Documents and Readings List
Documents and Readings

I. Documents and Readings List

II. Chronology of Events

III. List of Persons

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X. Other Published sources:

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no. 14, 29 March 1961, pp. 398-400

XI. List of Secondary Sources / Background Material:


Chronology of Events
Chronology
U.S. Soviet Competition in West / Central Africa
and the Congo crisis, 1945-1965
compiled by Lise Namikas

1945
U.S. closes bases in West Africa.
International negotiations on former Italian colonies.

1954
May
French defeat at Dienbienphu.

1955
Van Bilsen publishes *The Thirty Year Plan* for the Independence of the Congo.

18-24 Mar
Bandung conference.

1956
Suez crisis.

1957
6 Mar
Independence of Guinea.

Apr
Nixon trip to Africa.

Apr
NSC 5719/1 adopted, first major U.S. policy statement on Africa.

1958

June

28 Aug
De Gaulle declares in Brazzaville that France will not oppose independence.

2 Oct
Independence of Guinea.

6 Nov
Van Hemmelrijck becomes Minister of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.
14 Nov  Zhukov makes his recommendations on improving propaganda in Africa.

8-12 Dec  All-Africa Conference, Accra (attended by Lumumba, Diomi, and Ngalula).

28 Dec  Lumumba delivers speech in Leopoldville before huge crowd.

1959

4-5 Jan  Uprisings in Leopoldville.

13 Jan  King sanctions eventual independence for Congo.

Feb  Khrushchev tours India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan.

22 Feb  Khrushchev announced establishment of People's Friendship University.

Aug  Soviet diplomats arrive in Ghana to a warm welcome.

3-4 Sept  Van Hemmelrijk resigns and is replaced by de Schryver.

23 Oct  Kasavubu rejects Belgium's plan of gradual approach to independence.

9 Oct  Lumumba attends executive committee meeting of All-Africa Conference, in Accra.

17-22 Oct  Riots in Stanleyville result in Lumumba's arrest.

15 Dec  De Schryver announces the Round Table conference for January, fulfilling promise of 26 Nov for a conference on the future of the Congo.

20 Dec  Elections for city councils are boycotted by Abako.

25 Dec  The Cartel of 5 nationalist parties demands complete independence.
1960

20 Jan-19 Feb  Belgian government sponsored Round Table conference with the Congolese in Brussels. Final resolution established that the Congo would become independent on 30 June and set out principles on which constitution (loi fondamentale) would be drawn.

Apr  Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee meeting in Conakry. Belgian Congo to be represented on the permanent secretariat.

10-25 May  Provincial and national elections in the Congo.

16 May  van der Meersch nominated to post of Minister of African Affairs.

19 May  Basic Law goes into effect (after being passed by Chamber, then Senate and signed by King).

15 June  Basic Law modified by Belgian parliament to allow election of provincial government without 2/3's majority, allowing Conakat cartel to approve Tshombe as president.

23 June  Coalition government formed by Lumumba, approved in Chamber with 74 in favor, 5 abstaining, and 57 absent (including MNC-K).

29 June  Treaty of friendship signed by Belgium and Congolese, never ratified. Treaty stipulated that Belgian troops stationed at bases (Kamina) could only be used at request of Minister of Defense.

30 June  Independence day in the Congo.

4 July  Congolese troops at Camp Leopold II mutiny. Belgians now leave country at faster rate than previously.

5 July  Mutiny spread to Camp Hardy, Thysville, Europeans attacked and rumors suggest several women raped.
7 July  Panic among Europeans who begin leaving in large numbers.

Soviet Union and Congo exchange ambassadors.

8 July  Belgium takes steps to send reinforcements to its bases in the Congo.

Congolese Government sends delegation to provinces, are refused landing in Katanga. Lumumba says he was threatened by Belgians.

9 July  de Schryver and van der Meersch are sent to Leopoldville.

Mobutu becomes chief of the army, now called the ANC.

10 July  Belgian troops sent to Congo, at least 1200 serve as reinforcements to restore order.

Lumumba and Kasavubu appealed to the United Nations (via Bunché) for technical assistance to help them reorganize the Congolese army and reestablish order in the Congo.

11 July  Tshombe announced secession of Katanga from Congo and asks Belgium for military aid.

12 July  Lumumba and Kasavubu refused permission to land in Katanga. Congo government accused Belgium of aggression and asked for UN troops to protect the Congo. Lumumba and Kasavubu send Secretary General urgent request for military assistance against “external aggression”.

13 July  Belgian troops land in Leopoldville.

Soviet Union charges Belgium with aggression and “enslavement” of Congo and demands U.N. resolution condemning Belgium.

14 July  1st resolution adopted (3:00 am) by the Security Council authorizing Secretary General to provide military assistance and called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops. First ONUC forces will arrive the next day.
Lumumba and Kasavubu break diplomatic relations with Belgium.

Lumumba and Kasavubu cabled Khrushchev that their lives were “in danger” and asked him to watch events.

Belgium authorized Minister of Defense to ensure security in Orientale and Kivu although the decision is never executed due to the arrival of U.N. troops.

15 July
Lumumba declares that “a state of war” exists with Belgium.

Soviet Union makes public telegram of previous day and states that the Soviet Union might consider direct intervention if the western camp did not end its aggression.

The State Department calls the message irresponsible.

Belgium informs its allies that it considers the question of Katangan independence an internal affair.

16 July
Zorin tells “Western ambassador” that declaration was prepared in Party office, not ministry of foreign affairs. Belgium dodges issue of recognition of Katanga.

First U.N. troops arrive in Congo.

Belgium decides to support de facto Katangan independence (and to encourage its recognition by other countries), to create a bastion from which to reunite the Congo without Lumumba. D’Aspremont Lyndon is sent to Katanga. Tshombe asks for de jure recognition.

17 July
Congo government issues ultimatum to UN to clear all Belgian troops from the Congo within 72 hours and threatens to call in Soviet troops if request not carried out.

18 July
Congolese Senate resolution opposing resolution. Tshombe demands UN recognize Katanga. Belgium agrees to abide by orders of UN command.
19 July Soviet Union protests arrival of US “military group” in Congo and asks for its withdrawal.

State Department accused Soviet Union (of trying to stir up trouble). Belgian troops begin withdrawal from Leopoldville area.

Soviet government announces that three plans loaded with food have left for Leopoldville, and then at Ghana’s request, will carry Ghanaian troops to the Congo.

20 July Congolese cabinet, according to communiqué distributed by Lumumba, decides to make “immediate appeal” to Soviet Union or any Afro-Asian countries to send their troops to the Congo.

Tshombe warns that U.N. troops will have to fight their way into Katanga.

22 July 2nd resolution on the Congo approved by Security Council calling on the Secretary General to “take all measures necessary” to bring about the speedy withdrawal of Belgian troops. Kuznetsov resolution demanding withdrawal of Belgian troops in three days fails.

Belgium agrees to accept resolution, and decides that it would not oppose with force the entry of U.N. troops. It decides to proceed with its rescue operation and sends d’Aspremont Lyndon to head Belgian technical mission (Mistebel) to Katanga. Wigny (who was in New York for Security Council debate) opposed to choice of d’Aspremont.


23 July Last Belgian troops leave Leopoldville.

24 July Lumumba arrives in New York.

25 July Hammarskjold sends telegram to Tshombe insisting that the resolutions of the Security Council concern all the Congo.

27 July Lumumba met with U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter in Washington.
28 July Hammarskjold, after stopping in Belgium for a night, arrives in Congo to negotiate an agreement with Congolese government.

31 July Lumumba’s letter to Hammarskjold expressing anxiety over the continued failure of the U.N. to enter Katanga. Ghana, Guinea and the Soviet Union criticize Belgium. Ghana and Guinea threaten to directly support the Congolese government if the UN operation fails.

4 Aug Bunche goes to Elizabethville to arrange with Tshombe entry of U.N. troops into Katanga. Tshombe refuses, threatening to fire on U.N. troops.

5 Aug Hammarskjold cancels decision to send U.N. troops into Congo.

King Baudoin demands Eyskens resign.

6 Aug Guinea pledges troops to the Congo government if the U.N. postpones entry of its troops into Katanga. Nkrumah also says Ghana would lend armed assistance.

7 Aug Belgian troops withdraw from all provinces except Katanga.

8 Aug Kalonji announces secession of South Kasai.

Lumumba returns to Leopoldville and declared state of emergency, finally closing the Belgian embassy.

9 Aug 3rd Security Council resolution declaring it necessary for U.N. forces to enter Katanga to end the secession.

12 Aug Hammarskjold arrived in Katanga for negotiations with Tshombe.

15 Aug Hammarskjold and Lumumba exchange bitter letters. Lumumba demands that U.N. troops enter Katanga, and when Hammarskjold refuses, announces that the Congolese people have lost confidence in the Secretary General.

Congo-Brazzaville becomes independent, giving Abbé Youlou more freedom of action in support of the opposition against Lumumba.
mid-Aug    Brussels approves “Operation-L” for the elimination of Lumumba.

18 Aug    Devlin sends telegram warning of “classic communist effort takeover government”.

NSC meeting at which Eisenhower officials, at least indirectly, discussed the assassination of Lumumba and insist that the United Nations must stay in the Congo.

20 Aug    Announcement that Bunche to be replaced by Dayal, with Cordier serving as interim representative of Secretary General.

21-22 Aug    Security Council meeting, but fails to adopt new resolution.

23 Aug    Meeting between Lumumba and Yakovlev on the subject of Soviet aid.

25 Aug    All-Africa minister’s conference in Leopoldville, Lumumba seeks aid for his planned attack on Katanga, but receives little.

NSC meeting discussed “getting rid of Lumumba”.

26 Aug    Congolese troops flown to Luluabourg to begin attack on Katanga. Soviet aid, including trucks, weapons, and 11 Illyushin transport planes are used.

Dulles cable to Devlin that Lumumba’s “removal” must be an “urgent and prime objective”.

Belgian cabinet approves the first sum of 20 million Belgian francs for the “secret fund”.

27 Aug    As first part of attack, Lumumba begins invasion of Kasai.

1 Sept    NSC Special Group authorized CIA payments to Kasavubu as part of the CIA’s covert action program “Project Wizard” (Weissman).

3 Sept    Soviet aid began to arrive in the Congo, and the next day Congolese reinforcement from Stanleyville are flown (in Soviet manned planes) to aid in attack on Katanga.
5 Sept Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as prime minister and announced he was setting up a new government under Joseph Ileo. A few hours later Lumumba made a radio broadcast dismissing Kasavubu. U.N. representative Andrew Cordier closed airport and radio station in Leopoldville.

7 Sept Congolese chamber revoked both dismissals of Lumumba and Kasavubu.

8 Sept Senate passes vote of confidence in Lumumba.

Dayal takes over from Cordier.

9-15 Sept 5th Security Council meeting again fails to adopt resolution, this time because of Soviet veto, and debate passes to General Assembly under the uniting for peace resolution.

Mobutu asks Hammarskjold to release $1 million to pay for ANC soldiers.

12 Sept Mobutu arrests Lumumba but he is released.

13 Sept Joint Chamber-Senate session votes to restore powers to Lumumba.

13 Sept Beginning of Baracuda, Belgian plans to assassinate Lumumba (de Witte).

14 Sept Kasavubu states that joint meeting is illegal and adjourns parliament. Mobutu staged his first coup d'etat by announcing that he is "neutralizing" Lumumba and Kasavubu, expels Soviet diplomats, and sets up College of Commissioners to govern country.

CIA, under "Project" Wizard helps finance the College of Commissioners, which is dominated by two of its allies, President J. Bomboko and vice president Ndele, while another ally Nendaka becomes chief of security policy (Weissman).

16 Sept Soviet and Czech embassies closed after Kasavubu's orders their withdrawal.

17 Sept General Assembly emergency session.

Troops loyal to Lumumba attack Kongolo in northern Katanga.
18 Sept  Mobutu calls off invasion of Katanga; U.N. sets up neutral zones.

23 Sept  Khrushchev addressed the General Assembly with troika proposal and called for Hammarskjold to resign.

29 Sept  Kasavubu called on to formally install College of Commisioners.

6 Oct   D’Aspremont Lyndon (now Minister of African Affairs) sends telegram to Elizabethville with message that it is in the best interests of the Congo, Katanga, and Belgium that Lumumba be “eliminated”. Colonel Marlier arrives as official counselor to Mobutu.

8 Oct   Hammarskjold letter calling on Belgium to withdraw its military and civilian personnel in the employ of Katanga government.

11 Oct  Mobutu sends ANC troops to arrest Lumumba but they are prevented from doing so by U.N. troops which surround Lumumba’s residence. Mobutu’s relations with the United Nations continue to deteriorate.

12 Oct  Mistebele ended, and Belgian operation put under control of René Clemens in Katanga.

14 Oct  Gizenga arrives in Stanleyville.

22 Oct  Mobutu announced break off of relations with UN authorities in Leopoldville for their refusal to recognize his regime and alleged support of Lumumba.

26 Oct  Mobutu agrees to increased UN responsibility for maintaining order after ANC troop disorders.

27 Oct  NSC Special Group approved $250,000 for the CIA to win parliamentary support for a Mobutu government. Congolese legislators refused to abandon Lumumba and money goes directly to Mobutu (Weissman).

2 Nov   Dayal report recommending U.N. does not recognize College of Commissioners and criticizing Mobutu.
5 Nov  U.N. Conciliation Commission established.

8 Nov  General Assembly begins discussion of Dayal report, but is adjourned two days later.

10 Nov  U.N. Credentials Committee meets to decide which of the two Congolese representatives should be recognized at the United Nations.

20 Nov  NSC Special Group authorized CIA to provide arms, ammunition, and training to Mobutu’s military to prepare for action against Lumumba’s forces (Weissman).

21 Nov  Congolese troops try to expel Ghana’s ambassador (name) by force from Leopoldville.

22 Nov  General Assembly, on recommendation of credential committee approved Kasavubu delegation.

27 Nov  Lumumba escapes his Leopoldville residence where UN troops have isolated and “protected” him from Mobutu’s forces, begins to make his way to Stanleyville.

28 Nov  Congo-Brazzaville celebrates its independence.

1 Dec  Lumumba captured crossing (Sankuru), Kasai by Mobutu’s troops.

Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Morocco, Mali, Guinea announced they will withdraw their troops from ONUC.

(Kasavubu and Tshombe meet at Brazzaville to find agreement. None reached.)

3 Dec  Lumumba imprisoned in Thysville.

7-14 Dec  Security Council meets as Soviet request to discuss Lumumba’s arrest. UAR, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Morocco, Guinea announce they will withdraw their contingents from the ONUC.

12 Dec  Gizenga declared himself prime minister of the interim government in Stanleyville.
15 Dec Kasavubu and Tshombe meet again at Brazzaville, this meeting hosted by African states.

16-20 Dec General Assembly discusses situation in the Congo, no resolution passed.

Mobutu begins economic blockade of Orientale.

22 Dec Katangan franc created, and is formally introduced 9 January 1961.

24 Dec Bomboko, in the name of the Congolese government, demands the transfer of Lumumba to Katanga.

25 Dec Stanleyville forces arrest president of Kivu, assume control of that province, until Kashamura arrives on 2 January.

31 Dec Mobutu tries to re-occupy Kivu, using Ruanda-Urundi, but fails.

1961

4 Jan Conciliation Commission finally begins work in the Congo.

7 Jan Casablanca conference (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, UAR, Morocco, Algeria) ends, with resolution on Congo to withdraw troops from U.N. unless stronger measures taken against Belgium.

9 Jan With support from (900 soldiers from) Stanleyville, Balubas of North Katanga announce they are setting up independent government.

11 Jan Soviet Union demands retreat of Belgium from Ruanda-Urundi and the Congo.

12 Jan Security Council resumes discussion of situation in the Congo.

13 Jan CIA station chief (Devlin) writes to Washington that the return of Lumumba will mean a failure for the policy of the United States.
14 Jan  Mutiny in Thysville prison where Lumumba is being held. Kasavubu fears a pro-
Lumumba. College of Commissioners asked Kasavubu to move Lumumba to
Elizabethville. Kasavubu instructed Nendaka to transfer Lumumba to either
Katanga or Kasai.

16 Jan  D’Aspremont Lyndon tells Tshombe that Lumumba must be transferred to
Katanga “without delay”. Belgian advisors reportedly oppose the measure for fear
of its repercussions on Katanga’s secession.

17 Jan  Lumumba, Joseph Okito, Maurice Mpolo are transferred to Elizabethville, are
brought to house of Brouwez where they are mistreated, and later brought to a
field where they are assassinated by Belgian and Katangan guards.

18 Jan  Soviet demarche to Hammarskjold.

20 Jan  John F. Kennedy became President of the United States.

21 Jan  Emergency meeting of Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Committee with pledge to
give material and moral support to the Stanleyville government.

23 Jan  Nasser withdrew Egyptian troops from the Congo. Morocco (24 Jan) and Guinea
(2 Feb) follow suit.

25 Jan  Kasavubu called “Leopoldville Round Table conference” to consider a replacement
for College of Commissioners. Conference formally closes on 16 Feb, having
shown their support for a federal government and recall of parliament (but their
calls are ignored by Kasavubu).

1 Feb   Kennedy approved new U.S. policy for the Congo.

2 Feb   Kasavubu announced installation of Ileo government.

10 Feb  Katangan Minister Munongo announced that Lumumba escaped from prison.

11 Feb  NSC’s Special Group on the Congo authorized $500,000 for a continuation of
Project Wizard.
13 Feb  Katanga government announced that Lumumba and friends had been killed angry villagers, and that villagers are to be rewarded.

13 Feb  Security Council meets.

14 Feb  Stanleyville government recognized by UAR, and Guinea, East Germany, and Yugoslavia follow the next day, and followed by China on Feb 21st.

At the Security Council, the Soviet Union demands the recall of Hammarskjold and an end to ONUC.

17 Feb  Eyskens government submits resignation.

19 Feb  Conciliation Commission report supports Basic Law and recognition of Ileo government.

21 Feb  4th resolution approved by Security Council (early am) authorizing Hammarskjold to use force to prevent a civil war in the Congo and to secure the removal of Belgian mercenaries from Katanga.

Announcement that 15 political prisoners executed by Stanleyville regime.

Ileo, Tshombe, and Kalonji sign a military alliance “against communism” and announce they will meet in Tananarive in a couple of weeks. Tshombe mobilizes his forces against the United Nations.

~1 Mar  Covert operation “Silver bullets’ approved for the Congo (FRUS).

3-5 Mar  U.N. personnel attacked, including Sudanese in first attack against African troops, and they withdraw, leaving Matadi (and supplies) temporarily undefended.


15 Apr  After nearly month long discussion, General Assembly adopted 3 resolutions on the Congo.
17 Apr  U.N.-Kasavubu sign an agreement of cooperation. Mobutu rejects agreement.

21 Apr  General Assembly adopted resolution on financing Congo operation. Soviet Union rejects and refuses to make any payments toward ONUC.

24 Apr  Coquilhatville conference, this time with Lumumbists, Tshombe threatens to walk out, he does two days later, and is held at the airport.

25 Apr  Government of Lefevre (a Social Christian- Socialist coalition) takes power. Spaak becomes Foreign Minister, with special responsibility for Congo.

25 May  U.N. announces Dayal will not be returning to Congo.

28 May  Coquilhatville conference ends after agreement recall of parliament.

14 June  Conor Cruise O’Brian arrives in Elizabethville as U.N. representative.

22 June  Tshombe released and announced his agreement to go along with recall, but as soon as he returns to Katanga (two days later) ignores agreement.

June  Khrushchev and Kennedy meet in Vienna.

12 July  Spaak and Hammarskjold meet to discuss Belgian withdrawal of mercenaries and advisors.

19 July  Parliamentary representatives meet at Lovanium University, outside of Leopoldville, under U.N. protection. Tshombe refuses to send delegation and Gizenga sends a representative.

24 July  At Lovanium, the Chamber elects Kasongo as its president (61:57) from the pro-Lumumba nationalist bloc. Senate elections the next day also show heavy nationalist bloc support.

July  CIA reportedly (Gibbs) built under ground tunnels to channel aid to Lovanium to swing vote in favor of Adoula, but this has never been verified.
1 Aug  Ileo resigns and Kasvubu asks Adoula to form a government, and the next day an Adoula government with Gizenga as vice-prime minister is approved by Lovanium. Although Gizenga accepts the post, he never takes up his duties.

28 Aug  Conor Cruise O'Brien and Mahmoud Khiaiy launched "Operation Morthor" to sweep Katanga of remaining Belgian personnel.

3 Sept  Adoula and Gizenga represent Congo at Belgrade non-aligned conference.

17 Sept  Dag Hammarskjold, on his way to a meeting with Tshombe, dies in plane crash in Ndola. U Thant becomes acting secretary general.

24 Nov  5th Security Council resolution on the Congo gave secretary general use of force to end the secession of Katanga.

3 Dec  Second round of U.N. military action against Katanga began.

1962

20 Jan  Gizenga arrested, brought to Leopoldville in U.N. plane, and eventually imprisoned at Bula Bemba.

31 May  Kennedy and Mobutu met in Washington.

20 Aug  Thant accepted "Plan for National Reconciliation" based on U.S. proposals.

Sept  Mobutu expelled Soviet diplomatic mission from Congo.

Dec  U Thant began "Operation Grand Slam" (third round) which will eventually reunite Katanga.

1964

June  U.N. troops withdraw from the Congo, bringing an end to ONUC.
1975 Church commission on assassinations.

2001 Belgian parliamentary commission publishes “Inquiry” into Lumumba’s assassination.

Sources:


“A Congo Chronology,” Records of G.M. Williams, Subject file, Congo, Box 18, NARA.
List of Persons
List of Persons

Adoula, Cyrille. Native of Leopoldville, he joined Kalonji's MNC wing in 1959. In May 1960 represented Equateur in the Senate, where he became an ally of Kasavubu. Adoula served the Ileo government as Minister of the Interior until July 1961, and then became Prime Minister, August 1961 to 1964.


Boggs, Marion W. Deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in Eisenhower administration from 1959 to 1960.

Bolikango, Jean. Denied a cabinet post by Lumumba in 1960 and became his implacable enemy.

Bomboko, Justin. The Congo's first foreign minister, June to September 1960. He held that same post for the college of commissioners (until October 1960) and in the Ileo and Adoula governments, 1961 to 1964.

Bowles, Chester B. Under Secretary of State, January to December 1961. Then served as the President's special advisor on African, Asian and Latin American affairs, until May when he was appointed Ambassador to India.


Bunche, Ralph J. U.N. Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, 1958 to 1971 and Special Representative of the Secretary General in the Congo, July to August 1960.


Burke, Admiral A.A. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, June 1961 to August 1961 when he retired. Burke had a reputation as a strong anti-communist.

Cleveland, J. Harlan. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, February 1961 to September 1965.


Dayal, Rajeshwar. Indian diplomat, served as Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary
General in the Congo, from 8 September 1960, replacing Bunche, until he was recalled by Hammarskjold in mid-1961.

**de Schrijver, Auguste.** Minister for the Congo, 1960-

**Devlin, Lawrence.** CIA station chief in Leopoldville, 1960 to 1962 and again from 1965 to 1967.


**Dillon, C. Douglas.** Served as ambassador to France and then worked for economic affairs in the State Department before becoming Under Secretary of State, June 1959 to January 1961. He served the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as Secretary of the Treasury, January 1961 to March 1965.

**Dodd, Thomas.** Democratic Senator from Connecticut, 1959 to 1970. Founded Committee for Aid to Katanga.

**Dulles, Allen W.** Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to November 1961. Authorized plans to assassinate Lumumba.


**Gilson, Arthur.** Belgian Minister of Defense in Eyskens cabinet, reputed to prefer a military solution in the Congo.


**Godley, McMurtie G.** Counselor of the U.S. embassy in the Congo, June 1961 to August 1962, and then Ambassador, from mid-1964 to 1965.

**Gullion, Edmund.** U.S. ambassador to the Congo, 1961 to 1964.
Herter, Christian A. Under Secretary of State until April 1959, whereupon he became Secretary of State, April 1959 to January 1961 (after John Foster Dulles resigned due to illness).

Hilsman, Roger. Director of the Bureau of Intelligence Research, February 1961 to April 1963. Then became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Hoffacker, Lewis. Consul, then Secretary, at Elizabethville, Oct 1961 to [1964?]

Hoyt, Michael P. American commercial officer in Leopoldville, 1960. In 1964 served as consul in Stanleyville where he was taken hostage by CNL rebels.

Ileo, Joseph. Helped Lumumba found the MNC, but broke with him in 1959. President of the Senate, June 1960, was appointed prime minister for a brief time in September 1960, then again in February 1961. Later served as minister of information in Adoula's government.


Kanza, Thomas. Congolese representative to the Security Council until removed by Lumumba in September, then ambassador to London during Adoula government. By 1964 was living in exile and sympathized with the rebels.

Kasavubu, Joseph. Helped found ABAKO in 1956 and became its president. President of the Republic of the Congo, June 1960 to 1965, during which time he dismissed Lumumba. Was overthrown by Mobutu.

Kashamura, Anicet. A member of Cerea elected to the chamber (for Bukavu) in May 1960. Served as minister of information, until dismissed in September 1960 when he fled to Stanleyville.


Kuznetsov, Vasili V. Became Soviet representative at the UN from 1958 until September 1960, replaced by Zorin.


Lundula, Victor. Commander-in-chief of Congolese National Army but dismissed by Kasavubu in September and then commanded troops at Stanleyville for Gizenga until 1961 when he returned his loyalties back to the Adoula government.


Mpolo, Maurice. President of MNC-Lumumba. Minister of sport in Lumumba government until dismissed by Kasavubu in September 1960. Served as chief of staff for Lumumba and was assassinated along with him in January 1961.

Murphy, Robert D. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August-December 1959. Lead delegation to Congolese inaugural ceremonies.


Nemchina, Sergei S. Worked in the Soviet Foreign Ministry from 1947 to 1953 when he became ambassador to Syria and Lebanon. In August 1962 became the Soviet ambassador in the Congo.

Nendaka, Victor. Mobutu’s chief of security police.


O'Brien, Conor Cruise. Hammarskjold’s representative who directed U.N. operations in Katanga in the fall of 1961. Author of numerous works regarding the Congo.

Rakhmatov, Mirzo. Vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and President of the


Stans, Maurice. U.S. Deputy Director, then Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1958 to 1960.


Strulens, Michel. Director of Katanga Information Service in New York City in 1961, and later became an emissary for Tshombe to the United States.

Terve, Jean. Communist member of Belgian Parliament in 1947. He edited the Communist newspaper *Drapeau Rouge* from 1945 to 1954. Was a friend of Lumumba and supported the Congolese independence movement.

Timberlake, Clare H. U.S. ambassador to the Congo, July 1960 to mid 1961.

Thant, U. In 1953 became Burma's representative at the United Nations. Served as Acting Secretary General after Hammarskjold's death and was elected to that post in 1962 and remained until 1972.


Urquhart, Brian. Assistant to secretary general's special representative in the Congo and UN representative in Katanga, 1961. Thereafter served in the United Nations as Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs.

van den Bosch, Jean. Belgian Ambassador to the Congo, 1960-.

Vandewalle, Frederic. Belgian representative in Elizabethville in December 1960, then returned in February 1964 to organize Mobutu's mercenary army to defeat the rebels in Orientale.


Yakovlev, Mikhail D. Former Foreign Minister of the RSFSR. Appointed Soviet ambassador to the Congo, August 1960 and remained until expelled by Mobutu in October of that year.

Documents from U.S. Archives
FROM: Leopoldville
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 12, August 6, 2 p.m.

Following thoughts offered view upcoming Byroade address:

US dilemma is to find policy for Africa that is at same time realistic and to encourage natural aspirations peoples this backward area for eventual self-government. Primarily we must have order in Africa. If self-government in North Africa will restore order there we should favor it and speedily. But if to encourage rapid progress towards self-government in Central Africa at this time will bring disorder we should recognize this and play down theme. In Congo there is order because there is hope and prosperity which all levels population increasingly share. There is tranquility because Belgian motives are not (repeat not) suspect to indigenous peoples.

For us to imply that Belgian policy is founded on old order of colonialism would do an injustice and if done publicly would only sow suspicion among Africans. We would thereby play into hands Soviet propagandists. If at any time we feel Belgians are too slow to grant franchise we might say so privately but publicly we should credit them with this goal. Belgians avert issue of nationalism by holding reins of political authority closely while concentrating energetically on raising level of education and welfare of masses on theory that public welfare is basis good government and when Africans get franchise they will insist on no (repeat no) less. Belgians have no intention to colonize Congo; their trade policy is based on open door under Berlin, St. Germain treaties making mother country merely most favored nation. We can expect nothing better from Central Africa under present conditions than that we continue have steady its strategic materials and that as rapid progress as possible be made toward increasing measure self-government for Africans. These are also Belgian objectives.

We would raise our stock with Belgians and enlightened Africans alike if we recognize the great and good work being done here. Respectfully suggest careful analysis Consulate General despatch 57, August 2 and pages 35, 36, 41, 47 of Governor General’s annual address June 6 for present Belgian thinking re eventual self-government here. No one doubts sincerity these motives.

Byroade
Confidential File
HO
Reproduction from this copy if classified. 13
CONFIDENTIAL

-2- #12, August 6, 2 p.m. from Leopoldville.

Byroade's speech October 6 did much dispel uncertainty American position re African policies metro-powers. Suggest all further references to colonialism be limited describe Soviet enslavement processes. To use word colonialism in referring present day Africa is to furnish propaganda material our adversary. Can we not (repeat not) proclaim colonialism dead in Western world and prove it by citing positive evidences rather than pointedly refer its remaining vestiges. This will make our policy dynamic, forward looking and encourage metro-powers whose assistance is cornerstone our national security.

MCGREGOR

EOC/6
Documents from U.S. Archives

Analytical Chronology
I. EARLY BACKGROUND

The Congo crisis has become so complicated that some of the early, rather simple facts about it are sometimes forgotten. Although basic information is found in a number of research documents (notably the excellent IR 8358), it may be helpful to recall some early US planning assumptions and basic political factors.

1. Constitutional difficulties for the Congo were freely predicted because of the tribal diversity of the country, the brevity of the life of political institutions which might have developed unifying trends, the clashing personalities of the candidates for leadership, and the differing regional interests. The constitution under which the new state obtained independence was a provisional document. The Congolese parliament was at the same time a constitutional convention which was to elaborate a new constitution. The United States was informed, even prior to the independence of the Congo, of Mr. Tshombe’s intention to proclaim an independent Katanga. (We discouraged him and also told the Belgians that we thought this a dangerous idea that should not be supported. At the same time, we decided to maintain friendly relations with Mr. Tshombe as far as possible since support for an independent Katanga might still become desirable some time in the future.)

2. Severe economic difficulties in the Congo were predictable, and the Department in fact worked intensively on plans to help overcome those initial difficulties. The flight of capital, especially during the year prior to independence, the drawing-down of reserves by the Belgians, the advance collection of taxes to meet the growing difficulties, and the enormous public debt which the Belgians proposed to saddle on the Congo, coupled with Belgium’s limited ability to assist the new country, clearly foreshadowed an economic crisis almost immediately upon the attainment of independence. Although Belgian investments in the Congo amounted to about $3.5 billion, public improvements had been largely financed by the floating of bonds, many of which had been sold in foreign money markets. Service on that debt was expected to absorb 23 per cent of ordinary Congolese budget expenditures. We estimated a gap of about $180 million between expected internal financial resources, and planned Congo Government expenditures during the first year of independence, and had worked out plans to help close that gap by a combination of Congolese efforts and US, Belgian, other European, and IBRD assistance. There existed an imminent danger that otherwise, faced with an acute financial crisis and unexpectedly large foreign commitments, the new Congolese government would repudiate its debt, resort to the printing press and possibly expropriate Belgian assets in order to meet its difficulties.

3. A breakdown
3. A breakdown of the internal security system was not expected, even though great internal strains were anticipated due to political, tribal and regional divergences. The "Force Publique," consisting of 24,000 African troops and 975 Belgian officers, was correctly regarded as a well-trained, non-political organ of the executive, but the Belgians (and we, who relied on Belgian information) completely misjudged the degree of loyalty of the troops to their Belgian officers. The Belgians expected that some of their women would be molested and some of their property endangered, but they saw the danger as coming from civilians—who on the whole did not misbehave—and thought that the Belgian-officered "Force Publique" would help to unify the country and protect European lives and property.

4. Even before the crisis erupted, it had become clear that the radical Patrice Lumumba would be an undesirable Prime Minister from the point of view of Belgium and that Joseph Kasavuba would be more likely to preserve friendly ties with Belgium. In the elections to the House of Representatives in May, 1960, Lumumba and his affiliates obtained 36 out of 137 seats whereas Kasavuba's Abako party obtained 12 seats. The fragmentation of the new Parliament meant that Lumumba, even though he headed the largest grouping, would have to create a broad coalition to obtain a majority. In the maneuvering for the Premiership in June, the Belgians clearly showed that they wished to handicap Lumumba's government-forming mission and that they favored Kasavuba. Their plan miscarried, however. Kasavuba failed to create a coalition government, Lumumba succeeded, and as a result of this maneuvering Lumumba was even more bitter about the Belgians and Kasavuba more clearly identified with them. As part of the deals that resulted in Lumumba becoming Prime Minister, Kasavuba became President, a position that was initially thought to be largely honorific.

5. There was no known Communist among the top Congolese leadership. However, there were a number of leftist radicals. Foremost among these was Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), who was known as a clever anti-white rabble-rouser. In his political campaigns, Lumumba opposed Communism but there had been reports that the Communists (well as certain radical African leaders of other countries) had helped finance his campaigns. Antoine Gizenga, the leader of the Parti Soli Africain (PSA), who subsequently also came under heavy Communist influence, was an unknown quantity for a long time except that it was known that he had been invited on a brief trip to Eastern Europe following the Brussels Round Table Conference in December, 1959. He is thus sometimes referred to as being "Moscow (or Prague-) trained" but there is no evidence that he actually was trained or that he embraced the Communist ideology and party discipline. He returned from his Eastern European trip by way of Guinea.
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of Guinea where he picked up Madame Andree Blouin, a confirmed anti-Western Marxist. Aniset Kashamura, who was Information Minister in the Lumumba Government, was a radical anti-Belgian exponent of CEREA (Centre de Regroupement Africain), a pro-Marxist and had visited East Berlin and Prague during the Brussels Round Table Conference, and likewise became a friend of Mme. Blouin. He was also at one time eager to visit the United States. In general, the line between pro-Communism on the one hand and hyper-nationalist, anti-"colonialist", Marxist thinking on the other is very difficult to draw in the Congo or anywhere else in Africa. Events, including the kind of support and opposition they encountered subsequent to independence, no doubt influenced the thinking of the entire Congolese leadership.

Although there was no Communist Party in the Congo, accusations of Communist sympathies or loyalties were freely used already during the election campaign in May. In Katanga province, for instance, the anti-Lumumba propaganda of Moise Tshombe's Belgian-financed CONAKAT (Confederation des Associations Katangaises) party pictured Lumumba as a puppet manipulated by Moscow. Clearly, to all the parties that realized that cooperation with Belgium and with the West in general was most desirable and indeed necessary for the Congo, Lumumba was the arch-enemy. He reciprocated the sentiment by picturing his conservative enemies as stooges of the Belgians. The line between moderates (such as Bombo, Bolikango, Sendwe, Tshombe) and radicals (such as Lumumba, Gisenga and Kashamura) was thus pretty clearly drawn before the Congo emerged onto the international scene.

II. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS

The independence ceremonies on July 1 passed off without excessively bad feelings between the new Government and the Belgians, although Lumumba saw fit to make a reference to the Belgian record of brutality and exploitation during its early administration of the Congo. King Baudouin almost left the ceremony, but Lumumba subsequently made some conciliatory public remarks. He surrounded himself with some Belgian non-Communist advisers, personally blocked the entry into the Congo of some East Germans who had not been invited, and publicly stressed the importance to the Congo of good relations with Belgium (Letter 14).

Shortly after the declaration of independence, there occurred sporadic strikes and disorders as Congolese demanded wage increases to express more concretely the benefits of freedom. Substantial wage increases were granted, especially to government employees. The soldiers of the "Force Publique" were told by their Belgian commander, General Janssens, however, that democracy did not apply to the Congolese army and that he would continue to expect them to do their duty. In the opinion of many qualified observers, including Ambassador Timberlake, the handling
the handling of the Force Publique during those critical days may well have marked the point of origin of the entire subsequent calamity.

On July 5, the "Force Publique" detachment based at Thysville, two hours from Leopoldville, revolted and refused to serve under white officers. Soldiers at Camp Leopold II, in Leopoldville, also mutinied. Prime Minister Lumumba immediately went to Camp Leopold II but failed to calm the soldiers. Later a group of about 100 soldiers demonstrated in front of Lumumba's house. "The general feeling," our Embassy reported, "is against Lumumba and Janssens" (Leotel 22). The Prime Minister thereupon addressed a radio message to the Force Publique announcing that all Congolese soldiers were being promoted by one grade, retroactive to July 1. He also announced that "measures would be taken against certain European officers and non-coms who are responsible for the unrest." The unrest in Leopoldville subsided for the moment, but it continued elsewhere in the Congo, and Lumumba flew to Elisabethville where the trouble seemed most acute.

On July 6, Ambassador Timberlake lunched with French Ambassador Charpentier who expressed the tentative view (Leotel 25) that the Congo needed a strong government which only Lumumba seemed capable of providing. Charpentier felt that many Belgian officials would be dismissed or would leave and discussed the possibility of replacing them with Western and ex-French African experts. He said Lumumba had orally asked for the dispatch of teachers from France. A strike of communications workers in Leopoldville continued, but there were no disorders.

On July 7, our Ambassador met with Lumumba to lay the groundwork for negotiation of a bilateral aid agreement, develop projects and institute the English-language program which had been orally offered and accepted. "The Prime Minister was most cordial," our Ambassador reported, "and he gave every indication that the Government is anxious to accept technical assistance and urged the establishment of the necessary US-Congo technical contacts to develop specific projects... In closing the meeting, the Prime Minister volunteered that he would personally intervene to overcome any problem should we so desire." (Leotel 30)

Late that evening, refugees began arriving in Leopoldville from Thysville with stories of horrors about raping, pillaging and murder by mutinous soldiers of the Force Publique. This immediately set off an exodus of Belgians and other white persons, many of whom fled across the river to Brazzaville. Some troops of the Force Publique in Leopoldville again went wild, stopping cars, roaming the streets in disorder and molesting some white people. Reports of attacks on white people in outlying areas began to arrive in Leopoldville, adding to the general panic. The government
government radio, while calling for law and order, did not criticize the rioters but took on a clearly anti-Belgian tone. Approximately at this time Belgium began to fly reinforcements to its bases in the Congo, which it was retaining under an as yet unratified agreement with the new republic.

On July 9 at 4 a.m., our Ambassador gave the following assessment: "The Government is striving to maintain the loyalty of the Force Publique... Certain demands have been met, i.e., a sharp reduction of Belgian officers and promotions, but these may not prove sufficient. If the Force Publique does not actively and loyally support the Government, no other effective instrument is available except foreign aid which I feel would probably not be requested until the last minute, perhaps after the balloon has gone up. From our own experience, at least some of Force Publique have deliberately and without provocation or even encountering efforts at self-defense (which might have been fatal error) severely roughed up Americans on the streets, robbing them as well. This pattern makes for great uncertainty regarding whom to trust, or indeed for how long. Should the Force Publique break down wholly or in substantial degree, Africans (already being harangued by some radio speeches as the disparity of wages and living standards) might start sacking or worse. That would require fast and strong action before it is too late. Any such action, however, would entail obvious risks—it would be likely to make the pot really boil over and immediately endanger many isolated people. This would be more likely the case if Belgian troops were used, though I admit no other substantial force apparently is now in the neighborhood." (Lectel 35). Our Embassy started evacuating American women and children to Brazzaville.

On July 10, Mr. Ralph Bunche, the personal representative of UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, had a four-hour conference with Kasavubu, Lumumba and fifteen cabinet members, which resulted in an appeal to the UN for "technical military assistance to help in organizing, strengthening and training the national forces of the Congo for purposes of defense and the maintenance of law and order." This idea, which was quickly overtaken by events, would have involved the dispatch of only a small number of French-speaking non-Belgian officers to take the Force Publique in hand. It was the first admission of the Congolese government that it was unable to cope with its security forces.

On the same day, the Belgian representative, Mr. Van den Bosch, informed Foreign Minister Bombolo that two companies of Belgian forces were being dispatched to the port of Matadi from the Belgian base in Kitona to protect the port installations and operate the facilities since the Congolese government authority in that vital port of ingress for the Congo.
Congo had broken down. He added that Belgium would relinquish the "security responsibility" as soon as the Force Publique established control and would continue to operate the port until civilian operators could operate it. According to Van den Bosch, Bomboke said he personally agreed but could not speak for Kasavubu and Lumumba who were travelling in the country trying to reestablish order (Leotel 40).

An interesting sidelight on the mutiny was furnished by Albert Kalonji, a disdain former ally of Lumumba, who called on Ambassador Timberlake on July 11 and requested funds to assist him to overthrow the government. "According to Kalonji, Lumumba and his friend General Janssens completely misunderstood the psychology of members of the Force Publique. While Congolese in all other sectors were being told they were now free and independent, Janssens persisted in telling his men that independence was not for them but that they were still subject to extremely strict discipline." At the same time, Belgian and other observers felt that Communists had instigated the mutiny. On June 11, as the Belgian army went into action at Matadi, there were armed clashes with the Force Publique and for the first time the cry was raised that Belgium was violating the sovereignty of the new republic. On the same day, the provincial Premier of Katanga, Mr. Tshombe, announced the secession of his province from the Congo and asked Belgian troops (already stationed at the Belgian base of Kamina) to intervene to restore order.

On July 12, with the security situation in many parts of the Congo still more out of control and with Belgian troops arriving in increasing numbers, the Congolese cabinet decided to ask for United States intervention. The request (Leotel 54) was signed by Foreign Minister Bomboke and, in the absence of Lumumba who was in the provinces, by Vice Premier Antoine Gizenga. (Lumumba on that day tried to fly to Elisabethville, but was refused landing permission there by provincial Prime Minister Tshombe.) The operative paragraph of the request for US troops read: "Since the situation is particularly serious in this part of the Congo and since the hope for collaboration between the Congolese Army and the Belgian Army has been compromised by the incidents of Matadi, it is essential that a foreign, neutral army be on the spot in order to assure peace and order in collaboration with the Congolese Army."

The foregoing request was immediately overtaken by a formal request from the Congolese government addressed to the United Nations. In a radio address, Foreign Minister Bomboke explained that the request for United States troops had been meant as an emergency stop-gap "since it is impossible to bring together the members of the United Nations on short notice and since events in the Congo brook no delay." He said that United States troops had been requested "within the framework of United Nations aid." He blamed the security situation not on the Force Publique but on the
but on the Belgian intervention and claimed that the government had been "on the point of achieving success" in restoring order when "grave incidents" at Matadi and elsewhere in the Lower Congo had compromised its efforts.

Late on July 12, Foreign Minister Bomboko called on Ambassador Timberlake and was told that while the Ambassador had not yet heard from Washington, he personally "did not believe US troops would be sent to the Congo unless they arrived under auspices of the United Nations. I pointed out," the Ambassador telegraphed (Lectel Unclassified 59) "that Khrushchev had already made a statement accusing us of trying to reimpose colonialism on the Congo." Bomboko showed the Ambassador a telegram which his government had sent to Ghana, the UAR, Sudan, Israel, Libya, Guinea, Liberia and Cameroun, urging them to support the Congolese request for troops of the US "in its capacity as member of the UN" as the only means of saving the independence of the Congo. In a secret telegram (Lectel 58), our Ambassador urgently recommended the dispatch of two companies of US troops to stabilize the situation long enough to permit the peaceful entry of other forces. ("Cannot too greatly urge most immediate dispatch of the two companies," he cabled.)

On July 13, Belgian parachutists took control of Njili, the big airport serving Leopoldville. The Force Publique put up feeble resistance and erected barriers between the European and native quarters of the city. Excesses occurred on both sides: Belgian parachutists appear to have shot some Congolese without provocation, and the Force Publique continued to rape and attack Belgians. Retreating to Camp Leopold II, the Force Publique arrested those Belgian officers who had remained in its vicinity and proceeded to rape those officers' wives who, trusting to their good standing with the Congolese, had not yet fled. The Belgian representative asked the Congolese Government to legalize the intervention by asking for it under the treaty of June 29, but he said the intervention would continue regardless of any Congolese request.

Meanwhile, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba returned to Leopoldville. On July 13, they sent another cable to the United Nations, explaining that the reason for their request for UN intervention was "the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship of June 29. Under the terms of that treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene at the express request of the Congolese Government... We accuse the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of the Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country... The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace." Kasavubu signed in his capacity as President and Supreme Commander—of the Congolese National Army.
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The scene now shifts to the UN Security Council in New York.

III. THE ORIGINAL UNITED NATIONS MANDATE

The Congo was not represented at the Security Council meeting of July 13/14 which decided on UN intervention. Before the meeting convened, the Congolese Government sent yet another communication to the UN denying that it had ever asked for US intervention and stating that its request for assistance related only to military personnel of "neutral nations." At the same time, the Congo threatened that if UN assistance was not received without delay, it would be "obliged to appeal to the Bandung powers." The Congo Government also denied that it had ever asked for Belgian intervention.

During the Security Council debate, the Belgian representative did not argue that the intervention had been legal under the treaty, but he cited the chaos that had existed, claimed that in one instance Kasavubu and Lumumba even "countersigned an agreement between Congolese authorities and Belgian authorities requesting Belgium to intervene to reestablish security at Luluabourg and in Kasai" and referred to requests by "foreign representatives" for Belgian protection at Leopoldville. He quoted Prime Minister Eyskens' declaration that Belgium will continue to respect Congolese independence and concluded by saying that "the intervention of Belgian metropolitan troops is thus justified by the total inability of the Congolese national authorities to ensure respect for fundamental rules which must be observed in any civilized community and by the Belgian Government's sacred duty to take measures required by morality and by public international law."

The Soviets attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the Security Council include language in its resolution that would have condemned Belgium for armed aggression against the Congo. They also attempted, unsuccessfully, to have intervention authorized only by troops from "African States Members of the United Nations." The first amendment was rejected by all non-Communist members of the Security Council. The second amendment was rejected, but France and Ceylon, the two former colonial members on the Council, voted with the Soviet Union. In the final vote on the resolution, France and the United Kingdom abstained (because of the criticism of Belgium) while the United States and the Soviet Union voted affirmatively with the majority.

The resolution of July 13 called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and then proceeded as follows:

"2. Decides to authorize the Secretary General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the..."
Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks."

The foregoing paragraph has been the subject of much subsequent controversy and will be referred to frequently in the rest of this narrative. In voting for the resolution, Ambassador Lodge interpreted the call for Belgian withdrawal as being "contingent upon the successful carrying out by the United Nations of paragraph 2 -- that is, in providing the Government of the Republic of the Congo with the military assistance necessary until the national security forces are able to fulfill their task." This was a source of some satisfaction to the Belgians who otherwise were bitterly disappointed that the United States had voted for a resolution which by implication condemned their intervention in the Congo.

IV. CONGO DEVELOPMENTS IN JULY

Events continued to move very fast in July, but the pattern was clearly one of increasing exacerbation of Congo-Belgian relations, increasing Belgian commitment to the independence or at least separateness of Katanga, and increasing radicalism on the part of the Congolese Government. Meanwhile, despite the arrival of UN forces, the security situation still remained precarious.

On July 15, Prime Minister Lumumba, in a radio broadcast, declared that the Congo was at war with Belgium. In an address to the Congo Parliament, he called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops and asked that Belgium also withdraw its diplomatic representatives in the Congo. (There were approximately 85,000 Belgians in the Congo at the time of the outbreak of the crisis.) The continuing exodus of Belgian technicians, administrators, teachers, doctors and other professional people resulted in an enormous paralysis and contraction of the entire economy. As tens of thousands of Belgians left the country, only a few hundred UN civilian experts gradually arrived and attempted to take their place.

The USSR on July 15 made public a telegram sent to Khrushchev by Kasavubu and Lumumba, telling him that their lives were in danger and that they might be compelled to ask for intervention by the USSR if the "Western camp" did not desist from aggression against the Congo. In his reply, Khrushchev pledged Soviet support for the Congo and warned that the USSR would not shrink.
shrink from "resolute measures to curb the aggression." In the opinion of Ambassador Timberlake, the refusal of the US to send troops was interpreted by many Congolese as evidence of US sympathy for or even complicity with the Belgian action. Others felt that Lumumba was dissatisfied with the fact that the US had not explicitly condemned the Belgian action and that he became impressed by Belgian claims that Belgium was acting for the protection of all Western interests in the Congo.

Illustrative of the atmosphere in Leopoldville are the two following excerpts from telegrams:

(1) On July 14, Kasavubu and Lumumba went to Njili airport to take off for Stanleyville to attempt to restore order. On their arrival at the airport Belgians gathered there and shouted epithets. As the two men boarded the plane, several Belgians and Congolese started scuffling. Lumumba descended to try to quell the disturbance and was pushed around but not injured by the Belgian crowd. Kasavubu then joined him, eliciting cries from the assembled Belgians and some from Congolese of 'long live Kasavubu, down with Lumumba.'" (Leotel 88).

(2) Ambassador Timberlake sent two officers to meet Kasavubu and Lumumba when they returned, to counsel them to delay the final break with Belgium at least for a little while. "The reception was polite but frigid—both men being under great strain and obviously very angry with the Belgians. As they descended the plane ramp, Belgian troops and civilians booed and called them 'macaque,' about the worst possible insult in the Congo. After they had entered the car, the crowd shook it violently until they finally got away. Parenthetically, Belgian troops and civilians are behaving similarly and worse in Leopoldville streets. One Congolese civilian was killed by a white civilian on the street near the Merling Hotel this morning without any provocation." (Leotel 106).

Prime Minister Tshombe of Katanga sent telegrams to the capitals of the world on July 15, asking for recognition of Katangan independence. "Considering that Katanga is not bound by the decision taken by Mr. Lumumba to break diplomatic relations with Belgium to which they are beholden for their economic and social development, their well-being and their prosperity, the people of Katanga through their elected representatives address a solemn appeal to all the countries of the Free World, asking them to recognize immediately the independence of their territory." Our Consul in Elisabethville recommended recognition and predicted a "critical situation if Lumumba is permitted in future to take revenge on Tshombe."

On July 16, Ralph Bunche had a long quarrel with Lumumba who insisted that the UN troops, which were now arriving in Leopoldville, should be placed under Congolese command. Mr. Bunche also explained that it was inadmissible.
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Inadmissible that the Congo should ask for Soviet help after it had requested UN intervention. Lumumba said he had sent the request for USSR assistance after the US had failed to act on his request for US troops and before the UN had given its favorable response for UN intervention. Lumumba claimed that the Congolese Parliament had endorsed the break with Belgium and had granted him special powers, but Bunche confirmed to our Embassy that there had been no vote in Parliament. "After an impassioned angry speech in each case, Lumumba took the ensuing applause as a mandate." (Lectel 121). Bunche said several times he thought Lumumba was crazy and that he reacted like a child. Lumumba's principal interest at the time appeared to be to get to Stanleyville, and Ambassador Timberlake provided him and Kasavubu with transportation on a US Air Force C-130 which was sent to pick up refugees there.

Meanwhile, as Tunisian and Ghanaian UN troops continued to arrive, Belgian troops did not leave the Congo. Lumumba, who was trying to bring the Force Publique under control in Stanleyville, insisted to General Alexander (British officer of Ghana army under UN command) that "Belgian troops be out by Monday or he could not vouch for actions of the Force Publique." Alexander told him that was physically impossible. Lumumba withdrew and after one hour presented Alexander with an ultimatum addressed to the UN and signed by Lumumba and Kasavubu. The ultimatum said that "if by July 19, 1960, the United Nations is unable to discharge the mission which we have entrusted to it, regrettfully we may be obliged to call upon the Soviet Union to intervene." The rationale of the ultimatum was that the UN had, through Bunche, assured the Congolese government that Belgian troops "in accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council, were to leave the Congo upon the arrival of United Nations forces." UN forces had arrived in the Congo, but Belgian troops were still going into action and had only on the previous day disarmed the Force Publique at Kindu and Coquilhatville. (Bunche subsequently denied that he had given assurances of Belgian troop withdrawals to Lumumba.)

Our Ambassador in a long message about the state of affairs in the Congo (Lectel 125) said the country "may be in its death throes as a modern nation. The Congo itself was never such a nation and no Congolese has any real comprehension of what makes such a nation live... The present government and any that is foreseeable, has not the slightest idea of what is happening, let alone what might be done about it... It is violently anti-Belgian. Some Belgians on the other hand, particularly the military, have become completely irrational and in many instances have behaved worse than the worst Congolese." The Ambassador stressed the vital necessity of the reestablishment of some satisfactory rapport between the Congolese and the Belgians, and saw future policy alternatives as follows: (1) Go along with present UN plans and programs even though they are insufficient.

(2) Urge
(2) Urge and support an enormously greater economic plan which would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. (3) "Permit the Katanga, which is viable and has emerged so far practically unscathed, to become independent and face the fragmentation of the country which might well continue." In a separate message, the Ambassador pointed to increasing friction between Lumumba and the more moderate Congolese politicians, and trends toward the establishment of separate states in the Lower Congo, Orientale, and Equateur provinces.

Far from withdrawing their troops, the Belgians were on July 18 still planning additional air drops to rescue persons in distress. General Alexander said after a personal investigation at Stanleyville that he was convinced that the introduction of Belgian paratroopers into Orientale province "would result in deaths and atrocities on numbers of Europeans in that area who are so far safe and are more likely to remain so if the Belgians stay out." (Leopoldville 134). In long negotiations with the Belgian army commander, the UN obtained agreement that he would for the time being desist from further air drops and would consider the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Leopoldville. Our Ambassador commented that "even the presence of Belgian troops anywhere now is most highly explosive, and affirmative action could well put situation out of what little control now exists or is in prospect. For example, this morning Belgian troops are wiring themselves in along Boulevard Albert and have strung barbed wire around the residence. I am forced by repeated examples of such stupidity to the inescapable conclusion that if this is not stopped and Belgian troops put under UN control, there will be great and wholly unnecessary loss of life throughout the interior of the Congo."

Opposition against Lumumba's radicalism became stronger. On July 19, the Senate repudiated Lumumba's ultimatum to the UN, rejected all possible intervention by the Soviet Union, insisted on being consulted before the Congo broke diplomatic relations with Belgium, but at the same time reaffirmed its previous call for immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. It became clear that several cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Bomboko, strongly disapproved of the line being pursued by Lumumba. The Bishop of Leopoldville publicly protested against tendentious, inflammatory and leftist propaganda broadcast by Radio Leopoldville under the control of Anicet Kashamuka. On July 20, Lumumba held a press conference in which he accused Belgium of violating the Security Council resolution of July 13 by making the withdrawal of Belgian troops dependent on a Belgian decision as to when the UN had the situation under control. He said, "We will take aid from the devil or anyone else as long as they get the Belgian troops out." He attacked the Western powers, especially France and Great Britain, for not having dared to condemn Belgium for aggression against the Congo. "If no Western nation helps us," he said, "why can we not call on other nations?"

On July 22,
On July 22, Lumumba announced that he had just signed a financial and management agreement with an American company headed by Mr. L. Edgar Detwiler. The agreement provided for 50 per cent of the shares to be held by the Congolese Government and 50 per cent by American and other bankers, industrialists, engineers and experts in all fields who allegedly had been drawn together by Mr. Detwiler. The new corporation was to permit the immediate exploitation of mineral and hydro-electric resources of the Congo and would thus result in full employment and the raising of Congolese living standards. Moreover, the signing of the agreement, which was subject to parliamentary ratification, proved, Lumumba said, that he was not anti-white or that he wished to expropriate private investments. (Mr. Detwiler, who subsequently accompanied Lumumba to New York, turned out to have no important resources and the project was later disavowed by Lumumba.)

Meanwhile, the Security Council in New York had been called into another session to clarify the UN mandate.

V. SECOND UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING: LUMUMBA VISIT TO US

Secretary General Hammarskjöld reported what the UN had done and set forth his position on the question of Katanga and the question of the rate of Belgian troop withdrawal. On Katanga, he stated that "in my view, the United Nations Force, under the resolution and on the basis of the request of the Government of the Congo, is entitled to access to all parts of the territory in fulfillment of its duties." He thus rejected the claim of Katanga for special treatment. He also rejected the Congolese ultimatum. On the question of Belgian troop withdrawal, he said he was doing what he could but said a clarification of his mandate might be useful. He implied that he did not think he had a right, under the resolution of July 15, to set up any time-table for the Belgian withdrawal.

The Congo was represented by Thomas Kasavubu, a moderate (who later sided with Lumumba when the split occurred with Kasavubu). Kasavubu cited the Congo-Belgian treaty of June 29, which had clearly stated:

"The Belgian troops at present in the Congo shall not be used on Congolese national territory unless the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or the Congolese Minister for National Defense, explicitly so requests."

Kasavubu recalled that the first Belgian troop intervention had been at the request of the Belgian-supported provincial government of Katanga. "If the Belgian Government had made a simple telephone call or sent a short cable to our Prime Minister, who happens also to be our Minister of National Defense,"
Defense," he said, "everything could have passed off legally." While not accepting the Belgian position that Belgian troops would be withdrawn when and where public order had been restored by the UN, he pointed out that in Leopoldville there were now 1,200 UN soldiers and yet the Belgians had not withdrawn. Kanza tried to soft-pedal the ultimatum and the threat to resort to Soviet aid, but insisted on a clear resolution telling the Belgians to get out of the Congo unconditionally and immediately.

Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny was taken aback by the moderate tenor of Kanza's speech and abandoned his own prepared speech. He explained that Belgium, which had just given the Congo its independence, could not possibly be guilty of "aggression" against it but was merely protecting its nationals after the Congolese Government proved incapable of doing so.

As he talked, he became more and more excited. He quoted from messages of distress in various parts of the Congo, cited cases of Belgian women, some of them pregnant, having been raped by Congolese soldiers, and went into lengthy quotations from reports to show the degree of urgency.

(Sample: "Mme. O. said: 'I did not give in, I resisted, but they pulled out my pubic hair and stuffed it in my mouth for me to swallow. I was raped by several soldiers... Then they brutally pushed a rough object into my vagina and afterwards wrenched it out.')

M. Wigny revealed, incidentally, that Lumumba, having signed an agreement with the Belgians at Luluabourg that seemed to legalize their intervention in Kasai-province (see Section III above), countermanded that agreement the same day when he returned after having been refused the right to land at Elisabethville, in the Katanga, and created the impression that that abortive flight on July 12 represented something of a turning point in Lumumba's thinking. It was in Katanga that the Belgians first intervened, it was there that Lumumba's government was first challenged by a provincial government, and it was Katanga which now refused to admit the troops of the UN and was asking for international recognition.

M. Wigny insisted that the Belgians could not immediately withdraw without creating "a gap, an interval at a time when massacres may start again." At the same time, he pleaded for an end to "this madness, this incitement to murder which is continuing over the Congolese radio."

Mr. Kanza, in reply, cited messages of panic among Congolese upon the arrival of trigger-happy Belgian troops, and said, among other things: "Is it necessary to remind the Council that Mr. Kasavubu, our Chief of State, and Mr. Lumumba, our Prime Minister, were insulted and abused and subjected to offensive treatment when they landed at the Nijl airfield? Need I recall that the Chief of State and the Prime Minister of the Congo were held up to ridicule at Elisabethville in the aircraft in which they were travelling? The aircraft circled over the Elisabethville airfield more than six
than six times and then flew back to Kamina, they were told that they were being taken to Stanleyville but instead they were taken to Leopoldville; some Belgians were allowed to mock our Prime Minister." Kanza insisted on the earliest possible evacuation of all Belgian troops from the Congo.

The Soviet representative again accused the US of complicity in Belgian aggression and subversive activities in the Congo; he paid tribute to statements by African leaders against the Belgian action; and announced that "the Soviet Government has decided to furnish the Republic of the Congo with food and other assistance and to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations accordingly. Food supplies to the total of 10,000 tons have been allotted. The Soviet Government has also assigned five aircraft for the delivery of goods to the Congo and for other transport services required in connection with the granting of aid to the Republic." At the same time, the Soviet representative complained about the presence in Leopoldville of a small number of US Air Force personnel in connection with the airlift operation.

Ambassador Lodge paid tribute to the UN action, cited the massive US assistance given to the UN, but he was clearly anxious not to offend the Belgians when it came to the question of troop withdrawal. He said: "We think we can understand the feelings of everyone concerned with this problem. We understand the fears of the Congolese leaders when troops of the former administering power returned to the Congo. We can understand equally well the anxieties of the people and Government of Belgium and their feeling that they had to send urgent contingents to protect their nationals. The atrocities committed are certainly deplorable." Mr. Lodge recalled that on July 13 he had interpreted the withdrawal provision of the Security Council resolution "as being contingent upon the successful carrying out of the entire resolution by the United Nations." He welcomed the fact that some Belgian troops were beginning to leave Leopoldville.

With respect to Soviet intervention, Mr. Lodge said: "Despite an official request from the Government of the Congo some days ago for United States troops we insisted that all American help should be sent through the United Nations... Obviously, no troops should be introduced into the Congo other than those requested by the Secretary General pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of July 14... With other United Nations Members we will do whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of any military forces not requested by the United Nations."

The Security Council in July 30 adopted a resolution whose operative language was as follows:

"1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizes the Secretary General to take all necessary action to this effect;"
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"? Requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo."

Shortly after the Security Council meeting, Lumumba arrived in New York for consultations with the UN Secretariat and expressed a desire to visit Washington and call on President Eisenhower. The visit took place from July 27 to July 29 over Belgian objections. (The Belgian press was particularly outraged that Lumumba was put up in Blair House where he slept in the same bed in which the King of the Belgians had once slept.) In a long conversation with Secretary Herter—he did not get to see the President, who was at Newport—Lumumba explained that he had planned to come earlier to Washington, at a time when he had been led to believe by the Belgians that the United States was opposed to UN intervention, but that he had been put straight by Secretary General Hammarskjold. He went at great length into the Belgian and Congolese positions on Belgian intervention and withdrawal and said that if the US had supported the Belgian position that the Security Council resolution permitted them to stay "three or six more months" in the Congo, there would have been a rupture between the Congo and the United States.

Twice during the interview, Lumumba solicited United States assistance in persuading the Belgians to withdraw their troops from the Congo. The first time he did so, the Secretary made no reply but talked of US aid through the United Nations. When Lumumba brought the question up a second time, the Secretary replied that "the Department is in contact with Mr. Hammarskjold and that our understanding of the situation is the same as his. He said that the United States realized the difficulties of the situation and would do what it could to be of assistance." (MemCon July 27.)

When Prime Minister Lumumba raised the question of US aid, the Secretary and Mr. Dillon explained that we were prepared to give substantial aid through the United Nations. Mr. Lumumba reiterated his concern over the status of the Congolese franc, since the Belgians had impounded the Congolese reserves. It was agreed that he would take the matter up with the IBRD and IMF. Mr. Lumumba said he hoped to obtain an official loan from the United States, as well as private loans, during his visit. "Mr. Dillon expressed his feeling that during the period of emergency, with the United Nations willing to take the responsibility for improving the situation, the US believed it would be more helpful if it operated through the Secretary General." There was a brief discussion of the Detwiler contract, and Lumumba said Detwiler would be arrested if he ever set foot again.
again in the Congo. Finally, Lumumba made a request for an airplane, to be placed at the personal disposal of himself and the Chief of State. "Mr. Dillon suggested that the Prime Minister discuss this matter with Mr. Bunché on his return to Leopoldville, to see if any of the US-supplied aircraft of the UN might be made available." (MemCon July 27.)

Two days after the Herter-Lumumba interview, the Embassy at Leopoldville sent a NACT telegram (Lectel 282) reporting that "Senate President Joseph Iléo has advised an Embassy officer it is imperative that Lumumba not be permitted to return empty-handed to the Congo from the US. He stated that at least some type of commitment or promise be made Lumumba for assistance to the Congo in public or private sectors. According to Iléo, if Lumumba returns to the Congo empty-handed he will state that although he tried to obtain assistance in order to care for the unemployed and for helping the economy of the country, the US turned him down. Iléo, who claims to know Lumumba thoroughly, is certain the Prime Minister will then turn for assistance to the Soviet and bloc countries." (Iléo was then, as he is now, a political opponent of Lumumba.)

On July 29, on the eve of his departure from Washington, Lumumba gave an interview to Tass in which he reiterated his position about immediate Belgian withdrawal and about the Katanga problem, after which the reporter asked him to comment on the Soviet position on the Congo's problems. His reply was: "The Soviet Union has been the only great power which supported the Congolese people-in-their-struggle from the beginning. I express the deepest gratitude of all our people to the Soviet people and personally to Nikita Khrushchev for the moral support given by your country when we most needed it against the imperialists and the colonialists. I wish likewise to thank the Soviet Union for the food it is sending to the Congo." (Actually, the wheat which was then en route to the Congo could have been milled only in Katanga and was thus not delivered.)

While he was in New York after his Washington visit, Lumumba signed an agreement with the Phelps-Stokes Fund, an American philanthropic institution, for the recruitment of American negroes to serve, without cost to the Congolese Government, in the Congo. The key sentence read: "As you may know, the United Nations is providing certain technical assistance in recruitment and dispatch of personnel. We would view your assistance, however, as a vital supplement to this aid in view of our especial interest in the recruitment of qualified Afro-Americans and in view of your specialized experience and knowledge in this area." (The agreement was no doubt drafted by the Phelps-Stokes Fund, as there was only an English original.) Because of the US policy of giving all its aid through the United Nations, nothing came of this project. It was evidence, in any case, of Lumumba's desire to receive bilateral technical and other assistance from all quarters in addition to UN assistance.
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF US POLICY

The Department from the beginning supported the principle of a UN operation in the Congo and believed that exclusive reliance on the UN for the rehabilitation of the Congo provided the best means of keeping out Soviet assistance and its inevitable subversive accompaniments. The President issued a directive that US aid should be given through the United Nations. In implementing this policy, we placed severe restraints on our own bilateral aid operations. In this respect, our policy was clear from the beginning. On the other hand, the US position with respect to Katanga and the rate of Belgian troop withdrawal was heavily influenced by the uncertainties of the situation, the desire to keep open the possibility of alternative policies, Lumumba's violent pronouncements, and considerations of NATO solidarity.

When Premier Tshombe of Katanga asked for US recognition, we informed our Consul that "should other states recognize Katanga it is possible that the US might reconsider its position (against recognition) but under no, repeat no, circumstances will we take the lead." Tshombe himself was informed that we hoped he would feel free to continue to discuss problems with our Consul on a frank and friendly basis and that our inability to recognize his government should not be interpreted as hostility toward himself or his government (Deptel 17).

The Belgian Government consistently attempted to picture the Congo crisis in terms of the Cold War. On July 16, Foreign Minister Wigny told the US, British and French ambassadors that "Lumumba's activities of the past few days... have now made it clear that the Congo problems must be looked at in the context of the East-West struggle. This means that the essential thing is to get rid of Lumumba. From now on he can only be a source of trouble and an instrument for a Soviet takeover in the Congo." (Brussels 200). He argued that the UN operation would result in strengthening Lumumba's position. The Director of Political Affairs of the Belgian Foreign Ministry on the same occasion "suggested that the Western countries might withdraw recognition from the central government of the Congo and deal on a de facto basis with the actual authorities in control of the situation in the country, i.e., the six provincial governments."

Belgium did not give outright recognition to the Katanga government, but from the beginning it sought "de facto autonomy enforced by Belgian troops" (Brussels 207). Our Embassy at Brussels recommended that "the United States continue publicly to proclaim support for the maintenance of unity of the Congo as long as this objective has any chance of fulfillment. At the same time, we cannot avoid dealing on a day-to-day basis with the
with the de facto government of Katanga province, which should protect our position for the future."

Belgian Minister of State Camille Gutt called on the Secretary on July 19 and drew parallels between the Congo situation and Korea, expressing the hope that the US reaction "would be as firm as in the Korean case." He said his Foreign Minister hoped for "full US support in the UN" and said at the same time that the Belgians intended to withdraw only their "intervention forces," i.e. that Belgian troops originally stationed on the Belgian bases in the Congo would remain. He opposed the dispatch of UN forces to the Katanga. The Secretary and Gutt discussed the possibility that the UN "presence" in the Katanga might consist of only one or two civilian representatives.

On July 20, the Belgian Ambassador called on Under Secretary Merchant and asked that the US oppose, if necessary by its veto, any proposal setting a time limit for the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo. He claimed that the Congo-Belgian treaty was still alive because it had not been put to a vote by the Congolese and Belgian parliaments. Mr. Merchant urged the Ambassador to have at least some troop withdrawal take place before the Security Council met, but said the question of ultimate withdrawal could still be related to the ability of the UN to establish and maintain order (i.e., the position which had been so violently denounced by Lumumba).

The Department was disturbed about the possibility of armed clashes between the UN troops and the Belgian troops serving Premier Tshombe of Katanga, and consistently counseled caution on the part of the UN. In view of Belgian agitation over the possibility of an armed UN action against Katanga, the Department on July 27 upon recommendation of Ambassador Burden in Brussels instructed Ambassador Timberlake (Deptel 282) "as soon as possible after Hammarskjold's arrival... (to) seek to see him and ascertain his plans with respect to Katanga and Belgian bases. The Department has consistently felt that the best chance of working out these problems lies in the passage of time and the absence of precipitate UN action."

The British and French Governments also made demarches to Hammarskjold, urging him to "slow down" the evacuation of Belgian troops from Katanga. Hammarskjold refused, citing the UN resolutions, and urged instead that the British and French put pressure on the Belgians to see the light and comply (Deptel 269). (Our Charge d'affaires commented: "Judged by Lumumba's press statements in the US and conversations with Congolese of various political stripes here, the Belgian troop issue is the central, all-pervading issue occupying all Congolese minds. Despite the pitiful state of almost everything, they think and talk about nothing else. The whole future... "

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whole future of the UN mission is tied up in this issue. If the UN fails
or appears to drag its feet they will very probably be asked to leave and
be replaced by someone who wants Belgian troops out.

The Belgians also frequently cited NATO interest in their bases in
the Congo, but these were feeble arguments. (Any public references to such
arguments, however, were eagerly seized by Radio Moscow to picture the
Belgian action in the Congo as NATO-inspired and approved.) One factor
in British and French support for the Belgian position on the bases was
the argument that "for Belgium to withdraw from these bases under pressure
of a UN decision would create a precedent which could jeopardize other
foreign bases in Africa and elsewhere, particularly Bizerte." (Brussels 378).
The Belgians and the French, and to a lesser extent the British, were
concerned with maintenance of NATO solidarity on the Congo issue, and this,
too, operated as an inhibiting factor in establishing a clear US position
in favor of speedy implementation of the UN resolutions.

Illustrative of the developing US policy mid-way between support for
Belgium and the Congolese Government, are the following key paragraphs
from a briefing paper for the National Security Council discussion,
dated July 25:

"With respect to Katanga, I (Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite)
am convinced that we are following the right course -- refusal to
recognize while not closing the door completely in view of the
possibility that the Katanga is all that can be salvaged for the
West. All African states feel -- and with some justice -- that
Prime Minister Tshombe of Katanga is the creature of the Union
Minieres, the large Belgian mining interest, and even such
moderate Africans as the Nigerians have stated publicly that
Tshombe should be executed. It behooves us therefore to proceed
with the utmost caution.

"The question of the Belgian bases is, if anything, even
trickier. The Congolese and the other African states interpret
the Security Council Resolution as calling for the withdrawal
of Belgian forces from all of the Congo including the bases.
The Belgian position has been that while they do not exclude
an eventual withdrawal from the bases, this is something to be
left for the future and for the moment they attach enormous
importance to their continued possession of these installations.
For the time being the best public and United Nations posture for
the United States would be to insist that this is a matter for
negotiation between the Congo and Belgium once order has been
restored."

It is readily
It is readily apparent that the formulation of such paragraphs was the result of compromises in the clearance process within the Department. The Bureau of European Affairs insisted on inclusion of a statement concerning the "enormous importance" attached by the Belgians to continued possession of their bases in the Congo. This position became gradually more and more untenable legally and politically, and we finally counseled the Belgians to withdraw from the bases without trying to negotiate a quid-pro-quo from the Congolese.

The moderate degree of support given by the US to Belgium's position was far from appreciated in Brussels where the government sharply criticized the US position in the UN. We pointed out to the Belgians in reply that we had prevented Belgium from being branded an aggressor; had "largely on Belgian behalf" interpreted the paragraph on the withdrawal of forces in the first SC resolution to mean phased withdrawal as UN forces assure effective control; had defeated a Soviet proposed 3-day deadline for Belgian withdrawal in the second SC Resolution; and had, pursuant to a specific Belgian request, issued a warning to the USSR against intervention in the Congo. We added, "The possibility cannot be discounted that the Soviets, Congolese and/or Afro-Asians will call for another Security Council Meeting and table another resolution condemning Belgium for not implementing the Security Council Resolutions and calling for withdrawal of Belgian forces within a short time limit... We see no alternative except for the Belgians to withdraw gradually from the Katanga and later from the bases. By accepting an initial UN Contingent in the Katanga, the chances for keeping the Security Council situation under control would, we think, be improved." (Brussels 398). The Belgians did not heed our advice, which turned out to be prophetic.

VII.
VII. CONGO DEVELOPMENTS IN AUGUST

During the remainder of July and the month of August, events can be grouped under five headings: (1) Tshombe's opposition to entry of UN forces, leading to another Security Council meeting. (2) Entry of the UN into Katanga, but continued exclusion from Katanga of the Congolese government, leading to a break between Lumumba and Hammarskjold and yet another Security Council meeting. (3) Growing internal instability in the Congo outside of Katanga. (4) Growing friction between Congolese and UN troops. (5) Growing involvement of African countries in the situation in the Congo, and growing Communist involvement.

Prime Minister Tshombe flatly refused to let the UN troops into Katanga. He declared that the entry of such forces would mean war. When Mr. Bunch went to Elisabethville, he saw with his own eyes how "bulldozers, jeeps, oil drums and other items were being placed on the runway" to prevent alleged imminent landings of UN troops. He had the greatest trouble getting them removed so he could return to Leopoldville. Meanwhile Katanga adopted its own constitution and pressed for recognition as a separate country by the UN. When the UN Command postponed entry because it would obviously have meant bloodshed, the Congo Government immediately accused it of bad faith and of failure to implement the Security Council resolution.

The UN Security Council session of August 8 and 9 put Belgium in a bad light. The Belgian representative claimed that Belgium had agreed to entry by the UN and was withdrawing troops from the Katanga, but the Tunisian representative, Mongi Slim, pointed out that "the Katanga forces seem to be well armed and to be led by Belgian officers, many of whom belonged to the police force. The Belgian responsibility, whether direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, is increased by the fact that the provincial government of Katanga is surrounded by advisers of Belgian nationality..." The Soviet representative, by quoting statements from African leaders denouncing Belgium's role in Katanga, tried to take the role of spokesman for Africa. In the end, the Council passed a resolution of which the operative language read:

"2. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions;

"3. Declares that the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution;

"4. Reaffirms
"4. Reaffirms that the UN force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise;"

On the same occasion, Secretary General Hammarskjold made a number of important clarifying statements. In reply to a Soviet complaint that the UN forces were disarming Congolese national military units, he cited a statement by Foreign Minister Bomboko of the Congo that the Force Publique had laid down its arms in certain instances in response to a call from the Congolese government, which had been requested in that sense by the UN Command. He also said: "It was said that the (UN) Force should assist the Central Government. Yes, certainly, in the maintenance of order, but not as a political instrument. That has never been the intention and it goes against the very principles on which the Force has been established."

On August 12, Hammarskjold traveled directly from New York to Elisabethville stopping in Leopoldville only to pick up a detachment of 300 Swedish troops which entered Katanga with him. Meanwhile a UN spokesman in Leopoldville declared that the UN would assist neither Lumumba nor Tshombe in their dispute – in other words, that the UN would not open up the Katanga to Lumumba's force. Upon returning to Leopoldville from Elisabethville, Hammarskjold addressed a letter to Bomboko, asking for an opportunity to report to the Congolese government "on the actions thus far taken by the UN in implementation of the Security Council's resolutions. In expressing this desire," he continued, "I refer to the wish to the Security Council that the necessary steps should be taken, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide that government with such military assistance as may be necessary."

Lumumba thought insult was being added to injury since he had considered precisely the above-quoted language of the original Security Council resolution as the basis for his expectation that the UN not only enter Katanga but would open it up to the Government of the Congo to which it was pledged to "provide military assistance." He had seen the door to Katanga open to the UN, only to have it remain closed to him. He sent a long, legalistic and extremely well-drafted note to Hammarskjold in which he argued that the recent resolution of August 9 had to be interpreted in the light of the Security Council's earlier resolution of July 11. However, he then went on to write: "It is therefore clear that in its intervention in the Congo the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of my government. From these texts it is clear that, contrary to your personal interpretation, the United Nations Force may be used to subdue the rebel govern-
ment of Katanga', that my government may call upon the United Nations services to transport civilian and military representatives of the Central Government to Katanga in opposition to the provincial government of Katanga and that the United Nations force has the duty to protect the civilian and military personnel representing my government in Katanga."

Lumumba now demanded that (1) all airfields in the Congo be turned back to control of the Congo National Army (CNA, formerly Force Publique) and the Congolese police; (2) Moroccan, Guinean, Ghanaian, Ethiopian, Malian, Tunisian, Sudanese, Liberian "and Congolese" troops be sent to Katanga; (3) all non-African troops be withdrawn from Katanga immediately; (4) all arms and ammunition "distributed by the Belgians in Katanga to the partisans of the rebel government" be seized and put at the disposal of the Congolese government; (5) aircraft be placed at the disposal of the Government of the Congo for the transportation of "Congolese troops and civilians engaged in directing order throughout the country." Hammarskjold replied coldly that Lumumba's letter would be circulated to the members of the Security Council. Lumumba, still more excited, sent another letter declaring that "the government and people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the Secretary General of the United Nations" and asking for a group of African and Asian representatives "to ensure the immediate and entire application of the Security Council resolutions of July 14 and 22 and August 9."

Prime Minister Tshombe issued a declaration expressing full confidence in the Secretary General of the UN. He was delighted because, contrary to his earlier fears, he now saw the UN as giving him de facto recognition and even interposing itself between him and his arch-enemy Lumumba. Meanwhile, other provincial leaders also became more active against Lumumba. Earlier, in late July, Parliament had been informed about the first "plot" against Lumumba. On July 30, the Abako (a major party of the Lower Congo) had called for a federal constitution and a referendum. Albert Kalonji, an exponent of separatist tendencies in Kasai province, issued a similar call. In Kasai province, fighting broke out between the Lulua and Baluba tribes. Already on August 10, the Abako party had voted a resolution of "no confidence" in Lumumba. (Lumumba's famous letter to Hammarskjold was dated August 14.) On August 15, the day after his break with Hammarskjold, Lumumba declared martial law in the Congo. For several weeks, he and his henchmen had been active in trying to make the Force Publique into an instrument of power directly responsible to him.

After Lumumba's break with Hammarskjold, the situation in Leopoldville became increasingly ugly. By this time it was quite clear that
that Lumumba was receiving advice and encouragement not only from
Guinean and other African leftists but also from European Communists
and of course from the Soviet and other Communist representatives in
Leopoldville. On August 16, there occurred incidents in Leopoldville
when the Force Publique began to search private houses and hotels
looking for "Belgians disguised in UN uniforms." They arrested two
Belgians, including the former counselor of the Belgian embassy but
also arrested eleven UN officials who were briefly detained. Accord-
ing to one report (Leotel 450), forty Belgian soldiers and some radio
equipment were seized. It was clear that the Belgians were organizing
the Abako and other elements to overthrow Lumumba and that Lumumba
was preparing to fight dirty. Leopoldville radio, under Kashamura's
direction, became even more vituperative and anti-Western.

In this atmosphere, Ambassador Timberlake reiterated his view
that the UN had to disarm all the Force Publique. He cabled: "This
force has already shown its lack of responsibility and under Lumumba's
direction could be incited to action against UN troops and even whites
in general. He has already shown the direction of his next step which
is an attempt to secure the withdrawal of the Swedes. If that is
successful, I expect the Irish and Canadians will be next on the list...
I can assure the Department that if the UN does not immediately act
to take the Force Publique out of GOC control and if the FP continues
to get away with its current conduct, most of the handful of Europeans
still in Leopoldville will leave and the remainder would be some foreign
Embassy personnel, Communist agents and carpetbaggers. We are con-
vinced that the foregoing is the Communist plan. Lumumba, Kashamura,
Ghanaian ambassador Djin and Madame Blouin are all anti-white and the
latter is a Communist. So are their Guinean advisers. Our latest
arrival, Serge Michel of the FLN, is even more in the Commie camp and
anti-Western. They seem to be having no trouble urging Lumumba further
down roads which his own instincts direct him at least part of the way."
(Leotel 433.)

On August 18, US Air Force personnel were stopped by the Force
Publique at Leopoldville airport, searched and their identification
cards taken away. (A Ghanaian officer rescued them and had their
cards returned.) Yet at the same time, Information Minister Kashamura
expressed the desire to have the US undertake its English-teaching
program over Leopoldville radio as soon as possible, (Leotel 428),
and on August 18, the day of the airport incident, Lumumba made a
three-minute impromptu broadcast addressed to the American people,
assuring them that the Congolese "desire real democracy and if the
West understands us we will be friends. We know that the US under-
stands us," he said according to a summary, "and we are pleased to see
the US position in bringing about international peace. If the

Congoese
"Long live their confidence in the U.S., which is a great friend, they will find themselves rewarded." (Lectel 496) Apparently he was trying to show that his government was opposing the Belgians and Hammarskjold but did not wish this to be construed as opposition to the United States.

The UN Security Council session of August 21/22 considered Lumumba's charges and demands but adopted no resolution. It was noted that Hammarskjold had stated:

"We cannot, we will not and we have no right to raise any resistance to any move made by the Central Government to assert its authority in Katanga. Similarly, we, of course, cannot assist the efforts of the Central Government in that respect." (86th meeting, para.99).

In the words of Sir Claude Correa of Ceylon, "it is quite apparent to anyone who is aware of previous instances of military assistance furnished by the Security Council that when reference is made to the provision of military assistance to any Government, it does not mean that the military assistance which the United Nations provides is to be handed over and put under the orders of the Government to which the assistance is given... It is clear that the only role which can be played is the role of neutrality. This does not mean that it (the UN) will abandon its duty to maintain law and order; but once law and order are maintained it is the duty of the UN Force to permit the Central Government to have full access to the whole of the territory of the Congo, because the Security Council has made it clear that it does not recognize the province of Katanga as a different state or as something separate from the Republic of the Congo." While the Secretary General was backed against Lumumba, the degree of neutrality which the UN could exercise was not defined.

Ambassador Timberlake continued to press for UN action to disarm the Force Publique. "Arbitrary and senseless arrests are common occurrences. Houses, offices and apartment buildings are regularly invaded by Force Publique and police on any and all pretenses from harboring Belgian paratroopers to possession with or without permits of arms and radio transmitters or simply to check identity documents. While in any ordinarily organized society any of all of these acts might be expected and justified, here they are carried out by simple tribal types who have been trained to use rifles, bazookas, machine guns and even mortars, but who cannot read and most do not speak French." (Lectel 496) The Ambassador went on to express a theory which was somewhat at variance with the original UN resolutions:

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"I am even more concerned in this regard to find increasing misconception of the original request to the United Nations and what motivated it. Even during the recent Security Council proceedings it was stated several times that the UN troops were sent to 'get the Belgian troops out.' This is a serious error. The UN troops were requested to restore law and order which had to do solely with the lawless Force Publique. They are still lawless and undisciplined. The issue of Belgian troop withdrawals became ancillary but only subsequent to the request. This fact must be kept clearly in mind because it is vital to the present problem."

The Ambassador's telegram was brought to the attention of Hammarskjold who said he agreed with the essential idea that the situation in the Congo would not be straightened out until Lumumba was dealt with but did not feel that he now had authority to disarm the Force Publique. The Secretary General thought "that the issue in the Congo must come to a crisis shortly and that Lumumba must be broken." (New York 517) He apparently had in mind that Lumumba would seek a showdown with the UN in which he would lose, which would undercut his political power and permit Kasavubu or Iléo to assume effective control. Hammarskjold incidentally confirmed what Bomboy had said in the Security Council (see earlier in this section), that when the UN first arrived in the Congo it had not "disarmed" the Force Publique but that the latter had given up its arms as the result of a Congolese government order — only, the government itself had meanwhile rearmed the Force Publique units in the Leopoldville area.

At this point of the crisis, the African countries were somewhat disunited with regard to Lumumba and the UN action. President Sekou Toure of Guinea had offered troops to Lumumba to get the Belgians out, and he inveighed against "imperialist aggression against the Congolese people." President Nkrumah of Ghana inclined for a time toward the idea of disarming the Force Publique, or at least pretended to agree with General Alexander's advice to that effect while carrying on a secret correspondence with Lumumba. The latter called an African conference in Leopoldville for the end of the month. The conference included representatives who were suspicious of Lumumba, but it was unanimous in coming out for the fastest possible withdrawal of all Belgian troops in favor of control of the entire Congo by the Congo government, and against separatist, Belgian-supported Tshumwe government of Katanga.

On August 26, it became known that ten Soviet IL-18 planes with "food" were en route to the Congo. According to our Embassy, even before
before the arrival of those planes there were at least 100 Soviet and other bloc "technicians" in Leopoldville. On August 27, Lumumba asked our ambassador what had become of the plane he had requested while in Washington. Our ambassador said Lumumba already seemed to have a Soviet plane, but Lumumba said that Kasavubu would need another plane. Our ambassador suggested he write him a letter which he would forward to the State Department. At the same time, the ambassador recommended that we give Kasavubu a "plush" plane that would make Lumumba's IL-14 look "like a Model T Ford." If Lumumba appropriated it for himself, the American crew could gather useful intelligence. If the President kept it, it would "improve the stature of Kasavubu who may still be an important, even though passive, key in the formation of a new government if Lumumba is overthrown." (It was decided to send no plane.)

On August 27 our Ambassador reported: "In the apparent belief that Belgian paratroopers had dropped on Stanleyville in connection with Lumumba's arrival, the Force Publique this morning went mad and attacked all Europeans. It entered UN headquarters (in Stanleyville) and carried off all white personnel. The crew of a US Globemaster delivering Canadian communications equipment was attacked at the airport" (Leotel 524). Later that day, he cabled: "Bunche informs us that one US airman seriously injured. Thousands of people were collected at the airport to welcome Lumumba. When the US plane landed word was passed that they were Belgian paratroopers and the incident ensured."

Our Ambassador intensified his recommendation for forceful action: "I hope," he cabled, "that the Stanleyville incident has removed any lingering trace of the fiction that we are dealing with a civilized people or a responsible government in the Congo... Thousands of Congolese watched the beating of our air crew. Lumumba, arriving minutes after this event, did not even refer to it in his speech to the crowd at the field... The UN has suffered several Lumumba attacks already, and he is quite capable of demanding seriously that the UN troops leave the Congo. Unless their present wraps are removed, I would favor the immediate acceptance of an invitation to start sending some troops home, starting, I suggest, with Guineans. I think such action might just shock even Lumumba into a recognition of what his and the Congo's prospects would be and cause him to do an about-face... At the same time, we are receiving more and more reports that the people are turning against Lumumba. He may just be on his last spectacular lap and it could not end too soon for me." (Leotel 545)
The battle-line had been drawn. Lumumba had become the man to "get." Hammarskjöld was thirsting for a showdown. The Belgians poured in money and agents to bring about Lumumba's downfall, while the Soviets poured in help for him. The US hoped he would fall and was beginning covertly to work in the same direction as the Belgians. Leopoldville became a city of anarchy as well as cloak-and-dagger intrigues. The Soviets unloaded 100 trucks for Lumumba's government, to help him in his military campaigns to unify the Congo. The Cold War had arrived.

VIII. POLICY PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON

In considering what to do if (a) Lumumba asked the United Nations to leave, and (b) the United Nations could not agree on a basis on which to continue despite Mr. Lumumba, the Department (during this period (August/September) experienced serious difficulties because of different approaches between the African and European Bureaus. The Bureau of African Affairs, with support from the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, felt that if the UN could not agree to maintain its troops against the wishes of the legal government, the least damaging solution -- albeit an unhappy one -- would be for the UN to withdraw its forces even while retaining, if at all possible, responsibility for the re-training of the Force Publique and for the rehabilitation of the country. It was felt that by giving up a part, the UN could keep the rest of its operation and could manage its role as to keep out, or at least minimize, massive Soviet interference in Congolese affairs. Next in order of preference, it was felt that the US might encourage the creation of an all-African "umbrella" for foreign aid to the Congo, with the military training function either retained by the UN or entrusted to a neutral country. It was felt that the US could not succeed in the Congo unless it had the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the African countries and that the latter had an important interest in minimizing the cold war in the center of Africa.

The Bureau of European Affairs felt that if Lumumba asked the UN to get out and if the UN complied, it would represent a Communist triumph and a declaration of bankruptcy by the UN. Consequently, the answer should be to get Lumumba out, to organize a coup d'état, or to split the Congo and openly support the Katanga, to get behind the provincial governments, to warn the Soviets more forcefully to keep out, to consult with CENTO and NATO, etc. At about the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff printed out to the Department that they "consider it essential that the airfield at Kitona, and the port of Banana, and the Kamina base complex (in other words, the Belgian bases in the Congo) remain in friendly hands, and further that these facilities
facilities be denied to the military forces of the Soviet Bloc."

At the urging of the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council decided on August 1 that the US should be prepared "at any time to take appropriate military action to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo."

As a result of these varying interests, a number of contingency plans were worked out. One dealt exclusively with things that should be done in the event Lumumba remained in power but asked the UN to withdraw. (The conclusions were generally along the lines of the first paragraph above). Other planning, of an operational nature, dealt with covert activities to bring about the overthrow of Lumumba and install a pro-Western government, although it was recognized that it would be difficult in the atmosphere of Leopoldville to keep such operations secret from Lumumba. (Operations under this plan were gradually put into effect by CIA.) Finally, another contingency plan was worked out to give effect to the National Security Council decision. This plan dealt not only with the possible arrival of Soviet military forces in the Congo but also tried to deal with the possibilities of denying access to the Congo to military supply flights not authorized by the United Nations. It also envisaged the situation that might obtain if there were Soviet intervention after a withdrawal of the United Nations.

The US military, at a meeting with high Department officers on August 31, indicated their distress at the possibility that, as the Belgians were leaving their base in Katanga, the Soviets might be arriving to take it over. They were assured that the UN would do everything to prevent that. The question was asked whether Secretary General Hammarskjold might not ask the US or some other friendly country to come into the Congo and disarm the Force Publique. They were told that if the Secretary General did that, he would in fact justify Soviet military intervention. The military were assured that the State Department would also like to see Lumumba's forces disarmed, that Mr. Hammarskjold himself wishes nothing more, but that at present there was no legal basis for it. The military warned that if the UN continued to adhere to its present policy, it might preside over a Communist take-over of the Congo. It was agreed that the other African countries share our desire to avoid this, and that their position was likely to be most important. (MemCon August 31.)

With respect to the rehabilitation of the Congo, the Department on August 6 sent a circular telegram asking to have it explained to friendly governments that in our decision to give aid through the UN "we have been motivated by the belief that bilateral assistance from the US, which would be followed by bilateral assistance from the
Soviet Union and other Communist countries, would have transformed
the Congo rehabilitation into a cold-war competition which would not
be to the advantage of the Congo, of Africa, and of the entire Free
World. We also feel that centralization of the urgent rehabilitation
task in the UN results in greater efficiency, permits the tapping of
additional resources from many countries throughout the world, and
provides reassurance against penetration of the Congo by the Communists
under the guise of technical or economic assistance." (Circular 223)

To make this policy effective, we tried to have the Secretary
General issue an appeal to all countries to give all their rehabilita-
tion assistance to the Congo through the UN. In discussing this idea
in New York, two high officials of the UN Secretariat "agreed that
such an appeal by the Secretary General would be desirable from the
standpoint of countries outside the Congo. However, both expressed
some doubt whether the Secretary General would wish to make such an
appeal because of the effect it might have in Leopoldville. Lumumba
from all indications wants bilateral aid and does not want the UN
to be the channel for all assistance... An appeal by the Secretary General
might simply be seen as an attempt to increase UN control and diminish
Congolese sovereignty." (New York 318 dated August 4, more than a
week before the break between Lumumba and Hammarskjold.)

US attempts to propitiate the Lumumba radicals (even while
covetly working to unseat them) were hampered by the developing US
public, congressional and official opposition to Lumumba as a wild man
and by pressure from Belgium. Yet Lumumba, even while denouncing
"imperialism" and "colonialism", was still not attacking the US.
In a radio speech on August 23, he referred to the recall of
Congolese students from Belgium and said the Congo would instead send
300 to the US, 150 to Russia and 20 to Guinea." (Leget 194)
Information Minister Kashamura was receptive to the idea of a trip to
the US. Our Embassy in Brussels commented that such a visit "would
inevitably have the most serious consequences for US-Belgian relations...
The precarious recovery which the US is just beginning to make in the
eyes of even our best friends in Belgium would certainly be wiped out...
The Lumumba visit to Washington was the one unforgivable act in the
eyes even of our best friends here... In sum, a visit by Kashamura to
the US at this time, sponsored and financed by the US, could do
literally irreparable harm to the US standing in Belgium." (Brussels 356)

The introduction of Soviet technicians into the Congo also
resulted in a somewhat more positive attitude on the part of the
Department of State with respect to Belgian officers serving under
Tshombe in Katanga. The Department telegraphed the US Delegation in
New York on September 3, "We welcome the Secretary General's decision
to take issue with the Soviets on the introduction of planes and

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technicians
technicians into the Congo outside the UN framework. However, the Department is seriously concerned over the security implications of his contemplated counterpart of requesting the withdrawal of Belgian officers from the Katanga forces... In our view, the removal of Belgian officers is neither desirable nor equitable as long as the UN is not at the same time controlling and officering Lumumba’s forces.” (Deptel 316 to USUN)

At the urging of the Department of Defense, the Department of State also agreed to the dispatch of a naval task force to the Western coast of Africa. The force, given the operational name SOLANT AMITY, was to make a series of “show-of-the-flag”, courtesy, people-to-people friendship visits to ports along the entire coast. However, it differed from previous visits of this kind in that it included not only two destroyers but two amphibious-type vessels with landing craft, helicopters and about 500 United States Marines. The existence of the force in the general area was intended to serve notice to the Soviets, at least implicitly, that the US was prepared to act militarily to keep them out of the Congo. It was also felt that SOLANT AMITY would have the capability of helping to restore order in disturbed situations and to assist in the evacuation of Americans. It was agreed that the force should spend a considerable time in the waters off the mouth of the Congo. (The first echelon of SOLANT AMITY arrived in Africa in November.)
IX. COUP AND COUNTER-COUP IN LEOPOLDVILLE

"On the evening of September 5, President Kasavubu in a statement broadcast personally over the national radio declared that the Prime Minister had betrayed his office by provoking discord within the government, depriving citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging the country into a fratricidal civil war. He therefore revoked the government with immediate effect and named the President of the Senate, Mr. Joseph Iléo, to form a new government. He requested the United Nations to assure peace and order. On the same evening, however, Lumumba went to the same radio station and spoke three times to the population, declaring that President Kasavubu was no longer president and calling upon the people, the workers and the army to rise." (The language of this and the two next paragraphs is taken verbatim from the report of the UN Representative to the Congo, dated September 21.)

"In the face of an imminent breakdown of law and order, with a civil war already under way in parts of the country, and with a clear threat to the United Nations Force from the prospective movements of mutually hostile elements of the army, the UN Command, in the interests of the maintenance of peace and security, that night closed all major airports to any traffic other than that of the United Nations. The following day, recognizing that the risk of major clashes between political and ethnic groups could present the Force with a peace and security problem far exceeding its powers, the United Nations took a directly related emergency measure and temporarily closed the Leopoldville radio station."

"Also during the night of September 5, the Council of Ministers published a communiqué declaring the Chief of State deprived of his functions for having violated the fundamental law, nullifying the latter's revocation of the Government and accusing him of high treason. Parliament met continuously on September 7. After an address by the Prime Minister, the Chamber of Representatives, by a vote of 60 to 19, undertook to cancel both the decisions of the Chief of State and of the Prime Minister dismissing one another. The Foreign Minister and one other Cabinet member who had countersigned the presidential revocation of the Government both announced their resignations. The following day the Senate voted 41 to 2, with 6 abstentions and 29 absent, against the presidential proclamations. (The 29 absent senators did not include those from Katanga, who had long since left Leopoldville.) On the same day the Prime Minister stated at a press conference that he would consider demanding the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations Force if the airports and radio stations were not immediately turned over to the exclusive control of the Government. Mr. Kasavubu also protested that his spokesman had not been permitted to broadcast from the station." (End of quotation from UN report.)

It is important
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It is important to recognize that the UN, which had up to then refused to intervene, intervened to freeze the situation after Kasavubu had dismissed Lumumba, but before Lumumba had successfully resisted Kasavubu. By taking over control of Leopoldville airport, the UN prevented Lumumba from bringing the forces most loyal to him into Leopoldville from Orientale Province (Stanleyville) and from Kasai Province where he had dispatched his units in Soviet and other planes to unify the country by force of arms. Being the most skilled rabble-rouser, denial of access to the national radio network also imposed on him an intolerable handicap. His reaction to the UN order was to issue appeals to African leaders (also to Sukarno, who had Indonesian troops en route to the Congo) to put their forces at his disposal. Lumumba considered that he had received confirmation that the UN, which had refused to help his government militarily, was now militarily opposing him.

On the evening of September 6, Lumumba called Ambassador Timberlake for a long session in which he explained his position, accusing Kasavubu of being the cat's paw of the Belgians and the French and complaining of UN partiality. "I pointed out," the Ambassador reported (Leotel 640), "that the US felt the UN was the best guarantor of the new country's integrity and therefore the US had given the UN massive financial support whereas the Russians had attempted to sabotage by acting bilaterally and that this could only result in involving the Congo in the East-West struggle to the country's detriment. Lumumba said he had asked both the US and the UN for planes but had been turned down so he was forced to accept them from the Russians. It was obvious that he was obsessed with the idea of airplanes and that nothing that has been done by the UK or UN has made much impression."

The parliamentary sessions of September 7 were described as follows by our Embassy (Leotel 645). Lumumba took the position that Kasavubu's act was illegal because it was not countersigned by Ministers "with the competence to do so," that a government could only fall through an act of Parliament and that Kasavubu was attempting to deprive parliament of its rights. "At his very best Lumumba then devastated the points raised by the opposition. Every act impinging on liberty was explained by associating those arrested with Belgian imperialists. He brought up plot after plot and made Kasavubu look ridiculous. He attacked the UN saying the country was not really free if arms, airports and radio facilities were controlled by the UN. How could the UN justify this interference if it refused to liberate Katanga? He denied the charges of Communism and commented that everything in Africa that is done for the people is called Communism by the imperialists. He had turned to the Russians for planes only when the Belgians supplied planes to Tshombe and after both the UN and US had abandoned him by failing to furnish transportation."
On September 8, as the Senate was voting confidence for Lumumba, the Ambassador telegraphed: "I believe today may well close the door, open for the past few months and wide open since Kasavubu's declaration of last Monday, to the opportunity of at least stopping the current trend... Yesterday's exhibit of masterful demagoguery in the Chamber by Lumumba is now being repeated in a four-hour address before the Senate. Aside from the fact that yesterday's 'vote' was by voice and the count by the Chamber President was arbitrary, it was obviously substantially for Lumumba. A secret ballot would have cut into Lumumba's majority. If the Senate vote is eventually secret, I believe it is likely to go against Lumumba, but if it is open and especially if taken shortly after his speech today, he might collect a majority. It would then become much more difficult, to put it mildly, for the UN to move against Lumumba who could claim both houses back him against Kasavubu and his supporters. Disarming the Force Publique... will be much tougher to justify in face of the seeming parliamentary support for Lumumba. Continuance of interdiction of airfields and the radio station would seem even harder to justify." (Leotol 652). Immediately after the Senate vote, Lumumba announced that he would demand the withdrawal of UN troops but would continue UN technical assistance.

Notwithstanding the Ambassador's analysis of September 8, he reported the next day that when he called on Kasavubu in the company of Governor Harriman, the President "agreed with my analysis that in order to bring peace and security, the Force Publique and police should be disarmed and courts should be set up and organized." When Governor Harriman expressed his surprise that Lumumba had obtained majorities not only in the Chamber but also in the hitherto anti-Lumumba Senate, Kasavubu explained that his forces were afraid since Lumumba had control of a major portion of the military and police. (Our Ambassador commented that when the vote was taken in the Senate, "many anti-Lumumba senators had left. Others with fresh memories of recent arrests and beatings were undoubtedly unwilling to stand up and be counted in Lumumba's presence.") The President said that although many soldiers were loyal to him, Lumumba had succeeded in converting the Army into a political weapon by placing his friends in key positions. He voiced the opinion that all the regional problems in Katanga, Kasai and other provinces could be solved if Lumumba were removed, but he seemed to have no plan on how to proceed although he stood firm on the legality of his dismissal of Lumumba.

On September 8, immediately after Lumumba's counter-coup, control of the UN operation in the Congo passed from Bumoh to Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal of India. Summarizing the situation, Ambassador Timberlake on September 9 reported: "The talks which Harriman and I had with Kasavubu and Dayal and later Harriman conversation with Lumumba strengthen my
conviction that we can expect little, if anything, to be successfully organized in parliamentary form against Lumumba. The latter will continue to gain power unless the Secretary General can obtain a stiffer mandate from the Security Council regarding law and order and safety of life and liberty, or unless the opposition resorts to violence." The opposition was shortly thereafter legalized when Kasavubu announced the formation of a government under Ileo. There were now two governments in the Congo, Lumumba's which had the support of Parliament, and Ileo's which had the support of the President. Ileo also had one other good card: He received messages from Tshombe and Kalonji, the separatists, informing him that they were not against the Congo but against Lumumba. However, Tshombe refused to join the Ileo government although he was offered the Vice Premiership (Elisabethville's 109).

When Lumumba called the diplomatic corps to his residence on September 11, all the Western ambassadors by agreement did not attend. Neither did the Russians. Represented were the UAR, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. (When Kasavubu and Ileo called in the Corps, Liberia was the only African country to come.) Our Ambassador strongly favored having the UN deal only with Kasavubu and Ileo, on the grounds of constitutionality but also because the UN cannot assume the prerogative of interpreting the Congo constitution. In any case, he pointed out, "Lumumba has incited disorder and violence and has thrown troops into attack in civil wars both in Kasai and Katanga. He has attacked the UN repeatedly. Kasavubu, on the other hand, is firmly on record against civil war and disorder, fully supports the UN effort and is capable of bringing an end to separatism if he and his government can be given guarantees of security." (Leopold 748). Judging from the reactions of the African and Asian countries, however, it seemed that as long as Lumumba was de facto in charge of the situation, he would receive support even against the Chief of State whose legal action in dismissing Lumumba had become beclouded by the confidence votes of Parliament for Lumumba.

In a one-and-one-half hour interview with Governor Harriman, Lumumba said he was not a Communist and was not surrounded by Russian or Communist advisers. To him, the Communist dictatorship was as bad as colonialism. As he had previously stated on numerous occasions he wished the Congo to steer a policy of neutralism between East and West. He attributed Kasavubu's action against him to Belgian machinations. Turning to the subject of aid, he said "he did not like the idea of all countries channeling their aid through the UN. This would make the Congo subservient to the UN. As a sovereign nation, the Congo should be able to negotiate bilateral treaties with various nations." (Leopold 655). In a public statement, Lumumba took issue with President Eisenhower who had criticized
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The Congo. Lumumba said he would accept any aid provided it was given without political conditions. "To the cheers of the Cabinet members present he thanked the Russians for their assistance." (Lectel 656).

On September 12, Lumumba was arrested by order of the Chief of Staff of the Force Publique, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, but was shortly thereafter released by other Congolese soldiers. Lumumba handed Dyal an appeal to the Security Council asking for direct UN aid in the form of 20 aircraft with crews, a "large quantity" of arms and ammunition, and a powerful radio transmitter, adding the threat that if the UN did not furnish these he would be forced to turn elsewhere. On September 13, a joint session of Parliament conferred full powers on Lumumba in a vote which, in the words of Dyal's report to Hammarskjold, "was somewhat uncertain both as to substance and count." In fact, Lumumba's goon squads made a mockery of the proceedings. In any event, Lumumba's triumph did not last long. During one day, as the UN relinquished control of the radio, Kasavubu and Bolikango seemed to have it. The next day, Lumumba again went on the air, "praising Parliament, the Army and the people for their loyalty." (Lectel 721). Finally, Mobutu took Lumumba to Camp Leopold II and went on the air to announce that he, Mobutu, was taking over to end the quarrel between the opposing governments of Ileo and Lumumba.

In the words of the Dyal report, "the following morning, September 15, Mr. Lumumba took refuge in the Ghana Officers Mess in the Army's principal camp in Leopoldville. Throughout the day his life was seriously threatened while hard-pressed Ghana troops held off riotous soldiers of the hostile Baluba tribe who charged that their families had been victims of the civil war in Kasai. After personal intervention on the spot by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (i.e., Dyal), it proved possible by nightfall for the national Gendarmerie and the Ghana troops to escort him out. During the same afternoon the Chief of State and his Prime Minister-designate requested the United Nations to effect the arrest of Mr. Lumumba, which the Special Representative firmly declined, explaining that this was entirely outside the functions of the UN Command. On September 16, Mr. Lumumba demanded that the United Nations enable his government to fly in troops from Stanleyville to assure the security of Leopoldville. That request, too, was refused.

As this most exciting and confusing chapter of the Congo drama closed, the following additional facts need to be noted: Kasavubu sent a telegram of protest to Hammarskjold, against interference by the UN with the arrest of Lumumba. The UN, however, posted guards around Lumumba's residence. Kasavubu and Ileo sent orders to the Soviet and Czech diplomatic missions to get out of the Congo. Amazingly, Anicet Kashama turned up at the US Embassy asking for help to get him back to his native Kivu province. (He was...

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("He was told how sorry we were not to be able to help him.") Mobutu announced that he would install a "College of Commissioners" consisting of university students to conduct the affairs of the country until December 31. Kasavubu endorsed this action although he was not able to give it legality. Our Ambassador commented: "Events of yesterday and today give me some hope that Act One of the Congo drama has ended. The prologue ended with the arrival of UN troops and the withdrawal of Belgian troops to their bases. Act Two will be concerned with the slow and difficult process of establishing some sort of government..." (Lectel 736). Act Two was destined to lengthen into several acts.

Before turning to the United Nations debates of September, it must also still be noted that as the United Nations met and discussed the Congo, the situation there for a while took on elements of comic opera due to the protection afforded Lumumba by the UN troops of Ghana. At one time, Lumumba held a "press conference" in which he acted as though he were still in office, claimed to have had a reconciliation with Kasavubu, and spoke with strange tones about the UN, praising it and denying that he had ever had any differences with Hammarskjold. (It turned out that he pursued these tactics on the advice of Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana.) At another time, likewise under the protection of Ghanaian troops, Lumumba made a brief "triumphal tour" of the city. His goons at one time beat up some of the new Commissioners. Ghana, Guinea, the UAR and Morocco were putting continuous pressure on Kasavubu and Ileo to reach a compromise with Lumumba. The US, Belgium and other Western powers were putting on countereviling pressure to prevent this. Meanwhile, the real power was increasingly held by Mobutu. The Colonel arrested Gisenga (who was subsequently released by Moroccan troops) and obtained the departure of the Communist diplomats, technicians and planes. Serge Michel (see Section VII) left the Congo, too, and Andrée Blouin (see Section I) reportedly took refuge in the Guinean mission. Lumumba's power had been broken, at least for the time being.

X.
X. UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS IN SEPTEMBER

The UN Security Council was meeting in New York to discuss the Congo at the very time when the coups and counter-coups were taking place in Leopoldville. The Council was considering the financial requirements of the UN civil rehabilitation operation, but the debate inevitably became interlinked with the question whether Kasavubu or Lumumba represented the Congo and to what extent the United Nations operation should be responsive to the wishes of the legitimate Congolese government, whichever it might be. In this respect, Secretary General Hammarskjold said on September 9:

"In this situation spokesmen of the Central Government speak about the assistance rendered by the international community through the United Nations as if it were an imposition and treat the Organization as if they had all rights and no obligations. They seem to believe that the independence of the Republic of the Congo, in the sense of international sovereignty of the state which everybody respects, means independence also in a substantive sense of the word which, in our interdependent world of today, is unreal even for a country living by its own means and able to provide for its own security and administration. A government without financial means is dependent on those who help it to meet its needs..."

This expressed very neatly the position which Lumumba and many African and Asian leaders were opposing with all their might and which they said meant the imposition of a UN "trusteeship" on the Congo. It was a position which was widely held not only in the United Nations Secretariat, which had become exasperated by the obstruction of UN efforts in the Congo, but also among most of the Western countries and especially by the U.S. Government which was footing most of the bill of the U.N. effort. As both Kasavubu and Lumumba announced that they were sending delegations to New York, the Security Council became embroiled in a long debate over the question of which delegation to recognize. The majority felt that to take a decision on this would amount to involvement in Congolese internal constitutional matters, and a Polish proposal to seat the representative of Mr. Lumumba was thus rejected.

The Security Council met to discuss the Congo situation on September 16 but was unable to adopt a resolution because of a Soviet veto. Accordingly, the UN General Assembly was immediately called into Special Session. The debate in the Security Council showed that a number of African countries were disquieted by developments in the Congo and were looking for the creation of some UN mechanism or commission to solve the political difficulties—Ceylon and Tunisia, which had sponsored the earlier three Security Council resolutions, came up
with a draft resolution which would have "reaffirmed that the United Nations Force should continue to act to restore and maintain law and order as necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security" and would have appealed to member nations to make contributions to the U.N. Fund for the Congo. Both the Ceylonese and the Tunisian representative spoke out against the provision of military assistance outside the U.N. channel, with shafts against the Belgians but also with unmistakable unhappiness over the earlier provision of Soviet planes to the Lumumba government.

The Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin, declared:

"The representative of Ceylon and later the representative of Tunisia themselves stated that we have no right to deprive the Government of military assistance. They also said that such assistance should, according to the proposal, be provided exclusively through United Nations channels, but this is precisely a violation of a basic principle of the United Nations, the principle of the sovereign rights of all States. This would mean the imposition of a United Nations trusteeship on the Republic of the Congo."

The United States representative, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, said:

"This historic United Nations action in the Congo is at the crossroads. Under attack by the Soviet Union and others, it must be supported. If the United Nations fails there will be no alternative to unilateral action by many parties with all the implications that this would have for Africa. If the United Nations succeeds, and for its part the United States is doing everything it can to that end, a major crisis will have been averted largely through the efforts of the Africans themselves - working as they are through the United Nations."

Both sides thus appealed primarily to the Africans. The Soviets were playing on African fears that the U.N., if given an exclusive role, might end up taking the Congo under trusteeship, i.e. a large step backward from independence. The United States was appealing to African awareness that the United Nations as an instrument that might some day protect their own independence was in jeopardy, that failure of the UN mission would be a heavy blow to the United Nations as an institution. At the same time, the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Indonesia made it clear that they felt the U.N. should support Lumumba as head of the only legal Congolese government. Each of them was talking against his own particular experience. Ghana under Nkrumah had suppressed its tribal opposition and had reason to fear any political role of the army. Morocco compared the interest of Belgian mining companies
in Katanga with the interest of French mining companies in Mauritania ("Morocco's Katanga"). Indonesia, which had struggled against foreign-supported separatist elements, was obviously in favor of Lumumba's kind of centralism.

In the special session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union accused Secretary General Hammarskjold of having managed UN "non-interference" in such a way as to favor Lumumba's enemies. Zorin said: "It is pertinent to observe that the United Nations Command relaxed its control of broadcasting and the airfields pari passu with the execution of the plot to remove Mr. Lumumba from power. When the Central Government's forces were approaching the borders of Katanga... the UN Command, with the Secretary General's blessing, issued an order for a so-called cease-fire along Katanga's borders... (which) constituted military support for the proteges of Belgium... By siding with the rebels and separatists, the United Nations Command and the Secretary General have violated the provision of the Security Council resolution of August 9 which states that the United Nations Force will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

Secretary General Hammarskjold defended his actions vis-a-vis Lumumba and went into detail why he had to "negotiate his way into Katanga" since it was obviously the view of the Security Council members when the matter was discussed that we should not use force to get into Katanga. He then went on to reaffirm that it would have been inadmissible to turn the UN force into an instrument of the Congolese national government. "That is what I refused to do", he said, "and if that is wrong I do not understand the Charter." Finally, he said:

"It has been said that the United Nations Force is the predominant power in the country. No, that is not so, that cannot be so, that should not be so. There is the Congolese National Army, which is the instrument of the Government, but we cannot dictate how that force works, in what direction it works, for the Government or against the Government. It is, however, the army of the Government in the country."

The African and Asian countries met in lengthy caucus sessions to work out a draft resolution which could find universal acceptance. They sought between conflicting pressures, with Morocco, Ghana and Guinea threatening to withdraw their forces from the UN Command and place them at the disposal of Lumumba unless the UN changed its attitude. On the other hand, the majority of the Afro-Asians clearly did not agree with the Soviet Union that unilateral (usually called "bilateral") military assistance should be permitted. Despite his violent language with regard to the UN attitude toward Lumumba, the Ghanaian representative

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said. "There should be no provision of arms, whether directly or indirectly, or of other materials of war and military personnel, or other assistance for military purposes, during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations." The Belgians, who had only recently openly landed arms at the airfield in Elisabethville, were under attack, but the Soviet Union was clearly also meant by this language.

The Afro-Asian resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on September 19, by a vote of 70:0, with 11 abstentions. The Soviet bloc, France and the Union of South Africa made up the abstentions. The resolution was ambiguous in its political part because it "requested the Secretary General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with (the previous resolutions) and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo" without, however, defining who constituted the Central Government. Operative paragraphs of direct importance were the following:

"3. Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary General, for the purpose of conciliation.

"6. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, calls upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of July 14 and 22 and of August 9, 1960 of the Security Council."

The Soviet government thus did not in the General Assembly oppose the very principle which it had vetoed in the Security Council, and that principle had been embraced or accepted even by the most violent African and Asian partisans of Lumumba. The words "without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo" were added to overcome the reluctance of some who were afraid that paragraph 6 would be the first step toward legalizing the imposition of a UN "trusteeship."

The constitutional legality or illegality of Lumumba's dismissal was frequently discussed in the subsequent regular session of the General Assembly. Since the debate is continuing to this day and since it involves serious misrepresentations and misconceptions concerning the Congolese constitution..."
constitution or Basic Law, the arguments against and for the legality of Lumumba's dismissal warrant a short but careful review. As spokesmen for the two contending viewpoints, we choose President Sekou Touré of Guinea who developed the pro-Lumumba argument in the General Assembly on October 10, and Foreign Minister Charles Okala of Cameroun who on October 13 effectively demolished Touré's arguments. (In parentheses are additional arguments against the Toure position which were not put forward by Okala.)

President Touré pointed out that the Preamble of the Constitution adopted by the Brussels Round Table Conference defined "the system of a non-responsible (irresponsible) Chief of State, whose actions will have no effect unless they have been countersigned by a Minister of the Congolese Government, who alone is responsible... It therefore becomes perfectly clear that the only one responsible for the conduct of the fate of the Congolese people, in accordance with Congolese legality, is the Government of Mr. Lumumba, which was duly elected by the Parliament and which preserves the confidence of that Parliament. Therefore, the intervention of the United Nations cannot be justified unless it is recognized that it was requested by a responsible Government, that of Mr. Patrice Lumumba."

Foreign Minister Okala declared:

"The divesting of Mr. Lumumba's power was an action on the part of the Congolese Chief of State. It was in keeping with Article 22 of the Basic Law which says, 'The Chief of State nominates and revokes the Prime Minister and Ministers.' The decision of the Chief of State, moreover, was in keeping with the provisions of Article 20 which reads as follows: 'No act of a Chief of State can have effect unless it is countersigned by a Minister, who thereby makes himself responsible.' (Actually, two Ministers, Justin Bomboko and Albert Delvaux, countersigned Kasavubu's order.) Accordingly, it is legally impossible for the United Nations or its Secretary General to declare invalid or to modify such a constitutionally juridical act as the deposing of Mr. Lumumba..."

"The President of the Republic of Guinea read to us the provisions of the preamble and he told us that the Chief of State was not responsible and therefore had no right to revoke the Prime Minister. I do not want it to be said that I am contesting his interpretation. I am just complementing it. If the Chief of State is non-responsible, that does not mean that the Basic Law places no responsibilities upon him. It merely means that as Chief of State he is not responsible to Parliament, and we know perfectly well what this means in constitutional law."

"In the case in question, the fact that the Chief of State is not responsible cannot be invoked when he dismisses the Prime Minister in accordance with Article 22... All that remains now is,
as Nigeria has suggested, for the United Nations to permit the
Congolese Parliament to meet as soon as possible to express or
refuse to express confidence in Mr. Lumumba's successor. And
if, through a compromise, the Chief of State asked Mr. Lumumba
to succeed Mr. Lumumba, that would not be irregular, and Mr.
Lumumba could have recourse to Article 37 of the Basic Law —
that is, he could ask Parliament for a vote of confidence.
But in no case can the Lumumba Government of June 30, 1960 be
considered to exist legally any longer."

(Another argument that was sometimes advanced was that Kasavubu
could not have more power in the Congo than King Baudouin has in Belgium,
since the Congolese Basic Law follows Belgian constitutional practice.
Thus King Baudouin in 1960 had asked Prime Minister Eyskens to resign,
but Eyskens refused. While it is true that Eyskens refused to resign,
he did at the same time say he would vacate his office if the King
dismissed him under Article 65 of the Belgian constitution, which
the King did not choose to do. That article is repeated almost verbatim
in the Congolese constitution as Article 22, and Kasavubu's dismissal
of Lumumba was based on Article 22. For Africans and Asians trained
in British law, the dismissal of Lumumba no doubt appeared more ultra
vires than it was, although Kasavubu's action was an unusual one and
would have, in an equivalent situation, produced a constitutional
problem in any democratic country. In Belgium, the crisis would have
occurred when Parliament refused to give investiture to the successor
of a Prime Minister dismissed under circumstances similar to those of
Lumumba's dismissal, or when the successor failed to present himself
to Parliament within a reasonable period.)

XI. MOBUTU VS. THE UNITED NATIONS

This chapter begins with Lumumba living precariously in the Prime
Minister's residence in Leopoldville, surrounded by UN troops that
protected him against arrest by the Mobutu government, and with the UN
troops in turn surrounded by a ring of CNA (formerly Force Publique)
soldiers trying to prevent Lumumba from leaving the house. It ends with
the spectacular escape of Lumumba from Leopoldville, en route to Stanley-
ville where his supporters had gradually built up strength, no doubt
with some support from pro-Lumumba elements of the UN forces. During
this period, which roughly lasted from the beginning of October to the
end of November, the principal problems stemmed from the lacking
legality of the Mobutu government. Efforts were made to create a
legal basis for an anti-Lumumba government, but all of them failed.
The UN, which had been unable to work with Lumumba, found that it was
also unable to work with Lumumba's foes.

The first dispute between Mobutu and the UN Special Representative,
Mr. Dayal, occurred when the College of Commissioners wished to serve a
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warrant for Lumumba's arrest. Dayal, with Rasmarskjold's backing, did not order the Ghanaian and other UN troops to permit Lumumba to be taken away. Mobutu issued an ultimatum to the UN. The UN Command on October 11 issued a rather sanctimonious press release in which it said: "The principal political dignitaries of the Central Government have long enjoyed the protection of a UN guard without consideration as to where each stood in the political crisis or in relation to each other. As neutral in the internal political crisis, the UN cannot change the orders of the guard to facilitate service of a warrant of arrest which is not prima facie valid. This would especially appear to be the case when the warrant is expressly issued against a deputy without prior compliance with the Basic Law from which the warrant purports to derive its authority." For the first time, the UN was interpreting the Congolese constitution. (It is true that Article 40 of the Basic Law did provide that the immunity of a member could only be lifted by the Congolese Parliament.)

While protecting Lumumba in the name of neutrality, the UN failed to protect Lumumba's enemies — in the name of the same neutrality. Some of the young Commissioners were beaten up under the eyes of Ghana soldiers. The Ghana ambassador was a constant visitor of Lumumba and acted virtually as his agent in Leopoldville. There were many other instances of non-neutral behavior on the part of UN troops, even though many were probably acting under national, rather than UN orders. On October 14, for instance, our Embassy reported that two emissaries of Lumumba who wished to go to the United Nations, "were accompanied to Leopoldville airport by members of the UAR Embassy and UAR troops serving with the UN. At the airport, Congolese police and soldiers prevented them from boarding the plane." (Leoel 1167) As friction between the CNA and the UN increased, Dayal leaned more and more to the idea of disarming the CNA, but it was now Ambassador Timberlake who urged him not to go too fast lest "the Lumumba mobs" take over. Meanwhile, Mobutu declared the Ghanaian ambassador and minister persona non grata, but the Ghanaians stated they were accredited to the Lumumba Government and ignored the invitation to depart.

The telegrams from Leopoldville describe very graphically the parting of the ways between Ambassador Timberlake and Ambassador Dayal, with the former arguing in favor of Lumumba's arrest and in favor of working with the Mobutu government while the latter termed the arrest of Lumumba a dangerous "trick" which would bring on a crisis within the UN and called for a "democratic solution" to the crisis. (Leoel 347) While hundreds of CNA soldiers were milling around the protective ring of UN soldiers guarding Lumumba, our Ambassador cabled: "If the CNA gets in, the beneficiary on Lumumba's life insurance is likely to collect promptly. I have worked night and day to prevent a violent solution... the British, French, Dutch Ambassadors and I feel that the position of the UN Command is wrong. The argument that the warrant is "not prime facie"
facie valid merely does not wash. It was issued by proper authority and was countersigned by Kasavubu. Furthermore, on what basis can the U.I.B. interpret the Congo’s law and constitution? (Leitel 962)

As for a democratic and constitutional solution to the governmental crisis, Ambassador Timberlake on instructions worked tirelessly to persuade Kasavubu, Mobutu, Iléo, Bomboko and even Tshombe of the need for the establishment of a legal government that could obtain parliamentary approval. All of them, however, were bearish about the prospects. On October 11, Bomboko “replied this (a parliamentary solution) is impossible while Lumumba is still potentially able to regain power since the parliamentarians fear him with good reason because of the arrests, brutalities and intimidations in Stanleyville, plus the fact that the last parliamentary session saw Lumumba’s troops ringing Parliament.” (Leitel 35) On October 13, the Embassy expressed ‘doubts that the anti-Lumumba coalition has sufficient votes in Parliament at this time to provide a confidence vote for the Iléo government.” (Leitel 980) On October 25, the Ambassador said “current readings among parliamentarians do not reassure us that anti-Lumumba forces would prevail.” (Leitel 1037).

On November 1, the Ambassador still said: “Lumumba is the central problem. There is always the danger that no matter how firm the opposition lines up, Lumumba’s oratory plus threats can turn it (a parliamentary session) into a victory for himself.” (Leitel 1078) On November 15: “Little confidence should be placed in the durability or even accuracy of our head count (of a conceivable anti-Lumumba majority). We know very large amounts have been already given to members of Parliament by the Soviet bloc and lately through the UAR for pro-Lumumba votes...Hence, I feel there is a very real risk that Parliament will vote by pocket rather than by principle in enough numbers to support Lumumba in the near future and might do so even after the best efforts of a working coalition of anti-Lumumba leaders. I think it is logical and prudent, therefore, to keep in mind that Mobutu and the CNA represent the only relatively stable counter to a return of Lumumba at the present... I would not like to see them emasculated.” By this time, of course, the Soviets had left Leopoldville more than six weeks ago and the UAR and Ghana were not the only ones to pump money into the political picture. By mid-November, U.S. activities on the political scene in Leopoldville were of sizeable proportions and may have been fairly conspicuous.

The idea of a coalition government with Lumumba’s participation was considered and rejected by all Western and pro-Western persons on the scene. The position was aptly summarized in a telegram sent to the field (Deptel 753 to Rabat) which stated: “Participation of Lumumba in a Congo Government has been discussed in the Department and the
consensus is that such a development would be disastrous, with Lumumba using any position, however minor, as springboard for his return to full power." On the other hand, Jayal and Hammarskjold clearly felt that no solution was possible in the Congo unless it took into account the popular strength of Lumumba. This was brought out most clearly in an interview between Hammarskjold and Ambassador Barco in New York on October 28 (USUN 1188), of which the following two paragraphs represent a summary.

The Secretary General remarked that he believed the UN and the US were following different philosophies and pointedly remarked he considered outside influences should not be permitted in the Congo. He reiterated his position that the UN was acting on principles even though they appeared to be helping one party or another at any particular point. In any case, Lumumba had sufficient backing in the Congo that a solution without him seemed impossible. He expressed himself strongly in favor of building a government which would be based on Kasavubu, as uncontested Chief of State, and would enjoy at least some prospect of parliamentary approval. He thought even Africans were coming to realize that the continued absence of any effective government was playing into Belgian hands (as Belgians were streaming back to Leopoldville at the request of the Council of Commissioners.) He cited examples of Belgian judges volunteering to set up a court system without any prospect of payment from either the UN of the Congo, a move which to him indicated that the Belgian Government was providing financial guarantees in order to re-establish their influence throughout the Congo. Clearly, Hammarskjold was irritated because Belgian advisers increasingly interposed themselves between the UN civilian officials and the Congolese authorities.

"We picked up the Secretary General's remarks regarding a new Government and said that the US was prepared to encourage Kasavubu to appoint a new caretaker government which he would say he would soon submit to parliamentary approval and which we hoped could bring some order out of the present chaotic legal and political situation. The Secretary General immediately responded that this would be most helpful particularly if we could put some 'fire' into Kasavubu, so long as we could do it 'delicately' and not 'visibly' and so long as we 'put nothing in his pocket!' -- an apparent reference to US 'covert' activities in Leopoldville. (As to Katanga and Kasai provinces, our Ambassador on the very same day, October 28, telegraphed: "All Embassy officers who have visited there state that the heavy-handedness and lack of subtlety on the part of the Belgians is unbelievable. On the other hand, without the Belgians, how can the UN or anyone else provide know-how to operate the Government?")

The case against a constitutional and parliamentary solution, and indeed against any compromise solution, was most eloquently made by
Ambassador Timberlake in his telegram 1888 of November 2, of which the following excerpts: "The fact is that the Congo is years away from more than a facade of democracy. I do not believe there is one single Congolese who has more than a theoretical idea of even the most elementary principles of democracy. They obviously cannot practice something they do not understand... Furthermore, I do not believe democracy can be imposed upon any people overnight any more than it can be injected by hypodermic. Therefore I do not share the UN enthusiasm for an accelerated parliamentary solution in the Congo. The fact is that such a solution would be a simple decision to support Lumumba or not. There is no real positive alternative which would engage parliamentary attention." Put in another way, this meant that Lumumba had become the single most popular issue in the Congo, and there was no assurance that even within a period of years a majority might not vote in favor of him. Therefore, democracy was not the solution.

The Ambassador continued: "If the foregoing analysis is accepted, then our policy should be definitely against the restoration of Lumumba as bad for the Congo, bad for the US and bad for the UN." But he added: "We continue to believe that the outlook for real leadership coming from the moderate group is very dim indeed. I feel sure that the UN experience with the ineptitude of the Commissioners and the impotence of Kasavubu and Lleo government has not only disillusioned the UN but that Mobutu, by impulsive acts and lack of qualities of leadership, has impelled Dyal to reject him. Mobutu's troops, certainly undisciplined but no more so than formerly, are a source of friction and keep the UN constantly under tension in view of their capability to cause a really serious clash with the UN forces. The return of Belgian advisers, some of whom might have stupidly sought to interpose themselves between the UN and the Commissioners, has ruffled some sensitive UN feathers and raised the bogey of a return of Belgium to a position of major influence under cover of the Commissioners."

The Ambassador concluded that he saw no quick solution and had no 'favorite son.' Eventually, a combination might be forged which could successfully oppose Lumumba in a parliamentary showdown. However, if the CNA were disarmed, that possibility would suffer a serious setback. "If Dyal has any hopes for positive parliamentary action which would remove Lumumba from government," the Ambassador cabled, "I have yet to hear them stated. I think he feels no solution is possible without Lumumba and that we might as well get the present unpleasantness over with and let him back in. This, he reasons, will get the unholy alliance (UAR-Norocco-Guinea-Mali-Ghana and Soviet bloc) off his neck, give the UN Command an acceptable government with which to work and even serve the resolution on unity of the Congo since Lumumba is an acknowledged centralist.
centralist and unitarian. While the semblance of logic might sell this line to the simple and uninformed, I am satisfied that such a policy will blow up in the faces of the UN. It will, I believe, achieve exactly the opposite ends from those apparently sought." Ambassador Burden telegraphed from Brussels (Embtl 901) that he was "fully in accord with Ambassador Timberlake's views." Those views were also shared by Washington, and they illustrate the nature of the conflict between Mobutu and the UN and of the conflict between the UN Secretary General and the US.

Toward the end of November, fighting broke out between Mobutu's CNA troops and troops of the UN Command, brought on by a showdown over the couter of Ghana's Minister Welbeck. Mr. Welbeck was finally removed. After a series of incidents between the CNA and the UN, most of the CNA were by agreement moved to their barracks outside of Leopoldville and the degree of their loyalty to Mobutu continued a matter of speculation. Meanwhile, Lumumba's henchman Gizenga had managed to reach Stanleyville in Orientale Province where he quickly check-mated the anti-Lumumba forces and took over the bulk of the local CNA forces. He imprisoned eleven anti-Lumumba parliamentarians and proceeded to build up his forces in anticipation of the escape of Lumumba from Leopoldville. The stage was set for the creation of a new Lumumba government. Lumumba escaped from Leopoldville on November 27. He was re-arrested after he had covered half the distance to Stanleyville, and eventually Gizenga, the former Vice Premier under Lumumba, established the dissident government himself. (This made altogether five governments in the Congo: The Mobutu military dictatorship working through the Council of Commissioners, the shadow Ileko government which never functioned, the Gizenga government in Stanleyville, the Tshombe government in Katanga, and Albert Kalonji's little "mining state" in Kasaï province.)

In the general gloom of the period under review, one bright shaft of light was a success for the West and a defeat sustained by the backers of Lumumba in the UN. The General Assembly had decided in September, in view of the uncertainty of the situation in Leopoldville, to seat neither the Lumumba nor the Mobutu (Bomoko) delegation. In October, eight Afro-Asian delegations (Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco and the UAR) introduced a draft resolution calling for "respect for Congolese legality" and asking the General Assembly to "decide to seat the representatives of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) immediately", pending the General Assembly's decision on the report of the Credentials Committee. Although the resolution did not explain who was meant by the term "Central Government", it was clear that the backers of the resolution meant Lumumba. The tactics of the pro-Lumumba forces encountered the
suspicion and resentment of other African delegations, especially those of the newly admitted French-speaking African countries. When it became clear that the pro-Lumumba forces had over-reached themselves, the US decided to encourage moves for a showdown, to have a delegation appointed by President Kasavubu seated as representatives of the Congo. Kasavubu himself came to New York, and at US encouragement Prime Minister Youlou of the Congo (Brazzaville) Republic and Foreign Minister Okala of Cameroon also flew there. (The British Government felt it was a mistake to precipitate a showdown, and it took much work to bring the UK to go along. The UK position in October was still in favor of a Kasavubu-Lumumba reconciliation.)

The pro-Lumumba forces were severely discomfited in the ensuing debate because they did not oppose the legality of Kasavubu as Chief of State even while they did deny the legality of Kasavubu's ouster of Lumumba. The debate was acrimonious, with charges and counter-charges of "colonialist intrigues" of one power bloc or another. One important element of the debate was the general agreement that a UN Conciliation Commission should go to the Congo. The pro-Lumumba forces finally tried to postpone the vote, but lost, 36 to 51, with 11 abstentions. The Assembly vote (Nov. 22) in favor of seating Kasavubu's delegation was 53 to 24, with 19 abstentions. Among the African countries, the following voted in favor of postponement: Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and the UAR; while Liberia, Somalia and Upper Volta abstained. (In the final vote, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic also abstained.) Kasavubu had scored a triumph, but the Africans were now about evenly split and the UN had still not decided who represented the "Central Government of the Congo." It had merely seated the representatives of the Chief of State. Mobutu had received no endorsement. The Lumumba controversy continued.

The foregoing summary of events during October and November committed one very important aspect which relates to the question of the Belgian presence in the Congo. Events which occurred in this connection in New York, Leopoldville and Elisabethville are summarized in the next following section.

XII. BELGIAN ROLE IN KATANGA AND LEOPOLDVILLE

Although Moise Tshombe seemed firmly in the saddle in Elisabethville, the province of Katanga was in no way unified behind him. In October, the uprising of the Baluba tribe in Northern Katanga became a serious problem as attacks occurred on the Katanga army, on European residents and even on the UN force. It was clear that the Baluba population wanted
wanted no part of Thombe, but it was not yet clear whether they favored Thombe's political arch-enemy, Lumumba. After prolonged wrangling the UN finally secured Tshombe's agreement to the establishment of a zone in North Katanga where the UN was to assume responsibility for maintaining order. As the price for his agreement, the UN gave further de facto recognition by promising that "occupation by UN forces will not exclude an effective collaboration with the Katanga government and the existence in the occupied localities of the regular administrative and police services of that government and the exercise of their normal functions." (Elisabethville 172)

On October 14, Secretary General Hammarskjold handed the first of a series of notes to the Belgian representative in New York, complaining of the massive arrival of Belgian officials, technicians and military personnel in the Congo and asking for their withdrawal. Ambassador Burden commented from Brussels (816): "I am appalled at Hammarskjold's demand for the 'withdrawal' of all Belgian personnel now serving the Government of the Congo and provincial governments. If taken seriously it could only restore the chaos of the worst days of Lumumba, force the Belgians once again into the position of whipping-boys of world opinion, or both. I understand there are now some 2,000 Belgian technicians, mostly civilians, in the employ of the GOC and provincial governments. They are there at the request of the governments concerned..." Ambassador Timberlake commented: "If this means that the Secretary General has asked across-the-board withdrawal of Belgians serving the GOC and provincial governments, I am as appalled as Ambassador Burden. I have felt from the beginning, as the Department knows, that the best hope for resumption of anything like the normal functioning of the public services and the private economy was the reflow of Belgian technicians and businessmen. That was begun over the past two weeks. To reverse this trend would cause the almost complete halt in economic activities still functioning and multiply the already huge task the UN has before it."

Following are excerpts from one of the notes addressed by Hammarskjold to the Belgian representative (from Brussels 848):

"...The Secretary General of the UN desires to inform the Permanent Representative that according to recent reports by his representative in Leopoldville, 114 officers and 117 other Belgian military are still serving in the gendarmerie of the Katanga police. It appears, in addition, from these reports that all key posts of Katangan civil as well as security services are directly in the hands of Belgian functionaries or under the control of Belgian advisers assigned to Congolese administrators... Concerning the so-called autonomous state of South Kasai,
Kasai, reports continue to affirm that Colonel Crevecoeur wears Belgian uniform in the exercise of his functions and is assisted by a Belgian officer, Colonel Levaurog, and that both are occupied training new military units in the service of the authorities of South Kasai...

"The Secretary General has decided also to draw the attention of the Permanent Representative to recent information that a recruitment agency for the Congo has been created in Brussels under the direction of Professor lacroix... It appears that the purpose of this agency is to send to the Congo an increasing number of Belgian functionaries, of whom several have already assumed their positions with the so-called College of Commissioners. The authorities of the UN in the Congo have already been informed of several cases in which these Belgian experts have seriously impeded the development of the UN technical assistance program. Certain of these experts have even seriously delayed the presentation of requests for technical assistance to the UN by the Congolese authorities.

"It is evident that the employment of Belgian experts by the Congolese authorities and the activities of these experts are often directed against the United Nations organization and can only be a source of grave conflict, particularly because of the unstable political situation which currently reigns in the Congo. In this connection, the Secretary General must note that the agreements between Belgian technicians and various Congolese authorities were not approved by any government or other authority which can justly claim to be the legitimate Central Government of the Congo."

The Belgian Government considered the complete withdrawal of Belgians from the Congo utterly unacceptable, but it was prepared to work out a modus vivendi with the UN, either by way of coordination of a separate Belgian technical assistance program with the UN program, or by "placing all Belgian technicians under the UN umbrella provided the total level of Belgian assistance, including personnel, were not reduced," (Brussels 866). Ambassador Burden commented: "If we are to influence Belgian tactics in this situation, it is important that our basic support for the maintenance of Belgian technicians in the Congo be reaffirmed." He also drew attention to an earlier statement by Haarsskjold which had indicated that the Secretary General was alive to the importance of maintaining a large number of Belgians in the Congo. Our Representative to NATO recalled that we had stated to the North Atlantic Council that we considered the return of Belgian personnel to the Congo
to the Congo essential. (Paris PUL1O 577. There was no mention in these messages either of the presence of Belgian military in the Congo or of the activities of Belgian advisers in Leopoldville who were hardly overflowing with a spirit of cooperativeness toward the UN.

As attacks of Belgium's role in the Congo increased, the Belgian reaction became more and more violent. "Even moderate Foreign Office officials," our Embassy reported (Emtelt 903), "are shocked at what they consider a concerted effort by the UN Secretariat to curry favor with the 'unholy alliance' by making Belgium a scapegoat for all the troubles of the Congo... Belgians once again are looking to their NATO allies, especially the US for support... Failure to speak up will be regarded by the Belgians as an inexcusable failure to come to the support of an ally whose present record in this case, while not perfect, is very good and which is acting in the general Western interest." Our Ambassador recommended, "as a minimum" that the US make clear that it believes in Belgium's good faith and that the Congolese should have the right to call on "individual Belgians whom they know and trust" to help get the wheels of government going again. The formula about "individual Belgians" was presumably to mark the distinction between Belgian unilateral assistance, which we approved, and Russian unilateral assistance, which we had denounced.

On November 4, the State Department Press Officer, in commenting on the latest Dayal report that had severely criticized the Belgians, said: "We have every confidence in the good faith of Belgium in its desire to be of assistance to the Congo. We therefore are unable to accept the implications to the contrary contained in various parts of the report." (The prepared reply went on to express hope that the UN and the Belgian Government would be able to collaborate for the benefit of the peoples of "all the Congo.") Despite this US support, the Belgians did not follow through to negotiate an agreement with the UN with respect to their nationalism in the Congo.

The Dayal report of November 2, in addition to making the points that had been contained in Hammarskjöld notes to the Belgians, was particularly critical of the Tshombe regime whose insistence that it was a "sovereign state" ran directly counter to the Security Council resolution of July 22. Our Embassy in Brussels commented: "It would appear from recent Department and USUN cables that Secretary General Hammarskjöld is acting on the basic premise that Belgian government policy favors the continuing permanent separation of Katanga from the rest of the Congo. This premise is false. The Belgian Government has consistently supported the maintenance or restoration of a united Congo, though on a decentralized basis, despite
despite strong internal and external pressure in the other direction" (Brussels 877). President Tshombe, while insisting that his new state was independent, professed to seek "a new formula of association more in conformity with regional particularities" but at the same time he announced a policy of "entering into broad collaboration with all countries of Africa." To this end he tried to send his Foreign Minister on a mission to obtain recognition from other African countries, but not a single one recognized Katanga.

When Kasavubu was fighting to have his delegation seated in New York, the question was raised whether he was able also to speak in the name of Katanga. Foreign Minister Kimba of Katanga was instructed to join Kasavubu's delegation "provided prior discussions between Kimba and Bomiboko resulted in agreement by the Central Government to recognize the independence, or at least application for autonomy, of Katanga." When our Consul pleaded with Tshombe to forgo negotiations in New York and leave the future open, he complained that "the US and Kasavubu were attempting to entrap him into returning as a part of the Congo Republic." (Elisabethville 232). As a result of Kimba's instructions, an ambiguous agreement was worked out in New York whereby Kimba was to join Kasavubu's delegation. However, the Belgian adviser of Kimba, an employee of the Union Miniers, convinced the Katangan Foreign Minister that he had been tricked and issued a statement explicitly stating that Kasavubu could not speak for Katanga (USUN 1357).

Ambassador Timberlake made a two-day visit to Elisabethville at the end of November and had a two and one-half hour conversation with President Tshombe. The conversation was so bizarre that it is hard to summarize. At one point, Tshombe said he had "made" Colonel Mobutu by contributing funds which "corrupted" that leader. Becoming more excited, he sweepingly claimed full credit for the overthrow of Lumumba and the emergence of a moderate regime in Leopoldville through the instrumentality of Mobutu. "Speaking on the problem of Katangan cooperation with the moderate leaders, the assembled Katangans began a systematic denigration of each leader, notably Mobutu, Kasavubu and Bomiboko, whom they described in considerable detail as unworthy of their support and totally unreliable as champions of Congolese democracy. All described Katanga as alone capable of offering courageous leadership to the Congolese people. At the height of the discussion Tshombe fell on his knees before the group and asked the Ambassador if he wished to see Tshombe in this posture before the multitude Kasavubu, the inexperienced Mobutu or the snippet Bomiboko. In answering his question he said he preferred death." (Elisabethville 260).

Upon his return to Leopoldville, our Ambassador summarized his impressions. He noted that Tshombe had told him that "Katangan
independence was a fact and they would never resume a political association with the Congo, although they were prepared to make arrangements to give financial help to their brothers in the Congo... While I had the feeling that Tshombe might be exhibiting a public profile for the benefit of his four ministers, my net impression at the end of the visit was most pessimistic. Propped up by Nineteenth Century Belgian advisers and growing to like the attributes of kingship, it seemed to me Tshombe was hardening his position of separatism. (Leotelt 1292).

In a conversation in New York with Ambassadors Wadsworth and Barco and Acting Assistant Secretary Bohlen, Secretary General Hammarskjold meanwhile said "with regard to Katanga and the Belgian presence there, that Katanga's unity with the rest of the Congo is a political, legal and economic necessity. If Katanga remains separate it would mean that the Cold War would come to Central Africa. The problem for the UN was how to get Katanga back into the Congo while remaining aloof from internal affairs. The Secretary General felt that so long as Tshombe can turn to Belgium he will not cooperate with the Central Government. With regard to our concern at the Secretary General's note to the Belgians, he said he was only asking the Belgians to do what the US had already asked, namely, that all aid go through the UN. The Secretary General said the Belgians had been anything but helpful. He referred to 'special interests' and spoke of the 'systematic return of Belgians to Leopoldville under the control of the Commissioners.'" (Deptel to Leopoldville 1186). At the same time, Hammarskjold expressed "complete disagreement" with our legal analysis regarding the status of Lumumba. He considered that until the Congolese parliament had expressed itself, Lumumba might not be the legitimate Prime Minister but he was "more the Prime Minister than anyone else."
XIII. CONGO DEVELOPMENTS IN DECEMBER

As noted in the preceding section, Lumumba was captured by Mobutu's CNA and brought back to Leopoldville where he was now directly in the custody of Mobutu. (He had previously been surrounded by UN troops which in turn had been surrounded by CNA troops, but had slipped away with the connivance of Moroccans of the UN force.) The United Nations Command, which earlier had refrained from the affirmative action of relinquishing the protection of Lumumba, now refrained from the affirmative action of rescuing him and taking him again under its protection. The imprisonment of Lumumba and the indignities to which he was subjected created an outcry of protests, warnings and threats from the African and Asian countries that had upheld him as the legal head of the government. In addition, of course, the Soviet bloc culminated about a NATO-supported, Hammarskjöld-abetted Belgian plot to use Mobutu's "fascist gangs" to stifle democracy and enslave the Congo.

Lumumba's arrest had a number of longer-range consequences: First, it catapulted the even more radical Gizenga into the position of leadership of the Lumumba forces in Stanleyville where the top pro-Lumumba politicians had concentrated. As former Vice Premier, Gizenga now proclaimed himself as the head of the legitimate "central" government of the Congo. Secondly, it greatly improved Mobutu's political bargaining position in Leopoldville, and for a time it looked as though a viable new anti-Lumumba government might be established. Thirdly, combined with more acts of lawlessness on the part of Mobutu's CNA, it further exacerbated relations between Mobutu and the UN Command. Finally, the heightened passions of the pro-Lumumba governments outside the Congo produced the longest, most acrimonious and perhaps most revealing UN debates so far, which are described in a separate section. Some of the countries represented in the UN force now denounced the Congo operation and declared that they would withdraw their troops.

The consolidation of Gizenga's power in Orientales province confronted the U.S. with a danger of "separatism" in the Congo which was, this time, not anti-Lumumba and anti-Communist (as in Katanga and Kasai) but pro-Lumumba and Communist-supported. In a circular instruction to twelve embassies in Africa, we asked to have it brought home to the respective governments that "we believe it essential that all governments abide by the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, which preclude recognition or support for any separatist movement (Katanga as well as Orientales)." If the Soviet bloc were to recognize the Gizenga regime, we said, this would "bring civil war to the Congo. It would also constitute a grave threat to international peace. As we have previously made clear, the US would take the most serious view of such a development."

(Cirtel 840).
We made special efforts to persuade the Sudan government to deny overflight and landing rights to flights that might bring Communist or UAR supplies and personnel to Gizenga. At the same time, however, Belgian interests were still regularly supplying the Tshombe regime at Elisabethville with supplies and personnel, overflying many African countries on route there.

The United States redoubled its efforts to stimulate creation of a new regime with better international credentials in Leopoldville. Our ambassador and the representatives of another agency had intensive discussions with Kasavubu, Mobutu, Ileo, Bomboke, Audula, Bolikango and others. The difficulties are well illustrated by the following passage from Ambassador Timberlake's telegram 1351: "I hope the Department is not assuming from a few modest successes that the Embassy has Kasavubu, Mobutu or any other Congolese 'in the pocket'. While we have consistently endeavored through counsel and advice to guide moderate elements along a reasonable path, they rarely consult us voluntarily regarding their prospective moves... It would be necessary to live 24 hours a day with the principals in this drama to know what role they may decide to play at any given moment. I can add only that Lumumba's coterie of advisers encountered the same difficulties even though they had him literally hedged in." In addition, of course, the separatists Tshombe and Kalonji presented special difficulties. Without their deputies, it would be especially difficult to obtain an eventual majority in parliament.

Toward the end of the month, the prospects for a new government improved to the point where guarded optimism seemed in order. President Kasavubu, who did not wish to see parliament reconvene until a working coalition had been forged, proposed a round-table conference of Congolese anti-Lumumba politicians. Some defections from Gizenga's camp appeared to make this fairly promising. Tshombe appeared prepared to attend a round-table provided it was held in Elisabethville. Then a meeting of the principal leaders was arranged at Brazzaville, across the river from Leopoldville. The meeting was a fiasco: Kalonji and Ileo immediately got into a fight over the persecution of the Baluba tribe in Kasai province, Tshombe denounced all the assembled leaders, declared he could not attend a round-table until March 31, and walked out of the meeting. Then, on December 25 the Gizenga government displayed unexpected vigor and leadership in mounting a "Blitzkrieg" operation against Kivu province. Arriving in a column of jeeps, the Gizenga soldiers arrested the (pro-Mobutu) governor of Kivu and took over that province without firing a shot.

Meanwhile, Mobutu's relations with the UN Command were going from bad to worse.
bad to worse. Ambassador Dayal refused to have anything to do with the Council of Commissioners. He repeatedly protested, to no avail, against arrests of UN personnel, thefts of UN supplies (at one time the CNA hijacked 40 UN trucks), an "invasion" of the former Belgian base at Kitona by Mobutu troops, and similar incidents. Ambassador Timberlake tried to minimize these excesses by pointing to similar, and worse, excesses committed under Lumumba and now by Gizenga. Dayal became increasingly bitter about US support for Mobutu and in an interview with a New York Times correspondent (not printed) broady implied that he knew the US was financing Mobutu. (Leotel 1384). Our ambassador was kept busy trying to put out a number of fires. Perhaps the worst occurred when Mobutu decided simply to deny the use of Congolese river transportation to the UN. Another disastrous incident occurred when Mobutu's soldiery in Bukavu (in Kivu province, prior to the take-over by Gizenga) imprisoned an Austrian UN medical unit. The Austrian team included one learned doctor who could speak Kiswahili and Lingala, so the CNA troops reasoned that the Austrians must be Belgian spies. The medical team was finally rescued and evacuated by UN troops.

Toward the end of the month, there was increasing discussion in Leopoldville of a military operation that might be undertaken by Mobutu against Gizenga's forces in Orientale province. Plans were drawn up which included various forms of covert outside support for Mobutu. A careful assessment of the risks, however, resulted in a decision to go ahead with the planning but not to start the operation itself for the time being. In making this decision, Washington was influenced, first, by Ambassador Timberlake's assessment that "barring substantial airborne assistance from Bloq and UAR, which would be most difficult from standpoint of logistics, a solution in Stanleyville seems fairly near. Economic collapse is predictable in two to four weeks. There will be a potential violent reaction which the population becomes hungry and out of work...Mobutu himself favors blockade as a solution, which seems to be effective." (Leotel 1129).

The second reason for going slower was the Department's assessment that "military operations (against Gizenga) would almost certainly be interpreted by the UN itself and a great majority of its members as a defiance of the UN effort and would run the great risk of bringing Mobutu's forces into direct conflict with the UN forces." The third reason was the fear that a covertly Western-supported Mobutu offensive against Stanleyville "could well be used as an excuse, which would appear justified to the entire Afro-Asian group, for more overt and effective outside aid to Gizenga, thus contributing to an East-West confrontation in the Congo under conditions which would enlist minimal neutralist support on the side of the West." (Deptel to Leopoldville 1627). A factor in the assessment of the
of the risks was certainly also the ease with which Gizenga's forces had taken over Kivu province. The ease with which the Gizenga forces subsequently defended Kivu seemed to reinforce the Department's assessment.

Meanwhile, President Tshombe of Katanga made a visit to Brussels where he was received in audience by the King of the Belgians and given a high Belgian decoration. (Ambassador Timberlake had cabled about the prospect of such a visit: "It makes me physically ill. Nothing could be more calculated to alienate friends and encourage enemies." Leotet 1328). The visit, as well as other information, increasingly indicated that Tshombe was not really controlled by the Belgian government but was quite capable of blackmailing the Belgians. The government, for instance, would have preferred that Tshombe be not decorated, but the Katangan president put such a tantrum and uttered such threats against the Belgian position in Katanga that the Belgians relented. It also became clearer in December that the Belgian government did not in all cases control the Belgian advisers to Tshombe. Most of them seemed more responsive to influence from the Belgian mining trusts than to that of the Belgian government. The mining interests at times acted in direct defiance of the Belgian government. Tshombe, whose authority controlled the mines of Katanga, presumably was also less than a complete puppet of the mining companies.

As our Embassy in Brussels reported, in connection with Tshombe's departure from Brussels: "Rothschild of the Belgian Foreign Ministry saw Tshombe off at the airport. His impression was that Tshombe did not fully take the Belgian aide-memoire (favoring a United States of the Congo) seriously. Tshombe implied he believed that Belgian interests in Katanga are too great to enable Belgium to carry out its threat to re-examine its technical assistance program if the Katanga government continued to pursue a policy contrary to Belgium's. Although Rothschild emphasized the firmness of the Belgian position on the need for a reconciliation between Katanga and Leopoldville, he doubts he made much more impression. Embassy comment: In addition to the feeling that he has a stranglehold over Belgian interests as well as support of strong forces in the Belgian private sector, Tshombe, after his experience with the Belgian decoration, probably feels that the Belgian government is something of a 'paper tiger'. (Brussels 1121). Our Consulate in Elisabethville shared this assessment (Elisabethville 323).

On December 30, Mobutu sent some troops by air to retake Bukavu, the capital of Kivu province. The operation was a complete fiasco. His troops landed at Uumba, in the Belgian-administered UN Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Although the Belgians denied to the UN that they had had advance knowledge of the arrival of Mobutu's troops at a Belgian-controlled airport outside of the Congo, our Embassy at Brussels had reported that "the
that "the Belgian government recognizes the probable adverse international repercussions (from its connivance in a violation of the UN resolution of September 19), but it believes Belgium cannot stand by supinely and refuse to permit the Congolese Government to take every justifiable step in endeavoring to hold on to Kivu." (Brussels 1203). The Mobutu troops were taken by the Belgians to the Congolese border where they attempted to negotiate their way into Bukavu. The Gizenga troops, warned in advance by the UN Command (and by Mobutu's earlier public announcement that he was sending a force to Bukavu), opened fire from prepared positions. The Mobutu troops retreated or surrendered without firing a shot.

XIV. U.N. DEBATES OF DECEMBER

The Security Council was called into session on December 7 at the request of the Soviet Union which had circulated a long bill of particulars against the West and against Hammarskjöld. (Sample sentences: "When non-interference had in fact been necessary to enable the lawful government to carry out its functions, the representatives of the UN had grossly interfered in the Congo's affairs and had paralyzed that government's effectiveness. But when need arose to defend the head of the government and other members of Parliament and the Government of the Congo from manhandling by the imperialists and colonialists, a policy of 'non-interference' -- in reality one of complicity with the imperialists and colonialists -- was adopted.") The meeting also took place against a background of decisions by the UAR, Guinea, Indonesia and Yugoslavia to withdraw their personnel from the Congo. The immediate issue to be discussed was the treatment given to Lumumba, but the entire role of the UN came in for re-examination.

Hammarskjöld made several long policy statements, hitting back vigorously against the Soviets but also not sparing criticism of Belgium and even, by implication, of the U.S. He started out by stating the original aim of UN intervention: "The aim was to protect life and property within the Congo." (He did not mention "law and order", words which only made their appearance in the resolution of August 19, when it was a matter of "assisting the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo"). He reiterated that the UN had to be strictly neutral in the domestic politics of the Congo. He went on to say:

"...there can be no doubt that if the United Nations Force were employed to 'enforce the Constitution', it would involve the United Nations in coercive action against competing political factions to a degree that was clearly excluded."
excluded from the scope of its mandate. Moreover, as several
deleagtes have observed, such forcible intervention in internal
constitutional and political conflict could not be considered
as compatible with the basic principles of Article 2 of the
Charter relating to sovereign equality and non-intervention in
domestic jurisdiction."

However, the Secretary General later asked: "Why were the critics
not, at an earlier stage, interested in widening the mandate, as their
comments now indicate, including a disarming of the Armée nationale
congolesie (CNA)? Are they really willing to do so now, irrespective
of what further changes may come about in the Congo?" He defended UN
action to separate the warring factions and tribes, and then turned to
the phenomenon of Mobutu's growing forces in Leopoldville: "It is
difficult to see," he said, "how this emergence of a more consolidated
CNA in the Leopoldville and surrounding area could be possible without
some outside technical and financial assistance." He refused to have the
UN effort judged by the internal political difficulties in the Congo,
because, as he said, it had not been the mandate of the UN "to create a
stable government within the framework of the Constitution."

At a later point in the debate, Hammarskjold eloquently pleaded
for a continuance of the UN operation. He said:

"If the United Nations operation were, for whatever
reason, to be forced out of the Congo, I am convinced that
the consequence would be immediate civil war, degenerating
into tribal conflicts fought in the most uninhibited manner.
And such a situation could last for years. It would also
mean the complete disintegration of whatever fabric of
national unity still remains, as it can be foreseen that
the country would be disrupted into fragments.... I believe
it can be safely anticipated that the outside world would
not stand aside in such a situation, but that assistance of
a military nature, in one guise or another, would be forthcoming from
the different factions. If and when that were to happen, the world would be facing a confused Spanish war
situation, with fighting going on all over the prostrate
body of the Congo and pursued for nebulous and conflicting
aims. Could such a situation be contained? And if not
contained, how would it influence peace and war in the
world?"

Hammarskjold also explained why the negotiations between Belgium
and the UN about a modus vivendi concerning the Belgian technicians in
the Congo

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the Congo had not got off the ground. He said that he had asked the
Belgian Government whether it continued to disclaim responsibility for
the actions of its nationals in the Congo, in which case "the questions
raised by the Belgian return should be discussed between the United
Nations representatives and Congolese authorities, not with the Belgian
Government." If, on the other hand, the Belgian Government "directly
or indirectly" recognized responsibility for the return of the Belgian
nationals, then it should accept certain principles regarding UN control
which he had outlined to the Belgian Government. The Secretary General
explained that the foregoing approach to the problem had been rejected
by the Belgian Government, and under the circumstances he saw no basis
for negotiations since his hands were tied by the outstanding
resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly.

Speaking for the United States, Ambassador Wadsworth stoutly defended
the legality of Mobutu's actions: "There is no question as to the
right of the Congolese authorities to place Mr. Lumumba under arrest.
It is the evident judgment of these authorities that the activities of
Mr. Lumumba have constituted a threat to the security of the State. A
warrant for his arrest signed by the President of the Republic has been
outstanding for some time. He was apprehended in the process of fleeing
to Stanleyville. It was widely understood throughout the world that had
he reached Stanleyville he would have attempted either to establish a
separatist regime or to seek to usurp power in the Congo in opposition
to the Chief of State. The Soviet Union's anger in calling this meeting
is explainable very simply: because this plan, which they supported, did
not succeed."

At a later point, Mr. Wadsworth said:

"The objective of the United Nations, which we should
endorse and seek to advance, is the establishment of
conditions in the Congo which will promote law and order and
the general observance of fundamental rights. In the view
of the United States, this purpose could be very significantly
advanced if all Members of the United Nations — and I repeat:
all Members — would give full support and recognition to what
has been characterized as one of the two organs still functioning
in the Congo, the office of the President, Mr. Kasavubu; and if
they would give full support and recognition to President
Kasavubu's efforts to restore law and order throughout the Congo."

The foregoing statement of Mr. Wadsworth was subjected to some rather
caucustic analysis by India's Krishna Menon who quoted it in its entirety
and then remarked: "Now, what I find in this paragraph is that there is

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a reference to two organs in the first part of it, but as the paragraph goes on it gets fatigued and loses sight of one organ: there is only the President there. We entirely endorse what has been said by representatives at the United Nations, that there are only two legal organs that we can deal with at the moment... but the implications of the statement should be carried out." Menon castigated Belgian intervention and arms shipments to the Katanga. He was against UN intervention to disarm Congolese and argued in favor of a constitutional solution. He said that it was not for the UN to interpret constitutions, but immediately went on to give extensive interpretations of the Congolese constitution, castigating the illegality of Mobutu's government and Lumumba's arrest and pointing to the absence of any functioning court system which might have tried Lumumba. He concluded:

"I would point out that the United Nations is there for the maintenance of law and order, because the breakdown of legal institutions has created a state of anarchy, and that has established rule by private armies. Having regard to the position in Stanleyville and so on, the best thing to do is to get Parliament convened. We recognize that the United Nations has no authority to convene Parliament but we also recognize that Mr. Kasavubu has the authority to call Parliament. Our appeal would be to those who have greater access to Mr. Kasavubu to ask him to call Parliament, because Parliament has not been-dissolved... It would be the business of the United Nations to neutralize some area, with the consent of everyone concerned, where Parliament could meet and function in peace, because Mr. Kasavubu himself has said that one of the difficulties in calling Parliament is the fact that there are these physical troubles... the political prisoners have to be released and some sort of immunity provided by the protective arm of the United Nations."

The Security Council had before it a US-UK-Italian-Argentinian resolution and a Soviet resolution. The first, which merely expressed itself against any violation of human rights in the Congo and reiterated the mandate of the Secretary General, received 8 votes against 2 but was vetoed by the Soviets. The Soviet resolution contained the usual propaganda ("resolutely condemning the continuing interference by Belgium and other colonial powers in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo," "calls upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to secure the immediate release of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo" etc.) but at the request of Poland there was a separate vote on its last paragraph, which read:

"Calls upon

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"Calls upon the Government of Belgium, in accordance with the decision of the United Nations Security Council and the special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, immediately to withdraw Belgian military, paramilitary and civil personnel from the Congo."

The vote on that paragraph was 4 to 6, with Ceylon and Tunisia (the only Asian and African members) voting with the Soviets and the Poles, while Argentina, China, France, Italy, the UK and US voted against. (Ecuador abstained.) The resolution as a whole was overwhelmingly defeated. The scene now shifted to the General Assembly.

In the UN General Assembly, Krishna Menon introduced a resolution sponsored by Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, the UAR and Yugoslavia. The preamble included the phrase "Noting with grave concern the hostile attitude and resistance of armed detachments to the operation of the United Nations in the Congo as recently reported by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and also the continuation of lawlessness, violence and continuing deterioration of the economic situation in the Congo... Conscious of the inescapable and urgent responsibility of the United Nations both in the interests of the Congo as well as in the interests of peace and security which stand endangered and for the avoidance of civil war" and then featured the following operative paragraphs:

"1. Considers that the United Nations must henceforth implement its mandate fully to prevent breach of peace and security, to restore and maintain law and order and the inviolability of persons, including United Nations and diplomatic personnel and property, in accordance with the Charter, and to take urgent measures to assist the people of the Congo in meeting their most pressing needs;

"2. Urges the immediate release of all political prisoners under detention, more particularly members of the Central Government of the Congo and officials of Parliament and others enjoying Parliamentary immunity;

"3. Urges the immediate convening of Parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures thereto by the United Nations, including custodial duties;

"4. Urges that measures be undertaken forthwith to prevent armed units and personnel in the Congo from any interference in the political life of the country as well as from obtaining any material
material or other support from abroad,

"5. Draws the attention of the Government of Belgium to its grave responsibilities in disregarding the resolutions of the United Nations;

"6. Demands that all Belgian military and quasi-military personnel, advisers and technicians be immediately withdrawn in pursuance of the resolutions of the United Nations, the repeated pledges and assurances given by the Government of Belgium and in the interest of peace and security."

This was a tough draft resolution many of whose provisions would probably have been welcomed by Ambassador Timberlake in the days when Lumumba's troops were harrassing the United Nations and intimidating the opposition and when Soviet assistance was going to the Force Publique. The resolution was obviously unacceptable to the West, if only because its last paragraph drew no distinction between Belgian officials and advisers on the one hand and the multitude of Belgian technicians, educators and professional people on the other. In opposing the resolution, Ambassador Wadsworth made the most of this point, but when he opposed a mandate for the UN to deal with all military factions, his own preferences were showing:

"Now I come to another point, perhaps the crucial point in the set of sweeping proposals which Mr. Zorin brought to the Assembly. That is that the Congolese national army, under Colonel Mobutu, should be disarmed — presumably by force, because I know of no other way — by the United Nations. As the Secretary General has pointed out, any such action would far exceed the mandate of the United Nations; it would be a direct violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo. In fact, the representative of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Cardoso, was entirely justified in saying during the Security Council debate that any such attempt against the will of his Government would be aggression. Even if there were a legal, moral, ethical basis for taking this step, its result would be obviously to weaken the constructive forces of the country and to strengthen those who oppose the constitutional institutions of the country — including the Stanleyville faction, which appears to have the full backing of the Soviet Union."

This, then, was what the United States opposed. On the constructive side, the US representative said "full constitutional government should be restored in the Congo as soon as possible, but for the United Nations to attempt to
attempt to impose this from outside would be quite wrong. Only the Congolese and their leaders themselves can take the necessary initiatives and establish parliamentary government in the conditions of tranquillity and mutual tolerance which it requires in order to function at all. As for the convening of Parliament, "the initiative must come from the Congolese people and from their leaders."

The US and UK shortly thereafter introduced their own draft resolution which (1) came out once again against the introduction or presence in the Congo of any foreign military or para-military personnel; (2) reiterated the earlier call against the provision of arms or other materials contained in the last three resolutions; (3) requested the Secretary General to do everything possible to assist the Chief of State... in establishing conditions in which Parliament can meet and function in security and freedom from outside interference; (4) called for observance of human rights; and (5) expressed the hope that the forthcoming Round-table Conference would help to resolve internal conflict by peaceful means and to preserve the unity and integrity of the Congo. The US-UK draft said nothing about Belgium.

Secretary General Hammarskjold also came out against the Ghana-India resolution. He said:

"If I did not ask for a widened mandate or for new means, it was because I do not believe that it is by such new means, within the limits set by the Charter, that the present problem of the Congo can be solved. That is so for two reasons. First, I reject everything that would have a touch of control or direction of the Congo's internal affairs — noting with some surprise that proposals in that direction have been made from highly authoritative African sources — and, second, I do not believe that the use of military initiative, or pressure, is the way to bring about the political structure, in terms of persons and institutions, which at present is the first need of the Congo. The United Nations can help in such a direction, but that is by normal political and diplomatic means of persuasion and advice, not by the use of force or intimidation."

At the same time, however, he warned that the civil war in the Congo might get out of hand to the point where he might have to recommend withdrawal of the UN Force. He said:

"In the Security Council I drew attention to the possibility that, following a United Nations withdrawal, a situation of civil war would develop, with direct or indirect engagement of outside..."
Powers being practically inevitable. What about the position of the United Nations if such a situation were to develop while the Force is still there...? One thing is obvious; it is the duty of the United Nations by all means to try to forestall such a development... However, even the most energetic action by the United Nations... may not be successful in forestalling a change of the situation into one of acute civil war with the grave overtones to which I have referred. If that happens, what should thereafter be the policy of the United Nations? A taking of sides obviously would be impermissible... (but) a standing aside would be likely to place the United Nations and its Force in an untenable position, being so to say in the role of a passive witness to developments diametrically opposed to those which the Organization wishes to further."

"Should then the United Nations try to interpose itself? In situations of much lesser scope and without the same overtones the Force has to a limited extent locally interposed itself and has succeeded in doing so without compromising its basic position. However, in the situation envisaged here the change to pursue such a policy would be very slight indeed. Practically every act of interposition in such a situation might lend itself to the interpretation that it was taken in order to help one side or the other — and that not only locally but in an international sense, due to the support that may be given from the outside to the various parties in the Congo. Therefore, were a situation for the United Nations of the kind I have described to develop, I would have to put up to the Security Council the question whether the United Nations Force should not withdraw."

To this, Krishna Menon had a ready answer: "...there is violence, anarchy, illegal rule, suspension of Parliament, imprisonment of political people, ill-treatment of foreign nationals with indignities heaped upon them; there is total lack of observance of all diplomatic courtesies. Then there is the opposition offered by Belgium on the one hand, and now by Mobutu's troops on the other, to the forces of the United Nations. This is not a challenge merely to our dignity, but really a challenge to the authority and prestige of the United Nations which, if it is lost in Africa, would be one of the greatest calamities of our time, reflected in the rest of the world... What we are saying is this: the situation having reached its present state, it is now necessary for the United Nations to govern or get out." By the word "govern", he meant the forcible return to constitutional government under UN military protection. He stressed the useful role that would be placed by the UN Conciliation Commission.
Commission which had just departed for the Congo and pleaded that the
Western Powers withdraw their resolution and permit the Ghana-India
resolution to be voted.

Menon rejected the US-UK draft resolution as being essentially
designed to help Kasavubu. With respect to the forthcoming Round-table
conference, he said: "That conference is going to be called by the Presi-
dent who is himself a party to the dispute. Therefore, any attempt at
mediation in this matter must either be carried on with the aid of the
Conciliation Commission or by the general initiative of the contending
parties or by the Secretary-General. I would therefore say that this
round-table conference is one in name only. It is not a conciliation
conference and to call upon the General Assembly to support the partisan
attempt of one side is gross interference... in the internal affairs..."
He was even more critical of the US-UK resolution's point about "assisting
the Chief of State in establishing conditions in which Parliament can
meet and function" and claimed that the main obstacle to such conditions
was President Kasavubu himself. With devastating effect, Menon quoted
a statement by Kasavubu that "in the existing sociological and
political conditions" the institutions established by the Basic Law
were not suitable to the Congo.

In the ensuing debate, very little was heard from Africans who
disagreed with the Ghana-India draft resolution. The representative of
Cameroon in opposing Menon made the most of the latter's statement that
the UN must "govern or get out", but he also rose to the defense of the
CMA and claimed rather unconvincingly that the structures against
excesses of the CMA were "addressed to all the national armies of
Africa." The representative from Congo (Brazzaville) delivered a
panegyric of Kasavubu and the Abako party which has tribal links with
the government on the right bank of the Congo, and then said: "Let us
leave the people responsible to meet around the campfire in order to
prepare for what we call in our country the 'palavers' which generally
meet with success." On the whole, however, the African opposition to the
Ghana-India draft was weak in the debate, and the vote bore this out.

The Ghana-India resolution was rejected by 12 votes to 28, with 27
abstentions. Voting in favor were the following Africans: Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, UAR. Voting
against were only Kasavubu's delegation and that of the Union of South
Africa. All other African delegations abstained. Since Ethiopia and
Nigeria furnished two of the three members of the Conciliation
Committee mission, their votes were especially significant. Then came
the vote on the US-UK resolution.

The US-UK
The US-UK resolution (summarized on page 25 above) carried by 43 to 22, with 32 abstentions. Among those voting in favor was not a single African delegation. Of 26 African delegations, five opposed the resolution, nineteen abstained and two were absent. Not even Congo (Brasavilla), which openly favored Kasavubu, voted for the resolution. Cameroon, which had spoken so vigorously during the debate, was one of those absent. For the first time, the US had voted for a resolution on the Congo which did not have the support of a single delegation from an African country.

XV. JANUARY DEVELOPMENTS.

As the new year began, the stock of Lumumba and Gizenga had perceptibly risen and that of Kasavubu and Mobutu perceptibly dropped — in spite of the UN resolution which seemed to support Kasavubu and indeed partly because of that Pyrrhic victory. The Gizenga take-over of Kivu province and his subsequent repulse of the Mobutu counter-move, both involving victories with small forces and little violence, raised the question whether political rather than military factors might not have been predominant in the outcome of those actions. As Gizenga's forces entered the Baluba country of Northern Katanga, whose inhabitants had risen against the Tshombe government, internal Congolese political factors again seemed to favor the Communist-supported side. The fact that the Mobutu soldiers captured at Bukavu promptly rallied to the Lumumba cause also gave cause for concern. This was further increased by reports of unrest and disaffection among Mobutu's CNA troops stationed at Thysville near Leopoldville. Even in Elisabethville, the anti-Lumumba stronghold of Moise Tshombe, about one thousand pro-Lumumbaists had to be arrested (Elisabethville Hill).

The Gizenga forces were receiving political and moral support from the Communist bloc and from the UAR, Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Ghana, all of whom had forces in the Congo. The precise extent to which they also received material aid was difficult to determine, but there was undoubtedly substantial financial and some other support. Although the Sudan held firm against the use of its airfields or territory for flights to Stanleyville, one UAR plane is known to have delivered supplies to Gizenga's forces. There were unconfirmed reports of Czech and other military advisers to Gizenga. Although the UN forces interposed themselves between the forces of Gizenga and Tshombe in northern Katanga, their sympathies were obviously less with Tshombe than with Gizenga. Even in Leopoldville, when pro-Lumumba elements attacked an area of Kasavubu supporters, the UN troops offered no assistance and confined themselves to taking pictures (leotel 167).

Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, the Belgian position in the UN, which was a poor one
to begin with, became still weaker — if this was possible — as the
USSR and many Afro-Asians castigated the use of the UN Trust Territory
of Ruanda-Urundi for Mobutu's abortive operation against Bukavu. In the
UN, we still made efforts to "avoid a resolution highly critical of
Belgium" and stated in a telegram to New York (Deptel 1256) that "we
recognize that the Belgian Government is put in a difficult spot (but)
believe the Belgian record of compliance with past Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions demonstrates Belgian good faith and
willingness to cooperate with the UN." An Afro-Asian resolution calling
for the withdrawal from the Congo of all Belgian military personnel,
advisers and technicians, was defeated in the Security Council on
January 14 by a vote of 4 to 0, with 7 abstentions. (It was defeated
because it did not receive a majority.)

Increased attention was given to the possibility of establishing
an internationally more acceptable government in Leopoldville and to the
possibility of increased armed actions by Mobutu with Western assistance.
As regards the first possibility, Ambassador Timberlake telegraphed on
January 6: "We have some to another at least emporary dead end with the
announcement last night of Tshombe's refusal to attend the proposed round-
table in Leopoldville January 25.... Kasavubu and Tleo are presumably
unwilling to have the conference held in Elisabethville. This means that
the hopes of drawing Tshombe into a conference on the future of the Congo
have dimmed. Kalembia is accordingly left with the dilemma of deciding
whether to improve relations with Tshombe or to rely upon the central
government. There are still no indications that other political leaders
in the Congo have come any closer to subordinating their own personal
aspirations to the need for a strong and active government of the Congo."
The ambassador felt it would be better to go ahead with a round-table even
without Tshombe since the Council of Commissioners seemed to be losing
momentum "as too many of them are more interested in high life than in the
serious business of providing a government." (Leotel 1483).

Illustrative of the stagnation and paralysis in Leopoldville was a
message from our Embassy there reporting a conversation with Joseph
Kasongo, the President of the Chamber of Representatives. "Kasongo
today told an Embassy officer that one can at least argue with Lumumba
but Kasavubu is hopeless. He just sits and smiles even if you insult
him. Kasavubu's inaction in the face of the grave crisis has forced
Kasongo to conclude that the only solution is the release of Lumumba.
Lumumba, he said, now realizes he committed many errors and will act
much more responsibly." (Leotel 1508). The Embassy commented:
"Kasongo's attitude is a reflection of the growing dissatisfaction with
Kasavubu's failure to convene parliament or to take other positive action.

In view
In view of Gizenga's recent success the prospects for installing a moderate government, which about a month ago were reasonable, have considerably dimmed.*

As for a military solution, it was the opinion of Kasavubu and of qualified Western experts that this was now possible only if the CNA were beefed up with white officers or technical advisers. Ambassador Timberlake gave his own opinion that there was little likelihood of success of "any extended military operation mounted by the CNA without the help of foreign experts particularly in logistics and planning. We are reasonably sure that this element has been supplied to Gizenga's forces in Stanleyville while we have been understandably inhibited from marshaling suitable experts in aid of Mobutu." (Icotel 1434). Mobutu's representative Justin Bomboko went to Brussels where he requested Belgian arms, money and 100 officers as training instructors, Belgian or others." The Belgians indicated to us that they were willing to provide this assistance despite the international risks involved, but would not do so without the full support of their allies, particularly the US. (Brussels 1293).

Bomboko also went to Paris and made similar requests. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, while offering no explicit encouragement, pointed out that the French Government had always taken the position that sovereign states are entitled to aid the Congo directly and did not have to confine themselves to the UN channel, presumably notwithstanding all the outstanding UN resolutions against unilateral outside military assistance to the Congo. As the threat to Katanga increased, the Tshombe government also consulted with the Portuguese military authorities who assured him that "in the event of foreign intervention in Orientale or Kivu provinces, the Portuguese would... transship military equipment for Katanga via rail from Lobito in cases with false markings." A Rhodesian delegation to Elisabethville gave similar assurances of clandestine military and other assistance to Katanga (Elisabethville 360).

But this was not considered enough to shore up Tshombe's position. Although Belgian officers and advisers were already serving with his security forces, he sought an additional contingent made up entirely of white people, Tshombe's Belgian military adviser explained the views of the President of Katanga as follows: "Weber said the Katangan troops are frequently undisciplined, given to inter-tribal disputes, and increasingly suspicious of white officers to the extent that several minor mutinies have occurred in training camps and garrisons. The Belgian Government is sending an officer to reorganize the armed forces staff here. At the same time, Tshombe has assented to the organization of an entirely white
white company to be recruited in Belgium, France, etc., which would serve as protection in the event the African forces get out of hand. Weber said Tshombe supports the idea of a white company because, as Tshombe put it: "In these matters I trust only whites." (Elisabethville 361). By mid-January, the first 100 or more new European "volunteers" for Tshombe's army had arrived in the Katanga.

The Department, in an effort to arrest and reverse the unfavorable trend in the Congo, instructed the US Delegation to approach the Secretary-General and to "remind him strongly that if the Congo falls under Communist domination while the UN is sharing major responsibility for the security of the country, the results in US public and Congressional opinion are likely to be extremely damaging to the UN." We proposed the following concrete steps: (1) Replacement of Ambassador Dayal on the ground that he was biased in favor of Lumumba. (2) Now that Guinea had requested withdrawal of its troops from the Congo, encourage that withdrawal and the withdrawal of the other unreliable contingents, particularly those of Ghana, the UAR and perhaps Morocco. (3) Substitution by troops from more reliable countries, African, Latin American, etc. (4) Stiffer and more precise instructions to the UN Command to prevent a recurrence of such incidents as the kidnapping of the Kivu political leaders and indifference to local acts of violence. (6) Clarification of the responsibilities of the UN forces in Katanga, so that they would either keep out the Gizenga forces or not restrain Tshombe in his legitimate efforts to counter such a takeover (Deptel 1273).

The Secretary-General did not take kindly to this démarche, particularly because by an unfortunate coincidence Kasavubu had just sent and made public immediately a telegram to Hammarskjold, demanding in rather intemperate language that Dayal be withdrawn. Hammarskjold said, among other things, that his experiences with the US in Lebanon and Laos had given him reasons to be doubtful about US intelligence reports. Our mission commented: "The most important aspect of the conversation was his reference to Laos and Lebanon, reflecting his deep-seated distrust of US intelligence activities in both these situations and giving further indications of his belief that we are similarly involved in the Congo. Unqualification he views our attitude toward Dayal in the light of Lebanon and distrusts our motives in opposing Dayal." (USUN 1931). Put differently, Hammarskjold apparently did not think the US was coming to him with clean hands when it was criticizing the lack of neutrality of his principal lieutenant in the Congo.

It remains to note that on January 17, Lumumba was taken from the military camp at Thysville where he had been imprisoned since the beginning of December.
of December, and flown to Elisabethville where he was turned over to the
tender mercies of his arch-enemy, Moise Tshombe. Although there is no
hard evidence to that effect, it appeared that this might have been a
condition exacted by Tshombe for his attendance of a round-table conference
to solve the constitutional impasse. It is also likely that the transfer
was motivated by increasing doubts about the loyalty of the garrison at
Thysville to Mobutu. There had been reports about some of the CNA
officers there eating and drinking and otherwise fraternizing with the
prisoner.

On January 13, after a gloomy analysis of the deteriorating situation,
Ambassador Tumetlake ventolated anew the possibility of radical UN action.
He telegraphed: "While we may eventually have to oppose a
militarily takeover by the Communists I believe I would like to suggest two
alternatives for consideration. The first is that we endeavor to obtain
a UN mandate to disarm the forces in revolt against the UN-recognized
legitimate Government of the Congo... I realize this may be impossible to
sell to the UN. As a second alternative for consideration but not for
immediate implementation, I suggest an effort to obtain a mandate for
the UN Command to disarm all, and I mean all, military and police forces
in the Congo. The Department will recall I advocated this at the very
beginning but subsequently revised my recommendation after the political
polarization of the Army became of importance last September and with
the emergence of Mobutu as at least nominally accepted commander of a
majority of the forces supporting a reasonable and moderate government."
(Leotell 1558).

In other words, the Ambassador recalled that we had advocated the
disarming of the Force Publique when it was under Lumumba but had argued
against it when it was under Mobutu. Now that its loyalty and utility
to Mobutu were becoming more and more doubtful and Gizenga's pro-Lumumba
forces were on the ascendant, he was prepared to see both disarmed because
he recognized that the UN would not accept the idea of disarming only one
side of the contending parties. The Ambassador's recommendation was
not far removed from the purport of the first paragraph of the Ghana-India
resolution in the General Assembly (see Section IV), except that he
wished to keep Lumumba in jail and the Parliament suspended, whereas the
sponsors of the Ghana-India resolution had asked for a return of "law"
as well as "order."

This completes the summary of events in 1960. This up to
January 14, the day when the new Administration came into office in
Washington.
Documents from U.S. Archives

NSC Briefings
BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON AFRICA

I. Many African problems foreseen in NIE 100-52 are materializing possibly even more rapidly than we had anticipated. We will be increasingly faced with need to make adjustments in our planning and our actions. Militant African nationalism is spreading to almost all areas of the continent.

A. Political change has been most rapid in French Africa where autonomous republics have replaced colonies.
   1. Recent violence in Brazzaville indicative of continuing strength of primitive tribal forces in areas of rapid political evolution.

B. British Africa is now experiencing nationalist unrest.
   1. African extremists are responsible for extensive rioting in Nyasaland. They aim at dismemberment of white-settler dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa.
   2. In Kenya where we had the Mau Mau terrorism and unrest is growing as British refuse to permit rapid African political evolution and early control.

C. Formerly quiet Belgian Congo is also now experiencing nationalist violence.
   1. Brussels has recognized inevitable Congo independence but hopes to channel nationalism by extensive political reform which will probably be ineffective.

D. UN trust territory of Somalia confronts West with serious political problems. (As was noted last week)
1. Legislative elections in early March held in atmosphere of violence and illegality.

2. Problem of growing Somali nationalism with its appeal to tribesmen in adjacent territories is damaging relations between Britain and Ethiopia and offers potential advantage to Cairo.

II. Communist efforts in Africa growing.

A. Emphasis in Soviet Union on African academic studies, stepped up broadcasting, and contacts with African students.

B. Increasing efforts to infiltrate independent countries, particularly Guinea and Ghana.

1. In Guinea, Bloc granted early diplomatic recognition and has established embassy and signed economic and cultural agreements.

2. Ghana has agreed to the imminent establishment of a Soviet embassy.

III. There has been a noteworthy development of African regional unity.

A. Growing number, importance, and attendance at pan-African conferences like the December meeting at Accra.

B. Sentiment is increasing for political groupings like the Ghana-Guinea association.

C. Tendency to work as a bloc in United Nations matters like current Cameroun question.

D. Regionalism felt in economic field where special UN office set up in Addis Ababa and labor leaders moving to found an African labor federation independent of both ICFTU and WFTU.
BELGIAN CONGO and CAMEROON

I. Severe rioting near Stanleyville—which has cost about 56 lives since 31 October—marks first spread of serious nationalist disorders in the Belgian Congo beyond lower Congo (Leopoldville) area.
A. Rioting triggered by Belgian authorities' arrest of a leader of the pro-independence Congo National Movement who made inflammatory statements at a party meeting.
B. Tension remains high and more violence possible.
C. In the Leopoldville area there have been sporadic troubles since the big riots of January 1959, and the situation there also remains uneasy.

II. Reaction in Congo to moderate program (de Schrijver plan; should lead to Congo independence in about 4 years) outlined by Belgium on 16 October has been entirely negative.
A. Several African groups planning boycott of local elections scheduled for next month as first step toward self-government.
B. Congo notable for absence responsible African leadership; political groups want immediate independence, while tribal leaders interested primarily in perpetuating own local authority
1. Leaders of Congo National Movement may have felt they had to take extreme position to keep up with Abako, the leading group in Leopoldville area which demands independence for the lower Congo apart from the rest of colony.
2. At present, none of town leaders is a "national" leader, and each depends primarily on support of other members of his own tribe.
3. Inter-tribal antagonisms are still strong in many areas, and some of the rioting this year has reflected these differences as well as political tensions between blacks and whites.

III. Brussels seems to be making genuine effort accommodate Congo nationalism; but it appears not to recognize rapid deterioration of political stability there, and reportedly was "surprised" by reaction to de Schrijver plan.
   A. Congo question becoming a major issue in Belgian domestic politics; opposition Socialists may come up with own plan.
   B. Brussels' 3 November offer to hold round-table discussions with Congo leaders late this month appears an effort to ease the situation and mollify Congo leaders who claim they were not consulted on de Schrijver plan.

* * *

IV. Tension is also running high in nearby French trust territory of Cameroun, already scheduled for independence on 1 January.
   A. Here Communist-supported extremists are engaged in last-ditch effort to oust moderate Ahidjo government and force new elections before independence.
      --BASED LARGELY OUTSIDE TERRITORY--
   B. Extremists have stepped up terrorism and are reported plotting new violence involving attacks on US and British consular installations and a coup attempt.

-2-
C. However, extremists do not now have significant popular following in Cameroon and would need substantially greater external support than now getting from Ghana, Guinea, UAR and Communist bloc.

1. Extremist leader Mounie is now in Peiping, presumably seeking additional material aid.

2. Four of these leaders now in New York agitating at UN for immediate elections.
NSC BRIEFING

AFRICA

18 April 1960

I. The picture in the Union of South Africa continues bleak, and in the face of increasing government repression, further racial disorders may occur at any time.
A. However, should mention two other areas in Africa where problems are multiplying as independence approaches—Belgian Congo and Somali area.

II. Congo approaching 30 June independence date amid frantic efforts by Brussels to prepare Congolese for self-government.
A. Belgians belatedly attempting train Congolese administrators for takeover.
B. Legislative election campaign beginning despite recurring indications of tribal unrest. Should be some consolidation among 80-odd political parties of Congo before elections begin 16 May.
C. Elections unlikely lead to domination by any one party or coalition, but Patrice Lumumba's star on the rise.

1. Lumumba intelligent and magnetic, but often irresponsible in his actions.

2. Lumumba supported by Belgian Communists, the UAR, Ghana, and certain Belgian financial interests. Possible that Brussels reconciled to him as first Congo premier.

3. Another front-runner is Joseph Kasavubu, but his support seems limited to Leopoldville area, and there is some nationalist concern over his reported ties with French.
III. Confusion in Congo may facilitate Communist penetration.

A. Roundtable conference in Brussels last January was occasion for Congo politicians to seek outside financial aid for elections. Some delegates visited European satellites and several are believed to have been promised Communist support.

B. Although no known Communists among Congo leaders, Bloc help to persons such as Lumumba may enable Communists to influence policies of independent Congo.

IV. Meanwhile, Belgians seeking US aid to meet Congo deficit.

A. Belgian officials have warned that "economic and political turmoil" will result if outside aid of $120 - 135 million not obtained before independence.

B. Flight of European capital from Congo, which accelerated with promise of independence, is a major problem (first half '59 - $50 million; second half '59 - $80 million; Jan '60 alone - $20 million).

V. The situation in the Somali area is equally confused and explosive.

A. Recent demands by nationalist leaders of Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia and of British Somaliland Protectorate for an early union increase prospects for serious difficulties between Somalis and Ethiopia.

B. Nationalists in the Italian trust territory--which is to achieve independence on 1 July--are campaigning for creation of "Greater Somalia" state.
1. This would aim at eventual unification of all Somali tribesmen living in Horn area, including those occupying trust territory, British and French Somalilands, northern Kenya, and eastern Ethiopia.

2. Trust territory's legislature seeks to promote UN-conducted plebiscite in all areas inhabited by ethnic Somalis in support of "Greater Somalis" concept.

C. Enthusiasm mounting in British Protectorate for early independence and unification with trust territory by 1 July.

1. Group of Protectorate Somali leaders visiting trust territory to discuss unification agreement. Local British officials hope differences will arise between Protectorate and trust territory leaders which will hinder such an agreement.

2. British Colonial Secretary Macleod has agreed to meet Protectorate Somalis in London early in May, and will probably not oppose principle of unification, but will seek to delay it.

D. Ethiopia fears "Greater Somalis" concept will result in detaching its southeastern province of Ogaden, populated largely by nomadic Somalis. This Ethiopia intends to resist strongly.

1. Ethiopia has already become suspicious of Rome and London for what it views as an effort to perpetuate their influence in Horn of Africa.
BELGIAN CONGO

I. We foresee a variety of problems arising as the Congo approaches the 30 June independence date amid frantic efforts by Brussels to help Congolese get ready for independent government and resolve economic difficulties.

A. Legislative election campaign has begun despite recurring indications of tribal unrest. Some 80-odd political parties in Congo at present but probably will be some consolidation before elections begin mid-May.

B. Elections unlikely lead to domination by any one party or coalition, but two men leading field (Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Kasayubu

II. Confusion in Congo may facilitate Communist penetration.

A. Roundtable conference in Brussels last January was occasion for Congo politicians to seek outside financial aid for elections. Some delegates visited European satellites and several are believed to have been promised Communist support.
B. Although no known Communists among Congo leaders, bloc help to several persons--including Lumumba--may enable Communists to influence policies of independent Congo.

1. At present, Czech Consulate is only bloc representation in Congo.

C. US Consulate-general believes Communist penetration activities increasing. Growing interest in post-independence bloc aid may push Congo toward bloc-oriented neutralism.

III. Meanwhile, Belgians seeking US aid to meet Congo deficit.

A. Belgian officials have warned that "economic and political turmoil" will result if outside aid of $120-135 million not obtained before independence.

B. Flight of European capital from Congo, accelerated with promise of independence, is a major problem (first half '59 - $50 million; second half '59 - $80 million; Jan '60 alone - $20 million). Recent Belgian controls governing outward flow of capital irritating interests with large holdings unable to repatriate funds.

C. Economic roundtable conference now in progress in Brussels. Results up to now inconclusive, but Congolese critical of shaky economic structure being presented them by Belgians.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

25 July 1960

I. Situation within the Congo has apparently eased somewhat in past few days.
   A. Half of eventual 12,000-man United Nations Force now on scene, are restoring order almost without incident.
   B. Belgian Forces, responding to last week's Security Council resolution, pulled back on Saturday to two Congo bases (except in Katanga Province where nearly 2,000 Belgian troops helping keep order).
   C. Work progressing toward restoring port facilities at Matadi, dredging Congo river, and restoring vital fuel pipelines.
   D. Katanga Premier Moise Tshombe, having failed in secessionist move to obtain recognition as independent state, now proposes loose federation of autonomous states composed of Katanga and five other Congo provinces.

II. Serious problems remain and require prompt action, however.
   A. Foremost among these is status of Belgian bases. Agreement of 29 June 1960 (which not yet ratified) granted Belgium two bases at Kamina and Kitona.
   1. But Lumumba stated to the press in London on Saturday that: "It is inconceivable that foreign bases should exist in a sovereign state."
B. Katanga Province where Premier Tshombe—apparently egged on by some Belgian groups—opposes strongly unitary state is most important to new Congo state.

1. Landlocked Katanga is richest of Congo's six provinces and adjoins Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia to the south.

2. Katanga supplies two-thirds of total value of Congo's mineral production—all Congo's copper (7% of world production), cobalt (60% world production), manganese, zinc, cadmium, germanium and uranium. Agricultural resources, however, are poor.

3. Katanga's wealth essential to creation of viable Congo state.

4. Congo's leaders have unanimous support of increasingly vocal African bloc in opposing dismemberment of Congo.

C. Faced with loss of Belgian technicians, Congo in dire need of administrative and economic cadres.

1. UN representative Bunche has approached Morocco and Tunisia—seriously shorthanded in capable administrators themselves—and possibly other African governments for administrators.

2. Congo leaders may resist assignment of "white technicians"; probably will be influenced by other African leaders such as Ghana's President Nkrumah who, although he retains British advisors and technicians, recently declared "our campaign is to drive out the white people from Africa."
E. Unemployment and food shortages create immediate problems, may produce some serious localized situations until employment is obtained and distribution problems can be solved.

III. Mercurial Premier Patrice Lumumba is major negative factor in present Congo situation.

A. Described both as "crazy" and paranoid. Congo's advance mission to the UN informed African group of Lumumba's "particularly violent character."

C. Despite Lumumba's withdrawal of his threat to request Soviet intervention and his remarks concerning his desire for Western assistance, Congo's position appears to be moving toward Soviet-oriented neutralism.
IV. The USSR may have become concerned over Lumumba’s appeals for Soviet military support.

A. After proposing a three day ultimatum from the UN to Brussels, the Soviet delegation supported the moderate Tunisian-Ceylonese resolution in the UN Security Council, probably to avoid becoming isolated from the Afro-Asian position.

B. The hasty dispatch of a small party of Soviet officials to Leopoldville on 21 July suggests that the USSR is anxious to be in a position to coordinate further moves as well as to put some limitation on further Congolese initiatives which would directly involve the USSR.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

I. The status of Katanga Province and of Belgian bases in the Congo remains a major source of friction between UN and Belgian officials.

A. The Lumumba government is showing increased impatience at the failure of the UN to take steps to occupy Katanga. If UN does not, Lumumba may revive threats to call for Soviet intervention.

B. UN officials in Leopoldville sympathetic to Lumumba's evacuation objectives, since Katanga's "independence" not generally recognized and Brussels-Leopoldville agreement on bases never finally ratified.

C. Belgians, meanwhile, are concerned about safety of their nationals and have reiterated their unwillingness to withdraw from their bases or from Katanga.

1. Brussels' withdrawal of 1,500 of their 10,000 troops appears designed as a gesture in the direction of the UN resolution calling for a "speedy" Belgian troop withdrawal.

II. Belgian policy appears to be one of delay. Belgians probably hope that with passage of time Lumumba will prove willing to negotiate with Tshombe concerning Katanga, and will meet his demand for a loosely-joined Congo federation of semi-autonomous provinces.

A. Tshombe--probably acting on advice of Belgians--continues to talk tough and to refuse UN troops entry into Katanga.

B. But his bargaining position is not strong. Not even Belgians have recognized Katanga's "independence," and parliamentary opposition group has left assembly in protest over Tshombe's policies.
III. Despite Lumumba's withdrawal of his threat to request Soviet intervention, and his remarks concerning his desire for Western assistance, Congo's posture appears one of Soviet-oriented neutralism. 

A. His vice premier has claimed that the Bloc has promised arms to the Congo once the Belgians withdraw.

1. But Lumumba wants aid from any and all quarters; he is therefore not anxious to burn his bridges to West.

B. A Guinean general now in Leopoldville reportedly has delivered political lectures to Congo ministers to show them way to "true independence."

1. He also strongly attacked UN Commanding General Van Horn's order to disarm Force Publique.

C. Soviets appear disinclined to intervene militarily in Congo, but will continue efforts to expand influence there by other means.

IV. Although arrival of more than 10,000 UN troops has lowered tensions, threat of violence remains.

A. US Embassy in Leopoldville has characterized UN military effort as lacking direction.

1. UN failure to disarm Force Publique, and fact that UN troops from Ethiopia appear to have themselves participated in depredations, cast some doubt on effectiveness of UN force.

B. Unemployment is a potential security threat in Leopoldville and other urban centers; in Leopoldville alone, an estimated 90,000 are unemployed.

1. Although food shortage considerably alleviated, many Congolese lack money to buy food.
V.

Restoration of public order is only a prelude to solution of critical problems facing Congo, especially that of obtaining technical assistance in exploiting resources to provide economic basis for independence.

A. Thousands of skilled Belgians have left, and many more will follow if Belgian troops are withdrawn.

B. Congo is almost totally lacking in qualified native personnel to replace Belgians.
   1. Foreign Minister Bomboko is only man in government with college degree, and there are only about fifteen others in entire country.
   2. Congo has no native engineers or medical doctors.

C. UN is formulating plans for technical assistance, with first objective to determine what must be done.
   1. UN office for coordination of technical assistance has been set up in Congo.
   2. A UN telecommunications official and an agricultural expert are in Leopoldville for a survey, and a member of the UN's Economic Commission for Africa is en route to help set up governmental administration.

D. Moscow statement on 31 July charged continuing "imperialist aggression" in Congo and reiterated Soviet offer of economic and technical aid to Congo.
   1. Statement asserted aid to be "without any conditions of a political, military, or other nature liable to prejudice the interests or sovereign rights of the independent Republic of Congo."
2. Also said Soviet ship to leave shortly for Congo with 100 trucks, spare parts, repair depot, and group of instructors.

3. Statement promised prompt dispatch of medical personnel, medicines, and medical equipment.
CONGO

Katanga Premier Tshombé's apparent willingness to permit the entry of UN troops probably stemmed from his recognition that Belgians will not retain their troops in Katanga in face of UN disapproval.

A. Tshombé possibly hoping to capitalize on growing sentiment within Congo for decentralized government such as he himself favors.

B. Signs of backing for Tshombé's confederation views have appeared in Leopoldville, where Abako party has voted no confidence in Lumumba regime, and in Kasai Province, where anti-Lumumba groups are attempting to form a new province in area adjoining Katanga.

C. Hammarskjold and two companies of Swedish troops expected to arrive Elisabethville 12 August.
C. Belgians continue to take their pique out on US and to hint they will have to review their commitments to NATO. Brussels may turn over to UN the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, which adjoins the Congo, on grounds that it too expensive to administer by itself. Public criticism of Prime Minister Premier Eyken has stated that he will ask for a vote of confidence in his Congo policies next week. Eyken's government has sparked rumors that he may soon resign.

III. In Leopoldville, Lumumba faced with increasing domestic opposition at time when he does not have reliable security forces of his own.

A. Lumumba injured only slightly when his car stoned by Abako adherents on 10 August. Crowd had gathered after Congolese police raided an Abako office, possibly to forestall any attempted coup.

C. Lumumba probably hopes to "use" UN as vehicle by which to re-establish dominance of central government. If UN balks openly at serving Lumumba's ends, he may accept troops which have been offered him by Ghana and Guinea.

1. Nkrumah reportedly replaced British officers of Ghanian troops now in Congo, to facilitate troop transfer from the UN to Congolese command should he so desire.
IV. Soviet pronouncements on Congo carefully avoid committing USSR to any unilateral action but at same time attempt to sustain impression that Communist bloc countries stand ready to send forces if present UN contingents unable to enforce Security Council's resolutions.

A. Soviet leaders apparently hope that implied threats of unilateral action will increase pressure for early withdrawal of Belgian forces, enabling Moscow to claim credit for having protected Congolese independence and unity.

(B. USSR has stepped up efforts to discredit UN role in Congo.

1. Soviet officials in Leopoldville, described as "free-wheeling," are openly predicting failure of UN measures to restore order, after which they boast USSR will step in and "save the day."
I. Rival regimes in Leopoldville and Stanleyville continue to spar.
   A. Mobutu hampered by logistical problems operating against distant Orientale province.
   B. Gizenga threatened by critical shortage food and gasoline in Stanleyville.

II. Gizenga has broken Mobutu's "economic blockade," however, by moving forces into Kivu Province which should relieve pressure on food supply Stanleyville.
   A. Next move up to Mobutu who will probably now have to use stronger measures.
   B. Mobutu likely to ignore Hammarskjold's threat to withdraw UN forces if Mobutu moves against Stanleyville in view of UN inability to forestall Gizenga forays into Kivu.
   C. Extent of dissident control in Kivu unclear, but apparently most of the 3,000 Congolese army troops there responsive to Gizenga.

III. African states still hesitant concerning extent to which they should aid dissidents. UAR, however, has been giving some aid and considering expansion of this aid to Lumumba supporters.
   A. Gizenga may go to meeting African states in Rabat scheduled to convene 3 January to plead cause in person. This meeting to concern itself largely with Congo problem.
   B. While some African states are likely to offer some form of material aid, pro-Gizenga sentiment not unanimous.
C. Sudan continues to bar UAR overflights to Stanleyville and no nation has formally recognized Gizenga regime as legal Congo government.

1. Sudanese PM Abboud, however, stated that he might not be able to control or observe some flights over this country.

IV. Kasavubu has sent a message to UN Sec Gen Hammarskjold and also has stated to the Liberian Ambassador in Leopoldville that he is ready to receive the UN Conciliation Commission. He suggested 3 January as a date on which they might begin meetings.

A. This would seem to be a step in right direction, although it is still unclear how this UN Commission will go about resolving the bitter Congo disputes and splits.

B. There is also an unresolved problem on the UN Commission, since Kasavubu told Hammarskjold that he did not wish to have Ghana, Guinea, Mali, India or Morocco serve on the Commission.
Documents from U.S. Archives

Rest of Pre-Independence Documents
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS

NO.: CA-5721  January 8, 1959

SUBJECT: United States Draft Paper on Africa

TO: USRO, Paris
   For Embassy and USRO

The Department has prepared the enclosed paper on Communist penetration in Africa as the United States contribution toward a NATO paper on this subject (TOPOL 2209). USRO is authorized to circulate it to other delegations, if this method of procedure is decided upon, and when the Committee on Africa meets, it is our intention that the paper should serve in effect as both guidance and background material for the United States representative on that Committee, although the Department will of course send such additional instructions as may be necessary. It is our present assumption that the Committee will function in a manner generally similar to that of the experts' groups which met last November to agree background papers for the NATO Ministerial meeting.

As stated in TOPOL 2209, the Department would appreciate USRO's comments on the paper prior to its circulation, also the comments of Mr. Witman, if the Embassy accedes to the Department's request that he serve as United States representative on the Committee.

Enclosure:
Draft Paper
COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA

I. PRELUDE TO SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

The USSR took a new look at Africa soon after the death of Stalin. It had, of course, spoken and published frequently over the years concerning the progress of "national liberation" in Africa. With the help of propaganda and agents from the Communist parties in the Metropoles (there are no Communist parties in most of Africa), the USSR has always been hopeful of stimulating and seizing control of nationalist movements, especially in areas where there were important Western military bases. But a rigid application of Stalinist tactics brought meager success, particularly since it rested on a deductive application of Marxist-Leninist theory to an area with direct knowledge of clear perception of actual trends. The only book on Africa published in the USSR between the end of World War II and the death of Stalin was thought even by a Soviet reviewer to "solve very hastily many grave questions which demand profound study... and display a certain ignorance of historical facts." 2/ As late as 1955, the Herald of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR acknowledged that African studies were a "backward sector of Soviet science." Meanwhile the USSR also closed its consulate in Algeria in 1951, partly in response to French limitations on its operations. Unwilling to associate itself with a colonial regime participated in by France-Spain, the USSR sent no delegate to occupy the seat to which it was entitled on the Committee of Control of Tangier while it remained an International City. Until 1956 it made no serious effort to establish diplomatic relations with Liberia.

Dogmatic conceptions in particular blinded the USSR for a time to growing opportunities for Soviet exploitation of African currents. One was Stalin's tendency to see the world as divided into two camps --- the "socialist" and the "imperialist" --- and hence to view even neutralist leaders as "imperialist stooges" and independent countries as still "semi-colonial" as long as they remained bound to the economy of the West. Related to this conception was the search for proletarian allies in Africa (where there was as yet only in certain territories the beginning of a self-conscious working class) and consequently a neglect, or at least a barely hidden suspicion, of the intelligentsia and middle class which led the nationalist movements in Africa. Nonetheless, aware

1/ This paper excludes consideration of internal developments in Egypt.
2/ S. Daltin, Africa under the Yoke of Imperialism, State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1951.
of their own weakness, the Communists sought to enter united fronts with the nationalists. The international Communist movement, however, found it difficult to achieve enduring contact with the politicians who mattered.

However, contact with African nationalists was difficult not only for the USSR but for all Europeans. Certainly few colonial officials anticipated, or were prepared for, the tremendous pace of change in Africa after World War II, nor had they altogether succeeded in understanding the changes in Africa's many societies or in achieving contact with the emerging leadership. Prior to World War II, there were few important nationalist movements, and the colonial administrations were strong enough to blunt any Soviet efforts at penetration. Once in a position of influence, the nationalist leaders, in turn, were obviously eager to reject a politically dependent relationship with any part of the modern West, including the USSR. And the more the nationalists came to be in control of popular political movements, the less they felt under any compulsion to bargain for the support of a few Communists.

After Stalin's death, the USSR began to recognize the intrinsic importance of the great uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa. It set itself the task of persuading and influencing the emerging groups of areas which it obviously could not, or certainly could not yet, hope to control. The USSR began to utilize all the conventional techniques of diplomacy, trade, economic assistance, and cultural relations to gain African acceptance of the USSR as a powerful, respectable, and sympathetic friend. It stimulated a greatly expanded research, teaching, and scholarship program on Africa within the Soviet Bloc. And it re-examined its theoretical estimate of the role of the "national bourgeoisie" in semi-dependent and colonial areas, asserting, as it had done, for example in the early twenties, that this bourgeoisie could still play a positive or progressive role by opposing foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.

This reassessment had practical consequences of the utmost importance. It provided a rationale for Soviet support of states such as Egypt, which suppressed Communist movements. It also enabled local Communists to display an attitude of support for "bourgeois nationalist" governments or movements with Moscow's approval. The Soviet periodical International Affairs in its review of Soviet foreign policy in September 1957 expressed this radical change in Soviet thought perhaps more succinctly than other pronouncements when it stated that the "colonies and semi-colonies suffer not so much from capitalist relations as from their being insufficiently developed, because the imperialist yoke retards and stunts their development." In these conditions, it stated, "capitalism, especially in its narodnik (popular) forms, can be a historically progressive factor in the colonial and dependent countries, hastening their complete liberation and, in the long run, facilitating the victory of democracy," i.e., communism.
This justification as to the ultimate advantage to communism of present Soviet aid to non-communist Oriental and African countries may constitute genuine Soviet belief. At the same time it provides an effective rationalisation for the USSR's present policy of engaging as a big power in a contest with other big powers to extend its influence through traditional means of trade, loans and technical aid to underdeveloped countries.

In Africa — with a population of over 200,000,000, an area about four times that of the United States, and a storehouse of many crucial raw materials — basic social and political change is proceeding at an ever growing pace. Ten years ago only three African states were independent, and none of these was typical of most emergent Africa. One (the Union of South Africa) was ruled by Europeans; one (Ethiopia) by a Christian emperor; and one (Liberia) by a group of descendants of American slaves. Today about 15 percent of all Africans rule themselves. Before another decade ends, two-thirds of all Africans are likely to possess their own independent governments. All of them will be experiencing profound problems in achieving national cohesion, economic development, and social and political stability. Many of them will need large foreign economic and technical assistance. Having cast off Western controls, all will be seeking new relations or, at least, relationships on a new basis.

II. RECENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES

The Soviet Bloc has not yet been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with all independent African states. It has diplomatic missions in Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, and Sudan, and has agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors with Ghana, and has consular representation in the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo. The Bloc countries were among the first to recognize China.

It has trade agreements with Ethiopia, Morocco and the Sudan, and has also been able to negotiate trade agreements and participate in trade fairs in countries with which it has no diplomatic relations, i.e., Tunisia and Guinea. East Germany and Czechoslovakia sent missions to negotiate trade and cultural agreements with China well before such active interest was shown by the West. Furthermore, delegations from Communist China visited a number of African countries during 1958 and were successful in negotiating various trade accords and commercial arrangements. Communist China has been recognized by Morocco and Sudan, but no agreements have yet been reached on the establishment of Chinese missions in Rabat or Khartoum. Ghana holds that it inherited recognition of Communist China from the UK at independence, but there has been no exchange of diplomatic representatives to date. Communist China (but not the USSR) has also recognized the Algerian "provisional government" and three of its ministers have recently visited Peiping.
Loans, grants, and technical assistance, which figure importantly in Bloc policy toward certain other underdeveloped countries, have not so far played a significant role in Africa. Offers of economic aid have been accepted for relatively small amounts by the Sudan, Libya and Ethiopia.

Bloc trade with Africa, while still minor, has made substantial gains in recent years. Between 1954 and 1956, total trade rose by about 17%, and in 1957 alone increased by more than 55% primarily because of large purchases of wool from the Union of South Africa and cocoa from Ghana. African imports from the Bloc have risen steadily but exports have been erratic due to large and irregular purchases made by the USSR. Despite the sharp increases, in no case does trade with the Bloc constitute more than 5% of a country's (excluding Egypt) total external trade.

Person-to-person contacts have played a leading role in Bloc relations with Africa and appear to be increasing steadily in scope. A growing number of Africans, ranging from an Ethiopian football team to the Liberian Minister of Agriculture and from Moroccan trade syndicates to a Ghana goodwill mission, have visited or are planning to visit Bloc countries, sometimes at the expense of the host government. In turn, a leading Soviet Africanist, Professor I. I. Potekhin, conducted research at the University College of Ghana in 1957, among other things, on the role of the United Africa Company, the dominant European trading company in West Africa. A group of Soviet experts attended a Tunisian education conference in October, and Bloc delegations attended the African Peoples conference in Accra and the Cairo Afro-Asian Economic conference in December 1958.

An important part of the Bloc's cultural efforts in Africa is directed toward students and intellectuals. Soviet orbit universities freely offer scholarships and awards to African students, either directly or through front organizations such as the communist-controlled International Union of Students. These offers are attractive financially and intellectually for a people which has a traditionally high regard for education and learning. Communist contacts with African students studying in the UK (about 5,000-7,000) and particularly in France (about 6,000) are effectively exploited. Some 400-500 Africans from 10 states and territories attended the Moscow Youth Festival in July-August 1957, led by 140 from the Sudan, 170 Tunisians, and 50 Moroccans. (Other areas represented include the Cameroons, Ethiopia, French West Africa, Ghana, Belgian Congo, and French Equatorial Africa.) Many of these delegates were students in European universities, especially in France and the United Kingdom. More recently a number of Africans attended the Afro-Asian Writers conference at Tashkent in October 1958.

Unhindered by ties with the colonial powers, the Soviet Union and its allies are able openly and consistently to champion nationalist causes on the world
stage, especially in the UN and through the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo. Local Communist groups or individuals help in this effort despite the efforts of local authorities in most areas to neutralize or suppress their activities. Special attention is also paid to trade union activities, either directly or through the medium of the World Federation of Trade Unions. In the minds of Africans yearning for independence, the Soviet Union is increasingly winning recognition as the leading anti-colonialist power or, at least, as a most useful tool to Western counter-measures involving political and economic support for Africa.

III. AFRICAN POLITICAL RECEPTIVITY AND ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY

The receptivity of African states to Soviet bloc economic overtures springs, in large measure, from their inability to meet with their own resources growing popular pressure for social and economic improvements. In fact, the rate of population growth in some countries, e.g., Morocco and Tunisia, is so high that even present low standards of living are imperiled. Education and daily contact with manifestations of the West's material progress have made Africans relative about their underprivileged status, and the dramatic example of rapid industrial development in the USSR and elsewhere has convinced them that quick material progress is possible in areas that are initially far behind the West. The administrative and economic models of the USSR and Communist China are seen as useful guides by some of the more radical elements.

The leaders of virtually all of Africa's newly independent states are haunted by the dependence of their countries upon external sources of aid, and are particularly hesitant to make any concessions to former colonial masters to obtain such assistance. Moroccan and Tunisian frustration in their efforts to convert their past economic and military dependence into a mutually advantageous relationship with the West has been compounded by their inability to achieve a unified Maghreb, for which an independent Algeria is a necessity. Should the Algerian conflict and accompanying border incidents intensify or drag on with little promise of resolution, the advocates of cooperation with the West will almost certainly become discredited and be replaced by more radical and nationalist proponents.

Moreover, there is a growing awareness on the part of independent African states of the tactical advantages to be derived from developing contacts with bloc nations. Ideologically, most African leadership is neither fully committed to democratic principles nor entirely repelled by Communist doctrines. The "Cold War" seems remote, almost academic, in comparison with the problems confronting them at home. Certain leaders of independent Africa view the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West essentially as a struggle between great powers in which they are too weak to become allies except at the price of renewed dependence. In such a situation, they are inclined to reason that the most
African intellectuals studying in France and the UK have been exposed to socialist doctrine, and are attracted to socialist solutions for the problems of transition in Africa. Many African students induced to visit Bloc countries under one program or another can be expected to report enthusiastically on progress under the Soviet system, perhaps even exude Communist doctrines upon their return to Africa. Within the African student community, the feeling is growing that Africa cannot afford to "take sides" but must "select the best elements for Africa from both worlds." Authoritarian rule that succeeds in eliminating cultural backwardness and tribal divisions and in bringing about rapid industrialisation will continue to be profoundly attractive to the African intellectual.

On the other hand, there are, at the moment, relatively few Communists in
Africa, and popular acceptance of Communist ideology has been slight and only incidental to the rise of anti-colonial sentiment. The Soviets will experience much the same difficulties as does the West in learning to appreciate the African mentality or the problems facing African leaders today. Moreover, the spread of Communist ideology will continue to be restricted by the active efforts of almost all governments to prevent Communist movements from gaining influence and by the African prejudice against any movement which appears to be European-inspired or controlled.

The struggle for political predominance within the African community is likely to be between authoritarian-minded groups which are either modernist or traditionalist-oriented. Since there is little ground for compromise between them, political instability is likely to be endemic. However, the varieties of modernism, even of socialism, are many, and there is no necessary connection between the growing strength of socialist-oriented groups in Africa and a pro-Soviet orientation in foreign affairs. The USSR will no doubt try to exploit the developing clash between nationalists and colonial regimes, between Negro Africans and white settlers, and between modernists and traditionalists. In the Union of South Africa, for example, there have been mounting indications of cooperation between white Communists and the leaders of the most important African, Colored, and Indian movements.

IV. THE OUTLOOK

A. Economic

Efforts by the Soviet Bloc to expand its influence in Africa are likely to meet with increasing success over the next few years, particularly in independent states such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Guinea, and Ethiopia. Most of these states have reduced the ties with Europe that previously ensured their economic support and will be under increasing pressure to meet growing popular demands for improved living standards. Economic growth will be slow in most of these countries and there will be an increasing -- and indefinite -- need for foreign assistance. Since Western assistance is rarely likely to measure up to their expectations, some offers of aid from the Soviet Bloc probably will be accepted.

The dependence of most African countries on one or a few export products for foreign exchange earnings could enhance the Bloc's bargaining position as the financial situation of these countries tightens. Soviet ability to absorb several major African commodities is sufficiently great that concentrated buying could have a profound effect in such African states as Ghana, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In any case, Bloc competition for key African exports will increasingly threaten the virtual monopoly which the West has enjoyed in the
in the purchase of African products and raw materials. At present, Africa supplies
the major share of free world needs for industrial diamonds, chrome, cobalt,
tantalum, manganese, and copper, and is an important source of uranium, iron ore,
beryl, and columbites. The Bloc will not be in any position to deny Western access
to these materials over the next few years as they are largely produced by
Europe-controlled companies.

B. Military

The quest of African nations for arms offers another opportunity for the
Bloc to extend its influence in Africa. Military aid to independent states,
whether from the Bloc, China or the West, may help a particular regime to stay
in power. Depending on circumstances, such aid can also contribute to internal
and regional rivalries and instability. In fact, unless African governments
manage to solve their difficult social and economic problems, military aid above
certain modest amounts is particularly in the present African environment to pro-
duce adverse results.

Soviet offers of arms have so far been vague and limited. However, inade-
quate response to African needs on the part of the West, or simply an interest
on the part of African nations in diversifying their political and economic
obligations may well bring forth more positive offers from the Bloc.

C. Political

As African states become independent, their leadership is likely to become
increasingly authoritarian, socialist in orientation, and neutralist in policy.
In an effort to demonstrate their independence, these states will be inclined to
establish diplomatic relations with the Bloc, agree to cultural exchange, expand
trade relations, and accept economic assistance. Political considerations are
likely to outweigh economic factors, however, in determining whether such closer
ties are likely to produce a pro-Soviet orientation on the part of African states.
Although patterns of disturbances and threats of violence recently involving OAU countries, Congo, Somalia, Angola, Tanzania, the Rhodesias, and others, have not directly involved the United States, it is important to consider that OAU activities and current threats involve Africa as a whole and may influence United States foreign policy. The United States has had to respond to these changes in the political climate. The State Department has had to respond to threats that current war and unrest throughout Africa, especially in the Rhodesias, will lead to increased instability and violence throughout Africa, including in the United States.

Although the United States has never officially recognized the legitimacy of African liberation movements, it has supported through financial and military aid the efforts of those movements. The United States has also supported the use of force by those movements to achieve their goals.

Address this subject report promptly and fully, taking into account the potential impact of unrest and violence on the stability of the region. In discussing these disturbances with both metropolitans and African leaders, the United States should stress its commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

 Acting Secretary

Sent to:
Amembassy, Accra
Addis Adera
Asmara
Blantyre
Brussels
Casablanca
Dakar
EaduC
Elmina
Entebbe
Harare
Kathmandu
Kigali
Kampala
Kano
Kenya
Lagos
Liberia
Lisbon
Lome
Malabo
Mogadishu
Mombasa
Nairobi
Niger
Nigeria
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Paris
Port Louis
Porto Novo
Quaxito
Rabat
Riyadh
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Sao Paulo
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[Date]
Department of State

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VERBATIM TEXT

SENT TO: Embassy CONAARY PRIORITY 21

Diallo expressed great concern to Department last evening over April New York Times story of Czech arms shipment particularly part reading QUOTE. Both at the Pentagon and in the State Department there are experts who wish some new initiative in West Africa could be developed soon particularly in view of the Guinea situation. Experts in several branches are studying developments. However US military officials have not dealt with the subject as a matter for immediate action. There have been no meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor any Pentagon-State Department consultations in this respect. UNQUOTE

Diallo interpreted word QUOTE action UNQUOTE to connote possibly military action and said this would create serious repercussions in Conalory.

Department officials explained nature of free press to Diallo and said article in no way repeated views of US Government. Department doubted use of word QUOTE action UNQUOTE by Times Reporter referred to military action. In any event there is no repeat no military aspect to current US policies with respect to Guinea.

Department told Diallo however while US officials familiar with situation

[Signatures]

AP: AFS: C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by AFS: C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr.

AP: R. P. Prohaska

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might be able understand Guinea's willingness accept aid from all sources US press and public opinion were bound to interpret receipt of large number Czech arms as contrary to interests American people and Free World. Diallo replied that although he had no precise information he strongly doubted Czech arms shipment anything like as great as that reported in press.

Department will leave to your discretion best means of handling Times story in Conakry but at some stage conversation with Toure himself would seem warranted.
Department of State

SECRET
Classification

SENT TO:  Amembassy PARIS  PRIORITY  4088
         Amembassy LONDON  PRIORITY  9537

RPTD INFO: USUN NEW YORK  8421
           UNITED NATIONS
           UNITED STATES MISSION

Paris TEL 3929  RPTD London 870 and DEPTEL 4054 RPTD London 9488.

Re Tripartite Talks on Africa. Experts met April 27 to discuss Guinea
in advance Ambassadors meeting requested by French.

It clear during course of discussion French taking extremely serious
view of recent developments in Guinea but are not repeat not prepared take
steps US feels most suitable under circumstances such as sending Ambassadors and
demonstrating friendship through aid or otherwise counter Communist gifts.

French representative expressed strong opposition any attempt meet situation by
strengthening security forces in surrounding areas and left US officers present
with impression French contemplate some sort drastic action. This would appear
in line with Boegner's remarks to Lyon reported REFTEL. French concern not
repeat not confined to future shipment of arms but definitely included stocks
already in Guinea and it seems possible that QUOTE strong action UNQUOTE
mentioned by Boegner refers to military intervention.

British representative noncommittal and said he lacked instructions.
They have also declined to meet at Ambassadorial level this week for same reason although we understand urgent cable sent London today seeking instructions.

It is clear from above, although we have no positive evidence French are planning use of force that General line of thinking appears to point in this direction since they have been unreceptive to other suggestions for dealing with Guinea situation. On outside chance that this is the case and in view UN implications suggest you discuss this with Secretary to see if situation/Paris claim please communicate with De Gaulle since it seems clear no one else in French Government can speak with authority with regard to Guinea. If French should embark on any policy which would bring Guinea question into the UN it is difficult to say how anything would emerge except serious damage to Western position throughout entire non-Western world.

Hertel

SECRET

Classification
Within the past two years, a number of external factors have played a significant role in the rapid change of the Belgian Congo from a sheltered haven of political quiescence and business as usual to a front runner in the race for African colonies toward independence. These external factors, admittedly due to economic recession and Belgian indecision in the Congo, have been principal the changes wrought in French Africa by de Gaulle, the example and influence of Ghana, the Exposition at Brussels in 1958, the probing of International Comm and contacts with political leaders in the British territories on the eastern frontier. Going to historical factors, Egyptian influence has been slight, the insistent and clearly audible voice of Radio Cairo.

French Africa. Although the 1956 loi cadre marked a political advance for Africans in the French territories over their racial brothers in the Congo, the effect in the Belgian colony was minimal because of the political backwardness of well-being of the Congolese. President de Gaulle's concessions in 1958 were much more drastic. Not only did they contrast sharply with the small political advances gained by the Congolese under the Statut des Vl and the December 1957 "consultations": they were granted while the Congo was the midst of a full-scale economic recession. The politically aware Congolese in the belwather capital of Leopoldville were egged on by a leader, Joseph KASA-YUBU, who used both his Bakongo tribal association known as Abako and his burgomaster post as forums for his demand for "immediate independence".

The French territory whose political fortunes most strongly influence Leopoldville and the lower Congo is of course ex-Noyen Congo, which opted for the de Gaulle referendum to remain within the French Community and to become Republic of Congo, with full internal autonomy. The Republic's President, P. YOULOU, uses as his power base the Baluali tribe, which is closely related to the Bakongo tribe across the river. Contact between the two groups is regular -- a 20 minute ferry ride is all that separates them and reaches to all echelons. Although the precise effect of the Republic of Congo's political posture on political aspirations in the Belgian Congo remains to be measured, it is undoubtedly considerable. Concrete examples of how this has made itself felt include the following:

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1. Following the January 1959 riots in Leopoldville, 7 Abako leaders fled to Brazzaville to avoid arrest. Here they set up an "exile" headquarters which, according to QAS, was in regular contact with representatives of the Youloou government, including Youloou's long-time French advisor (and present Minister of Information) Christian JAYE. The Brazzaville Abako group remained active until its return to Leopoldville in June 1959. Its activities included the sending of emissaries to Accra and Conakry, preparation of tracts and letters for distribution in Leopoldville and elsewhere, and the launching of a campaign against tax payments in the lower Congo.

2. President Youloou reportedly intervened personally in securing the services of French lawyer Jacques-Arnold CROUZEZ to defend Joseph Kasa-Vubu after his arrest in January 1959. Crouez in his defense of Kasa-Vubu heaped ridicule on the laws under which his client was held.


4. Kasa-Vubu has personally contacted President Youloou on several occasions.

5. Brazzaville is known to have served as a communications center for Congolese who wish to avoid Belgian censorship, and as a base for Communist activities directed against the Congo.

Of the other former French territories in Africa, Guinea by its example of defying its former colonizers and surviving, and being thereafter courted by both East and West, has made a strong impression on the Congolese. Conakry was the site of the April 1959 meeting of the permanent secretariat of the All African People's Congress (AAPC), attended by Patrice LUMUMBA of the Mouvement National Congolais. When the first issue of Lumumba's weekly independence came out in September, Sekou TOURE was one of four great African leaders signing a page, the others being HERUTAH, Kasa-Vubu, and Lumumba himself. Toure's Union Generale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire (UTAN) has not yet had any influence on the development of labor unions in the Congo, but leftist Antoine TSHINDIMBA's effort to line up his abortive Union Natonale des Travailleurs Congolais (UNTC) with UTAN may be an indicator of future developments.

Ghana. The influence on the Congo of an independent Ghana, governed by Africans, has been considerably more than symbolic, thanks largely to the success of Prime Minister Kwame NKRUMAH and the late George PARIBOE in making their country a focal point of militant Pan-Africanism. Physical contact with Congolese political leaders came in December 1958 when Accra served as the host city for the AAPC. Three of the several Congolese who received invitations to
1. The Belgian Communist Party stepped up its production and distribution of tracts, using both rail and Congo-bound cargo ships to effect delivery.

2. Three pro-Communist lawyers from Belgium turned up in Leopoldville to defend two Abako leaders charged with responsibility for the riots. Although the lawyers' services were not accepted, one of them stayed on as attorney for another defendant, Antoine KUNAMA -- the Congolese whose efforts had enabled the lawyers to come to Leopoldville in the first place. When the various defendants were released in March 1959, the Communists claimed credit.

3. Leopoldville's Czech Consul Joseph Virtus, who had largely been mending his legitimate commercial business prior to the January riots, appears to have branched out rather abruptly thereafter into the political field. According to CAS, Virtus has developed and maintained a wide circle of Congolese acquaintances since January. These include:

   A. Burgresses and press representatives. There is some evidence that Virtus is a financial backer of the socialist newspaper 
   Samalala.

   B. Influential members of Abako, the MOC, the socialist 
   Parti du Peuple, the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) 
   and the Union Progressiste Congolaise (UPCQ).

   C. Youth groups and students. It has been confirmed that one student who applied to the Czech Consulate for 
   scholarship aid is now studying behind the Iron Curtain. 
   There may be others.

4. Radio Moscow, Radio Peking and various satellite radio stations have beamed broadcasts to the Congo, and Radio Moscow has instituted regular programs. These latter have achieved some success among Congolese intellectuals, and have enabled Radio 
Moscow to enter into epistolary contact with several Congolese and with the student council of Lovanium University.

5. African Communists in Brazzaville have been utilized for the distribution of Communist propaganda in the Congo.

   British Territories. About two years ago, Governor General Henri 
   CORNELIS made the observation to Consul General James F. Green that the greatest 
   external threat to the Belgian Congo came from the British territories to the 
   east, because of the British practice of permitting Africans to go to England to 
   complete their education. According to Mr. Cornelis, many of these individuals 
   returned as out-and-out nationalists and anti-colonialists, who spread their 
   doctrine across the frontier into the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.
SECRET

FROM: Brussels
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 760, January 11, 8 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 760, REPEATED INFORMATION LEOPOLDEVILLE 82.

A. ENTEL 610 repeated Leopoldville 54.

B. Leopoldville 139 to Department.

Belgian military authorities have advised us an immediate urgency transfer of 48 surplus anti-aircraft guns to Congo (reference 4) and request may be suspended for several months. However, Belgian army proceeding with plans to transfer temporarily to Congo 6 (not 12) L-188 aircraft provided under AID (reference B). Joint Chiefs Staff has overlooked necessity requesting US permission but have now addressed letter to Chief NAAG requesting US agreement temporary loan these aircraft to force public and metropolitan forces in Congo to keep adequate watch over certain border and interior points (Belgians suspect illegal arms shipments into Congo). Letter states aircraft will be unarmed and bear no markings identifying American origin. Also states that in view urgency, first two planes being sent by air freight January 11, next two scheduled shipment January 13 and final two at later undetermined date.

Belgium has 111 these aircraft on hand and temporary transfer of 6 from reserves will not adversely affect efficiency or requirements NATO committed forces. Since during my recent discussions Washington, Department appeared disposed approve transfer mentioned in reference B, recommend no protest be made regarding two planes being shipped today. However, Department may wish send instructions re remaining four aircraft on which NAAG requesting formal approval through USCINCEUR.
FROM: Elisabethville - CORRECTED COPY
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 41, February 12, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 21; REPEATED INFORMATION BRUSSELS II.
LEOPOLDIVILLE II.

Reference: COMAGAM II, February 11, 1960

Reactions in Katanga to round-table developments.

While Africans in Elisabethville anticipate independence with
epicurean enjoyment, Katangans' faces are grim and they ar
contemplating the dramatic and grim situation which will
undermine township development after independence. The outlook
for Katanga is attributable to following causes:

1. Deterrent to evolutionary Belgium Government (COB) prepared
by surrendering key post at round-table (RTC) to African extremists'
organizing before new masters of Congo;

2. Belief that this surrender policy will prevent COB in few re-
pealing days RTC from securing right retain minimum controls
before transition period to assure Belgians here will be pro-
vided with chaotic conditions expected if Africans assume reins
overnight;

3. Appointment of Schrijver's treatment Kalumpa was, in defending
continuing Belgian presence, was accused of favoring inde-
pendence with Belgium paying bill;

4. Resentment of treatment accorded Combat delegates by
African parties favoring centralization or federalism built on
strong central government and by Belgian officials bent on
 stamping out separatist sentiment in provinces. Controversy
over control of mineral wealth seen as crucial issue of future
Katanga.

The RGMR
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CG AF56
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2-21, February 12, 4 p.m. from Kisangihville

Kar-Kal said military at RTK still strong. Co-pa state shared by Katanga coalition of Katanga and Kasaibaluba*, coupled with attacks on European advisors at RTK, will strengthen position coalition in Katanga to detriment Conakat and other leaders, especially if xenophobia increases in Congo.

Comment: Believe European-Conakat alliance has its maximum political strength has probably been reached and decline is possible. In present atmosphere this belief could result in move of desperation. Also, Consulate expects growth anti-US sentiment among Europeans for our failure counsel Belgium to insist main toward independence proceed at more measured pace.

JRC-2

(#) Omission; correction to follow.

* As received; correction to follow.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Victor Nendaka, ex-Vice President of MNC (Lumumba Wing)
Robert A. McKimson, Second Secretary
Lawrence R. Devlin, Attaché

DATES: March 25, 1960

In view of the many rumors concerning Victor NENDAKA's resignation, or expulsion, from the MNC (Lumumba Wing) Lawrence R. Devlin, the reporting officer, arranged for Nendaka to call at the Embassy on Friday, March 25. A Brussels daily, La Libre Belgique, had published an article that morning reporting on Nendaka's alleged resignation from the MNC (Lumumba Wing) and his statements to the effect that he had documentary proof of Lumumba's acceptance of Communist support in the forthcoming electoral campaign in the Congo. Thus, Messrs. McKimson and Devlin were able to raise questions concerning these allegations without referring to their recent talk with Albert KALONDIJ. (See Embdes 1053.)

When questioned about his resignation from the MNC (Lumumba Wing), Nendaka admitted that he had resigned, stating that he felt it his duty to leave the party because Lumumba was obligating himself by accepting aid from the Communist Party of Belgium (CPB) and the Soviet Union. He elaborated on this preliminary statement, claiming that almost all campaign costs of the MNC (Lumumba Wing) are paid by the CPB working through an individual whom Nendaka refused to name and he added that it was only after the Brussels Round Table Conference that he had learned of this arrangement. He alleged that, by accepting such aid, Lumumba was morally committed to his benefactors and noted that he could not agree with such a step, as he favors a "truly free and independent" Congo. He stated that he wants to see the country developed by foreign capital but does not want to have the country obligated to the nations of the Soviet bloc. Nendaka also stated that he does not favor the acceptance of aid from Cairo, Conakry or Accra, areas from which he believes Lumumba is receiving help. Thus, he claimed that he had warned the "Committee" of the MNC (Lumumba Wing) of the dangers involved in Lumumba's acceptance of Communist aid and had told Lumumba that he (Nendaka) would have to leave the party, unless Lumumba agreed to change his policies. Nendaka concluded these comments with a long statement to the effect that his decision to resign from the MNC (Lumumba Wing) was based on his personal convictions, ideals and his belief in freedom.

When questioned concerning his allegations that Lumumba is accepting aid from the Soviet Union and the CPB, Nendaka replied that he would not provide the Embassy officers with specific details and would not allow them to see the documents which he said he has in his possession and which he alleges prove that Lumumba is accepting Communist support. He explained that he does not wish to blacken Lumumba's name and is not attacking him personally. He believes Lumumba should be free to adopt whatever policy he believes to be best for the Congo. However, as he disagreed with this policy, he felt it was his duty to
leave the MNC (Lumumba Wing). Continuing in this vein, he opined that all Congolese parties are subsidized by external or internal interests who hope to gain some advantage from their support of one or more parties. Nendaka commented that he, too, was free to seek aid in the United States, West Germany or some other free country in support of his policies or programs.

Despite Nendaka's refusal to produce documents or to provide specific information concerning Lumumba's dealings with the Soviets and the CPB, the Embassy officers continued to ply him with questions on this subject. His replies were extremely vague and often contradictory, but he offered the following allegations and/or information:

a. He does not know whether Lumumba has direct contact with Soviet officials. However, he said that funds are received from a member of the CPB and opined that the money actually is provided by the Soviet Union.

b. Lumumba allegedly has signed promissory notes in return for the aid he has received, but Nendaka stated that the MNC (Lumumba Wing) does not have sufficient funds to repay these notes.

c. A printing press ordered by Lumumba and allegedly paid for by funds provided by the CPB is now on its way to the Congo.

d. Lumumba signed a "contract" with the CPB intermediary for 10,000,000 Belgian francs ($200,000) in campaign aid or subsidies.

e. When Nendaka left Leopoldville on March 17, none of the campaign material ordered in Belgium by Lumumba and allegedly to be paid for with CPB subsidies had been forwarded to the Congo because of "administrative difficulties." He explained that the Belgian banks had refused to accept Lumumba's notes as a guarantee of payment. When pressed on the discrepancy between this statement and his allegation that the CPB actually is providing the funds in return for notes signed by Lumumba, Nendaka was extremely vague and was unable to reconcile his conflicting statements. He merely suggested that the Belgian authorities must have learned of the situation and taken the necessary action to prevent the banks from accepting the notes.

f. The CPB, through an intermediary, is arranging to have a Belgium firm with an office in the Congo give Lumumba 5,000,000 francs for use in the electoral campaign. The CPB will reimburse the company in Belgium. Thus, there will be no record of the transfer of these funds to Lumumba. Nendaka refused to identify the firm in question, but at one point he mentioned the name CONDOMANE (phonetic spelling), and the reporting officer believes that he inadvertently thus let slip the name of the company in question. (The Brusselle telephone book lists a firm by this name with offices at 157 rue Joseph II.)
g. The MNC (Lumumba Wing) campaign buttons now worn by party members were manufactured in Belgium and paid for by the CPA.

h. He has received information to the effect that Lumumba sent two representatives to Accra in mid-March to obtain campaign funds. However, he was unable to provide information as to the specific source of funds in Accra.

i. The Soviet Union has provided Lumumba with a considerable amount of campaign literature in the form of brochures. Nendaka saw samples of the brochures which deal with such subjects as the Seven Year Plan, the life of an average worker or peasant in the USSR, agricultural cooperatives in the Soviet Union, etc. He said the brochures covered a multiplicity of subjects and admitted that they were Soviet propaganda vehicles. Some of this literature already has been shipped to the Congo by air, said Nendaka, and he believes that the balance is now on board a ship on its way to the Congo. Nendaka claimed he had urged Lumumba to give up his plan to distribute these brochures. When asked whether the Belgian authorities would prevent such propaganda from entering the Congo, Nendaka merely replied that the Belgians were not aware of the shipment.

In discussing the finances of the MNC (Lumumba Wing), Nendaka stated that Lumumba retains complete control over all party funds. All party funds allegedly are held in bank accounts in Lumumba's personal name. For example, Nendaka said that Lumumba has such an account at the Banque de Commerce, 6 Place Royale, Brussels. He referred to this as a "small account," noting that the balance stands at 210,000 francs ($4,200), but he added that Lumumba has a "very large" account in a Geneva bank. Nendaka admitted that he tried to obtain information relative to the balance in that account, but the bank refused to provide him with the desired information. Nendaka believes that Lumumba has other bank accounts, but he was unable to cite specific examples.

When Mr. McKinnon asked if Lumumba had anything to do with the recent transfer of ownership of the Congo newspaper, L'Echo de Stan, Nendaka was unable to provide information on the subject. However, he volunteered the view that Lumumba is trying to eliminate newspapers that oppose him politically, both as a means of eliminating opposition vehicles and as a venture for personal gain. Nendaka explained that the current political situation in the Congo has undermined the confidence of many investors. This fact, combined with threats of eventual expropriation or other pressures by persons representing Lumumba, allegedly has permitted Lumumba, working through intermediaries, to purchase a number of business ventures. Similarly, Nendaka said that Lumumba is purchasing stocks of companies with large investments in the Congo. As almost all such stocks now are selling at extremely low prices because of the uncertainty as to the future of such companies under a Congolese Government, he said Lumumba stands to earn a great deal of money after independence, if he achieves a position of power and is thus able to facilitate the activities of the companies in question.
When queried as to the information he might have concerning the sources of income of other Congolese political parties, Nendaka replied that the Centre de Regroupement Africain (CERA) receives "aid from Moscow." He did not document his assertion but said that CERA has "Communist tendencies." Nendaka does not believe CERA is dangerous at the present time, but he admitted that it might become so at a later date. In this context, he noted that Antoine GIZENGA, President General of the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), recently visited the Soviet Union, but he did not specifically express the view that Gizenka or the PSA receive Soviet funds. Nendaka claimed that the ABAKO receives funds from French, German, British and Belgian firms, but he did not think that ABAKO was obtaining financial support from Communist bloc sources. He also alleged that the Confederation des Associations du Katanga (CONAKAT) and the Parti National du Progres (PNP) are financed by Belgian firms.

Nendaka has received letters and telegrams from MNC (Lumumba Wing) members in Orientale Province (his native province) congratulating him on his withdrawal from the party headed by Lumumba. Thus, although he does not know how many MNC (Lumumba Wing) leaders and members will follow him out of the party, he believes that he will take with him a large bloc from that province. In this respect, he commented that Orientale Province has been the stronghold of the MNC (Lumumba Wing) and added that his withdrawal from the party would hurt it considerably in that area. He reiterated his statement, previously made to the reporting officer on March 21, that he will stand for election in Orientale Province. When queried by Mr. McKinnon, he said that he does not know whether he will form a new political party or whether he will take his followers into the MNC (Kalondji Wing). He admitted that he would be unable to reach a decision until he returns to the Congo on or about April 1 and consults with various political leaders who may wish to follow him out of the MNC (Lumumba Wing). He will see many of these people at a congress which is being called to meet in Buta, Orientale Province, on March 30. The leaders of all tribal and political groups in the province will meet at the congress, and Nendaka, who hopes to arrive there before it ends, will consult with his political friends and allies. Nendaka said that, despite the fact that Lumumba's principal strength has been in Orientale Province, he will not be invited to the Buta meeting as he is a Batetela from Kasai.

Despite his break with Lumumba, Nendaka expressed the view that the MNC (Lumumba Wing) is the strongest party in the Congo and the only one which stands a chance of winning a majority of seats in Parliament. He believes that the Lumumba Wing of the MNC is much stronger than the Kalondji Wing and he gives credit to Lumumba for this. Nendaka lauded Lumumba as an excellent orator who has a facility for capturing the imagination of his audiences and convincing them of his point of view. He specifically referred to Lumumba as a "trained" orator, and then said that the Soviet bloc trains Africans to propagate the ideals of revolution. Thus, by implication, he suggested that Lumumba is under the influence of the Soviets. Continuing on the same subject, he added that there are some sixty Congolese students now studying in Prague. He was unable to provide additional information on this matter — or to cite
any of the students' names - but he suggested that they would return to disseminate Communist propaganda in the Congo. He added that the Czech consul in Leopoldville arranges for Congolese to study in Czechoslovakia and noted that Lumumba is in frequent direct contact with the consul.
The language and ideas of the extreme left have become increasingly apparent on the Congolese political scene, as leaders of the Parti du Peuple, the ABADI (Alliance des Beyani), and a handful of other parties have liberally salted their party pronouncements not only with the usual attacks on "colonialism" and "imperialism" but also with demands for the abolition of capitalism in the Congo. These same leaders have also been among the most active in developing Communist contacts, notably with Deconinck of the Belgian Communist Party (PCB), and several of their pronouncements appear to have been directly inspired by such contacts.

The most extreme statements have been made by the avowedly socialist Parti du Peuple, whose President, Alphonse NGUVULU, recently attended the Congress of the PCB in Brussels. After the Congress, he held a press conference in which he demanded an accounting from Belgium of the assets which would be turned over to the independent Congo (Brussels G-149 to Department), and at the Economic Round Table Conference he posed a number of particularly pointed questions reportedly provided him by Deconinck (Brussels Tel'-1873 to Department). Earlier, on April 9th, the party newspaper Emancipation launched a bitter attack on capitalism, which it characterized as "a system based on profits for the minority through exploitation of the majority," and called for "African socialism" in the Congo.

Parallel language was used by Arthur MABAYA of the ABADI in a press conference on May 3rd, at which he castigated capitalism for "exploiting one group for the profit of the rich few." For Mabay, the choice is again seen in terms of the black-and-white alternatives of capitalism and socialism, with the latter clearly considered the right choice for the Congo. According to CAS, Mabay has not been reported in direct contact with Communist sources, but two other leaders of the ABADI joined Nguvulu of the Parti du Peuple in attending the Congress of the PCB in mid-April. One of these, Wassenaar MEBANY, visited Prague during the Round Table Conference and has several contacts at that time with PCB liaison man Degoinan. Interestingly, both Mabay and Abadi "economic counselor" Valere BELMANS, who is also reported to have attended the PCB Congress, approached the Consulate General in March for financial support for their electoral campaign. At that time, they argued that such support was necessary to enable them to compete successfully with the "Communist-backed" Parti Solidaire Africain in the Evandro-Kazu
area of Leopoldville Province. (See D-277, March 17, 1960)

To a lesser extent, the language of the left has been reflected in the pronouncements of three other groups. The Kashamuka wing of CEREA (Centre du Regroupement Africain), reputed to be a recipient of funds from Bloc sources, declared in an editorial in its party newspaper Le Vérité early in April that it favored "nationalisation" of all basic industries. The paper insisted, however, that this merely represented a means of insuring national independence rather than as a step toward doctrinaire socialism or communism. According to CAS, the party's president, Amiet KASHAMURA, also visited Prague during the Round Table Conference and has had several additional contacts with Communist sources.

In a similar vein, two members of the MNC-Lumumba — also generally believed to be supported in part by Bloc funds — have made statements couched in the terminology of the left, although Lumumba's own declarations have been milder in tone. Leon MUKI, a member of the MNC-Lumumba who represented the independent Fédération des Jeunesse Africains at the recent WEU conference in Conakry, spoke in a press conference after his return of the "fight against colonialism" and declared himself in favor of "peaceful co-existence." He also mentioned that he had discussed with Guinean officials the possibilities of obtaining study or travel grants for young Congolese to go to Guinea "or to other countries." Another recent visitor to Conakry was MNC-Lumumba leader Ferdinand-Galliera TUMBA, originally from Katanga. Tumba attended the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference and according to press reports was elected permanent secretary of the group for a term of two years.

Communist contacts have also been reported for leaders of the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), though only a bare minimum of the terminology of the left has yet appeared in party pronouncements. The party has adopted the appellation "comrade" for its members and has included the Marxian theory of colonialism (albeit somewhat simplified) in its newspaper, but has otherwise simply adopted a strongly nationalistic line in its public statements. PSA president Antoine GIZANGA visited the USSR several months ago and, according to CAS, a sectional secretary of the party is in the employ of the Czech consul at Leopoldville.

COMMENT:

MNC-Lumumba, all five of the parties mentioned above — Parti du Peuple, Abasi, Cersa, and PSA — are tarred to some extent with the brush of Communist contacts, although the relationship between these contacts and the increasingly leftist tinge of their public statements remains perhaps conjectural. Ngwuluni of the Parti du Peuple, for example, has for some time been characterized as a Marxian, while Kashamuka (Cersa) may have absorbed some of the terminology from his labor background. Similarly, having had a brief and relatively bloodless fight for their independence, many Congolese political leaders are for the first time feeling the heady wine of nationalism and ex-
pressing their feelings in extreme terms. Nevertheless, the statements by Mambaya of the Abasi, following closely on Mbaeny's visit to Prague; and by Mbuyi of the ANC- Lumumba following his own return from Conakry, displayed a line which had not hitherto been evidenced in the public declarations of these parties.

The three parties whose public positions more strongly reflect leftist influences -- the Parti du Peuple, Abasi, and Corea -- do not presently appear to have any significant following. The Parti du Peuple has never had any substantial backing, and its leader, Alphonse Nguvu, carries little weight. The Abasi may win a few seats in Leopoldville Province; but its leaders are relatively unknown. Corea has split into competing wings, allegedly in part over the issue of Kashamba's Communist leanings, and the breach will certainly weaken Kashamba's political position. (See D-342 April 21, 1960.) A coalition in the first government combining them with other nationalist parties, however, would probably strengthen their influence.

John D. Tomlinson
American Consul General

cc: Brussels

Department please repeat to: Brazzaville
                          Elisabethville
                          Luanda
This is in brief the latest information obtained about communist activity in the Congo.

In Brussels a service of reception and organization with Africa is maintained by a certain Mrs. Marthe Kent (we are not quite sure of the spelling of this name). The Congolese are received at Iralles by this woman. They are housed, fed and have free laundry service in a sort of family hotel where they are contacted by "comrades". They can go to that hotel with all the friends they want to, and all are admitted to the table without any charge. It is the same woman who gives pocket money to the Congolese and arranges their trips behind the Iron Curtain. (It is possible that we may get the exact address of Mrs. Kent in a day or two.)

In Moscow a certain Ivanof, who takes care of the Congolese, speaks fluent French. He complained that he had not heard from Ferdinand Tumba with whom he had several contacts in Moscow. Tumba is a former clerk of the lawyer Humble (Elisabethville). He represented the Congo at the Afro-Asian conference and is supposed to reside for two years in Cairo as Secretary of this conference. He is said to be in Leopoldville now. He was seen in Elisabethville during the formation of the Katanga government and presented himself as a candidate of the Katanga coalition party in the communal elections. He is affiliated with the MNC-Lamumba party.

In Peking the first Congolese group received a very warm welcome. They were received by Chou-en-Lai and taken care of by a Chinese girl who speaks fluent French. An indicative fact is that when Chou-en-Lai presented the 30 Congolese to the girl she was able to identify them by name without mistake. This made a deep impression upon the Congolese. A group of 16 Congolese (of the 30) which remained in Peking was offered the equivalent of 200,000 francs in dollars per person. The 14 Congolese who left Peking ahead of the others received only 40,000 francs each in dollars and have since sent claims for the balance from Belgium and Leopoldville because they believe that they were cheated by their Chinese friends. The equivalent of 1,200,000 francs in dollars was also given to the delegation as a whole in order to help comrades in the Congo who might lose their jobs upon their return to their country. If the exact amounts of these sums are difficult to verify, it can nevertheless be certified that those returning to Elisabethville made a show of dollars among their friends especially the 50-dollar bills, and that a certain Beys carried a minimum of 250,000 francs in dollars which he quickly put into a safe deposit box in the bank in order not to lose anything in case of devaluation of the Congolese franc. He intends to change his money at a better time.

All those returning are strongly pro-communist. They are impatiently waiting for the construction in Leopoldville of the Soviet Embassy whose cost is said to be as high as 25 million francs. They are not afraid to show their pro-Soviet feelings for they are impressed by the power of their Russian and Chinese comrades.

CONFIDENTIAL
The hierarchy of the pro-communist group in Katanga is as follows: François Mukuna, who is the leader in presently in Leopoldville; the leader at Elisabethville in his absence is Tshihake of the Credit Foncier Company who pretends to have anti-communist feelings when talking to Europeans but who thinks quite differently. The overall leader of the communist movement, Henri Kasongo, who has just returned to Leopoldville, left 32,000 francs to a girl in Europe to have her follow him to Africa. This she did and is now in Leopoldville. Kasongo will be in Katanga on July 15 with his European woman but will stop July 7 in Luxembourg to show off his conquest.

The Congolese travelers were disappointed because they did not get to "know" any Chinese girls. On the other hand, they were satisfied with their relations with Russian girls whom they find very beautiful (the Congolese like heavy and plump girls).

It cannot be denied that this situation is serious and that something should be done about it as soon as possible. It seems that some travelers to Moscow and Peking would like to compare their impressions with those of the United States before deciding to play the Soviet card. We are wondering if it might not be useful to contact the Americans secretly and advise them to invite the United States those who have returned from Moscow. This might prove to be an antidote to the favorable impressions which seem to have conquered these travelers in the course of their visit behind the Iron Curtain. We have the names of eight Congolese who could go to America if the Americans would be agreeable to this form of counter-propaganda.
Documents from U.S. Archives

Post-Independence Documents,
1960-1961
SECRET

1.

Communist Menace and Lumumba's Position Analyzed - Our Ambassador at Leopoldville likens the Communist pattern in the Congo to that in Cuba, believing the Soviets are well on the way to complete capture of Lumumba and his followers as they took Castro in Cuba. The Soviets, who went along with UN intervention because of strong African backing, have introduced disruptive and threatening resolutions at the UN in New York to induce the UN to walk softly in the Congo, and at the same time in Leopoldville they have been making a serious effort to win Lumumba and his country. Our Ambassador observes that we are not dealing with civilized peoples in the Congo nor with a responsible government in de facto control, since the principal control instrument has broken up into independent groups of armed, savage bandits. Pointing out that the Congo can be in for a blood bath of frightening proportions unless real order is restored, he states that the present UN strength would suffice only to keep order in the principal population centers, but not in the interior. Our Ambassador feels that Lumumba is quite capable of demanding that UN troops leave the Congo, and unless the UN's wraps are removed he would favor the acceptance of such an invitation, beginning with the removal of the Guineans, believing this might shock Lumumba into a recognition of what his and the Congo's prospects would be in the absence of the UN and cause him to do an about face. The UN would then be in a position to demand certain conditions without which the contemplated economic and social programs cannot be carried out. He concludes that a showdown with the UN is near, and he hopes the UN is ready for it.

Leopoldville 545 8/29/C

AFRICA

1.

Pressure on Bases Grows in Morocco - Our Ambassador at Rabat reports three important recent developments which have materially strengthened pressure for an early evacuation of French and Spanish troops from Morocco. These developments are: 1) the Congo's success in bringing about rapid evacuation of the Belgians, making the Moroccan Government appear less independent and less effective than the primitive Congoles; 2) the Moroccan Government's decision to press the Mauritanian issue, which may possibly give rise to clashes with the French and make the presence of French troops in Morocco obviously disadvantageous; and 3) the increased pressure of the Provisional Algerian Government for removal of all foreign forces from North Africa. Our Ambassador comments that there have been no specific
SECRET

1. Casablanca Resolutions Contain Few Surprises - Consulate General Casablanca reports that the resolutions reached by the participants the Casablanca "summit" Conference contained no dramatic surprises and at least a partial victory for the forces of moderation. The Conference somewhat surprisingly accepted totally the Moroccan position on Mauritania, and approved any action the Moroccan Government might now take to exert its rights to that area. The coverage of nuclear tests and Palestine can be summed up as condemnation of both. Israel was denounced as an instrument of imperialist and colonialism and as an enemy of all Africa. The Conference invited all African nations to reconsider their relations with France in view of the latter's insistence on continuing nuclear tests. On the Congo, the Conference declared its intention and determination to withdraw its participants' respective troops from the UN command but forecast no immediate action; it reaffirmed recognition of the Lumumba Government.
Casablanca 98, 99 l/7/C

2. Congo Army Success Seen Unlikely Without Help - Timberlake believes Mobutu's failure in the Bukavu effort does not augur well for the conduct of the Congo Government's military operations against either Kivu or Orientale. He is skeptical of any military success by the Congolese Army without the help of foreign experts in logistics and planning, and he thinks the need for some adequate formula which would permit the marshaling of suitable experts in aid of Mobutu should be urgently studied. He states there is reason to think Gizenga may contemplate a move from Bukavu to Lulukabourg. Tshombe's refusal to attend the Leopoldville roundtable on January 25 brings us, he feels, to a political dead end, at least for the time being; as a result, Kalonji is left with the dilemma whether to improve relations with Tshombe or to rely upon the central Government. At present, encouragement of those leaders who are prepared to get together to form a cabinet, which could be installed by Kasavubu against the day when Parliament might be called, appears to be a better solution than the continuance of the present Government of Commissioner. Meanwhile, Consulate Elisabethville reports Tshombe has canceled his visit to the United States. Our efforts to persuade him to postpone it, however, made him extremely angry, and he questioned our Consul's right to be in a country the US does not recognize. Leopoldville 1483 1/6/C, 1484 1/6/S; Elisabethville 373 1/8/S, Elisabethville 370 1/7/S
SECRET

-1-

Monday
January 16, 1961

AFRICA

1. Congo Situation Continues to Deteriorate - Our Ambassador at Leopoldville has urged Kasavubu to take vigorous action to assert his authority and that of the central Government in the face of the rapidly deteriorating situation throughout the Congo. Kasavubu, while concurring in the assessment of the gravity of the situation, gave no indication of proposed initiatives other than the roundtable and subsequent formation of a Government. Even if the most optimistic estimates of the success of these moves prove justified, our Ambassador fears the moves will be too little and too late. Meanwhile, Consulate Elisabethville has been informed that the UN operation there has no orders to restore the situation in Katanga or throughout the eastern Congo. Our Consul has no hope that the UN will initiate a more effective policy or effectively prevent the armed forces in Katanga from fighting it out. The situation in Katanga is very critical and will reach a climax rapidly. He estimates that Belgian, UK, and Rhodesian Federation authorities are principally concerned in saving Tshombe and Katanga, and that plans may be in formulation to assist south Katanga to withstand attack, with the South African Government likely to be making similar plans. We informed Embassy Brussels that Bombo's request for arms, funds and military instructors, and tentative Belgian willingness to agree to the request, present a problem of the gravest implications for the US and the West generally. It would mean flouting the UN, contravening UN Congo resolutions and incurring a violent reaction from the Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs. Embassy London believes it doubtful the UK would agree to such unilateral aid. Leopoldville 1513 1/12/C; Elisabethville 401 1/14/S; To Brussels 1271 1/14/S; London 2854 1/15/S

FAR EAST

1. US Views on Laos Summarized - We have informed all diplomatic posts that our objective in Laos remains to ensure its independence and territorial integrity. To achieve this objective we must act on three levels. On the domestic plane in Laos we have sought the legalization of Prime Minister Boun Oum's Government, and we have sought to bring that Government to a realization of the international consequences of its actions. Under this heading is included its assuming a posture of non-alignment and eventually broadening the Government. Militarily, we have sought to meet
2. EFTA Nears Agreement on Finnish Association - Consulate General Geneva has learned that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries have practically reached agreement on the problem of Finnish accession to the organization. EFTA Secretary Knut Hammarskjold defined the probable arrangement as a "consultative status" through which Finland would be allowed full participation in the tariff and trade work of EFTA, but would be excluded when sensitive matters such as EFTA-Common Market relations, or association of other countries such as Yugoslavia, are discussed. Finland would have no veto power in the proposed organization but would participate in routine meetings. The Consulate General understands that the Finns themselves asked that the veto power be excluded in order to avoid the possibility of an irresistible pressure from the USSR.

Geneva 811 1/20/C

UNITED NATIONS

1. Views on Belgian and UN Roles in Congo - We informed the Belgian Ambassador here of our alarm at reports of the formation of a "white legion" at Elisabethville, saying we felt this could only serve to isolate Tshombe further. We emphasized that Kasavubu and Mobutu appeared to be more and more identified with the Belgians, while Lumumba's strength appeared to increase, and added that any resumption of formal contact between Belgium and the Congo should be played down as much as possible. The Ambassador observed that, if the Stanleyville situation continued unchanged and if it became clear that Gizenga was getting outside help in violation of UN resolutions, the West would be put at a disadvantage if it could not also assist its friends in the Congo. We replied that the only apparent answer was to strengthen the UN to prevent this sort of situation, adding that we hoped Belgium would do what it could to improve relations between the Congo and the UN. On Thursday, Hammarskjold told UN Representative Wadsworth he recognized "political facts" and would consider replacing Dayal when his contract expires in two months. He asked the US to influence Kasavubu, Bombo, and others to say no more publicly about Dayal. Hammarskjold showed great concern over the way things are developing in the Congo. He saw the possibility of a divided Congo, with one part based on a Kasavubu-Tshombe axis and the other on an Orientale, Kivu, and Kasai axis. He would regard this development as extremely unfortunate. Meanwhile, our Charge at Leopoldville reports that Bombo informed him Friday that the Nigerian Chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission shares the Congo Government's view on Dayal and promised a report to the UN that would be a "bombshell." The Chairman claimed that the majority of the Commission shared his views.

New York 1966 1/20/S; Leopoldville 1575 1/21/C
AFRICA

1. **Belgian Military Aid to Congo Opposed** - Our Ambassador at Leopoldville observes that Bomboke's request for Belgian military aid raises a most serious problem for us and our allies. He states that, if he felt certain the satisfaction of Bomboke's request might solve the Congo problem, he would not hesitate to accept the risks. Unfortunately, he does not believe there is much likelihood the aid would be effective. While we may eventually have to militarily oppose a Communist takeover, our Ambassador suggests two alternatives for consideration: 1) that we endeavor to obtain a UN mandate to disarm the forces in revolt against the legitimate, UN-recognized, Government; or 2) that we attempt to obtain a mandate for the UN forces to disarm all military and police forces in the Congo. He believes the second alternative, although not solving the Congo problem by itself, would favor the moderates, avoid our taking the political risk in the UN of matching Communist military intervention, and tend to support our concept of a UN operation designed to pacify and help the Congo in restoring law and order. However, the alternative assumes: 1) a new UN mandate; 2) a new UN representative in the Congo; 3) a new posture by the UN organization in the Congo; and 4) the elimination of unreliable UN units from the Congo.

Leopoldville 1558 1/18/S

2. **Lumumba's Plight Discussed** - Katanga's Minister of the Interior Munongo informed Consulate Elisabethville that he was astounded that the US would raise the question of Lumumba's welfare, adding that the Katanga Government stands on its own two feet in the present circumstances and gives no credit to world opinion. Our Consulate believes any effort to dissuade Katanga from using its "white legion" to combat Lumumbist troops is doomed to failure. Meanwhile, a UN official told our UN Mission that Lumumba was definitely not beaten or abused at Elisabethville, although it is possible that he might have been while on route.

(Later, according to Consulate Elisabethville, the UN there revised its version by stating that Lumumba was repeatedly struck on the back by rifle butts while being herded toward a jeep, but was not knocked down or struck on the head or face.) He added that Lumumba is in no great danger of death since: 1) Tshombe is aware of the political consequences to him if anything happens to Lumumba while in Katanga; and 2) the Congolese have no record of killing their political leaders, but instead indicate their displeasure by beating them and raping their females. On Saturday, Khrushchev told Thompson we had put Lumumba in prison and, although he was sorry for him personally, this was much to the Soviets' advantage.

Elisabethville 421 1/20/C; New York 1964 1/19/C; Moscow 1708 1/21/S

Elisabethville 2 425 1/20/S-LD
SECRET

UNQUOTE

SECRET

From: Brussels
To: Secretary of State
No: 388, August 3, 8 p.m.

Sent Department 388, repeated information Leopoldville 177,
Paris 171, London 133, Ruman 78.

Parts for Thurston, Finn and USRO.

Embassy telegram 370, repeated information London 124, Paris 156,
Leopoldville unnumbered.

Re: CIA report

Today, minor upswell, great deal on lack of coordination
of US goals for approval for secondary forces. 2, 3, 1-1/2
UN approved 7-24-60, financed 7-25. UN to use 2/16
am. for moves in coming week. Belgian reports on UN's
menial and friendly. However, today we were asked formally: Original
comments: Are these for Belgium and do they follow any conversation
that followed indicated a recent article toward us as
result of US position. UN has replied that yes and provided
us with comment and additional comment of Belgian forces
because they feared the reemergence of Belgian forces
on our ability of UN forces to maintain order in new tribal warfare. He was
also deeply concerned that Belgium's future financial support
for its own military forces. Current operations in Congo will
consume a greater portion of defense budget. Belgian Army and
Air Force programs for modernization will suffer. Political and
financial reactions may be adverse toward NATO defense expendi-
tures. Although visit terminated on a more friendly personal
note, he left no doubt about sincerity of his convictions and
his worry over future of Belgian forces.
SECRETARY FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: Specific request for intelligence information on Soviet aid to the Republic of Congo

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has an urgent need for further information on corrupt Soviet aid imports into the Congo which can be used to forestall disorder, or to create a more difficult situation for the United Nations Command there.

2. It is requested, therefore, that all obtainable information on the specific subjects as listed, be forwarded to the Director for Intelligence, J-2, as soon as possible.

   a. Advisory, technical, military and civilian personnel by numbers and names.

   b. Arms, ammunition and other types of military supplies and equipment (including communications).

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE:

25X1A9a

Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP70T00686R000100100005-9
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff, JCS

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid to the Republic of Congo

REFERENCE: Memorandum for DCI from Director for Intelligence, JB, 25 August 1960, JEX-311-60

1. This is in response to your referenced request for information on Bloc aid to the Congo. The enclosed statement presents a brief analysis of information on the subject available here through 8 September.

ROBERT AMORY, JR.  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Enclosure.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addresses
  2 - DD/I
  1 - AD/CI
  2 - AD/RR
  1 - Ch/E
  1 - St/CS

ORR/St/CS: ew/4585(9 September 60)

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL.
9 September 1960

BLOC PERSONNEL IN THE CONGO

A. There now are 200-300 bloc personnel—mostly Soviet—in the Congo. As many as 100 additional Soviet personnel may arrive shortly. Flight crews and ground crews are estimated as:

- 6 IL-18 transports: 20 — 40
- 11 IL-14 transports: 94 — 96
- 5 AN-12 transports: 26 — 50 (on route)
- 149 — 233 (all Soviets)

Medical teams:

- Soviet: 30 — 30
- Czech: 30 — 30
- East German: 25 — 30
- 65 — 75

Truck technicians:
- 0 — 20

Diplomatic and press personnel:
- 30 — 40

TOTAL: 232 — 334

In addition, Poland has offered a 20-man technical and engineering team. The other satellites have offered smaller numbers of various specialists.

BLOC LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE CONGO

B. At Lusambe's [redacted] meeting with Soviet ambassador Kuznetsov in New York in late July, Soviet arms aid to the Congo was discussed, but there is no conclusive evidence that bloc arms have yet been brought into the Congo. However, small amounts of light weapons could have been covertly introduced; most of the bloc aircraft, when arriving in the Congo, landed first at Stanleyville—Lusambe's stronghold.

[Redacted]

State Department has obtained photographs of these weapons in Stanleyville, but these photographs are not presently available nor have

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 — CIA-RDP70T00666R000100100005-9
Although the exact number of aircraft flights from the bloc to the Congo is unknown, recent reports indicate that many of these flights appear to be heavily loaded. Moscow's concern over their flight to the Congo may suggest they are carrying military supplies.

In addition to the six Soviet IL-18s now operating in the Congo, five other bloc IL-18s—three Soviet and two Czech—have also delivered food, medical supplies and personnel, both medical and diplomatic. One of these aircraft made two trips to the Congo from the USSR. These five planes have since returned to their home bases.

Two Soviet merchant ships—the Leningradsk and the Arkhangelsk—have called at the Congo. The former carried 9,000 tons of wheat, 1,000 tons of sugar, and 300,000 cans of milk. Most of the wheat was not unloaded because of the unavailability of milling facilities. The ship, therefore, has had to go to Dakar to have the wheat processed and bagged and probably will return to the Congo later this month.

The Soviet Union reportedly has offered economic aid to the Lumumba government. The nature of the offer is not yet known, however, the USSR undoubtedly is capable of supplying technical assistance and development capital. The Congo's need for mining engineers and geoscientists can easily be satisfied by the Soviet Union. Soviet developments credits may well be offered in return for Congolese copper—a commodity the USSR most import—other minerals and industrial diamonds. A Czech economic mission reportedly is due to arrive shortly here to negotiate an aid agreement with Lumumba.
Direct Soviet Bloc Aid to Congo Government as of 5 PM, September 12, 1960

The following is supplementary to the previous report covering all bloc aid through noon, September 8, 1960:

There have been no specific reports of any Soviet bloc aid entering the Congo since noon of September 8, 1960. The closing down of Leopoldville and Stanleyville airports by UN forces appears to have effectively blocked further Soviet airlifts for the time being, although the five Soviet AN-12 planes previously reported en route to the Congo are fully capable of landing at some of the smaller fields not under control.

The following information received during the past three days throws further light on previously reported Soviet aid shipments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Reliable reports received September 12 stated that the five Soviet AN-12 transports which had been at Cairo since September 2, presumably awaiting orders to continue on to the Congo, have left Cairo within the past 24 hours and are presumed to be returning to the USSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet planes in</td>
<td>In a conversation with Governor Averell Harriman on September 10, the Soviet Ambassador to the Congo stated that the Soviet aircraft now operating in the Congo had been sent there at the request of Lumumba, that their use was the private affair of the Congo Government, and that they had been loaned to the Congo Government for a one-year period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo reportedly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>there on one-year loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR may try to negotiate air transport agreement with Sudan, begin regular air service to Congo</td>
<td>In a conversation September 7 with officers of US Embassy Khartoum, the Sudanese Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that the USSR has expressed an interest in negotiating an air transport agreement with the Sudan preliminary to establishment of regular USSR-Congo air service and in view of recent conclusion of Soviet civil air transport agreement with Congo. The Under Secretary also stated that Soviet planes were transiting Sudan en route to the Congo but that none were returning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

2

Category

Bloc personnel

Soviet economic mission described

Comments

An article published in pro-Lumumba Leopoldville newspaper September 7 described the Soviet economic mission to the Congo as made up of "a number of experts experienced in several economic fields, notably geology, culture, industry, finance, professional education and university studies." Mission was reported as having had discussions with Minister of Economy and officials of other ministries.

A three-man Kasai delegation in Johannesburg September 10 claimed that Soviet army officers using cover of medical personnel and technicians were advising and directing Lumumba troops against Kasai.

IHR/219/56\AJSmith\r\n9/12/60
Purpose:
1) Contact rebel groups
2) Put down pro cood.
3) Pol. development
4) State will pull out
5) Determine policy. No commitment.
6) Out differences

USE: Warfit, Jack Bell
Ira, Cleveland, Longo,
CIA, Beavell, Field, Clark
ODA/ISA, Hayden Williams, Sametem, Butler
USIA, Morrow, Roberts
Kretzmann

SMW: Background of Congo Crisis.

Acting: Mejco—program secretary level
No final points—policy.

New Congo Policy:
Objective: Keep UN in business
Fair order
Afris admin, check campbell
Reach to set consensus
Policy itself:
1. Strengthen UN mandate
   Neutralizing
   Security
Congo Committee - 7/6/61

Attendance: MTW - Chas. E. W.
AF: F. Redenius, Fa. Valley, Travulake
HT & CV: Gordon Dumont
ER: Blake, Chadbourne, Andy Burden
PA: Sanger, Edmund, Roberts.

FC: Jordan, Butternfield
NISE: Ayres, Jack Bell
TO: Four, Cleveland, Cairo
FR: Russell, Field, Clark
DO/IA: Hayden Williams, Gramham, Rushie
USA: Morrow, Roberts.

P: Ketelsen

GMW: Background of Congo Crisis.

Action

Memo - program Secretary read
forreibic parts - far da agency
A. New Congo Policy.
Objective: Keep UN in business
Fair & order
After Alliance, shed camp bell
Reach to seta carnage

Policy (area)

1. Strengthen UN mandate
   "neutralizing" Congo forces

SECRET
2. Broadly based Government quickly
   - Strengthen Kasa, i.e. very moderate gov't
   1. Pull them together into elements to form a new structure including moderate elements.

3. Recognition that Bel left Kasa unprepared for gov't; a way needed to build up Kasa administration to getting into Trusteeship if UN or others.

Cleveland Reactions -
1. Europeans complaining about concentration
   - Bel. Bel not free as in Kasangi re.
   - Tokwakong in W. Kasa.
2. Afro-Asians
   - America’s answer: parallel except get Tanzania out somehow

Boy: Concentration in W. Kasa.
1. But, tech, Bel
2. Ningi - no final plan given.
L.C. Tomorrow - mostly Conflagrations
Powers. \& \& Nyeri \& \& Inde \& \& Telia, Nigeria to speak up.

If Afro龘(Conv) don't step up, perhaps US should make a statement in order to avoid

CIA

GurLEAN: effect of their new policy on those who were included in - Director General, who is waiting.
Wants to prevent shift toward Guevara while our policy being worked out.

GMW

They have gone to Kasa. To receive him it we regn him as d exhibition.

CIA

Guevara knows he will receive support if Kasa. Powers plus USA & USSR.
Kasa may react.

GMW

We were aware of supporting UN & UN institutions, maintaining our position of supporting UN, we must needs force African nation to succumb.
Recog. diff. of acting thru UN +
about time supporting our friends
in Congo (Kazu)

Tin. comments on degree of Africa
support for Lusumbo - heterogeneous

QMW: We will have to study this
point - a good one - on
our next combo perhaps

QMW: What should we do, as fall
approach, if new policy doesn't work?

Military intervention

We judge overall strategy JPR. faverable
US — if Kasa remains in
central pot. Then our entry would be
diff.

If we go in against regime, the
diff story.

QMW: Hypothetical — our judgment will
be each.

Judge: Pot (Stoke) & 1000 roles are overlay
it is hard to sep. cutbacks & predict ne
Danger of coming out with African supporters — difficult.

Budden to release Tshembe. Move up then DEL will release.

Tsun. Other will take final wage — rel. of Tshembe as 1st piece.

Tsun. Con Communique report — not due until after seeing Tsun. Report will be made on return of 08/10 NY.

FTT Does YQ believe Congo will okay peace? Yes, perhaps weakly but……

FTT Congo feels Kasavu Gezena will not shoot down arms if Africans agree.

FTT Complete & likely; give up arms — have no faith in U.N.

GMU Working to that end. Threatening Clynke.

First Clynke — one of the agencies. Put gate at Clynke rep. — agreed Point for agenda.

1. Technical problem w/pc. jobs to Mil. consider.
3. Admin. contingencies

GMU wants due prep also for other
African problems: Algeria,
Libya.

Sheehy spoke re: call in GMU re. persons to rep. Them.

Cleveland FV$ - one more not possible
re K defeating Jemen.
OK for free - under mandate.

3. Decks will be rel. before
many other things happen.
2. Badly injured
Trav. seen by C.
Release after order restored.

Story source: prospective successor.
5. Fleder: Jemen, Senegal,
Cameroon, Libya - interested in
Speaking.

Regalia is under [illegible] Cypoluxo -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Working Committee on the Congo

The inter-departmental Working Committee on the Congo was constituted at a meeting on February 6 under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary Williams. Senior officials who attended the meeting were Messrs. Mitsui (Defense), Bissell (GIA), Morrow (USIA), Gordon (IGA) and from the Department of State Messrs. Cleveland (IO), Kretzmann (P), Bell (V/MSC), Scott (M), Sanger (IMR), Blue (UR) and Ambassadors Burden (Brussels) and Timberlake (Leopoldville).

Mr. Williams summarized the recent decision of the President to give a new orientation to our Congo policy, the actions which had been taken so far in moving forward with that policy, and the President's directive to the Secretary of State to focus responsibility for coordination of further policy development in the assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

Mr. Cleveland summarized the responses received so far from European and Afro-Asian countries. Ambassador Yeat related the preliminary results of consultations in New York and pointed out the immediate problem of finding African speakers who would counterbalance the expected speeches of the (pro-Lumumba) Casablanca powers.

Mr. Morrow pointed out that the fact that our own plan is now public knowledge puts us in an unhappy posture. We are, in effect, looking for Afro-Asians to "front" for us in putting forward our new ideas. The reaction will predictably be adverse in Western Europe. He wondered whether the solution might not lie in putting our cards on the table in the UN and explain and defend our new ideas. Ambassador Yeat expressed the view that if we cannot get any Afro-Asian representatives to come forward soon with our ideas, we should express them ourselves, though without freezing our position in too much detail.

Mr. Bissell voiced concern that the short-run impact of public knowledge of the US position might be to undercut public support for Kasavubu in the Congo. In the present situation, the morale factor is all-important. If the Kasavubu forces become demoralized, we might be confronted with a fait accompli (i.e., a bloodless take-over by Gisenga) before our policy can go into effect. He urged immediate steps to prevent this. Mr. Williams enumerated measures we have taken recently to bolster Kasavubu's bargaining position. Mr. Mitsui said some public indication that we are interested in achieving a genuine consensus is necessary, otherwise the Gisenga forces would emerge as victors.

Mr. Williams pointed to indications that the degree of support of the Casablanca powers for Gisenga appears to be lessening. Ambassador Timberlake added that it should not be assumed that all African countries support Lumumba. Those who support him about the loudest, but others feel differently. Mr. Williams pointed out that even some of the presumed opponents of Lumumba (such as Tunisia, Liberia and Nigeria) privately tell us that no solution is possible without Lumumba.

Mr. Williams
Mr. Williams invited the participants to address themselves to the possibility that our policy of reaching a consensus in the Congo may not work out. We must consider the feasibility of other policies, including military action, in the event the United Nations effort breaks down. Mr. Nitez observed that two very different contingencies must be envisaged: support for an established anti-Communist government such as now exists in Leopoldville, or action against a Communist-supported government in control over most of the Congo. Mr. Williams suggested that a sub-committee explore possible action in both these hypothetical situations, as well as perhaps in other situations. Mr. Gordon reported that ICA has worked out contingency plans for US aid to the Congo, both on a bilateral basis and through the UN.

After some discussion of tactical elements in the present situation (consequences in the Congo and in Belgium of a premature release of Lumumba, role of the UN Conciliation Commission, degree of force to be used by the UN in neutralizing the military forces), it was agreed to establish a sub-group which would discuss, on a current basis, both tactical problems in implementing the new policy and military and administrative contingencies in connection with both success or failure of the policy in the Congo. The sub-group would also have to take into account the psychological and public relations aspects of various courses of action.

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M - Mr. Clock
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TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: INR - Roger Hilsman

SUBJECT: Assistance to the Stanleyville Regime.

Speculation about extensive material aid from the Bloc or Casablanca powers to the Stanleyville regime appears unfounded. Most of the assistance furnished has been financial and diplomatic. There are reliable indications of only a limited amount of equipment being supplied to Gizenga. Some of the financial assistance has been given to him directly. The remainder, which is not overwhelming, has been furnished to his representatives in Cairo. Larger sums have been promised but there is no indication that these credits have been realized.

The USSR has provided Gizenga $250,000, a plane load of small arms, and a radio transmitter. These were shipped in by a UAR Ilyushin IL-14. It had a UN clearance and transited the Sudan on December 31, landing at Lisala in the Equateur province. The clearance was granted on the basis of a UAR-statement that the plane carried spare parts and New Year's gifts. The UN requested its return to Cairo on January 16, and the plane departed during the withdrawal of the UAR troops at the end of the month. A Czechoslovakian plane load of supplies for Gizenga arrived in Cairo early in February, but there is no indication that it crossed the Sudan or that its contents reached Stanleyville.

It is very probable, but not yet fully substantiated, that about ten truckloads of materials reached Gizenga from the Sudan through Aba on the northeast border of the Orientale province. The first report, which appeared in a New York Times dispatch of January 22 from Leopoldville, mentioned six trucks. A member of the UN Secretariat stated next day to the UN mission that reliable reports had been received about the arrival of "trucks" on the border. There has been no further firm information on the subject. The Gizenga regime has not yet permitted the UN to set up control points on this part of the frontier over which road traffic still passes. The Sudanese Government has always

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has always categorically denied that any military supplies have crossed the border for Gizenga. On January 28, the USSR published a request asking that 20 trucks of "food and medicine" be permitted to transit the Sudan. There is no evidence that permission was granted, or that the supplies were forwarded by other means to Gizenga.

Some minor smuggling of supplies may have taken place over the Congo's borders with the Sudan and Uganda since the establishment of the Stanleyville regime.

When the UAR withdrew its troops from the Congo, it was suspected that equipment might be left behind for Gizenga. It is possible that small amounts may have been thus furnished Stanleyville, but all major pieces of equipment have been accounted for. The UAR forces took out about two-three tons of materiel less than they brought in, a discrepancy that may be due to normal wear and tear on supplies.

Evidence of financial assistance to Gizenga appears reliable. Besides the funds furnished him directly, his representatives in Cairo have reportedly received $150,000 from the Soviet Embassy, $20,000 from the Yugoslavs, about $3,750 from the Communist Chinese Embassy, and about $1,500 plus free accommodations from the UAR. The Chinese Communists have reportedly promised Gizenga over $1 million, but there is no firm evidence that these credits have been realized. Czechoslovakia has promised equipment for 2,000 soldiers none of which is yet reported to have been delivered.

There are no reports of direct material or financial assistance to Gizenga from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, or Mali.

Diplomatic support for Gizenga from the Bloc and Casablanca powers has been strong, loud, and open. On February 22, representatives of the Casablanca powers at Accra announced a common Congo program. It recommended recognition of the legitimacy of Gizenga's government, basing all UN actions on requests by the legitimate government, expelling all Belgian and foreign military personnel from the Congo, reinforcing the UN with a view to setting up an African command, reconvening Parliament, and the withdrawal of all diplomatic missions.

These suggestions contain elements of several different Congo policies held by the radical African states who are not fully united on any one course of action. They frequently act or speak unilaterally on Congo matters. On some points they appear susceptible to Soviet views. The UAR, however, appears recently to have been resisting USSR pressures. It withdrew its Congo forces despite USSR objections and has not pressed the Sudan for transit permission as hard or as often as the Soviets would like. The UAR's joint UN resolution with Liberia and
Liberia and Ceylon did not have USSR support. Recent public reports to the contrary, President Nasir does not appear to have said that he is extending assistance to Gizenga.
41. Editorial Note

President Kennedy and a number of his advisers, including Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, discussed the Congo at a meeting at the White House from 3:15 to 5:15 p.m. on March 3. A March 3 memorandum from Department of State Counselor George C. McGhee to Rusk summarized the meeting’s conclusions as follows:

“In the discussions with the President today on the Congo, it was agreed that:

(1) The Department and Mr. Stevenson were to continue their efforts to have Mr. Dayal replaced as UN Representative in the Congo;

(2) The CIA was to expedite its ‘silver bullets’ program in the Congo.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)

Notes of the meeting by JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer add little to this, but indicate that, after discussion of Laos, the President said they should move on to their “next legacy.” Rusk then reviewed the situation in the Congo, speaking critically of Dayal and stating that information was lacking on Gizenga. Dulles stated that the Congolese were unanimous on one point: they would not disarm. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers)

42. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, March 4, 1961, noon.

1845. For Secretary and Stevenson from Williams. ¹ There are three challenges in the Congo to which I feel we must direct our immediate attention with understanding and vigor. First the strengthening of the lawful government of Kasavubu. Until there is a broad nationally based government no political solution in the Congo will be forthcoming. I see

¹ Assistant Secretary Williams visited Léopoldville February 27–March 4 in the course of a visit to several African countries.
FROM: Leopoldville

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 974, October 13, 3 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 974, INFORMATION USUN 647, BRUSSELS 574,
LONDON 379, PARIS 376, NEW DELHI 7, BRAZZAVILLE UNNUMBERED.

Canadian CG Guavin whom we have found to be accurate well-informed colleague showed Embassy Officer today telegram reporting ninety minute conversation with Canadian Charge. Rahman who has represented Soviet interests Congo since expulsion Soviet diplomats. Rahman indicated Communists have given up Gizenga as third rate theorist. Are annoyed with him for he had not arranged their accreditation and "Bomboko's views had prevailed that they must return home and request resumption diplomatic relations through normal channels". Rahman said Soviets reported Gizenga told them they should have waited Stanleyville until he summoned them Leopoldville. Rahman considers Gizenga still under shock for not having obtained two-thirds majority Lovanium. Rahman considers Obyne lacking backbone. He has not yet gotten rid of Nendaka and the three Belgians he fired from Interior were rehired by Bomboko. Latter according Rahman is despicable character and Belgian stooge. Rahman considered Adoula best Congolese statesman available but his remaining in power depends on Katangese reintegration. Rahman recommended to GOC it recognize Communist diplomats lest they return Stanleyville if position of GOC deteriorates.

Rahman bitterly opposed cease-fire, stated Indian Brigadier Raja could "clean up mess" if had been given chance. Spoke with pride re Indian troop activity Albertville where Indians destroyed 150-odd Katangese trucks (not withstanding fact that at that time, UNOC air lifting vehicles Leopoldville-Elisabethville for use by Indian troops).
Documents from U.S. Archives

Post-Independence Documents,
1962-1963
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Thursday
September 7, 1961

FAR EAST

1. US Thinking on Laos Reviewed - Yesterday we met with representatives of the SEATO countries here to review our latest thinking on Laos. We said that we saw three possible developments in the Laos situation: 1) our present efforts with Prince Souvanna Phouma will succeed in producing a truly neutral Lao Government; 2) there will be no agreement either at the Laos Conference in Geneva or on the formation of a government of national union, and the situation will remain ambiguous; and 3) the Communists will resume their attack. If the Communists resume their offensive, we believe that our most important military and political objective should be to protect that portion of Laos which borders on Thailand and South Viet-Nam from Communist control. We also said we are attempting to stiffen the Lao Army by supplying US advisers down to the company level and by increasing our support of the Meotribe. The French Ambassador criticized this presentation, saying that President de Gaulle remained opposed to any military solution and that our increased training of the Lao Army was likely to provoke an equivalent increase in Viet Minh assistance to the Pathet Lao. Circular 407 9/6/S

AFRICA

1. Yugoslavs Seen Pressuring Gizenga - Our Ambassador at Belgrade reports that he managed to see Congolese Prime Minister Adoula and Foreign Minister Bomboko yesterday despite the protestations of the Yugoslav security guard. He found the Adoula party virtually prisoners of the Yugoslav secret police. The party was unaware of the Embassy's efforts to get in touch with it, and it had been unable to reach the Embassy by telephone. Although he has no proof, our Ambassador believes that Vice Prime Minister Gizenga, leader of the dissident Stanleyville group, is being carefully kept in separate quarters and subjected to intensive pressures to claim again that he is prime minister of the sole legitimate Congolese government. He comments that, if Gizenga emerges from this process unaffected, he is indeed a strong personality.

Belgrade 433 9/6/OUO

2. Katangan Developments Cause Alarm - Embassy Brussels has asked Consulate Elisabethville for information concerning a report made to our Ambassador by an official of the Belgian firm, Union Miniere, that the Katangan government, enraged by Belgium's support of and acquiescence in UN action against Katanga's President Tshombe, had
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AFRICA

1. Congo Government Reported in Disarray - Our Ambassador at Leopoldville reports that Premier Adoula telephoned him late on December 10 and requested that he see President Kasavubu to find out what the latter's party (ABAKO) is up to and to warn Kasavubu of possible reactions by the Congolese Army. Adoula calmed there would probably be dramatic developments in 24 hours, and noted he was unable to reach Kasavubu. The Ambassador sees the Government threatened by: 1) a revolt from within as General Mobutu and Security Chief Nendaka, feeling their security at stake, will probably act to block any changes in the Government with or without Adoula; 2) a Tshombist-Gizengist takeover, inasmuch as this unholy alliance - with or without Kasavubu's knowledge - has made headway in subverting some of his ABAKO party. The Ambassador notes that Gizenga's release is very possible whether or not the Government falls. Other dangers include a takeover by the reviving National Congolese Movement, on which the Communist bloc is counting, and an assertion by the Communist bloc of its influence in the Congo. The Ambassador reiterates that if the Soviets wish to topple Adoula all they have to do is offer aid to the Congo and he would resign. He comments that they seem to prefer to wait to start fresh with a new man. The Ambassador says that in the situation no one is really "tending the store", intrigue is continuous, and the atmosphere recalls that of July 1960 or that on the eve of Mobutu's coup.

Leopoldville's 1370 12/10/62 (C)

EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH

1. Sino-Soviet Rift Widens - Embassy Moscow reports that the Sino-Soviet dispute has reached a new level of intensity with publication in Pravda of closing Party Congress speeches made by party leaders Novotny in Czechoslovakia and Togliatti in Italy. Both openly and by name criticized the Chinese Communists for support of the Albanian party leadership. The Embassy notes the assertion that the Albanians have placed themselves "outside the ranks of the world Communist movement" has now appeared three times in the December 9 and 10 Pravda accounts of the Czech and Italian Party Congresses, thus making it clear that the Chinese are being increasingly chastized and isolated. The Embassy presumes that the Soviet tactic continues to be to place the onus on the Chinese Communists for any move which would result in an openly proclaimed split. It considers that Moscow appears to be goading Peiping into making a direct polemical attack upon the Soviet Communist Party. It believes that, in any event, the open publicity now being given to the dispute in the Soviet press in a significant step toward informing the Soviet people of the possible
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AFRICA

1. Soviets Take Cautious Attitude Toward Congo - Our Embassy at Moscow reports that recent Soviet press commentaries suggest the Soviets are still feeling their way in devising immediate and long-range tactics on the Congo. Despite an increasing show of sympathy in the press for Congolese Parliamentary opposition groups, the Soviets remain cautious in their treatment of Prime Minister Adoula, assuming a general "wait-and-see" attitude. This treatment is accompanied by a continuing effort to discredit UN and Western efforts to settle Congolese-Katangan differences. Our Embassy believes the ultimate Soviet hope obviously remains the withdrawal of UN presence from the Congo. Meanwhile, Soviet efforts appear directed toward creating a favorable image of themselves in Congolese eyes. The Embassy believes the Soviets are willing and able to allocate limited resources for aid and technical assistance to the Congo, despite other world-wide commitments and despite the fact that the Soviet economy is currently under considerable pressure. At this juncture, however, the Embassy thinks it unlikely that the Soviets view the Congo as an area where they could achieve a spectacular coup which would to some extent offset their abortive Cuban venture.

   Moscow 1478 12/12/C

2. Tanganyika Ceremonies Portend Closer East African Ties — In summing up the significance of the recent ceremonies in which Tanganyika became a republic, our Ambassador at Dar-es-Salaam comments that they constituted a major event in Tanganyikan history. In addition, they marked a new phase in concerted pressure on the UK for early resolution of the Kenya question and possibly set the stage for closer future association in East and Central Africa. Moreover, the ceremonies posed the question of an incipient conflict in Tanganyikan priorities as between economic development, depending largely on UK assistance, and political action in Bantu Africa, probably offensive to UK interests. According to our Ambassador, the atmosphere surrounding the ceremonies was understandably conducive to expressions of heightened nationalism and assertive militancy on issues of primary importance to Africa; but there was, beyond this, a strong undercurrent, both in Public statements and in private conversations with African representatives present, of new forms of political coordination and tactical cooperation in support of shared African aims.

   Dar es Salaam 366 12/12/C
Background: It seems almost incredible - so much has happened - but only a little more than a year and a half has passed since the Belgians gave Congo its independence on June 30, 1960. The present situation, perhaps, can be seen as arising from the events of last August, when all elements of the Congo body politic, except Tshombe, President of Katanga Province (although provision had been made for Katanga representation also), had agreed through the national Leopoldville parliament upon the formation of a new government under the moderate, anti-Communist Prime Ministership of Cyrille Adoula. The inauguration of the Adoula government brought to an end (at least for the time being) the illegal, breakaway regime of Antoine Gizenga, who had sought to replace the late pro-Communist Lumumba as national Prime Minister and whom in turn the Communists have long sought to make their puppet. Adoula has been described by Secretary Rusk as "a man of intelligence, moderation and nation-wide stature. He has made clear his determination to keep his country from control of any foreign quarter." With his moderation, Adoula has emerged from the background of tribalism in the Congo as a man not only of unusual sanity and steadiness—like Nyerere of Tanganyika— but of outstanding firmness of purpose with a real gift of leadership.

After UN forces had overcome resistance at the Katanga capital of Elizabethville, and accompanied by the usual Congolese disorder as to where a meeting between Adoula and Tshombe was to take place, the Katanga leader agreed to meet the national Prime Minister at Kitoma on the Congo’s west coast. There, on December 31, 1961, agreement was reached between the two leaders on the reintegration of Katanga Province into the national government. It is to be hoped that Tshombe, who as the leader of Katanga is in a relatively strong financial position, will not welch on this agreement. Katanga is not only in the best financial position of any province in the Congo, its propaganda agents (whether in support of secession or whatever it might be) are well-heeled abroad.

UN forces in the Congo must be freed to attend to other urgent work in the Congo. Gizenga, although he is first Vice-Prime Minister of the Congo under Adoula, has abandoned that regime and fled to his stronghold at Stanleyville. Unless the Katanga situation is relatively stabilized, serious menaces such as the dissidence of Gizenga, and others following his lead, cannot be dealt with and the cold war will come to the Congo with a vengeance with still more bloodshed to follow.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3

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The Katanga Integration Problem
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

- The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring:
- Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
- Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
- Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
- Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:
- The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
THE KATANGA INTEGRATION PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for early agreement on reintegration of Katanga into the Congo and the likely consequences of the failure of current efforts to secure such agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Katanga separatism is regarded by the Central Government, other Africans, and the neutrals as a successful effort by Western commercial interests to retain a "neocolonial" position in Katanga and thus to prevent the full independence of the Congo. Adoula is under considerable pressure to show progress toward the integration of Katanga under the Central Government. Adoula wants a wide measure of authority over Katanga. However, his minimum needs would probably be satisfied by recognition of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.² (Paras. 5, 9, 20)

2. Although Tshombe recognizes the many outside forces opposed to his maintaining Katanga as a near-independent state, he is under no significant pressure from within Ka-

¹SNIE, "Possible Developments in Katanga," dated 7 December 1961, remains essentially valid.  
²The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would prefer that this sentence read as follows:  
In order to preserve his own political position in Leopoldville, he must have, as an absolute minimum, recognition by Tshombe of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues.
tanga to reach any accommodation with Adoula. On the contrary, the tribal elements of southern Katanga, and Belgian and British commercial interests and residents in Katanga, as well as the Europeans in neighboring countries (Northern Rhodesia in particular), support his present position. In any agreement with Adoula, Tshombe's minimum requirements would include a considerable degree of provincial autonomy plus a guaranteed share of Katanga revenues. (Paras. 15, 20)

3. Negotiations between Adoula and Tshombe are unlikely to achieve any early accommodation unless both sides are subjected to stepped up pressures and inducements by outside forces, particularly by the Belgian and UK Governments and economic interests, the UN, and the US. We do not believe that their minimum needs are so inconsistent as to make agreement impossible. If some movement on the issue is not evident in a relatively short time, Adoula or a successor may take more radical and intransigent initiatives, including acceptance of military aid from Afro-Asian or Bloc states. It cannot be excluded that the Central Government will attempt to subdue Katanga by force. (Paras. 20-21, 25)

4. We do not believe that any attempt to subdue Katanga militarily, by either UN or Congolese Army forces, would be promising. Such action would be likely to bring about conditions of such disorder that the prospects for unity and an orderly political and economic development of the Congo would be further reduced. (Para. 23)
5. Katanga's separation from the rest of the Congo has symbolized to Africans and to many others the power of Western commercial interests and "neocolonialists" to block the realization of unity and full national independence. Behind the pressure for unification are: the desire of leaders of the Central Government to establish Leopoldville's authority over Katanga, the desire of all parts of the Congo to share the revenues of the mining enterprises of Katanga, and the importance to the Afro-Asian world of the principle of national unity.

6. However, there are also strong centrifugal forces. The Central Government does not exercise effective control over all the territories now under its nominal authority. Even among Central Government politicians there are many who favor a high degree of local autonomy. Moïse Tshombe has the support of the tribal elements in southern Katanga in his effort to maintain the autonomy of the province. Even if Tshombe were to submit to Leopoldville, the Central Government would still be faced with a long and difficult task of unifying the country. If a serious effort were made to impose national unity, the demands of other parts of the Congo for local autonomy would become more vocal.

The Current Negotiations

7. Premier Adoula of the Congo Central Government and President Tshombe of Katanga have been negotiating off and on in Leopoldville since 18 March 1962. Adoula has continued to insist that Katanga accept the Loi Fondamentale as evidence of its subordination to the Central Government, although he has acknowledged that the Loi needs to be modified to provide increased provincial autonomy. Tshombe has shown some willingness to make concessions on minor functional details of the Katanga-Central Government relationship, but has refused to give up any meaningful authority he now has in Katanga pending adoption of a new constitution.

8. There is little chance that either of the two principals will offer concessions sufficient to gain agreement unless pressures and inducements are stepped up considerably. Meanwhile Adoula is telling representatives of the US Government that political pressures on him are building up to the point where he must seek other means than the current negotiations and reliance on the UN, or risk overthrow. He has talked several times of asking the UN to withdraw and of seeking the aid of sympathetic Afro-Asian and Bloc states. More recently he has told US representatives that he will not go to the Communists for help and that his approaches to Afro-Asian states are for help within the context of their role as UN members.

9. We cannot estimate with any certainty the future of present negotiations under UN sponsorship. Adoula is unquestionably under strong pressure from his supporters as well as his opponents in Leopoldville to show progress on integration, but he can, if he wishes, continue to negotiate for some time. Tshombe, for his part, has every reason to employ delaying tactics and keep the talks going, although he might be forced to break them off by pressures from Elisabethville. We are inclined to believe, however, that the negotiations will break down only if and when Adoula feels compelled to resort to other means to obtain the reintegration of Katanga.
Adoula's Situation and Likely Courses of Action

10. Adoula's lack of commitment to any particular tribal, regional, or party group has made him an acceptable head of a government made up of men with a wide range of political viewpoints and representing widely dispersed tribes and territories. However, his lack of a political base of his own may make him increasingly vulnerable as the pressures build up for action against Katanga separatism. Sooner or later Adoula is going to have to show progress in solving the Katanga issue or develop an increasingly tough approach to the problem—or be forced to step aside for someone else to have a try.

11. Adoula's frustrations may have led him to overstate the immediacy of the danger to his position. Less than a third of the active members of the Chamber of Deputies now favor removing him. However, that number will grow as time passes without evidence of progress toward the integration of Katanga. At any time some unforeseen incident could crystallize opposition forces that might lead to Adoula's replacement by a radical and less cooperative leader. It is equally likely that Adoula would himself adopt a more radical course if necessary to preserve his political position.

12. We believe that the chances are better than even that, in the absence of practical evidence of progress toward the integration of Katanga, Adoula will, before many weeks have passed, try new initiatives. He is unlikely to begin with a sudden attack on the UN and the US and the efforts they have been making in behalf of a settlement, but will rather step up his attempts to persuade the US and the UN to bring increased pressures to bear on Tshombe. Before long he would probably go to the UN for help in bringing about the integration of Katanga by force. In the event of failure, he would then turn to the Afro-Asian states, and possibly even to the Bloc for assistance in the buildup of his military forces in preparation for forceful seizure of Katanga. It cannot be excluded that Adoula might at an earlier stage try to use the army, unreliable and incapable as it may be, to impose unification on Katanga. He might do this in the hope that it would bring UN forces into action on his side. He is probably aware that there are important elements among the UN forces which would welcome a chance to subdue Tshombe.

13. If Adoula goes to the UN for a mandate to end Katanga's secession, by force if necessary, differences among the interested Western states would inevitably be spotlighted. Western opposition to a "unity-by-force" resolution would be exploited by many Afro-Asian states and the Bloc.

14. All along the line Adoula would be looking for a solution to his basic problem, which is essentially political. What he will be searching for is some means of providing convincing evidence that his government is acknowledged by the whole Congo as the Central Government.

Tshombe's Situation and Likely Courses of Action

15. It is Tshombe's purpose to maintain his position in Katanga and to retain for Katanga as much of its present autonomy as possible. He recognizes the various pressures upon him to integrate his province with the rest of the Congo. None of these, however, has persuaded him that he must make more than minor concessions. He recognizes that the UN with its representatives and military forces in the Congo, the US Government, the Afro-Asians in the UN and elsewhere are all against his maintaining Katanga as a near-independent state. On the other hand, Tshombe feels that he has the direct backing of Belgians and other Europeans in Katanga and the support of important influences in Europe and America. Also important is the fact that the Acting UN Secretary General
has publicly indicated his belief that financial problems will require a significant reduction of the UN presence in the Congo, probably beginning about mid-1962. Although two UN attempts to force Congo integration have been abortive, we believe Tshombe would make considerable effort to avoid a third round of hostilities with its attendant disorder and destruction. We expect Tshombe to continue to play a waiting game, and to make no concessions to the Central Government which he does not feel compelled to make.

Other Parties to the Situation

16. Belgium's interest in the Congo tends to be dominated by its large economic investment, a significant part of which is in the Katanga. It has also been powerfully influenced by the blame and opprobrium which were heaped on it as the "imperialist" power responsible for the chaotic international mess which the Congo became in 1960-1961. The powerful mining interests, while showing some awareness of the need for a Katanga settlement, essentially support Tshombe against both the Central Government and the extremists in his own regime. They tend to discount the problems of the Central Government and the dangers in the situation which might follow the downfall of Adoula. The government in Brussels, however, is increasingly disposed to think of the problem in terms of the future of the Congo as a whole, though it is frequently unable to influence the Union Minière du Haut Katanga or the UMHK's representatives in Katanga. When it is able to carry the UMHK people in Brussels, they are not always able to persuade their representatives on the spot to carry out instructions.

17. The UK is another interested party, not only because of its large financial stake in Katanga, but further by reason of its involvement in the Rhodesias. The latter are now going through an extremely delicate and highly important phase of decolonization which would almost certainly be adversely affected by another upheaval in the Congo, particularly by another round of fighting in Katanga. The UK Government would probably accept and cooperate with any measures to bring a resolution of present problems in the Congo so long as they did not involve use of force in Katanga.

18. Most of the Afro-Asian states regard Katanga's integration as a moral obligation incumbent on the Western world and the UN. Were integration efforts to fail, many Afro-Asian states would consider the US responsible along with the UK, Belgium, and France. Soviet Bloc states are currently playing no significant role in the Congo, but they will be alert to exploit for their own purposes any change which turns Adoula or the Afro-Asians against the West on the issue of integration.

19. The UN itself is also a party to the situation. There are differences of opinion on UN objectives and courses of action among the various responsible UN officials in New York and in the Congo. UN officials generally are acutely conscious of the extent to which the world organization's future is tied to the success of its operations in the Congo. Most UN officials and commanders of the military units in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) are disposed to use the UN's influence and authority to press for integration and some even favor the use of UNOC troops to force Tshombe to his knees. Past experiences in the use of military force for political objectives in the Congo have, however, made some of them cautious. The Acting Secretary General, U Thant, probably shares the interest of his advisers in integration of the Congo, but he is concerned about financial problems, and dubious of the use of force by the UN. He also probably considers that the UN lacks the means and the mandate to impose integration by force.
Prospects

20. Despite their inability to reach agreement yet and the lack of promise that they will be able to do so on their own, Adoula's and Tshombe's minimal political requirements are not necessarily irreconcilable. We believe that each is capable of making the concessions which would satisfy the political problems of the other without himself losing his own political position. Adoula's minimum needs would probably be satisfied by recognition of the formal civil and military authority of the Central Government and assured access to Katanga revenues. Tshombe needs a grant of partial autonomy to the government of Katanga—something which all the provinces probably will ultimately demand—and a guarantee of revenues. Each is afraid to offer concessions before the other has come forth with balancing concessions and each distrusts the other's good faith in the implementation of an agreement. The UN can certainly continue to play an important role as mediator, but settlement is unlikely unless further pressures are brought to bear on both parties at the same time.

21. We believe that such pressures, to be effective, would have to be imposed upon both Tshombe and Adoula, and that they would have to be agreed to and jointly exercised primarily by the UN, the US, the UK, and Belgium, including Belgian economic interests in the Congo. We also believe that they would be most effective if developed in support of a master plan to develop and unify the Congo, politically and militarily as well as economically, but which would permit a considerable degree of provincial autonomy.

22. The threat to use UN military force against him might, in certain circumstances, influence Tshombe to enter into agreements integrating Katanga into the Central Government. Tshombe himself, as well as the economic interests in Katanga, would wish to avoid the physical damages inescapable in the case of hostilities.

23. However, the actual use of UN military force to bring concessions from Katanga would raise many difficulties. The UN forces as presently constituted in Katanga probably could not successfully expand operations beyond securing and holding areas presently occupied. In north and central Katanga, they are few in number and do not possess offensive capabilities. In southern Katanga, they would meet strong resistance if they attempted to occupy areas outside Elisabethville, particularly the Katangan military strongholds at Jadotville and Kolwezi. However, if provided with additional logistical support and freedom of military action, including air operations, present UN forces probably could secure and hold all the main centers in Katanga. In this last case, however, Katanga forces would be likely to resort to guerrilla-type operations and could severely harass UN forces for some time. In any event, we believe that once hostilities were actually in train between UN forces and Katanga, the prospects for the restoration of a peaceful unified Congo would not be bright.

24. Any extensive use of UN forces against Katanga would be strongly opposed by our Western Allies. In particular, the UK would be apprehensive that any violence in Katanga would upset the political transition now under way in Northern Rhodesia. Hostilities in southern Katanga would almost certainly involve physical damage to the economy and place foreign investment in
jeopardy and thus be opposed by all having economic interests there.

25. Unless tangible progress is made toward integration of Katanga, the Central Government—under Adoula or a successor—increasingly will be tempted to resort to radical courses of action outside the UN framework. One of these will probably be to send the Congolese Army (ANC) against Tshombe. The ANC, however, is almost certainly incapable of imposing Leopoldville's authority on southern Katanga. External help from Afro-Asian and Bloc sources could in time—probably a good many months—improve the ANC, but we anticipate that at the same time a buildup of Katangan forces would take place. In any event a military showdown would not resolve the problems of Congo unity but rather would result in disorders reminiscent of the summer of 1960. Likewise, efforts to rebuild public administration in the Congo are likely to be frustrated, as would be attempts to organize and develop the economy of the country as a whole.
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DISTRIBUTION:
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FOR: CIA - Mr. McCona

FROM: William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

For your information.

SECURITY ATTACHMENT

Approved For Release 2003/06/16: CIA-RDP80B01676R003000080014

Contingency plan for Congo
November 9, 1962

FOR: CIA - Mr. McCone

FROM: William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

For your information.

SECRET ATTACHMENT
SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION SLIP
(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO: AF - Mr. MacQuaid
Control # 18541

Date November 9, 1962

Subject: Memorandum for Mr. Brubeck, from Mr. Carl Kaysen, dated November 7, re Contingency Plan for the Congo.

ACTION:

☑️ For appropriate handling action.

☐ For direct reply.

☑️ Prepare reply.

* PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.
RETURN BASIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH REPLY. IF DELAYED CALL TELEPHONE EXTENSION BELOW.

AF should coordinate and follow up on this.

A response for signature by the _ should be submitted to S/S by _.

Appropriate clearances should be obtained, including _.

☐ For your information.

Remarks:

(Copy of memorandum attached)

cc: S - Mr. Swank EUR - Mr. Holloway
    U - Mr. Hartman G/PM - Mr. Dunlop
    G - Mr. Hackler SCA - Mrs. LeStrange
    IO - Mr. Handyside
    S/S - Carol Moor
    CIA - Mr. McConc (with Contingency Ext. 7552 Plan)
    DOD - Mr. McNamara (with Contingency Plan)
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Congo Review

1. The President reviewed the Congo problem with the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State Ball, Under Secretary McGhee, Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Mr. Wayne Fredericks and Mr. Harlan Cleveland on November 7.

2. The President approved the plan of action presented in the State Department paper of November 6, "Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo." In so doing, the President directed that discussions be begun as soon as feasible with the Belgians on their willingness to undertake sanctions against Tshombe. Mr. McGhee would go to Brussels for these discussions. He would make clear to the Belgians that we were asking for a contingent commitment conditional on Adoula's performing his part of the program and Tshombe's failing to act. We would at the same time make it clear to Adoula that our willingness to impose further pressures on Tshombe, including the economic sanctions, would be conditional on his making progress with the list of his tasks under the program. The exact time and mode of this negotiation was left open.

3. The President requested that the Secretary of State and Mr. McGhee brief all senators going to the Congo on our national policy with respect to the Congo and, to the extent possible, see that a well balanced group of senators did in fact make visits there.

4. The President directed an examination of the problems of moving to expel Strucens; he asked Mr. Kayser to be responsible for this.

CIA-DO-DOD "" ""

Carl Kayser

Approved For Release 2003/08/16: CIA-RDP80B01676R003000080014-8
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NEAL GEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo

Attached is the proposed contingency plan for the Congo. The first draft of this plan was approved yesterday afternoon by the Secretary. Mr. McGehee subsequently revised the plan incorporating certain ideas expressed by the Secretary in the meeting that followed the Secretary's approval of the first draft. Mr. McGehee will not return from Maxwell Air Force Field until later this evening.

/s/ E. S. Little

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment

S/S-S: HAHolmes: mao: 11/6/62

Approved For Release 2003/06/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00300008014-8
PROPOSED CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE CONGO

Objective of our Policy

Stated in positive terms, the objective of our policy in the Congo is to achieve the settlement of the Katanga secession on terms representing agreement between Adoula and Tshombe, so that the outcome would be a viable Central Government under Adoula with Katanga retaining a reasonable measure of autonomy. In negative terms, we want to prevent a large-scale civil war as well as involvement of the UN in fighting, we want to deny to the radical Afro-Asians and the Bloc the opportunity of bringing the Congo into the sphere of their influence, and we want to prevent the UN from suffering a defeat in its first attempt at settling by military presence a major conflict.

Possible Developments

Although some progress is being made toward integration of Katanga through the UN Plan, we may at any time face a deadlock which we cannot resolve by pressure on Adoula and on Tshombe without risking renewed fighting between the UN and the Katanga troops. We do see a definite risk of such fighting if the UN should attempt to impose the Leopoldville Government on Katanga through forceful measures, even if limited to the economic field. A deadlock would not, however, last indefinitely but sooner or later would result either in withdrawal of the UN from the Congo, large-scale fighting between the AEC and the Katanga gendarmerie or the disappearance of the Adoula Government.

These developments might occur as follows:

a) UN withdrawal might result from pressure by the GOC and the radical Afro-Asian countries for enforcement of the UN plan and our or other influential governments' refusal to permit the UN to take drastic action against Tshombe. In such a situation the Congolese Government would most likely request the UN to withdraw, or alternatively the Indians, Ethiopians, Indonesians, and other Afro-Asian nations contributing soldiers would withdraw their troops so that the UN could no longer stay in the Congo and the Secretary General would have to ask the Security Council to revoke the mandate under which he operates. This situation would give the USSR an opportunity to re-intervene in the Congo.

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The effects of a UN withdrawal for any of these reasons, whether by decision originating in Leopoldville or in New York, as a result of lack of troops, funds, or our or others' refusal to permit the UN to support the ANC, would create a very serious situation in the UN itself. The US would clash with the Africans supported, of course, by the Bloc. As a result of such a clash, the US position in the UN as well as in Africa would suffer and the prestige of the UN itself would be at stake.

b) Outbreak of large-scale hostilities between ANC and Katangaese troops might result from a decision of the GOC to attempt ending the secession by military force, without prior UN approval. Should at such time the UN still be in the Congo, there would be considerable pressure on the Secretary General from the GOC and Afro-Asian countries to give Leopoldville assistance. Unless the fighting ended rapidly with a victory of the ANC, which is very unlikely, the pressure for UN support of the ANC would become very great and if we successfully opposed such support, the pressures on the UN to withdraw from the Congo would also increase substantially. In fact, certain nations contributing military forces to UNOC might wish to withdraw them and place them at the direct disposal of the Leopoldville Government. Tshombe on the other hand would get strong covert support from the European and white African sources.

c) Should the ANC engage in action without foreign support and be defeated by the Katangaese, the Adoula Government would certainly fall. Since Adoula is generally recognized as being pro-American and following the policy of reconciliation, which the West has developed and supported, any new government would have an anti-Western bias.

d) Downfall of Adoula in a parliamentary session is likely if the Katanga issue is not resolved within the near future. Adoula now envisages transforming parliament into a constituent assembly which would take up the draft constitution. This may defer the day of reckoning. If this does not work Adoula, with the help of the chiefs of the army and police, might dissolve parliament and govern with emergency powers granted by President Kasavubu. Such a government, however, would have a very difficult time obtaining UN cooperation. A similar situation existed in 1960-61 before the Adoula Government was formed. The Afro-Asian
nations would consider Adoula an American "stooge" and insist that the UN not give its support.

e) Conceivably, a downfall of Adoula in a parliamentary session might permit one of his opponents to form a government. By all indications such a government would be much less amenable to UN and US wishes. Radical influences would become dominant. Eventually the Congo would join the group of the anti-Western neutralists. Algeria, Ghana and Yugoslavia are among those most likely to play an important role in such a situation. If troops were not offered by the African extremists to be used against Katanga, an extremist Congolese government would probably be willing to accept Bloc military assistance, if not troops, which would presumably be available for this purpose. The Congo would become the focus of African nationalism, which would not stop at the borders of Rhodesia and Angola.

Alternative US Policies

Strong US support of the UN position in the Congo, in particular its military and administrative capabilities, and of the Adoula Government through economic aid and support of the re-training and re-equipment of the ABC, would greatly reduce the danger of a serious deadlock developing on the UN Plan. In case such a deadlock did develop, such support should permit us to make an attempt at resolving it with good prospect of success. In particular, we should be able to influence Adoula's policy effectively and induce him to take a flexible attitude and increase his ability to withstand extremist pressures within the Parliament and his government.

A deliberate policy by the US Government to withdraw from the Congo by refusal to continue supplying airlift for the UN troops, by proposing the withdrawal of the UN itself from the Congo, or by creating financial difficulties for the continued operation of the UN in the Congo, would have the effects described above under (a). It would provide a ready opportunity for the Bloc to castigate the US as destroying the UN and might even permit them to muster a majority vote in the General Assembly in which the US and other Western powers would be made responsible for the UN inability to implement the resolutions of the Security Council in the Congo.

Recommended
Should the present effort of the UN to renew progress on the UN plan be unsuccessful we should engage in appropriate consultation with the UN, the Belgians and the British in order to obtain agreement on the following program:

1. Messages would be sent by the respective governments at an appropriate level to Aouda and Tsahome, urging them to resume work on the implementation of the UN plan.

2. The UN should define specific steps it expects both parties to take within a very short period of time, which should be stated.

3. With regard to Tsahome, these steps should include:
   a) release of UN supplies at the borders;
   b) regular monthly payments to Leopoldville of a fixed percentage, determined at the time, from revenues and foreign exchange earnings and acceptance of the principle of foreign exchange payments pending full agreement this issue;
   c) rendering of the oath by the military;
   d) acceptance of GOC customs and passport inspection at the Elisabethville airport which Aouda would be asked to open;

   e) instruction
e) instruction to Katangan representatives in the military and other commissions to cooperate constructively and the setting of firm deadlines for accomplishment of their tasks;

f) closing down the Foreign Ministry and of Katangese offices abroad;

g) granting freedom of movement for the UN in South Katanga, beginning first; with the inspection of South Katanga military facilities.

4. We would follow up vigorously with Adoula the particular requests made of Bomako by McCreery on October 31. Specifically, we would urge Adoula

a) to facilitate parliamentary consideration of the new constitution and give Katanga an opportunity to present proposed modifications;

b) to cooperate with the UN in putting tripartite observation teams into the field if this had not been done;

c) to issue a suitable amnesty and facilitate the execution of the oath of allegiance by the Katanga gendarmerie;

d) to instruct his representatives in the military commission and economic commissions to adopt realistic and flexible attitudes towards Katanga's real problems and accept deadlines for the accomplishment of their tasks;

e) to cooperate by every means possible in arrangements outside the plan, such as the opening of Elisabethville airport, establishment of CCC customs and immigration facilities in Katanga, etc.; and

f) in general do his part in creating a feeling of mutual confidence.

5. The UNOC military posture in Katanga would be strengthened

a) by
a) by making available to UNOC two or more US Air Force cargo planes of adequate capacity to transport weapons, carriers, and other equipment into Elisabethville as well as aviation fuel and other supplies;

b) by increasing the Air Force capacity of the UNOC, preferably by obtaining an Italian or other European fighter squadron. If these are not available US fighter aircraft would be made available, with pilots of other nationality;

c) If desirable, efforts would be made to obtain additional UN troops.

The basic concept of this operation would be to strengthen the UN posture so to leave no doubt in the mind of Tshombe and his friends that the UN is able to back up the UN plan and could withstand an attack by Tshombe’s military forces. In this way the danger of fighting would be greatly reduced.

6. In order to strengthen our capacity to influence Adoula, in particular to be able to make sure that he does not start large-scale fighting in North Katanga or be forced to resign, we would supplement our efforts to strengthen the UN posture by a program to strengthen Adoula’s Government. This should include, in particular

a) stepping up of the implementation of the Greco plan by supplying transport and other equipment to the AMC;

b) the sponsoring of a training program for AMC officers;

c) training of an airborne gendarmerie unit; and

d) further efforts to obtain financial support for the Congo to supplement US aid.

On the other hand, Tshombe would be deprived of any recognition of independence by

e) discontinuation of direct postal and telecommunication services with Katanga; and

f) refusal of visas and entry permits to Katangese without Congolese passports.
7. In order to add force to these efforts and credibility to their being carried out, Tshombo and Adoula would both be advised that if Tshombo did not carry out the measures requested of him, and there was continuing support of the Plan by Adoula, that, after a definite period, say one month, the following actions would automatically be taken:

a) Belgian technicians would be withdrawn from Katanga;

b) Belgian and other companies operating in Katanga would be requested by their governments to pay their taxes and foreign exchange receipts directly to the COC;

c) The COC would be requested to deny foreign exchange for imports to companies in the Congo associated with any companies that did not comply.

These steps can obviously not be undertaken without prior approval with the UN, the Belgian Government, and at least the acquiescence of the British Government. The approval of the Belgian Government would in all probability require some offers of assistance from the US Government as has been discussed with them to compensate for damages sustained by Belgian companies and Belgian nationals and Katangese.

Possible Results

If in fact it became necessary to carry out these measures, there is a real possibility that Tshombo would take retaliatory action against Belgian and other foreign nationals in Katanga and, in the event that it appeared that the stoppage of the plants would be threatening, might seek to take them over or perhaps even attempt their physical destruction. Under these circumstances the UN would make its best efforts to extend protection, which it would be in a better position to do for having been strengthened. In any event, the end product would likely be the closing down of the plants and a large scale exodus of Europeans, which would mean that the functioning of Katanga as an economic entity in anything like its present form would become impossible.

At this stage there would be a very real possibility of direct conflict between the UN and Katangan troops. However, if would,
if it occurred, be as a result of Katangan initiative, which would make UN efforts to defend itself and extend its control over the remaining populated Katanga area, much easier from the standpoint of UN, US and world public opinion. The UN could then attempt to seize control of these areas, and, if successful, forcibly integrate that portion of Katanga into the Congo. Although Katangese resistance might continue in the "bush," it should be possible to insulate it from the populated areas and it would ultimately subside.

The eventualities which may result from the application of strong economic measures are ones that we would much prefer to avoid. However, it is believed that they represent a much lesser ultimate danger to the US, the UN and the free world, than to permit through failing to take the risks involved, the consequences which would otherwise ensue.
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**ACTION**
- DIRECT REPLY
- PREPARE REPLY

**APPROVAL**
- DISPATCH
- RECOMMENDATION

**COMMENT**
- FILE
- RETURN

**CONCURRENCE**
- INFORMATION
- SIGNATURE

**Remarks:**
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
INR-13, March 29, 1963

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: INR - Thomas L. Hughes

SUBJECT: The Soviets, the UN and the Congo

To avert Soviet bilateral military, technical and other assistance to the Congo, the US and Belgium have agreed to seek UN assent to a proposal that all bilateral aid projects for the Congo be submitted to UN approval. It has been assumed that the Soviets would be reluctant to break their apparent precedent of refusing aid to the Congo so long as proposals were required to be submitted to prior UN coordination. Afro-Asian and Soviet claims that U Thant favors the Western powers, however, have made the Secretary General reluctant to accept a formula providing a UN "umbrella" for assistance to the Congo. Against this background, we analyze recent evidence of Soviet interest in furnishing military and other aid and the possible aims of current Soviet policy toward the Congo.

ABSTRACT

The USSR is attempting to scuttle Western proposals for UN coordination of Congolese National Army (ANC) retraining and of foreign economic and technical assistance to the Congo. The Soviets apparently seek primarily to prevent a Western aid monopoly by opposing a UN "umbrella" requiring UN approval of any eventual Soviet aid to the Congo. The mercurial character of Congolese politics, irresponsibility of the ANC, and chaotic economic conditions likely will open new opportunities for bloc involvement. Although the Soviets have shown an interest in bilateral assistance, and have gone so far as to suggest their possible participation in UN-sponsored ANC retraining, they probably conclude that their immediate interests are well served by harassing Western proposals. If the USSR is frustrated in its attempt to foreclose a UN "umbrella" on aid programs, however, it may be expected to redouble charges that the West seeks a UN or Western trusteeship in the Congo.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
Congo Army Retraining

a. Background

The Congo Government seeks through retraining to make the undisciplined and ill-trained Congolese National Army (ANC) an effective security force. A program prepared by the US -- the so-called "Greene Plan" -- envisaged the participation of Belgium and other Western powers in carefully phased retraining of all elements of the ANC. To implement the Greene Plan, Belgium and the US have also suggested the establishment of a multi-national retraining coordination group responsible to the UN. Though U Thant originally favored the proposed plan, in the face of Afro-Asian and Soviet pressure he reversed in late March his earlier approval, and appeared prepared to reject UN sponsorship of ANC retraining.

b. Soviet Offers of Military Assistance

On March 22, the Congolese Chief of Staff, General Mobutu, stated that the Soviet Military Attache in Brussels had approached his Congolese counterpart there with offers to provide everything required for ANC retraining, including equipment, weapons, literature, and technicians, provided the Congo Government first got the UN out of the Congo. Earlier in mid-February, the USSR had offered to the UN -- through UN Under Secretary Kiselev, a Soviet national -- assistance in ANC retraining.

The recent Soviet offers constitute a renewal of earlier proposals made during the last months of Katanga's secession. In October, November, and December 1962, before the UN sweep in Katanga, the USSR reportedly offered Congolese civil and military officials military aid sufficient to subdue the province, provided the Congo expelled the UN. Following press reports in December that the US would provide military aid to the Congo, the Soviet Union reportedly told the UN Secretariat privately that it, too, wanted to contribute military assistance to the Congo. Soviet participation at that time probably was averted by the limitation of the US role to logistical support.

2. Soviet Offers of Economic Aid

No hard Soviet offers of Soviet economic aid have yet been made to the Idula Government. The UN Chief of Civil Operations in the Congo said March 15 that, during his recent visit to New York, a senior Soviet official in the UN Secretariat told him the USSR was
Considering favorably an offer of bilateral technical assistance to the Congo, possibly in the field of mining technology. The Soviet official linked this offer to a public statement by the Secretary General suggesting the Congo be opened to bilateral assistance. Earlier, in October 1962, upon the arrival in Leopoldville of the Soviet Ambassador, Moscow had suggested in general terms its readiness to extend economic aid to the Congo.

The Soviets will be tempted to capitalize on any future Western hesitation in the aid field. The principal obstacle to date to Soviet assistance has been the strong pro-Western sentiments of Prime Minister Adoula and his small circle of advisors. Were the Adoula Government to fall, or were the Prime Minister to include in his cabinet radical nationalist elements, Congolese official resistance to Soviet aid might be diluted. Moreover, if the Western powers are unable to meet the massive Congolese needs and expectations for assistance, Adoula will be under strong pressure to accept any future bloc offers.

3. Soviet Preference for Bilateral Aid

Between the alternatives of a military aid program for the Congo under a UN "umbrella" or on a bilateral basis, the USSR appears to favor a bilateral approach and termination of UN responsibility. Early in March, Moscow officially called for the withdrawal of UN troops from the Congo, stating that the UN exceeds its military mandate by maintaining troops indefinitely in the Congo solely because the country is beset by domestic problems. Soviet press and radio denunciation of a Western military aid program under UN auspices has meshed effectively with this anti-UN line. Soviet preference for bilateral aid possibly was further indicated in the approach to the Congolese military attache in Brussels, described above, and in recent reports that, for the first time, the Soviet Embassy in Leopoldville was giving heavy bribes to ANC junior officers and men. The bribes may be a Soviet attempt, among other objectives, to enhance ANC receptivity to bloc military aid, as well as to inhibit ANC support for a military take-over in the event the Parliamentary opposition were successful in replacing the government of Prime Minister Adoula with a coalition of a more radical cast. Against this evidence, the apparently contradictory Soviet offer to the UN to assist in a multilateral program for retraining the ANC may be a tactic to retain the possibility of participation in a UN-sponsored program should the Soviets desire.
Soviet Motives

Recent Soviet tactics suggest their desire to maintain and, if possible, eventually play an expanded role in the Congo, while at the same time preventing a Western aid monopoly in the country. To date, however, they have been forced to restrict their activities to covert and tentative encouragement of radical parliamentarians and potential AEC dissidents. But the mercenary character of Congolese politics, the irresponsibility of the U.N., and the chaotic condition of the economy will open new opportunities for bloc involvement. Moreover, the gusto to which any Congo government will be subjected in coming months may make impractical Congolese leaders' efforts to maintain an "umbrella" over aid programs, even if proffered.

The Soviets probably have reckoned the financial and other costs of involvement at this time and may have concluded that little will be lost in waiting. Although they sacrifice by abstention a possible opportunity to interfere in the development of economic institutions, their aloofness also serves to prevent Soviet identification with assistance programs whose success in stabilizing the Congo is far from assured. Moreover, were Moscow to provide aid to the Alculla regime, it would be widely construed at least as tacit endorsement of the present moderate Congo government, if not of the overall aid program being devised mainly by the West. It might also tend to dampen Soviet covert efforts to subvert the Alculla regime.

Apart from its interest in the Congo, Moscow may also be motivated by a desire to impress upon the UN its claim that the Soviet Union, like the West, must be at least consulted in matters of general interest, particularly in underdeveloped or former colonial areas.

5. Likely Soviet Reaction to Escalation

Besides its apparently primary Soviet effort to scuttle UN sponsorship of AEC retraining, and its less forceful offer to participate in UN-sponsored training the Soviets have pursued a third approach. They have attacked Western plans for AEC retraining as an attempt to place the Congo under a UN or Western trusteeship in order to preserve Western financial domination. Javansky charged March 22 that the US intends to use its presence in the Congo as a means of dominating other African states and preventing the national liberation movement from spreading to the southern third of the continent. If the USSR is frustrated in its apparent attempts to be included in a program to retrain the Congolese army, Moscow likely will redouble these charges in propaganda to the Congo and other African states, possibly as part of an intensified
effort to obtain UN withdrawal from the Congo. A Soviet representative told the Secretary General March 27 that the Western proposal for ANC retraining, if persisted in, would invoke a Soviet demand for discussion in the Security Council. Moscow's stance at the UN under these conditions would be influenced to some extent, however, by the attitudes of other African states. Although the USSR is on record as favoring a withdrawal of UN military forces, Moscow may hesitate to press the issue in the Security Council or the General Assembly unless some Afro-Asian states also support it. In manifesting its displeasure, Moscow will also be handicapped by its desire to avoid giving public offense to the Aduola regime. Moscow's failure to give tangible support to Ghana's recent call for a Security Council meeting on Lumumba's murder is evidence of such Soviet concern for Congo Government sensibilities.
Congo White Paper

I. Summary
II. Background
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restored order throughout much of the vast Congo (one-third the size of the United States). It had also preempted a serious colonial issue and avoided a potential conflict between Belgian and African forces.

b. Political Disunity and Cold-war Threat

New internal political issues were simultaneously injected into the Congo crisis which further threatened security in the Congo and international peace. A violent political struggle erupted between Premier Lumumba and President Kasavubu, resulting in the assassination of over 30 leaders and tremendous civil disturbance. Premier Lumumba sought massive Soviet aid, invoking the threat of cold-war conflict. The Government's collapse and arrival of Bloc personnel and equipment further complicated the situation.

There were two main related, political issues. The first was the country's orientation and the second was its unity. Patrice Lumumba, the Premier, was a reckless, burning personality, suspicious of Europeans, prepared to maximize East-West competition to his own ends, and determined to create a tightly centralized state under his personal control. President Kasavubu was a moderate, favoring collaboration with the West, and a unified but federal state with considerable local autonomy in recognition of the Congo's predominantly tribal structure.

The Congolese had not resolved these issues among themselves upon independence. They had had no chance to do so. Political activity had been permitted only two years previously. Over 115 parties, representing the main tribal elements, sprang up. Governmental institutions—the presidency, premiership, national parliament and local assemblies—were created just weeks before independence. Although the country had been
a unit for 75 years, and had a closely knit economic and colonial administrative structure, it began self-government with minimum political cohesion and experience.

The secession of Katanga under provincial president Tshombe on July 11, 1960, and Kasa-Vubu's dismissal of Lumumba September 5, inaugurated a new phase in Congo developments. To obtain the means of attacking Tshombe, Lumumba requested Soviet aid. The USSR quickly furnished 17 transport planes with pilots and ground crews, 100 trucks, supplies, and considerable funds. Lumumba's attempted attack on Tshombe during August precipitated wide tribal fighting. To stem Lumumba's increasing imperiousness, left orientation, and use of violence, Kasa-Vubu dismissed him from office. Lumumba then dismissed Kasa-Vubu and confusion reigned supreme.

The Congbé, without an effective government, started disintegrating. As the first step in battling the process, United Nations forces stopped the fighting in Kasai by closing the airfields to Lumumba's troops, an effort was then made to bring about a national reconciliation.

c. Restoration of Central Government

The Conference of Congolese leaders in early 1961 at Coquilhatville Tananarive and in early 1961 failed to resolve the associated questions of political orientation and national structure. Progress on these issues was achieved by the reconvening of parliament under strong United Nations encouragement and full guarantees of safety. If established a broadly supported, internationally recognized Government under Premier Adoula, a moderate, progressive leader. The UN chief mandate given Adoula was the reunification of the country.
each state and maximize their share of revenue originating in their area. Until such a law should come into effect, the Central Government and Katanga would share equally all tax revenue (as had been the practice prior to Katanga's secession) from mining concessions. All foreign exchange earned anywhere in the Congo would immediately be remitted to the National Monetary Council or to an institution names by it. The Central Government also was to request through the United Nations experts from the International Monetary Fund who would work out a phased program of currency stabilization. The standardization of currency would be effective ten days after approval of the program by the Central Government.

Military reintegration was to begin with an oath of allegiance by all military and gendarmerie commanders to the President of the Congo. With the help of United Nations experts a commission composed of a Central Government and a Katangan representative would draw up within thirty days a plan for the integration of all forces into national army and national gendarmerie units. This plan would be executed in sixty days.

Conduct of foreign affairs was recognized as a Central Government function and no state was to maintain overseas representation without the Governments' consent. The Central Government was expected to enact a general amnesty while Premier Adoula would reconstitute his cabinet, offering ministries to Tshombe's Comakat party. Finally, all central and state authorities were to cooperate fully with the execution of United Nations resolutions.

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1/ The National Monetary Council serves as the Congo's Federal Reserve Board and is directed by United Nations personnel.
appropriate, however, as efforts to implement the Plan slowly bogged down in the following months.

F. Implementation Efforts

The United Nations quickly followed up acceptance of the Plan by detailed implementation proposals which were presented to Premier Adoula, and Tshombe on September 10. These had been worked out in consultation with the Governments sponsoring the Plan. They called for the immediate creation of three commissions composed of Central Government, Katangan, and United Nations representatives which would arrange the execution of the Plan's military, revenue, and foreign exchange proposals. The Central Government would simultaneously proceed with preparing the constitution, financial law and amnesty while Tshombe would close Katanga's missions abroad and have Katangan officers take an oath of allegiance to President Kasavubu.

The Commissions met in mid-September at Elisabethville and set to work immediately. Progress was slow. The two Congolese delegations approached the problem from opposite extremes. The Katangans considered the Commissions as means of negotiating the Plan's provisions while the Central Government felt they were primarily executive. As the Plan was more an outline than a blueprint, however, there was room for considerable discussion.

The military commission, which was to arrange the integration of the National Army and Katangan gendarmerie, met on September 22. After preliminary talks showed little progress, it attempted to break the stalemate by arranging a cease-fire in northern Katanga.
U Thant on September 5 had declared that in view of the acceptance of the Plan there was "no further need for troop movements in the Katanga on either side." As part of the implementation proposals, U Thant had also appealed for cessation of troop movements and promised United Nations assistance in supervising it.

The commission succeeded in reaching a cease-fire agreement on October 16. It provided for observer groups composed of Central Government, Katangan, and United Nations representatives. These groups were to have full freedom of movement in northern Katanga to direct the removal of roadblocks, exchange of prisoners, and cessation of troop and supply movements. The cease-fire did not include southern Katanga, from which mercenaries had been flying supplies to Tshombe's forces in the north and bombing Central Government troops. It also did not accord the United Nations the freedom of movement throughout the Katanga which Tshombe had been notified was an integral part of the Plan.

The Revenue and Foreign Exchange Commissions met on September 21. They had reached only tentative agreement by mid-October despite the strongest encouragement of United Nations representatives. The revenue commission developed a program for centralizing customs procedures and reopening national transport routes. There was no agreement on the division of revenue accruing from customs taxes and the Katangans made no payments on the provisional 50-50 basis...
specified in the Plan. Tabombe did publicly announce on October 17 that he was depositing two million dollars to the MM account of the Central Government as an installment but the money was never received.

The exchange commission followed a similar pattern, agreeing on procedures but not on actual payments. On October 13 and 14 it accepted proposals for MM consolidating exchange controls in the Monetary Council and for arranging financial transfers. There was no agreement on the amount of foreign exchange to be retained by the Central Government. When the Katangans refused to MM begin remitting exchange to the Monetary Council as called for in the Plan, the commission was stymied.

Implementation of other aspects of the Plan ran into similar difficulties. The draft constitution prepared by the international jurists was submitted to parliament on October 13 by the Central Government. It was not, however, brought up for debate as expected under the Plan. Premier Adoula instead called for discussion of the constitution at a meeting of all provincial governments and political groups in Leopoldville from October 16-23. The Katangan authorities declined to attend. A widely representative provincial group did participate in the talks, but more interest was shown in the practical administrative questions of taxation, transport, and schooling than in constitutional phraseology. When Tabombe continued to contend that he was ignorant of constitutional
developments despite publication of the draft at the October meeting, the United Nations furnished him a copy on November 15. Other aspects of the Plan met with complete disagreement. Premier Aduola promised safe conduct for Katangan gendarmerie officers coming to Leopoldville for the oath of allegiance. Tshombe refused to send the officers unless there was a general amnesty. He submitted a draft proposal to the Central Government which would have amnestied mercenaries and freed Gizenga and other radical leaders outside Katanga. The Central Government was willing to issue a general amnesty for Katanga, but this was unacceptable to Tshombe.

In the field of foreign affairs, the Central Government sent immigration officials to Elisabethville to provide Katangans appropriate services. The Katangan authorities ignored them and continued to maintain several missions abroad, including an "Information Office" in the United States.

A virtual standstill on the Plan's implementation was reached on October 18 when the Central Government disavowed the ceasefire accord achieved by the military commission. Katangan failure to execute the clearly defined provisional revenue and foreign exchange obligations of the Plan had aroused strong feeling in Parliament and within Aduola's cabinet. The continued bombing of National Army troops in northern Katanga by mercenary flown planes from the south excited further anger. When the cease-fire was found to cover only northern Katanga and to omit United Nations freedom of movement, Aduola was faced with internal revolution. He managed to control it but at the cost of rejecting the cease-fire.
The United Nations and other sponsors of the Plan had been exercising maximum diplomatic pressure to encourage its implementation. The Plan appeared the best and fairest means to achieve reintegration peacefully. To help promote settlement on these terms, the Department of State's Under Secretary for Political Affairs George McGhee undertook a three-week mission in the Congo. He had long talks with Premier Adoula and Tshombe which helped achieve some progress during early October. Tshombe was reassured at length that the United States was seeking not the destruction of Katanga but rather stability throughout the Congo through the creation of a fair and reasonable federal structure. Radio-telephone communications were reestablished between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. The railroad was reopened and two freight car loads of copper were shipped through to Leopoldville. (The Katangans, however, refused to remit the Monetary Council even the small amount of foreign exchange involved in this shipment.) These small advances were encouraging at the time but they were nullified by the failure of the three commissions to advance on the major issues.

Faced again with a stalemate, the United Nations, United States, and other UN sponsoring Governments concerted efforts to revive peaceful integration. With strong United States support, the United Nations sent identical letters to Premier Adoula (Nov. 1) and to Tshombe (Nov. 2). These reviewed the two parties' commitments
and assessed their respective performances under the Plan.

It was noted that while the actions of the Central Government were not to be minimized, the purpose of the Plan was to end the secession and the main burden was on Katanga to give up its separatist attitude.

Premier Adoula replied November 9, reaffirming the Central Government's complete support of the Plan. On November 13, he reviewed the positive steps taken by his government and again offered ministerial posts to Tshombe. The Katangan reply of November 12 cited the reopening of telecommunications and rail traffic as indicative of its cooperativeness and blamed the Central Government for lack of progress on implementation. The United Nations replied to Tshombe on November 16, declaring that if he really wished to end secession Katangan officers should take the oath of allegiance, the provisional revenue and exchange obligations should be fulfilled, and United Nations forces should be allowed freedom of movement. The Katangans took no actions on these points.

During the remainder of November, the rift between the Central Government and Katanga deepened under the stress of local developments. In Leopoldville, opposition to Premier Adoula strengthened and almost upset the Government. At Elisabethville, tension mounted between the Katangan regime and the United Nations forces.

The trouble in Leopoldville was compounded of frustration with the Reconciliation Plan, local issues, and opportunistic politics. Parliament had resumed on November 14 with the election
of moderate Chamber and Senate officers. A week later, the government decreed martial law over the capital in a drive against an upsurge of banditry. It also arrested Obeny, a radical nationalist leader, for subversion. Many Senators and Deputies feared that the state of emergency would be used either for further arrests or to disband parliament. The radicals then raised a clamor against the government for "softness" towards Tabombe. Tabombe's representatives and opportunists joined them in organizing a vote of censure. The insurgents achieved a narrow majority (50 to 47, with 2 abstentions) on November 28 but the government survived as a successful censure required a two-thirds vote.

Trouble had been growing in Elisabethville little by little. The political leaders continually manifested their dislike of the United Nations. The gendarmes steadily built up military positions around United Nations forces. Patrols, minefields, and roadblocks were used to restrict United Nations movements. An accidental confrontation of opposing patrols at the outskirts of town on September 12 resulted in shooting and two Katangan losses. A United Nations patrol on September 24 suffered two deaths and several men seriously wounded from booby traps in the same area. During November there was continued friction. Tabombe blocked over a million dollars of United Nations supplies on the frontier of southern Katanga. Much of them were pillaged by the gendarmerie. In addition, the Katangans held 33 five Tunisian soldiers whom they offered to release only if the whole contingent were repatriated. The gendarmerie became more belligerent and...
harassment grew. In contrast to the fall of 1961, however, the European population remained largely neutral and avoided involvement.

G. Collapse of Katangan Secession

The combination of the Plan's frustration and rising tensions confronted the United Nations and the United States with the moment of decision at the end of November. Secretary-General U Thant met it firmly. He reiterated the Security Council's mandates to maintain in the Congo's territorial integrity, prevent civil war, keep law and order, and remove foreign military personnel. To achieve them, he moved resolutely to implement the economic sanctions visualized as a last resort under the Plan's courses of actions. The United States, with equal determination, provided the United Nations supplies for its forces and diplomatic support for its policies. The combination broke the back of Katanga's secession.

In the face of the double threat to Premier Adoula's moderate Government at Leopoldville and to the United Nations forces at Elisabethville, the United States approved a series of internal airlifts in the Congo. These flew heavy United Nations vehicles and extra supplies into Elisabethville. Simultaneously, the United States consulted with other major sponsors of the plan. In a joint White House statement on November 27, President Kennedy and Belgian Foreign Minister Speaks reaffirmed their full support of the Plan and declared:

"...The United States Government and the Government of Belgium have up to this point directed their efforts..."
toward accomplishment of the Plan along the XIX/II of voluntary discussions and actions of the parties concerned. This approach has not, however, produced the necessary results. If there is not substantial progress within a very short period of time, the United States Government and the Government of Belgium fully realize that it will be necessary to execute further phases under the United Nations Plan which include severe economic measures."

Other friendly Governments rallied to the support of the United Nations. Sweden announced November 22 that in response to U Thant's request it was sending four more planes for the United Nations Congo force. Italy responded to a similar request, promising five planes. Iran agreed to supply four planes with full groundcrews and the Philippines pledged five more. The United States for its part undertook to furnish the logistic support and transport necessary for these contingents to reach the Congo promptly.

On December 13, after consultations with the United States and other supporting Governments, U Thant notified Tshombe that he had failed to carry out seriously the provisions of the Plan and that economic sanctions would be applied. The next day, Premier Alassa asked seventeen Governments to embargo imports of Katangan copper and cobalt. The Secretary General informed these same states on December 14 that the Central Government's request was fully consistent with the Plan and that he supported it.

At the same time that pressure on Katanga was being increased, the United Nations, United States, and Belgium made new attempts to achieve a break-through on integration. Noting that UNRRA revenue and foreign exchange payments to Katanga were the key to Tshombe's
secession, U Thant appealed to Belgium on December 11 to use all possible influence with UMK to stop such remittances until the problem of their proper division could be settled. Tshombe and the UMK promptly indicated willingness to have the Monetary Council at Leopoldville assume control over foreign exchange but on condition that their own needs were first met. The UMK reportedly was ready to send its representative to Leopoldville. Tshombe, however, felt that Katangan officials should undertake the mission. The UMK then cancelled the departure of its representative on December 21, undercutting the negotiations.

Before new efforts under the Plan could be organized, a series of incidents broke out in Elisabethville. They precipitated a sharp clash between the gendarmerie and United Nations forces that signaled the end of Katangan secession.

During the morning of December 24, random fire directed at a United Nations checkpoint sparked general shooting in the area. A United Nations helicopter investigating the incident was disabled and its personnel captured and beaten. Brigadier Boronka, commander of the Indian troops in XXXX Elisabethville, assembled a force and recovered the helicopter and crew. His conduct exemplified the highest standard of leadership. He stopped the United Nations force several hundred yards short of Katangan positions and walked alone up to the gendarmerie, resolving the incident by negotiation. The presence of Tshombe's military aide-de-camp, who had instructions to assure the release of the plane, assisted in ending the apparently independent outburst by the gendarmerie.
A repetition of the incident occurred on the afternoon of December 27. At that time the firing spread to other areas and continued into the evening. There were no troop movements. The shooting appears to have spread spontaneously, probably from the excitement and nervousness of the Katangan gendarmerie. Mr. Mathu, the United Nations civil representative, and General Prez Chandi, Commander of United Nations forces in Katanga patrolled the city with Tshombe. They verified that the firing was coming from Katangan positions and Tshombe agreed to halt it. The firing did not stop. Next morning it recommenced accompanied by mortars. The United Nations representatives and Tshombe made another tour of the city. The shooting was not generalized and seriously threatened the security of the city and United Nations forces.

During the morning and forenoon of December 28, the United Nations repeatedly pressed Tshombe to stop the shooting and withdraw the roadblocks and gendarmerie from the outskirts of town. When Tshombe refused to accept these proposals, the United Nations representatives informed him that their forces would have to push back the gendarmerie itself if the firing was to be stopped. Tshombe remained unwilling or unable to halt the shooting and the United Nations security movement began.

The central part of Elisabethville remained calm and saw almost no conflict. The gendarmerie on the outskirts of town fired at approaching United Nations forces but made no determined stand. By the end of the next day, December 29, the gendarmerie had been half pushed, half frightened, out of the immediate Elisabethville area.
full of the unfortunate experience of 1961, when a Katangan jet fighter almost immobilized United Nations forces, United Nations planes attacked Katangan aircraft and installations on December 29 and 30. (It should also be noted that these Katangan planes had been brought into Katanga in violation of Security Council resolutions and were operated solely by mercenaries). United Nations forces following up gendarmerie units entered the neighboring town of Kipushi on December 30. There was no fighting and they were welcomed by the local population. Simultaneously, small United Nations units patrolled 10-25 miles out the road to Jadotville, removing mines and barricades.

On December 31 there appears to have been what the United Nations itself described as a regrettable breakdown in effective, quick communication between the United Nations Secretariat in New York and its forces in the field. Acting within their general instructions, United Nations forces reached the Lufira River a few miles outside Jadotville and put a small group across it on December 31. Unaware of the troops' position because of delays in servicing classified cables, the United Nations headquarters, issued an order to halt at the Lufira. It was received at the moment when the troops were under fire and in a position already straddling the river. To safeguard his area, the commander moved next morning against the immediate opposition and found no further resistance. He entered Jadotville on January 1 with the assistance of the UN mayor and local officials and stopped his forces. Most unfortunately, two Belgian women were killed in the process.
Two weeks later, with no further fighting, the United Nations established their full freedom of movement by entering Kolwezi with Tshombe's cooperation. Tshombe's mercenaries departed. Throughout the rest of the Katanga United Nations forces assumed security duties from the gendarmerie.

Katanga's secession was ended, opening an opportunity for the Congo to concentrate on consolidating its productivity and unity. The whole action cost the lives of three European civilians, about 51 Katangese, 9 United Nations soldiers, about 27 gendarmerie, and 2 or 3 mercenaries. The fighting had, however, unquestionably been provoked by the gendarmerie; there was no alternative to preventative action short of capitulation; and the United Nations forces were obligated to restore order under Security Council mandates. The destruction of life and property can only be most deeply regretted. This should nonetheless not obscure the months of patient United Nations effort to negotiate the Katanga issue, the restraint shown throughout the year, and the successful operation of many countries in enabling the Congo now to move towards law and order.
IV. The Internal Security Problem

Concurrent with the major problem of Katangan secession, the United Nations continued to face the remnants of past security problems. Undisciplined rebel troops and delinquent youth massacred churchmen at Kongolo January 1. Lumumbist leader Antoine Gizenga recreated a radical separatist movement in Stanleyville and provoked a small conflict which the Bloc attempted to exploit. Foreign mercenaries continued serving in the Katangan army, contributing to provincial separation and drift toward civil war. In the absence of adequately trained security forces, local disputes still flared into inter-tribal combats disrupting entire communities. These problems were no longer the major issues they had once been. They were strong indications, however, of the continued usefulness of the United Nations presence.

A. Gizenga's Seccession

Antonie Gizenga never accepted Aduola’s election as Premier by Parliament. Gizenga attempted to restore his political power by returning to Stanleyville and creating a radical separatist movement. His efforts to organize a new Lumumbist party failed but he gained control over much of the Orientale province through a private military force.

The Central Government disapproved as much of Gizenga's separatist activities as of Tshombe's. On January 8, 1962, the Chamber of Deputies voted 66 to 2 that Gizenga should return to Leopoldville. When he refused, parliament voted his censure. On January 13, fighting broke out between Gizenga's gendarmes and National Army forces under General Lundula. When fourteen men were killed, Lundula requested United Nations help in disarming Gizenga's troops. With the approval of the Central Government, United Nations
forces cooperated in quelling the outbreak. There was no further bloodshed. Cisenga surrendered and returned to Leopoldville on a United Nations plane.

The prompt action taken by the United Nations proved instrumental not only in maintaining order but in preserving Congolese unity. Cisenga's separatist regime in Stanleyville quickly collapsed and his own political influence dropped abruptly. Cisenga's party renounced his leadership. The Chamber of Deputies removed his parliamentary immunity and voted 76 to 10 its approval of the Government's handling of the issue. After a period of house arrest at Leopoldville, Cisenga was transferred to an island in the mouth of the Congo river where he remained under detention.

B. Bloc Initiatives

The success of the United Nations in meeting the Congo's successive crises had frustrated several Soviet attempts to penetrate the country. They had first supported Lumumba only to lose and be ignominiously expelled from the Congo. They then backed Cisenga for Premier and lost again. In an attempt to save their investment, the Soviets tried early in 1962 to send a medical mission to Stanleyville and to call a Security Council meeting to debate issues beneficial to Cisenga. Both these efforts failed.

The Soviet medical team arrived early in January. It had not been requested by the Central Government and its mission had not been coordinated with United Nations assistance operations. The group immediately pressed United Nations and Central Government officials for permission to work in the Orientale province. After consultation with United Nations and diplomatic representatives in Leopoldville, including the United States, the Central Government insisted that the Soviet team work under the direction of the
World Health Organization. The Soviet doctors were then assigned missions in politically uncontroversial areas. After several months of service, the mission was quietly withdrawn.

Simultaneous with this effort, the Soviet Union on January 26 requested a Security Council meeting, ostensibly to discuss United Nations failure to remove mercenaries by force. (The United Nations was at this moment making every effort to arrange this peacefully, see below). The United States believed that such debate would only serve bloc ends and interrupt the United Nations' effort to implement peacefully the Kinshasa accord. Premier Adoula shared our views and issued a statement on January 28 protesting the Soviets' proposal. The Lagos Conference of African States next day strongly supported Adoula's position. The sixteen Heads of State jointly declared their anxiety at the Soviet initiative and labeled it "unwise and prejudicial to the interests of the Congo." On January 30, the Security Council met in response to the Soviet's request and voted to adjourn before adopting the agenda.

The collapse of Gizenga by no means stopped Soviet efforts to gain influence in the Congo. They invited Premier Adoula to Moscow but the offer was declined. Adoula instead visited the United States in February. Soviet propaganda then concentrated on Katangan secession, apparently hoping to undercut moderate Congolese leadership by creating dissatisfaction with its policy of cooperating with the United Nations on a negotiated settlement.

As the months passed without result, discontent did grow both within and without the Central Government. By November, Premier Adoula's leadership had become seriously threatened and strong pressure had built up to act...
on bloc hints of bilateral assistance. The combination of increased United States support for the United Nations and the decisive events of late December, however, nipped a growing opportunity for Soviet penetration.

C. Mercenaries

Following the Kitona accord, United Nations representatives pressed Tshombe repeatedly to expel mercenaries from Katanga. Nothing was done. On January 26, Tshombe finally declared in a letter to the United Nations that he wished to see the problem resolved "once and for all." He requested a month to accomplish the expulsions, promised a list of all mercenaries who had served in Katanga, and proposed creating joint United Nations-Katanga commissions authorized to investigate mercenaries throughout Katanga.

The United Nations accepted the joint commission proposal. It was agreed that two groups would be formed immediately and that they would have "access to all places to which they wish to go and will be granted all facilities in the accomplishment of their task for the purpose of inquiry and investigation." The commissions visited Jadotville and Kipushi on February 9 and Kolwezi and Sunkeya February 21-23. The Katangans kept the visits formal, provided limited access to installations and maintained steadfastly that there were no mercenaries in Katanga. The United Nations disagreed and the commission effort broke down.

The evidence available to United Nations and diplomatic representatives in the Congo indicated that mercenaries not only remained in Katanga but that their number increased throughout the year. On verifying lists of departed mercenaries presented by Tshombe on January 30 and February 12, the United
Nations found little hard information. There were frequent instances of duplication. Many of those who had died or who had left but returned were included. Through deaths, desertions, and arrests the United Nations established indisputable cases of mercenary activity. By August, when the United Nations reconciliation plan was proposed, it was generally estimated that 300-500 mercenaries were serving in Tangabe's forces.

2. Tribal Problem

The United Nations forces throughout the Congo continually faced the threat of sudden violence erupting from age-old tribal antagonisms. It could be sparked by politics, personal quarrels, or even rumors. Particularly in the Kasai and Kivu, the United Nations provided continuing, unpublicized, local security services. Its forces patrolled wide areas, assisted the arrest of malfeasant s, provided asylum, faced down angry mobs, and in many areas was the backbone for all the police protection available.

In Elisabethville, a particularly difficult problem was created by the Baluba minority which had originally been brought in from the Kasai and north Katanga to work in the mines. In August 1961, many of the Balubas sought United Nations protection from harassment by Tangabe's police. By the end of 1961 there 50-70,000 Baluba and other minority elements in the United Nations refugee camp, constituting a continuing security problem.

Upon finding that many village areas in Kasai and north Katanga would accept the refugees, the United Nations undertook the repatriation of the whole camp. Between the beginning of May and the end of July, over 71,000 were moved out by air or train. Only 280 elected to settle in Elisabethville. On August 1 control of the camp area was transferred to Katanga authorities, resolving a major local security problem.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Counterinsurgency Developments:

1. Congo

The government's military operation to seal the northeast border begun on 14 March was just about completed by 30 March. The military picture remains dark, however, in the Fizi-Uvira area south of Bukavu, where a rebel build-up is under way.

The government advance through the northeast was unexpectedly rapid. There was no effective rebel resistance and sizable quantities of Communist-manufactured arms were recovered. Aru on the Ugandan border was captured on 25 March, and Aba--106 miles to the north and the principal point of entry from Sudan--was captured on 28 March. The column then captured Faradje, 40 miles west of Aba, and one of the last major airfields remaining under rebel control nearby. On 29 March it captured Watsa, believed to be the last rebel stronghold in the northeast. Some of the mercenaries and Congolese have been left behind to garrison the captured towns. A further move to Dungu, 90 miles west of Faradje, is now planned.

The lack so far of any concerted and organized rebel resistance is surprising. Colonel Hoare had estimated that the movement from Bunia to Aba...
would require up to two months. His forces accomplished it by foot and vehicle in less than two weeks. Some of the factors involved in the apparent rebel collapse were the lack of good leadership, the growing disenchantment of the local tribes with the outsiders, and the effectiveness of mercenary units and air strikes.

While some rebel resistance may yet be encountered, the rebels' supply and communications lines have been cut off, and they may not be able to mount more than harassing operations.

Rebels remain active around Paulis. A sizable, well-armed force is reported north of Bumba—240 miles downriver from Stanleyville. The Bumba garrison has recently been reorganized, but operations to clear the banks of the Congo River to Stanleyville have again been postponed. There is also continuing rebel activity in the region southwest of Bumba and east of Boende.

The current key trouble spot is around Fizi in the eastern Congo, where the rebel build-up continues. Rebels are harassing government forces at the important road junction at Lulimba, preventing a counter offensive into Fizi. Part of the rebel group has moved north and now threatens the Uvira region. (Map)

2. Sudan

The long-awaited conference to determine the constitutional status of the three southern provinces was finally convened in Khartoum on 18 March. It quickly became clear, however, that neither north nor south was willing to compromise, and the meeting collapsed amid increased mutual hostility. Government efforts to suppress recently stepped-up terrorism in the south will further inflame anti-Arab feeling there and the conflict will probably drag on indefinitely.
SITUATION: The Burundi government's early February expulsion of the entire staff of the Chinese Communist embassy temporarily halted Peking's march through the countries forming the northern crescent around their main goal: Congo (Leopoldville). The CPR's success in buying their way into the Burundi government and key organizations apparently led to their overestimating the extent of their control; then they and their local lackeys blundered badly.

In December a massive Chicom arms shipment was transiting Burundi when the King determined to put a stop to the use of his non-aligned country as a base for support to the Congolese rebels. He seized the arms and replaced pro-Peking Prime Minister Nyamuya. Still the extent of Chicom subversion in Burundi might have gone unnoticed had not the new Prime Minister been assassinated. (See unclassified attachment, "Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi.")

There is nothing new in the Chicom pattern of operation in Burundi. Their clandestine operations might be likened to damage termites do below the surface which is brought to light only by accident -- in this case, murder. Key figures from youth and labor, from government and opposition political parties are suborned (as the Chinese have also done, respectively, in Congo (B), Sudan, Mali, and Senegal). Communications media are established or penetrated (as in Kenya); refugees and dissidents are armed (as in Cameroon and Niger). Political indoctrination and training play a key role: some leaders and students were sent to Peking, as has been standard procedure in other African countries, but Communist guerrilla warfare training facilities in Africa are being increased. Chinese specialists are teaching guerrilla warfare at bases in Congo (B), Ghana and reportedly are negotiating with Algeria.

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F. #857 "The Truth About the Congo"
Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi

On January 15, 1965 Pierre Ngenandumwe, recently installed liberal Prime Minister of the African Kingdom of Burundi, was assassinated. On February 2nd, Burundi suspended diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists and expelled the 20 man staff. The eighteen days between these two events revealed a pattern of Chinese Communist activity -- some of it previously unknown even to top government elements in Burundi -- which can be likened to early stages of Chicom or Soviet infiltration in Zanzibar, Mali or other African countries. The Burundi government has not released all details of improper Chinese behavior but enough is known of Chinese contacts and techniques to put together a familiar picture of subversion in one more small country mistakenly believed to be gullible and defenseless against communism.

Government Investigation. An intensive investigation begun immediately after the assassination led to the arrest of several top figures who were outspokenly opposed to Ngenandumwe's replacing pro-Peking Albin Nyemoya. Those arrested included leaders of the trade union federation, the youth group, former ministers and other prominent government figures, many of them close to the confessed assassin and all of them strong supporters of CPR positions. Gradually the Chicom role in Burundi has been pieced together.

Chinese Campaign against Congo. Tung Chi-ping, a 24-year old cultural attaché in the Chinese Communist Burundi embassy who fled to the U.S. embassy within 24 hours of his arrival, had worked for the CPR Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He stated that the Burundi embassy was set up primarily as a base for fomenting political disorder in the Congo (Leopoldville). "Actually, Communist China does not care about Burundi. What they really care about is the Congo. Chairman Mao has said that if we can grab the Congo, we can grab the whole of Africa." He also said the embassy staff was expected to establish the friendliest of relations with the Burundi government so that the embassy could be used as a "stepping stone for our operations in the Congo."

Chinese Communist support to Congolese rebels is well known, beginning with Chinese arms and money invested in the Kivu rebel movement through Peking-trained Pierre Mulele. Burundi-based Chinese support to the rebels in eastern Congo is supplemented by Chinese military training camps in Congo (Brazzaville) -- which may now be increased in size due to the loss of Burundi as an operating base.

One of the more flagrant abuses of Burundi's non-alignment occurred in December 1964. After 12 months in Bujumbura the Chinese, quite confident of their protected position, shipped in 100 tons of arms and ammunition intended for transshipment to the Congolese rebels. The King of Burundi learned of the plan, however, and seized the shipment.
Subversion inside Burundi. Communist Chinese training, coercion and bribery of key individuals are most significant for all countries. Two groups in Burundi -- labor and youth -- were prime targets as they are in any country which opens its doors to Communist representation.

For example, Augustin Ntamgara, a member of the National Assembly was among those arrested. He established a labor front, Federation Travailleur Burundi as a Communist-line political base but it had no legitimate labor membership. Ntamgara made frequent trips to both Moscow and Peking but Chinese money was apparently decisive. He boasted openly that the Bujumbura Chinese embassy had paid for his cars and had given him 5 million francs for demonstrations against newly installed Prime Minister Ngendandumwe. The FTB planned to publish a news sheet with Chinese funds and FTB apprentices were sent to Peking for "journalistic" training.

Also arrested were Francois Bangemou, President of the Burundi youth organization, Jeunesse Nationale Rwagasore, and Secretary General Prime Niyongabo. Both had led popular demonstrations against the Burundi government and had been strong supporters of the former premier, Albin Nyamoya and some of the JNR leaders were members of his government. The youth group program, like that of the labor group, had a pronounced Communist flavor. According to the West African Pilot of Lagos, Nigeria (1 February 1965), "JNR leaders have long been in the pay of the Chinese and Soviet governments, as police investigations have revealed."

Former Prime Minister Nyamoya and Zenon Njuyenzi, his chief of cabinet, were also among those arrested. Nyamoya's connivance with Communist China culminated in his signing a secret barter agreement including provisions which would have totally enslaved the Burundi economy. This move, coupled with the massive arms shipment intended for the Congo rebels, may have been the immediate basis for suspending relations with the CPR.

Tribal Targets. Communist exploitation of tribal animosities is widespread in Africa. The most radical Tutsi refugees from Hutu-controlled Rwanda (once coupled with Burundi as Rwanda-Urundi) received guerrilla training and money from the CPR. Chicom strategy may aim at overthrowing the republican government of Rwanda in order to gain another base for attack against the Congo. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Memmen Williams told a Senate committee that Communist Chinese involvement,

"...has included encouragement of extremist agitators who stir up the refugees to pursue a militant policy toward Rwanda and to terrorise raids across Rwanda's borders. Communist assistance to refugee extremists reportedly has encouraged financial support to the exiled ex-King of Rwanda and his close adherents, advice on organizing terrorist raids, some arms aid and the training of guerrilla instructors in mainland China. It is believed that this assistance in recent months has probably been coordinated by the Chinese Communist embassy in Bujumbura."
Many of those arrested in Burundi for pro-Chinese, anti-government actions are Tutsi. Burundi is dedicated to "national reconciliation among brothers" and abolition of "racial discrimination," according to the so-called Gitega agreements of the ruling political party. Prime Minister Baminick, who succeeded the assassinated Ngandandumwe, said that the Gitega agreements

"... were sabotaged and compromised, as the facts unfortunately testify. Those who sabotaged the Gitega conference were seeking all kinds of opportunity to further their prestige.

In bringing about the defeat of the resolutions adopted at the Gitega summit conference, the embassy of the Chinese People's Republic gravely compromised itself, and this interference on the part of a foreign country in the internal politics of Burundi obliged the Government of Burundi to suspend diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic. In fact their support and their encouragement were always operated in one direction only and risked compromising not only our feelings of unity and esprit de corps between the Burundians but also the relations between Burundi and neighboring countries."

Who is Next? The CPR now has embassies in Algeria, Congo (Bras-ville), Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Dahomey, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Central African Republic and United Arab Republic. There are NCNA representatives in Tunis, Ethiopia and Senegal which have no embassies. (The notorious Kao Lăng who was expelled from India for "unjournalistic activities" and then became funding channel for CPR agents in Zanzibar, was NCNA representative for East Africa -- including Burundi! -- until recently. He has now moved his operations to Brazzaville, Congo.)

Moves against moderate or liberal elements may be expected in any of these countries. Labor and youth groups will most certainly be infiltrated in all of them. All the familiar techniques will be used but the measure of their success may not be evident in some cases until a great deal of damage has been done to African sovereignty and independence.
Report on U.S. Archives
Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder

By Stephen R. Weissman

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In his latest film, "Minority Report," director Steven Spielberg portrays a policy of "preemptive action" gone wild in the year 2054. But we don't have to peer into the future to see what harm faulty intelligence and the loss of our moral compass can do. U.S. policies during the Cold War furnish many tragic examples. One was U.S. complicity in the overthrow and murder of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.

Forty-one years ago, Lumumba, the only leader ever democratically elected in Congo, was delivered to his enemies, tortured and summarily executed. Since then, his country has been looted by the U.S.-supported regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and wracked by regional and civil war.

The conventional explanation of Lumumba's death has been that he was murdered by Congolese rivals after earlier U.S. attempts to kill him, including a plot to inject toxins into his food or toothpaste, failed. In 1975, the U.S. Senate's "Church Committee" probed CIA assassination plots and concluded there was "no evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about the death of Lumumba."

Not so. I have obtained classified U.S. government documents, including a chronology of covert actions approved by a National Security Council (NSC) subgroup, that reveal U.S. involvement -- and significant responsibility for -- the death of Lumumba, who was mistakenly seen by the Eisenhower administration as an African Fidel Castro. The documents show that the key Congolese leaders who brought about Lumumba's downfall were players in "Project Wizard," a CIA covert action program. Hundreds of thousands of dollars and military equipment were channeled to these officials, who informed their CIA paymasters three days in advance of their plan to send Lumumba into the clutches of his worst enemies. Other new details: The U.S. authorized payments to then-President Joseph Kasavubu four days before he ousted Lumumba, furnished Army strongman Mobutu with money and arms to fight pro-Lumumba forces, helped select and finance an anti-Lumumba government, and barely three weeks after his death authorized new funds for the people who arranged Lumumba's murder.

Moreover, these documents show that the plans and payments were approved by the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration, either the NSC or its "Special Group," consisting of the national security adviser, CIA director, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and deputy defense secretary.

These facts are four decades old, but are worth unearthing for two reasons. First, Congo (known for years as Zaire) is still struggling to establish democracy and stability. By facing up to its past role in undermining Congo's fledgling democracy, the United States might yet contribute to Congo's future. Second, the U.S. performance in Congo is relevant to our struggle against terrorism. It shows what can happen when, in the quest for national security, we abandon the democratic principles and rule of law we are fighting to defend.

In February, Belgium, the former colonial power in Congo, issued a thousand-page report that acknowledged "an irreparable portion of responsibility in the events that led to the death of Lumumba." Unlike Belgium, the United States has admitted no such moral responsibility. Over the years, scholars (including myself) and journalists have written that American policy played a major role in the ouster and assassination of Lumumba. But the full story remained hidden in U.S. documents, which, like those I have examined, are still classified despite the end of the Cold War, the end of the Mobutu regime and Belgium's confession.

Here's what they tell us that, until now, we didn't know, or didn't know for certain: In August 1960, the CIA established Project Wizard. Congo had been independent only a month, and Lumumba, a passionate nationalist, had become prime minister, with a plurality of seats in the parliament. But U.S. presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was vowing to meet "the communist challenge" and Eisenhower's NSC was worried that Lumumba would tilt toward the Soviets.

The U.S. documents show that over the next few months, the CIA worked with and made payments to eight top Congolese -- including President Kasavubu, Mobutu (then army chief of staff), Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, top finance aide Albert Lone, Senate President Joseph Leo and labor leader Cyrille Adoula -- who all played roles in Lumumba's downfall.
The CIA joined Belgium in a plan, detailed in the Belgian report, for Ileo and Adoula to engineer a no-confidence vote in Lumumba's government, which would be followed by union-led demonstrations, the resignations of cabinet ministers (organized by Ndele) and Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba.

- On Sept. 1, the NSC's Special Group authorized CIA payments to Kasavubu, the U.S. documents say. On Sept. 5, Kasavubu fired Lumumba in a decree of dubious legality. However, Kasavubu and his new prime minister, Ileo, proved lethargic over the following week as Lumumba rallied supporters. So Mobutu seized power on Sept. 14. He kept Kasavubu as president and established a temporary "College of Commissioners" to replace the disbanded government.

- The CIA financed the College and influenced the selection of commissioners. The College was dominated by two Project Wizard participants: Bomboko, its president, and Ndele, its vice-president. Another CIA ally, Lumumba party dissident Victor Nendaka, was appointed chief of the security police.

- On Oct. 27, the NSC Special Group approved $250,000 for the CIA to win parliamentary support for a Mobutu government. However, when legislators balked at approving any prime minister other than Lumumba, the parliament remained closed. The CIA money went to Mobutu personally and the commissioners.

- On Nov. 20, the Special Group authorized the CIA to provide arms, ammunition, sabotage materials and training to Mobutu's military in the event it had to resist pro-Lumumba forces.

The full extent of what one U.S. document calls the "intimate" relationship between the CIA and Congolese leaders was absent from the Church Committee report. The only covert action (apart from the assassination plots) the committee discussed was the August 1960 effort to promote labor opposition and a no-confidence vote in the Senate. How did Lumumba die? After being ousted Sept. 5, Lumumba rallied support in parliament and the international community. When Mobutu took over, U.N. troops protected Lumumba, but soon confined him to his residence. Lumumba escaped on Nov. 27. Days later he was captured by Mobutu's troops, beaten and arrested.

What happened next is clearer thanks to the Belgian report and the classified U.S. documents. As early as Christmas Eve 1960, College of Commissioners' president Bomboko offered to hand Lumumba over to two secessionist leaders who had vowed to kill him. One declined and nothing happened until mid-January 1961, when the central government's political and military position deteriorated and troops guarding Lumumba (then jailed on a military base near the capital) mutinied. CIA and other Western officials feared a Lumumba comeback.

On Jan. 14, the commissioners asked Kasavubu to move Lumumba to a "surer place." There was "no doubt," the Belgian inquiry concluded, that Mobutu agreed. Kasavubu told security chief Nendaka to transfer Lumumba to one of the secessionist strongholds. On Jan. 17, Nendaka sent Lumumba to the Katanga region. That night, Lumumba and two colleagues were tortured and executed in the presence of members of the Katangan government. No official announcement was made for four weeks.

What did the U.S. government tell its Congolese clients during the last three days of Lumumba's life? The Church Committee reported that a Congolese "government leader" advised the CIA's Congo station chief, Larry Devlin, on Jan. 14 that Lumumba was to be sent to "the home territory" of his "sworn enemy." Yet, according to the Church Committee and declassified documents, neither the CIA nor the U.S. embassy tried to save the former prime minister.

The CIA may not have exercised robust control over its covert political action agents, but the failure of Devlin or the U.S. embassy to question the plans for Lumumba could only be seen by the Congolese as consent. After all, secret CIA programs had enabled this group to achieve political power, and the CIA had worked from August through November 1960 to assassinate or abduct Lumumba.

Here, the classified U.S. chronology provides an important postscript. On Feb. 11, 1961, with U.S. reports from Congo strongly indicating Lumumba was dead, the Special Group authorized $500,000 for political action, troop payments and military equipment, largely to the people who had arranged Lumumba's murder.

Devlin has sought to distance himself from Lumumba's death. While the CIA was in close contact with the Congolese officials involved, Devlin told the Church Committee that those officials "were not acting under CIA instructions if and when they did this." In a recent phone conversation with Devlin, I posed the issue of U.S. responsibility for Lumumba's death. He acknowledged that, "It was important to [these] cooperating leaders what the U.S. government thought." But he said he did "not recall" receiving advance word of Lumumba's transfer. Devlin added that even if he had objected, "That would not have stopped them from doing it."
By evading its share of moral responsibility for Lumumba’s fate, the United States blurs African and American history and sidesteps the need to make reparation for yesterday’s misdeeds through today’s policy. In 1997, after the Mobutu regime fell, the Congolese democratic opposition pleaded in vain for American and international support. Since then, as many as 3 million lives have been lost as a result of civil and regional war. The United States has not supported a strong U.N. peacekeeping force or fostered a democratic transition. The collapse in late April 2002 of negotiations between Congolese factions threatens to reignite the smoldering conflict or ratify the partition of the country.

Our government’s actions four decades ago in Congo also have special meaning after the tragedy of Sept. 11. They warn that even as we justly defend our land and our people against terrorists, we must avoid the excessive fear and zeal that lead to destructive intervention betraying our most fundamental principles.

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