabe win the election, a bloody clash between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces is a strong possibility—once again a situation which could be exploited by South Africa.”

Lancaster House had been possible because each political party, with its own sizeable army, believed it could triumph through the ballot box. So, equally important in the process of final transference of independence were the period of the Soames’ governorship and the arrangement of new elections. The signs were not promising: there was the death of Josiah Tongogara, the ZANLA military commander, on Christmas Day in a car crash in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{59} Then the Governor and his small team discovered that “far from being

\textsuperscript{58} October 1979, ZRGBS REPORT: ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA (Z–R) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 4.

\textsuperscript{59} The public British line was that this was a tragic accident. MI6 felt the evidence of foul play was inconclusive, whilst Rhodesian and South African intelligence reports pointed to an East German contract killing on behalf of disaffected elements within ZANU/ZANLA, irate at Tongogara’s moderate stance at Lancaster House.
over, the war had developed a new intensity as ZIPRA and ZANLA tried to get the bulk of their forces in Zambia and Mozambique into Rhodesia and the Rhodesians responded with ferocious cross-border raids.”60 (The British estimated that approximately 2–3,000 ZANLA combatants remained in the field, but in reality, ZANLA kept approximately 7,000 men outside the assembly points.61) There was detailed knowledge of the extent of violence and intimidation in the run up to the March elections—threats, mutilation, abduction, murder. Mutterings about the widespread intimidation of rural constituencies by Mugabe’s militants, who had used the lightly guarded assembly points as bases to target the surrounding communities, were matched by knowledge of atrocities by the Rhodesian security forces to discredit ZANU-PF. There were no innocents. Soames was faced with the unenviable task of turning a blind eye to the scale of ZANU-PF election abuses, because barring Mugabe’s party from participating in the forthcoming poll would destroy the chances of final peace and ensure the civil war continued.62

The South African records show that various members of Zimbabwe’s political parties and factions made clandestine approaches to South African representatives in Salisbury and in New York. Members of ZAPU had approached the South African mission in Salisbury in January 1980, and the South African DFA also had contacts with elements of ZANU-PF in New York. Relatively confident that it had hedged its bets sufficiently on a Muzorewa victory, while not gaining an overall majority but winning sufficient support to be in the forefront of a coalition that would exclude Mugabe, the South Africans faced the Z/R polls with relative equanimity.63 But on 3 March ZANU-PF secured a stunning electoral victory. This result, together with the brutality of Nkomo’s electoral support being narrowly confined to Matabeleland, and the poor slowing of Muzorewa’s UANC, left the South African Cabinet stunned. It was the worst possible outcome. At the South African Cabinet meeting on 4 March, a series of terse instructions were issued: the inter-departmental committee on fugitives was activated, contingency planning to remove South African equipment was to be implemented; the arrangements for future South African representation in Salisbury, and

60. Renwick, Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa, 63.
61. Ibid., 86.
63. The Times, 5 March 1980.
“the necessity that Ministers must keep themselves informed in the course of events.”

There was acute consternation in European capitals that South Africa might intervene militarily. Certainly, the South African intelligence gathering network had fully expected Muzorewa to win. Its failure therefore to predict the stunning success of ZANU-PF at the polls was an abject failure of South African intelligence. The South African military was forthright in its criticism of the Rhodesian passive acceptance. On 8 March General Magnus Malan, head of the South African Defense Force, commented to the local South African representative that he had been horrified “at the manner in which [the Rhodesian] security chiefs had thrown in the towel when it would have been a relatively easy matter for them to make a stand.” However, although the South African military’s preference was for a robust response, the political leadership ruled out either supporting a coup d’état or active South African intervention. There had been defiant talk among certain sections of the white Rhodesian officer corps of a coup—and planning for an insurrection against a Mugabe victory; however, this was scotched by Walls, who was keenly aware that the South African military would not intervene to support this. But there was one last throw of the dice envisaged by South African military intelligence. This was a planned assassination attempt by ex-members of the Rhodesian security forces (now under the direction of the SA Special Forces), of the ZANU leadership, together with other international dignitaries and heads of state, on their way to the independence celebrations on 17/18th April 1980. This attempted coup attempt was scotched by the Rhodesian intelligence community and the police, who were appalled at the prospect of a blood bath.

**Question: How closely were the Soviet Union and Cuba monitoring events in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe after Lancaster House?**

ZANU-PF’s victory at the polls had far reaching consequences for South Africa’s regional policy and strategy. It spelled disaster for South Africa’s Total National Strategy based on the establishment of a neutral constellation of friendly, client states. Thus the Botha

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64. SANA CAB 1/11 Cabinet Meeting 4.3.80.
65. SADFAA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 17A, Telegram Bonn 4.3.80 to Secextern, FA Cape Town, No K34.
government’s bid for regionalism and insularity, founded on domestic security and political reform, regional cooperation and achievement of “acceptable” settlements in South-West Africa/Namibia and Rhodesia, rapidly unraveled in 1980. Immediately after the election results were announced on 4 March, there was an exodus of remaining South African personnel and a considerable amount of South African military equipment. South Africa was not invited to the independence celebrations, much to Pretoria’s chagrin.

CONCLUSION:

This paper has sought to highlight some of the complex ways in which the Cold War struggle interacted with the confrontation between white minority rule and the black nationalist challenge in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Much of its analysis has emphasized the role of South Africa as a crucial piece of the diplomatic and military jigsaw in the resolution of the long running crisis. In part this is a function of the availability of primary material, and this meeting provides a very welcome opportunity to explore and emphasize other key aspects of the Cold War and the Rhodesia question. What is particularly striking in the Rhodesia case is the extent to which the South African State Security Council regarded Rhodesia as a potential repeat of the Angolan conflict in which three competing factions of African nationalism were determined to win power through the barrel of a gun. However, unlike the Angolan conflict, South African policy was much more closely coordinated and circumspect. The outcome of the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia struggle for independence proved decisive in terms of South Africa’s view of international solidarity and regional liberation movements. Mugabe’s victory both radicalized South African regional policy and behavior, and delayed Pretoria’s willingness to concede Namibian independence by nearly a decade. From 1980 onwards, the battleground of the racial struggle shifted decisively against South Africa and increasingly the very existence of the apartheid state was at stake.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Arguments presented in this paper are drawn from:

RAFTOPOULOS: Welcome to our afternoon session. Let me just remind you, I am Brian Raftopoulos, I gave you my full reference when I spoke this morning. Before we start, can I ask everybody to please switch off their cell phones if they have not done so already.

Our session this afternoon is on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe confrontation, 1974 to 1980. Our presenter, Dr. Sue Onslow, will make a brief presentation, setting out what are the main issues involved. So, without much more ado, I’ll hand it over to Sue.

ONSLOW: Thank you very much, Brian. I am going to be very brief, because I set out in my paper a number of more detailed questions which I, as a historian, am very interested in. But I have four basic themes which I will summarize in my paper to Professor Raftopoulos.

Now, as I begin my paper by pointing out, and as Professor Terry Ranger, with whom I work, has pointed out, there are overlapping and contradictory black narratives, and overlapping and contradictory white narratives in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe story. Here I quote Professor Ranger: “It is too simplistic to interpret [Rhodesian] history in binary terms, white versus black or colonialism versus anti-colonialism.” In understanding the course and dynamics of the struggle in Rhodesia, to my mind, it’s crucial to appreciate the impact of the Cold War upon the perceptions of the Rhodesian elites and their consequent response, the outlook and strategy of the regional hegemon, South Africa, towards Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the 1970s, and the response of the various nationalist and liberation movements themselves who looked for external assistance and support in that increasingly violent struggle for accelerated political change.

Now, my paper, in brief, seeks to point to the complex ways in which the struggle in Rhodesia interacted with the broader Cold War environment. Much of the analysis in my paper focuses on the role of South Africa. Now, in part this was a direct function of the availability of primary material that I was able to source. I really welcome this opportunity of the gathering of key players from that particular era to highlight where I need to look further, the aspects I need to explore, particularly the role of the Soviet...
Union and Cuba and of course that vital part of the story, the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe national struggle itself.

So, the four principle questions that I suggest as the framework for discussion are:

Firstly, what was the place of anti-communism for white Rhodesians in the accelerating war? I might say, yes, it is important, but I’d like to know what did they really think?

Secondly, how important was external, be it Soviet, Cuban, or other, support and direction for ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA?

Thirdly, how did South Africa see Rhodesia in the 1970s? I’m very struck by also the role of Brand Fourie\(^{67}\) and I would be very grateful for a comment on this particular civil servant’s contribution.

And fourthly, how was the long running question of the Rhodesian UDI rebellion, the violent nationalist struggle against white-led security forces, how was the conflict resolved in the participants’ views? Thank you.\(^{68}\)

RAFTOPULOS: Thank you, Sue. I think there are four very broad questions which would cover very broad dimensions and I hope are also linked up with some of the debates this morning. So I think we will see the overlaps and begin to draw the different discussions together. I will start off with Wilf [Wilfred Mhanda] and please ask the speakers to just introduce themselves. Thank you.

MHANDA: My name is Wilfred Mhanda. I’m a former liberation war fighter who served under ZANU, fighting first from Zambia and then subsequently from Mozambique.

After independence—it was truly the start, we had problems with being conflict-ridden thanks to Robert Mugabe. As soon as Robert Mugabe took over leadership of ZANU in 1977, he introduced an element of repression, and oppression into his leadership. What is happening today is not something that has just developed, knowing what happened, since what we are actually experiencing right now, dates back to the time that Robert Mugabe took over the leadership of ZANU in 1977. So, I will actually be speaking from the perspective of someone [who] participated in the liberation struggle and who was also

\(^{67}\) Bernardus Gerhardus Fourie, also known as Brand Fourie, served as the South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the 1970s and became South African Ambassador to the United States in 1982.

earlier on one of the very first victims of Robert Mugabe, [and] someone who is still alive to testify to the origins of the problems that we have in Zimbabwe.

Please, can I just have the questions again?

RAFTOPOULOS: The questions are: the place of anti-communism in white perceptions of the struggle and also in the liberation movements; the external support of the Cubans, Soviet support for the liberation movements; how did South Africans see the Rhodesian problem; and how was Rhodesia/Zimbabwe problem eventually resolved?

MHANDA: Ok, thank you very much.

Maybe I should begin by just talking to the context of this oral history discourse in terms of the Cold War itself. I concur with the views actually of earlier speakers, who say we should not just confine ourselves to 1974 onwards. We have to go back, I think to the end of the Second World War. That’s where all these problems began. That’s when the Cold War itself began and that is where seeds of the subsequent conflict in southern Africa originated. I think there was, strictly speaking, no world-wide phenomenon of national liberation movements before the end of the Second World War. What happened was, I think, during the Second World War, the imperial powers drafted in people from the colonies—both white and black, but mostly black, because from Africa as they were the majority—and the call was actually, “we are fighting for freedom, because Hitler’s objective is to oppress us, to subjugate us.” Much of Western Europe was under German occupation and had to be liberated. So, it already became logical to the African nationalists to demand liberation as well. “Why should we also be subjugated by the French and the British?” they demanded. This is what’s pulled the trigger, the need, for freedom. The Western powers at the time were now on the defensive after the end of the War; they could not justify their struggle against Hitler and Mussolini whilst denying the oppressed people in their colonies, the same rights they were asking them to sacrifice for. So it created an untenable position for them.

So, the end of the war was the trigger. Soon after the Second World War you had countries like India and Pakistan and subsequently Sudan and Egypt getting liberation, but this was the trigger for independence. So, like Professor Shubin said, this put the West on the defensive, because what they asked the people to fight for during the Second World War, they were not actually prepared to deliver to their colonies. This was the context. And of
course, the Soviet Union which, I’m neither afraid nor ashamed to say, bore the brunt of the war against Hitler and the Germans. Why did [the West] invade Europe only in 1944? The tide of the war had by then already turned against the Germans, and with Hitler on the defensive. The danger was, if Germany was going to fall to the Soviet Union, which meant the whole of Western Europe, which was under German occupation, [it] would logically also fall to the Soviets. So, it was in the interest of the Americans and the British actually to go and defend Europe against the advance of the Soviet Army. They were actually also motivated by the desire to defend the very values of freedom on which Western society stood. And when we then look at what then happened, of course after the war progressively former colonies demanded independence, beginning with India and Pakistan, and then we also have nationalist movements other than South Africa taking shape in Africa and elsewhere. In most of the African countries nationalist organizations were formed after the Second World War except for South Africa where the African National Congress, the ANC, was formed in 1912. So that is actually the impact in terms of how the Cold War, how it actually motivated the agenda of the nationalists movements. At that time the nationalist organizations had not yet developed into liberation movements. They were just nationalist movements. I think I want a clarification from Professor Shubin about this later as I feel we had nationalist organizations, not liberation movements; nationalists at the time had narrower objectives than they subsequently demanded, in terms of the articulation of the ideals that they wanted: freedom, democracy, social justice and so on. But this is not the objective of this discussion.

So, what I would say regarding what was the place of communism in the [desired objectives] of the liberation movements and the whites, maybe beginning after the Second World War, is that the whites were determined that they would not fall under the control or the rule of the indigenous black majority. That was clear to them. That was the big thing. They didn’t want that. This had nothing to do with the freedom for the blacks, which to them was an incompatible objective. And for the blacks, they felt they were also entitled to freedom just like the Europeans were fighting for against Hitler’s dictatorship. But the point now was, the whites could not just come out in the open and say “we don’t want to be ruled by blacks,” who happened to be the majority. They had to use propaganda, which was couched in terms of “we are fighting in defense of Western civilization against the threat of communism.” This was a cloak to disguise their resentment to be controlled by black rule. This is the way I see it. The threat of communism was a pretext that was used
by the whites to say “okay, this would enable us to gain support from the Western Powers, since they share the same concerns.” So it was a ploy, just like what Robert Mugabe is saying; he is saying now “I’m fighting against imperialism.” It’s a ploy, we all know today he is fighting against imperialist interference in his country. It’s a ploy, we all know that. All Mugabe is interested in is his personal power and it has nothing to do with resisting imperialist interference and the defense of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. He is using it as a ploy to justify his oppressive hold on power. That’s exactly what the whites were also doing. It was nothing more than a ploy, exactly the same of what is happening now; using the struggle against Western interference as a pretext for Mugabe to cling onto power.

On the part of the blacks, I think those who were in the war, i.e. the Second World War, were told that they were being told that “we were all fighting as allies of the West.” The Russians and the West were fighting for their emancipation from fascism. Hitler was the enemy, not the Soviet Union. So, for them, the African soldiers in the war believed that the Soviet Union and the West were on the same side, all fighting for freedom. So basically, what they also wanted after the war was freedom. But when the doors they were knocking on to get that freedom from the colonial powers remained closed, they had to find support elsewhere. On account of the West’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the Chinese nationalists and communists in the war against Hitler and imperial Japan, the Africans reasoned that it was only logical for them to turn to the communist countries as well for assistance who were formerly the West’s allies in the fight for freedom during the Second World War. So the African nationalists had every justification and a rationalization to go to the same people with whom the Western world had joined hands against Hitler. There was nothing morally wrong with that. It couldn’t be a sin! But all of a sudden the West was now balking at the African nationalists’ approaches for assistance to the Soviet Union and the Chinese.

All I’m trying to do is to put it into context, that the black nationalists could not be ashamed to seek assistance from the Soviet Union or China, because they had been allies of the West and the same West was a free world during the Second World War in the fight against fascism. So you’ve got to understand it from that perspective. It wasn't something shameful for the African nationalists to approach the Soviet Union or China. A spin was then put onto African nationalists’ relations with the East, particularly by the white settler regimes in southern Africa to justify their hold on power. And also the West was anxious of the growing military power and growing political influence of the Soviet Union on the one
hand and also their vulnerability, politically, to the demands for freedom in their colonies. So for that reason they fanned anti-communist sentiments, which I think only served to complicate the struggles for freedom for the people in southern Africa. It was totally needless for that to have developed to induce that semantic characterization, but anyway, that is how it happened. We cannot wish it away.

My understanding of the role of communism, both within the liberation movements and also among the Rhodesian whites—that anti-communism was a pretext on the part of the whites. But also, increasingly, I have to point out that, within the nationalist organizations themselves, the influence of the West in terms of their opposition to communism also played a role. Whilst they looked forward to support from the Soviet Union and China, they were also awake to the dangers of the opposition to free enterprise and repression and freedom, which characterized communist rule. As is now, as common cause, and something that both China and Russia would testify, there was no freedom: there was repression in the communist countries. They now talk about it openly. But while we now say in the case of Zimbabwe, Mugabe is oppressing us, the Russians and Chinese are not prepared to accept that. But they are prepared to accept that their own leaders were oppressing them. I don't quite understand this. They are not ashamed to say that they had dictators; that communist rulers were dictators. They accept that openly today. But when it comes to Zimbabwe, they don't want to use the same yardstick. But this is now an extension again of the Cold War polemic, which is being used, like I said, by Robert Mugabe and the latter day rulers in Russia and China.

In terms of external support, how important was it? In the case of Zimbabwe, I would say it was Ian Smith who provoked the nationalists into starting the war, and taking up arms. The black nationalists had no desire at all to go to war. Their demand was simply for independence; one man, one vote; for democracy. By declaring independence, unilaterally, from Britain, and the Rhodesians coupled with the inaction by the British and the West, closed all peaceful avenues for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The nationalists were left on their own and they had to seek support from the socialist countries. And, as a result, I think without support from the socialist countries at the time, it would have been extremely difficult, but not impossible, for countries in the white minority ruled southern African states to attain liberation. Probably it would have taken much longer for the nationalist organizations to achieve freedom. But the support from the socialist countries had only a catalytic effect. (For those who understand chemistry, the catalyst is
not changing the process, it just speeds it up.) Attaining liberation was inevitable; it would have happened some or other time, just like maybe any major state, like the United States of America won their independence after fighting on their own without the presence of Soviet Union or socialist countries; and also Ireland gaining freedom from Britain, also without the support of socialist countries. So support from the socialist countries was not a prerequisite or an indispensable condition, but it was a favorable factor which accelerated the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe.

I will not say much about South Africa; it is for the Hon. Pik Botha to talk about that.

How was the conflict resolved? In terms of interests in Zimbabwe—yes, probably the Soviet Union might have had, China might have had interests, but that was not the major motivator for them to support Zimbabwe. Their support for liberation movements was prompted by proletarian internationalism. Their support for the liberation movements was not based on economic interest. Whereas with the West, it was quite clear that they had strategic and economic interests that they couldn't risk losing. So, they had to do whatever they could to prop up the racist white minority regimes in southern Africa. In the end, the resolution that came about I think was influenced by both political and military factors. The Nationalist Liberation War itself—as it was formally called in Zimbabwe—had by 1978/79 probably reached a state of what I would in military terms call a strategic stalemate, where the nationalist military could not defeat the Rhodesians militarily, and also the Rhodesians [on the other hand were] not in a position to defeat the insurgents. So, such an objective condition was amenable to compromise and a negotiated settlement. So in military terms, the situation was also conducive to a settlement. It was a war of attrition that could have gone on for more years, causing more harm and destruction without necessarily producing the desired results for either party. That was on the military side.

On the political side, of course the British had interests to preserve and through a negotiated settlement began applying pressure on the Rhodesians. The fact that the nationalists, i.e. ZANU and ZAPU, gave Ian Smith the leeway to go ahead with an internal settlement in March 1978, which they could have actually prevented politically long before 1976, weakened them politically. This reality was then used as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the Patriotic Front, who militarily could no longer vanquish the Rhodesians. So, the Rhodesian internal settlement was used as a bargaining lever, which was also conducive, again, to apply pressure on the nationalists. This created circumstances conducive to striking a compromise. And also I think the convergence of opinion on the need for
a settlement on the part of the Western powers, the African frontline states and the actors themselves, was also a factor which was conducive to the resolution of the conflict. I think the guerrilla fighters were also tired of war just like the Rhodesian soldiers, and they were also suffering from the military raids by the Rhodesians, and the British also felt that maybe they could extract sufficient concessions from the nationalists to guarantee the preservation of their interests; and it was conducive to that. And I think also on the part of the socialist countries, they think actually by supporting the liberation movements, the nationalist organizations, they had actually created a situation within southern Africa that generated sufficient goodwill for them. So, actually it was a convergence of circumstances where actually or probably, everybody could get something. But what I would say is, probably the biggest losers in all this were the freedom fighters themselves and the general population, because what is happening now in terms of the current settlement that yielded the inclusive government, their interests and their positions were not taken into account. But because they were not an immediate political factor at that time, they could not have influenced the outcome of the negotiations, of the resolution of that conflict. Had they also been a partner in that, there would have been a different outcome altogether, and we wouldn’t be regretting the excesses of what is happening in Zimbabwe today. What is happening in Zimbabwe today is most reprehensible and a shame to all of us. I am ashamed to say this is where I come from. And I find it incomprehensible that any sane person, particularly those in the former liberation movements, that they could just look aside and wish this away. It is a disservice to ourselves, to our dignity as African people and also to the values that we stand and fought for. We are corrupting it! We should stand for principle, which unfortunately, like I said, those of us who were fighters, could not have had the opportunity, because we were not also at the [negotiating] table. Thank you.

RAFTOPOULOS: Thank you, Wilfred. I think a lot of food for thought there and invariably evoking the present. These issues are very much alive and I don’t want us to get caught in discussions on present Zimbabwe, but maybe at the end, maybe to draw on some of the issues and what it means for us now. But let me move on to Dr. Sadomba.

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69. The so-called “frontline states” include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
SADOMBA: Okay, thank you, my name is Wilbert Sadomba and I am a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Johannesburg. I joined the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe with ZANLA, when I was 15 years [old] in 1975. After that I went into government, UNICEF, and so forth. Basically, that is who I am.

Now, I think what I would want to talk about briefly is actually the impact of the Cold War in relation to the developments within the liberation movement, which I think is quite a critical factor, although my colleague has talked about the nationalist movement, the guerrilla war and so forth. But exactly what were the internal developments that could give a different form and outlook to the liberation movement, is the question. Because the liberation war itself, mainly from the ZANU/ZANLA side of it, took what I could roughly take as three major phases. The first one was very much the nationalist control, with the Liberation Council controlling it. Then there was another phase, when it was actually one of the objectives, when the military had more control over the whole liberation movement or over the guerrilla war than the nationalists. It’s quite critical because that was the period when the different ideologies of the Cold War era took a much more grounded route in the liberation struggle, in that they actually tried to transform the war machine into an ideologically equipped movement by actually trying to teach Marxism/Leninism in order to actually transform the leaders in the liberation movement. That was very critical. However, this period was so short-lived that we then got into the third phase, which was now the Mugabe era. That was from around 1977. That is the era which we are in up to this present moment. This is very important in that in very many cases, there is the mistake of looking at the liberation movement as a homogeneous entity; looking at the guerrillas or war veterans as just one lump thing; and also even looking at the relationships between the war veterans, the former fighters and the political parties or the national leaders, the nationalist parties, just as a one form of relationship, which is actually wrong, because here we see that there are varied characters which came out of that liberation movement, solely because of the differential ideological teachings at different particular moments in that history. Now, this is important in understanding also the transition in 1979, because nationalists in the Mugabe era were at the top of the situation; they were leading the liberation movement and, as he said, they had not just different interests, but they had also a class position which was different from the generality of the fighters. In addition, there were also some ethnic contradictions within. An amalgam of all this resulted in a well-directed
resolution that favored the nationalist opposition, which in itself was contradictory to the general objectives and agenda of the liberation movement.

So, in 1979, we see a great fracture or a fissure within the liberation movement, where the nationalists were in alliance with settler capital and also with international capital at the expense of the objectives and intentions of liberation. Liberation had been defined at least at this point by total emancipation from, well, maybe European rule, but also from the racist settler regime and so forth. Now, when that fracture happened in 1979, it led to a basic contradiction within the society of Zimbabwe, where the aspirations of the common people, of the people who were actually fighting to dispose of colonialism, to dispose of settlerism, and to dispose of imperialist dominance, [were] in contradiction with the Lancaster House Alliance, between the elite nationalists, and international capital. That was the political position in the society from 1980, at independence. This is why it is not surprising, as he [Wilfred Mhanda] said, that the first major casualty or victim of that negotiated settlement were the ex-combatants, the freedom fighters. As I said, it also raises some ethnic content in it. But then, also the peasants themselves, the farm workers, the urban workers were passed over in favor of the settler/elite alliance. Now, that contradiction was so well managed during the first decade of independence, until, from the second decade in 1990, it began to ruffle feathers and it began to steer in a different direction. This is the point when also economic structural adjustment and so forth were introduced, at which point the Lancaster Alliance was so confident that it could go on suppressing the liberation agenda forever. So, they then were comfortable to now introduce further measures that would marginalize the people. And at that point, the war veterans started to re-organize, and they started to make demands to Mugabe as President, to ZANU-PF as the ruling party, and to the state. That was the first challenge to the Lancaster House settler/elite alliance and that challenge actually also sent warning waves to international capital, because that alliance, as I said, was also in the interest of international capital. It was then important to create a surrogate force if you will, to displace or to take the place of the elite within the liberation movement or the elite that have broken out of the liberation movement. So, the MDC\textsuperscript{70} in mobilization

\textsuperscript{70} The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is a Zimbabwean political party created in 1999 in opposition to former Prime Minister and current President Robert Mugabe.
of the society and so forth was actually created by imperial powers in order to actually attack the position of the elite.

But anyway, this is the historical part which again is affecting Zimbabwe, in which case I see it as a continuation of the Cold War in the current situation, in that we are still having an imperialist involvement in the whole thing. Actually the settling, I mean the nationalists who are still against the liberation agenda, are still in antagonism with the war veterans, the peasants and the workers. So the Zimbabwean situation is much more complex when you look at it from that historical point and also from the current forces which are operating within. Thank you.

RAFTOPOULOS: Thank you. I will now hand over to Professor Richard Wood.

WOOD: Well, I’m retired. I was a part-time conscripted intelligence officer, I have to warn General Geldenhuys. However, if the military hierarchy still exists, if all the old retired fellows knew I was talking for the Rhodesian forces, they would say: “Who is he?” This is because I was simply an anonymous called-up member of the territorial forces. But I spent 27 years doing that, so I have certain insights. I have also written extensively on the subject, three huge books (The Welensky Papers, So Far and No Further! and A Matter of Weeks rather than Months) and another one in production, if I live long enough.

Answering the first question, it wasn’t a defense of a concept of nationalism to the Rhodesian whites. It was more a product of white myopia. The whites understood that they were 4% of the population. They knew they could not hang on to power forever, but they sought to implement a “not in my time” political evolution, bringing up the Africans to what they conceived to be political maturity. And if you read now, as I do, the statements by the Rhodesian Front in the early 1970s, they predicted Mugabe’s excesses exactly. So, they were soothsayers, but the wrong sort of soothsayers completely. Another aspect that must be put into perspective is that everything was very small. To go forward into the war after 1966, Rhodesia could field 1,800 men in any one day in a country three times the size of England. Most police forces can field more than 1,800 men on any one day. So, the scale was pretty small.

My colleagues are absolutely right about 1945, because the world was seeing a retreat from empire and Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination was being put into practice. But then Rhodesian whites used to governing and defending themselves didn’t see what they
should have seen, namely black impatience. You cannot tell adults that they cannot run their own lives and that was the essence of it. There was racial segregation but a number of Prime Ministers slowly got rid of most of it. But they did not tackle the key issue of land and, after all, most wars are fought about land. The land other than national parks and forestry reserves was divided roughly equally between the white 4% of the population and the African 96%. So there was 96% confined to half the land while the 4% never fully occupied the other half. It was greatly unjust and should have been realized as such.

Various other stupid mistakes were made. Rhodesia was tied to the British Pound and in 1949 Britain devalued it. The vote was non-racial, anyone could vote if they satisfied the qualifications. Instead of retaining or lowering the value of the financial qualifications for the vote, the Southern Rhodesia Government raised it to meet the devaluation of the Pound. This was not simply for reasons of trying to keep Africans out. It was just stupidity.

So you had the Mugabe/Nkomo generation coming into the post-1945 political scene utterly frustrated, and to give Mugabe his credit, he never compromised. He never ever came to the party until the apple fell in his lap. There were attempts to advance the political evolution, but never far enough. The Africans were becoming impatient while watching, as my colleagues have rightly said, Palestine, India and then Africa, West Africa followed by East Africa, all becoming independent. Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi)—Nyasaland had never had an election—were given one man, one vote, majority rule constitutions and independence. Denied independence, the Southern Rhodesian whites were left there arguing, “We’ve governed ourselves perfectly since starting in 1923 and we’re left out.” The consequence was UDI.

On the second question: the threat of communism played little part in forming white views. As an infantryman, I was never lectured on communism, on Soviet threats, on anything of that nature. Sure, we understood the Cold War. We saw the fighting in Vietnam, we understood the domino principle, but we didn’t see it applying locally even though I think we all knew of the decision by ZAPU (before its split in 1962) to adopt the Marxist concept of the armed struggle. That happened in the time of Whitehead, before the

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71. Sir Edgar Cuthbert Fremantle Whitehead, a member of the United Federal Party (UFP), served as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1958 to 1962. In the election of 1962, the UFP was voted out of power and replaced with the more conservative Rhodesian Front—the party under which Ian Smith would become Prime Minister in 1965.
arrival of the Rhodesian Front in power and three years before UDI. The view was that the African nationalists who were seeking power were an elite doing so for themselves, not the masses, but I would argue that most politicians want power even though they might carry their constituencies along with them.

The question of Soviet and Cuban support ignores the Chinese Communist contribution, which was very important, as many ZANLA cadres were sent to Nanking. Others were trained in Tanzania by Chinese instructors with heavy emphasis on Marxist indoctrination. The only time I encountered the Soviet threat was on the battlefield, when we were picking up AK-47 assault rifles. On another, however, the ground was littered with the little red books of Chairman Mao.

The South Africans can speak for South Africa. The Rhodesian view was that Prime Minister Vorster adopted détente in 1974 to secure a client state, a peaceful state north of the Limpopo, keeping the frontier as the Zambezi as it had been after the South African police had manned it in response to the ANC’s Wankie campaign in 1967. There had been the secret defensive pact, the ALCORA Pact, between Portugal and South Africa and Rhodesia. Under this, Portugal supplied Rhodesia with various arms and equipment. As part of it, Rhodesian aircraft flew photo reconnaissance missions from south of the Congo River, right across Africa, and even photographed Dar es Salaam harbor. The Portuguese supplied the film and the South Africans processed the film. South Africa built strategic runways at Wankie (Hwange), Buffalo Range in the southeast and Flyde near Gadzema in the Midlands for rapid deployment of troops and to provide forward bases for the Mirage fighter aircraft. The South African influence went through phases. Vorster decided on détente with Kaunda and forced Smith to hold the 1975 conference on a train parked on the Victoria Falls Bridge. This failed, ending up with rather drunk delegates because there was a bar at each end of the carriages. The South Africans then forced Smith into accepting majority rule, almost immediate majority rule, given a two-year transition period. This happened on 23 September 1976, when Kissinger was brought in to twist his arm. Vorster had cut off the ammunition—we were down to two weeks ammunition—and cut off the fuel. Vorster just kept saying, “Sorry, but the trains are having some sort of blockage near Pietersburg (now Polokwane).” After a failed conference at Geneva in late 1976, Vorster’s successor, PW Botha, decided to support Smith’s internal settlement and then supported Muzorewa right through, thinking Muzorewa would win the 1980 election.
As to how was it resolved: Britain wanted to get rid of the Rhodesian problem which had hung around her neck since 1965. There had been continuous abortive settlement negotiations from 1965 to 1980. Smith always knew he had to achieve a settlement because although he had declared her independent, Rhodesia was not a sovereign country and nobody was going to recognize her. And nobody did. Consequently, he or at least Muzorewa, his successor, had to in the end ask the British for a settlement. But my colleague here confirms a theory of mine, because in April-May 1979, I was sitting in a little wooden hut at Cranborne Barracks, processing the daily situation reports about the war. As the Muzorewa election in April approached, the graph of the incidents rose steadily. When Muzorewa was elected with a 61% poll, the graph dropped to zero. The combatants stopped fighting immediately and then the graph stayed on zero because the people had defied ZANLA and ZIPRA and had come out and voted. Everything turned on whether Carter would do anything to dissuade Margaret Thatcher, who had said she would recognize Muzorewa. It was Carrington, who was sick of the problem, [who] told her that it was not going to resolve anything if you recognize him. So they ignored him and held the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, which led to the Lancaster House Conference, which produced the settlement.

1979 was the most terrible year for killing. The war had reached a stalemate. By 1978–1979, it was a no-win situation, and in fact in Peter Petter-Bowyer's book, *Winds of Destruction*, he describes touring the country during the 1979 ceasefire with General Nhongo [Solomon Mujuru], both being on the Ceasefire Commission, and Nhongo telling him—Nhongo being the successor to Tongogara as the commander of ZANLA—that he couldn’t have got through the next dry season. This was because of the rate that the helicopter-borne fire forces were killing his trained men faster than he could replace them; because the Rhodesian external operations and their sponsorship of RENAMO in Mozambique were cutting his supply lines and harassing his reinforcements; and because the deployment of the security force auxiliaries, the party militias, were increasingly denying the African rural areas to ZANLA, and ZIPRA for that matter. (A distraction was the ZANLA-ZIPRA civil war. ZANLA fought ZIPRA on an east-west front across the country south of Bulawayo.)

Later ZIPRA tried to wheel the scrum by coming into the Shona-speaking districts north of Harare.) The effect of the Rhodesian external raids, for which Zambia also suffered, was that Presidents Kaunda and Machel applied pressure on ZANU and ZAPU to settle with Muzorewa. Mozambique, in particular, took a heavy toll as the Rhodesians by 1979, with heavy South African assistance, launched attack after attack. On Operation Uric, the Rhodesians blew all the bridges down the Limpopo to prevent supplies coming through the southeastern border. Operation Manacle was planned, and would have destroyed all the bridges from the Sabi River to the Zambezi River, including the great Tete road bridge and the railway one further downstream. The troops were on the start line when General Walls, for reasons we have not discovered, cancelled it. This would have knocked Mugabe’s ZANLA back drastically because they could not easily reach the border and they were enduring heavy losses. I have a book, *Counter-Strike from the Sky*, coming out in a month or so, which has Operation Dingo in it and the attack on Chimoio, where the casualty rate was almost unbelievable. I know that in the paper there is stress on the Rhodesian preoccupation with counting bodies in the Vietnam way. I don’t think that’s correct. Nobody bothered to count the bodies on any of the external raids, for example.

We all understood that we were losing the war, in the sense that to win a war you have to win the support of the people. Governments depend on the people. Governments also have to act or abdicate. So Rhodesia, going back to the 1960s, never declared any sort of war, the government just had to act or abdicate. The nationalists chose the armed struggle and therefore it was a reaction. And part of the Rhodesian problem was they really never had a strategy; good on tactics, bad on strategy. That’s it. Thank you.

**RAFTOPOULOS**: Mr. Pik Botha?

**PIK BOTHA**: I never have much to say about Rhodesia. You know, I think I earlier reminded honorable guests here of the necessity to stick to history as it occurred and not as people many years later on with hindsight try to interpret it. And that is why at this stage before I forget, the usefulness of having media archives, that means all newspapers,

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is that you have access to the reporting on events and the editorial comment on the day it happened. It is very useful. I see very little of that displayed in the documents.

As far as Rhodesia is concerned at that time, until 1977, when I became Minister of Foreign Affairs, I was Ambassador in the United States and I assisted the meeting between Minister Vorster and Dr. Kissinger in Germany, and another meeting in Zurich, Switzerland. And Kissinger actually came quite close, remarkably close to an agreement—and I’m taking you back now to 1976—with the African leaders. Kaunda agreed, President Nyerere agreed, I think Arap Moi was the other one, and something then eventually went wrong. The Americans wanted Ian Smith to make the announcement. We warned, South Africa has said no, let a black leader do it, because if Smith does it, some of the black leaders might repudiate it. And it happened exactly that way. I’m just giving you events as they occurred. Mr. Vorster, in my presence, told Mr. Smith that he had no alternative. So, with respect to any documents here, which allege that we retarded or delayed progress to find acceptable solutions for the crisis in Rhodesia, let me say that the Department of Foreign Affairs just wanted to get rid of the Rhodesian issue and of the South-West Africa issue. That was our purpose. And luckily I had, to a large extent, the support, not always, of the government.

So, to come back to Rhodesia, as you know, again may I remind you, that Jameson was an emissary of Cecil John Rhodes74 and they missed out on the gold of the Witwatersrand and then decided they’ll go for the stories about gold in Rhodesia. So, they chased away Mzilikazi’s descendants and took large pieces of their land, drove them away and then during that time, put together a force to invade the Transvaal. And luckily we captured him and his invaders not far from Krugersdorp where we are sitting here this afternoon; otherwise they might have overrun the Transvaal also. This happened just the other day. So, my point to you is this: to come and allege that there was really a great wish on the part of the National Party government to keep them in power is just not true. I was personally summoned by Peter Carrington to London in ‘79, when trouble started in the negotiations there and they were almost ending in a dead-end. I went there and I spoke

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74. Cecil John Rhodes, for whom Rhodesia was named, was an English-born South African businessman, politician, and ardent proponent of British imperial expansion in southern Africa. In addition to founding the lucrative diamond mining company De Beers, Rhodes established and led the royally chartered British South Africa Company. The Company facilitated colonial development and the migration of British settlers further into the territories that soon became known as Rhodesia.
to Ian Smith, I spoke to Muzorewa and the others, and then eventually the Smith group asked me whether we could continue with our military assistance, financial assistance, and I asked him what is the amount involved and he said a thousand million for a year. And I asked him then, “And what is your purpose?” He said, “Well, we’ll win the war.” I then said to him, “I do not agree with you, Mr. Smith.” You can read Ian Smith’s book. 75 He is not really complimentary of me, and I then said that I can’t take a decision; it will have to be my Cabinet. So, I phoned Mr. Botha 76 from London. It was the Thursday of the week and he said he will call the Cabinet together on the Saturday, I must fly back, which I did, and Ian Smith and his crowd also came here. And much to my joy, Smith’s brother-in-law was Professor Horwood, our Minister of Finance—the two married two sisters—and I put the case to the Cabinet that Saturday morning, informing the Cabinet that, “Look, we must make it clear to them that the war must stop immediately. We cannot afford it. We need peace. South Africa’s future is at stake. We have not yet moved fast enough in the case of Namibia—we must resolve that problem; we cannot keep on over-rolling ourselves any further with Rhodesia.” I said, “We have the power and this is the advice I would like to give to the present-day ANC, you’ve got the power to force Mugabe if you want to, but they don’t want to.” I had the power to do so with Smith; I did so. And there are many white supporters who didn’t like it, but once you believe in something and you know it is the right thing to do, then you got to do it. And that’s what we did.

I just want to make it clear that the record reflects this; it is not correct that either under Mr. Vorster or Mr. PW Botha there was a hesitation on the part of the South African government to get rid of the Rhodesian headache and danger and threat to South Africa’s economy and South Africa’s wellbeing. It is not correct. I was involved in these matters. Thank you very much.

RAFTOPoulos: Thank you, Mr. Botha. Ambassador Urnov.


76. Clarification: Roelof Frederik “Pik” Botha, speaking here, was former South African Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is not to be confused with Pieter Willem (PW) Botha, former Prime Minister and President of South Africa.
URNOV: I may sound a bit aggressive, but I don’t mean any offense. I seem to be one of the few specialists on communism here, and now I shall speak about the communist threat. May I ask a question? What did Mr. Smith’s regime fear most? Majority rule or communist rule? I’m pretty sure that the main fear was the majority rule and the communist threat was a cover-up to a great extent. The minority rule was a racist rule. Racial superiority was the philosophy and ideology. Remember Smith talking about “standards” never to be lowered, saying that the white rule will last for a thousand years? For a long time the regime was not prepared even to genuinely share power, to say nothing of giving it up. Muzorewa’s government could not be compared even to the most Western-oriented neo-colonialist black regimes in some of the African countries. It was a surrogate, pure and simple.

Then, to the questions in the paper—to what extent did the white Rhodesian government’s resistance to accelerated black political and economic rights create “the communist threat”—the collaboration of African nationalist liberation movements and Soviet bloc and Cuban support? My answer is: the longer would be the resistance, the longer and closer would be the collaboration. Finally the balance of forces changed radically and Ian Smith had to surrender.

And again on communism, maybe it sounds like the ABCs, but I have to repeat it. For the Soviet Union, the national liberation movement was a very important part of the world revolutionary process, but it was never equated to the world communist movement. No immediate plans to build socialism in the newly liberated countries were drafted.

These are the main points I wanted to make. And then if I can say something to Mr. Pik Botha. I understand that after 1975 Zimbabwe did become a sort of a burden and you had to somehow get rid of it. But I am a bit doubtful that the same can be said of Namibia. I think Namibia was much closer to your government and that there was much tighter interconnection and correlation between the solution of the Namibian problem and that of apartheid in South Africa. This is as much as I wanted to say. Thank you.

BOTHA: Yes, thank you. When you find yourself again in a situation, I believe we must be guided by the facts. Reagan was elected at the end of 1980, and he came into power ‘81. And I take it we will discuss it at another session—the origin of leverage and all that goes with that. And I don’t want to use your time unnecessarily. Fact of the matter is: in 1978, the South African government accepted Resolution 435. I’m sure my Cabinet memorandum or presentation must still be available. In it, my last paragraph to all my Cabinet
colleagues stated that—we have no choice but to accept the solution now. And then my words were: “And we must presume that SWAPO may one day win this election.” This is what the Foreign Minister told his colleagues in getting their approval for Resolution 435. I hope I'm making myself clear. There is just no way—it is easy now to talk today with hindsight—but I take you back to ‘78; I take you back to ‘77, ‘79, and the situation that arose in Namibia. In Namibia, the Ovambo were almost half the population. The Germans never governed Ovambo, Okavango or Caprivi. It was the so-called red line at the south of Ovambo. And then you have the Hereros, the Nama, Dama, the San, the whites, Rehoboth Basters—now don’t look at me when I say Basters, they prefer to call themselves that; I didn’t give them that name, my Namibian friends will confirm what I’m saying here—and then the whites; people of German origin, but mostly Afrikaans-speaking people. They had a whole century of war. The Herero were virtually exterminated by the Germans. The Namas and the Herero had wars for decades. The Dama lost their language because they were servants of the Nama. So, once we are talking of these matters, we got to get down to facts as they were, and represent them, etc., not suddenly grab things from the blue sky and say this is it now what has happened there. It is against that background that South Africa got the mandate in 1920 after the First World War to govern Namibia. It has been a tremendous burden. I and my department wanted to get rid of this large arid region; it just brought us huge financial burden and trouble at the United Nations. One third of the agenda items in the United Nations were Namibia. Now is there anybody here that would think that a Foreign Minister liked that? But I did my best to try and get it off as fast as I possibly could, but fact of the matter is—my SWAPO friends will also admit—quite rightly, they were full of suspicion. We were suspicious of them and that sort of thing, and imbedded suspicion is a thing you can’t resolve overnight.

But when Reagan came to power, I went to see him. I was one of the first foreign visitors received by him, and General Alexander Haig was his Secretary of State—a very interesting, amusing guy. And when we discussed in the Oval Office the problems of southern Africa, I said to him: “Mr. President, for the past few years during President Carter’s time, virtually no progress has been made. And I suggest to you, instead of relying on your usual traditional channels, appoint a person that you trust, you, Mr. President, and send him to South Africa and Namibia. And let that person go and inspect and investigate and come and report to you and then we can talk again.” And he did send a judge, Judge Clark, Bill
Clark, who came to South Africa, who went to Namibia, who went back and report[ed] to him. And during Clark’s visit here, one evening in Cape Town, when we reached a dead-end with the Americans, I said to them, “Look: the internal parties in Namibia are already spreading the word that we have betrayed them and that we will be handing them over to the SWAPO terrorists, etc.” And the Americans said, “Minister, there will be six thousand United Nations troops.” And I said, “Yes, we are against six thousand, because the internal parties say, the United Nations have said, that SWAPO is the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia, and now they say if the blue helmets of the United Nations are there, everyone will say that they have already taken over, and the black people of Namibia will not know how to vote, and for whom to vote, because the UN had already taken over, and they will use it as propaganda.” I said, “You must not use that number.” And then Bill Clark said to me: “Mr. Minister, will it change your view if we insist on Cuban troop withdrawal?” And I said, “Now you are cooking with gas.” And from that moment onwards, we worked on that linkage. We worked on that until eventually in ’88, we could sign a trilateral agreement providing for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia.

I just wanted to give—in case I can’t make it tomorrow, I’ll try to—these views to you here this afternoon and want to express my appreciation to Dr. Sue Onslow, and my appreciation to my old Russian foes and now my friends, and everybody else here, my Namibian brother over there, and all the others and congratulate you for this kind of arrangement. This is what we need in Africa, in southern Africa. We need to sit like this and talk and get to know each other and find out why did we think the way we think, why did we do, etc. Then we will resolve our problems. Thank you very much.

**RAFTOPOULOS**: Ambassador Villa?

**VILLA**: Well, thank you all very much. This is just to add very few comments on Zimbabwe. Of course, for us, the case of Zimbabwe has very big differences to the case of Angola we discussed in the previous session. Basically our support to the liberation

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movement from Zimbabwe was on the case of assistance, training assistance, basically in Angola. The crisis of the Rhodesia regime, basically, in our opinion, it was a big blow for South Africa, because it implies also a deep crisis for the capitalists, in theory. Almost all the European countries’ South African territories finally get their independence or freedom with new governments as a result of the struggle of the liberation movements. That’s why in our perception, it served to continue delaying the accomplishment of Resolution 435. Finally it was done at the end of the ‘80s, but definitely in our perception, this situation of the new government in Zimbabwe served particularly for that purpose. Thank you.

RAFTOPOULOS: Sue, would you like to respond?

ONSLOW: Thank you very much indeed. I have individual questions which I would like to put to each of the kind panelists.

The first goes to both Wilfred and Wilbert. Please, could you explain in more detail what was the role of violence in ZANLA’s political and military strategy? How did you see it at your level?

For Minister Botha, I can understand why Rhodesia wasn’t of much importance to South Africa, and you should get rid of it, but please, how much were you also guided by the question of which black nationalist movement? How much was your policy designed and framed to exclude the more radical elements? Also, Kissinger encouraged the Geneva Conference. Why did he not follow it through? I know that you had a meeting with him to encourage him to lend his enormous political weight to the Geneva meetings, which seemed to fragment.

To Ambassador Urnov, please, I’m curious to know about Soviet assistance to particularly ZAPU and ZIPRA: was this at their request, or was it also at your guidance?

And one last question, please, for Professor Wood. From your standpoint in 1979/1980, how did you and your friends, your family, regard the Lancaster House settlement from your point of view within the white Rhodesian community?

RAFTOPOULOS: Professor Shubin?

SHUBIN: Just a very short question to Mr. Botha. Where are your memoirs?
**BOTHA:** They are too dangerous. I will reveal too much.

**RAFTOPOULOS:** Okay. We have very specific questions, so let me start with Wilfred.

**MHANDA:** Thank you. On the question of the role of violence, I think Ambassador Urnov would agree with me on one thing: Lenin said that violence was a regrettable necessity. Sometimes, political circumstances make it impossible to reach your objectives by peaceful means. The nationalists in Rhodesia at the time were not inclined to violence; it was not their option. They were forced to use that option and then the violence that took the form of armed struggle had two objectives. Firstly, military objectives in terms of destroying the state machinery, defeating the enemy, that is, destroying the repressive machinery. That’s the first objective of an armed struggle. The second one is political. Maybe for those who might have actually familiarized themselves with what happened during the Vietnam War—the Vietnamese resistance was using armed propaganda. The objective of guerrilla warfare—especially when you have to recruit people to swell your ranks, to build your ranks—but how do you do that without convincing them that you are capable of defending them, that you have power? So the use of arms is also a statement of your capabilities. That you can actually rely on us, because the enemy uses violence to repress you [and] so we can also use that capability to defend you and also to punish those who actually harass you. That’s the secondary objective, but the first objective is a military objective. But like I said, there were very unfortunate consequences, particularly towards the end of the war in 1978/1979, where you had violence perpetrated by the Selous Scouts, by the Rhodesian cadres masquerading as guerrillas. Even Ken Flower in his book[^78] describes how more than seventy-four civilians were massacred by Selous Scouts at Bhasera in Gutu district. Everybody there was just killed! So you have to show your people that you are also capable of retaliating, so if there are any enemies, against sell-outs, as a lesson for others not to sell you out, is that we can also use the violence. You can say it’s regrettable, but when there is a field full of so many armed groups, it is very easy for the situation to get out of hand. The presence of too many violent armed groups like the party militia and the

Selous Scouts brought violence to very unacceptable levels. Also, as we said was—when we had a field full of so many armed groups, it gets out of hand. It gets out of hand, it was the worst situation, which actually then brought violence to very unacceptable levels. Also, like I think General Geldenhuys was saying earlier, sometimes the generals are up there, [but] people on the ground here must respond to the situation. In most cases people might believe it has been sanctioned by the high levels. No, it’s not. I’ll give you an example of what happened, I think it was 1974. It was at St. Albert’s Mission where the school was raided and students were kidnapped and abducted. This was never sanctioned by the ZANLA High Command; it was never approved. But in some cases, especially in these informal military clashes, it happens that things do get out of hand. Thank you.

**SADOMBA:** I think the question of violence can also be looked at from the point of view of the intra-violence within the liberation struggle, I think that’s quite critical, because it also has the bearing of the state of mind and social psychology of Zimbabwe at the moment. When I look at the various phases, I think one of the most violent periods within the ground struggle is when there was a change. It was in 1975, when new young recruits trained in Mozambique and they were going into the hands of previously, well, I wanted to say a clique; but people who had been recruited mainly from the north-eastern regions. There was a generational difference as well as a difference in levels of education. And actually people suffered, you know, because these people were older, coming from the north-east and had not received… or maybe [did not have] the same capacity to absorb political education, [and they] were very violent towards the young recruits. That’s one.

Then secondly, you will find that when they were arrested and we were left in the struggle. When the changes of leadership took place, we were brutalized. I mean, just the fact that because you were coming from school and you had gone through some of the ideological lessons that they had introduced, we were really brutalized. This also explains the behavior of war veterans after independence, because the question is being, for example, why didn’t the war veterans rise up in the mid-1980s to take over land? Why do the war veterans question things now and so forth? It is also the psychology of violence, which continues out of the experiences during the liberation struggle.

**WOOD:** When Muzorewa was elected, the whites understood—although Smith was in the Cabinet without portfolio—the whites understood that they had lost control and they
understood the game was over as far as political control was concerned. So the way we saw it was that we hoped that Muzorewa would continue. Now, we hoped and the security forces believed, as Mr. Botha has told you, that they could win. Whether they could or not, I’m not qualified to judge, at least yet, I haven’t got the good stuff. But Lancaster House was seen with grave suspicion, because Carrington was not trusted, not liked and we could see the British shoving through their version of a constitution. And all the whites really hoped—well, myself and my family and so on—was that Muzorewa could somehow emerge as a victor, because then you would have in the whites’ eyes a kindlier and more tolerant society and that was going to emerge from the people you have been fighting. Thank you.

**URNOV**: Maybe I will start by saying that I don’t really like this word “violence.” I prefer “armed struggle.” But if one speaks of violence, then let’s admit that this was mutual. Wasn’t the Smith regime violent towards the black majority? So, that government violence provoked the counter violence if we stick to the term.

As for the question: was our military assistance requested and guided? I didn’t quite understand the question, but I will try to answer it anyway. One definite thing is that we didn’t impose on ZAPU our military assistance. It was rendered on their request. The delegations would come, requests were sent. We submitted them to the Central Committee. The Central Committee then instructed the Defense Ministry to consider the request, usually within a month. The Ministry then reported what could be given, how much and so on. So, without a request nobody would think of giving any assistance—and you know, it meant spending money. And I wouldn’t say that everybody in Moscow was very enthusiastic about it, but there was an understanding that it had to be done.

As for guidance, how I understand it: there was training and when you train, you teach people something. If you have advisors, then they are there to advise. But one definite thing is that the Soviet Union or Cuba didn’t control or run the armed struggle in Zimbabwe. So, “violence” I think is a wrong word. Thank you.

**BOTHAt**: Sue, I didn’t quite hear the words you whispered. Pardon me, when you have been a hunter you suffer in your ears after a while. Could you just repeat your questions?

**ONSLOW**: Sorry, I have two questions. The first was: why do you think Kissinger didn’t support the Geneva meeting more actively? I know you had a meeting with him to
encourage him to lend the power of his diplomacy. This is in 1976. You had done so much to try to encourage a settlement on certain terms.

**BOTHA:** He came here, he came to South Africa, he went to African leaders, went to Rhodesia, he met with Ian Smith in Pretoria, etc. So he went out of his way.

**ONSLOW:** But when did you meet with him? The Geneva meeting was convened and it seemed to be unraveling. I know that you had a meeting with Secretary of State Kissinger, to encourage him to step in, to lend American pressure.

**BOTHA:** Yes, but he did. He did submit a plan, which almost succeeded, but it was shot down eventually.

**ONSLOW:** So you don't recall exactly why he was not willing to press even further?

**BOTHA:** Well, it was the end of his term.

**ONSLOW:** My second question is: to what extent was South African policy towards Rhodesia also guided by which government would have power after black majority rule? It was not simply a question of getting rid of Rhodesia as fast as possible, please?

**BOTHA:** No, no, no, of course, if we could get a black leader who would be friendly towards us, then we would go for it! That was the case with Muzorewa. But again let me—maybe I shouldn’t mention their names, because some of them are still alive—certain African leaders told me that they considered Sithole as the real leader of Zimbabwe. They told me in so many words that this man Mugabe crept in from the woods and stole Sithole’s reputation and position and everything that goes with it. This is not Pik Botha speaking now; this is a black African leader speaking now. And this is the warnings they gave us. And you know, no one can always explain to you what went wrong, but it is clear today to me that the Ndebele and Shona were opposed to each other, whether you like it or not. Go and ask Moeletsi Mbeki, the brother of Thabo Mbeki, he was in Rhodesia for many years, worked there. Go and have lunch with him, he will appreciate it very much indeed. He would tell you something about the relationship between the Matebele and the
Shona. Okay, that is a different matter. But fact of the matter is, in our government, we had our last meeting with Ian Smith, Muzorewa—no Ian Smith was not there, Muzorewa was there—and David Smith, a nice fellow, and they, [at] the beginning of December 1979, they were assuring us, they had opinion polls and you name it, that they were going to win. I had asked my officials at Foreign Affairs to make contact with Mugabe’s men abroad, and Nkomo’s men, with a message from me that if they win we stood ready to have friendly relations with them and that we would work to pursue good economic relations, although we differ politically. I just want to make again my position clear. I never ever expected the others to win. But again, you know if you swim against these intelligence services, with millions in their budget, bribing left and right, even their own governments it seems to me, then you are in a really dark alley.

RAFTPOLOUS: Ok, I’m going to open it up now for some general comments. I think we need to give others a chance to respond. David [Moore] and then Ben [Magubane].

MOORE: Partially in response to Sue’s question: Ivor Richard, who was the chair at the Geneva Conference, told me that the British had basically given up on the Geneva Conference, but Kissinger was getting orders from the USA to keep it going because there was this election campaign coming up and his superiors had to be seen to be doing something about Africa by the electorate. So, according to Richard, it was Kissinger who kept it going when they saw that it was a disaster. And when I told to him that this actually paved the way for Mugabe to come to power, because it gave Mugabe the chance to consolidate a whole new alliance with external ZANU people, [and] gave him a chance to give the British, and perhaps the South Africans, perhaps whoever else needed to know, the opportunity to show that he had control over the guerrilla forces. So, somehow Kaunda released Tongogara, Hamadziripi, Kangai, the whole group of people who were accused of murdering Herbert Chitepo. It might be interesting to ask the participants around the table what their responses were at the time to the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, ranging from the Rhodesians to the South Africans, to the rest of the participants. That would be my question.

79. Herbert Chitepo, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), was assassinated in 1975. Following Chitepo’s death, Robert Mugabe assumed leadership of ZANU.
But the Geneva Conference gave Mugabe the chance to show the West that he had control of the guerrillas, which are Wilfred and Wilbert, as did Tongogara, who was allied with him too. So Richard said, “Yes, that’s what happened. We gave Mugabe the chance to come into power.” And there were many, many people, or let’s say a significant few, with power in the British state who [were] supporting Mugabe, as supposed to Nkomo, who they feared a little bit because he would get support from the Soviets, but they also feared him more because he was profligate. One British fellow who was close to Mugabe said, “Well, I gave Nkomo a thousand pounds one weekend in London and it was gone by Monday morning.” And I said to Nkomo, “What did you do with it?” He said, “Well, I spent it on women and song.” So Nkomo was not necessarily trusted by the British as David Owen tried to present it to the BBC on the release of the 1978 Archives in London. So I’m quite sorry that the Brits aren’t here, aside from Sue who wasn’t a diplomat back then, because I’d like to know more about what did the South Africans think about the relationship between Kissinger and the British, and Crosland, because Kissinger apparently, and I have the letter—well I have photographs of my scribbles of a letter that Sue told me about that was sitting in the LSE Archives, the Crosland papers. Now this correspondence was between Kissinger and Crosland, and Kissinger told Crosland to destroy it; Crosland didn’t. There was previous correspondence [prior] to that, and Crosland and Kissinger were quite angry because Kissinger apparently told the South Africans—I don’t know if you [indicating to Mr. Botha] were there, but Brand Fourie was there—Kissinger was telling Crosland that the South Africans were saying that they should not present to the Geneva Conference a black majority on a cabinet that would come into the transitional government. Kissinger said, “No, no, no we cannot do this, this is crazy, Crosland. You will get the Rhodesians off side and the blacks will never really believe it as a real policy because they know the sort of things we go for.” So Kissinger and Crosland were playing this game about how to structure this council that would end in a transitional government. And of course we didn’t hear any of this today. And Kissinger later wrote in a letter that he wanted it to be destroyed. He said: “Crosland, let’s talk about Bismarck here. You’ve got to use force rather than just argument. You’ve got to play your hand here; you’ve got to force this deal at Geneva to come through. The African nationalists need you because they

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80. Anthony Crosland served as British Foreign Secretary from 1976 until his death in 1977.
can’t get their act together. And they won’t believe anything that comes from Smith and they won’t believe anything that comes from the South Africans. They need you to push this forward.” Aside from the election, Kissinger pulled out in the latter part of December and you had a new regime coming in, and Carter came in, and the Carter regime didn’t know who was who and they put Andrew Young in. I did speak to one American guy who was on the transitional team, and he said we really thought Muzorewa would win at that time. So ‘76/’77, you are talking about an American regime who was thinking Muzorewa would win; you had the Brits trying to get the Geneva Conference back together again and have an election. But they couldn’t find Mugabe. The Patriotic Front was no longer the Patriotic Front because Mugabe was never there. He was busy cleaning up the mess that he created after getting rid of Wilfred and his comrades. So Mugabe could not play the game throughout ‘77, when I heard Richard went down to talk to the South Africans and so on. So I’m trying to get a sense of what the actors in South Africa and the Soviet Union thought about the conflict between, well, the relationship between the British and the Americans, and the relationship within the Patriotic Front.

RAFTOPOULOS: Ben [Magubane]?

MAGUBANE: First, I’d like to ask Foreign Minister Pik Botha, during the Wankie campaign, which was launched by ZAPU and the ANC—it caused a great deal of consternation in South Africa, and then South Africa sent what they called a police force, because they couldn’t send the military, because Rhodesia was still a British colony and it would be against diplomatic protocol. And South African forces stayed in Rhodesia right up to 1980. They became part of the counter-revolutionary force in Rhodesia from 1967 through to 1980. If in fact South Africa wanted to get rid of Rhodesia, why did these forces stay that long?

The second question, 1974 to ‘76 was a very difficult time for the United States. They had just suffered their worst defeat in Vietnam; there was Watergate, and Nixon had resigned in humiliation. So Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy was already handicapped from the very beginning, but he had thought he could recoup something if he could find a settlement in Rhodesia, which eluded him in fact, until of course Carter assumed power. In the meantime, in South Africa for instance, the South African forces had shot and killed students in
1976; killed Steve Biko\textsuperscript{81} [in 1977]. The African states had asked the Security Council to pass an arms embargo and were it not for the intervention of the five Western powers who said, “No, no, we can find a way out for Namibia,” and therefore they constituted themselves into the Contact Group to negotiate for the general independence, if I may say so, of Namibia. And during the Carter administration, especially with Carter as the representative for Africa, South Africa found itself being put in a corner. So, it’s not surprising that in 1978, for instance, they would acknowledge that they are accepting Resolution 435, but rather reluctantly. In the meantime, in the United States, the right-wing forces were mobilizing, wanting the Carter administration to recognize the Muzorewa government. Now Carter was put in a very awkward position, because at the same time, he was very suspicious of ZANU-PF and ZAPU; about what would happen if Rhodesia fell into the wrong hands, because it would mean opening the whole of southern Africa from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic to guerrilla infiltration. And South Africa simply did not have the forces to patrol that extremely long border. So, all those are the issues that were critical between 1978–1979 and the assumption of power by the Reagan administration. But it is also quite interesting, the contact between yourself as Foreign Minister in the United States and at the United Nations, between you and the representatives for instance of the Republican Party, Crocker, Haig and others, about what would be the scenario if the Republicans came into power. Because when PW Botha assumes power in 1978, he attached a lot of conditions on the acceptance of Resolution 435. But what I’m trying to say, and want to find an answer to—what impact did the killing of Steve Biko, the banning of organizations, the arrest of hundreds in South Africa, and the assumption of power by Carter have on the thinking of your government?

RAFTOPOULOS: Maybe one more comment? Just state your name, please.

SHEE: Thank you very much. My name is Laurence Shee and I come from Monash South Africa; I teach here. I also happen to be an ex-white Rhodesian and if I could just make a comment, because I think in many respects, the poor old white Rhodesian is much maligned. I think it is important to make a distinction at which stage white Rhodesians

\textsuperscript{81.} Steve Biko was a prominent black anti-apartheid activist in South Africa throughout the 1960s and ’70s until his death at the hands of police while in custody. A founder and leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, Biko became a symbol of black empowerment and resistance to white minority rule.
should be blamed for what happened. And I understand fully the suffering that went on in Zimbabwe, but if one reads *Rhodizens Never Die*,82 constantly the world gets one view of what white Rhodesians were like. When I read *Rhodizens Never Die*, for example—I enjoyed the book, it was interesting, but I didn't recognize all the characters. That wasn't the Rhodesia in which I grew up. If Joshua Nkomo was sick, my father was called in to see him as a medical specialist; if Seretse Khama was ill, my farther saw him as a medical specialist. And my father was sent to Rutenga, aged 65, as a medic in the Rhodesian war; he saw to the indigenous population. He saw to the ailments of the indigenous population. I am not trying to minimize the tragedy of Zimbabwe, the violence that went on there. I do think, you know, it is important just to step back and see who was to blame. Those of us who were of fighting age in the Rhodesian War—and I wasn't there incidentally; I extended my study as long as I could, up and through the Muzorewa era. So, I didn't do national service, but my family was intimately involved; brother and father in the Rhodesian forces. Growing up in a school in Rhodesia, I never had cadets; we were never politicized, other than some primary school reference to define the colony and various “ra-ra” Rhodesian episodes. That historical indoctrination never crept into senior school history. I did senior school history until O-level, and maybe I wasn't a good scholar and didn't notice all the content. But I think it is just important to realize who was this bulk of what Professor Wood had already indicated was a very small army. Now, the bulk of those soldiers would have been my contemporaries, many of whom both experienced and inflicted atrocities; and you know that is the sad history. My friends, of all my friends, at military and CBC83—and I'm talking of hundreds of contemporaries I knew—only one went into the Rhodesian Army as a regular soldier. The rest were conscripts who knew nothing about the army, played rugby, went fishing on the Zambezi and yes, enjoyed the privileged life, but on leaving school they entered the army. It was compulsory national service and they too were brutalized, but they were not necessarily bad or brutal people. They too, white Rhodesians too, were victims of circumstances. And if I think back to my youth growing up, and I realize my contemporaries—you know, we have already had one of our great ZANLA representatives saying he was called into the army and went into the liberation struggle at 15—we came from a very different background. I admit

83. I.e., Christian Brothers College, Bulawayo.
we came from a privileged background. If you are not forced to query where you come from, what is going to trigger you to change and see what is wrong with your society? 

So, just to mention my late father once more, because he was what I would consider a great white Rhodesian. He did as much work at—Zimbabweans here will know—at Bela Hospital, the Central Hospital, the Richard Morris Hospital. He spent equal time in each, one of which of course was black. But I would just like to make that point, [that] white Rhodesians are embarrassed and I can tell you I have friends who will be remorseful until the end of their days because of some of the atrocities they committed as conscripts, but when they wrote their A-levels, they had absolutely no idea; they were not politicized. Perhaps all of us whites enjoyed a privileged life, a fact I can’t deny, but we were young, we were schoolboys and probably never even queried; we never thought about what the next year would bring, until suddenly national service was on you and you are converted into a killing machine. Thank you.

RAFTOPOULOS: Ok, I’m going to give a chance to the panel to respond to some of the comments. Mr. Botha, would you maybe like to respond to Professor Magubane’s question?

BOTHA: Yes, I do not agree that our police were in Rhodesia until 1980. I would very much like to see your evidence to that effect. What I can tell you is that the British government had requested some weeks before that time South African vehicles and air support with the view to assisting in the elections. Mr. PW Botha turned it down. The British came back and I went back to PW Botha and I said to him, “Look, I think we’re going to incur the anger of Mrs. Thatcher if we do not comply and assist with this election.” And these are the facts. If you have different ones, please let me have your evidence, because that will be great news to me, quite frankly.

MAGUBANE: Are you saying that the South African Police never went to Wankie?

BOTHA: I never said that. You must sometimes listen, Professor; I’m not now one of your students. With all respect, that’s not what I said. You said they were there until 1980, and I responded to that. There was a time, I agree, that our police operated there and we ended it. The government decided to end it, but that was long before 1979. Long before that time, it was ended, officially ended.
RAFTOPOULOS: Can you say when, specifically?

BOTHA: No, I don’t have those figures and facts here in front of me. But I know it was a Cabinet decision that all South African police must be withdrawn. Every Rhodesian will know this. The Rhodesians didn’t like it at all at the time, but we made the decision and told them, “Look, I’m very sorry, we don’t want to be involved there.” And that was that. Whether individuals then resigned and joined Rhodesian forces, I can’t tell you, and so on, but it was definitely not sanctioned by the government after the decision was taken to withdraw them. And as regards 1980, that’s when the elections took place, and I remember clearly, vividly this request for assistance between voting, polling booths and vehicles by the British governor there. And at first Mr. PW Botha said no, under no circumstances. I persuaded him to do it, to assist in the elections.

And then I want to thank our Rhodesian friend there [indicating Laurence Shee]. I understand it very well what you were saying there. And this is a problem affecting also South Africans. We are getting it more and more to some extent, that we have earned it; my government has handed over power to the ANC. And I’m getting messages—where they get my phone number, I don’t know, but it is very unpleasant—telling me, “You see, you handed over to them and look what a mess the education is in now. Look what a mess we have with crime. Look what a mess the health services, hospitals, churches, clinics, schools [are in].” This comes from white South Africans. Not only did we have no choice, but the system of apartheid was inherently wrong. It was inherently oppressive, reprehensible and unethical. And the only way we could liberate ourselves from this unethical behavior was to get rid of it. So, by getting rid of Apartheid, we liberated ourselves and enabled ourselves to play now a positive role. Not as a minority, but just as normal people within a society. It was a tremendous event. It was not always easy to persuade the majority in the National Party—and this is not always remembered—to persuade the majority in the caucus that this policy cannot be continued. Not only will it destroy this country—not only that, it is unethical, it is against you going to church on Sunday and you having a Christian creed. We did it for decades in our churches every Sunday, and then when you walk out of that church you do exactly the opposite. At last, we liberated ourselves from this tremendous burden and that’s why I have sympathy with the Rhodesians feeling the same. But we still have a responsibility now, having been liberated of policies that oppress people. Now, let us reach out to them and give what we have to assist all the people to achieve a better life, better education. Let’s not go
abroad as doctors, let’s stay here and do our jobs here, do our duty here, because in helping fellow South Africans, we are ensuring our own future. Thank you.

RAFROPOULOS: Thank you. I think just one or two more comments. David Moore asked a question about the relationship between the British and the Americans.

MOORE: Yes, what did the South Africans and the Russians figure was going on between the British and the Americans, Kissinger and Crosland. Crosland played a big role, but the poor guy died in February 1977. But also what was the reaction to the Chitepo assassination in 1975 and the repercussions of that, and from inside Rhodesia, as well?

WOOD: Chitepo—well, frankly I believe that the CIA was responsible and I believe that, in fact I knew… he is dead now… Alan Brice killed him. So I think it was a Rhodesian, I have no proof apart from what Brice told me, but I think the Rhodesians were trying to sow this call within the ranks of ZANU/ZANLA, and I think they succeeded for quite a period. But I have no concrete evidence, and I have always wondered why this swirled on, this idea swirled on. After all, Ken Flower admitted to it in his memoirs in roundabout 1982–1983. So why? Was it somehow [a] political nice thing to play with within the ranks of the African nationalists? I never understood it, but “Taffy” Brice did all sort of things in Zambia and I didn’t think it was a targeted assassination. Jason Moyo was also taken out.

RAFROPOULOS: Any other one? Ambassador Urnov?

URNOV: What was the question?


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84. By “CIA,” Wood means here the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).
85. Alan “Taffy” Brice was a white Rhodesian who allegedly organized the assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo under the auspices of the CIO.
86. Jason Moyo, assassinated in 1976, served as Joshua Nkomo’s second-in-command within the ranks of ZAPU.
**URNOV**: It was long ago, so I don’t remember exactly. We always considered them allies working in concert, but nobody would rule out the possibility of some contradictions, arguments and so on. But never had we expected that Great Britain will let the United States down or the United States will let Great Britain down.

**RAFTOPoulos**: Thank you. I think we need to round up. It’s been a fascinating discussion. I think we’ve got a lot of food for thought. Clearly there are, and continue to be, unresolved issues, but clearly also the history of this period very much impinges on what is going on in Zimbabwe now. There are clear influences at play. The different roles which South Africa has played in the 1970s and now—I think the context is different, the role of SADC\(^{87}\) as a different position now to South Africa in a sense is bound to work within a particular framework within SADC, which is very different to the 1970s. The international context has also changed and the role of Mugabe as a figure within Africa and within the region of course is very different to the role that Smith played in the 1970s. So there are similarities, but there are also fundamental differences and which have impinged on what South Africa as a government has been able to do in a bilateral way on the Zimbabwean question. I think it is a very different, but an interesting development and I think one that certainly draws out. Also of course the implications of Lancaster for what has happened in Zimbabwe over the last 10 years—the unresolved issues and the fact that we had a Rhodesian question from 1965 to 1980. We now have a Zimbabwe crisis from 1997–1998 to the current period. So, there are obviously longstanding issues, unresolved issues from that period which are taking place. I don’t necessarily agree with Wilbert’s interpretation of that crisis, but clearly the legacies of that period are playing themselves out now and we are all still very much in that history and feeling the weight of that past.

With that I would like to say thank you to everybody, to all the participants. I think your interventions have been wonderful, key interventions. And thank you to you [indicating the audience] also. Thank you very much.

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\(^{87}\) I.e., Southern African Development Community, an intergovernmental organization that facilitates regional cooperation in economics, politics, and security.
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Present: Mark Chona and George (Zambian Representatives)  
Gaylard and EAT Smith ( Rhodesia)  
Attorney General Brand Fourie (SA Secretary for Foreign Affairs)

Chona: began by saying that Zambia wished to assist in the normalisation of the political situation in Rhodesia and the promotion of a genuine peace so that Southern Africa could move into a new era. There were two problems—existence of a conflict and second was the escalation of this conflict was a certainty and this was Zambia’s fear. While he had no doubt that Rhodesia could contain the conflict, Rhodesia could not end it but together we could bring it to an end. He said they wanted to look at the fundamentals and not the effects. The growth of militarization in Rhodesia was dangerous and there as a desire on the part of Zambia to end the confrontation… Zambia wanted liberation movements to negotiate and their response had been positive. The Zambians now wanted to create favorable conditions for negotiations. The guerrillas were not Communists though they were supported by them. Communism was going out; it was not attractive to Africans. Zambia wanted to move the African nationalists to negotiate and our (Rhodesian) help was needed to do this. The Zambians felt that they could be of assistance in this exercise. President Kaunda had asked him to say that no-one wished to humiliate Mr. Smith. As a politician he understood Mr. Smith. President Kaunda himself was in a difficult position because he had to convince a lot of people that he was embarking on the right course. There would be no question of victors and vanquished… President Kaunda needed Rhodesia to strengthen his hand so that he could assist. Chona emphasised that they wished to assist but not to interfere. Otherwise there would be no end to the situation in Rhodesia. They were concerned that there should be no humiliation for the Whites in Rhodesia, nor that they should be caused any alarm. Law and order was necessary as also was peace and freedom for all. Their aim was racial harmony.

The question then, was one of mechanics, of looking for the best formula which could be sold successfully. Therefore we must all be realistic. Everyone wanted to end the war and to talk, provided the talks could take place on realistic and acceptable basis.
He then said that the next step, if we agreed, would be for him to meet the three African leaders, Nkomo, Sithole and Muzorewa that he would be advised by us as to what he should say to them. He, Chona, would then go back to Lusaka and report to President Kaunda who would get in touch with his colleagues, President Nyerere, Seretse Karma and Samora Machel, and arrange for them all to meet in Lusaka.

Subject to our agreement, before Nkoma and Sithole were released from detention, the four presidents together would talk to them and to Muzorewa in Lusaka and impress upon them that the time had now come for talks....

Chona throughout the meeting gave out that this was a matter of extreme urgency and was intent on everything moving at a fast pace. This was related not only to the proposed early meeting of the four Presidents in Lusaka but also to the Mogadishu Conference at which the ZAPU representative in particular, Silundika, would be president and might be won over by the Russians to a policy of continued violence. Furthermore, according to Chona, if the Russians were to get wind of the attempted settlement of the Rhodesian situation, they might well do all they could to sabotage it.

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In a surprise radio broadcast December 11th, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith announced a dramatic new step toward solving Rhodesia’s nine-year-old constitutional stalemate. Smith said he had received assurances that Rhodesian insurgents:

- would cease hostilities immediately;
- were prepared to enter into new constitutional negotiations without preconditions.

In return, Smith agreed to:

- release all African political detainees;
- guarantee their freedom to participate in normal political activities.

A joint communique by Rhodesia’s African nationalist leaders on December 12 confirmed
the agreement. The communique, differing from Smith’s announcement, however, stated that cease-fire instructions would not be issued to insurgents in the field until a firm date had been fixed for the start of the proposed talks. The contradiction appeared to be a technical one that could be easily resolved.

Smith’s announcement mentioned no date, but the talks are expected to begin within two months. They may be chaired by the British Government.

**An Intensive Series of Maneuvers.**

The surprise development came only four days after an intensive diplomatic campaign, which was jointly initiated by Zambia and South Africa in strict secrecy in September, appeared to have reached a serious impasse. That campaign brought together, in Lusaka in early December, leaders of Rhodesia’s four nationalist movements [Bishop Abel Muzorewa, chairman of the African National Council (ANC); Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU); Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); and James Chikerema, head of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), a splinter group comprised of ZANU and ZAPU dissidents], and the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana for meetings aimed at establishing a basis for new constitutional talks.

The nationalist leaders, after agreeing to form a common front under the ANC to negotiate with Rhodesia’s white minority regime, reportedly added—in the last session of the talk—a demand that future negotiations be conditioned on Smith’s acceptance of the principle of immediate majority (i.e., African) rule. Smith rejected this demand on December 7.

What happened between then and December 11 to cause the dramatic turnabout?

The earlier deadlock may have resulted from misrepresentations and/or misinterpretations of the Africans’ position. At any rate, the demand for immediate majority rule was not included in the joint communique issued by African leaders at the conclusion of their talks in Lusaka. (The communique did imply, however, that the insurgency would continue until a settlement had been achieved).
An ANC spokesman who participated in the Lusaka meeting said that while the issue of majority rule had been discussed, the question of timing was to be negotiable.

South African Prime Minister Vorster, who was kept informed of developments in Lusaka, told our Ambassador that the demand for immediate majority rule had been put forward by ZANU’s militant leader, Ndabaningi Sithole during the closing sessions of the Lusaka meeting. The demand was subsequently presented to two Rhodesian emissaries who journeyed to Lusaka on December 6 to learn the results of the meeting.

Smith publically blamed Tanzania’s President Nyerere, who chaired the meeting between the nationalist leaders and Smith’s emissaries, for encouraging the hard-line position.

Whatever the cause of the apparent deadlock, Smith remained in contact with Zambia’s President Kaunda, who in turn consulted with the four nationalist leaders. Kaunda evidently was successful in persuading the nationalists to withdraw their demand for immediate majority rule.

According to Vorster, Kaunda and Smith were then able to reach agreement that, subject to the approval of Presidents Nyerere and Khama, Smith would announce:

- an immediate release of political prisoners; and
- a mutually agreed cease-fire, effective almost immediately.

Following Smith’s announcement on December 12, the nationalist leaders returned to Salisbury, where they issued their communique confirming that an agreement had been reached. ZANU’s Sithole and ZAPU’s Nkomo, whom Smith had provisionally released from prison to attend the Lusaka meeting, returned to Salisbury as free men for the first time in almost 10 years. The Rhodesian Government’s ban on activities by ZANU and ZAPU will not be lifted, but both men and their followers will be allowed to engage in political activities as members of the expanded African National Council, the only effective black political organization nor proscribed by the regime.

**Nine Years of Settlement Efforts**

For the nine years that Smith has governed Southern Rhodesia, meaningful political participation by the black population has been virtually suspended. Britain, as the responsible power, has repeatedly failed in its efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to both the white minority, numbering 250,000, and the African majority of over 5 million. Despite
the pressure of UN-enforced economic sanctions, the Smith regime grew increasingly intransigent in its refusal to allow even a gradual diminution of its political control.

**Good Offices From Rhodesia’s Neighbors**

But a new event, the April coup in Portugal, which precipitated progress toward independence and majority rule in Angola and Mozambique, destroyed South Africa’s geo-political rationale for supporting Rhodesia as a “buffer state”. In refusing to take action, covert or overt, to interfere with Mozambique’s progress toward independence under a FRELIMO government, Pretoria tacitly implemented the carrot side of a carrot and stick approach to black governments in the region: the assumption or hope that new black governments, once in power, will recognize the undeniable economic need for South African goodwill.

Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, always an astute politician, seized on this opening in South African policy to enlist Pretoria’s aid in pressing Rhodesia to negotiate. Discreet consultations with the South Africans prepared the way for a new round of talks about a Rhodesian settlement.

The Zambian-South African campaign took a dramatic turn early in November, when Smith agreed to release prominent Rhodesian nationalists to attend secret talks in Lusaka, which were aimed at establishing a unified black Rhodesian position on settlement.

This first round of Lusaka talks (about November 8) did not produce a united front despite:

- the unusual efforts made to include long-imprisoned nationalists Nkomo and Sithole. (Sithole first sent substitutes but shortly afterward visited Lusaka secretly himself).
- a concerted drive by the presidents of the neighboring states of Tanzania and Botswana, along with Kaunda and the prospective head of Mozambique’s independent government, Samora Machel (all present in Lusaka) to bring into one fold (1) Rhodesians in exile, (2) the imprisoned leaders, and (3) Bishop Abel Mozorewa, leader of the African National Council.

**Smith—Signs of Movement**

Responding to pressure from his neighbors, notably South Africa, Prime Minister Smith
told the press on December 1 that he:

- favored “detente” in southern Africa; and
- would talk to those who previously supported “terrorism” if they were now prepared to work constitutionally.

Smith’s statement suggested that he and many white Rhodesians were reluctantly being forced to consider alternatives to the relatively comfortable situation they had enjoyed since 1965. Long accustomed to the reassuring presence of the Portuguese on their eastern flank in Mozambique and of South Africa on the south, they face a changing situation in which they cannot be sure of Pretoria’s continuing support if guerrilla warfare spreads or intensifies.

**Rhodesian Nationalists Unite**

Smith again agreed to release Nkomo and Sithole to participate in a second round of talks among the nationalist leaders, which got underway in Lusaka on December 4. Kaunda, aided by Nyerere and Botswana’s President, Sir Seretse Khama, evidently succeeded in pressuring the four nationalist groups into forming a common front, a goal which has persistently eluded the OAU and other outside mediators. The joint communique stated their agreement to:

- unite under the umbrella of ANC for the purpose of conducting negotiations;
- accept the ANC’s Muzorewa as temporary leader of the coalition, pending the convening within four months of a conference to decide on permanent leadership and organizational structure.

The apparent price for acceptance by the militants in ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI of a merger under Muzorewa’s moderate leadership was the inclusion in the communique of language endorsing the continuation of the insurgent struggle until a settlement was achieved.

**Prospects**

Smith’s surprise announcement and its confirmation by African leaders give cause for renewed optimism that the Rhodesian constitutional deadlock may be closer to resolution than at any time in the past nine years. But the toughest bargaining still lies ahead: as in
past settlement efforts, the greatest difficulties will center on how rapidly the transition to majority rule will be achieved. African demands for immediate majority rule will be unacceptable to Smith and perhaps represent a maximum bid put forth by the liberation groups for bargaining purposes.

**RHO 3 — 23 JUNE 1976, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, BETWEEN BALTHAZAR VORSTER, PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA AND U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY.**

**PARTICIPANTS:**
Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister, Republic of South Africa
Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Bernardus Gerhardus Fourie, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Roelof Frederik Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN
General Hendrik Johannes van den Bergh, Director, Bureau for State Security; Security Advisor to the Prime Minister
Amb. Donald Sole, Ambassador to FRG

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Amb. William Bowdler, Ambassador to South Africa
Robert Funseth, Special Assistant to Secretary for Press Relations and Spokeman of the Department
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff Member

[The Prime Minister and Secretary conferred alone from approximately 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. The principals then joined their delegations for cocktails. At about 7:10 the dinner began. The Prime Minister began the meal by saying grace. The conversation then began].
Kissinger: I asked the Prime Minister whether he could give us his assessment of the Rhodesian situation—the military situation and the prospects. We will give you our assessment but you, being closer, I'm sure study it more closely. I can say I learned from the Prime Minister that there is a tribe in [excised] that is called Bastards.

Schaufele: We can give you new recruits!

Vorster: I said this to Waldheim and he nearly went through the roof. They call themselves Bastards and are insulted if you don't say, “Hello, Bastard.” [Laughter]

Vd Bergh: It is literally true.

Kissinger: Do any speak German here?

Vd Bergh: Some older ones do.

Kissinger: What is the situation in Rhodesia?

Vorster: The situation in Rhodesia, Mr. Secretary, is, in a nutshell: Some people are inclined to think it's a fight between whites and blacks. But it's a fight between certain blacks and a group of whites and blacks. Two-thirds of the Rhodesian Army are blacks; volunteers, not conscripted. They're good fighters, as good as the others.

Kissinger: By “as good as the others” do you mean as good as the whites? Or as the other blacks?

Vorster: The other blacks. If the Cubans and Soviets stay out, the fight between 15,000 on the Rhodesian side and a few thousand terrorists can go on for 15 years.

Vd Bergh: Right. It could be forever and ever.

Kissinger: At what point—since this is a psychological problem—will the whites move out of the outlying farms into the cities, because their homes are insecure?

Vorster: Some will do it. But the morale of the people is very high. It's do or die for them. This is all they have.
Kissinger: But this doesn’t preclude its becoming untenable. It happened in Angola.

Vorster: Don’t equate the Portuguese settler with the Rhodesian farmer. That is a different kettle of fish.

Kissinger: Our estimate is they have 11,500—in training.

Schaufele: We estimate 3,500 already trained.

Vorster: But they’re not even as well-trained as those who came in five years ago.

Kissinger: But in the history of guerrilla wars, the government always begins by trying to recruit the local population to fight the guerrillas.

Vorster: Here they hurt themselves by killing and maiming black women and children. The number of whites killed is very small. But hundreds of blacks have been killed and maimed.

Vd Bergh: And kidnapped.

Kissinger: But leaving aside the moral question, the example of Algeria—where they were there longer—guerrillas started by attacking the local population. At first they were outraged, then they’re intimidated. The Government has to intensify measures. If they make reprisals, they lose their international position; if they don’t, they lose the war.

So, with all respect, it seems to me to be the first phase of the war. At some point they reach a phase where, according to Mao, they swim in the sea of the population.

Vorster: But it’s not at that phase. They can liquidate the terrorists, and they’re doing quite well. And the populace in Mozambique comes over to us for food. If they don’t get it from us, they’re starving.

Muller: They buy corn.

Vorster: Wheat and corn.

[Botha and Funseth arrive after giving a press briefing. See Tab A].
Kissinger: Will the casualties begin to increase?

Vorster: They have increased already, on both sides, but more so on the terrorist side than on the Rhodesian side. We’ll give you the figures.

Kissinger: But our estimate is that the ratio is declining. About three to one.

Vd Bergh: That is so.

Vorster: That’s the civilian population; not just fighting men.

Schaufele: But they’re aiming at the populace.

Vd Bergh: Most of the casualties are from the mines. They killed four black kids yesterday.

Kissinger: But I’m trying to be analytical. At what point will the settlers begin to abandon the outlying districts?

Vorster: The point has not yet been reached. But I’d mislead you if I said it wouldn’t be.

Muller: But you must realize the determination of the settlers.

Kissinger: But I’m just trying to understand. Don’t you think at some point the people will start to leave?

Vorster: They’re leaving now, and in increasing numbers. But they’re not the people who count. They’re the hangers-on. The Portuguese fought office hours—9 to 5. Not these.

Vd Bergh: There are no boats in the harbors.

Vorster: The Portuguese had boats in the harbors. Ready to go. These people aren’t looking over their shoulders.

Lord: Are there blacks fighting with the whites?

Vorster: There are, and they’re well trained. The black man is no fool. He knows Machel promised a paradise and now it’s getting hell. He says: “We’ve got no jobs, so if that’s the kind of paradise they have, we’ll stay here”.

Lord: Do you think Smith’s strategy will be to give concessions?
Vorster: He has gotten jobs for them and made concessions. He created a commission to combat discrimination and accepted all the recommendations that count. He appointed seven black Ministers. That makes a difference.

Kissinger: Do they (the blacks) really know what’s going on in Mozambique?

Vorster: There is a story about Mozambique—there are no telegraph lines. A man shot a lion, and ten minutes later it was known fifty miles away.

Kissinger: How?

Botha: By bush telegraph.

Vorster: That’s Africa.

Vd Bergh: It’s the same tribe living on both sides of the border. One brother might be in Rhodesia and the other in Mozambique.

Vorster: I grew up on a farm. I spoke Xhosa before I spoke Afrikaans. They know exactly what goes on in Mozambique—or Tanzania—or Ethiopia. That’s Africa.

Kissinger: Let’s go back to Rhodesia. We get extremely different opinions. Some say the situation will begin to unravel by this time next year.

Vorster: Next year?

Kissinger: The cities won’t be insecure, but the roads will be unsafe at night, etc. Some say two years. But all say it will happen at some point.

Vorster: We can’t disprove that. We can’t say it will happen, and we can’t say it won’t. Unless there is outside intervention I’ll go along with you to some extent. I’ll agree it’s going to happen in X years, but I can’t say two years.

Kissinger: By outside intervention do you mean officers, or actual troops?

Vd Bergh: Actual troops.

Kissinger: Why won’t white officers make a difference?

Vorster: Because they’ll be new and they will have a communications gap. And they
won’t know the psychology of the troops they’re commanding. That makes a difference in Africa.

Vd Bergh: The blacks in Rhodesia know their white masters; they grew up with them on farms. They fought together as kids.

Kissinger: That was true in Algeria too.

Schaufele: And Kenya.

Vorster: But the whites didn’t fight in Kenya.

Schaufele: If the blacks can’t fight, won’t this encourage outside intervention?

Vorster: That is the million dollar question. Kaunda, for one, will be very wary of it because he’s genuinely afraid of Russian communists as you and I are.

Kissinger: But he may be equally afraid of not letting them in.

Vorster: I can tell you a story. I won’t mention names, but it was a Southern African President. He said he didn’t fear the Chinese but he did fear the Russians. I said my mother said “if you sup with the devil, use a long spoon, and they’re both devils.” He said: “You’re wrong. If you make a deal with the Chinese to build a machine, they’ll come on the appointed day and ask our experts to come they’ll train our people. So if anything goes wrong with the machine, our people can handle it. That’s the Chinese. The Russians will arrive on the appointed day and ask our people to clear off. They don’t teach us a thing. They say that if we need help we should call them. And once they aid you they enslave you”.

Kissinger: It just shows the Chinese are shrewder.

Botha: Yes.

Vorster: But the Chinese aren’t a factor. It doesn’t mean they won’t be a factor in future.

Muller: Will they stay out of Rhodesia as they did in Angola?
Kissinger: I’m not sure. One could make a case for the proposition that having been humiliated indirectly in Angola, they might become more active in Rhodesia—to ensure that what happens in Rhodesia doesn’t happen under Russian tutelage.

Vorster: Not yet. There is no evidence at the moment. That doesn’t mean it won’t happen in future.

Muller: Isn’t it clear that they (the Chinese) want to remain on good terms with the U.S.?

Kissinger: They do; in fact they were ready to help in Angola if we could have kept up a front.

Muller: If they intervened, wouldn’t it interfere with good relations with the U.S.?

Kissinger: With advisers—I’ll be honest—I’m not sure it would interfere with good relations. Troops, yes.

Vorster: The Russians might say to the terrorists: “If you get involved with the Chinese, count us out.”

Kissinger: Really?

Vd Bergh: The Chinese have no say in Rhodesia now.

Vorster: I think the Russians laid down the law. All their weapons are Russian.

Vd Bergh: Except the Chinese train terrorists in Tanzania. You shouldn’t get the impression we think white Rhodesia will find it easy.

Vorster: No, I made that point to the Secretary in our talk. And it will get harder for them.

Vd Bergh: And it depends on whether Botswana needs the railway line.

Schaufele: I thought Botswana allowed the terrorists to leave Rhodesia through Botswana.

Vorster: That they allow. They look the other way.
Muller: They don’t have the police force to control it.

Schaufele: Will you help them?

Vorster: We help Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho. It’s really a closer union than the European Common Market.

Fourie: There is an understanding that if the line is interrupted—it’s a Rhodesian line—we will help them.

Kissinger: “Help” means?

Fourie: It means if the line is cut in Botswana without cooperation with Botswana and they have no communications, South Africa will help. But if that situation is brought about only without Botswana’s cooperation. The line is operated through Botswana to the Republic and Botswana can’t operate it itself.

[Excised]

Fourie: And it was the Prime Minister who first introduced Nkomo and Sithole.

Vorster: Nkomo, Sithole, Muzorewa, and [excised] were there. Nkomo stood out. If you went in there not knowing who was the leader, you would have picked out Nkomo. If I had to ride the river with one of them, I’d pick Nkomo.

Muller: And the Rhodesians do too.

Kissinger: But how long will he be in the game? It’s between him and the men with the guns.

Vorster: That’s right. Even if there is an agreement tomorrow with Nkomo, the men with the guns wouldn’t recognize him as their leader.

Kissinger: But it would be an entirely different situation internationally. If there is a legitimate government in Salisbury, if Nkomo was in office under international guarantees, and then terrorism started…

Vorster: Of course.

Kissinger: I’ve said publicly—so it’s no secret—that if the Cubans and the Soviets did some-
thing, we would act. But with fifty percent of our combat troops being black because of our All-Volunteer Army—and we could do it against Cuba because of Western Hemisphere grounds. But if Vietnam came in, or the North Koreans… Ironically, the easiest one for us to tackle is Cuba. But if there were a legitimate government, and then the terrorists started, we could do something.

Muller: They won’t have support in the world.

Kissinger: We’d be in a much better position. We’d give arms to Nkomo.

Muller: The Rhodesian Party is the equivalent of our Progressive Party, which we’re fighting.

Schaufele: But Smith is ruining Nkomo.

Vorster: It’s only a question of Standard 6 or Standard 7 or Standard 8. It’s not one-man-one-vote—which would mean dictatorship.

Kissinger: Standard 7 means? Education?

Vorster: Standard 7 is primary plus one. Standard 8 is primary plus 2.

[Excised]

Fourie: It’s 160,000 including 80,000 Britons.

Kissinger: But if it’s like Mozambique and it’s a big force, no guarantees will work.

Vorster: That’s right.

Vd Bergh: And you’ll have a Marxist government in Rhodesia.

Vorster: And the entire country will be a shambles, and the beautiful cities, Salisbury and Bulowayo, will be in rack and ruin.

Muller: But if there is a solution where the whites don’t feel threatened, if they could be encouraged to stay behind regardless of the color of the government, then it could be a great asset to the West, because Communism could be held back.

Kissinger: I’m a newcomer to Africa. But my understanding is, if there is finite time—
maybe a year—when one can settle with men like Nkomo, then afterwards one has to settle with the guerrilla high command. Then it’s an unwinnable situation, no matter how long it takes, whether five or ten years.

Vorster: Maybe not. Unless the Russians and Chinese intervene.

Kissinger: Given the evolution of world politics…

Muller: But the whites will leave.

Kissinger: But there is no domestic situation in which we could support Smith. We could even support Nkomo.

Vorster: Nkomo enforced by specific guarantees can save the situation.

Kissinger: For us, we can support Nkomo, but we can’t support Smith. This is the reality, whatever any American tells you.

Vorster: Nkomo, bolstered up with specific guarantees, can save the present situation.

[Excised]

Muller: But we should consider an anesthetic.

Schaufele: Can I ask a very blunt question, Mr. Prime Minister?

Vorster: Yes?

Schaufele: Can any deal be made with Smith?

Vorster: If it can be a reasonable deal that I can sell to my people, I can sell it to him, or if not, to the leaders. I’ll sell it to David Smith, the second in command.

Kissinger: If you can sell it to your people…

Muller: We can sell it across the border.

Kissinger: And your definition of reasonable is something that gives reasonable incentives for the whites to stay and plausible assurance of compensation if they leave.

Vorster: If there is no mass exodus. We’ve had a mass exodus from Mozambique and
from Angola; God knows we don’t want another.

Muller: For many reasons.

Vorster: Plausible assurance of life and property.

Kissinger: That’s something we will think about.

Vorster: There has to be assurance it will stick.

Kissinger: A government by Nkomo, or someone like him.

Vorster: Guaranteed by outside powers.

Kissinger: In what way?

Vorster: Financial and otherwise.

Kissinger: Financial we can do, but we can’t guarantee Nkomo against an overthrow.

Vorster: No, that is not realistic.

Muller: Do you want to bring the British in?

Kissinger: Yes, definitely. We don’t want to do it alone.

Muller: And the Europeans, who are very keen. And some Africans… the Zambians and others.

Kissinger: We want that. But the only way we can sell it to the Africans is if we can say: IF all these conditions are met, on a certain date something will happen. If we could go to the four Presidents within a measurable time and say: by February 1, Nkomo will be President, or March 1.

Vorster: There must be a transition period.

Kissinger: Or conceivably, I’m thinking out loud, a transitional period with the British coming back.

Vorster: Amen.

Kissinger: In which Nkomo could come in.
Vorster: But not a black Parliament.

Kissinger: I think we can then sell it to the Africans.

Vorster: And then you can look to me. I don’t want to stick my neck out—but you can look to me because it’s my responsibility to sell it to my subcontinent.

Kissinger: Then my only responsibility is to keep my people quiet.

Botha: Absolutely.

Vorster: It would be dynamite.

Kissinger: You talk about a bush telegraph! [Laughter]

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**RHO 4 — 3 MARCH—1 SEPTEMBER 1976, SAG CABINET MINUTES, SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES, CAB 1/1/6.**

3.3.76 Report of the Rhodesia position. Worsens according to all reliable sources. Request came from Kaunda to intervene in Rhodesia as Zambia’s position is becoming untenable with regard to the purpose of a thoroughfare and bases for Cubans on their way to Rhodesia and Mozambique. According to message from this source the situation in Rhodesia has reached crisis proportions. South Africa’s standpoint remains unchanged in that it is not prepared to exert pressure on Rhodesia. South Africa did not pressurize or influence Rhodesia to have discussions. We informed Rhodesia that in calculations it must, in the case of war, operate with the assumption that it is alone. The difficult decision, however, awaits the government, namely if Rhodesia becomes involved in war could South Africa remain on the outside.

10.3.76 State Security Council assembled on 5/3/76. Defense Force’s point of view is that we are not prepared to open a second front by fighting in Rhodesia. Defense Force feels that, at this stage, it is the most important from a military point of view.
15.6.76 Prime Minister reports about discussions with Rhodesian Prime Minister from which it appears that parity is no longer his policy, that Rhodesia believes that Mozambique will collapse and their position with regard to terrorists will improve, and that he prefers to speak with Western leaders personally.

23.6.76 Min PW Botha reports that the Prime Minister phoned from Bonn, Reception was (described) as friendly.

3.8.76 Prime Minister reports on his discussions in Germany with Kissinger. It took place in a spirit of good will. Kissinger… further worried that the Russians will call American bluff about further Russian interference in Southern Africa such as Angola. Therefore wishes to handle situation in a different manner by finding acceptable settlement for Rhodesia… The prospect of further meetings is held out, and then in South Africa… Dr. Muller gave a survey of the international scene which at present looks dark for South Africa. We have just escaped action in terms of Chapter 7 of the Charter. Circumstances favor communism which has lost face with interference in Angola. This action is now accepted to be legal and justified in Africa. The situation is serious:

The Prime Minister: We receive icy winds, economically and politically, from the front. We must not become panic stricken, or take crisis decision.

Rhodesia: Prime Minister, Adj Prime Minister and Min of Transport of Rhodesia have had discussions. There are strong differences within the Rhodesia Front. Suggestion that Rhodesia be divided in three was discussed by their caucus. The Prime Minister does not think that… will be acceptable as settlement. Their caucus requested that South Africa must take the initiative to bring the Rhodesian Government into the conversation once again. The same request was received from ANC through Kabella. The economic position is extremely weak. They want R20m for airplanes…
Min PW Botha: If Rhodesia falls into hostile hands, South Africa will have additional defense problems with the extended border which has to be defended. South Africa can defend itself against insurgency. South Africa cannot defend itself against conventional attack such as Angola. ..We must gain time, which will require that we implement our policy and come to an agreement with the nature of the black and brown so that there is internal order….

Dr C P Mulder: We must get rid of the Rhodesian and SWA issue…. Min v.d. Spuy thinks that we must not do anything that will undermine trust. That also holds for SWA.

31.8.76 The Prime Minister is not prepared to negotiate with opposition parties of Rhodesia, but with Mr Smith who will shortly visit the Prime Minister, unless Mr Smith requests that the Prime Min speaks to the opposition parties.

1.9.76 The hospitality of the Swiss government during visit to Zurich was remarkable. .. The negotiations were tough but amicable… When he visits Dar es Salaam Dr Kissinger will try to negotiate for an interim government for Rhodesia consisting of five in which there will be three white and two black.
They are very despondent and obviously hoped we would be more forthcoming. They are not enthused by the line we wish them to take with Kissinger. They say Friend (Vorster) tried for two years to sell (Smith)’s sincerity of purpose to Kaunda and colleagues but he could not do it now. A large section of Congress has already written off Rhodesia. The basis we set out yesterday will do nothing to alter this and we should not deceive ourselves that the expressions of support we get from certain American and other right-wingers will change things in our favor. They do not feel the Americans, French or Germans will be persuaded to talk to Farmer (Smith) as ‘they know what to expect’. Vorster’s aim at the meeting was to find out (Smith)’s position. Our response when he raised the issue of parity brought them to despair. They thought we were too sanguine about the possibility of Russia using Cubans or Satellites in Southern Africa. The more success we have in countering terrorism the more likely it is that neighboring African states might seek external intervention. At present those states thought Africans could win by themselves. (Vorster) had put RSA attitude politely but he had made it clear that RSA would not come to Rhodesia’s aid. First, because it would give others the excuse to intervene; secondly, if African states sought external intervention, the West would ‘cut South Africa off’ if she then attempted to participate in our battle.

They thought our air strike on Espungabera only 12 days before Kissinger meeting was unfortunate. Outsiders would say we had done it to torpedo talks. They were incredulous over our claiming success in previous negotiations. Even if we thought they were naïve the people they were going to see were not... They were “shattered” we had not thought about the minimum terms for settlement. (Smith) had said we intended to move to a certain goal. The US view “responsible government” would be diametrically opposed to ours. Did we believe the evolutionary process would go on forever? He wished to know because he would be asked what brief he had from Rhodesia to support
his statements. We had replied that could go along but we could not be specific on the franchise or the time limit. Vorster said that the idea would be if we could say that we were moving along a certain path and we would get there in X or Y years. This is what he had hoped for. Something must be held out to show Rhodesia was prepared to move towards her goal in a practical way.

They thought (Smith) misread South Africa in two ways. First he thought the Friend was trying to dictate to him. Second, when the Friend listened sympathetically and quietly he took it as indicating agreement with what he was saying. He was wrong.

They had thought they saw how some use could be made of the American initiative and had begun to hope this could be exploited. Yesterday dispelled this.

**For Gaylard only from ADR, Re “your query about military equipment if terrorism continues on eastern border”**.

I have pointed out to contacts that was sticking point and we must know what assistance we might get… it is a matter of life and death. (Rhodesian) Cabinet needed assurances.

(The message from Vorster is) “as of this moment we have not applied boycotts of any nature against Rhodesia. Therefore no boycott is conceivable after sanctions have been lifted. In other words this type of thing could only become easier and nobody should think otherwise”. Short said Vorster could not admit in front of Kissinger that he was supplying us and would go on doing so. He had always evaded the charge, saying Rhodesia bought on the black market etc…

David Scott drafted immediate signal which he showed me, emphasizing our problem and urging that we be given some assurance. He said Labour Government were chary on arms supplies to any country but it was manifest(ly necessary) since aim was to set up anti-communist government that they and others should be ready to assist. Told him what Kissinger had said on position re arms supplies.
The Basic UK terms offered 22 March 1976 were modified to Rhodesia’s advantage under Kissinger’s influence…

It remains RSA prime concern there should be no economic collapse in Rhodesia resulting from mass exodus of whites, and no consequent power-vacuum which would be filled by Communists.

In this event Pretoria judges the whole of central Southern Africa would fall to communist hegemony and the time which South Africa requires to put its own house in order would not be so readily available.

Consequently, the Rhodesian acceptance of the settlement proposals has been widely acclaimed with only the electorally insignificant Herstigte Nationale Party, among organised opinion, dissenting. The risks of a sudden influx of penniless white refugees have been averted by financial guarantees and, wherever may happen in the longer term, an internationally acceptable transitional government will ensure relative and short term stability in the region. Above all, the dilemma faced by the Government of risking either electoral opprobrium by abandoning the whites or international opprobrium b continuing to support them, has been obviated.

The Government probably regards itself as having fully discharged its responsibilities towards Rhodesia and plans to behave with strict decorum towards the transitional government. Whilst it is in SA’s interests that a non-Marxist black government should accede to power on independence, it is doubtful whether the Government contemplates exerting any overt political influence to secure this for fear of the attempt being counterproductive. For the same reason, having reconciled itself to a black Zimbabwe, the Government would not wish to jeopardise its future standing by showing itself unduly sympathetic any signs of intransigence on the part of white members of the Government.

However, on the economic plane South Africa will be anxious to assist although such assistance will be tempered by the knowledge that Rhodesia will become a competitor in certain commodities, especially in Central Africa.
Cooperation that has hitherto existed in sensitive areas, eg interchange of intelligence will tail off.

**RHO 7 — 14 OCTOBER 1976, CIO INTELLIGENCE REPORT, FORMATION OF PATRIOTIC FRONT, RHODES UNIVERSITY, CORY LIBRARY, SMITH PAPERS, BOX 4/005 (M)**

With reference to the formation of ANC (Nkomo) + ZANU (Mugabe) with backing of ZIPA (Zimbabwe Peoples Army), in Maputo 7.10.76.

(Mugabe had been proposed by Frontline Presidents as new and effective head of ZANU— rather than Sithole (“who was shaking with rage when he was told this”). Kaunda emphasized to Nkomo the importance of the forthcoming Geneva talks that everything must be done to ensure its successful conclusion.)

It was agreed common front to be formed to present unified front at Geneva.

Official ANC thinking on their demands or preconditions for Geneva conference is that it was essential to give publicity to them in order to take along Mugabe faction and not to be denounced by ZIPA. This was done in the full knowledge that these demands would only be implemented after settlement and the formation of the Interim Government. It was therefore a political move and absolutely essential for any unity with Mugabe... A marriage of convenience... The ANC are under no illusions as to the personal ambitions of Mugabe, but at this particular stage they need him as much as he needs the ANC.
RHO 8 — 8 DECEMBER 1976, REPORT, FOR VDB FROM ADR, PM’S RETURN TO GENEVA, RHODES UNIVERSITY, CORY LIBRARY, SMITH PAPERS, BOX 4/005 GENEVA CONFERENCE, INFORMAL MEETINGS (AMERICANS)

7.12.76

No. H23 top Secret

Following is message from Pik Botha to his government yesterday. He and Fourie phoned me from Washington early this morning and said I should get this to the PM soonest. They said K was taking a position that suited them very well. He had confirmed with them shortly before they telephoned me that they had send the messages to Nyerere and Kaunda. He would have reminded the two presidents of his discussions with them during his African visits. Kissinger said the African delegations at Geneva were raising issues never agreed in his talks with them. Only the original proposals could form an agreement.

Botha and Fourie stressed that Kissinger had asked them to emphasise that we must not reveal under any circumstances that this particular message was being made known by him to us, as it would destroy his credibility. They had given him the assurance that they would only pass it on, on condition that we would keep it quiet.

They stressed the conference must be keep going until after the date of Carter’s inauguration. Botha said he felt that we can believe Kissinger as the latter has nothing to lose now. He thought the substance of the signal represented reasonably good advice.

Fourie said the Americans had given him their assurance that they were going full steam ahead with the Trust Fund.

Botha message begins.

1. I saw K this afternoon (Sat 4 Dec) for approximately 1 hour. He had just returned from Mexico

2. As regards Rhodesia I said the talks in Geneva were heading for a failure because the black Rhodesian reps were ignoring the 5 points. I appealed to K to go Geneva personally to confront the reps there with the five points which had been agreed upon.

3. K agreed that the chances of success were slim but he feels that all is not yet lost. He has given instructions that messages be sent to Kaunda and Ny this w/e to inform
them that “the present proposals advanced by the black delegates in Geneva offer no basis for agreement.”

The two black presidents will also be reminded of the “basic structure” of the five points was discussed with me by four separate American missions as well as by the British. The concept of the Council of State and the two-tier system proposed for the interim gov had indeed been discussed with them and neither Kaunda nor Nyerere had at any time shown any opposition regarding these proposals. The only two points which appeared to be problematical for Kaunda and Nyerere were the question of a white chairman for the Council of State and the appointment of two white ministers for the two security ministries. K continued “the African presidents seem to operate on a different version of the truth. Now says that he did not know anything about the Council of State until very last stage. Discussed the matter personally with him. The Council of State was not an American idea. It was not conceived by us but we supported it and we discussed it with them. The African leaders did not agree to every word in the section concerning the Council of State, but they did agree with the concept.”

4. I urged K to go to Geneva personally to confront the delegates with the background of events. His reaction was he would have done so gladly if Ford had won the election. “If Ford had won I would by now have forced a showdown and I would have confronted them with the reaction of the frontline presidents. However the way the British have been conducting the Geneva talks and the fact that we have lost the election now makes it impossible for me to go to Geneva. K fears that the black delegates will not at present pay much heed to him unless the new Admin makes it clear they will execute his programme and support him.

5. I asked K why he did not try to obtain a categorical undertaking from Carter that Carter would support him. K is of the opinion that Carter will not be willing to execute the five points. The blacks brought Carter into power and he will not dare to support Smith.

6. I told K that it then no longer really paid us to try to do anything further to save the talks at Geneva. It was clear to me that the talks would fail. We had pinned our hopes on a firm American reaction but it was clear to me that this was lacking. Matters must then take their course and the war must escalate.

7. K replied that there was still a slender possibility that a peaceful solution could be reached. He wished to emphasise that Mr Smith should try to have the talks continue as long as possible. At least for a few weeks until after Carter has assumed office on 20 January 1977. If the talks then fail, Kissinger will at that stage be willing to state in public that there had been a reasonable chance of success but that the Carter Administration had
caused the peace effort to miscarry. Am Ambassador tells me Schaufele was instructed to remain in London on way home from Lesotho…to meet Kissinger there today. Richard’s visit was probably not purely coincidental. Bowdler says it is possible Schaufele will return Geneva. Let us hope they might stiffen the Brits’ backbone.”

Editor’s Note: In early 1977, Cuban President Fidel Castro took an extensive tour of Africa and then continued on to Europe and the USSR. During a stop in East Berlin, Castro recounted his experiences to East German Communist leader Erich Honecker. The record of those discussions was located in the archives of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) by Christian F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive).

The following excerpt—from a discussion on 3 April 1977 at the House of the SED Central Committee in East Berlin—contains Castro’s impressions of the situations in several southern African countries, (e.g., Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, People’s Republic of the Congo), and several guerrilla or liberation groups in the region, such as the African National Congress (ANC), then struggling for power in South Africa, and two groups fighting to rule Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU). Also included are Castro’s assessments of individual political leaders, remarks about coordination with Moscow, and an over-all conclusion that Africa was the place to inflict a major blow against world imperialism. (For Castro’s remarks at this meeting on the situation in the Horn of Africa, see the excerpts printed later in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.)

Transcript of Honecker-Castro Meeting, 3 April 1977 (excerpts)
Minutes of the conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel Castro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of the Central Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen, Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cienfuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes

[Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him to take the floor—ed.]

Fidel Castro: [sections omitted—ed.]. We visited Tanzania because of an old commitment. We have built three schools there, sent a medical brigade, and given help in other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talk about economic matters above all. The rise in oil prices had affected Tanzania tremendously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oil a year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal and cotton crops has to be used for the purchase of oil. The Chinese are still present in Tanzania. They have built a few things there, in particular the railroad. The armed units of the ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tanzania also carries some responsibility for the split of the liberation movement of Zimbabwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Africa armed fighting has begun.

RHO 10 — 31 March 1977, Memorandum of Meeting, Jack Gaylard Meeting File, Meeting PM, ADR, Pik Botha and Brand Fourie, Rhodes University, Cory Library, Smith Papers.

Botha gave a summary of recent experiences in USA—that people were sympathetic, but not in Washington or New York. As a result he had become somewhat cynical. He was convinced that there would be no assistance forthcoming for either of our countries from USA. Botha had warned his own government that they could not rely on the West. This was proved by the Angola experience. He believed that Ford and Kissinger would be seen as angels compared to Carter. Vance was described as cold and calculating. On Rhodesia,
the big question seemed to be whether or not PM genuine in seeing a settlement. He had been asked this question at every interview.

PM asked what it was Carter wanted? What did he want him to do? He had accepted majority rule in his talks with Kissinger.

Botha: He had talked with Sir Anthony Duff and Schaufele together. He had told them that the Black majority leader should be identified beyond doubt. Smith had been identified as the leader of the whites. If there were five or six contenders seeking white leadership as well as Smith, would the US and UK accept this, as you seemed to accept the state of affairs with the Blacks. Had said it was necessary to get Mugabe out and given the eg of installation of MPLA in Angola. Surely the US must be able to support the search for the majority black leader in Rhodesia… All they said was they would have to report his view higher up. Duff said he could not argue against the force of Botha’s logic. However, the Front Line Presidents constituted a reality and no agreement cld be made without considering this.

Carter was more positive. He had asked if RSA was committed to Muz. Botha had replied RSA not committed to anyone, but they would be for any individual who could lead the blacks towards a peaceful solution provided this was obtained in an open and fair way. They would even accept Mugabe if he came to power by such means.

Botha: the rightwing revolt in Rhodesia had been good thing overseas. It had showed Smith could not do as he liked, and he had just managed to get through the new legislation. This had made a good impression, and the same had happened to RSA over SWA. Carter had said he wanted to see Rhodesia and Namibia settled peacefully as soon as possible. He wanted black majority rule within a reasonable period, by irreversible process. PM said he agreed to this.

Botha rejoined they did not believe us. PM said if they did not want to believe him, what did they wish to bring in, in order to convince them? ..

Botha: he had been waiting for PM to say this. His idea was that the RSA should submit a document to Carter regarding RSA’s attitude to Rh and SWA. This would set up the basic elements and should be delivered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. His advice was that we should always look and sound reasonable to European and US ears. Very little of our case had been committed to paper and if we could put across our views in writing this might achieve something; indeed it might even put them (US) in an impossible situation.
In SWA RSA had conceded it should go forward as an entity rather than be fragmented into homelands. 10 of the 11 members of the Council of Ministers would be black; Apartheid was abolished. They could not hand over the territory to SWAPO, just as Mr Smith could not hand over to Mugabe...

.. The poison of the unresolved Rhodesian problem was affecting good relationships and there was a growing feeling the white presence should be removed. He repeated that there was great value in submitting the document he mentioned getting our case across.... At end of meeting Bzezinski had said he found Botha's exposition compassionate and moving, but had gone on to say “you have not got the time.”

Pm: thanked Botha. We would keep in close touch. He would always be available for consultation. Botha responded similarly: He said he would play straight with us. It was the only way he knew.

It was a warm and fruitful meeting and was significant for the rapport struck up between the PM and the new Foreign Minister.

1st April 1977, Cape Town

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**RHO 11 — 27 DECEMBER 1977, MEMORANDUM ON VISIT TO HEAD OFFICE—DAVID RICHARDSON: LIAISON WITH THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3.**

SADFA BTS 1 / 156 / 3 VOL. 15
MEMORANDUM. 27 December 1977.
THE CONSUL-GENERAL, NEW YORK.
VISIT TO HEAD OFFICE : MR. DAVID RICHARDSON : LIAISON WITH RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

My memorandum 8/3 of 28 October 1977 and your letter to the Secretary in this connection bear reference.

Mr. and Mrs. Richardson returned shortly before the Christmas week-end from their
visit to Africa and South America. During the week-end, while they were guests at our house, Mr. Richardson told me the following:

Their visit to Africa went very well. In Rhodesia they had discussions with Bishop Muzurewa and his people. On this occasion he was told that they have abandoned the idea of forming an alliance with N’Komo in favour of a new idea to obtain cooperation with Mugabe. Briefly some of the most important reasons for this change of strategy are the following:

i) Old moot points between Muzurewa and N’Komo have already begun to take on a certain degree of unbridgeable bitterness.

ii) It appears clearly that their different tribal backgrounds are a strong factor. (Muzurewa is Mashona and N’Komo is N’Dbele/Matabele). The N’Dbeles are suspected of wanting to establish “a new minority government”. (They form only about 10% of the population).

iii) Early in the race for leadership N’Komo had already obtained the support of Tiny Roland of Lonrho company, probably with the understanding that the latter would receive considerable advantages from the N’Komo Government. On the one hand this position is morally unacceptable for Muzurewa and on the other hand strengthens N’Komo’s bargaining power through Roland’s influence on Pres. Kaunda of Zambia and in London, as well as the advantage which Roland’s financial support affords him. It causes N’Komo to be less willing to make concessions. There are strong indications that Mugabe is losing his hold on some of his more militant generals. He himself never was much of a military leader and apparently owes his position mainly to the fact that in his camp he was regarded as one of the best qualified to negotiate…

iv) Mugabe himself is also a Mashona and in public speeches Muzurewa has never taken a strong standpoint against Mugabe. Should he be able to get Mugabe in his camp in an acceptable way it would afford him unequalled prestige, even should most of Mugabe’s generals not follow suit. Mr. Richardson says that he was surprised by this new turn, but that it makes sense to him as Muzurewa is apparently convinced that with Mugabe’s support he could establish a strong government which could avoid a full-scale civil war. In this process he will still to a large degree be dependent on support from the white ranks, especially with regard to the Rhodesian army. He needs the latter to ensure that he
retains the upperhand over Mugabe and that in the process the tables are not eventually turned. Further he believes that white support is indispensable for Rhod.'s economic future. Apparently he has already appealed to whites who have left the country to return.

Muzurewa presumably has one big problem, namely a shortage of money. This places him in a weak position especially regarding N’Komo, who with Roland’s money has apparently already established a large organisation. He fears that with this N’Komo might eventually cause him problems in an election.

At this stage Muzurewa already has, according to Mr. Richardson, a debt burden of 80,000 dollars. He is not keen to accept money from circles who in future could wring economic concessions from him. Money from South Africa would be ideal for him as he believes South Africa could have no other motive than good neighbourliness. He would in any case strive for good co-operation with South Africa as the economy of his country is now closely linked to the economy of the Republic. Furthermore at this stage he is also not sure how Africa would receive an independent Rhodesia under his government. That is why it would be important to him not to lose the friendship of South Africa.

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**RHO 12 — 16 FEBRUARY 1978, TRANSIT VISIT OF REV NDABANINGI SITHOLE, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3**

SADFA BTS 1/156/3
Transit visit of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole
Confidential

In London Rev Sithole would be taking up Britain’s continued support for the PF which he said was not comprehensible. In order to build up pressure against the British attitude his party had sent representatives recently to West Africa where they had visited Liberia, Benin, Togo, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, all of whom had
apparently indicated their support for the internal settlement and were making their voices heard in London. In addition Kenya, Zaire, Tanzania and Nigeria also supported the internal settlement.

Rev Sithole said his party was in touch with the terrorists in Rhodesia who had indicated that they supported the internal settlement and would like to lay down their arms once the interim government was established. In the meantime they would continue their activities in order to keep up the pressure on Mr Smith.

Rev Sithole was quite convinced that once an internal settlement was reached the support for Mugabe and Nkomo would erode. In this connection he mentioned that Moz’s support for the terrorists was diminishing.

Regarding the Anglo-American proposals Rev Sithole said that while many of the principles will be taken up in the internal settlement, the negotiating nationalist parties could not support a role for Britain in the transitional period as they no longer trusted Britain in such a role because of its stubborn adherence to Mugabe and Nkomo.

Pretoria 16.2.78

Before Sithole left SA news came through of internal settlement. Rev. Sithole told me that the settlement had greatly strengthened his hand and he was looking forward eagerly to his meeting with Dr. Owen. The Rev was not very interested in the attitude that Andrew Young would adopt. When I asked him about the attitude of President Kaunda he said he could not say at that stage but that Kaunda would have to accept the settlement. His present support of the PF was merely because he wanted to see his friend Nkomo become the first president of Zimbabwe.

Mr Killern Secret.
RHO 13 — 27 FEBRUARY 1978, REVEREND SITOLE’S VISIT TO EUROPE, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3

Sithole told me that he was very satisfied with the way the talks went with the British Foreign Secretary. He said he was now very hopeful that independence for Rhodesia would become a reality during 1978.

The first meeting with Dr. Owen took place in a tough atmosphere and lasted 2 ½ hours. Sithole gave Owen a full account of the settlement reached and what it meant for Rhodesia. He stressed that the settlement was a fact which nobody could change and that nothing could stop it. Sithole further emphasised that if they had to go it alone, they were prepared to do so and added that they were even prepared to die for it. When Dr Owen referred to the importance of bringing in the Patriotic Front in any settlement, Sithole told him that the PF were welcome to join the talks but that such participation could not be accepted on the terms of the PF.

At the next meeting between Rev Sithole and Dr. Owen the atmosphere was much more relaxed and friendly. The latter was more sympathetic to the internal settlement arrangement. During these and subsequent talks the following main points emerged;

i) Dr. Owen was emphatic that Mr. Smith should not be permitted to be the leader of the interim government. Mr. Sithole agreed but stressed the need for Mr. Smith to be part of it. He said that if this was not the case, the white people would lose confidence and there would be a mass emigration of whites from Rhodesia. This had to be avoided as the cooperation of the white people was very important for the future development of Rhodesia. Dr. Owen agreed but added that if Mr. Smith should head the interim government problems would be created. The OAU, for example, would not accept such an arrangement. Dr. Owen also said that if a black leader would lead the interim government he would be in favour of recognition of the government and sanctions would be lifted.

ii) Dr Owen felt strongly that the interim government should not function for an unduly long period as its credibility would suffer and there would be a loss of confidence.

iii) As far as the allocation of ministries in the new government were concerned Dr Owen held the view that while Mr Smith could be part of the cabinet he should
not be allocated either the Ministries of Justice or Defence. This, Dr Owen said, would create suspicion and complicate matters.

iv) In connection with the proposed referendum, Dr Owen said that it should not be for whites only but all the people, to show that all Rhodesians accepted the internal settlement.

v) Rev Sithole made it clear to Dr Owen that he did not desire a UN peace-keeping force during the interim period leading up to the elections. He had no objection to UN observers in Rhodesia during the elections.

27.2.78

RHO 14 — 31 JULY 1978, MEETING, THORNHILL AIR BASE, BETWEEN SMITH, FOURIE, GAYLARD AND SNELL, JACK GAYLARD MEETINGS, RHODES UNIVERSITY, CORY LIBRARY, SMITH PAPERS

Fourie began. He and Pik had recently been in New York where he had met Owen and Vance. The reason for wanting to meet Smith was to convey to him certain suggestions which Dr Owen had made. Mr. Fourie stressed he was merely acting as a messenger and did not wish to give the impression that SA Gov was committed in any way. Botha would have come himself to see PM but for the fact that Special Cabinet Meeting was being held today to consider consequences of certain decisions recently taken by the security Council of UN.

Basically, the British Government wanted the Prime Minister to meet Nkomo. Both Owen and Vance were of the opinion that, without Nkomo being part and parcel of any settlement exercise, the war would continue. Mr. Fourie said they had mentioned to Owen that there had been a certain de-escalation of the war, but the feeling of the British was that, under the present situation with Nkomo being outside any agreement, the only consequence would be an escalation of the war. The British had in mind a scheme which would be based on the present Executive Council. They were not insisting on going back to the original Anglo-American proposals. Dr Owen hoped to have a meeting with the PM as soon as possible, and this could well be tied in with a meeting
between the PM and Nkomo. Owen wanted to fly out to Rhodesia this w/e and would leave the choice of venue and timing to the PM. If necessary, Nkomo could be kept in the aircraft and not be allowed out until such time as a meeting could be organised between himself and PM.

Fourie: Nkomo might not be prepared to come to such a meeting by himself and might insist on the presence of a General Garba of Nigeria. If this happened, the latter could be excluded from the talks. Fourie said that neither Owen nor Nkomo would undertake such a visit to Rhodesia unless they were convinced it would lead to something successful rather than be a complete failure. What they had in mind was to enlarge the present Executive Council by the inclusion of PF members. They envisioned a Council of eight members, the present four plus an additional four—two from the Nkomo faction and two from the Mugabe faction. Once such a Council had been established it would be difficult to operate on the basis of a consensus. The British had raised the question of a Chairman and they felt that the Chairman should be elected from amongst the eight members. If this was unacceptable the British would want to appoint a Resident Commissioner, who could be made the Chairman of the Executive Council with a casting vote. Once this enlarged Executive Council had been established the British would grant independence on the basis of a transitional constitution.

Another problem which the British raised was the question of who would have control of the Police and the Army. Fourie said he and Botha had gained the impression the British wanted the Resident Commissioner to hold this office. The Executive Council would be given executive and legislative authority. Fourie and Botha queried what the British intended to do about the present Rhodesian parliament. Owen was very vague about this issue.

Once agreement had been reached the new transitional constitution the British would lift sanctions. Fourie added that he and Botha considered that there were three main problems regarding composition of suggested Ex Co—

(i) unlikely internal black members would agree to Nkomo/Mugabe faction having four members;
(ii) Chairman;
(iii) Control of police and army.
Owen had advised Botha that he was not necessarily wedded to Lord Carver because he realized that he was unpopular in Rhodesia. He also indicated he would be seeing Muzorewa and Sithole in London this week.

It was most important for Owen to get an early reply to his suggestions because the GB and U.S. were firmly of the opinion that August was the last month for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. After that the war would escalate and a reasonable solution would be impossible.

Owen had also said that he would be prepared to look at various adaptations of a constitution and would not be dogmatic about anything which had already been suggested. Fourie stressed he and Botha gained the very firm impression that as far as the British were concerned, there were only now two key figures in the Rhodesia settlement exercise, namely, PM and Nkomo.

PM told Fourie that he felt the reason for Owen’s urgency was the forthcoming general election in Britain. Owen was playing party politics and if he could gain some kudos for Labour regarding the Rhodesia issue this would help the Labour party in their election battle. PM stressed, however, he did not want to appear destructive but if such a meeting were to prove beneficial to the nation then obviously it would have to be seriously considered.

Fourie agreed decision whether or not to meet Owen and Nkomo would have to be based on whether would be fruitful for Rhodesia. He said if was decided no meeting, he would convey this decision to GB.

Gaylard: inquired any other possible composition of Ex Council mentioned.

Fourie—no; GB wanted parity in Ex Council. He had gained the impression that the British hoped that Nkomo would be the chairman.

Gaylard: what power, if any, the British envisaged for the Resident Commissioner;

Fourie, if RC not Chairman of Ex Co, would have little power. If was Chairman, he would naturally have considerable power because of his casting vote.

Fourie—he and Botha found ‘difficult to understand’ that HMG keen to arrange meetings between PM, Owen and Nkomo but appeared to be paying no attention to other members of Ex Co.

PM: he had to be very careful not to do anything behind the backs the other three members of the Ex Co. He was now part of a team of four. It would be interesting to learn what Muzorewa and Sithole had to say when they returned from London—whether they had in fact been given same story by Owen as the one conveyed to him today.
PM: if he decided the British suggestion was a starter, he would have to put it to other three members. Was possibility the British trying to work with him behind backs of other 3…

PM asked whether Owen had said anything about driving a wedge between Nkomo and Mugabe.

Fourie: the British had said Mugabe was probably of little consequence. They indicated there could be a split between the Muzorewa faction, but he had definitely gained the impression that the British felt that if Nkomo came back Mugabe would be of little importance.

PM: asked whether Owen had given a clue as to the latest British thinking on Zambia and Mozambique.

Fourie: they had mentioned they wanted the PM to meet Machel and a leader of one of the other African states, though he did not remember which one. The British now felt that the Front line states were now toeing the line.

PM: asked Fourie for a true assessment of the position in Mozambique (over the stability of Machel, whether any Russians there, although in the estimation of the RSA, there was little evidence of this; Neto was now tending to move away from Russian influence. Their assessment was Machel could well do the same. Also what was Nyerere attitude?)

Fourie—his attitude was now fairly reasonable in that he had told SWAPO to accept the plan for SWA or he would have nothing further to do with them.

PM: was Seretse Khama of any real consequence?

Fourie: he is a sleeping partner, though it was obviously in the RSA’s interest to have him there as president, rather than someone else.

PM: would discuss Owen’s ideas with Muzorewa and Sithole when returned. In meantime he would ‘turn over suggestions in his mind’; he had the feeling though Owen might be trying to use RSA to try and put pressure on him.

Fourie—he and Botha had made it quite clear that they would not apply any pressure—they would merely convey a message and take back a reply.
Comment

Above-mentioned two studies were discussed on 5 December 1978 by heads of departments. It was pointed out that the aims set out in the short term strategy for Rhodesia, namely to maintain a stable moderate anti-communist government, do not accord with the concept [draft] recommendations especially regarding Mozambique, namely to co-operate on economic level. It was further pointed out the South African Government would like to create an anti-communist bloc in Southern Africa and that attention must be given to how we could achieve this goal.

About the aim of an anti-communist bloc there is of course unanimity. There could, however, be differences about the methods which should be applied to achieve this aim. Regarding the methods certain factors have to be considered, inter alia the practical implementation, costs, the attitude of the international community and the effect on South Africa’s status and credibility.

In the case of Rhodesia we have to deal with a fluid situation and with a government that is moving in a certain direction but which is not enjoying recognition from the international community. Due to the country’s dependence on South Africa it is possible for South Africa to try to influence the course matters take in such a way that the ideal of a stable moderate anti-communist government may hopefully be achieved.

The picture in South West Africa is the same, although the involvement of the U.N.O. somewhat limits South Africa’s room to maneuver. In the case of Mozambique and Angola, however, we are dealing with governments which, in spite of their ideology and their history of taking over the reins of government, are recognized by the international community and enjoy membership of the United Nations. It is clear that South Africa has to act circumspectly to achieve its aim. Our freedom of movement to bring about changes to the governments of these two countries is limited, because we are already under threat of sanctions. We have to apply more orthodox diplomatic methods, of which the economic weapon constitutes an important part. Looking further to the vitally important development task in South Africa itself and the importance of removing difficulties that could
lead to violence, it is of the utmost importance that a stable situation, where possible, be maintained along our borders and that means are spent on aims according to priority.

The present relations between South Africa and Mozambique do not cause concern. They are pragmatic and based on the recognition of mutual interests. In discussions with spokesmen of the Mozambican Gov., and during the present negotiations with Mozambique on the revision of the Mozambican Convention, we were repeatedly told that Mozambique desires peace in South Africa and that it would like to live in good neighborliness with South Africa. The Mozambican Gov.’s first priority presently appears to be economic development. Without lessening our vigilance towards the communist threat, economic co-operation with Mozambique, over the medium term at any rate, ought to serve the best interests of South Africa. That is especially so if the high expenditure involved in the protection of our border with Mozambique, in case of hostility, has to be taken into consideration, whilst the situations in South West Africa and Rhodesia remain unsolved.

Angola presently shows signs of wanting to approach the West and there are even signs that it would like to normalize its relations with South Africa. The position has not yet developed to such an extent that we could say with any degree of certainty that Angola would like to live with us in good neighborliness, but in the present unfolding situation our approach should be the same as that in the case of Mozambique.

There are certain political currents in both Mozambique as well as Angola which could be developed to the advantage of South Africa’s relations with the two countries. Assistance to and co-operation with these two states can bring about their being weaned away from Russian imperialism and militarism and that they themselves realize that their interests will best be served by being part of a developing and stable Southern Africa.

With an eye on the preceding analysis it is felt that there is not a contradiction between the proposed short term approach regarding Rhodesia and the proposed longer term approach regarding Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South West Africa. The ideal remains the same, but the different circumstances have to be taken into consideration.
RHO 16 — 21 FEBRUARY 1979, MEMORANDUM, MEETING ON RHODESIAN SITUATION HELD AT HF VERWOERD BUILDING, (OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3

Brand Fourie: Referred to Mr Smith’s (statement in Durban)… that he would retire from politics only when Rhodesia had achieved recognition and sanctions had been lifted by Britain and the United States. This would have an effect on the (forthcoming) elections…

Sir Anthony Duff: Was more concerned about the effect of Smith’s continued presence both before and after the elections. If Smith was there progress would be precluded. Assuming that there were to be no lifting of sanctions and no recognition after the election, deadlock would continue. The United Kingdom thought that it had been useful for Smith to remain, up to a point. That point had now been reached.

Fourie: Agreed…

Richard Moose: Another factor which has a strong bearing on the situation is the question of Cuban/Russian involvement. There is evidence accumulating of Soviet willingness to increase material support for the Patriotic Front and to help the Zambians, in the face of Rhodesian air attacks. There is also the related factor of the probable reaction of the Soviet Union and Cuba to the military situation. Mugabe yesterday in conversation referred to the possibility of outside intervention. He has two kinds of intervention in mind. Firstly, the United Kingdom and the United States mounting a rescue operation for whites and secondly South African intervention. The question arises how they would interpret South African involvement such as the provision of supplies, the transfer of equipment and joint operations. Such involvement might trigger larger involvement on the Soviet/Cuban side. The situation was close to the point that the Patriotic Front would reach a decision that there was no alternative to a military solution. This was a matter of grave concern. He could not believe that South Africa would fail to see the situation in the same light. South Africa would not want that sort of situation developing on the border, although he was not questioning South Africa’s ability to handle such a situation. However, South Africa’s diplomacy had been directed to avoiding just such a situation on its borders.

Fourie: Was indeed very aware of the many perils of the situation. However, one point should not be lost sight of; it would be very harmful to the image of the Patriotic Front if they had to admit that they could not do the job themselves. What they would like was to
have more instructors and material support but it would be a disaster for them politically to have to introduce Soviet and Cuban fighting units. He was however puzzled by the reference to joint operations and would be glad of an explanation.

Moose: Understood that South African forces have operated joint patrols with Rhodesians in Mocambique and Zambia.

Duff: Agreed that there had been rumours of small units cooperating.

Fourie: There were always many rumours…. He would be glad to receive particulars about the alleged joint patrols.

Duff: Was not thinking so much in terms of South African involvement such as had been just discussed but in terms of the thinking of the Africans. He detected a change, particularly in the mind of Nyerere. Previously Nyerere had believed in Africans solving their own problems but now he seemed to be thinking of using Cubans for the defence of Mocambique, Tanzania and Zambia against Rhodesian attack. There was a gradual change in attitude discernable. Eventually the Africans may no longer consider it to be a disaster if the Cubans were to help them. The undesirable scenario he foresaw as a possibility was the creation of a climate receptive to Soviet and Cuban intervention; the departure of the whites; black civil war; the establishment of a Government subservient to the Soviet Union. What was giving rise to concern at present was the increasing evidence over the past two months of changing attitudes in African politicians in Tanzania and Zambia and the stepped-up pattern of visits of Soviet military and political representatives.

Fourie: Did not dismiss that possibility. However, there was a difference in the procedure which we believe necessary to cope with the situation. The first step would be to get past the elections. Only then would it be realistically possible to counteract the deteriorating situation…

Duff:…. He wished to stress… that the penultimate disaster would be South African involvement, even in the case of small units getting experience.

Fourie: There was a time when there had been a danger of South African involvement, i.e. when South African police were in Rhodesia. They had perhaps given the impression of bolstering Smith. They had however now been withdrawn.

Moose: The same impression would be created by the use of South African aircrew in aircraft or helicopters.

Fourie: Was not under the impression that Rhodesians were short of personnel of this nature.
Chief Ndiweni (of UNFP) came to see me immediately after return from visit to Europe.

Ndiweni explained that purpose of visit to London was to inform the British of danger of Civil War if the UNFP did not get enough votes in forthcoming elections which would immediately raise fear under Matabele of domination by the Shona. He also explained the UNFP’s concept of federation in Rhodesia to Owen.

Owen said he was not basically against a Federation but that it should be left to the people of Rhodesia to decide on that. Owen then applied pressure on him to pull out of the election with veiled promises of financial aid to promote the idea of federal government. Ndiweni reacted angrily to this and flatly refused to be used by Owen. He then listed a long range of Owen’s failures criticising his policies towards Rhodesia, especially failure to find a solution. Owen lost his composure and said he would remind them that under no circumstances would he recognise the April elections. He added that he would not deal with any Government in which Smith had any say. Owen continued angrily, that after the elections he would then invite to an all party conference whom he Owen, wanted to, implying that Ndiweni would be left out. Ndiweni replied, “We shall have to see if you yourself are still around.” Ndiweni apparently had successful discussions with reps of the Conservative party and made good contacts in Germany and one or two other countries which he would not disclose. He also had discussions with a number of Nkomo’s aides in London and was much encouraged by those discussions that would be passed to the Ndebele to vote for Ndiweni.

Ndiweni told me he was confident of getting at least 15 seats in the Zim/Rh parliament and possibly 26 if he could get sufficient financial support.

His needs for the election are estimated 70,000 dollars and he indicated that he will get all that except for about 20,000 dollars which he would like to ask us for.

As indicated in previous submissions strongly recommend assistance of about this figure. (even if could not get Ndiweni to see Minister.)
RHO 18 — 24 MAY 1979, RECORD OF DISCUSSION WITH RAUL VALDES VIVO, FROM THE JOURNAL OF M.A. MANASOV, TSKHSD, F. 5, OP. 76, D. 834, LI. 82–84, REPRODUCED AND TRANSLATED IN THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT DIGITAL ARCHIVE, WWW.CWIHP.ORG.

CWIHP, From the journal of M.A. Manasov
SECRET
copy no. 3
re: no 265
“24” May 1979
RECORD OF DISCUSSION
with member of the CC Com[munist] Party of Cuba comr. Raul Valdes Vivo
Description:
Memorandum of conversation between Minister-counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Havana M. Manasov and Cuban Communist Party CC member Raul Valdes Vivo where Vivo discusses plans for Soviet-Cuban cooperation on the Angolan situation

7 May 1979

I met with R.V. Vivo in the CC of the Party and, referring to the instructions of the Soviet ambassador, informed him of the discussion in the International Section of the CC CPSU with the members of the Executive Committee of the Jamaican People’s National Party (PNP).

R.V. Vivo, having thanked me for the information, noted the significance of this meeting, which will enable the development of the connection between the CPSU and the PNP and, first and foremost, opens the possibility for the preparation of PNP cadres in the Soviet Union.

Then, in the course of the discussion, R.V. Vivo spoke about his recent trip to several African countries, which was carried out on the orders of F. Castro. This trip was undertaken, continued my interlocutor, because of the fact that the information which we had received from our embassies in a number of African countries is of a subjective nature. In this
connection I [Valdes Vivo] was given the task of becoming acquainted with the situation on location, to have discussions with the leaders of Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nigeria, and likewise with the Soviet ambassadors in these countries, in order to receive more complete and more objective information about the state of affairs in southern Africa.

I was tasked, he said, to convey to J[oshua]. Nkomo [leader of the Zimbabwe African Political Union, ZAPU] and R. Mugabe [leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU], that Cuba is unable to satisfy their request to send pilots for the repulsion of air attacks on the training camps for the Patriotic Front armed forces; to clarify the possibility of unified action between ZAPU and ZANU; to lay out before their leaders and the leadership of the front-line governments the Cuban plan for the creation of a provisional government in Zimbabwe.

R.V. Vivo meanwhile remarked that in Angola at first there had not been clear cooperation between Cuba and the USSR, whereas in Ethiopia our countries have achieved the full coordination of our joint actions. The policy of Cuba and the Soviet Union with regard to southern Africa should likewise be coordinated, he underscored.

My interlocutor laid out the essence of the Cuban plan, which is summarized as follows. The declaration of a provisional government in Zimbabwe is realized not in exile, but in a part of the liberated territory of the country; J. Nkomo is proposed for the post of president of the country, R. Mugabe for prime minister; the program platform of the provisional government provides for the realization of a series of social-economic transformations, secures the interests of those countries which recognize its government; the rights of the white part of the population are guaranteed, elections are planned for the legislative organs of the country; constitutional guarantees are proclaimed, etc.

According to the words of R.V. Vivo, J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe have agreed with this plan, as have the leaders of the front-line states. The provisional government, in the estimation of the Cuban side, would possibly be recognized at first by 30 countries.

The active interference of England in the affairs of Zambia may ensure the victory of the puppet government, which would possibly lead to a conflict between ZANU and ZAPU if the unity of their actions are not achieved, noted my interlocutor.

He reported that the armed forces of the ZANU and the ZAPU include in total 24 thousand people (12 thousand in each organization), but unfortunately, these forces are as yet inactive. In the ranks of mercenaries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2 thousand whites.
R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the content of his discussion with the Soviet ambassador in Mozambique.

According to his words, during the discussion of the situation in southern Africa, our ambassador noted that according to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerate events in a country where there is not a revolutionary situation and where there is not civilization. “To that I responded in jest to the Soviet ambassador,” said R.V. Vivo, “that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F. Castro decide that our countries will take part in the operations in Rhodesia, then we will participate in them.”

By my request R.V. Vivo briefly informed me about the work of the last plenum of the CC Comparty of Cuba. He reported that the plenum summed up the fulfillment of the resolutions of the First Party Congress, revealed the deficiencies in the development of the national economy of the country, and set its course to overcome them. In view of the fact that the project for the resolution of the plenum on the given question did not reflect all aspects of the economic situation, the corresponding section of the CC of the Party was tasked with its reworking and with its publication.

With regard to the resolution of the plenum of the CC concerning the appointment of Lionel Soto [Prieto] as a member of the Secretariat of the CC of the Party, R.V. Vivo spoke very highly of him (“He is no Garcia Pelaes,” he said) and reported, that L. Soto will be occupied with the issues of the party leadership of the country’s economy; along the party line he is tasked with responsibility for Khuseplan, the National Bank, GKES [State Committee for Economic Cooperation], and other central organs of the national economy.

COUNSELLOR-MINISTER OF THE EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA
/s/ M. Manasov

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 834, ll. 82–84.]

Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Centre
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) Gov.’s security objective with regard to Southern Africa, which includes Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, is to assist in protecting the national security of the various states against aggression, in whichever form, by united action of the Southern African Constellation of States through the implementation of a total national strategy.

13. To realize this security objective in practice, the RSA Gov. has inter alia, accepted the following security policy:

   a. To consider applications for support from governments of Southern African states in order to oppose communist aggression.

   b. To assist, at the request of governments of Southern Africa, with the establishment, build-up and maintenance of stable, effective security forces, for the protection of territorial areas, maintenance of law and order and the assurance of their independence.

   c. To ensure, through pro-active action outside the territorial area of the RSA, the safety of the constellation and to oppose any aggression against members of the Southern African Constellation of States.

14. The implementation of the RSA Gov.’s security objectives, within the specified security policy assumes that the RSA and ZR continually remain in close contact in order to ensure that their objectives, policy and strategies, especially in respect of Southern Africa, are pursued.
2. With the implementation of short term strategy in the after-election period it is clear that priority is given to retaining and expanding political initiative that was gained by election. Political guide-lines which are at present valid are focused on ensuring maximum room for politicians to manoeuvre in attempts to have sanctions lifted in order to bring about recognition for Zim. Rhod. Point of departure is that any action which could cause embarrassment to new Conservative Gov. in UK and moderates in USA who campaign for lifting of sanctions should be guarded against. Coming Commonwealth Conference during Aug. 79 at Lusaka is obvious important factor which Rhod. politicians have to take into account.

3. With regard to military action present political climate has limiting influence on external operations. There are indications of influence by British Gov. that action in adjoining states, especially Commonwealth countries, should be limited as far as possible. Present guide-lines for military action come down to following:

A. Planned action, even clandestine, against the infrastructure of adjoining Black states to destabilise them has been put on ice—for example action against the Tanzam railway line.

B. Action against command and action structure, logistic system and bases of terrorist organisations in host countries are continuing, but limited and far more selectively. Attacks on terrorist bases in Tanzania (Nachingwea) have been put on ice.

C.
For the immediate future, especially regarding action against ZANLA, internal operations will be concentrated upon. Point of departure is that largest section of ZANLA’s trained terrorist force is already within Rhodesia and that they, due to fact that they filter into Rhodesia as fast as possible from where they are trained outside Mozambique, offer few good targets within Mozambique. With regard to ZAPRA [sic] situation is reversed—the major section of its terrorist force is still in Zambia. In principle it is therefore accepted that priority is given to external action against ZPRA. The conditions, however, are that targets must really be worthwhile and clearly distinguishable as a terrorist complex/base.

3. [sic] Combined operations have somewhat adapted their internal strategy for after election period. Assets of vital importance have been revised as well as terrain of tactical importance. Deployment of troops is done according to that and briefly comes down to the following:

A. Security Force Auxiliaries. Continues to be deployed in certain tribal trust territories [lands] and slight increase is envisaged in short term especially to include certain tribal areas in Matabeleland.

B. Furthermore, certain power assessments are made on main infiltration routes as well as to protect vitally important assets.

C. Fire Force. Operations are especially planned in area north-east of Salisbury KMA Manicaland and Fort Victoria—Shabani—Selukwe area as they contain problem areas in ZANLA sector and terrain lends itself to effective operations of this nature.

D. Comment. This military strategy aimed at maintaining status quo in short term in order to give stability to GNU for expected political breakthroughs.

Limiting influence of present political climate in respect of external operations impede military capacity to move [operate] and could in long term lead to terrorist war escalating CMA [Chimerenga (war of liberation)] unless there is a timely political breakthrough or
exceptional success is achieved with the amnesty programme after black take-over of the reins of government.

4. Concerning psychological action, the main focus is on the amnesty scheme in order to convince terrorists to come over, as well as on opinion shapers in especially the UK and the USA to promote the lifting of sanctions as well as recognition.

A. Amnesty scheme has thus far produced only limited and sporadic success.

Planned, especially through Sky Shout Operations, to reach terrorist groups in country coupled to high density Fire Force Operations. Lack of equipment causes great difficulty as two available jets have to return to the RSA towards 1 June. Request has been made for extension of loan of equipment while Rhod. plans to acquire similar equipment as soon as possible.

B. Although Rhod. is continuing with the influencing of opinion shapers in foreign countries it is felt that they are slowly but surely losing ground. The absence of a psychological action member in RGBS handicaps our ability to monitor this aspect properly. Indeed the RGBS is in the dark about which contribution the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] and RSA press media deliver at this stage. Placing of full-time member of SA Information Service at RGBS here is urgently needed to overcome this deficiency.

5. General.

... 
Apart from your telex K48/08 May 79 RGBS has received very few further guide-lines. With Brig. Huyser’s departure he took all RSA documents except TNSD 1 as well as correspondence with him. Clearer direction from your side would be appreciated.
RHO 21 — 20 OCTOBER 1979, MEETING AT LIBERTAS, BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER BOTHA AND A ZIMBABWE/RHODESIAN DELEGATION LED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3.

SADFA BTS 1/156/3
Top Secret
Meeting held at Libertas on Saturday 20 October 1979 at 1400 hours between the Hon Prime Minister and a Zimbabwe/Rhodesian delegation led by the Hon the Deputy Prime Minister

Present

South Africa
The Prime Minister, PW Botha
Min FA, RF Botha
Chief of the Defence Force, General M Malan
General van Deventer, NSC
Mr P R Killen, Foreign Affairs
Mr V R Steward, Foreign Affairs

Z/R
Dept PM, Dr the Hon S C Mundawarara
Min of Finance, Hon David Smith
Commander in Chief, General Walls
Secretary for Finance, Mr David Young
Dr Mundawarara extended

Dr Mundawarara extended greeting from his PM, whom he was representing… Thanked SA for all assistance which had been given and which was still being given by SA to ZR. It was much appreciated.

The struggle was by no means all over. On the contrary, the most difficult time of all lay immediately ahead. Z/R had been fighting the Marxists with weapons. The time might be
breaking when the Marxists would have to be fought through the ballot box as well. It was essential to beat them and for this purpose he was not inhibited from asking assistance.

The terrorists had recently commenced massive infiltration into the villages, aimed at influencing the elections their way. Whether they (the terrorists) were to decide to participate or to decide against participation, the infiltrators would serve their purpose. The Z/R’s biggest asset in this kind of warfare is the auxiliary force. There are presently 9800. Another 16,000 (making about 26,000) are required.

PM Muzorewa specifically requested that this matter be brought to SA’s attention.

PM: thanked Dr Mundawarara…. noted that SA’s assistance was appreciated…

If the Z/R delegation was satisfied with the developments in London, it was not for SA to query the progress. What was, however, vital for SA was know that if SA rendered assistance, that assistance would help to attain the objectives to which both parties subscribed.

He had to take SA along with him, and this he could only do by convincing the people that the support given would contribute to preserving stability in Southern Africa. The vast development needs of South Africa had a competing claim on SA’s resources.

Dr Mundawarara:

Up to the present time the London talks were proceeding on course. He could not say what might happen in the next few weeks,

David Smith

There was a time in the life of every individual when he had to stand up and be counted, and he had had to make his choices in London, putting his political career at risk. There had been two fundamental motivations for his decision;

i. the best interests of his own country as he saw them
ii. the greater horizons opening in regard to the vision of southern African complex.

In regard to the latter aspect, it was the Observatory meeting that had opened his eyes to the possibilities. He had however, two conditions

i. the lifting of sanctions
ii. international recognition.

… if PM Muzorewa returned empty-handed from London there was no doubt in his mind there would be massive white emigration from Z/R. The problem was uncertainty… the time had come to act decisively…. Any future constitution would undoubtedly be worse. They had to get the best possible deal now…. 
There was complete mistrust on both sides to the extent they were not prepared to say precisely what their problems were. They had, however, managed to keep going through informal contacts. Not all discussions had been conducted with the full delegation but with different groups.

He had no doubt about their ability, with SA assistance, to put his government back into power. But there would have to be a quick snap election. .. The fact that the PF wanted the election in two years was sufficient to persuade him against waiting.

His priorities were to fight the war and defeat Marxism. Others might have different priorities, but he had coordinated this attitude with Prime Minister Muzorewa, who agreed with his priorities. With or without SA support, they would have to continue fighting the war. But they required finance on a large scale. They were short of $100m in balancing their previous budget alone. The “crunch” could be expected within a month. The previous discussions with SA had focussed on an amount of $300m and had resulted in SA promising to make available $200 m which, however, left a balance of $100 m outstanding. They needed the $100 m before they could even begin to talk of implementing a second phase. Then they had a further requirement of $70m for an extra 16000 auxiliaries. The PM was emphatic on the need for a total of 26,000 auxiliaries (SFA’s). He himself saw merit in the PM’s idea.

There was a need for more men on the ground. One must “meet bushmen with bushmen”.

PM Muzorewa had been humiliated into having to accept a second election in the interest in the southern African vision and of getting the British out of the system. The risks were worth taking. Now was the best chance because thirty-nine Commonwealth Countries, the EEC and the USA have supported Mrs Thatcher’s plan, on the basis of acceptance of the Lusaka Declaration. With sanctions removed and international recognition they could fight the war, on the understanding they could be getting the necessary equipment elsewhere.

Although they needed $170m the economy was still strong. They could service the $100m although they did not feel they should be called upon to service the $70m as it was viewed as being for southern Africa.

In his opinion, Minister RF Botha’s visit to London had been a great breakthrough. The timing of the visit was perfect and the Minister had never been more effective. It was now the twelfth hour. The Civil Service and security forces were solidly behind his concept.
He and Young were returning to Salisbury later in the day and then to London on Tuesday next. General Walls was returning to Salisbury the next day. He and Young could come back later to discuss details either on Tuesday or later on the way back to London. But they needed something quite categorical in the next few days…

General Walls
The political decision had been taken in London. From the security point of view an opportunity had now arrived which could not be missed. There was a way ahead with risk but the risk was worth taking. In his view it was worth taking. There was no viable alternative because of the economic situation and white uncertainties. Historically, he and his colleagues did not trust the British. However, there was now a better basis of trust than before and the British had asked the Z/Rs to trust them this time. They had been friendly and constructed. In fact they had put their trust in Z/Rs, even put themselves in the hands of the Z/Rs; certainly in Bishop Muzorewa’s hands. This had been indicated in many ways. They had stated clearly that they wanted Z/R to be an anti-Marxist state with a moderate, Bishop Muzorewa, in charge and the Patriotic Front out. In fact they wanted to be in collusion with the Z/Rs in maintaining security.

He felt that there was an opportunity now and that they must go for it as soon as possible. The British would like SA to continue its help to Z/R and even to increase it.

PM
Asked the auxiliaries planned could be trained in the time available.

General Walls
Replied that 6000 could be recruit within two weeks. When their training commenced, recruiting of another 6000 could begin, so that training of the two intakes could overlap. The training period, based on the present auxiliaries, was four weeks, so that 12000 could be trained within 10 weeks. However it was possible that the process could be speeded up…

PM
Although his FM had returned from London only the same morning, he had already reported to him on developments in London which he, the PM found most interesting. He had no objection in principle to helping the Z/Rs again. He would go out of his way to convince the Cabinet accordingly. However, there were certain points that he had to stress:

Firstly, he was perturbed about the possible situation that might arise if PM Muzorewa were to be isolated from the security forces. SA needed to have access and to be in coordinated communication with both of them.
Secondly, he would have to take his country with him. To do so he would have to make out a strong case for increased support. He would have to consult the other parties. He would therefore need the facts from the Z/Rs, in detailed discussions.

Thirdly, it was vital that sanctions be lifted. If sanctions were lifted ZR could start rebuilding and redevelopment. This was essential for the evolution of the southern African concept, as the two strong countries in the region were SA and ZR. Without the participation of ZR, SA would have to carry the full burden on her own shoulders. International recognition could however wait.

Finally he was not prepared to be “dropped” as we had been dropped by the Americans in Angola.

General Walls
The lifting of sanctions will be the first step. If ZR is not happy with the Muzorewa-Security Forces relationship, the British will accept their objections. A “slide over” of control was envisaged and the British Governor would not intervene in the day to day management of security operations. He had received a secret protocol in regard to military cooperation, but this information should be regarded as highly sensitive. A return to legitimacy was an essential pre-requisite to the lifting of sanctions for there to be any advantage to Rhodesia. This would ensure international support, without which the lifting of sanctions would be meaningless.

PM
We would not be so worried if we knew that the British would not “chase us out” of ZR and shift the blame on to us in the United Nations, as happened in regard to Angola. We needed assurances.

Dr Mundawarara
At this stage we must accept their assurances.

Mr Smith
Believed that the British Government were sincere for the first time. They were obliged to go through with their policy for otherwise the British public would turn against them. The British say that they cannot disclose all their plans to all the members of the Z/R delegation and vice versa. They had extracted many concessions from the British in private talks, for example the reinstatement of the 10 tribal chiefs in the Senate, which meant that the Chiefs, with the headmen below them and their supporters, were now “with” Bishop Muzorewa. If the British were to come out openly, however, it would rebound against them.
1.1 After the constitutional conference in London had initially struggled to get off the ground, the Prime Minister of Z–R in the third week of the discussions accepted the British constitutional proposals and the Patriotic Front (PF) indicated that they would approve a 20 per cent reserve of Whites in the intended new parliament. According to the latest indications a spirit of cautious optimism prevails in official Z–R circles that the conference will serve a constructive purpose and that it will lead either to a settlement or that the position of the PF—should the latter prove to be the fly in the ointment—would be dealt a serious blow. The lifting of sanctions within the next few months, as far as it concerns Britain, appears to be accepted as a strong possibility…

1.2 It has, for instance, been heard reliably that on 21 September in Brussels NKOMO informed MOBUTU that a settlement was imminent and that MUGABE had been neutralized. MUGABE’s position is also affected in that he cannot rely on the loyalty of the ZANLA leader, TONGOGARA…

3. POLITICAL POSITION REGARDING THE PF

3.1 Due to the ethnic constitution and various other latent differences, various attempts to unify ZANLA and ZPRA have failed. Under the increasing pressure of the USSR and the ‘front line’ states success has apparently been achieved in the unification of the two organizations in a loose alliance. After various failed attempts, in July 1979 after the Maputo and Dar-es-Salaam Conference, it was announced that the two wings had created a basis for co-operation—consisting of the following bodies:
3.1.1. A Co-ordinating Council consisting of six members of each to serve as the executive body.

3.1.2. A Defence Council consisting of eight members to serve as a ‘war council’.

3.1.3. A Joint Operational Command, consisting of six military commanding officers from every organization to be jointly responsible for the planning of the war strategy.

3.2. As far as is known a draft constitution has already been accepted by both organizations. Despite the seeming readiness for co-operation it appears to be a smoke screen to increase the PF’s bargaining position in the negotiations.

4. PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR THE RSA

According to information the Z–R government as well as Britain agree that, as soon as a settlement treaty has been signed, an election must be held as soon as possible to give the PF as little time as possible to organize domestically. It is in this regard that a period of weeks are at present mentioned. This, combined with the result of the previous election as well as the possibility that the PF will not be able to retain a united front, contributes to the supposition that MUZOREWA will win such an election. This accompanies the further assumption that the Defence Forces would be allowed and would have the capability of maintaining law and order.

[There is, however] further information which indicates that MUZOREWA's chances of winning an election under present circumstances have weakened.

4.1 In the event, however, where MUZOREWA does win the election, it would lead to at least partial international recognition and it could be expected that Z–R would campaign for affiliation with bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). It might lead to the present close relations with the RSA ‘cooling’ to a degree. It is, however, doubtful whether, at least in the short to medium term, it would crystallize into an openly hostile attitude towards the RSA. For a considerable time Z–R will be caught up in the attempts to overcome the disruption which has been caused by the war and would probably want to avoid coming into confrontation with the RSA.
4.2 Moreover it can be foreseen that within the Z–R many ‘difficulties’ [obstructions] would still exist which could be exploited by the RSA should relations appear to be unsatisfactory.

4.3 Given the ethnic reality it is unlikely that NKOMO will come into power after an election. Should MUGABE win the election, a bloody clash between ZPRA and ZANLA forces is a strong possibility—once again a situation which could be exploited by the RSA.

4.4 If, due to MUZOREWA’s actions, a settlement is not reached and recognition fails to materialize, it must be foreseen that Z–R would have to rely even more heavily on the RSA to keep it going. In this case a protracted struggle must be foreseen during which the RSA’s accountability will increase progressively, and where an increasing involvement by outside forces might occur. In such a case the consequences appear to be potentially more detrimental to the RSA than the calculated risk which an internationally accepted moderate government in Z–R might hold for the RSA and the Southern African strategy… In spite of all the means that the PF can/will apply to ensure a military victory, the Z–R security forces could continue maintaining the military status quo in the short term through a sustained effective centralised command and the effective utilisation of available means if the Security Forces/White morale do not collapse.

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**RHQ 23 — OCTOBER 1979, SVR GUIDELINES IN LIGHT OF LONDON CONFERENCE, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3**

**SADFA BTS 1 / 156 / 3 VOL. 4**

October 1979

SVR GUIDE-LINES FOR ZR IN THE LIGHT OF LONDON CONFERENCE AND THE ACTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE IN CONSEQUENCE STRATEGIC INFORMATION SUMMARY AND THREAT ANALYSIS

1. The management mechanism of the National Security Force Base responsible for the management of national safety in ZR, the ZRGBS, drew up, on 9 October 79, a report
on the possible result and implications of the London Conference. It is given verbatim in Annexe A. The findings of the ZRGBS are also endorsed by the Information Committee of the SVR’s Information Summary which is attached as Annexe B. Both these documents have been used as background for the following exposition.

2. The political situation can be summarised as follows:
   (a) The PF have succeeded in prolonging the negotiation process in London. This has a detrimental effect on the situation in ZR.
   (b) Concessions by ZR delegation were mainly to the advantage of the Black population and have therefore probably somewhat improved Muzorewa’s status amongst them.
   (c) Concessions by ZR delegation with regard to protective measures for rights of Whites, without British Gov. taking a clear stand in respect of the lifting of sanctions and role of Zim.-Rhod. Security Forces during transitional period, has resulted in division among Whites: one faction is optimistic; the other pessimistic. There is division in the ZR delegation regarding the acceptance of the British constitutional proposals between Mr. Ian Smith and the rest of the delegation.
   (d) As a result of British assurances behind the scenes that sanctions will be lifted, that the Whites must be retained in ZR, that the ZR DFs will not be affected and that they wish to keep the present moderate government in ZR it is clear that the UK’s aim is an internationally acceptable settlement; in spite of reports by the CIO that events have thus far gone according to plan at the London Conference and that the ZR delegation has made only the concessions which they were, in any case, prepared to make, there are, in certain official circles in ZR, no illusions about the probable game played by the British government. (i.e. the Salami process: Pressure for more and more concessions by the GNU in order to obtain an internationally acceptable settlement). It is hoped that the British are honest, but there is not much talk of optimism.

3. The economic situation can be summarised as follows:
   (a) The reconfirmation for the application of continued sanctions / boycotts by the UN, EEC and OAU could, to date, not force ZR’s foreign trade to a standstill which points to large-scale RSA support.
(b) Since 1975 the ZR economy has shown a negative rate of growth. Although, mainly because of improved price conditions on world markets, a moderate upswing in economic activities has been observed during the second half of 1978, and which has lasted for the first half of 1979, it cannot be expected, owing to the ever greater demands the war-attempt is making, that the improvement will be strong enough to place the economy on a positive road towards growth [in the short term]. Ability of ZR economy to carry the present war burden and to keep going is closely related to the country’s present dependence on RSA for procuring essential means, as well as using RSA for import and export routes and will remain like this in the foreseeable future.

(c) Favourable economic prospects are in an important degree connected to lifting or partial lifting of sanctions. Should present sanctions and/or boycotts against ZR continue to exist it could reasonably be expected that it would continue exerting a restraining influence on ZR’s national economy and particularly on ZR’s military ability [resources].

(d) Serious problems that are at present being experienced in agricultural sector like drought and unstable security situation, could add to ZR’s present economic situation weakening further.

4. The military situation can be summarised as follows:

a. There is ever an increase in terrorist numbers within ZR. Terrorist incidents do not increase accordingly, yet threat has increased in so far as it concerns terrorist action in ZR’s vitally important territory (VAG: Vital assets ground).

b. Vast majority of terrorists within ZR are still ZANLA (10 ZANLA against 3 300 ZPRA). Increasing infiltration, however, by ZPRA along entire border area with Zambia, but especially between Kariba and Feira during past month (September).

c. With the increase in terrorist numbers in ZR the possibility of urban terrorism also heightens.

d. The ZR DFs at present still succeed in maintaining the security situation. Important limiting factors are still shortage of manpower and equipment. Successes have been achieved with the maintenance of balance between internal action and external operations with an eye on disruption of command–and–control as well as logistic system of terrorist organisations. It is, however, constantly becoming more difficult to maintain a healthy balance between protection of vitally important area and necessary offensive action. The hesitation to act overtly against targets in neighbouring states during London Conference
as it could possibly be used against ZR in the negotiations, is at present an additional limiting factor for ZR DFs. In contrast with this terrorist organisations have complete freedom of movement and they further use the opportunity to consolidate.

5. Possible Scenarios. Owing to uncertainty of further course and result of London Conference it is difficult to foresee specific result. Depending on British aims/handling GNU and PF could react in various ways under different circumstances. Basically four scenarios are foreseen with various permutations:
   a. Scenario one: Both factions of PF withdraw and negotiations are continued with GNU.
   b. Scenario two: GNU are compelled to withdraw.
   c. Scenario three: Only Nkomo (ZAPU) takes part in negotiations while Mugabe withdraws.
   d. Scenario four: Both factions of PF take part in negotiations together with GNU.

6. Summary of Threat Analysis based on the Preceding Scenarios. After a detailed analysis of the various scenarios the ZRGBS came to the conclusion that:
   a. In all scenarios, however, the war will continue in varying intensity…
   b. In the event of PF participation or take-over the possibility of a civil war is strong.
   c. Should conference fail terrorist struggle [war(fare)] will continue:
      i. Should GNU bear blame struggle will escalate.
      ii. Should PF bear blame struggle will still continue for considerable time, yet with suitable assistance could be de-escalated.
   d. RSA’s involvement in any case plays a key role which varies from an extreme form of extensive involvement to prevent Marxist take-over, to suitable action and involvement to utilise a situation to advantage of South Africa.
   e. Moderate Black government would probably move away from South Africa to establish connection with international community and Africa. Would not, however, be possible in medium term. Suitable contingency planning must therefore now be initiated in order to thwart such a tendency.
   f. In light of possible Marxist take-over suitable contingency planning must therefore now be initiated in order to prepare the correct ethnic groupings for a resistance movement to exploit the situation to the benefit of South Africa.
   g. It therefore appears as if Scenario 1 will serve ZR’s interests best.
ABILITY ANALYSIS

7. The ability of South Africa to execute a total national strategy in support of ZR must be viewed against the background of ZR’s geographical position, economic dependency on the RSA and the ZR’s readiness to support the RSA in seeing a Southern African Strategy implemented.

8. In determining the RSA’s ability to support ZR in ensuring its national security it is of paramount importance to evaluate ZR’s power [capacity, potential] as “ally” in the execution of the Southern African Strategy. With the support of the RSA ZR at present succeeds in maintaining the NS [National Security] of ZR. Through joint action of the RSA and ZR against the neighbouring states of ZR especially; namely Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique the situation could probably in the short/medium term be settled in favour of ZR and Southern Africa. The support which is desired from the RSA could escalate, should ZR be overthrown, to such a degree that the RSA would have to replace the ZR’s ability in order to ensure the RSA’s NS on own territory. It is in the interest of the RSA that such a situation should be avoided in consideration of the RSA’s own ability and domestic priorities.

9. The readiness of the government of ZR to undertake jointly with the RSA the execution of the Southern African Strategy is contained in ZR’s TNSD 1/79 dd 23 March 1979. Through that the RSA’s power [capacity] would be considerably enhanced. During the Southern African Conference of 15–16 June 1979 ZR’s Prime Minister, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, in his opening speech confirmed the letter and spirit of the ZR’s TNSD 1/79.

THE RSA’S NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY AND GUIDE-LINES

11. It is accepted that the aim, objectives and policy as spelt out in Books 1, 11 and 111 and Section 1V and as amplified by the contributions of different states departments, will be approved and the Southern African Constellation of States indeed materialise.

12. The RSA Gov.’s security objective with regard to Southern Africa, which includes ZR,
is to assist in protecting the national security of the various states against aggression, in whichever form, by united action of the Southern African Constellation of States through the implementation of a total national strategy.

13. To realise this security objective in practice the RSA Gov. has, inter alia, accepted the following security policy:
   a. To consider applications for support from governments of Southern African states in order to oppose communist aggression
   b. To assist, at the request of governments of Southern Africa, with the establishment, build up and maintenance of stable, effective security forces, for the protection (security) of territorial areas, maintenance of law and order and the assurance of their independence.
   c. To ensure, through pro-active action outside the territorial area of the RSA, the safety of the constellation and to oppose any aggression against members of the Southern African Constellation of States.

14. The implementation of the RSA Gov.’s security objectives, within the specified security policy, assumes that the RSA and ZR continually remain in close contact in order to ensure that their objectives, policy and strategies, especially in respect of Southern Africa, are pursued.

15. In consequence of the strategic situation which developed as a result of the London Conference the SVR approved the following guide-lines in respect of ZR on 15 October 1979:
   a. Pressure must be kept up on the British for the lifting of sanctions against ZR and on Bishop Muzorewa to continually insist thereupon. International recognition is a matter for the future. The RSA would accept de facto recognition of ZR which is accompanied by the lifting of sanctions, but campaign against de jure recognition which might remove ZR from the sphere of influence of the RSA. The Whites in ZR must be influenced and motivated to unite with the ZR government.
   b. Bishop Muzorewa must be clearly informed that the RSA will support him provided that his Gov. remains anti-marxist and retains a pro-RSA attitude.
   c. Bishop Muzorewa must be clearly informed that should matters go wrong for him and he makes a public appeal to the RSA, the RSA will assist ZR. The RSA is not prepared to allow ZR to collapse or a troublesome [unreasonable] regime to cause chaos in ZR. The
RSA would then have to act with the sanction of parliament, although it would have to be assembled ex-post facto.

d. Information suggests that Nkomo wishes to jump [leave] the PF and join the Muzorewa group with an eye to a later coup d’état. Under no circumstances must Nkomo be accommodated.

IMPLEMENTATION

16. The RSA Gov. has accepted as aim, objectives, policy and strategy that the national security of the RSA must be ensured by a Southern African strategy. The conflict situation in ZR must be handled within the scope of this [these specifications]. Therefore the point of departure of any action taken by the RSA must be directed at influencing the ZR Gov. and ZR negotiation party in London to let the outcome of the conference not take a course which would be detrimental to the objectives of the Southern African strategy. Furthermore it is accepted that the ZR is still in earnest about their goal, objectives and policies as has been set out in TNSD 1/79 dd 22 March. The ZR Gov. must continuously be reminded and referred back to the contents thereof.

17. The KTS for ZR as approved by SVR on 16 July 1979 must be executed [implemented] by all State [Govt.] Departments and organisations. In the implementation of the strategy the guide-lines as stated below must be taken into consideration.

INSTRUCTION

18. To ensure that the ZR, as an anti-communist state, remains free of international sanctions within the sphere of influence of the RSA.

TASKS

19. To realise the directive the following tasks must be implemented:
   a. Task 1. Pressure must be exerted on Bishop Muzorewa and his negotiation party not to comply with any further demands of the British Gov. or the PF.
   b. Task 2. The influencing of White political and other leaders on:
i. The ZR. Gov. that their interests be protected and in exchange for that influence Whites not to leave ZR.

ii. The Whites to support the ZR Gov.

c. Task 3. Emphasis on the close bond for continued existence and survival which exists at present between ZR and RSA.

d. Task 4. Influencing of the PF to reject the British constitutional proposals.

e. Task 5. Influencing of the British Conservative Party not to accommodate the demands and aspirations of the PF.

f. Task 6. The continued implementation of the KTS of ZR—including all reasonable military and police assistance.

20. Guide-lines for the implementation of the tasks:

a. Task 1. To exert pressure on Bishop Muzorewa and his negotiation party not to comply with any further demands of the British Gov. or the PF.

   i. Through political channels Bishop Muzorewa must be informed that the RSA Gov. cannot guarantee his personal position if he accommodates the PF in his government. No further concessions may be made in the present negotiations.

   ii. The dissatisfaction of the Whites regarding the impairment of their rights which were embodied in the entrenched clause must be pointed out as a serious threat to retaining his position of power. Should he further continue to adversely affect the power position of the Whites, the RSA does not see its way open to influence and support the Whites in giving him the necessary support.

   iii. Should he continue yielding to the PF and the British Gov., and make concessions which are not in the interest of the RSA’s Southern African strategy, the RSA Gov. has to state clearly that it does not see its way open to further grant him the privileges of the RSA’s assistance and infrastructure. It must be pointed out to him that, in such a situation, he would become dependent on the allies of the PF, namely marxist Mozambique.

   iv. A repeat of the assistance the RSA gave him in order to hold a free and fair election cannot simply be accepted without further ado for a second election, especially if the PF are allowed to take part in the election.

   v. It must be pointed out to him that, should he act against the RSA’s Southern African strategy, he cannot simply rely thereon that the economic, financial, social and security support for his government will continue unqualified.
vi. If, however, he acts according to TNSD 1/79 dd 22 March 79 he can be assured thereof that the RSA, as in the past and on an increasing scale, will support him in keeping his government in power. It could even include action in terms of the approved KTS against the host countries [countries which are hosts??]. Bishop Muzorewa must, however, publicly ask the RSA for overt support. Should ZR prefer, the RSA will also accept to recognise his government as the only legally elected government.

b. Task 2. The influencing of White political and other leaders on the ZR. Gov. that their interests be protected and in exchange for that influence Whites not to leave ZR. The Whites to support the ZR Gov.

i. Through White political and others leaders, to claim the rights of the Whites on the Muzorewa government so that they do not sacrifice their democratic rights for international recognition. If Muzorewa does not react to this appeal, he will have to accept the consequences of the withdrawal of the White power basis and the consequent instability which might result from this. It could lead to a marxist take-over by the PF.

ii. To assure the Whites that the RSA, within its ability [power] will support them to maintain their security should the negotiations be suspended.[postponed].

c. Task 3. Emphasis on the close bond for continued existence and survival, which exists at present between ZR and RSA:

i. Through diplomatic channels and if regarded as absolutely necessary, Bishop Muzorewa must be warned that the RSA will make known the assistance and support which it has given to ZR The announcement of this information could, however, should Muzorewa prefer it, also be done to indicate the close co-operation of the ZR and the RSA against Soviet imperialism. Should the first course of action be taken, the ZR will be compromised disadvantageously, whilst the second action would lead to ZR’s voluntary closer co-operation with the RSA.

ii. If the ZR’s negotiation party acts against the interests of Southern Africa, the ZR must be notified that the RSA does not see its way open to covertly support them militarily. If, however, it is prepared to act according to the policy spelt out by its government in TNSD 1/79 and is prepared to request military assistance from the RSA in public, the RSA would be prepared to provide it.

iii. Emphasis on the fact that the RSA, also in the interest of the Southern African strategy, will continue maintaining diplomatic relations with ZR and will proceed with close economic co-operation. If ZR should prefer it, it would be done openly with diplomatic recognition.
d. Task 4. Influencing of the PF to reject the British constitutional proposals. Through psychological campaigning action the PF must be prevailed upon to reject the proposals.

e. Task 5. The influencing of the British Conservative Party to give up accommodating the demands and aspirations of the PF.

   i. To persuade the right wing of the Conservative Party, through diplomatic and psychological means, to convince Mrs. Thatcher of the unreasonableness of the PF demands.

   ii. To exert pressure on the right-winged in the Conservative Party for the complete lifting of sanctions against ZR.

   iii. The British must be influenced not to yield to the demands of the PF to establish an indemnity fund. Bishop Muzorewa must be influenced to oppose the steps which the PF take to establish the fund.

e. Task 6. The continued implementation of the KTS with regard to ZR. Actions as laid down in the KTS, must be followed.

END

21. The implementation of the strategy must continuously be directed towards bringing the negotiation process with the British Gov. to a successful conclusion as soon as possible without making any concessions which affect the interests of Southern Africa detrimentally.

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**RHO 24 — OCTOBER 1979, MEMORANDUM, SVR GUIDELINES FOR ZR, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3**

SADFA BTS 1/156/3
SVR GUIDELINES FOR ZR IN THE LIGHT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND THE ACTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE IN CONSEQUENCE.
FINAL DRAFT OCTOBER 1979

After a detailed analysis of the various scenarios the ZRGS came to the conclusion that:

a. In all scenarios, however, the war will continue in varying intensity.

b. In the event of PF participation or take-over the possibility of civil war is strong.
   i. Should conference fail terrorist struggle will continue.
   ii. should GNU bear blame struggle will escalate.
   iii. should PF bear blame struggle will still continue for considerable time, yet with
       suitable assistance could be de-escalated.

c. RSA's involvement in any case plays a key role which varies from an extreme form of
   extensive involvement to prevent Marxist take-over, to suitable action and involvement to
   utilize a situation to advantage of South Africa.

d. Moderate black government would probably move away from South Africa to establish
   connection with international community and Africa. Would not, however, be possible in the
   medium term. Suitable contingency planning must therefore now be initiated in order to
   thwart such a tendency.

e. In light of possible Marxist take-over suitable contingency planning must therefore
   now be initiated in order to prepare the correct ethnic groupings for a resistance movement
   to exploit the situation to the benefit of South Africa.

7. The ability of South Africa to execute a total national strategy in support of ZR must be
   viewed against the background of ZR’s geographical position, economic dependency on
   the RSA and the ZR’s readiness to support the RSA in seeing a Southern African Strategy
   Implemented.

8. In determining the RSA’s ability to support ZR in ensuring its national security it is
   of paramount importance to evaluate ZR’s capacity as an ally in the execution of the
   Southern Africa Strategy. With the support of the RSA ZR at present succeeds in maintaining
   the National Security of ZR. Through joint actions of the RSA and ZR against
   the neighbouring states of ZR especially: namely, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique,
   the situation could probably in the short/medium term be settled in favour of ZR and
   Southern Africa. The support which is desired from the RSA could escalate, should ZR be
   overthrown, to such a degree that the RSA would have to replace the ZR’s ability in order
   to ensure the RSA’s NS on own territory. It is in the interests of the RSA that such a
   situation should be avoided in consideration of the RSA’s own ability and domestic priorities.
SVR Guidelines

If the ZR’s negotiating party acts against the interests of Southern Africa, the ZR must be notified that the RSA does not see its way open to covertly support them militarily. If, however, it is prepared to act according to the policy spelled out by its government in TNSD 1/79 and is prepared to request military assistance from the RSA in public, the RSA would be prepared to provide it.

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SADFA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 4
MEMORANDUM October 1979
From: Secretary of the CSC [Central Security Council], CSC/6/3
To: Chairman of the CSC

OBJECTIVE

1. To spell out the National Security actions [course] in consequence of the input Minister R.F. Botha provided for the ZR negotiations in Britain.

SITUATION

1. The main participants in the Lancaster Conference [Talks] can be divided into the following groups:
   a. Britain who, apart from its own interests, indirectly furthers the interests of the West in Southern Africa.
b. The PF which further their own interests, and indirectly the interests of the communistic imperialism in Southern Africa.

c. The Front Line states that further the interests of the PF; therefore indirectly communistic imperialism. The GNU of ZR and the RSA that strive for community of interests in Southern Africa.

2. It is logical that Britain has determined a strategy for each of these groups to further Britain’s, and indirectly the West’s, interests. It could be the following:

a. West: Action to accommodate the PF and the GNU through a free election in a political economic ground-plan. Inducements are used predominantly, for example promises that sanctions will be lifted; promises of a compensation fund; promises of international recognition; promises that peace will be brought about.

b. The PF: Obtain their co-operation by making them full negotiation parties which can through bargaining, compromises and reconciliation with the GNU further their interests.

c. The Front Line states: Influence the Front Line states to convince the PF that it is in their interests to participate in the conference.

d. The GNU and the RSA: Obtain the co-operation of the GNU and the RSA as allies to let the conference succeed through covert sympathizing and covert support of the joint interests of ZR and the RSA. Therefore—the RSA and the GNU become indirect allies of Britain in furthering its interests regarding the solution to the ZR problem.

e. The sum total of the strategies is to create in ZR a true Black majority government, which would be accepted as far as possible by Africa, the West and the UN.

f. During Minister R.F. Botha’s negotiations in Britain the ‘strategy of alliance’ with the RSA and the GNU developed through:

a. By promoting the GNU’s negotiating party as the fair, just and correct group. The GNU is held up as the favoured in the negotiations.

b. The close co-operation and mutual assistance between the RSA and GNU are not construed as interference in domestic matters or assault on British interests, but are commended and encouraged to be expanded further.

c. The image of the RSA as protector of the oppressed GNU is commended and actions to expand it further are not opposed.

d. The initiative of the RSA to strive for stability in Southern Africa is underwritten with acclamation.
g. Should the RSA and GNU support Britain in implementing their possible strategy, Britain will succeed in achieving the interests of the West with the support of the RSA and the GNU. The aim of the West’s strategy is to create Black majority governments in Southern Africa which receive international recognition, limited or extensive.

CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION SHOULD THE BRITISH STRATEGY REGARDING THE RSA AND THE GNU BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED

h. Should the London Conference be allowed to take its course as has been spelled out to Minister R.F. Botha, the strategic situation in Southern Africa could change as follows:
   a. A de facto sovereign independent anti-communist state which will be rejected internationally is in the interim transformed [changed] into a British colony. The return to legality according to Britain.
   b. A present democratically chosen anti-communist government is compelled to once again hold an election. Chances of success are not absolute.
   c. The preservation of ZR in the sphere of influence of the RSA through the exploitation of its isolation in the international community, could change to a situation where the RSA is isolated and ZR is taken up in the sphere of influence of the international community. Although recognition will have to be given to the existence of forces that could work against such a situation.
   d. The means and power basis of the PF to pursue their interests have been broadened from force to equal partners in a diplomatic bargaining process. The Front Line states are used by Britain to exert pressure on the PF.
   e. The outward strategy as embodied in the Southern African strategy could be converted into close defensive strategy should ZR move out of the sphere of influence of the RSA after independence.
   f. A legally elected and appointed Prime Minister would be replaced by an unknown British Governor.
   g. The legal ‘head’ of the Defence Force could now change from Bishop Muzorewa to an unknown British Governor.
   h. Comment. The preceding strategic situation is not beneficial to the interests of the RSA and the implementation of the Southern African strategy.
i. The factors which would determine whether the foregoing strategic situation will develop are:
   a. Whether the RSA will co-operate in allowing the British Strategy to succeed or not.
   b. Whether the Muzorewa negotiation party is going to co-operate in allowing the British strategy to succeed or not.
   c. International support for the British strategy.

THE DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RSA

i. This new British ‘alliance’ strategy with the RSA and ZR GNU has various unanswered questions which first have to be cleared on a diplomatic level, before the RSA could consider accepting it:
   a. Is Britain now going to declare the arms boycott against the RSA invalid in order to place the RSA in a position of supporting its colony ZR to ensure its national security?
   b. Is Britain itself now going to supply arms to its colony to ensure its national security or does Britain expect the RSA, against which it imposed an arms boycott, to supply the arms?
   c. Is Britain going to replace the present military equipment that the RSA placed at ZR’s disposal with British equipment?
   d. Does Britain expect the RSA to finance its colony in order to hold its British election in ZR?
   e. Will the British Gov. take steps to curb the movement in Britain in favour of disinvestment in the RSA as the RSA has to provide financial support to its colony?
   f. Is Britain prepared to overtly allow the RSA to assist in ensuring the national security of ZR?
   g. Is Britain prepared to overtly allow ZR and the RSA to act against the terrorist bases in Zambia and Botswana to ensure the national security of ZR?
   h. What return does the RSA get for its alliance in leading its colony to independence, for example:
      a. Does the arms boycott still apply?
      b. Does the censure of the RSA, that it is illegally in South West Africa (SWA), still apply?
      c. Does the British censure of the RSA’s territorial multinational [multiethnic] policy still apply?

j. [sic] Will Britain support the RSA if the PF comes into power and a communist
government such as in Mozambique comes into power and the RSA supports Muzorewa to overthrow the government?

CONCLUSIONS

j. If the RSA does not oppose the strategic situation with regard to the RSA and the GNU, there is a strong likelihood that the RSA's interests in Southern Africa and the execution of the Southern Africa strategy could be seriously prejudiced.

GUIDELINES FOR RSA ACTION

k. Instruction. To exploit the British strategy with regard to ZR GNU and the RSA to the advantage of the Southern African strategy.

1. Tasks:
   a. The instructions and tasks as spelt out in the CSC guide-lines with regard to ZR in the light of the London Conference, and the actions that might result from it, hold and must be executed.
   b. Task

1. To inform a delegation of the ZR Gov., which includes Bishop Muzorewa, about the RSA Gov.'s interpretation of the British strategy and to spell out the possible detrimental implications thereof for the Southern African strategy.
   c. Task

2. The bona fides of the covert British promises must be tested by the RSA, by obtaining official answers from the British Gov. to the questions as set out in para 8. (above).
Acting on a ministerial instruction, the Psychological Action Committee (ISAK) met on 2 October 1979 to consider how assistance could be rendered to Zimbabwe Rhodesia, in the event of an anticipated further election a) to bring out the voters and b) to ensure that Bishop Muzorewa’s government would win. It was decided to send Mr Els of INSA to Salisbury to ascertain i) whether in the light of the different current of political opinion, South African help was welcome, ii) what the physical and material requirements of the Rhodesians would be and iii) what the anticipated cost of the required South African support would be, ie to draw up a budget. It was assumed that the Head of Mission would be kept informed by the Information Counsellor and within the framework of the ZRGS. We shall in future as far as practicable ourselves keep you informed of such visits. In our view Mr Els’ task as outlined in i) above was of a delicate nature, requiring an up to date assessment of the political climate and contacts in the party political field, which you would have been in a position to assist. Mr Els reported on 29th Oct that South African assistance for an election would be welcome but that in some white circles there was less enthusiasm than in others and, moreover, that some felt that it would be in the white interest if Muzorewa won only very narrowly. Mr Els tabled a list of equipment the Information Department would require for an election. This would be for an open promotion of the election, persuading voters to go the polls again relatively soon, explaining the voting process etc., although there could be a clandestine component. South African cooperation would of necessity also be clandestine. Mr Els had also been in touch with the
Psychological Operations Unit of the Zim. Rhodesian Defence Force but had ascertained that their requirements for essentially clandestine operations had been transmitted to us at service level. The Defence representatives at the meeting of 29th October outlined these requirements and any duplication between the Information and Military lists was eliminated. ZRGBS will doubtless be informed in this regard. It is planned that Mr Els should work in close collaboration with the ZRGBS.

Signed P R Killen, Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

VRWS/lg.

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**RHO 27 — 28 DECEMBER 1979, MEETING OF PRIME MINISTER AND BISHOP MUZOREWA, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3**

**SAA DFA BTS 1/156/3**

Meeting of the Honourable the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister with Bishop Muzorewa, Cape Town, 28 December 1979

Mr Flower: We have hard evidence that Mugabe was forced into acceptance of the cease-fire agreement by Machel. It was therefore not a genuine acceptance which he would feel obligated to uphold. The most that we can accept of him is lip service to the conditions (of the Lancaster House Settlement). Mugabe is expected to violate the agreement at will. Tongogara was the only individual in ZANLA with the capacity to make a cease-fire implementation effective. The personal relationship between Mugabe and Machel is most significant. We were told that the Security Council resolution repealing sanctions against Zimbabwe/Rhodesia was initially sponsored by Machel. There is every indication that Machel wants to normalize relations with Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in respect of border-posts, traffic and travel between the two countries, trade, etc. In our speculation as to the reason for Machel’s position we have come up with two possibilities. He is perhaps assured that his protégé, Mugabe, will win the elections, or he had no option but to support peaceful resolution because of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia’s effective raids into Mocambique, shortage of
food, transport difficulties, irritation over ZANLA presence and the additional burden this places on the limited capacity of Mocambique—all this may have contributed to pressuring Mugabe into acceptance.

Bishop Muzorewa: We can win the elections with hard work and continued assistance from South Africa. We are called upon to double our efforts of the previous time. We need more funds to compete with the Patriotic Front which is receiving almost unlimited amounts from the Russians… Mugabe is my worst political threat. We do not have real concern for Nkomo. His reputation has faded over the years especially in Mashonaland where 80 per cent plus of the population live. He does not even command complete support of the Matabeles.

Mr Flower: The British have always wanted Nkomo as political leader of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, primarily because of the increased prospect of retaining President Kaunda’s and other Commonwealth support. This stems from a longstanding personal relationship between Nkomo and Kaunda. The British are not really interested in Mugabe’s leadership. Nkomo separately would be very much confined to his Matabele tribal base. Mugabe, on the other hand, if he campaigns on his own, will erode support from the Bishop’s party…

The Prime Minister: Mugabe is reported as saying the presence of South African troops in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia is one of the stumbling blocks in the peace effort. I want you, Bishop Muzorewa, to tell me whether our presence is an embarrassment for you in the political campaign. If it is you must tell me in which case our men will be withdrawn.

Bishop Muzorewa: Definitely not. I have already dealt with the issue in public. I appeal to you Mr Prime Minister, to leave it to us to deal with the issue. We want you, we need you. It is a matter of life and death for us…

General Walls: The British are completely happy with the arrangement. Mrs Thatcher, Lord Carrington, Governor Soames and the deputy Governor (Sir Anthony Duff) are all aware of the South African presence and the extent of the presence. The British will continue to say that there are no South African troops in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia apart from those at Beit Bridge. It is not their purpose to purge our security forces to determine whether
South Africans are among the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia forces. The British have asked me to convey to you their desire for the same kind of electoral help that South Africa gave in the previous election. They want to determine from you the manner in which they should direct the request. There will be partly monitoring but only from a distance. Some of the monitors know about the actual situation and will tacitly condone our arrangement. There is no real danger that the British will yield to the pressures of our opponents on the understanding that we have reached and the assurances they have given us in this matter.

The Prime Minister: I have a country and an electorate to whom I have responsibilities.

General Walls: No Sir, we need you. We are not able to do the job without you. The British government has taken the decision to be open about the issue, namely that South Africa protects its own interests. The British accept that. They have actually asked me to clear the wording of a proposed statement on the issue with you. The suggested wording is:

‘At the request of the Government of South Africa, the Governor agreed that a unit of the South African Defence Force should continue to be stationed on Rhodesian territory, uniquely for the purpose of defending Beit Bridge.’

Subsequently amended by the British government to read:

‘South African forces are present, with the Governor’s agreement, at Beit Bridge for the sole purpose of helping to ensure the protection of the bridge, which is the essential communications link between South Africa, Rhodesia and Zambia.’

The Prime Minister: I agree with the proposed statement. If there is any possibility that our presence may become a political embarrassment and an impediment in the peace agreement we should remove ourselves in a manner and in circumstances that can be determined by us. Would it not be better to withdraw some units to our side and maintain a readiness?
Mawena of NFZ came to see me this morning and said that he desperately needed a further 18,000 Rhod. dol. Reason is that on Thursday he has to speak to Karanga group of Mugabe’s terrorist leaders who intend breaking away from Mugabe and that funds are lacking to make arrangements. He regards it as extremely important to get support from this group as they will then throw in their support against Mugabe. Their intention is to lay down arms and not to go to assembly points so that they can participate in election against Mugabe. As you know, Tongagara who was recently killed in an accident was a Karanga. Suspicion, however, is strong that he was liquidated by Mugabe and this suspicion can be exploited against Mugabe.

My impression is that if we do not urgently help Mawena his campaign might fall flat. That would be a pity, because Mawena could indeed play a role in lessening Mugabe’s support amongst Karanga. Funds that have already been given to Mawena have apparently been well spent.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CAPE TOWN
10 JANUARY 1980

Dear Prime Minister

A member of our Mission in Salisbury recently discreetly met a few members of ZAPU. During the conversation the latter emphasized that it was a great lack that there existed
no contact between them and us. They further expressed concern about South Africa’s “open” support of the Bishop and a gift of 300 cars was also mentioned in this respect. They wanted further information or confirmation about this, but the relevant member of the Mission said that he had no knowledge of this.

Later some of these representatives stated clearly that the lack of communication is actually between South Africa and Nkomo. One of them (Kophas Msipa) voiced the thought that a meeting between Nkomo and me should be considered. Our man only said that he would bring it to my attention.

Our Head of Mission pointed out that as ZAPU is now legal there can be nothing irregular in discreet contact with representatives of that party. We should also consider that Nkomo could still play a reasonably important role in Rhodesian politics, especially if he can gain a reasonable number of seats in the election.

My own feeling is that in the meantime we should indeed discreetly keep contact with ZAPU but that a meeting with Nkomo is too early. We first have to sit tight and wait to see which way the cat jumps, and in the meantime I have instructed Salisbury thus.

With kind regards
Yours faithfully
R.F. BOTHA

RHO 29 — 21 JANUARY 1980, TELEGRAM, FROM SALISBURY, SECEXTERN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3

NO. K. 41

As has been telephonically envisaged, I met Nkomo Saturday evening. Also present were Cephas Msipa (a member of his Executive Committee) and Stroebel.

Nkomo went straight to the point and said that he was worried about the South African troops at Beit Bridge. He said that he was aware of other troops in Rhodesia, but that it did not worry him and that moreover they were under Rhodesian command. He does not understand why South Africa insists on keeping the troops at Beit Bridge—it is not to the
advantage of Rhodesia or to the advantage of South Africa. On the contrary, it could be to our disadvantage on international scene. Moreover it could also have the effect that this presence would be exploited, especially by the African states, to oppose recognition of the new Zim. because the election, due to the presence of foreign troops, could be interpreted as being not free.

My reaction to this was that the troops, amongst other things, are there with the approval of the British and that we want to safeguard the bridge and thus keep our trade route open not only with Rhodesia, but also with Zambia, Zaire and Malawi, and added that in spite of prevailing attitudes with Zambia we nevertheless export that country’s copper and import mealies there. To this Nkomo replied that neither he nor Mugabe would ever take steps to blow up the bridge. He added that it is just as important to him to keep the bridge open—on the contrary, he wanted to see that the facilities at the bridge were improved, that the bridge is widened. For the same reason he had also not blown up the Chirundu or Victoria Falls bridges. It is not in the interest of Rhodesia.

Upon this I mentioned our concern about possible SA ANC and/or SWAPO actions, and mentioned that he was quoted in the press as having said that he would house these two groups after Zim became independent and that he would assist them in their actions against South Africa. He categorically denied this and assured me that under him [his leadership] Zim. would not be used as a base for terrorists against South Africa. He is, however, willing, as is recognised by international custom, to harbor fugitives from South Africa, but nothing more. The supply of arms to any group that would be aiming attacks against South Africa is completely excluded. At this stage he suggested that in the best interest of both countries our troops be taken just over the bridge. Thus a highly emotional question would be defused. I suggested that in his public speeches he could perhaps make a contribution to such a defusing by placing less emphasis on the troops. He replied that he himself did not wish to speak about it in public, but that his people expect him to take a stand on the matter. Besides, he added, the references that he had made up to now about the troops are on a reasonably low profile scale, but in such a way that His Honour the Minister gets the message from him—the Minister will, according to Nkomo, know exactly how he (Nkomo) thinks because they understand each other very well. His utterances [statements] are therefore of such a nature that they are meant for the ears of the Minister in the hope that the message is received and the necessary action taken.
Nkomo then enquired about His Honour the Prime Minister’s attitude in respect of Rhodesia and the party that wins the election. In this respect he said that according to reports the Prime Minister had said that if the PF comes into power, South Africa would take military action and put the Bishop in office. I categorically denied this and referred to the Prime Minister’s reply to a question during a press conference on 22 November 1979 in Johannesburg when he intimated that South Africa will accept the decision of the Rhodesian population in a free, democratic election. He was reassured by this. I undertook to supply him with a copy of the speech.

In general he said he foresaw that the future Zim. and South Africa would extend relations. He is a realist and does not foresee that it could be otherwise. He specifically referred to our education system and praised it. I added that South Africa could also contribute much to the technological development of Zimbabwe. He referred to the excellent objectivity of Radio RSA’s reporting, but said that the news commentary is not conducive to good future relations and asked whether I could possibly be of assistance in this respect. I undertook to give attention to the matter.

At this stage he also referred to Mugabe and said that the latter had already belittled him on various occasions. He (Nkomo) is no communist. (According to him he had his entire education in South Africa and through UNISA and is Southern African orientated). He believes that neither is Mugabe a communist—he is a Catholic—but uses Marxism to further his ideal. Also he (Nkomo) had to make communistic noises from time to time because both of them (Nkomo and Mugabe) got their support from Eastern Bloc countries.

For his part, however, it is far-fetched to think that Zim. would be communist orientated. He is a realist and as a realist he realises that he has to live as a capitalist state with South Africa, and in good neighbourliness. He would very much like to meet His Honour the Minister again, but there is now too little time. It is now too close to the election and such a meeting, he feels, should rather be held in Europe after the election.

I also made use of the opportunity to explain our internal [domestic] relations to him. He listened attentively and expressed the hope that South Africa’s problems would be solved. He said he realised it was a complex situation and he did not wish to prescribe to us how we should solve our internal matters. We have, according to him, the best human material [manpower] in Africa.

In my opinion the meeting went well—Nkomo also regarded it as very useful. We arranged to keep contact.
Following is text of telegram No. 33 from Salisbury: SECRET, NO K 33

As has been envisaged in last paragraph of my no. K 28 and 33 (Pretoria) tentative evaluation of prospects in election of the various political parties follows.

**General**

It will be remembered that next Parliament will be constituted of 20 Whites (separate election for them will be held on 14 February) and 80 Blacks (election on 27, 28 and 29 February). For the Black seats country is divided into 8 constituencies [electoral divisions] and voting takes place on party lists. In each district the party therefore places a number of names of its candidates corresponding to the number of seats for Parliament which have been allocated to the specific district on the basis of estimation of the number of voters of the district. If a party draws less than ten percent of the total (estimated number) of votes in the district it gets no representative for the district.

Parties that draw above ten per cent of total votes then divide the number of seats amongst them on the basis of percentage of votes received.

**Participating Parties UANC (Bishop Muzorewa)**

It is the only party with a relatively effective party organisation which can function on a country-wide [national] basis and can activate all the voters. It has set a modern publicity campaign in motion and gives the impression that it opposes PF (ZAPY) REPEAT (ZAPU) and ZANU (PF) effectively. The positive aspects of Bishop’s Gov. since taking office, and fact that Bishop has brought peace is being projected effectively. Bishop himself comes across more positive and aggressive. Influence of his ‘Man of Peace’ must not be underestimated. If cease-fire holds as at present appears and election is held on free and fair basis, he ought to gain majority of people.

Governor clearly showed that intimidation amongst others by ZANLA will not be tolerated. Continued intimidation by Mugabe followers could have result that Governor disqualifies Mugabe—although this will only be done as extreme measure. Intimidation cannot be eliminated completely, but it will be borne in mind that Bishop has nearly 30 000 auxiliary troops (SFA) who are specially trained to cope with counter-intimidation.

Bishop’s greatest potential support comes from cities industrial and mining areas and white farms that represent 60 per cent of registered voters and it stands to reason that
certain pressure can be exerted on these people to support UANC, and intimidation can also be more easily restrained than in TTL areas [Tribal Trust Lands] where former terrorists enjoy their greatest support (due to intimidation). If intimidation is restrained there, and that is quite possible because majority of terrorists are now in assembly points under monitory powers, UANC (and other democratic parties) could expect greater support there. It also depends whether the RF (whites in businesses, industries and farmers) give their support to the Bishop, i.e. assist with transport, winning over, etc. as in previous election. Ian Smith’s attitude at present is to remain neutral. Thus he hopes to keep his options open and to prevent the Bishop from achieving such a big majority that he can act completely independently from whites.

We must, however, still see what impact Mugabe’s return has on the nation. So far he continues his threats, which, in my opinion, cannot add to his enhancing his support and exposes him to attacks from the parties that want peace. His methods at present therefore prejudice his prospects rather than improve them.

The UANC does not have great support amongst the Matabele, as has also been proven in April 1979 election. Nkomo will gain majority of seats there, with possible 2 by UANC in Bulawayo (where they stand) and Midlands.

Indications are that Bishop and UANC’s positions are strengthening. Where previously, at the time of London Conference and after, I had doubted that Bishop would get absolute majority I am now more optimistic. Present indications are that UANC can definitely gain the majority of seats, namely between 40 and 50, with positive strong campaign. Minister David Smith is in agreement with this estimation.

Bishop informed me this morning that lack of funds is seriously hampering his campaign.

**ZANU (Sithole)**

Sithole’s campaign has not yet quite got off the ground. Meeting addressed by him was poorly attended. He has lost much of his support of the April election through his prevarication and accusations of irregularity committed by UANC, and the fruitless court case (which he will formally withdraw next week). There are, however, indications that Sithole will draw support from Mugabe’s terrorists who are disappointed with Mugabe’s “sell-out” [“surrender”] instead of a triumphant entry into Salisbury. Nevertheless I do not believe Sithole can gain more than four or five seats.
**UNFP**

The party is purely tribe orientated and Ndiweni’s support in the April 1979 election was given to him solely because he is Ndebele. Nkomo has, however, greater status and support than Ndiweni who is tribal chief but no politician. Nkomo will draw virtually all Ndiweni’s support to himself. As traditional tribal chief, however, he enjoys more support amongst the rural people in the Matabele tribal areas and he might gain one or two seats. Ndiweni himself said he might gain half a dozen seats from Nkomo as a result of Nkomo’s cruelties towards the people, but I doubt that he has that much support.

**ZDP**

All indications are that Chikerema’s campaign draws little interest, apart from his own people, the Zezuro. It will be remembered that Mugabe himself is Zezuro, and so is Chinamo, Nkomo’s adjunct. Chikerema therefore has strong opposition within his own tribe and little or none on national level. I believe he cannot gain more than a few seats (2).

**NFZ**

Now stands under leadership of P-Mandaza (a previous lieutenant of Ndiweni, who still maintains good relations with Ndiweni and the UNFP). Mandaza claims the resignation of Mawema from the party (he joined the UANC) is to the advantage of the NFZ. As has already been reported, NFZ lays claim to the support of the Karanga tribe. (Karanga is 32 per cent of population). Mugabe’s terrorists heavily infiltrated Karanga area in south-east of country, especially because his forces consisted mainly of Karanga. Tongogara, former commanding officer of ZANLA was Karanga. Allegations are that Mugabe had him killed. Support for Mugabe amongst Karanga is therefore doubtful, especially as he is still detaining in Maputo (or has already murdered) more Karanga leaders like Hamadziripi, Grumbo and Taderera. NFZ and UANC are exploiting these uncertainties.

If NFZ launches strong campaign it can obtain amongst Karanga only a significant number of votes, which would be at the cost of Mugabe especially (and not of the Bishop). Mandaza has obtained, as I have heard from a reliable source, funds from overseas, but these are not sufficient. Because his role is important in discrediting Mugabe amongst Karanga, his success will largely determine the number of votes for Mugabe. Nevertheless, time (and finances) are a problem and NFZ can hardly gain more than five seats of which possibly one in Salisbury on account of large concentration of Karanga here. UNFP and
NFZ now collaborate and may therefore unitedly exercise influence and new government. Bishop writes NFZ off as a joke.

**PF (Nkomo)**

All indications are that Nkomo’s esteem as national leader has declined in the past few years and presently he is only accepted as leader by the Matabele. To the Matabele electoral divisions only sixteen seats were allocated, but large number of Matabele also live in urban areas and at mines in Midlands. If we accept that he has all the Matabele tribal affiliations, he can at the utmost gain 18 to 20 seats. As Ndiweni may possibly gain a few seats in the rural Matabele areas, Nkomo’s share might be less.

**ZANU(PF)**

Mugabe was the most reluctant signatory to the London settlement and even continues from outside the borders with his threats and intimidation and the ZANLA elements are responsible for most breaches of the cease fire up to now. He was warned by Governor to cease breaches. He has not yet indicated when he is going to return to fight election. Only when he arrives in country will impact of his presence, his style and nature of campaign be analysed and a thorough evaluation of his chances be made. At present his followers continue with intimidation and threats and, according to observers, allow no peace for people who have had enough of war and only desire peace. If a free and fair election, without intimidation, can be held and he can be called to account for his misdeeds over the past years, observers believe that he could make no impression on the electorate. Sithole is competing strongly for his votes and if Mandaza can succeed in getting the Karanga campaign off the ground Mugabe will run into difficulties. At this stage I would not like to go further than to make a guessestimate, namely that he might possibly gain in the region of 15 seats.

For the rest a few insignificant domestic parties remain such as NDU, ZUPO, (headman Chirau), United Peoples Association of Matabeleland, which will receive no support worth mentioning from the electorate and should, for all practical purposes, not be taken into account.

Finally, may I remark that spot-checks by “Gallup” polls amongst the electorate cannot be made so easily as in more sophisticated communities. Preceding evaluation, however, based on best sources available to us. My view is basically optimistic. If no unforeseen incidents
influence the course of events, cease-fire holds and is strictly enforced by Governor so that intimidation is eliminated, Muzorewa could obtain sufficient support to defeat Mugabe convincingly in election.

**RHO 30 — UNDATED, LIKELY FEBRUARY 1980, TELEGRAM, FROM STEWARD NEW YORK TO SECEXTERN FA, KAAPSTAD, SOUTH AFRICAN ARCHIVES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BTS 1/156/3**

SADFA BTS 1/156/3 Volume 18
Telegram from Steward New York, to Secextern FA, Kaapstad
No. K87. Geheim
Secret

(Reference his lunch with T Kangai, Zanu’s representative in New York)

As expected, Kangai’s purpose in requesting the meeting was to sound us out on SA’s likely reaction to the outcome of forthcoming elections. Steward accentuated points of PM Botha of 19 and 22 Nov 1979—People of Rhodesia must decide on their gov. SA would be concerned if any party attempts to seize power by armed force against clearly expressed wishes of majority of population.

As in case of Mozambique, we are prepared to co-exist with our neighbours despite political differences. However, should such neighbouring states interfere in our external affairs, or should they permit their territories to be used for terrorist attacks against us, we would take whatever steps necessary to defend ourselves.

In reply Kangai made following points:

1. ZANU confidently expects to win election outright. Their latest estimates indicate they will win 55 seats. However, should they not win a majority, and should Muz and Nkomo
form a coalition against them, the war will continue ‘because ZANU will find it very dif-
ficult to control its younger officers.’ The result of any such outcome would also be rejected
because it would have been achieved through intimidation and rigging permitted by Lord
Soames. It would be unacceptable to independent African countries. Should war break out
again Kangai believes that ZANU would win. Muz’s auxiliaries would present little problem
and Nkomo’s forces would soon be overcome. The present Rhodesian forces would continue
to be far more formidable proposition, particularly if they are supported by SA. In this regard
Kangai was worried about the continued presence of SA troops in Rhodesia…”

2. If ZANU comes to power it will try to ensure that there is no chaos. In such circum-
stances whites would be welcome to stay and there would not be a large-scale refugee
problem. ZANU was not nearly so extreme as we imagined. Mugabe was more tolerant
and democratic than Nkomo. The whites would have nothing to fear. Should Muzorewa
and/or Nkomo supported by war and Rhodesian forces, attempt to execute a coup d’etat
then there would be civil war and chaos and SA could expect a serious refugee problem.

3. (denied ZANU received Russian aid, or unlikely to invite foreign forces in). However, if
the war were to start the possibility that ZANU might be assisted by other African coun-
tries could not be excluded.

4. A ZANU government would not interfere in South Africa’s affairs and would adopt
the policy that SA’s problems should be solved by SA. Kangai indicated that ZANU
would not permit terrorists to operate against SA from Zim.

5. Kangai concluded by stating that it was not in SA’s interests to support Muz/
Nkomo coalition:

- ZANU enjoys support of large majority of Zim
- It has much more powerful army and thus the only party that can end the war and
  ensure stability.
- The rest of Africa will recognise only a ZANU victory…
With reference to last par. K 110 I have to inform you that after group evaluation by heads of safety had been heard it was decided that in the light of—

1. indication that Bishop will indeed draw majority of votes

2. slight difference that any steps by Governor could have at this stage on result and

3. negative international reaction against such steps,

4. no representations are directed to Governor.

After meeting of Lancaster group conversation was carried on only among white members of group. There was *inter alia* discussion of the possibility of a coup d’état by security forces should Mugabe win election, in order to create status quo before arrival of Governor, but the feeling was that such an action is no longer practical politics.

26-0915-
## TIMELINE ON RHODESIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 November 1965</td>
<td>UDI declared by Rhodesian government, and a new constitution published. Britain immediately invokes selective sanctions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 December 1965</td>
<td>Britain imposes total economic sanctions against Rhodesia (renewed annually).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 December 1966</td>
<td>Mr Wilson and Mr Smith meet on HMS Tiger to discuss possibility of settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 December 1966</td>
<td>Rhodesian Government accepts the six principles as the basis for a settlement. However, British proposals are rejected on the grounds that the investiture of the Governor with legislative powers and the dissolution of parliament cannot be tolerated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 May 1968</td>
<td>UNO Security Council approval of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, proposed by Britain (Resolution 253)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10–13 October 1968</td>
<td>HMS Fearless talks between Mr Smith and Mr Wilson. A joint statement on 13 October states that the talks had ended without agreement “on fundamental issues.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 March 1970</td>
<td>Rhodesia becomes a Republic and new Constitution takes effect</td>
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Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Secretary, and Mr Smith sign an agreement setting out proposals for settlement. Under these, the 1969 Rhodesian Constitution (which permanently denied Africans a majority in the House of Assembly) would be modified. The African franchise would be considerably widened, and provision for unimpeded progress towards majority rule made. In addition, British aid of £50m over 10 years is to be made available for economic and educational development in African areas; this would be matched by the Rhodesian Government. The package would be submitted to the Rhodesian people for approval, with a test of acceptability to be conducted by a commission appointed by the British government and led by Lord Pearce.

The African National Council is set up as a temporary non-political body under Bishop Abel Muzorewa to oppose the settlement terms.

Publication of Pearce Commission Report, that settlement proposals were not acceptable to ‘the people of Rhodesia as a whole.’

US Senate votes against re-imposition of embargo on Rhodesian chrome.

Attack on Altena farm in Centenary area. Marks beginning of upsurge of insurgency activity.

Leaders of African Nationalist movements sign the Lusaka Declaration, uniting ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and ANC under UANC and chairmanship of Bishop Muzorewa.

Conference at Victoria Falls Bridge, attended also by President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster.

Conference at Victoria Falls Bridge, attended also by President Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster.

Deadlock at Victoria Falls Conference.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4 September 1975</strong></td>
<td>Split emerges within UANC, between ZAPU led by Mr Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Sithole in Lusaka.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>November 1975</strong></td>
<td>The Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) set up in Mozambique by guerrilla leaders. Guerrilla cadres are chiefly ZANU members; Robert Mugabe becomes ZIPA spokesman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 1975</strong></td>
<td>Negotiations open between Mr Smith and Mr Nkomo.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3 March 1976</strong></td>
<td>Following border clashes, President Machel of Mozambique announces the closure of the border with Rhodesia, and the application in full of UN sanctions against Rhodesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>19 March 1976</strong></td>
<td>Talks between Mr Smith and Mr Nkomo break down over the timing of majority rule, the extent of the franchise and the composition of an interim government. Mr Smith said he believed Britain ‘should now actively assist in resolving the constitutional issue in Rhodesia’.</td>
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</table>
| **22 March 1976**  | Following earlier contacts between the British Government and the Rhodesian regime, Mr Callaghan proposes in Parliament a two stage operation for a peaceful settlement:  
  1. Prior agreement by all parties to a number of preconditions 
     a. Acceptance of the principle of majority rule. 
     b. Elections for majority rule to take place in 18–24 months. 
     c. Agreement that there will be no independence before majority rule 
     d. The negotiations must not be long drawn out.’ Assurances would be needed that the transition to majority rule and to an independent Rhodesia would not be thwarted and would be orderly.  
  2. the negotiation of the actual terms of the independence constitution. |
<p>| <strong>27 April 1976</strong>  | During a tour of 7 African countries, Dr Kissinger emphasises in Lusaka the US commitment to an early negotiated settlement and urges acceptance of Mr Callaghan’s proposals. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 September</td>
<td>Prime Minister Vorster and Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger meet in Zurich.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 September</td>
<td>Mr Smith meeting with Dr Kissinger and Mr Vorster in Pretoria. Dr Kissinger presents Mr Smith with a discussion paper containing a set of draft proposals aimed at solving the constitutional issue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 September</td>
<td>Mr Smith’s broadcast to Rhodesian nation that he has accepted the Kissinger proposals for majority rule in two years, conditional upon the removal of sanctions and end of the insurgency. Mr Smith announces that the Kissinger proposals also provided for representatives of the Rhodesian Government and African leaders ‘to meet immediately at a mutually agreed place’ to organise an interim government. This would comprise a Council of State with equal numbers of black and white members, nominated by their respective sides, and a white chairman without a special vote; and a Council of Ministers with a majority of African members and an African First Minister, taking decisions by a two-thirds majority. For the period of the interim government, the Minister of Defence and Law and Order would be white. When the interim government was established, sanctions would be lifted and all acts of war, including guerrilla warfare, would cease. Substantial economic support would be made available by the international community to stimulate the Rhodesian economy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 September</td>
<td>The Presidents of Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania (the Front Line States) issue a statement in which, while discounting the proposals as outlined by Mr Smith, they call upon Britain immediately to convene a conference outside Rhodesia with ‘the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people’ to discuss the structure and functions of the transitional government and to set it up, to discuss the modalities for convening a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution, and to establish the basis upon which peace and normality could be restored in the territory.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 September 1976</td>
<td>Mr Crosland announces that Britain has decided to convene a conference to discuss the formation of an interim government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 October 1976</td>
<td>Formation of a joint ‘Patriotic Front’ announced by Mr Nkomo (ZAPU) and Mr Mugabe (ZANU). A joint statement declares that the front has ‘decided to intensify the armed liberation struggle until the achievement of victory’. The co-leaders agree to attend any conference as a joint delegation under joint leadership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 December 1976</td>
<td>Formation of ZUPO (Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January 1977</td>
<td>Ivor Richard arrives in Rhodesia to present new British Proposals</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 January 1977</td>
<td>Mr Smith broadcasts to the nation, rejecting British proposals on the grounds that they differ considerably from the Anglo-American proposals as presented by Dr Kissinger. As an alternative, he hints at the possibility of an ‘internal’ solution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 February 1977</td>
<td>Vorster discussions with US and British Ambassadors about new settlement initiative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**10 March 1977** Prime Minister Callaghan and Dr Owen visit to Washington for talks with President Carter and Secretary of State Vance. Dr Owen decision to work as closely as possible with Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, as well as Angola and Tanzania, and South Africa and Rhodesia. Launch of a new joint Anglo-American initiative. The aim is to reach agreement with the parties on the independence constitution and on arrangements for a brief transition period, during which elections will be held.

**16 March 1977** Repeal of Byrd Amendment allowing US to import Rhodesian chrome.

**25 July 1977** Following discussions with Mr Vance and President Carter, Dr Owen informs Parliament that it has been agreed that the Anglo-American initiative should continue.

**20 August 1977** African nationalist leaders move towards a new political line up (Rev. Sithole, Senator Chief Chirau and Dr Gabellah [Vice President of Muzorewa's ANC].

**25 August 1977** Announcement of Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia

**27 August 1977** Mr Smith meeting with Mr Vorster in Pretoria.

**27–30 August 1977** Dr Owen and Mr Andrew Young (US Ambassador to the UN) hold meetings in Lusaka with FLPs and the Patriotic Front; with Mr Vorster and Mr Botha in Pretoria; with President Nyerere in Dar es Salaam; and with Mr William Eteki Mboumoua, Secretary-General of the OAU, in Nairobi.

**28 August 1977** Mr Vorster discusses latest settlement proposals with Anglo-American negotiators in Pretoria.

**1 September 1977** Dr Owen and Mr Young arrive in Salisbury to present Anglo-American proposals (Command Paper 6919 Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 September</td>
<td>Patriotic Front leaders announce their objections to some aspects of the proposals.</td>
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<td>15 September</td>
<td>Mr Smith sends representations to British government on proposals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 September</td>
<td>Mr Smith announces the formation of a new white-dominated Cabinet and the shelving of the interim settlement plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 October</td>
<td>In Moscow, Dr Owen discusses with Mr Brezhnev and Mr Gromyko Britain's initiative to involve the UN in efforts to reach a settlement in Rhodesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>Talks held between Mr Smith’s government and nationalist parties (UANC, Rev N Sithole ANC and Chief Jeremiah Chirau (ZUPO) on an internal settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 December</td>
<td>The Presidents of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, meeting at Beira, reaffirmed their commitment to the Anglo-US settlement proposals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January</td>
<td>Rhodesian Government launches ‘safe return’ programme for nationalist guerrillas wishing to return to Rhodesia in peace.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 January</td>
<td>Meeting in Malta between Dr Owen, Lord Carver, Mr Andrew Young and General Prem Chan, and PF leaders, Mugabe and Nkomo, to discuss Anglo-US proposals. Each side agreed to consider proposals made by the other and to meet again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February</td>
<td>Announcement by Mr Smith and Bishop Muzorewa of internal settlement, including establishment of an interim government to lead Rhodesia to majority rule.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26–27 February</td>
<td>OAU Foreign Ministers’ Conference, Tripoli, rejects the Salisbury negotiations and calls for further talks on the basis of the Anglo-US proposals.</td>
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</table>
Internal Settlement reached between Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa (head of UANC), Rev. Sithole (leader of ZUPO), and Chief Chirau: the Salisbury Agreement

Includes provision for:

i) a Constitution to provide for majority rule on the basis of university adult suffrage;

ii) 100 member legislative assembly (72 black and 28 white);

iii) a Declaration of Rights;

iv) the independence, qualifications and security of the judiciary;

v) an independent Public Services Board;

vi) establishment of a transitional government to bring about a ceasefire and deal with matters relating to the future composition of military forces, release of detainees, review of sentences for political offences, removal of discrimination, election and the drafting of a Constitution.

vii) Composition of the transitional government:

a. An Executive Council, comprising Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev. Sithole, Chief Chirau and Mr Smith (chairmanship by rotation);

b. A Ministerial council, with black and white parity (chairmanship by alteration), responsible for initiating legislation and for duties referred to it by the Executive Council;

viii) continuation of Parliament during the life of the transitional government for the purpose of passing or enacting legislation as required to implement the agreement;

ix) independence on 31 December 1978.

Dr Owen refuses to give assurances that Britain will not recognise the agreement without the involvement of the Patriotic Front. 16 members of Congressional black caucus urge President Carter to reject the internal settlement. The Patriotic Front issue a communiqué condemning the internal agreement and advocating negotiations on the basis of the Anglo-US proposals.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25–26 March 1978</td>
<td>Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front Leaders hold summit meeting in Dar es Salaam. They condemn the internal agreement (“as illegal as the previous regime”); criticised the British and US Governments for not condemning it; called on the two governments to convene a meeting as a follow-up to the Malta talks; demanded an intensified armed struggle; and called on the international community to tighten and widen sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May 1978</td>
<td>Speech by Mr Vorster, expressing support for the internal settlement, and plea for international recognition and removal of sanctions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 June 1978</td>
<td>Mr Nkomo meeting with State Dept officials in Washington: rejects idea of all-party settlement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 July 1978</td>
<td>A spokesman for the Council of OAU Foreign Ministers in Khartoum announces that “while supporting the Patriotic Front in the context of the armed struggle, the Council still maintains that other political groups should be involved in an all-party conference (and) choice of leaders in Zimbabwe is up to the people of Zimbabwe.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 July 1978</td>
<td>US Senate votes by 48-42 against an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill, providing for the immediate lifting of sanctions. After a conference with the House of Representatives, which also debated a similar amendment, Senators Case-Javitz compromise amendment, calling for sanctions to be lifted by December 31 1978, ‘if the President determined that the Rhodesian government had demonstrated its willingness to attend an all-party conference’ and a new government had been installed following ‘free, internationally supervised elections.’ Approved by the Senate 59–36.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 August 1978</td>
<td>Mr Smith-Mr Nkomo secret meeting in Lusaka, attended by Brigadier Garba of Nigeria.</td>
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**18–20 August 1978**  
Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe meet for a Patriotic Front coordination meeting in Lusaka. Following this, Mr Mugabe flies to Lagos and returns with Brigadier Garba, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, who has talks with the Front leaders and with President Kaunda. Brigadier Garba later flies to Maputo for talks with President Machel. Mr Mugabe announces to the Press that ZAPU and ZANU will soon unify under one leader.

**2 September 1978**  
Nkomo reveals details of the meeting on 14 August. He said that he refused Mr Smith’s offer of the chairmanship of the transitional administration. Mr Smith also confirms that the meeting had taken place, but denies having made any specific offer to Mr Nkomo.

**3 September 1978**  
Air Rhodesia Viscount civilian aircraft shot down by ZIPRA fighters, using Soviet SAM missile. 10 of 18 survivors killed by ZIPRA guerrillas.

**23 November 1978**  
Mr Callaghan announcement of another initiative: tour of Mr Cledwyn Hughes, to be accompanied by Stephen Low to Nigeria and Southern Africa, to investigate whether conditions were ‘right’ for convening all-party conference.

**12 February 1979**  
ZIPRA shoot down another Viscount aircraft.

**9 April 1979**  
British Conservative party announce it will recognise Rhodesian government after ‘satisfactory elections’

**12–13 April 1979**  
Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation sponsored assassination attempt on Nkomo, and destruction of ZAPU’s headquarters in Lusaka.

**24 April 1979**  
Rhodesian Election Results announced:
- UANC 1,212,639 votes (67.27%) 51 seats
- ZANU (Sithole) 262,928 votes (14.59%) 12 seats
- UNFP 194,446 votes (10.79%) 0 seats
- NDU 18,175 votes (1.00%) 0 seats
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>26 April 1979</td>
<td>OAU declares the Rhodesian election results “null and void.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 1979</td>
<td>Adoption by UN Security Council of a Resolution condemning the April elections in Rhodesia and reiterating the call on member States not to accord recognition to the ensuing government. The UK, US and France abstain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 1979</td>
<td>Conservative victory in British General Election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 1979</td>
<td>Lord Carrington, new Foreign Secretary, statement: ‘I do not think anyone can ignore an election in which 65% of people voted.’ Announces that the British Government was committed to restoring Rhodesia to legality if the elections were found to have been free and fair.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 May 1979</td>
<td>Meeting of OAU Liberation Committee warns UK and US against recognition of new regime in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 June 1979</td>
<td>US Senate rejects (52:41) Carter Administration compromise proposal that sanctions would not be lifted until 1 December.</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 June 1979</td>
<td>US House of Representatives votes 350-37 in favour of a Bill, initiated by Representatives Solarz and already approved unanimously by the Foreign Affairs Committee, calling for the termination of sanctions against Rhodesia on 15 October unless President Carter determines that it is against US interests to do so.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 July 1979</td>
<td>Lord Harlech reports to Lord Carrington on his discussions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 July 1979</td>
<td>Bishop Muzorewa meets President Carter and Mr Vance, together with Congressional and other leaders in Washington, to put the case for lifting US sanctions against Rhodesia.</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>12–14 July 1979</td>
<td>Bishop Muzorewa visits London at his own request for talks with the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 July 1979</td>
<td>The 16th meeting of the Heads of State of the OAU adopt a resolution calling on member states to “apply effective cultural, political, commercial and economic sanctions against any State which accords recognition of the illegal racist minority regime in Zimbabwe or lifts the mandatory sanctions against it in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions”. The resolution recognises the PF as “the sole, legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe”. Five countries—Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia and Zaire—enter reservations on this section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1979</td>
<td>Mrs Thatcher says in the House of Commons that the British Government is now engaged in a process of consultation with a view to bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with the widest possible international acceptance. It will put forward proposals, based on the six principles which have been supported by successive governments, after further consultations at the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Lusaka.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1–5 August 1979</td>
<td>Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference convenes in Lusaka. In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, the Commonwealth Heads of Government: Confirm that they are wholly committed to black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe; Recognise, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects; Fully accept that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule; Recognise that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict; Are deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours; Accept that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities; Acknowledge that the Government formed under such an independent constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers; Welcome the British Government’s indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a Constitutional Conference to which all parties would be invited; and Consequently, accept that it must be a major objective to bring about the cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions;</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>7–9 September 1979</td>
<td>Meeting of Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, attended by Patriotic Front.</td>
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<td>10 September 1979</td>
<td>Formal opening of Lancaster House Conference in London.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 December 1979</td>
<td>Zimbabwe/Rhodesia Constitutional Amendment Bill is passed in both Houses of Parliament in Britain. Lord Carrington announces Lord Soames’ departure for Salisbury as Governor; also that the expanded (now 1,200) Commonwealth Monitoring force will be at the 15 assembly points.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 December 1979</td>
<td>Agreement signed at Lancaster House for a cease-fire between Government of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and PF, and new Constitution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 March 1980</td>
<td>Election victory for Robert Mugabe/ZANU-PF</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 April 1980</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Independence Day</td>
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BRIEFING PAPER

Christopher Saunders

Namibia, 1974-1989 (including Angola in the 1980s in as much as it relates to Namibia)

With the aim of providing a suitable framework for discussion on the Namibia issue, I here set out a series of assertions, and relate them to a set of questions that will, I hope, help take the discussion forward. I begin with some fairly general statements, and a few that relate to the pre-1974 period, then proceed largely chronologically, linking my assertions to the documents (in bold: the SWA/Namibia documents are “Nam,” the Angolan ones from Session 1, above, are “Ang”) and highlighting questions for discussion.

1. Namibia was of relatively little importance intrinsically to the main adversaries in the Cold War, given its very small population and geo-strategic position. It did, however, contain mineral resources that the West sought to preserve within its sphere of influence and which some believed the USSR was out to “capture”: uranium, mainly sent to Britain, some of which was used for nuclear fuel for Trident submarines, and diamonds.

How important was Namibia itself in Cold War terms? Were its minerals ever of any significance in Cold War thinking? (Uranium for Britain? Diamonds?)
2. Namibia was significant in global terms largely because it was under South African occupation and extracting it from South African occupation seemed likely to be linked directly to the future of South Africa itself. The West thought that if the “Namibia issue” could be “settled,” which meant South African withdrawal via a relatively peaceful transition process and not as the result of a military victory by SWAPO, that would help make the “South African apartheid issue” easier to solve, for it would create an example of a peaceful transition that could be applied to South Africa itself. On the other hand, the South African government (SAG) knew that if it withdrew from Namibia, that would be seen by many as a victory for the struggle against apartheid, and that the likelihood was that even more attention would then be directed to ridding South Africa of apartheid rule. The SAG knew that any future Namibia would be highly dependent on it economically, especially given its insistence that Walvis Bay was South African territory. But the SAG was not prepared to see a hostile regime in Windhoek, and a SWAPO that might work closely with the ANC was seen as unacceptable. Spokespeople for the SAG sometimes said that they were determined to prevent a chaotic and violent transition to independence in Namibia, and that they were acting in the interests of a peaceful transition there.

Given the inevitable economic dependence of an independent Namibia, what were the most important reasons for South Africa’s reluctance to withdraw from Namibia? Were they fearful of the consequences of such a withdrawal in South Africa itself: that far-right whites would see such a withdrawal as a betrayal and blacks as a step towards liberation in South Africa? Or that whites might flee from Namibia to South Africa if SWAPO came to power? How important was the concern that an independent Namibia might provide bases for the ANC? Was there ever any likelihood of that? Were Namibian diamonds of any significance in the thinking of the SAG?

3. Namibia had been a Cold War concern before the Lisbon coup of 1974, in that it had long been on the agenda of the UN as a contested international issue, on which the U.S. and the Western countries and the Soviet Union took diametrically opposite views. The West had many close ties with South Africa, from historical ones to contemporary
economic and strategic ones; the USSR had begun giving military assistance to SWAPO. But before 1974 Namibia was a low priority issue in Cold War terms: significant international action seemed unlikely, South Africa was firmly in control of the territory, the war was a low intensity one and there seemed little likelihood either of it escalating into a major conflict or of SWAPO coming to power.

4. While the West came to admit the case for an independent Namibia, which was the goal for which SWAPO was fighting and receiving USSR backing, the West was determined not to “lose” Namibia. In Cold War terms this meant that it wanted an independence process that would be relatively peaceful, and wished to avoid the introduction of any foreign forces or a settlement that would lead to a regime linked to the USSR. SWAPO was seen as having such a link. At the same time, SWAPO proclaimed itself ready to enter into talks with the SAG in 1974. [Nam 1]

Was the USSR’s assistance to SWAPO motivated entirely by altruistic support for Namibian liberation? Was SWAPO concerned that its links with the USSR, and its more socialist political program from 1976, would jeopardize its relations with the West? Was the fear that SWAPO was intending a “communist” future for Namibia as a client of the Soviet Union a mere figment of apartheid imagination, or was there an element of truth in it? Did SWAPO’s armed struggle conflict with its diplomatic program and goals? If the Western Contact Group (WCG)1 could engage SWAPO from 1977 and accept that it had primarily nationalist goals, what accounts for SAG resistance to engage it on similar terms?

5. As a direct result of the Lisbon coup of 1974 and the independence process for Angola that followed [see Angola session], the Namibian issue became a much more important Cold War one, with the U.S. taking a leading role in trying to effect a settlement.

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1. The Western Contact Group (WCG) was a grouping of five Western countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and West Germany—that were then members of the United Nations Security Council. The WCG led diplomatic efforts to address the issue of Namibian independence in the United Nations.
Angola was perceived to have been “lost” to the West in 1975 with the MPLA coming
to power, thanks to the advent of Cuban military forces. There was now the possibility
of Cuban forces moving south to aid SWAPO coming to power in Namibia. SWAPO
was able to open bases in southern Angola and pose a much greater challenge to South
Africa. And the UN Security Council now accepted a plan for a transition in Namibia
involving a UN presence to supervise an election before independence. [Nam 2] One
indication of the new importance the Namibian issue now had was the meeting in
1976 between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Sam Nujoma and three
other members of SWAPO in New York. [Nam 3] This was to try to get SWAPO to
participate in a Namibian conference with the Turnhalle parties.\textsuperscript{2} SWAPO rejected
the idea of participating in such a conference with “puppets” of the South African
government. Under pressure from its Western allies, the SAG agreed to scupper the
Turnhalle process and accept some UN intervention, recognizing that this was the
only way to achieve international recognition for the government of an independent
Namibia. SWAPO was skeptical of the Western initiative, but nevertheless agreed
to engage with the Western Contact Group. [Nam 4] The WCG negotiated with
SWAPO and South Africa in 1977–1978 and in April 1978 produced a compromise
plan for taking the territory to independence. [Nam 5]

6. One of the elements of the compromise was the exclusion of Walvis Bay from the
independence plan. A UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution fudged this, to the
great annoyance of the SAG, in order to get SWAPO to support the plan, [Nam
6] which it agreed to do. The plan was then embodied in UNSC Resolution 435,
[Nam 7] on which the USSR abstained (it could have vetoed it, but it was sup-
ported by the African countries and SWAPO had signed up to it under pressure
from the Frontline states).

Many aspects of the independence plan for Namibia were not
spelled out clearly in the Western Plan, then embodied in UNSC
435 (e.g. whether or not SWAPO could have bases in the north

\textsuperscript{2}. I.e., the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a union of multiple political parties in opposition to SWAPO.
during the transition period), and so gave rise to much dispute. Was the plan deliberately left vague when drafted in order to get around difficulties? Why were later disputes not anticipated by the parties when the plan was drawn up?

7. PW Botha, who became South African Prime Minister in September 1978, is known to have opposed the Western Plan when it went to cabinet earlier that year. When the Western Foreign Ministers visited Pretoria in October 1978, PW Botha laid out the Cold War arguments against allowing Namibia to become independent under a SWAPO government. [Nam 8]

What realistic alternative did PW Botha envisage for the future of SWA/Namibia, given that only the Western Plan, embodied in UNSC Resolution 435, would bring international recognition? Did the SAG think there was a realistic chance of a settlement in late 1978–1979 involving a UN supervised election? Was it ever prepared at that time to signal that implementation of 435 could begin? Did it expect that SWAPO would fail to get two-thirds of the votes in an election, or did it think it could manipulate things so that the DTA would win such an election? Why did the SAG raise objections to the UN’s conception of how the plan would be implemented in late 1978/early 1979? Were the objections advanced deliberately to undermine any chance of such a settlement?

8. A recent memoir reminds us that the SAG’s “propaganda machine projected the SWAPO struggle for Namibian independence as the spearhead of the communist assault on the white south.”

How seriously did the SAG and the West take the idea of a communist threat via SWAPO to South Africa? How important was socialist thinking and planning in SWAPO, and what were its links with Moscow? Did the SAG think, after the visit of the WCG Foreign Ministers in October 1978, that the West would not support sanctions on the Namibian issue, so allowing it total control of whether or not to allow the implementation of the settlement plan? What were relations like between the SAG and the West on the Namibian issue? What areas of disagreement were there?

9. Once the SAG had made it clear in early 1979 that it was going to use the issues of UN partiality and “no SWAPO bases in the north” as reasons not to allow the implementation of 435, the WCG spent much time planning for a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between northern Namibia and Angola, which never came to anything.

Was the idea of a DMZ a mere stalling device or a serious suggestion to solve the problem for the West and South Africa that SWAPO bases in Angola would not be monitored in the transition period? If the latter, why did it come to nothing?

10. It was finally agreed between the parties, as confirmed by the UN Secretary-General, that there would be no SWAPO bases in the north of Namibia during the transition period.

Why was this not given more prominence and communicated widely in SWAPO? (For the consequences see 19 below.)

11. The victory of Mugabe in Zimbabwe in early 1980 suggested that SWAPO would win in any free and fair election held in Namibia.

How important was Mugabe’s victory in reinforcing the reluctance of the SAG to go ahead with the implementation of UNSC 435?
12. The Geneva pre-implementation meeting of January 1981, organized by the UN, brought together the SWAPO leadership, the internal Namibian parties and the SAG for the first time in one room. It was widely said at the time that the SAG, knowing that the Reagan administration was about to come into office, saw the conference as a way of advancing the status of the internal Namibian parties and had no intention of allowing implementation of UNSC 435. [Nam 9; Nam 10]

Given the timing, relative to the advent of the Reagan administration, why was the conference held, if it was known it would be a waste of time? Did the conference have any lasting consequences? Did SWAPO ever think of setting up a government-in-exile? Why did it not?

13. After Reagan came into office, the U.S. administration introduced the idea of formally linking the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 with the withdrawal of the Cuban military forces in Angola. This was welcomed by the SAG, and relations with members of the Reagan administration grew close, as seen from the meeting between Chester Crocker and R.F “Pik” Botha and Magnus Malan in April 1981, and subsequent correspondence, [e.g. Nam 12; Nam 13] though the South Africans remained somewhat skeptical about Crocker’s intentions. He claimed that his policies were realistic ones, designed to bring about Namibian independence as soon as possible. The Cuban and Angolan governments issued a declaration in 1982, after the large South African incursion into southern Angola in 1981, stating that the question of any Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola was a bilateral matter, unrelated to Namibia, and that there was no question of such a withdrawal so long as South African forces invaded and occupied southern Angola. [Nam 14]

Was linkage a sincere attempt on the part of the U.S. to get 435 implemented, or was it a delaying tactic (as Nujoma and others have suggested)? To what extent were the SAG and Crocker on the same wavelength in the early years of the Reagan administration? Why did the Angolans and Cubans not agree earlier to what they accepted in 1988 regarding Cuban troop withdrawal? Were there
any disagreements between SWAPO and the Angolans and Cubans relating to linkage and the response to it? Was there a lot of unhappiness in SWAPO about fighting against UNITA in Angola? Why was there not more cooperation between SWAPO and the ANC, as both were confronting the same enemy?

14. One of Crocker’s attempts to move the process ahead was to get agreement on a set of Constitutional Principles (CPs) by both the SAG and SWAPO in 1982. [Nam 15]

Under what pressures did SWAPO accept the CPs, and what was their significance? Was it always assumed in SWAPO that they would be accepted if and when SWAPO won an election held in terms of UNSC 435?

15. The South African and Angolan governments conducted a series of secret talks in the early 1980s, many of them on Sol Island on Cape Verde.

What role did these meetings play in the events that followed? Did they help produce the Lusaka agreement of February 1984? Did the SAG think that it might be able to bring about a Namibian settlement outside UNSC 435 and without the U.S. playing a dominant role?

16. The Lusaka agreement of February 1984 provided for the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to oversee the withdrawal of SWAPO fighters from “the area in question” in southern Angola and for FAPLA to ensure that they did not return to that area. [Nam 16; Nam 17; Nam 18; Nam 19]

Was the Lusaka agreement ever thought to be a step towards the implementation of UNSC 435? Why did the JMC scheme, provided for in that agreement, not work? Did it ever seem to be working, or was it a dead duck from the beginning? Why were SADF recces involved in destabilizing Cabinda in 1985? How important
were the Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that the Reagan administration gave UNITA in altering the balance of forces in Angola? Why were they not more effective in 1987/88?

17. It has sometimes been said that it was the winding down of the Cold War, after the rise of Gorbachev to high office in 1985, that made possible the Namibian/Angolan settlement of 1988, i.e. the Tripartite Accord.

How important were new superpower relations under Gorbachev in explaining the events of 1988 leading to the signing of the Namibia/Angola Accords in December that year? At what point did the Soviet Union change its policy towards Angola, and why, and with what implication for relations with the Cubans and Angolans? What was the role of the USSR in the negotiations of 1988?

18. Clearly the changed military situation in southern Angola by early 1988 had much to do with the talks that began in London in May and continued in other cities before the Namibia/Angola Accords were signed in December in New York. In the military story, key moments were the battle on the Lomba River on 3 October 1987, which General Geldenhuys says had a “decisive effect on the negotiations,”4 and the battles close to Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988. [Ang 13; Ang 14; Ang 16; Ang 17; Ang 18] In the negotiations, key moments included the New York meeting in July at which principles were agreed to that for the first time suggested that the Angolan government would no longer be able to host Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, and the Geneva meeting in August, from which a protocol emerged that provided for South African forces to withdraw from Angola and for the withdrawal of SWAPO’s forces northwards in Angola. [Nam 21]

How important was what happened in southern Angola to the Namibia settlement? What was the precise relationship between the military events of 1987–1988 in southern Angola and the negotiation process? Is it possible to reach any consensus on what happened on the Lomba River in 1987 and at Cuito Cuanavale in late 1987–early 1988, and their relative significance? What were the causes of the FAPLA debacle at the Lomba, and what were the goals of the SADF? Did the U.S. threaten in early 1988 not to show its satellite photos of the Cuban advance southwards towards the Namibian border to the SADF as a way of pushing the SAG into negotiations? What is the significance of the principles agreed to in New York in July, the Geneva protocol and the Brazzaville meeting in December? Was the final agreement signed later that month in New York one in which all parties won, as Chester Crocker claimed? Why was SWAPO not included in the negotiations of 1988, given that it was likely to come to power in an independent Namibia?

19. UNSC Resolution 435 was implemented from 1 April 1989 but the ceasefire that came into effect on that day was almost immediately broken. Within a few days over 300 SWAPO fighters had been killed in northern Namibia by South African police and military units, allowed out of their bases by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, urged on by Mrs. Thatcher and Pik Botha. A smaller number of South African police and military died in the encounters with the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) forces. SWAPO said that PLAN guerrillas had always been in northern Namibia and that they now had no hostile intent but wanted to present themselves to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) so that they could be placed in bases in the north. UNTAG was not in place in northern Namibia on 1 April because of delays in approving the logistics and numbers at the UN. [Nam 22; Nam 23; Nam 24; Nam 25]

What led to the April crisis? Why were SWAPO fighters allowed to cross into northern Namibia heavily armed without confirmation
that the UN was in place there? In the way the crisis was resolved, did SWAPO not in effect admit that it had made an error? Are the criticisms made of Martti Ahtisaari’s actions on 1 April by Nujoma and others valid? Did he have any alternative but to permit South African forces to attack SWAPO guerrillas? If he could have acted differently, how?

20. A final set of general questions for this session:

What was the role of the Cold War in delaying Namibian independence? How important was the Cold War in delaying Namibian independence compared to the unwillingness of South Africa to see a SWAPO government in Windhoek? How and why (under what influences) did the fears that the SAG had held of a SWAPO government in Windhoek abate? Had there been no Cold War, how different might have been the story of how Namibia moved to independence, and what consequences might that have had for South Africa?

SELECT READING LIST:


5. Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari served as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Namibia from 1978 to 1988 and directed the UNTAG operation in Namibia from 1989 to 1999. Implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 was to begin on 1 April 1989. However, on the morning of 1 April, SWAPO militants allegedly began advancing from Angola into northern Namibia—a violation of the peace agreement. At the behest of Margaret Thatcher, Ahtisaari authorized the deployment of limited South African forces to contain the advancing SWAPO guerrillas. Violence ensued, and SWAPO incurred approximately 300 fatalities. The SWAPO forces later said that they were simply attempting to return to their homes in light of the new peace accords. Ahtisaari was roundly criticized for failing to communicate properly and for favoring the South African regime.

**MEMOIRS:**

DISCUSSION

Chair: Tilman Dederer
Provocateur: Christopher Saunders

DEDERING: So let’s carry on, otherwise we will lag behind. I have been informed that Mr. Botha will join us a little later but I don’t think we should wait, otherwise it will be a problem time-wise. I am Tilman Dederer from the Department of History at UNISA [University of South Africa] and I will chair this first session today on Namibia. I welcome the participants and you, the audience. I think at the previous sessions we have established a nice and functioning pattern. There will be an academic paper read at the beginning and then this will open further discussion, first from the participants and then later we can open and widen the discussion, by inviting people from the audience to participate. So, I would like to ask Professor Christopher Saunders to present to us some of the pertinent questions on Namibia during the Cold War. And perhaps then we should try—although nothing has been cast in stone—absolutely we should try to crystallize the further discussion around some of these pertinent questions. So, Christopher would you like to take over?

SAUNDERS: Thank you, Tilman. Just before I come to the topic, can I just express my appreciation to the organizers and others for making this conference possible. It is really a great opportunity. Especially to Sue, without whose vision and drive and energy and determination we wouldn’t be here. So thank you very much to everybody.

So, we come to this country South-West Africa, which some will call Namibia, and we also are going to include Angola in the 1980s because, thanks to Professor Shubin, we agreed that some of the questions he wanted to raise about Angola in the 1980s would be included in this session. So, if you looked at my briefing paper in the pack you would see that there were a large number of questions raised and I am going to boil these down and talk about three phases in this complex story of Namibia and Angola. And of course I’m happy to be corrected in anything I say. Maybe I’m not even asking the right questions, so please put me right.

Where to begin? We could begin in 1946, with the United Nations blocking the incorporation of Namibia into South Africa; or 1966, with the beginning of the armed struggle. But the conference title said 1974. This turning point came with the Portuguese
revolution and the independence of Angola and the arrival of the Cuban forces there. From then on it seems there are three main phases. I’m just going to run through these phases to help to organize the discussion. The first phase is from 1974 to say 1978 and in that period the questions are around the increased involvement of Western powers in relation to the Namibian issue and Cold War terms policy. That involves the formation of the Western Contact Group. The negotiations there were held between the Western Contact Group and the South African government and SWAPO. This is the period when in the South African government thinking talk of “total onslaught” and the “total strategy” emerged and so one needs to ask what the meaning of those terms was and what that meant to the South African government. What its fears were at the time and so forth. And that could relate also to what perceptions were of SWAPO and what the implications would be of SWAPO coming to power. This is the period also of increased South African military activity, and the Cassinga massacre,6 the conclusion of the negotiations in 1978, the Western Plan that was embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, and the question of the exclusion of Walvis Bay, etc. So, this is where this era ends, with the passage of Resolution 435.

And then the second phase I think we can usefully talk about: that of the non-implementation of Resolution 435. Why was there a long delay in obtaining Namibian independence? Yesterday we had a brief intervention from Minister Pik Botha, who is to arrive any moment, on the whole question of the linkage. He said it was the Americans who introduced the concept in 1981 by [Deputy Secretary of State] Clark. Before that there was the Geneva implementation meeting—why was that such a total failure? Then the period of the Reagan administration; the increased emphasis on linkage; the Lusaka agreement in 1984; the establishment of the Joint Monitoring Commission; the arrangement for South African forces to withdraw from southern Angola. Why wasn’t that successful and what was the relationship between that and the implementation of Resolution 435?

These are a lot of questions. There are specific questions in that period, but the general question that we hopefully will address is why was there the long delay in implementing 435?

6. On 4 May 1978, the SADF conducted an airborne attack on Cassinga in southern Angola. South Africa claimed that Cassinga was a SWAPO military base and training camp and maintained that the assault was justified. However, SWAPO reported that Cassinga was merely a refugee camp and that those residing in Cassinga were innocent civilians. Hundreds were killed in the airstrike.
In the third phase one comes to the implementation of 435. There we would look at the military situation in southern Angola, and pick up the questions that Vladimir Shubin might have liked to have asked yesterday around the battle of Lomba River, Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuban move to the south. What were the implications of that? How important was the military situation in southern Angola for the negotiations in 1988? There are some documents in the pack relating to the actual negotiations, the principles agreed to in New York and the Geneva protocol, and then the December 1988 Namibia/Angola Accord. So there are a whole range of questions about why that happened and the form it took—why linkage was, if it was, successful at that point, why it was agreed that the Cuban forces would leave Angola and the South African troops would withdraw from Namibia.

And then lastly, the crisis that took place at the beginning of the implementation of 435 on 1 April 1989. Why did it happen? Why was there new conflict in the north? What was the role of Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General? Then how was that crisis resolved at the meeting at Mount Etjo? What was the role of the Joint Commission? I’m very keen to get the participants’ view on these.

What was the role of the superpowers in all of this? How important was Gorbachev and “new political thinking” and the Soviet Union in relation to what happened in regard to Namibia? How important was the military situation? How important were the fears of the SWAPO government coming into power in Namibia from the South African point of view? Was there really any idea that the Cuban forces would move south from Angola into Namibia? What role did the ANC bases in Angola play? How important was it to get rid of them? So, lots of questions. I’m going to stop there. Thank you.

**DEDERING:** Thank you, Christopher. This is quite a handful of questions and I’m sure there are going to be interesting contributions from the participants. If I can just perhaps quickly summarize some of the main points or questions. The whole issue of the non-implementation of Resolution 435, I think, is very much at the center of your paper. Second, what were the implications of the Cuban advance in 1988 and how did the military situation in the border region influence decision making in South Africa? Third question, I think we’ve heard already very interesting comments from Mr. Botha yesterday on the background. What is the background to “linkage” and why was it actually successful? Then what happened when SWAPO fighters emerged in April 1989 in the north of Namibia. What went wrong there? Was something going wrong? Was it
part of the strategy? How was it resolved? What was the role of the UN in the resolution of this conflict? And then of course the superpower rationale during this period and the end of the bipolar Cold War. How did it impact on the Namibian situation and other situations in southern Africa more generally? I would like to invite the participants here on the panel to help us understand these issues.

So, first: the question about non-implementation of 435.

**STEWARD**: I’m David Steward. Between 1978 and 1982, I was at the United Nations in New York as the South African ambassador there. From 1983 to the end of 1985, I was responsible in the Department of Foreign Affairs for activities in Namibia and Angola. The run-up to the adoption of Resolution 435 was long and complex. It started with the South African government’s plan for an internal settlement—the so-called DTA process—an internal process in the early ’70s. Pressure built up from the international community during the subsequent years. South Africa had already taken the decision in principle that the territory should become independent—but as we wanted it in terms of the internal process. Resolution 385 placed considerable pressure on South Africa and led to the formation of the Western Five Contact Group of the Security Council. The negotiations then with South Africa centered on the central principle that it was no longer a question of whether Namibia would become independent; it was a question of the basis on which it would do so. The South African government then accepted the idea of the UN Plan7 and the implementation process and it agreed to Resolution 435 in good faith.

However, its confidence received an enormous blow just before the adoption of Resolution 435 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 432 with very little consultation with the South African government. 432, in essence, gave Walvis Bay to Namibia. Now, in terms of international law there was absolutely no doubt whatsoever that Walvis Bay was part of South Africa. Even the United Nations’ own legal advisors accepted that. The legal advisors of the Western powers accepted that. But Walvis Bay was one of the prices that SWAPO insisted on for its support of the UN process. Now that was the first serious blow to the confidence of the South African government. Nevertheless, Resolution 435 was adopted and the whole process of negotiations and consultations

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7. I.e., the Western Contact Group’s proposal as set forth in UNSC Resolution 435.
with the United Nations began. A pre-implementation team was sent to Namibia and included General Phillip of Austria. Broad agreement was reached between Phillip and the South African government on the modalities of the implementation of Resolution 435, but when General Phillip got back [to] the UN, as I recall, the plan was really torn to pieces and new proposals were put in place which were quite unacceptable to the South African government. And this led to a great crisis in confidence. Again, as I recall, and I’m now speaking from a perspective of twenty five years, the South African government lost confidence in the process and decided to proceed with its own internal initiative.

So, in December 1978 elections were held in Namibia in terms of the Turnhalle process which, to everybody’s surprise, were well supported and indicated quite widespread support for the DTA. At the same time the Western Five countries on the Security Council put further pressure on the South African government. They sent a mission to Pretoria in December and the result was that Prime Minister Botha said, “Look, the election will go ahead but I will advise the elected assembly to implement the plan.” And that’s what happened towards the end of December 1978. In January 1979 the process got back on to the road. A new mission was sent to South Africa. A new plan was developed which was embodied in the Secretary-General’s letter to us, I think sometime toward the end of February/beginning of March. Once again, this was an enormous deviation from what we believed would be the central elements in the implementation plan. Among other things, SWAPO bases just north of the border would not be monitored by the United Nations, which we felt would give SWAPO an enormous tactical and strategic advantage, particularly because they would then have easy access to the most populated part of the territory.

So, this led to a huge collapse of confidence on the part of the South African government. On 6 March, PW Botha made a speech in Parliament in Cape Town saying that the deal was off and that South Africa was withdrawing from the process. Again the five Western countries on the Security Council came together and launched new initiatives centering on measures to build mutual trust and confidence, and so on and so on. So what happened was that by March/April 1979 the South African government had lost confidence in the good faith of its main negotiating partners; it had no confidence whatsoever in the United Nations under Waldheim. The perception was that whatever
happened, the United Nations would favor SWAPO’s interpretation of events. The South African government was deeply disappointed by the lack of principle manifested by the Western countries of the Security Council, and so for a period after that, I think there was a stalling process. We listened to what the Western Five had to say on the matter. One process reeled out into another. There were suggestions for a demilitarized zone and all this culminated in January 1981 in proximity talks, which were held in Geneva. But that was on the eve of the inauguration of President Reagan, which also was a factor in the South African government’s attitude at that time. At the Geneva talks, our main concern was to make it clear that SWAPO was not the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia—which was a decision, we thought, that only the Namibian people could make. There were other genuine political parties and we wanted to make sure that they also were included in the equation, when it came to the determination of the territory’s future. Of course after that, the Reagan administration came into power. Judge Clark was sent to South Africa and, as you heard from Pik Botha yesterday, that was the beginning of linkage. Then that was another long story. So, anyway, this is my brief summation from the perspective of thirty years.

**DEDERING:** Thank you very much. So, I think some very interesting points here and I think it might be interesting to hear perhaps from Mr. Amathila in help[ing] us understand SWAPO’s position vis-à-vis the United Nations. Perhaps in relation to 432, which Mr. Steward said was regarded as a problem by the South African government. Mr. Amathila, will you be in the position to address this?

**AMATHILA:** Yes, my name is Ben Amathila. Thank you very much to the organizers for these facilities for us to come together. At least what comes to mind, now and then when I see myself in the situation, and on occasion when I meet my South African contacts from the former regime, I ask myself the question: why is it possible now to sit together and to talk together in a civilized way? What prevented us doing this before the whole thing ran out of control? It is just one of the questions that keep on in my mind. Yesterday I alluded to—when I saw General Geldenhuys with some of the generals on the SWAPO side who fought each other at Cuito Cuanavale. They were sitting together talking, recounting on the experiences about the war. They came out of those discussions very, very friendly to each other. Now, that is the question that possibly needs to be asked.
My contribution—before I attempt to answer the questions raised. Let me just go back into history. South-West Africa or Namibia was a German colony. In the First World War the Germans were routed by the South African forces under General Botha, Louis Botha, and then from there on South Africa established its own interest on South-West Africa or German South-West Africa. Their interest was to incorporate South-West Africa as the fifth province of South Africa. South Africa was made up of four provinces at that time. Now, this went to the extent that at a conference in Versailles in France where those victorious powers discussed what would be done with German war spoils, Britain and South Africa made heard their intentions of annexing South-West Africa, because South-West Africa was put in the category “C” mandate.9 Was it not the American politician, President Woodrow Wilson, who took a position to oppose annexation, and was very positive? That was Woodrow Wilson who stopped the process of straightaway annexation of South-West Africa, supported by the Danish government representative. This attempt did not really stop South Africa trying to establish, or to annex the territory of South-West Africa in the future.10

When the League of Nations came to an end with the commencement of the United Nations in 1945, one of the biggest problems on the mandate of SWA was that South Africa did not recognize the United Nations as the legal successor to the League of Nations. As far as they [were] concerned, their mandate over South-West Africa died with the League of Nations; therefore they could go ahead and treat South-West Africa as they wished. That is a position which led to various court interpretations by the World Court.11

9. Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, colonized territories belonging to the powers that were defeated in the First World War—the German and Ottoman Empires—were categorized by the victorious Allied Powers into three “classes” according to “the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.” Class A mandates—territories of the former Ottoman Empire—were considered sufficiently advanced to warrant near-independence and self-determination; Class B mandates—former German territories in West and Central Africa—were allowed some degree of freedom but placed under administration of a member of the League of Nations; and Class C mandates—South-West Africa and some South Pacific Islands—were to be “administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory.” South-West Africa (present-day Namibia) was deemed a Class C mandate territory and was placed fully under the administration of the Union of South Africa (present-day South Africa).

10. The Union of South Africa continued to administer South-West Africa. Although South-West Africa was not formally incorporated into South Africa, it was treated as a de facto “fifth province” of the Union. On 27 October 1966, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2145 (XXI), terminating the Mandate of South-West Africa and thereby abolishing South Africa’s right to administer the territory. At the same time, hostilities increased between SWAPO—considered the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia—and the sustained South African presence.

11. I.e., International Court of Justice.
The World Court was to give its opinion as to whether the United Nations was indeed the legal successor to the League of Nations or not. And I think, before 1960, the World Court confirmed that the United Nations was the successor to the League of Nations, and South Africa had the obligation to give all the reports on its administration of the territory of South-West Africa. It was only in 1960 that the only two countries who were members of the League of Nations—that is Ethiopia and Liberia—on behalf of the African states tried to seek a binding resolution against South Africa on the state of South-West Africa. The case took a little bit long. It took almost six years before 18 July 1966, when the World Court finally gave its verdict. But in the meantime, there was enough evidence to show the people of South-West Africa that the international community wanted to encourage an understanding in South Africa because of the South African mandate—because in terms of a mandate, South Africa was to lead, to develop, to help the people of South-West Africa to become independent. It was the mandate, but instead South Africa had their own objectives to the extent that, in 1963, I had the opportunity to meet a delegation from South Africa who came to South-West Africa at that time, led by Mr. de Wet Nel and MC Botha, with whom I had an opportunity to discuss this issue. South Africa wanted to cut the country into various portions in the implementation of a Bantustan, or Odendaals plan. That was a very critical point contrary to the anticipation of the people of South-West Africa to be led to independence. Instead, there was now the attempt to partition the country into a number of tribal homelands which some of us felt was not going to be viable economically to run. The closest that South Africa came to accepting an independence resolution, contrary to incorporation, was—and let me say when I talk of South Africa, I am talking about white South Africa, because the ANC already in 1931 pronounced itself against the incorporation of South-West Africa, according to JB Marks who was a very, very good friend of ours.

In 1956 a committee of the United Nations called the Goodwill Committee led by Sir Arden-Clarke came to South Africa to discuss the issue of SWA. South Africa came up

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12. Michel Daniel Christiaan de Wet Nel served as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and Bantu Education in South Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
13. Michiel Coenraad (MC) Botha succeeded de Wet Nel as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and Bantu Education in South Africa in the 1960s.
14. Charles Arden-Clarke served as governor of the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) from 1949 until 1957, when the colony achieved independence from Britain.
with the proposal that the territory of South-West Africa be cut into two halves: the northern half to be developed according to the UN mandate to become independent, and the southern part to be linked to South Africa. You see in all these attempts to solve the SWA issue, South Africa had its own design for the territory South-West Africa. South Africa was very, very important to the West. She was the most developed country in southern Africa at that time. The British influence was still very strong economically and the British crown was represented by a Governor-General, a certain Mr. Jansen, who was based in Cape Town as a representative for the Queen or the King. But it was only during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 that the significance and the strategic importance of South Africa was again enhanced. With the Suez Canal closed, all ships were going around South Africa, and it was tremendously important and significant to the importance of South Africa to guard the route around the Cape. And because [of] that South Africa obviously started developing and becoming more aware of their role as the bastion of Western civilization, as they used to call it at that time. In 1957 when Ghana or the Gold Coast became independent, and 1960 when Harold Macmillan came to talk to the people of South Africa in the parliament of South Africa, and the warning that the “winds of change” were blowing across the continent of Africa. And South Africa is to meet the challenge by changing itself. [But] the strategic, the southern strategy, the immediate strategy of SA was build[ing] a buffer which was based on the presence of Portuguese rule in Mozambique and Portuguese rule in Angola. Then you had in 1964 a collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Southern Rhodesia became part of that South African strategic belt which was supposed to prevent any conflict from being played in South African soil. When the Portuguese Empire started collapsing because of the pressure by the liberation movement, obviously the first reaction in South Africa was to do something very drastic in order to prevent both these territories from being used to fight in South Africa and Namibia.

This is just a very short synopsis on how South Africa came to Angola and their interest in organizing counterrevolutionary activities of RENAMO in Mozambique, and UNITA in Angola, because the defense line of South Africa had collapsed. South Africa certainly did not have the capacity to patrol the border from Mozambique to Angola on the Atlantic Ocean. That was simply not possible.

15. Ernest George Jansen served as Governor-General of the Union of South Africa from 1950 to 1959.
I would say that the decision by SWAPO to go to war was a very painful decision. It was a decision that was realized after all avenues of dialogue were actually closed, and as President Julius Nyerere\(^\text{16}\) used to say, we would not be expected to fight with bow and arrows against a well-armed South Africa. South Africa was a powerful nation and it was the most industrialized nation on the African continent. There was no question about the strength of South Africa and you could not expect anyone to fight the war against South Africa with bows and arrows. Although a colleague of mine, in 1966 when the South African police or army came to attack Ongulumbashe in northern Namibia—he as a last resort took his bow and arrow and shot at the helicopter there, but that was not a practical sort of solution. So we went to those who were prepared and ready to give us the necessary weapons, and there was nobody else but the Soviet Union at the time who came up on our request to our assistance, to give us the necessary weapons to fight this liberation war. The details about this will vary from time to time. South Africa thought she had all the time at her disposal to design the solutions they wanted. SWAPO’s strength had increased, as had its position through the international organization of the United Nations. South Africa tried to create a local entity by splitting the people of South-West Africa into a home-based group which would be amenable to the solutions that South Africa put on the table. And all these solutions that South Africa provided to the entity were excluding SWAPO, and the SWAPO leadership, most of whom were based outside the country. And that is one of the reason why most of the attempts they made to have a permanent solution based on establishing a local entity would not work.

I would not be able to give answers to all the specific questions raised, but let me just say that in 1976 I became the Secretary for Economic Affairs of SWAPO. My responsibility was to prepare SWAPO for the post-independence period. During the late 1950s and 1960s we were just fighting a war to liberate our country. There was no vision as to what would happen next. I saw a documentary on General Zapata\(^\text{17}\) and the Mexico revolution.

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\(^{16}\) Julius Nyerere was the founder of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the leading political party in the Tanzanian campaign for independence from British rule. Nyerere became the first Prime Minister of Tanganyika in 1962. In 1964 mainland Tanganyika merged with the archipelago of Zanzibar to become present-day Tanzania, of which Nyerere was President until 1985.

\(^{17}\) Emiliano Zapata was a key figure in the Mexican Revolution against the government of Porfirio Díaz. Leader of the Liberation Army of the South (Spanish: Ejército Libertador del Sur), Zapata and his followers—Zapatistas—were decisive in replacing Díaz with Francisco Madero, a politician who claimed to share Zapata’s passion for implementing land reform in Mexico.
The title was “After the liberation what ‘what?’” The event unfolding in the documentary
struck me as very interesting. That we were fighting a war and we didn’t have any prepara-
tion to run the country after independence. So, in 1969 to 1970 in the town of Tanga
in Tanzania, we had a conference which resulted in the resolution that military warfare,
diplomatic and political mobilization was not contradictory. We needed to involve and
prepare our people for the future role they were going to play in 1976 of preparing the
economic part of the struggle after independence. And that’s a long story. But the most
important thing in our struggle was the resolution to isolate South Africa at all levels and
at the international level: economic, sports, diplomatic, United Nations, etc. We mobil-
ized everybody in order to make South Africa feel bad because that was our strength. It
was only after the Tanga Congress in Tanzania that we approached seriously the Soviet
Union to provide us with the military hardware, and the Nordic countries came in with
the supply of support in the education field and also food and material support, which
grew from time to time.

Mr. Chairperson, the question is, what was it that South Africa was afraid of in SWAPO?
What was done to change that after independence? After independence SWAPO did not
provide any bases to the ANC to launch war from Namibia. SWAPO was not a commu-
nist party. We were a liberation movement and ideologically we tried to develop socialistic
principles, but we were not a communist movement at all. South Africa tried to distort
our aims and objective. And let me just, as an anecdote, tell you, in 1961, I was working
for one of the fishing factories. I did not understand all this ideological terms of “reds.”
There was a ship, a fishing boat in the port of Walvis Bay and the papers started talking
about “reds in the port.” And I wanted to see these red people. I went to the port to see
how red people actually look like, and I lifted my head to try and see over the others where
the red people are. I couldn’t see any red people, but all of a sudden somebody tugged me
on my shirt and said to follow him. It was a policeman from the South African Railways
and Harbors at that time. Now, I was confronted with one question: what was I doing at
the port? I said, I just wanted to see the red people. He said, “But why are you wearing a
red cardigan?” I suggested it was cold when I left home. I was blamed that this was just a
sign to make contact with the “red” people in the port. So, that caused me to suffer quite
a lot of beating, attention.

So, SWAPO was a communist party to South Africa who tried to make us look bad
and the West also tried to make us look bad. Now, as a representative of SWAPO in the
Nordic countries, most of them being politically neutral, such as Sweden, we used that opportunity to show to the world that we were not communist. We were a liberation movement and our liberation movement was representative of all the people [of] South-West Africa. The churches and all these other people supported us. As a matter of fact, we had the discussions at the congress in Tanga. We decided we had to mobilize each and every one, whether they agreed with us, in order to assist in our struggle. So, let me just stop here for a while because I think I have talked a little long. But I will be able to come to the nitty-gritty of the specifics later. Thank you.

**DEDERING**: Thank you very much, Mr. Amathila. Before we continue, I just want to say I would like to welcome Mr. Botha back to the panel. Thank you very much for being able to join us again today and I just want to fill you in very briefly. We’re discussing the big questions around Namibian independence: Resolution 435; the implications from the South African perspective of the Cuban advance—and of course you have already made some interesting comments on it yesterday, the whole question about linkage; and also the role of the UN, especially during the moment of crisis in April 1989. All this, of course, against the whole background of the transformation of the relations between the superpowers. And I’m sure you will be able to make some important contributions to this debate. But before I ask you to do so, I was quite intrigued by Mr. Amathila’s comments on how important perceptions of “the enemy” were and are, and I was wondering whether General Geldenhuys could perhaps give us some inside information about how the enemy was seen from within military headquarters. What was the view of the military professionals?

**GELDENHUYYS**: Ok, Mr. Chairman, that’s a bit sudden on me, because if there is something you want to know about politics—national politics about Namibia—I’m certain Mr. Pik Botha will know. As a matter of fact, the military found themselves in a very, very, very difficult position, but I can give you an account of how I experienced the war. But I must tell you, I find it very difficult, I’m the only military man around here, and if you don’t know the military council then I’m afraid you won’t understand me. And it is quite true, as Mr. Amathila said, soldiers on opposing sides are not hateful of one another at all. And if you will please forgive me, it’s perhaps not the right time or the right place, to illustrate this, I am going to talk about [the Anglo Boer War]. In 1901, before the peace was signed after
the Anglo-Boer War, the burghers, the soldiers of General Manie Maritz\(^\text{18}\) insisted that he, the General, arrange with the opposing side commander, Major Edwards of the English, the time and date for a ceasefire, so that they could play a game of rugby. The Boers and the English. Now, remember—and I don’t want to tell you the whole sad story again—the concentration camps, how many people got killed, how many farms were burnt down. And in spite of all that, the opposing side played a game of rugby, and you know, I got this information from the man who was known as the “Mr. Rugby” man, Danie Craven,\(^\text{19}\) and he gave me the manuscript of the letter that the General wrote to Major Edwards. So I said to him, “But did the game take place?” He said no, that he couldn’t find. The other day, a few weeks ago, I was at a book signing session in Brits, and all of a sudden I saw Manie Maritz, the General’s son, in the audience. Can you imagine? He must have been deep in his eighties or early nineties. Yes, I cut it short. What I’m trying to say is, it is true what Mr. Amathila said. Amongst the fighters you don’t find problems. It’s amongst the politicians.

Now, let me tell you about how a soldier… in what position a soldier finds himself in command. I was in command of all the forces, South African and Namibian outside and at the time. Also at that time there was an election that was not a nationally acclaimed election, which SWAPO preferred not to participate in, and we served from that time onwards under a black majority government. That is the position in which we found ourselves. And then in Pretoria, we had the white government. So, can you imagine in what position you find yourselves in, and the change that took place with Resolution 435 and all that came from it was emotionally something that went quite deep. The National Party of South-West Africa split into two and amongst the soldiers we had right-wing and left-wing soldiers. And all of a sudden with the South-West Africa artillery force that I created, we had black soldiers for the first time in the Defense Force, and they walked around the streets of Windhoek with their weapons when they had to put up a show at the Windhoek Show,\(^\text{20}\) which was the big thing of the year in that area. But there are some things that people like you—by that I mean non-military people—perhaps won’t think about. And at that time, unlike in South Africa, the political parties were not banned. We had to

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18. Manie Maritz was a Boer general in the Second Boer War, known among South Africans as the Anglo-Boer War.
19. Danie Craven, nicknamed “Mr. Rugby,” was a famous South African rugby player and coach.
20. The Windhoek Industrial and Agricultural Show, also known as the Windhoek Show, is an annual trade fair that takes place in Windhoek, the capital of Namibia.
fight that war when SWAPO had a meeting of a few thousand people in Katutura, and a few miles away further north we were busy with a fight. Let me tell you further how I experienced this, then, to get something from the Boer culture I am talking about, which I suppose is a little bit too much now. I was driving down Kaiser Street, the main street in Windhoek. On a very big building, white wall, was painted the words: VORSTER, GELDENHUYS AND [Unintelligible] ARE BUYING THE WHITES OUT. Now, many of the troops, a very large percentage, were part time troops and the political party had split and there’s derision. And you know what? We managed to do our job through all these problems. I don’t know if it could have happened anywhere else but in South Africa and Namibia. But I come back later, I [have] spoken too much, I realize that, so there’s other things what we discussed here, linked up with some of the other points that were mentioned that I will come back to.

Dедеринг: Thank you, General. I think that gives us very interesting ideas about attitudes and perspectives from military circles and I think we should perhaps now focus our discussion on some of these strategic and political issues which have been originally raised by Professor Saunders. Perhaps some comment on 435 for example, or on the relation between South Africa and the United Nations. Mr. Botha, perhaps?

Ботха: Yes, can you all hear me? May I say that in the archives in the International Court of Justice, you have roughly four to five thousand pages with more than ten thousand source references. The whole history of South-West Africa was dealt with; it is part of the Court record. The facts presented by South Africa when Ethiopia and Liberia made their case against us were categorically admitted by Ethiopia and Liberia. Unfortunately it is not realized that the applicant states in Court, it is on record, admitted all the facts submitted by South Africa. That’s when they changed their case from one of oppression policies to a norm or standard of non-discrimination. Originally in the briefings they made a case based on the oppressive policies of apartheid in the various disciplines and then, during the oral proceedings in 1965, they changed their case to say that they admit all the

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21. Katutura is a township of Windhoek that was established following the implementation of apartheid in the 1950s. Black Namibians were removed from the “Old Location”—the segment of Windhoek designated for blacks since 1912—and forced to resettle in Katutura. The police violently quelled the ensuing protests.
facts presented by South Africa, but they now rely on a norm as standard in international law that prohibits the allocation of rights, duties and privileges, benefits on the basis of membership in a class or race. Then that became their case, but I just want to save us time. All this is recorded and there are plenty [of] books about the case. Maybe you should just allow me to highlight one or two aspects.

The mandate—granted on the 17 December 1920, Article 2 is the important one: “The mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require. The mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present mandate.” This is a very important article. It was not considered at that time that C mandates would ever become independent. It only later became a possibility. On 18 July 1966, the International Court of Justice, after proceedings lasting six years, gave judgment rejecting all the claims of Ethiopia and Liberia, without deciding whether the mandate was still in existence. The Court held that even if it was, Ethiopia and Liberia had no legal right or interest to question the mandatory’s performance of those obligations which their complaints related. A crucial judgment. That was on the day of Dr. Verwoerd’s last public address before he was assassinated early in September, and he warned South Africa not to crow over, to boast about this judgment, but to dedicate us anew to the mandate obligation to promoting to the utmost the material and moral well-being of the inhabitants. Mr. Chairperson, friends, I want to say today to you that Namibia became independent with by far the best infrastructure on the African continent. We invited the International Court of Justice to come and do an inspection *in loco*. Dr. Verwoerd instructed the legal team—and unfortunately I was a member of the legal team—to go on an inspection visit to Namibia. We started off at Katima Malilo in the Caprivi, the Kavango and Ovamboland. Then southwards we moved to the area where the Bushmen were living, and eventually landed in Windhoek. And we went back to Dr. Verwoerd and said to him, “Prime Minister, with respect, you cannot invite the Court on an inspection visit.” He wanted to know why. We said: “Because you might lose your case. There is little development, very little in the North.” It took us, the legal team, from Tsumeb to Ondangwa in the Ovamboland, eight and a half hours. And now after we build the roads, I think it takes you one and a half hours. In Ondangwa was nothing,
maybe initially a church; in Kavango virtually nothing, only the Native Commissioners. And the Native Commissioner was the magistrate, the judge, the chief administrator, the person who collected taxes and imposed fines. And I think he was also the prison warden. All included in one major concept named the Native Commissioner. They were ruling in Caprivi, Okavango, Ovambo. All this had to change. And we made this clear to the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd. And then he appointed a commission which was called the Odendaal Commission. Odendaal was the Administrator of the Transvaal at the time. He submitted a report on the development and we spend £50 million in 18 months on colleges, roads, rooms, renovations, upgrading, hospitals, and clinics, from Ovambo, Cavango, right through including £385 million on the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme, and a channel which will bring water from Ruacana right through Ovambo to Ondangwa. This changed the whole scene. Windhoek today—just for the information to all our friends, particularly our Russian friends—Windhoek is the cleanest city in Africa and, I think, in the world. It’s a pleasure to visit Windhoek. Mr. Chairperson, another important thing I must add here today is that we of course engaged in lengthy discussions on Cuito Cuanavale, on the Lomba River battles, but what matters is what was eventually achieved. I want to make one thing very clear. By the end of 1987, there were from the side of the Angolan government feelers, we call it, put out to us to our representatives in New York and elsewhere on how to proceed to implementing Resolution 435. Because without that, there was no prospect of independence for Namibia.

I personally believe for quite a while during those years that unless we could stop the war in Angola, it would be exceedingly difficult to release Mr. Mandela and other political prisoners here. So, Foreign Affairs—the Department of Foreign Affairs, speaking our culture—was to get Mr. Mandela out of prison because the whole world was demanding his release, and we in Foreign Affairs could clearly see how this was going to affect us every month, more critically and to our disadvantage, and in the end leading to more sanctions against South Africa. So it was of great importance to us. Indeed, I drafted a section for PW Botha for his speech in Durban in August 1985, which would have included an announcement implying Mr. Mandela’s release, negotiations with the leaders of the black people, release of political prisoners, removal of all racial discrimination, and then I said, “Today we’ve crossed the Rubicon.” Unfortunately Mr. Botha retained that one sentence, “We’ve crossed the Rubicon,” but watered down the rest of the speech. It was really a great setback for me personally, and for us in the Department of Foreign Affairs. But,
Interestingly, by September of that year, 1985, I gave a briefing to the media in which I said that we, the National Party, had done a lot of wrong, it would have to change and we would have to follow a new route. And that was accepted. And then I went a further step in February 1986 to say yes, the country would have a black president, and I nearly lost my job, but I did survive. Just to complete the record.

Be that as it may, back to Namibia, because these events are interrelated—that the events in South Africa and the events all over southern Africa are interrelated. And this is what a good historian will have to try to do, namely to link events. It was extremely important therefore to get the war ended in Angola. I had no doubt that with SWAPO and ANC camps in Angola, if you would have released Mr. Mandela, then the police might have to arrest him again. And then we would have been in more severe trouble internationally and get more severe criticism. So, it was of extreme importance for us in Foreign Affairs to get that war to end. Quite apart from the fact that wherever South African prisoners were taken, with respect to General Geldenhuys and the Department of Defense, it was Foreign Affairs that would have to do the release of the prisoners. After the first incursion I was loaded with those 7 young men that were taken prisoner; I was loaded with Wynand du Toit eventually, to get him out after he and a few reconnaissance troops ventured into Cabinda on a failed military mission without our knowledge whatsoever. Foreign Affairs had to—as we say in Afrikaans—take the hot coals out of the fire, every time. I remember the case of those seven young men after our first invasion in 1975. It cost us, as I remember, R5 million in cash, which I gave to the Committee of the International Red Cross, who assisted us to hand over to the Angolan government.

So, we want the war to end. That is why when Reagan came to power in the beginning of 1981, Chester Crocker and I had many meetings. But I’m going to take hours, if not days of your time, if I must go with you through all the various steps and meetings, so for your record and to enable you to do your task, I will just mention the main events. After years of discussion, Dr. Chester Crocker and I met in March 1988. As far as I’m concerned, Cuito Cuanavale was never a point. We prevented the major thrust against UNITA. It was clear the Cubans wanted to assist Angola to destroy UNITA in good

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22. Wynand du Toit was a major in the South African Defence Force. He was captured by Angolan forces in 1985 and remained a prisoner of war for two years until his release. For more information see Appendix B.
time, because they knew we might be moving to an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal, and once that took place, Namibian independence and then if UNITA remained a strong force, it might defeat FAPLA and the MPLA. So, that is why with respect also to our ex-Soviet experts—you can just ask General Geldenhuys—but in the Lomba River battles at the end of 1987, 4,785 FAPLA and Cubans died; 31 South Africans. I repeat 4,785 against 31. Tanks destroyed on their part: 94; ours, 3. MiG combat aircraft on their part: 9 shot down; on our side, 1 Mirage. Armed troop vehicles on their side: 100 destroyed; on our side, 5. I am not going to argue with you. These are the figures. You decide what these figures mean. I want to take you back to my discussions with Crocker. I asked Chester Crocker at our meeting in Geneva in March—this is now 1988—how we should proceed. He said to me, “Pik, you must remember Reagan’s term ends the end of this year, and we wouldn’t know who would succeed.” (There was a gentleman at that time called [Michael] Dukakis who was going to run as presidential candidate for the Democratic Party against Bush, the recent George Bush’s father, but how could you know who will win?) So, Chester Crocker warned me and said, “Pik, if we want to move, we better move fast.” I then said to him, “Look, Dr. Crocker, it looks to me if the Soviet Union is withdrawing from Afghanistan, if that is true, they would only withdraw if they were badly hurt there, and that would psychologically change their mind, and their appetite, their enthusiasm to carry on in Angola would be diminished. And that would help me to get decisions from my government to move faster on the implementation of Resolution 435.” Then Chester Crocker said, “Pik, we don’t know for sure now.” Their experts were evaluating the import of the Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan, but he said to me, “Let’s go full steam ahead and if by October”—this is now March—“if by October we see that the Russians are not going to go out, then we can always bring down the sluices. But we’ll waste time unless we now do not move full speed ahead.”

And that’s how it came about. First meeting in London—in May, which was also the first time that Angola, South Africa, and Cuba met with the Soviet and American observers. On the Soviet side, I think it was Adamishin, the Deputy Minister, and of course on the American side Chester Crocker. 3–4 May 1988 was the first meeting. This was followed by, in my opinion, one of the most important meetings of the whole lot, and that was in Cairo. In Cairo on 24–25 June 1988. There we agreed to a set of principles which became indispensable to the eventual comprehensive settlement. And what happened there at the opening ceremony in the hotel where we met was amusing. Mr. Jorge
Risquet—a hefty man with a big beard, but a very friendly guy, a Cuban—made a scathing attack on South Africa. He was very severe on our policies of apartheid. He said you are colonialist, imperialist, you are just following the capitalists. It was just one thunderous statement of aggression against us. In the end, it was my turn to address the meeting. I said, “Look, I thought we came here to negotiate a settlement on Namibia and Cuban troop withdrawal, but now it seems to me we are attacking each other’s countries’ internal affairs.” And then I suggested that we get the organization in the United Nations on human rights to investigate Cuba’s internal affairs, Angola internal affairs, and South Africa’s: freedom of the press, freedom of movement, freedom of association—all those fundamental human rights, property rights, of course, the independence of the judiciary, etc. I said, “Let’s ask this body to investigate South Africa, Cuba, and Angola.” They did not display any interest. And I proposed an adjournment. During the adjournment, we were in the pub at that hotel—a very pleasant hotel, I must say—and we were all having a drink. Risquet was also in the pub. He walked over to me with a glass of whiskey in his hand. I had one too. He said to me, “Look, Mr. Minister, I just want to say we are going to increase our troops by 15,000, 15,000.” I said, “Well, I would ask our military to increase our troops by another thousand.” And then he lost his temper because he thought I was insulting him by saying one thousand South African troops would be more than enough for the 15,000 Cuban troops. Which was not my idea, because that was the proportion already applicable. Cuba had 50,000 or more troops and we never had more than 3,000. Never, at any given moment, unless General Geldenhuys has different figures. But that was the position. But then I calmed him down, and I said to him, “Look, I have not tried to insult you. What I don’t understand about you people is your inability to grasp that we could both be winners.” And that shook him and he said, “What do you mean? Are you joking?” I said, “No, I’m not joking, we could both be winners.” And then he said to me, “Let’s have another drink.” So, we poured each other another whiskey and then he said, “Explain.” And I said, “Look, Mr. Risquet, I’ve studied your history, and I have come to the conclusion, respectfully, what your leader Fidel Castro requires is for you to be able to withdraw from Angola with honor. There’s no way he is going to allow you to withdraw unless you can claim something monumental.” And he said, “Yes, you are quite right.” And I said, “Well, if I undertake to convince the South African cabinet and the parties inside Namibia to implement Security Council Resolution 435, Castro can claim that he made a contribution towards the achievement of the independence of Namibia, and I can...
tell the white voters of South Africa that I got rid of the Cubans. Both winners.” And he said to me he must discuss this with his colleagues. A few hours later we had an informal meeting in the garden of the hotel, and then we decided we would adjourn and meet again in about three hours after I suggested that each side draw up 10 points of steps required to reach a solution. You know, not eight points, not 12 points. It’s funny how this figure 10 is so potent and can make a difference. December is called the 10th month, although it is the 12th month. What a miracle figure that 10 is. I said, “Let each side go and put down 10 points in writing which we now think are essential steps to achieve a full, comprehensive settlement.”

We adjourned for three, four hours and came back again. And, do you know, that on five of the 10 points both sides put on paper, we were in agreement. Here we’ve been battling, swearing and screaming and yelling for almost eight years. Here we adjourned and within three hours, both sides agreed on five important points connected with a comprehensive settlement required for implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 and Cuban troop and South African troop withdrawal. From there on—I’ll be quick—after Cairo, a meeting in New York. Oh yes, my Angolan friends must not take this amiss. It was a very strange phenomenon. I insisted consistently that our meetings must be held in Africa. The Cubans and the Angolans insisted always on either America or Europe. I hope that the researchers on your side will one day tell us why this is the case. I couldn’t. But New York was the next venue, 13 July 1988. There for the first time, the linkage between implementation of Resolution 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal was acknowledged. Geneva, 2–5 August 1988. Then Brazzaville. Three important meetings at Brazzaville: 24–27 August; 6–9 September; 26–28 September. Again back to New York, 6–8 October; Geneva, 11–13 October; again back to New York, 20–24 November; Brazzaville again, 1–3 December; and Brazzaville again, 13 December, when the date was set for signing of the comprehensive trilateral agreements and bilateral agreements between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa on 22 December 1988. Maybe one fact that I should mention here is it was our custom that when we go on important missions of this nature, I would send half my staff a day before I went, and then just take myself, my private secretary, and one or two assistants with me on the plane. And the first part of my delegation would already be in New York for the signing of this agreement where I headed too. The day before we left I asked my private secretary to rebook us from that Pan Am flight that eventually crashed over Lockerbie. We would have gone to Frankfurt to board that plane, and I said, “It’s
too much nuisance. Let’s go directly via London and take a flight from there.” At first we couldn’t get seats, then I phoned our ambassador and said to him, “You’d better get seats.” And he got seats on Pan Am 101, and so we moved from that flight (Pan Am 103) and in this way escaped being destroyed in the Lockerbie air disaster.

**DEDERING**: Mr. Botha, I hate to interrupt you but we need to give some other people who would like to make contributions. I’m sorry to do it, but I’m afraid we’re just running out of time if we don’t give other people the chance. If you wish to quickly wrap up your contribution and make perhaps one final point.

**BOTH A**: Yes, I am on the point of concluding. After then there was the independence of Namibia, there was the SWAPO incursion on 1 April across the border, and I met with Cuba and Angola at Mount Etjo in Namibia. We issued a joint statement in which we agreed. SWAPO also agreed to withdraw to the 16th degree of latitude back into Angola and the elections continued and independence was achieved in 1990. It was a fantastic day. I was there. President de Klerk was there. To our gratitude, we received tremendous applauds from Namibians, not merely from the whites. By far the majority were black people. It was a wonderful day and I want to congratulate the government of Namibia. I think in Africa they are one of the stable governments and they’re doing well. Namibia can say to the other Africa brothers, “Come and look at Windhoek if you want to see how a city should be run.”

**DEDERING**: Thank you very much, Mr. Botha. I know that Ambassador Urnov wanted to say something and Ambassador Villa. Please, it’s over to you.

**URNOV**: I would like to congratulate Professor Saunders on a rather interesting paper he presented. I share most of the ideas expressed in it, but I would like to comment on some points raised in the paper alongside the matters raised in the course of this discussion of ours. The first question: how important were diamonds in Namibia for the Soviet Union’s policy? Well, everybody knows that diamonds are forever. Nevertheless, the economic factors were never important in our foreign policy when it concerned the liberation movements. And with the newly liberated countries, our economic collaboration was more of an aid. We didn’t get much of a profit, if any, out of this collaboration. So, definitely the diamonds were not the primary interest.
There were political interests, and yesterday we discussed the matters of the Cold War and of global confrontation and the impact of this confrontation on what was happening in the south of Africa. But in this particular case, I would like to say that we shouldn’t underestimate the moral, the philosophical approach on the part of the Soviet Union to this matter. To a certain extent Marxism is not only a theory, it’s a faith, and you are not just supposed to sympathize, you sincerely sympathize with the oppressed people, you want to help them, and that’s what you are doing—of course, alongside with all the things which can be said, and were said yesterday, about the political interest.

There is a matter of interdependence of [the] Namibia/South Africa future and I believe that our provocateur, Professor Saunders, puts it mildly when he says that the extraction of Namibia from South African occupation, I quote, “seemed to be likely to be linked directly to the future of South Africa itself….” I think that is a very mild formulation. Not “seemed to be likely,” but was definitely and directly linked.

Now I once again agree with my neighbor on the right, that SWAPO was not a communist party. Definitely. And again, just like yesterday during our discussion on Rhodesia, I would like to emphasize that the fear of the majority rule was much stronger than that of the communist rule. On the other hand, Namibia was much closer to the heart of South Africa than Zimbabwe. And in this respect, I would venture to say that the decision of the problem of power in Namibia could not be taken in isolation from the decision of what had to be done in South Africa itself. It had to follow on the same pattern. Our colleagues from South Africa, when they spoke about internal settlement and the formation of Bantustans, actually confirmed this thesis.

One more thing. I fully understand the words of Ambassador Steward when he said that the Boers were afraid of being subjected to oppression, like the one they experienced at the time of [the] Anglo-Boer War. But one thing is to be afraid and another is what you are doing. Mr. Pik Botha was quite eloquent when he characterized the nature of apartheid regime. Self-determination is all right, but when the minority gets 87% of the territory and the majority is left with 13%, well, this is a peculiar self-determination. In the report it is said that [the] South African government agreed to scupper the Turnhalle process and accept the United Nations intervention. I think that “scupper” is not the best word. After the resolution was passed, it took many, many years for it to be implemented and South Africa did stick to the internal settlement, for many years. I would like to draw your attention to two factors which—as it is said in the paper—“reinforced the reluctance.
of the South African government to go ahead with the United Nations plan.” One was the elections in Zimbabwe. And I believe that the victory of ZANU was a very bad message for South Africa. It must have realized that the implementation of Resolution 435 didn’t augur anything good for the government of South Africa or the Turnhalle alliance.

And the second factor—it was mentioned but I suppose it has to be stressed: the election of Ronald Reagan, the United States President. Actually Reagan shared the views of South Africa. He didn’t want SWAPO to win. And hence the South African government and the American government began to cooperate much closer and acted in concert. And with all the understandable aspects emphasized by our South African colleagues, the linkage at that time was first of all a stalling device. And it was something which had nothing to do, legally, with Resolution 435. Resolution 435 spoke of the withdrawal of South African troops but nothing was said there of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. And if one remembers the 4 February 1982 statement of Angola and Cuba: they declared that they are ready to consider the withdrawal of Cuban troops, provided Resolution 435 was implemented and South African troops withdrawn from Namibia, because the withdrawal also meant lessening of the military threat to independent Angola. I believe it was quite a flexible decision.

On SWAPO bases in the north: I would appreciate if our provocateur clarifies some of the provisions of the agreement concerning these bases. As for the April 1989 crisis, definitely SWAPO actions were not irreproachable. Definitely they failed to assess the possible consequences of their move, but I don’t think anybody will argue that it certainly was not a deliberate offense. No orders to open hostilities against South African troops were given to the soldiers. My belief is that under the circumstances the South African overreaction cannot be justified. As President Dos Santos said at that time, it was imbalanced and inflexible and South Africa was at least as guilty for what happened—the bloodshed and killing of more than 300 people.

And as for the alternative for now-Nobel laureate, Mr. Ahtisaari: did he have any other alternative than to permit South African forces to attack SWAPO guerrillas? Of course he had. He shouldn’t have permitted South Africa to attack; he should have tried to clarify the situation, to consult with all the parties concerned. But he preferred a unilateral decision.

And the last point which I would like to make—it is raised in the paper: the U.S.-Soviet relations and the Namibian settlement. Was the winding down of the Cold War, after the advent of Gorbachev made possible [by] the Namibia and Angola settlement of
1988? Well, here is my view. Gorbachev’s policy in the Third World passed through two stages. In the first stage—and that is 1985–1988/9—the Soviet policy of active support to national liberation movements as well as that of the competition with the U.S. for the influence of the Third World was pursued. Then things began to change very, very seriously. You may have heard the name Anatoly Chernyaev, the closest assistant of Gorbachev and one of the authors of the “new thinking” theory. In his book—it was published in 2000—he openly says that in 1988, Gorbachev totally renounced his former outlook and his perception on world politics. And I think this is true. Among other things, this change of “skin” found expression in the loss of interest in the Third World. The West was no longer regarded as a rival, but rather as a legitimate patron of developing countries. The book says nothing of the fact that by that time the internal positions of Gorbachev were so weak that he could in no way challenge the policy or the positions of the West in the Third World. Gorbachev was even interested in the support of the West in his scramble with the opposition inside the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in Namibia, Soviet support of SWAPO continued. And the improvement of U.S. relations undoubtedly helped the signing of [the] December 1988 document. But the main reason behind [this], in my opinion, was not the new Soviet-American relations, but the inner realization by South Africa that the case was lost. So, one had to act in such a way as to make this transformation more orderly and less painful.

In South Africa, by the way, our support for ANC was drastically reduced. We’ll discuss South Africa later, but just one point to be made. It is quite clear that it didn’t prevent [the] ANC from winning the elections in 1994. That just proves that with all the importance of the outside, the main strength of the ANC grew out of support of the South African people. Thank you.

DEDERING: Thank you very much, Ambassador Urnov. Ambassador Villa.

VILLA: Thank you very much. Well, today we are discussing a very interesting case, the case of a country which had a very long road to freedom. It is the case of Namibia.

This case is also surrounded by what we can call the very vicious Western propaganda on the confusion between liberation movements [and] communism. This is also happening today, for instance—some confusion, if I can say so, between some liberation movements and terrorism.

On the case of Cuba, the situation—we are forced to look at the international conflicts in the period of adoption of Resolution 435. At that moment the Carter administration was in power, [and] there were some approaches to Cuba. For instance, it was the period when we opened interest sections in both countries. We started some kind of talks and interactions with the Americans. It was also the period where Cuba became the chair of NAM,24 and our international activism also was multiplied. In the area, the power of the South African neighbors was falling one after the other because of the struggle of the peoples of those countries; most of them had new governments as a result of those liberation movements. We believe that the Carter administration, particularly Andrew Young,25 took a decision to put on paper the willingness of the international community regarding the Namibian case. That was not a resolution drafted by any Third World country. It was a Western resolution. The main aspiration from the international community was contained in that document. Already Ambassador Urnov has stated that that resolution didn’t include a single word related to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. The linkage appeared exactly at the moment of the beginning of the administration of Ronald Reagan. And that was an effort to delay the independence of Namibia. Particularly SWAPO requested Cuban assistance on the negotiations conducted by the Group of Five, with SWAPO. So we assisted them, in the negotiation process.

On the case of our presence in Angola—that’s why I mentioned yesterday we cannot separate what was happening in Angola from what was happening about Namibia. During that period there were some different kinds of situations in the Angola war. There were some setbacks; there were some South Africa incursions in Angola. That implies that Cuba started a process of withdrawal, but at certain moments we were forced to just increase our

24. Established in 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a grouping of states that considers itself independent of major power blocs.

25. Andrew Young is an American political figure, diplomat, and civil rights activist. Serving under President Carter as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1977 to 1979, Young was engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, Namibia, and Angola.
presence in Angola. The declaration of Cuba and Angola in 1982 was a critical document that established the history of what happens about our presence in Angola. That included also a very painful passage related to Namibia: the Cassinga massacre, which has not been mentioned yet in this event. That was to justify—if we can say so—us not as humanitarians, and the critical assassination of people in those Namibian camps. Resolution 435 was quite important not only for Namibia, but for the preservation of the dignity, integrity, and sovereignty of Angola. South African troops should withdraw from Angola and that was even not mentioned by South Africa in the negotiations that started in the 1980s. That was only the insistence of the withdrawal of the Cuban troops. The [South African] withdrawal from Angola at a certain stage was never mentioned there; the withdrawal from Namibia was also compulsory just to find the final solution in this area.

On the case of the negotiations—at the very beginning Cuba was not invited. And in our particular case our history proved that in two critical moments for Cuba our opinions were not taken into account, and at this time, we decided that for the third time in history this should not happen. (The very first one was during the period of independence of Cuba where the negotiation of Cuba was agreed in the Paris Treaty of 1898 between the United States and Spain, and Cuba was not taken to that meeting. Also it happened after the Missile Crisis in 1962 where the former Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the solution of the crisis, but the opinion of Cuba was not taken into account.) In the case of Angola the reluctance of the United States at the very beginning was also present.

I know that usually in a war, and it is very well known, victory has a lot of fathers but usually defeat is orphaned. It is very well documented what happened in Cuito Cuanavale. Definitely it was a turning point on the situation of southern Africa. It is true Cuba made a very big effort; we mobilized a lot of soldiers and a lot of military equipment, and so on. Fortunately, as South Africa had very strong armed forces and it was widely and well known. That’s why probably they should use their very best troops than Cubans in the battle. They knew better than us the battle field. Both reality and history are on the table. The result of that series of battles of Cuito Cuanavale finished with the withdrawal of the South African troops. That’s why it was at that moment and not before, that [it] was possible to sit at a table and discuss among all the forces involved the final withdrawal of both the troops and the solution during the series of conferences and talks among all of the countries that were just mentioned. It is true the Cairo conference was quite important in this process. I will not elaborate on the whiskey exchange between Mr. Botha and
Mr. Risquet because I was not there. [Interjection and laughter.] I don’t know, but I was not present at that time. I read the piece of Risquet and, well, I acknowledge some of the bond that Mr. Botha already mentioned. But in real terms, I believe that at the end of the day, all the parties should show flexibility because without this flexibility today it will be impossible to sit and analyze in a peaceful manner this result. During the negotiations also the issue of the release of Mandela was included. And definitely that had not happened until 1990, even after the withdrawal of all the troops. In general terms, I would like just to emphasize that after 13 years in Angola, the main purpose of the Cuban troops was just to keep Angola free and sovereign as was requested by the Angolan side. Cuba did not have any material or economic interest in Angola. The only things we took from Angola were the bones of our fallen people, and we withdrew with our heads just looking to the sun. I thank you.

DEDERING: Thank you very much, Mr. Villa. Before we continue I would just like to say that the organizers have suggested that we extend this very fascinating discussion to a quarter past eleven because it’s now Professor Shubin’s turn. But I think we should open the floor for comments. We then have our break from 11:15 to 11:30 and we convene at 11:30 and lunch would then be at a quarter past one. So if it meets with your approval, I would like to ask Professor Shubin now to make his comments.

SHUBIN: I will be very short. Unfortunately time is running out. Just a few words. I don’t think we are in a position now to make a profound discussion on what some people call Lomba and some people call Cuito Cuanavale, but just a couple of observations. First, if you speak about losses and these figures are provided by one side, I don’t think they are reliable, especially if you count losses of your enemy. There should be a more profound estimation. This is point number one. Point number two, very often some people say that they never wanted to take Cuito Cuanavale, but if my memory serves me well, around 23 January, UNITA announced that they had taken Cuito Cuanavale. If they did not want to take it, why did they announce it? And once again, I’m not expecting answers. That should be discussed properly, preferably with documents. Some people say it’s not the right time; maybe we should leave it to another day.

The next point, you see I deliberately put those documents here, some pieces of memoirs of our officers who were at Cuito Cuanavale, but the truth is that there were no Soviet
troops around. You can read even in the books of serious academics—for example, Steve Chan, who is Dean at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London; he says that Soviets were flying MiGs around Cuito. This is wrong. What I’m really worried about is that people don’t give references. They don’t give reliable sources. Chan’s source was a diplomat in Lusaka. This is not serious; he’s a good scholar but it is not serious. So, my humble suggestion to my fellow historians here is let us dig deeper into this. Those legends, those myths going around from one person to another are becoming alive—more alive than life itself. And the last point, maybe. I also included here one piece translated into English from Ambassador Kasimirov’s memoirs and a small piece from Deputy Minister Adamishin’s memoirs. I am very sorry that the Adamishin memoirs are not translated into English because it’s kind of a rejoinder to Chester Crocker. (I was their editor.) And what he writes there is quite different from the famous Chester Crocker! Thank you.

**Dederin:** Thank you very much, Professor Shubin. I think we are left with about 20 minutes and I would like you to keep any further contribution short and focused because otherwise I’m afraid we will run out of time. It will really be a shame if we don’t give other people the chance now to comment. And I would like perhaps to ask the participants on the panel to hold back any further comments they might have now at this stage, because there might be a chance [to respond] to questions from the floor, perhaps bundling questions, and also to raise concerns which have come up during the last two hours. So, may I ask other participants to raise issues and questions. Sue, you look like you want to.

**Onslow:** Thank you very much indeed. I would be very interested to hear the panel interaction on the contribution on each because there are some different views that emerged here, with very different interpretations of what had happened. These are not necessarily contradictory, but it is as if they are parallel narratives, based upon misinformation, or misunderstanding. So, I would be very grateful to hear what the panel feels about the contribution of others.

**Magubane:** Thank you very much. What I thought what was missing in the discussion was an attempt by South Africa and its imperialist partners to integrate the whole region of South Africa economically. And one would have to go back to the troubles in the Congo, and the role that South Africa, you know, played, for instance in Shaba in
supporting the United States, and in supporting Tshombe. That was a very important lesson for South Africa because their argument was that the Congo was a very important political buffer and that, you know, the communist powers were banned from controlling the Congo, and that the best way of preserving the Congo and South Africa’s influence in southern Africa would be to create a government that is similar to the government of the Congo—one that is anti-OAU and that is favorably disposed to South Africa. Now, the building, for instance, of Cabora Basa and the dam that was already mentioned, Ramakoena, on the Kunene will become important. I mean, if you know American interest and imperialist interest are minimal in Angola, but it was quite obvious that Angola had enormous potential, economically and otherwise. There was oil, there were diamonds and wonderful agricultural land and therefore the Ramakoena dam here is going to be extremely critical. Now, the collapse of Portuguese imperialism in 1974 really upsets a lot of things but more importantly it upset[s] the assumption of the United States that the white minority regimes were stable in that and that policy in supporting them. And it is going to begin an active process of supporting them. Then of course 19 April 1974, you know, happen[ed]. Now, that not only exposed Namibia to greater infiltration by SWAPO, but it made the position of Rhodesia after the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland extremely precarious. If you just look at the map of southern Africa and the position of Rhodesia, it is like a rock that is perched on top of the Transvaal. But then of course the collapse opened the whole Rhodesian front to the infiltration by ZANU. Now, South Africa here did not have unlimited manpower resources. Indeed, it was at this time that South Africa began to think for itself by incorporating coloreds and Indians and others like Africans into its armed forces, but the importance—the economic importance—of the region and the investment by imperialism, you know, are critical in terms of introducing the Cold War into the entire region.

**DEDERING:** Thank you, Professor Magubane, for making some cogent questions. There might be a possibility to perhaps [address] some of these issues in the next session that deals more specifically with South Africa. But I would certainly like to ask the

26. Moïse Tshombe was a pro-Western, anti-communist Congolese politician in Katanga Province (formerly known as Shaba) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire). A founder of the CONAKAT political party, Tshombe oversaw Katanga’s secession from the Congo in 1960 and became president that year.
participants perhaps to try and integrate some of these questions into their comments and replies. I would just like Dr. Simpson because he raised his hand and I want to isolate him here. If you can make it very brief and perhaps feed your ideas into the ongoing discussion here on the panel.

**SIMPSON:** My question is, how did the South African military government go about accumulating the body counts? The first time that these figures in the 1987–1988 campaign were aired was in March 1988 and the total then was 41 white South Africans killed. Now, the day after, *The New York Times* released a statement saying that was not a cumulative figure because they were keeping a daily count that the South Africans released of their casualties and they counted 67, which was the day after the press conference. And, in a broader perspective, South Africa came back from the war claiming they lost 700. But now when we read from the websites keeping figures of this sort, we read they lost over 3,000, which is over 3 times the amount the Americans lost in Vietnam [sic]. One speculation to why this is the case is that various people have asked if there has been funny accounting with regards to people who were killed in the battlefield being counted as being lost to accidents and other injuries. So the question I always wanted to ask is how was this body count figure accumulated? And also with regards to the 1987–1988 campaign considering the battle formations used by South Africa. They used the UNITA troops in the front line. What was the UNITA body count? That was probably the most useful with regards to comparison. Thank you.

**DEDERING:** Thank you very much. I think there are some people on the panel who would like to respond. May I just ask you again please to be as concise as possible.

**GELDENHUYS:** With regards to the last question: most of the enemy losses, 90% or more, we got from radio intercepts. It is not what we think it was, the body count. It was through intercepts. About our losses: I came across a book yesterday saying that I lied about the number of aircraft that we lost. Can I give you the explanation for this? I know exactly where it happened, when it happened. It was in that area of the Lomba River, and our guys send up weather balloons to which they attached square tin aluminum boxes. These things would then be picked up by our enemy radar and then they shot them down. And I verified this—what I’m telling you now—with three persons who were involved.
I phoned them yesterday. The navigator, Ken Snowball; the pilot, Mossie Basson; the electronic warfare guy, Chris van Zyl. So then, after they shot these things down, they monitored the messages that were being sen[t] and that is how we picked up what they reported, which was wrong. In my book I give the real figures and that is absolutely correct.

About Cuito Cuanavale, and I will make it very brief. There was not a battle at Cuito Cuanavale. There was not. Period. A note on Wynand du Toit in passing, with all respect to my good friend Mr. Pik Botha. With the authority and knowledge of his Director-General, Neil van Heerden27 and another guy, Neels van Tonder, I went to France as a go-between to negotiate certain things with President Jacques Chirac. And we were in touch every day on the telephone with Mr. van Heerden. And after 2 or 3 days we got the green light and went back to Pretoria. And the Department of Foreign Affairs took it up from there.

Next one, about the Cuban advance. The London Browns Hotel [was] the first session in a series of negotiations. After the first opening I got a message that my counterpart, my Cuban counterpart, General Ochoa, asked if he could see me in private, confidentially. I didn't like that because we were here for normal diplomatic official discussion, but I can't say no, so I said yes. So we now are getting to the Cuban advance, so he said to me—and I'll make it brief—so that you know, “We've got a formidable force going down the western side of Angola towards Ovamboland in Namibia.” His message to me was, “Now you better do your job here during the negotiations so we can have peace. Otherwise you are going to get a hell of a hiding.” I cut the story short again. I said to him, “General”—actually I quoted Mr. Botha, but that will make the story long, but it is very good story—I said to him, “Listen, you. We knew about the advance that you are talking about. You know we were there for more than a decade. Do you think our intelligence would be so bad that at that time we wouldn't know if there was a Cuban force coming down?” In fact, that force included their emergency reserve, I forget what it is called, which they keep if Cuba itself is stranded. So we knew about it. So I said to him, “General, I can tell you now if you put one toe over that border, it will be the blackest day in Cuban history.”

So I said to him, “General, I can tell you now if you put one toe over that border, it will be the blackest day in Cuban history.”
through the channels, that the Cuban force came down there and he said—I cannot recall all the details at present—he said, “We were not really involved with the Cubans. So leave them be. But if they come across that border you give them all you got.” Now this thing has very recently grown a tail to it. P Cilliers, the author of *Human Affairs*, he came to me and he said, “You guys were very scared”—I nearly used the wrong word—“you were very scared when that menacing force of the Cubans came down.” I said, “No, no.” Goldfield went and he took out a paper from the archives, which was nothing more than a press conference, and I forgot about that completely. What happened was when I got back from London, I said to my staff, “Send me a brigade, a small brigade up into the north of Namibia,” because I thought to myself, you can’t threaten a guy and leave it to that. You got to do a make-believe so that the Cubans know that you have the ability to do what you say and that you are willing to do it. So, I thought, send the brigade. So, I forget about it. Later on I was told that Minister Malan said you just can’t call up a brigade because these are citizen force people; they’ve got wives and children, they got jobs. You must give somebody… So, I said to my press liaison officer, you tell them there are Cuban forces north of us and we are calling up the brigade. I forgot about that. It was really not for political purposes or peace that we did that. So, we were not scared.

The last one. Geneva. My colleagues and superiors here on my right will give you the time and date, but at Geneva before the talks started I asked if I could see Mr. Crocker. They said, “Yes, he will meet you at breakfast tomorrow.” It’s always breakfast, or lunch or drinks or something like that. Ok, so I said to Mr. Crocker, “I will cut it short. How long will it take the United Nations to have their United Nations military force in place from the word go?” He said, giving the United Nations the benefit of speed, make it three months. Now that was about 31 July of that year. So, August, September, October. So I said, “Okay, Mr. Crocker, what I want to say is briefly to propose 1 November for the implementation of Resolution 435.” He didn’t believe me so I repeated it to him and I said, “Of course.” He said, “Why are you doing that?” I said, “Listen, if you are in a strong position, that is when you can do things like this.” He said, “Okay.” So, I reported to Mr. Neil van Heerden; he phoned Mr. Pik Botha. Mr. Pik Botha phoned Mr. PW Botha. PW Botha said, “What does Magnus say?” So he [points to Mr. Pik Botha] phoned Magnus, the Minister of Defense. The Minister of Defense said, “Well who suggested that?” He said, “Geldenhuys.” So he said, “Well, if Geldenhuys suggested that, then I agree.” So he [points to Mr. Pik Botha] went all the way back and the next morning Mr. Neil van
Heerden went and addressed that conference and he said, “We propose 1 November for the implementation of Resolution 435.” And there was dead silence. And he said the next person who should have been around the table was Mr. Risquet, or his candidate, but that made the conference end. Thank you.

**DEDERING:** Thank you very much General. Who would like to…

**GELDENHUIS:** Oh, just one last thing about our losses. There is one thing I want to make clear, and that is for an author or reporter or a journalist to write a book on the war is one thing; if you were *in* a war and you write a book, is a completely different matter. Can you imagine that, for example, one thing that came up was that more of our aircraft were shot down than the figures that I gave? Now, can you think for one minute if such and such a pilot was shot down, and his widow heard that I hushed that up? I’d have to resign. I will lose confidence with my troops that I had. A commanding officer cannot afford to lie about these things. It’s absolutely out. So, when we say only so many aircraft it was only so many aircrafts. You can’t hide anything. And the same with the troops. What we didn’t do, you [points to Dr. Simpson] are right there, we didn’t report the UNITA losses. I think for obvious reasons. And second, it wasn’t our responsibility to do that. You know, they also claimed some sort of independence. So we didn’t show the losses. Have I answered all your questions about the losses? [Points to Dr. Simpson] Thank you.

**DEDERING:** Thank you very much, General. I’m actually not sure now who was first. Mr. Botha or Ambassador Urnov? Perhaps…

**URNOV:** I’m through.

**DEDERING:** Okay, thank you very much. Then Mr. Botha, you want to make a brief comment on this.

**BOTHAA:** Just for the record again. Here is a publication: *Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop withdrawal*. It’s a factual document with all the original letters sent to the United Nations. The agreements we reached with Cuba and Angola. We are talking here hours. All of this is in this one document and freely available. This is my one point for the
record. So we don’t argue anymore because here are the facts; here are the letters and the signatures. This is my one point. And secondly, there is a *South West Africa Survey*, here it is: 1967, containing all the facts, the history [shows book *South West African Survey 1967*] and everything that happened and which will contradict 90% of what I heard here this morning. So that brings me back just to one point of Professor Shubin. “Diamonds,” he said it again. Mr. Chairperson and friends, the government of Namibia’s income from tax on diamonds was a fraction: a fraction of the millions, the millions we had to spend. As a matter of fact, on more than one occasion, I told Mr. PW Botha, “For heaven’s sake, can’t we take this billion Rand per year that we spend of our taxpayers’ money in Namibia to build clinics and schools in South Africa?” So diamonds never played a role. It was unimportant. Namibia was a major financial drain of South Africa’s taxpayers’ money. Let me make that very clear. It never played a role whatsoever. In any case, foreign countries stole all the fish in the sea. So, Namibia also lost that as an income. That’s about all I have to say beyond just inviting the honorable members today, participants includ[ed], can’t we just also in the months ahead go back to the International Court of Justice, go back to the documentation of the UN, go back to documents and letters of origin that you know are available? Because otherwise I foresee that we may sit around conference tables like this for hours and hours and each just presenting his particular impression of an event while there are in fact documents that will tell you what the facts are. Thank you.

**DEDERING:** Thank you very much, Mr. Botha. I really do regret very much that I have to close, but we are already running late. May I suggest that people discuss further more questions over a cup of coffee now, and we must reconvene at 11:30 and to convene the panel on South Africa. I thank all the participants with this fascinating discussion and thank you very much to the other participants and all the others.

**SEE APPENDICES A, B AND C**

A. Addendum from Amathila

B. The Wynand du Toit Affair (Geldenhuys)

C. The Key to Peace in Angola and Namibia (Geldenhuys)
APPENDIX A

ADDENDUM FROM MR BEN AMATHILA

A question was raised in this panel on SWAPO being the authentic representative of the people of Namibia. SWAPO being the authentic representative of the people of Namibia came as a result of the termination of South Africa’s mandate over Namibia by the UN and her attempt to parade selected internal leaders outside Namibia as the true leaders of the people of Namibia. The South African power to do so has been terminated and replaced with the UN Council for Namibia. The coup d’état in 1974 in Portugal caught many by surprise, especially South Africa whose military strategy to maintain a military buffer between herself and independent black Africa was based on the Portuguese Government presence in Angola and Mozambique. The events of the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and her breaking from the British Commonwealth (in 1961) made South Africa obtain military and technological assistance to develop a capacity to protect the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope. So much that when a leftist coup in Portugal dawned upon Washington and the West, they had already established local capacity in South Africa to stem the tide. There was on their part no longer the need to send intervention forces to stop the USSR “expanding their influence” south. Through support for the SWAPO, ANC and MPLA to restore their right to self-determination. Unlike the events in the Belgian Congo in 1960 when a single statement by Patrice Lumumba at independence made Belgium and the USA eliminate him and to replace him with Joseph Mobutu, the situation in southern Africa was different in the sense that the liberation movements in southern Africa were well advanced and their struggle was well supported by popular support. All that the West was to do was to provide money, materiel, military and political support. In the case of Namibia, Britain, France, and the USA had to cast triple vetoes in support of South Africa several times. Satellite imagery and the turning of a blind eye to South Africa developing a nuclear bomb. Any direct intervention by the West in southern Africa would have made it difficult for most of the African states to keep quiet. The introduction or entry of the Cuban force in Angola in time, curtailed South Africa’s air dominance in southern Angola to back their infantry. This was true with the battle of Cuito Cuanavale when the SAAF could not at will enter
the area of battle. The attack on Cassinga by the South African units was more out of a political consideration meant to force SWAPO to back of the negotiation track. South Africa knew that Cassinga was not a military base.

The event of 1 April, 1989, just before UN Resolution 435 came into force, some of us had serious questions as to whether South Africa could keep to an international agreement. What if South Africa broke off all understanding with the UN after all SWAPO leaders had entered Namibia? Would SWAPO military already in the country have had the capacity to defend their leaders? When one came to hear about these special trained units entering Namibia one understood this to be a special precautionary measure in the event South Africa reneged on earlier agreements. South Africa had all this information on SWAPO movements, most of which seems to have been satellite information. The question is why did they not put this information to the UN with the demand that the UN act? To move out of their bases was exactly what some of us were afraid South Africa could do when the situation was in their favor.
APPENDIX B

ADDENDUM FROM GENERAL JANNIE GELDENHUYS:
THE WYNAND DU TOIT AFFAIR

A General’s Story—From an Era of War and Peace
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—A General’s Story is available worldwide in e-book format.

Chapter 14
The End of a Decade

… General Neels van Tonder of military intelligence came to see me one day. He wanted us to go to Paris. I did not like the idea and told him impatiently that he had to persuade me that the trip would be cost-effective. So he mentioned around a dozen things that we had to go and do. I was more stubborn than usual and told him that under such circumstances I was not prepared to go. If a person gives me too many reasons I become suspicious; if he had given me only one good reason, I would have been more agreeable. He was justifiably upset.

A few days later he was back at the office. This time he listed three things. The very first one persuaded me—the possibility that we could arrange the release of Major Wynand du Toit. He was captured during an operation in Cabinda and evacuated to Luanda as a prisoner of war. I immediately contacted my friend and colleague, Neil van Heerden, the Director General of Foreign Affairs. Would he have any objections if I concerned myself with the issue? He was naturally affable and even excited about the idea. “I will welcome any effort by anybody who has a chance to get him out. We must try everything.”

Sometime in July Neels van Tonder, Johann Sonnekus and I left for Paris. We wanted to persuade a major power, France, to play a role. France looked promising for a number of reasons. A Frenchman, Albertini, was being held in detention by the Ciskei. The French sought his release. The Premier, Jacques Chirac, and the presidential couple, especially
Mrs. Danielle Mitterrand, all for their own reasons, dearly wished to bring it about. An acquaintance, Mr. Olivier had access to the Chirac government. We could assist them in trying to secure Albertini’s freedom if they could arrange Wynand du Toit’s release.

However, there were two problems. First, Neil van Heerden was contemplating to persuade Pres Lennox Sebe of the Transkei to free Albertini in an effort to facilitate the acceptance of the accreditation of my namesake, Mr. Hennie Geldenhuys, as the new South African ambassador to France. This was the least of the two problems. The second problem reared its head during the evening when we went for dinner with Mr. Olivier at his apartment in the 16th arrondissement. He was compliant and enthusiastic when I explained the idea which offered them an opportunity to get Albertini out. His problem was, how could he approach the Angolans to set Wynand free? It would create the impression of blatant interference in their domestic affairs.

Fortunately for us there were favourable factors too. Pres. Jos, Eduardo dos Santos of Angola had planned to visit France towards the end of September 1987. So he would be keen to create a favourable climate for his visit. The government of the Netherlands also brought pressure to bear on Luanda as the release of Wynand du Toit could mean the release of their Klaas de Jonge being detained in South Africa. This was a current point of discussion between our Department of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch administration.

I asked Olivier if he could not present the case along these lines: He did not want to interfere in Angola’s domestic affairs, the subject of discussion was a French concern. The detention of Albertini was a matter of great importance to the French. He should not be taken amiss if he explored all avenues to get Albertini back. South Africa is of no concern to him, but if the release of Du Toit could assist him to solve French problems, he had to try all options. From his point of view Albertini was all that mattered and he would appreciate Angola’s assistance. I got the impression that he found my approach to be quite reasonable. We enjoyed the dinner.

That is how it goes. With a few exceptions, if you want to talk business, you arrange a meal. The follow-up meeting the next day took place over breakfast, also at Olivier’s apartment. Between the previous night’s dinner and this breakfast I had phoned Neil van Heerden from my hotel room and reported to him. I asked him if he could mark the time with his negotiations about the release of Albertini to give me the chance to fully exploit the possibilities of a reciprocating action by the French government. He agreed. So, I
could confirm to Olivier that South Africa would undertake to go all out to have Albertini freed if they would do the same in respect of Du Toit.

On a happy Friday, two days later, I could tell Gen. van Tonder to categorically inform Mr. Roussin, the Chef de Cabinet of Chirac, that Albertini could be set free—if Du Toit could be released.

But it would take a long time and many discussions before this story came to an end. In the meantime we went back to Pretoria. And to war.

Chapter 15
Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent

... Two years after Maj. Wynand du Toit was captured in Cabinda, he was set free at Maputo on 7 September 1987. He was exchanged for 133 Angolan soldiers released by Savimbi and two Dutchmen charged with terrorism, Klaas de Jonge and Helena Pastoors. It happened, ironically, at the same time when South African and Unita forces and Angolan-Cuban forces were clashing at the Lomba River, and while Pres. Dos Santos was preparing himself for a visit to Paris.

The exchange was an extensive undertaking. There were small wheels within big wheels and riddles one saw through mirrors. It had become bigger and more complex. There were many intrigues. A lot of people worked hard, cleverly and together to set it all up. Gen. Neels van Tonder was a key man. I played only a very small part.
APPENDIX C

ADDENDUM FROM GENERAL JAN NIE GELDENHUIYS:
THE KEY TO PEACE IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA

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Chapter 17

…A day or so after our return from Sal, we were off again to Geneva. For me this was without doubt the turning point of the negotiations. Here the discussions of the preceding sessions at the other places reached a high point. The fate of countries and peoples was at stake and it taxed one’s moral guts.

The formal discussions took place between 2 and 5 August 1988…

…It was now 31 July 1988 and before the negotiations began we had to have a working meal with Crocker. During the eating and talking and in view of our “failed” attempt at Sal I asked Crocker how long it would take the UN from the time one gives the word go until they could begin with the implementation of Resolution 435. Crocker replied that if one credited the UN with speed, they should be able to do it within approximately three months. So I did the following sum in my head: tomorrow is 1 August 1988, add three months and the answer is 1 November 1988.

Later in the day Sonnie asked me, why don’t we attend the first plenary session, the full formal session of all parties the following day, and propose a specific date for the implementation of Resolution 435? So I said to him yes, brilliant—1 November 1988; and then we work out all the other dates from this one backwards: South African troop withdrawal, Cuban redeployment and withdrawal, disengagement of forces, and ceasefire. That evening we put it to Neil van Heerden, Derek Auret and Niel Barnard.
Probably more than a year later Neil invited all the members of his team, together with their wives or girlfriends for an “in-house” dinner at the State Guest House in Pretoria. That evening he delivered a short intimate speech and thanked everyone for his contribution. He recalled some of our experiences: “The negotiations around a settlement in Namibia and Angola proceeded through many phases and alternated between moods of optimism that a solution was close and stages of deep mistrust between the respective delegations.

“Gen. Geldenhuys and Brig. Sonnekus came with the suggestion, at the end of July 1988, in my hotel room during one of our countless late-night preparatory discussions, that we should simply propose to the other parties a date for the implementation of the settlement plan. It would allay the mistrust on the part of mainly the Cubans and the Angolans and give direction to the negotiations which at that particular point had reached a state of near checkmate.”

This proposal was submitted to the government and approved, and the next morning when we proposed in plenary that 1 November 1988 be the starting date for the implementation of the settlement plan, it had a dramatic effect on the whole meeting. There was an immediate request for an adjournment of the meeting. Our “opponents” were clearly caught off-sides. In the end this decision made an important contribution to an agreement being reached and which resulted in the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola.

During this round, agreement was reached on the Geneva Protocol. From a purely personal point of view this success was for me to a great extent the result of the wearisome work we had done in the side-halls at New York and especially at Sal Island. It included:

- A recommendation to the Secretary General of the United Nations that 1 November 1988 be earmarked as a date for the implementation of Resolution 435.
- Fixing 10 September 1988 as the target date for signing a trilateral agreement.
- Fixing 1 September 1988 as the deadline for Angola and Cuba to reach agreement acceptable to all three parties on a schedule for the northward redeployment and the total withdrawal, in stages of the Cuban troops from Angola.
- South Africa’s assent that all its troops will be withdrawn from Angola by 1 September 1988.
- Angola and Cuba would use their good offices to restrict SWAPO to the north of
the 16th parallel after the withdrawal of the South African troops (the latter was later done before 1 September 1988).

- An undertaking by Cuba not to deploy its forces within specified geographical boundaries described in the protocol. (This excluded Cuban forces from an area in the southeast of Angola.)
- The establishing of a Joint Commission (JC) to develop additional practical measures to build confidence and to reduce the risk of unintentional incidents.

It became clear later that it was impossible in practice to keep to all these target dates. The delay of only a few months, however, made no material difference to the content of the eventual agreement. This round put us, in Niel Barnard’s words, in command of the “moral high ground.”

On the road of war the last major battle with FAPLA and the Cubans was delivered on 27 June 1988 on the border in the southwest of Angola. The path of negotiations towards peace was firmly paved during the end of July and beginning of August 1988 at Geneva.

Following the conference, Geldenhuys elaborated.

**General Jannie Geldenhuys, former head of the South African Defense Force, comments on this description of events:**

“The reader will probably find it most unbelievable that a long awaited and extremely significant decision—seriously affecting many of the big powers and so many smaller ones, with such profound and far reaching consequences, awaited for so long while so many people got killed—that such a decision would be made, during the time between an evening at a hotel and the next morning at a conference room in Geneva by a government in Pretoria.”

General Geldenhuys’ explanation is: “Neil van Heerden did not describe how it happened. Here is the simple explanation: First and foremost the reader should be reminded that all this in Geneva and Pretoria happened at a point in time *after* the devastating and decisive defeat of the Soviet Union-, Cuban- and FAPLA forces in the Lomba region in their final but futile attempt to end the war by conquering Savimbi’s stronghold of Jamba in South East Angola. It is naturally easy to be agreeable after victory. It doesn’t take time.”
He attributes the decision, and process of decision making, to the following sequence of events: “Neil van Heerden phoned minister of foreign affairs Pik Botha—he phoned state president PW Botha—PW asked, what says Magnus (Minister of Defense, General Malan)? Pik phoned Magnus—Magnus says, whose idea is it?—Pik says your man, Jannie Geldenhuys—Magnus says, then it’s okay—end of story.”

**Source:** General Jannie Geldenhuys to Dr. Anna-Mart van Wyk, 1 December 2009.
DOCU

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Nam 12  15–6 April 1981, Memorandum of Conversation, Between Pik Botha and Chester Crocker, U.S. Dept. of State

Nam 13  19 May 1981, Letter, From South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information R.F. Botha to U.S. Secretary of State A.M. Haig Jr., U.S. Dept. of State

Nam 14  4 February 1982, Cuba-Angola declaration, SALEG Washington 12.2.82 1220 Nam12

Nam 15  Principles for a Constitution for an independent Namibia

Nam 16  6 March 1984, Message of R.F. Botha to the governments of the United States, Angola, and Zambia, South Africa Dept. of Foreign Affairs

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Nam 19  1 May 1985, Letter, From R.F. Botha to Lt-Col Manuel Rodrigues, South Africa Dept. of Foreign Affairs

Nam 20  15 June 1988, Secret Report from AA Jaquet to SRA on Current State of Negotiations between South Africa and Angola

Nam 21  20 July 1988, Principles for a peaceful settlement in Southwestern Africa
Nam 22  2 April 1989, Statement on cease-fire violations in Namibia, Luanda, SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, Namibia Communications Center

Nam 23  9 April 1989, Mount Etjo Declaration, Namibia

Nam 24  26 April 1989, Letter, From the State President of South Africa to the President of Zambia, requesting that he assist in the transition process by pressuring SWAPO to withdraw all armed forces from Namibia, Digital Imaging South Africa, Source: Aluka Project www.aluka.org

Nam 25  28 April 1989, Press Release, SWAPO Dismisses South African Charges of Amassing Troops on Angola-Namibia Border, repro from Namibia Communications Center

Nam 26  28 April 1989, Joint Press Statement, repro from Namibia Communications Center
A leader of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) spoke to the Express from London this week, giving this message to the South African Government: “We are prepared to hold talks at any time to discuss a peaceful, democratic solution in Namibia (S.W.A.)”

Mr. Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO representative in Britain and Western Europe, told me: “We have resorted to violence as a desperate measure. Non-violent efforts to bring about change in Namibia failed. “Peaceful protest and dialogue did nothing to put an end to the oppressive system imposed on us. We were forced to take up arms as an alternative means of gaining freedom”, the SWAPO leader said. He accused the South African Government of “occupying the territory illegally” and warned that it was “only a matter of time before the indigenous people gain independence.”

“The momentum of resistance to the South African occupation of Namibia is increasing within the territory. At the same time, world-wide pressure is being applied on South Africa by overseas countries,” said Mr. Katjavivi.

The South African Government was responding to this, he said, by clamping down even harder on the Black people of the territory. “We are prepared to sit down tomorrow and work out a peaceful, non-violent solution to the political problems of Namibia, but South Africa must be prepared to solve the problems democratically. We want to benefit, too, from all the country has to offer—and not be left the crumbs as is the position now. SWAPO is not against the White man as such. Our fight is not against the man but the system which oppresses us. Whites would receive full protection under the new Government of Namibia. The colour of a man’s skin would not matter. Everyone would be allowed to participate fully in the affairs of the country. We would never dream of replacing one repressive regime. That would be a betrayal of the principles we are fighting for! We need to build a strong Namibia. We need all the brothers and sisters of the country to help us—White and Black.”

Mr. Katjavivi said “liberation movements in Africa” had been heartened by the Lisbon coup. “It has given us new hope,” he remarked.
INVITATION

Lisbon had been forced to negotiate round the conference table with the “liberation movements” after the coup. But South Africa had an opportunity to negotiate now, before more lives were lost.

He extended an invitation to the South African government to hold talks with SWAPO on the future of the country. He made it clear, too, that SWAPO would rather talk than engage in terrorist warfare. “If sense is allowed to prevail, a peaceful settlement can be achieved,” he said.

SWAPO was determined to gain freedom for the people of Namibia. The foundations had already been laid and the organization was committed to the task of continuing to build. “All attempts to crush SWAPO have failed.”

Formerly of Windhoek, Mr. Katjavivi said he visited the Caprivi strip a year ago. He noticed that the morale of the attacking forces was exceedingly high and great strides had been taken in improving training methods. Besides this activity, demonstrations and rallies were also planned.

NAM 2 — 30 JANUARY 1976, RESOLUTION 385 OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, REPRO FROM NAMIBIA COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement of Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa’s mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,


Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia and is persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa’s brutal repression of the Namibia people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation regime of South Africa,

1. Condemns the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;
2. Condemns the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;
3. Condemns the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighboring countries;
4. Demands that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of Bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;
5. Further condemns South Africa’s failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;
6. Further condemns all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia,
7. Declares that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
8. Further declares that in determining the date, time-table and modalities for elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time to be declared upon by the Security Council for the purposes of enabling the United
Nations to establish the machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of such elections;

9. Demands that South African urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. Reiterates its demands that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 263 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (194), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

11. Demands again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:
   a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
   b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offenses under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;
   c) Abolish the application of Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly Bantustans and homelands;
   d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa’s compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.
SWAPO Participants: Comrade Sam Nujoma, Comrade Theo-Ben Gurirab, Comrade Obed Emvula, Comrade Kapuka Nauyala

USA participants: Dr Kissinger, Two others (secretaries)

On Dr Kissinger’s own initiative, the President accompanied by four [sic] SWAPO officials met and held discussions with the U.S.A. Secretary of State in New York on September 29th 1976.

Dr Kissinger put forward a proposal for a “Namibia Conference” to be attended by SWAPO, the Turnhalle puppets and South Africa. He was “convinced” that SWAPO would obviously emerge as the leading force from the “Conference”. Dr Kissinger also promised that the United States Government would give its support to SWAPO as the leading “group” in Namibia, and that, with SWAPO’s standing recognition by the U.N. as the authentic representative of the Namibian people, there could be no doubt that SWAPO would take the leading position at the “Conference” and would emerge from there as a leading force in the Government of an independent Namibia.

In reply, Comrade President pointed out, point blank, that, until racist South Africa accepts all SWAPO’s preconditions to talks, SWAPO will never participate in any talks or conference. Comrade President also told Dr. Kissinger that the so-called “Namibia Conference” should be a new venture altogether, and not a continuation of the Turnhalle tribal talks. SWAPO will not accept to renegaded [sic] to the level of puppets.

SWAPO’s pre-conditions to talks are:

1. SWAPO has been and is still ready to talks directly with the South African Government regarding the modalities for transferring power to the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO.
2. SWAPO demands that the participants at the Namibia Independence Conference shall be SWAPO, South Africa and the United Nations.
3. SWAPO demands that the United Nations shall convene and chair the Conference.
4. SWAPO insists that before any talks the South African Government must release all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees. Some of the leaders now in detention, restriction and in prison are likely to be part of the SWAPO delegation to Independence Talks.

5. South Africa must make prior commitment to withdraw all its armed forces from Namibia and to end its repression of the Namibia population.

6. The talks must be on entirely new basis reflecting the unity of the whole people of independence [sic] and some reign [sic] Namibia as a unitary state.

Dr. Kissinger then decided to go back to Vorster to inform him of SWAPO’s position.

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**NAM 4 — 18 JUNE 1977, SWAPO PRESS STATEMENT, DELIVERED BY D.T. TJONGARERO AT AN IMPROMPTU PRESS CONFERENCE IN WINDHOEK, SWAPO DEPT. OF INFORMATION**

**Introduction**

The 31 year-old deadlock of Namibia has been a creation of South Africa and her allies the Western Powers, who are permanent members of the Security Council. While South Africa has been continuing to rule Namibia against the wishes of Namibian people, the West has been incapacitating the UN to take concerted action in Namibia, especially through vetoes in the Security Council.

The West’s latest attempts to talk to South Africa cannot be seen otherwise than the continuation of this alliance to legalize South Africa’s presence in Namibia to try and lessen the international pressure on South Africa, to try and thwart SWAPO’s attempts to effect genuine independence for Namibia.

We take cognizance of the West’s attempts to boost the image of the Turnhalle, to pose it as an alternative to SWAPO’s peaceful takeover of Namibia. There is no alternative to SWAPO’s peaceful takeover through elections within the framework of Resolution 385 except SWAPO’s intensification of the struggle at all levels.

The West succeeded in one thing to come and attend the Turnhalle’s funeral. The Turnhalle was appointed to divert the struggle, and your achievement was to again show
that the Turnhalle members are puppets of the Pretoria regime. Today the Liberation war in Zimbabwe is costing Smith almost a million Rands a day. No country can cope with such expenses without breaking her economy. Thus we are aware of the West’s attempts to save the racists before they are crushed for their own interests will go down the drain. Thus their primary interest is not at all the welfare of the Namibian people but saving their racist agents from total annihilation.

**Questions with regard to your initiative**

1. Is your coming to Namibia still within the framework of the Security Council resolution which gave you the green light to explore possibilities of a solution for Namibia? What is the legal status of your visit to Namibia?

2. You have put it to us that you are not negotiators but explorers. If this is still the case, why are there talks of a settlement? If you came as explorers how do you explain the agreement which led to South Africa’s enactment of laws in the SA Parliament empowering the SA State President to rule Namibia by proclamation?

3. Who’s to appoint the Administrator General? What would his functions be? To whom should he be answerable? Was this agreed upon? Between whom? And if so, is it still within the framework of Security Council Resolution 385, paragraphs 7 and 8?

4. (A) The Security Council Resolution 385 paragraphs 10 and 11 make as priority conditions for free and fair elections in Namibia:
   (1) The withdrawal of the whole South African presence in Namibia: Army, Police, Administration.
   (2) The release of all political prisoners.

   What has happened to these conditions?

   (B) In the light hereof, how do you explain SA committment to uninhibited national elections with the banning order on the acting Vice-President of SWAPO, comrade Nathaniel Naxuillili, having been extended to 1982, the execution of Filemon Nangolo, the indefinite detention of Axel Johannes and Victor Nkandi after having served a one-year prison term, the continued detention of captured SWAPO guerrillas and supporters all over Namibia?

5. What about the draconian emergency resolution R 17 in Northern Namibia and trial under the Terrorism Act of four Namibians, in the event of an agreement having been reached, or was this not taken into account?
6. Why is the West meeting several leaders of SWAPO separately and not together, when SWAPO maintain to be one organisation?

7. What is the role accorded to the UN Council for Namibia in your discussion with South Africa during the period before elections, the UN Council for Namibia being the legitimate administrative body to lead Namibia to genuine independence? Has the Western Five taken over the responsibilities and duties of the Namibia Council?

8. It is an indisputable fact that Walfishbay is an integral part of Namibia, while SA is claiming it. What is your view on this issue?

9. What are the concrete guarantees for the return of expatriate Namibians?

1. Having considered what has been said up to now about the Cape Town talks, and bearing in mind that the West cannot negotiate on behalf of Namibian people, SWAPO condemns the West’s attempts to negotiate outside the UN.

2. The West’s meeting South Africa outside the UN, and for that matter in SA on the Namibian issue is a clear endorsement of South Africa’s legality over Namibia. By meeting the extended arm of South Africa through the Turnhalle, the West wants to give alternatives where there are no alternatives, and they thus deserve the strongest condemnation. Your attempt is to be seen as endorsing the Turnhalle’s ethnic obsession, thus dividing and weakening the Namibian people’s bargaining power.

3. At our last meeting with you we indicated that as long as SWAPO was geographically divided there would be no stand on your initiative. What have you done to make this meeting possible? We believe that it is convenient for you to meet the leadership here and outside, for it would seem easy for you to divide SWAPO between external and internal. Or are you not interested in having our response? If you are prepared to go ahead without SWAPO you should also be prepared to face the unavoidable consequences.

4. Nothing outside Resolution 385 of the Security Council is acceptable to SWAPO. Empowering the SA State President to rule Namibia by proclamation and the appointment of an Administrator General does not fall within the provisions of Resolution 385. And thus SWAPO rejects it. South Africa has no right to prescribe what the Namibian people do; she’s merely a colonial power to vacate Namibia to make room for a people’s government in Namibia. The Cape Town talks are an evasion of Res. 385 and deserve the total condemnation of SWAPO and thus the people of Namibia.
5. There is a war between South Africa and SWAPO. Any decision taken between the West and SA, who are partners in exploiting Namibia, is null and void as long as no agreement has been reached between South Africa and SWAPO—the parties at war. The West is sustaining South Africa militarily and economically; their talks are thus an attempt to undermine the people’s struggle.

6. SWAPO is prepared to take part in open national elections for a constituent assembly under the supervision and control of the United Nations, in accordance with Res. 385.

7. If SA does not want to leave Namibia peacefully, SWAPO, and thus the Namibian people, will intensify the struggle at all levels to overthrow the SA regime or any other regime installed against the will of the Namibian people. SWAPO reserves the right to call for support from all peace- and freedom-loving people of the world.

8. It should be clear to all that the inalienable right of the Namibian people for independence is not negotiable at all.

SIGNED:
D. TJONGARERO, ACTING NATIONAL CHAIRMAN

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**NAM 5 — 10 APRIL 1978, LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CANADA, FRANCE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON PROPOSED RESOLUTION, REPRODUCED FROM NAMIBIA COMMUNICATIONS CENTER**

On instructions from our Governments we have the honor to transmit to you a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation and to request that it should be circulated as a document of the Security Council. The objective of our proposal is the independence of Namibia in accordance with resolution 385(1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. We are continuing to work towards the implementation of the proposal.
I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council, the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted with the various parties involved with the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with resolution 385(1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.

2. To this end, our Governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. While the proposal addresses itself to all elements of resolution 385(1976), the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with an appropriate United Nations role in accordance with resolution 385(1976). A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would then be assumed during 1978 by the Government of Namibia.

4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our Governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing resolution 385(1976) while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities, the Special Representative will work together with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator-General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the legality of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.
II. The Electoral Process

5. In accordance with Security Council resolution 385(1976), free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity to enable the people of Namibia freely and fairly to determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect. Moreover the Special Representative may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process. He will have at his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), sufficient to carry out his duties satisfactorily. He will report to the Secretary-General, keeping him informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.

6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls, and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. The official electoral campaign shall commence only after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results, will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.
7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections:

a. Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator-General will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit that objective.

b. The Administrator-General will make arrangements for the release, prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees will be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of international standing who will be designated by the Secretary-General to be legal adviser to the Special Representative.

c. All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes.

d. The Special Representative, with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and of other appropriate international bodies, will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia will be given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.

8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts will be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. The annex describes provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning UNTAG, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia, and with respect to the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:

a. A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base.
b. Thereafter, a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.

c. The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.

d. Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside the Territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process.

e. A military section of UNTAG to ensure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The five Governments as members of the Security Council will support the Secretary-General’s judgment in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The United Nations Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary-General informed of developments in this regard.

9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period will rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator-General will ensure the good conduct of the police forces to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative and will take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative will make arrangements, when appropriate, for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.

10. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.
11. Immediately after the certification of election results, the Constituent Assembly will meet to draw up and adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. It will conclude its work as soon as possible so as to permit whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to the installation of an independent Government of Namibia during 1978.

12. Neighbouring countries will be requested to ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, will be respected. They will also be requested to afford the necessary facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquility in the border areas.

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**NAM 6 — 27 JULY 1978, UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 432 (1978) ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY.**

Full text of Security Council Resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978, adopted unanimously:

The Security Council,
Reaffirming in particular the provisions of resolution 385 (1976) relating to the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia,
Taking note of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 32/9 D of 4 November 1977, in which the Assembly declares that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia,

1. Declares that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory;

2. Decides to lend its full support to the initiation of steps necessary to ensure early reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia;

3. Declares that, pending the attainment of this objective, South Africa must not use
Walvis Bay in any manner prejudicial to the independence of Namibia or the viability of its economy;

4. Decides to remain seized of the matter until Walvis Bay is fully reintegrated into Namibia.

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**NAM 7 — RESOLUTION 435 OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, ADOPTED AT THE 105TH PLENARY MEETING, 29 SEPTEMBER 1978.**

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978),
Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),
Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,
Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),
Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869).

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa’s illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976).

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry
out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

4. Welcomes SWAPO’s preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General’s report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the ceasefire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841).

5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution.

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution, are null and void.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

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**NAM 8 — 19 OCTOBER 1978, PW BOTHA RE: TALKS WITH THE WESTERN FIVE**

… Thirdly I shall make a short but important statement on behalf of the South African Government which I yesterday submitted to the Five for their information before they left. I’ll deal first with a few paragraphs of the first statement in welcoming the Five to South Africa. I started by welcoming them and said: “It is the sincere hope of the our Government and peoples that your historic visit will accomplish the rediscovery of the Cape of Good Hope—its strategic importance and its friendship to the free world. I’m also very glad that some of you found it possible to visit Windhoek and to have discussions with representatives of those most directly concerned with the future of South West
Africa. Before we come to specific points I should like to express my views to you as leading members of the Western world on some salient factors affecting the strategic situation in Southern Africa. South Africa is part of the free world and is anxious to discuss problems that have arisen between us and the rest of the family of nations, on the basis of mutual respect. We have understanding for the points of view of others, and hope on their part those who are animated by goodwill would appreciate the real nature of the great problems which face the Southern African sub-continent.” Then I referred to the year since South Africa became a unitary state following the act of Union in 1910, and I stated furthermore that “It is perhaps ironical that a current dispute with the United States and the United Nations can be traced back to a war in which South African forces acting on behalf of and in concept with Great Britain seized what was then German South West Africa, and held it as captured territory until it was turned over to South Africa’s administration as a mandate from the League of Nations at the end of the First World War. During the First World War this country brought upon itself a bloody civil war in which some of the best people of South Africa died as a result of our participation on the side of the West, and more specifically because the government of the time conquered South West Africa.” I went on to say that “From that time until the present year South Africa has been concerned with and responsible for the security of the territory of South West Africa. For many decades this was not a serious problem, only in recent years as the security of South West Africa become affected by new developments in the Southern African strategic context. These new developments to which I refer concern of course the entry of Soviet Russia into Africa and more especially into Southern Africa”. I doubt fully with the strategic position resulting from that, and I said that I cannot ignore the dramatic build-up of the Soviet Blue Water Fleet in the Indian Ocean which does not concern African strategists but from all the reports available to me, is very much a matter for concern for Nato who have drawn up contingency planning for the protection of the Oil Route around Southern Africa.”

“Russian intervention in Angola through their Cuban surrogates clearly had only one purpose. This was no war of national liberation with so-called freedom fighters supported by the USSR against so-called Colonialist oppressors. The Portuguese had gone and the issue was—who was going to rule in Angola—the pro-Western UNITA or FNLA, or the pro-communist MPLA? The Russians were determined to get the MPLA into power, and having cocked their noses at the West, they did so.” I dealt with that fully and the consequences following the Angola situation.
“South West Africa together with Angola, if the Soviets and SWAPO succeed in their efforts, South West Africa together with Angola would provide the USSR with a solid block along the West Coast of Central and Southern Africa enabling it to be used at will to the detriment of Southern Africa and the free world. It would for example control South West Africa’s mineral resources including its uranium,” and I dealt with a number other aspects of the matter. Then I wish to draw your attention to p. 9 where I stated: “Before concluding my remarks I wish to draw your attention to the substantial progress of South West Africa and its peoples have made under the guidance of my country.

South Africa’s support is not only a matter of money, but also embraces railways, harbors, post and telegraph services, research in various directions, water supply, power supply and development. General economic development such as banking, agriculture, mining took place under the leadership of the Republic of South Africa.

Since 1961 to 1977 (not to mention earlier statistics) the RSA contributed to South West Africa’s development in the form of special subsidies, loans for electrical supply, building of main roads, the sum of not less than R637 million. This amount does not include the more or less R200 million we are spending annually on our peace-keeping forces to maintain the security and peace in South West Africa against Marxist insurgency.

Let me be quite candid with you, an independent South West Africa with a responsible Government will have to take cognizance of these facts.

An irresponsible government motivated by Marxist theories, can only destroy South West Africa and its infrastructure in the same way it brought chaos, hunger, lacks of health services upon and destroyed potential economic growth in Angola and Mozambique.”

Then finally on the next page I said: “—let me advise you, we have a practical vision for Southern Africa.” And I explained the background for what I have to say at the end on page 11. “We believe in a community of free nations in Southern Africa—where proper health services, training of people, higher standards of living, proper housing of families, opportunities for work and economic progress will be possible. Our neighboring states in Southern Africa need technological scientific and other forms of assistance. They need capital for sound development. They do not need terrorists who exploit their territories.

The Republic of South Africa is capable of contributing its proper share in a positive way. My advice is—stop shouting at us; stop creating stumbling blocks in our way.”
In the course of our meeting yesterday afternoon, certain specific questions were asked of the United Nations. I wish to answer them this afternoon.

Mr. Kirkpatrick asked a series of questions centring on two subjects. First, on what basis is the Constituent Assembly to take its decisions, and second, what would be the principle on which the elections will be held? These are important matters for all Namibians, and I feel sure, Mr. Kirkpatrick will agree that the settlement Proposal contains no specific provision which will enable us to answer his precisely.

Certain things, however, are clear. First, as we emphasized at our meetings yesterday, the settlement Proposal provides that the “elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of Government”. It goes on to state, inter alia, that the electoral system will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process”. It also states that the campaign shall commence only after the Special Representative “has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures”. Overall, while the Proposal makes it clear that it will be for the Administrator-General to conduct the elections, they will be held under United Nations supervision and control.

Thus, it will be for the Administrator-General to draw up proposals as to the form of the electoral system. It is the Special Representative’s duty to satisfy himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of what he has suggested. I mentioned yesterday the importance which I would attach to the process of consultation with all political parties. They would doubtless wish to express their views to me on this, as on other subjects. I do not think that it is possible to take the matter further at this time.

As to the functioning of the Constituent Assembly, the Proposal states that it will meet immediately after the certification of the election results. It will conclude its work as soon as possible. The Proposal does not state how it will take its decisions. Accordingly, various possibilities, some of which were referred to by Mr. Kirkpatrick, are open to it. It will
be convened under the law relating to its election. The draft of this law, like the others to which I have referred, will be prepared by the Administrator-General and I, as Special Representative, will need to be satisfied that it is fair and appropriate. As I have said I shall maintain these consultations with the various political parties. Whether the law should contain a simple or weighted majority system for decision-making by the Constituent Assembly, whether it will make provision for referendum in any circumstances, or whether, once elected, the Assembly will decide its own procedure, could be determined only after implementation, following the approach I have described.

I will turn now to the questions put by Mr. Diergaardt. The first related to the statement made by the High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Hartling:

Who is going to distinguish refugee from foreigner? And will there be any identification or can anybody claim the right to come back?

As the High Commissioner for Refugees explained, those wishing to return will complete a standard registration form, recording basic biographic details. The countries of asylum know the origin of those to whom they give refuge and attest to this. There will be immigration formalities on arrival. UNHCR sometimes encounters concern on the question of identification in advance of repatriation but problems have rarely arisen in its recent experiences.

His next questions related to the demilitarized zone. Would UNTAG carry out the demilitarization of the zone? On this, the position is clearly set out in the documents whose details have been under discussion since October 1979. It has been agreed that each Government concerned will be responsible for the demilitarization of its own portion of the zone. Their police forces will remain in the zone and will extend full cooperation with UNTAG. UNTAG will be responsible for monitoring the demilitarized character of the zone. It will conduct regular and frequent patrols by air and land. Should any apparent violation be observed at any point within the zone, UNTAG forces will, after appropriate investigation, take or initiate prompt action to ensure compliance. In Namibia, the appropriate action will be in accordance with the settlement Proposal. In the area of the DMZ in Angola and Zambia, UNTAG will inform the Government concerned which will thereupon ensure compliance with the ceasefire and the demilitarized character of the zone.

The next question referred to any possible attempt to send armed personnel to Namibia after the cease-fire. This would be in breach of the settlement Proposal and action would be taken accordingly.
Mr. Diergaardt’s next question asked what would happen if a party sought to stop the electoral campaign by the use of force. This would an extremely serious violation of the settlement Proposal which, as was noted yesterday, contains a number of provisions on the prevention of any form of intimidation. Primarily, of course, the duty to deal with the matter will rest with the local police, for, as Chief Superintendent Fanning stated yesterday, quoting the agreed settlement Proposal, “Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces”.

It would be my duty to satisfy myself that the proper implementation of the electoral process was undisturbed by any such actions coming from any source. Paragraph 10 of the Proposal further provides that the Special Representative “will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter”. Any attempt, from any quarter, to perpetrate any such gross infringement of the Proposal would, if necessary, lead to a special report to the Security Council for its consideration and urgent action.

A further question related to action which might be taken by UNTAG in the event of any attempt to cause disruption after the certification of the election results. This, too, would be a most blatant breach of the settlement Proposal. All the parties concerned have undertaken to respect the outcome of the elections.

As regards deployment of the military component throughout the whole of the DMZ, the South African Government has already been informed that this would indeed be the case, in terms of its operational functioning. UNTAG would patrol throughout the entire zone, as I have already mentioned, both by ground and air. Various logistical facilities would accordingly be provided by the Angolan and Zambian authorities, as they have already agreed.
Council resolution 435 (1978) in 1981. I added that, in order to achieve that aim, a
date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation should be set in the early part of
1981. As a means of facilitating agreement, I stated the intention to hold a pre-im-
plementation meeting under the auspices and chairmanship of the United Nations.

2. The proposed meeting was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 7–14 January
1981. In accordance with paragraph 24 of my report of 24 November 1980, South
Africa and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) were contacted
concerning the composition of the respective delegations that would participate in
the meeting. The front-line States and Nigeria, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and the Contact Group of the Western Five were also contacted about the
sending of observers.

3. The two delegations participating in the meeting were led respectively by the South
African Administrator-General of Namibia, Mr. Danie Hough, and by the President
of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma. The observer delegations were represented at a high
level, including some at the ministerial level. OAU was represented by its Secretary-
General, Mr. Edem Kodjo. In addition, the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs
of Sierra Leone attended the meeting on behalf of the President of Sierra Leone, the
current Chairman of OAU, Mr. Siaka Stevens.

4. In view of the importance that I attached to the meeting, I personally chaired the
opening sessions held on 7 and 8 January 1981. The working sessions were thereafter
chaired by Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.

5. In my opening statement on 7 January 1981, I reiterated the central purpose of the
meeting as set out in my report of 24 November 1980. I emphasized that a very
large area was already covered by a general consensus and noted that the problems
remaining related in one way or another to confidence, and especially to confidence
in the future. I expressed the hope that the courage and vision that had brought the
participants to Geneva would carry them over that obstacle as well. I reiterated that
our main aim was to get a firm agreement on a date for a cease-fire and the start of
implementation of the Proposal which would allow for the achievement of Namibian
independence before the end of 1981. It was made clear that basic agreement on the
Proposal and the demilitarized zone had already been reached and that there could
be no question of renegotiating those fundamental arrangements or of going back on agreements previously reached.

6. In a meeting on 8 January 1981, following consultations, I called upon the leaders of the two delegations to introduce those members of their delegations whom they wished to introduce.

7. Mr. Hough, the Administrator-General, whom South Africa had designated to lead the delegation, then introduced his personal staff and the delegation led by him, “pursuant to paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/14266) and consisting of parties who are present here to discuss with the United Nations and to participate in the Conference, on an equal basis with those who would take part in the elections, the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 and other practical proposals”. I thereupon recalled the precise wording of paragraph 24 of my report of 24 November 1980, indicating that it was on that basis alone that the meeting had been convened.

8. Mr. Nujoma, President of SWAPO, in introducing his delegation, stated that some of its members were still in prison, not having been released by the South African Government. Mr. Nujoma reiterated acceptance by SWAPO of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and added that SWAPO was “ready to sign a cease-fire with the delegation of South Africa, so that peace can come to Namibia” and to “co-operate with UNTAG, both military and civilian components, in order to ensure implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)”.

9. Working sessions with the two delegations, in the presence of the observers, commenced on 8 January. In his opening statement, the Chairman, Mr. Urquhart, recalled the framework within which the meeting was being held. He described the wide area of agreement which had been reached with the Government of South Africa during more than two years of consultations in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He stated that the United Nations believed that the technical issues relating to implementation had essentially been resolved and that none existed which could possibly justify any failure to decide to go forward. The Chairman reiterated that the meeting had not been called to re-negotiate matters already agreed. He pointed out that in any conflict situation or prolonged dispute there was inevitably a legacy of distrust and lack of confidence among the parties. To
overcome such a legacy a high degree of statesmanship was called for. It was not only
the future of Namibia that was at stake; it was also the future of the entire region and
the prospects for peace and progress in Africa as a whole.

10. On 8 and 9 January, detailed presentations were made on behalf of the United
Nations regarding the manner in which the Special Representative for Namibia of
the Secretary-General, appointed under Security Council resolution 431 (1973), and
the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), would fulfill their vari-
ous responsibilities under the settlement Proposal as approved in Security Council
resolution 435 (1978). In the course of those presentations the overall struc-
ture of UNTAG and the Special Representative’s duties, the functions of the office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the election supervisory role of UNTAG,
the tasks and deployment of UNTAG police monitors and the tasks and deployment
of the UNTAG military component were described by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Special
Representative of the Secretary-General; Mr. Poul Hartling, High Commissioner
for Refugees; General Prem Chand, Commander-designate of the UNTAG military
component; and other senior United Nations officials. Points of clarification arising
from those presentations were dealt with during a working session held on 10 January.

11. A number of statements were also made by members of the delegation led by the
South African Administrator-General. It was asserted, inter alia, that the United
Nations had disqualified itself from supervising free and fair elections in Namibia,
in particular, by recognizing SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of
the people of Namibia and by its attitude towards other political parties in the
Territory. The general tenor of many of those presentations was that only after an
unspecifed period, in which the United Nations would demonstrate its impartial-
ity, would a definite date for implementation be acceptable. Anxiety was also ex-
pressed as to the nature of the laws and related arrangements which would govern
the Territory in the future.

12. At the meeting on Saturday, 10 January, the Chairman made a number of general
comments on the statements heard from the delegation led by the South African
Administrator-General during the previous meetings. In particular, he referred to the
context in which the United Nations had been involved in the Namibia problem and
to the central purpose of the meeting, namely, the setting of a firm date for the cease-fire and the commencement of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

13. In referring to the questions that had been raised about the “impartiality” issue and the need to create trust and confidence, the Chairman pointed out that this seemed to be putting the problem the wrong way around and that, in any case, the matter of trust and confidence was a two-way street. He explained that it was precisely because the decisions of the United Nations concerning Namibia, dating back as far as 1947, had not been heeded that the situation had reached the present pass. He pointed out that the fundamental aim of the membership of the United Nations as to enter a new phase, in which all concerned would cooperate with the international community to attain the goal of independence of Namibia through an act of self-determination. The key was a definite agreement to proceed on a specific date with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), at which time a number of things would have to change, because there would be a completely different situation. At that time, both South Africa and the United Nations would require to make the necessary arrangements for the impartial discharge of their respective responsibilities under the settlement Proposal.

14. The Chairman concluded his statement by urging the participants not to be distracted from the main objective of the meeting, namely, in the words of the Secretary-General’s report of 24 November to attain the independence of Namibia in 1981, in accordance with resolution 435 (1978) and, to achieve this aim, to set a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation in the early part of 1981.

15. In intensive consultations after the meeting on Saturday, 10 January, a course of action was discussed which was designed to lead, at the conclusion of the meeting, to a declaration of intent by the parties to the cease-fire: This would have provisionally established a cease-fire at an early date—30 March 1981 was suggested—to be confirmed in writing by 10 February 1981. It was also suggested that in the meantime, specific measures could be taken to ensure—and to reflect in public decisions—the impartiality of the United Nations, as well as South Africa, from the time of agreement on the implementation date.

16. It became clear, from a statement by the South African Administrator-General in the meeting on 13 January, that it would not be possible to achieve such a declaration of intent at the meeting in Geneva. In that meeting, the Administrator General stated
that, in the light of the proceedings thus far, it was clear that the questions raised in paragraph 19 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/14266) had not been resolved, and it would therefore be premature to proceed with the discussion on the setting of a date for implementation.

17. At the closing meeting on 14 January, the leader of the SWAPO delegation, Mr. Nujoma, reiterated that SWAPO was ready to proceed, at the meeting in Geneva, to sign a cease-fire and to agree to a target date for the arrival of UNTAG in Namibia. Since South Africa had not agreed, SWAPO had no alternative but to continue with the liberation struggle.

18. In his closing statement, the Chairman reviewed the developments at the meeting and commented that it was clear that the date for the commencement of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still remained to be agreed upon. His concluding statement contained the following remarks:

“In the light of all that has taken place during our meeting, the question arises whether the obstacle is the matter of trust and confidence which the South African Government informed us in Pretoria last October was the core issue affecting the setting of a date. If that is so, I am sure few will challenge the fact that this meeting has provided the participants not only with a better understanding of the international effort for a settlement of the Namibia question but also valuable opportunities for contact and discussion. In my view, this has been a most unusual meeting. An enormous effort has been made, in many forms and at many levels, to demonstrate good faith, reasonableness, a will to co-operate in the future and an understanding of the pre-occupations and anxieties of others. It is a matter for regret that these extraordinary efforts have not yet succeeded in facilitating an agreement on a date for implementation and that a great opportunity has thus been missed… I believe that all participants and observers here will wish to consider urgently the events of the last few days and the course which must be taken to expedite the attainment of the objective we have set ourselves. In particular, and on behalf of the Secretary-General, I appeal to those who have been unable so far to assent to the proposals made by the Secretary General to reconsider their position at the earliest possible time.

The Secretary-General has been kept fully informed on the efforts made at, and on the outcome of, this meeting. He sincerely hopes that means will soon be found to go forward,
as we had intended to do, to the early implementation of resolution 435 (1978), so that our time and efforts here will prove to have made a positive contribution to the solution of the question of Namibia.

Although it has not proved possible here to secure agreement on a ceasefire date and on the commencement of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the United Nations will not relax its efforts to ensure for the people of Namibia their right to self-determination and independence through free and elections under United Nations supervision and control.”

**Observations**

19. The pre-implementation meeting which concluded in Geneva on 14 January did not succeed in achieving the objective set for it in my report of 24 November 1980, namely, the setting of a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation in the early part of 1981. It became clear in the course of the meeting, that the South African Government was not yet prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement and proceed with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

20. The meeting was, nevertheless, important in many ways. Participants were informed in detail of the manner in which the United Nations would discharge its responsibilities during the implementation process. Further, through contacts and exchanges at a variety of levels, a remarkable effort was made to demonstrate good faith and reasonableness, with a view to proceeding towards implementation in a spirit of cooperation and understanding. I wish, in this connection, to express my particular appreciation to OAU, represented in Geneva by its Secretary-General and by the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, to the front-line States, Nigeria and the Contact Group of the Western Five.

21. I believe that the outcome of the meeting in Geneva must give rise to the most serious international concern. Members of the Security Council, and all those concerned, will wish to consider the proceedings and the situation which has now arisen. I wish urgently to appeal to the Government of South Africa to review, with the utmost care, the implications of the meeting and to reconsider its position with regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) at the earliest possible time.
1. In my report of 24 November 1980 to the Security Council (S/14266), I stressed the vital importance of Namibia achieving independence in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) in 1981. I added that, in order to achieve that aim, a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation should be set in the early part of 1981. As a means of facilitating agreement, I stated the intention to hold a pre-implementation meeting under the auspices and chairmanship of the United Nations.

2. The proposed meeting was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 7–14 January 1981. In accordance with paragraph 24 of my report of 24 November 1980, South Africa and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) were contacted concerning the composition of the respective delegations that would participate in the meeting. The front-line States and Nigeria, the Organization of African United (OAU) and the Contact Group of the Western Five were also contacted about the sending of observers.

3. The two delegations participating in the meeting were led respectively by the South African Administrator-General of Namibia, Mr. Danie Hough, and by the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma. The observer delegations were represented at a high
level, including some at the ministerial level. OAU was represented by its Secretary-General, Mr. Edem Kodjo. In addition, the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone attended the meeting on behalf of the President of Sierra Leone, the current Chairman of OAU, Mr. Siaka Stevens.

4. In view of the importance that I attached to the meeting, I personally chaired the opening sessions held on 7 and 8 January 1981. The working sessions were thereafter chaired by Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.

5. In my opening statement on 7 January 1981, I reiterated the central purpose of the meeting as set out in my report of 24 November 1980. I emphasized that a very large area was already covered by a general consensus and noted that the problems remaining related in one way or another to confidence, and especially to confidence in the future. I expressed the hope that the courage and vision that had brought the participants to Geneva would carry them over that obstacle as well. I reiterated that our main aim was to get a firm agreement on a date for a ceasefire and the start of implementation of the Proposal which would allow for the achievement of Namibian independence before the end of 1981. It was made clear that basic on the Proposal and the demilitarized zone had already been reached and that there could be no question of renegotiating those fundamental arrangements or of going back on agreements previously reached.

6. In a meeting on 8 January 1981, following consultations, I called upon the leaders of the two delegations to introduce those members of their delegations whom they wished to introduce.

7. Mr. Hough, the Administrator General, whom South Africa had designated to lead the delegation, then introduced his personal staff and the delegation led by him, “pursuant to paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/14266) and consisting of parties who are present here to discuss with the United Nations and to participated in the Conference, on an equal basis with those would take part in the elections, the implementation of the Security Council resolution 435 and other practical proposals.” I thereupon recalled the precise wording of paragraph 24 of my report of 24 November 1980, indicating that it was on that basis alone that the meeting had been convened.
8. Mr. Nujoma, President of SWAPO, in introducing his delegation, stated that some of its members were still in prison, not having been released by the South African Government. Mr. Nujoma reiterated acceptance by SWAPO of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and added that SWAPO was “ready to sign a cease-fire with the delegation of South Africa, so that peace can come to Namibia” and to “co-operate with UNTAG, both military and civilian components, in order to ensure implementation of Security Council 435 (1978)”. 

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10. On 8 and 9 January, detailed presentations were made on behalf of the United Nations regarding the manner in which the Special Representative for Namibia of the Secretary-General, appointed under Security Council resolution 431 (1978), and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), would fulfill their various responsibilities under the settlement Proposal as approved in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In the course of those presentations the over-all structure of UNTAG and the Special Representative’s duties, the functions of the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the election supervisory role of UNTAG, the tasks and deployment of UNTAG police monitors and the tasks and deployment of the UNTAG military component were described by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Mr. Poul Hartling, High Commissioner
for Refugees; General Prem Chand, Commander-designate of the UNTAG military component; and other senior United Nations officials. Points of clarification arising from those presentations were dealt with during a working session held on 10 January.

11. A number of statements were also made by members of the delegation led by the South African Administrator-General. It was asserted, inter alia, that the United Nations had disqualified itself from supervising free and fair elections in Namibia, in particular, by recognizing SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and by its attitude towards the other political parties in the Territory. The general tenor of many of those presentations was that only after an unspecified period, in which the United Nations would demonstrate its impartiality, would a definite date for implementation be acceptable. Anxiety was also expressed as to the nature of the laws and related arrangements which would govern the Territory in the future.

12. At the meeting on Saturday, 10 January, the Chairman made by a number of general comments on the statements heard from the delegation led by the South African Administrator-General during the previous meetings. In particular, he referred to the context in which the United Nations had been involved in the Namibia problem and to the central purpose of the meeting, namely, the setting of a firm date for the ceasefire and the commencement of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

13. In referring to the questions that had been raised about the “impartiality” issue and the need to create trust and confidence, the Chairman pointed out that this seemed to be putting the problem the wrong way around and that, in any case, the matter of trust and confidence was a two-way street. He explained that it was precisely because the decisions of the United Nations concerning Namibia, dating as far back as 1947, had not been heeded that the situation had reached the present pass. He pointed out that the fundamental aim of the membership of the United Nations was to enter a new phase, in which all concerned would co-operate with the international community to attain the goal of independence of Namibia through an act of self-determination. The key was a definite agreement to proceed on a specific date with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), at which time a number of things would have to change, because there would be a completely different situation. At that time, both South Africa and the United Nations would require
to make the necessary arrangements for the impartial discharge of their respective responsibilities under the settlement proposal.

14. The Chairman concluded his statement by urging the participants not to be distracted from the main objective of the meeting, namely, in the words of the Secretary-General’s report of 24 November to attain the independence of Namibia in 1981, in accordance with resolution 435 (1978) and, to achieve this aim, to set a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation in the early part of 1981.

15. In intensive consultations after the meeting on Saturday, 10 January, a course of action was discussed which was designed to lead, at the conclusion of the meeting, to a declaration of intent by the parties to a cease-fire. This would have provisionally established a cease-fire at an early date—30 March 1981 was suggested—to be confirmed in writing by 10 February 1981. It was also suggested that in the meantime, specific measures could be taken to ensure—and to reflect in public decisions—the impartiality of the United Nations, as well as South Africa, from the time of agreement on the implementation date.

16. It became clear, from a statement by the South African Administrator-General in the meeting on 13 January, that it would not be possible to achieve such a declaration of intent at the meeting in Geneva. In that meeting, the Administrator-General stated that, in the light of the proceedings thus far, it was clear that the questions raised in paragraph 19 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/14266) had not been resolved, and it would therefore be premature to proceed with the discussion on the setting of a date for implementation.

17. At the closing meeting on 14 January, the leader of the SWAPO delegation, Mr. Nujoma, reiterated that SWAPO was ready to proceed, at the meeting in Geneva, to sign a cease-fire and to agree to a target date for the arrival on UNTAG in Namibia. Since South Africa had not agreed, SWAPO had no alternative but to continue with the liberation struggle.

18. In his closing statement, the Chairman reviewed the developments at the meeting and commented that it was clear that the date for the commencement of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still remained to be agreed upon. His concluding statement contained the following remarks:
“In light of all that has taken place during our meeting, the question arises whether the obstacle is the matter of trust and confidence which the South African Government informed us in Pretoria last October was the core issue affecting the setting of a date. If that is so, I am sure few will challenge the fact that this meeting has provided the participants not only with a better understanding of the international effort for a settlement of the Namibia question but also valuable opportunities for contact and discussion. In my view, this has been a most unusual meeting. An enormous effort has been made, in many forms and at many levels, to demonstrate good faith, reasonableness, a will to co-operate in the future and an understanding of the pre-occupations and anxieties of others. It is a matter for regret that these extraordinary efforts have not yet succeeded in facilitating an agreement on a date for implementation and that a great opportunity has thus been missed. I believe that all participants and observers here will wish to consider urgently the events of the last few days and the course which must be taken to expedite the attainment of the objective we have set ourselves. In particular, and on behalf of the Secretary-General, I appeal to those who have been able so far to assent to the proposals made by the Secretary-General to reconsider their position at the earliest possible time.

“The Secretary-General has been kept fully informed on the efforts made at, and on the outcome of, this meeting. He sincerely hopes that means will soon be found to go forward, as we had intended to do, to the early implementation of resolution 435 (1978), so that our time and efforts here will prove to have made a positive contribution to the solution of the question of Namibia.

“Although it has not proved possible here to secure agreement on a cease-fire date and on the commencement of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the United Nations will not relax its efforts to ensure for the people of Namibia their right to self-determination and independence through free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control.”

**Observations**

19. The pre-implementation meeting which concluded in Geneva on 14 January did not succeed in achieving the objective set for it in my report of 24 November 1980, namely the setting of a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation in the early part of 1981. It became clear in the course of the meeting, that the South African Government was not yet prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement and proceed with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).
20. The meeting was, nevertheless, important in many ways. Participants were informed in detail of the manner in which the United Nations would discharge its responsibilities during the implementation process. Further, through contacts and exchanges at a variety of levels, a remarkable effort was made to demonstrate good faith and reasonableness, with a view to proceeding towards implementation in a spirit of cooperation and understanding. I wish, in this connexion, to express my particular appreciation to OAU, represented in Geneva by its Secretary-General and by the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, to the front-line States, Nigeria and the Contact Group of the Western Five.

21. I believe that the outcome of the meeting in Geneva must give rise to the most serious international concern. Members of the Security Council, and all those concerned, will wish to consider the proceedings and the situation which has now arisen. I wish urgently to appeal to the Government of South Africa to review, with the utmost care, the implications of the meeting and to reconsider its position with regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) at the earliest possible time.

81-01436


This verbatim text of a leaked US Department of State internal memorandum of conversation was previously published, with a few minor cuts for space reasons, as *Africa Bureau Document Paper No. 26*, London, July–August 1981. The text of the original document is here reprinted in full.

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION**

Participants:
South Africa:  Foreign Minister - Pik Botha  
Defence Minister - Magnus Malan  
US:  Assistant Secretary - Designate Chester Crocker  
Alan Keyes, SIP  

Date & Place: April 15/16, 1981, Pretoria  
Subject: Discussion with SAG  
Copies to: AF, 10- McElhaney, SIP- Keys, AF/S  

**US-Africa Relations**  

Botha opened first day’s discussion by expressing unhappiness over what SAG perceives as backsliding by Administration from view of South Africa taken during U.S. presidential campaign. Reagan campaign statements produced high expectations in South Africa. But, administration, in response to views of allies, such as UK and Germany, and to influence of State Department professionals, has disappointed SAG expectations. USG handling of visit by military officers example of this. Botha raised issue of trust, referring to earlier ‘McHenry’ duplicity on issue of SWAPO bases.  

However, he affirmed that it means a great deal to SAG to have good relations with U.S. and that SAG understands U.S. problems in maintaining friendly relations with black African states. To begin second day’s discussion, Crocker noted that, though he hadn’t come to discuss South Africa’s internal affairs, it was clear that positive movement domestically would make it easier for the U.S. to work with SAG. U.S. ability to develop full relations with SAG depends on success of Prime Minister Botha’s programme and extent to which it is seen as broadening SAG’s domestic support. ‘Pik’ Botha cautioned against making success of P.W. Botha’s programme a condition of U.S./South African relations. Crocker responded with view that this is not a condition but reflects U.S. desire to support positive trends. In response, Pik Botha went more fully into reasons for deep SAG distrust of U.S. Botha reiterated view that, as result of pressure from African states in UN, and influence of State Department, USG has backed away from initial recognition of importance of its interests in southern Africa (read South Africa). He doubted whether, given domestic pressures and views of such African states
as Nigeria, U.S. could continue any policy favorable to South Africa, which would not provoke constant criticism.

In response, Crocker replied that present Administration would have more backbone in face of pressure than previous one. U.S. has many diverse interests and responsibilities, but will stand up for what we think right. Our objective is to increase SAG confidence.

Toward end of discussion, in context of Angola issue, Botha again came back to question of trust. He said he is suspicious of U.S. because of way U.S. dropped SAG in Angola in 1975. He argued that SAG went into Angola with USG support, then U.S. voted to condemn in UN. Cited many examples of past USG decisions that didn’t inspire confidence - Vietnam, Iran, USG failure to support moderate governments in Africa, while aiding those with leftist rhetoric. Alluding to Chad, Botha asserted that African leaders became so desperate for help against Qadafi that one even approached SAG privately, as last resort, to ask for help. Botha admitted that SAG can’t yet pass judgment on present Administration. He pleaded for consistency, ‘when we say something, let’s stick to it’.

Crocker addressed trust issue, saying that new Administration is tired of double think and double talk. Despite rocky start in US/SAG relations, improvement is possible. Reagan election victory represents enormous change in US public opinion on foreign policy reversing trend of post-Vietnam years.

**SAG View of Regional Situation**

During first day’s session Botha discussed at length situation in southern Africa and Africa at large. He cited economic, food and population problems to support view that Africa is a dying continent because Africans have made a mess of their independence. Botha asserted belief that cause isn’t race, but fact that new nations lack experience, cultural background, technical training.

Referring to South African past experience in helping and training blacks in neighboring states, Botha discussed the need for peaceful co-existence between South Africa and its neighbors. Until they recognize they’re making a mess of their independence, South Africa can’t help them. South Africa is willing to help those who admit they need its help. On this basis Botha presented vision of southern Africa’s future, in context of ‘Constellation of States’ concept. He appealed for USG support for South Africa’s view of region’s future, involving a confederation of states, each independent, but linked by a
centralizing secretariat. SAG doesn’t expect U.S. support for apartheid, but it hopes there will be no repeat of Mondale’s ‘One Man, One Vote’ statement. SAG goal is survival of white values, not white privileges.

Botha argued that central issue in southern Africa is subversion. Noting that what ANC does, South Africa can do better, Botha stressed need for agreement of non-use of force. If region starts to collapse, fire will spread, there will be no winners. This is not meant as a threat, but simply stating facts. Botha emphasized view that if you kill the part of Africa containing people who can do things, you kill whole of Africa.

Asked about U.S. view of the importance of southern Africa, Crocker summarized U.S. regional interests in context of its global responsibilities. He emphasized U.S. desire to deal with destabilization threat worldwide by going to their sources, using means tailored to each source and region involved. Crocker made clear that in Africa we distinguish between countries where Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence, and those whose governments espouse Marxism for their own practical purposes. He stressed that top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. U.S. wants to work with SAG, but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia. Crocker alluded to black African view that South Africa contributes to instability in region. Said he agrees with this view to extent SAG goes beyond reprisal. Putting fear in minds of inferior powers makes them irrational.

**Namibia/Angola Issue**

Malan raised topic of Angola during first session. He asked about a supposed U.S. plan for an all-African force to replace the Cubans in Angola. Crocker responded that he was aware of no such plan, except perhaps as a symbolic gesture. Views were exchanged on the character of the MPLA Government, with the South Africans firmly asserting its domination by Moscow, while Crocker suggested a more nuanced view, allowing for several factions within the MPLA varying in ideological commitment and character. Discussion touched briefly on the nature of SWAPO. Botha alluded to the view that Nujoma is a ‘Bloody Thug’.

Malan flatly declared that the SAG can’t accept prospects of a SWAPO victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from any election which left SWAPO in a dominant position. Therefore a SWAPO victory would be unacceptable in the context of a Westminster-type political system. Namibia needs a federal system.
SAG does not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO unchecked power. Botha asserted that Ovambo dominance after the election would lead to civil war.

Crocker addressed these concerns saying USG recognized need to build South African confidence and security. Malan interposed with the view that it is the local people in Namibia who need security, and SAG could accept SWAPO victory only if their security is provided for. Crocker remarked upon need to negotiate with governments, which ultimately means that parties can’t have veto power. In response Botha gave eloquent rendition of SAG’s problem in dealing with the internal parties. These parties fear secret plot to install SWAPO government. SAG doesn’t wish to entrench white privileges but some confidence-building measures needed. South Africans asked who would write a constitution. Crocker alluded to idea of expert panel.

SAG sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia. SAG believes Savimbi wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed.

Second round of discussions went into greater detail on Namibia/Angola questions. Malan declared SAG view that Angola/Namibia situation is number one problem in southern Africa. Angola is one place where U.S. can roll back Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa. Need to get rid of Cubans, and support UNITA. UNITA is going from strength to strength, while SWAPO grows military weaker.

In his response Crocker agreed on relation of Angola to Namibia. USG believes it would be possible to improve US/South African relations if Namibia were no longer an issue. We seek a settlement, but one in our interest, based on democratic principles. Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to SAG, and ways must be found to address its concerns. USG assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of Namibia settlement. We agree that UNITA is an important factor in the Angola situation. We believe there can be no peace in Angola without reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA. We see no prospect of military victory for UNITA. Must achieve movement toward reconciliation by playing on divisions in MPLA. With regard to Namibia, USG assumes that constitution is an important issue, which must be resolved before elections. The constitution would include guarantees for minority rights and democratic processes. We have said we believe SCR435 is a basis for transition to independence for Namibia, but not for a full settlement. We wish to meet SAG concerns, while taking
account of views on other side. We cannot scrap 435 without great difficulty. We wish to supplement rather than discard it.

Malan took up Namibian questions, observing that internationalization of the issue posed greatest difficulty. He alluded to tremendous distrust of UN in South Africa. He questioned inclusion of South Africa and Front Line States in the quest for a settlement, asserting that SWAPO and the internal parties should conclude it. He agreed on the need for a constitution. But 435 can’t work. The longer it takes to solve the Namibia question, the less South African pressure will be required there. We will reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO.

Malan’s remarks set stage for Botha to discuss SAG view of SWAPO. Botha noted that SAG thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet gains. But if you say SWAPO not Marxist, you move in same direction as previous administration. SWAPO’s people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day. Savimbi considers SWAPO universally Marxist. SAG’s bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek. If U.S. disagrees, let sanctions go on, and get out of the situation. South Africa can survive sanctions. Eventually South Africa can get support of moderate black African states. Better to start U.S./SAG relations with lower expectations, than to disagree angrily later. At moment, U.S. doesn’t believe SAG view of SWAPO; you’re soft on SWAPO. SAG appreciates U.S. firmness against Soviets, Botha continued. Even Africans now see you assuming leadership. But SAG worried that USG is moving toward Namibia plan SAG cannot understand. As with Kissinger attempt on Rhodesia, it will be difficult to get consensus, especially with so many parties involved. SAG tried one-to-one approach with Angolans, but Geneva meetings sidetracked effort. SAG has tried Angolans several times. Each time there is progress, but then something intervenes. We’re convinced Moscow controls present government in Angola. We’re convinced SWAPO is Marxist. Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving South Africa. We will have to invade Namibia, and other countries as well. We are pleading with you to see the dangers of a wrong solution in Namibia. It would be better to have a low-level conflict there indefinitely, than to have a civil war escalating to a general conflagration. If Nujoma governs as an Ovambo, the Hereros will fight. Also, Nujoma made promises to the Soviets. Defectors from SWAPO have revealed their plan to SAG—first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, followed by the final attack on South Africa. SAG can’t ignore this reality. We couldn’t justify that to our people. South Africa is a democracy as far as white voters are concerned. Even black
leaders can criticize the government. South Africa had freedom, and can have more, but survival is the pre-requisite. The BLS leaders agree with us. Even some Front Line leaders see the danger. We have twice saved Kaunda's life.

The situation is not what you think. You think in global terms; we’re not a global power. We must safeguard our interests here. Not just white interests. We see the necessity of avoiding black-white polarization. But we see it as an ideological struggle. Developed moderate blacks are not communists. They will engage with us in common effort against communism. When whites see blacks as allies, whites will move away from discrimination. With more distribution of economic goods, more blacks will join us. But if we all come under Moscow's domination, that’s the end.

Crocker addressed Botha's expressed fears and concerns by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the danger. But U.S. believes best way to avoid that danger is to get Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where U.S. can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open South/Central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not acceptable. The ideas U.S. has in mind don’t include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujoma wins or not.

Botha said this is the nitty-gritty. Without Soviet support, others won't accept Nujoma's rule. To satisfy others we need a political solution. Crocker agreed that a political solution is needed. Botha stressed the need to consult with leaders in Namibia. If U.S. can gain their confidence, and SWAPO's, and talk about minority rights, progress is possible. People in Namibia are concerned about property, an independent judiciary, freedom of religion, the preservation of their language and the quality of education under the present system, discrimination has been abolished by law, though it continues in practice. There is also the problem of the white ethnic Legislature vs. the black majority Council of Ministers.

Crocker said that the U.S. understands concern with constitutional rights. U.S. has inherited a situation with many parties but we must build a consensus in Africa that we are serious and not just delaying. We believe a Lancaster type conference won’t work. We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it through the Contact Group. With SAG’s help, we could sell it to internal parties. Botha referred to reports of a French constitutional plan. He said that he’s against multiple plans. Botha stressed need for U.S. leadership and emphasized need for U.S. to consult with internal
parties in Namibia. He discussed SAG relations with internal leaders, and need to avoid leaving them in lurch in order not to be discredited with other moderate leaders in Africa. He tied this to possibility of SAG co-operating with moderate African states to deal with economic development problems. Botha concluded by saying that SAG doesn’t want to let Namibia go the wrong way; that’s why South Africa is willing to pay the price of the war. We pray and hope for a government favorably disposed to us. The internal parties don’t want us to let go until they have sufficient power to control the situation. We want an anti-Soviet black government.

Following the substantive discussion, Botha conveyed to Crocker written communications from the heads of Bophuthatswana and Venda. He explained that their ambassadors wanted to deliver the messages in person, but Botha decided to convey them to avoid appearance of trying to force U.S. hand. Then question of invitation to Botha to visit U.S. in May was discussed. Crocker stressed need for SAG to decide cooperation with U.S. was worth it before accepting invitation. Botha resisted setting any conditions for visit, and said he would prefer not to come if conditions are set. Crocker said there were no conditions, just a question of clarifying the spirit in which the visit would take place. Botha ended the discussion by noting that he would inform internal parties about discussion immediately. He said he would tell Prime Minister Botha that SAG should explore question of constitution before an election in Namibia. He noted that a referendum on the constitution rather than constituent assembly elections, would make matters easier.


19 May 1981
The Honorable Alexander M Haig Jr.
Secretary of State WASHINGTON, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary
I have the honor to refer to our discussions on 14 and 15 May in Washington regarding independence for South West Africa/Namibia.

It is my Government’s understanding, based on my discussions with you, that the United States and South Africa share a goal in respect of South West Africa/Namibia, specifically, the achievement of internationally recognized independence for that territory, under a government which does not subscribe to Marxist-Leninist doctrines and which does not pose a security threat to neighboring countries.

It is our understanding, moreover, that both the United States Government and the South African Government recognize that this joint goal can only be achieved within the ambit of stabilization of the Southern African region and the exclusion of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate forces.

On the basis of our discussions I have, moreover, been able to communicate to my Government my understanding of your Administration’s assessment of its broader interests in Southern Africa, including specifically: the maintenance of access to the critical minerals of the region; the preservation of the security of the Cape sea route including the Mozambique Channel; the containment and progressive elimination of regional conflict, leading to the emergence of a stable regional environment; the normalization of South Africa’s relations with the United States and respect for South Africa’s rights as a sovereign state.

Against the background of this understanding, the South African Government is prepared to seek an internationally acceptable settlement that recognises the following elements:

1.(a) The non-acceptability to the major democratic parties and to the South African Government of the military component of UNTAG. The reasons were explained during our discussions, one of them being that the people of the Territory have by now acquired an entrenched view that the military component of UNTAG would be the most glaring symbol of U.N. partiality towards and alignment with SWAPO. The mere presence of a military component of UNTAG would be seen as a SWAPO victory.

The recent meeting of the Security Council—the body under whose ultimate authority that component of UNTAG will operate—when the DTA was denied a hearing, confirmed the people’s worst fears of U.N. partiality towards SWAPO. As I have pointed out in more than one letter to the Secretary General
of the U.N. dating back to December 1978, the South African Government has consistently maintained that the successful implementation of any proposal designed to achieve a peaceful solution will be seriously jeopardized if all the parties were not treated on an equal basis.

(b) The South African Government believes, however, that it might be possible to overcome resistance to a U.N. presence and to persuade the major democratic parties to accept civilian observers, to be constituted in consultation with all the parties, who could testify to the fairness of the process leading to independence. Due regard should be paid to the civilian nature of the functions as was the case on previous occasions where the U.N. had to deal with an electoral process.

2. The establishment and maintenance of a ceasefire to be dependent on an agreement being reached between South Africa and the states bordering on South West Africa. If there is a genuine desire on the part of such states to see a successful conclusion they should be prepared to accept a legal obligation to ensure that SWAPO does not infiltrate the territory and violate the ceasefire. The South African security forces, if and when satisfied that the threat had receded, would reduce their numbers in the light of the conditions prevailing on the ground. The question of a ceasefire and progress towards a situation of peace would be a matter for mutual arrangement between South Africa and the states concerned.

3. Guarantees of a non-aligned and neutral position for an independent South West Africa with regard to world power blocs and world and regional conflicts.

4. Guarantees of continued adherence to democratic procedures, such as regular elections based on universal franchise, the secrecy of the poll and the freedom of peaceful electoral action by political parties.

5. Guarantees for certain fundamental rights, such as respect for private ownership of property, the independence and inviolability of the judicial system, freedom of speech and of peaceful association.

6. Guarantees for the rights of minorities inter alia by guaranteeing representation in the supreme legislative body of at least two representatives of each ethnic group to be chosen by the groups themselves.

7. The inclusion of the Republic of South Africa in such group of guarantors as may be assembled for the purpose of the foregoing.
8. In addition to the South African Government’s efforts, the United States Government individually or collectively with the Western Contact Group would elicit details as to the formulation and extent of these guarantees in consultation with the major democratic parties before the commencement of the independence process.

9. The question of the use of Walvis Bay by a future government of an independent Namibia to stand over until such a government is elected and it could then be discussed between that government and the South African Government.

My Government, Mr. Secretary, has been encouraged and heartened by the spirit and content of our discussions, which indicate a new understanding of our problems of our position in Southern Africa. We trust that we can move forward in a positive way on the issues we have discussed.

With warm personal regards
Yours sincerely
R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information

NAM 14 — 4 February 1982, Cuba-Angola Declaration, Saleg Washington 12.2.82 1220

In less than 20 days the South African troops advanced more than 700 kms, into Angola territory. At the same time, in the north, regular foreign and mercenary troops were coming dangerously close to the capital. It was at this time that President Antonio Agostinho Neto asked for Cuba’s military assistance. The heroic resistance of the Angolan people, assisted by friendly internationalist forces, permitted not only stopped the advance of the South African racist troops some 200 kms from Luanda but also expelling them from Angolan territory on March 27, 1976. The occupation of Angola by South Africa constituted a serious threat for the nations of that region, and in fact, for all independent Africa. Cuba’s internationalist help to the Angolan people in the resistance against the South African racist invaders is therefore a valuable contribution to the struggle of the African people against colonialism, racism and apartheid.
Since this action was justified, a directive of the principles and objectives of the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, the Fifth Summit Conference celebrated in Sri Lanka in August of 1976, said “it congratulated the government of the people of Angola for its heroic and victorious struggle against the racist invaders from South Africa and their allies and praised the Republic of Cuba and the other nations that helped the people of Angola to frustrate the expansionist and colonialist strategy of the South Africa regime and its allies.”

In agreement with this, the Cuban and Angolan governments declare:

1) The presence and the departure of Cuban troops stationed in Angola represent a bilateral matter between two sovereign states, the Popular Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, according to the contents of Article 41 of the UN Charter.

2) The governments of Angola and Cuba, scarcely one month after the expulsion of the South Africa racist troops, began a program of gradual reduction of Cuban troops, on April 22, 1976. In less than one year, the Cuban military contingents were reduced by more than one third. This process was stopped due to new exterior threats against Angola.

3) The magnitude and the depth of the South African aggression against Kasinga, in May 1978, and the threatening presence of NATO paratroops stationed near its northeastern border signified great danger to Angola and made even more necessary the presence of the Cuban military troops and material to guarantee the territory’s and integrity.

4) In mid-1979, the governments of Angola and Cuba agreed, once again, to initiate another program of gradual reduction of Cuban forces, but almost immediately, in September of that year, the South Africans carried out repeated large scale acts of aggression against the provinces of Cunche and Huila.

5) In August 1981, a large scale act of aggression took place with the invasion of the province of Cunene by large contingents of regular South African troops armed with powerful means of artillery, armored vehicles and dozens of airplanes and included, in fact, the occupation of the provincial capital and other places for several weeks. In spite of the condemnation by the international community of this criminal act, as expressed in the Security Council resolution. Although vetoed by the USA, South African troops persisted in occupying considerable areas of the provinces of Cunene and Cuando-Cubango.
6) It is thus demonstrated that the carrying out of the gradual reduction program of Cuban troops in the Popular Republic of Angola has been impeded several times because of the constant and criminal attacks against Angola.

7) Every year the USA and South Africa have increased the use, as a means of aggression against Angola, of counterrevolutionary bands who have their headquarters, training camps, military material warehouse and radio communication centers in Namibia. Meanwhile, the present North American administration is today giving greater economic and military support to South Africa, its policeman against the Southern African people, with complete disdain for U.N., OAS, and the Non-aligned Movement’s resolutions as well as international public opinion. Therefore the danger to Angola on the Frontline is greater than ever before.

8) Faced with the hypocritical stipulation of conditioning the question of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the Angolan and Cuban governments reiterate that the presence of these forces provoked by the external aggression from the racist and fascist South African troops, in close alliance with the USA, constitutes an absolutely sovereign and legitimate act of countries and therefore is in no way related to the problem of Namibia.

9) If the unselfish struggle of SWAPO, the one and only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the requirements by the international community should help reach a true solution to the problem of Namibia, based on strict compliance with Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the U.N. and if this would bring about a truly independent government and the complete withdrawal of the South African occupation troops to the other side of the Orange River, which would diminish considerably the danger of aggression against Angola, the Angolan and Cuban governments would analyze reinitiating the gradual reduction of Cuban forces within a period of time agreed to by both governments.

10) Therefore, when the governments of Angola and Cuba see this become reality, the withdrawal of Cuban forces stationed in Angolan territory will be made by the sovereign decision of the government of the popular Republic of Angola, once that any and all possibility of aggression or armed invasion have ceased in this sense, the government of Cuba reiterates that it will abide, without hesitation, by any decision that the sovereign government of the Popular Republic of Angola makes about the withdrawal of said forces.
Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic state.

The Constitution will be the supreme law of the state. It may be amended only by designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum.

The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. It will provide for a system of government with three branches: an elected executive branch which will be responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote.

The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A.1. above.

There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.

It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect.

Provision will be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the police service and the defense services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these services.
The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local and/or regional administration.

**NAM 16 — 6 MARCH 1984, MESSAGE OF R.F. BOTHA TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ANGOLA, AND ZAMBIA, SOUTH AFRICA DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

In my statement of 26 February 1984, I mentioned that the South African Government had made it clear to the Angolan delegation on the Joint Monitoring Commission that SWAPO’s activities in the area were contrary to the letter and the spirit of the agreement reached in Lusaka. The Angolans did not question this analysis and undertook to consider concrete ways and means of giving effect to the Lusaka agreement.

Although the Joint Monitoring Commission commenced its operations as scheduled and cooperation on the ground between the Angolan and South African components is satisfactory, it is nevertheless clear that serious breaches of the Lusaka agreement have continued as a result of SWAPO activities. These breaches include the following:

SWAPO has used the disengagement process to infiltrate a large number of terrorists, possibly as many as 800 into South West Africa. This is a clear breach of the condition set out in South Africa’s offer of 15 December 1983 that “SWAPO… would not exploit the resulting situation, in particular with regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia”.

There are still considerable numbers of SWAPO in the area of the Joint Monitoring Commission. One company of SWAPO is at present in the Mupa-Evale-Nehone area. Two companies are in the vicinity of Mulola-Chitando and one company is north of Mupa.

SWAPO continues to move southward from Dongo despite the FAPLA presence there. There are indications that 350 SWAPO special unit members in the Indungo area, within FAPLA’s sphere of control, have already begun to move southwards. FAPLA deployed reconnaissance units in Xangongo and Mupa as early as 28 February 1984 in contravention of the terms of the Mulungushi Minute. SWAPO units in Jamba and
Cahama continue to receive the military supplies required for their operations against South West Africa via FAPLA controlled routes from Namibe and Lubango. FAPLA has not exerted pressure on SWAPO to call back its forces in the area in question by radio, even though it has this capability.

As a result of these developments the Angolan component of the Joint Monitoring Commission was informed today that the South African forces in southern Angola and the Joint Monitoring Commission will remain in their present positions for as long as may be necessary to give the Angolan authorities the fullest opportunity of restricting SWAPO activities in accordance with their commitments.

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**NAM 17 — 21 MARCH 1984, LETTER FROM C.A. CROCKER TO R.F. BOTHA, SECRET, SOUTH AFRICA DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

The Honorable R. F. Botha  
Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of South Africa  
Cape Town

Dear Pik:

We did not ever think that it would be easy to pull off a negotiated settlement including Cuban troop withdrawal. We quite agree with you that the treatment of the subject of the ANC and SWAPO in the March 19 Angola/Cuba communiqué is gratuitous and provocative, and we understand perfectly that you are under pressure to respond. We have made that clear to the MPLA as well in passing your message to them. We have also been in touch with Presidents Kaunda and Machel.

At the same time, I think it is important to consider whose ends it serves for the inclusion of those points to result in serious damage to the negotiations. That is the risk of the escalation of public statements that is occurring.

It remains very true that real analysis of what took place at Havana and its significance for the future of the negotiations will have to await our next meeting with the MPLA. It is not an unknown phenomenon that an organization under severe pressures like the MPLA kicks up a big cloud of dust just before it does something useful. It is thus not
impossible that the MPLA and the Cubans have just fired off a large volley of face-saving words prior to making what could be a very major concession to us in private on Cuban troop withdrawal.

I want you to know that I, too, was disturbed to see that President Dos Santos signed a document with those points about SWAPO and the ANC. As I mentioned in our phone conversation, words are cheap and may be the one tool the MPLA has to fend off criticism of its diplomacy with you and us. At the same time, I do believe we would make a mistake to let the success of some Cuban drafter in putting that point in the communiqué lead us into taking action that would let the MPLA off the hook or give the Cubans and MPLA hardliners cause to make fresh trouble. We must find out exactly what was meant in the communiqué by the statement that “Cuba and Angola… by their own decision and in exercise of their sovereignty… will reinitiate the implementation of the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist military contingent…” Despite all of the rigid and unreasonable positions surrounding that statement in the communiqué, it nonetheless opens up to us very interesting possibilities that it would be very unfortunate if we were unable to pursue with the MPLA.

The withdrawal of Cuban communist troops from your region remains at the very core of South African and American objectives in Southern Africa. We have had to repeat this to each other several times. We believe it; we believe that you believe it. I appreciated your decision not to withdraw South African participation from the Joint Monitoring Commission. I urge you and South Africa to bear with us as we… with the negotiations.

As we see it, Angola and Cuba had to meet if there was to be movement on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. It was perhaps inevitable that that meeting would result in a cloud of disagreeable words. Even if the Angolans did not want it that way, the Cubans and almost certainly the Soviets did. The trick for us now is not to let their malicious actions distract us from our pursuit of this main point. We ask your help in that endeavor.

Finally, I would underscore how much has recently been achieved through our joint diplomacy. Through fast, but careful effort, we have isolated the Soviets and Cubans on Southern Africa. Our allies and your friends in Europe are solidly supportive. Even the French are making warm noises about rejoining the work of the Contact Group. The Frontline States have held more or less solid with you and President Machel; despite the best efforts of Moscow, Havana and the ANC, the OAU Ministers did not pull the rug from under the participants in the peace process in Southern Africa. In sum, you (and
we) have accumulated a solid store of diplomatic capital in the past two months. We have created a dynamic and seized the initiative. To capitalize on this, we must continue to create new facts and forward movement quicker than Moscow’s agitpropaganda can poison the wells in Southern Africa. Only your Government and ours, by full coordination, can make this happen.

Sincerely,

Chester A. Crocker

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**NAM 18 — 5 APRIL 1984, TELEGRAM, SECRET, TO D. STEWARD FROM AURET**

1. As you know Genl. Geldenhuys and his delegation visited Ongiva today for discussions with an Angolan delegation headed by De Moura and including, with the exception of its usual members, also Maj. Jose Maria, Secretary of Defence in the President’s Office and Maj. Mutindi (?), governor of the Cunene Province.

2. At a pre-meeting discussion, Genl. Geldenhuys indicated that he wanted to make use of the meeting, which would not take place under the usual pressures of deciding to move the headquarters of the JMC or not, to indicate to the Angolans that the final and most critical phase of Phase One of the present operation had been reached. The Commission had reached the final point before the final move to Oshikango, i.e. the withdrawal from Angola and the South African Government would have to be satisfied that the process had achieved its objective and that a visible peace had been established in the area in question (AIQ) before the final move could be made. He was of the opinion that no SWAPO presence or movement in the AIQ should be seen as insignificant and that if there was even the slightest indication that this was the case, the JMC should not move.

3. In his opening remarks at the meeting, De Moura said that there was not much to discuss but that he wanted to reiterate that the process in which South African and Angola was engaged should proceed apace. The sincerity of the Angolan government to achieve success made it possible that senior members of its government could
attend such meetings to assist the JMC in its work. He saw the purpose of the meeting as evaluating progress which had been made and planning its next steps. He would also like to receive information regarding the timing of the next ministerial meeting, the proposed agenda and the names of the South African delegation.

4. Geldenhuys pointed out that it had become a routine for him to visit the JHC at regular intervals in the past. Although a precise period could not always be determined, every opportunity should be used to assist the JMC in its work. He agreed that there was not much to discuss since the last meeting had taken place only a few days ago and the JMC had only just moved to Ongiva. With regard to the exchange of prisoners he indicated that this matter would soon be finalized since the mechanics had been set in motion. Turning to the JMC, he said that he wished to raise one important and serious point. A critical stage of the process agreed to at Lusaka had been reached. The next move of the JMC would be the last physical step in this process.

[Excised], which embodied a peace plan for the AIQ. In a week or so, the truth would have to be faced and the question asked whether or not the Lusaka Agreement had worked. The general feeling, also amongst the South African public, was that progress has been made. The activities of the JMC had been made public through the press, radio and TV, and the public was aware of the various moves of the JMC from Cuvelai, southwards. Everyone was eagerly waiting to see what would happen when the JMC moved to Oshikango.

There was an expectation whether or not there would be peace. The Lusaka Agreement and the JMC activities had been presented in a positive light, also in a TV program which had been factual and non-controversial and had been seen by the JMC. This had added to the expectancy, although not everyone in South Africa was positively disposed to the agreement. The South African Government (SAG) had to consider all these factors in judging the results which had been achieved. The SAG was adamant that everything should be done to make the Agreement work. If, in the next week or two, events should show that all was not well, this could have a serious effect on the process. The SAG could be placed in an embarrassing situation and future steps and progress could be negatively influenced. The SAG required the JMC to do everything in its power to ensure success.

Success and the evaluation thereof could not only be based on the good cooperation which existed between the components of the JMC, but on whether the terms of
the agreement had been and still are being observed. The question which have to be asked was whether there were South African, Cuban or SWAPO troops in the AIQ. The SAG would not give its blessing to a move to Oshikango if a situation in which the terms of the agreement had not been fulfilled.

5. A this stage I said I had not yet received any information regarding the ministerial meeting but I would be in a position to respond early next week.

6. In his comments on Geldenhuys's remarks, De Moura launched a long and rambling exposition of his point of view. Apart from rehashing his known and negative views of violation of Angolan sovereignty, he said that SA had tried to propagandize the information which it had released on the activities of the JMC. He referred also to the question of the UNITA bandits and solution to problem of Namibia. At this point Geldenhuys interrupted De Moura and said that he was not prepared to continue discussions if De Moura persisted in speaking substantively on matters falling outside the ambit of the Lusaka Agreement and in using offending language. De Moura responded that he had had no intention of offending. Geldenhuys rejoined and amongst others pointed out that other forums has been created to discuss the points De Moura had referred to. He repeated that the point at issue was what the position would be when the JMC reached Oshikango. Would the peace which had been created be maintained and would the terms of the Lusaka Agreement be continued to be respected. There should be no SWAPO, Cuban troops or SA forces in the air. If there were any violations in this regard it should be brought to the notice of the JMC. He wanted to state that in his view the JMC should continue to operate in the past until such time as further ministerial discussions took place and other decisions had been reached. The discussions were thereafter adjourned without setting a date for the next meeting.

7. De Moura’s outburst is perhaps typical of what we have come to expect of him but he clearly embarrassed the other members of his delegation who were, in my view, receptive to the points raised by Geldenhuys. However, it is patently clear that political questions such as UNITA, which fall outside the purview of the JMC, are becoming increasingly important to the Angolans and that such questions and others will have to be discussed at a further meeting at ministerial level. This, I believe, should take place sooner rather than later. Even though these matters are not discussed at JMC level, I fear that the continued reference to them at this level will, to a large extent, negatively influence the atmosphere in the JMC. I do not think this is conducive to
the future activities of the JMC, especially now when we are about to conclude the first '30 day' period and to proceed with the second period of 30 days. Geldenhuys made this point clearly and effectively in his reaction to De Moura, but I believe that we should seriously consider a further ministerial meeting as soon as possible.

NAM 19 — 1 MAY 1985, LETTER, FROM R.F. BOTHA TO LT-COL MANUEL RODRIGUES, SOUTH AFRICA DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Lt-Col Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues (Kito) Minister of the Interior
People’s Republic of Angola
LUANDA

Dear Mr Minister

I am pleased that we shall soon have an opportunity of renewing the discussions which we conducted last year. As you are aware, there are a number of important issues of concern to our two countries which we will be able to discuss in Maputo on 9 May 1985. These issues include the utilization of the Ruacana/Calueque project and the situation which will arise along the SWA/Angola border after the Joint Monitoring Commission has completed its operations.

There are, however, two matters of more immediate concern to us which I should like to bring to your attention now.

Firstly, it is clear that SWAPO has taken advantage of the disengagement of South African forces from the Area-in Question, by moving large numbers into the area which has been vacated by South Africa. SWAPO activities have escalated sharply since 17 April 1985. Since then, it has carried out three unsuccessful attacks on South African positions at Okalongo on 20 April 1985, at Ruacana on 26 April 1985 and on a temporary base near Beacon 16 on 27 April 1985. The South African Government has reason to believe that SWAPO intends to escalate its attacks in the near future. These attacks are being planned in Angola and would be launched from Angolan territory.
Secondly, South Africa has been disturbed by inflammatory reports which have recently been disseminated by the Angolan media. According to these reports, South Africa’s decision to withdraw its forces was a “disgusting political maneuver, despite the fact that the Angolan Government has repeatedly called for an urgent completion of the disengagement process.” Other Angolan reports complained of the continuing presence of South African forces at Calueque, despite the fact that Angola had agreed to their presence there. Unsubstantiated allegations were made that South African aircraft had overflown Angolan territory and that the SADF was responsible for increasing tension along the border. However, during the whole of this period the JMC continued to function effectively and harmoniously and there was no trace of increased tension.

South Africa strongly urges the Angolan Government to take whatever steps may be necessary to ensure that SWAPO will not use Angolan territory to launch attacks on South West Africa. South Africa also wishes to point out that the anti-South African propaganda campaign of the Angolan media does not promote the cause of reasoned dialogue between our two countries.

South Africa believes that the Lusaka Agreement has, during the past 15 months, enabled both our countries to improve channels of communication with one another, to maintain peace between our forces and to make progress toward the solution of the problems of the region. It would be regrettable were anything to occur which might jeopardise this process.

Yours sincerely
RF BOTHA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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**NAM 20 — 15 JUNE 1988, SECRET REPORT FROM AA JAQUET TO SRA ON CURRENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA**

Sending/Completion priority: Priority.
Codes: SRA
Security Classification: Secret
CURRENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA

Missions will be aware of the useful exploratory discussions held on 3 and 4 May in London at senior officials level between a South African delegation and an Angolan delegation (which contained a strong Cuban component) and facilitated by a U.S. delegation led by Dr. Chester Crocker.

In the course of these discussions, the Angolan delegation presented, as an opening bid, an unrealistic set of proposals for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. After South Africa had rejected the proposals and had provided written comment and objections, Angola requested that the South African delegation prepare its own proposals and present these at a follow-up meeting between the parties. Informal agreement was also reached on an African venue for the subsequent meeting.

During and immediately after the London talks it became apparent that a large Cuban expeditionary force, intermingled with SWAPO and FAPLA elements, was moving aggressively southwards towards the Cunene River and on the SWA/Namibia border. Since SA had been pursuing direct bilateral negotiations with Angola for some time before the London meeting and in view of Congo Brazzaville’s offer during separate bi-lateral contacts to be of assistance, the Angolans were invited to meet urgently in Brazzaville and in mid-May Ministers R.F. Botha and M. Malan met with an Angolan ministerial delegation in Brazzaville. At this bilateral meeting South Africa expressed concern at the
deployment of Cuban troops on the SWA border, which did not tally with the peace negotiations currently underway. Concern was also expressed at revelations that on at least two occasions ANC terrorists, trained and supplied in Angola, had entered South Africa with missiles which they intended using against civilian aircraft. SA also raised the important question of the threat posed by the newly-deployed Cuban troops to the continued supply of water to Ovamboland from the Calueque hydroelectric installation close to the SWA border.

The Angolans conducted themselves in a constructive manner throughout, gave assurances that they were serious about peace negotiations, said South Africa’s concerns would be conveyed to their government immediately and that nothing would be done from the Angolan side to hamper these negotiations. They also undertook to provide SA with a response to concerns about the continued water supply to Ovamboland. It was also agreed and publically announced that with the concurrence of the Brazzaville government, the follow-up meeting that had been agreed on would now take place in Brazzaville. The United States and Cuban governments subsequently agreed on the venue and the meeting was scheduled for 8 and 9 June.

Late in May, the Angolans unexpectedly, and to the great annoyance of the Brazzaville government, changed their minds and suggested Paris as a venue. While this sudden about-face remains without a satisfactory explanation, it appears to have been imposed by the Cubans, who are reportedly irritated that South Africa is successfully using discussions with the Angolans on African soil as a means of furthering a diplomatic offensive in Africa. We also believe that pressure exerted on the Angolans by African states at the OAU summit in favor of national reconciliation also contributed to the Angolan decision to abandon Brazzaville as a venue.

Although a matter of procedure and not of substance, the choice of venue is proving problematical and is characterized by an exchange of proposals and counterproposals between the South African, Angolan and U.S. governments. At this stage, the Angolans have yet to react to a choice of four African venues proposed by South Africa (Zaire, Ivory Coast, Malawi, or Swaziland). SA also indicated informally to the USA that Maputo would be acceptable and that SA would respond favorably if invested by the Kenyan government to meet in Nairobi.
There are several reasons for South Africa’s insistence on an African venue. In the first place there seems to be merit in finding African solutions to African problems. This signals to Africa that we are committed to the continent and do not seek salvation elsewhere. This stand is strongly supported by every African leader we have spoken to in recent times.

Secondly, beyond the symbolic gesture, our rationale springs from a need to get African leaders involved in a concerted effort to bring about national reconciliation in Angola. While the superpowers and South Africa are best placed to broker Cuban troop withdrawal, only other African states stand a chance of persuading the MPLA to settle its differences with Savimbi and UNITA. Consequently the choice of an African location for peace talks would be helpful to nudge African leaders into a more active role.

In the meantime a comprehensive set of proposals and a detailed implementation plan have been compiled and will be provided to missions at the time of the next meeting between the parties. In London Angola requested that advance copies of the proposals should be provided to them but this will only be done once firm agreement has been reached on a date and venue.

In conversations with host governments and other contacts, missions should stress the following aspects:

1. A serious situation has developed along the SWA/Namibia–Angola border. Over the past months a large buildup of Cuban forces and SWAPO elements has been taking place at a time when discussions between South Africa and Angola appear to indicate the possibility of reaching agreements which would lead to the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola and an end to the civil war in that country. This would be achieved through a process of national reconciliation and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, which would lead to the independence of SWA/Namibia. The South African government views this buildup of force just north of the SWA/Namibia border with grave concern and as a violation of the spirit of the discussions which took place in London and Brazzaville. All parties interested in peace in the region should urge the Angolan and Cuban governments to exercise the utmost restraint in this regard and not to jeopardize future discussions.
2. On its part South Africa is serious about peace negotiations and has shown flexibility in the meetings thus far. Proof of this can be seen in South Africa’s unequivocal statement at the beginning of the London talks that it considered itself bound to the letter and spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 435 for the independence of SWA/Namibia. What is now required for the negotiations to regain momentum is a show of good faith by the Angolans who up to now have only come forward with proposals they made in a different form several years ago and who in fact have lengthened their proposed timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from two years to four years.

3. Prevarication and their about-face on the venue raises suspicions as to the intentions of the Angolans and Cubans vis-à-vis the peace talks. (For your own information: the words of President Sasso Nguesso of Brazzaville, “If the Angolans go back on their word about a venue, how can they be trusted to abide by substantive agreements they sign?”)

4. The Angolan and Cuban sides have put their good faith in further doubt, in breaking an explicit undertaking by all sides involved in the London talks not to engage in propaganda which would impede future talks. The Angolans have in the past weeks issued repeated exaggerated statements at the UN in New York. The Cubans, in addition to their military maneuvers in S-W Angola, have launched an extensive propaganda exercise in Havana, in the course of a special conference of “non-aligned” nations during which Castro made a series of provocative statements which have been widely publicized. Diplomatic representatives of both countries have been particularly active in a public propaganda exercise aimed at projecting their “flexibility” in the face of SA’s “intransigence and delaying tactics.”

5. South Africa enters these negotiations in a strong position. UNITA’s military victories in the past year and the SWA Territorial Forces’ success in neutralizing SWAPO infiltration, together with the capture of close to one billion dollars’ worth of Soviet equipment, has had a serious negative impact on the Luanda government. Although UNITA are the big winners, they are not represented at the negotiating table. However neither they nor South Africa can be expected to give up advantages gained on the ground until satisfactory arrangements have been made for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which is our main objective in these negotiations.
6. In view of the November Presidential Elections, the United States appears to be in more of a hurry than other parties to reach a settlement. This is reflected in the speed with which the USA agreed on the Soviet proposal of September 29, 1988 as a target date for a solution to outstanding problems. While South Africa is serious about negotiations, the complicated issues involved mean that we do not expect to achieve success at one or even several meetings and SA will not be rushed into a quick settlement for the sake of the U.S. of Soviet agendas. It could also be argued that the MPLA and Cubans are merely going through the motions and are not inclined to make concessions now when there is a chance that in November a U.S. President may be elected who could stop U.S. assistance to UNITA and recognize the MPLA government.

7. National reconciliation (i.e., bringing UNITA and Savimbi into a coalition government, with the promise of elections down the road) is a very important element for South Africa. The MPLA’s main objective with these talks appears to be to break the power of UNITA or at least neutralize Savimbi, and this is a major obstacle to peace in the region. The Luanda is a major obstacle to peace in the region. The Luanda government’s reluctance to seriously pursue national reconciliation with UNITA is unrealistic. Luanda’s contention that UNITA can be accommodated by means of the MPLA’s “clemency and harmonization program” indicates a reluctance to come to grips with the real issues. This program amounts to attracting minor dissidents into the MPLA fold through financial and other inducements and by no stretch of the imagination does UNITA fit into this category under Savimbi’s leadership, UNITA has achieved significant military success on the ground, and physically controls roughly one third of the country. His commando units operate throughout the country, in the far north Cabinda province and in the suburbs of Luanda. UNITA enjoys strong support from moderate Africa and many Western countries. Luanda in fact fears UNITA’s strength as well as Savimbi’s support and addresses this situation by saying that national reconciliation is an internal matter to be dealt with after Namibian independence has been achieved.

8. Another major obstacle to peace remains the Cuban presence in Angola. Recent reports indicate that far from being withdrawn, that presence has recently been increased
to a level approaching 54,000 Cubans. A report from Washington indicates that the Cubans may have three goals in mind with this increase:

a. To make their decision of withdrawing troops from Angola to appear afterwards to have been a bigger concession that it in fact was, and in so doing extract more concessions from South Africa;

b. To put South Africa under direct military pressure through cross border activity; and

c. To withdraw from a position of strength so as to avoid losing face.

A fourth motive can be added that of placing SWAPO elements in secured camps on the SWA/Namibia border, a position they have been unable to achieve on their own to date. The Cubans appear to be acting increasingly independently from the MPLA in pursuit of their own agenda. In the London talks it was quite apparent that a great deal of tension existed between the Cubans and the Angolans.

Finally Cuba may see a distinct advantage in projecting itself as a long standing firm supporter of SWAPO which it hopes will soon be in power in Windhoek.

9. Cuba has its own agenda in Africa since it sees itself as the chief liberator of the continent from colonial domination. Close to thirty thousand students from Africa are presently in Cuba and children as young as 9 years old are sent to Cuba for school and university education so as to return to their countries as conditioned Marxists. Some of the less-schooled black Cubans are conditioned to believe that their forefathers came from Angola and that they therefore have a moral duty to go and fight for freedom in their country of origin. Further evidence of their duplicitous behavior is the covert program of “nationalization” of their troops in Angola.
The Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa. They recognize that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

   The parties shall agree upon and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the commencement of implementation of UNSCR 435/78.

B. The Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and of the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with the dispositions of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations, cooperate with the Secretary-General with a view toward ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of said Resolution.

C. Redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both states to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.

D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of states and for the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

F. Abstention from the threat and utilization of force against the territorial integrity and independence of states.

G. The acceptance of responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states.

H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.
I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.

J. Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.

K. Recognition of the role of the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.

L. The right to each state to peace, development, and social progress.

M. African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa.


The Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988

Delegations representing the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola / Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, 2–5 August 1988, with the mediation of Dr. Chester A Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, United States of America, have agreed as follows:

1. Each side agrees to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that 1 November 1988 be established as the date for implementation of UNSCR 435/78.

2. Each side agrees to the establishment of a target date for signature of the tripartite agreement among Angola, South Africa, and Cuba not later than 10 September 1988.

3. Each side agrees that a schedule acceptable to all parties for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be established by Angola and Cuba, who will request on-site verification by the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties accept 1 September 1988 as the target date for reaching agreement on that schedule and all related matters.

4. The complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola shall begin not later than 10 August 1988 and be completed not later than 1 September 1988.

5. The parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures of restraint in order to maintain the existing de facto cessation of hostilities. South Africa stated its willingness to convey this commitment in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Angola and Cuba shall urge SWAPO to proceed likewise as a step prior to the ceasefire contemplated in resolution 435/78 which will be established prior to 1 November
1988. Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total of withdrawal of South Africa troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO’s forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel. The parties deemed it appropriate that, during the period before 1 November 1988, a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General be present in Luanda to take cognizance of any disputes relative to the cessation of hostilities and agreed that the combined military committee contemplated in paragraph 9 can be an appropriate venue for reviewing complaints of this nature that may arise.

6. As of 10 August 1988, no Cuban troops will deploy or be south of the line Chitado-Ruacana-Caleque-Naulila-Cuamato-N’Giva. Cuba furthermore stated that upon completion of the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola not later than 1 September 1988 and the restoration by the People’s Republic of Angola and of its sovereignty over its international boundaries, the Cuban troops that lie east of meridian 17 and south of parallel 15 degrees, 30 minutes, provided they are not subject to harassment.

7. Following the complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, the Government of Angola shall guarantee measures for the provision of water and power supply to Namibia.

8. With a view toward minimizing the risk of battlefield incidents and facilitating the exchange of technical information related to implementation of the agreements reached, direct communications shall be established not later than 20 August 1988 between the respective military commanders at appropriate headquarters along the Angola / Namibia border.

9. Each side recognizes that the period from 1 September 1988, by which time South African forces will have completed their withdrawal from Angola, and the date established for implementation of UNSCR 435, is a period of particular sensitivity, for which specific guidelines for military activities are presently lacking. In the interest of maintaining the ceasefire and maximizing the conditions of the orderly introduction of UNTAG, the sides agree to establish a combined military committee to develop additional practical measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of unintended incidents. They invite the United States membership on the committee.

10. Each side will act in accordance with the Governors Island principles, including paragraph E (non-interference in the internal affairs of states) and paragraph G (the acceptance of responsibility of states to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states).
The allegations by the South Africa Foreign Minister in Windhoek yesterday that SWAPO has carried out military raid on South African troops in Namibia is misleading and false.

The information that SWAPO has is that the South African military authorities have lately authorized two of their anti-SWAPO units, namely Battalions 101 and 202 to conduct a general hunt of PLAN soldiers who had been inside Namibia avoiding armed contacts with the South African forces since September last year. The apparent reason for this was to try to eliminate all armed SWAPO cadres inside Namibia before the cease-fire went into effect on 1 April. After having exhausted all options to evade the pursuing army, PLAN combatants decided to stand and fight. They thus clashed with South African troops at Okahenga in northern Namibia, and from then on the situation developed from bad to worse as more units joined the fighting. More PLAN men took positions in echelon to fight in support of their comrades facing a premeditated campaign of annihilation.

However, SWAPO armed cadres have been under strict instructions not to initiate any act of military hostility in violation of the cease-fire agreement which came into effect yesterday. To this end, the President of SWAPO visited Namibia/ Angolan frontier areas on 30 and 31 March to issue cease-fire directives to PLAN members in an effort to ensure that the terms of the cease-fire agreement were respected to the letter and spirit. It remains the earnest desire of SWAPO to scrupulously observe the terms of the cease-fire agreement. To avoid further clashes, SWAPO considers it imperative that UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) moves swiftly to destabilize end confine to base the former warring troops. The leadership of SWAPO is ready to play its part in ensuring that further
clashes are avoided by moving swiftly all PLAN cadres on both side of the Namibian/Angolan border under UNTAG confinement. To this end, SWAPO extended an urgent invitation to UNTAG that a meeting should be held between the UNTAG Force commander or his representative to meet with PLAN Senior commanders to work out arrangements for troops demobilization and confinement to bases. This was on 22 March. It is to be regretted that such a meeting has not yet taken place. Our delegation of PLAN commanders is in Luanda waiting for the planned meeting with UNTAG military officers.

UNTAG also need to deploy the necessary force to carry out the demobilization and confinement of the opposing forces. The skeleton of 873 troops now on the ground is far inadequate. As a consequence of this inadequacy, the Special Representative of UN Secretary General in Namibia has authorized South African troops to attack and eliminate PLAN cadres in their motherland.

The need to move with maximum speed cannot be over emphasized, because the ceasefire agreement is being violated in many other forms by the vengeful South African troops and their local conscripts. For instance, on the ceasefire day, South African helicopter gunships fired shots at a group of SWAPO supporters at Orunghulo in northern Namibia, killing 8 of them and wounding several others. The crime for which these compatriots were killed and others maimed is that they wore SWAPO T-shirts. Indeed, people are being killed and beaten up every day in northern Namibia for daring to put on SWAPO T-shirts. Houses of SWAPO supporters are daily being burnt down by members of Battalion 101 and 202.

On 31 March, the city of Windhoek was turned into a huge military barrack as the South African military authorities in the territory brought thousands of members of these notoriously anti-SWAPO Battalions to beat up and shoot at SWAPO members who had gathered in the capital to welcome the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative. Because it was quite obvious that there was going to be bloodshed, the SWAPO leadership in the country decided to call off the planned welcome march to the airport.

For the last 5 months, the South African troops in Namibia have been waging an unmitigated anti-SWAPO political and intimidation campaign to harass and humiliate our supporters.

This is the background against which the present situation must be seen.
The Joint Commission created by the Protocol of Brazzaville of 13 December 1988, met at Mount Etjo, Namibia, on 8 to 9 April 1989 in an extraordinary session.

Delegations of the Peoples’ Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa, parties to the New York accord of 22 December 1988, attended this meeting.

Delegations from the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics participated in their capacity as observers.


(b) In order to facilitate the restoration of peace and to promote the full application of Resolution 435/78, the Security Council of the United Nations and the subsequent agreements subscribed to by the parties, as well as the restoration of the situation in existence on 31 March 1989, and taking into account in this regard the declaration by the leadership of SWAPO on 8 April 1989, the parties agree to a package of recommendations which are reflected in the attached annexure.

(c) The parties urge the Secretary General of the United Nations to urgently adopt all the necessary measures for the most rapid and complete deployment of UNTAG so that it can fully and effectively carry out its mandate. They likewise urge all member states of the United Nations, particularly those who are members of the Security Council, to extend to the Secretary General their full cooperation with the carrying out of UNTAG’s tasks.

MOUNT ETJO, NAMIBIA, 9 APRIL 1989
Tuynhuys, Cape Town
26 April 1989

Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 24 April 1989. I have noted the concern which you express regarding the events in northern Namibia.

I too share your concern that there should not be senseless loss of life in the critical situation which has developed because of the illegal SWAPO incursions into Namibia. I can assure you, Mr. President that the security forces are acting with great responsibility and restraint under very difficult circumstances. However, I am afraid that one-sided and false reports have been disseminated by certain elements, alleging brutalities on the part of the South African security forces. I stand ready to have each and every charge properly investigated, if evidence substantiating improper behavior could be produced.

Mr. President, the facts regarding the situation are by now beyond dispute. After a period of almost eight months during which very few incidents took place, SWAPO decided to bring the war back to Namibia. There can be no other conclusion in view of the intelligence which we have been able to gather since 31 March 1989.

The South African response to this violation of its commitments by SWAPO was measured and, in the circumstances, restrained. Despite the provocation, South Africa at all times acted in strict compliance with the provisions of the agreements it had entered into. South Africa’s duty to protect the people of Namibia did not end upon the implementation of the peace process. But we did expect that others who had solemnly accepted the responsibilities placed upon them by the agreements, would honour their commitments.

Thus, while South Africa did what was required to protect life and property in Namibia, in the immediate aftermath of the illegal SWAPO invasion, it also mobilized all
available diplomatic means in order to rectify the situation at the earliest opportunity. As you are aware, South Africa’s concern led to the meeting at Mount Etjo on 8 and 9 April 1989, where the three countries most directly involved, South Africa, Angola and Cuba, together with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers formulated a procedure which would have allowed SWAPO to withdraw from the Territory of Namibia without being attacked. SWAPO chose not to avail itself of the established procedures. Even under these circumstances the South African security forces exercised restraint in their operations and at the Ruacana meeting which took place on 20 April 1989, a further effort was made to find a solution.

That process is now underway and as you are aware, all South African security forces will be restricted to their bases for a period of sixty hours, commencing at 18h00 local time this evening. It is to be hoped that SWAPO will now use this opportunity to withdraw all its remaining armed elements from Namibia.

I believe, Mr President, that you have a role to play in convincing SWAPO of the error of its ways. It is one thing to piously accept commitments, but quite another to keep to them. SWAPO should now do so. A repetition of the tragic events occasioned by SWAPO’s ill-considered actions on 1 April 1989, must not be allowed to re-occur. This would irreparably damage the positive signs we are seeing emerge in the region as countries set aside differences and threats and commit themselves to new relationships on the basis of dialogue and economic co-operation. Your statements in this regard at the celebrations in Swaziland last week, have not gone unnoticed.

In conclusion, Mr President, I would request you to use all means at your disposal to bring the leadership of SWAPO to its senses.

With kind regards
Yours sincerely
P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDNT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

His Excellency Dr K D Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, LUSAKA
SWAPO has dismissed South African allegations, as a “red herring”, that it is amassing troops on the Angola-Namibia border poised to go into the territory.

The President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, categorically rejected the South African charges “with the contempt they deserve” and described them as a “red herring” aimed at diverting attention from exposure of the massacres, reign of terror and atrocities being committed by its rampaging troops in Namibia.

Nujoma added that the charges are designed to dupe the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) so that South African troops are not confined to base end instead let loose on the pretext of guarding against an “illusionary SWAPO invasion”.

The SWAPO leader was reacting to the South African charges made through the office of the UN Special Representative, who summoned the SWAPO representative in Windhoek, Niko Bessinger, on 26 April. Bessinger, a member of the Central Committee of SWAPO, who is based in the Namibian capital, was confronted with charges submitted to UNTAG by South African Brigadier Generals Louw and Meyer alleging that SWAPO was amassing troops in large numbers on the border poised to go into Namibia. In addition, the South Africans have stated that alleged SWAPO arms caches must be located and dug before the implementation of Resolution 435 can proceed.

In rejecting this other new South African charge as yet another attempt to create confusion and derail the implementation of Resolution 435, Nujoma said “UNTAG is welcome to investigate the claims and avoid its earlier blunder when it acted on false South African charges which led to the recent fierce fighting in Namibia, following the UN licensing of South African military attacks on peacefully regrouping SWAPO guerrillas.”

UNTAG, he pointed out, has its men in southern Angola who have been verifying the redeployment of SWAPO armed cadres, who were inside Namibia, to Angola and monitoring their confinement north of the 16th Parallel. The same UNTAG contingent has seen more that 1300 PLAN fighters who left Namibia for Angola, following the Mount Etjo Agreement of 9 April. They should, therefore, be in a position to find the truth, he said.
Bessinger has similarly informed the UN Special Representative’s Office that UNTAG has its own observers on both sides of the border, but was told that UNTAG did not have a verification of its own of the South African claims and promised to look into the matter.

Nujoma reiterated SWAPO’s commitment to the implementation of Resolution 435, saying that “that is why we made the difficult decision to redeploy in Angola our troops who have been inside the territory—for over 22 years of the protracted armed struggle. We have done our part. UNTAG must also seriously take up its responsibility to ensure that Resolution 435 is implemented according to schedule.”

**NAM26 — 28 APRIL 1989, JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, REPRO FROM NAMIBIA COMMUNICATIONS CENTER**

**Joint Press Statement**

The Third Regular Meeting of the Joint Commission established in terms of the Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December 1988, took place in Cape Town, Republic of South Africa from 27 to 28 April 1989.

Delegations of the Peoples’ Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa, the members of the Joint Commission, as well as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as observers, attended the meeting.

During the course of the discussions it was decided to invite the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Namibia, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs and the Military Commander of UNTAG to attend the meeting. A similar invitation was extended to the Administrator General of the Territory. The Joint Commission considered that the presence of these officials would facilitate its work.

The Joint Commission gave specific attention in its deliberations to the situation in the northern area of Namibia and in southern Angola since 31 March 1989 and subsequent developments. The decisions taken by the Joint Commission at its First and Second Extraordinary Meetings, held at Mount Etjo, Namibia, on 8 and 9 April 1989 and at Ruacana, Namibia, on 20 April 1989, respectively, were also reviewed.
The Joint Commission decided on further practical measures to ensure, as agreed at Mount Etjo, the restoration of the situation in existence on 31 March 1989 at the earliest opportunity. In this regard, agreement was reached that, following the completion of the restriction of the security forces to base for a period of 60 hours, a process of verification as called for by the Mount Etjo Declaration and lasting 14 days until 06h00 on 13 May 1989 will be conducted. On this date, the confinement of all SWAPO forces in Angola to bases north of the 16th parallel under UNTAG monitoring, will have been completed, South African forces will resume restriction to base and implementation of Security Council Resolution 435/78 will continue as originally scheduled.

The Commission will meet at Ruacana on 15 May 1989 to consider the situation.

As far as the frequency of its subsequent meetings is concerned, the Joint Commission decided to amend its Regulations and Rules of Procedure to allow for future meetings of the Commission take place on a bi-monthly basis.

The delegations expressed their appreciation to the South African Government for the excellent facilities provided for the Meeting.

CAPE TOWN
28 APRIL 1989
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>South African occupation begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>League of Nations mandate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>UN refuses to allow South Africa to annex SWA</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>Ovamboland People’s Congress, forerunner to SWAPO</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>ICJ refuses to rule on SWA case; war begins in the north</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>SWA mandate revoked by UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>ICJ advisory opinion: SA rule is illegal and SA must withdraw</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>UN General Assembly recognizes SWAPO as authentic representative of the Namibian people</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Lisbon coup; process leading to independence of Angola begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Turnhalle conference; Operation Savannah; arrival of Cuban forces; independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>SA withdrawal from Angola; meeting between Kissinger and Nujoma in NYC; SWAPO’s new political programme; UNGA recognizes SWAPO as ‘sole and authentic’ representative of the Namibian people</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>Western Contact Group (WCG) negotiates with SWAPO and SAG; SAG appoints Administrator-General for Namibia</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Assassination of Clemens Kapuuo; South Africa agrees to Western Plan; SADF attack on Cassinga; Walvis Bay issue before UNSC; SWAPO accepts Western Plan; UNSC Resolution 435; visit by Western Foreign Ministers to Pretoria; internal election won by DTA</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>SAG refuses to allow the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435; discussions with the WCG relating to a DMZ between Namibia and Angola</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Mugabe victory in Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Geneva conference; Reagan administration (Crocker); linkage; SADF occupation of part of southern Angola</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>Constitutional Principles accepted by SWAPO and SA</td>
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<td>1982/3</td>
<td>South Africa-Angola discussions</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Lusaka agreement; Lusaka conference attended by SWAPO and Multi-Party conference; JMC process begins: SADF pullback from southern Angola</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity formed in Namibia; Cabinda incident; Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Lomba battle; FAPLA retreats to Cuito Cuanavale, SADF follows</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>Cuito Cuanavale battles; London conference. Calueque attack; Cairo, New York (Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South West Africa, Angola, Cuba and South Africa) and Geneva conferences; de facto ceasefire; collapse of Mukurob (Finger of God); Brazzaville meeting; New York accords</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>1 April ceasefire; arrival of UNTAG; April conflict; Mount Etjo meeting; return of exiles, registration process; code of conduct; election victory of SWAPO; Constituent Assembly (CA) meets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>CA finalizes constitution; independence (21 March)</td>
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For a very detailed chronology see [www.klausdierks.com/Chronology](http://www.klausdierks.com/Chronology)
BRIEFING PAPER

Thula Simpson
South Africa, 1974–1991

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

The Soviet Union’s foreign policy identified “three detachments” of the world revolutionary process: nations that had already had communist revolutions; the working class of the capitalist countries of the West; and Third World peoples waging anti-imperialist struggles. The Soviets viewed the latter as being advantageous because they forced Western powers to retreat politically and militarily. For the Soviets, the conflict within South Africa fell within the category of anti-imperialist struggle and accordingly they supported the struggle against the apartheid regime. Realistically, however, the USSR’s security concerns focused primarily on its immediate neighbors and the West. Capturing southern Africa’s minerals or the Cape Sea route was never an important geostrategic objective within its global strategy. Spokespeople of the USSR even denied the applicability of the term “Cold War” to their policy in southern Africa.1

In the mid-1970s, at the beginning of the period under consideration, Soviet bloc influence expanded into Angola and Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen, Kampuchea

1. Interview with Vladimir Shubin, 13 September 2008.
and Afghanistan. These new governments proved to be liabilities rather than assets for the Soviets. By the end of the decade most were facing serious internal military resistance and severe economic difficulties. The Kremlin was unwilling to see them collapse, perceiving that their overthrow would represent an unacceptable loss of face for the USSR, and accordingly poured in military assistance.

A significant success in the southern African sphere was recorded when Cuban troops helped the MPLA government in Angola to repulse the South African invasion of 1975–1976. This event had major reverberations within South Africa itself. As Piero Gleijeses has noted in his groundbreaking work, the South African press fretted about the “boost to African nationalism” that would follow from the South African Defense Force being forced to retreat by black Cubans, whilst *The World*, South Africa’s biggest black newspaper, wrote: “Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban success in Angola” and “tasting the heady wine of the possibility of realizing the dream of total liberation.” This event following closely on the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa in 1974, surely contributed to the upsurge of political protest in South Africa from 1976 to 1994.

The Soviets were less able to help economically due to the onset of recession, and hence encouraged their clients to seek economic assistance from the West. There resulted a perverse triangular trade between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their surrogates in the Third World. In the southern African sphere, the Angolan government sold their oil to the Americans who funded the UNITA rebel movement, whilst the Cubans, who arrived in Angola in the mid-1970s to support the MPLA government against UNITA and South African attacks, guarded the country’s oil installations; whilst in Mozambique, South Africa paid the government in Maputo for electric power and use of the country’s railway and port, whilst training and funding RENAMO to sabotage Mozambique’s economy, as the Soviet Union armed the FRELIMO government’s counterinsurgency campaign. South Africa and the Soviet Union also pursued a clandestine but lucrative trade. Officially, economic ties between the two were severed when the Soviets instituted a full trade embargo prior to a 1962 United Nations resolution that called on member states to

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cut economic connections with the apartheid regime. The Soviets cancelled their contract to sell diamonds to the De Beers corporation. However, they then entered into a contract with an alternative buyer known as the Central Selling Organization, which was registered as British, but which the Soviets knew was controlled by De Beers. This arrangement was periodically renewed by the interested parties over the following years, and subsidiaries of De Beers acquired all uncut diamonds sold by the Soviet Union on the open market. According to Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of De Beers, the value of the trade to the Soviet Union in 1977 was $500 million. This made De Beers the Soviet Union’s largest supplier of hard currency. [SA 1]

**Questions:**

1. What did the Soviet government understand by the term “Cold War,” and was South Africa ever part of this “war”?
2. What was the division of responsibility between Cuba and the Soviet Union in southern Africa?
3. Under international law, did the Soviet Union’s continued links with surrogates of De Beers constitute a breach of international sanctions on South Africa? Did such ties continue into the 1980s?
4. Was the ANC ever made aware of the existence of the economic relationship between the Soviet Union and De Beers?

**THE SOVIET BLOC’S MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ANC**

After assuming power in America in 1981, the Reagan administration ratcheted up its hostility to the Soviet Union and strengthened its military budget. This intensified economic pressure on the recession-hit USSR. During the 1980s the focus of the USSR’s foreign policy came to focus on isolating America. In the Third World, the principal form this anti-American policy took was identifying and supporting struggles that could unite regions against the United States and its local surrogates. The questions of Palestine and

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South Africa were the two struggles selected because of their resonance in large areas of the Third World. In pursuing its strategy of counter-encirclement in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union showed itself willing to trade with practically any nation besides the United States, Israel and South Africa.

China was included amongst the list of potential allies. In the early 1960s the People’s Republic had worked closely with the ANC and had in fact trained the first members that the movement sent out for military training. However, the Sino-Soviet split drove a wedge in this relationship and the Chinese forged closer links with the ANC’s rival, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). However, the PAC was not effective as an exile organization. With relations between Beijing and Moscow improving, the Soviet Union’s allies in southern Africa moved to improve their connections with China in the early 1980s. Both Angola and Mozambique sought to renew their dormant ties with the country, as did the ANC.

Soviet assistance to the ANC came in the humanitarian, educational and military forms. In the early 1980s Soviet bloc countries provided an estimated 90 percent of the ANC’s military supplies. Yet in terms of overall support to the ANC, their aid probably fell well below the 60 percent claimed by the Reagan administration. The aid raised the prestige of the communist nations within the ANC, which perhaps exaggerated the per capita magnitude of this support. ANC National Executive Committee member James Stuart later stated that the USSR’s eventual collapse was “partly due to the fact that they had to sacrifice the bread of their own people to give to us and to liberation movements all over the world,” because “if they did not have to make those sacrifices, the Soviet Union as a state would now have been one of the strongest in the world.”

This is surely a gross exaggeration. As observers noted at the time, most of the military equipment the ANC received consisted of surplus supplies of outdated Warsaw Pact munitions, whilst much of the equipment had a comparatively low level of firepower. Only a limited amount of up-to-date equipment was supplied by the Soviet Union. Vassili Solodovnikov, who in the early 1980s was the Soviet ambassador to Zambia and the country’s senior diplomat in Africa, has been quoted corroborating this view when saying that

in providing assistance: “We were sure we were weakening the rich West whose economies were based on colonialism and cheap natural resources…the costs to us were less than might be thought. It was not big money. The military equipment was not first-class, and many people from those countries have now received their education in our instructions.”

Military overspending may well have bankrupted the USSR, but that spending was incurred to prepare for World War III, not to liberate the Third World. In turn, Tom Lodge has criticized Soviet military assistance to the ANC for being more suitable for a Third World War than a Third World liberation struggle. Lodge has written that in the Angolan camps: “military and technical skills were taught to a degree of sophistication well in excess of the requirements of ANC operations inside South Africa.”

“For example, in some of the advanced courses, ANC recruits were taught to operate field guns, a skill that had no value in guerrilla warfare.”

Questions:
1. How relevant was the military equipment and training provided by the Soviet bloc to the kind of military support required by the ANC?
2. Was the People’s Republic of China a significant donor to the South African liberation movement in the 1980s?
3. To what extent was the disproportion between the Soviet Union’s share of military versus non-military aid to the ANC a reflection of its inability to finance greater economic assistance, versus the unwillingness of the West to provide military aid?
4. Why did countries outside the Soviet bloc not secure an equal degree of acclaim from the ANC for their support?

EAST-WEST IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES

During the struggle, observers have noted that the ANC in exile projected a variety of identities before distinct constituencies. American journalist Joseph Lelyveld noted that

amongst the ANC’s “different faces in different forums” were its Christian face before religious audiences and its Marxist one in the socialist bloc. Dan Mokonyane noted that in Africa and Asia the ANC and its allies were “radical nationalists and anti-imperialists,” whilst being anti-racist democrats in the West. Critics argued that amongst these competing tendencies the communists had managed to gain ascendancy by exploiting their control of the flow of arms supplied by the Soviet Union to the movement. The ANC rejected this charge with indignation, maintaining that it made its own arrangements with governments that supported it, including the USSR, and that it was non-aligned in its quest for support, seeking assistance wherever they could find it.

It is nevertheless true that the South African Communist Party (SACP) did wage a battle for ideological hegemony within the ANC-led alliance. In 1987, Joe Slovo, who at the time was general-secretary of the SACP, declared that one of the principal tasks the party had always set itself was to inject a Marxist understanding of the conflict into the ANC. The tenets of this understanding were that the “economic exploitation” of capitalism represented the true foundation of racism, and that only a shift from capitalist to communist property relations could bring genuine liberation. The SACP’s success in securing the hegemony of this view can be seen in any of the major papers on strategy and tactics produced by the ANC during its exile period. The SACP viewed it as their task to defend this perspective in any negotiations that may occur. Party member Chris Hani noted that the “imperialist countries,” i.e. the leading Western countries (who at the time were actively courting the ANC), would probably have no problem with a black government in Pretoria as long as it preserved capitalist property relations and kept South Africa open to foreign investors.

Great Britain, the United States and West Germany—the three Western countries with the largest economic stake in South Africa—all stated that they were against apartheid but that they opposed sanctions. They advocated that “minority rights” for the country’s various


10. Chris Hani was leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and a prominent figure in the upper ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe. He was assassinated in 1993.
ethnic groups be included in the post-apartheid constitution, and that South Africa’s future economy be based on “free enterprise.” [SA 4] British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that if South Africa were allowed to collapse, the only other source for many of these materials she produced would be the Soviet Union. However, it must be noted that in the discussion she offered of Britain’s South Africa policy in her autobiography, the Soviet “threat” was not a prominent feature.11

The question of the extent to which the West, and particularly the Americans, succeeded in developing a counter-hegemonic ideology among black South Africans in the 1980s has not been probed by academics. It is a question worth investigating. Denis MacShane, a Labour member of Parliament in Britain, in the 1980s worked closely with the South African trade unions, has noted that in the 1980s the South African labor movement built up extensive links with European and North American trade unions, and notes that they both rejected “external Communist-Stalinist control” and were “inspired by Polish Solidarity”12 which did not sit easily with the communist elements in the ANC.” [SA 4] To what extent were their links with the West responsible for this?

At the same time, it must be noted that substantial segments of the internal resistance did look to the external liberation movements for inspiration and guidance, and furthermore that they were inspired by communism. These allegiances were on display at the many political funerals of the mid-1980s where imitation AK-47s and rocket launchers, flags featuring the hammer and sickle, and other paraphernalia celebrating the ANC and the Soviet connection, were openly flown.13

Questions:
1. What was the Soviet Union’s contribution towards securing the hegemony of Marxist ideology within the ANC?
2. Was the ANC’s ideological conflation of racism with capitalism an obstacle to improving its relations with Western nations in the mid-1980s?

12. Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Polish: Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”) is a Polish trade union. Established in 1980, it was the first independent labor union in the Soviet bloc. Solidarity became a prominent anti-communist element in Poland in the 1980s.
3. How important were “Cold War” considerations to Britain, America and West Germany when developing their policies towards South Africa?

4. What influence did American funding of the promotion of “democracy” have on the political culture of black South Africans?

5. What was the extent of “pro-Western” versus “pro-communist” sentiment amongst black South Africans in the 1980s?

PERESTROIKA

After Gorbachev came to power the Soviet Union’s policy shifted to achieving a rapprochement with the United States and ending the financially ruinous arms race. This led them to advocate the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Third World. Arms supplies to the ANC continued and the USSR continued to pledge political support, but the armed struggle was deemphasized when Soviet leaders described their policy towards South Africa. By the late 1980s the term “armed struggle” when used in a South African context had become quite unpopular amongst Soviet government figures. For some of them it became a subject of ridicule. Alexander Yakovlev, who became the International Secretary of the Soviet Politburo towards the end of 1988, stated in March 1989, with specific reference to the ANC: “What armed struggle? How can one support something which does not exist?”

From August 1989 the newly created Soviet Foreign Ministry limited the quantity of military supplies it made available to the ANC—although it continued to provide military support, including assistance with the relocation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres from Angola in the same year. The Soviets also attempted to establish direct diplomatic links with Pretoria. This rapprochement proceeded without the knowledge of either the ANC or SACP.

According to Professor Philip Nel, the Director of Stellenbosch University’s Institute for Soviet Studies, after the establishment of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, a policy divide emerged between the Ministry, which sought to distance the USSR from the ANC, and

the “Soviet Committee on Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia and Africa,” then headed by Vassili Solodovnikov, which remained staunchly pro-ANC. Another factor contributing to a negotiated settlement was the fact that internal and external action by the South African security forces had made it clear that for the foreseeable future there was no prospect of the ANC gaining power through guerrilla warfare and armed insurrection.

Questions:
1. Is it accurate to say that there was an institutional divide between the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization and the Soviet Foreign Ministry on policy towards South Africa after August 1989?
2. What influence did events in Europe from the mid-1980s onwards have in persuading the ANC to open negotiations with the South African government?
3. What were the Soviet Union and South Africa seeking to gain in opening diplomatic relations with each other?

PEACE

Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the edifice of the Soviet bloc collapsed. In the process the ANC was cut off from important networks of support. East Germany itself had supplied the ANC with military and intelligence advisors, educational support, and an agreement to print its monthly journal Sechaba free of charge. [SA 9] The impact of events in Eastern Europe was felt by the ANC-alliance in spiritual as well as material terms. As ANC member Garth Strachan later reflected, the Soviet Union had always been promoted by South African exiles as a model of the type of society they would try and construct upon their return. However, at the moment that the exile period ended (the ANC was of course officially unbanned in February 1990), communism in Eastern Europe was crumbling, leaving ANC members to grasp for an alternative vision. [SA 15] In the subsequent ideological realignment, the SACP sought to distance itself from the political and economic model espoused by the Soviet bloc countries. In a significant concession, in the build-up to the party’s official re-launch in South Africa, Joe Slovo proclaimed that genuine liberation would not require abandoning capitalist property relations. [SA 12] Meanwhile, Chris Hani claimed to feel “deceived” by the Soviets who, he said, made sure that he and his comrades were never “shown the ugly side” of the system
during their visits. He regretted that the movement had gone out of its way “to justify everything the Soviet Union did.” Nevertheless, this did not lead the movement to repudiate communist ideology. During the final death agony of communism in the Soviet Union towards the end of 1991, the general tendency within the SACP was to dismiss the one-party state and command economics as bad things, but within the party, the divide was between a majority who looked back to a golden age under Lenin, and a minority prepared to defend Stalin.

**Questions:**

1. Were events within South Africa more important than those in Eastern Europe in persuading the ANC to abandon its demand that changes in property relations accompany political liberation in South Africa?
2. How did the SACP’s internal debate over the Soviet Union’s legacy proceed in the years after its unbanning?
3. What was the itinerary of South African exiles when they visited the Soviet Union: what did they see and what, if anything, was hidden from them?
4. Looking back from 2009, who “won the Cold War”?

**SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY**


DISCUSSION

Chair: Iain Edwards
Provocateur: Thula Simpson

EDWARDS: We’re back again. I suppose in terms of the Cold War conference and it is not inappropriate that I use the Cold War metaphor to describe this session as “the last of the dominos.” Now, we are in South Africa for this session. We have finished the other sections, and we have an enormous amount to do with a little bit of time, but we pressed for time as well. We have got to try this in a way that it is manageable and maintains the interest and the important historical points of this particular session. I need to ask to Dr. Simpson not even to speak to his paper but take the paper as read, and to give us in bullet form, but not book form, his main questions: bang, bang, bang. I will then ask the participants to respond to those questions and different people too, but I will ask the participants to be as brief and interesting as possible. I don't want to exclude the raconteur and the anecdotal, because it is important, but I will ask them to be as direct as possible. And the third point is that unless things change over the session, I will probably be restricting the contributions to the participants themselves. I don't think we have the luxury to open the discussion to the floor but let’s see. I hope I don’t make too many enemies but we have a lot to do in this session and we can’t go further over the time. Okay. So, without further ado, Dr. Thula Simpson.

SIMPSON: Thank you. History doesn’t come contained in neat packages but, for better or worse, the period of world history between 1945 and 1991 has come to be known as the era of the Cold War. I want to take that era and just interrogate and write down a few points of how accurate the understanding is for us trying to interpret the history of South Africa, especially between 1974 and 1991. Now, events in the rest of the region did have a resonance within South Africa as surely the events in Angola in 1975 and 1976. Fred Bridgland has written a book called [The] War for Africa in which he says, or he claims, without citing evidence, that one of the purposes of the Cubans in intervening in southern Africa was to send a wave of revolution running
down the sub-continent all the way to South Africa.\textsuperscript{17} One question that I think might be important for us to investigate is, as the Soviet bloc countries and Cuba were intervening in Angola, was South Africa ever in their thoughts? How did they feel that their intervention in that country would influence developments within South Africa itself? Was there a strategy behind it, or was it a more piecemeal approach? Also the fact—as we know from reading more contemporary sources—is that Cuba acted as an autonomous power in intervening in Angola. The question of the second tier countries below the level of the United States and the Soviet Union: their contribution, their interest, what were they pursuing? The East Germans were also very active in helping, yet their nation’s been written out of history. Any contributions on the role of those second tier countries, I think, would be very useful. How important is ideology as a guide for us in understanding the interventions of these countries? For example, as I pointed out in the paper, the economic relations within the region were actually very fluid. Countries were trading with each other clandestinely, in spite of the ideological rhetoric. So, is it not more useful for us to speak in terms of interest rather than ideology when trying to discern the motive for various powers in intervening in the region? And if so, what were the interests of these nation-states? Soviet material interest and assistance was shoveled towards the African National Congress. The section in my paper points out a few criticisms which were made by observers of that aid. And I think linking that to the presentation that was done on Zimbabwe, people around the time, well I’m sure, will remember that a lot of ZANLA members were evangelists with a Chinese approach of waging guerrilla warfare. Many of them had trained with the ZIPRA in the Soviet Union itself. And they came back saying that the Chinese form of assistance for guerrilla warfare was much better, more useful and more practical for the purpose of waging insurgent warfare. One of the subtexts to the discussions on Soviet assistance which I produced in my paper, are people questioning the appropriateness of the kind of conflict which is going to be waged in South Africa? So, the Chinese dimension, I think, is another important point.

Finally, the period from mid-1980 onwards towards the negotiation settlement, the mid-1980s to 1994. Western attempts to increase their influence to establish links was one of the interesting things from the documents which were circulated—were the American

\textsuperscript{17.} Fred Bridgland, \textit{The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent} (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing House, 1990).
attempts through agencies like the National Endowment for Democracy, the Agency for International Development and others, to try and influence the development of internal black protest, but black political protest within the country. How successful were they? And looking back from the final settlement that was achieved, can it be said that it was a contribution in the aim of promoting democracy? Were they successful in that? A point with a few sources relating to that in my paper.

Another thing is dealt with in Vladimir Shubin’s book, ANC: [A] View from Moscow, but the idea that the Soviet policy towards South Africa lost its former coherence after 1989, and the divisions within the Soviet foreign policymaking establishment. Could we revisit that question and investigate more closely what those divisions were? What were the positions within the Soviet foreign policymaking establishment?

Finally, the collapse of the Cold War within the ANC itself. I mean, it had partly material aspects because of the important external backers, but we heard in the last panel, communism described as “a faith.” It also had a spiritual dimension, and how is that played out? Many of us at this conference were at a conference organized by Professor Saunders at the University of Cape Town. One of the papers was by Professor Irina Filatova, and it was called the “The Lasting Legacy,” which shows how the rhetoric of the National Democratic Revolution which the ANC inherited from the Soviet Union has continued to play out and has continued to take different meanings. So, as an interesting theme, could we trace the evolution of this concept and what the lasting legacy of the Soviet Union could be?

EDWARDS: Thank you, Thula. Without losing any of what Thula said, let’s sum up the 5 points from the discussion. The Cold War: was it a game? Was it a great game? What was it? Secondly, what was the place of South Africa? Thirdly, what was the place of the ANC? Fourthly, the dynamics of [the] 1980s onwards. And fifthly, the consequences of the collapse of the Cold War for the South African actors. Comments? Ambassador?

URNOV: I think I have to speak first because most of Dr. Simpson’[s] paper abounds in assessments of Soviet policy. I’ll try to answer some of the questions dealt with in this paper. First, about the Cold War. We talked about it a lot but here we have a question. What was the Soviet government’s understanding of the “Cold War” and was South Africa ever part of this war? We talked about it and we agreed that it was a part of the war, and that the Cold War influenced the developments in South Africa. But I would like just to make
one point: that this idea of “the communist onslaught” played very much into the hands of the South African government which, may I say, deliberately overplayed it because that was a way to mobilize the support in the West. That in particular could be illustrated by the example of the Reagan administration.

Now, the question about the impact on South Africa the Cubans expected to have when they intervened in Angola. I think this is not a correct or a proper way to formulate the question, because indeed the Cubans—and here I support fully my friend, the Ambassador—didn’t think of the impact of their intervention on South Africa. They intervened to save the MPLA government from South African aggression. All the rest was secondary. There were no long-term plans—first, we step in, and then we take Namibia, and then we attack South Africa. No. After all, the Cubans arrived in Angola after the South African invasion.

Another very strange thing, which I found in the text. Sorry to say, but the idea of the Soviet Union pursuing a strategy to make Angola another Vietnam, well, is something very strange. I don’t want to use the word “rubbish,” but I already used it.

Another question: the relevance of Soviet military support to the ANC. Armed struggle was an important element of the freedom fight and made a significant contribution to the liquidation of apartheid. And the main assistance came from the USSR. Doesn’t it prove that the assistance was relevant? Isn’t it obvious? Now, about the question of disproportion between our military assistance and economic aid. Well, one should not forget that at that time the ANC was not a government, it was a liberation movement and what it needed most was political, diplomatic and, yes, military support. The Soviet Union provided it. Material assistance was important, and it was also rendered, but with all its importance, it was less important for the outcome of the struggle. And this is the reason why the West would not assist the ANC military.

Another thing. The author wonders: “the countries outside the Soviet bloc could not secure an equal degree of a claim from the ANC.” I think it is understandable because with the exception of maybe the Nordic countries, there was a principle difference between the Soviet aid and the anti-ANC stand of the West. So, how could the countries outside the Soviet bloc secure an equal degree of a claim from the ANC?

Another thing. In the text, there is a thesis that the Soviet policy focused on the isolation of America at the time of Reagan. Well, it was Reagan who launched the anti-Soviet campaign, who started to fan the Cold War. We were just reacting; we were on
the defensive to a certain extent. It was not our initiative to isolate the United States. It was our policy to rebuff the policy of Reagan. And it looks like Dr. Simpson is a bit saddened by the fact that the Soviet Union aid raised the prestige of communist nations within the ANC, and, as a matter of fact, within other liberation movements. Why blame the Soviet Union? Why not blame the West, which by its policy helped to raise the prestige of the Soviet Union?

Now, about hegemony of Marxist ideology within the ANC. There was no hegemony of Marxist ideology within the ANC. And I don’t think there was an ideological conflation of racism with capitalism. This was not a reason for the ANC not to talk to the South African government. I’m sorry to repeat it, but it was the Western support of the white minority regime that was the obstacle to improving its relations with the ANC.

On the cooperation between the ANC and the South African Communist Party. I worked in the International Department of the Central Committee, so I can share my personal perceptions and recollections. I can assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that there was no hegemony. The Communist Party never bossed the ANC. There was a full agreement between the two organizations on what they wanted, and how to get it. They wanted majority rule, and they understood that to achieve it, one had to combine various methods of struggle, from political to military ones. One thing that needs to be emphasized is that this cooperation was mutually beneficial, in terms of ideology as well. The ANC kept the Party from falling into the left sectarianism while the Party kept the ANC from falling into black racism. Once again, there was a mutual trust. I’ve been dealing with Oliver Tambo for many years and I saw that he was the “boss.”

Of course, the Communists played a great role, and I just want to mention some names: JB Marks; Moses Kotane; Moses Mabhida; Chris Hani; Joe Slovo; Jusuf Dadoo, Brian Bunting; Michael Harmel. Well, that reminds me. You know, the Communist party from time to time used to have meetings of its Central Committee in Moscow. We provided them with the premises. And one of the premises was the place where Stalin lived and where he died. It was quite a comfortable place. So the meeting is to begin, everybody

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18. Oliver Tambo was a prominent South African anti-apartheid politician who served as President of the African National Congress (ANC) from 1967 to 1991.
19. These were important figures in the South African Communist Party (SACP).
is there but Moses Mabhida.20 We don’t know what is going on, what happened to him, we don’t know his flight number. So everybody is worried. And then Mike Harmel, and he was a very witty man, says, “Look. Why do we worry about Moses? He is the only Zulu who’s going to come to Moscow today. He cannot be lost!” And, he was found!

On perestroika: I spoke about it a little when we discussed Namibia. My advice to Dr. Simpson [is] not to pay much attention to what Alexander Yakovlev said. He is a typical turncoat, opportunistic, and I must say, a dishonest person. Well, just in the middle of the ‘80s when the “new thinking” was on the rise, he published a book which was called From Truman to Reagan and it was extremely critical of the United States, written in the spirit of the worst times of the Cold War. And then two years passed and Mr. Yakovlev fell in love with the United States. So, this is not a source which I would recommend for use.

I also want to say that the guerrilla warfare was not expected to end in military victory. It was part of the struggle.

On the divide between the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Again, that is a bit artificial because the Soviet Foreign Ministry was a state organ and the Solidarity Committee was an NGO. The thing was much more profound. There was a collision between the so-called “new” thinkers and traditional thinkers. The Solidarity Committee was just a fraction of the traditional wing. And I must say that traditional thinking was overwhelming in the International Department of the Communist Party. But we were disciplined functionaries, and followed the instructions.

About the influence of events in Europe on the ANC decision to negotiate. I don’t think the ANC was ever against negotiations. It was a question [of] what kind of negotiations it wanted. The ANC expected, and rightfully so, to be recognized as a leading force of the liberation movement and wanted to negotiate on the basis of such a recognition. It rejected attempts, again rightfully, to put the ANC on the same plane with the internal surrogates. I would not deny that the change of the Soviet policy and the disintegration of the socialist community in the Eastern Europe affected the positions of the ANC and weakened it to a certain extent. But the ANC stuck to its position of principle while negotiating. That was important. And, you remember, they ended the military struggle, but after the ban was lifted and political prisoners were released.

20. Moses Mabhida served as the General Secretary of SACP beginning in 1978.
On diplomatic relations with the government of de Klerk. My feeling is that it was premature, but there were reasons behind it. First of all, Gorbachev and his team underestimated the ANC role and overestimated the South African government’s strength and ability to influence the events. Underestimation of the ANC, on the one hand, and overestimation of the potential of the government, on the other. There was also a wish to oblige, to demonstrate Russia’s loyalty to the West. And, as I already mentioned, a general loss of interest in the Third World inherited from Gorbachev of the late ‘80s. On the other hand, although the apartheid regime was still in power, there were very important changes in South Africa and I would like to say here that Mr. Pik Botha and President de Klerk played a very important and positive role and they had to have courage to bring about such changes.

Now again to the text. It is definitely an exaggeration to say that “the ANC demanded the change of political power alongside with the change of property relations. Property relations change had to accompany the political liberation.” Maybe, but not in terms of socialist reforms. What they talked about was redistribution of wealth because most of the wealth was in the hands of the white minority. So it was a just demand. It was just. But there was no talk about socialist transformations.

And finally, on the Cold War. The Cold War was not “won” in the strict meaning of the word. It ended when one of the adversaries, the USSR, ceased to exist. Of course, the West did contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it certainly won as a result of this collapse and rushed to build a unipolar world. But it was not the Cold War, but a combination of objective and subjective internal factors, which brought about the fall of the Soviet Union. Objectively, the country was in a very deep economic, political and ideological crisis. As for subjective factors these were the activities of two “fifth columns.” In the last years of his power Gorbachev was at the head of one “fifth column” and Yeltsin was at the head of the other. And there was a certain division of labor. Gorbachev wanted to dismantle socialism, and Yeltsin wanted to destroy the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was in need of the Union because he wanted to stay president. And it was this combination that brought the fall of the country. Subjunctive mood is not applicable to history—what happened, happened. But still the historians have a right to analyze the situation and to express their views. I think that an example of China which was deep in the abyss of the Cultural Revolution, and then raised on its feet, made a real big leap under the new leadership, shows that a lot depends on the leadership, its broadmindedness, foresight, patriotism, and so on and so forth. Thank you.
EDWARDS: Ambassador, thank you. Professor Shubin?

SHUBIN: Most of the points have been covered, I think, by Ambassador Urnov. I want to be short. Perhaps one point which Dr. Simpson makes in his book is “the lucrative trade between the Soviet Union and South Africa.” This is of course nonsense. See, if you mean selling diamonds, we were not responsible for it. Who is responsible? Those guys who allowed De Beers to monopolize the world [diamond] trade, who allowed De Beers to create a certain trading organization in London. If not for the monopoly of De Beers, we would [be] happy to sell diamonds directly and we tried but every time we failed. In any case there was no trade between our country and South Africa until, say, the early ‘90s. Full stop.

Next point, about military training. Thula refers to Tom Lodge in the paper. Tom Lodge is a serious scholar, but why not refer to the fighters themselves? He criticizes the training of ANC military in the USSR, that some of them were taught artillery pieces. First of all, Joe Modise21 more than once early on asked us to train people for the future army. Unfortunately our military usually were a bit hesitant because their rule was to train for the arms which either had been supplied or were in the pipeline. But finally in 1986/1987 we managed to organize the training for the regular forces, including navy officers and air force officers. But most of the people were, of course, trained for guerrilla warfare. In particular, two successors of General Geldenhuy—former SANDF Chief Sphiwe Nyanda and incumbent Chief Godfrey Ngwenya—had been trained exactly in what we call MCW, Military Combat Work. It is a very specific training for the armed underground.

Dr. Simpson mentioned outdated arms. Again, of course, some of them may not be very new, but they were still very good, like the Stechkin pistol. I remember Joe Slovo specifically asking for it because it was smaller than a Kalashnikov, but bigger than a usual pistol, like Makarov. It was very good for underground operatives in the country. Some of the arms were new, like the Malytka, and it was not easy to get it from the military, by the way. It is the portable antitank missile which the ANC wanted to use for sabotage activities.

One more point which you raised in your presentation, about the strength in comparison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Solidarity Committee. I can only support

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21. Joe Modise was a founder and commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed guerrilla wing of the ANC. In post-apartheid South Africa, Modise served as Minister of Defense from 1994 to 1999.
what Ambassador Urnov had already mentioned, more so because for seven years I was secretary for that committee for Africa. But what shocked me: apparently, Dr. Simpson believes the Foreign Ministry was created in the Soviet Union only in August 1986. How did the Soviet Union survive without a Foreign Ministry for 62 years? You see, of course, it’s not his idea. He took it from an unreliable source.

And maybe last point. I don’t want to take much time. You said about the “final death agony of communism.” This is not academic language. For somebody to have an agony, he would have to exist. Communism as the system did not exist. We never claimed to be a communist society. Communist ideology suffered a lot in the early 1990s. That is correct. Communist governments were overthrown or had to go in some countries. This is also correct. But not in all countries, by the way.

And a general observation, I think you have to be much more careful when selecting your biographies and sources. You still refer to Ellis and Sechaba. Ellis, who is now in Leiden, former editor of Africa Confidential, is a serious scholar. Sechaba is just a renegade, as everybody knows. Ellis wrote other books, good ones, about Madagascar, about Liberia, etc. But the book you referred to has no references. There is one line there, that Sechaba himself is a reference. But Sechaba apparently joined the ANC in the late 1970s, while the authors speak about the ‘50s and ‘60s also referring to Sechaba.

Since we, Ambassador Urnov and I, are now in the Africa Institute, I mean, its staff members, I want to say that the book contains a claim by an unnamed source that the Freedom Charter was sent for approval to the Africa Institute in Moscow. The authors did not support this claim but did not rebuff it either. The only problem is that the Africa Institute was created exactly four years after the adoption of the Freedom Charter. Thank you.

EDWARDS: Professor Shubin, thank you very much. Mr. Botha?

BOTHA: Thank you. Just before, I would like to make some remarks on the effect of the Cold War on the changes that have come about in South Africa. The one regarding the Nkomati Accord, whether that was a loss of Mozambique for the Soviet Union. I can’t talk from the Soviet point, but I want to say that I do not think so, because I vividly remember on the day that we signed the Nkomati Accord at Komatipoort, between President Machel and PW Botha. On that day we received—and that is one thing I will always remember—a telegram of congratulations from the Soviet president,
congratulating us on the conclusion of the Nkomati Accord and I don’t think that the Soviet Union regarded the Nkomati Accord as a loss for them. I think the Soviet Union indeed was honest in sending that telegram and I accepted it in that spirit. Then again, could I just urge our friends in one day researching all these events, do not forget the history of Africa and South Africa. Go back to before the landing of van Riebeeck\(^2\) in 1652 and work from the days that the black peoples start moving southward from the central African Great Lakes into South Africa and settled mostly on the eastern side where the rainfall was always good, water abundant and good grazing. The Bantu people never occupied the west side of South Africa, the arid region. Those were San people and not Bantu people. Secondly, let us go back to where our problems really started. It didn’t start with the coming into power of the National Party in 1948. It came into being when Britain occupied, as a colonial power, countries in Africa, and in 1910 the Union of South Africa Act was passed by the British Parliament. It was the British Parliament, therefore, that endorsed a parliament voted for by whites. Of course it suited the white South Africans at the time. Yes. But Britain could have refused. And my point to you is—I already made the point yesterday, of Mr. Mandela’s first speech to us when we commenced our negotiations with the ANC in May 1990 was: “You Afrikaners, why did you not reach out? You suffered so much. Why did you not reach out to the black people?” And you see I’ve tried to explain it, but there’s no excuse for it, no excuse following such an oppressive, painful and reprehensible political system, except if you consider that your survival might be at stake and realizing that the cruelty on which you base your system is far more destructive. The central point of apartheid was the non-permanence, this concept of non-permanence of blacks in what was considered white South Africa. That’s where the trouble lies. The whole concept of how to keep the black people in their traditional homelands, and allow only so many laborers that the mines may require or industry may require, but they should not be given equal rights because they haven’t got permanence in what was considered white South Africa. That’s where the problem started and that’s where the problem lies. It only started to change, in my

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22. Jan van Riebeeck was a Dutch colonial administrator who landed in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope, where he was tasked by the Dutch East India Company with establishing the Fort of Good Hope—a refreshment post for passing ships. Van Riebeeck is considered the founder of Cape Town. His arrival in southern Africa marks the beginning of permanent European colonial settlement in the region.
opinion, after 1976, after the Soweto riots. Another important year, of course, is 1960. We must look at that. That was the year that Harold Macmillan made his “Wind of Change” speech. It was also in January, Verwoerd announced a referendum on whether the Union of South Africa should become a republic. On 20 March you had Sharpeville, a great tragedy; in April, the first assassination attempt on Verwoerd; October, the referendum on the republic; in March 1961, going out of the Commonwealth; in 1962 the ANC opted for armed struggle; in ’64, Mr. Mandela and others were sentenced to life imprisonment.

These were his words, and I believe this captures his legacy and I would hope this would become the legacy of all South Africans. “I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony, and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve but, if needs be, this is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” This is a legacy that I hope we could concentrate more on what Mr. Mandela had in mind here. The Cold War to some extent delayed change. You know, worldwide there were over 600 anti-apartheid movements, bodies or organizations. Over 600 different ones—each with a president, chairperson, vice chairperson and a secretary, etc., or a treasurer, etc. One third of the agenda of the General Assembly, one third was Namibia, one third South Africa and apartheid. Now, now what did the Americans tell us, and the West in general? They said, “Look, it’s your apartheid system that attracts the Russians, the Communists. You do away with Apartheid then we can more effectively battle the communists. But in South Africa you are making it difficult for us because apartheid is in the way. Apartheid attracts them and gives them a moral platform. The African states are clever; they solicit the communist countries of the world to support their campaign against you.” That was the case. That was the position, and so what the West told us, “Get rid of apartheid, then we promise you, we will be able to stem the tide of Soviet intrusion and aggression elsewhere in the world.”

Now, against that background, we knew that we had to effect change in South Africa, particularly after 1976, the Soweto riots. For the first time there was a commission appointed after those riots, and for the first time, to a very limited extent, the permanence of certain black people were recognized in white South Africa. And so piecemeal, piece-meal, slowly, one act after the other, the Immorality Act, other acts, the Pass laws, were
changed. And so it went on to the point where academics in this country, editors of papers in this country, professors and academics in our universities, and people like Beyers Naude, an Afrikaner, Ben Marais, also an Afrikaner, a preacher, who said, “Look, what we are doing is wrong. It is a sin. We’ve got to stop doing it not because the Russians are a danger, not because the Americans wanted us to change, not because of sanctions in the world, but simply because it is sinful. It is unethical. It is bad. It is evil.” And I’m glad to tell you here today to a very large extent this acknowledgement is what eventually won. This is what eventually won. With all respect, this country in 1989 still had enough military and police power and money at its disposal to go on for 10 years or 15 years, which would have plunged this country into a civil war and destroyed it, so that neither the ANC nor anyone else would wish to govern this country. And luckily we came to our senses in good time before destruction could take place, and eventually we drew up together, the ANC and the National Party, sensibly, a new constitution for South Africa. So I’m not trying to minimize the effect of the Cold War in these changes, but I must state that the Cold War retarded rather than expedited the changes. You know, it is very interesting, in the case of Namibia, you had Americans, Russians, Angolans, the Cubans, mostly the United Nations. In the case of South Africa, it was South African leaders, black and white, South Africans, almost by themselves, who gathered and brought about the transformation. And this is, I think, the secret and strength of the agreement that we made. We in the government had decided on dismantling apartheid and releasing Mandela before the Berlin Wall fell. When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union disintegrated, friends in the ANC told me that that sent a warning signal to us. We then knew that channel of resources would be cut. So, here we found ourselves now by ourselves on one ship that we had to save and steer away from the storms that threatened us, irrespective of outside turmoil.

Redistribution of wealth. I would just like to say this in conclusion: if you look at the incalculable mess in which the economic, financial, debt crisis of the Americans has brought the world, a friend asked me, “Do we now have now capitalist-socialism or

With all respect, this country in 1989 still had enough military and police power and money at its disposal to go on for 10 years or 15 years, which would have plunged this country into a civil war and destroyed it.

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23. The Immorality Act was first passed by the Parliament of South Africa in 1927 to prohibit sexual relations between white “Europeans” and black African “natives.” The 1927 Act was amended in 1950 to prohibit sexual relations between “Europeans” and “non-Europeans,” thereby broadening restrictions to include not only black Africans, but all non-whites. In apartheid-era South Africa, Pass laws were imposed in order to restrict and control movement of blacks in white areas.

24. Beyers Naude was a white South African cleric and prominent anti-apartheid activist.

25. Ben Marais was a white South African theologian and anti-apartheid activist.
socialist-capitalism?” I said to him, “Look, I don’t know, but what I do know for sure—there is a new renaissance necessary. I believe, mark my words, there is a new phase waiting for planet Earth. The Americans are not 5% of the world’s population; they consume 30% or more of the world’s resources. That means, in short, you need 3 or 4 more planets if the rest of the world was ever to achieve America’s standard of living unless the Americans are prepared to drop 60% of their present standard of living. They must drop it by 60%. I cannot see any other alternative. So there must come a new time also on climate change: Professor Stephen Hawking warned us, he said, “We might already have reached the point of no return. What will our children think when they inherit an Earth that is destroyed? Climate change is more lethal than the weapons of mass destruction of the Cold War.” So, let us hope that a new sense of survival and of decency and ethics arrive in the world, and that the rich West, the rich countries, including Japan, will once and for all come to realize they have poured their carbon gasses into the earth’s atmosphere through their industrial achievements. Africa is being left behind. Now that we are poor and must still burn coal, they want to penalize us for our products because we are using coal with which they destroyed the Earth’s atmosphere. So, they will have to assist Africa in billions and billions so that we can also qualify in terms of their own rules and regulations, but which have been applied so unethically and in such a cruel, oppressive, and dominant way.

Mr. Chairperson, in conclusion, I think I’m getting older. There’s a new era waiting on planet Earth. We will have to lower... when I say we, I mean the whole West, all the rich people who use up all the resources, they would have to drop their standard of living by 60% less meat, less chocolates, less caviar, 60% less clothing, that’s for the women and sorts of the bloody funny shoes that they wear, 60% lower down. Only in that way will we be able to bring about the survival of the Earth. Thank you very much.

EDWARDS: Mr. Botha, thank you. I saw a number of people moving in their shoes backwards... It is Professor Magubane and then Mr. Steward.

MAGUBANE: Okay, I was supposed to have chaired this session and unfortunately Mr. Sidney Mufamadi who was supposed to present the ANC position has had to be absent because of the developments in Zimbabwe. So, I’m really a poor substitute for Mufamadi. Now, when I read Dr. Simpson’s paper and I came to page two, I was jarred by some of
his assertions. Let me just read the second paragraph. He says that “the Soviets were less able to help their allies economically due to the onset of the recession, and hence encouraged their clients”—the word “clients,” sort of judging—and then he also speaks about their “surrogates.” Now, to me, it seems there was really a complete misunderstanding of the relationship between the liberation movements and the Soviet Union. The ANC was never a client, nor was SWAPO a client, nor was MPLA or FRELIMO a client of the Soviet Union. They went to the Soviet Union to ask for solidarity help in terms of their internationalism. The Cubans, for instance, were requested by Neto to fulfill the principles of internationalism and they offered the MPLA government their help without expecting anything in return. So, it seems to me that you cannot use such words as “surrogates” or “clients” when you talk about the relationship between the socialist countries and the national liberation movement. Now, when it comes to the ANC, for instance, I think one has to begin at the beginning: the Act of Union, which was adopted by representatives of the white minority in the four provinces in 1909. That completely denied black people or the initial people the franchise—the only means whereby they could defend themselves. And therefore the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, with the token franchise of the Cape retained with also provisions to eliminate it, you know, along the line. The African National Congress, of course, was formed in 1912. Its mission was to unify the hitherto divided African kingdoms and chiefdoms and to make them into one nation in order to oppose the white minority rule. It was not going to be easy.

Now in the meantime, in South Africa socialist ideas had been brought by European workers who came to work in the mines. And the South African Communist Party was formed in 1921. Its focus was that white workers were going to lead the socialist revolution. But then during the Rand revolt, they proclaimed white workers—proclaimed, you know, the slogan, “Save white South Africa,” and so forth. “Workers of the world unite and save white South Africa.” Now, by 1925 the South African Communist Party had to do a turnabout in terms of its white workers. In the meantime, quite a number of Africans, Coloreds and Indians had individually, you know, joined the Communist Party. Now, this was a period also in South African history where the nature of African oppression was being debated vigorously, and the core question of the national question was being debated. Consultations were made with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the nature of this particular oppression. So, the national democratic revolution arises from these particular debates.
Now, to bring the story much closer: the banning of the ANC and the Pan-African Congress in 1960. South Africa withdrawing from the Commonwealth has already been mentioned. The decision, first of the Communist Party to adopt armed struggle, then ultimately the formation of MK in 1961 and the launching of the sabotage campaign—all those are extremely important. Now, what that meant, in fact, is that the struggle of the oppressed in South Africa was no longer a civil rights struggle, it was a human rights struggle, and it would determine whether South Africa was a white man’s country, or whether South Africa would belong to all that live in it, as declared by the Freedom Charter. I think all those things are extremely important.

Now, up to 1994, you know, South Africa literally belong[ed] to the number of nations that called themselves capitalists. It was part, in fact, until South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth, of the white Dominions. South Africa was a white Dominion in the British Empire, which was the champion, you know, the place for white settlers. But the quarrel between the Afrikaners and the English which had led to the Anglo-Boer War was a very sore point in the consciousness, you know, of the Afrikaners. The distribution of wealth between the Anglo-Saxon[s] and the Afrikaners was such that all the commanding heights of the South African economy were controlled, in fact, by English capital. When the National Party assumed power, they wanted to reach a state of parity economically with the Afrikaners. And it was the Africans who are going to bear the burden of the accumulation of capital by the Afrikaner. I think that is very, very important. But it is also very, very important, to go back to the nineteenth century, the discovering of diamonds and gold, because during the so-called “kaffir wars”—indeed predictions were being made in the literature and elsewhere that Africans were going to suffer the same fate as native Americans and indeed as Australians. When Trollope26 came to South Africa—you know, he wrote his book *South Africa*—he visited the Big Hole in Kimberley. Here he saw the African migrants working in the mines and he said the idea of the extinction of native resident in South Africa simply did not apply. They were too critical for the mining industry, so that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Africans were no longer compared to the native Australians or the Native Americans. The question now was, how are we going

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to establish a proper relationship between whites as overlords and natives or “kaffirs” as the underdog? So a constitutional means had to be found to work out this relationship. Therefore the denial of the franchise and the fragmentation of the Africans into tribal entities becomes the only policy that was supposed to work. Now, I think the background is extremely important.

Now, with the beginning of decolonization—the independence of India for instance, of Ghana in 1957—the formation of the OAU and the Liberation Committee, to assist those who were under white colonial rule, are extremely important. Now, most of the African countries in the 1960s, and especially after the formation of the OAU and the liberation movement, were nationalists. They were very suspicious of the relationship that existed between the ANC and the South African Communist Party, and in the distribution of arms of the OAU Liberation Committee. They tended to favor, you know, the PAC. That is when, you know, the South African Communist Party through Moses Kotane, JB Marks and Joe Slovo was going to be critical in approaching the Soviet Union for financial and other assistance to make up for what the African Liberation Committee was denying the African. But this does not make the ANC or SWAPO or other any other organization clients or surrogates of the Soviet Union.

Now, when the struggle begin[s] to sharpen, especially after the Soweto uprising in 1976, the whole idea that South Africa as a white man’s country began to be revised. Now, you know the question because new realities had set in. Africans were now infiltrating not only the unskilled part of the labor force, but they were entering into the semi-skilled market. And just to make the long story short, the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule, then the election of Margaret Thatcher in Britain in 1979, Reagan in 1980, who [Thatcher] was in power till 1990: the policy of constructive engagement. Crocker in his book makes it clear that Reagan was not elected to see another communist state established in Namibia as in the case of Angola and Mozambique. So the eight years of the Reagan administration became very critical, because constructive engagement in fact was intended to squeeze the ANC out of any South African section. Indeed, I think it was General Malan who said, the aim was to expel the African National Congress, to cut it. And indeed, as part of the Nkomati Accord, the ANC was expelled from Mozambique. But then after that, the aim now was to expel it from Angola. And this posed serious problems for SWAPO because SWAPO belonged to those as an ally of the ANC just as MPLA and FRELIMO and others of the ANC. And the struggle of the ANC between 1981, when the Reagan
administration assumed power, and 1989—it is one of the most important and one of the most principled [periods] as well. I think this should be acknowledged. Thank you.

**EDWARDS:** Thank you. Okay, over to Dave Steward.

**STEWARD:** Thank you. David Steward, speaking here. Just to address some of the points that have been raised in the discussion so far. “South Africa overplayed the Soviet threat.” I don’t think so. In the perceptions of the South African government, the role of the South African Communist Party and the ANC and also the geostrategic role of the Soviet Union and southern Africa were central concerns. They weren’t based on any kind of “the Reds under the beds” perception of the world, but they were based on some hard realities. The first is the relationship that the SACP developed with the ANC over a number of decades. In the 1928 Comintern Conference in the Soviet Union, the SACP was given the instruction to infiltrate the ANC and to prepare it as an organization to combat British imperialism and, over time, to develop leadership of the organization. This quote was repeated, interestingly enough, at the Twelfth Conference of the SACP in July 2007, and the SACP underlined, “and the objective is to progressively take over control of the ANC.” Now that, I think, addresses another of the questions as to the lingering legacies of this relationship.

Then during the 1980s, when we had many of the international problems coming to a head, our assessment was that the majority, perhaps 60% of the National Executive Committee of the ANC were also members of the SACP. In fact, according to Mark Gevisser’s recent book, it wasn’t 60%. It was virtually all of the members of the ANC who were also members of the SACP. Our problem was that we knew that the SACP subscribed to a two-phase classical revolutionary theory. The first phase of the revolution is under the broad national liberation movement, which in this case is the ANC, which was supposed to lead the country to the national liberation. Then in the second phase, the SACP as the representative of the workers class is supposed to take over as the vanguard party and move society to the unalloyed benefits of a fully-fledged socialist society. We were very worried about this because the kind of settlement that we ultimately reached—which is based on a genuinely democratic constitution under the law, with genuine multi-party democracy, a Bill of Rights—would not have been possible under those circumstances. So, for us, the whole question of the SACP and Soviet influence in southern Africa were very major considerations. The collapse of the
Soviet Union [Soviet bloc] in 1989/1990—that was one of the major factors which facilitated the process that we were able to launch on 2 February 1990.

There was also some reference to the role of the arms struggle. The reality is that the armed struggle played a very, very minor role inside South Africa. There was a much more significant development from 1984–1986, but this was in several aspects a spontaneous explosion of anger against the system, but not essentially directed from Lusaka, or outside the country. It was a domestic home-grown revolution, which I think caught the ANC by surprise. And this was not directed or assisted, I think, by the Soviet Union at that time. So what is the ongoing significance of this? The reality is that the SACP is the second largest party in our Parliament as 80 members. Its vision is the establishment of worker hegemony over all the institutions of the state. It and COSATU have greatly strengthened their position within the ANC alliance since Polokwane, and this is a development we have to watch very carefully. As for the broader picture, those of us on this side including Mr. Botha and General Geldenhuys wanted the kind of outcome in South Africa and in Namibia that we achieved. We wanted a plural, multi-party democracy with Bills of Rights, the right to vote in genuine elections. This is what we’ve achieved in South Africa. This is what, I think, we helped to achieve in Namibia. And I don’t think that this would have been the outcome if we had settled and did what we did in 1990, in 1980 or 1970. I think the outcome would have been quite different.

EDWARDS: Thank you very much.

GELDENHUYS: Meaning well, I must say that I find it quite difficult to grasp the rationale behind these questions and what we are going to do with the answers. There are other questions which I think would serve much more of a purpose. Is it to assist for sake of sakes, or for the sake to correct history, for the sake of a thesis or a book? I don’t know, but I would confine myself to this paragraph one on the onset of my questions. “What did the Soviet government understand by the term “Cold War” and was South Africa ever part of the war?” And confine myself to the latter part: “and was South Africa part of this war?” By the way, it had different questions—how did it [come] into place, how the Cold War
ended—and that would include the Bisho fiasco. It would have included the Mmabatho armed rebellion. It would have included the fighting in Natal between the ANC, the UDF and the IFP. It would have included something which is very much like the First World War. The First World War—nobody knows what the [point] was, [what it was] supposed to attain or what it did attain. And the same [is true] with the invasion into Lesotho, for what? It remains a mystery.

Now to come back to the little part that I’m concentrating on: “is and was South Africa ever part of this war?” It is important, I think, that we should research what was the impact of the global Cold War in the southern African states, or even the other way around. What was the impact of the Cold War in the southern African states on the global Cold War? I will give you a practical example. I said something that I’m telling you now, and you can find it in the archives in Windhoek in the Suidwester newspaper of a date in September 1979. I made a speech there at the annual agricultural show. And I said at that stage to the public, after there was some murders, some attacks across the border, I said, “Please be patient. We will eventually safeguard the whole of southern South-West Africa in total.” And we did. As a matter of fact, right throughout that Cold War era, the international Etosha Game Parks, the Parks were opened for international tourists. It never stopped.

Let me carry on. I said, “But be patient, because eventually”—let me put it this way, I said, “There is quite a difference between fighting a war against the Soviet Union, and Cuba, and SWAPO on the one hand, and fighting only SWAPO on the other hand.” And I predicted then that as I read the Cold War into the future, I said, “They wouldn’t, the Soviet Union wouldn’t be able to just carry on supporting SWAPO and Angola in the way they did. They have to get out of it some way or another.” Now, many foreign journalists called me—and I would like to mention that it happened quite a few times that there were more international journalists in Windhoek or in Namibia in relation to the total population of Namibia than any other place in the world—and they said to me, “But, Geldenhuys, how can you say that? The Soviet Union is a mighty big global power.” I said, “And so was the United States of America before they got out of Vietnam.” So our strategy was based on that we must just keep the situation under control and that is exactly what

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27. The Bisho massacre took place on 7 September 1992 when 28 ANC protestors and one soldier were shot dead during a march to demand that the nominally independent Ciskei region be reincorporated within South Africa.

28. Etosha National Park is a vast wildlife reserve in northern Namibia.
happened. And I never heard anybody coming up with this solution that we actually won that war because the Soviet Union came to a halt. Thank you.

**EDWARDS:** Thank you very much. I think at this point we have time on our side and I can open up the discussion to the floor generally, making comments and observations. Any questions?

**MAGUBANE:** There is just one correction that I would like to make. You know, mention was made of the fact that the South African Communist Party infiltrated the ANC from instruction from Moscow. Now, in his biography, which was written by Bunting, Moses Kotane said—which I think is very important—he said, “I was born an African and am black. I was recruited to the mines and I became a worker.” And he says, “I decided momentarily to join the South African Communist Party as a worker.” And that is the same with JB Marks; it’s the same for Moses Kotane. They never hid the fact that they were both members of the African National Congress Party and the South African Communist Party. It was really never a secret. To say that they infiltrated the ANC is not only to distort, but in fact it is an insult. It is only those who believe in conspiracy who use the word “infiltration.” Dadoo, for instance, was a member of the South African Indian Congress but also a member of the South African Communist Party. [James] Stuart was a member the Colored People’s Organization but also a member of the South African Communist Party. This is no secret. Now, if you look at the Africans in this country, they are mostly workers and peasants. Now being a worker, what is the party that addresses your concerns as a worker? It is, of course, the labor movement in the form of COSATU and indeed for a future, it is the South African Communist Party. Therefore, the relationship between the South African Communist Party and the ANC to me—it is not a conspiratorial relationship, but on several occasions the British, the Americans and indeed the liberals have attempted to break the alliance. But how do you break it? How do you make Kotane, who is the Treasurer General of the Communist Party but also an important man of the ANC Executive, break himself into various parts? I mean, they combine within their person these types of relationship. It is not something that is imposed from outside. It is something that derives from the structural nature of the African in South Africa.

**EDWARDS:** Thank you. Ambassador?
VILLA: Thank you. I had the flu so I couldn’t make any comment on the Namibian session regarding some comments on Cuito Cuanavale. I will not do so now. I just would like to express comments on this particular paper we are discussing now. I believe that probably this document could have more consultation of more [Cuban archives]. It was also expressed by Ambassador Urnov before and just to give a better picture on South Africa was the contribution on Dr. Kotane. It was quite sorry, but he was quite an exemplary man on how the South African liberation movement was not so influenced in terms of participation of the socialist bloc, as it was during the cases as we discussed before, like Angola, Namibia, etc. There were links in terms of what the biggest contribution to the final situation in the new South Africa was made by the same liberation movement. They were the ones who sacrificed themselves just to liberate the country. I believe that probably Mr. Simpson could also try to find particular comments on an assertion that Cuba acted as autonomous but not as independent country in Angola which gave me some sort of confusion. Finally I would like to pass a question to Mr. Botha regarding his comment on the losses from South Africa, the GDPs and so on, particularly on the case of Cuba. We lost 85% of our GDP in just one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union and we got a new start. We don’t believe that this was nothing, but it was very painful. Thank you.

URNOV: I will try to be short. From his Excellency Minister Botha’s intervention I have learnt a fact which is new for me. I would highly appreciate if he finds it possible to supply me with the text of the Soviet President’s congratulation on the occasion of Nkomati, and I promise I will go home and I will look through our archives in search of it. Somehow I’m not sure.

SHUBIN: I’m sure there was no such a thing.

URNOV: About the “overplay.” I would just like to say again that the real threat was not communism. The real threat was majority rule. And indeed, when you fight against the majority rule under the pretext, under the cover of fighting communism, it helps to secure support of the right-wing forces in the world. And I don’t think it is proper to cite the decision of Comintern of 1928 while talking of what was happening in the ‘60s. Comintern was dissolved in 1943 and the relations between the Communist parties of the world became quite different. In Comintern, they were just sections of Comintern and the decisions of Comintern were obligatorily for them. The situation in the ‘60s was
quite different. I would like again to state that genuine cooperation did exist between the ANC and the Party and the reason for that was common interest. The two organizations were in agreement on both the aim and methods of the struggle. After the victory the situation changed. Now long-term programs of the two organizations differ. Socialism is not the aim of the ANC, while it is the aim of the Party. But that does not prevent them from cooperation since there is still a broad agreement on what are the national interests of South Africa.

I fully agree that with Yeltsin the South African government felt much better than with Gorbachev, although Gorbachev’s policy in the late ‘80s did not differ much from that of Yeltsin. When Yeltsin met with President de Klerk, the latter complained that the Communist Party was too radical and complicates the achievement of settlement. And the reaction of Yeltsin was very symptomatic. He said, “Ban them. Just as we did.” (Later the court overruled his decision.) And Yeltsin promised that Nelson Mandela will be received in Russia not in his capacity of the ANC President, but as a human right[s] activist. So, in this respect, of course, the life of the South African government did become easier. Thank you.

AMATHILA: Yes, thank you very much to the panel. Just a question maybe to General Geldenhuyys or whoever may be able to shed some light on the issue. At one point in the conflict between SWAPO and the South African government in the military field, General Geldenhuyys was quoted by one of the newspapers that he believed that the conflict was, I think, 85% or 95% political, and not military. It could be solved politically. At that particular point in time, what was going through your mind after you had admitted […] Just listening to some of the statements you made, we thought that you were possibly one of the enlightened generals in war, as one of the members of the South African force, but it puzzled us a little bit as to how did you come to that conclusion. That was the first question.

The second one, did South Africa at one point in time consider introducing nuclear weapons in the theater of war in Angola? There was always this argument that South Africa did indeed have some pieces of nuclear weapons, although it was denied. I remember Pik ‘moet nou nie so baie kyk nie maar nou raak ek bietjie’… [Pik, don’t look at me so intensely, I am getting somewhat…] now I was in Europe and General van den Berg ‘moet skielik…” [suddenly bad to] gosh I’m getting confused now, General van den Berg had to rush to Germany. I think that was in 1975, to have an on-the-spot investigation of the disappearance of a very, very critical and very sensitive file from the South African embassy.
The South African embassy was shifting from Cologne to Bonn and a very sensitive file disappeared. That sensitive file did reveal the communications between South Africa and Germany and the procurement of submarines, the development of the enrichment programs of nuclear fuel and the development of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{29} I had personally a chance to travel on a plane with Joe Modise and three of his generals, [including] Kat Liebenberg; they were on their way to London and New York, or just to London, and it was basically confirmed to me not by Kat Liebenberg, I think that was Joe Modise, that South Africa did have some pieces of nuclear weapons and which were surrendered or destroyed, or whatever. My question is did South Africa at one point in time consider using those pieces at that time in the conflict? That's very important because that will give us a better light on the question of the Cold War and possibly also the conclusion or events leading to the independence of Namibia and the agreements to be reached. I wanted to raise some questions also on Namibia but I thought let me just refer to here and if there is some additional time left to respond or say something on it. [See addendum below]

\textbf{GELDENHUYYS}: Mr. Chairperson, yes. We accepted that formula of 80% politics which would include diplomacy and 20% military, but we didn't invent it. Well, I didn't, but it was actually done by General AC “Pop” Fraser or CA “Pop” Fraser, but we observed that. That is why we could manage to…let me put it this way, it was in fact our mission, it became our mission to create such stability and safety within Namibia so that political diplomatic procedures could go through its final completion. And that is exactly what happened. Namibia was quite a safe place because of our actions, but the politics and diplomacy [were] done by people like John Vorster, PW Botha, Dirk Mudge and the continuation man was Pik Botha, if I may say so.

About the nuclear. I start to laugh when I hear that, because in a new book about Fidel Castro he was interviewed throughout. The form of interview was the theme of the whole book, he says, “Yes, it is the South Africans who invaded Angola,” and he was referring to the 1975/1976 Operation Savannah. “The South Africans had atom bombs provided to them by the United States.” Now, that is absolutely untrue. I see you all are looking at me

\textsuperscript{29}. There is some academic dispute over whether this file referred to nuclear weapons. See Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, \textit{The Nuclear Axis: The Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa} (The New York Times Book Co., New York, 1978).
so, so seriously. It was regarded as a big joke. It was a big joke. So, I had to address a meeting in Stellenbosch and I quoted that piece from the book to start on a humorous note in my speech. A little bit later there was a session in parliament and one of the parliamentarians quoted or said the same thing that we regarded as a joke and everybody seemed to believe it. There was applause. So, it was not true. Did we have nuclear capability? Yes, I can’t remember the date but I’m sure somebody that did research on these things is Anna-Mart van Wyk. She will be able to tell us what date it was that we acquired a nuclear deterrent. I must just also say this: if we would have had it, we wouldn’t have any use for it. Any nuclear capability is for bargaining purposes and intelligence purposes, and that’s that.

**BOTHA:** I will endeavor to confine myself to the nuclear questions here. The question regarding whether we ever intended to use a nuclear bomb or weapon in Namibia? No. The answer is definitely no. I can give you the assurance we manufactured six and a half, the seventh one was never completed. When I became Minister in 1977, the Americans, in particular the Americans, but also the British, the French to a lesser extent, but I think the Soviet Union cooperated with the Americans in this respect and exerted pressure on us to sign the NPT. One morning, soon after I became Minister, the American ambassador came into my office and displayed some photographs on my desk. And the photographs were of a drill, a big drill with big holes, and he asked me, “Minister, do you mind explaining to me what is happening here?” And he said this was taken in the western arid part of our country in the Kalahari near Upington. And I said, “Well, ambassador, you ought to know it is a very arid region, with very little rainfall, and maybe we need to drill big holes and deep holes to get water.” He did not laugh and politely requested a logical explanation. And then I found out a Soviet satellite took the pictures and they gave it to the Americans to confront us with the pictures. I succeeded in getting the Prime Minister Mr. Vorster to stop any testing. I knew that the Americans would immediately have picked it up. There was a gentleman called Kennedy—not President Kennedy—white hair, a handsome fellow. Every year they came and exerted pressure on us to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And every year we were negotiating, not gaining time so much, but we wanted to know, if we do, what advantages are there in it for us? What will we get in return? And in the end, I can tell you, when President de Klerk succeeded PW Botha on 15 August 1989, I said to him that we had two top priorities to attend to, namely the release of Mandela and the other prisoners, and equally, dismantling our nuclear bombs. And in conclusion,
coming back to the Cold War, I’m hesitant to say it, but I hope it will not be used before I complete my book, when I first met President Reagan, the French had to produce the fuel elements for Koeberg, our nuclear power station in the Cape and the only one on the African continent. A law passed in President Carter’s time prohibited the delivery to us of a whole shipload of uranium for low enrichment for fuel elements, worth 300,000 to 400,000 rand. And when I first met President Reagan, it was in the Oval office, General Haig was present, and we discussed Namibia, the war in Angola and events in southern Africa, and then suddenly after that, he asked me, “Is there any other matter?” and I said, “Yes Mr. President.” I hadn’t cleared it with General Haig—the convention was you must clear with the State Department every matter that you raise with the President, and I kept this one secret until I saw him. And then I said to him, “Yes, Mr. President, it concerns our nuclear power station. We spent millions and millions on it. It’s going to become a white elephant on the seashore north of Cape Town because of the pressure on the French not to manufacture the fuel elements.” I then asked whether he could assist in diminishing that pressure. And then Haig interrupted and said, “Under no circumstances, Mr. President. The South Africans are under suspicion that they are producing a nuclear weapon. Under no circumstances can we ever afford to be associated with this. Under no circumstances must you agree.” And then President Reagan looked at me and he asked me, “Mr. Minister, do you have the bomb?” Just like that. And I said, “Mr. President, could I put it to you this way, we have the capacity to manufacture one.” And then he looked puzzled and I said to him, “I want to ask you one thing, and I commit myself. We will never test a bomb without first consulting the United States government. We believe the Soviet Union suspects that we might have the bomb. Do not remove that suspicion.” And he looked at General Haig and said, “General Haig, that sounds fair.” And Haig again objected and then I said, “Mr. President. We need this as a deterrent for the Soviet Union because if they suspect that we have it they will think twice before they overstep the margin of their intervention.” And President Reagan agreed. I can assure here today the South African government at no stage had any intention of ever using the bomb. It was that dirty bomb that they used on Hiroshima, and the decision was firm, it will never be used, but let us have it as a deterrent.
and provides power for the Western Cape today. But this is the history, this is the story somewhat in confidence that I revealed here today. I reiterate to my friend from Namibia we would never, ever have used that bomb. The purpose was a deterrent.

EDWARDS: I think we had wonderful Cold War moments and can close this session quite happily.
| SA 1 | 4 December 1978, Extract from interview with Harry Oppenheimer |
| SA 4 | 20 January 2009, Letter from British MP Denis MacShane to Professor O Arne Westad |
| SA 5 | 12 June 1985, Letter from South African President P.W. Botha to US President Ronald Reagan |
| SA 6 | 4 July 1985, Letter from UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archives |
| SA 7 | 10 July 1985, Letter from UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archive |
| SA 8 | 6 September 1985, Letter from US President Reagan to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archive |
| SA 9 | 31 October 1985, Letter from UK Prime Minister Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archive |
SA 10 8 November 1985, Cover letter from South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha to US Secretary of State George Shultz, available at www.aluka.org

SA 11 12 November 1985, Letter from South African President P.W. Botha to UK Prime Minister Thatcher

SA 12 17 November 1985, Letter from UK Prime Minister Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archive

SA 13 14 December 1985, Letter from UK Prime Minister Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archive

SA 14 9 January 1986, Letter from UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to South African President P.W. Botha, available via margaretthatcher.org/archive
SA 1 — 4 DECEMBER 1978, EXTRACT FROM INTERVIEW WITH HARRY OPPENHEIMER

R.S Roberts
Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki, 87.

It was no secret that De Beers acquired, through subsidiaries, all the uncut diamonds that the Soviet Union wanted to sell on the open market. “We have of course no reason for concealing this arrangement other than the Russians prefer not to receive any public attention for obvious reasons,” [Oppenheimer] said almost apologetically...[the interviewer] asked how [Oppenheimer] could be sure that the Soviets would renew the deal. “We paid the Soviet Union more than half a billion dollars last year,” he answered.

“This is not a sum it can easily replace, and I can see no conceivable reason why it would want to abandon such a profitable arrangement.” His logic was brutally direct: De Beers provided the Soviet Union with its single largest source of hard currency (only petroleum was a more important export for Soviet trade in 1977). If the Soviet Union withdrew its diamonds from De Beers, it would have to find other outlets to sell its uncut diamonds.

SA 2 — 15 FEBRUARY 1983, EXTRACT FROM LETTERS BETWEEN LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER AND PIK BOTHA, AVAILABLE AT WWW.ALUKA.ORG

United States Department of State
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 15, 1983

Dear Pik:

I would like to express my personal appreciation for your interest in the U.S. evaluation of Soviet intentions toward southern Africa in the post-Brezhnev era. As we survey the
global implications of the USSR’s actions, there can be little doubt that one of the areas of greatest concern has to be southern Africa. Dealing effectively with the Soviet policy in this region is a challenging task. It is important that the United States and the Republic of South Africa share their views on how best to manage this issue.

Because we place so much importance on this topic we have taken great pains to insure that the evaluation of the Soviet position which we are providing you incorporates the best thinking of all relevant agencies of my Government. The results of our efforts are contained in the reply I have asked Herman Nickel to deliver to you. This answer represents the considered opinion of the United States Government; it also reflects my own views.

I hope that you will find our evaluation useful in reaching your own conclusions. Once you and your colleagues have had a chance to construct your own assessment of the Andropov regime’s policy toward southern Africa, I would appreciate hearing from you.

I enjoyed talking with you in November, and hope to have the opportunity to do so again.

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger
His Excellency
Roelof F. Botha,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town

SA 3 — 21 FEBRUARY 1983, LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA TO U.S. AMBASSADOR, AVAILABLE AT WWW.ALUKA.ORG

Minister R.F. Botha by U.S. Ambassador on 21 February 1983
U.S. Assessment of Soviet strategy and actions in Southern Africa
Forwarded to R.F. Botha under cover of Lawrence Eagleburger’s letter of 15 February 1983
SECRET

The Soviets in Southern Africa

—As I know you are aware, it would be too easy for both of us to see the question of Soviet motivations in southern Africa as an either/or question. We believe it is unlikely that the Soviets are directly orchestrating Angolan and Mozambican contacts with South Africa or that these two countries are acting strictly at Moscow's behest. On the other hand, neither Dos Santos nor Machel is pursuing such contacts without careful reference to Soviet views and interests.

—Our judgment is that the reasons for these developments lie between these two poles. We also believe that the new situation presents us both with major opportunities for dealing with all three parties in the months ahead.

The Soviets

—An analysis of possible Soviet motivations in southern Africa is one important part of a view of their overall strategic objectives in this period of leadership transition.

—Andropov has stressed continuity in Soviet foreign policy during his first months in office as a way of reassuring the military, the bureaucracy and Soviet allies that there will be no sudden shifts detrimental to their interests. At the same time, however, he has worked hard to demonstrate a new vigor and activism and to associate himself personally with important diplomatic initiatives.

—The Soviets will try to achieve their objectives with the appearance of flexibility rather than real change in substance. We must prevent them from succeeding in this endeavor. If we can succeed in sustaining pressure and demanding real change, there is some reason to believe that other factors will work in this direction as well. Andropov’s desires to consolidate his position, avoid the risk of highly visible foreign policy setbacks, and deal with domestic economic problems all argue for his trying to reduce external pressures. There is a precedent for such behavior in the 1953–56
leadership transition period when the Soviets agreed to a settlement on Austria’s status and on the Korean peninsula.

—In these first months, Andropov’s energies have focused on several key areas of paramount importance to Soviet interests and in which Moscow sees opportunities for some immediate gains. On area is Europe, where the Soviets hope to prevent INF developments and to drive wedges between the U.S. and its allies. Another is East Asia, where the new leadership is moving to follow up the Brezhnev initiative towards China.

—In both areas Moscow is trying to project an image of reasonableness and flexibility in order to quiet European and Chinese suspicions of Soviet motives.

—A large part of this strategy is to mute regional conflicts and keep them in the background. In their propaganda and public relations efforts, therefore, the Soviets have tried to suggest a more forthcoming attitude toward a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Deployment of SA-5’s to Syria is worrisome, but in general they have kept a surprisingly low profile in both the Mideast and Southeast Asia and have remained cautious on further commitments in Central America.

—Furthermore, except in the case of China, the Soviets appear to prefer at this point to keep their Third World friends and allies—Vietnam, Afghanistan, Cuba, Angola, and Mozambique—in front in diplomatic discussions. If there is progress, they avoid the charge they were responding to pressure, if not, they avoid the blame for failure.

—Recent Soviet assertions of support for Cuba and Vietnam, as well as the Syrian SA-5 deployment, indicate that Moscow intends to consolidate ties with its principal long-standing allies. But even in these relationships, it has moved carefully to avoid confrontations which could tarnish its “peace-loving” image in this “Year of the Missile” in Europe.

—Allowing a certain degree of flexibility in southern Africa would fit this pattern—and this sense of priorities—perfectly. In addition, the Soviets may have specific reasons, relating to the recent history of their involvement in the region, for exercising caution. Among these considerations are the diplomatic defeat they suffered for backing the wrong side in
Zimbabwe, the increasing costs of sustaining pro-Soviet regimes in Maputo and Luanda and the special place their interventions in Africa have in causing the collapse of détente with the U.S. The Soviets have good reason to maintain this publicly cautious attitude as long as they are not threatened with public humiliation or faced with a direct challenge to their fundamental interests which they must answer.

—Notwithstanding all of the above, there has not been a change in the Soviets’ strategic objectives. They remain determined and formidable adversaries and we will have to watch carefully whether ex-KGB chief Andropov engages in higher levels of covert action, deception, and military support of clients at the same time he is showing diplomatic flexibility. Indeed raising the ante in political action and arms supplies could go hand-in-hand with new flexibility. At the very least, we can expect the Soviets to protect their existing position through these means as the diplomatic game becomes more complex.

The Africans:

—Such a Soviet approach to regional conflicts in general and such to southern Africa in particular creates a situation in which Moscow’s African clients, despite their great dependence on the USSR, have probably acquired some room for maneuver on their own. Certainly, the regimes in Luanda and Maputo have enough reasons to take the opportunity to use this freedom of action.

—Both regimes face a stubborn domestic insurgency and a deteriorating regional environment which threaten their long-term chances for survival. They also may have noticed that Soviet priorities lie elsewhere and therefore come to doubt the staying power and strength of the Soviet commitment to their security.

—In any event, both regimes appear to be taking initiatives, domestically and diplomatically, to improve their prospects by creating more options for resolving the various difficulties they face.

—On the diplomatic front, in both cases, there has been an effort to diversify relations, which has included not only contacts with South Africa but also an improved dialogue
with the West and other important nations outside the Soviet bloc. Both Angola and Mozambique have sought to sustain a dialogue with us and both have moved recently to renew long-dormant ties with China.

**The Western Response:**

—The Soviets and the Africans cannot know, of course, where the new diplomatic movement in southern Africa will lead. Neither can we. But it is definitely in our interest to use this period of some diplomatic flexibility to try to shape events in southern Africa to our liking.

—In order for the United States and South Africa to succeed, we will have to walk a careful line between firmness and flexibility. Our handling of the diplomatic opportunities before us must be resourceful and subtle. The Soviets have not given up on their long-term objectives or their desire to disrupt any negotiations which threaten to reduce their influence in the area. On the other hand, they have apparently decided not to make southern Africa a major priority in their overall strategy for the time being and have thus left their position open to gradual erosion through our diplomatic efforts.

—Our opportunity, therefore, is to move ahead vigorously in our separate bilateral contacts with Angola and Mozambique, using these newest channels of communication to reinforce and complement the Contact Group effort to achieve a broader regional settlement.

—If we can move forward in these diplomatic negotiations to reduce Angolan and Mozambican security concerns, and thereby their dependence on the Soviets, we may be able to create a new situation in the region which Moscow will find it difficult to reverse. At that point, given other priorities and commitments, the Soviets may find they do not have the capability to reverse a significant shift in regional relationships even if the new configuration is inimical to their interests.

—We could lose this opportunity, however, through a sharp military confrontation in the region. This development would drive the Angolans and Mozambicans back into the Soviet orbit and could lead the Soviets themselves to a re-evaluation of the risk to their basic position in the
area, resulting in an escalation of their commitment to southern Africa. This could completely polarize the nations of southern Africa and relinquish our current diplomatic advantage.

—It is obviously in the West’s advantage to maximize the room for diplomacy in the region. Through diplomacy we can create an alternative for black nations to continued or increased dependency on Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers—an alternative which holds the promise of peace and economic development that the Soviets are unable to provide.

—In the months ahead, therefore, in our view, our interests clearly lie in dampening the possibilities of a military flare-up and making the most of the promising diplomatic opportunities which have been placed before us.

DECL: OADR

SA 4 — 20 JANUARY 2009, LETTER FROM BRITISH MP DENIS MACSHANE TO PROFESSOR O ARNE WESTAD

“I was very active in South Africa in the 1980s travelling regularly to work with black South African trade unions…. It was my view that the unions showed that apartheid could not co-exist with the nascent mass consumption capitalism under way in South Africa. By going on strike, by organizing, by electing leaders like Cyril Ramaphosa, by rejecting fakes like Chief Buthelezi, by rejecting external Communist-Stalinist control of trade unions and by building extensive links with European and North American trade unions (a more powerful force in the 1980s than today) the black (including so-called colored and Indian) workers demonstrated to a) themselves, b) the world, c) the South African white minority their ability to take control of their own destiny…. The trade union movement in South Africa was inspired by Polish Solidarity which did not sit easily with the communist elements in the ANC. They also looked to Lula’s trade union movement in Brazil and to the 6-week general strike and occupation union movement in South Korea in 1987 which helped push the South Korean military out of government.”
Dear Mr. President:

I wish to thank you for your letter on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Nkomati Accord.

The South African Government is committed to the fulfillment of the Nkomati Accord and I can assure you that we shall pursue our efforts to bring about a ceasefire and peace in that unhappy country. It is only by achieving a ceasefire that political stability and economic progress can be achieved.

High level contact between the South African and Mozambique governments continues. My Foreign Minister was in Maputo on 14 March 1985, for discussions in the context of the Joint South African/Mozambique Security Commission set up in terms of the Nkomati Accord. He was in Maputo again on 20 March 1985 for discussions with President Machel and on 9 April 1985 I received high-level emissaries from President Machel in Cape Town. My Foreign Minister, Minister of Defence and four Deputy Ministers were again in Maputo on 9 May 1985 to look seriously at areas of further bilateral co-operation together with Mozambique Ministers.

It is clear from recent discussions with the Mozambique Government that they do not wish to continue with the process of dialogue with Renamo initiated through the Pretoria Declaration of 3 October 1984. They have, however, re-iterated their offer of amnesty to members of Renamo who are prepared to lay down their arms.

I would, however, be less than frank, Mr. President, if I did not state that it is the view of both the Mozambique as well as the South African Governments that not enough is being done by the West in terms of economic and military assistance to Mozambique and

Tuynhuys
Kaapstad
12/6/85
to support the efforts by both of the Governments to stop the machinations of influential industrialists and financiers who do not have the best interests of Mozambique at heart.

Mr. President, South Africa’s resources are limited and our priorities must naturally lie within our own borders. Nevertheless, given the size of our Gross National Product, I am sure, that you will agree that we are doing more than our fair share towards trying to wean Mozambique from Moscow.

There can be little doubt about my personal commitment to the Nkomati process. I would urge the United States Government to take an even closer look than it is at present, at the opportunities presented in Mozambique for a resounding victory over the Soviet Union and its allies and the implications for the West of failure to capitalize on the situation.

Mr. President, Secretary of State Shultz’s speech on 16 April 1985 addresses some of the positive developments which are currently taking place in South Africa. Although I welcome this recognition of what to us are profound changes in South Africa, affecting South Africans of all colours and political persuasions, I am constrained to point out a lack of real perception in the understanding and analysis of the forces currently at work in South Africa and how much the South African government has done and is still doing in terms of sincere and observable reform. If the United States Government is in any doubt about the effect of this reform process, it need look no further than the outcome of recent political by-elections in which the South African Government has suffered significant electoral setbacks which do not augur well for the very survival of my Government at the next General Election. Mr. President, you have personally, in public statements, recognised that the major part of the unrest in South Africa does not revolve around black/white conflict but is in effect violence by black people against moderate black people. It is overwhelmingly the black people who are suffering and dying but it remains the responsibility of my Government to maintain law and order so that the reform process can go forward and that the forces of revolution can be defeated.

Given the stark realities of the situation in South Africa, I ask you, Mr. President, to consider realistically on what basis my country should be governed. The drive towards urbanisation which has been sweeping through Africa and other third world countries, has
not left South Africa untouched. Many factors including drought, famine and the current world-wide recession have contributed to the mass movement of people towards the cities but many millions of them remain ethnically bound.

On the other hand there are also many millions of black people in South Africa who moved to the cities one or two or more generations ago and who have built up urban communities which no longer have tied to their original homelands. It is the problems and pressures created by these and many other circumstances which my Government is trying to solve through the reform process. We are trying to create equitable structures and institutions to accommodate the legitimate desires and aspirations of all communities in our society.

With kind regards

Yours sincerely

P.W. Botha
State President of the Republic of South Africa

President Ronald Reagan
Washington D.C.
United States of America
Dear Mr. President,

In our last exchange of letters I referred to a number of positive developments in Southern Africa earlier this year. I was much encouraged by these clear signs that progress was being made in overcoming some long standing problems.

I was therefore greatly concerned by the recent operations involving South African armed forces in Angola and even more so by the raid on Gaborone on 14 June. Such an attack on a neighbouring country must surely be inconsistent with your attempts to build a better relationship with your neighbours. Our strong views about it were made clear by the UK delegation during the recent United Nations Security Council Debate. The reaction in Britain was all the stronger because the target was a Commonwealth partner which has always pursued moderate policies.

I have always held strongly to the view that violence and confrontation, whoever is responsible for them, have no role in resolving the problems of Southern Africa. We have instead lent Britain's support to what has been done to improve co-operation between the countries of the area, and have in particular tried to make a helpful contribution through our many links with your country. But the recent actions of your Government make it very difficult to sustain the approach which we have adopted hitherto; and were there to be another incident of the kind which we saw in Gaborone, I do not see how we could avoid taking specific steps to mark our repudiation of it. This would cause me great regret and I sincerely hope that there will be no cause for it.
I should like to take this opportunity to thank you for your letter of 2 May and for your account of South African assistance to Mozambique. You suggested that the West should be doing more to help President Machel. As you will know, we have offered, with the agreement of Prime Minister Mugabe, training for members of the Mozambican army under the auspices of the British Military Advisory and Training Team in Zimbabwe. We have also agreed to provide some military equipment, for example radios and uniforms. President Machel has warmly welcomed this offer, the details of which have still to be worked out. I hope this initiative will serve to underline the importance which my Government continues to attach to the Nkomati process.

I have chosen to speak frankly because the issues at stake could have a very considerable effect on our bilateral relations. I do so in the same spirit of candour which has characterized our earlier correspondence.

Yours sincerely [written]

Margaret Thatcher [signature]

The Honourable P.W. Botha, DMS
10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 July, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 5 July. I shall reply with equal frankness.

Yes, it is my Government’s policy to combat terrorism wherever it may occur. My letter to you of 4 July made clear that we oppose violence whoever is responsible for it. But this does not lead us to condone an attack on a neighbouring state, in which innocent people, including children, were killed and injured.

You mention the IRA. There has, as you know, been a continuing series of terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland in which some 2000 soldiers, policemen, prison wardens, and ordinary citizens have lost their lives. What would the international community think if Britain retaliated by launching attacks across the border into the Irish Republic, where many of the terrorists are? Rather we believe that close co-operation with the Irish authorities is the best way and indeed essential to the eventual defeat of the IRA.

As far as the attitude of Botswana is concerned, I can only say that President Masire, in a personal message to me, expressed his indignation at the attack. He also asked for our support at the United Nations and more widely for what he described as an unprovoked act of aggression. The fact that his Government has been ready to meet with you at regular intervals, and is even now prepared to resume the discussions interrupted by the raid, merely strengthens my view that this problem could and should have been resolved by diplomacy rather than by force.

I have to say, therefore that your perception of this episode is not shared in this country. The impact on our bilateral relations has been thoroughly unfortunate and this at a time
when Britain, almost alone in the international community, is attempting to resist pressure for economic measures against South Africa. This is why I was dismayed by your action and why I said that any further attack of this kind would leave us with no choice but to take specific steps to mark our repudiation of it.

Yours sincerely [written]
Margaret Thatcher [signature]

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S.

SA 8 — 6 SEPTEMBER 1985, LETTER FROM US PRESIDENT REAGAN TO SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 6, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

I have asked Ambassador Herman Nickel to return to South Africa to convey to you the deep concern and compassion with which I have been following the difficult times the people of South Africa and your government are experiencing. The international repercussions of events in South Africa, including the financial effects, trouble me greatly; I have briefed fully on the visit to Washington of the Governor of your Reserve Bank, Dr. de Kock. Within our own country, the problems of South Africa have occupied the attention of the American public as never before, arousing deep emotions on issues that touch the most sensitive nerves in our body politic.

Let me assure you that, along with an overwhelming majority of Americans, my Administration would like to see, and is prepared to encourage those working for a stable, prosperous, and democratic South Africa. This can only mean a South Africa that is at
peace with itself. I am reminded of the warning of Abraham Lincoln, that “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” Therefore, there is no question in my mind that the conflict your beautiful and promising country faces will have to be solved politically by South Africans of all races. Given our profound concerns and important interest in your country’s future, I want you to know that I and my Administration are determined to conduct a responsible policy toward your government and country, mindful of the dangers that all South Africans face at this moment in your history.

With this in mind, I have decided to oppose legislation being considered by the United States Senate and which has already passed our House of Representatives. I do not want my Administration to be party to measures which further disrupt South Africa’s economy and undermine the prospects of its people. At the same time and with a view to building support in the United States for a constructive approach to help end apartheid and contribute to a new political future for South Africa, I have decided to accept certain features of current legislation which signal the deep distress Americans share about the need for an end of repression and injustice in your country. My decision will not be a popular one but I have taken it after great reflection. I can only hope that decisions you take in the days and weeks ahead will make it possible for me to maintain the course I have chosen.

I must be frank. It is clear to me that the troubles which your country now faces, both internally and internationally, require you to take bold initiatives if the current debilitating impasse in South Africa’s affairs is to be broken and the negotiations to which you committed your government on August 15 are to start. Without such initiatives, our Congress, the international banking community and governments in the West more broadly, will not be able to play a constructive role in South Africa’s future. The time has come for all South Africans to reach out to one another, end the violence and begin to build a peaceful society. Your government has a special responsibility to open the way.

The initiatives you take must be ones that will bring representative black leader to the table for open-ended talks on the elimination of racial discrimination and political participation by all groups, in a manner that protects the rights and interests of everyone. For such talks to begin and be successful, I believe that even key leaders now in jail or detention must participate. There must also be a return to normal conditions in communities subject
to the State of Emergency. While I accept that South Africans alone can negotiate their political future, such a negotiation will only take shape if you and your government are clear about your intention to end inequality between South Africa's racial groups and to define the extent to which power will be shared and the steps required to reach that goal.

Concrete movement by your government on the Namibia and Angola negotiation would go far to quell the stormy international atmosphere. Our synthesis paper is a fair and workable proposal. I urge that you respond positively to our efforts in the region which continue to promote the objective of regional peace and the reduction of foreign intervention.

Creative action on both domestic and regional issues would receive the support of my Administration and, I believe, the Western political and financial leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. I have instructed Ambassador Nickel to explain my decisions and explore your own thinking and that of your government on the initiatives you plan to take. I will give your views my most careful and immediate attention and they will influence the future of our relationship and the role which my country will play in your region. I repeat, we want to help and the thoughts contained in this letter are my best judgment of what is required for South Africa to secure domestic tranquility and regional security. But I must emphasize time is of the essence. The moment has come to move forward decisively.

Mr. President, I believe that we now stand at a crossroads. Let history record that, with God's help, we took the right turn, for the sake of our peoples and their relationship with each other.

Sincerely,

Ronald Regan [signature]

His Excellency
Pieter Willem Botha
State President of the Republic of South Africa
Pretoria
SA 9 — 31 OCTOBER 1985, LETTER FROM UK PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA

P.W. Botha

[illegible, appears to be PA Embassy]
Hill Street, Pretoria

31 October 1985

Private Secretary to the State President of the Republic of South Africa

Dear Private Secretary, [written]

I have been instructed to pass on the enclosed text, which I have just received from London, of a further message to the President from the Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher MP.

Yours sincerely [written]
Patrick Moberly [signature]
P.H. Moberly
HM Ambassador

SECRET AND PERSONAL
10 DOWNING STREET

The Prime Minister
31 October, 1985

The Prime Minister

Dear Mr. President,
Thank you for the message which you sent me on 28 October. Now that I am back in London, I should like to give you a fuller account of the discussion of South Africa at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in the Bahamas and to put some ideas to you on the way forward. These cover some of the points raised in the message. I should be grateful is you would treat this letter very much as personal to you.

The Commonwealth meeting opened with forty-five countries seeking extensive trade and economic sanctions against South Africa. In some cases this amounted to lip-service only; the interests of some countries would be severely damaged by sanctions if they were applied. But the plain fact of the matter is that nobody else in the course of the meeting was prepared to speak out against them. It was left to me.

My rebuttal of the case for sanctions rested on two main premises: that sanctions do not work, indeed are likely to be counter-productive and damaging to those they are intended to help; and that it was inappropriate to take punitive action against South Africa at the very moment when you are taking steps to get rid of apartheid and to make major changes in the system of government in South Africa. I received a good deal of abuse in response, being accused of preferring British jobs to African lives, of being concerned pennies rather than principles, of lack of concern for human rights and much more in the same vein. I in turn reminded them of some of the less satisfactory features of their own societies and pointed to the inconsistency of trading with the Soviet Union, with its appalling human rights record, and putting trade sanctions on South Africa. In short, as your message acknowledged, the debate was a highly unpleasant and bitter one; and there is no doubt that the issue of sanctions will not go away, despite my success in preventing the Commonwealth from adopting them at this meeting.

My other main purpose was to secure Commonwealth backing for dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community in the context of a suspension of violence by all sides. The concept of course comes from your earlier letter to me: and I hope you will agree that it is no small achievement to have persuaded the Commonwealth to put its name to a suspension of violence, though there are several governments who will not wish to see substance given to this commitment if they can avoid it.
Looking now to the future, one has to draw the two strands together. The case for sanctions will undoubtedly continue to be pressed at the United Nations and when the Commonwealth considers progress in six months’ time. I am resolved to continue to resist that pressure, and I was encouraged to find President Reagan similarly determined when we discussed the matter in New York last week. But I need your help in this task and I need it in three ways:

i. Obviously you cannot and will not allow outsiders to dictate the pace and scope of change within South Africa. The Commonwealth Accord looks only for “progress” within six months and acknowledges in terms that “the forms of political settlement are for the people of that country—all the people—to determine.” But it would in my view be unwise not to receive the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, explain patiently to them what your Government has done and is intending to do, and allow them to make contacts among the various communities. I can well imagine that you will find this tiresome to say the least. While we shall do our best to guide the group in a constructive direction, I am under no illusion that much of what it will say and do will be distasteful to you. But I am convinced that it will be infinitely more damaging to South Africa’s standing and to the hopes of securing a wider understanding for what you are trying to do, were you to refuse to see the Group or to limit its activities unreasonably. At this stage I cannot tell you how soon the composition of the Group will become public knowledge, nor how long it will take to decide on how it should tackle its task. My best guess is that it will be three to four weeks before any firm request will be put to the South African Government.

ii. Your letter of 4 October to me set out in great detail what you have done and what you are proposing to do both in terms of removing discriminatory legislation and practices and of developing a political role for black people. It seems to me that you will need to have an eye to the international repercussions of the timing and presentation of your decisions. What was eventually said in your speech in August did not match the expectations which had been created nor indeed the reality of the decisions which you were then considering. I should like to see you present the sort of proposals you mentioned to me as a major initiative by the South African Government, at whatever you judge the appropriate moment. The initiative would not be taken in
response to international pressures: it would be the result of what you and your government considered appropriate in terms of your country’s needs and interests. But the international impact would be very much greater.

iii. Finally—and this is the most difficult since it involves an outsider presuming to trespass on your affairs—I do very strongly believe that you should be aiming to take further specific measures in the next month or so. I have noted the decision to lift the state of emergency in six districts: but have been sad to see that violence in the Western Cape has forced a further extension on you. Please do not under-estimate the impact on international opinion of the imposition of states of emergency and the gain from lifting them as soon as you are able. I continue to believe, as I have said to you before, that the release of Nelson Mandela would have more impact than almost any single action you could undertake. A specific initiative to launch a political dialogue before the Commonwealth Group gets far into its work would also be a skillful move and one in line with the intentions which you expressed to me.

I have spoken frankly on these points because I want to be able to go on helping you end the violence and bring about peaceful and fundamental change. But there are many more others who do not share these goals. I shall continue to resist sanctions because I believe they are wrong and because it is in Britain’s best interest to do so. But if my efforts are to carry conviction more widely in the international community, then I need to be able to point to concrete results from them. It is up to you to decide what weight you attach to these efforts. I very much hope that you will conclude they are worthwhile and that we can help each other in this way.

Yours sincerely [written]
Margaret Thatcher [signature]

The Honourable P.W. Botha, DMS
Dear Mr. Secretary

I should like to address a number of points which have arisen during the current debate in the United States on the provision of assistance to UNITA.

On 29 October 1985 commenting on proposals that the United States should assist UNITA, Assistant Secretary of State Crocker told the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa that he believes that the American people would not want to see the United States involved with South Africa in a regional alignment in the Angolan conflict. South Africa cannot see how the provision of assistance, particularly humanitarian assistance, to UNITA would involve the United States in any such “regional alliance”. A number of other countries in Africa and elsewhere give aid to UNITA without there being any question of their involvement in an alignment with South Africa.

South Africa has also taken note of reports that the State Department is using the argument in Washington that any assistance to UNITA at this would upset the negotiations on Cuban withdrawal which have regained momentum after the recent talks between South Africa and the United States in Vienna and Washington.
It has never been South Africa’s view or intention that the current negotiations should be used as a reason to deny assistance to UNITA. We have consistently held the view that UNITA should not suffer any disadvantage as a result of the negotiation/settlement process. Nor do we believe that such assistance would necessarily jeopardise the negotiations. On the contrary, it would exert pressure on the MPLA to enter into serious negotiations. We have reason to believe that moderate elements in the MPLA who favour Cuban withdrawal and national reconciliation would be encouraged by such assistance to UNITA since it would strengthen their position against the radicals in the party. The granting of assistance to UNITA would also be welcomed by moderate African States which are looking for signs of Western resolve in counteracting Soviet expansionism in Africa. Finally, a decision to aid UNITA would send a clear signal to the Soviet Union concerning its expansionist policies in southern Africa. Such a signal at this time is more urgent and critical than ever. There are strong indications that the Soviets and the Cubans might be planning to renew the offensive against Mavinga within the coming days. There is a possibility that one or two Cuban regiments might participate directly in the initiative. Any such development would entail the risk of a serious escalation in the conflict in southern Angola.

South Africa, like the United States, supports the ideal of negotiated settlements. But negotiations which are not backed up by resolution or which are divorced from the realities of power, will not achieve our common objectives. After consultations with UNITA this week South Africa is now in the process of completing its reply to the United States on the point which were raised during our talks in Washington at the end of September 1985.

Yours Sincerely

[signature]
R.F. Botha
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa

The Honorable George Shultz
Department of State
Washington DC
20520
SECRET AND PERSONAL

Union Buildings
Pretoria

12 November 1985

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your personal message of 31 October which I have studied most carefully. The candid way in which you expressed your views on developments at Nassau is appreciated.

You may be assured that I have much understanding for your position vis-à-vis the Commonwealth. We are, moreover, gratified by the strong, principled, stand that you and Sir Geoffrey Howe have taken against economic sanctions and also by your refusal to meet with the ANC for so long as that organization remains committed to violence.

I must, however, tell you—informally and confidentially since we have not been officially approached to date—that my government will find it impossible to co-operate with the Commonwealth initiative. The insurmountable problem that Nassau presents has to do with both principle and practical concerns of great importance.

The principle I refer to relates to the nature, scope and presentation of the Commonwealth initiative. The initiative is announced by foreign governments, who formally decide upon a course of action which directly bears upon the most crucial issues falling squarely within the national concerns of a sovereign nation. South Africa is not consulted. We are confronted with a fait accompli, reinforced by the threat of further sanctions, embraced within an ultimatum.

Our practical concerns are equally serious. Our primary objective is to advance reform by means of negotiation between our diverse communities. Intrusion into this process by those who are the originators of threats of punitive measures cannot facilitate this process. Indeed, it would do the exact opposite by polarizing opinions and sharpening divisions.
Democratic reform is our objective. We must necessarily assume that a group that is representative of the Commonwealth is likely to include governments whose commitments to democratic government and fundamental rights are, to say the least, suspect. Names and countries now being mentioned do, indeed, include states which are fairly described as total strangers to democracy. Such persons would not be acceptable to important sections of the South African public. The sort of reaction I anticipate might even limit my Government’s options are regards advancing reform. I trust that you will understand that many Commonwealth countries exactly represent the fears of many South Africans who are opposed to my Government’s policy.

Were it not for your admirable efforts, I would have had no hesitation in rejecting the Nassau initiative outright. Cognisant as we are of your position, we have endeavoured to explore all possible ways in which we could accommodate your concerns. In our view, there are two possible options.

Firstly, I reiterate that we would be prepared to consider sympathetically the possibility of emissaries of individual governments visiting South Africa, to which I referred in my letter of 22 October. The purpose would be to acquaint themselves with the realities of the South African situation and to hold discussions with representatives of my Government, various communities, the private sector and other interested parties on the same basis as that which pertained to the EEC Foreign Ministers in August 1985.

Alternatively, we have informally learned of a study being undertaken by the Foundation for International Conciliation. We understand that your Government is informed about this project which is already well-advanced the Foundation members involved in this project are recognized experts in constitutional, legal and political matters.

I do not know what conclusions the Foundation’s study will reach. Whatever they may be, my initial impression is that the work of the Foundation could be viewed by us in a very different way from which we regard the Commonwealth initiative. In essence the former are not closely associated with foreign governments. Their actions do not represent politically inspired intrusions or threats of punitive measures. This does not, of course, mean that we feel bound by such conclusions as they may reach. It is rather a question of being able to take account of advice which is offered on a constructive basis devoid of extraneous considerations.
If you feel that the Foundation’s project, together with a visit by the persons involved to South Africa, is a viable alternative, I will not stand in the way of it being pursued. My Ambassador will be in a position to provide further information to your Government as to the basis on which discussions with the South African Government, other leaders and communities might be arranged.

Yours sincerely

[signature]

P.W. Botha
State President of the Republic of South Africa

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

SA 12 — 17 NOVEMBER 1985, LETTER FROM UK PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER TO SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
10 DOWNING STREET

The Prime Minister

17 November 1985

Dear Mr. President, [written]

I have to say I am very disappointed, indeed dismayed, by your message of 12 November and particularly by the statement that your Government consider that it would be impossible to co-operate with the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. I recognize the difficulties both of principle and of domestic politics which the Commonwealth initiative inevitably raises for you. Equally I am convinced that it would be infinitely more damaging to South Africa’s future interests were you to refuse to have anything to do with the Group.
At the very least I would urge you to avoid any public statement of refusal to co-operate with the Commonwealth initiative. None of us yet know precisely what form it will take. The only guidance in the Commonwealth Accord is that it should “encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue”. This does not seem to me too alarming a mandate. The Group of Eminent Persons has not yet been completed, let alone held a first meeting to consider its course of action. At this stage it is far from clear whether the Eminent Persons would even want to visit South Africa as a group. It might be possible for your Government to meet individual members of it. The Group’s very existence will begin to focus attention on the complexities of the South African situation, to which you have always rightly drawn attention.

It will give you a fresh chance to put your case to important sections of international opinion in this country, in the United States, and elsewhere.

We are aware of the studies by the Foundation for International Conciliation to which you refer in your letter. I would want to encourage all well intentioned and helpful efforts. But I fear the Foundation will not carry much credibility internationally. I can see no prospect that this initiative could possibly become a convincing alternative to the Commonwealth Group.

May I ask you to consider for a moment the full implications if your Government were to reject co-operation with the Group. Your enemies in the Commonwealth would be delighted: they never wanted it anyway. We and others who had hoped for progress through dialogue will be told that we should have known better. The international pressures for sanctions against South Africa will fast gather momentum again. Most of the value of my having held the line at Nassau will be lost. My ability to help preserve the conditions in which an internal dialogue of the sort you are seeking as a chance of success will be critically, perhaps fatally, weakened.

In short I can see no need for you to take a decision about co-operation with the Group now, let alone reject it publicly. If you value my continuing help, I urge you most strongly not to do so. I do not think I could be plainer.

Yours Sincerely [written]
Margaret Thatcher [signature]

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S.
SA 13 — 14 DECEMBER 1985, LETTER FROM UK PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA

CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy
Hill Street, Pretoria

14 December 1985

Private Secretary to the State President of the Republic of South Africa

Dear Private Secretary, [written]

I have been asked to pass to you the enclosed message from the Prime Minister to the State President, which I have received today.

Yours sincerely [written]

[signature]
P.H. Moberly
HM Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

Message from the Prime Minister to the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha

I write to let you know that I had an opportunity for a long discussion with the members of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group during their recent visit to London. I was greatly encouraged by their general approach and believe that you will be also. They clearly get on well together. I understand that the two co-Chairmen are writing to you to ask whether the group can pay an early visit to South Africa. They assured me that they had taken care to couch it in terms acceptable to your Government.
In the course of our meeting the members of the Group said that they well understood that it was no part of their task to purport to tell the South African Government or people how to organize their own affairs. Rather they recognized that their mandate was simply to see if they could facilitate a dialogue between the various communities. They would be conducting their mission as discreetly as possible. They will not seek publicity but have yet to work out how to respond to inevitable press interest in what they recognized is a very sensitive situation. They said in terms that it was no part of their intention to embarrass the South African Government but rather to be constructive. General Obasanjo acknowledged the need to preserve the strength and buoyancy of the South African economy which he described as important not only for South Africa itself but for the Southern African region as a whole. The Group agreed with me that the six month period mentioned in the Commonwealth Accord was not a deadline but a “review clause”. They also recognized that it was unrealistic to expect changes to happen overnight.

[OMITTED] effort to preserve this. The Group made clear to me that they were very anxious to start on their task as soon as possible. They particularly asked me to urge you to let them visit South Africa in January. They recognize that their first day is to meet your Government and carry out whatever programme you might recommend, though they would subsequently also like to see representatives of all communities. In view of the Group’s responsible approach, I hope very much that you will feel able to respond positively to their letter and in particular agree to see them before the end of January as they ask.

I have asked the co-Chairman to keep me informed of progress in case I can help with any difficulties that may arise. I would hope that you would similarly feel able to take me into your confidence in such circumstances.

With my best wishes,

(MARGARET THATCHER)
Dear Private Secretary, [written]

I enclose the text of a further message dated 8 January, just received at the Embassy, which is addressed to the State President from the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher MP.

Yours Sincerely [written]
Patrick Moberly [signature]

P.H. Moberly
HM Ambassador

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 24 December as well as for your earlier letter of 14 December which crossed with mine of the same date.

I greatly appreciate the positive and constructive way in which you have responded to the approach from the co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. The Commonwealth Secretariat are pursuing the question of dates for the visit with the Group and will no doubt be in touch with your Government shortly.
I am also much encouraged by your comments both to me and to the co-Chairmen about your determination to proceed with reform and begin negotiations. You may recall that in my letter of 31 October I urged the importance of presenting your proposals as a major new initiative. Events since then have only strengthened my view on this. I am sure that you do not need advice from me about how to handle the expectations which are building up for your opening speech. Yet a forthright bringing together of your policies, including a firm timetable for new legislation which would remove important aspects of discrimination, could have a great impact. If it was then followed by a successful visit by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, the international climate towards South Africa might be considerably altered. Support for peaceful change would be vindicated and that for coercion and violence weakened.

I have urged others not to prescribe exact solutions to South Africa’s problem and shall not presume to do so myself. You will know what measures you need to adopt to transform the situation. My letter of 31 October made various suggestions about what would have the greatest international effect. But it must be for your to judge. Let me simply underline the crucial importance of what you do for the policies of others in the coming year.

I very much regret that the end of last year and the beginning of this should have been marked by an upsurge of violence against civilians within South Africa. There can be no empathy or justification for acts of indiscriminate violence and we have condemned them firmly. At the same time, I suspect that your enemies may be seeking through the planting of landmines and other such incidents to provoke you into military reprisals against your neighbours. These would inevitably cause a new wave of international protest and increase the pressures for sanctions. I hope very much that you will seek diplomatic solutions to the problems as you have done recently with Zimbabwe, despite the strong feelings which such wanton attacks naturally arouse.

May I extend my best wishes to you for the New Year and to say how valuable I have found it to be able to correspond frankly and confidentially to you. Let us continue to do so.

Yours sincerely
MARGARET THATCHER
### TIMELINE ON SOUTH AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Sharpeville shootings and State of Emergency; banning of ANC, SACP and PAC.</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>SA departure from the Commonwealth, and creation of the Republic of South Africa. Foundation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) guerrilla movement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>General Laws Amendment Act permits detention without trial. Voluntary UN arms embargo against South Africa</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>Rivonia trials sentence ANC leaders to life imprisonment</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>Mandatory UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia Formation of <em>Herstigte Nasionale Party</em> (<em>Reconstituted National Party</em>), a splinter group of the Nationalist Party [NP])</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Foundation of South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) under Steve Biko</td>
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<td>1974-5</td>
<td>Collapse of the Portuguese empire in Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Foundation of Inkatha under Chief Buthelezi</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Independence of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>SA invasion of Angola, against MPLA. Cuban and Soviet assistance to MPLA forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>February–March 1976</td>
<td>Soviet-British secret diplomacy at the UN to secure SA troop withdrawal by end March 1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 1976</td>
<td>Uprising in Soweto and other townships</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Steve Biko’s death in detention; banning of Black Consciousness Organisation, Sullivan Principles introduced by General Motors (USA) in support of black workers’ rights in SA (including equal pay, no segregation, better training); Gleneagles sports agreement, banning South African from participating in international competitions; mandatory UN embargo on trade in arms to South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</table>
| 1979 | Election of Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher  
Carlton Conference meeting of government and business leaders: Riekert Commission recommends easing job colour bar, permitting blacks with Section 10 rights to own homes, and greater freedom of movement; Wiehahn Commission recommends recognition of African trade unions  
Formation of Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)  
Lusaka CHOGM conference  
Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesian/Zimbabwean independence |
| 1980 | Zimbabwean independence. SA assumed responsibility for financial and logistical support of RENAMO, against FRELIMO government in Mozambique  
Election of Ronald Reagan as US President |
| 1981 | De Lange commission on education (recommendations rejected, but SA state spending on education increased.) |
| 1982 | Ruth First assassinated in Mozambique by letter bomb sent by SA government agents  
Formation of Conservative Party by Andries Treurnicht (following his expulsion from NP) |
| 1983 | Constitutional changes: Tri-cameral parliament (whites, Coloureds, Indians). Multi-racial electoral college to elect State President, who was to be advised by multi-racial President's Council. (constitutional reforms included shifting of responsibility of black rents to black local councils)  
White referendum approved new constitution  
Formation of United Democratic Front (UDF) intended to unite all black resistance groups (2m members by 1985)  
Foundation of National Forum (NF) |
1984
New constitution comes into force.
International business and banks begin disinvestment from South Africa.
Bishop Desmond Tutu awarded Nobel Peace Prize.
Nkomati Accord, signed by South Africa and Mozambique
PW Botha tour of Europe.

1984–1987
Township Uprisings, sparked by rent rises. Violent rivalry between Inkthata and UDF, and ANC and AZAPO

1985
Declaration of partial State of Emergency (36 magisterial districts)
Meetings of ANC representatives with leading SA businessmen in Lusaka, Zambia (Sir Timothy Bevan, Chairman of Barclays, & Gavin Reily, Chairman of Anglo American, discussions with ANC)
Foundation of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); International bank loans called in, new loans refused, and sanctions intensified.
US disinvestment campaign continues (From $2.5bn in 1982, to approx $1.7bn in 1985. SA experiences capital outflow of $2.2bn in 1984 alone.)
Conflict in Natal
Major strike organised by National Union of Mineworkers (led by Cyril Ramaphosa)
Meetings of ANC intelligence (led by Jacob Zuma) with South African National Intelligence Agency representatives in London; subsequent meetings in Switzerland 1986/7)
Financial crisis in South Africa (Chase Manhattan cut its links; value of the rand dropped by 35%; and Johannesburg Stock Exchange closed for 4 days).
October 1985

Nassau CHOGM: South Africa dominated proceedings

Prime Minister Thatcher's ardent opposition to the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.

The final communique announced a programme for common action: This included
• the reaffirmation of all members for the strict observance of the UN arms embargo and the Gleneagles sports agreement.
• the ban on the import of kruger rands (worth approx. £500,000 pa to Britain)
• Britain agreed to end official funding of trade missions to SA (9 in 1985)
• after 6 months more stringent measures would be considered if no further ‘concrete’ progress.
• agreement to call on all parties and organisations in SA to suspend violence
• agreement to call on Pretoria to initiate ‘a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.’

Establishment of 7-member Eminent Persons Group
• Malcolm Fraser (Australia)
• Dame Nita Barrow (Bahamas)
• Archbishop Edward Stott (Canada)
• Swaran Singh (India)
• Lord Anthony Barber (Britain)
• John Malecela (Tanzania)
• General Olusegun Asabanjo (Nigeria)

Decision to send this delegation of ‘Eminent Persons’ to report back whether sanctions is the most appropriate tool.

1986 January

PW Botha reform speech

February–May

Eminent Persons Group makes several visits to South Africa and FLS. Interviews wide range of SA leaders, including PW Botha, RF Botha and other ministers; Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders in Lusaka
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>March</strong></td>
<td>Lifting of partial state of emergency; repeal of Pass Laws and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>May</strong></td>
<td>After meeting with Nelson Mandela, 7 member Commonwealth delegation aborted by South African raids on Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>June</strong></td>
<td>Publication of EPG Report. EPG presents NP government with ‘possible negotiating concept’, requiring meaningful steps to reform (includes removal of military forces from townships, restoration of black political activity, lifting of bans on ANC and PAC, release of political prisoners. Black political leaders required to renounce violence and enter into negotiations.) Extension of State of Emergency to entire country Archbishop Trevor Huddleston shares platform with Thabo Mbeki for AAM march demanding Nelson Mandela’s release. US Congress passes Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) imposing mandatory trade sanctions on SA. Dutch Reform Church declares apartheid ‘an error’.</td>
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<td><strong>June</strong></td>
<td>European Community summit at the Hague</td>
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<td><strong>July</strong></td>
<td>GB Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (also President of EC Council of Foreign Ministers) visit to SA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>August</strong></td>
<td>Meeting of 7 Commonwealth leaders in London. GB agreement to voluntary ban on new investment, future sales of coal, iron and steel (subject to EC agreement); and promotion of tourism in SA</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>September</strong></td>
<td>EC Foreign Ministers meeting. Eventual EC agreement on ban on new investment; imports of iron steel and kruger rands. Japan announcement of ban on imports of iron and steel imports, and tourist visas for South Africans</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>October 1986</strong></td>
<td>Congress overrides President Ronald Reagan's veto on sanctions against South Africa. Prohibition on import of SA coal, iron, steel, uranium, arms and ammunition, textiles and agricultural products; also new investment and export of oil, and South African Airways landing rights revoked. $40m allocated to victims of apartheid.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1986–1989</strong></td>
<td>Widespread conflict between Inkatha and UDF in Natal</td>
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<td><strong>1987 August</strong></td>
<td>Major strike by NUM (largest union within COSATU). Escalating bomb attacks against urban targets. SA government covertly bombs HQ of COSATU Establishment of Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October</strong></td>
<td>Renewed Angolan/Cuban offensive against UNITA/SADF forces in Angola Vancouver CHOGM. No new sanctions adopted. All members (except GB) agree to set up Committee of Foreign Ministers to monitor developments and to commission study on SA relationship with international financial institutions. By year end 143 American companies (approximately 50% of the total) have left SA, 94 since beginning of 1986. (In contrast Japan and Taiwan substantially increase their trade with SA in the same period.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>AAM initiation of the Nelson Mandela ‘Freedom at 70; campaign Kwa Ndebele resistance to ‘independence’</td>
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<td>SA government covertly bombs HQ of SA Council of Churches.</td>
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<td>SA security raids against neighbouring states</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Military stalemate followed by new round of negotiations, beginning with meeting in London (May). Subsequent protracted negotiations in Cairo, Brazzaville, Geneva and New York.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Fourteen Principles ‘for a peaceful settlement’ accepted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>New York Accords on Namibia (simultaneous Cuban withdrawal (approx 50,000) from Angola, and South African troops (over 50,000) from South West Africa/Namibia) by July 1991. UN central role, supported by US and USSR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PW Botha replaced by FW de Klerk, following former’s mild stroke; Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) launches civil disobedience campaign</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emergence of non-communist reforming governments in Hungary and Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Elections in Namibia. Victory of SWAPO movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 November</td>
<td>Fall of the Berlin Wall</td>
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**Note:** Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974

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**New York Accords:**

- Simultaneous Cuban withdrawal (approx 50,000) from Angola and South African troops (over 50,000) from South West Africa/Namibia by July 1991.
- UN central role, supported by US and USSR.
February 1990

President FW De Klerk announcement in Cape Town Parliament of unbanning of ANC, PAC, South African Communist Party, and 31 other anti-apartheid organisations; Nelson Mandela released from jail.

NP renounces apartheid

Namibia obtains independence

Following release, Mandela international tour, including visit to PM Margaret Thatcher

State of Emergency lifted by de Klerk

Return of Oliver Tambo to South Africa

1990–1991

Repeal of Group Areas, Natives’ Land and Population,
Registration and Separate Amenities Acts;

1991

ANC announces end of armed struggle

CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) formed to negotiate with ANC for a new democratic constitution.

Government backing of Inkatha vigilantes against ANC

1992

White referendum support for CODESA negotiations, but ANC withdrawal from negotiations (May). ANC desire for multiracial one-person-one-vote democracy as soon as possible.

National Party preference for power-sharing arrangement between racial groups, and arrangements safeguarding white rights, together with moderated transition to full democracy)

Intensification of Inkatha-ANC conflict. (Boipatong and Bisho massacres.)

Goldstone Commission concludes that the government used covert force against its enemies.

De Klerk and Mandela agree on 1994 as the date for the first national election
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Negotiations resumed in April at Kempton Park to form interim Constitution. Assassination of Chris Hani (Secretary General of SACP; and leader of MK) by member of AWB. Death of Oliver Tambo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1993</td>
<td>South Africa’s President F. W. De Klerk, announced that it had fully dismantled its stockpile of six operational nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1993</td>
<td>Constitutional agreement. Universal suffrage election April 1994. 400 MPs to be elected by proportional representation. A government of National Unity for 5 years, while the President was to be ‘elected by new MPs. Any party with more than 80 seats to elect the Deputy President, and any party with more than 5% of the national vote to have a position in the national government. Nine new provinces to replace old provinces, and the Bantustans.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Failure of AWB invasion of Bophuthatswana.</td>
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</table>
EDWARDS: Can I pass it over to Sue who might want to make some comments? I’m sure you do of a more general nature of whatever.

ONSLOW: Thank you very much, Iain. And thank you to all the panelists for particularly interesting, wide ranging revelations of how each group saw the Cold War and how it impacted on South Africa; and how that played back into the wider arena. I think it is very apparent. We don't have a formal wrap-up session for this conference. This is quite deliberate because this has been quite a difficult and different type of conference. Yes, it has been an academic occasion. As I said in the outset, it has been a unique occasion bringing together historic opponents, historic enemies in the southern African region. I would just like to say my personal thanks to each of you for your participation. I thank you for your energy and for your honesty. I don’t think for a moment that this was necessarily comfortable, or easy for any of you. And that is what I wish to acknowledge and honor. But I’ve also been struck over the course of the last two or three days by points of reconciliation and particularly the dignified and civilized manner in which very contentious and very painful memories have been discussed. I’m also very struck by the manner in which each member has contributed, and how each group they represent has very different historical reference points and very different but very important historical narratives, which must be remembered by historians as we look at southern Africa in the Cold War region. They were parallel but they didn’t necessarily start at the same point. For the history of Africa, the Cold War was a very short interlude: I believe it was a very important one, particularly during the 1970s through to the 1980s because of the range of actors, the scale of violence, and because of its lingering legacies.

Now, briefly, from the point of view of looking forwards: as I said at the start, these recordings—and again I urge you please to sign that acceptance form which is still in your information packs—the recordings will be transcribed. The transcriptions will be returned to each of you who has participated and that includes members of the audience who have
also contributed. This is for verification and any redaction. Please, if you have any amend-
ments, keep these separate; these can be added at the end. As far as papers are concerned,
it’s the intention of the scholars whose work is in progress to take away your comments
and insights and to work together towards a publication. But from the point of view of
moving on from here, I was particularly intrigued by Professor Saunders and Dr. Dederin
talking about the possibilities and the opportunities of having a conference perhaps next
year on Namibian independence, because, as they highlighted, this is ongoing research.
There’s a rich history there that needs to be brought alive by you and hopefully it will draw
on the same approach of bringing together peoples who experienced it and contributed,
as well as scholars. So, my last point is, Anna-Mart and I hope to build upon General
Geldenhuys’ very pertinent remark: the dynamic of the global Cold War on the southern
African states and the southern African states impact on that wider war, the global war.
General, we plan to have a summer school here in Monash, South Africa in [the] future.
Thank you very much indeed.

EDWARDS: If I can say a few words from my side. First of all, to Anna-Mart, this
wouldn’t have had the result without your amazing amount of work. And then finally
to Sue. This is what brought us here together. It has been of enormous importance and
historical importance in broader sense, but also of enormous importance in the political
sense. Thank you for the initiative and we intend to carry on this work. Thanks very much
to everybody attending.

ONSLow: Wilbert Sadomba has asked to read a poem, as the final point.

SADOMBA:

FREEZING MOTHERLAND

It is this strong
Hissed through muffled voices
In a long tale of subjugation. This is hiss-tory
The dark past of colonisation and slavery: It is yet this unfolding episode
That triggers a yearning—a quest, An intrigued mind interrogating,
Whether it is indeed the passage
Of an era of trapped time, An end of the ice-age
Oh my fractured motherland…
Is it not, or is it?
The dawn of a new era
When anecdotal past is
A penetrating tap-root downward deep
To feed and anchor the growth of Africa?
History is a fascinating piece,
Colourful cloth of fading/rescinding memories
But the use-value of it
Remains the question:
Whether this cloth of history
Will illuminate and decorate
The dark pages of life ..
Or to warm frozen bodies
of black people shivering
From exposure of a war Cold

© Wilbert Sadomba
31/01/09